International Law by Wheaton's Elements

E"^
WHEATON'S ELEMENTS
INTERNATIONAL LAW
FIFTH ENGLISH EDITION,

REVISED THROUGHOUT.
NOTE.
Wheatoii's Elements of Internatvmal haw
'
was first *
published in 1836, in two editions, one appearing in

Philadelphia and the other in London. The third edition
was issued in 18^6, in Philadelphia. In ISIfS, a French
edition of the icork was published at Leipsic and Paris ;
and in 1853 a second French edition was brought out at the
same places. In 1857 an edition in Eyiglish {called the
sixth) was edited by W. B. Lawrence, and published in
Boston ; a second edition by the same editor appeared in
1863, also in Boston. The next issue, in 1864, teas a

translation into Chinese executed by order of the Chinese
Governmetit. The edition after that was the tvell-knoivn
one, edited by R. H. Dana, 1866, Boston. The first

English edition proper ivas edited by A. C. Boyd and
issued by the present publishers in 1878 ; the same editor
prepared the second and the third edition, the latter in

1889. The fourth English edition, edited by J. B. Atlay,
appeared in 190If.
WHEATON'S ELEMENTS
OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
FIFTH ENGLISH EDITION,
REVISED THROUGHOUT, CONSIDERABLY ENLARGED

AND RE-WRITTEN
BY
COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, M.A., LL.D., Litt.D.,

OF THK INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER- AT- LAW,
" '* "
Author of'"'' Studies in International Laiv ; Ilf'ect of War on Contracts ;
" The International Law and Custom "
of Ancient Greece and Rome ;
" International Law and the Great War**
;
'*
Fart Author of Great Jurists of the JVorld** ;
'*
Editor of Footers Frivate International Jurisprudence"" ; etc.
WITH AN INTRODUCTION
BY
The Rt. Hon. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, Bt., D.C.L., LL.D.,
Author of " " " The Law

Principles of Contract ; of Torts,** etc.
LONDON :
STEVENS AND SONS, LIMITED,

119 & 120, CHANCERY LANE.
New York: BAKER, VOOEHIS & CO.
1916.
si4^s<r-2?s?
(
V )
PREFACE
TO THE FIFTH ENGLISH EDITION.
The present edition contains extensive additions, as well

as a great number of modifications and corrections. The
position of a good deal of the matter has been rearranged

for the sake of systematic exposition and logical co-
herence. Several omissions have been made relating to
subjects that have now lost their importance; whilst

other questions are considered much more fully. Thus
— to give but one or two instances among many — in the
previous editionWheaton's case (involving a discussion

between the American and the Prussian Governments,
in 1839, as to the exemption of public ministers from the
local jurisdiction) occupied thirteen pages ;
in the present
edition it lias been reduced to half a page. Thirteen

pages were also —
given to an account practically a
verbatim reprint -of diplomatic negotiations between
the United States and the Prussian Government con-
cerning the renewal of their treaty of 1785 now half a ;
page is devoted to it. On the contrary, in the previous

edition, International Arbitration occupied but three
pages ;
in the present edition it has received thirteen
pages. The previous edition contained little or nothing

on many now (owing
subjects, which are to the labours
of the Second Hague Conference and the London Naval
(conference) considered with comparative fulness. More-
over, the resulting Conventions have not been relegated
713803
vi PREFACE TO THE FIFTH ENGLISH EDITION.
to an appendix, as was done before in the case of the

Hague Conventions of 1899; they have, rather, been
— —
analysed out often critically and their constituent
elements have been put in different places in the book,
according to the general scheme and division of the
subject-matter.
The preceding Wheaton's text throughout

editors left
intact ;
and their supplementary matter was printed in
smaller type. Now, in view of modern requirements, the
—
whole both original text and editorial additions has —
been subjected to revision, though Wheaton's funda-
mental conceptions have generally been left unaltered ;
and a uniform type, intermediate in size between that of

Wheaton's own text and that of the previous editors, has
been introduced. The
reader will thus find the appear-
ance of the page more pleasing. It may perhaps be
thought a disadvantage to remove all distinction between
the original author's writing and that of his editors ;
it
seemed, however, impossible to keep on preserving it in

the case of a growing, changing subject that has to be
necessarily adapted to the exigencies of time and place.
The have not only been retained

historical portions
throughout, they have also been expanded here and

there; so that the student may obtain a body of rules
and principles as well as an outline of their modern
development. The references to treatises and docu-
ments have been made more precise. There is a
tendency in modern books on international law to dis-
regard the work of earlier writers (such as Grotius,

Bynkershoek, Pufendorf, Vattel, Martens, Kliiber,
Heft'ter, and many others), and to refer simply to each
other. This appears to the present editor to be a mis-
take; it gives the elementary student an erroneous
notion of the growth of the subject, and it does an in-
PREFACE TO THE FIFTH ENGLISH EDITION. Vll
justice to the earlier writers, especially so when their

views have been admirably expounded, and are now
accepted as principles of this branch of jurisprudence.
Accordingly the numerous references, given by Wheaton,
to the earlier authors have been retained What good
purpose can itserve to refer only to present-day writers,
when their conclusions are the same as those of their
predecessors, and frequently are not so well expressed ?
Examples of conduct in modern wars, as furnishing

have been added unsparingly; thus to
illustrations,
—
—
name but a few there are thirty references to the
American Civil War, thirty to the Franco- Germ an War,
thirty-five to the Russo-Japanese War, and fifty to the
Great War of to-day. Many of the changes introduced
during the present war have been referred to they ;
cannot, however, yet be considered as part of inter-

national law.
The number of cases has been increased by nearly

three hundred, many which being quite recent ones;
of
and they have in general been dated. These comprise
not only judicial causes, but also diplomatic and arbitra-
tion cases, as well as other international incidents, which
are all of great importance in our subject.
The table of contents and the index have been

enlarged, and so arranged as to facilitate reference to
the subject-matter of the book. In spite of the large
increase in matter, was found possible to present the
it
work in one volume, owing to the adoption of a more

compact type, and the omission of several appendices.
Another new feature of this edition is the Introduction
by Sir Frederick Pollock, to whom the editor owes a

Vlll PREFACE TO THE FIFTH ENGLISH EDITION.
debt of gratitude. The forcible observations of a writer

so eminent in the sphere of jurisprudence and political
science cannot but stimulate all readers.
In conclusion, it
may be said that, by reason of the
large quantity of new matter added — which amounts,
—
indeed, to more than 200 pages and the great number
of alterations made, the present editor ought perhaps to
be regarded as a co-author of this edition of the book,
rather than as an editor in the usual sense of the term.
COLEMAN PHILLIPSON
Inner Temple,
October, 1915.
ix )
CONTENTS,
PAGE
Preface to Fifth English Edition v
Index of Cases Cited xxvii
Introduction xxxix
PART FIRST.
DEFINITION, SOURCES, AND SUBJECTS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW.
CHAPTER I.
Definition and Sources of International Law.
Origin of International law 1
Natural law 2
Natural law and Divine law 2
Natural law and intercourse of States 3
Law of nations and natural law —view of Grotius 3
—view of Hobbes and Pufendorf 5
Law of nations and reason and usage —view of Byn^kershoek... 6
—
Systeni of Wolf presumed consent 8
Difference between Wolf and Grotius as to origin of the volun-
tary law of nations 9

System of Vattel 9
Voluntary, conventional, and customary law of nations 11
System of Heffter 12
Distinction between public and private international law 13
Is there a universal law of nations ? 14
Jus and lex 15
Is international law true law ? 15
Opinion of Savigny 18
International status of non-Christian nations 19
Definition of international law 22
Sources and evidences of international law 22
(1) Writings of jurists 22
Authority of text- writers 22
X CONTENTS.
PAGE
Sources and evidences of international law — continued.
(2) Treaties 24
(3) Ordinances and other municipal acts 25
Marine ordinances 26
Courts of Admiralty 27
International law and mimicdpal law 27
(4) Decisions of Courts 29
(5) Official legal opinions 29
Official manuals of warfare 30
(6) Records of international transactions 31
CHAPTER II.
Nations and Sovereign States.
Subjects of international law 32

Definition of a State 32
Nations and States 33
Meaning- of State in the American Constitution 34
Objects of international law sovereign princes
;
34
individuals or corporations 34
' ' ' '
Use of the terms Sovereign and State 34

—
Sovereignty its nature 34
Internal and external sovereignty 35
How acquired '. 35
De jure and de facto governments 36
Recognition of sovereignty 37
Identity of a State 37
How affected by internal revolution 37
Effect of civil war 38
How affected by external violence 38
Recognition of independence 39
Recognition of belligerency 41
The Civil War and the Confederate States 42
Independence of Oreeoe, Belgium, etc 43
International effects of a change in the person of the Sovereign,
or in the Constitution of the State 45
(1) Treaties
—personal and real 45
(2) Public debts 46
(3) Public domain and private rights of property 48
(4) Wrongs and injuries 50
Sovereign States defined 50
Equality of sovereign States 51
Semi-sovereign States and protectorates 51
Examples 52
CONTENTS. XI
PAGE
The Papacy 56
The former Germanic Empire and Confederation 57
Egypt 57
Status before the British occupation 57
Status after the British occupation 58
A
British protectorate 62
Position of Cuba 63
Tributary and vassal States 64
The Barbary States 64
North American Indians 66
Certain Asiatic States 68
Protected States in India 69
Single and united States 69
' ' ' *
Personal and real unions 70
' '
Incorporate unions 72
Anomalous unions 72
Federal unions 73
' '
Staatenbund 73
' '
Bundesstaat 74
Germanic Confederation 74
The German Empire 79
The United States of America 80
The Swiss Confederation 84
PART SECOND.
ABSOLUTE INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS OF STATES.
CHAPTER I.
Rights of Self-Preservation and Independence.
Rights of sovereign States with respect to one another ..". 87

Right of self-preservation 87
Self-defence 88
Self-defence and extra-territorial acts 89
Right of intervention 90
Balance of power 92
Earlier wars 92
Wars of the French Revolution 93
Alliance of European Powers 94
Congress of Troppau and Laybach 94
Congress of Verona 95
XU CONTENTS.
PAGE
—
Right of intervention continued.
War between Spain and her American colonies 96
The Monroe Doctrine 97
British interference in the affairs of Portugal, 1826 101
The European Powers and Greece 102
The European Powers and Turkey 105
The Eastern Question 107
The European Powers and the Belgic Revolution of 1830... 122
Intervention in Mexico, 1861 123
The French garrison in Rome 124
Independence as to internal government 125
Mediation for settling internal dissensions 125
Treaties of mediation and guarantee 125
Proposed mediation in the American Civil War 126
Independence as to choice of rulers 126
Exceptions arising out of compact or other just right of inter-
vention 127
Quadruple alliance of 1834, and the Spanish Peninsula 127
CHAPTER II.
Rights of Civil and Criminal Legislation.
Exclusive j)ower of legislation 131

Public and private international law 131
Fundamental principles of the conflict of laws 131
Lex loci rei sitcfue 134
'
'Droit d'aubaine 136
Rights of aliens to hold land 137
Effect of birth; acquisition of nationality 138
Lex domicilii 139
Universal assignments of moveables 141
Wills 141
Personal status 142
Extra-territorial operation of municipal law 142
Status and capacity of persons Exceptions
;
142
Effect of naturalization 143
Immoveables situated within the foreign territory ... 143
Personal property 144
Matrimonial domicile 144
Bankruptcy discharge 145
Lex loci contractus 146
Contracts; Exceptions 146
Foreign marriages; lex loci contraotus and lex domicilii 147
Acts as to marriage of British subjects abroad 150
CONTENTS. xni
PAGE
Extra-territorial operation of municipal law —continued.
Proceedings; lex fori 151
Foreign Sovereign, ambassador, army, or fleet abroad 151
Position of public vessels 152
Distinction between public and private vessels 157
Other property of foreign Sovereigns 161
Suits by foreign Sovereigns 162
Merchant vessels and the local jurisdiction —French law ... 163
Doctrine of extra-territoriality 165
Merchant vessels in foreign ports 168
Exceptions to exemption of public vessels 170
Jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas 172
Former i'mpressment of seamen 1 73
Ca&e of The Trent 178

Consular jurisdiction 180
Independence of the State as to its* j udicial power 184

Exceptions 184
Judicial power over criminal offences 184
Extradition 187
Practice of England 189
Practice of the United States 191
Practice of France 192
What criminals subject thereto 193
Political offences 193
Treaty between Great Britain and the United States... 195
Extradition Act, 1870 197
American cases 197
Treaty between France and the United States 200
Principle of extradition treaties 202
Surrender by a State of its own subjects 202
Extra-territorial operation of a criminal sentence 203
Piracy under the law of nations 204
Piracy under municipal law 206
Insurgents carrying on war at sea 206
Insurgents and belligerency 212
Slave trade and the law of nations 213
Fugitive slaves 222
Slaves escaping to ships of war 223
Extent of the judicial power as to property within the
territory 224
The rule of decision and the rule of procedure 225
Succession to personal property ab intestato 225
Foreign wills 225
Foreign sentences in rem 226
Transfer of property under foreign bankruptcy 227
XIV CONTENTS.
PAGE
—
Independence of the State as to its judicial power continued.
Extent of the judicial power over resident aliens 228
Anglo-American law 229
French law 229
Proceedings against absent parties 230
Rule of decision and of procedure in contracts 230
Bankruptcy 231
"Wrongs comlmitted abroad 232
—
Contracts obligation and form 233
Foreign judgments in personal actions 234
English, American, and French law 234
Foreign divorces 236
The matrimonial domicile 237
CHAPTER III.
National Character and Domicile.
National character, domicile, and allegiance 241

—
Domicile definition 242
Domicile of origin and of choice 243
Change of domicile 244
Acquisition of domicile and nationality 246
—
National character incidents 246
Permanent residence in foreign countries 246
Expatriation
— English law 247
American law 248
Law of other States 251
Naturalization in United States 252
Naturalization treaty between England and United
States 254
Former discussion between England and America as to the
allegiance of their subjects 254

British subjects in America during the Civil War 255
German subjects abroad and military laws 256
Naturalization in Germany 258
in France 258
Imperfect naturalization and domicile —cases of Koszta,
Tousig and Heinrieh 258
Military service in France 259
CONTENTS. XV
CHAPTER IV.
Rights of Equality.
PAGE
Legal equality of States 261
Equality modified by compact and usage 261
Royal honours 262
Precedence among princes and States 262
The great Republics 263
Monarchs not crowned and semi-sovereigns 263
' '
Usage of the alternat 264

Alphabetical order of signatories 264
Language used in diplomacy 265
Titles of sovereign princes and States 265
Maritime ceremonials 266
CHAPTER V.
Rights of Property.
National proprietary rights ba.sis — 268

Public and private property 268
Eminent domain 268
^Prescription 268
Conquest and discovery confirmed by compact and the lapse
of time 269 -
Papal Bull of 1493 270

Dispute between Great Britain and Spain as to
Nootka Sound 271
Controversy between United States and Russia as to
N.-W. coast of America 272
V Alaska boundary question 275
Anglo-American dispute as to the Oregon territory 276
Occupations on the African coast the West African —
Conference 281
Maritime territorial jurisdiction 282
The Franconia 282
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 283
Extent of territorial waters 283
' ' ' '
Meaning of term coasts or shore 284

' '
The King's Chambers 285
' '
The former Hovering Acts 286

Present customs legislation 286
XVI CONTENTS.
PAGE
Eight of fishery 287
Convention between Great Britain and France 287
Conventions between Great Britain and United States 287
Later fishery disputes between Great Britain and United
States 290
Fishery dispute between Great Britain and France 291
Claims to other portions of the sea 291
Straits 292
The Black Sea, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles 292
The Sound and the Belts 295
The Baltic Sea 297
Controversy as to dominion of the seas 298
The Behring Sea dispute 300
Territorial waters 302
Ports,mouths of rivers, etc 302
The marine league 303
Straits and Sounds 303
The Dardanelles 304
Rivers 305
National rivers ; 305
International rivers —înnocent passage and use of banks ... 306
Modification of rights by compact 307
The Scheldt tolls 307
Treaty of Vienna ajs to the great European rivers 308
The Danube— various treaties 308
The Rhine 310
The Mississippi 312
Claim of the United States 312
The St. Lawrence 315
Anglo-American controversy 316
Treaties 319
African rivers 320
International canals 320
Suez Canal 321
Panama Canal 324
CONTENTS. XVll
PART THIRD.
INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS OF STATES IN THEIR
PACIFIC RELATIONS.
CHAPTER I.
Rights of Legation.
PAGE
Permanent diplomatic missions 329
Right to send and obligation to receive public ministers 329
To what States rights of legation belong 330
Effect of civil war or contest for the sovereignty 330
Communication with rebels 331
Conditional reception of foreign ministers 331
Classification of public ministers 332
Diplomatic precedence 333
Letters of credence 335
Full power 336
Instructions 336
Passport 336
Duties of a public minister on arriving at his post 337
Audience of the Sovereign or chief magistrate 337
Diplomatic etiquette 337
Privileges of a public minister 338
Inviolability and exterritoriality 338
Exemption from the local jurisdiction 339
Exceptions^ 340
Instances of expulsion of ambassadors 343
Exemption extends to house, property, family, and suite... 346
Public minister passing through the territory of a State other
than that to which he is accredited 349
Consuls —position and privileges 352
Termination of public mission 354
Letter of recall 355
CHAPTER II.
Rights of Negotiation and Treaties —Arbitration.

Power to enter into treaties 357
Form of treaty 357
Cartels, truces, and capitulations —sponsions 358
Full power and ratification 358
w. h
XVlll CONTENTS.
PAGE
When refusal to ratify is justified 363
When begin to bind
treaties 364
The treaty-making power dependent on municipal law 365
How far auxiliary legislation necessary to the validity of a treaty. 365
American Courts on commencement pi treaties 366
Freedom of consent and validity of treaties 367
Kinds of international compacts 368
Transitory, dispositive, or executed conventions 368
Executory conventions (fcedera) 368
Transitory conventions perpetual 368
Effect of war—Anglo-American controversy 369
Executory conventions
—when they expire 377
Eevival of treaties 378
Treaties of guaranty 378
Treaties of alliance 380
Kinds and examples 380
Casus foederis of the alliance 386
Kecent examples of operation 388
Hostages for the execution of treaties 389
Interpretation of treaties 389
Eules for interpretation 389
Mediation 390
International arbitration 391
Arbitration treaties 392
Instances of arbitration prior to the Hague Conference 393
The Hague Peace Conference, 1899 : Convention for the
pacific settlement of international disputes 395
The Hague Peace Conference, 1907 Eevised and enlarged
:
Convention for the pacific settlement of international

disputes 396
Good offices and mediation 396
International commissions of inquiry 396
—
International arbitration object 396
Permanent Court at the Hague 397
The Hague code of procedure 398
Instances of arbitration since the Hague Conference 399
Scope of arbitration 401
Compulsory arbitration '. 402
Proposed Judicial Court of Arbitration 403
CONTENTS. XIX
PART FOURTH.
INTEENATIONAL RIGHTS OF STATES IN THEIR HOSTILE
RELATIONS.
CHAPTER I.
Commencement of War and its immediate Effects.

PAGE
Redress by forcible means between nations 404
Porcible means short of actual war 404
Reprisals
—kinds; embargo 405
Case of DonPacifico 407
Other cases of reprisal 407
Pacific blockade 408
Right of angary 409
Right of making war, in whom vested 410
Public or solemn war 410
Perfect and imperfect war 411
Civil war 411
Declaration of war, how far necessary 412
Recent examples 414
The Hague Rules, 1907 415
Latest instances 416
Enemy's property found within the territory 417
Earlier views and practice 417
The Silesian loan, 1753 418
Vattel's opinion 418
The modern rule 419
Droits of Admiralty 420
View of American Court (Brown v. U. 8.) 421
Permitted departure of vessels in enemy ports at outbreak
of war 422
The Hague Rules, 1907 423
Practice in the Great War, 1914 424
Debts due to the enemy 424
'Trading with the enemy 427
Grounds of prohibition 428
American decisions 430
Apparent exceptions to the interdiction 434
Licences, how
granted; their vitiation 435
Occasional relaxation of rule 438
Extent of prohibition of intercourse with enemy 438
b2
XX CONTENTS.
PAGE
Trading with the enemy continued.
—
Debts contracted during the war 439
Contracts with neutrals to be performed in enemy's country 439
Trade of allies with the common enemy 440
AIJ contracts prohibited 441
War or trade domicile 442
Resident aliens liable to reprisals and acts of war 442
Species of residence constituting such domicile 443
Resumption of native character 445-
Domicile distinguished from allegiance 449

Effect of domicile in a foreign State 449
Renunciation of domicile 450
Time for election to
change .• 452
Merchants residing in the East 454
House of trade in the enemy country 45&
Produce of the enemy territory 456
National character of ships 459
The flag as evidence 460
Ownership of British ships 461
Sailing under the enemy's license 461
Article 23 (h) of the Hague Rules —the Continental view 462
The Anglo-American doctrine —illustrations in the Great War,
1914 462:
Meaning of
*
alienenemy
'
—recent cases 463
Locus standi of enemy aliens 465-
CHAPTER II.
Rights of War as betvsêen Enemies —Land Warfare.
Rights of war and the object of the war 468

Limits thereto 468
Tendency in modern warfare 469
Fundamental principles 469
When reprisals are justifiable 470
Movement for mitigating the severities of war 470
Brussels Conference, 1874; Hague Conferences, 1899, 1907. 471
Persons exempt from acts of hostility 472
—
Lawful belligerents their status 473
Prisoners of war 476
Earlier treatment 476
Modern rules and practice 477
—
Internment labour of prisoners 479
—
Maintenance discipline escape — 480*
CONTENTS. XXI
PAGE
Prisoners of war —continued.
Release on parole 481
Army followers 482
Bureau of information 483
Relief societies 483
Privileges of prisoners of war 483
The sick and wounded 484
Geneva Conventions 485
Treatment 485
The dead 486
Exchange of information 487
Medical units —extent of protection 488
The personnel 489
The material 491
Convoys of evacuation 491
The Red Cross and flag 492
Application of the Convention 494
Means of injuring the enemy on land 495
Means limited 495
Special prohibitions and —^military necessity
restrictions .... 496
Explosive bullets 498
Expanding bullets 498
Aircraft projectiles 499
Poisonous gases 499
Poisoned weapons 499
Treacherous conduct 500
Ruses of war —use of enemy flag and uniform 501
Quarter 502
Other forbidden weapons 503
Enemy's legal rights and actions 503
Services of enemy subjects 503
Inciting enemy soldiers to desert, etc 503
Treatment of enemy territory 504
Devastation and destruction 504
Sieges and bombardments 507
Spies and espionage 510
Non-hostile intercourse between belligerents 512
Truce or armistice 512
Capitulations for surrender 514
Military occupation 519
Occupation, conquest, and sovereignty 520
Military law and martial law 522
'
War ' *
and war treason
crimes
'
528
Occupation and the local law 529
Exacting unlawful information and oath of allegiance 530
XXll CONTENTS.
PAGE
Military
—
occupation continued.
Family honom* and rights 531
Private property 531
Pillage , 533
Collection of taxes 534
Contributions 534
Requisitions 535
Treatment of property 536
State movable property, military material, etc 536
Things liable to seizure 537
Submarine cables 538
Immovable State property » 5S9
Penalties imposed by the occupant 543
Hostages 544
CHAPTER III.
Rights of War as between Enemies —Maritime Warfare.
Lawful belligerents in naval war 546

Non-commissioned captors 546
Abolition of privateering 547
Volunteer navy 548
Conversion of merchantmen into warships 551
Defensively armed merchantmen 553
The sick, wounded, and shipwrecked 554
Hospital ships 554
Treatment of wounded 559
Belligerents' duties 560
Restrictions on maritime capture 561
Mail boats and postal correspondence 561
Coastal fishing boats 563
Ships charged with religious, scientific, or philanthropic
missions 565
Cartel ships 567
Crews of enemy merchantmen 567
Maritime capture and enemy character 568
Enemy's goods under a neutral flag 569
Private property on the high seas 569
Enemy character 571
Test of the flag 572
Transfers made in transitu 574
Sale of ships by belligerents to neutrals 576
CONTENTS. XXlll
PAGE
Capture and destruction of prizes 579
Use of false colours 579
Title to property captured 580
How capture is effected 583
Joint capture of prize 584
Destruction of prizes at sea 586
Kansom of captured property 587
Recaptures and salvage 589
Recapture from pirates 589
captor not an enemy 590
enemy 593
Laws of different countries 595
Necessary conditions 600
Prize Courts 604
Their functions 604
Property lying in the ports of an ally 604
Property carried into a neutral port 604
Jurisdiction —how far exclusive 605
Effect of unjust sentence 606
Relation to municipal law 607
Conclusiveness of decisions 613
As municipal tribunals 614
The proposed International Prize Court 616
Naval bombardment 619
The Hague Rules 620
Aerial bombardment 622
Submarine mines 623
The mines Convention 623
Mine-laying in the Great War 627
CHAPTER IV.
Rights of War as to Neutrals.
Conception of neutrality 628

Earlier notion of different species 628
Neutrality of Switzerland 629
Belgium 633
Luxemburg 635
Guaranteed neutrality 635
Qualified neutrality 637
Neutrality in land warfare 639
Passage through neutral territory 640
XXIV CONTENTS.
PAGE
—
Neutrality in land warfare continued.
Wireless telegraphy stations in neutral territory 641
Export of arms, etc 642
Loans to belligerents 642
Levying of troops on neutral territory 643
Arming and equipping vessels, etc 644
British Foreign Enlistment Act 645
Internment of belligerents, prisoners, wounded 647
Neutral persons 650
Neutral property 658
Neutrality in maritime warfare 563
Captures within neutral waters 654
Extent of maritime jurisdiction 660
Prize Courts in neutral territory 662
Neutral territory as base of operations 663
Supply of war material, etc 664
Fitting out or arming vessels in neutral territory 666
Neutrality laws of the United States 666
Breaches of American neutrality laws 672
English neutrality laws 674
American Civil War
Violations of, in 675
—
The Geneva arbitration The Alabama, etc 675
Foreign EnKstment Act, and cases under it 681
Belligerent vessels in neutral ports 686
Neutral impartiality 689
Twenty-four hours' stay 690
Repairs in neutral ports 692
Supply of provisions and fuels 693
Prizes in neutral ports 695
Internment of belligerent vessels 697
Neutral commerce and belligerent rights 698
Neutral vessels on the high seas 698
Distinction between public and private vessels 699
Enemy goods on neutral vessels 700
Neutral goods on enemy vessels 700
'
The doctrines free ships free goods,'
'
and enemy ships
enemy goods' 702
Contraband of war 714
Meaning 714
Earlier classification and views 715
Naval stores —how far contraband 716
Articles of promiscuous use 722
Provisions 722
Anglo-American treaty of 1794 —contraband articles ... 724
CONTENTS. XXV
PAGE
Contraband of war —continued.
What goods are contraband 730
Anglo- American practice 730
Classification of contraband goods 732
Contraband trade no breach of neutrality 735
Contraband in Russo-Japanese war 737
The Declaration of London (1909) 738
Absolute contraband 739
Conditional contraband 740
The free list 741
* '
Doctrine of continuous voyage 742
Earlier application 743
Present application 745
Penalty for carrying contraband 751
Effect of ignorance of outbreak of war 753
Unneutral service 754
'Hostile aid' 755
Transport of enemy military persons 757
civil officials 758
despatches 759
Rules of Declaration of London 761
Lesser offences 761
More serious offences 762
Enemy combatants on neutral vessels 764
Neutrals carrying on trade closed to them in time of peace 765
The 'rule of the war of 1756' 765
The law of blockade 767
Views of earlier writers 767
Legal aspect of blockade-running 768
Extent of blockade 7 70
Lnpartiality 771
What constitutes a violation of blockade 772
Presence of blockading force —effectiveness 772
Knowledge of the party notification— 776
Cessation of blockade 782
Act of ingress or egress 784
Intent to violate blockade 785
Duration of the offence 787
Range of capture under Declaration of London 787
' '
Continuous voyage inapplicable 788
Penalty for breach 789
The right of visit and search. Convoy 789
The customary law 790
The Armed NeutraHty of 1800 792
Divergent views 793
Forcible resistance by the master 793
XXVI CONTENTS.
PAGE
The right of visit —
and search. Convoy continued.
Neutral goods in an armed enemy vessel 794
Neutral vessels under enemy's convoy 795
British practice 797
Declaration of London on convoy 798
Destruction of neutral prizes 799
Rules of Declaration of London 800
As to the vessel 800-
the cargo 801
compensation 802
CHAPTEE V.
Treaty of Peace.
Power to make peace 803

Dismemberment of States by treaty 804
Treaty-making power of Great Britain 805
of a confederation 805
Effects of a treaty of peace 806
807
i
Principle of uti possidetis
Effect of restoration of territory 807
Date of peace 808
Continuance of hostilities after treaty 808
In what condition things are to be restored 809
Breach of the treaty 81G
How resulting disputes adjusted
810
APPENDICKS.
A. British and American Foreign Enlistment Acts 8ia
B. The British Naval Prize Acts, 1864—1914 830
C. Treaty of 844
Washington
D. Anglo-French Agreement, 1904 859-
INDEX 867
INDEX OF CASES CITED.
{This Index includes references not only to judicial cases, but also ta
arbitrations, international and diplomatic incidents — in peace aiid
ivar — relating to ships, persons, States, etc.)
Abby, The (1804), 434. Annandale, The, 461.

Abdallah v. Eickards (1888), 246. Anne, The, 659.
Abd-ul-Messih v. Earra (1887), 61, Anstruther v. Adair (1834), 145.
143, 180, 182, 242, 246. Antelope, The (1825), 173, 222, 261.
Abigail, The (1801), 546. Antoine v. Morshead (1815), 466.
Abouloff V. Oppenheimer (1882), Antonia Johanna, The (1816), 455.
227 235 Aphrodite, The (1904), 737.
Acteon, The (1810), 593, 799. Apollo, The
(1802), 731.
Actif, The
(1810), 600. Arabia, The
(1904), 738.
Adam, In re (1837), 138. ArgueUe's Case (1864), 192.
Adams v. Olutterbuck (1883), 135. Ariadne, The (1817), 462.
Adela, The (1867), 659. Ariel, The (1857), 575, 576, 577.
Adeline, The (1815), 596. Armstrong v. Lrear (1827), 225.
Admiral, The, 780. Armytage v. Armytage (1898), 238.
Adonis, The (1804), 789. Arrogante Barcelones, The (1822),
Adula, The (1899), 778, 783, 785. 662, 669.
Adventure, The (1814), 602. Aryol, The (or Orel) (1905), 557.
Aernam (Von), Ex parte (1854), Askold, The (1904), 692.
197 203 Aspinwall v. Queen's Proctor
Aina,'The (1854), 575, 577. (1839), 353.
Aitchison v. Dixon (1870), 242. Astrea, The (1816), 601.
Alabama, The (1872), 394, 586, 677, Asturias, The (1915), 555.
680, 696. Atalanta, The (6 C. Eob.) (1808),
Alerta and Cargo, The v. Bias, 669. 759
Alexander. The (1801), 789. — Wheaton) (1818),
— (1814), 431, 432.
(3
795
Alexander v. Duke of Wellington, Atlas, The (1801), 576.
583, 585. Attorney-General v. Bowens (1838),
Alexander's Cotton (Mrs.) (1864), 226.
412, 533. — V. Campbell
Alfred, The (Moodie v. The Alfred) (1872), 141.
(1796), 668, 669.
— V. Kent (1862),
AUanton, The (1904), 737. 355.
Alleganean, The (1885), 285. — V. Wheeden
Allsop's Case (1858), 197. (1699), 466.
Almida, Re (1901), 244. Attorney-General for Hong Kong v.
Amedie, The (1807), 216. Kwok-a-Sing (1873), 204.
Amiral Ganteaume (1914), 566. Augusta, The, 584.
Amistad de Eues (1820), 662, 669. Aurora, The (1802), 576.
Amorduct Manufacturing Co. v. — C1814), 462.
Defries & Co. (1914), 464. — (1904). 693.
Andersen v. Marten (1908), 581.
Anderson's Case (1861), 196.
Andre Case (1780), 511.
Andromeda, The (1864), 775, 785.
Anemone, The (1875), 170. Baigorry, The (1864), 775, 785.
Anna, The (1805), 285, 655, 659. Bain v. Speedwell (1784), 808.
Anna Catherina, The (1802), 766. Baiz, In re (1889). 347.
Anna Maria, The (1817), 586. Balfour Case (1892), 187.
XXVlll INDEX OF CASES CITED.
Baltazzi v. Eydor (1858), 772, 789. Brunswick, Duke of v. King of

Baltica, The (1857), 577. Hanover (1844), 34, 151, 162.
Banco de Portugal v. Waddell Brutus, The (1804), 736.
(1880), 228. Brymer v. Atkins, 766.
Banda and Kirwee Booty, The, 585. Buena Ventura, The (1899), 422.
Banfield v. Solomon, 228. Bulwer Case (1848), 344.
Barbuit's Case (1737), 342. Bunch Case (1861), 353.
Barne, Ex 'parte (1886), 245. Bundesrath, The (1899), 562, 734,
Bas Tingy, 411.
V. 745, 749.
Bater v. Bater (1906), 239. Burley's Case (1864), 198, 203,207.
Batten v. The Queen, 577. Buron v. Denman, 222.
Battle, The (1867), 575, 577. Burton v. Pinkerton, 683.
Beaumont, Be (1893), 243. Buttenuth v. St. Louis Bridge Co.
Becquet v. McCarthy (1831), 235. (1888), 306.
Bedreechund v. Elphinstone, 527.
Behring Sea Case (1893), 272,300,
394.
Bell V. Kennedy (1868), 245.
Belle, The (1809), 600.
Bello Corrunes, The (1821), 669. Cagliari, The (1857), 207.
Bellone, The, 584. Caldwell, In re (1871), 198.
Benedict, The (1855), 577. Caldwell v. Vanvlissengen (1851),
Benito Estenger, The (1899), 577. 133
Bennett, In re (1864), 197. Caledonia, The (1819), 462.
Bentzon v.
Boyle (The Thirty Hogs- Calvin's Case (1608), 50, 138.
heads of Sugar) (1815), 456,459, Calypso, The (1799), 776.
522. Cammell v.Sewell (1858), 141.
Berens Kucker (1758), 766.
v, Canevaro Case (Italy and Peru)
Berlin,The (1914), 564. (1912), 401.
Bermuda, The (1865), 743, 752. Carl, The (1855), 584.
Berne, City of v. Bk. of England CarlVogt Case (1873), 192.
(1804), 41. Carlo Alberto, The (1832), 171.
Bethell, Be (1888), 150. Carlos F. Boses, The (1899), 574,
Betsey, The (1797), 444, 613, 663, 575
772, 776, 784, 786. Carlotta, The (1803), 593.
BidweU Case (1874), 190. Carolina, The (1807) 179, 349, 566,
Bishop of Eoss Case, 343. 760.
Blendenhall, The (1814), 603. Caroline, The
(1802), 758.
Bloxam V. Eavre (1884), 138. — (1841), 89, 641.
Boades Lust, The (1804), 407. Carrington v. Merchant Ins. Co.
Bolletta, The (1809), 521. (1834), 752.
Bonati V. Welsh (1861), 144. Carthage Case (France and Italy)
Bothnea, The, 586. (1913), 401.
Boussmaker, Ex parte (1806), 425. Casa Blanca Case (1909), 400.
Boyce v. Tabb (1873), 222. Castioni, Be (1890), 193, 194.
Bradford v. Young (1884), 244. Castrique v. Imrie (1870), 227.
Bremer v. Freeman (1857), 140. Catherina Elizabeth, The (1804),
Breslau, The (1914), 579. 602, 794.
Briggs V. Briggs (1880), 238, 239, Cellamare Case (1718), 343.
242 245 Ceylon, The (1811), 600.
— V. The Light Ships (1865), Chamizal Case (U. S. and Mexico)
160. (1911), 401.
Brindilla, The (1914), 579. Charkieh, The (1873), 34, 58, 158,
Brinkley v. the Attorney-General 162.
(1890), 150. Charles, The (1814), 437.
Brodie v. Barry (1813), 135. Charlotte, The (1804), 722, 731.
— V. Brodie (1861), 239. Charlotte Caroline, The (1812), 603.
Brook V. Brook (1861), 143, 146, Charming Betsey, The (1804), 28,
14^. 249.
Brown v. U. S. (1814), 420, 421, Chartered Bank of India v. Nether-
426. lands India Steam Navigation Co.
Brunei v. Brunei (1871), 244. (1883), 233.
INDEX OF CASES CITED. XXIX
Ohavasse. Ex farte {Re Grazebrook) Da Sa Case, 346.

(1865), 770. Davis V. Packhard (1833), 353.
Cherokee Nation, The v. State of De Almida, Re (1901), 244.
Georgia (1831), 66. De Bass Case (1654), 343.
— V. Southern Kansas Eail- De Couche v. Savetier, 144.
way Co. (1890), 67. D'Etchegoyen v. D'Etchegoyen
Cherokee Trust Funds (1885), 66, (1888), 242.
67. De Geer v. Stone (1882), 248.
Chesapeake, The (1863), 196, 655. De Gortz Case (1717), 351.
Cheshire, The, 780. De Haber v. Queen of Portugal
Chile, The (1914), 424. (1851), 152.
Chirac Chirac (1817), 368.
v. De la Chetardie Case, 346.
Christopher, The (1799), 663. De Lane v. Moore (1852), 145.
Church V. Hubbard (1804), 286. DelagoaBay Case (1875), 394.
Cigala's Trust, In re (1878), 141. Del Col V. Arnold (1796), 586.
Circassian, The (1864), 521, 744, De Montaigu v. De Montaigu
774, 779, 783, 785. (1913), 243.
Citadc de Lisboa, The (1806), 711. DeNicols v. Curlier (1900), 145.
City of Berne v. Bank of England Dentv. Smith (1869), 182.
(1804), 41. Des Hais, In the goods of (1865),.
Clark V. Cretico (1808), 353. 226.
— V. Smith (1839), 68. Desmare v. U. S. (1877), 244. -
CUo, The (1805), 437. Dever,Ex parte (1887), 146.

Cohens v. Virginia (1821), 340. DeWahl v. Braune, 439.
Colliss V. Hector (1875), 145, 227. De Wutz V. Hendricks (1824), 642.
Columbia, The (1799), 773. Diana, The (1803), 447, 772.
Comet, The (1808), 771. — (1812), 218, 785.
Commercen, The (1816), 722, 755. — (1904), 691.
Comus, The (1816), 160. Diligentia, The (1814), 581, 601,
Concepcion, La (1821), 669. 602.
Concha v. Concha (1892), 245. Direct United States Cable Co. v.
Confederate Note Case, The (1873), The Anglo-American Telegraph
412. Co. (1877). 269, 285.
Constantia, The (1807), 576. Dispatch, The (1801), 602.
Constitution, The (1879), 161. Divina Pastora, The (1819), 38.
Continental Tyre and Eubber Co. v. Doelwyk, The (1896), 733, 809.
Thomas Tilling (1914), 464. Dolphin V. Eobins (1859), 238,243.
Cooke, Re (1887), 231, 244. Don V. Lippman (1837), 150.
Cooper V. Cooper (1888), 231. Donaldson v. Thompson (1808), 521.
Cope V. Doherty (1858), 27. Donegani v. Donegani (1835), 138.
Coppin -y. Coppin (1725), 135. Don Pacifico Case (1850), 407.
Cornelius, The, 785. Dordrecht, The (1799), 584.
Cosmopolite, The (1801), 437, 441. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 237.
Costa Kica (1897), 394. Dos Hermanos, The (1817), 445.
Costello's Case (1867), 255. Douglas Douglas (1871), 245.
V.
Cotton Plant, The (1870), 581. Dred Scott v. Sandford (1856), 223.
Craignish v. Hewitt (1892), 242. Dree Gebroeders, The (1802), 448.
Creole, The (1841), 168, 394. Duke of Brunswick, The v. King of
Crookenden v. Fuller (1859), 244. Hanover (1844), 34, 151, 162.
Crow Dog, Re (1882), 67. Dumba Case (1915), 346.
Cumberland, The (1803), 565. Duncan, Pox & Co. v. Schrempt &
Cunningham, Ex parte (1884), 245. Bonke (1914), 464.
Curling v. Thornton (1823), 140. Dupont V. Pichon (1805), 346.
Cutting's Case (1886), 186.
Czarevitch, The (1904), 691.
East India Co. v. Campbell (1749)^

189.
Ebenezer, The (1806), 743.
Dacia, The (1914), 579. Edward, The (1801), 752.
Daifje, The (1800), 512, 567. Edward and Mary, The (1801), 584,.
Dainese v. Hale (1875), 182. 601.
XXX INDEX OF CASES CITED,
Eleanora Oatharina, The (1802), Frau Anna Howina (1854), 733.

593 Frau Ilsabe, The (1801), 770.
Eliza Ann, The (1813), 413. Frau Margaretha, The (1805), 745.
Ellis V. Mitchell (1874), 169. Frederick Molke (1798), 773.
Elsebe, The (1804), 582, 583. Freke v. Lord Carbery (1873), 135.
Emden, The (1914), 580. Freundschaft, The (1819), 455.
Emily St. Pierre, The (1862), 602, Friendship, The (1807), 756, 759.
603. Frith V. WoUaston (1852), 232.
Emperor of Austria v. Day and Furtado v. Rogers (1802), 425, 588.
Kossuth (1861), 27.
Enohin v. Wylie (1862), 140.
Erstern, The (1782), 712.
Esposito V. Bowden (1857), 220, Gaetano and Maria, The (1882),
442. 27.
Este V. Smith (1854), 145. Gage, The (1806), 601.
Estrella,The (1819), 605, 669. Gaily, In the goods of (1876), 142.
Etrusco, The (1795), 659. Ganz, Re (1882), 203.
Evert, The (1803), 731. Gauntlet, The (1871), 682.
Ewine v. Orr-Ewing (1883), 228. Geipel V. Smith, 773, 785.
Exchange (1808), 789. General, The (1900), 734, 745, 749.
Exchange, The (The Exchaîge v. General Armstrong, The (1814,
McEadden) (1812), 152, 160, 170, 1851), 394, 657.
669, 687. General Hamilton, The (1805), 577.
Express, The, 440. Genet, Case of (1792), 344, 644.
Genoa and its Dependencies (1820),
581.
Geoffroy^s Case (1832), 526.
Georgia, The, 577.
Fair American, The, 452. Georgia, State of v. Stanton (1867),
Ealaba, The (1915), 587. 66.
Eama, The (1804). 521. Georgiana, The (1814), 546, 600.
Fanny, The (1814), 662. Gerasimo, The (1857), 521.
— (1815), 794. Gertruvda, The (1799), 407.
Felicity, The (1819), 799. Gesellschaft Michael, The (1802),
Firebrace v. Firebrace (1878), 243. 731.
Fisher, In re (1827), 190. Gladstone v. Musurus Bey (1862),
Fitzsimmons v. The Newport Ins. 162, 340.
Co. (1808), 782. Gloire, La (1804), 567.
Flad Oyen, The (1799), 6, 606, 662. Godard v. Gray (1870), 235.
Fleming v. Page (1850), 521. Goeben, The (1914), 579.
Fletcher v. Peck (1810), 66. Goss V. Withers, 581.
Florida Bonds Case (1885), 394. Grace, The Slave. 223.
Florida, The (1864), 656, 657, 678. Gran Para, The (1822). 605, 669.
Forbes Cochrane (1824), 222,
v. Grange, The (1793), 285, 286, 662,
223 667.
— 'V. Forbes (1854), 242, 241.
Gray Jacket, The (1866), 432, 433.
Forest King, The (1861), 772. Green v. Green (1893), 238.
Forsigheid, The (1801), 584. Griswold v. Waddington (1818),
Forte, The, 394. 442.
Fortuna, The (1802), 711. Grove, Re
(1887), 242.
— (1811), 217. Grozovoi, The
(1904), 692.
Foster v. Neilson (1829), 367. Guillaume Tell, The (1808), 584.
Fox, The (1811), 615. Guver v. Daniel, 242.
Frances, The (1814), 574. Gyilenborg Case (1717-), 343.
Francis, The (1813), 575.
Franciska, The (1854), 771, 777,
778.
Franconia, The (E. v. Keyn)
ri876), 17. 22, 23, 27, 282. Haabet, The (1800), 731, 753.
Frknkland v. McGusty (1830), 235. Ilagedorn v. Bell, 521.
Franklin, The (1801), 601, 752. Haimun, The (1904), 763.
— (1805), 434. Haldane v. Eckford (1869), 245.
INDEX OF CASES CITED. XXXI
Halley, The (1867), 232, 233. Indian Chief, The (1800), 445, 455.
Hamilton v. Dallas (1875), 245. Industrie, The (1904), 764.
Hampton, The (1866), 575, 577. Ingle V. Continental Insur. Co. of
Hampton v. McConnel (1818), 236. Mannieim (1914), 464.
Hanger v. Abbott (1867), 438, 439. Inglis V. Sailors' Snug Harbour
Hardner v. WoodrufE (1872), 412. (1830), 246, 248.
Hardy, Le v. La Voltigoante International, The (1871), 682.
(1799), 572. Invincible, The (1814), 663.
Harford v. Morris (1776), 148. — (1816), 604, 669.
Harmony, The (1800), 444. Ionian Ships, The (1855), 54.
Harrison v. Sterry (1809), 146. Iowa V. Illinois (1893), 306.
Harvey v. Farnie (1880), 149, 238, Isaacson v. Durant (1886), 248.
239 243
Haver v. Yaker (1869), 367.
Hawksford v. Giffard (1886), 235.
Haycraft v. U. S., 533.
Heathfield v. Chilton (1767), 27. Jack v. Jack (1862), 239.
Heinrich Case (1873), 259. Jacobs V. Credit Lyonnais (1884),
148.
Helen, The (1801), 600.
— (1855), 770.
James Cook, The (1810), 789.
Janson v. Driefontein Mines Co.
Helena, The (1801), 64.
Henderson, Re (1887), 235. (1902), 435, 466.
Henrick and Maria, The (1799), Japanese House Tax Case (1905),
399
604, 663.
The (1906), 161.
Hercules, The (1819), 583. Jassy,'
Herzog, The (1900), 734, 745, 749. Jauncey v. Sealey (1686), 226.
Jecker v. Montgomery (1851), 438,
Hiawatha, The, 772.
Hill V. Good, 149. 603.
Hilton V, Guyot (1894), 24. Jeune Eugenie, La, 213.
Johanna Emilie, The (1854), 558.
Hipsang, The (1904), 800.
Hobbs V. Henniiig (1865), 733. John, The (1818), 584, 808.
V. De Beauchesne John Anderson (1879), 172.
Hodgson (1858),
John Brown Case (1819), 165.
241, 245.
John Gilpin, The (1863), 785.
Hoffnung, The (1805), 783.
Holden v. Joy (1872), 67, 68. John and Jane, The (1802), 601.
Holmes v. Jennison (1840), Johnson v. Mcintosh (1823), 271.
188,
Jonge Klassina, The (1804), 455.
191.
Hoop, The (1799), 427, 428, 441,
— Margaretha, The (1799), 721,
731.
588.
Hope, The (1813), 436.
— Petronella, The (1799), 776.
Horatio, The (1806), 600.
— Pieter, The (1801), 743.
Horizon, The (1807), 593.
— Thomas (1801), 766.
Hornet, The (1870), 674.
— Tobias, The (1799), 731, 751.
Hovt V. Gelston (1818), 41, 645. Joseph, The (18t4), 433.
Huascar, The (1877), 210. Josephine, The (1801), 574, 575.
Hudson V. Guestier (1810), 602, Juffrow Catharina, The (1804), 434,
448.
604, 663.
Hullet V. of Juffrow Maria Schroeder, The
King Spain (1828),
162. (1800), 785, 787.
Huntress, The (1805), 593. Julia, The (1814), 441, 462.
Hurtige Hane, The (1801), 15. Jumeaux, Les (U. S. v. Guinet)
Hyde v. Hyde (1866), 150. (1795), 667, 668.
Jupiter, The (1817), 672.
Justitia, The (1886), 683.
Ida, The (1854), 577.

Ikhona, The (1904), 800.
lUeanon Pirates, The, 33. Kastellans Case (1875), 252.
Imina, The (1800), 734, 750. Kellv V. Harrison (1800), 50.
Immanuel,The (1799), 766. Kennet v. Chambers (1852), 44.
Imperial Japanese Government v. Kerv. Illinois (1886), 200.
The P. & O. Co. (1895). 184. Kershaw v. Kelsey (1868), 438.
XXXll INDEX OF CASES CUED.
Kim, The (1915), 748. Madrazo v. Willes (1820), 220.

Kindersley v. Chase (1801), 26. Magdalena, The (Talbot v. Jansen)
Kingt;. Foxwell (1876), 242,245. (1797), 668.
King of Spain v. Oliver (1810), 163. Magdalena Steam Navigation, Co. v.
King of Two Sicilies v. Wilcox Martin (1859), 340, 341.
(1851), 50. Magellan Pirates, The (1853), 205.
Kniaz Potemkin, The (1905), 212. Mahoney v. U. S. (1869), 182.
Knight Commander (1904), 738, Maisonnaire «;. Keating (1815), 589.
800. Major Barbour, The (1862), 772.
Koszta Case (1853), 258. Malacca, The (1904), 551.
Kotic, The
(1905), 564. Maltassv. Maltass (1844), 242.
Kowshing, The (1894), 763. Mandjur, The (1904), 690.
Mangrove Prize Money, Re (1902),
584.
Laconia, The (1863), 181, 182. Manila Prize Cases, The (1902), 581.
Lacroix, In the goods of (1877), Manilla, The (1808), 41, 521.
142. Manouba Case (France and Italy)
Lafayette, The (1870), 685. (1913), 401.
Lamar Browne (1875), 581.
v. Manouba, The (1912), 764.
Lariviere v. Morgan (1872), 162. Marais, Ex parte (1902), 525.
Latimer v. Poteet (1840), 68. Margaret, The, 750.
Lauderdale Peerage Case (1885), Maria, The (1799), 27, 615, 717,
244, 245. 790.
Lawford v. Davies, 150. — (1805), 743. .
Lawrence Case (1875), 197.

Marianna, The (1805), 575, 713.
Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier (1895), Marianna Flora, The (1826), 173.
238. Marie Glaeser, The (1914), 548, 575.
Lena, The (1904), 692. Maritime Boundary Case (Norway
Lennie Mutineers, The (1876), 196, and Sweden) (1909), 400.
198.
Marrett, Re (1887), 244, 245.
Lesnik, The (1904), 564.
Le Sueur Marshall v. Marshall (1908), 146.
Le Sueur v. (1876), 144,
243. Marsland, Re (1886), 145.
Leucade, The (1854), 615, 752, 799. Mary, The (1817), 601.
Levy, Re (1885), 228.
Mary and Susan, The (1816), 454.
Liesbet van den Toll (1804), 565. Mary Ford, The (1796), 602, 605.
Lisette, The (1807), 787. Mashona,The (1900), 434.
V. Guibert (1865), 148. Matchless, The, 743.
Lloyd McCardale's Case, 527.
Lody Case (1914), 511, 525. McConnell v. Hampden (1815), 525.
Lola, The (1899), 563, 565.
McGoon V. Scales (1869), 135.
Lolley's Case (1812), 237, 238.
McHvaine v. Coxe's Lessee (1808),
Lopez Case (1850), 673. 36.
Lord Nelson, The (1809), 601.
McKeev. U. S. (1868), 438.
Louis, The (1817), 173, 213, 219, New
286.
McLeod V. Att.-Gen. for
South Wales (1891), 185.
Louisa, The (1813), 603.
Louisa Agnes, The (1862), 785.
McLeod Case (1885), 394.
Melan v. The Duke of Fitzjames
Luna, The (1810), 770.
Lusitania, The (1915), 554, 580, (1797), 232.
587.
Memor v. Happersett (1874), 224.
Borden Mendoza Case (1584), 343.
Luther v. (1849), 525.
Mentor, The (1810), 785, 808.
Mercantile Investment and General
Trust Co. V. Eiver Plate Trust
M. MoxHAM, The Loan and Agency Co. (1882), 135.
(1876), 233.
Macartney v. Garbutt (1890), 340, Mercurius, The (1799), 752, 776,
342, 348. 789.
Macedonian, The (1821), 394. Messina v. Petrocochino (1872),
Mackey v. Coxe (1855), 67. 182.
Madonna del Burso, The (1802), 15. Meteor, The (1866), 671.
Madonna delle Gracie, The (1802), Meunier, In re (1894), 193, 194.
434. Mickilchenkorff Case (1867), 339.
INDEX OF CASES CITED, XXXlll
Mighell V. Sultan of Johore (1894), Northcote v. Douglas (The Fran-

34,151, 161. ciska) (1854), 771, 777.
Miller v. The Eesolution (1781), North Sea Incident (1904), 400.
586, 589. Nostra de Begona, The
— V. The U. S. (1870), 206, (1804), 731.
Signora
533 Novelli V. Eossi (1831), 235.

Milligan, Ex parte (1867), 525, 526, Novik, The (1904), 691.
527. Nuestra Senora de la Caridad, The
Mills V. Duryee (1813), 236. (1819), 38.
Minerva, The, 577. Nuestra Senora de los Dolores, The
Miramichi, The (1914), 576. (1809), 425.
Miranda Case (1806), 672. Nueva Anna, The (1821), 41.
Mississippi, State of, v. Johnson
(1866), 83.
Missouri Steamship Go., Be (1889),
148.
Mitchell V. U. S. (1874), 242,244,
434. Ocean, The (1804), 447.
Monroe v. Douglas (1846), 227. Octavie, The, 353.
Monte Allegre, The (1822), 673. Oddy V. Bovill (1802), 663.
Odin, The (1799), 576.
Montezuma, The (1887), 212.
Ogden V. Ogden (1908), 143, 243.
Montgomery v. U. S. (1872), 438.
Moodie v. The Alfred (1796), 668,
— V. Saunders (1827), 146.
Oleg, The (1904), 693.
669.
— V. The Phoebe Ann,
669.
Olindo Eodrigues, The (1898), 774.
Olivera v. Union Ins. Co. (1818),
Moore v. Darell (1832), 140.
— V. Hegeman (1883), 240.
786.
Moultrie v. Hunt (1860), 141. Omnibus, The (1805), 576.

Ophelia, The (1915), 558.
Mowe, The (1914), 424, 465.
Mure V. Kaye (1811), 190. Oppenheim v. Eussell, 576.
Orel,The (or Aryol) (1905), 557.
Murray v. The Charming Betsey
Orinoco Steamship Co. Case (1910),
(1804), 249. 400. .
Muscat Dhows Case (1905), 399.

Musurus Bey v. Gadban (1894), Orozembo, The (1807), 179, 757,
341. 759, 762.
,
Oster Eisoer, The, 751.
Ostsee, The (1856), 586, 615, 752.
Owachita Cotton, The (1867), 438.
Nafire v. U. S., 68.
Nancy. The (1800), 750.
— (1892), 798.
Nashville, The (1861), 691.
Nassau, The, 501. Packet de Bilboa, The (1799), 574.
Nayade, The (1802), 414. Palme, The (1872), 460.
Naylor v. Taylor, 770, 774. Panaghia Ehomba, The (1858), 772,
Neeley v. Henkel (1900), 521. 789.
Neptune, The, 729. Panama, The (1899), 422.
Neptunus, The (1799), 779. Panariellos, The (1915), 441.
— (1800), 731, 751. Papayanni v. The Eussian Steam
— (1807), 441. Navigation Co. (The Laconia)
Nereide, The (1815), 27, 28, 703, (1863), 181, 182.
794, 798. Paquete Habana, The (1899). 23, 28,
Nerevda, The (1823), 662, 669. 563, 565.
Neutralitet, The
(1801), 752, 771. Parisot, Be, 200.
New Chile Gold Mining
Co. v. Parkinson v. Potter (1885), 340,
Blanco (1888), 341, 352. 342.
Newton, The (1806), 164. Parlement Beige, The (1878), 34,
Nibojêt V. Niboyet (1878), 238, 245. 152, 161.
Nicol, de. In re (1900), 143. Patria, The (1871), 440.
Nigretia, The (1905), 575, 758. Paxton, In re (1866), 197.
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Peacock, The (1802), 585.
(1910), 400. Pedro, The (1899), 422.
W.
XXXIV INDEX OF CASES CITED.
Pensamento Feliz, The (1809), 601. K. V. Keyn (The Franconia)

Perkeo, The (1914), 424. (1876), 17, 22, 23, 27, 170,
Peterburg, The (1904), 294, 550. 282.
Peterhoff, The (1866), 732, 733, 745,
— V. Lesley (1860), 168, 172.
770, 771.
— V, Lynch (1903), 185.
Phillips V. Allen (1828), 146.

— V. Sandoval (1886), 683.
— V. Eyre (1870), 232, 527.
— V. Sattler (1858), 168.
Phoebe Ann, The (Moodie v. The — V. Seberg, 461.
Phoebe Ann) (1796), 669. — V. Tubbee, 197.
Phoenix, The (1803), 457, 459.

— V. Wilson (1877), 203.
Pinner v. Arnold, 220. — V. Zulueta (1843), 220.
Pious Fund of the Galifornias Case Eadich v. Hutchins, 434.
(1902), 399. Eanger, The (1805), 731, 752.
Pitt V. Pitt (1864), 239. Eapid, The (1814), 430, 432, 441,
Plakat, The (1915), 566. 760.
Polka, The (1854), 604, 663.
— (1854), 577.
Pollock V. Farmers' Loan and Trust Eauscher's Case (1886), 198.
Co. (1894), 83. Eecovery, The (1807), 27, 615.
Porter v. Freundenberg (1915), Eeform, The (1865), 438.
466. Eendsborg, The (1802), 766.
Portland, The (1800), 455. Eepublic of Peru v. Dreyfus (1888),
Potsdam, The (1801), 786. 41, 50.
Price V. Dewhurst (1837), 226. — V. Peruvian Guano
Price, Re, Tomlin v. Latter (1900), Co. (1886), 41,
143. 50.
Prigg V. Pennsylvania (1842), 224.
— v. Weguelin (1875),
Prince of Wales, The (1861), 408. 162.
Princess Bibesco's Case (1875), 239. Eeward, The (1814), 437.
— Maria (1904), 800. Eicord v. Bettenham (1765), 588.
— Thurn and Taxis v. Mof- Eingende Jacob, The (1750), 752.
fitt (1914), 465, 466. Einger v. Churchill (1840), 239.
Princessa, The (1799), 766. Eita, The (1899), 550.
Prins Frederik, The (1820), 161. Eobinson & Qo. v, Continental In-
Prinz Heinrich, The (1904), 550, surance Co. of Mannheim (1914),
562. 465, 466.
Prioleaut;. U.S. (1866), 162. E<)binson v. Campbell (1818), 135.
Prize Causes, The (1862), 43, 206, Eolla, The (1807), 771.
411, 414. Eosalie and Betty, The (1800), 750.
Progress, The (1810), 596. Eose V. Himely (1808), 206, 226,
Protector, The (1871), 439. 411.
Purissima Concepcion, The (1805), Eosine, La (1800), 567.
659, 808. Eoth V. Eoth, 150.
Eusbia, The (1904), 575.
Euvs V. Eoyal Exchange Assurance
do. (1896), 733, 809.
QuANGNAM, The (1905), 764. Eyeshitelni, The (1904), 656.
Queen Christina of Sweden (1657),
152.
Saokville Case (1888), 345.

E. V. Anderson (1868), 168, 170, Sally, The (1806), 164.
172. Sally Magee, The (1865), 577.
— V. Chad wick, 149. Salvador, The (1870), 683.
— V. Cunningham (1859), 170, 285. San Jago, The, 598.
— V. Dawson, 204. San Eoman, The, 440.
— V. Dudley (1884), 23, 172, 283. Sansom, The (1807), 593.
— V. Earl Eussell (1901), 238. Santa Anna, The (1809), 521.
— V. Ganz (1882), 203. Santa Brigada, The (1800), 584,
— V. Gould (1869), 196. 600.
— V. Hutchinson (1678), 204. Santa Cruz, The (1798), 420, 594,
— V. Jameson (1896), 683. 599.
INDEX OF CASE8 CITED. XXXV
Santa Maria, The (1822), 673. Sorensen v. Reg., 353.
Santissima Trinidad, The. alias The Sottomayor v. De Barros (1877),
El Poderoso (1762), 517. 143, 149, 150.
Santissima Trinidad, The (1822), South African Republic v. La Com-
161, 172, 605, 662, 670, 671. pagnie Franco-Beige du chemin
Santos V. Illidge (1859), 220. de fer du Nord (1898), 34, 162.
Sapphire, The (1870), 163. Springbok, The (1866), 613, 744,
Sarah Christina, The (1799), 752, 745.
753. Statham v. Statham (1912), 152.
Saul V. His Creditors, 145. Stathatos v. Stathatos (1913), 243.
Savarkar Case (1910), 400. St. Andrew, The (1915), 555.
Sawyer v. Marine Fire Ins. Co. St. Kilda, The (1904), 800.
(1812), 227. St. Lawrence, The (1814), 432.
Schaffenius v. Goldberg (1915), 467. St. Luke's Hospital v. Barkley,
Schibsby ij. WeHenholz (1870), 230, 340, 353.
235 Staadt Embden, The (1798), 731.
Scotia, The (1871), 28. 751.
Scotland, The (1881), 27. Stanley v. Bernes (1830), 140.
Scotsman, The (1904). 737. State of Georgia, The v. Stanton
Scott V. Att.-Gen. (1886), 238. 240. (1867), 66.
Scudder v. Bank (1875), 151. State of Mississippi v. Johnson
Sea Lion, The (1866), 438. (1866), 83.
Sea Nymph, The (1901), 798. State of Missouri v. Patterson
Sechs Geschwistern, The, 577. (1893), 200.
Secretary of State for India v. Statira,Le (1800), 591.
Sahaba (1859), 32. Steamer Nassau, The. 577.
Selkriggv. Davis (1814), 228. Stephen Hart, The (1863), 744.
Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co. Stert, The (1801), 771.
(1871), 439. Strader v. Graham, 223.
The (1845), 33.
Serhassan Pirates, Strother v. Lucas (1838), 50.
Seymour v. London and Provincial Success, The (1812), 414, 460.
Marine Insurance Co. (1872), Susa, The (1799), 455.
733 Susan, The (1808), 760.
Sharpe v. Crispin (1869), 245. Sutton V. Sutton (1830), 369.
Shaw V. Attorney-General (1870), Swineherd, The (1801), 809.
239
— V. Gould' (1868), 239.
— V. Shaw (1867), 245.
Shenandoah, The (1864). 679. Tacoma, The (1904), 737.
Sibeth, Ex parte (1885), 146. TalbotV. Jansen (The Magdalena)
Silesian Loan Case (1753), 405. (1796), 668.
418, 420, 607, 700 n.
— Seeman (1801), 593. 603.
V.
Sill V. Worswick (1791), 146. — V. The Three Briggs, 584.
Simonin v. Mallac (1860), 148, 149. Talton V. Mayes (1896), 67.
Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of '
Tatnall v. Hankey (1838), 141.
Paridkote (1894), 69. 230. Taylor v. Best (1854), 162, 340,
Sir William Peel, The (1866). 613, 342, 346.
659. Tempest, The, 170.
Sitka, The (1855). 160. Terceira Affair, The (1827). 675.
Slave Grace, The. 223. Terek, The (1905), 694.
Slavers, The (1864). 222. Terrett v. Taylor (1815), 50.
Smith V. Condrv (1843), 233. Teutonia, The (1870), 414, 440.
— V. Shaw (1815), 525. Texas v. White (1868), 32. 34, 37,
Smolensk, The (1904). 294. 550, 562. 412.
Snell V. Dwi?ht fl876), 438. Thea, The (1904), 800.
The (1812), 615. Theresa Bonita, The (1802). 407.
Snipe,
Society for the Propagation of the Th6tis, The (1801), 808.
Gospel in Foreign Parts, The v. Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar, The
The Town of New Haven (1823), (Bentzon v. Boyle) (1815), 456,
369. 459 522
Soslasie,The (1854). 577. Thompson -y. Powles (1828), 41.
Sophia, The (1805), 808, 409. Thomson v. Adv. -Gen. (1848), 141.
XXXVl INDEX OF CASES CITED.
Thomvris, The (1808), 743. U. S. V. Eavara (1793), 340.

Thorington v. Smith (1868), 37, 412.
— V. Eeyburn (1832), 673.
Thorp V. Thorp (1882), 240.
— V. Eeynes (1850), 367.
Three Friends, The (1896), 674. — V. Eice (1819), 521.
Tilonko v. Att.-Gen. of Natal — V. Eogers (1846), 67.
(1907), 523.
— V. Smith (1820), 204.
Tirnan, In re (1864), 196, 207. — V. The Ambrose Light
Tobago, The (1804). 575. (1885), 212.
Tomlin v. Latter {Re Price) (1900), — V. Wagner (1867), 41, 162.
143. — V. Witey (1870), 439.
Tootal's Trusts, Re (1883), 180, 182, Udny V. Udny (1869), 241, 242, 244.
246. Urquhart v. Butterfield (1887),
Tousig Case (1854), 259. 243, 244.
Tovey v. Lindsay (1813), 237. Usparicha v. Noble (1811), 437.
Trent, The (1861), 178, 331_, 764.
"
Triheten, The (1805), 782.
Triomphante, The (1885), 688.
Triquet v. Bath (1764), 27.
Triton, The, 586. Vandyck v. Whitmore, 437.
Trois Preres, Les (1793), 574.
Van Matre v. Sankey (1893), 24-').
Trotter v. Trotter (1829), 141.
Van Eeenen's Case (1904), 523.
Trueman Smith, In re (1869). 196.
Vaterland, The (1914), 553.
Trufort, Re (1887), 235. Vavasseur v. Krupp (1878), 162.
Turner, Le (1870), 575, 577.
— V. Thompson (1888), 238.
Venezuela Boundary Dispute, 395.
— Claims (1904), 399.
Tuscaloosa, The (1863), 696.
Venus, The (1814), 454, 456, 567.
Tuscarora, The (1861). 691. Viditz V. O'Hagan (1900), 231.
Twee Gebroeders, The (1800), 655.
Twee JufProwen, The (1802). 731. Vigilantia, The (1798), 455, 460.
Twende Brodre, The (1801), 731. Villasseque's Case (1818), 521.
Two Friends, The (1799), 595. Virginie, La (1804), 445.
Virginius, The (1873), 89, 209.
Viveash v. Becker (1814), 353.
Voinet v. Barrett (1885), 235.
Von Aernam, Ex parte (1854), 197,
203.
U. S. V. Arredondo (1832), 367.
— V. Cook (1873), 68.
Vrow Anna Catharina, The (1803),
— V. Crosby (1812), 135.
457, 460, 659, 766.
— V. Davis (1873), 191.
Vrow Judith, The (1799), 778, 786.
— V. Deacon, 188.
Vrow Margaretha, The (1799), 575.
— V. Diekelman (1875), 152,
527.
— V. Green, 188.
— V. Grossmayer (1869), 439.
— V. Guillem (1850), 454. Walcot v. Botfield (1854), 242.
— V. Guinet (1795), 667, 668. Wallace v. Attorney-General
— V. Hand(1810), 340. (1865), 141.
—
.
V. Holliday (1865), 67. War Onskan, The (1799), 593.

— V. Joseph (1876), 68. Ward V. Smith (1868), 439.
— V. Kagama (1886), 67. Ware v. Hilton (1796), 425, 439.
— V. Kazinski, 645. Warren's Case (1867), 255.
— V. Klintock (1820), 206. 207. Warrender v. War render (1835),
— V. Liddle (1808), 347. 144, 237.
— Lyon et al. v. Huckabee Warter v. Warter (1890), 240.
(1872), 412. Washburn, In re, 188.
— V. McEae (1869), 50. Watts V. Schrimpton (1856), 144.
— V. Meteor, The (1866), 671. Welvaart Van Pillaw, The (1799),
— V. Padelford, 533. 785, 787.
— V, Palmer (1818), 38, 41. West Eand Central Gold Mining
— 'V. Pirates (1820), 206. Co. V. Eex (1905), 22, 28.
— V. Quincey (1832), 670. Wheaton's Case (1839), 347.
— V. Eauscher (1886), 198. Whicker v, Hume (1858), 245.
INDKX OF CASES CITED. XXXVll
White V. Hart (1871), 412. Worcester v. State of G-eorgia

Whitney v. Robertson (1887), 390. (1832), 66, 68.
Wiborg V. U. S. (1896), 685. Wren, The (1867), 789.
Wight, The (1804), 600. Wright's Trusts (1856), 144, 243.
Wildenhus' Case (1886), 152, 168,
169.
William, The (1806), 743.
William Bagalay, The (1866), 442.
William H. Northrop, The (1862),
785. Yangtze Insurance Association v.
Williams v. Amioyd (1813), 227. The Indemnity Marine Mutual
— V. Brown, 223. Assurance Co. (1908), 758.
— V. Colonial Bank (1890), Yeaton v. Fry (1809), 785.
141. Young Jacob and Johanna, The
Willison Paterson (1817), 439.
V. (1798), 563, 565.
Willoughby, Re (1885), 248. Yrujo Case (1804), 344.
Wilson V. Blanco (1889), 352.
— V. Marryatt (1798), 143.
— V. Wilson (1872), 238, 239.
Wilson's Case (1877), 202.
Windsor, In re (1865), 196, 203.
Winslow's Case (1876), 198. Zamtchug, The (1904), 693.
Wolft' V. Oxholm (1817), 27, 426, Zelden Rust, The (1805), 745.
466. Zollverein, The (1856), 27.
(
xxxlx )
INTRODUCTION
Some men may think this a strangely chosen time to re-
publish a nineteenth century classic of international law.

We are in the midst of a general war in which the
validity of all rule, convention and usage appears, at
first sight, to be shaken to its foundation. The rulers of
the Central Empires and the leaders of their armies have

not only acted as if the laws and customs of civilized
warfare, the faith of treaties, and the dictates of the
commonest humanity, were subordinate to military con-

venience; they have not been ashamed to assert this
damnable doctrine (for so the publicists of all other
nations deem it) as a principle of deliberate conduct.
True, they talk of necessity, but in the sense that the

convenience of military advantage amounts to necessity
whenever the officer commanding on the spot is of that
opinion. Yet these same innovators are eager to seize
any pretext for charging their adversaries with some

breach, as often as not purely fictitious, of the rules from
which they claim unlimited dispensing power for them-
selves. We have now learnt tiie simple and compre-
hensive reason for this attitude ;
it would seem incredible
were not established by abundant German testimony.
if it
In the fixed belief of the German leaders and most of

their people, Germany is not a country having equal
xl INTRODUCTION.
rights among equals, but the home of a superior race
entitled to impose its own policy and methods on the

rest of the world by the use of any requisite degree of
force, and not bound to treat men of inferior races as
human beings unless and until they behave as docile

subjects. Germany has rights in virtue of a paramount
mission to Prussianize the world. Germany's allies have
rights because they are her allies. Neutrals have just
what Germany chooses to allow them, and enemies have
none. As for the ethical relationship of German
' '
colonists to subject races, it is defined by the egregious

Dr. Dernburg as '
an inflexible attitude.' Such is the
law down by our new judges of Berlin. Until we
laid
have accomplished the task of making it impossible for

them on the world, is it worth while to go on
to force it
repeating the formulas we thought sacied even in war

time? If a colonel of Ulans taken at random, drunk or
sober, is to be free to overrule everything hitherto ac-
cepted, to take private owners' goods against receipts in

the name of Captain Koepenick, and to shoot the owners
themselves on bare suspicion that some other man has
fired on a German trooper, why trouble ourselves to pore
over authorities at all ? If treaties are scraps of

paper,
learned books and considered judgments are mere scraps
of paper too.
But on reflection it seems that, when great Powers
commit themselves to principles of anarchic
tyranny,
that is the very reason why those who still believe in the
rule of law should reassertand republish their faith as
the most dignified form of protest, and in the long run
not the least effectual. Law does not cease to exist
merely because it is broken, or even because, for a time,

it may be broken on a large scale neither does the ;
INTRODUCTION. xll
escape of some criminals abolish penal justice. No

country is so well ordered that offences are not fre-
quently committed, or that wilful and concerted resistance

to the law never occurs. Concerning the law of nations,
the wonder is not that it should be broken, but that,
down to the present war, it should have been fairly well
observed by most nations and ostensibly respected by
all, in spite of lacking any defined sanction. What is

new and shocking in the present situation is the open
defiance of public law, the shameless assertion of mere
arbitrary power under the sophistical pretence that the

State, having no earthly superior, is subject to no moral
rules : a position, be
remarked, far beyond anything
it
that even Hobbes dared to maintain. Such defiance can

be met, in the first instance, only by the one argument
which the rebel Powers acknowledge, that of manifestly
superior force. But there will as surely be a reaction in
favour of law and order in the affairs of Europe as there
has been, after periods of civil turmoil, in the affairs of
particular nations and then we shall do well to give

;
some care to considering, with a view to better settle-
ment for the future, the principles accepted and formu-

lated by the wisdom of cool heads in bygone days of
peace.
In Wheaton's Elements we have an exposition of such
principles delivered on a more spacious historical scene
and with more wealth of detailed illustration than can be

found in most modern text-books. Wheaton stands for
the opinions received or allowed among the best in-

structed publicists during the period following the
Congress of Vienna, sometimes called the Forty Years'

Peace a period in the course of which there were many
;
w. d
xiil INTRODUCTION.
military operations, and in the latter part of it formidable

civil wars, but never a state of actual war between any
two of the greater European Powers. It was a period

favourable to disinterested treatment of international
problems by learned writers, and especially favourable to

their impartial treatment by Americans, who still ac-
cepted it axiom that their country was not to be

as an
involved in European controversies. For the purpose of

comparing the former rules with recent variations, and
judging how far any new departure is to be censured as
lawless or tolerated as an endeavour to follow the spirit
of the law when novel conditions have made literal
obedience impracticable, it is plainly the safer course to

look to the statements made by approved writers before
the present questions arose. There is
perhaps even
stronger political than scientific justification for Dr.
Phillipson's decision to retain Wheaton's references to
the earlier treatises which in Wheaton's own time held

authoritative rank.
It is needless to dwell here on Wheaton's general
merits. They are, to begin with, those of a
good
scholarly lawyer of the first generation of American in-
dependence but his combination of forensic, judicial
;
and diplomatic experience gave him almost unique

advantages in handling this subject. The time may
come when it will be a seemly and pious work for some
learned American to reprint Wheaton's text as a classic,
with no more annotation than will serve to prevent it
from actively misleading a reader who has not a current
modern treatise at his elbow. But that time is not yet,
and while the book is still in use as a practical manual
Dr. Phillipson's method of frankly rewriting obsolete or
inadequate sections appears the best.

INTRODUCTION. xllii
Some readers be discontented at not being able,

may
in this edition, to see at a glance whether they have
under their eyes Wheaton's own words or an editorial

supplement. To this it
may be answered that the dates
and editorship former issues are given in a note
of
opposite the title-page, and with that aid it is no great

feat of legal or literary discernment to make out to what
recension any important passage belongs. Besides, the

earlier editions have not ceased to be accessible to those
who may be curious matters.

in The only
such
alternative, as Dr. Phillipson has indicated, would have

been to preserve or indeed multiply typographical dis-
tinctions which, for the reader who wants information
and not literary history, are merely irritating. Still less
is apology needed for the text or notes reflecting the

confused and transitory state of present affairs. One
footnote added, it seems, at the last moment, suggests an
impending development of examples on the point of
recalling ambassadors which will quite overshadow the
petty tragi-comedy of Lord Sackville's case. At the

time of passing these lines for the press there has arisen
a curious and seemingly novel case as to the position of
consular agents of one belligerent party, in territory
occupied by but not belonging to the adverse party, who

have abused their official position to promote hostile
operations. The contention that in such circumstances
they are to be exempt from even the mildest forms of

military interference, or have an indefeasible claim to
remain at their posts, appears at least adventurous.
After the war far-reaching measures will be needed to
restore and maintain the public law of Europe. I ven-
ture to think they will be not less but more thorough

than any one, as yet, is in a position to forecast, and to
xliv INTRODUCTION.
hope that Dr. Phillipson may live to put forth another

edition of this book which will exhibit the custom and
ordinance of civilized nations at last clothed with fitting
authority, and armed' with power to assure the harmony

of the world.
F. POLLOCK.
Lincoln's Inn,
Chrtstmas Vacation, 1915.

ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
PAET FIEST.
DEFINITION, SOUEOES, AND SUBJECTS OF

INTEENATIONAL LAW.
CHAPTER I.
DEFINITION AND SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
iiiERE IS no legislative or ludicial recognised by all Ongm

autlioritv' of
nations, which determines the law that regulates the reciprocal Law.
relations of States. The origin of this law must be sought in the
principles of justice, applicable to those relations. While in every
civil society or State there is always a legislative power which
establishes,by express declaration, the civil law of that State,

and a judicial power which interprets that law, and applies it to
individual casos, in the great society of nations there is no legis-
lative power, and consequently there are no express laws, except
those which result from the conventions which States may make
\vith one another. As nations acknowledge no superior, as they
have not organised any common paramount authority, for the
purpose of establishing by an express declaration their inter-
national law, and as they have not constituted any sort of
Amphictyonic magistracy to interpret and apply that law, it is
impossible that there should be a code of international law illus-

tratedby judicial interpretations.
The inquiry must then be, what are the principles of justice
which ought to regulate the mutual relations of nations, that is
to say, from what authority is international kw derived?

w.^ 1
DEFINITION AND SOURCES
When the question is thus stated, every publicist will decide it
according to his own views, and hence the fundamental differences

which wo remark in their writings.
Natural Law The leading object of Grotius, and of his immediate disciples
defined.
and successors, in the science of which he was the principal
founder (a), seems to have been, iirstly, to lay down those rules of
justice which would be binding on men living in a social state,
independently^ of any positive laws of human institution; or, as
' '
is commonlyexpressed, living together in a state of nature and, ;
secondly, to apply those rules under the name of Natural Law,

to the mutual relations of separate communities living in a
similar state with respect to each other.
Witli a view to the first of these objects, Grotius sets out in
liis work; on the laws of war and
peace (h), with refuting the
doctrine of those ancient sophists who Avholly denied the reality of
moral distinctions, and that of some modern theologians, who
asserted that these distinctions are created entirely by the arl)i-
trary and i-evealed will of God, in the same manner as certain

political '\vriters (such as Hobbes) afterwards referred them to
the 2)0sitive institution of the civil magistrate. For this purpose,
Grotius labours to show that there is a law audible in the voice of
conscience, enjoining some actions, and forbidding others, accord-
ing to respective suitableness or repug-'nance to the reasonable

theii'
"
and sociable nature of man. jSTatural laAV," says he, "is the
dictate -of right reason pronouncing that there is in some actions

a moral obligation, and in other actions a moral deformity, arising
from their respective suitableness or repugnance to the rational
and social nature, and that, consequently, such actions are either
forbidden or enjoined by God, the Author of nature. Actions
which are the subject of this exertion of reason, are in themselves
lawful or unlawful, and are, therefore, as such, necessarily
commanded or prohibited by God" (c).
Natural Law The term Natural Law is here evidently used for those rules of
identical
witli the law justice which ought to govern the conduct of men, as moral and
of God, or accountable beings, living in a social state, independently of posi-
Divine Law.
tive human institutions, (or, as is commonly expressed, living in
a state of nature,) and which may more properly be called the
law of God, or the divine law, being the rule of conduct prescribed
by Him to His rational creatures, and revealed by the light of
reason, or the Sacred Scriptures.
On Grotius, see Article by Sir

(a)
national (Paris, 1904), ed. A. Fillet.
W. Eattigan, in Great Jurists of the (b) De Jure Belli ac Paeis.
World (London, 1913), pp. W9 seq. ; (c) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac,
Article in Fondateurs du droit inter- lib. i.
cap. 1, § X. 1, 2.
OF IXTEENATIOXAL LAW. '$
As Natural Law
independent communities acknowledge no common buporior,
applied to the
T
,
1 t A'
they may be considered as hvmg
•
p •
-1
m
•
a state oi nature with respect intercourse

o^ States.
to each other: and the obvious inference drawn by the disciples
and successors of Grotius was, that the disputes arising among
these independent communities must be determined by what they
call tlie Law of Nature. This gave rise to a new and separate
'
brancli of the science, called the Law of Nations, Jus
'
Oentium {d) .
Grotius distinguished the law of nations from the natural law Law of
^ J^ Tfv (»• •• 1-11 Natious dis- TIT •
by the diiierent nature oi its origin and obligation, which he tinguisbed

attributed to the general consent of nations. In the introduction Natural
ôn^
"
to his great work, he says, I have used in favour of this law, Grotius.
the testimony of philosophers, historians, poets, and even of
orators; not that they arc indiscriminately to be relied on as im-
partial authority; since they often bend to the prejudices of their
respectixe sects, the nature of their argument, or the interest of
tlieircause; but because where ma 113' minds of different ages and
countries concur in the same sentiment, it must be referred to some
general cause. In the subject now in question, this cause must be

either a just deduction from the principles of natural justice, or
universal consent. The first discovers to us the natural law% the
second the law of nations. In order to distinguish these two

branches of the same science, we must consider, not merely the
terms which authors have used to define them, (for they often
confound the terms 'natural law' and 'law of nations,') but the
nature of the subject in question. For if a certain maxim which
cannot be fairly inferred from admitted principles is, nevertheless,
found to be e^ erywhere observed, there is reason to conclude that
it derives its origin from positive institution" (e). He had pre-
Tiousiy said, "As the laws of each particular State are designed
to promote its advantage, the consent of all, or at least the greater
number of States, may have produced certain laws between them.
And, appears that such laws have been established,

in fact, it
tending to promote the utility, not of any particular State, but of

the great body of these communities. This is what is termed
the Law of Nations, when it is distinguished from Natural
Law"(./).
{cV) With respect to the jus gen-

'
Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome
'
-tium as understood by the Romans, (1911)., vol. i. chap. iii.
sec Maine, Ancient Law, ed. Sir F. (e) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac,
Pollock (1903), pp. 44 seq.; Inter- Prolegom. 40.
national Law, Lecte. i. and ii.; C. (f) Prolegom. 17.
Phillipson, International Law and
1(2)
All the reasonings of Grotius rest on the distinction which

he makes between the natural and the positive or voluntary Law
of Nations. He derives the first element of the Law of Nations
from a supposed condition of society, where men live together
in what has been called a state of nature. That natural society
has no other superior but God, no other code than the divine law
engraved in the heart of man, and announced by the voice of
conscience. Nations living together in such a state of mutual
independence must necessarily be governed by this same law.
Grotius, in demonstrating the accuracy of his somewhat obscure
definition of Natural Law, has given proof of a vast erudition,
as well as put us in possession of all the sources of his knoAvledge.
Ho then bases the positive or voluntary Law of Nations on the
consent of all nations, or of the greater part of them, to observe
certain rules of conduct in their reciprocal relations. He has en-

deavoured to demonstrate the existence of these rules by invoking
the same authorities, as in the case of his definition of Natural
Law. We thus see on what fictions or hypotheses Grotius has
founded the whole Law of Nations. But it is evident that his
supposed state of nature has never existed. As

to the general
consent of nations of which he speaks, it can at most be con-
sidered a tacit consent, like the 'jus non scriptum quod consensus
of the Roman jurisconsults.
'
facit This consent can only be

established disposition, more or less uniform, of nations to
by the
observe among themselves the rules of international justice, recog-
nised by the publicists. Grotius would, undoubtedly, have done
betterhad he sought the origin of the Natural I/a\v of Nations
in the principle of utility, vaguely indicated by Leibnitz {g),
but clearly expressed and adopted by Cumberland (/i), and ad-
mitted by almost all subsequent writers, as the test of international
morality (^). But in the time tliat Grotius wrote, this principle
which has so greatly contributed to dispel the mist with which the
foundations of the science of Liternutioual Law wore obscured,
was but very little understood. The principles and details of
international morality, as distinguished from international law,
are to be obtained not by applying to nations the rules which ought
to govern the conduct of individuals, but by ascertaining what are
the rules of international conduct which, on the whole, best
promote the general happiness of mankind. The means of this
(<7) Leibnitz, De usu Actorum Pub- (/) BentJiam, Principles oc Inter-

liconim, § 13. national Law; Works, ed. Bowring^
{h) Cumberland, De Legibus Part VIII. p. 537.
Naturae^ cap. v. § 1.
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 5
inquiry are observation and meditation; the one furnishing us

with facts, the other enabling us to discover the connection of
these facts as causes and effects, and to predict the results which
will follow, whenever similar causes are again put into opera-
tion (k).
-Neither Hobbes nor Pufendorf entertains the same opinion Law of
as Grotius upon the origin and obligatory, force of the positive Law of
Law of Nations. The former, in his work, De Cive, says, " The Nâtious to
' '
. « asserted be 1 1
natural law may be divided into the natural law of men, and the identical, by
natural law of States, commonly called the Law of Nations. The pj^fendorf"^
precepts of both are the same; but since States, when they are
once instituted, assume the personal qualities of individual men,
that law, which when speaking of individual men we ca,ll the
Law of Nature, is called the LaAv of Nations when appliedto whole
States, nations, or people" (/). To this opinion Pufendorf im-

"
plicitly subscribes, declaring that there is no other voluntary
or positive law of nations properly invested with a true and legal
force, and binding as the command of a superior power" {?n).
After thus denying that there is any positive or voluntary law
of nations founded on the consent of nations, and distinguished
from the natural law of nations, Pufendorf proceeds to qualify
this opinionby admitting that the usages and comity of civilized
nations have introduced certain rules for mitigating the exercise
of hostilities between them; that these rules are founded upon
a general tacit consent; and that their obligation ceases by tlie
express declaration of any party enguged in a 'just' war, that it
willno longer be bound by them. There can be no doubt that
any belligerent nation which chooses to withdraw itself from
the obligation of the Law of Nations, in respect to the manner
of carrying on war against another State, may do so at the risk
of incurring the penalty of vindictive retaliation on the part of
other nations, and of putting itself in general hostility with the
civilized world. As a celebrated English civilian and Admiralty
"
judge (Lord Stowell) has well observed, a great part of the
law of nations stands upon the usage and practice of nations. It
is introduced, indeed, by general principles, but it travels with
those general principles only to a certain extent; and if it stops

there, you are not at liberty to go further, and say that mere
(k) Senior, Edinburgh Review, No. of the World (London, 1913), i>p. 195
150^ pp. 310, 311. seq.
(I) Hobbes, De Give, cap. xiv. § 4. (m) Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et
For an Article on Hobbes (by J. E. Gentium (1672), lib. ii. cap. 3, § 23.
G. de Montmorency), see Great .Jurists For an Article on Pufendorf (by
C. Phillipson), see ibid., pp. 305 seq.
general speculations would bear you out in a further progress;

thus, for instance, on mere general principles, it is lawful to-
destroy your enemy; and mere general principles make no great
manner by which this is to be effected; but
difference as to the
the conventional law of mankind, which is evidenced in their
practice, does make a distinction, and allows some, and prohibits

other modes of destruction; and a belligerent is bound to confine
himself to those modes which the common
practice of mankind
has employed, and to relinquish those which the same practice
has not brought within the ordinary exercise of war, however
sanctioned by principles and puiposes" (?^).
its
The same remark may be made as to what Pufendorf says
respecting the privileges of ambassadors, which Grotius supposea

to depend upon the voluntary law of nations; whilst Pufendorf
says thej depend, either upon natural law, which gives to public
ministers a sacred and inviolable character, or upon tacit consent,
as evidenced in the usage of nations, conferring upon them certain
privileges which may be withheld at the pleasure of the State

where they reside. The distinction here made between thosei
privileges of ambassadors, which depend upon natural law, and

those which depend upon custom and usage, is wholly ground-
less ;
since both one and the other may be disregarded by any State
whicli chooses to incur the risk of retaliation or hostility, these
being tlie only sanctions by wîich the duties of international law

can be enforced.
Still it is not the less true that tlie law of nations, founded
upon usage, considers an ambassador, duly received in another
State, as exempt from the loeal jurisdiction by the consent of that
State, which consent cannot be withdrawn without incurring the
risk of retaliation, or of provoking hostilities on the part of the
sovereign by Avhoni he is
delegated. The same thing may be
affirmed of all the usages which constitute the Law of Nations.
They may be disregarded by those who ohoose to declare them-

selves absolved from the obligation of that law, and to incur the
risk of retaliation from the party specially injured by its violation,
or of the general hostility of manikind (o) .
Law of
Bynkershoek (who wrote after Pufendorf, and before Wolf
Nations
derived from and Vattel,) derives the law of nations from reason and usage
reason and
('
ex ratione et usu '), and founds usage on the evidence of treaties
usage by
Bynkershoek. and ordinances ('pacta et edicta'), with the camparison of ex-
amples frequently recurring. In treating of the rights of neutral
(w) The Flad Oyen (1799), 1 0. (o) Wheaton, History of the Law
Rob. 140. of Nations (New York, 1845), p. 96.
OF INTERN ATIOXAL LAW.
"
navigation in time of war, he says, Keason commands me to
be equally friendly to two of my friends who are enemies to each
other; and hence it follows that I am not to prefer either in war.
Usage is shown by the constant, and, as it Avere, perpetual custom
which sovereigns have observed of making treaties and ordinances
upon this subject, for they have often made such regulations by
treaties to be carried into effect in case of Avar, and by laws en-
acted after the commencement of hostilities. I have said 'by,
'
as it were, a perpetual custom ;

because one, or perhaps two
treaties, which vary from the general usage, do not alter the law
"
of nations (p).
In treating of the question as to the competent judicature in
"
cases affecting ambassadors, he says, The ancient jurisconsults
assert, that the laAv of nations is that Avhich is observed in accord-
ance with the light of reason, between nations, if not among all,
at least certainly among the greater part, and those the most
civilized. According to opinion, we may safely follow this
my
definition, Avhich establishes two distinct bases of thislaAv; namely,
reason and custom. But in whatever manner we may define the
law of nations, land however we may argue upon it, Ave must come
at last to this conclusion, that Avhat reason dictates to nations, and
Avhat nations observe between each other, as a consequence of the
collation of cases frequently recurring, is the only laAv of those
Avho are not governed by any other
— ('unicum jus
sit eorum, qui
alio jurenon reguntur'). If all men
are men, that is to say, if
they make use of their reason, it must counsel and command them
certain things Avhich they ought to observe as if by tnutual con-
sent, and Avhich being afterAvards established by usage, impose
upon nations a reciprocal obligation; Avithout Avhich law, Ave can

conceive neither of Avar, nor peace, nor alliances, nor embassies,
"
nor eonnnerce (g). Again, he .says, treating the same ques-
"
tion: The Roman and
pontifical laAv can hardly furnish a light
to guide our steps; the entire question must be determined by
reason and the usage of nations. I have alleged Avhatever reason
can adduce for or against the question; but Ave must noAv see
Avhat usage has approved, for that must prevail, since the laAv of
nations is thence derived" (r). In a subsequent passage of the
"
same treatise, he says, It is nevertheless most true, that the
States General of Holland alleged, in 1651, that, according to the
Qp) Bynkersliook, Quocstioiies Juris (g) De Foro Legatorum (1727),

Publici (1737), lib. i. cap. 10. See cap. iii. § 10.
the Article by O. Phillipson in Great (r) Ibid., cap. vii. § 8.
Jurists of the World, pp. 390 seq.
b^ DEFINITION AND SOURCES
law of nations, an ambassador cannot be arrested, thougb guilty

of a criminal offence; and equity requires that we should observe
that rule, unless we have previously r(Miounced it. The law of
nations is only a presumption founded upon usage, and every
such presumption ceases the moment the will of the party wîo is
affected by it is expressed to the contrary. Huberus asserts that
ambassadors cannot acquire or preserve their rights by prescrip-
tion; but he confines this to the case of subjects Avho seek an
asylum in the house of a foreign minister, against the wdll of
their own
sovereign. I hold the rule to be general as to every
privilege of ambassadors, and that there is no one they can pretend

to enjoy against the express declaration of the sovereign, because
an express dissent excludes the supposition of a tacit consent,
and there is no law of nations except between those who volun^
taril}^ submit to it by tacit convention" (s).

System of The public jurists of the school of Pufendorf had considered
the science of international law as a branch of the science of ethics.
They had considered as the natural law of individuals applied

it
to regulate the conduct of independent societies of men, called

States. To Wolf belongs, according to Vattel, the credit of sepa-
rating the law of nations from that part of natural jurisprudence
which treats of the duties of individuals.
"
In the preface of his great Avork, he says: Since such is the
condition of mankind
that the strict law of nature cannot always
be applied to the government of a particular community, but it
becomes necessary to resort to laws of positive institution more or
less varying from the natural law, so in the great society of
nations it becomes necessary to establish a law of positive insti-
tution more or less varying from the natural law of nations. As

the common welfare of nations requires this mutation, they are
not bound to submit to the law which flows from it than they
less
are bound to submit to the natural law itself, and the new la.w
thus introduced, so far as it does not conflict with the natural law,
ought to be considered as the common law of all nations. This
law we have deemed proper with Grotius, though in a
to term,
somewhat voluntary Law of Nations" (/).
stricter sense, the
"
Wolf afterwards says, that the voluntary law of nations
derives its force from the presumed consent of nations, the con-
ventional from their express consent, and the consuetudinary from
their tacit consent" (w).
(s) De Foro Legatorum, cap. xix. {t) Wollius^ Jus Gentium (1749),
§ 6. Pref. § 3.
(«) Wolfius, Prolog. § 25.
OP INTERNATIONAL LAW. 9
This presumed consent of nations to the voluntary law of nations

he derives from the fiction of a groat commonwealth of nations
('civitas gentium maxima') instituted by nature herself, and of
which all the nations of the world are members. As each separate
society of men is
governed by peculiar laws f reel}^ adopted by
its
itself, so is the general society of nations governed by its appro-
priate laws freely adopted by tlie several members, on their en-

tering the same. These laws he deduces from a modification of
the natural law, so as to adapt it to the peculiar nature of that
social union, which, according to him, makes it the duty of all
nations to submit to the rules by which that union is governed,

in the same manner as individuals are bound to submit to the
laws of the particular community of which they are members.
But he takes no pains to prove the existence of any such social
union or universal republic of nations, or to show when and how
all the human race became members of this union or citizens of
this republic.
Wolf differs from Grotius, as to the origin of the voluntary Biffereuces of
law of nations, in two particulars: between

1 Grotius considers it as a law of positive institution, and
^°|i^^ ^^
.
rests its obligation upon the general consent of nations, as evi- origin of the
denced in their practice. Wolf, on the other hand, considers it Lawof^^
as a law which nature has imposed upon all mankind as a necessary Nations.
consequence of their social union; and to which no one nation is at

liberty to refuse its assent .
2. Grotius confounds the voluntary law of nations with the
customary law of nations. Wolf maintains that it differs in this

respect, that the voluntary law of nations is of universal obligâ-
tion, whilst the customary law of nations merely prevails between
particular nations, among whom it has been established from long

usage and tacit consent.
from the work of Wolf that Vattel (x) has drawn the mate-
It is System of
^ ^'
rials of his treatiseon the law of nations. He, however, differs
from that publicist in the manner of establishing the foundations
of the voluntary law of nations. Wolf deduces the obligations
of this law, as we have already seen, from the fiction of a great
republic instituted by nature herself, and of which all the nations

of the world are members. According to him the voluntary law
of nations is, as it were, the civil la\v of that great republic. This
" ''
idea does not satisfy Vattel. I do not find," says he, the fic-
tion of such a republic either very just or sufficiently solid to
[x) On Vattel, see an Article (by J. E. G. de Montmorency) in Great Jurists of

the World (1913), pp. 4 77 w/.
10 DEFINITION AND S0UKCE8
deduce from it the rules of a universal law ot" nations, necessarily

admitted among sovereign States, I do not recognise any other
natural socioty between nations than that which nature lias estab-
lished between all men.
It is the essence of all civil society
('civitatis '), that each member thereof should have given up a
part of his rights to the body of the society, and that there should
exist a supreme authority capable of commanding all the members,
of giving to them law^s, and of punishing those who refuse to obey.
Nothing like this can be conceived or supposed to exist between

nations. Each sovereign State pretends to be, and in fact is,
independent of all others. Even according to Mr. Wolf, thoy
must all be considered as so many free individuals, who live to-
gether in a state of nature and acknowledge no other law tliau
that tof nature itself, and its Divine Author" (?/).
According to Vattel, the Law of Nations, in its origin, is

'
nothing but the law of nature applied to nations.'

Having laid down this axiom, he qualifies it in the same manner,
and almost in the identical terms of Wolf, by stating that the
nature of the subject to which it is applied being* different, the
laAV which regulates the conduct of individuals must necessarily
be modified in itsapplication to the collective societies of men
called nations or States. A
State is a very different subject
from a human individual, from whence it results that the obliga-
tions and rights, two cases, are very different. The same
in the
general rule, applied to two subjects, cannot produce the same

decisions when the subjects themselves differ. There are, con-
sequently, many cases in which the natural law does not furnish
the isame rule of decision between State and State as would be
applicable between individual and individual. It is the art of
accommodating this .application to the different nature of the
subjects in a just manner, according to right reason, which con-

stitutes the law of nations a particular science.
This application of the natural law, to regulate the conduct
of nations in their intercourse with each other, constitutes what
both Wolf and Vattel term the 'necessary law of nations.' It is
'necessary,' because nations are absolutely bound to observe it.
The precepts of the natural law are equally binding upon States
as upon individuals, since States are composed of men, and since
the natural law binds all men, in whatever relation .they may
stand to each other. This is the law which Grotius and hi3
'
followers call the internal law of nations,' as it is obligatory
{y) Vattel, Droit des Gens (1758), Preface.

OF IXTKJiNATJOXAL LAW. 11.
upon nations in point of conscience. Others term it the

'natural law of nations.' This law is immutable, as it consists
in the application to States of the natural law, which is itself
immutable, because founded on the nature of things, and especially
on the nature of man.
This law being immutable, and the law which it imposes neces-
sary and indispensable, nations can neither make any changes in
it by their conventions, dispense with it in their own conduct, nor
reciprocally release each other from the observance of it {z) .
Vattel has himself anticipated one objection to his doctrine

that States cannot change the necessary law of nations by their
conventions with each other. This objection is, that it would
be inconsistent with the liberty and independence of a nation to
alloAv to others the right of determining whether its conduct was
or was not conformable to the necessary law of nations. He
obviates the objection by a distinction which pronounces treaties
made in contravention of the necessary law of nations, to be in-
valid, according to the internal law, or that of conscience, at the
same time that thej^ may bo valid by the external laAv; States being
often obliged to acquiesce in such deviations from the former law
in cases where they do not affect their perfect rights (a) .
From this distinction of Vattel, floAvs what Wolf had denomi-

nated the voluntary law of nations, ('jus gentium voluntarium,')
to which term his disciple assents, although he differs from Wolf
as to the manner of establishing its obligation. He, however,
agrees with Wolf in considering the voluntary law of nations as a
positive law, derived from the presumed or tacit consent of nations
to consider each other as perfectly free, independent, and equal,
each being the judg'e of its own actions, and responsible to no
superior but the Suôreme Ruler of the universe.
Besides this voluntary law of nations, these writers enumerate Voluntary,
two other species
^
of international law. These arc: conventional, —
and customary
, ,
1. The conventional law of nations, resulting from compacts Jaw of

between particular States. As a treaty binds only the contract- "* ^*^^"''
ing parties, it is evident that the conventional law of nations is not
a universal, but a particular laAV .
2. The customary law resulting from usage

of nations,
between particular nations. This law
not universal, but bind- is
ing upon those States only which have given their tacit consent
to it.
Vattel concludes that these three species of international law,
(z) Droit des Gens, Prcliminaires, («) Droit des Gens, Preliminaires,
§§ vi. vii. viii. ix. ^ ix.
P-i DEFINITION AND SOURCES
the Noluntary, the conventional, and the customary, compose
together the positive law of nations. They proceed from the will
of nations; or (in the words of Wolf) "the voluntary, from their
presumed consent; the conventional, from their express consent;

and the customary, from their tacit consent" (b).
Jt almost superlluous to point out the confusion dn this
is
enumeration of the different species of international laAV, which

might easily have been avoided by reserving the expression
"voluntarj- law of nations," to designate the genus, including
all the rules introduced by
positive consent, for the regulation of
intoinational conduct, and divided into the two species of con-
ventional law and customary law, the former being introduced
by treaty, and the latter by usage; the former by express consent,
and the latter by tacit consent between nations (c).
%Hteiii of According most distinguished public
to Heffter (d), one of the
"
jurists of Germany in the nineteenth century, the law of nations
'jus gentium,' in its most ancient and most extensive accepta-

tion, as established by the Roman jurisprudence, is a law
('Recht') founded upon the general usage and tacit consent of

nations. This law is applied, not merely to regulate the mutual
relations of States, but also of individuals, so far as concerns
their respective rights having everywhere the same
and duties,
character and the same and the origin and peculiar form
effect,
of which are not derived from the positive institutions of any par-
ticular State." According to this writer, the 'jus gentium'
consists of two distinct branches:
1. Human rights in general, and those private relations which
Sovereign States recognise in respect to individuals not subject

to their authority.
2. The direct relations existing betwêen those States them-
selves.
In the modern Avorld, this latter branch has exclusively reeeived
'
the denomination of law of nations, Volkerrecht,' 'Droit des

Gens,' 'Jus Gentium.' It may more properly be called external
public law, to distinguish it from the internal public law of a
particular State. The first part of the ancient 'jus gentium'
has become confounded with the municipal law of each particu-
lar nation, without at the same time losing its original and essen-
tial character. This part of the science concerns, exclusively,
(6) Droit dcs Gens, Prcliminaires, (d) Das Europaischo Volkerrecht

§ xxvii.; Wolf, Prolog-. § xxv. der Gegenwarfc (first published in
(c) Vattel, Droit des Gens, ed. de 1844).
Pinheiro Forreira, torn. iii. j). 22.
OF INT1]RXATI0XAL LAW. 13
certain rights of men in general, and tlioso private relations whieh

are considered as being under the protection of nations. It liu>
'
been usually treated of under the denomination of private inter-

national law.'
This division of the subiect into public and private international Distinction
between
law is now very generally accepted. According to Sir E,obert public and
Phillimore. rights arising under the former class are called abso- P"vate mter-
iute, or rights stricti juris, "and their breach constitutes a casus
belli, and
justifies in the last resort a recourse to war/' Avhereae
private international law, or international comity, as it is some-
times called, confers no absolute rights. Its rules are founded
upon convenience, and intended to facilitate the intercourse

between the subjects of different States. "For a want of comity
towards the individual subjects of a foreign State, reciprocity
of treatment by the State whose subject has been injured, is,
after remonstrance has been exhausted, the only legitimate

''
remedy (e).
Heffter does not admit the term international law ('droit in-
ternational') introduced half a century before he wrote and gene-

rally adopted by contemporary writers. According to him this
term does not sufficiently express the idea of the 'jus gentium'
of the Roman jurisconsults. He considers the law of nations as
a law common to all mankind, and which no people can refuse to
acknowledge, and the protection of which may be claimed by all

men and by all States. He places the foundation of this law on
the incontestable principle that wherever there is a society, there
must be a law obligatory on all its members; and he thence deduces
the consequence that there must likewise be for the great society
of nations an analogous law.
"Law in general (' Eecht im AUgemeinen ')
is the external
freedom of the moral person. This law may be sanctioned and
guaranteed by a superior authority, or it may derive its force
'
from self -protection. The 'jus gentium is of the latter descrip-

tion. Anation associating itself with the general society of
nations, thereby recognises a law common to all nations by which
its international relations are to be regulated. It cannot violate
this law, without exposing
itself to the danger of incurring the
enmity and
of other nations, without exposing to hazard its own
existence. The motive which induces each particular nation to
observe this law depends upon its persuasion that other nations
will observe towards it the same law. The 'jus gentium' is
(e) Phillimore, Int. Law, vol. i.

§ xvi.
14 DEFINITION AND SOURCES
founded upon reciprocity of will. It has neither law-giver nor

supreme judge, since independent States acknowledge no superior
human authority. Its organ and regulator is public opinion:
its supreme tribunal is
history, which forms at once the rampart
of justice and the JSTemesis by whom injustice is avenged. Its
sanction, or the obligation of all men to respect it, results from
the moral order of the universe, which will not suffer nations and
individuals to be isolated from each other, but constantly tends
to unite the whole family of mankind in one great harmonious
society" (/).
There IS no
jg there a uniform law of nations? There certainly is not the
law of same one for all the nations and States of the world. The public
Tjatioiis.
law, with certain exceptions, has alwaj^s been, and still is, limited
to the civilized and Christian people of Europe or to those of
European origin. This distinction between the European law
of nations and that of the other races of mankind has long been
' '
remarked by the publicists. Grotius states that the

jus gentium
acquires its obligator}^ force from the positive consent of all
nations, or at least of several. "I say of several, for except the
natural law, Avhich is also called the 'jus gentium,' there is no
other law which is common to all nations. It often happens, too,
that what the law of nations in one part of the world
is isnotsa
in another, as we shall show in the proper place" (r/). So also
"
Bynkcrshoek, in the passage before cited, says that the law of
nations is that whicli is observed, in accordance witli tlie light of
reason, between nations, if not among all, at least certainly among

"
the greater part, and those the most civilized (/^) Leibnitz .
speaks of the voluntary law as established by the tacit consent of

nations. "Not," says he, "that it is necessarily the law of all
nations and of all times, Europeans and the Indians
since the
frequently differ from each other concerning the ideas which they
have formed of international law, and even among us it may be
changed by the lapse of time, of which there are numerous exam-
ples. The basis of international law is natural law, which has
"
been modified according to times and local circumstances (/).
"
Montesquieu, in his Esprit des Lois, says, that every nation has
a law of nations—even the Iroquois, who eat their prisoners, have
(/) Hefftor, Das Euroiiiiisehc Vol- 11,
korrocht, § 2. (.v) De Jur. Bol. ac Pac, lib. i.
The Jesuit Francisco

theologian, cap. 1, § xiv. 4.
Suarez, lias anticipatecl thisview of (A) Bynkei-shoek, De Foro Lega-
tho moral obligation of the pts gen- torum. Vid. supra.
Hum: Suarez, De Legibus et Deo (i) Leibnitz, Cod. Jur. Gent.
Logislatore (1612), lib. ii. cap. xix. diplom. Pref.
OF IXTERNATIOXAL LAW. 15
OHO. They send and receive ambassadors; they know the laws of
war and peace; the evil is, that their law of nations is not founded
upon true principles" (k).
There is then, according" to these writers, no universal law of
nations, such as Cicero describes in his treatise De Repuhlmt,
binding upon tlie whole human race which all mankind in all
—
ages and countries, ancient and modern, savage and civilized,
Christian and Pagan, have recognised in theory or in practice,
have professed to obey, or have in fact obeyed (/).
A
French writer has questioned the propriety of using the Jus and Lfx.
' '
term droit des gens (law of nations) as applicable to those rules

of conduct which obtain between independent societies of men.
Ho asserts '' that there can be no droit (right) where there is
' '
no 'loi' (law); and there is no law where there is no superior:

without law, obligations, properly so called, cannot exist; there
is only a moral obligation resulting from natural reason; such is
the cas(; between nation and nation. The word 'gens,' imitated
from the Latin, does not signify in the French language either
people or nation" (m).
The same writer has made
the subject of serious reproach Is inter-
it
to the English language thatapplies the term 'law' to that f^^wtrue

it
system of rules which governs, or ought to govern, the conduct 1^^?

of nations in their mutual intercourse. His argument is, that law
is a rule of conduct, deriving its obligation from sovereign
authority, and binding only on those persons who are subject to
that authority; —
that nations, being independent of each other,
acknowledge' no common sovereign from whom they can receive

the law; —
that all the relative duties between nations result from
right and wrong, from convention and usage, to neither of which

' '
can the term law be properly applied; that this system of rules —
had been called by the Eoman lawyers the 'jus gentium,' and
in all the languages of modern Europe, except the English lan-
guage, the 'right of nations,' or the laws of war and peace (w).
The eminent legal reformer, Jeremy Bentham, had previously
expressed the same doubt how^ far the rules of conduct which
obtain between nations can with strict propriety be called
'laws' (o). And one of his disciples has justly observed, that
(k) Esprit dos Lois, liv. i. ch. 3. Diritto delle genti (Italian). Diroito
(I)The Madonn-a Del Burso (1802), das Gentos (Portuguese). Volkerrecht
4 O. Rob. 172; The UuHUje Hone (German). Volkenregt (Dutch). Fol-
(1801), 3 C. Rob. 326. ^
keret (Danish). Folkratt (Swedish).
{ni) Rayneval, Institutions du droit Derocho des gentes (Spanish),
de la nature et des gens (1811), liv. I. (o) Bentham, Morals and Legisla-
noto 10, p. viii. tion, vol. ii. p. 258 (ed. 1823).
(;/) Droit des gens (French).
16 J)EFINITION AND SOLRCKS
laws, properly so called, are commands proceeding from a deter-

minate rational being, or a determinate body of rational beings,
to whicli isannexed an eventual evil as the sanction. Such is the
law of nature, more properly called the law of God, or the divine
law; and such are political human laws, prescribed by political
superiors to persons in a state of subjection to their authority.
But laws imposed by general opinion are styled laws 1)y an
analogical extension of the term. Such are the laws of honour
imposed hy opinions current in the fashionable world, and
enforced by appropriate sanction. Such, also, arc the laws which
regulate the conduct of independent political societies in their
mutual relations, and wdiicli are called the law of nations, or
international law. This law obtaining between nations is not
positive law^; for every positive law^ is prescribed by a given

superior or sovereign to a person or persons in a state of sub-
jection to its author. The rule concerning the conduct of
sovereign States, considered as related to each other, is termed law
by itsanalogy being imposed upon nations or
to positive law%
sovereigns, not by the positive command of a superior authority,

but by opinions generally current among nations. The duties
which, imposes are enforced by moral sanctions: by fear on the
it
part of nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking

general hostility, and incurring its probable evils, in case they
should violate maxims generally received and respected (/>) .
Though international law^ may not be regarded as positive law

in the strict Austinian sense, it is none the less laiv in a wider
sense, and possesses binding force. Here the distinction drawn
by Richard Hooker may be recalled. "They who are thus accus-
tomed to speak," he observes, "apply the name of law^ unto that
only rule of working which superior authority imposeth; wdiereas
we, somewhat more enlarging the sense thereof, term every kind
"
of rule or canon, w^hereby actions are framed, a law It
(g).
be that some time in the future machinery may be devised —may
for
example, an authoritative international tribunal, as well as inter-

—
national police to safeguard and enforce the provisions of inter-
national law, whicli wdll then assume more or less a positive
character, and will be supported by positive sanctions. As con-
ditions are at present, however, it may nevertheless be said that the
criterion of immediate enforceability by a determinate superior
is not an indispensable factor to every class of binding rules.
'
Moreover, international law is not to be identified with inter-
(p) Austin, Province of Jurispru- (q) Ecclesiastical Polity, Bk. I.

dence determined, pp. 147, 207. chap. iii. 1.
OJ^^ INTKRNATXONAL LAW. 17
national morality'; for whilst the former comprises rules that

must be observed by States because they have consented to be
bound by them, and because, if they do not observe them, the
relationships Ibetween the imembers of the family of States will
degenerate 'into chaos and confusion, international morality, on

the other hand, implies such principles and rules as nations ought
to observe in addition, so that the stricter legal relations may
23roceed not only smoothly, but amicably, honourably, and con-
scientiously. We may here recall the pronouncement of Lord
Russell of Killowen, who, criticising Lord Coleridge's view (r)
"
as being based on too narrow a definition of law, a definition
which relies too much on force as the governing idea," observed:
"
If the development of law is historically considered, it will be
found to exclude that body of customary law which in early stages
of society precedes law. As government becomes more frankly
democratic, laws bear less and less the character of commands
imposed by a coercive authority, and acquire more and more the
character of customary law founded on consent. ... I claim
that the aggregate of the rules to which nations have agreed to
conform in their conduct towards one another are properly to bo
designated 'International Law" {s).
This law governing the relationships between States has com-
' ' ' '
monly been jus gentium in the Latin, droit des gens

called the
in the French, and law of nations in the English language. It
'
was more accurately termed the jus inter gentes,' the law between
or among by the Spanish Dominican
nations, for the first time,
theologian and jurist, Franciscus a Victoria (^); and afterwards
the more appropriate character of this terminology was emphasised
by Richard Zouch, an English civilian and writer on the science,
distinguished the celebrated controversy between the civil and

;in
common lawyers during the reign of Charles II., as to the extent

of theAdmiralty jurisdiction. He employed
term as being this
more pointed and more accurate and object
to expres's the real scope
of this law (ii) An equivalent term in the French language was
.
subsequently j)roposed by the Chancellor D'Aguesseau, as better

adapted to express the idea properly annexed to that system of
(r) Expressed in The Franconia (11. (u) Zoueli, Juris et judicii fecialis,
V. Ketjn) (1876), 2 Ex. D. 63. sive Juris inter gentes. (Oxford,
(«) Address at Saratoga Springs, 1650.) See the Article on Zouch by
N. Y., 1896; Law Quarterly Review, C. Phillipson in Great Jurists of the
Oct. 1896. World, pp. 220 At p. 224 this
(0 —
(1480 1546).Relectiones theo-
seq.
"terminological innovation" is re-
logicffi (Lyons, 1557). For an Article f erred to; but it was not meant to
on him by C. Phillipson, see Journal convey that Zouch was the first in-
of Comparative Legislation, July, 1915. ventor of the phrase.
w. 2
18 DElflXITlON^ AND SOUliCES
'
jurisprudence eommonlj le droit des gens,' but which,

called
according to him, ought properly to be termed 'le droit entre les

gens' ('i;). The term Vinternational' law was afterwards (1789)
proposed by Bentham as well adapted to express in our language,
"in ,a more significant manner that branch of jurisprudence,
'
which commonly goes under the name of law of nations,' a de-

nomination so uncharacteristic, that were it not for the force of
custom, it would rather seem to refer to internal or municipal
jurisprudence" (i^;). The terms 'international law' and 'droit
international' have now taken root in the English and French
languages, and are constantly used in all discussions connected

with the science. The expression 'law of nations' is still used
by writers and publicists, not to indicate any distinction, but to
refer to th e identical body of law .
Opinion of According to
Savigny, "there may exist betwêen different
nations the same community of ideas which contributes to form
the positive unwritten law ('das positive liecht') of a particular
nation. This community of ideas, founded upon a common origin
and religious faith, constitutes international law as we see it
existing' among the Christian States of Europe, a law which was

not unknown to the people of antiquity, and which wê find among
tlio llomans under the name of jus feciale. International law
may therefore be considered as a positive law, but as an imperfect
positive law, ('eine unvollendeteRechtsbildung,') both on account
of the indeterminateness of its precepts, and because it lacks that
solid ibasison which rests the positive law of every particular
nation, the political power of the State and a judicial authority
competent to enforce the law. The progress ;of civilization,
founded on Christianity, has gradually conducted us to observe a
law analogous to this in our intercourse with all the nations of
the globe, Avhatever may be their religious faith, and without
reciprocity on their part" (x).
It may be remarked, in confirmation of this view, that the
more recent intercourse between the Christian nations of Europe
and America and the Mohammedan and Pagan nations of ^Vsia
and Africa indicates a disposition, on the part of the latter, to
renounce their peculiar international usages and adopt those of
Christendom. The rights of legation have been recognised by,
and i-eciprocally extended to, non-Christian States. The inde-
(v) CEuvrcs de D'Agucsseau, tome ii. (x) Savigny, System des heutigen
p. 337 (ed. 1773). romischen Reehts, Band I., Buch 1,
(if) Bentham, Principles of Morals Kap. ii. § 11.
and Legislation, vol. ii. p. 253.
OF IXTEIIXATIOXAL LAW. 19
pendenco ,aiitl integrity of the Ottoman Empire have been long

regarded as forming European balance of
essential elements in the
power, and, as such, became the objects of conventional stipulations

between the Christian States of Europe and that Empire; thus
by the Treaty was brought within the pale of
of Paris, 1856, it
the public laAv and system of Europe (y).

The same remark may be applied to the diplomatic transactions
between the Chinese Empire and the Christian nations of Europe
and America, in which the former has been compelled to abandon
its inveterate anti-commercial and anti-social principles, to
acknowledge the independence and equality of other nations in the

mutual intercourse of war and peace, and to recognise the funda-
mental principles of international law.
Qlhc gradual process by which the Chinese Empire has been Intornatioual
" "^'^'
brought to acknowledge the independence and equality of other christian
nations" dates from the mission of Lord Macartney to Pekin in nations.
1792, occasioned by a long series of acts of oppression perpetrated

by the Chinese on the merchants of the East India Company
trading at Canton. A
second mission under Lord Amherst in
1816 failed to reach the Emperor owing to the refusal of the
British Ambassador to perform the kow-tow. In 1834 the
Britisli Government sent out a resident minister to Canton to
superintend the foreign trade thrown open by the lapse of the
East India Company's monopoly. The war of 1840, forced upon
<^reat Britain by a persistent policy of outrage to hor subjects,
resulted in four treaty ports besides Canton being opened to
-commerce. But it was not until the ratification in 1860 of the
Treaty of Tientsin of 1858, following upon the capture of Pekin
hy the English and French troops, that regular diplomatic inter-
•courscwas established between China and the foreign Powers.
By this instrument the Emperor of China agreed to the residence
in his capital of a representative of the Queen of England with a
proper establishment and freedom from the obligation to perform
aaiy ceremony derogatory to his position; provision was made for
the establishment of a European consular service, and for the
residence of a Chinese minister at the Court of St. James. A
similar treaty was concluded with France, and in course of time
witli the United Slates, with tlic other European nations, and
with Japan.
(^) Cf. Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, p. 533; Holland, European Concert
in the Eastern Question (Oxford, 1885), p. 245.
3(2)
20 DEFlNlTiON AND SOUliOES
Of tlie ability and capacity of China to form binding inter-

national engagements there can be no doubt, but how far she hus
even now entered within the pale of public law is another matter.
She lacks certain attributes essential to regular ;and complete
membership of the family of States, governed by, and enjoying
the privileges of, the system of general international law. All
jurisdiction civil and criminal over foreigners within the bounds
of the Chinese Empire is carefully resented to tribunals of their
own nationality, andvthe refusal or inability of China to adopt
the rules of war prescribed by the rules of civilized' States for
some time formed a grave if not an insuperable bar to her full
recognition as a subject of international law.>Un the words of
Professor Holland: "The Chinese have adopted only the rudi-
mentary and inevitable conceptions of international law. They
have shown themselves to be well versed in the ceremonial of
embassy and the conduct of diplomacy To a
.
respect for the
laws ;of war they have not yet attained. 'JS It is true that China
was invited by the Czar to send representatives to the Hague Con-
ference of 1899, and that she is a party to the Convention for
securing the pacific regulation of international disputes and to
some of the subsidiary conventions, including that for the applica-
tion to maritime warfare of the principles of the Convention of
Geneva . But the gross contempt for the comity of nations shown
by the assault on the Pekin Legations in the following year, and
the murder of the German Minister and the Chancellor of the
Japanese Legation, went far towards depriving her of what credit

and status she had acquired. However, considering her rapid
development of late, her increasing relationships with the West,
her efforts to regularise her government, and to fall in line with
the conceptions of international intercourse entertained by the
civilizedcommunities oi the world, it may be said that, not-
withstanding certain restrictions imposed upon her, she is now a
member of the international circle. In 1907, too, China despatched
representatives to the second Hague Conference.
Japan, prior to 1854, had succeeded in maintaining absolute
political isolation as regards non- Asiatic powers. In that year
Commodore Perry on behalf of the United States, and subse-
quently Admiral Stirling on behalf of Great Britain, concluded

conventions for regulating the admission of ships bearing their
respective flags into certain ports of the Empire of Japan. In
1858, a treaty of "peace, friendship and commerce" was concluded
between Great Britain and Japan, and in the same year the con-
sular jurisdiction over British subjects trading or residing in
OF IXTERXATIOXAL LAW. 21
the latter country was established. Similar treaties were con-

cluded with the United States, with France and with Holland.
Since the Revolution of 1868 the Powers owning the obligations
of international law have, without exception, entered into dijDlo-
matic relations with Japan. In 1886 Japan notified her adherence
to the Geneva Convention. In 1894, after prolonged negotiations,
the European and American Governments agreed, largely on the
initiative of Great Britain, to the abolition at the expiration of
fiveyears of the consular jurisdictions, and since 1899 all persons
of whatever nationality within the confines of Japan have been
subject to the Japanese tribunals; as a return for this all limita-

tions imposed upon foreigners in respect to trade, travel and
residence, have been removed. In the latter year Japan was

invited to the Conference, and her representatives signed
Hague
the various conventions there adopted. In the Chinese war of
1894, with the grave exception of the Port Arthur massacre,
Japan had striven scrujjulously to comply with the highest civi-
lized standards. Her soldiers were equally conspicuous for
efiiciency and humanity during the military operations which
followed the Boxer rising in 1900. To her prompt despatch of a
division of 21,000 splendidly equipped troops, the relief of the
Legations may be largely attributed. In 1902 an offensive and

defensive treaty of alliance was concluded between Great Britain
and J apan {z) .
In the Ilusso-Japancse war, 1904, Japan showed herself not

only fully conversant with the rules of international law, but
disposed throughout to apply them in a conscientious and en-
lightened manner (a). In 1907 she sent delegates to the second
Hague Conference, and indeed was acknowledged as the eighth
Great Power in the World Concert, inasmuch as she received the
right of a summons for her chosen judge to participate in the
judicial functions of the International Prize Court (6). Again,
in 1909, she took part in the London Naval Conference. Thus,
we may say that Japan now occupies a position in the community
of States and in relation to international law^ equally with the
leading Powers of the West.
(c) See Hall, International Law japonaise au point de vuc dc droit

(5th ed.), pp. 41-2; Holland, Studies int<)rnational (Paris, 1907); S. Taka-
in International Iâw, p. 112; Herts- haslii, International Law applied to
let, Commercial Treaties, ix. p. 977, the Russo-Japanese War (London,
X. pp. 468, 1075; Wharton, Digest of 1906).
International Law, §§ 67, 68, 141a, (6) E. A. Whittuck, International
144, 158. Document (London, 1908).
{a) Cf. N. xVriga, La guerre russo-
Definition of
"international law, as understood among civilized nations, may
intcTuational
law. bo defined, from one point of view, as consisting of those rules of
conduct which reason deduces, as consonant to justice, from the
nature of the society existing among independent nations, sub-
ject to such definitions and modifications as may be established
b}' general consent (c)..>'In 1896 Lord llussell of Killowen (the
Lord Cliief Justice of England) gave this simple definition: the
rules accepted by civilized States as determining their conduct
towards each other; and as such it has been adopted judicially (d).
A distinction is sometimes drawn between the customary, un-
written, or 'common law' of nations, based on long-established
usages and customs, and the written or conventional laAV, based on
express international declarations, treaties, and conventions.
Sources and The various sources and evidences of international law in these
evidences of
international different branches are the following: —
law.
1, Text writers of authority, showing what is the approved
Writings of
jurists. usage of nations, or the general opinion respecting their mutual
conduct, with the definitions and modifications introduced hy
general consent.
Without wishing to exaggerate the importance of these writers,
or to substitute, in any case, their authority for the principles of
reason, it may be affirmed that they are generally impartial in
their judgment. They are witnesses of the sentiments and usages
of civilized nations, and the weight of their testimony increases
every time tliat their authority is invoked by statesmen, and every
year passes without the rules laid down in their worlds being
tliat
iinpugned by the avowal of contrary ]3rinciples.

The authority Jurists accustomed to the Common ,Law of England and
of text-
writers. America, where judicial decisions form a binding precedent, and
are authoritative expositions of the law, are, as a rule, inclined
towards resting international law on practice and precedent, and
prefer to rely upon the decision of a court or the act of a govern-
ment, rather than upon theory or the dicta of text-writers, however
unanimous or eminent the writers may be. On the other hand,
in France and other countries where the whole law is contained
in a code, and where the decisions of the courts only settle the
matter in dispute between the parties, and form no binding prece-
dent, place very great reliance on the theoretical
jurists
speculations of text-writers, and frequently consider the rules they
(c) Madison, Examination of the (d) West Rand Central G old Mining
British Doctrine which subjects to Co. V. Rex, (1905) 2 K. B. 407. Cf.
Capture a Neutral Trade not open in R. V. Keyn (The Franconia) (1876),
Time of Peace (London ed. 1806), 2 Ex. D. at 154.
p. 41.
or INTEllNATIONAL LAW . 23i
lay down as the highest authority. It is not too' much to say,

that the influence of speculative writers in England is compara-
tively small. In the days of Grotius, when his own works, and a
few other treatises, were almost the only source from which any-
thing on the subject could be derived, text-writers had the greatest

reverence paid to their opinions But now that precedents are to
.
be found upon so many points, a text-writer who ignores them,

and appeals to theory or to other text-writers instead of to facts,
must not expect to receive any great attention in this country.
"
Writers on international law," says Lord Chief Justice Cockburn,
"
howevei' valuable their labours may be in elucidating and ascer-
taining the principles and rules of law, cannot make the law. <To
bo binding, the law must have received the assent of the nations
who arc to be bound by it. This assent may be express, as by
treaty or the acknowledged concurrence of governments, or may
be implied from established usage"
(e).y'
On the other hand, it has been pointed out that "the founders
of international law, though they did not create a sanction, created
a law-abiding sentiment. They diffused among sovereigns, and
the literate classes in communities, a strong repugnance to the
neglect (Or breach of certain rules regulating the relations 'and

actions of States" (/). And it is very doubtful if the judgments
of Sir Alexander Cockburn, and those who agreed Avith him in
the FranconmCase, can be taken as correctly representing the
law of England; for the opinion of the minority in that case has
been since not only enacted, but declared by Parliament to have
been always the law {g) \In America also, at any rate, inter-
. A.- ,
national law is regarded as founded upon natural reason and

justice, . the opinions of writers lof known wisdom, and the
'
practice of civilized nations, and is to be respected as part of the

"
law of the land (/^)y In cases where the principal jurists agree,
the presumption Avill be very great in favour of the solidity of
their maxims; and no civilized nation that does not arrogantly
set allordinary law and justice at defiance, will venture to dis-
regard the uniform sense of the established writers on international
law" {i). In The Paquete Habana, Mr. Justice Gray remarked
that the works of jurists "are resorted to by judicial tribunals,
not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law
(e) 2i. V. Ket/n {The Vranconict) 273, 281, per Lord Coleridge, L. C. J.
(1876), 2 Ex. D. 202. Of. West Hand {Ji) Wharton, Digest, § 8. See also
Central Gold MinirKj Co. v. Rex, Ileffter, ed. 1883, note by Geffcken,
(1905) 2 K. B. 391,' 401-2, 407, per § 2, p. 3.
Lord Alverstone, L. C. J. (*) J. Kent, Commentary on Inter-
->(/) Maine. International Law, p. 51. national Law (1878), p. 19.
iff) R. V. D>fdle>/ (1884), 14 Q. 15. I). .
ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really
is'' (k). With regard to private international law, the works of
writers like Savigny in Germany, Story in the United States, and
Westlake in England, have done much to establish a systemutie
branch of jurisprudence.
2. Treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce declaring, modi-
fying, or defining the pre-existing international law.

What has been called the positive or practical law of nations
may also be inferred from treaties; for though one or two treaties,
varying from the general usage and custom of nations, cannot
alter the international law, yet an almost perpetual succession of
go very far towards

treaties, establishing a particular rule, will
proving what that law on a disputed point. Some of the most

is
important modifications and improvements in the modern law of

nations have thus originated in treaties (/).
" "
Treaties," says Madison, may be considered under several
relations to the law^ of nations, according to the several questions to
be decided by them. They may be considered as simply repeating
or affirming the general law; they may be considered as making'
exceptions to the general law^, which are to be a particular law

between the parties themselves; they may be considered exjDlana-
tory of the law of nations on jôints where its meaning is other-,
wise obscure or unsettled, in which they are, first, a law between
the parties themselves, and next, a sanction to the general law,
according to the reasonableness of the explanation, and the number

and character of the parties to it; lastly, treaties may be considered
a voluntary or positive law of nations" (m).
Examples of treaties, which simply declare or emphasize the
existence of certain rules, principles, or usages, are found in those
of the Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800 (?^) (though some
of the rules contained therein Avere incompatible with what was
considered by some to be established practice, followed by Great
Britain). In the Treaty of Washington, 1871, the three rules
laid down as a guide to the Court of Arbitration in considering
the Alabama claims were maintained by the United States to be
merely declaratory previously existing law; the British

of
Government, on the contrary, denied this contention, but in order
that an amicable settlement might be reached, agreed to submit to
(A) The Paquete Ilabana (1899), {m^ Madison, Examination of the

175 U. S. Eep. €77, 700. Cf. also British Doctrine, &e., p. 39.
Hilton V. Gwjot (1894), 159 U. S. (n) Cf. G. F. de Martens, Reeucil
—
Rep. 113, 163 4, 214 5.
— dcs principaux traites, vol. i. pp. 193,
(0 Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. 194; vol. ii.
pp. 215—219.
lib. i.
cap. 10.
tlio rules as though they had already been established. However,

the contracting Powers engaged to accept the rules for the future
as between themselves, and to bring them to the notice of other
maritime Powers, with a view that they might also signify their
adherence to them. But this was not done, owing to disagree-
ments as to the interpretation of certain clauses, and to the
discovery that some of the leading States Avere not disposed to
accept the rules (o) Ilecent remarkable examples of treaties and
.
conventions that express in a written form already existing

customs and usages are furnished by several of the Conventions
of the Hague Conferences, 1899 and 1907, and by the Declaration
of London, 1909.
Examples of treaties laying down a voluntary or jôsitive law
of are those entered into at the International Congresses;
nation.*-:
or Conferences, where new rules are established; thus, at the
Hague Conferences and at the London Naval Conference, 1909,

many- new provisions Avere arrived at. Similar to these Con-
ventions are the Declaration of Paris, 1856, Declaration of St.
Petersburg, 1868, and the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906.

Again, there is another class of treaties, less general in scope
and applicable only two or three States that are the parties
to the
signatory thereto. Thus certain new^ rules may be laid down and
as sucli are to be observed only in the relationships between thej
parties in question. An examj^le is Franklin's Treaty of 1785

betweeji the United States and Prussia, stipulating exemption
from capture of private enemy property at sea.
Oidinances of particular States prescribing rules for the
3. Ordinances,
conduct of their commissioned cruisers and prize tribunals; also

proclamations, decrees, and instructions issued to the various
departments of government or to the people at large.
The marine ordinances of a State may be regarded not only as
historical evidenoes of its practice with regard to the rights of
maritime war, but showing the views of its jurists with
also as
respect to the rules generally recognized as conformable to the

universal law of nations. The usage of nations, which constitutes
the law^ of nations, has not yet established an impartial tribunal
for determining the validity of maritime captures. Each belli-
gerent State refers the jurisdiction over such cases to the courts
of admiralty established under its own authority within its own
territory,with a final resort to a supreme appellate tribunal, under

the direct control of the executive government. The rule by
(o) C'f. J. B. Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations,

&c. (Washington, 1898), vol. i.
pp. 666—670.
which the prize courts thus constituted are bound to proceed in

adjudicating such cases, is not the municipal law of their own
country, but the general law of nations, and the particular
treaties by which their own country is bound to other States. They
may be left to gather the general law of nations from" its ordinary
sources in the authority of institutional writers; or they may be
furnished with a positive rule by their own sovereign, in the form
of ordinances, framed according to what their compilers under-
stood to be the just principles of international law.
The theory of these ordinances is well explained by Sir William
Grant: "When Louis XIV. published his famous Ordinance of
1681, nobody thought that he was undertaking to legislate for
Europe, merely because he collected together and reduced into the
shape of an ordinance the principles of marine law as then under-
stood and received in France. I say as understood in France, for
although the law of nations ought to be the same in every country,

yet as the tribunals which administer the law are wholly indepen-
dent of each other, it is impossible that some differences shall not
take place in the manner of interpreting and administering it in
the different countries which acknowledge its authority. What-
ever may have been since attempted, it was not, at the period now
referi'ed to, supposed that one State could make or alter the law
of nations, but it was judged convenient to establish certain
princii3les of decision, partly for the purpose of giving a uniform
rule to their own and partly for the purpose of apprising
courts,
neutrals what that rule was."The French courts have well and
properly understood the effect of the ordinances of Louis XIV.
They have not taken them as positive rules binding upon neutrals;
but they refer to them as establishing legitimate presumptions,
from which they are warranted to draw the conclusion, which it
is necessary for them to arrive at, before they are entitled to pro-
nounce a sentence of condemnation (p) .
Marine ordi- The i^rinciples laid down in marine ordinances must not be
nauces not "
necessarily assumed have necessarily a universal application.
to They fur-
universal.
nish, however," says SirR. Phillimore, "decisive evidence against
any State which afterwards departs from the principles Avhich it
has thus deliberately invoked; and in every case thus clearly
{p) Kindersley v. Chase (1801), re- Mansfield, have borrowed very freely,
ported from the MS. in Marshall, and which is often cited by Sir W,
Insurance, vol. i. 425. The commen- Scott (Lord Stowell) in his judgments
tary of Yalin upon the marine ordi- in the High Court of Admiralty.
nance of Louis XIV., published in Valin also published, in 1763, a sejia-
1760, contains a most valuable body of rate Traite des Prises, which contains
maritime law, from which the Eno^lish a complete collection of the French
writers and judges, especially Lord prize ordinances down to that period.
^
recognize the fact that a system of hiw exists, which ouglit to

regulate and control the international relations of every
State" (q). But since these ordinances are ex lyarte instruments,
they ought not to be enforced if at variance with the established'
usago of nations, for no State has the right of laying- down rules
which shall bind other States that have not consented to
them(ri).
Courts of Admiralty are really municipal courts that pro- Com-tsof
""'^^ ^*
nounce judgments in conformity with the law of nations (s). It
is the duty of the judge presiding in such courts "not to deliver
occasional and shifting opinions to servo present purposes of par-

ticular national interest, but to administer with indifference that
justice which the law of nations holds out, without distinction,
to independent States, some happening to be neutral and some
belligerent" (t). Where, howêver, the judge is confronted Avith

orders, decrees, or regulations made by the sovereign autliority
of his State for the purpose of modifying the existing rules of
international law, he is bound to obey them and give his deci-^
sion accordingly. The records of the English and American
Courts of Admiralty are peculiarly valuable, from their contain-
ing the judgments of such eminent men as Lord Stowell and
Dr. Lushington, Kent, Story, and Chief Justice Marshall. The
judgments pronounced by Sir Samuel Evans, the judge of the
British Prize Court, in the great European War, 1914-19b5,
constitute worthy additions to these judicial records.
Is international law necessarily part of the law of England? lutemational

From the time of Blackstone {u), for about a century, it was
mmiicipal
consistently held in judicial decisions that the law of nations con- law.
law of the land {x)
stituted part of the In 1876 this view Avas to
.
some extent weakened by a decision of the majority of the Court

(seven judges out of thirteen) in Reg.v. Ke^/n (The Franconia) .
But in 1905 the old doctrine was re-asserted by Lord Alverstone,
{q) Phillimore, Commentaries upon U. S. 24; The Gaetano and Maria

International Law, vol. i. § 57. (1882), 7 P. D. 137, 143.
(/•) Wolf V. OxJiolm (1817), 6 M. («) Commentaries (4th ed. 1765),
.^ 8. 92
;
The Nereicle (1815), 9 Cranch, iv. €7.
388; The Zollverein (1856), 2 Jur. {x) Triquet \. Bath {11M),Z 'Rxxvr.
N. S. 429; S. C, Swa. 96; Cope v. 1478; Heathfield v. Chilton (1767), 4
Boherty (1858), 4 K. & J. 390. Burr. 2015; The Maria (1799), 1 C.
is) Cf. The Recovery (1807), 6 C. Eob. 350; The Recovery (1807), 6 C.
Rob. 348. Rob. 348; IVolff v. Ox'holm (1817), 6
{t) Per Lord Stowell, in The Maria M. & S. 92; Emperor of Austria v.
(1799), 1 C. Rob. 350. Cf. Calvo, Bay and Kossuth (1861), 2 Giff. 623,
Droit International, vol. i. p. 111. 678.
But see The Scotland (1881), 105
^S DEFINITION AND SOURCES
"
who It is quite true that whatever has received the common
said:
consent of civilized nations must have received the assent of our
country, and that to which we have assented along Avith other
nations in general may properly be called international law, and
as such will be acknowledged and aj^plied by our municipal
tribunals when legitimate occasion arises for those tribunals to
decide questions to which doctrines of international law may be
relevant. But any doctrine so invoked must be one really accepted
as binding between nations, and the international law sought to be
applied must, like anything else, be proved by satisfactory evi-

dence, which must show either that the particular proposition has
been recognized and acted upon by our own country, or that it is
of such a nature and has been so widely and generally accepted
that can hardly be supposed that any civilized State would
it
repudiate it. The mere opinions of jurists, however eminent or

learned, that it ought to be so recognized, are not in themseh os
sufficient. They must have received the express sanction of inter-
national agreement, or gradually have grown to be a part of
international law by their frequent j^ractieal recognition in dealings
between various nations" {y).
The same view has uniformly been held in the United vStates.
Thus Chief Justice Marshall laid down that an Act of Congress
should never be construed contrary to international law, if any
otlier possible construction is available (2;), and that international

law^ is part of tlie law of the land (a). Similarly, half a century
later it was declared that maritime law cannot be changed by any
single nation, as it is of universal obligation and rests upon the
common consent of civilized countries (h). In a later and much
more important case, the Supreme Court of the United States
observed in the course of its judgment: ''International law is a
part of our law, and must be ascertained and admitted by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction. For this pur-
. . .
pose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or

legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
custom and usages of civilized nations. ."(c).
. .
(y) West Rand Central Gold Mining Crancli, 64, 118.

Co. V. Rex, (1905) 2 K. B. 391. For («) The Nereide (1815), 9 Crauch^
an Article by the late Prof. Westlake 383, 423.
on this question, in reference to the (6) The Hcotia (1871), 14 Wall,
latter case, see Law Quarterly Review, 170, 187.
vol. xxii. (1906), pp. 14—26; re- (c) The Paquete llahana (1899),
printed in his Collected Papers (1914), 175 U. S. Rep. 677; per Justice Grav,
pp. 498 seq. p. 700.
{z) The Channing Betsey (1804), 2
4. The adjudications of international or qtiasi-internntioiial

Decisions of
tribunals, such as boards of arbitration, international commissions

of inquiry, and courts of prize.
Greater weight justly a.ttributablc to the judgments of mixed
is
tribunals, appointed by the joint consent of the two nations

between >vhom they are to decide, than to those of Admiralty
courts established by and dependent on the instructions of one
nation only. Notable examples of such adjudications and deci-
sions are seen in the settlement of the Alabama claims in 1872,
the decision of Marshal MacMahon in the Delagoa Bay arbitra-
tion (187o) relating to the dispute between Great Britain and
Portugal, the decisions of the West African Conference, 1884-5,

in the investigation of the North Sea incident in 1906 by tha
North Sea International Commission of Inquiry, and in the
various judgments pronounced by the Hague Court established
in 1899. The twelfth Convention of the Hague Conference, 1907,
pro\ ided for the creation of an International Prize Court, intended

to serve as an appellate tribunal from the judgments delivered in
national Prize Courts. If this project should ever be realised,
the society of nations will, obviously, possess a court, which will
become an important source of international law.
0. Another depository of international law is to be found in Official legal
State papers and diplomatic correspondence representing the views

of ministers and statesmen, as wxll as in the written opinions of
official jurists that are given confidentially to their own Govern-
ments. Only a small portion of the controversies which arise

between States become public. Before one State requires redress
from another, for injuries sustained by itself, or its subjects, it
generally acts as an individual would do in a similar situation.

It consults its legal advisers —
for example, the law officers of the
Crown in Great Britain, the Attorneys-General in the United
States —and is guided by their opinion as to the law of the case.
Where that opinion has been adverse to the sovereign client, and
has been acted on, and the State which submitted to be bound by
it was more powerful than its opponent in the dispute, we may
confidently assume that the law of nations, such as it was then

supposed to be, has been correctly laid down. The archives of
the department of foreign affairs of every country contain a
collection of such documents, the publication of which would form
a valuable addition to the existing materials of international law.
An excellent instance of such publication is J. B. Moore's Digest
of International Law (d), which presents in a well-organized

manner a rich harvest of documents contained in the archives of
the American State Department.
The written opinions delivered hy Sir Lcoline Jenkins, Judge

of the High Court of Admiraltj^ in the reign of Charles II., in
answer to questions submitted to him by the King or by the
Privy Council, relating to prize causes, were regarded as possessing
great authority (e). They form a rich collection of precedents in
tlio maritime law of nations, the value of which is enhanced by the
circumstance that the greater part of these opinions were given
when England was and was consequently interested in
neutral,
maintaining the right of neutral commerce and navigation. The
decisions they contain are dictated by a spirit of impartiality and
equity, which does the more honour to their author as they wen-
addi'cssed to a monarch who gave but little encouragement to those
virtues, and as Jenkins himself was too much of a cour;tier to

practise them, except in his judicial capacity (/). The opinions
of American Attorneys-General are published. There has also
been published a collection of some of the opinions of English law
officers given at various times {g) Some of these relate to inter-
.
national law.
"Amongst the most interesting legal products of our day,"

"
says Sir Henry Maine, are the manuals of the usages of war
wliicli a great number of civilized States are now^ issuing to their
officers in the field perhaps the most singular feature of
. . .
the manuals is the number of rules adopted in them, which have

been literally borrowed from the De Jure Belli et Pads'' (h).
Tho manuals was issued for the use of its army
earliest of these
by the United States Government towards the close of the war of

Secession, and it has largely served as a model for its successors.
A manual for the use of the British Army was said to have been
drawn up by Lord Thring. In 1899 the signatories of the Hague
Convention on the laws and customs of war undertook to make the
])rovision? of that instrument part of the instructions furnished
by them to their land forces. In the case of Great Britain these
laws and customs have been, together with illustrations and inter-
(d) 8 vols. (Washington, 1906). cd. 1806).

O) Reprinted in Wynne's Life o£ (g) W, Forsyth, Cases and Opinions
that eminent civilian, 2 vols. fol. on Constitutional Law (1869).
(London, 1724), (A) International Law, pp. 27, 130,
(/) Madison, Examination of the 168.
British Doctrine, &c., p. 113 (London
OF INTERXATIONAL LAW. 31
pretations, embodied in ollicial manuals of land warfare (i). The

German official manual, KriegshraitcJi im Landkriege, issued in
1902, has been in several quarters subjected to much criticism,
because it puts a stern construction on many of the Hague rules,
and incorporates doctrines that are inconsistent with theêry spirit
and intention of those rules.
6. The history of the wars, negotiations, treaties of peace, and Records of

other transactions relating to the public intercourse of nations, transactions.
may conclude this enumeration of the sources of international law.

( The one in force at present was drawn up by Col. Edmonds and Professor
Oppenheim. 1 :
62 NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES.
CHAPTER II.
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES.
Subjects of Q'he peculiar subjects of international law are Nations, and

international
law. those political societies of men called States.
Definition of Cicero, and, after him, the modern public jurists, define a State
a State.
to be a body politic, or society of men, united together for the
purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by their
combined strength («).
This definition cannot be admitted as entirely accurate and com-
plete, unless it be understood with the following limitations:
—
1. It must be considered as excluding corporations, public or
private, created by itself, under whose authority they

the State
exist, whatever
may be the purposes for which the individuals
composing such bodies politic may be associated.
Thus the great association of British merchants that had been
incorporated, first, by the Crown, and afterwards by Parliament,

for the purpose of carrying on trade with the East Indies, could not
bo considered as a State, even whilst it exercised the sovereign
powers of war and peace in that quarter of the globe without the
direct control of the Crown, and still less could it be so considered
since it was subjected to that control. Those powers were exer-
cisedby Company in subordination to the supreme
the East India
power of the British Empire, the external sovereignty of which

was represented by the company towards the native princes and
people, whilst the British Government itself represented the com-
pany towards other foreign sovereigns and States (&).
(a) Cic,
De Eep. i. 25. Cf. his Chapters on the Principles of Inter-
Philipp. iv. 5, 6. Grotius, De Jur, national Law, chap. x. ;
in Collected
Bel. ac Pac., lib. i.
cap. i. § xiv. 2. Papers (1914), pp. 194 seq. Among
Vattel, Prelim. § 1, 1, ch. 1,
et liv. existing bodies which hold a position
§ 1. Burlamaqui, Droit naturel, torn, in some measure analogous to that
ii. part 1, ch. 4. Heffter, liv. 1, § 16. formerly held by the East India Com-
Texas v. White (186«), 7 Wallace, 720. pany may bo mentioned the North
(b) See The Secretary/ of State for Borneo Company, incorporated by
Imlia Sahaba (1859), 13 Moo. P. 0.
V. Eoyal Charter 1881; the British East
22. The company's powers and autho- Africa Company, 1888; the New
rity were largely curtailed in 1834, Guinea Company of Berlin, 1885; and
and finally abolished in 1859. For the German East Africa Company,
the relation of the Empire of India 1888.
to International Law, &ee Westlake,
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES. 33
2. Nor can the denomination of a State be properly applied to
voluntary associations of robbers or pirates, the outlaws of other

societies, although they may be united together for the purpose
of promoting their own mutual safety and advantage (c).
3. A State is also distinguishable from an unsettled horde of
wandering savages not yet formed into a civil society. The legal
idea of a State necessarily implies that of the habitual obedience
of its members to those persons in whom the superiority is vested,
and of a fixed abode, and definite territory belonging to the people
by whom it is occupied. The number of inhabitants occupying

sucli definite territorymust, in order to enjoy sovereignty and
international personality, be sufficiently large. What is the mini-
mum number, or the maximum number, oamiot, of course, be
stated. Thus, these essential attributes are inherent in the British
Empire with its population of over 400,000,000 and its area of
1 1 ,500,000
square miles, and also in as small a State as Monaco
with a population of about 20,000 and an area of eight square
miles. As to whether sovereignty is an indispensable requisite of
a State there is a difference of opinion among jurists and
publicists.
4. A is also distinguishable from a Nation, since the
vStatG
former may be composed of different races of men, all subject to

tlie same supreme authority. Thus the Austro-Hungarian,
German, and Ottoman Empires, are each composed of a variety
of nations and people. So, also, the same nation or people may
be subject to several States, as is the case with the Poles, subject
to the dominion of Austria, Germany, and Russia, respectively.
The Jews and the Gipsies are undoubtedly nations, but they Nations and
cannot bo said to form States. The idea of a nation implies

community of race, which is generally shown by community of
language, manners, and customs {d). A State, on the other hand,
implies the union of a number of individuals in a fixed territory,
and under one central authority. Austria-Hungary is a State,
but as Prince Gortchakoff once sarcastically remarked, "it is a
government, and not a nation."
* * " nee ccetus doubt united for their own mutual

(e) piratarum aut
latronum civitas est, etiam si forte safety and advantage, but they did
aequalitatem quandam inter se servent, not form States. The Serhassan
sine qua nullus ccetus posset consis- Pirates, 2 W. Rob. 354; The llleanon
tere." Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac., Pirates, 6 Moo. P. C. 471. Nor did
cap. iii. § ii. No. 1. Thus the
lib. iii. the Buccaneers of the seventeenth
Malay and Sooloo pirates of Borneo century.
and the Eastern Archipelago were no (^) Calvo, Droit Int. vol. i. § 29.
w. 3
Meaning of In the constitution of the United States, the term State most
State in the
American frequently expresses the combined idea of people, territory, and
Constitntion.
government. A
State, in the ordinary sense of the constitution,
is a political community of free citizens, occupying a territory
of defined boundaries, and organized under a government sanc-
tioned and limited by a written constitution, and established by
the consent of the governed. It is the union of such States, under
a common constitution, which forms the distinct and greater
by that constitution as the United States,
political unit, designated
and makoF of the people and States composing it one people and
one country (e).
Sovereign Sovereign princes may become the objects of international law,

princes the in respect to their personal rights, or rights of property, growing
objects of
international out of their personal relations with States foreign to those over
law.
whom they rule, or with the sovereigns or citizens of those foreign
States. These relations give rise to that branch of the science
which treats of the rights of sovereigns in this respect (/).
Individuals, Private individuals, or public and private corporations, may in

or corpora-
like manner, incidentally, become the objects of this law in regard
tions, the
objects of to rights growing out of their international relations with foreign
international
law. sovereigns and States, or their subjects and citizens. These rela-
tions give rise to that branch of the science which treats of what
has been termed private international law, and especially of the
between the municipal laws of different States.
conflict
The terms But the peculiar objects of international law are those direct
sovereign and relations w^hich exist between nations and States; that is, the sub-
State nsed sy-
nonymously, jects of international law are, properly speaking, only States,
—
or the former
used meta- for they alone are vested with international personality. Wher-
phorically for ever, indeed, the absolute or unlimited monarchical form of
the latter.
government prevails in any State, the person of the prince is
necessarily identified with the State itself: 'I'Etat c'est moi.'
Hence the public jurists frequently use the terms sovereign and
State as synonymous. So also the term sovereign is sometimes
used in a metaphorical sense merely to denote a St,ate, whatever
may bo the form of its government, whether monarchical or
republican, or mixed.
Sovereignty
defiiied.
Sovereignty is the supreme power inherent in a State, by which
that State is governed. According to the definition of Grotius,
Per Chief Justice Chase, in Texas

(e) 5 P. D. 197; Mighell v. Sultan of
V. White (1868), 7 Wallace, 721. Johore, L. E. (1894) 1 Q. B. 149;
(/) See Duke of Brunswick
v. King South African Republic v. La Com-
of Hanover (1844), 2 H. of L. Cas. pagnie Franco- Belqe du Chemin de
1; The Charkieh (1873), L. E. 4 A. Fer du Nord, L. E^ (1898) 1 Ch. 190.
&: E. 87: The Parlement Beige (1878),
\'ATIOXS AND SOVEREIGN STATES. -35
sovereignt} h ''the power whose acts are iioL feuhjoet to the con-
"
trol of another (^). The supreme power may be exercised
. . .
cither internally or externally.

Interna] sovereignty is that which is inherent in the people of Intemal
*^^^*'*'^^^ '^•
any State, or vested in its ruler, by its m.unicipal constitution or
fundamental laws. is the object of what has been called
This
'
internal public law, droit public interne,' but which may more
properly be termed constitutional law.

External sovereignty consists in the independence of one poli- External
1
tical society,
•
m respect to allni
•
T'l--
other political societies,
T'li
by the
it is
sovereignty.
exercise of this branch of sovereignty that the international rela-

tions of one political society are maintained, in peace and in war,
with all other political societies. The law by which it is regu^
'
lated has, therefore, been called external public law, droit public
i'xterne,' but may more properly be termed international law.
The recognition of any State by other States, and its admission
into th(! general societ}' of nations, may depend, or may be made
to depend, at the will of those other States,
upon its internal con-
form of government, or the choice it may make of its
stitution or
rulers. But whatever be its internal constitution, or form of
government, or whoever may be its rulers, or even if it be dis-
tracted with anarchy, through a violent contest for the government
between different parties among the people, the State still subsists
in contemplation of law, until its sovereignty is completely extin-
guished by the iinal dissolution of the social tie, or by some other

cause which puts an end to the being of the State. "
Sovereignty is acquired by a State, either at the origin of the* Sovereignty,
civil society of Avhich it is composed, or when it separates itself

from the community of which it previously formed a part, and on
which it was dependent (/^).
This principle applies as well to internal as to external sove-
reignty. But an important distinction is to be noticed, in this
respect, between these two species of sovereignty. The internal
sovereignty of a State does not, in any degree, depend upon its
recognition by other States. A
new State, springing into exist-
ence, does not require the recognition of oiKei" States to confirm its
internal sovereignty. The existence of the State de facto is
sufficient, in this respect, to establish its sovereignty de jure. It

is a State because it exists.
Thus the internal sovereignty of the United States of America

was complete from the time they declared themselves ''free, sove-
(r/) De Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. i. (A) Kliiber, Droit des Gens moderne
r-. 3, § 7. do I'Europe, § 23.
3(2)
reign, and independent States," on theJuly, 1776. It was 4tli of
upon this principle that the Supreme Court determined, in 1808,

that the several States composing the Union, so far as regards
their municipal regulations, became entitled, from the time when
they declared themselves independent, to all the rights and powers
of sovereign States, and that they did not derive them from con-
cessionsmade by the British King. The treaty of peace of 1782
contained a recognition of their independence, not a grant of it.
From hence it resulted, that the laws of the several State
governments were, from the date of the declaration of inde-
pendence, the laws of sovereign States, and as such were obliga-
tory upon the people of such State from the time they were
enacted. It wâs added, however, that the Court did not mean to
intimate the opinion, that even the law of any State of the Union,
wdiose constitution of government had been recognised prior to
the 4th of July, 1776, and which law had been enacted prior to
that period, would not have been equally obligatory (i).
Dejure and
''
A dc oôvernnient is one which, in the opinion of the
jiirc
de facto •
.
.1 i ^1 1 4. ^
governments, person using the phrase, ought to possess the powers 01 sove-
reignty, though at the time it may be deprived of them. de A
facto government is one which really in possession of them,^
is
"
although the possession may be wrongful or precarious (/^) .
There are several degrees of what is called de facto govern-

ment. Such a highest degree assumes a
government in its
character very closely resembling that of a law^ful government.

This is when the usurping government expels the regular autho-
rities from their customary seats and functions, and establishes
itself in their place, and so becomes the actual government of a<
country. The distinguishing characteristic of such a government
is, that adherents to it in war against the government de jure
do not incur the penalties of treason; and, under certain limita-

tions, obligations assumed by it on behalf of the country, or
otherwise, will in general be respected by the government de jure
when, restored. The government of England under the Common-
wealth an example of such a de facto government.
is
There is another species of de facto government, and it is one

which may be perhaps aptly called a government of paramount
force. Its distinguishing characteristics are: (1) That its exist-
ence maintained by active military power, within the territories,

is
and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful
(J) M'llvaine v. Coxe's Lessee (A-) Mountague Bernard, Neutrality

(1808), 4 Cranch, 212. Wharton. of Great Britain during American
Digest, §§ 6, 150. Civil War (London, 1870), p. 108.
NATIONS xVND SOVEREIGN STATES. 37
government; and (2) that while it exists, it must necessarily be

obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedi-
ence, rendered in submission to such force, do not become
res])onsible, as wrong-doers, for those acts, though not warranted
by the laws of the rightful government. The government of the
Confederate States was one of this class. The rights and obliga-
tions of a belligerent were conceded to it in its military character,
very soon after the war begun, from motives of humanity and
expediency by the United States. The whole territory controlled
by it was thereafter held to be enemy's territory, and the inhabi-
tants of that territory were held in most respects for enemies. But
itwas never recognised as an independent Power (I).
The external Sovereignty of any State, on the other hand, may Recognition
require recognition by other States in. oxder to, render it perfect

reignty".
and^_complete.
So long, indeed, as the new State confines its
action to its own citizens, and to the limits of its own territory, it
may well dispense with such recognition. But if it desires to

enter into that great society of nations, all the members of which
recognise rights to which they are mutually entitled, and duties

which they may be called upon reciprocally to fulfil, such recogni-
V|:ion becomes essentially necessary to the complete participation
of the new State in all the advantages of this society. Every
other State at liberty to grant, or refuse, this recognition,
is
subject to the consequences of its own conduct in this respect: and

until such recognition becomes universal on the part of the other
States, the new State becomes entitled to the exercise of its exter-
nal sovereignty as to those States only by whom that sovereignty
has been recognised (m) .
Tho identity of a State consists in its having the same origin Identity of a
or comniencement of existence; and its difference from all other

States consists in having a different origin or commencement
its
of existence. A State, as to the individual members of which it is
composed, is a iiuctuating body; but in respect to the society, it

is one and the same body, of which the existence is perpetually
kept up by a constant succession of new members. This existence

continues until it is interrupted by some change affecting the being
of tho State (n).
If this change be an internal revolution, merely altcrino" the ^^^ affected
. .
,
. . , p p 1 CI .
by internal
municipal constitution and form oi government, the State remains revolution.
Q) Thorington v. Smith (1868), 8 stitutes of Natural Law,b. ii. c. 10,

Wallace, 8—11. §§ 12, 13. lloffter, Das Europaische
(y>i) See poHt, p. 43. Volkcrreclit, § 24. Texas v. White
in) Grotius,
De Jur. JJcl. ac Pac, (1868), 7 Wallace, 729.
lib. ii. cajj. 9, § 3. Rutherforth, In-
tho same; it neither loses any of its rights, nor is discharged from
any of its obligations (o) .
The habitual obedience of the members of any political society

to a superior authority must have once existed in order to con-
stitute a sovereign State. But the temporary suspension of that
obedience and of that authority, in consequence of a civil war, does
not necessarily extinguish the being of the State, although it may
affect fo]- a time its ordinary relations with other States.
Conduct of Until the revolution is consummated, whilst the civil war in-
foreigu States
towards volving a contest for the government continues, other States may
another uation
involved in
remain indifferent spectators of the controversy, still continuing
civilwar. to treat the ancient government as sovereign, and the government;
de facto as a society entitled to the rights of war against its
enemy; or may esj)Ouse the cause of the party which they believe
to have justice on its side. In the first case, the foreign State
fulfils all itsobligations under tlie law of nations; and neither
party has any right to complain, provided it maintains an im-
partial neutrality. In the latter, it becomes, of course, the enemy
of the party against whom it declares itself, and the ally of the
other; and as the positive law of nations makes no distinction, in

this respect,between a just and an unjust war, the intervening
State becomes entitled to all the rights of war against the opposite
party (p).
Parties to
civil v/ar
If foreign State professes neutrality, it is bound to allow
tlie
entitled to impartially to both belligerent parties tho free exercise of those

rights of war
against each rights which war gives to public enemies against each other; such
other. as tho right of blockade, and of capturing contraband and enemy's
property {q). But the exercise of those rights, on the part of the
revolting colony or province against the metropolitan country,
may be modified by the obligation of treaties previously existing
between that country and foreign States (r) .
Identity of a on the other hand, the change be effected by external violence,

If,
State, how
affected by as by conquest confirmed by treaties of peace, its effects upon
externa]
the being of the State are to be determined by the stipulations
violence.
of those treaties. The conquered and ceded country may be a
portion only, or the whole of the vanquished State. If tho

former, the orioînal State still continues; if the latter, it ceases
(o) Grotius, lib. ii. cap. 9, § 8. (London, 1863), p. 29.

Rutherforth, b. ii. c. 10, § 14. Pufen- {q) United States v. Pcdmer (1818),
dorf, De Jur. Nat. et Gent., lib. viii. 3 Wheaton, 610; The Bivina Pastora
cap. 12, §§ 1—3. (1819), 4 Wheaton, 63; The Nuestra
(j)) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. ii. Signora de la Caridacl, 4 Wheaton,
eh. 4, § 56. Martens, Precis du Droit 502.
des Gens, liv. iii. ch. 2, §§ 79—82. (r) See post, Part IV. ch. iv. p. 628,
Sir W. Harcourt, Letters of Historicus Rights of War as to Neutrals.
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES. ^
to exist. In either case, the conquered territory inaj be incor-
porated into the conquering State as a province, or it may be
united to it as a co-ordinate State with equal sovereign rights.
Such a change in the being of a State may also be produced by By the joint
the conjoint effect of internal revolution and foreign conquest, internal and
subsequentlv
^ confirmed, or modified and adiusted
"^ ' J by international external ./
violence
compacts. Thus the House of Orange was expelled from the confirmed bj
*^®**>'-
Seven United Provinces of the Netherlands, in 1797, in conse-
quence of the French Revolution and the progress of the arms of
France, and a democratic republic substituted in the place of the
ancient Dutch constitution. At the same time the Belgic pro-
vinces, which had long been united to the Austrian monarchy as
a co-ordinate State, Averc conquered by France, and annexed to
the French republic by the treaties of Campo Formio and Lune-
ville. On the restoration of the Prince of Orange, in 1813, he
assumed the title of Sovereign Prince, and afterwards King of the
Netherlands; and by the treaties of Vienna, the former Seven

United Provinces were united with the Austrian Low Countries
into one State, under his sovereignty (s) .
Hero is an example of two States incorporated into one, so as

to form a new State, the independent >existenoe of each of the
former States entirely ceasing in respect to the other; whilst the
rights and obligations of both still continue in respect to other
foreign States, except so far as they may be affected by the
compacts creating the new State.
In consequence of the revolution which took place in Belgium,
in 1830, this country was again severed from Holland, and its
independence as a separate kingdom acknowledged and guaranteed

by the great Powers of Europe, Austria, France, Great
five —
Britain, Prussia, and Russia. Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg
having been subsequently elected king of the Belgians by the
national Congress, the terms and conditions of the separation were
stipulated by the treaty concluded on the 15th of November,

1831, between those Powers and Belgium, which was declared by
the conference of London to constitute the invariable basis of the
separation, independence, neutrality, and state of territorial pos-

session of Belgium, subject to such modifications as might be the
result of direct negotiation between that kingdom and the
Netherlands (0-
If the revolution in a State be effected by a province or colony Province or
shaking oft' its sovereignty, so long as the independence of the wk^tnde-'
(s) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, (t) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations,
p. 492. pp. 538—555.
40' NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES.
pendence,
how con-
ncAV State is not acknowledged by other Powers, it may seem
sidered by doubtful, in an international point of view, whether its sovereignty
other foreign
States.
can be considered as complete, however it may be regarded by
its own government and citizens. It has already been stated,
that whilst the contest for the sovereignty continues, and the civil
war rages, other nations may either remain passive, allowing to
both contending parties all the rights which war gives to public
enemies; or may acknowledge the independence of the new State,
forming with it treaties of amity and commerce; or may join in
alliance with one party against the other. In the first ease,
neither party has any right to complain so long as other nations
maintain an impartial neutrality, and abide the event of the
contest. The two last cases involve questions which seem to
belong rather to the science of politics than of international law;
but the practice of nations, if it does not furnish an invariable
rule for the solution of these questions, will, at least, shed some;
light upon them. The memorable examples of the Swiss Cantons

and of the Seven United Provinces of the Netherlands, which so
long levied war, concluded peace, contracted alliances, and per-

formed every other act of sovereignty, before their independen(;e
—
was finally acknowledged, that of the first by the German
—
empire, and that of the latter by Spain, go far to sliow the general
sense of mankind on this subject (m).
The acknowledgment of the independence of the United States
of America by France, coupled with the assistance secretly
rendered by the French court to the revolted colonies, was con-
sidered by Great Britain as an unjustifiable aggression, and,
under the circumstances, it probably was ho(x). But had the
French court conducted itself with good faith, and maintained
an impartial neutrality between the two belligerent parties, it may
be doubted whether the treaty of commerce, or even the eventual
alliance between France and the United States, could have fur-
nished any just ground for a declaration of war against the
former by the British Government. The more recent example
of the acknowledgment of the independence of the Spanish Ameri-
can provinces by the United States, Great Britain, and other
Powers, whilst the parent country still continued to withhold her
assent, also concurs to illustrate the general understanding of
nations, that where a revolted province or colony has declared and
(w) Motley, Life and Death of John Droit des Gens, tome i.
i^p. 370 — 498.
Barneveld (1874), chap. i. It was the cause of war being declared
(a;)Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, by England. Letters of liistoricus,
Pt. § 12, pp. 220—294.
ill. Ch. de p. 32.
Martens, Nouvelles Causes celebres du
XATIOXS AND SOVEREIGN STATES. 41
shown its ability to maintain its independence, the recognition

of its sovereignty by other foreign States is a question of policy
and prudence only.
This question must be determined by the sovereign legislative Recognition
or executive jôwer of these other States, and not by any subordi-
pendence by
other foreign
nato authority, or by the private judgment of their individual
subjects. Until the independence of the new State has been
acknowledged, either by the foreign State where its sovereignty
is drawn in question, or by the government of the country of
which it was before a province, courts of justice and private in-
dividuals are bound to consider the ancient state of things as
remaining unaltered (i/) .
On
it is
the outbreak of a rebellion or insurrection in any country. Recognition
primla, facie the duty of foreign States to take no part in the
belliger-
andin-
.of ^ncy
matter, an3~Eo allow events to follow their own course. But the dependence,
facts of the case frequently render it necessary for other nations
to take cognizance of the existînce of the insurrection. When
•countries are intimately connected wdth each other, through situa-
tion or commerce, a revolt of any magnitude in one materially
affects the rights and interest of the others, and entails upon them
the necessity of pursuing some definite course of conduct towards
the disturbed State. This may be done either by recognising
the insurgents as belligerents, or by acknowledging them to be
independent. There is, however, a very material distinction be-
tween the state of facts whicli will call for the former, and that
which will justify the latter mode of recoguition.
When a rebellion has assumed such proportions that it may, Belligerency.
Avithout abuse of language, be called a war, and when it is carried
on by some species of organized government or authority, in full
possession of the territory where it claims to exercise authority,
neutral States may then recognise such revolted government as a
belligerent. simply the assertion of a fact, and ought
This is
in no case to give offence to the parent State. It is no violation

of neutrality. It informs the subjects of the neutral officially
that war and that they must observe towards the combatants
exists,
"
the duties that international law imposes. The question," said
Lord Ilussell, "for neutral nations to consider is, what is the
character of the war, and whether it should be regarded as a war
(y) Citi/ of Berne v. Bank of Eng- Wheaton, 193; Thompson v. Powles

land (1804), 9 Ve&ey, 347; The (1828), 2 Simons, 194; U. S. v. Wag-
Manilla, Edwards, Ad." Rep. 1, App. ner, L. R. (1867) 2 Ch. 582; Republic
iv. Note D; Royt v. GeUton (1818), 3 of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co. (1886),
Wheaton, 324; V. 8. v. Pabner (1818), 36 Ch. D. 489, 497; Republic of Peru
Z Wheaton, 634. The Nueva Anna, G v. Breyfus (1888), 38 Ch. D. 348, 359.
carried on between parties severally in a position to and

wage war,
to claim the rights and to j)erform the
obligations attaching to
belligerents?" (z). By a recognition of belligerency the neutral
accepts and recognises within its jurisdiction the flag of the
revolted government, the commissions it issues, and the decisions
of prize courts sitting within its territory, not as being emanations
and symbols of sovereignty, but as proceeding from an organized
body of persons who, so far as waging Avar goes, arc able to act as
a sovereign State (a) When the struggle is carried on by sea
.
as well as by land, the interests of neutral commerce render a
recognition of belligerency absolutely necessary. Without it the

struggle is not, in the eye of international law, a Avar, and if not a
wai", there is no obligation on the part of neutrals to respect any
blockade, or to allow their merchant-vessels to be sto^Dped and

searched on the high seas by the cruisers of either party.
Inevitable collisions would ensue, Avhich Avould not improbably
drag neutral nations into the conflict. Moreover, the higher con-
siderations ofhumanity require a de facto Avar to be acknoAvledged
as such. If the conflict continues entirely unrecognised as a Avar,
every insurgent is liable to be executed as a rebel or traitor on

land, and as a pirate on the sea. A
recognition of belligerency
is not simply a benefit conferred upon insurgents; it gives the
parent State belligerent rights, Avhich it Avould not otherAvise
possess,and relieves it from all responsibility for acts done in the
rcAolted territory, or by the insurgent authorities (6).
Recognition The United States have loudly and continually asserted that
of the
Confederate the recognition of the belligerency of the Confederates by Great
States.
Britain Avas an unfriendly act; but the right to accord it is not,
and cannot be, denied. "A
nation," said the President, in his
annual message to Congress in 1869, "is its own judge Avhen to
accord the rights of belligerency, either to a people struggling to
free themselves from a government they believe to be oppressive,
"
or to independent nations at Avar Avith each other (c). The course
pursued by the British Government is not only justified by having
been followed by all the chief maritime States, but Avas, under the
circumstances, the only proper course. Hostilities commenced
(z) Lord Russell to Lord Lyons, 6th (Boston, 1866), n. 15. Pari. Papers,
May, 1861. Pari. Papers, N. America, N. America, 1873 (No. 2), p. 75. Pari.
1873 (No. 2), p. 79. Papers, N. America, 1876 (No. 3),
(â) Mountague Bernard, Neutrality p. 19. Whiting, War Powers under the
of Great Britain during American U. S. Constitution (43rd ed.), p. 333.
Civil War, j). 115. See also Bluntschli (c) Annual Message to Congress,
in Revue de Droit International, 1870, 1869. See Pari, Papers, N. America,
pp. 455. 456. 1872 (No. 2), p. 17.
(b) Wheaton, ed. by R. II. Dana
NATIONS x\ND SOVEREIGN STATES. 43
in April, 1861; on the 13tli of April Fort Sumter had fallen, and
on the 19th President Lincoln declared the ^ôrts of the seven
provinces to be blockaded. No official copy of the proclamation
of the blockade was received in England till the 10th of May,
and Her Majesty's Proclamation of Neutrality, recognising the
Confederates as belligerents, was not issued until the 14th of that
month (d). When the intimate relation between the two countries
is considered, it seems
hardly possible to deny the propriety of
The rebellion "sprang forth suddenly from the
this recognition.
Minerva in the full panoply of war^" and the
parent brain, a
Supreme Court of the United States decided it was a war from
the commencement of hostilities (e). The very fact of declaring a
blockade was a virtual admission of the existence of a Avar; and
after this, what objection could there be to foreign nations recog-
nising it? (/).

A very different state of facts must exist before neutrals arc Recognition
^^"
justified in recognising an insurgent province as independent, ênê
"
When a sovereign State, from exhaustion, or any other cause,
has and substantially abandoned the struggle for
virtually
supremacy, has no right to complain if a foreign State treat
it
the independence of its former subjects as de facto established.

When, on the other hand, the contest
not absolutely or perma-
is
nently decided, a recognition of the inchoate independence of the

insurgents by a foreign State, is a hostile act towards the sove-
reign State, which the latter is entitled to resent as a breach of
"
neutrality and friendship (g). It is to the facts of the case that
foreign nations must look. The question with them ought to be,
is there a bond fide contest
going on? If it has virtually ceased,
the recognition of the insurgents is then at their discretion. It
was upon this principle that England and the other Powers
acted, in recognising the independence of the South American

Republics (h) .
The action of some of the European Powers towards Greece in Independence

1827, and Belgium in 1830, was not a simple recognition of indc- Belgium, 'etc.
(d) See Sir A. Cockburn's Reasons A. Rougier, Les guerres civiles et le

for Dissenting from Geneva Award, droit des gens (Paris, 1903).
Pari. Papers, 1873 (No. 2), pp. 73, 81. (rj) Letters of Ilistoricus (Sir W.
Report of Neutrality Laws Commis- Harcourt), See Pliillimore,
p. 9.
sion, 1869, p. 74. It is dated 13th vol. ii.
Despatch of Canning,
§ xiii.
May. State Papers, vol. xii. pp. 913—4.
(e) The Prize Causes (1862), 2 Speeches of Lord Lansdowne and Lord
Black. 669. Liverpool, Hansard, vol. x. p. 970.
(/) As to recognition of belliger- {h) Cf. Moore, Digest, vol. i. §§28
ency, see further, Wharton, Digest, —37; F. L. Paxson, The Independence
§ 69; Moore, Digest, vol. i. §§ 59— 71; of the South American Republics
Calvo, Droit Int., vol. i. §§ 84—86; (Philadelphia, 1903).
44; NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES.
poiulence, and does not come ^Yithin the preceding rule. In both
cases the Powers intervened to settle the
disputes, and without this
assistance the insurgents would not have succeeded. In the case
of Greece, the intervention was based on the of
ground humanity,
and for the suppression of piracy and anarchy. In that of
Belgium, the Powers, by their own act at the treaty of Vienna,
had united that country to Holland; but finding the union incom-
patible, they intervened to dissolve it. Later cases of intervention
exercised in the form of recognition of independence are those of
Cuba in 1898, and Panama in 1903. In the former, the United
States declared the people free and independent, without recog-
nising the insurgent government (i) In the latter, the indepen-

.
dence was formally recognised by the American Government a

few days (November 13th, 1903) after the Panama revolutionists
had asserted it (k).
Texas and The recognition of the independence of Texas by the United
States, although it preceded that of other nations, did not take
place until 1837, and all substantial struggle with Mexico was
over early in 1836 (?). But in the case of the Hungarian revolt of
1849, the conduct of the United States, in investing an agent in
Europe with power to declare the willingness of his government
promptl}^ to recognise theindependence of Hungary in the event
of her ability to maintain it, was unjustifiable towards Austria.
The sympathy which the American people undoubtedly felt for
the Hungarians should not have been thus expressed officiallj^
more especially as the geographical situation of both countries
jDrevented the United States being in any way concerned in the
matter (w). Dana says that, "as a jôint of international law,
the transaction has little significance"; and he adds that ''the
episode belongs rather to history, as indicating the policy and

feeling of the United States "(w). This might be so if the
American Union were an insignificant State; but it can scarcely
bo denied that insurgents learn that the government of such a
if
great Power as the United States gives them its full sympathy,
and is j)repared to recognise their independence at the earliest
possible moment, this may give the rebellion a very different
(0 Cf. E. J. Benton, International Mondes, 1837, p. 745. Webster,

Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish- Works, vol. vi. p. 414. Cf. Moore,
American War (lialtimore, 1908), ibid.; Paxson, ibid.
chap, iv.; Moore, Digest, vol. vi. (?«) Letters of Ilistoricus, p. o.
§§ 40, 1909—1910. President Taylor's Annual Message to
(A-) Cf. Moore, Digest, vol. iii.
Congress, 1849.
§ 344. (n) Wheaton, ed. by Dana, n. 18,
(0 Kennet v. Chambers (1852), 14 p. 47.
Howard, 38. Annuaire des deux
comjjloxioii, and is almost sure to strengthen the hands of the

rebels, and make it more difficult for the parent State to maintain
its sovereignty (o) .
Recognition on the part of one or two States does not neces-

sarily imj^ly recognition of independence by other States; but in
practice this has not infrequently happened, especially when it
was some leading Power that had first accorded such recognition.
Sometimes recognition is signified by a solemn treaty, declaration,
or other act of the great Powers; for example, Roumania, Serbia,
and Montenegro were recognised as independent States by the
Treaty of Berlin, 1878. In 1881 Roumania was recognised as a
monarchy; similarly Serbia in 1882. At the West African
Conference, 1884-5, the Congo Free State was recognised as an
independent State; but in September, 1908, it was annexed to
Belgium.
The international eft'ects produced by a change in the person International
of the sovereign, or in the form of government of any State may chanJe°in*the

be considered: — person of the
I. As to its treaties of alliance and commerce. in the internal
II. Its public

^ debts. T.f^^S?''.''
. . . .
of the State.
III. Its public domain, and private rights of property.
TV As to wrongs or injuries done to the government or citizens
.
of another State.
I. Treaties are divided by text writers into personal and real. Treaties.
The former relate exclusively to the persons of the contracting
parties, such as family alliances and treaties guaranteeing the

throne to a particular sovereign and his family. They expire, of
course, on the death of the king or the extinction of his family.
The latter relate solely to the subject-matters of the convention,
independently of the persons of the contracting parties. They
continue to bind the State, Avhatever intencning changes may
take place in its internal constitution, or in the persons of its rulers.
The State continues the same, notwithstanding such change, and
consequently the treaty relating to national objects remains in
force so long as the nation exists as an independent State. The
only exception to this general rule, as to real treaties, is where the
convention relates to the form of government itself, and is intended
to prevent any such change in the internal constitution of the
State (p).
(o) As to recognition of sovereignty, Letters of Historicus, No. iii.

see further Wharton, Digest, §§ 70, (;>) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. ii.
71; Moore, Digest, vol. i. §§ 30 seq.: ch. 12, §§ 183—197.

46 NATIONS AND SOVEIIEIGN STATES.
The correctness of this distinction between personal and real

treaties, laid down by Vattel, has been questioned by more modern
public jurists as not being logically deduced from acknowledged

principles. Still it must be admitted that certain changes in the
internal constitution of one of the contracting States, or in the
person of its sovereign, may have the effect of annulling pro-
existing treaties between their respective governments. The obli-

gation of treaties, by whatever denomination they may be called,
is founded, not merely upon the contract itself, but upon those
mutual relations between the two States, which may have induced
them to enter into certainengagements. Whether the treaty be
termed real or personal, will continue so long as these relations
it
exist. The moment they cease to exist, by means of a changê in

the social organisation of one of the contracting parties, of such a
nature and of such importance as would have prevented the other
party from entering into the contract had he foreseen this change,
the treaty ceases to be obligatory upon him.
fft^lie^^''^
^" ^^^*-' reparation of Belgium and Hollaiid, the United States
deemed herself justified in withdrawing from an agreement to
accept the King of the Netherlands as umpire on the north-east

boundary question. When Texas joined tlie United States, France
and England intimated that she did not thereby cease to be bound
by her treaties with them (q) and a like intimation was given by
;
Great Britain to France respecting Tunis, on the French occupa-

tion of that country (r).
The United States regarded her treaties with Algiers as termi-
nated by the French conquest of 183il, her treaties with Hanover
as terminated in consequence of incorporation with Prussia in
1866, those wdth Nassau as terminated for the same reason in 1846,
and her treaties with the Two Sicilies as terminated by absorption
of that kingdom into Italy (s) .
Public debts. H. As to public debts —whether due to or from the revolu-

tionised State — a mere change in the form of government or in
the person of the ruler, does not affect their obligation. The
essential form of the State, that which constitutes it an independent
community, remains the same; its accidental form only is changed.

The debts being contracted in the name of the State, by its autho-
rised agents, for its public use, the nation continues liable for them,
notwithstanding the change in its internal constitution (/). Tiie
see p. 65, infra.

(q) Whoaton, ed. by Dana, n. 17, 7 (1881);
p. 48; Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Eliot, (v) Wharton, Digest, pp. 63, 64.
3rd Dec. 1845. (0. Grotius,
De Jur. Bel. ae Pae.,
(f) Pari. Papers, Tunis, Nos. 3 and
lib. ii. cap. 9,
—
§ viii. 1 3. Piifen-
new government succeeds to the fiscal rights, and is bound to f ullii
the liscaL obligations of the former government.

It becomes entitled to the public domain and other property of
the State, and is bound to pay its debts previously contracted {uj .
Most treaties relating to the transfer of territory contain a clause Payment of
providing for the payment of the debts of the territorj' ceded. ^^^^^^7
Thus, when Holland and Belgium were united in 1814, it was ceded by
provided that the new Kingdom of the Netherlands should bo

responsible for the debts of both countries (x) . When Schleswig,
Holstein, and Lauenburg were ceded by Denmark, in 1864, to
Austria and Prussia, it was agreed between the parties that the
debts of the Danish monarchy should be divided between Denmark
and the ceded provinces, in proportion to the population of the twô
parts (y) . On the acquisition by Italy of the Papal States, in
18G4, and of Venice in 1866, she, in each case, took upon lierself
the debts of those provinces {z). In some cases territory has been
transferred free from the general debt of the State it belonged to.
This was the case when Saxe-Coburg ceded Lichtenburg to Prussia
in 183.4,and when Austria, Sardinia, and some of the other Italian
States, rectified their boundaries in 1844 {a). On the cession of
Alsace and Lorraine by France, in 1871, Germany refused to take
upon herself any share of tire French national debt (h). By the
treaty of Berlin, 1878, the portions of Turkish territory given to
Serbia and Montenegro were charged with a share of the Turkish
debt. The portions given to Russia were not so charged, being*
taken as part payment of a war indemnity demanded by Russia
from Turkey (c). After the war of 1898 the United States /de-
clined to assume any part of the Cuban debt, acting on the prin-
ciple that, as incorporation of Cuba ^vithin the Union was not

intended, they merely occupied the temporary position of a liqui-
dator. Similarly, in 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan
refused to saddle herself with any portion of the Russian debt
dorf, De Jur. Nat. efc Gent., lib. viii. tially, affirmed

— namely,
that the suc-
cap. 12, §§ 1, 2, 3. But see M. Huber, eessor State to take over along with
is
Die Staatensuccession (Leipzig, 1898) ;
the property of the extinct State its
and the Eeport of the commission debts and obligations,
appointed by the British Government (x) Heffter, Das Europiiischc Vol-
to enquire into the various concessions kerreclit, § 24. "Bona non intelli-
granted by the Transvaal Government: guntur deduoto aere alieno."
nisi
Pari. Papers, South Africa, 1901, (x) Art. VI. of the Treaty. Sec
Cd. 623, pp. 6—8. The report of ihe Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. i. p. 38.
Transvaal Concessions Commission de- (y) Annual Reg. 1864, p. 236.
dared that " a State which has annexed (z) Hertslet, Map of Europe,
another is not legally bound by any pp. 1628, 1721.
contracts made by the State which (a) Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. ii.
has ceased to exist." But this declara- pp. 948, 1052.
tion was modified by such important (h) Calvo, vol. iii. p. 244.
qualifications, that the principle 'res (r) Pari. Papers, Turkey (No. 44),
transit cum suo onero 1878, and Turkey (No. 22), 1878.
'
was, substan-
48 NATIONS AND SON'EllEIGN STATES.
ill
respect of the southern part of Sakhalien, which was ceded by
" "
Kussia with all public works and properties thereon (d).
Public domain
jjj^ ^g ^^ ^j-^g public domaiii and private rights of property,
rights of If the revolution be successful, and the internal change in the

proper y.
constitution of the State is finally confirmed by the event of the
contest, the public domain passes to the new government; but
this mutation is not necessarily attended with any alteration what-
ever in private rights of property .
It may, however, be attended by such a change: it is competent

for the national authority to work a transmutation, total or partial,
of the property belonging to the vanquished party and if actually ;
confiscated, the fact must be taken for right. But to work such a
transfer of ^proprietary rights, some positive and unequivocal act
of confiscation is essential.
If, on the other hand, the revolution in the government of the
State is followed by a restoration of the ancient order of things,
both public and private property, not actually confiscated, revert
to the original proprietor on the restoration of the legiti-
mate government, as in the case of conquest they revert
to the former owners, on the evacuation of the territory occupied
by the public enemy. The national domain, not actually alienated
by any intermediate act of the State, returns to the sovereign
along with the sovereignty Private property, temporarily seques-
.
tered, returns to the former owner, as in the case of such property

recaptured from an enemy in wâr on the principle of the jus
postliminii.
But if the national domain has been alienated, or the priNâto
property confiscated by some intervening act of the State, the
question as to the validity of such transfer becomes more difficult
of solution.
Even the lawful sovereign of a country may, or may not, by
the particular municipal constitution of the State, have the power
of alienating the public domain. The general presumption, in
mere internal transactions with his ow^n subjects, is that he is liot
so authorized (e).But in the case of international transactions,
where foreigners and foreign governments are concerned, the
authority is presumed to exist, and may be inferred from .the
general treaty-making power, unless there be some express limi-
tation in the fundamental laws of the State. So, also, where
foreign governments and their subjects treat with the actual head
(d) Cf. S. Takahashi, International De Jur. Nat.

Law applied to the Eusso-Japanese
(e)
Gent.,
Pufendorf,
lib. viii. cap. 12, §§ 1
— et
3.
War (London, 1908), p. 775. Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i.
chap. 21,
§§ 260, 261.
of the State, or the government de facto, recognised by the acqui-

escence of the nation, for the acquisition of any portion of the
public domain or of private confiscated property, the acts of such

government must, on principle, be considered valid by the lawful
sovereign on his restoration, although they were the acts of him
;who is considered by the restored sovereign as a usurper (/) On .
the other hand, it seems that such alienations of public or private
property to the subjects of the State may be annulled or confirmed,

as to their internal effects, at the will of the restored' legitimate'
sovereign, guided by such motives of policy as may influence

his counsels, reserving the legal rights of bonce fidei purchasers
under such alienation to be indemnified for ameliorations {g) .
Where
the price or equivalent of the property sold or exchanged
has accrued to the actual use and profit of the State, the transfer
may be confirmed, and the original proprietors indemnified out
of the public treasury, as was done in respect to the lands .of the
emigrant French nobility, confiscated and sold during the revolu-
tion. So, also, the sales of the national domains situate in the
German and Belgian provinces, united to Franco during the revo-
lution, and again detached from the French t^^rritory by the
treaties of Paris and Vienna in 1814 and 1815, or in the countries
composing the Rhenish confederation in the kingdom of Italy,

and the Papal States, were, in general, confirmed by these treaties,
by the Germanic Diet, or by the acts of the respective restored
sovereigns. But a long and intricate litigation ensued befoi'e
the Germanic Diet, in respect to the alienation of the domains in
the countries composing the kingdojn of Westphalia The Elector
.
of Hesse Cassel and the Duke of Brunswick refused to confirm

these alienations in respect to their territory, whilst Prussia, which'
had acknowledged the King of WestiDhalia, also acknowledged the
validity of his acts in the countries annexed to the Prussian domi-
nions by the treaties of Vienna (Ji) .
"I apprehend it," said Vice-Chancellor James, "to be clear Opinion of

*^^™^^' ^-^'
public universal law% that any government which de facto succeeds
to any other government, whether by revolution or restoration,
conquest or reconquest, succeeds to all the public property, to

everything in the nature of public property, and to all rights in
respect of the public property of the displaced power, whatever
(/) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac., Europaisohe Volkerrecht, § 188;

ii. cap. 14, § 16.
lib. Kluber, Offentliches Recht des deuts-
(^g) J. L. Kluber, Droit des Gens, chen Bundes, § 169; Rofcteck und
'
sec. ii. ch. 1, § 258. Welcker, Sfcaats-Lexikon, Art. Do-
(A) Conversations Lexikon, Art. mainen-kaufer.'
'Domainen-verkauf ;' Hefftcr, Das
w. 4
may bo the nature or origin of the title of such displaced power.

This right of succession is a right not paramount, but derived
through the suppressed authority, and can only be enforced in the

same way, and to the same extent, and subject to the same correla-
tive obligations and rights, as if that authority had not been
suppressed, and was itself seeking to enforce it" (i).

Wrongs and IV. As to wrongs or injuries done to the government or citizens
injuries.
of another State; — seems, that, on strict principle, the nation
it
continues responsible to other States for the damages incurred for

such wrongs or injuries, notwithstanding an intermediate change
in the form of its government, or in the persons of its rulers. This
principle was applied in all its rigour by the victorious allied
Powers in their treaties of peace with France in 1814 and 1815.
More recent examples of its practical application have occurred
in the negotiations between the United States and France, Holland,
and Naj^les, relating to the spoliations committed on American
commerce under the government of Napoleon and the vassal States
connected with the French Empire. The responsibility of the
restored government of France for those acts of the preceding ruler
was hardly denied by it, even during the reigns of the Bourbon
kings of the elder branch, Louis XVIII. and Charles X.; and was
cxpresslj^ admitted by the government of Louis Philippe
in the
treaty of indemnities concluded with the United States in 18SI.,

The application of the same principle to the measures of confisca-
tion adopted by Murat in the kingdom of Naples was contested
by the restored government of that country; but the discussions:

w^hich ensued were at last terminated, 'in the same manner, by a
treaty of indemnities concluded between the iimcrican and Nea-
politan governments.
Sovereign A Sovereign State is generally defined to be any nation or

States
defined. j)eople, whatever may
be the form of its internal constitution,
which governs itself independently of foreign Powers (/c).
This definition, unless taken with great qualifications, cannot

be admitted as entirely accurate. Some States are completely
sovereign and independent, acknowledging
no superior but the
36 Ch. D. 489; Itcpnhllc of Peru v.

(0 U. S. V. McRae (1869), L. E.
8 Eq. 75. Of. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Dreyfus (1888), 38 Oh. D. 348; Whar-
Cranch, 50; Kelly v. Harrison, 2 ton, Digest, §§ 5, 5a; Iluber, Die
Johnson's Cases, 29; Calvin's Case Staatensuccession (1898); G. Gidel,
(1608), 7 Coke Rep. 27; Strother
v. Des effets de I'annexion sur les con-
Lucas (1838), 12 Peters, 410; King cessions (Paris, 1904); Moore, Digest,
of the Two Sicilies v. Wilcox (1851), vol. i. §§ 92—99.
1 Simons, N. S. 302; Hepicblio of (Jc) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i.
Penc V. Peruvian Guano Co. (1886), chap. 1, § 4.

XATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES. 51
Supreme Kuler and Governor of the ;uiiiverse. The sovereignty

"
ofothei* States is limited and qualified in various degrees. By a
Sovereign State, we mean," says Berna^rd {I), "a community or
number of persons permanently organised under a sovereign
government of their own and by a sovereign government we mean

;
a government, however constituted, which exercises the power of

making and enforcing law within a community, and is not itself
subject to any superior government. These two factors, one posi-
tive, the other negative
—
the exercise of power, and the absence
—
of superior control compose the notion of sovereignty, and are
-essential to it."
All Sovereign States are equal in the eye of international law, Equality of
whatever may be their relative power. The sovereignty of a gjates!^"
particular State is not impaired by its occasional obedience to the

commands of other States, or even the habitual influence exer-
cised by them over its councils. It is only when this obedience,
or this influence, assumes the form of express compact, that the
sovereignty of the State, inferior in power, is legally affected by

its connection with the other. Treaties of equal alliance, freely
conti'acted between independent States, do not impair their sove-
reignty. Treaties of unequal alliance, guarantee, mediation, and
protection, may have the effect of limiting and qualifying the
sovereignty according to the stipulations of the treaties .
States which are thus dependent on other States, in respect to Semi-sove-

^<^ôn states.
the exercise of certain rights, essential to the perfect external
.
sovereignty, have been termed semi -sovereign States (m) Semi- .
sovereign or dependent States are frequently divided into two

classes, namely, international protectorates and States under
suzerainty (or vassal States). Examples of present international

protectorates are those of Great Britain over Egypt, and Zanzibar;
of France over Tunis, Morocco, Annam; of United States (vir-
tually) over Cuba. Examples of States under suzerainty are

Egypt, which was under the suzerainty of Turkey (before the
country was declared a British protectorate in December, 1914),
and Crete, which was recognised by the Powers, in 1899, to be an
autonomous State under the suzerainty of Turkey. Interesting
instances of protectorates, from a historical point of view, which
existed in the nineteenth century, are those of Austria, Prussia,
(I) Neutrality of Great Britain dur- (m) Kliiber, Droit des Gens moderne
ing American Civil War, p. 107; see de PEurope, §24; Ileffter, Das Euro-
Cobbett, Cases and Opinions on Int. j)aische Volkerreclit, § 19.
Law (1909), vol. i. pp. 49 seq.
4(2)
and Eussia over the city of Cracow (1815 — 1846), of Great Britain
over the Ionian Islands —
(1815 1866).
City of The
Cracoir city of Cracow, in Poland, with its territory, was declared
(1815—1846). by the Congress of Vienna to be a perpetually free, independent,
and neutral State, under the protection of Russia, Austria, and
Prussia {n) By the final Act of the Congress of Vienna, Article
.
9, the three great Powers, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, mutually

engaged to respect, and cause to be respected, at all times, the
neutrality of the free city of Cracow and its territory; and they
further declared that no armed force should ever be introduced
into it under any pretext whatever. It was at the same time
reciprocally understood and expressly stipulated that no asylum'
or protection should be granted in the free city or upon the terri-
tory of Cracow to fugitives from justice, or deserters from the
dominions of any of the said high Powers, and that upon a
demand of extradition being made by the competent authorities,
such individuals should be arrested and delivered up without delay
under sufficient escort to the guard charged to receive them at the
frontier (o) . Some
thirty years later, however, the city of Cracow
was annexed to the Austrian Empire by a convention, entered into
at Vienna, November 6, 1846, between Russia, Austria, and
Prussia. The governments of Great Britain, France, and Sweden
protested against this proceeding as a violation of the Federal
Act of 1815 (p).
United States By the convention concluded at Paris on the 5th of November,
of the Ionian
Islands 1815, between Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, the
(1815—1866). islands of Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante, St. Maura, Ithaca, Cerigo
and Paxo, with their dependencies, were constituted a single, free,
and independent State, under the denomination of the United
States of the Ionian Islands, and placed under the immediate and
exclusive protection of Great Britain. With the approval of the
protecting Power, this State was to regulate its internal organiza-

tion, under the control of a British Lord High Commissioner,
who was to regulate the forms of convoking a legislative assembly,
and direct its operations. In order to secure to the inhabitants of
the United States of the Ionian Islands the advantages resulting
from the high protection under which they were placed, as well
as for the exercise of the rights incident to this protection, His
Britannic Majesty was empowered to occupy and garrison their
{ii) Acta du Ck)ngres de Vienna du Congresses, Band V. § 138.

9 Juin, 1815, Arts. 6, 9, 10. (?)) Of. Hartslet, Map of Europe,
(o) Martens, Nouvaau Eecueil, tome vol. ii. pp. 1065, 1073.
ii. p. 386. Kliiber, Acten des Wiener
fortresses and places, and to command their military forces. A

special convention with the government of the United States of
the Ionian Islands was to regulate the maintenance of the for-
tresses, the jDayment of the British garrisons, their numbers in
time of peace, and the relations between this armed force and thet
Ionian government. The merchant flag of the Ionian Islands was
to bear, togetherwith the colours and arms it bore previous to
1807, those which His Britannic Majesty might grant as a sign
of the protection under which the United Ionian States were
placed; and to give more weight to this protection, all the Ionian
ports were declared, as to honorary and military rights, to be
under the British jurisdiction; commercial agents only, or consuls
charged only with the care of commercial relations, should be
accredited to the United States of the Ionian Islands; and they
should be subject to the same regulations to which consuls :and
Commercial agents were subject in other independent States (g).
On comparing this act with the stipulations of the treaty of
Vienna relating to the republic of Cracow, a material distinction
will be perceived between the nature of the respective sovereignty
granted to each of these two States. The "free, independent,

and Cracow" was completely sovereign,
strictly neutral city of
though under the protection of Austria, Prussia, and Eussia;;
"
whilst the Ionian Islands, although they formed a single free*
and independent State," under the protection of Great Britain,
were closely connected Avith the protecting Power both by the
treaty itself and by the constitution framed in pursuance of its
stipulations, in such a manner a.s materially to abridge both itS(
internal and external sovereignty. In practice, the United States
of the Ionian Islands were not only constantly obedient to the
commands of the protecting Power, but they were governed as a
British colony by a Lord High Commissioner named by the
British crown, who exercised the entire executive, and participated
in the legislative, poAver with the Senate and legislative Assembly,
under the constitution of the State (r) .
During the Crimean war two Ionian vessels were captured by Status of
British ships on a voyage to Taganrog, and their condemnation citizens,

was demanded on the ground that lonians were in the same posi-
tion as British subjects as regards trade with the enemy. The
Court held that the status of the Ionian Islands, and their relation
{q) Martens, Nouveau Eecueil, tome (r) Martens, Precis du Droit des
ii. p. €63. Gens, liv. i. ch. 2, § 20. Note «,
3mc edition.
to Great Britain, were regulated exclusively by the Treaty of

Paris, 1815; that Great Britain had the jôwer to make peace
or war for them, but that the intention to place them in a state of
war must be clearly exj^ressed, as they were not necessarily placed
in a belligerent condition by the fact that Great Britain wa« at
war. The ships were therefore released, as the lonians, being'
deemed neither British subjects nor allies, Avere entitled to trade
with Russia during the war, England never having expressly de-
clared the Islands to be at war Avith Russia (s) The Ionian .
Islands were ceded to Greece in 1864, and have since ceased to exist
as a semi-sovereign State {t).
Other semi- Besides the free city of Cracow and the United States of the
sovereign Ionian Islands, several other semi-sovereign or dependent States
States.
— —
were and some are still recognised by the public law of
Europe.
The j^riiicipalities of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia, under
the suzerainty of the Ottoman Porte and under the protectorata
of Russia, as defined by the successive treaties between these two
Powers, confirmed by the Treaty of Adrianople, 1829 (ii).

Cession of The Russian j)rotectorate over these provinces ceased in 1854,
Russian
and the privileges accorded to them by the Sultan were thence-
protectorate.
Union of foi'ward placed under the collective guarantee of the five great
Moldavia and Powers (a?)
Wallachia.
By a convention entered into in 1858, between
.
Turkey and the Powers, Moldavia and Wallachia were placed

under th(^ suzerainty of the Sultan, but carried on their own
administration freely, and exempt from any interference of the
Sublime Porte, within the limits stipulated by the agreement
of the guaranteeing Powers Avith the Suzerain Court. An annual
tribute was paid to Turkey by each 2:)rovince. The executive
poAver Avas Acsted in a Hospodar, and in t\\i.> event of any of the
immunities of the principalities being violated, the Hospodar was
first to represent this to the Suzerain Power, and if not attended
to, he might then communicate Avith the guaranteeing PoAvers.

The Hospodar was represented at Constantinople by diplomatic
agents (' Capou-Kiaga ') accepted by the Porte (|/). In 1861,
Moldavia and Wallachia were formed into one Princiioality, called
Roumania. In 1877, Roumania joined Russia in the war Avith
Turkey, and at the end of this Avar she declared herself indepen-
(s) The Ionian ships (1855), 2 Nations, pj). 556 —560.

Spinks, 212. See also Forsyth, Cases {x) Hei-tslet,Map of Europe by-
and Opinions, p. 472. Treaty, vol. p. 1225.
ii.
(t) Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. iii. (y) Convention of 19th Aug. 1858.
p. 1610. Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty,
(?^) Wheaton, Hist, of the Law of vol. ii.
p. 1329.
dent of the Porte. This independence was recognised and con-

li]'mtd by the Powers in the Treaty of Berlin, and Roumania
is now no longer a semi-sovereign, but has become an independent
State {z)^ and was declared a monarchy in 1881.

The history of Serbia has been very similar. After various Serbia and
abortive efforts she at length attained to conxplete independence, •M^<>°*enegro.x
which the Powers confirmed at the same time as that of

Boumania (a), and in 1882 tlio prince assumed the title of king.
The Treaty of Berlin also declared Montenegro to be an indepen-
dent State (6).
A new semi-sovereign State was created by this Treaty, to Bulgaria,
which the name of Bulgaria was given. It was given a local
government and a national militia, but was made tributary to the

Sultan. The prince was to be elected by the people, but confirmed
by the Porte with the assent of the Powers. The Sultan was not
permitted to keep his army in the province (c) It is to be noted .
that in 1885 Bulgaria went to Avar with Serbia without consulting

either Turkey or the Powers. The independence it had enjoyed
was de facto, if not strictly de jure. However, in 1908 it declared
its complete independence.
The Principality
of Monaco, which had been under the pro- Monaco,
tectorate of France from 1641 until the French Revolution was ,
rej)laced under the same protection by the Treaty of Paris, 1814

(Article^ 3), for which was substituted that of Sardinia by the
Treaty of Paris, 1815 (Article 1) (d). In 1861, the Prince of
Monaco sold a portion of his territory to France, and the princi-
pal t}^ now consists of little more than the town of Monaco
itself (e). It is now unprotected, and is a fully sovereign State.
The republic of Polizza in Dalmatia, which was under the Polizza.
protectorate of Austria (/), is now absorbed into the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.
The small republic San Marino (thirty-eight square iniles)
of Republics of
is a 'protected' sovereign State, which was formerly under the
a^d Andorra,
protection of the Holy See, but which is now under that of
Italy (g). The mere fact of its being placed under the ''exclu-
sive protective friendship" of Italy does not make it a Protec-
torate, and does not in law impair its sovereignty.
(2.) Treaty of Berlin, Art. xliii. ii. pp. 5, 687.

Pari. Papers, Turkey, 1878, No. 44, (e) Hertslet, Map of Europe by
p. 25. Treaty, vol. ii. p. 1462.
(a) Art. xxxiv. (/) Martens, Precis du Droit des
lb) Art. xxvi. Uens, liv. i. ch. 2, § 20.
(o) Arts. i. to xii. See also as to Convention of 22nd Marcli, 1862.
(ffj
this Treaty, infra, pp. 107 et seq. See Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. li.
{fl) Martens, Nouveau Rcpucil, torn. p. 1508.
Andorra is a small independent republic (175 square miles)

situate on the Pyreneean between France and Spain (/?),
frontier,
and is under the joint suzerainty of France and the Spanish Bishop
of Urgel. It can scarcely be described as a State.
The Papacy. Until 1870 the Pope exercised the rights of temporal sove-
reignty, in addition to his supreme spiritual authority over the
Roman Catholic Church; and as a temporal sovereign he was a
member of community. In 1870, however, Home
the intiernational
was occupied by an Italian army, and was made the capital of the
Kingdom of Italy. The Papal States disappeared and the tem-
poral power of the Papacy came to an end. In 1871 the Italian
Parliament enacted a statute, called the Law of Guarantees, which
regulated the international status of the Pontiff. It ensures his
inviolability, and enjoyment of certain rights, privi-

secures his
leges and immunities that attach ordinarily to the persons of

political •sovereigns. Certain States send diplomatic envoys to
him, and receive representatives from him. these repre-
Though
sentatives are accorded many of the privileges of ambassadors,
they are considered to be ecclesiastical and not international offi-
cials. He is empowered to make treaties, named concordats, with
other States in reference to ecclesiastical affairs; but they are not
treaties in the sense contemplated by international law. Possess-
ing neither territory nor temporal subjects (even his houses are
not his own and his attendants owe no allegiance to him as to a
sovereign), he cannot enjoy international rights or be subject to
international obligations. Thus, having no international per-
sonality, he is an object rather than a subject of the law of nations.
Whatever rights the Italian statute has guaranteed him, it cannot
invest him wdth international personality. However, it is im-
possible to consider him as an ordinary person in reference to
international law, inasmuch as a large number of States have
tacitly consented to regard the Pontiff as being endowed with

many of the privileges of sovereignty. His status is, therefore,
somewhat anomalous. As important evidence of the fact that the
Holy See is not a member of the community of States, we may
mention that its occupant was not invited to either of the Hague
Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 {i) .
Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol.

(Ji) (t) On the status of the Paiiacj^, see
ii.p. 1510. State Papers, vol. xxx. E. Nys, Droit international, vol. ii.
p. 1217. An interesting historical ac-
—
pp. 297 323; E. Despagnet, Droit
count of San Marino and Andorra will —
international public, §§ 147 164; II.
be found in Calvo, ii. § 72. Bonfils, Droit international, §§ 370 —
396 (and the references there g-iven).
The former Germanic Empire was composed of a great number The former
of States, which, although enjoying what was called territorial
Empire,
superiority, (' Landeshoheit,') could not be considered as com-
pletely sovereign, on account of their subjection to the legislative
and judicial power of the emperor and the empire. Tliese were
all absorbed in the sovereignty of the States composing the late
Germanic Confederation, with the exception of the Lordship of
Kniphausen, on the North Sea, which retained its former feudal
relation to the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, and might, therefore,
have been considered as a semi-sovereign State (/c) .
Egypt had been held by the Ottoman Porte, during the domi- Egypt.
nion of the Mamelukes, rather as a vassal State than as a subject
province. The attempts of Mehemet Ali, after the destruction
of the Mamelukes, to convert his title as a prince-vassal into abso-
lute independence of the Sultan, and even to extend his sway over
other adjoining provinces of the empire (1831), produced the
convention concluded at London the loth July, 1840, between
—
four of the great European Powers, Austria, Great Britain,
—
Prussia, and Russia, to which the Ottoman Porte acceded by
the firman of 1841. In consequence of the measures subse-
quently taken by the contracting parties for the execution of this

treaty, the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt was finally vested by
tlie Porte in Mehemet Ali, and his lineal descendants, on the
payment of an annual tribute to the Sultan, as his suzerain. All
tho treaties and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire wore to be
applicable to Egypt, in the same manner as to other parts of the
empire. But the Sultan consented that, on condition of the
regular payment Pasha

of this tribute, the should collect, in the
name and as the delegate of the Sultan, the taxes and imjoosts
legally established, it being, moreover, understood that the Pasha
should defray all the expenses of the civil and military adminis-
tration; and that the military and naval force maintained by him
should always be considered as maintained for the service of the
State (0-
The international position of Egypt prior to the British occu- Status of

was discussed by Sir E. Phillimore in the Admiralty ^^^
*
pation
*
/io»^n\ Af. •• nin
Court (187c}). Alter exammmg all the hrmans ol the Porte, British
«it^
Before the
,
and the other authorities on the subject, his lordship said that
occupation.
"
the result of the historical inquiry as to the status of His High-
ness the Khedive is as follows: That in the firmans, Avhose
(A) Heffter, Das Europaische Vol- Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations,

kerrecht, § 19.
(I)
pp. 572
—583.
5^ NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES.
authority upon this point appears to bo paramount, Egypt is in-

variably spoken of as one of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire;
that the Egyptian army is regulated as part of the military force
of the Ottoman Empire; that the taxes are imposed and levied
in the name of the Porte; that the treaties o£ the Porte are
binding
upon Egypt, and that she has no separate jus legationis : that
the flag for both the army and the navy is the
flag of the Porto.
All these facts, according to the unanimous opinion of accredited
writers, are inconsistent and incompatible with those conditions
of sovereignty which are necessary to entitle a
country to be ranked
as one the great
among community of States" (^). After the
judgment in was delivered, the Khedive obtained from
this case
the Sultan a new flrman, granting him some
powers of soê-
reignty he did not before possess, {e.g., to make non -political
treaties and to maintain armed forces,) the absence of which was
commented on by Sir R. Phillimore {n). A contingent of Egyp-
tiaii troops was sent to serve with the Turkish
Army in the
liussian war of 1877.
1879 the then Khedive (Ismail) was deposed by an Imperial

Ill
Irade, and his son, Tewfik, was aj^pointed in his room. Under
tlio nevv Khedive the Dual Control of Great Britain and
France,
exercised through resident controllers, entitled to sit at the council
After the of ministers, was revived. In 1881 disturbances and disorder,
occupation.
consequent upon a nationalist ferment, aided by military revolt,
compelled Great Britain, after an offer of co-operation to Prance
had been declined, and Turkey hesitating, to intervene, with
armed forces, for the restoration of order and in suj)port of Tewfik.
By October the country was in 230Ssession of the British army of
—
occujjation, the rebel soldiers having been defeated at Tel-el-
Kebir,
— and was under the de facto control of the Queen's Govern-
ment. By a decree of the 18th January, 1883, the Dual Control
was abolished. In 1884, Great Britain i:)roposed that the country
should bo neutralized (o).
In August, 1885, Sir Henry Drummoiid Wolff was sent to
Constantinople on a special mission having reference to the affairs
of Egypt. It was the wish of Her Majesty's Government to
recognis(! in its full significance the jDosition which was secured
to the Sultan as sovereign of Egy]3t by treaties and other instru-
ments having a force under international law. But the general
{m) The CJtarJcieh (1873), L. K. 4 1873.

A. &E. 84. (o) Holland, European Concert,
(w) Phillimore, vol. iii., Introdue- cliap. iv.
tion. Journal des Debats, 7tli July,
NATIONS AXD SOVEKEIGX STATES. 59
object of the mission was, in the first instance, to secure for this
country the amount of influence Avhich Avas necessary for its own
imperial interests, and, subject to that condition, to provide a
strong and efficient Egyj^tian government, as free as possible from
foreign interference. Especial attention was drawn to the un-
satisfactory position of Egyptian finance, upon Avhich the facilities
for foreign interference, furnished by the international obliga-
tions attaching to so many branches of Egyptian administration,
depended (p) As a first result of this mission, by a convention,

. Angrlo-
which Avas signed at Constantinople on the 24th October, 1885, Convention

and ratified on the 24tli November in the same year, it was agreed, C>ct. 1885.
between Her Majesty and the Sultan, (1) that each of them respec-
tively should send a High Commissioner to Egypt; (2) that the
Ottoman High Commissioner should consult with the Kliedive,
or with a functionary designated by His Highness, u2>on the
best means for tranquillizing the Soudan by pacific measures, the
two to keep the English High Commissioner currently informed
of the negotiations, and as the measures to be decided upon would
form jDart of the general settlement of Egyptian affairs, such
measures were to be adoj)ted and placed in execution in agreement
with the English High Commissioner; (3) that the two High
Commissioners should re-organize, in concert with the Khedive,
the Egy2)tian army; (4) and, in the same way, examine all
branches of the Egyptian administration, and introduce the modi-
fications they might consider necessary within the limits of tlie
firmans: (5) that the international engagements contracted b}'
the Khedive should be approved by the Ottoman Government in
so far as they should not be contrary to the privileges granted by
the firmans; (6) that so soon as the two High Commissioners
should have established that the security of the frontiers and the
good working and stability of the Egyptian government were
assured, they should present a report to their respective Govern-
ments, who Avould tlien consult as to tlie conclusion of a convention
regulating the AvithdraAval of the British troops from Egypt in a

convenient period (g) .
It has been observed that by this convention the legitimate
sovereignty of the Sultan was recognised by Great Britain, and

tlio de facto occupation by England Avas acknoAvledged and lega-
lized by the recognition of the Imperial Ottoman Government;
(p) Lord Salisbury's Instructions to (q) Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 1

SirH. D.Wolff. Pari. Paper, Egypt, (1886). Hertslet, Map of Europe by
No. 1 (1886). As to the latter point, Treaty, vol. iii. p. 3274.
see Holland, loc. cit.
60 NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES:
while the forces of both were to be utilized for the purposes of a

permanent settlement (r) .
On the conclusion of this convention, Sir Henry Drummond

Wolff was appointed British High Commissioner. A Commis-
sioner was appointed on behalf of the Sultan; and the two
proceeded to Egypt. After satisfying himself as to what^ ^taking
—
into consideration the peculiar features of the Egyptian question,
and the policy of Her Majesty's Government, who disclaimed all
idea of annexing Egypt, but were anxious to preserve the rights of
the Sultan, and the interests of other countries, and, in concert
with Europe, to secure, except as regards the transit of troops in
regulated numbers, the territorial inviolability of Egyj^t was
—
really required for the permanent safety and prosperity of the
country, the British Commissioner returned to Constantinoj^le,
in liis character of Envoy Extraordinary, and resumed negotia-
tions with a view to the conclusion of an ulterior convention, by
Anglo- ^
which these ends might be secured. Some delay was caused by
Convention changes of government in England, and in other ways, but on the
May, 1887. 22nd May, 1887, a convention was signed at Constantinople,
betwêen Great Britain and Turkey, by wîich it was agreed that
at the expiration of three years from the date of the convention,
the British troops should be withdrawn from Egypt, unless the
appearance of danger in the interior or from wdthout should render

necessarj^ the adjournment of the evacuation, when the British
troops were to withdraw immediately after the disappearance of
this danger. On the withdrawal of the British troops, Egypt
was enjoy the advantages of the principle of territorial immu-
to
nity ('surete territoriale'), and on the ratification of the present

convention the Great Powers were to be invited to sign an Act
recognising land guaranteeing the inviolability of Egyptian terri-
tory; under which Act no Power should have the right, in any
circumstance, to land troops on Egyptian territory, except in the
event of obstruction in the Suez Canal, when the passage of 1,000
men at one time might be effected by the most rajDid means and
route. But Ottoman Government might land troo23S to repel
the
apprehended invasion, or in case of internal disorder; and a similar
right was reserved to the British Government. If at the expira-

tion of the three years stipulated in the convention for the with-
drawal of the British troops, one of the Great Mediterranean
Powers should not have accepted it, this was to be considered as
an appearance of danger from without justifying the postpone-
(r) Sir H. D. Wolff to Lord Salisbury. Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 66.
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGX STATES. 61
mciit of evacuation. The adhesion of the signatories of the

Berlin Treaty, and subsequently of other Governments having
arrangements with the Khediviate, was to be invited (s) The .
Sultan, under j^ressure from other Powers, failed to ratify the

convention within the stipulated period of one month, or within an
extended period allowed by Great Britain, and it consequently
fell through (^). The
legality of the British occupation was
therefore remitted to the convention of 1885.
In July, 1887, in the course of negotiations with reference to the
Suez Canal Convention, M. Waddington gave expression to the
hope of the French Government that the whole of Egypt might
some day be neutralized (u); and this was a solution of the ques-
tion which would, apparently, have met with the approval of the
Powers. But as Great Britain insisted on the reser\âtion of a
right of re-occupation in certain contingencies, and of a right of
regulated transit for any Great Power in case the canal was
blocked, there were obvious difficulties in the waj' of an arrange-
ment with France, for the latter country, which had a hold on
Egyptian affairs through the Mixed Administrations, and whose
traditional interest was strengthened by the part taken by French-
men in the construction of the Suez Canal, hitherto declined to
aseent to neutralization except on the condition that Egypt should
be a forbidden land to all European troops (x) .
In a cause, instituted in 1885, decided in the Privy Council in Abd-ui-

^'
1888, on appeal from Her Majesty's Supreme Consular Court at ^^^**^
Constantinople, Egypt was regarded as part of the Ottoman

dominions. "Cairo," it was said, "is in no sense
British soil;
it is the possession of a foreign government, and subject to the
"
sovereignty of the Porte (^), and in the Order of Council estab-
lishing Consular Courts of August 8, 1899, Egypt was expressly
mentioned as being included in the "dominions of the Sublime
Ottoman Porte" {z). But while no legal act affected the titular
sovereignty of the Porte, the course of events had the effect of
gradually wêakening the tie. The pacification of the Soudan
was carried out (1898) wdthout any reference to the Sultan, and
itsadministration, after the overthrow of the Khalifa, was orga-
nized on the basis of an agreement made between the British and
Egyptian Governments in January, 1899; nor was the Sultan's

(s) Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (x) Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 7
(1887). (1887).
(0 The Times, 28 June, 1887; 4 (y) Abd-ul-Messih v. Farya (1887),
July, 1887. 13 App. O. 431, 438, per Lord Watson,
{u) Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 1 delivering the judgment of the Judi-
(1888). eial Committee.
{z) London Gazette, iUig. 11, 189*).
^2 XATIOXS AND SOVEREIGN STATES.
oo-operation invited in tlio organization of the army and the

various departments of the public service. On the other hand, the
attempt made in June, 1893, by the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, to
assert hisfreedom from foreign control was repressed by Lord
Cromer manner which emphasised his dependence on the
in a
2)rotectingPower, and ho was made to understand that no changes

in the personnel of the Adtninistration would be permitted without
a previous agreement Avith the Agent of Great Britain, whose
very title proclaimed his anomalous position (a).
Beforo Great Britain entered into the occupation of Egypt she
Aêei^n^r^
1904. undertook to withdraw from the country as soon as she had placed
its finances on a sound basis and had established a satisfactory
native administration. But subsequent events showed that the

moment for withdrawal must, for the sake of the country, be
indefinitely postponed (6). Hence it was necessary to strengthen

and regularize the British position in Egypt. This was accom-
plished by the Anglo-French Agreement of April, 1904, whereby
France abandoned her demand for the retirement of Great
Britain (c) and other Powers afterwards recognised the occupa-
;
tion. Theoretically, Turkey remained the suzerain, but practi-

cally Great Britain become more and more the guiding and
controlling power. In accordance with the capitulations, justice
in Egypt continued to be administered under European control.
All these circumstances contributed to impart to the country an
anomalous international status.
Egypt a fully
constituted
rpjîg anomalous position came to an end durino-
° the Great War
British of 1914-1915. On December 17, 1914, the following official
Protectorate,
announcement was made: "His Britannic Majesty's Princijial
Secretary of State for Foreign Afi'airs gives notice that, in view
of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey, Egyi^t is
placed under the protection of His Majesty, and will henceforth

constitute a British Protectorate. The suzerainty of Turkey over
Egypt thus
is terminated, and His Majesty's Government will
adopt all measures necessary for the defence of Egypt and the
protection of its inhabitants and interests. The King has been
pleased to approve the appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir
Arthur H. McMahon to be His Majesty's High Commissioner
for Egypt."
(o) For a French view of the then Commons, Aug. 10, 1882, Hansard,
English occupation, see J. Coeheris, 3rd series, vol. cclxxiii.; Lord Salis-
Situation de I'Egypte et du Soudan bury 's speech at the Mansion House,
juridique et politique (Paris, 1903). Nov. 9, 1898.
{b) Cf. the debate in the House of (c) See infra. Appendix D.
Oji the da}' following this announcement the French Govcrn-

niont notified their recognition of the British Protectorate over
.
Egypt, and the British Government notified their adherence to

the Franco-Moorish Treaty of March 30, 1912(«^).
At thesame time the following notice was issued by the British
"
authorities: In ^'iew of the action of His Highness Abbas Hilmi
Pasha, lately Khedive of Egypt, who has adhered to the King's
enemies, His Majesty's Government have seen fit to depose him
from the Khediviate, and that high dignity has been offered, with
the title of Sultan of Egypt, to His Highness Prince Hussein
Kamel Pasha, eldest living Prince of the family of Mehemet Ali,
and has been accepted by him," In a communication from the
Acting High Commissioner in Egypt to Prince Hussein, it was
pointed out (after reciting the circumstances in which Turkey
joined Germany against Great Britain) that the British Govern-
ment regarded themselves as trustees for the inhabitants of Egypt,
that the}' would defend its territory against all aggression, that
with the disappearance of Ottoman suzerainty would also vanish
the limitations that had before been imposed on the number and
organization of the new Sultan's army and on his j)Ower to grant

distinctions of honour, that foreign relationships wôuld be con-
ducted through His Majesty's representative in Cairo, that in
internal administration the governed would as far as possible be
associated in the task of government, individual liberty would be
secured, education promoted, religious convictions respected, and
that the anomalous system' of capitulations would be revised at
the end of the wâr .
Since the treaty of June 12, 1901, by which Cuba was made Position of
over to the Cuban people, it has occupied a position with respect ^^^*-
to the United States which seems to bring it within the category
of international Protectorates. It may manage its own internal
and external affairs, but it is precluded from entering into any
euch treaty with a foreign Power as may endanger its indepen-
dence; and it undertakes to contract no debt for which the current
revenue will not suffice, and to concede to the United States the
right of intervention to preserve Cuban independence, to maintain
a government adequate for the protection of life, propert}^ and
individual liberty, and the right to use its harbours as naval
stations (e). In 1906, when a revolution broke out on the island
(d) See further, Phillipson, Inter- (e) Annual Register, 1901; fifty-
national Law and the Great War sixth Congress, c. 803; Statutes at
(London, 1915), chap. xvi. Large, vol. xxxi. p. 897. Cf. Moore,
Digest, vol. vi. § 910.
and the then President resigned his office, the United States inter-
vened, entered into military occupation of the country, appointed
a provisional governor, and removed various abuses. As soon as
the administration of the newly-elected President was firmly
established, the American governor and troops were withdrawn
(1909). There is little doubt that the United States will take
over the islanid self-government should prove a failure.
if its
Already in 1906 President llooscvelt issued a warning to that

effect (/). As conditions are at present, there does not appear to
be unanimity of opinion as to the precise international status of
the republic of Cuba. Some hold that it is a fully sovereign
State {g), others that it is a semi-sovereign State {h).
Tributary and Tributary States, and States having a feudal relation to each
other, are istill considered as sovereign, so far as their sovereignty
is not affected by this relation. Thus, it is evident that the
tribute,formerly paid by the principal maritime Powers of
Europe Barbary States, did not at all affect the sovereignty
to the
and independence of the former. So also the King of Naples had
been a nominal vassal of the Papal See, ever since the eleventli
century: but this feudal dependence, abolished in 1818, was never
considered as impairing the sovereignty of the Kingdom of
Naples {i) .
Former Tho political relations between the Ottoman Porte and the
relatione
Barbary States were of a very anomalous character. Their occa-
Ottoman sional obedience to the commands of the Sultan, accompanied
* ^^
Barbary
with the irregular payment of tribute, did not prevent them from
being considered by the Christian Powers of Europe and America
States.
as independent States, with whom the international relations of

war and peace were maintained, on the same footing as with
other Mohammedan sovereignties. During the Middle Ages, and
especially in the time of the Crusades, they were considered as

pirates
" —
Bugia ed Algieri, infami nidi di corsari," as Tasso
calls them. But they have long since acquired tho character of
lawful powers, possessing all those attributes which distinguish a
lawful State from a mere association of robbers (A:). "The
Algerines, Tripolitans, Tunisians, and those of Salee," says
(/) Foreign Eelations of the United internationale de Cuba (Paris, 1905),

States, 1906, Part I. p. xlv. chap. v.
{g) Cf E. J. Benton, International

. (i) E. Ward, Hist, of the Law of
Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish- Nations (London, 1795), voL ii. p. 69.
American War (Baltimore, 1908), {k) Sir L. Jenkins, Works, vol. ii.
pp. 290—291. p. 791. The Helena (1801), 4 O.
(A) Cf. A. Whitcomb, La situation Eob. 5.
''
Bynkershoek, are not pirates, but regular organised societies,

Avho have a fixed territory and an established government, with
whom we are alternately at peace and at war, as with other nations,
and who, therefore, are entitled to the same rights as other in-
dependent States. The European sovereigns often enter into
treaties wdth them, and the States-General have done it in several
instances. Cicero defines a regular 'Qui habet
enemy to be:
rempublicam, curiam, serarium, consensum et concordiam civiuni,

rationem aliquam, si res ita tulisset, pacis et foederis.' (Philip. 4,
c. 14.) All these things are to be found among the barbarians of
Africa; for they pay the same regard to treaties of peace and
alliance that other nations do, who generally attend more to their
convenience than to their engagements. And if they should not
observe the faith of treaties with the most scrupulous respect, it
cannot be well required of them; for it would be required in vain
of other sovereigns. Nay, if they should even act with more
injustice than other nations do, they should not, on that account, as
HuberUiS very properly observes, (De Jure Civitat. 1. iii. c. 5,
"
§ 4, n. ult.) lose the rights and privileges of sovereign States (/).
Algiers was conquered by France in 1831. Tunis has been Present
occupied by the same Power since 1881, and

administered by
is
Barbary^*
French officials under a convention concluded with the Bey in States.
1883. The Sublime Porte protested against this occupation, as
it had previously against the virtual protectorate assumed by
Franco for some years before. But the French Government re-
fused to recognise a claim which had had no effective assertion for
two centuries. Thus Tunis is now considered to be an inter-
national protectorate under the protection of France. The Tuni-
sian occupation gave rise to an apprehension of French designs
on Tripoli, and led to a diplomatic correspondence, in which the
British Foreign Secretary (Lord Granville) asserted Tripoli to
be an integral part of the dominions of the Sultan of Turkey, and
this proposition was assented to on the part of France as indis-
putable (m). In September, 1911, a quarrel having broken out

between Italy and Turkey, the former Power invaded Tripoli, and
in November issued a decree of annexation, which was ratified by
the Italian Chamber in February, 1912. The war continued,
however, till October, when the Treaty of Ouchy was signed,
(I) Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub. It is by no means clear that Tunis is

lib. i. cap. xvii. not legally under the sovereignty of
(>/i) Pari. Papers, Tunis, Nos. 1 8 — the Sultan. Pari. Papers, supra;
(1881); Annual Register, 1882, 1883. Calvo, ii. § 75.
w. 5
whereby Italian sovereignty Avas established in Tripoli. This

change was accepted by the Great Powers.
North The political relation of the North American Indians towards

Mfans^^ the United States that of semi-sovereign nations, under the
is
exclusive protectorate of another Powxr. Some of these savage

tribes have wholly extinguished their national fire, and submitted
themselves to the laws of the States within whose territorial limits
they reside; others have acknowledged, by treaty, that they hold
their national existence at the will of the State; others retain a
limited sovereignty, and the absolute proprietorship of the soil.
The latter is the case with the tribes to the west of Georgia {7i) .
Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States determined, in

ISSI, that, though the Cherokee nation of Indians, dwelling within
the jurisdictional limits of Georgia^ was not a "foreign State"
in the sense in which that term is used in the Constitution, nor
entitled, as such, to proceed in that Court against the State of
'
Georgia, yet the Cherokees constituted a State,' or a distinct
political society, capable ofmanaging its own

affairs, and govern-
ing itself, and that they had uniformly been treated as such since
the first settlement of the country. The numerous treaties made
with them by the United States recognise them as a people capable
of maintaining the relations of peace and war, and responsible in
their political capacity. Their relation to the United States was
nevertheless peculiar. They were a domestic dependent nation;
their relation to the United States resembled that of a ward to his
guardian; and they had an unquestionable right to the lands they

occupied, until that right should be extinguished by a voluntary
cession to the American Government (o) .
The same decision was repeated by the Supreme Court, in

another case, in 1832. In this case, the Court declared that the
British crown had never attempted, previous to the Revolution, to
interfere with the national affairs of the Indians, further than to
kee]3 out the agents of foreign Powers, who might seduce them
into foreign alliances. The British Government purchased the
alliance and dependence of the Indian nations by subsidies, and
purchased their lands, when they were willing to sell, at the

price they were willing to take, but it never coerced a surrender
(n) Fletcher v. PecA;, 6 Crancli, 146. Funds, 117 U. S. 288, 308, where the
(o) The Cherokee Nation v. The history of the Cherokees is traced in
State of Georgia (1831), 5 Peters, 1. the course of the judgment of the
See also The State of Georgia v. Sta1^- Court; Worcester v. State of Georgia
ôw,€ Wallace, 71; the CheroTcee Trust (1832), 6 Pet. 515.
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES. i>7
of them. The British crown considered them as nations, com-

petent to maintain the relations of peace and war, and of governing
themselves under its protection. The United States, who suc-
ceeded to the rights of the British crown, in respect to the Indians,
did the same, and no more; and the protection stipulated to be
afforded to the Indians, and claimed by them, was understood by
all parties ;as only binding the Indians to the United States, 'as
dependent allies. A
weak power does not surrender its indepen-
dence and right to self-government by associating with a stronger
and taking its protection. This was the settled doctrine of the
Law of Nations, and the Supreme Court therefore concluded and
adjudged, that the Cherokee nation was a distinct community,
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, within which the laws of Georgia could not rightfully
have any force, and into which the citizens of that State had no
right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or
in conformity with treaties, and with the Acts of Congress (p) .
More recent cases have established that the Indians residing Present status
within the limits of the United States are subject to their autho- Indians,
rity and form a dependent political community. The Federal
power can govern Indians by Act of Congress, the States having
no control so long as Indians retain their tribal organization, and
do not separate themselves from their tribe (g). An Act of Con-
gress, March 3rd, 1871, declared: "No Indian nation or tribe
within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged
or recognised as an independent nation, tribe, or Power, with
whom the United States may contract by treaty; but no obliga-
tion of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such
Indian nation or tribe prior to March 3rd, 1871, shall be hereby
invalidated or impaired" (r). Since this Act was passed, agree-
ments with Indian tribes have been made, subject to the approval
of Congress (s) The Indians are, however, protected in the terri-
.
tories retained by them. Thus, every person who makes a settle-

ment on any lands secured or granted by treaty with the United
States to any Indian tribe, is liable to a penalty of 1,000
Qp) Kent, (Comment, on American Funds, 117 TJ.S. 288; TJ . 8 w Kagama

. .
Law, vol. iii.p. 383 (12th ed.). (1886), 118 U. S. 375; The Cherokee
(^q) V . S. V. Sogers (1846), 4 Nation v. Southern Kansas Rail. Co.
Howard, 572; Machey v. Coxe (1855), (1890), 135 U. S. 641; Talton v. Mayes
18 Howard, 104; Holden v. Joy, 17 (1896), 163 U. S. 372.
Wallace, 211; U. S. v. Holliday, 3 (r) U. S. Revised Statutes, Title
Wallace, 407 ; Abbott, National Digest, Indians, xxviii. eh. 2, sect. 2079.
vol. iii. tit. Indians; Crow Dog, In (*) Moore, Digest, vol. i. p. 37.
re, 109 U. S. 556; The Cherohee Trust
5(2)
68 NATIONS AND SOVEEEIGN STATES.
dollars (if). No one but an Indian may trade in their territory

without a licence (w), and even hunting there is prohibited (a?) .
For purposes, American Courts

also, of private international law,
regard Indians, and white men naturalised within an Indian tribe,

residing on Indian reserves, as members of alien nationalities («/).
Relations of Korea *was regarded by the Chinese Government until quite

China and
certain recently as a vassal kingdom of that empire, though the claim was
Asiatic from time to time repudiated by the Korean king. On the out-
kingdoms.
break of the Chino- Japanese war in 1894, Korea renounced the
Chinese suzerainty, and in January, 1895, formally declared her-
self independent. In October, 1897, the king of Korea pro-
claimed himself emperor (2;). In 1904, Japan and Korea con-
cluded a treaty, by which Japan engaged to guarantee the
integrity of the latter country, reserving to herself a right to
occupy it in case of necessity; and Korea agreed to appoint hei'
diplomatic and financial advisers on the recommendation of
Japan, and to make treaties with foreign Powers only with the
latter' s approval. A further treaty between the two parties,
November, 1905, established a Japanese protectorate over Korea,
in that Japan acquired the right to control Korean foreign rela-
tionships, and appointed a Japanese ^Hesident-General to direct

diplomatic laffairs. In 1910, however, Japan annexed Korea.
By the treaty of 9th June, 1885, between France and China,
the foreign intercourse of Annam' was to be through France,
but the question of Chinese suzerainty was left unsettled (a) .
Annam is therefore a French international protectorate.

By the Anglo-Chinese Convention, signed at Pekin on the 24th
July, 1886, England agreed that the highest authority in Burmah
shall send to Pekin the customary decennial missions to present
articles of local produce, the members of the mission to be of
Burmese race; but China agreed, that in all matters whatsoever
appertaining and rule which England is now exer-
to the authority
cising in Burmah, England shall be free to do whatever she

deems fit and proper (&). The Chinese claim to suzerainty in
Tibet was fully recognised by Great Britain in the convention
for carrying out the frontier delimitation of that country (c) .
(t) U. S. Ee vised Statutes, ch. iii. Wharton, Digest, § 208; Calvo, Bk. II.
sect. 2118; Worcester v. State of § 69.
Georgia (1832), 6 Peters, 515; Clark (^) Wharton, loc. eit. ; Nafire v.
V. Smith, 13 Peters, 195; Latimer v. U. S., 164 U. S. 657.
Poteet, 14 Peters, 4; U.S. v. Joseph, (2;) Annual Eegister, 1895, 1897.
4 Otto, 614. (a) Annual Eegister, 1886, p. 334.
0^) Ibid. ch. iv. sect. 2133. (6) Hertslet, Com. Treaties, xviii.
Ix) Ibid. sect. 2137. See also the p. 299; and see ibid. xix. 163, xx. 233.
cases of Holden v. Joy^ 17 Wallace, (c) Ibid, xviii. 288.
211 ; U. S. V. 6^00^, 19 Wallace, 591 ;
In British India there are more than 600 Native States, whose Status of the
rulers are knoAvn as Protected Princes. Of their precise relations protected

to the suzerain Power not ea^y to give a satisfactory defini-
it is Trinces.
tion, nor are they regulated by any uniform code of rules. The
Protected Princes are strictly precluded from forming any con-
nection or engagement either among themselves or with foreign
Powers. In the words of Sir William Lee- Warner, s" They
cannot enter into a treaty of extradition with their neighbours
without the intervention of the British authority; they cannot
receive commercial agents; they are even unable to allow
Europeans or Americans to enter their service without the con-
sent of the paramount Power; they have no direct intercourse
with the consular agents or representatives of foreign nations
accredited to the government of India; and they cannot receive
from foreign sovereigns decorations or orders except under the
regulations prescribed for British subjects." But they are not
subject to legislation by the Governor-General in Council or by
the Legislative Councils of the Presidency in which they are
situated, nor is the law of British India administered within their
borders. They enjoy and exercise under the sanction of the
British Government the functions and attributes of internal sove-
reignty, but they are bound to receive the Resident or Agent

appointed by the Viceroy The Indian Government has formally
.
declared that the principles of international law have no bearing
upon the relations between itself and the Native States under the
suzerainty ,of the king. Whether this declaration is rigidly
correct or is completely followed in practiceperhaps be
may
doubted, but it is clear that the Native Princes of India have
no international status in the sense in which it is used in this
volume (<^). But for purposes other than those involving public
international relationships, and more especially with regard to
matters falling within the sphere of private international juris-
prudence, these Native States of India are considered separate
political communities possessing an independent civil, criminal,
and fiscal jurisdiction (e). ^^
States be single, or may be united together under a
may common Single or
1
j> i 1 , united States,
sovereign prince, or by a lederal compact.
{<£) See Lee- Warner, The Protected Papers, 1914); ihid. pp. 020 seq., a
Princes of India (1894); the quota- paper on the Native States of India,
tion in the text is at p. 245 (a second as a review of Lee- Warner's second
edition of this work was published edition; Notification published by the
in 1910 under the title, The Native Government of India, Aug. 21, 1891.
States of India); Westlake, Chapters (e) Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. The
on the Principles of International Law Rajah of FaridJcote, (1894) App. C.
(1894) (reprinted in his Collected 670.
70 NATIONS AND SOVEEEIGN STATES.
* '
Personal 1. If this union under acommon sovereign is not an incor-
union under ' '
the same jjorate union, that is to say, if it is only personal in the reigning
'
sovereig-n .
or even
sovereign ;
if it is real,' yet if the different component
parts are united with a perfect equality of rights, the sovereignty
of each State remains unim^paired (/) .
Thus, the kingdom of Hanover was formerly held by the king

of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, separately
from his insular dominions (1714-1837). Hanover and the
United Kingdom were subject to the same prince, without any
dependence! on each other, both kingdoms retaining their respective
national rights of sovereignty. It was thus that the king of
Prussia was, down to 1857, also sovereign prince of Neufchatel,
one of the Swiss Cantons; which did not, on that account, cease to
maintain its relations with the Confederation, nor was it united
with the Prussian monarchy {g) .
Other historical examples of personal unions are that between

Spain and the Holy Roman Empire in the reign of Charles V.;
and that between the Netherlands and Luxemburg between 1815
and 1890.
Such a form of union existed also between Belgium and the
Congo Free State (1885-1908). With the annexation of the
by Belgium, September, 1908, the last example of

latter a per-
sonal union disappeared. It may be said, however, that a personal
union not, strictly speaking, a union at all, as it simply comes
is
into existence when the same monarch happens to be the sovereign

in more than one State at the same time.
'Real' union
under the
A real union, on the contrary, consists of several States forming
together a single international person The constituent members
.
so vereig-n .
retain their respective constitutions and internal sovereignty, and
miay also enjoy, to a certain extent, international personality.

Thus, the kingdoms of Sweden and Norway were united from 1814
to 1905 under one crowned head, each kingdom retaining its
separate constitution, laws, and civil administration, the external
sovereignty of each being represented by the king. Further, each
State retained its own naval and commercial flag, a fact which —
rendered the union imperfect. After their separation was effected
by the Treaty of Karlstad, 1905, the independence of Norway was
guaranteed by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia in
1907 and 1908.
De Jur. Bel. ac Pac,

(/) Grotius, by the King of Prussia in 1857, and
lib. ii.
§§ 8, 9. Kluber, Droit
cap. 9, Neufchatel has since formed part of
des Gens mod erne de I'Europe, Part I. the Swiss Confederation, on the same
cap. 1, § 27. Heffter, Das Europaische footing as the other cantons. See-
Volkerrecht, § 20. Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. ii.
(^) This sovereignty was renounced p. 1317.
NATIONS AND SOVEEEIGN STATES. 71
The union of the different States composing the Austrian

monarchy union, at all events since the year 1867 (h).
is a 'real'
The hereditary dominions o£ the House of Austria, the kingdoms

of Hungary and Bohemia, the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and
other States, are all indissolubly united under the same sceptre,
but with distinct fundamental laws, and other political
institutions.
It aj^pears to be an intelligible distinction between such a union
as that of the Austrian States, and other unions w^hich are merely
'personal' under the same crowned head, that, in the case of a

'real' union, though the separate sovereignty of each State may
stillsubsist internally, in respect to its co-ordinate States, and in
respect to the imperial crown; yet the sovereignty of each is

merged in the general sovereignty of the empire, as to their inter-
national relations with foreign Powers. The political unity of
the States which compose the Austrian Empire forms what the
Germ.an publicists call a community of States (' Gesammtstaat '); -"^
a community which reposes on historical antecedents. It is con-
nected with the natural progress of things, in the same way as the
empire was formed, by an agglomeration of various nationalities,
which defended, as long as possible, their ancient constitutions,
and only yielded, finally, to the ovei^whelming influence of superior
force.
Since the Ausgleich or Compromise of the year 1867, the Constitution
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, as it is now called, forms a bipartite Hungarian'**"

" "
State, consisting of a German, or Cisleithan monarchy, and a monarchy.
' ' "
Magyar, or Transleithan kingdom, the former officially desig-
nated as Austria, and the latter as Hungary. Each of the two
countries has its own parliament, ministers, and government, while
the connecting ties between them are comprised in the person of
the hereditary sovereign, in a common army, navy, and diplomacy,
and in a controlling body known as the delegations. The dele-
gations form a parliament of 120 members, one-half of whom are
chosen by, and represent, the legislature of Austria, and the other
half that of Hungary, the Upper House of each returning 20,
and the Lower House 40 On
subjects affecting the
delegates.
common affairs, the delegations have a decisive vote, and their
resolutions require neither the confirmation nor the approbation of
the representative assemblies in which they have their source. The
jurisdiction of the delegations is limited to foreign affairs and war
(A) Ae to whether the Pragmatic Austria and Hungary, there is a dif-

Sanction of 1723 established a real or ference of opinion,
eimply a personal union between
72' NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES.
and tli(} finance involved therein, and their final vote on these
points binding* upon the whole empire.

is A
commercial union
also subsists between the two countries, w4iich has, however, to be
renewed levery ten years and is dependent on identical acts of the
two legislatures (i) .
2 An incorporate
' '
Incorporate . union is such as that which subsists

miion.
between Scotland and England, and between Great Britain and
Ireland; forming out of the three king'domis an em^Dire, united
under one crown and one legislature, although each may have
distinct laws and a separate administration. The sovereignty,
internal and external, of each original kingdom is completely
merged in the United Kingdom, thus formed by their successive
unions.
Union 3. The union established by the Congress of Vienna, between
between
Russia and the :empire of Russia and the kingdom of Poland, is of a more
Poland. anomalous character. By the final act of the Congress (1815),
the duchy of Warsaw, Avith the exception of the provinces and
districts otherwise disposed of, was reunited to the Russian
Empire; and was stipulated that it should be irrevocably con-
it
nected with that empire by its constitution, to be possessed by his

Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, his heirs and successors
in perpetuity, with the title of King of Poland; his Majesty
reserving the right to give to this State, enjoying a distinct

administration, such interior extension as he should judge
proper; and that the Poles, subject respectively to Russia, Austria,
and Prussia, should obtain a representation and national institu-
according to that mode of political existence which
tions, regulated
each government, to Avhom they belong, should think useful and
proper to grant (k) .
Charter In pursuance of these stipulations, the Emjêror Alexander

accorded by
granted a constitutional charter to the kingdom of 'Poland, on
the Emperor
Alexander to 15th (27th) November, 1815. By the j)i'Ovisions of this charter,
the kingdom
of Poland, in the kingdom of Poland was declared to be united to the Russian
1815.
Empire by its constitution; the sovereign authority in Poland
was to be exercised only in conformity to it; the coronation of the
King of Poland was to take place in the Polish capital, where he
was bound to take an oath to observe the charter. The Polish
nation was to have a perpetual representation, composed of the
king and the two chambers forming the Diet; in which body the
legislative ]30wer was to bo vested, including that of taxation. A
(0 a. The Statesman's Year Book, (k) Hertslet, Map of Eurojê, vol.
1915, pp. 669 seg. See G. Drage, i.
p. 216.
Austria-Hungary (1909).
distinct Polish national army and coinage, and distinct military

orders were to be preserved in the kingdom .
In consequence of the revolution and reconquest of Poland by Manifesto of
Russia, a manifesto was issued by the Emperor Nicholas, on the ]sichok^^^^^

14th (26th) of February, 1832, by which the kingdom of Poland 1832.
Avas declared to be perpetually united ('reuni') to the Russian
Empire, and to form an integral part thereof the coronation of the ;
emperors of Russia and kings of Poland hereafter to take place at

Moscow, by one and the same act; the Diet to be abolished, and the
army of the empire and of the kingdom to form' one army, without
distinction of Russian or Polish troops; Poland to be separately
administered by a Governor-General and Council of Administra-
tion, appointed by the emperor, and to preserve its civil and
criminal code, subject to alteration and revision by laws and
ordinances prepared in the Polish Council of State, and subse-
quently examined and confirmed in the Section of the Council of
'
State of the Russian Empire, called The Section for the affairs
'
of Poland consultative Provincial States to be established in the

;
different Polish provinces, to deliberate upon such affairs con-
cerning the general interest of the kingdom of Poland as might

be submitted to their consideration the Assemblies of th:> Nobles,
;
Communal Assemblies, and Council of the Waiwodes to be con-

tinued as formerly. Great Britain and France protested against
this measure of the Russian Government, as an infraction of the
S2)irit if not of the letter of the treaties of Vienna (Z).
Russian Poland had its separate government till 1864, when it
was finally dej^rived of its administrative independence. In 1868,
hj an Imperial decree the government of Poland was entirely
incorporated with that of Russia.

4. Sovereign States permanently united together by a federal Federal
^^^^^^•
compact, form either a system of confederated States (properly so
called), or a supreme federal governin'ont, which has been some-
' '
times called a compositive State (m) .
In the first case, the several States are connected together by a Confederated
compact, which does not essentially differ from an ordinary treaty ^^f-*.^^.'
®^^^
of equal alliance. Consequently the internal sovereignty of each its own
member of the union remains unimpaired; the resolutions of the ??staaten-^
federal body (acting through a Diet or Congress) being enforced, î^nd').
aiot as laws directly binding on the private individual subjects,
(0 Wheaton, History of the Law of compacts are very appropriately ex-

!Nâtions, p. 434. Hertslet, Map of pressed in the German language, by
Europe, vol. iii. p. 1685, note. the respective terms of Staatenbund '
'
(;«) These two species of federal and ' Bundesstaat.'

but through the agency of each seiparate governmient, adopting

them, and giving them the force of law within its own jurisdic-
tion. Hence it follows, that each confederated individual State,
and the federal body for the affairs of comjmon interest, may
become, each in its appropriate sphere, the object of distinct diplo-
matic relations with other nations. Some historical examples
of this kind of Confederacy are the United Netherlands (1580-
1795), the United States of America under the Articles of Con-

federation (1781-1789), the Swiss Confederacy (before 1798 and
1815-1848), the Germanic Confederation (1815-1866), the con-
federacy between Honduras, San Salvador and Nicaragua (1896-
1898).*^
Supreme In the second case, the federal government created by the act
federal
of union is
sovereign and supreme, within the sphere of the powers
government or
compositive granted to it by that act; and the government acts not only upon
State (' Bun-
desstaat '). the States which are members of the confederation, but directly
on the citizens. The sovereignty, both internal and external, of
each several State is impaired by the powers thus granted to the
federal government, and the limitations thus imposed on the
several State governments. The compositive State, which results
from this league, is alone a sovereign Power. Existing instances
of federal unions are the United States of America since 1789,
Switzerland since 1848, (the united States of) Mexico since 1857,
(the united States of) Argentina since 1860, the German Empire
since 1871, (the united States of) Brazil since 1891, Venezuela
since 1893 (w).
Germanic Germany, as it was constituted under the name of the Germanic
Confedera-
tion (1815— Confederation, presented the example of a system of sovereign
1866). States, united by an equal and permanent Confederation. All the
sovereign princes and free cities of Germany, including 'the
Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, in respect to their

possessions which formerly belonged to the Germanic Empire^
the King of Denmark for the duchy of Holstein, and the King of
the (Netherlands for the grand duchy of Luxemburg, were united
in ia perpetual league, under the name of the Germanic Confedera-
tion, established by the Federal Act of 1815, and completed and

developed by several subsequent decrees.
The object of this union was declared to be the preservation of
the external and internal security of Germany, the independence
and inviolability of the confederated States. All the members
(n) Cf. L. Le Fur, Etat federal et of Federal Government (Boston^

confederation d'Etats (Paris, 18%); 1891).
A. B. Hart, Introduction to the Study
NATIONS AND SOVEEEIGN STATES. 75
of the Confederation, as such, were entitled to equal rights. New-

States might be admitted into the union by the unanimous con-
sent of the members (o)The affairs of the union were confided
.
to a Federative Diet, which sat at Frankfort-on-tlie-Main, in

which the respective States were represented by their ministers
with a voting power proportionate to the importance of each State.
Austria presided in the Diet, but each State had a right to pro-
pose any measure for deliberation. The Diet was formed into
what was called a 'General Assembly' ('Plenum'), for the deci-
sion of certain specific questions. Every question to be submitted
to the general assembly of the Diet was first discussed in the ordi-
nary assembly, where it was decided by a majority of votes. But

in the general assembly ('in pleno') two-thirds of all the votes
were necessary to a decision. The ordinary assembly determined
what subjects were submitted to the general assembly. But
to be
all questions concerning the adoption or alteration of the funda-
mental laws of the Confederation, or organic regulations estab-
lishing permanent institutions, as means of carrying into effect
the declared objects of the union, or the admissipn of new members
or eoncerning the affairs of religion, were submitted to the general
assembly; and, in all these cases, absolute mianimity was necessary

to a final decision (p) . The Diet had power to establish funda-
mental laws for the Confederation, and organic regulations as to
its foreign, military, and internal relations (g) All the States
.
guaranteed domi-
to each other the possession of their respective
nions within the union, and engaged to defend, not only entire
Germany, but each individual State, in case of attack. When
wâr was declared by the Confederation, no State could negotiate
separately with the enemy, nor conclude peace or an armistice,
without the consent of the rest. Each member of the Confedera-
tion might contract alliances with other foreign States, provided
they were not directed against the security of the Confederation,
or the individual States of which it was composed. No vState could
make war upon another member of the union, but all the States
were bound to subniit their differences to the decision of the Diet.
This body was to endeavour to settle them by mediation; and if
unsuccessful, and a juridical sentence became necessary, resort was
to bo had to an arbitral tribunal, (' Austragal Instanz,') to which'
the litigating parties were bound to submit without appeal (r).
(o) Acte final du Congres de Vienne, (ji) Acte fiinal, Art. 58. Wiener
Art. 53j 54, 55. Deutsche Bundesacte, —
Schluss-Acte, Art. 12 15.
vom 8 Juni, 1815, Art. 1. Wiener {q) Acte final, Art. 62.
Schluss-Acte, vom 15 Mai, 1820, Art. (r) Acte final, Art. 63.
1,6.
Ill (Ca-so of rebellion or iiisuiToction, or iiixminent danger thereof

in one or more States of the Confederation, the Diet might inter-
fere to suppress such insurrection or rebellion, as threatening the
general safety of the Confederation. The decrees of the Diet

were executed by the governments of the particular States
local
of the Confederation, on application to them by the Diet for that
purpose, excepting in those cases where the Diet interfered to

suppress an insurrection or rebellion in one or more of the States;,
and even in these instances, the execution was to be enforced, «o
far as practicable, in concert with the local government against
Avhose ^subjects it was directed (s). The Diet had also power to
regulate the commercial intercourse between the different States,
and the free navigation of the rivers belonging to the Confedera-
tion, as secured by the Treaty of Vienna (^).
Of the
Notwithstanding the great mass of powers thus given to the
sovereignty of Diet, and the numerous imposed upon the exercise of

restraints
the States
internal, sovereignty, by the individual States of which the union
of^
Confedera- was composed, it does not appear that the Germanic Confederation
tion.
could be distinguished in this respect from an ordinary equal alli-
ance between independent sovereigns, except by its permanence,
and by the greater number and complication of the objects it was
intended to embrace. In respect to their internal sovereignty,
the several States of the Confederation did not form, by their
union, one compositive State, nor were they subject to a common
sovereign. Though what were called the fundamental laws of
the Confederation were framed by the Diet, which had also power
to make organicregulations respecting its federal relations, these
regulations were not, in general, enforced as laws directly binding

on the private individual subjects, but only through the agency
of each separate Government adopting them, and giving them tlie
force of laws within its own local jurisdiction All the members of
.
the Confederation, as such, were equal in rights; and the occa-

sional obedience of the Diet, and through it of the several States,
to the commands
of the two great preponderating members of the
Confederation, Austria and Prussia, or even the habitual influence

exercised by the'm over its councils, and over the councils of its
several States, did not, in

legal contemplation, impair their
internal sovereignty, or change the legal character of their union.
Of the In respect to the exercise by the confederated States of their
sovereignty of
external sovereignty, we have already seen that the power of
these States.
(s) Wiener Schluss-Acte, Art. 32. (t) Bundesacte, Art. 19. Acta final,
Art. 108—117.
contracting alliances with other States, foreign to the Confedera-

tion, was expressly reserved to all the confederated States, with
the proviso that such alliances were not directed against the secu-
rity of the Confederation itself, or that of the several States of

which it was composed. Each State also retained its rights of
legation, both with respect to foreign Powers and to its co-
States (u) Although the diplomatic relations of the Confedera-
.
tion with the five great European Powers, parties to the Final
Act of the Congress of Vienna, 1815, were habitually maintained
by permanent legations from those Powers to the Diet at Frank-
fort, yet the Confederation itself was not habitually represented
by public ministers at the courts of these, or any other foreign

Powers; whilst each confederated State habitually sent to, and
receivetl such minister from other sovereign States, both within
and without the Confederation. It was only on extraordinary
occasions, such, for example, as the case of a negotiation for the
conclusion of a peace or armistice, that the Diet appointed
plenipotentiaries to treat with foreign Powers (x) .
Such of the confederated States as had possessions without the states with
limits of the Confederation, retained the authority of declaring
bevond^the
and carrying on war against any Power foreign to the Conf edera- Confedera-
tion, independently of the Confederation itself, which remained
neutral in such a war, unless the Diet should recognise the
existence of a danger threatening the federal territory. The
sovereign members of the Confederation, having possessions with-
out the limits thereof, were the Emperor of Austria, the King of
Prussia, the King of the Netherlands, and the King of Denmark.
Whenever, therefore, any one of these sovereigns undertook a
war in his character of a European Power, the Confederation,
Avhosc relations and obligations were unaffected by such Avar,
remained a stranger thereto; in other words, it remained neutral,
even if the war was defensive on the part of the confederated sove-
reign as to his possessions without the Confederation, unless the
Diet recognised the existence of a danger threatening the federal
territory {y) .
In other cases of disputes, arising between any State of the

Confederation and foreign Powers, and the former asked the inter-
vention of the Diet, the Confederation might interfere as an all}',
or as a mediator; might examine the respective complaints and
(m) Kliiber, Offentliches Eecht des {y) Wiener Schluss-Acte, Art. 4<j,
Beutfichen Bundes, §§ 461, 463. 47. Offentliches Recht des
Kmber,
ix) Kliiber, § 148, § 152 a. Wiener Bnnde^ S^ 152
rjeutsohen liundes,
ueutsclien T)2 t.
f
Schluss-Acte, § 49.
pretensions ,of the contending parties. If the result of the inves-
tigation was, that the co-State was not in the right, the Diet would
make the most serious representations to induce it to renounce its
pretensions, would refuse its interference, and, in case of necessity,,
would take proper means for the preservation of peace
all If, on .
the contrary, the preliminary examination proved that the con-

federated State was in the right, the Diet would employ its good
offices to obtain for it complete satisfaction and security (z) .
The Grermanic It follows, that not only the internal but the external sove-
Confedera-
tion a reignty of the several States composing the Germanic Confedera-
eystem of remained unimpaired, except so far as it might be affected
confederated tion,
States.
by the express provisions of the fundamental laws authorizing
the federal body to represent their external sovereignty In other .
respects, the several confederated States remained independent of

each other, and of all States foreign to the Confederation. Their
union constituted what the German public jurists call a
'
Staatenbund,' a league of States, as contradistinguished from a

'
Bundesstaat,' that is to say, a union of States under a supreme

Federal Government (a) .
German The growing power of the Germanic Confederation, and the

unity.
desire of establishing German unity, gave rise to the project of
creating an empire that should embrace the whole German race.

In 1848, a congress assembled at Frankfort for the purpose of
discussing this scheme, but nothing was then effected. Since that
date the idea has been frequently revived, but the rivalry of
Austria and Prussia, and the ambition and jealousy of the minor
States long prevented its being carried out.
The war of 1864 entered into by Austria and Prussia against
Denmark, tended materially to promote German unity; and the
subsequent war of 1866, between Austria and Prussia, resulted
in the dissolution of the Germanic Confederation, and the estab-
North lishment of the North German Confederation. Austria was
German Con
federation. thereby excluded from participating in the affairs of Germany (6),
and Prussia placed at the head of a national movement. This
Confederation consisted of the kingdoms of Prussia and Saxony,
(z) Wiener Sehluss-Acte; Art. 35

— but de cette Confederation est le main-
49. Kliiber, § 462. tien de la siirete exterieure et inte-
(«) Kliiber, §§ 103a, 176, 248, 460, rieure de I'Allemagne, de I'independ-
461, 462. Heffter, Das Europaische ance et de I'inviolabilite de ses etats
Volkerrecht, § 21. confederes."
The Treaty of Paris, 1814, Art. 6, For further details respecting the
"
declares: Les etats de FAllemagne Germanic Constitution, see Wheaton,
seront independans et unis par un lien History of the Law of Nations, pp. 455
fedoratif." et seq.
The Final Act of the Congress of Map of
Vienna, 1815, Art. 54, declares:
" —
Le
(b) Hertslet,
Treaty, vol. iii. p. 1699.
Europe by-
the Grand Duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-
Strelitz, Oldenburg, and Saxe-Weimar, the Duchies of Anhalt,

Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Coburg, and Saxe-Altenburg, some smaller
States, and the free cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Liibeck (c).
These States agreed to enter into a perpetual confederation for
the defence of the Federal territory, and of the rights prevailing
therein, a*s well as for fostering the welfare of the German people.
After the war of 1870-71 with France, the idea of unity The Grerman
received its fullest development. The kingdoms of Bavaria and thT war with
Wiirtemberg, and the Grand Duchies of Baden and Hesse, were France.
united to the North German Confederation, and the whole received
the name of the German Empire {d) Within this Confederate
.
territory the empire exercises the right of legislation according to

the tenor of the Constitution, and with the effect that the imperial
laws take precedence of the laws of the States (e). Legislation
is carried on by a Council of the Confederation (' Bundesrat '),
and an Imperial Diet (' Reichstag') (/). The Council consists

of the representatives of the members of the Confederation,
amongst whom the votes are divided in such manner that Prussia
has, with the former votes of Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Holstein,
Nassau and Frankfort, seventeen votes, Bavaria six, Saxony four,
Wiirtemberg four, Baden three, Hesse three, Alsace-Lorraine
three, Mecklenburg-Schwerin two, Brunswick two, and seventeen
smaller States, one each {g). The totality of such votes can only
be given in one sense, and there are sixty-one votes in all.
The Presidency of the Confederation belongs to the King of
Prussia, who bears the name of German Emperor, and who repre-
sents the empire internationally, declares war, makes peace, enters
into treaties, and receives ambassadors. The consent of the Coun-
cil is necessary for declaring war, unless the territory of the empire
is actually attacked (/i). The Imperial Diet is elected by uni-
versal land direct election (^), and its proceedings are public (A;).
The army and navy of the whole empire are single forces under
the command of the Emperor {l).
Thus, Germany has now become a 'compositive' State, and
the independence of its various members is merged in the sove-
reignty of the empire; though the regnant heads of the several

vStates retain their personal position as Sovereigns.
(o) State Papers, vol. Ivii. p. 296. (/) Art. v.

Hertalet, Map of Europe by Treaty, {g) Art. vi.
vol. iii. p. 1807. (A) Art. xi.
{d) Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. iii. (€) Art. xx.
p. 1930. Ik) Art. xxii.
(<?) Art. ii. of the Constitution of (J) Arts. liii. and Ixiii.
the German Empire.
TheZoU- One of the drawbacks to the Germanic Confederation of 1815

verem.
^^^ ^j^^ preservation by each State of its own custom-houses and
imposts. This was found to interfere so materially with the
development of trade, that the Diet endeavoured to frame somo
legislative scheme for regulating" the whole customs duties of the
union, and for abolishing internal custom-houses within its terri-
tories. The Diet failed in its attempt, but the idea was gradually
carried out by independent action on the part of several of the
States. In 1827, Bavaria and Wiirtemberg signed a treaty sup-
pressing the custom-houses between themselves, adopting a uni-
form and dividing the receipts proportionally (m)
tariff of duties, .
This was the treaty of the kind, and was soon followed by
first
others with the same object, e.g., by Prussia with Anhalt and
Hesse-Darmstadt, and by Saxony with Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick,

Nassau, and some smaller States.
The customs association to Avhich Prussia belonged was called
'
the Zollverein,' and by the year 1855, the exertions of that State
had absorbed into this league the whole of Germany, except
Austria, the two Mecklenburg Duchies, Holstein, and the Hanse
Towns (t?). In 1867, the Zollverein was re-constituted by a
treaty which came into force on the 1st of January, 1868, and
was to continue till the 31st of December, 1877. In 1868, the
Mecklenburg Duchies and Liibeck joined the league, which, as
Austria had then been excluded from the affairs of Germany,
embraced all the German Empire except the free towns of Ham-
burg and Bremen. The constitution of the German Empire of
1871 expressly kept in force the treaty of July, 1867, and con-
firmed the right of Hamburg and Bremen to remain as free ports
outside the customs frontier, until they should apply to be ad-
mitted therein (o). This application Avas made in 1888, and
Hamburg and Bremen entered into the Zollverein in October of
that year (p) Since 1906 this customs union embraces practically
.
the whole of the States of Germany and the Grand Duchy of

Luxemburg, as well as the Austrian communes of Jungholz and
Mittelberg.
United States The constitution of the United States of America is of a very

merica.
different nature from that of the Germanic Confederation. It is
not merely a league of sovereign States for their common defence
(w) Martens, Nouveau Kecueil, vol. let, Map of Europe, vol. iii. pp. 1939,
vii. p. 167. State Papera, vol. xiv. 1941. Statesman's Manual, 1877, tit.
p . 8 3 . G ermany .
(w) Calvo, vol. i. § 63, p. 166. {p) Annual Register, 1888.

(o) Arts. xl. and xxxiv. See Herts-
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES. 81;
against external and internal violence, but a supreme federal

govern ment, or composite State, acting not only upon the sove-
reign members of the Union, but directly upon all its citizens in
their individual and corporate capacities. It was established, as
the constitutional act expressly declares, by ''the people of the
UiQite<l States, inorder to form a more perfect union, establish
justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common de-
fence, promote the general weKare, and secure the blessings of
liberty to them and their posterity" (g). This constitution, and
the laws made in pursuance thereof, and treaties made under the
authority of the United States, are declared to be the supreme law
of the land; and that the judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding .
The legislative power of the Union is vested in a Congress, Legislative
consisting of a Senate, the members of which are chosen by the union,

local legislatures of the several States, and a House of Representa-
tives, elected by the people in each State. This Congress has

power to levy taxes and duties, to pay the debts, and provide for
the common defence and general welfare of the Union; to borrow
mone}' on the credit of the United States; to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes; to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the Union;
to coin money, and fix the standard of weights and measures;
to establish post-offices and post-roads; to secure to authors and
inventors the exclusive jight to their writings and discoveiries;;
to punish piracies and felonies on tlie high seas, and offences
against the law of nations; to declare war, grant letters of marque

and reprisal, and regulate captures by sea and land; to raise and
support armies; to provide and maintain a navy; to make rules
for the government of the land and naval forces; to exercise
exclusive civil and criminal legislation over the district where the
seat of the federal government is established, and over all forts,
magazines, arsenals, and dockyards belonging'- to the Union, and

to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution all
these and the other powers vested in the federal government by
the constitution.
(<?) The form of government is a twelfth in 1804; a thirteenth in

based on the Constitution of Sept. 17, 1865; a fourteenth in 1868; a fifteentli
1787. To this ten amendments were in 1870; a sixteenth and a seven-
added in 1791; an eleventh in 1798; teenth in 1913.
w. 6
Executive Xo ffive effect to this mass of sovereign authorities, the execu-

tive power is vested in a President of the United States, chosen by
electors appointed in each State in such manner as the legisluture
thereof may
direct. The judicial power extends to all cases in
law and equity arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties
of the Union, and is vested in a Supreme Court, and such inferior
tribunals as Congress may establish. The federal judiciary exer-
cises under this grant of power the authority to examine the laws
passed by Congress and the several State legislatures, and, in
cases proper for judicial determination, to decide on the constitu-
tional validity of such laws. The judicial power also extends to
all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;
to âll eases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to contro-

versies to which the United States shall be a party to controversies ;
between two or more States; between a State and citizens of

another State; between citizens of different States; between citi-
zens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different
States; and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign
States, citizens, or subjects (r) .
Legislation in Danaconsiders the language of this Article of the Constitution

States. likely to mislead foreign readers. He denies the existence of any
tribunal which has special and direct power to decide questions of
constitutional law. The Supreme Court is the court of final
resort, from whose decision there is no appeal; but, like all other
courts, it only decides the questions of law that litigants bring
before it. The American Constitution a code of positive law;
is
and is, moreover, the law having the liighest authority in the
Union. Acts of Congress do not correspond to English Acts of
Parliament. The latter are supreme; and the only business of an
English Court, when an Act comes before it, is to fix upon it the
interpretation which the legislature is supposed to have intended.
In America, a litigant may appeal to the Supreme Court against
an x^ct of Congress, and the Court may declare whether the Act
is constitutional or not. If the Court pronounces an Act to be
unconstitutional, it remains on the statute book, but is inoperative,

unless the Court at a subsequent time reverses its own decision (s) .
Story, in his Commentary on the Constitution, says, "In

measures exclusively of a.political, legislative, or executive charac-
plain that, as the supreme authority as to these questions

ter, it is
belongs to the legislative and executive departments, they cannot
(r) Const., Art. iii. § 2. (s) Wheaton, ed. by Dana, note 31,
p. 79.
be re-examined elsewhere. But where the question is of a dif-

ferent nature, and capable of judicial inquiry and decision, there
it admits of a very different consideration. It is in such cases
that there is a finaland common arbiter provided by the Consti-
tution itself, to whose decisions all others are subordinate; and
that arbiter is the supreme judicial authority of the Courts of the
Union. No mode is provided by which any superior tribunal can
re-examine what the Supreme Court has itself decided" (^).

In 1866, an application was made to the Supreme Couii; to
restrain the Presidentfrom carrying into effect an Act of Congress
alleged tobe unconstitutional; but the Court decided that such a
proceeding was not within their jurisdiction. In 1895, the
Supreme Court decided that the income tax imposed by the Tariff
Act of the previous year was unconstitutional, and the amounts
alreadj^ paid under it were refunded. This decision involved a
loss to the revenue estimated at 30,000,000?. per annum' (u).
The treaty -making is vested exclusively in the Presi- Treaty-
power
dent and Senate; negotiated with foreign States being ^(f^g^^
all treaties
subject to their ratification. No State of the Union can enter

into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque
and reprisal; coinmoney; emit bills of credit; make any thing
but gold and a tender in the payment of debts; pass
silver coin
any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obli-
gation of contracts; grant any title of nobility; lay any duties on
imports or exports, except such as are necessary to execute its
local inspection laws, the produce of which must be paid into the
national treasury; and such laws are subject to the revision and
control iof Congress. Nor can any State, without the consent
of Congress, lay any tonnage duty; keep troops or ships of war
in time of peace; enter into any agreement or compact with
another State or with a foreign Power; or engage in war unlesg
actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as does not
admit of delay. The Union guarantees to every State a repub-
lican form of government, and engages
to protect each of them
against invasion, and, on application of the legislature, or of the

executive, when the legislature cannot be convened, against
domestic violence.
It is not within the province of this w'ork to determine how far The American
the internal sovereignty of the respective States composing the ^^^^^^^^
supreme
(t} J. Story, Commentarieg on the Loan mid Trust Co., 158 U. S. Rep.
Constitution of the United States, 601. A account of the American
full
vol. i. p. 266 (4th ed. Boston, 1873). judicial system will be found in Bryce,
(u) State of Mississippi v. Johnson, The American Commonwealth, chaps.
4 Wallace, 475; PollocJc v. Farmer's 22 and 42 (Revised ed. 1910).
:
6(2)
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES.
Union is impaired or modified by^ these constitutional provisions.

But since all those powers, by, which the international relations of
these States are maintained with foreign States, in peace and in
war, are expressly conferred by the constitution on the federal
government, whilst the exercise of these po\Vers by the several
States expressly prohibited, it is evident that the external sove-
is
reignty of the nation is exclusively Vested in the Union. The

independence of the respective States, in this respect, is merged in
the sovereignty of the federal government, which thus becomes
'
what the German public jurists call a Bundesstaat.'
The Swiss Confederation, as remodelled by the federal pact of

1815, consists of a union between the then twenty-two Cantons
of Switzerland ;
the obj ect of which
declared to be the preserva-
is
tion of their freedom, independence, and security against foreign
attack, and of domestic order and tranquillity. The several

Cantons guarantee to each other their respective constitutions and
territorial possessions.The Confederation has a common army
and treasury, supported by levies of men and contributions of
money, in certain fixed proportions, amlong the different Cantons.
In addition to these contributions, the military expenses of the
Confederation are defrayed by duties on the importation of
foreign merchandise, collected by the frontier Cantons, according
to the tariff established by the Diet, and paid into the com'mon
treasury. The Diet consists of one deputy from every Canton,

each having one vote, -and assembles every year, alternately, at
Berne, Zurich, and Lucerne, which are called the directing
Cantons (the 'Vororte'). The Diet has the exclusive power of
declaring war, and concluding treaties of peace, alliance, and com-
merce, with foreign States. A
majority of three-fourths of the
votes is essential to the validity of these acts; for all other pur-
poses, a majority is Each. Canton may conclude

sufficient.
separate military capitulations and treaties, relating to economical

matters and objects of police, with foreign Powers;- provided they
do not contravene the federal pact, nor the constitutional rights
of the other Cantons. The Diet provides for the internal and
external security of the Confederation; directs the operations, and
appoints the commanders of the federal army, and names the

ministers deputed to other foreign States. The direction of affairs,
when the Diet is nbt in session, is confided to the directing Canton
('Vorort'), which is empowered to act during the recess. The

character of directing Canton alternates every two years, between
Zurich, Berne, and Lucerne. The Diet may delegate to the
'
directing Canton, or Vorort,' special full powers, under extra-

ordinar}- circumstances, to be exercised when the Diet is not in
session; âdding, when it thinks fit, federal representatives, to
' '
assist the Vorort in the direction of the affairs of the Confedera-

tion. In case of internal or external danger, each Canton has a
right to require the aid of the other Cantons in which case, ;
'
notice is to be immediately given to the Vorort,' in order that the

Diet may be assembled, to provide the necessary measures of
security {x) .
The compact, by which the sovereign Cantons of Switzerland Constitution

are thus united, forms a federal body, which, in some respects, Confedera-^
resembles the Germanic Confederation, whilst in others it more tion compared
•
1 A •
/-I • •
-n 1 /-^
y^'mx those of
nearly approximates to the American Constitution, iiiach Canton the Germanic
retains its original sovereignty unimpaired, for all domestic pur- fônfedera-
poses, even more completely than the German States; but the the United
power of making war, and of concluding treaties of peace, alliance,

and commerce, with foreign States, being exclusively vested in
the federal Diet, all the foreign relations of the country necessarily
fall under the cognizance of that body. In this respect, the pre-
sent Swiss Confederation differs materially from' that which
existed before the French Revolution of 1789, which was, in effect,
a mere treaty of alliance for the common defence against external
hostility, but which did not prevent the several Cantons frorn
making separate treaties with each other, and with foreign
Powers {y) .
Since the French Revolution of 1830, various changes have Abortive

taken place in the local constitutions of the different Cantons, sincrFsso to
tending to give them a more democratic character; and several change the
attempts were made to revise the federal pact, so as to give it more of 1815.
'
of the character of a supreme federal government, or Bundes-

staat,' in respect to the internal relations of the Confederation.
Those attempts proved abortive; and Switzerland remained sub-
ject to the federal pact of 1815, except that three of the original
Cantons,
— Basle,
Unterwalden, and Appenzel, were dismem- —
bered, so as to increase the whole number of Cantons to twenty-
five. But as each division of these three original Cantons was
entitled to half a vote only in the Diet, the total number of votes
remained twenty-two, as under the original federal pact {z) .
In 1848, the Swiss Constitution was remodelled, but the essen- Changes in
tial principles of the pact of 1815 were maintained. The Cantons Constitution
(jc) Martens, Nouveau Recueil, torn. Public.

viii. p. 173. Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations,
(y) Merlin, E6pertoire, tit. if«we5;fr<3
(z)
pp. 494 —
i96.
in 1848 and retained their sovereignty, except where it was limited by the
'
constitution; they exercised all rights that were not conferred on

the Federal Government. All political alliances between the
Cantons were forbidden; but they were entitled to enter into
conventions among themselves for regulating matters appertaining
to legislation, the administration of justice, &c., subject to the
approval of the federal authority. The Federal Council repre-

sented the Cantons in their relation to foreign States. The rights
of declaring war, of making peace, and of entering into treaties
were vested, as before, exclusively in the Federal Government.
The supreme authority of the Union was vested in a Federal
Assembly, consisting of two houses— a national council ('Na-
tionalrat') elected directly by the people, and a council of States
(' Standerat ') composed
of two deputies from each Canton (forty-
four in all). The Federal Council or executive (' Bundesrat')
was composed of seven persons elected by the Federal Assembly
from all the citizens eligible for the National Council, but no
two members of it were to come from' the same Canton. They
retained their office for three years, and from among them a
President was annually to be chosen, but they Avere precluded from
sitting in either House of the Federal Legislature. This body
constituted the executive authority of the Confederation (a) . In
1874 the Swiss Constitution was again revised, and some serious
changes were made. The power of the Federal Government was
greatly strengthened, and the maintenance and control of the army
was conferred upon it(&). Switzerland has now ceased to be a
system of confederated States ('Staatenbund'), and has become a

' '
compositive State (' Bundesstaat ') (c).
(«) See Calvo, liv. ii. § 55. (c) Of. J. M. Vincent, Government
lb) Annual Eeg. 1874, p. 288. in Switzerland (London, 1900).
Calvo, loG. eit.
87
PART SECOND.
ABSOLUTE INTEENATIONAL EIGHTS OF STATES.
CHAPTER I.
RIGHT OF SELF-PRESERVATION AND INDEPENDENCE.
The which sovereign States enjoy with regard to one Rights of

rights
another may be divided into rights of two sorts: primitive or stater mtu
or absolute to one
primary, rights; conditional, or hypothetical rights (a), respect
Every State has certain sovereign rights, to which it is entitled
as an independent moral being; in other words, because it is a
State. These rights are called the absolute international rights.
of States, because they are not limited to particular circumstances.
^
The rights to which sovereign States are entitled, under par-
ticular circumstances, in their relations with others, may be termed
their conditional international rights; and they cease with the
circumstances which gave rise to them. They are consequences
of a quality of a sovereign State, but consequences which are not
permanent, and which are only produced under particular

circumstances. Thus war, for exam^ple, confers on belligerent
or neutral States certain rights, which c ease with the existence of
the war.
Ofthe absolute international rights of States, one of the most Right of self-
^^•
essential and important, and that which lies at the foundation of P^®^®''^*
all the rest, is the right of self-preservation. It is not only a right
with respect to other States, but a, duty with respect to its own
members, and the most solemn and important which the State
owes to them. iThis right nec-essarily involves all other incidental
rights, Avhich are essential as means to give effect to the principal
end .
(«) Kliiber, Droit des Gens modcrne de I'Europe, § 36.

88 RIGHT OF SELF-PRESERVATION
of self-
Right
defence
Among these is the right of self-defence. This again involves
modified by the right to require the military service of all its people, to levy-
the equal
troops and maintain a naval force, to build fortifications, and to
rights of
other States, impose and collect taxes for all these purposes.) It is evident that
or by treaty.
the exercise of tliese absolute sovereign rights can be controlled
only by the equal corresponding rights of other States, or by

special compacts freely entered into with others, to modify the
exercise of these rights.
Ik In the exercise of these means of defence, no
independent State
can be restricted by any foreign Power. But another nation may,
by virtue of own
right of self-j)reservation, if it sees in these
its
preparations an occasion for alarm', or if it anticipates any possible

danger of aggression, demand explanations; and good faith, as
well as sound policy, requires that these inquiries, when they are
reasonable and made with good intentions, should be satisfactorily
answered (b).
Thus, the absolute right to erect fortifications within the terri-
tory of the State has sometimes been modified by treaties, where
the erection of such fortifications has been deemed to threaten the
safety of other communities, or where such a concession has been

extorted in the pride of victory, by a Power strong enough to
dictate the conditions of peace to its enemy. Thus, by the Treaty
of Utrecht, between Great Britain and France, confirmed by that
of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, and of Paris, in 1763, the French
Government engaged to demolish the fortifications of Dunkirk.
This stipulation, so humiliating to France, was effaced in the
treatj^ of peace concluded between the two countries, in 1783,
after the war of the American Bevolution. By the treaty
signed
at Paris, in 1815, between the Allied Powers and France, it was
stipulated that the fortifications of Huningen, within the French

territory, which had been constantly a subject of uneasiness to the
city of Basle, in the Helvetic Confederation, should be demolished,
and should never be renewed or replaced by other fortifications,
at a distance of not less than three leagues from the city of
Basle (c). After the separation of Belgium and Holland in 1831,
the Powers agreed that as the neutrality of
Belgium had been
guaranteed, she ought to change the system of military defence
which had been adopted for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and
the Belgian fortresses of Menin, Ath, Mons, Philippeville and
Marienberg were accordingly selected for demolition (d). In 1856
Jib) Heffter, § 40. (d) Protocol of 17th April, 1831. /,
(c) Martens, Recueil des Traites, See Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. ii. \
torn. ii.
p. 4€9. pp. 856, 882.
AND INDEPENDENCE. 89
Russia agreed that the Aland Islands in the Baltic should not be
and that no military or naval establishment should be
fortified,
maintained there (e) . Eussia and Turkey also ugreed at the Peace
of Paris, 1856, not to maintain any military-maritime arsenals
on the coast of the Black Sea, but this clause of the treaty was
abrogated in 1871 (/).
^Tn pursuance of the fundamental right of self-defence, certain Self-defence
/jl^xtra-territorial acts involving a breach of international

law and territoiial"
/?
^ disregard of the rights of other States may sometimes be resorted
to on the ground of urgent necessity Thus in 1807 England
1
fi<'t8.
.)
seized the Danish order to prevent its falling into the hands
fleet in
of Napoleon, —a proceeding which has been condemned by con-

tinental writers, but defended by Anglo-American. In 1837,
during the Canadian insurrection, the American steamer, the
Caroline, w hich was intended to be used for an attack on British
"Territory, was seized by Canadian forces and set adrift over the
Niagara Falls. Before the expedition against the vessel liad
started it was thought that she would be found moored in British
territory, but afterwards it was found she had shifted to the

American side of the Niagara River; none the less, she was
seized. In the negotiations between the two Governments (which
lasted five years), the United States complained of the violation
of its territory, whereupon Great Britain replied that the Ameri-
can Government had permitted within its territory the making
of hostile preparations, and that its subjects had supported the
insurrection. Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, held that
in order to justify the act of the Canadian authorities England yu^-^-û.
"
must show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, ;
and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation," /
and also that the said authorities "did nothing unreasonable or

by the necessity of self-defence
excessive, since the act justified
must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it/|^^_^
These conditions were accepted by Lord Ashburton as being appli-
cable to the question at issue, and were shown to have been
fulfilled. The British Government, however, expressed its regret
for what had occurred and for not making an a2>ology earlier;
and so the matter was settled amicably (g). Again, during the
Cuban insurrection against Spain (1873), the Virginius, a vessel
belonging to Cuban insurgents and employed in furtherance of
(e) Ibid. vol. ii. p. 1272. (^) Of. Pari. Papers (1843), vol.
(/) Art. xiii. See Hertalet, vol. ii. Ixi.; J.B. Moore, International Arbi- ^^^""^^
p. 1256; vol. iii. p. 1920. trations (Washington, 1898), vol. iii.
pp. 2419 seq.
the rebellion, was capturied, flying theAmerican flag, by a Spanish

warship. She was taken to Santiago de Cuba, a number of her
officers, crew, and other persons on board (including Americans,
Englishmen, and Cubans) were court-martialled, condemned to-
death as pirates and executed. The charge of piracy was ground-
less, and the execution of the prisoners unjustifiable. Spain after-
wards paid compensation to the United States and to Great
Britain. On the other haîd, the seizure of the vessel (which was
handed OAêr to the United States) appears to have been reg-'arded
as justified on the ground of self-defence (/i). Similarly, by
reason of the necessity of self-preservation, the Japanese forces
invaded Korea and Manchuria at the outbreak of the Kusso-
Japanese war (1904). In the Great War (1914) the German
Government also appealed to necessity to justify the invasion of
Belgium in anticipation of the threatened attack by France. But
the facts and documents so far available by no means support the
German contention (^).
Right of in- Tlie right of every independent State to increase its national
interference, dominions, wealth, population, and power, by all innocent and

—
lawful means such as the pacific acquisition of new territory, tho
discovery and settlement of new countries, the extension of its
navigation and fisheries, the improvement of its revenues, arts^
agriculture, and commerce, the increase of its military and naval
force —is an incontrovertible right of sovereignty, generally recog-
nised b}'- the usage and opinion of nations. It can be limited in
itsexercise only by the equal correspondent rights of other States^
growing out of the same primeval right of self-preservation.
Where the exercise of this right, by any of these means, directly
affects the security of others— as where it immediately interferes
—
\ li^ wit]i tlie actual exercise of the sovereign rights of other States
there is precise limits. But where it
no difficulty in assigning its
merel)" involves a supposed contingent danger to the safety of

others, arising out of the undue aggrandisement of a particular
State, or the disturbance of what has been called the balance of
power, questions of the greatest difficulty arise, which belong

rath6>r to the science of politics than of public law .
Tlie occasions on which the right of forcible interference has

been exercised in order to prevent the undue aggrandisement of a
iJi) Cf. Pari. Papers (1874), vol. (0 Cf. Pliillipson, International

Ixxvi.; Moore, Digest, vol. ii. pp. 895 Law and the Great War (1915)^
-[ seq., 967 seq., 980 seq.) Cobbett, chap. ii.
Cases, vol. i. pp. 165 seq.

AND INDEPENDENCE. 1^1
particular State, by such innocent and lawful means as those above

mentioned, are comparatively few, and cannot be justified in any
case, in that where an exoessive augmentation of
except its
military and naval forces may giye just ground of alarm to its
neighbours. The internal development of the resources of a

country, or its acquisition of colonies and dependencies at a
distance from Europe, has never been considered a just motive
for such interference. It seenis to be felt with respect to the
latter, that distant coloniesand dependencies generally weaken,

and always render more vulnera^ble the metropolitan State. And
with respect to the former, although the wealth and population of
a country are the most effectual means by which its power can be
augmented, such an augmentation is too gradual to excite alarm.
To which it must be added that the injustice and mischief of ad-
mitting that riations have a right to use force for the express
pui-pose of retarding the civilization and' diminishing the pros-
perity of their inoffensive neighbours, are too revolting to allow
such a right to be inserted in the internâtional code. Interfer-
ences, therefore, to preserve the balance of power, have been
generally confined to prevent a sovereign, already powerful, from
incorporating conquered provinces into his territory, or increasing
his dominions by marriage or inheritance, or exercising* a
dictatorial influence over the councils and conduct of other
independent States (k) .
"
Sir W. Harcourt says of intervention: It is a high and sum- Legal aspect
^^ i^ter-
/W' mary procedure which may sometimes snatch a remedy beyond
/ the reach of law. Nevertheless it must be admitted that in the
j/y case of intervention, as in that of revolution, its essence is ille-
_^
r' gft ^,tx, and its justification is its success. Of all things at once
^ the most unjustifiable and the most impolitic is an unsuccessful
jf intervention" (?). Chateaubriand, in a speech in the French
f
Chamber on the Spanish war of 1823, asserted that "no Govern- t
f ment has a right to interfere in the affairs of another Government, i.j£^.

^)^ except in the case where the security and immediate interests of, %\z!S^,--
"
,x^the first Government are com|promised (w). It seems impossible ^ y^
^"^
to lay down any distinct rules with regard to intervention. ^^^
We may say, however, that as sovereign States are independent ^Hj^^
and equal from the point of view of international law, and are
J(ik) Senior, Edinb. Rev. No. 156, eh. 12, § 41; Moiiiteur, loth Feb.
^
Art. 1, p. 329. 1823; Manning, Law of Nations,
r {l) Letters of EQstoricus, p. 41. p. 98; Amari, Nouvel expose du prin-
/ {ni) See Halleck, International Law cipe de non-intervention, in Revue de
/(ed. Sir G. S. Baker, 1908), vol. i. Droit Int. 1873, p. 352.
pp. 104, 105; Alison, Hist, of Europe,
therefore entitled to work out their development in their own way,

a fundamental principle that follows as a corollary is that of non-
interference in the affairs of other soveireigns that is to say, in
;
the absence of a specific right conferred

by convention or neces-
sarily arising from the dominant principle of self-preservation.
But having regard to international practice, as well as to theoreti-
— to mention earlier periods
cal principles, we must admit that ^not
—during the nineteenth century there were numerous instances of
forcible intervention on other grounds than those just mentioned,
for example, in the interests of humanity, or with a view to jafe-^
guarding the balance of power (though this object may be more

or less connected with the principle of self-preservation) As has .
already been observed, the subject belongs to politics rather than to

public law. fit cannot be distinctly stated what combination of
circumstances menaces the security of any State, or tends to dis-
turb the balance of power, and what does not. Statesmen must
be guided by the knowledge they possess of the intentions of other
'JLCJ^ countries, and by what they deem necessary for the security of
their own, and in the present condition of Europe there seems little
probability of any rules regarding intervention being attended to,
even if they could be satisfactorily drawn up (n) .
Eqtiilibrium Each member of the great society of nations being entirely,

of forces.
independent; of every other, and living in what has been called a
st^te of nature in respect to others, acknowledging no common
sovereign, arbiter, or judge; the law which prevails between
nations being deficient in those external sanctions by which the
laws of civil society are enforced among individuals and the per- ;
formance of the duties of international law being compelled by

moral sanctions only, by fear on the part of nations of provoking
general hostility, and incurring its probable evils in case they
should violate this law; an apprehension of the possible conse-
quences of the undue aggrandisement of any one nation upon the
independence and the safety of others, has induced the States of
modern Europe to observe, with systematic vigilance, every
material disturbance in the equilibrium of their respective forces.
Earlier This 2Ji"eventive policy has been the pretext of the most bloody
and destructive wars waged in modern times, some of which have
certainly originated in well-founded apprehensions of peril to the
independence of weaker States, but the greater part have been
founded upon insufficient reasons, disguising the real motives by
which princes and cabinets have been influenced. Wherever the
(n) See Oalvo, vol. i. bk. iii.

AND INDEPENDENCE. 93,
spirit ofencroachment has really threatened the general security,

it commonly broken out in such overt acts as not only plainly
has
indicated the ambitious purpose, but also furnished substantive
grounds in themselves sufficient to justify a resort to arms by

other nations. Such were the grounds of the confederacies created,
and the wars undertaken to check the agg'randisement of Spain
and the house of Austria, under Charles V. and his successors; —
an object finally accomplished by the treaty of Westphalia, which *^'*"^::^^^''*^
so long constituted the. written publio law of Europe. The long

and violent struggle between the religious parties engendered by
the Reformation in Germany, spread throughout Europe, and
became closely connected with political interests and ambition.
The great Catholic and Protestant Powers mutually protected the
adherents of their own faith in the bosom of rival States. The
repeated interference of Austria and Spain in favour of the
Catholic faction in France, Germany, and England, and of the
Protestant Powers to protect their persecuted brethren in Ger-
many, France, and the Netherlands, gave a peculiar colouring to
the political transactions of the age. This was still moro
heightened by the conduct of Catholic France under the ministry
of Cardinal Richelieu, in sustaining, by a singular refinement of
policy, the Protestant princes and people of Germany against the

house of Austria, while she was persecuting with unrelenting
severity her own subjects of the xeformed faith. The balance
of power adjusted by the peace of Westphalia was once more dis-
turbed by the ambition of Louis XIV., which compelled the
Protestant States of Europe to unite with the house of Austria
against the encroachments of France herself, and induced the
allies to patronise the English Revolution of 1688, whilst the
French monarch interfered to support the pretensions of the ^

Stuarts. uThese great transactions furnished numerous examples V^^MOAv^'^^^
of interference by the European States in the affairs of each OA /t^-Cd/Ui^
other, where the and security of the interfering Powera
interest
were supposed to be seriously affected by the domestic transactions ,
of other nations, which can hardly be referred to any fixed and |
definite principle of international law, or furnish a general rule

fit to be observed in other apparently analogous cases (o) .
The same remarks will apply to the more recent, but not less Wars of the
important events growing out of the French Revolution. They Revolution
furnish a strong admonition against attempting to reduce to a
rule, and to incorporate into the code of nations, a principle so
(o) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, Pt. I. §§ 2, 3, pp. 80—88.

^
M RIGHT OF SELF-PEESERVATION
indefinite and so poculiaiiy liable to abuse, in its practioal appli-

cation. The formed by the great European
successive coalitions
monarchies against France subsequent to her first revolution of
1789, were avowedly designed to check the progress of her revo-
lutionary principles and the extension of her military power.
Such was the principle of intervention in the internal affairs of
France, avowed by the Allied Courts, and by the publicists who
sustained their cause. France, on her side, relying on the inde-
pendence of nations, contended for non-interVention as a right..
Alliance of The efforts of these coalitions ultimately resulted in the formation
the five great
European
ofan alliance, intended to be pernianent, between the four great
Powers. Powers of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain, to which
France subsequently acceded, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle,
in 1818, constituting a sort of superintending authority in these
Powers over the international affairs of Europe, the precise extent
and objects of which were never very accurately defined. As
interpreted by those of the contracting Powers, who were also the
original parties to the compact called the Holy Alliance, this union
was intended to form a perpetual systean of intervention among
the EurojDean States, adapted to prevent any such change in the
internal forms of their respective governments, as might endanger
the existence of the monarchical institutions which had been re-
-established under the legitimate dynasties of their respective
reigning houses. UThis general right of interference was some-
tim;es defined so as to be applicable to every case of popular
revolution, where the change in the form of government did not

jjroceed from the voluntary concession of the reigning sovereign,
or was not confirmed by his sanction, given under such circum-
stances as toremove all doubt of his having freely consented.
At it was extended :to every revolutionary movement
other times,
pronounced by these Powers to endanger, in its consequences,

immediate or remote, the social.order of Europe, or the particular
safetj' of neighbouring States.
;
The
events Avhich followed the Congress of Aix-la-ChapeUe
prove the inefficacy of all the attempts that have been made to
establish a general and invariable principle on the subject of
intervention. It is, in fact, impossible to lay down an .absjjlu.te
î^le on this Subject; anid every rule that wants that quality 'must
necessarily be vague,, and subject to the abuses to which human
passions will give rise, in its practical application.
Congress of The measures adopted by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, at the
Troppau and
of Laybach. Congress of Troppau and Laybach, in respect to the Neapolitan
Revolution of 1820, were founded upon principles adapted to give
the great Powers of the European continent a perpetual pretext

for interfering in the internal concerns of its different States The .
BritishGovernment expressly dissented from these principles, not

only upon the ground of their being, if reciprocally acted on, con-
trary to the fundamental laws of Great Britain, but such as could
not safely be admitted as part of a system of international law].
/(In the circular despatch, addressed oxi this occasion to all jts i
diplomatic agents, it was stated that, though no Government oould

be more prepared than the British Govermnent was to uphold the
right of any State or States to interfere, where their own immje- j /^jjt^^^ j
jdiate security or essential intejrests are seriously endangered by
the internal transactions of another State, it regarded the assump-
tion of such a right as only to be justified by the strongest neces-
sity, and to be limited and regulated thereby; and did not admit
that it could receive a general and indiscriminate application to
allrevolutionary movements, without reference to their immediate
bearing upon some particular State or States, or that it could be
made, prospectively, the basis of a;n alliance J) The British Govern-
ment regarded its exercise as an exception to general principles
of the greatest value and importance, and as one that only properly
grows out of the sj)ecial circumstances of the case; but it at the"

same time considered, that exceptions of this description never
can, without the utmost danger, be so fa^r reduced to rule, as .to
be incorporated into the ordinary diplomaey of States, or into the
institutes of thelaw of nations (2>) .
The British Government also declined to be a party to the Congress of
proceedings of the Congress held at Verona, in 1822, which ulti-

mately led to an armed interference by France, under the sanction
of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, in the internal affairs of Spain,
and the overthrow of the Spanish Constitution of the Cortes.
The British Government disclaimed for itself, and denied to other
Powers, the right of requiring any changes in the internal insti-

tutions of independent States, with the menace of hostile attack
in case of refusal. It did not consider the Spanish Revolution
as affording a case of that direct and imminent danger /to the
safety and interest of other States, which might justify a forcible
interference. The original alliaiiice between Great Britain and
the other principal European Powers, was specifically designed
for the re-conquest and liberation of the European continent from
the military dominion of France; and having subverted that domi-
(^) Lord Castlereagh's Circular Despatch, Jan. 19, 1821, Annual Register,
vol, Ixii. Part II. p. 737.
96 EIGHT OF SELF-PRESERVATION
nion, i,t took the state of possession, as established by the peace,

under the joint protection of the alliance. It never was, however,
intended as a union for the g-overnment of the world, or for .tihe
superintendence of the internal affairs of other States. No proof
had been produced to the British Grovernment of any design, on
the part of Spain, to invade the territory of France; of any
attempt to introduce disaffection among her soldiery; or of any

project to undermine her political institutions; and, so long as
the struggles and disturbances of Spain should be confined within
the circL of her own territory, they could not be admitted by ,the
British Government to afford
any plea for foreign interference.
Cf If the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth
century saw all Europe combined a,gainst France, it was not on

account of the internal chajiges which France thought necessary
for her own political and civil reformation ;
but because she
attempted to propagate, first, her principles, and afterwards her
dominion, by the sword (g) >\ .
War between Both Great Britain aoid the United States, on the same occa-
Spain and hi r
Ajnerican sion, protested against the right of the Allied Powers to interfere,
colonies.
by forcible means, in the contest between Spain and her revolted
American Colonies. The British Government declared its deter-
mination to remain strictly neutral, should the war be unhappily
prolonged; but that the junction of any foreign Power, in an
enterprise of Spain against the colonies, would be viewed by it
as constituting an entirely new question, and one upon which
itmust take such decision as the interests of Grea^t Britain might
require. It declared that it could not enter into any stipulation,
binding itself either to recognition of the inde-
refuse or delay its
pendence of the colonies, nor wait indefinitely for an accommoda-

tion between Spain and the colonies, and that it would consider
any foreign interference, by force or menace, in the dispute

between them, as a motive for recognising the la,tter without
delay (r).
Attitude of
the United
/The United States Government declared that it should consider
States. any attempt, on the part of the allied European Powers, to extend
their peculiar political system to the American continent, as
dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. With |
(q) Confidential Minute of Lord Same, 31st March, 1823, p. 141.

Castlereagh on the Affairs of Spain, (r) Memorandum of Conference
communicated to the Allied Oourte in between Mr. Secretary Canning and
May, 1822. Annual Register, vol. Ixv., Prince Polignac, 9th October, 1828,
Public Documents, p. 94. Mr. Secre- Annual Register, vol. Ixvi.^ Public
tary Canning's Letter to Sir C. Stuart, Documents, p. 99.
28th Jan. 1823, p. 114. Same to the
the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power they

had not interfered, and should not interfere; but with respect to
the Governments, whose independence they had recognised, they
could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing
them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, in any
other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition
towards the United States. They had declared their neutrality in
the war between Spain and those new Gt)vernments, at the time
of their recognition; and to this neutrality they should continue to
adhere, provided no change should occur, which, in their judg-

ment, should make a corresponding change, on the part of the
United States, indispensable to their ow n security The late events
.
in Spain and Portugal showed that Europe was still unsettled.

Of this important fact no stronger proof could be adduced than
that the Allied Powers should have thought it proper, on any
principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force

in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposi-
tions might be carried, on the same principle, was a question on
which all independent Powers, whose governments differed from
theirs, were interested,
—
even those most remote, and none more—
so than the United States.
The policy of the American Government, in regard to Europe,

adopted at an early stage of the war which had so long agitated
that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remained the same. This
policy was, not to interfere in the interna], concerns of a,ny of the

European Powers; to consider the government, de facto, as the
legitimate government for them; to cultiva,te friendly relations
with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly
policy; meeting, in all instances, the justcliaims of every Power,

— /
submitting to injuries from none.

yButf,
with regard to the
American continents, circumstances were widely different. It was y
impossible that the Allied Powers should extend their political
system to any portion of these continents, without endangering
the peace and happiness of the United States It was therefore
.v
impossible that the latter should behold such iiiterposition in any

form with indifference (s) .
This policy of the United States has acquired the name o£ the The Monroe
"
Monroe doctrine," from its having received its most explicit
enunciation in President Monroe's seventh annual message to Con-
(s) President Monroe's Message to Congress, 2nd December, 1823. Annual

" -—*
Register, vol. Ixv., Public Documents, p. 193.
w7 7,
"
gress, Dec. 2, 1823.. In the wars of the European Powers,"
said the President, "in matters relating to themBelves we havia
never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so.
It is only when our
rights are invaded or seriously menaced, that
we resent injuries or make preparations for our defeii^. With
the movements in this hemisphere we are of neoesslty^more inti-
mately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all
enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the

Allied Powers is essentially different in this respect from that of
America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their
respective governments. We owe it, therefore, to candour
. . .
and to the amicable relations existing between the United States

and those Powers to declare that we should consider any attempt
on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemi-
"
sphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety (t). This formula
7 mûst be now regarded as a permanent part of the foreign policy
"
of the United States, but it still exists only as a doctrine," and
has not been incorporated into any legislative enactment or into
aoij, convention {u).
Later developments of the Monroe doctrine have carried it to
a length, and have produced results which were scarcely foreseen
by its founder. President Monroe, it is true, went so far in an
"
earlier part of the sa,m;e
message a principle in which
to assert, as
the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the
American continents, by the free and independent condition which
they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be con-
sidered as subjects for future colonization by any European
"
Powers (x). In a letter written by Jefferson to Monroe, Oct. 24,
1823., the former thus formulated the American policy: "Our
first maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of
Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle in
cis- Atlantic affairs." This was extended by President Grant, who
"
in 1870 declared that for the future no territory on this continent
shall be regarded as a subject of transfer to an European Power."
That the United States came to claim the right of leadership and,
to a certain extent, of superintendence in American affairs relative
to non -American countries was emphasized in the report (July,
1870) of Mi:^îsh, the Secretary of State, to President Grant.
"
The United States," it was said, " by the priority of their inde-
Annual Message to
{t) President's p. 218. Calvo. Droit International,
(Congress,2nd Dec. 1823. Cf. J. D. Bk. III. §§ 143, 144.
Richardson, Messages and Papers of (u) Calvo, loc. cit.; Wharton,
the Presidents of the United States, Digest, §§ 45, 57.
10 vols. (Washington, 1896), vol. ii. 0^) Richardson, loc. cit. p. 209.
pendence, by tlie stability of their institutions,

bj the regard qf
their people for the forms of law, by their resources as a govern-
ment, by their naval power, by their commercial enterprise, by

the attractions which they offer tq European immigration, by the
prodigious internal development of their resources and wealth, and

by the intellectual life of their population, occupy of necessity a,
prominent position on this continent which they neither can nor
should abdicate, which entitles them to a leading voice, and which
imposes on them duties of right and of honour regarding A'merioan
questions, whether thoae questions affect emancipated colonies, or
colonies still subject to European dominion." With the exception
of the last statement respecting European rights in the existing
colonies in America, the accuracy of this pronouncement may be
accepted. It does not, of course,imply that the United States has

any right to intervene in the internal affairs of the States on the
American continent beyond the grounds of intervention stated
above, or to interfere with their independence.
Secretary Olney, in his despatch of July 20th, 1895, laid it
down as an axiom that "any permanent political union between a
European and American State was unnatural and inexpedient."
As Lord Salisbury hinted in his reply, this general condemnation
would apply to the connection between Canada, between the West
Indian Islands, Honduras, Guiana, and Great Britain, a Power
which actually possesses more territory upon the continent of
North America than does the United States itself. Finally, in
the course of the protracted negotiations arising out of the boun-
dary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, President

Cleveland gave a startling illustration of the lengths to which the
Monroe doctrine might be pushed. In his message of December
"
17th, 1895, he claimed for the United States the right to take
measures to determine with sufficient certainty for its justification
what is the true divisional line between Venezuela and British
Guiana"; for this purpose a Commission, <3onsisting solely of
United States representatives, Was to take evidence and report,
and on receipt of the report it would be the duty of the United 4/
"
States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful agg'res- ^
\
ncAr
sion upon its rights and interests, the appropriation to Great
Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction
/
over any territory which after investigation we have determined
of right to belong to Venezuela." The tone of the message natu-
rally excited much resentment in Great Britain, and was regretted

by a large section of ;public opinion in the United States Happily,
.
an accommodating spirit was manifested on both sides, and in the

7(2)
closing days of 1896 an Arbitration Treaty was concrudod, whose

award, made in October, 1899, set the disputed boundary finally
at rest {y) .
In accordance with the iprinciple upon which the Monroe doctrine

is based the United States has persistently refused to incur inter-
national obligations outside its own hemisphere. It authorized
the attendance of its delegate at the West African Conference at
Berlin, 1885, but declined to ratify the General Act, which would
have imposed upon its Government a duty in respect of the terri-^
torial integrity and neutrality of distant regions where it has no

established interests or control of any kind. And in ratifying the
General Act of the Brussels Conference for the suppression of the
slave trade, in 1892, the United States representative caused it
to be recorded that his Government disclaimed any intention to

indicate any interest whatever in the possessions or protectorates
established or claimed in Africa by the other Powers {z) .
Since,
however, annexation of Hawaii in 1898, and the cession to it of
its
the Philippine Islands by Spain in the same year, it has become
increasingly difficult for the United States to retain its policy of

isolation. Its commercial interests in China have forced it into
taking joint action with the other great Powers, its forces were
represented both in the garrison of the Pekin Legations and in
the subsequent military occupation.
It is generally admitted that the United States exercises a certain
political hegemony on the American continent. But neither this
position nor the insistence on the Monroe doctrine would neces-

sarily mean that the United States Government would intervene
to prevent a transatlantic Power from exacting just reparation
from an American State. Thus the United States, while it inter-
vened in 1865 between France and Mexico, and in 1896 between
Great Britain and Venezuela, held aloof in 1901 when Great
Britain, Germany and Italy sought to make Venezuela fulfil her
international obligations It was in reference to the latter occasion
.
that President Roosevelt observed in the course of his message,

Dec. 3» We do not guarantee any State against punishment if
:
''
it misconducts itseK, provided that punishment does not take

the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American
Power" (^).
During the course of the Great War, it was reported that the
(y) For the application of the {z) Wharton, Digest, § 51 Hertslet,

;
Monroe doctrine to the projected Map of Africa by Treaty, No. 22.

Panama and Nicaraguan canals, see («) Moore, Digest, vol. vi. p. 590,
post, pp. 324 seq.
Soutli American Republics of Ecuador and Colombia were not

observing the obligation of neutrality, in that they allowed
Germany tomake use of their wireless stations as intelligence

centres for her naval forces. Accordingly Great Britain and
France asked the United States to bring pressure to bear on the
Republics in question in order to secure the proper observance of
their duties of neutrality otherwise the Allies would be compelled
;
to take their own steps to bring the Republics to a sense of their

resjaonsibility (&). was felt in America that the action of the
It
Allies in giving the United States Government an opportunity of
using its good offices in South America amounted to a most

generous acceptance of the Monroe doctrine. However, as the
United States Government had no direct stake and was not closely
concerned, it was thought that there would be no objection to the
landing of British and French forces in Ecuador and Colombia

for the purpose of destroying the wireless installations and taking
similar punitive measures, so long as no territory theffi "Wf^s to be
. --o « ,
permanently occupied.
Great Britain had limited herself to protesting against' tKe British
interference of the French Government in the internal affairs of in^theâffSrs
Spain, and had refrained from interposing by force, to prevent

of Portugal
the invasion of the peninsula by France. The constitution of the

Cortes was overturned, and Ferdinand VII. restored to absolute
power. These events were followed by the death of John VI.,
King of Portugal, in 1825. The constitution of Brazil had pro-
vided that its crown should never be united on the same head with
that of Portugal; and Don Pedro resigned the latter to his infant
daughter, Donna Maria, appointing a regency to govern the king-

dom during her minority, and at the same time, granting a
constitutional charter to the European dominions of the House of
Braganza. The Spanish Government, restored to the plenitude

of its absolute authority, and dreading the example of the peace-
able establishment of a constitutional government in a neighbour-
ing kingdom, countenanced the pretensions of Don Miguel to the

Portuguese crown, and supported the efforts of his partisans to
overthrow the regency and the charter. Hostile inroads into the
territory of Portugal were concerted in Spain, and executed with
the connivance of the Spanish authorities, by Portuguese troops,
belonging to the party of the Pretender, who had deserted into

Spain, and were received and succoured by the Spanish authorities
(6) The Times, Nov. 14, 1914, p. 8.

102 EIGHT OF SELF-PEESEEVATI02^
on the frontiers Under these circunistaiices, the British Govern-

.
ment received an application from the regency of Portugal, claim-

ing, in virtue of the ancient treaties of alliance and friendship
subsisting between the two crowns, the military aid of Great
Britain against the hostile aggression of Spain. In acceding to
that application, and sending a corps of British troops for the
defence of Portugal, it was stated by the British minister that the
Portuguese Constitution was admitted to have proceeded from a
':<^ legitimate source, and

ready acceptance which
itwas recommended to Englishmen by the
had met with from all orders of the
it
Portuguese people. But it would not be for the British nation
vM7 to force it on the people of Portugal, if they were unwilling to

receive it; or if any schism should exist among the Portuguese
and congeniality to the wants and
themselves, as to its fitness
wishes of the nation. They wênt to Portugal in the discharge of
a sacred obligation, contracted under ancient and modern treaties.
When there, nothing would be done by them to enforce the estab-
lidhmGrit of the constitution; but they must take care that nothing
was done by others to prevent it from being fairly carried into
*
effect! The hostile aggression of Spain, in countenancing and

aiding the party opposed to the Portuguese Constitution, was in
direct violation of repeated solemn assurances of the Spanish
cabinet to the British Government, engaging to abstain from such
interference. The sole object of Great Britain was to obtain the
faithful execution of those engagements. The former case of
the invasion of Spain by France, having for its object to overturn
the Spanish Constitution, was essentially different in its circum-
stances. France had given to Great Britain cause of war, by
that aggression upon the independence of Spain.' The British
Government might lawfully have interfered, on grounds of poli-
tical expediency; but they were not bound to interfere, as they were
now^ bound to interfere on behalf of Portugal, by the obligations

War might have been their free choice, if they had
s#
of treaty.
deemed it politic, in the case of Spain; interference on behalf of
Portugal was their duty, unless they were prepared to abandon
the principles of naltional faith and national honour (c) .
Interference The interference of the Christia:n Powers of Europe, in favour

of the
Christian of the Greeks, who, after enduring ages of cruel oppression, had
Powers of
shaken off the Ottoman yoke, affords a further illustration of the
Europe, in
favour of the principles of international law authorizing such an interference,
Greeks.
not only where the interests and safety of other Powers are imme-
/ (e) Canning's Speech in the House of Commons, 11th December, 1826, Annual
iilegister, vol. Ixviii. p. 192.
Intervention
diately affected by the internal transactions of a particular State,
1 1 1 1
.
p ,
.
1 •
1 r»
on moral and
•
1
but where the general interests oi humanity are intringed by the humanitarian
excesses of a barbarous and despotic government. These prin- ^''o^^'^**-.
ciples are fully recognised in the treaty for the pacification of
Greece, concluded at London, on the 6th of July, 1827, between
France, Great Britain, and Russia. The preamble of this treaty
''
sets forth, that the three contracting parties were penetrated with
the necessity of putting an end to the sanguinary contest, which,
by delivering up the Greek provinces and the isles of the Archi-

pelago to all the disorders of anarchy, produces dail}' fresh impedi-
ments to the commerce of the European States, and gives occasion
to piracie-s, which not only expose the subjects of the high con-"
tracting parties to considerable losses, but, besides, rjender neces-
sary burdensome measures of protection and repression." It then
states that the British and French Governments, having received
a pressing request from the Greeks to interpose their mediation
with the Porte, and being, as well as the Em'peror of Russia,
animated by the desire of stopping the effusion of blood, and of
arresting the evils of all kinds which might arise from the con-
tinuance of such a state of things, had resolved to unite their
efforts, and to regulate the operations thereof by a formal treaty,
Avith the view of re-establishing peace between the contending
parties, by means of an arrangement, which was called for as much
by humanity as by the interest of the repose of Europe. The
treaty then provides (Article 1) that the three contracting parties
should offer their mediation to the Porte, by a joint declaration
of their ambassadors at Constantinople; and that there should be
made, at the same time, to the two contending parties, the demand
of an immediate armistice, as a preliminary condition indis-
pensable to opening any negotiation. Article 2 provides the terms

of the arrangement to be made, as to the civil and political con-
dition of Greece, in consequence of the principles of a previous
understanding between Great Britain and Russia. By the 3rd

Article it was agreed, that the details of this arrangement, and
the limits of the territory to be included under it, should be settled
in a separate negotiation between the high contracting Powers and
the two contending parties. To this public treaty an additional
and secret Article was added, stipulating that the high contracting
parties would take immediate measures for establishing commer-

cial relations wdth the Greeks, by sending to them and receiving
from them consular agents, so long as there should exist among
them authorities capable of maintaining such relations. That if,
within the term of one month, the Porte did not accept the pro-
posed armistice, or if the Greeks refused to execute it, the high
contracting parties should declare to that one of the two contending

parties that should wish to continue hostilities, or to both,;'; if it
should become necessary, that the contracting Powers intended
to exert all the means, which circumstances might suggest to
their prudence, to give immediate effect to the armistice, by pre-
venting, as far as might be in their power, all collision between

the contending parties. },,The secret Article concluded by declaring,
that if these measures did not suffice to induce the Ottoman Porte
to adopt the propositions made by the high contracting Powers,
or on the other hand, the Greeks should renounce the conditions
if,
stipulated in their favour, the contracting parties would neverthe-

less continue to prosecute the work of pacification on the basis
agreed upon between them; and, in consequence^ they authorized,
from that time forward, their representatives in London to discuss
and determine the ulterior measures to which it might become
necessary to resort.
The Greeks accepted the proffered mediation of the three
Powers, which the Turks rejected, and instructions were given to
the commanders of the allied squadrons to compel the cessation
of hostilities. This was effected by the result of the battle of
Navarino, with the occupation of the Morea by French troops;
and the independence of the Greek State was ultimately recognized
by the Ottoman Porte, under the mediation of the contracting
Powers, (flf, as some writers supposed, the Turks belonged to a
family or set of nations which was not bound by the general
international law of Christendom, they had still no right to com-
plain of the measures which the Christian Powers thought proper

toadopt for the protection of their religious brethren, oppressed
by the Mohammedan rule. In a ruder age, the nations of Europe,
impelled by a generous and enthusiastic feeling of symjDathy,
inundated the plains of Asia to recover the Holy Sepulchre from
5 the possession of infidels, and tOi deliver the Christian pilgrimsi
from the merciless oppressions practised by the Saracens. The
Protestant princes and States of Europe, during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, did not scruple to confederate and wage
!J^ war, in order to secure the freedom of religious worship for the
votaries of their faith in the bosom of Catholic communities, to
whose subjects it was denied. Still more justifiable was the inter-
ference of the Christian Powers of Europe to rescue a whole
nation, not merely from religious persecution, but from the cruel
alternative of being transported from their native land, or exter-
minated by their merciless oppressors. The rights of human
nature wantonly outraged by this cruel warfare, prosecuted for

six years against a civilized and Christian people, to whose
ancestors mankind are so largely indebted for the blessings of arts
and were but tardily and imperfectly vindicated by this
of letters,
measure. "Whatever," as Sir James Mackintosh said, "a nation
^^<^f7^
may lawfully defend for itself, it may defend for another people, jypJLt
if called upon to interpose." The interference of the Christian m £%jJ\J
Powers, to put an end to this bloody contest, might, therefore, have ^ ^^
been safely rested upon this ground alone, without appealing to the
interests of commerce andof the repose of Europe, which, as well
^
as the interests of humanity, are alluded to in the treaty, as the
determining motives of the high contracting parties (d!).

We have already seen, that the relations which have prevailed Interference
between the Ottoman Empire and the other European States have gt. Britain,
only recently brought the former within the pale of that public ^r^ssia*
law by which the latter are governed, and which was originally Russia 'in the
founded on that community of manners, institutions and religion, affairs of the
which distinguish the nations of Christendom' from those of the Ottoman
^^
Mohamimedan world (e). Yet the integrity and independence of 1840.^^^^'
that empire have been considered essential to the general balance
of power, ever since the crescent ceased to be an object of dread to
the western nations of Europe. The 'above-mentioned inter-
ference of three of the great Christian Powers in the affairs of
Greece had been complicated by the separate war between Russia
and the Ottoman Empire, which was terminated by the treaty of
Adrianople, in 1829, followed by the treaty of alliance between
the two empires, of Unkiar-Skelessi, in 1833. The casus foederis
of the latter treaty was brought on by the attempts of Mehemet
Ali, Pasha of Egypt, to assert his independence, and of the Porte,
which sought to recover its lost provinces. The status quo, which
had been established between the Sultan and his vassal by the
arrangement of Kutayah, in 1833, under the mediation of France
and Great Britain, on which the peace of the Levant depended,
and with it the peace of Europe was supposed to depend, was thus
constantly threatened by the irreconcilable pretensions of the two
great divisions of the Ottoman Empire. The war again broke
(d) Another treaty was concluded ruary, 1830, and accepted by Greece
at London, between the same three and the Ottoman Porte. King Otho
Powers, on the 7th of May, 1832, by was expelled in 1862, and, after some
which the election of Prince Otho of difficulty in finding any one to fill
Bavaria, as King of Greece, was con- his place. Prince George of Denmark
firmed, and the sovereignty and mounted the Greek throne and took
independence of the new kingdom the title of King of the Hellenes in
guaranteed by the contracting parties, March, 1863.
according to the terms of the protocol (e) Vide supra, p. 18.
signed by them on the 3rd of Feb-
106 EIGHT OF SELF-PEESERVATION
out between them in 1839, and the Turkish army was overthrown
in the decisive battle of Nezib, which was followed by the deser-
tion of the fleet to Mehemet Ali, and by the death of Sultan
Mahmoud II.
In this state of things, the w-estern Powers of Europe thought
they perceived the necessity of interfering to save the Ottoman
Empire from the double danger with which it was tlireatened; by
the aggressions of the Pasha of Egypt on one side, and the exclu-
sive protectorate of llussia on the other. A. long and intricate
negotiation ensued between the five great European Powers, from
the voluminous documents relating to which the following general
principles may be collected, as having received the formal assent

of all the parties to the negotiations, however divergent might be
their respective views as to the application of those principles.
^1. The right of the five great European Powers to interfere in

this contestwas placed upon the ground of its threatening, in its
consequences, the general balance of power and the peace of
Europe. The only difference of opinion arose as to the means by
wliich the desirable end of preventing all future conflict between
the two contending parties could best be accomplished.
2. It wâs agreed that this interference could only take place
on tlie formal application of the Sultan himself, according to the
rule laid dowai by the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1818, that
the five great Powers would never assume jurisdiction over ques-
tions concerning the rights and interests of another Power, except
at its request, and without inviting such Power to take part in the
conference .
3. The death of Sultan Mahmoud being imminent, and the

dangers of the Ottoman Empire having increased by a complica-
tion of disasters, each of the five Powers declared its determination
to maintain the independence of that empire, under the reigning
dynasty; and as a necessary consequence of this determination,

that none of them should seek to profit by the present state of
things to obtain an increase of territory or an exclusive influence.

The negotiations finally resulted in the conclusion of the con-
vention of 15th July, 1840, between four of the great
the
European Powers, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Eussia,

to wdiich the Ottoman Porte acceded, and in consequence of wliich
Mehemet Ali compelled to relinquish the possession of all
wâs
the provinces held by him, except Egypt, the hereditary Pashalic
of which was confirmed to him, according to the conditions
contained in the separate Article of tlie convention (/) .
(/) Wheaton, Hist, of the Law of Nations, pp. 563

—583. State Papers,
vol. xxviii. p. 342.
The Ottoman Empire has been an endless source of disturbance The Eastern
Question.
to th'3 peace of
Europe ever since this treaty of 1840.
It occupies
a peculiar and anomalous position, and all attempts to esta,blish a
permanent and satisfactory relation between this State and the

othei' European Powers have as yet proved failures. The situa-
tion of the inhabitants of European Turkey is in many respects
unfortunate. The majority are Christians belonging to various
nationalities, and subjected to the dominant and Mohammedan
race of the Turks, from whom they are alienated by differences
not onl} of religion and race, but of language, manners, and
customs. The Turks are not a civilizing people. They are a
nation of soldiers, who care
little for the peaceful pursuits of trade,
literature, and science; while many of theii' subjects are capable

of attaining to the highest forms of civilization. The result has
been that the governing race in Turkey has remained nearly
stationary, while many of its subjects, and all the neighbouring
States, have been rapidly progressing. The government of the
Porte is negligently, and in some cases oppressively, carried on.
Most of its Christian subjects are connected by the ties of religion
and nationality with some of the inhabitants of the neighbouring
coimtries, who are generally prepared to sympathise with and
encourage them in any efforts to throw off the authority of the
Porte. The result of this state of things has been to leave Turkey
in Europe in a condition of chronic disturbance. Insurrections
have been numerous, and, owing to the encouragement received
by the insurgents from outside, have in some cases been very diffi-
cult to quell. In several instances these insurrections have led
other European States to interfere between the Porte and its sub-
jects, either on the ground that the Porte would not redress the
wrongs of which the insurgents justly complained, or that the

treatment of the Christians by the Mohammedans was such as
could not be tolerated. The mere fact of the subjects of Turkey
calling themselves Christians, although the term Christianity
means something very different there from what it does in the
west of Europe, has caused them to receive much more sympathy
and support than in many cases they really deserved.
These interferences^ so long as force was not used to coerce the
government of the Sultan, may be justified in international law.
Turkej'' is certainly an independent sovereign State, and prima
facie no other States have a right to interfere in its internal affairs.
But it is not an independent State in the sense that England and
France are independent. It owes its independence in recent times
t„oj;ho support it has received from the great Powers, and this
consequently gives those Powers some right to require that its

government shall be properly administered. But this right is
not so extensive as to justify the use of force, and this is so not
only on general principles, but by express declaration in treaties.

The unfortunate error underlying all attempts to improve the
condition of European Turkey has been to suppose that, because
this country was situated in Europe, it was therefore capable of
being benefited by European institutions and the introduction of

European modes of thought and action. But this is not the case.
The Turks and many of their subjects are Orientals, and quite
different from Europeans; and institutions Which have proved
most beneficial in England and France are very likely to have
quite an opposite effect when established in Turkey. No insti-
tutions can be advantageous to a country unless they arc adapted
and ideas of the people.
fy to the habits
The unsatisfactory condition of Turkey makes it probable that,
if left to herself, her empire in Europe might gradually crumble
away, leaving the country split up into small and defence! CfSis
communities. But her geographical situation Avould make such
a result dangerous to the peace of Europe. If the authority of the
Sultan were removed, his territories might pass into the hands of
Russia, Austria, or some other great State, and this might
seriously alter the balance of powder in Europe. The great im-
portance of keeping Constantinople and the Straits of the
Bosphorus and Dardanelles in the hands of. a non-aggressivei

State, and of preventing Russia from planting her authority there,
and converting the Black Sea into a Russian lake, has led the
Western Powers, and especially England, to support and strengthen
the authority of the Porte as much as jDOssible. This 'was the
policy that brought about the Crimean War; and until the Treaty
of Berlin was executed, the maintenance in its integrity of the
Ottoman Empire was one of the most firmly established principles
of public law. Nor has the principle been yet abandoned. The
Treaty of Berlin, though depriving the Sultan of a considerable
portion of his European territories, professes to strengthen and
consolidate the remainder, so as to leave him as powerful as the
"
reduced area of his authority will allow him to be. The Treaties
of Paris and of Berlin resemble one another in that both alike are
a negation of the right of any one Power, and an assertion ,of the
right of the Powers collectively to regulate the solution of the

"
Eastern Question (^) .
(</) Holland, European Concert, p. 221.

By Crimean War, The Treaty-

the Treaty of Paris, 1856, which closed the
England, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia declared

**
the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of
the public law and system of Europe. Their Majesties engage,
each on his part, to respect the independence and the territorial ^ - ^^^
integrity of the Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict
observance of their engagement; and will, in consequence, consider '^'
any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest." ":^:^^^^

A separate treaty to the same effect was entered into between
England, France, and Austria, on the 15th April, 1856 ijfi) ,Thus, .
on two separate occasions in 1856, the great Powers solemnly

agreed to support the Ottoman Empire, and maintain it in its
integrity. And
was further stipulated in the Treaty of Paris
it
''
that if there should arise between the Sublime Porte and one or
more of the other signing Powers, any misunderstanding which
might endanger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime

Porte and each of such Powers, before having recourse to thei
use of force, shall afford the other contractiixg parties the oppor-
tunity of preventing such an extremity by means of their media-

"
tion (^) , The condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte was
also considered in the Treaty; and a firman, issued by the Sultan
"
for ameliorating their condition without distinction of religion
or race," was communicated to the contracting parties. At the
''
same time it was distinctly acknowledged that this firman cannot,
in an}^ case, give to the said Powers the right to interfere, either!
collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the

Sultan with his subjects, nor in the internal administration of his
"
empire (k). The international status of Turkey was thus clearly
defined. She was recognised as a sovereign State, whose mainten-
ance was deemed necessary for the welfare of Europe; and the
only right over her internal administration acquired by the Powers
was that already referred to, of pressing their advice on the Porte
as to its methods of governing, but not of insisting by force of
arms that this advice should be followed.
The first attempt to overthrow the Treaty of Paris took place The Treaty
in 1870. On the 31st of October in that year, Russia addressed
tSn^r^*"*^"
a note to England on the subject of the neutralization of the Black London, 1871.
Sea, the terms of which had been defined in the Treaty of 1856..
In this note. Prince Gortchakoff asserted the principle of neutrali-
zation to be no more than a theory. ''The Treaty of 1856,"
"
wrote the Prince, has, moreover, not escaped the modifications to
(//) Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. ii. (i) Art. viii.
pp. 1255, 1280. {k) Art. ix.

110 RIGHT OF SELF-PEESERVATION
which most European transactions have been exposed, and in the

face of which it would be difficult to maintain that the written
law, founded upon the respect for treaties as the basis of publio
right, and regulating the relations between States, retains the
moral validity which it may have possessed at other times." He
then enumerated some alleged infractions of the treaty, and con-
"
tinued: Our illustrious Master cannot admit, dke jure, that treaties
violated in several of their essential and general clauses should,
remain binding in other clauses directly affecting the interests of
his empire." He concluded by stating that " His Majesty, the
Czar, restores to the Sultan the full exercise of his rights in tllis
respect, resuming the same for himself" (i(). Such a proceeding
was utterly subversive of all international morality. If treatiea
solemnly entered into could be set aside at the mere wish of one of
the contracting parties, all public faith was at an end; and no
security could be felt as to the binding effect of any treaty what-

ever. To this note Lord Granville replied, on the part of England,
that had always been held, that the right of cancelling a treaty
it
belongs only to the Governments who have been parties to the

original instrument, and that whether the desire of Russia to be
freed from the Treaty of Paris were reasonable or not, she could
not by herown act abrogate any of its terms. He stated that Her
Majesty's Government could not give their sanction to the course
announced by Prince Gortchakoff, which he characterised as a
very dangerous precedent to the validity of international obliga-
tions im) .
On 22nd of November, 1870, a conference to discuss the

the
matter was j)i"oposed by Prussia, and ultimately it was agreed
that plenipotentiaries from the signatory Powers should meet in
London. Before discussing the actual point raised by Russia,
viz., the deneutralization of the Black Sea, it was deemed advisable
to put forward the following declaration: "The plenipotentiaries
of North Germany, of Austria-Hungary, of Great Britain, of
Russia, and of Turkey, assembled to-day in Conference, recognise
that it is an essential principle of the law of nations that ô
Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor
modify the stipulations thereof, unless ,with the consent of the
contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement" (n).
It is melancholy to think that the most civilised Powers of the
world should have considered it necessary to put forward such a
(I) Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. iii.

(n) Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. iii.
p. 1893. p. 1904.
(m) I bid. p. 1898.
AND INDEPENDENCE. Ill
declaration in the year 1871. It shows that international law,

however much talked of and appealed to, has not yet acquired
that moral force by which alone the welfare of nations in their
mutual intercourse can be secured. After solemnly enunciating
this elementary principle, the Powers then proceeded to comply
with the demands of Russia, which had first been put forward in
direct opposition to it, and a new treaty relative to the Black Sea
was entered into.
The binding force of the Treaty of Paris was shaken, but not Insvirrection
in Herze-
destroyed, in 1871 in 1875 fresh complications of the Eastern
;
govina.
Question commenced. Early in that year an insurrection broke
out in Herzegovina, which lasted throughout the year, and gained
ground by receiving encouragement from Serbia and Montenegro.
Various efforts were made by the other Powers to reconcile the
differences between the Porte and its subjects. The first collective
attempt was initiated by Austria, and put forward in a document

which has since become known as the Andrassy Note. This was
issued on the 3i0th of December, 1875, and was agreed to by the
other Powers but its terms were deemed inadmissible by Turkey,
;
and it was finally rejected altogether. The Andrassy Note having

proved a failure, another proposal was put forward in May, 1876,
known, as the Berlin Memorandum. This was issued by Austria,
Russia, and Germany, and was agreed to by France and Italy.
But England declined to join in pressing the acceptance of the
proposals contained in it upon the Porte, and in a despatch dated

19th May, 1876, Lord Derby explained the reasons for this
refusal. Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that the
course recommended would tend to strengthen instead of quelling
the insurrection; that the Porte did not possess the funds neces-
sary for doing what was asked oi it; that some of the pointsi
proposed Avould reduce the Sultan's authority to nullity in the
disturbed districts and that if the insurgents knew that the
;
Powers would intervene further in their behalf if they continued

the insurrection after the suggested armistice was over, they \vould
be perfectly certain to continue the insurrection. This scheme
also fellthrough without being productive of any result.
Before the next attempt at pacification was made, the whole
"
aspect of the question had changed. The Bulgarian atrocities,"
a series of massacres of Christians by Mohammedans, caused by
the fear of a universal rising of the former, had been perpetrated,
and had caused the feeling of Europe to be for the time unfavour-
able to Turkey. War had broken out between Turkey and Serbia;
a large Russian force was being assembled on the borders of
Eoumania; and. the insuiTection in Herzego\dna somehow ceased

to existand dropped out of all notice.
Conference of A Conference for the settlement of the whole question was then
tinople. proposed by England. The Conference did meet, but its proposals,
although considerably modified during the discussions, were ulti-
mately rejected by Turkey as inconsistent with her independence.
On the 3«lst of March, 1877, a final protocol was submitted to the
Porte, in which the Powers expressed a hope that Turkey would
ameliorate the condition of her Christian subjects, and that, should
''
she fail in this, they (the Powers) think it right to declare
that such a state of affairs would be incompatible with their inte-
rests and those of Europe in general. In such a case they reserve
to themselves to consider in comtoon as to the means which they
may deem best fitted to secure the well-being of the Christian
populations, and the interests of the general peace" (o). The

Porte, in its reply, regretted that it had not been invited to take
part in the deliberations preceding the protocol, although they

"
affected its vital interests, and it therefore felt imperiously
obliged to assert itself against the authority of such a pr£r
"
cedent (p).
Outbreak of
Up time the Powers had acted strictly in accordance with
to this
Russia. international law, but a different course was now adopted. On

the 19th of April, Russia issued a circular note, in which it .was
announced that her Government had exhausted all the means in
its power to bring about a lasting pacification of Turkey; that
as these had failed, the Czar was resolved to undertake this work
himself, and had therefore given his armies the orders to cross the
frontiers ofTurkey; in other words, had declared war(g). To
"
thisLord Derby replied on the 1st of Maj^, that the course on
which the Russian Government had entered . . . . is in contra-
vention of the stipulation of the Treaty of Paris, 1856, by which
Russia and the other signatory Powers engaged, each on its own
part, to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the
Ottoman Empire"; that by so doing the Czar had separated
himself from the European concert hitherto maintained, and had
violated the Declaration of London, 1871 (r). Nevertheless, the
war proceeded, and resulted in the overthrow of Turkey.
Roumania and Serbia threlv off the sovereignty of the Porte,
joined Russia in the war, and declared themselves independent.
(o) Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 9 (q) Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 18
(1877), p. 2. (1877), p. 2.
(p) Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 12 (r) Ibid. p. 3.
(1877), p. 5.
On March, 1878, a preliminary treaty of peace was

the 3lrd of
signed between the belligerents at San Stefano. As this treaty

made immense alterations in the existing state of things, and as
its whole tenor and most of its clauses affected the arrangements
made by the Treaty of Paris, it was clearly not obligatory upon
the parties to the earlier treaty, other than Russia and Turkey.
The Treaty of Paris had been signed by all the great Powers, and
their united action could alone dissolve or alter any part of it.
Accordingly the Austrian Government proposed that a Conference

or Congress (which Lord Beaconsfield considered synonymous
terms; should meet to discuss the treaty of San Stefano, and

ratify or reject such of its provisions as might be thought best.
The Russian Government raised several technical objections to
communicating the whole of this treaty to Congress, but finally,
through the firm attitude of England, it was agreed that a Con-

gress should meet at Berlin and freely discuss every clause (s) .
Before the final consent of Russia was obtained, a secret under- Secret agree-
standing was entered into between her and England, by which the England with
^^^
latter agreed not to oppose certain of the demands of Russia at S^^f^^
the Congress. This was divulged by a shorthand writer in the
temporar}^ employment of the Foreign Office, and published in an
evening newspaper, and its effect was somewhat to lower the
prestige England had recently gained as the champion of inter-
national law. But the understanding itself contained nothing con-
trary to that law. The fact that England would not resist certain
Russian proposals would not prevent other Governments from

doing so if they thought fit. And if, when these matters came to
be actually discussed, England would not oppose them, there could
be no objection to informing Russia on this point beforehand,
especially as without some such understanding it seemed probable
that the Congress would not meet at all. Another secret agree-
ment, but this time formulated into a treaty, was made between
England and Turkey. By it England undertook, if Russia
retained ^Batoiim, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them, and made any
future attempt to take possession of any of the Sultan's territories
in Asia, to join the Sultan in defending those territories by force
of arms. In return, the Sultan promised to introduce such reforms
into the country as might be agreed upon, and consented to assign
the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England .
(s) See Lord Salisbury's Despatch of 1st April, 1878. Pari. Papers, Turkey,
No. 27 (1878).
W. 8
Tiiis convention was only to last while Russia retained her oon-
qiie.sts in Armenia (i).
Congress of The Congress met at Berlin, and on the ISth of July, 1878, a
whole question was agreed to.
final treaty for the settlement of the
This entirely superseded those parts of the Treaty of San Stefano
which the Congress considered to concern the Powers, leaving in
force only twelve clauses of minor importance, relating to law-
suits in Turkey, prisoners, ratification, the indemnity, and so
on (w), and materially altered the stipulations of the Treaty of
Paris. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro were declared inde-
pendent, and certain portions of territory were added to each. A
new principality, under the name of Bulgaria, was formed out of
the region lying between the Danube and the Balkans. It was
declared autonomous and tributary under the sovoreignty of the
Sultan, but with a Christian government and a national militia;
and its position is somewhat similar to that occupied by Roumania
and Serbia before the war. An anomalous province, called Eastern
Roumelia, was formed south of the Balkans. The Sultan was
left the right of defending the frontiers of this province, but
internal order was to be maintained by a native gendarmerie as-

sisted by a local militia. Regular troops were not to be allowed
to remain in it unless called for by the Christian Governor-General.
The portion of Bessarabia at the mouth of the Danube, taken from
Russia and given to Roumania in 1856, was restored to Russia.,
Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be occupied and administered
by Austria (x) The rectification of the Turco-Greek frontier
.
was permitted by the 13th Protocol to follow the valley of the

Selmyrias on the .^gean side to that of Calamos on the side of
the Ionian Sea. In Asia the territories of Ardahan, Kars, and
Batoum were taken from Turkey and given to Russia. And,
finally, the Treaties of Paris, 1856, and of London, 1871, were
maintained in all such provisions as were not abrogated by these
stipulations.
Greek The negotiations between Turkey and Greece with respect to
frontier.
^j^^ delimitation of the new frontier showed only that the two
States were in a position of disagreement. The intervention of
the signatory Powers became necessary in 1880, and by the middle
of the following year they succeeded in gaining the acceptance by
both States of the frontier as laid down by an International Com-
(t) Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 36 A law including these provinces

(x)
(1878). in the Austrian Customs-Union was
(w) Holland, European Concert, passed on 20th December, 1879. Hol-
p. 222. land, loc. cit.
mission appointed in 1880 for that purpose, giving" to Greece the

Province of Thessaly and part of Epirus {y) .
Prince Alexander of Battenberg was elected ruler of Bulgaria Bulgaria,

on the 29th April, 1879, and the election was assented to by the
Powers in accordance with the Treaty. After some discussion
the Principality made good its claim, to communicate with the
Sultan through the Foreign Office at the Porte, and not through
a "bureau for the privileged provinces." The Organic Law,
provided for by Article IV., was adopted on 28th April, 1879;
was suspended by the Prince 10th May, 1881; but re-established
19th September, 1883(0).
In the autumn of 1885 a revolution, the object of which was to Union with
get rid of the expensive system' of double administration estab- ô^mdia

lislied by the Treaty, took place in Eastern Roumelia. The
Governor-General was arrested and sent under escort to Sophia.
The Prince of Bulgaria, at the invitation of a provisional govern-
ment, betook himself to Philippoli. He announced to the Sultan
his assumption of the Government and the union of the two
countries at the desire of the people {a) He expressly recognised
.
the suzerainty of the Imperial Ottoman Government; but, never-

theless, issued a proclamation in which he described himself as
Alexander I., by the grace of God and tlie national will. Prince of
the twô Bulgarias, both Northern and Southern. The Porte pro-
V
tested, and appealed to Article XVI. of the Treaty; but before
taking active measures awaited the result of the deliberations of

the Powers. The Czar forbade the Russian officers in the Bul-
garian army to enter Roumelia, and, later, commanded them to
resign. The Signatories condemned any violation of the Treaty,

and formally announced their intention to make their desire for
peace respected in the Balkan States. Meanwhile popular excite-

ment ran high in Greece (&) and Serbia. Each country com-
plained the disturbance of the balance of power in the
of
peninsula, and claimed a territorial aggrandisement equal to that

obtained by Bulgaria. On the 14th November, notwithstanding
recommendations in favour of peace made by the great Powers at
Athens and at Belgrade, the Serbian King proclaimed war against
the Principality, and, on the same day, the Serbian army, pro-
(y) Holland, European Concert, bKshed by the San Stefano Treaty,

pp. 25, 26, 27; Pari. Paper, Greece, which was to have extended to the
No. 2 (1886). ^gean.
(2;) Holland, European Concert, (6) The Greeks alleged that the
pp. 279, 282, 283. Bulgars, a people without any pastor
(a) This union was not the recon- future, were in a minority in Eastern
struction of the Great Bulgaria esta- Eoumelia (Thrace).
8(2)
voked, as was said, by repeated Bulgarattacks on Serbian outposts

on Serbian territory, crossed the frontier into Bulgaria.
On the receipt of the official declaration of war on the part of
Serbia, Prince Alexander telegraphed to the Sultan that he had at
once taken measures for the defence of Bulgaria, and asked tlie
co-operation of his Suzerain for the protection of the Empire.
About the same time his Highness signed a decree regulating the
manner in which the Eastern Eoumelia representatives for the
Great National Assembly were to be selected. The King of
Serbia disclaimed any intention of doing anything which would
from the rights of the Sultan. The Bulgarians were at
detract;
first worsted and driven back to their principal position at Sliv-
nitza, covering the plain of Sophia. Prince Alexander, in the
meantime, quitted Eoumelia, and withdl-ew Bulgarian troops from
that province. On or about 17th November, a series of fights
near Slivnitza resulted in the rapid retirement of the Serbian
forces towards their own frontier. The Prince again addressed
the Sultan. He had completely evacuated Eastern Roumelia. He
and his army wêre defending the integrity of Ottoman territory,
and asked his Majesty's co-operation. On 22nd November, the
Porte proposed an armistice, and that an Imperial Commissioner
should be sent to Eastern Roumelia. The Prince rejected the
fii-st
proposal while Serbians remained on Bulgarian soil, and
deprecating the execution of the second as likely to jeopardise the
tranquillity of the province, suggested its postponement till after
the conclusion of peace. On 26th November the Bulgars entered
Serbia, and the next day occupied Pirot. Their progress, how-
ever, was stayed by an Austrian intimation to the Prince that if
he advanced further into Serbian territory he would be met by
Austrian troops. In the beginning of December two Ottoman
delegates proceeded to Eastern Roumelia. On 21st December
an armistice was signed until 1st March, 1886, and ultimately the
hostile forceswithdrew into their respective territories under the
supervision of a commission composed of the Austrian military
attache at Belgrade, and the military attaches of the other great
Powers at Vienna (c) .
Treaty of On 3rd March, 1886, a treaty of peace, containing the single

Bucharest. "
Article, Peace is re-established between the Kingdom of Serbia
and the Principality of Bulgaria from the date of the signature of
the present Treaty," was signed at Bucharest by the agents of
(c) Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 1 (1886); Ibid. Turkey, No. 2 (1886).
Turkey, Serbia, and Bulgaria. The ratifications were exchanged

on the 17th of the same month (d).
On the 5th April, 1886, the Conference of ambassadors of the
great Powers and Turkish plenipotentiaries, which, with an inter-
mission of four months, had been sitting at Constantinople during
the continuance of the movement in Eastern Roumelia, adopted
a protocol, by which (1) the Governor-^Generalship of Eastern Eastern
Eoumelia was to be entrusted to the Prince of Bulgaria, in accord- protocol.
ance with Article XVII. of the Treaty of Berlin. (2) As long as
the administration of Eastern Roumelia and that of the Princi-
pality of Bulgaria should remain in the hands of one and the same
person, the Mussulman villages situated in the Canton of Kirdjali,
as well as the Mussulman villages situated in the Bhodope dis-
trict, were to be separated from Eastern Roumelia; and this in
lieu of tho*right of theSublime Porto, as laid down in the first
paragraph of Article XV. of the Treaty of Berlin (e); the neces-
sary delimitation to be carried out by a Turco-Bulgarian Com-
mission. (3) A
Turco-Bulgarian Commission was to be directed
to examine the Organic Statute of Eastern Roumelia, and to
modify it, with due regard to the exigencies of the situation and
local requirements. All the interests of the Imperial Ottoman
treasury were likewise to be taken into consideration. The labours
of this latter Commission were to be completed in four months,
and the result submitted to the sanction of the Conference.
Until these modifications should have been sanctioned, the task
of administering the province, in accordance with the forms
demanded by the then present condition of affairs, was to be en-
trusted to the wisdom and fidelity of the Prince. (4) All other
dispositions of the Treaty of Berlin relative to the Principality of
Bulgaria and to Eastern Roumelia were declared maintained and

in force (/) .
A few days later Prince Alexander, who had contended for a Later history
" ^* Bulgaria.
personal nomination of himself in place of the Prince of
Bulgaria," but had been defeated in this respect by Russian oppo-
sition, announced his submission to the international act, and his
readiness to nominate delegates to the commissions (g) The state .
of siege in Eastern Roumelia was raised, and preparations for the

elections were proceeded with. The Special Budget drawn up
by the Sophia Government, however, was the cause of much dis-
(d) Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 2 (/) Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 2
(1886). (1886); Hertslet, Map of Europe,
(e) That is, of the right to garrison No. 611.
the Balkans. (^) Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 2
(1886); Ibid. Turkey, No. 1 (1887).
content in Roumelia; the Prince's civil list being increased by the

addition of the salary before paid to the Governor-General, and
the total expenditure of the province showing- a large increase,
exclusive of the tribute to the Porte The Prince did not disguise
.
amalgamate and render

his intention, so far as lay in his power, to
homogeneous the Bulgarians north and south of the Balkans and ;
in his speech delivered at the opening of the Sobranje in June,

alluded to the complete union of the two provinces, as proved by
the meeting of a single Chamber. The Turkish Commissioners
for the revision of the Organic Statute arrived at Sophia in the
beginning of August. The first meeting of the Comlnission took

place on the 12th of that month; but there seemed little likelihood
of agreement. Military preparations were once more renewed in
both Serbia and Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian troops were sent to
the frontier. On the 22nd a cmo^p d'etat was perpetrated at
Sophia . The Prince was seized by a party of military rebels and
forcibly removed to Russian territory The Porte announced that
.
it held the authors of any disturbance responsible for events, and

declared its intention to decide and act in concert with the great
Powers. The
Prince, being released by the orders of the Russian
Government, returned to Bulgaria, but resigned his position and
retired from the country on the 7th September: declaring that the
Protocol of Constantinople had broken his back, and had given
the opposition an opportunity of working against him, by the
fact of his having been made a Turkish functionary Qi) .
The Powers were agreed that a successor should be chosen in

accordance with the provisions of the Berlin Treaty. Elections
were held in both Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia for a Great
National Assembly. In the opinion of Russia these elections were
illegal, and that country consequently ignored both the Assembly
and the Government. On the 29th October diplomatic intercourse
was resumed between Belgrade and Sophia (i) In November .
the Russian agent and consuls quitted Bulgaria and Eastern

Roumelia. After much correspondence between the Powers and
the Porte, and tentative movements in other directions, the
Sobranje, on 4th July, 1887, elected Prince Ferdinand of Coburg

as Prince of Bulgaria Qi) The Prince, shortly afterwards, ac-
.
cepted the position and entered the country. His election was not
confirmed by the Porte and the signatory Powers until March,
1896. In 1908, Bulgaria, which had on several occasions dls-
(70 Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 1 (Jc) Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 2
(1887). (1887).
(0 Ibid.
regarded the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan, declared its inde-

pendence (I), and proclaimed Prince Ferdinand Czar of Bulgaria.
The Powers recognised his sovereignty the following year.
The representations of the signatory Powers did little to hinder Greece,
the warlike preparations of Greece (m), whose attitude constituted

a menace to the peace of Europe, and, but for the strenuous
appeals of the Powers to the Porte to maintain a p-acific and con-
ciliatory attitude, was likely to precipitate a war, the consequences
of which, however incalculable in other directions, could not fail
to be calamitous to Greece (n) On the morning of 24th
.
January, 1886, the Greek squadron left Salamis Bay. On the
following day a collective note was delivered at Athens stating

that, in the absence of any just cause for war on the p'art of Greece
against Turkey, and in view of the injury which would be caused

by it to the commerce of other nations, a naval attack by Greece
on Turkey would not be permitted by the great Powers. Austria-
Hungary, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia sent ships
of war to Suda Bay to compel conformance with the note. France
agreed in the general policy, but could not contemplate acts of

hostilityby French ships against Greece, and opined that a clear
intimation to Greece that if she wore out the patience of the
Ottoman would be
forces she left to face the result unaided in
any way, would be sufficient to induce a return to a peacecful
demeanour. The Greek reply to the note protested against any
limitation of the free disposition of their naval forces as incom-
patible with the independence of the State and the rights of the
Crown. On the 13th April, the conclusion of the arrangement
with regard to Eastern Roumelia (o) was communicated to the
Greek Premier, with the expression of a hope that Greece would
comply Avith the unanimous wish of Europe for the maintenance
of peace. The disarmament being still delayed, certain ships of
the allied squadron were sent to the Piraeus. On the 6th May, a
final note was presented inviting the assurance, in the course of a
week, that orders had been promulgated to place the Hellenic land
and sea forces on a peace footing. The answer being unsatisfac-
tory, the representatives of the Powers and the Turkish Minister
left Athens en the following day. On May 8th, the Charges
d' Affaires communicated a notice of the blockade of the east coast
of Greece and the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth against all ships
(0 Statesman's Year Book, 1909, Greece, No. 2 (1886).

pp. 666, 667. (n) Pari. Papers, Greece, No. 2
(m) Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 1 (1886); Ibid. No. 3 (1886).
(1886); IbirL No. 2 (1886): Ibid. (o) See sîpra, p. 115.
No. 1 (1887); Ibid. No. 2 (1887);
120 RIGITT OF SELF-PRESEBVATION
under the Greek flag. Any ship under the Greek flag endeavour-
ing to violate the blockade was to be liable to deten,tion (/}) . The
Greek troops having retired from the frontier by the end of the
month, and Greece having notifled her Ministers at the Courts of
the PoAvers of her actual proceedings in the way of disarmament,
and the process of demobilization proceeding rapidly, the blockade
was raised on June 7th. Shortly afterwards the Ministers of the
Powers returned to xlthens (g).
Serbia, On 6th March, 1889, Milan, King of Serbia, abdicated in
.
favour of his son, Alexander, a boy of twelve, and resigned his

power into the hands of a council of regency. Since that date
the kingdom has been in a disturbed and unsettled condition,
culminating in the atrocious murder of King Alexander and his
consort Queen Draga by the chiefs of a military conspiracy on the
29tli day of May, 1903. The present occupant of the Serbian
throne is King Peter Kara-Georgevitch.
European
interventiou
During the Serbo-Bulgarian war 300,000 Turkish troops stood
in the idle on the frontiers of Roumelia. If the Sultan had not been
Salkans and condemned to inactivity by the fear of complications with the
Greece.
great Powers, and by public opinion in both Russia and G-reat
Britain, which would not have tolerated the entry of Ottoman
troops into the provinces as contemplated by the XVIth Article
of the Berlin Treaty, there is little doubt but that he could have
compelled both the population of the province and Prince

Alexander to the observance of the Treaty (r) In the same way,
.
if uncontrolled by Europe, the animosities and jealousies of
Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs, and Macedonians preventing them from

acting in concert and leading to internecine conflicts, might
quickly lead to the re-imposition of the Turkish yoke upon her
former provinces, or, more probably, to an international conflict
for the partition of Turkey, disturbing the peace of the world,
and fatal to the independence of these little States. It is upon
these and similar considerations that the intervention in the affairs
of, and dominant control by Europe of the former provinces of
Turkey, which owe their existence as States to Euro2>ean treaties,
is noAV, for the most part, ju^stified (s).
Greek war of The inability of the Porte to maintain order in Crete, and to
1897.
restrain the Christian and the Mohammedan from cutting one
another's throats, led, in February, 1897, to the intervention of
(t?) Pari. Papers, Greece, No. 1, (1886); Ibid. No. 2 (1886); Ibid.
No. 2, No. 3, No. 4 (1886). No. 1 (1887); Ibid. No. 2 (1887).
{q) Pari. Paper, Greeee, No. 4 (s) Pari. Papers, cited preceding
(1886). note; Pari. Paper, Greece, No. 2
(r) Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 1 (4,886); Ibid. No. 4 (1886).
Greece, which, in spite of the protests of the Powers, landed an \
armed force on the island, and established a local administration

in the name of the King of the Hellenes. By a joint note the
Powers assured Greece that, while Crete could not be annexed in
the present circumstances, they were resolved, since Turkey had
delayed the execution of the reforms settled in concert with them,
to endow Crete with an effective local autonomy, which should f ',
ensure her a separate government under the suzerainty of the

Sultan. Greece declined to withdraw her troops so long as the
Christian population was in danger, and the Powers replied by
proclaiming a blockade of the Cretan ports, and despatching
(March 18) a mixed force of 3,600 men to occupy the island.
Meanwhile war was becoming imminent on the Thessalian fron-
tier, and the Powers warned both Governments that if either
country assumed the aggressive in no case would the aggressor be

alloAvcd to derive any permanent advantage from the result of his
action. On April 8, Greek bands crossed the frontier; on the '^*^
11th 3\irkey declared war, and was comj)letely victorious in a

succession of engagements, re-occupying practically the whole of
Thcssaly. Thereupon the Powers compelled the Sultan to grant

an armistice, and further intervened to carry out what has become
—
an unwritten law that territory once wrenched from the Turk
can never be permitted to revert to Mohammedan jurisdiction.
Though she had not been the aggressor in the terms of the note of
tliGPowers, Turkey was not allowed to retain her conquests in
Thessaly, but some slight strategic modifications of frontier, in
favour of the Ottoman Empire, were allowed. The sole penalty
enforced upon Greece was the payment of a moderate indemnity
and the temporary occupation of her territory until its payment.
The Treaty of Peace made no provision for the settlement of
Crete, which was placed under a temporary administrative Com-

mission, consisting of the admirals of the French, English,
Russian and Italian fleets. Anarchy and disorder, however, con-
tinued to reign until in 1898 the Porte was finally compelled to
withdraw the whole of its troops and functionaries. In the same
year th(^ four Powers constituted the island an autonomous State
under a High Commissioner appointed by them, subject to the
suzerainty of the Sultan, but without tribute. Prince George of
Greece was the first Commissioner, appointed for a term of throe
years, which was renewed in 1901.
The
steps which were recently taken by Russia and Austria,
with the sanction of the other great Powers, to enforce a scheme of
reforms in Macedonia form another instance of European inter-
veiition on behalf of the subjects of the Porte and of the mainten-

ance of peace in the south-cast of Europe {f).
Austrian ôv a period of thirty years from the Treaty of Berlin, 1878,
annexation ('i i .
-fy- i i
•
Bosnia and Austria-Hungary had occupied and administered Bosnia and

Herzegovina.
Herzcgovina, over which Turkish sovereignty had nominally
remained. On October 3, 1908, however, Austria set the Turkish
claim aside, and formally annexed these provinces. The engage-
ment with the European Powers under the Treaty of Berlin, and
a separate engagement with Turkey that was concluded at the
same time, were thus repudiated. It would have been much
better, in the interests of the Balkan peninsula, as well as in the
interests of international law and diplomacy, if Austria-Hungary
had approached the parties to the Treaty of Berlin with a view to
securing an extension of her mandate of 1878 and transforming
her existing rights of administration into full rights of sove-
reignty. As it Avas, the annexation was afterwards recognised
by Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Eussia, not by an
international treaty arrived at in a general conference, but by
means of separate diplomatic despatches. In February, 1909,
an agreement between Austria-Hungary and Turkey was entered
into, whereby Turkey engaged to abandon her rights over the
provinces in question, in return for the payment of an indemnity^
the recover}^ of Novi Bazar, and certain other concessions made
by Austria-Hungary.
Albania. As a result of the recent Balkan war, the independence of
Albania was proclaimed, November 28, 1912. On December 20,
1912, the Ambassadorial Conference at London accepted the prin-
ciple of Albanian autonomy. Later, the Conference marked out
the boundaries of the new
and agTced that a European
State,
prince should be nominated as ruler. Accordingly the crown was
offered by an Albanian deputation to Prince Frederick William of
Wied; who accepted it (February 21, 1914). An International

Commission of Control was also appointed by the Conference to
support and advise him. After the outbreak of the great European
war in July, 1914, the Prince and nearly all the members of the
International Commission left the country; and a Turkish prince
ajDpears to have been elected ruler in September, 1914.
Interference The
interference of the five great European Powers represented
great Euro-
ii^the Conference of London, in the Belgic Revolution of 1830,
pean Powers affords ail example of the application of this right to preserve the
(0 See Annual Register, 1897; Statesman's Year Book, 1903.

AND INDEPENDENCE. 12'3
general peace, and to adapt the new order of thing's to the stipula- "' ^^'^ Belgic
•
PI •
T^ r> 1 TT- •
1 1 1 • Revolution of
1 1 1
•
tions 01 the treaties oi raris and Vienna, by which the kingdom i830.
of the Netherlands had been created. We have given, in another
wôrk, a full account of the long and intricate negotiations relating
to the separation of Belgium' from Holland, which assumed alter-
nately the character of a pacific mediation and of an armed inter-

vention, according to the varying circumstances of the contest, and
which was finally terminated by a compromise between the two
great opposite principles which so long threatened to disturb the
established order and general peace of Europe. The Belgic Revolu-
tion was recognised as an accomplished fact, whilst its legal conse-
quences were limited within the strictest bounds, by refusing to
Belgium the attributes of the rights of conquest and of postliminy,
and by depriving her of a great part of the province of Luxem-
burg, of the left bank of the Scheldt, and of the right bank of the
Meuse. The five great Powers, representing Europe, consented
to the separation of Belgium from Holland, and admitted the
former among the independent States of Europe, upon conditions
which were accepted by her and have become the basis of her
public law. These conditions were subsequently incorporated into
a definite treaty, concluded between Belgium and Holland in 1839,
by which the independence of the former was finally recognised
by the latter (w).
In 1861, there occurred a remarkable intervention in the affairs Intervention
of Mexico, which is thus described in the Queen's Speech on the igei.
opening of Parliament: ''The wrongs committed by various

parties and by successive governments in Mexico upon foreigners
resident within Mexican territory, and for which no satisfactory
redress could be obtained, have led to the conclusion of a convention
betAveen Her Majesty, the Emperor of the French, and the Queen
of Spain, for the purpose of regulating a combined operation on
the coast of Mexico, with a view to obtain that redress which has
hitherto been withheld" {x). The contracting Powers "engaged
not to seek for themselves, in the employment of the contemplated
coercive measures, any acquisition of territory, or any special
advantage, nor to exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico any
influence of a nature to prejudice the fight of the Mexican nation
and constitute the form of its governmient" {y).
to choose
The main reason for this intervention Avas to obtain the pay-
ment of debts contracted by the Mexican Government. The
(?0 Wheaton, Hist, of the Law of {y) Convention of Oct. 31, 1861,
—
Nations, pp. 538 555. Art. ii. Hertslgt, Treaties, vol. xii.
{x) Annual Register, 1862, p. 5. p. 475. -^ —
amount due to England was very largo, while that owing to

France was comparatively small, yet the Emperor Napoleon
thought fit to go much further than simply obtaining satisfaction
for the claims of France. He set up the unfortunate Maximilian
as Emperor of Mexico, and then, withdrawing the French troops,
left him to maintain his throne by his own resources, and to be
by court-martial and shot by the subjects upon whom

finallj^ tried
he had been forced. England and Spain refused to assist France
in these proceedings, and withdrew from the intervention when
their claims had been satisfied. The United States were invited
to join the allies, but declined, and it subsequently appeared that
France was desirous of setting up a powerful Latin State on
the continent of America in opposition to the United States (z) .
"
M. Calvo justly says that this intervention constitue pour les
puissances qui s'y sont laisse entrainer un

'
precedent aussi pen
digno d'eloges que funeste a leur consideration lot a leurs in-
terets "(,«). But it should be remembered that the British
demands included a claim for redress on account of the breaking
into the house of the British Legation on 16th November, 1860,
and the removal thence of 152,000/. sterling bonds, and on
account of the murder of a British subject on 3rd April, 1859 (6).
The French The maintenance of a French garrison in Rome was an al-
Rome!^^^° together anomalous proceeding. Li 1856, the Emperor Napoleon

occupied Bome. His troops were kept there on the ground that
the Pope required to be protected in the exercise of his spiritual
functions as head of the Catholic Church. The garrison was
partly withdrawn in 1864 (c), but returned in 1868, owing to the
aggressive attitude of the revolutionary party in Italy, and the
invasion of the Papal States by Garibaldi. However, on the
19th of August, 1870, the French troops evacuated Bome, and
what was left of the Papal States was afterwards incorporated
into the kingdom of Italy, leaving the Pope nothing but the
Vatican {d). But it was not until 1874 that the last trace of the
French occupation disappeared from Rome. Up to that date the
Orenoque, a French ship of war, was moored off Civita Veochia,
ostensibly to assist the Pope should he be in difiiculties, and she
was not removed until the 12th of October in that year (e).
^^^ {z) See Phillimore, Commentaries, {U) Wharton, Digest, p. 312.

^^ ô\. i.
p. 507. (c) Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. ii.
(a) Droit International, bk. iii. p. 1627.

§ 191. The view
of the United States (^) lUd. p. 1628.
wîll be found
stated in Wharton, (e) Annual Register, 1874, p. 193.
Digest, §§ 58, 318.
x\ND INDEPENDENCE. 125
EverA^ State, as a distinct

'
moral beiiisr,
&' independent
±^
of every
J Independence
of the State
other, freely exercise all its sovereign rights in any
may manner in respect to
its internal
not inconsistent with the equal rights of other States. Among srovemment.
these that of establishing, altering, or abolishing its own muni-
is
cipal constitution of government. No foreign State can law-

fully interfere Avith the exercise of this right, unless such
interference is, authorized by some special compact, or by such a
clear case of necessity as own independence,
immediately affects its
freedom, and security. Non-interference

the general rule, to is
which cases of justifiable interference form exceptions limited by

the necessity of each particular case.
The approved usage of nations authorizes the proposal by one Mediation of

State of its good officesor mediation for the settlement of the for the settle-
dissensions of When such
intestine
..State.
anotVer
.
-ipi is|»entofthe
offer
internal
accepted by the contending parties, it becomes a just title for the dissensions
of a State.
interference of the mediating Power.
Such a title may also grow out
of positive compact previously Treaties of
existing, such as treaties of mediation and guaranty. Of this ^^^f^fuarantv

nature was the guaranty by France and Sweden of the Germanic
Constitution at the peace of Westphalia in 1648, the result of
the thirty years' war waged by the princes and States of Germany
for the preservation of their civil and religious liberties against
the ambition of the House of Austria .
The Republic Geneva was connected by an ancient alliance

of
with the Swiss Cantons of Berne and Zurich, in consequence of
which they united with France, in 1738, in offering the joint
mediation of the three Powers to the contending political parties
by which the tranquillity of the republic was disturbed. The
result of this mediation was the settlement of a constitution, which
gave rise to new disputes in 1768; but they were again adjusted by
the intervention of the mediating Powers. In 1782, the French
Government once more united with these Cantons and the court of
Sardinia in mediating between the aristocratic and democratic
parties; butappears to be very questionable how far these
it
transactions, especially the last, can be reconciled with the respect

due, on the strict principles of international law, to the just rights
and independence of the smallest, not less than to those of the
greatest States (/) .
The former constitution of the Swiss Confederation was also

adjusted, in 1813, by the mediation of the great allied Powers,
torn.
(/) Flassan, Hiatoire de la Diplomatie Franâise,
torn. v. p. 78; vii.
pp. 27, 297.

and subsequently recognised b}^ them

at the Congress of Vienna
as the basis of the federative compact of Switzerland. By the
same act the united Swiss Cantons guarantee to each other their
respective local constitutions (g).

So also the local constitutions of the different States
composing
the former Germanic Confederation might be guaranteed by the
Diet on- the application of the particular State in which the con-
stitution was established; and this guarantee gave the Diet the
right of determining all controversies respecting the interpretation

and execution of the constitution thus established and guaran-
teed (;^).
Jlnd the Constitution of the United States of America guaran-
tees to each State of the federal Union a republican form of
government, and engages to protect each of them against invasion,

and, on application of the local authorities, against domestic
violence (i) .
Proposed
m 1862, a proposition was made by France to England and
jj-^
mediation -,-,.,, f .
the American Russia, that the three countries should offer their friendly media -
. .
ivj War.
|.-Qj^ ^^ the contending parties in the American Civil War. The
moment was deemed inopportune by Russia, and England declined
to accede to the proposal. "According to the information wo
possess," wrote Prince Gortchakow to M. D'Oubil, Russian charge
"
d'affaires in Paris, on the 27th October, 1862, we are led *to
believe that a combined movement
France, England, and of
Russia, however conciliatory it might be, and with whatsoever
precautions it might be surrounded, if it came with an official and
collective character, would incur the risk of bringing about a result
"
opposed to the pacificatory end which the three Courts desire (k).
The proposal would have been declined had it been made.. It
was thought in the Northern States that the policy of France was
hostile to the Union, and that the proposed mediation was only a
preliminary step to the acquisition by France of those parts of

the dismembered Union which had formerly belonged to her (I) .
Independence This perfect independence of every sovereign State, in respect

^
ô its political institutions, extends to the choice of the
in rerpect to supreme
the choice of
magistrate and other rulers, as well as to the form of government
itself. In hereditary governments, the succession to the crown
(g) Aete Final du Congres de (i) Constitution of the United

Vienne, Art. 74. States, Art. 3.
(A) Wiener Schluss-Acte, vom 15 (^) U. S. Dipl, Oor. 1863, vol. ii.
Mai, 1820, Art. 62. Von Mayer, p. 769.
Corpus Juris Germanici, torn. ii. (I) Draper, Hist, of American Civil
p. 198. As to the present constitution War, vol. iii. p. 439.
of Germany, see p. 78, ante.
being regulated by the fundamental laws, all disputes respecting
the succession are rightfully settled by the nation itself, indepen-

dently of the interference or control of foreign Powers. So also
in elective governments, the choice of the chief or other magis-
trates ought to be freely made, in the manner prescribed by the
constitution of the State, without the intervention of any foreign
influence or authority {mi) .
The only exceptions to the application of these general rules Exceptions

•
PIT 1 growing out
.
arise out oi compact, such as treaties oi alliance, guarantee, and of compact
mediation, to which the State itself whose concerns are in question

' ^ ^^ ^^.^^JP^
ot mter-
^ , right
has become a party; or formed by other Powers in the exercise vention.
of a supposed right of an intervention growing out of a necessity
involving their own particular security, or sonije contingent danger

affecting the general security of nations. Such, among others,
were the wars relating to the Spanish succession in the beginning,
of the eighteenth century, and to the Bavarian and Austrian
successions, in the latter part of the same century. The history
of modern Europe also affords many other examples of the actual
interference of foreign Powers in the choice of the sovereign or
chief magistrate of those States where the choice was constitu-
tionally determined by popular election, or by an elective council,

such as in the cases of the head of the earlier Germanic Empire,
the sovereign of the late kingdom of Poland, and the Roman
pontiff; but in these cases no argument can be drawn from the

fact to the right. In the particular case, however, of the election
of the Pope, who is the supreme pontiff of the Roman Catholic
Church, and who was a temporal sovereign till 1870, the Emperor
of Austria, and the Kings of France and Spain, had, by ancient
usage, each a right to exclude one candidate (n) .
The quadruple alliance, concluded in 1834 between Great Quadruple

Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal, affords a remarkable ^gsTbêtween
Great Britain,
•exiamplo of actual interference in the questions relating to the
succession to the crown in the two latter kingdoms, growing out of Portugal,
^'^^^ Spam.
compacts to which they were parties, formed in the exercise of a
supposed right of interference for the preservation of the peace of
the Peninsula, as well as the general peace of Europe. Having
(w) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i. cessor to Pope Leo XIII.; but it seems
ch. 5, §§ 66, 67. doubtful whether it amounted to more
(n) Kliiber, Droit des Gens Moderne than a protest to the effect that the
de I'Europe, Pt. II. tit. 1, ch. 2, § 48. election of Cardinal RampoUa would
This right of veto is said to have been be one that Austria would be unable
exercised by an Austrian cardinal, on to welcome. See Quarterly Review,
behalf of his emperor, at the conclave Oct. 1903, p. 443.
held in August, 1903, to choose a sue-
already stated in another work (o) the historical circumstances

wliich gave rise to the quadruple alliance, as well as its terms and
conditions, will only be necessary here to recapitulate the lead-

it
ing principles, which may be collected from the debate in the

British Parliament, in 1835, upon the measures
adopted by the
British Government to carry into effect the stipulations of the
treaty.
1. The
legality of the order in council permitting British sub-
engage in the military service of the Queen of Spain, by
jects to
exempting them from the general operation of the Act of
Parliament of 1819, forbidding them from' enlisting in foreign
military service, was not called in question by Sir Robert Peel
and the other speakers on the part of the opposition. Nor was
the lobligation of the treaty of quadruple alliance, by which the
British Government was bound to furnish arms and the aid of a
naval force to the Queen of Spain, denied by them. Yet it was
asserted, that without a declaration of war, it would be with the
greatest difficulty that the special obligation of giving naval aid
could be fulfilled, Avithout placing the force of such a compact in
opposition to the general binding nature of international law.
Whatever might be the special obligation imposed on Great
Britain by the treaty, it could not warrant her in preventing a
neutral State from receiving a supply of arms. She had no right,
without a positive declaration of war, to stop the ships of a neutral
country on the high seas.
2. It was contended that the suspension of the foreign enlist-
ment law was equivalent to a direct military interference in the
domestic affairs of another nation. The general rule on which
Gre^t Britain had hitherto acted was that of non-interference.
The only exceptions admitted to this rule were cases where the
necessity was urgent and immediate; affecting, either on account
of vicinage, or some special circumstances, the safety or vital
interests of the State. To interfere on the vague ground that
British interests would be promoted by the intervention, on the
plea that it would be for their advantage to see established a

particular form of government in Spain, would be to destroy
altogether the general rule of non-intervention, and to place the
independence of every weak Power at the mercy of its formidable
neighbours It was impossible to deny that an act which the
.
British Government permitted, authorizing British soldiers and

subjects to enlist in the service of a foreign Power, and allowing
(o) Wheaton, Hist, of the Law of Nations. (New York, 1845.)

tliem to bo organized in Great Britain, was a recognition of tiie

doctrine of the propriety of assisting by a military force a foreign
govei'iiinent against an insurrection of its own subjects. When

the Foreign Enlistment Bill wâs under consideration in the
House of Commons, the particular clause which empowered the
kiijg in council to suspend its operation was objected to on the
ground, that if there was no Foreign Enlistment Act, the subjects
of Great Britainmight volunteer in the service of another country,
and there could be no particular ground of complaint ag-ainst
them; but that if the king in council were permitted to issue an
order suspending the law with reference to any belligerent nation,
the Government might be considered as sending a force under its
own control.
Lord Palmerston, —
1. That the object of the
in reply, stated:
treaty of quadruple alliance, as expressed in the preamble, was to

establish internal peace throughout the Peninsula, including Spain
as well as Portugal; the means by which it was proposed to effect
that object was the expulsion of the infants Don Carlos and Don
Miguel from Portugal. When Don Carlos returned to Spain, it

was thought necessary to frame additional articles to the treaty
in order to meet the new emergency. One of these additional
articles engaged His Britannic Majesty to furnish Her Catholic
Majesty Avith such supplies of arms and warlike stores as Her

Majesty might require, and further to assist Her Majesty with
a naval force. The writers on the law of nations all agreed that
any Government, thus stipulating to furnish arms to another,
must be considered as taking an active part in any contest in
which the latter might be engaged; and the agreement to furnish
a naval force, if necessary, was a still stronger demonstration to
that effect. If, therefore, the recent order in council was objected
to on the ground that it identified Great Britain with the cause
of the existing Government of Spain, the answer was, that, by
the additional articles of the quadruple treaty, that identification
had already been established, and that one of those articles went
even beyond the measure which had been impugned.
2. As to what had been alleged as to the danger of establish-
ing a precedent for the interference of o;ther countries, he would

merely observe, that in the first place this interference was
founded on a treaty arising out of the acknowledged right of
succession of a sovereign, decided by the legitimate authorities of
the country over which she ruled. In the case of a civil war
proceeding either from a disputed succession, or from' a prolonged
revolt, no writer on international law denied that other countries
w. 9
130 RIGHT OF SELF-PRESERVATION AND INDEPENDENCE.
had a right, if they chose to exercise it, to take part with either
of the two belligerent parties. Undoubtedly it was inexpedient to
exercise that right except under circumstanoes of a peculiar nature.
That right, however, was general. If one country exercised it,
another might equally exercise it. One State might support one
party, another the other party: and whoever embarked in either
cause must do so with their eyes open to the full extent of the
possible consequences of their decision. He contended, therefore,
that the measure under consideration established no new principle,
and that it created no danger as a precedent. Every case must be
judged by the considerations of prudence which belonged to it.
The present case, therefore, must be judged by similar considera-
tions. All that he maintained was, that the recent j)i'ooeeding
did not go beyond the spirit of the engagement into which Great
Britain had entered, that it did not establish any new principle,
and that the engagement was quite consistent with the law of
nations (p).
Qp) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, pp. 523—538.

RIGHTS OF OIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION. 131
CHAPTEE II.
RIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION.
Every independent State is entitled to the exclusive power of Exclusive
legislation, in respect to the personal rights and civil state and fe^Jislltion!^^
condition of its citizens, and in respect to all real and personal
property situated within its territory, whether belonging to

citizens or aliens. But as it often happens that an individual
possesses real property in a State other than that of his domicile,
or that contracts are entered into and testaments executed by him,
or that he is interested in successions mh intestato, in a country
differentfrom either; it may happen that he is, at the same time,
subject to two or three sovereign Powers; to that of his native
country or of his domicile, to that of the place where the property
in question is situated, and to that of the place where the contracts
have been made or the acts executed. The allegiance to the sove-
reign Power of his native country exists from the birth of the
individual, and continues a change of nationality
till In the two .
other cases he is considered subject to the laws, but only in a

limited sense. In the foreign countries where he possesses real
property, he is considered a non-resident landowner ('sujet
forain'); in those in which the contracts are entered into, a tem-
porary resident ('sujet passager'). As, in general, each of these
different countries is governed by a distinct legislation, conflicts
between their laws often a
arise; that is to say, it is frequently
question which system of laws is applicable to the case. The Private
collection of rules for determining the conflicts between the civil j^î'âtional
and criminal laws of different States, is called private international
law, to distinguish it from public international law, which regu-
lates the relations of States {a) .
The first general principle on this subject results immediately Conflict of
from the fact of the independence of nations. Every nation

^
,
and exercises exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction

. .... '!^^"
-b
^
undamental
,
possesses principles.
tliroughout the full extent of its territory. It follows, from this
(«) Foelix, Droit International Prive, seq.; J. A. Foote, Priv. Int. Juris-
§ 3; Story, Conflict of Laws, §§ 9, 10, prudence (ed. Phillipson, 1914), pp.
11; Kent, Commentaries, vol. ii. p. 39; xxxvii. seq.
Westlake, Priv. Int. Law (1912), pp. 1
9(2)
lJi2 EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION.
principle, that the laws of every State control, of right, all the
real and personal property within its territory, as well as the in-
habitants of the territory, whether born there or not, and that
they affect and regulate all the acts done, or contracts entered into
within its limits.
Consequently, "every State possesses the power of regulating
the conditions on which the real or personal property, within its
territor}, may be held or transmitted; and of determining the

state and capacity of all persons therein, as well as the validity
of the contracts and other acts which arise there, and the rights and
obligations which result from them; and, finally, of prescribing

the conditions on which suits at law may be commenced and
carried on within its territory" (&).
"
The second general principle is, that no State can, by
its laws,
directly affect, bind, or regulate property beyond its own territory,

or control persons who do not reside within it, whether they be
native-born subjects or not. This is a consequence of the first
general principle; a different system', which would recognise in
each State the power of regulating persons or things beyond its
territory, would exclude the equality of rights among different
States, and the exclusive sovereignty which belongs to each of
them" (c).
Fromthe two principles, which have been stated, it follows that
all eft'ect, which foreign laws can have in the territory of a
the
State, depends absolutely on the express or tacit consent of that
State. A
State is not obliged to allow the application of foreign
laws within its territory, but may absolutely refuse to give any
effect to them. It with regard
may pronounce this prohibition
to some of them only, and permit others to be operative, in whole
or in part. If the legislation of the State is positive either way,
the tribunals must necessarily conform! to it. In the event only
of the law being silent, the courts may judge, in the particular
cases, how to folloAV the foreign laws, and to apply their ])ro visions.
The express consent of a Statie, to the application of foreign laws
within its territory, is given by acts passed by its legislative .'lutho-
rity, or by treaties concluded with other States.
Its tacit consent
is manifested by the decisions of its judicial and administrative
authorities, as well as by the writings of its publicists.
No obligation There is no obligation, recognised by legislators, public
^^^^^^
laws. authorities, and publicists, to regard foreign laws; but their
application is admitted, only from considerations of utility and
(&) Foelix, Droit International Prive, (c) Ibid. § 10.

§ 9.
EIGHTS OF OIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION. 133
the mutual convenience — '
ex comitate,' ob reciprocam
of States
'
utilitatem.' The public good and the general interests of nations

have cause to be accorded, in every State, an operation more or
less extended to foreign laws. Every nation has found its
advantage in this course. The subjects of every State have various

relations with those of other States;; they are interested in the
business transacted and in the property situate abroad. Thence
flows the necessity, or at least utility, for every State, iii .the
proper interest of its subjects, tO' accord certain effects to foreign

laws, and to acknowledge the validity iof acts done in foreign
countries, in order that its subjects may find in the same countries
a reciprocal protection for their interests. There is thus formed
a tacit convention among nations for the application of foreign
laws, founded upon reciprocal wants. This understanding is not
the same everywhere. Some States have adopted the principle of
complete reciprocity, by treating foreigners in the same manner

as their subjects are treated in the country to which they belong;
other States regard certain rights to be so absolutely inherent in
tliequality of citizens as to exclude foreigners from them; or they
attach such an importance to some of their institutions, that they
refuse the application of every foreign law incompatible with the
spirit of those institutions. But, in ;modern times, all States

have adopted, as a principle, the application within their territories
of foreign laws; subject, however, to the restrictions which the
rights of sovereignty and the interests of their own subjects

require. This is the doctrine professed by all the publicists who
have written on the subject (d).

"Above all things," says President Bohier, ''we must remem-
ber that, though the strict rule would authorize us to confine the
operation of laws within their own territorial limits, their appli-

cation has, nevertheless, been extended, from considerations of
public utility, and oftentimes even from ^ kind of necessity. But,

when neighbouring nations have pei^mitted this extension, they are
not to be deemed to have subjected themjselves to a foreign statute;
but to have allowed only because they have found in it their
it,
own interest by having, in similar oases, the same advantages for

their own laws among their neighbours. This effect given to
foreign lawsis founded on a kind of comity of the law of nations;
by which different peoples have tacitly agreed that they shall
apply, whenever it is required by equity and com'mon utility,

provided they do not contravene any prohibitory enactment" (e).
{(1) Caldwell v. Vanvlissengen (e) Bohier, Observations sur la cou-

(1851), 9 Hare, 425. tume de Bourgogne, ch. 23, §§ 62,
63, p. 457.
134 EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION.
Rules laid and best writers on

Huberus, One of the earliest this subject,
Huberus. lays down the following general maxims, as adequate to solve all
the intricate questions which may arise respecting it :
—
1 . The laws of every State have force within the limits of that
State, and bind all its subjects.
2. All persons within the limits of a State are considered as

subjects, whether their residence is permanent or temporary.
3. By the comity of nations, whatever laws are carried into
execution within the limits of any State, are considered as having
the same effect everywhere, so far as they do not occasion a preju-
dice to the rights of other States and their citizens .
From these maxims, Huberus deduces the following general

corollary, as applicable to the determination of all questions
arising out of the conflict of the laws of different States, in respect
to private rights of persons and property.
All transactions in a court of justice, or out of court, whether

testamentary or other conveyances, which are regularly done or
executed according to the law of any particular place, are valid,
even where a different law prevails, and where, had they been so
transacted, they would not have been valid. On the other hand,
transactions and instruments which are done or executed contrary
to the laws of a country, as they are void at first, never can be
valid; and this applies not only to those who permanently reside
in the place where the transaction or instrument is done or exe-
cuted, but to those who reside there only temporarily; with this
exception only, that another State, or its citizens, would be
if
aft'ected by any peculiar inconvenience of an important nature,

by giving this effect to acts performed in another country, that
State not bound to give
is effect to those proceedings, or to con-
eider them as valid within its jurisdiction (/).
Lex loci rei is considered as not depending altogether

Thus, real property
upon the will of private individuals, but as having certain qualities
impressed upon it by the laws of that country where it is situated,
and which qualities remain indelible, whatever the laws of another
State, or the private dispositions of its citizens, may provide to
the contrary. That State, where this real property is situated,
cannot suffer its own laws in this respect to be changed by these
dispositions, without great confusion and prejudice to its own
interests. Hence it follows, that the law of a place where real
(/) Huberus, Prcelect. Jur. Civ., torn. ii. lib. i. tit. 3, De conflictu legimi.
EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION. 135
property is situated governs exclusively as to the tenure the , title,
and the descent of such property {g) .
This rule is applied, by the inteniational jurisprudence of the

United States and Great Britain, to the forms of conveyance of
real property, both as between different parts of the same con-
federation or empire, and with respect to foreign countries. Hence
it is that a deed or will of real property, executed in a foreign
country, or in another State of the Union, mnst be executed with

the formalities required by the laws of that State where the land
lie^W.
But this application of the rule is peculiar to American and
British law. According to the international jurisprudence recog-
nised among the different nations of the European continent, a
deed or will, executed according to the law of the place where it is
made, is valid, not only as to personal, but as to real property,
wherever situated; provided the property is allowed by the lex
loci rei sitce to be alienated by deed or will; and those cases
excepted, where that law prescribes, as to instruments for the

transfer of real property, particular forms, which can only be
observed in the place where it is situated, such as the registry of a
deed or the probate of a will (i) .
The main reason for this divergence lies in the fact that con- Reasons for
^® ^ ®"
tinental conveyancing has always supposed public acts as the rule,
rence.
and made but a comparatively sparing use of the private docu-
ments which constitute Anglo-American titles. The inconveni-
ence arising from the inability to dispose of land unless the owner
was in the country where it was situate, naturally led to the rule
that conveyances of immoveables are rendered valid by the lex loci
actus. On the other hand, the Anglo-American law prescribes
formalities which may be performed anywhere, and are not con-
trary to the law of any nation, and it therefore justly refuses to
give effect to transfers of land, unless such formalities have been
complied Avith(/(;). However, no one maintains that a form ex-
pressly imposed as an exclusive one by the lex situs, can ever be
dispensed with. Thus the French law of the 23rd March, 1855,
(ff) Huberus, liv. i. tit. 3, De con- General Trmt Co. \. River Plate Trust
flictu leg. § 15. Loan and Agency Co., (1892) 2 Ch.
(/O Robinson v. Campbell (1818), 303; Beschamps v. Miller, (1908) 1
3 Wheaton, 212; U. 8. v. Crosby, 7 Ch. 856. Wharton, Conflict of Laws,
Cranch, 115; Cop pin v. Cop pin (1725), p. 372; Foote, Priv. Int. Jurisp.
2 P. W. 291; Brodie v. Barry (1813), (1914), pp. 205 seq.
2 Ves. Beames, 127; McGoon v.
«fe
(*) Foelix, Droit International Prive,
Scales, 9 Wallace, 23; Frehe v. Lord § 52; Huberus, st^>-«.
Carbery (1873), L. R. 16 Eq. 461; (A;) Weatlake,Priv. Int. Law (1912),
Adams v. Clxitterbiich (1883), 10 Q. B. p. 226; Foote, loc. cit.
D. 403; Mercantile Investment ami
requires immoveable property in France to be transferred inter

'
vivos by a transcription in the bureau des hypotheques,' and no

transfer is valid without such transcription {I).
This diversity of ojînion is now of no great importance, because
the laws of most European States have adopted the principle that
land is subject to the lex loci rei sitcE. This is done expressly by
the codes of France, Belgium, Spain, Holland, Prussia, Austria,
Saxony, Italy and Greece (m) Another point to be decided by

.
the lex loci rei the character of the property, that is, whether
sitce is
it be realty or not, for every nation may impress

upon property in
its dominions any character it pleases {n) .
Droit
^
The municipal laws of all European countries formerly pro-
d'aubaine.
hibited aliens from holding real property within the territor}' of
the State. During the prevalence of the feudal system, the acqui-
sition of property in land involved the notion of allegiance to the
prince within whose dominions it lay, which might be inconsistent

witli that which the proprietor owed to his native sovereign. It
'
was also during the same rude ages that the 'jus albinagii or
'droit d'aubaine' was established; by which all the property of a
deceased foreigner (moveable or immoveable) was confiscated to the
use of the State, to the exclusion of his heirs, whether claiming
ah intestato, or under a will of the deceased (o). In the progress
of civilization, this barbarous and inhospitable usage has been,
by degrees, almost entirely abolished. This improvement has

been accomplished either by municipal regulations, or by inter-
national compacts founded upon the basis of reciprocity., Previous
' '
to the French Revolution of 1789, the had been

droit d'aubaine
either abolished or modified between France and other
by treaties
States; and it Avas entirely abrogated by a decree of the Con-

stituent Assembly in 1791, Avith respect to all nations, without
exception and without regard to reciprocity. This gratuitous

concession Avas retracted, and the subject placed on its original
footing of reciprocity by the Code Napoleon, in 1803; but this

part of the Civil Code was again repealed by the Ordinance of
the 14th July, 1819, admitting foreigners to the right of possessing
(0 Tripier, Codes Franâis, p. 1618. (o) Du Cange (Gloss. Med. /Evi,

(m) France, Civil Code, § 3; Bel- voce Albijiaf/itm/ et Albani) derives the
gium, id. Art. v. sub-s. 1; Holland, term, from a-dvenrr. Other etymologists
Dr. gen. § 7; Spain, Civil Code, § 5; derive it from alibi natus. During the
Prussia, AUgemeines Landrecht, Ein- Middle Age, the Scots were called
leitung, § 28; Austria, Code Civil, Albani in France, in common with all
Art. 3; Saxon Civil Code, § 10; Italy, other aliens; and as the Gothic term
Civil Code, Disposition preUminaire, Albanach is even now applied by the
Art. 7; Civil Code of Greece, Art. 5. Highlanders of Scotland to their "race,
(«) Story, § 447; Foote, pp. 194 it may have been transferred by the
&eq. continental nations to all foreigners.

EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION. 1-^7
both real and personal property in France, and of taking by

succession ah intestato, or by will, in the same manner with native
subjects (p).
' '
The analogous usage of the droit de detraction,' or droit de
(jus detr actus), by which a tax was levied upon the

retrait(.''
removal from one State to another of property acquired by succes-

sion or testamentary disposition, has :also been reciprocally
abolished in most civilized countries.
The stipulations contained in the treaties of 1778 and 1800,
between the United States and France, for the mutual abolition
' ' '
of the droit d'aubaine' and the droit de detraction between the

two countries, have expired with those treaties; and the provi-
sion in the treaty of 1794, between the United States and Great
Britain, by which the citizens and subjects of the two countries,
who then held lands within their respective territories, were to
continue to hold them according to the nature and tenure of their
respective estates and titles therein, was limited to titles existing
at the signature of the treaty, and is rapidly becoming obsoleta
by the lapse of time (g) But by the stipulations contained in a

.
great number of subsisting treaties, between the United States

and various Powers of Europe and America, it is provided, that
"where on the death of any person holding real estate within the
territorie!-^ of the one party, such real estate would, by the laws of
the land, descend on a citizen or subject of the other, were he not
disqualified by alienage, such citizen or subject shall be allowed

a reasonable time to sell the same, and to withdraw the proceeds
' '
without molestation, and exempt from all duties of detraction
on th(> part of the government of the respective States (r) .
It is only of late years that the right of holding lands on the Rights of
same conditions as subjects has been conceded to foreigners by laads in

most countries. In Belgium this was effected by the law of the
^'^^jous
27th of April, 1865 Eussia conceded the privilege in 1860 (t).
(s).
Some of the SavIss cantons do not even now permit foreigners to
hold real property without the express permission of the Cantonal
Government, unless there be a treaty to that effect (2^.
(?j) Rotteck und Welcker, Staats- (r) Treaty of 1828 between the
Lexicon, Art. 6rfl!5^recA2;,, Band 6, § 362. United States and Prussia, Art. 14.
Vattel, liv. ii. oh. viii. §§ 112 —
114. Elliott, Am. Diplom. Code, vol. i.
Kliiber, Droit des Gens, Pt. II. tit. 1, p. 388. See U. S. Diplom. Gov. 1873,
ch. ii. §§ 32, 33. Von Mayer, Corp. vol. ii.
p. 1415.
Jur. Confsed. Germanicse, torn. ii. (5) Report of Naturalization Oom-
p. 17. Merlin, Repertoire, tit. ^w6«*«e, mission, 1869, p. 115.
(q) Kent, Coram, vol. ii. pp. 67—69 (t) Ibid. p. 128.
(5th ed.). (w) Ibid. p. 131.
Austria {x), the Netherlands (y), and Sweden (z), only accord the
right on condition of reciprocity in the foreigner's country. The
constitution of the German Empire provides, that every person
belonging to one of the confederated States is to be treated in every
other of the confederated States as a born native, and to be per-,
mitted to acquire real estate (a) But as regards other countries,
.
the laws of Bavaria, Prussia, Saxony, and Wiirtemberg, exact

for their own subjects, when abroad, the same rights they extend
to foreigners in their own dominions (6). In Italy, Denmark, and
Greece, aliens are under no disabilities in this respect (c) Th© .
ownership of land in the United States is regulated by the laws of

each individual State of the Union. Some of the States impose
no restrictions on foreigners (<^) others require residence and an
;
oath of allegiance (e) ;

in others a declaration of an intention to
become a naturalized citizen of the United States is necessary (/) .
Feudal principles were maintained so long in England, that until

the year 1870, an alien was incapable of holding land for more
than twenty-one years, that is, he could not purchase a freehold.
This, however, was remedied by the Naturalization Act, 1870 (g)^
which relieved aliens of most of their disabilities, and, as regards'
land, placed them on the same footing as subjects (h).
Effect of birth There is no uniform rule among nations by which the nation-
in various
States. ality of a person may be determined from the place of his birth.
England, America, and the majority of South American States
claim all who are born within their dominions as natural-born
subjects or citizens, whatever may have been the parents' nation-
ality; but in the case of England the child may elect to revert to
the nationality of his parents. And it seems that in practice the
United States do not claim as citizens children born of parents
whose residence is merely transitory (^) A child born in Den-
.
mark is considered a Dane while he remains in the country (k).
(x) Civil Code of Austria, § 33. Nat. Comni. p. 131; and U. S. Diplom.
(y) Civil Code of the Netherlands, Cor. 1873, p. 1414.
§§ 884, 957. (g) 33 k 34 Vict. c. 14, s. 2.
(z) Swedish Statute of Inheritance, (h) Bloxmn v. Favre (1884), 9 P. D.
"Arfda Balken," eh. 15, § 2. 130. As to British colonies and de-
(a) Art. iii. Hertalet, Map of pendencies, see Rep, of Nat. Comm.
Europe, vol. iii. p. 1931. 1869, p. 137.
(6) Report of Naturalization Com- (0 Calvin's Case (1608), 2 State Tr.
mission, 18^9, pp. 114, 124, 129, 138. 639; Donegani v. Bonegani (1835), 3
(c) Ibid. p. 116. Italian Civil Code, Knapp, P. C. 63; Re Adam (1837), 1
Art. iii. Civil Code of Greece, Art. 5. Moo. P. C. 460. Fourteenth Amend-
(d) Ohio, Michigan, Illinois. ment to U. S. Constitution, U. S.
(e) Vermont, N, and S. Carolina. Statutes at Large, vol. xv. p. 706; and
(/) Connecticut, Maine, Delaware, Wharton, Digest, § 183.
Maryland, Virginia, Tennessee, Arkan- (h-) G. Brock to Sir C. L. Wyke,
sas, Indiana, Missouri. See Rep. of 26th July, 1868, Nat. Coram. Rep.
p. 143.
RIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION. 139
Birth in Portugal confers Portuguese nationality, unless the

father Avas at the time in the service of a foreign State, or
unless the child formally renounces it{l).
Complete Dutch nationality is acquired by birth in Holland, if

the parents are established there, but is abandoned on proof being
given that such a practice is contrary to the laws of the parents'

country of origin. In Sweden the children of aliens who have
resided in the country without intermission from birth to the
attainment of their twenty-second year become citizens at that
age, but they can avoid naturalization on proof that they possess
civil rights in another country (m). In Italy, when an alien has
established his domicile in the kingdom uninterruptedly for ten
years, his child considered a citizen, but residence for commercial
is
purposes does not suffice to confer this status (n) If a child is .
born in any other European country, he does not acquire its

national character, but follows that of his father, if legitimate, and
that of his mother, if illegitimate (o) However, in Balden (p),
.
Belgium (q), France (r), Greece (s), and Spain (f), children of
alien parents born there are enabled to acquire the nationality of
the country by a declaration, made within a year after their
coming of age, of their wish to do so. Under recent legis-

lation (m), French nationality can be thus acquired by alien
children themselves born in France, irrespective of whether their
parents were born there or not. If either of the parents was born
in France, such children are now regarded as French subjects from
their birth; but if only the mother was born there the children
may declare for retention of their foreign nationality in the year
following the attainment of their majority (x).
As to personal property, the lex domicilii of its owner prevails J^'-*^ domicilii.
over the law of the country where such property is situated, so

'
far as respects the rule of inheritance, Mobilia ossibus inhgerent,
personam sequuntur.' Thus the law of the place, where the owner
of personal property was domiciled at the time of his decease,
(I) Civil Code of Portugal, tit. iii. (r) Code Napoleon; Code Civil,
Art. 18, No. 2. liv. i. c. i.
§ 9.
(m) Law of 28tli July, 1850, P. 0. (s) Civil Code of Greece, Arts. 17,
No. 44, Art. 1; Swedish law of Oct. 19.
1894; Martena, Nouv. Rec. Gen. 2nie (t) Royal Decree, 17th Nov. 1852.
Ser. XX. p. 823. (w) Law of 29th Jan. and 7th Feb.
(n) Civil Code of Italy, lib. i. tit. i. 1851, Art. 1; Law of 28th June, 1889.
Art. 8. {cc) Laws of 28th June, 1889, and
(o) Rep. of Nat. Comm. pp. 141
— 23rd July, 1893, and on the subject
149. generally, see G. Oogordan, La nation-
(p) Baden Landrecht, Art. 9. alite au point de vue des rapports
Iq) Oivil Code of Belgium, Art. 9. internationaux (Paris, 1890).
Law of 27th Sept. 1835, Art. 2.
governs the succession ah intestato as to his personal effects

wherever they may be situated (|/) Yet it had once been doubted,
.
how far a British subject could, by changing his native domicile

for a foreign domicile without the British empire, change the
rule of succession to his personal property in Great Britain;,
though was admitted that a change of domicile, within the

it
empire, as from England to Scotland, would have that effect (z) .
But these doubts were overruled in a later decision bj^, the Court
of Delegates in England, establishing the law, that the actual
foreign domicile of a British subject is exclusively to govern, in

respect to his testamentary disposition of personal property, as
it would in the case mere foreigner (a)
of a .
So also the law where any instrument, relating to

of a place
personal property, is executed, by a party domiciled in that place,

governs, as to the external form, the interpretation, and the effect
of the instrument: 'Locus regit actum.' Thus, a testament of
personal property, if executed according to the formalities re-
quired by the law of the place where it is made, and where the
party making it was domiciled at the time of its execution, is
valid in every other country, and is to be interpreted and given
according to the lex loci.
effect to
This principle, laid down by all the text-writers, was, in 1829,

recognised in England in a case where a native of Scotland, domi-
ciled in India, but who possessed heritable bonds in Scotland, as
well as personal property there, and also in India, had executed
a will in India, ineffectual to convey Scottish heritage; the
question then arose whether his heir-at-law (who claimed the
hei'itable bonds as heir) was also entitled to a shure of the move-
able property as legatee under the will. was held by Lord
It
Chancellor Brougham, in delivering the judgment of the House
of Lords, affirming that of the Court below, that the construction
of the will, and the legal consequences of that construction, must
be determined by the law of the land where it was made, and
where the testator had his domicile, that is to say, by the law of
England prevailing in that country; and this, although the will
(y) Huberus, Prselect. torn. ii. lib. i.

(z) Per Sir
J. NiclioU, in Curling v.
tit. 3, de Conflict. Leg. §§ 14, 15. TJiornton (1823), 2 Addame' Eccles.
Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. lib. i. Kep. p. 17. Wharton, Conflict of
cap. 16. See also an opinion given by Laws, § 585.
Grotius as counsel in 1613, Henry:, (a) Stanley v. B ernes (1830), 3
Foreign Law, App. p. 196. Merlin, Haggard Eccles. pp. 393 465; Moore —
Repertoire, tit. Loi, §6, No. 3. Foelix, v. Ifarell (1832), 4 Hagg. 346, 354;
Droit International Priv6, § 37. Foote, Bremer v. Freeman (1857), 10 Moo.
Priv. Int. Jurisprudence (1914), pp. P. O. 306; Enohin v. Wylie (1862),
252 seq., 269 seq., and the English 31 L. J. Oh. 402.
cases there cited.
EIGHTS OF OIVIL AND CEIMINAL LEGISLATION. 141
was made the subject of judicial inquiry in the tribunals of Scot-

land for these Courts also are bound to decide according* to the
:
law of the place where the will was m;ade (6).

The law
of the domicile regulates only universal assignments The kx domi-
of moveable property, as on marriage or death, because this is the
regulates
only source from which a rule common to Xproperty
^^^^versal
X ^ situated in successions.
. .
various countries can be derived. But when the title to a par- chang-e of
ticular chattel is concerned, in a case not involving <ô™icile as
any universal
assignment, the law of its situation is absolute (c). In England
no change of domicile Avill avoid or affect a will which was valid by
the law of the testator's domicile at the time of its execution {d).,
Some American Union have adopted a dif-
of the States of the
ferent rule. Thus, in New York the law of the testator's last
domicile is held to govern the will(e'). The payment of legacy
duty is regulated by the lex domicilii; and, in general, the lia-
bility to pay succession duty or no is determined by the same test.
But the domicile of the settlor
is not, in this latter
respect, con-
clusive. may There
be such a settlement made of the property as
to give it a British character, and then the duty Avill be
payable
whatever be the domicile of the settlor (/) .
The Wills Act (Lord Kingsdown's Act) of 1861 provides that, Wills of
'"
Every will or other testamentary disposition made out of the subjects made
United Kingdom by a British subject (whatever may be the domi- 'inroad,
cile of such person at the time of

making the same, or at the time
of his or her death) shall, as regards personal estate, be deemed to
be well executed for the purpose of being admitted in England and
Ireland to probate, and in Scotland to confirmation, if the same
be made according to the forms required, either by the law of the
place where the same was made, or by the law of the place where
such person was domiciled when the same was made, or by the
laws then in force in that part of Her Majesty's dominions where
he had his domicile of origin" {g). In 1874, Lacroix, a French-
man by birth, but naturalized in England, made a will in Paris in
the English form, relating to his property in England only. By
(b) Trotter v. Trotter (1829), S N. Y. 394; Wharton, Conflict of Laws.

Wilson & Shaw, 407. § 586a.
Cammell v. Sewell (1858), 5 H.
(o) (/) Thotnson v. Adv.-Gen. (1845).
& N. 728; Williams v. Colonial Bank 12 01. & F. 1; Wallace v. Attorneii-
(1890), 38 Oh. D. 388. See as to General (1865), L. K. 1 Ch. 1; Attor-
powers of appointment respecting pro- ney-General v. Campbell (1872), L. 1\.
perty in a foreign country, Tatnall 5 H. L. 524; In re Cicala's Trt/ai
V. Hankey (1838), 2 Moo. P. O. 342. (1878), 7 Ch. D. 351. Of. Foote,
Of. Foote, Priv. Int. Jurisprudence Priv. Int. Jurisprudence (1914), pp.
(1914), pp. 239 seq., 258 seq. 284 seq.
Ut) 24 & 25 Viet. c. 114, s. 3. {g) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 114, s. 1.
(e) Moidtrie v. Hunt (1860), 23
142 EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CEIMINAL LEGISLATION.
the law of France, the will of a naturalized British subject made

in Franco according to the forms required by the law of England,
Wills made in is valid in France, whatever may be the domicile of the testator at
England.
the time of his death, or at the time of making the will. The
will of Lacroix was therefore admitted to probate under this
statute, as being valid according to the law of the place where it
was made(/^). The same statute provides that, "Every will or
other testamentary instrument made within the United Kingdom
by any British subject (whatever may be the domicile of such

person at the time of making the same, or at the time of his or her
death), shall, as regards personal estate, be held to be well exe-
cuted, and shall be admitted in England and Ireland to probate,
and in Scotland to confirmation, if the same be executed according
to the forms required by the laws for the time being in force in
that part of the United Kingdom where the same is made" (^).
Under this section the will of an Italian who was naturalized in
England, who made his will in England, and then returned to and
was domiciled in Italy at the time of his death, was admitted to
probate in England. The section was held to apply equally to
naturalized as to native-born British subjects (k).
Personal
status.
The sovereign power of municipal legislation also extends to
the regulation of the personal rights of the citizens of the State,
and to everything affecting their civil state and condition.
It extends (with certain exceptions) to the supreme police over
allpersons within the territory, whether citizens or not, and to all
criminal offences committed by them within the same(Z).

Some of these exceptions arise from the positive law of nations,
others are the effect of special compact.
There are also certain cases where the municipal laws of the
State, civil and criminal, operate beyond its territorial jurisdic-
tion. These are,
Laws Laws
relating-
to the state
I. relating to the state and capacity of persons.
and capacity In general, the laws of the State, applicable to the civil condition
of persons
and personal capacity of its citizens, operate upon them even when
iriayoperate
extra- resident in a foreign country.
territorially.
Such are those universal personal qualities which take effect
either from birth, such as citizenship, legitimacy, and illegiti-
macy; at a fixed time after birth, as minority and majority; or
(A) In the goods of Lacroix (1877), (7c) In the goods of Gaily (1876),
2 P D. 95 1 P. D. 438. Of. Foote, p. 255.
(0 '24 & 25 Vict. c. 114, s. 2. (0 Cf Huberus,
. torn. ii. liv. i. tit. 3,
Do conflict, leg. § 2.
EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CKIMINAL LEGISLATION. 143
at an indeterminate time after birth, as idiocy and lunacy, bank-

ruptcy, marriage, and divorce, ascertained by the judgment of a
competent tribunal. The laws of the State affecting all these
personal qualities of its subjects travel with them wherever they
go, and attach to them in whatever country they are resident (m) .
This general rule is, however, subject to the following excep-

tions: —
1. The right
of every independent sovereign State to natura- Xaturaliza-
lize foreigners and to confer upon them the privileges of theit
acquired domicile.
Even supposing a natural-born subject of one country cannot
throv/ off his primitive allegiance, so as to cease to be responsible'
for criminal acts against his native country, it has been deter-
mined, both in Great Britain and the United States, that he may
become by residence and naturalization in a foreign State entitled
to all the commercial privileges of his acquired domicile and citi-
zenship. Thus, by the treaty of 1794, between the United States

and Great Britain, the trade to the countries beyond the Cape of
Good Hope, within the limits of the East India Company's
Charter, was opened to American citizens, whilst it still con-
tinued prohibited to British subjects: it was held by the Court of
King's Bench that a natural-born British subject might become a
United States, and be entitled to all the advantages
citizen of the
of trade conceded between his native country and that foreign
country; and that the circumstance of his returning to his native
country for a mere temporary purpose would not deprive him of
those advantages {n) .
2. The sovereign rig*ht of evevj independent State to regulate Regulation of

the property within its territory constitutes another exception siuate/iu a
to the rule. S<âte.
Thus, the personal capacity to contract a marriage, as to age,

consent of parents, &c., is regulated by the law of the party's
domicile (lex domicilii) (o); but the effects of a nuptial contract
upon real property (' immobilia ') in another State are determined
by the lex loci rei sitce. Huberus, indeed, lays down the con-
trary doctrine, upon the ground that the foreign law, in this case,
(m) Pardessus, Droit Commercial, (») Wilson v. Marryatt (1798), 1

Pt. VI. /tit. 7, ch. 2, § 1, Fffilix, Droit Bos. & Pull. 43; 7 T. R. 31. See
International Prive, Hv. i. tit. i. § 31. further on this subject at the end of
Huberus, torn. ii. 1. i. tit. 3, De con- the chapter.
flict.leg. § 12. Abd-ul-Messih v. (o) Sottamayorv. De Barros (1877),
Farra (1887), 13 App. Cas. 431, 438; 3 P. D. O. A.; Brook v. Brook
1,
Re Price, Tomlin v. Latter, (1900) 1 (1861), 9 H. L. Cas. 193; Ogden v.
Ch. 442; and pee In re de Nicol, O^^rfew (1908), P. 46, C. A. Cf Foote,
.
(1900) A. C. 21. Priv. Int. Jurisp. (1914), pp. 70, 340.

144 EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION
does not affect the territory immediately, but only in an incidental

manner, and that by the implied consent of the sovereign, for the
benefit of his subjects, without prejudicing* his or their rights.
But the practice of nations is certainly different, and therefore no
such consent can be implied to waive the local law which has
impressed certain indelible qualities upon immoveable property
within the territorial jurisdiction (p).
Personal As to personal property ('mobilia') the lex loci contractus, or
property.
lex domicilii, may, in certain cases, prevail over that of the place
where the propert}^ is situated. Huberus holds that not only the
marriage contract itself, duly celebrated in a given place, is valid
in all other places, but that the rights and effects of the contract,.
as depending upon the lex loci, are to be equally in force every-
where (g). If this rule be confined to personal property, it may
be considered as confirmed by the unanimous authority of the
public jurists, who unite in maintaining the doctrine that the
incidents and effects of the marriage upon the property of the
parties, wherever situated, are to be governed by the law of the
matrimonial domicile, in the absence of any other positive nuptial
contract (r) But if there be an express ante-nuptial contract,
.
the rights of the parties under it are to be governed by the) lex loci
contractus (s) .
Matrimonial Tlie matrimonial domicile has been defined to be the actual

domicile.
domicile of the husband at the time of the marriage, but it may
possibly, when persons marry with the avowed intention of im-
mediately settling in some country where the husband is not
actually domiciled, mean not tlie actual, but the intended, domi-
cile of the husband (^). "The marriage contract," said Lord
Brougham, "is emphatically one which parties make with an
immediate view to the usual place of their residence" {u). The
matrimonial domicile is not changed by an abandonment of one
party by the other (x) It seems fairly established that the law
.
of the matrimonial domicile will always govern personal property
acquired before marriage (y) and instruments relating to it, such

;
(p) Kent, Comment, vol. ii. pp. 182, Conflict of Laws, § 193. Wharton,
186, n. (5tli edit.); Foote, p. 220. § 190.
(q) Huberus, 1. i. tit. 3, De con- (u) Warrender v. Warrender (1835),
flict, leg. § 9. 2 01. & Fin. 488.
(/•)
66.
Foelix, § Westlake, Priv. {x) Bonati v. Welsh (1861), 2-1 New
Int. Law (1912), p. 77. Field, Inter- York, 157. See Le Sueur v. Le Sueur
national Code, § 575. Foote, p. 220. (1876), 1 P. D. 139.
(s) De Couclie v. Savetier, 3 John- (y) Phillimore, vol. iv. § 445.
son, Ch. Eep. 211. Wafts V. Schrmipton (1856), 21 Bea-
(0 Cf. Bicey, Conflict of Laws van, 97; Wright's Trusts (1856), 2
(1908), p. 640; and see Field, Inter- K. k J. 595. Westlake, loc. ctt.
national Code, § 577 (2iid ed.). Story, Dicey, p. 635. Foote, p. 312.
EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISIATION. 145
as marriago settlements, are to be construed according to that

law (2^). But when the matrimonial domicile is changed after
marriage, there is a difference of opinion as to what effect this will
have upon personal property acquired after such change of domi-
cile. Story lays it down that when there has been a change, the
law of the actual, and not of Ihe matrimonial, domicile will govern
as to all future acquisitions of personal property, if the laws ol
the place where the rights are sought to be enforced do not pro-
hibit such arrangements (a). On the other hand, in England the
law of the matrimonial domicile, in the absence of express contract,
regulates the rights of the husband and wife in the moveable pro-
perty belonging to either of them at the time of their marriage, or
acquired by either of them during the marriage. The French
law is to the same effect (6).
By general private international law of Europe and Effect of

the
America, a certificate of discharge
° obtained by
^
a bankrupt
^ in the ânkrupt and
. , . discharge
country of which he is a subject, and where the contract was made title of
and the parties domiciled, is valid to discharge the debtor in cvory fnânother
other country; but the opinions of jurists and the practice of country,
nations have been much divided upon the question, how far the
title of his assignees or syndics will control his personal property
situated in a foreign country, and prevent its being attached and

distributed under the local laws in a different course from that
prescribed by the bankrupt code of his own country. According

to the law of most European countries, the proceeding which is
commenced in the country of the bankrupt's domicile draws to
itself the exclusive right to take and distribute the property. The
rule thus established is restedupon the general principle that
personal (or moveable) property is, by a legal fiction, considered
as situated in the country where the bankrupt had his domicile.
But the principles of jurisprudence, as adopted in the United
States, consider the lex loci rei sitce as prevailing over the lex
domicilii in respect to creditors, and that the laws of other
States cannot be permitted to have an extra-territorial operation
and interests of the State
to the prejudice of the authority, rights,
(2) Anstrutherv. Adair (1834), 2 Wharton, § 198.

6U', Este v. Smith (1^64:),
'M.ylxiQ &l'K. (b) Be Nicols v. Curlier, (1900)
18 Beavan, 112; Saul v. His Creditors, A. 0. p. 21. Cf. Westlake, Priv. Int
6 Martin, N. S. 569; Be Lane v. Law (1912), p. 74, Foote, pp. 312
Moore (1852), 14 Howard, 253; Col- seq. For the French law, see Fcelix,
liss V. Hector (1875), L. E. 19 Eq. p. 91. This is approved of by Sir E.
334; Re Marsland (1886), 55 L. J. Phillimore, vol. iv. § 447, and accords
Ch. 581. with the opinion of Savigny; cf. Eng-
(«) Conflict of Laws, § 187. Burge, lish translation by Guthrie, p. 293.
Coi. and For. Laws, pt. i. ch. 7, § 8.
w. 10
146 RIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION.
where the property lies. The Supreme Court of the United States
has therefore determined, that hoth the government under its
prerogative priority, and private creditors attaching under the

local laws, are to be preferred to the claim of the assignees for
the benefit of the general creditors under a foreign bankrupt law,
although the debtor was domiciled and the contract made in a

foreign country (c).
The lex loci The general rule as to the application of personal statutes
3.
contractus
often causes yields in some cases to the operation of the lex loci contractus.
exceptions to Thus a bankrupt's certificate under the laws of his own country
this rule.
cannot operate in another State to discharge him from his debts
contracted with foreigners in a foreign country {d) And though .
the personal capacity to enter into the nuptial contract as to age,

consent of parents, and prohibited degrees of affinity, &c., is
generally to be governed by the lex domicilii, the marriage cere-
mony is always regulated by the law of the place where it is cele-
brated {lex loci celebrationis) (e); and if valid there, it is con-
sidered as valid everywhere else, unless made in fraud of the laws
of the country of which the parties are domiciled subjects.
Lex loci II. The municipal laws of the State may also operate beyond
contractus.
its territorial jurisdiction, where a contract made within the terri-
tory comes either directly or incidentally in question in the judi-
cial tribunals of aforeign State.
A. contract, valid by the law of the place where it is made, is,
generally speaking, valid everywhere else. The general comity

and mutual convenience of nations have established the rule, that
the lav/ of that place governs in every thing respecting the form',
interpretation, obligation, and effect of the contract, wherever the

authority, rights, and interests of other States and their citizens
are not thereby prejudiced (/).
Exceptions to This qualification of the rule suggests the exceptions which
its operation .
arise to its application.
(c) Bell, Commentaries on the Law domicile. Ex parte Sibeth (1885), 14

of Scotland, vol. ii. pp. 681—687. Q. B. D. 417; Ex parte Bever (1887),
Rose, Cases in Bankruptcy, vol. i. 18 Q. B. D. 660; 8iU v. Worsvnck
p. 462. Kent, Comment, vol. ii. pp. (1791), 1 H. Bl. &Q6. Of. Foote, pp.
393, 404—408, 459 (5th edit.); Har- 300 seq.
rison V. Sterry, 5 Cranch, 289; Ogden (d) Phillips v. Allan (1828), 8 B. &
v. Saunders, 12 Wheaton, 153. West- C. 477. Eoote, p. 430.
lake, Priv. Int. Law (1912), pp. 328 (e) Broolc v. Brook (1861), 9
seq. Story, §§ 403—415. The Eng- H. L 0. 193, 224; Marshall v. Mar-
lish Court will administer the estate shall (1908), The Times, March 10.
in accordance with the lex fori, but Cf. Foote, p. 92.
will allow due operation and effect to (/) See Huberus, 1. ii. tit. De
3,
a bankruptcy in the forum of the conflict, leg. § 11.
1. It cannot apply to cases properly governed by the lex loci

rei sitce (as in the case, before put, of the effect of a nuptial con-
tract upon real property in a foreign State), or by the laws of
another State relating to the personal state and capacity of its
citizens.
2. It cannot apply where it would injuriously conflict with the

laws of another State relating to its police, its public health, its
commerce, its revenue, and generally its sovereign authority, and
the rights and interests of its citizens.
Thus, if goods are sold in a place where they are not prohibited,
to be delivered in a place where they are prohibited, although the
trade ih perfectly lawful by the lex loci contractus, the price can-
not be recovered in the State where the goods are deliverable,
because to enforce the contract there would be to sanction a breach
of itsown commercial laws. But the tribunals of one country
do not take notice of, or enforce, either directly or incidentally,,
the laws of trade or revenue of another State, and therefore an
insurance of prohibited trade may be enforced in the tribunals of
any other country than that where it is prohibited by the local
laws(pf).
Huberus holds that the contract of marriage to be governed Foreign
is
by the law of the place where it is celebrated, excepting fraudulent "^^^^^ges.

evasions of the law of the State to which the party is subject (h).
Such are marriages contracted in a foreign State, and according
to its laws, by persons who are minors, or otherwise incapable of
contracting, by the law of their own country. But according to English law.
the international marriage law of the British Empire, a clan-
destine marriage in Scotland, of parties originally domiciled in
England, who resort to Scotland, for the sole purpose of evading

the English Marriage Act, requiring the consent of parents or
guardians, is considered valid in the English Ecclesiastical Courts.

This jurisprudence is said to have been adopted upon the ground
of its being a part of the general law and practice of Christendom,

and that and mischief would ensue, with respect
infinite confusion
to legitimacy, and other personal and proprietary
succession,
rights, if the validity of the marriage contract was not determined
by the law of the place where it was made. The same principle
(^g) Pardessus, Droit

Commercial, lias been strono^ly questioned by Byn-
vi. tit. eh. 2, § 3.
Emerigon, kershoek and Pothier. Also by Story,
pt. 7,
Traite des Assurances, torn. i. pp. 212 § 257; Heffter, § 38; but it is ad-
—215. Park, Insurance, p. 341 (6th mitted to be correct,
ed.). The moral equity of this rule (^) De conflict, leg. I. c.
10 (2)
has been recognised between the different States of the American

Union, upon similar grounds of public policy (i).
French \i\v.
On the other hand, the age of consent required by the French
Civil Code is considered, by the law of France, as a personal
quality of French subjects, following them wherever they remove;

and, consequently, a marriage by a Frenchman, within the re-
quired age, will not be regarded as valid by the French tribunals^
though the parties may have been above the age required by the
law of the place where it was contracted (Jc).
Execution of 3. Wherever, from the nature of the contract itself, or the law
contract in
another of the place where it is made, or the expressed intention of the
country.
parties, the contract is to be executed in another country, every-
thing which concerns its execution is to be determined by the law
of that countr}^ Those writers who affirm that this exception
extends to everything respecting the nature, the validity, and the
interpretation, appear to have erred in supposing that the autho-
rities arc at variance on this question. They will be found, on a
critical examination, to êstablish the distinction between what
relates to the validity and interpretation, and what relates to the
execution of the contract. By the usage of nations, the former
is tobe determined by the lex loci contractus, the latter by the
law of the place where it is to be carried into execution (l).
English law By the law of England, what is to be the law by which a con-
any part of it, is to be governed or applied, must always

tract, or
be a matter of construction of the contract itself, as read by the
light of the subject-matter and of the surrounding circum-
stances (m) .
" "
The law of There can be.no doubt," said Lord Campbell, of the general
the domicile
rule that a foreign marriage, valid according to the law of a
regulates the
capacity of
the parties to
country where it is celebrated, is good
everywhere. But while
marry.
the forms of entering into the contract of marriage are to be
regulated by the lex loci contractus, the law of the country in

which it is celebrated, the essentials of the contract depend upon
the lex domicilii, the law of the country in which the parties are
domiciled at the time of the marriage, and in which the matri-
monial residence is contemplated. Although the forms of
(i) Harford v. Morris (1776), 2 (0 Foelix, Droit International Prive,

Hagg. Cons. 428. Kent, Commen- § 74.
taries, vol. ii.
p. 93. (m) Lloyd V. Guib&rt (1865), L. R.
(A) Merlin, Eepertoire, tit. Loi, 1 Q. B. 115; Jacobs v. Credit Lyon-
§ 6. TouUier, Droit Franâis, torn. i. nais (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 589, "599;
No. 118, 576. Simonin v. Mallac Re Missouri Steamship Co. (1869), 42
(1860), 2 Swa. & Tr. 62. Ch. D. 321; 5 T. L. R. 438. Cf.
Foote, pp. 369 seq.
celebrating the foreign marriage may be different from tbose
required by the law of the country of domicile, the marriage may

be good everywhere. But if the contract of marriage is such, in
essentials, as to be contrary to the law of the country of domicile,
and it is declared void by that law, it is to be regarded as void in
the country of domicile, though not contrary to the law of the

"
country in which it was celebrated {n). It is quite obvious that
no civilized State can allow its subjects or citizens, by making a
temporary visit to a foreign country, to enter into a contract, to be

performed in the place of domicile, if the contract is forbidden
by the law of the place of domicile as contraiy to religion, or
morality, or any of its fundamental institutions.
In 1840, W. L. Brook married Charlotte Armitage in England. Srooky.Brook
In 1847, Mrs. Brook died, and in 1850 W. L. Brook married

Emily Armitage, the lawful sister of his deceased wife, at Wands-
beck, in Denmark, according to the laws of Denmark. At the
time of the marriage Brook and Emily Armitage were domiciled
in England, and had merely gone to Denmark on a temporary
visit. The question arose whether this marriage could be recog-
nised as valid in England. The law of Denmark does not pro-
hibit the marriage of a widower with his deceased wife's sister,
but the law of England then did (o) The House of Lords held
.
that the parties being at the time domiciled in England, their
capacity to marry, and the consequent validity of their marriage,

"
was to be decided by English law. A
marriage between a man
Lord Campbell, "being
ajid the sister of his deceased wife," said
Danish subjects domiciled in Denmark, may be good all over the
world, and this might likewise be so even if they were native-born
English subjects, who had abandoned their English domicile and
were domiciled in Denmark. But I am by no means prepared to
say that the marriage now in question ought to be, or would be,
held valid in the Danish courts, proof being given that the parties
were British subjects domiciled in England, that England was
to be their matrimonial residence, and that by the law of
England such a marriage is prohibited as being contrary to the

"
law of God (p). Every State has a perfect right to decide what
'
marriages it will deem contra bonos mores,' and what marriages
(n) Brook v. Brook (1861), 9 H. of (o) Hill v. Good, Vaughan, 302;

L. Cas. 207; Sottommjor v. De Barros R. v. Ohadwiok, 11 Q. B. 173, 205.
(1877), 3 P. D. 1. See also Simonin Marriage with a deceased wife's sister
V. Mallac (I860), 2 Sw. & Tr. 67; was made lawful by the Deceased
Harvey v. Farnie (1880), 8 App. Cas. Wife's Sister's Marriage Act, 1907.
43, 50. And see Dicey, Conflict of {p) Brook v. Brook (1861), 9 H. L.
Laws (1908), pp. 613 seq. Foote, Cas. 212.
p. 70.
150 EIGHTS OF OIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION.
it will prohibit within its jurisdiction. If such marriages are

entered into abroad by its domiciled subjects, their validity will
not be recognised in the State prohibiting them.
Polygamous
and incestuous
When a marriage is polygamous or incestuous by the law of
marriages. the place where it is drawn in question, its validity will not be
recognised in such place, although the marriage may have been

lawful where celebrated. There can be no question as to what is
a polygamous marriage. Marriage, as understood in Christen-
dom, has been defined to be the voluntary union for life of one
man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others (q). In 1866,
Lord Penzance refused to recognise a Mormon marriage as valid
in England. The marriage was a species of compact entered into
between the parties in Utah, but it was such that the law of
England could not take notice of it, so as to decree a restitution
of conjugal rights (r). But what amounts to an incestuous mar-
riage is by no means so clear. Marriages between blood relations
in the lineal ascending or descending line, and marriages between
brother and sister in the collateral line, whether of the whole or
of the universally regarded as incestuous (s).
half-blood, are
Beyond no rule upon which nations are agreed.
this there is
Clandestine As regards clandestine Scotch marriages, it is now enacted that
Scotch
''no irregular marriage contracted in Scotland by declaration,
marriages.
acknowledgment, or ceremony, shall be valid, unless one of the
parties had at the date thereof his or her usual place of residence
there, or had lived in Scotland twenty-one days next preceding
"
such marriage (t).
Marriages of By
the Foreign Marriage Act of 1892, it is provided that all
British
subjects marriages between parties of whom one at least is a British sub-
abroad. and solemnized in the manner therein provided in any foreign
ject,
country or place by a marriage officer within the meaning of the
Act, shall be as valid in law as if the same had been solemnized
in the United Kingdom with a due observance of all forms
required by law. The Act applies to embassy and consular mar-

riages, and marriages celebrated on board ships of war on foreign
"
stations. The marriage officer " is not required to solemnize a
iq) Hyde v. Hyde (1866), L. E. 1 the marriage laws of the British

P. & D. 130, per Lord Penzance, at Empire, see Eeport of Royal Com-
p. 133; see also He Bethell (1888), mission on the Marriage Laws, 1868,
38 Oh. D. 220; and Brinkley v. The and a return made to the House of
Attorney-General (1890), P. D. 76. Commons in 1894. Pari. Papers, H. O.
(r) Hyde v. Hyde, ut supra. (1894), 144, 145, 323, 324.
Is) Story, Conflict of Laws, § 114; (0 19 & 20 Vict. c. 96. Lawford
Foote, pp. 98 seq. See also Sotto- V. Bavies, 47 L. J. P. D. & A. 38;
mayor v. De Barros (1879), 5 P. D. L. R. 4 P. D. 6.
94; Roth v. Roth, 104 111. 35. As to
EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMHSTAL LEGISLATION. 151
marriage if in his opinion the solemnization would be inconsistent

with international law or the comity of nations (u). The Act of
1892 is supplemented by the Marriage with Foreigners Act, 1906,
which is intended to protect British subjects who marry aliens,
either here or abroad, and then find that though the marriage is
recognised here, it is not held valid by the other party's personal
law. Opportunities are thereby afforded to a British subject,
desiring to marry an alien in a foreign country, to fulfil the
provisions of the foreign law(cc).
4. As
every sovereign State has the exclusive right of regu-
Lex fori.
lating the proceedings in its own courts of justice, the lex loci
oonimctiU of another country cannot apply to such cases as are
properly to be determined by the lex fori of that State where the
contract is brought in question.
Thus, if a contract made in one country is attempted to be
enforced, or comes incidentally in question, in the judicial tribu-

nals of another, everything relating to the forms of proceeding,
the rules of evidence, and of limitation, (or prescription,) is to be
determined by the law of the State where the suit is pending, not
of that where the contract is made (i/),
III. The municipal

institutions of a State may also operate Foreign sove-J
beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction, in the following*

ambassador
cases :
— army, or fleet,
1. The person
of a foreign sovereign, or head of a State, going territory of
into the territory of another State, is, by the general usage and another State.
comity of nations, exempt from the ordinary local jurisdiction.

Bepresenting the power, dignity, and all the sovereign attributes
of his own and going into the territory of another vState,
nation,
under the permission which (in time of peace) is implied from
the absence of any prohibition, he is not amenable to the civil or
criminal jurisdiction of the country where he temporarily
resides (0). According to earlier practice, the foreign sovereign
(u) 55 & 56 Vict. c. 23. For pre- (z) Bynkershoek, De Foro Leât.,
vious legislation on the subject, see cap. iii. § 13, cap. ix. § 10. In the
schedule to the Act containing the case of Duke of Brunswick v. Kinr/
statutes repealed. Foote, pp. 103 seq. of Hanover (1844), 6 Beav. 1, at p. 51,
(x) Foote, p. 107. Lord Langdale said: "On the whole
(y) Kent, Commentaries, vol. ii. it ought to be considered as a general
p. 459 (5th ed.). Foelix, Droit Inter- rule, in accordance with the law of
national Prive, § 76'. I>on v. Lipp- nations, that a sovereign prince, resi-
man (1837), 5 Cl. «fe F. 1; Scudder v. dent in the dominions of another, is
Bank, 91 U. S. 406. Of. Foote, exempt from the jurisdiction of the
pp. 474 seq. (where numerous cases Courts there." See infra, p. 329; and
are cited). see Mighell v. Stdtariof Johore, (1894)
possessed criminal jurisdiction over members of his suite during

temporary residence within another State (a), but now this rule
is considered inapplicable. Thus, in 1873, when the Shah of
Persia was on a visit to this country, he condemned to death one of
the members of his suite, but the British Government refused' to
allow the sentence to be carried out.
2. The person
of an ambassador, or other public minister, whilst
within the territory of the State to which he is delegated, is also
exempt from the local jurisdiction. His residence is considered
as a continued residence in his own country, and he retains his
national character, unmixed with that of the country where he
locally resides (&).

3. A
foreign army or fleet, marching through, sailing over,
or stationed in the territory of another State, with whom the
foreign sovereign to whom they belong is in amity, are also, in

like manner, exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of
the place (c) .
Foreign jf there be no express prohibition, the ports of a friendly State

vessels. are considered as open to the public armed and commissioned
ships belonging to another nation, with whom that State is at

peace. Such ships are exempt from the jurisdiction of the local
tribunals and authorities, whether they enter the ports under the
license implied from the absence of any prohibition, or under an
express permission stipulated by treaty. But the private vessels
of one State, entering the ports of another, are not exempt from
the local jurisdiction, unless by express compact, and to the extent
provided by such compact {d) .
"m^F^^h^^
The above principles, respecting the exemption of vessels be-
longing to a foreign nation from the local jurisdiction, were
asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the cele-
brated case of The Exchange (e), a vessel which had originally
belonged to an American citizen, but had been seized and confis-
cated at St. Sebastian, in Spain, and converted into a public armed
vessel by the Emperor Napoleon, in 1810, and was reclaimed by
the original owner, on her arrival in the port of Philadelphia.
1 Q. B. 149; The Padement Beige of Sweden (1657), Calvo, Droit int.,

(1880), L. R. 5 P. D. 197; De Haber vol. iii. § 1477.
V. Queen of Portugal (l^bY), 17 Q. B. (6) Vide infra, pt. iii. ch. 1.
196. Cf. Foote, Priv. Int. Jurisp. (c) Casaregis, Discursus de com-
(1914), pp. 152 seq. In Statham v. mercio (Venetiis, 1740), 136, 174. See
Staiham (1912), 28 T. L. R. 180, an infra, p. 155.
Indian prLnc-e, recognised as a reigning (d) United States v. Diekelman
sovereign, was sued as a co-respondent (1875), 2 Otto, 520; 92 U. S. 520;
in a divorce suit, but on his application Wildenhus' Case (1886), 120 U. S. 1.
was struck out of the proceedings. (e) The Exchange v. McFadden
(a) Cf. the case of Queen Christina (1812), 7 Ctanch, 116.
In delivering the judgment of the Court in this case, Chief

Justice Marshall stated that the jurisdiction of courts of justice
was a branch of that possessed by the nation as an independent
sovereign Power. The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own
territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible
of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it,
deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminu-

tion of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an
investment of that sovereignty, to the same extent, in that Power
which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore,
to the full and complete power of a nation, within its own terri-
tories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They

could flow from no other legitimate source. This consent might
be either express or implied. In the latter case it is less deter-
minate, exposed more to the uncertainties of construction; but, if
understood, not less obligatory. The world being composed of
distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal indepen-
dence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each

other, and by an interchange of those good offices which humanity
dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have consented to a
relaxation in practice, under certain peculiar circumstances, of
that absolute and complete jurisdiction, within their respective
territories, Avhich sovereignty confers. This consent might, in
some instances, be testedby com'mon usage, and by common
opinion growing out of that usage. A nation would justly be
considered as violating its faith, although that faith might not be
expressly plighted, which should suddenly, and without previous
notice, exercise its territorial jurisdiction in a manner not conso-
nant to the usages and received obligations of the civilized world .
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns,

and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse,
has given rise to a class of cases, in which every sovereign is
understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete, exclu-
sive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attri-
bute of every nation.
1. One of these was the exemption of the person of the sove- Exemption of
reign from arrest or detention within a foreign territory. If ho

theforeiSi^*
enters that territory with the knowledge and license of its sove- sovereign
reign, that license, although containing no express stipulation jurisdiction,

exempting his person from arrest, was universally understood to
imph' such stipulation. Why had the whole civilized world con-
curred in this construction ? The answer could not be mistaken.
A foreign sovereign was not understood as intending to subject
154 RIGHTS OF OIVIL AND CEIMINAL LEGISLATION.
himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with his dignity and the

dignity of his nation, and it was to avoid this
subjection that the
license had been obtained. The character of the person to whom
it was given, and the object for which it was granted, equally
required that it should be construed to impart full security to the
person who had obtained it. This security, however, need not be
expressed; it was implied from the circumstances of the case.
Should one sovereign enter the territory of another, without

the consent of that other, expressed or implied, it would present
a question which did not appear to be perfectly settled, a decision
of which was not necessary to any conclusion to which the Court
might come in the case under consideration. If he did not thereby
expose himself to the territorial jurisdiction of the sovereign whose

dominions he had entered, it would seem to be because all sove-
reigns impliedly engage not to avail themselves of a power over
their equal, which a romantic confidence in their magnanimity
had placed in their hands.
Exemption of 2. A sccond case, standing on the same principles with the
ministers first, was the immunity which all civilized nations allow to foreign
from the local Whatever might be the principle on which
ministers. this immu-
nity might be established, whether we consider the minister as in
the place of the sovereign he represents, or by a political fiction
suppose him be extra-territorial, and therefore, in point of law,
to
not within the jurisdiction of the sovereign at whose court he
resides; still the immunity itself is granted by the governing
powei' of the nation to which the minister is deputed. This fiction
of extra -territoriality could not be erected and supported against
the will of the sovereign of the territory. He is supposed to
assent to it. This consent is not expressed. It was true that in
some countries, and in the United States among others, a special
law is enacted for the case. But the law obviously proceeds on
the idea of prescribing the punishment of an act previously un-
lawful, not of granting to a foreign minister a privilege which he
would not otherwise possess. The assent of the local sovereign
to the very important and extensive exemptions from territorial
jurisdictionwhich are admitted to attach to foreign ministers, is
implied from the consideration, that, without such exemptions,
every sovereign would hazard his own dignity by employing a
public minister abroad. ^ His minister would owe temporary and
local allegiance to a foreign prince, and would be less competent
to the objects of his mission. A
sovereign committing the interests
of his nation with a foreign Power to the care of a person whom
he has selected for that purpose, cannot intend to subject his
minister in any degree to that Power and, therefore, a consent to

;
receive him implies a consent that he shall possess those privileges

which his principal intended he should retain, privileges which
are essential to the dignity of his sovereign, and to the duties he is
bound to perform. In what cases a public taiinister, by infringing
the laws of the country in which he resides, may subject himself
to other punishment than will be inflicted by his own sovetreign,
was an inquiry foreign to the present purpose. If his crimes
be such as to render him amenable to the local jurisdiction, it must
be because they forfeit the privileges annexed to his character;
and the minister, by violating the conditions under which he was
received as the representative of a foreign sovereign, has surrendered
the immunities granted on those conditions; or, according to the
true meaning of the original consent, has ceased to be entitled to
them.
3. Athird case, in which a sovereign is understood to cede a Exemption
portion of his territorial jurisdiction, was where he allows the

jurisdictionôf
troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions. In such foreign troopg
case, without any express declaration Waiving jurisdiction over through the
which ^^î*®^-
the army to passage has been granted, the
this right of
sovereign who should attempt to exercise it would certainly be

considered as violating his faith. By exercising it the purpose
for which the free passage was granted would be defeated, and a
portion of the military force of a foreign independent nation

would be diverted from those national objects and duties to which
it was applicable, and would be withdrawn from the control of the
sovereign whose power and whose safety might greatly depend on

retaining the exelusive command and disposition of this force.
The grant of a free passage, therefore, implies a waiver of all
jurisdiction over the troops during their passage, and permits the
foreign general to use that discipline and to inflict those punish-
ments which the government of his army may require. But if,
without such express permission, an army should be led through
the territories of a foreign prince, might the territorial jurisdiction,
be rightfully exercised over the individuals composing that army ?
Without doubt, a military force can never gain immunities of any
other description than those which war gives, by entering a foreign
territory against the will of its sovereign. But if his consent,

instead of being expressed by a particular license, be expressed'
by a general declaration that foreign troops may pass through a
between such general per-
specified tract of country, a distinction
mission and a particular license not perceived. It would seem
is
reasonable, that every immunity which would be conferred by a

1*^6 RIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION.
special license, would be, in like manner, conferred by such general

permission.
It was obvious that the j)assage of an army
through a foreign
territory would probably be, at all times, inconvenient and
injurious, and would often be eminently dangerous to the sove-

reign through whose dominions it passed. Such a passage would
break down some of the most decisive distinctions between peace
and war, and would reduce a nation to the necessity of resisting
by war an act not absolutely hostile in its character, or of exposing
itself to the stratagems and frauds of a Power whose
integrity
might be doubted, and ^vho might enter the country under deceitful
pretexts. It is for reasons like those that the general license to
foreigners to enter the dominions of a friendly Power is never

understood to extend to a military force; and an army marching
into the dominions of another sovereign, without his special per-
mission, may justly be considered as committing an act of hos-

tility;and, even if not opposed by force, acquires no privileges
by irregular and improper conduct.
its It might, however, well
be questioned whether any other than the sovereign of the State
is capable of deciding that such military commander is acting
without a license.
Exemption of Put the rule which is applicable to armies did not appear to
be equally applicable to ships of war entering the ports of a
o7wS^^^^^'*
entering the friendly Power. The injury inseparable from the march of an
nation^ under army through an inhabited country, and the dangers often, indeed
an express
generally, attending it, do not ensue from admitting a ship of
permission. war, Avithout special license, into a friendly port. A
different
rule, therefore, with respect to this species of military force, had
been generally adopted. If, for reasons of State, the ports of a
nation generally, or any particular ports, be closed against vessels
of war generally, or against the vessels of any particular nation,
notice is usually given of such determination. If there be no
prohibition, the ports of a friendly nation are considered as open

to the public ships of all Powers with whom it is at peace, and
they are supposed to enter such ports, and to remain in them while
allowed to remain, under the protection of the government of the
place.
The treaties between civilized nations, in almost every instance,
contain a stipulation to this effect in favour of vessels driven in
by stress of weather or other urgent necessity. In such cases the
sovereign is bound by compact to authorize foreign vessels to
enter his ports, and this is a license which he is not at liberty to
retract. If there be no treaty applicable to the case, and the sove-
reign, from motives deemed adequate by himself, permits his ports

to remain open to the public ships of foreign friendly Powers,
the conclusion seems irresistible that they enter by his assent.
And if they enter by his assent necessarily implied, no just reason
is perceived for distinguishing their case from that of vessels
which enter by express assent.
The whole reasoning, upon which such exemption had been
implied in the case of a sovereign or his minister, applies with full
force to the exemption of ships of war in the case in question.
"
"It impossible to conceive," said Vattel,
is that a prince who
sends an ambassador, or any other minister, can have any intention
of subjecting him to the authority of a foreign Power; and this
consideration furnishes an additional argument, which completely
establishes the independence of a public minister If it cannot be .
reasonably presumed that his sovereign means to subject him to

the authority of the prince to whom he is sent, the latter, in
receiving the minister, consents to admit him on the footing of

independence; and thus there exists between the two princes a
tacit convention, which gives a new force to the natural obliga-
tion" (/). Equally impossible was
it to conceive, that a prince
who stipulates a passage for his troops, or an asylum for his ships
of war in distress, should mean to subject his army or his navy
to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. And if this could not
be presumed, the sovereign of the port must be considered as
having conceded the privilege to the extent to which it must have
been understood to be asked.
According to the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Distinction

United States, where, without treaty, the ports of a nation are ^^^^.^^^
open to the public and private ships of a friendly Power, whose private
subjects have also liberty, without special license, to enter the

country for business or amusement, a clear distinction was to be
drawn between the rights accorded to private individuals, or private
trading vessels, and those accorded to public armed ships which

constitute a part of the military force of the nation.
When private individuals of one nation spread themselves
through another as business or caprice may direct, mingling in-
discriminately .with the inhabitants of that other; or when mer-
chant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws
to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if
such individuals did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and
(/) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 7, § 92,

168 EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CjaiMINAL LEGISLATION.
were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. Nor can

the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemp-
tion. His subjects, then, passing into foreign countries, are not
employed by him, nor are they engaged in national pursuits.
Consequently there are powerful motives for not exempting
persons of this description from the jurisdiction of the country
in which they are found, and no motive for requiring it. The
implied license, therefore, under which they enter, can never be
construed to grant such exemption.
But the situation of a public armed ship was, in all respects,
different. She constitutes a part of the military force of her
nation, acts under the immediate and direct command of the
sovereign, is in national objects. He has many
employed by him
and powerful motives for preventing those o,bjects from being
defeated by the interference of a foreign State. Such interference
cannot take place without seriously affecting his power and his
dignity. The implied license, therefore, under which such vessel
enters a friendly port may reasolnably be construed, and it seemed
to the Court ought to be construed, as containing an exemption
from the jurisdiction of the sovereign, within whose territory she
clairris the rights of hospitality. Upon these principles, by the
unanimous consent of nations, a foreigner is amenable to the law«
of tho place; but certainly, in practice, nations had not yet asserted
their jurisdiction over the public armed ships of a foreign seven
reign entering a port open for their reception.

Bynkershoek, a public jurist of great reputation, had indeed
maintained that the property of a foreign sovereign was not
distinguishable, by any legal exemption, from the property of
an ordinary individual; and had quoted several cases in which
courts of justice had exercised jurisdiction over cases in which a
foreign sovereign was made a party defendant {g) Without in- .
on
'
dicating any opinion this question, it might safely be affirmed

that there is a manifest distinction between the private property;'
of a person who happens to be a prince and that military force
which supports the sovereign power, and maintains the dignity
and independence of a nation. A
prince, by acquiring private
property in a foreign country, may possibly be considered as sub-
jecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction; he may
be considered as so far laying down the character of a prince and
assuming that of a private individual (/^) but he cannot be pre-
;
(^) Bynkershoek, De Foro Legat., (A) Cf. The CharUeh (1873), L. R.

cap. i. 4 A. & E. 87.
EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CEIMINAL LEGISLATION. 159
sumed to do this with respect to any portion of that armed force

which upholds his crown and the nation he is intrusted to govern .
The only applicable case cited by Bynkershoek was that of the

Spanish ships of war, seizad in 1668, in Flushing, for a debt due
from the King of Spain. In that case the States-General inter-
posed; and there is reason to believe, from the manner in which
the transaction is stated, that either by the interference of
government, or by the decision of the tribunal, the vessels were

released (^) .
This case of the Spanish vessels was believed to be the only

case furnished by the history of the world, of an attempt made
by an individual to assert a claim against a foreign prinoe l^y

seizing the armed vessels of the nation. That this proceeding
was at once arrested by the government, in a nation which appears
to have asserted the power of proceeding against the private
property of the prince, would seem to furnish no feeble argument
in support of the universality of the opinion in favour of the
exemption claimed for ships of war. The distinction made in the

laws of tho United States between public and private ships would
appear to proceed from the same opinion.
Without doubt the sovereign of the place is capable of destroy-
ing this implication. He may claim and exercise jurisdiction,
either by employing force, or by subjecting such vessels to the
ordinar}^ tribunals. But until such power be exerted in a manner
not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as
having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction which
it would be a breach of faith to exercise. Those general statu-
tory provisions, therefore, which are descriptive of the ordinary
jurisdiction of the judicial tribunals, which give an individual,
whose property has been wrested from him, a right to claim that
property in the courts of the country in which it is found, ought
not, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, to be so construed as to
give them jurisdiction in a case in which the sovereign power had
implicitl}^ consented to waive its jurisdiction.
The Court came to the conclusion, that the vessel in question,
being a public armed ship, in the service of a foreign sovereign

witli whom the United States were at peace, and having entered
an American port open for her reception, on the terms on which
ships of war are generally permitted to enter the ports of a
friendly Power, must • be considered as having come into the
American territory under an implied promise that, while neces-
(i) Bynkershoek; cap. iv.

sarily within it and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, she

should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country (/c).
The Sitka As to tho position of persons on board public vessels, the case of
^ ''
The Sitka may be mentioned. During the Crimean war, 1855^
a British cruiser captured the Russian public vessel, Sitka, and
brought her into San Francisco, with a prize crew on board. On

behalf of two prisoners on board, application was made to the local
courts for a writ of habeas corpus to try whether their detention
was valid. Process was served, but was disregarded by the com-
mander of the Sitka, who departed with the prisoners on board.
The opinion of the Attorney-General of the United States was
taken as to whether the Government had a just ground of com-
plaint against Great Britain. The Attorney-General, after
stating that unless there had been a violation of a State's neu-

trality, its courts could not decide on the validity of a belligerent's
capture, pointed out that the Courts of the United States had
"adopted unequivocally the doctrine that a public ship-of-war of
a foreign sovereign at peace with the United States, coming into
our ports and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, is exempt
from the jurisdiction of the country" (/). This is now the
general rule of international law; it must be taken, of course^
subject to certain qualifications that arise in time of war (m).
Proceedings Tlie point actually decided in the case of The Exchange was,.
against ships i
i r ^ ^
•
i i
• •
i
•
i i i
of war. that the local court would not inquire into the title by which the
foreign sovereign held his vessel; but it did not follow from this
that ships of war were to be exempt from the jurisdiction in all
cases when complying with the terms of the implied license under
which they entered the friendly port. The municipal law of
most countries prohibits subjects from taking proceedings against
the ships of war of their own country, except with the consent
of the government (n). But whether a subject of one State could
take legal proceedings against a ship of war of another State for
the purpose of enforcing a maritime lien, like salvage or damage,
or for establishing any other claini against such ship of war, has
given rise to much discussion. The general rule, as to all persons

and property within the territorial jurisdiction of a sovereign
being amenable to the jurisdiction of himself and his courts, is
beyond dispute, but there are exceptions to it which are allowed
(A;) The Schooner Exchange on the rights of neutral States with

v.
McFadden and others 7 regard to belligerent vessels entering
135 — 147.
(1812),
Cranch, ,
their ports and territorial waters.
(J) Opinions of Attorneys-General («) The Comus, 2 Dods. Ad. 464;
of the United States, vol. vii. p. 122. Briggs v. The Light Ships (1865),
(m) See infra. Part IV. chap, iii., 11 Allen (Mass. Rep.), 157.
ill order to preserve the peaee and harmony of nations, and the
exemption of ships of war is one of the principal of these excep-

tions. But the exemption must be understood to apply onh^ to
the ship itself. The jurisdiction of the local sovereign over
persons on board such ship, or over acts committed thereon, is not
necessarily waived because no rights over the corpus of the ship
are claimed. The exterritoriality of such a ship is discussed
further on (o), but its exemption from: legal process may ,now
be considered as established in almost all piossible cases. It is
not even necessary, in order to claim exemption, that a ship should
be a ship of war. Any vessel declared by a sovereign authority
tobe a public vessel, and the property of the State, will be equally
exempt. Thus, a mail packet belonging to the Belgian Govern-
ment^ and running between Dover and Ostend, was sued for
damages resulting from a collision, but the Court held that it had
no jurisdiction, even though the ship was partly used as a trading
vessel (p) This principle has even been pushed to the extent of
.
exempting the cargo on board a public ship. The Constitution,

a frigate of the United States, Avas employed in carrying liome
goods belonging to American exhibitors at the Paris Exhibition.

She stranded off the English coast, and several tugs went to her
assistance. The sum of 200L was offered to the owners of the
tugs as payment, but, not being deemed sufficient, they sued the
Consiiiuiio'n. The Court held that it had no jurisdiction either
against the ship or the cargo on board, even though the latter
belonged to private persons (g). Similarly, in a more recent
case (r), it was held that no proceedings would lie against a
public vessel belonging to a sovereign State (Roumania), and that

the entering of an appearance by the vessel's local agents, under a
misapprehension, did not amount to a submission to the territorial

jurisdiction. It would seem, however, on principle, that if a
public vessel has practically ceased to be under the control of the

State, and is employed entirely for trading purposes, the exemp-
tion would not apply; for here the sovereign authority would
justifiably be presumed to have waived her public character, in

the absence of its declaration to the contrary (s) .
As regards other property belonging to a foreign sovereign, Other pro-

the principle of exempting it from^ the local tribunals is not so fo^êi^^
sovereigTig.
(o) See inini, p. 165. (r) The Jassy, (1906) P. 270.

(/?) The Parlement Beige (1880), (s) As to the proof of character,
L. E. 5 P. D. 197. cf. The Santissima Trinidad (1812),
iq) TheConstitution (1879), L. R. 7 Wheat. 283; The Parlement Beige
4 P. D. 39; The Prins Frederik (l^m), 6V. J). 1^1 Mighell y. Sultan
;
(1820), 2 Dods. Ad. 451. of Johore, (1894) 1 Q. B. 149.

W. 11
162 RIGHTS OF OIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION.
clear and simple as in the case of ships. The tendency of inter-

national law is to protect such property in all cases where any
dealings with it would impair the dignity of the foreign sove-

reign, and to substitute negotiations between governments for
proceedings in the local courts in such cases. But where the suit
can be carried on without affecting his dignity, there seems no
objection to the local court deciding the case in the ordinary
way (t). But no suit can ever be maintained against a foreign
sovereign for acts done by him by virtue of his authority as sove-
reign, for thiswould most undoubtedly impair his dignity. This
has been held to be the case even though the foreign sovereign
should also happen to be at the same time a British subject (w).
But if the foreign sovereign, who is at the same time a subject of
the British crown, enters into transactions or does acts in hia
private capacity, he will be subject to the local jurisdiction '(a?).

He will also be amenable to the local courts in respect of actions
arising out of such immoveable property as he possesses within
the territory (^). When the status of the foreign sovereign is
doubtful, the Court must of necessity inquire into that status,
for the purpose of ascertaining whether he is or is net an indepen-
dent sovereign. In the case of The Chm'kieh, a ship belonging
to the Khedive of Egypt, which was arrested by the Admiralty
Court in 1872 for running down a vessel in the Thames, Sir
E. Phillimore in his judgment reviewed the international position
of Egypt, and held that the Khedive was not at that time to all
intentsand purposes an independent sovereign, and therefore his
property was not entitled to exemption from the local courts (z).
Suits by If a foreign sovereign himself institutes a suit in the local court,
foreign
sovereigns. he thereby submits to its jurisdiction as regards all matters re-
lating to the suit (a); and therefore the Court may put him o-n
terms, and order all proceedings to be stayed, unless he complies

with its terms {h). Thus, the French courts would not allow the
United States to sue certain shipbuilders for fitting out privateers
(t) Gladstone v. Musurus Bey Republic V. Lu Oompugnie Franco-

(1862), 1 H. & M. 492; Vuvasseur v. Beige du Chemin de Fer du Nord,
Krupp (1878), L. R. 9 Ch. D. 351; L. R. (1898) 1 Oh. D. 190.
Lariviere v. Morgan (1872), L. 11. («) Ilullet V. King of Spain (1828),
7 H. L. 423. 1 D. & CI. 174; Duke of Brunswick
(ti) Duke of Brunswick v. King of V. King of Hanover (1844), supra.

Hanover (1844), 2 CI. & F. 1. (b) Prioleau v. U. S. of America
{x) Duke of Bnmswick v. King of (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 659; U. S. v.
Hanover, supra. Wagner (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. 582;
iy) The Cimrkieh (1873), L. R. 4 Republic of Peru v. Wegicelin (1875),
A. & E. 97; Taylor v. Best (1854), L. R. 20 Eq. 140. Westlake, Priv.
14 O. B. 487, 523; 23 L. J. C. P. 89. Int. Law (1912), pp. 274 seq. Foelix,
{%) The Charkieh (1873), L. R. 4 § 217. Foote, Priv. Int. Jurisp.
A. & E. 59; but see The South African (1914), pp. 147 seq.
for the Confederate States, until that Government had deposited

150,000 francs as security for costs (c). The rights of a foreign
sovereign, as regards the public property of his State, do not abate
by reason of a change in the person of the sovereign, and his suc-
cessor may continue or institute a suit to enforce such rights {d) .
The maritime jurisprudence of France, in respect to foreign Private
private vessels entering the French ports for the purposes of trade, the local
appears to be inconsistent with the principles established in the jurisdiction,
judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case The law of
of The Exchcmge ; or, to speak more correctly, the legislation of
Franco waives, in favour of such vessels, the exercise of the local
jurisdiction to a greater extent than appears to be imperatively
required by the general principles of international law. As it
depends on the option of a nation to annex any conditions it
thinks fit to the admission of foreign vessels, public or private,

into its ports, so it may extend, to any degree it may think fit, the
immunities to which such vessels, entering under an implied
license, arc entitled by the general law and usage of nations.
The lav/ of France, in respect to offences and torts committed
on board foreign merchant vessels in French ports, establishes a
twofold distinction between:
1 Acts of mere interior discipline of the vessel, or even crimes
.
and offences committed by a person forming part of its officers

and crew, against another person belonging to the same, where
the peace of the port is not thereby disturbed.
2.Crimes and offences committed on board the vessel against
persons not forming part of its officers and crew, or by any other
than a person belonging to the same, or those committed by the
officers and crcAv upon each other, if the peace of the port is thereby
disturbed.
In respect to acts of the first class, the French tribunals decline
to assert jurisdiction. The French law declares that the rights
of the Power, to which the vessel belongs, should be respected, and
tliatthe local authority should not interfere, unless its aidi is
demanded. These acts, therefore, remain under the police and
jurisdiction of the State to which the vessel belongs. In respect
to those of the second class, the local jurisdiction is asserted by
those tribunals. It is based on the principle, that the protection
accorded to foreign merchantmen in the French ports cannot divest
(c) Report of Neutrality Laws Ck>m- The Sapphire (1870), 11 Wal-

(d)
mission, 1868, p. 49. lace, 164; King of Spain v. Oliver
(1810), 2 Washington C. C. 431.
11 (2)
the territorial jurisdiction, so far as the interests of the State are

affected; that a vessel admitted into a port of the State is of right
subjected to the police regulations of the place; and that its crew-
are amenable to the tribunals of the country for offences committed
on board of it against persons not belonging to the ship, as well as
in actions for civil contracts entered into with them; that the
territorial jurisdiction for this class of cases is undeniable.
It is on these principles that the French au,thorities and tribu-
nals act, with regard to merchant ships lying within their waters.
The grounds upon w^hich the jurisdiction is declined in one class
of cases, and asserted in the other, are stated in a decision of th'ei
Council of State, pronounced in 1806. This decision arose from
a conflict of jurisdiction between the local authorities of France
and the American consuls in the French ports, in the two follow-
ing cases:
—
The cases of The first case was that of the American merchant vessel. The
^nAThe Sally.
-^wÔf^ in the port of Antwerp; where the American consul and
the local authorities both claimed exclusive jurisdiction over an
assault committed by one of the seamen belonging to the crew^
against another, in the vessel's boat. The second was that of

another American vessel, The. Sal^/„ in the port of Marseilles,
w^here exclusive jurisdiction was claimed both by the local tribu-
nals and by the American consul, as to a severe wound infldcted
by the mate on one of the seamen, in the alleged exercise of ^
discipline over the crew. The Council of State pronounced

against the jurisdiction of the local tribunals and authorities in
botli cases, and assigned the following reasons for its decision:
"
Considering that a neutral vessel cannot be indefinitely re-
garded as a neutral place, and that the protection granted to such
vessels in the French ports cannot oust the territorial jurisdiction.^
so far as respects the public interests of the State; that, conse-
quently, a neutral vessel admitted into the ports of the State is
rightfully subject to the laws of the police of that place where she
is received; that her offioers and crew are also amenable to the
tribunals of the country for offences and torts (e) committed by

them, even on board the vessel, against other persons than those
belonging to the same, as well as for civil contracts made wdth
them; but that, in respect to offences and torts committed on board
the vessel, by one of the officers and crew against another, the
rights of the neutral Power ought to be respected, as exclusively
(e) The term used in the original is whether they be '

delits publics
'
or
'delits,' which includes eveiy wrong 'delits prives.'
done to the prejudice of individuals,
concerning the internal discipline of the vessel, in which the local

authorities ought not to interfere, unless their protection is de-
manded, or the peace and tranquillity of the port is disturbed;
the Council of State is of opinion that this distinction, indicated

in the report of the Grand Judge, Minister of Justice, and con-
formable to usage, is the only rule proper to be adopted, in respect
to this matter; and applying this doctrine to the two spedifib
cases in which the consuls of the United States have claimed
jurisdiction; considering that one of these cases was that of an
assault committed in the boat of the American ship Neivion, by,
one of the crew upon another, and the other case was that of a
severe wound inflicted by the mate of the American ship Sally
upon one of the seamen, for having made use of the boat without
by the American
leave; is of opinion that the jurisdiction claimed
consuls ought to be allowed, and the French tribunals prohibited
"
from taking cognizance of these cases (/) .
Wheaton, in a notice of Ortolan's work, came to the conclusion Distinction

that the French law established the true rule, and was most in public and
conformity with the practice of nations {g) ship of war and a

. A
Private ships,
private merchant vessel cannot both claim' the sam'e immunities.

As has already been stated, it is doubtful whether a ship of war
may not be proceeded against in some cases, but it is beyond doubt
that merchant vessels are always liuble to be sued in a local court.
It is also a separate point how far a local court may exercise
jurisdiction over acts done or persons found on board a public or

a private ship ,
It has been laid down bymany AVriters that a ship of war is Doctrine of
in all respects a portion of the territory of the State to which she

aiity.
belongs, and that when in the waters of another State not only
is the vessel herself exempt from the looal law, but the exemption
extends to all persons and things on board her (h) Although this
.
doctrine of exterritoriality has been very widely received, there is

a great weight of authority against it .
In the case of John Brown, a British subject, who was im- Case of John
Brown.
prisoned by the Spaniards at Callao in 1819, for assisting in a
Peruvian revolt, and who escaped on board a British ship of ^var
Kegles Internationales this See Eeport of

(/) Ortolan,
de la Mer, tome i. pp. 293 298. — exterritoriality.
Royal Commission on Fugitive Slaves,
Appendice, Annexe H. p. 441. 1876, p. 7, where the subject is fully
{g) Revue de Droit Frangais et discussed. This Report is a most valu-
Etranger, vol. ii. p. 206. Wheaton,, able contribution to international law,
by Lawrence, p. 191. and well repays the most careful
(70 Historicus, The Times:, Nov. 4th, reading.
1875. Italy and Germany maintain
then ill the port of Lima, Lord Stoweli, on being asked

his opinion
as to whether BroAvn ought to have been delivered up to the
Spanish authorities, replied "that individuals merely belonging
to the same country with the ship of war, are exempted from the
civil and criminal process of the country in its ordinary jurisdic-
tion of justice by getting on board such ship, and claiming what
is called the protection of its flag, is a
pretension which, hoWevei-
heard of in practice occasionally, has no existence whatever in
principle" (^). In accordance with this opinion Lord Castlereagh
directed the English minister in Spain to disavow the act of the
captain of the ship of war in not delivering up John Brown.

Opinion of In 1794, the opinion of Mr. William Bradford, the United
the U. S.
Attorney- States Attorney-General, was taken, as to whether a writ of habeas
General.
corpus Avould go to bring up a subject illegally detained on board
a foreign ship of war. He replied that although he could find no
instance of this having been done, he was of opinion that a writ
might be legally awarded in such a case, and that the commander

of the foreign ship of war could not claim to be exempt from the
jurisdiction of the State where he happens to be {Tc) .
Opinion of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, in criticising the case of The

Cockbum,
C. J., on the Exchange, allows the exemption of a ship of war "if restricted
exemption of to the ship itself, which was all the Court had to deal with." But
public ships.
as regards those on board, his Lordship adds, that "inasmuch as
the crew may commit offences against the local law, which the
ship, being an inanimate thing, cannot, it cannot be equally im-
plied that the local sovereign has consented that if they violate
the local law they shall enjoy immunity from its penalties." It
isadmitted that they are liable to be arrested for offences against
"
the local law committed on shore, why therefore should they be
exempt because they get back to the ship before they are taken?
And a fortiori, why should a person living under the local law, as
a subject of the local State, be able to withdraw himself from the
operation of that law by getting on a ship which, but for this
alleged exterritoriality, would clearly be within the jurisdiction?
Is it necessarily to be implied that, because by the comity of
nations the ports of every State are open to the ships of w^x of
other States, the local sovereign has assented to his law becoming
powerless in respect of crime committed within its jurisdiction in
case the criminal can get on board a foreign ship lying in its
waters? Has this country ever assented to this doctrine? Is it
(?*) Report of Royal Commission on vol. i. p. 25. See also ibid., pp. %T,
Fugitive Slaves, 1876, p. 77. 54, 56. U. S. Papers on Foroign
(A) Opinions of Attorneys-General, Affairs, vol. i. p. 446.
RIGHTS OF CIVIL AXD CRIMINAL LEGISLATION. 167
prepared to do so now? Can. any instance bo cited in which a

criminal has been allowed to escape because he found his way to a
foreign ship of war? Certainly none such has been brought to
our knowledge."
This opinion was delivered on the question as to what course an
English naval commander was to pursue, when a slave escaped on
to his vessel, while she was in the waters of
a State that permitted
Rule laid
slavery. After reviewing all the leading authorities on this sub-
ject, the Lord Chief Justice arrived at the conclusion that, "The Cockbum,
rule which reason and good sense would,
as it strikes me, prescribe,
•
would be that, as regards the discipline of a foreign ship of vra,r,

and offences committed on board, as between members of her crew
towards one another, matters should be left entirely to the law of
the ship, and that should the offender escape to the shore, he should,
if taken, be given up to the commander of the ship on demand,
and should be tried on shore only if no such demand be made. But
if a crime be committed on board the ship upon a local subject, or
if, a crime having been committed on shore, the criminal gets on

board a foreign ship, he should be given up to the local autho-
rities. In w^hatever way the rule should be settled, so important
a principle of international law ought not to be permitted to
remain in its present unsettled state" (l).
There is, no doubt, a distinction between a criminal going on Criminals and
board a ship of war, and a slave escaping to it from his masteir, îÛ^^
Nevertheless, from an international point of view, to protect
either is a violation of the rights of the local sovereign. The law
of England, as is shoAvn further on, recognised the existence of
slavery in some countries, and consequently the rights of slave-

owners in such countries were to be respected. To assert that a
slave, by coming on board a ship of war while she is in the waters
of a slave-owning immediately becomes a free man, is
State
equivalent to asserting that a slave-owner's rights would not be

regarded, and is tantamount to making the State to which the ship
of war belongs, pass judgment on the laws of a foreign and
independent State. The question cannot be confined even to
criminals or slaves. England has abolished imprisonment for
ordinar}^ debt, but when her ships of war are in a State that
incarcerates debtors, is a debtor to escape by going on board an
English ship of war? No State would submit to such a pre-

tension. But the case of a slave and a debtor are very similar, so
far as the ship of war is concerned. Each claims the protection of
(/) Report of Royal Commission on Fugitive Slaves, 1876, pp. 37, 43.
from a liability imposed by the local law, and it is not for

its flag-
the commanderj by protecting either, virtually to decide whether

the local law is a proper or an improper one.
Merchant
vessels in
A merchant vessel is not in the same j)osition as a ship of war.
foreign ports. Every State claims to exercise jurisdiction over its own merchant
vessels wherever they are, and even when they are in the waters
of another State. But when in a foreign j)ort they must also
obey the laws of the country to which the port belongs (m) They .
are thus at the same time subject to two concurrent systems of

laAv. Any State may decline to exercise jurisdiction over foreign
merchant vessels in its harbours to whatever extent it pleases, as is
the case with France; but the right nevertheless exists, and might
be resumed on due notice being given. Thus, a claim by the
local officers of France to board the ship, search her, and take out
of her any one Avho has become amenable to the local laws, could
not lawfully be resisted or disputed after such due notice (w) .
Case of The
Creole.
A 23eculiar case arose in 1841 . The brig Creole, an American
merchant vessel, sailed from
a port in Virginia with 135 slaves
on board. On the high seas some of the slaves rose, and took
possession of the vessel, killing a passenger, and wounding the
captain and several of the crew. They compelled the mate to
navigate the ship to Nassau. On arrival there the local autho-
rities, at the request of the American Consul, arrested such slaves
as were proved to have committed acts of violence, and the rest
escaped to the shore, but whether with connivance of the local
authorities or not did not appear. The United States demanded
that those who had gained the shore should be restored, but this
was refused by Great Britain, on the ground that they could not
be seized while they had committed no crime within British juris-
diction. The matter was finally referred to an arbitrator, who
awarded a pecuniary indemnity to the American owner for the loss
of his slaves (o). The difficulty of this case arises from the fact
that the Creole entered the port of Nassau under duress, and
against the will of her owners and master. Yet it can hardly be
maintained that even under such circumstances the local autho-
rities were bound to try and prevent the slaves from
going on
(w) It. V. Anderson, L. R. (1868) (n) Report on Fugitive Slave<s, 1876,

1 C. C. R. 161; JR. V. Sattler (1858), p. 26.
D. & B. O. C. 525; M. v. Lesley (o) Report of Decisions of Commis-
(1860), 1 Bell, C. C. 220; Wildenhus' sions under Convention of 1853, p. 242.
Case (1886), 120 U. S. 1. Boyd, The See also Wheaton, ed. Lawrence,
Merchant Shipping Laws, p. 438. p. 206; ed. Dana, p. 166. Hansard,
Pari. Debates (Lords), vol. Ix. p. 318.
shore. The
ship was within British dominions, and the slaves
when trying to escape, violated no British law; but, on the con-
trary, were endeavouring to dissolve a tie looked upon with abhor-
rence by British law. The arrest of those who had committed
on a different ground. They were seized,
acts of violence rested
not because they had endeavoured to regain their liberty, but
because they had committed piratical acts (/>).
Generally speaking, we may now say that, though the muni-

cipal law of different States varies more or less on this question,
private vessels when in foreign ports and waters enjoy exemption
from the local jurisdiction in regard to such offences as affeot
simply the crew or the internal discipline of the vessel, and also
to those delinquencies that do not involve a breach of the peace of
the port. This is not a rule of universal or even general inter-
national law; it is based rather on considerations of comity or on
treaties expressly concluded for the purpose. By means of con-
sular conventions, consuls are frequently empowered to take
cognizance of these matters, which the French rule withdraws
from th(^ local jurisdiction, viz., such as concern only the crew
and the internal discipline of the vessel, including disputes as to
wages (g). In a case that occurred in 1874, it was held in the
Supreme Court of Hong Kong that failing a consular convention
of this kind the American consul was not entitled to settle a
dispute as to seamen's wages (r).
Wildenhus' Case (1886) {s) is one of the most important cases

relating to the present international usage as to the exercise of
jurisdiction over private vessels when in foreign ports. Whilst
the Belgian vessel Noordland was in the port of Jersey City,
U.S.A., one of the crew, Wildenhus, a Belgian subject, killed
another member There was a convention, concluded
of the crew.
in 1880, between the United States and Belgium, whereby it was
agreed that the Belgian consul should decide differences on Belgian

vessels when in the ports of the United States, and that the local
"
authorities should not intervene except where a disorder arose of
such a nature as to disturb the tranquillity or public order on shore
or in the port." However, the offender was arrested by the
American authorities; whereupon the Belgian consul made an
application to the Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus, urging
(p) Soe Calvo, Droit International, of Int. Law, voL ii. § 206.
voL ii. §§ 269, 550.
(r) Ellis v. Mitchell (1874), U. S.
{q) With regard to the British law Foreign Relations, 1875, p. 600.
and practice, of. Piggott, Nationality, (s) 120 U. S. 1.
ii. 17 — 32; for the law and practice vol. i. pp. 277 8eq.
Cobbett, Cases,
of the United States, cf . Moore, Digest

170 - EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION.
that by the general rules of international law, and more particu-

larly by the Convention of 1880, Belgium alone possessed the
jurisdiction in question. The prisoner's discharge being refused,
an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, Avhich held that the
crime of felonious homicide was not covered by the said conven-
tion, and that under the general rules of international law the
United States' Courts were empowered to try it.
In pronouncing the judgment of the Court, Chief Justice Waite
said that under the law of civilized nations a foreign merchant
vessel entering a State's jôrts for trading purposes became subject
any treaty to the con-

to the local jurisdiction, in the absence of
trary. In return for the protection afforded,

it was said in a
leading American case, temporary allegianco to the local law was

expected (i^). The English Courts, too, uniformly held that
offences, committed by one foreigner against another on a foreign
micrchantman, were triable by the local tribunals (z/). But it had

come to be generally recognised that, in comity, "all matters of
discipline and all things done on board which affected only the
vessel or those belonging to her, and which did not involve the
peace or dignity of the country or the tranquillity of the port>

should be left to be dealt with by the authorities of the nation to
which the Conventions were sometimes entered
vessel belonged."
into to define more precisely the rights ajid obligations of the
parties concerned. The Convention of 1880 did not exclude the
local jurisdiction in the case of a disorder on board disturbing the
peace or public order on shore or in port., The comimission of a
grave offence affected the community at large and warranted the
interference of the local government.
It may be added that in a case that came before the Supreme
Court of Mexico (x) it was held that the murder of a Frenchman
by another Frenchman on board a French merchant vessel when in
a Mexican port did not necessarily constitute a disturbance of
the peace of the port. On the contrary, in The Tempest (y), the
French Court of Cassation held that an act of homicide amounted
to such a disturbance.
Exemption of Whatever may be the nature and extent of the exemption of

private vessels the public or private vessels of one State from the local jurisdic-
from the local (-j^^^ j^^ ll^^ ports of another, it is evident that this exemption,
^ ^ '
jiinsdiction
(t) The Exchange (1812), 7 Cranch, Keyn (1877), 2 Ex. D. 63.

116, at p. 144, per Marshall, 0. J. {x) TJ Anemone (1875), see F. Snow^
{ti) Reg. V. Ctmningham (1859), Oases and Opinions on Int. Law
Bell, C. C. 72; Reg. v. Atiderson (Boston, 1893), p. 124.
Reg.. V. {y) Ibid. p. 121.
whether express or imfplied, can never be construed to justify^ doe.s not
acts of hostility comimitted by such vessel, her officers, and crew,

justify acta of
in violation of the law of nations, against the security of the State aggression
in whos^; ports she is received, or to exclude the local tribunals security of
* ^ *^'
and authorities from resorting to such measures of self-defence
as the security of the State may require.
This just and salutary principle was asserted by the French
Court of Cassation, in 1832, in the case of the private Sardinian
steam -vessel, the Carlo Alberto, which, after having landed on
the southern coast of France the Duchess of Berry and several of
her adherents, with the view of exciting civil war in that country,
put into a French port in distress. The judgment of the Court,
pronounced upon the 'conclusions' of M. Dupin aine, Procureur-
General, reversed the decision of the inferior tribunal, releasing
tlie prisoners taken on board the vessel, upon the following
grounds :
1 That the principle of the law of nations, according

. to which
a foreign vessel, allied or neutral, is considered as forming part
of the territory of the nation to which it belongs, and oonsequently
isentitled to the privilege of the same inviolability with the terri-
tory itself, ceases to protect a vessel which commits acts of hostility

in the French territory, inconsistent with its character of ally,/
or neutral; as if, for example, such vessel be chartered to serve
as an instrument of conspiracy against the safety of the State,
and after having landed some of the persons concerned in these
acts, still continues to hover near the coast, with the rest of tha
conspirators on board, and at last puts into port under pretext of
distress.
That supposing such allegation of distress be founded in fact,
2.
itcould not serve as a plea to exclude the jurisdiction of the local
tribunals, taking cognizance of a charge of high treason against
the persons found on board, after the vessel was compelled to put
into port by stress of weather (z) .
So also it has been determined by the Supreme Court of the The exemp-
United States, that the exemption of foreign public ships, coming ships^from the
into the waters of a neutral State, from the local jurisdiction, does local juris-
. .
diction does
not extend to their prize ships, or goods captured by armaments not extend to
fitted out in its ports, in violation of its neutrality, and of the
!Jj)ods^taken
laws enacted to enforce that neutrality. in violation
Such was their judgment in the case of the Spanish ship neutrality of
(«) Sirey, Recueil general de Juris- learned and eloquent pleading in this
prudence, tome xxxii. par tie i. p. 578.
; memorable case, in his Collection dee
M. Dupin aine has published his R^quisitoires, tome i. p. 447.
172 EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CEIMINAL LEGISLATION.
the country Santtssima Trinidad, from which the carô had been taken out,
into which 1 1
•
1 TT 1 •
they are on the high seas, by armed vessels commissioned by the Unitea
brought. Provinces of the Eio de la Plata, and fitted out in the ports of the
United States in violation of their neutrality. The tacit per-
mission, in virtue of which the ships of war of a friendly Power
are exempt from the jurisdiction of the country, cannot be so inter-
preted as to authorize them to violate the rights of sovereignty of
the State,by committing acts of hostility against other nations,
with an armament supplied in the ports, where they seek an asy-
lum. In conformity with this principle, the Court ordered
restitution of the goods claimed by the Spanish owners, as wrong-
fully taken from them (a) .
Jurisdiction 3.Both the public and private vessels of every nation, on the
olerTtfp«!blio ^^S^ ^^^ o^t of the territorial limits of any other State, are
^6^^'
and private subjccl to the jurisdiction of the State to which they belong '(&).
hig-h seas.
^^ Beg. V. Lesley (1860) (c) it was said: "It is clear that an
English ship on the high sea, out of any foreign country, is sub-i
ject to the laws of England; and persons, whether foreign or Eng-
lish, on board such ship are as much amenable to English law aa
thej^ would be on English soil "• (cc) .
Vattel says that the domain of a nation extends to all its just
possessions; and by its possessions we are not to understand its

territory only, but all the rights ("droits') it enjoys. And he
on the high seas as portions'
also considers the vessels of a nation
of its territory. Grotius holds that sovereignty may be acquired
'
over a portion of the sea, ratione personarum, ut si classis qui

maritimus est exercitus, aliquo in loco maris se habeat.' But,
as one of his commentators, Butherforth, has observed, though
there can be no doubt about the jurisdiction of a nation over
the j)ersonF who compose its fleets when they are out at sea, it
does not follow that the nation has jurisdiction over any portion of
the ocean itself. It is not a permanent property which it
acquires, but a mere temporary right of occupancy in a place

which is common to all mankind, to be successively used by all
as they have occasion (d) .
This jurisdiction which the nation has over its public and
(a) The Santissima Trinidad (1822), son (1879), Moore, Digest, vol, i.
7 Wheaton, 352. p. 932.

(b) R. V. Anderson, L. E. (1868) (^) Vattel, liv. i. eh. 19, § 216,
1 O. C. R. 161; R. V. Dudley (1884), liv. Grotius, De Jur.
ii. ch. 7, § 80.
14 Q. B. D. 273. BeL ac Pac, lib. ii. cap. iii. § 13.

(c) 29 L. J. M. O. 97; Bell, O. C. Eutherforth, Inst., vol. ii. b. 2, ch. 9,
220. §§ 8, 19.
(cc) Of. the case of John Ander-
private vessels on the high seas, is exclusive only so far as respects
offences against its own municipal laws Piracy and other offences
.
against the law of nations, being crimes not against any particu^
lar State, but
against all mankind, may be punished hj the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found, or into which he may be carried, although committed on

board a foreign vessel on the high seas (e).
Though these offences may be tried in the competent court of
any nation having, by lawful means, the custody of the offenders,
yet the right of visitation and search does not exist in time of
peace. This right cannot be employed for the purpose of exe-
cuting upon foreign vessels and persons on the high seas the
prohibition of a traffic, which is neither piratical nor contrary to
the law of nations (such, for example, as was the slave trade),
unless the visitation and search be expressly permitted by inter-
national compact (/) .
Every State has an incontestable right to the service of all its

members in the national defence, but it can give effect to this
right only by lawful means. Its right to reclaim the military
service of its citizens can be exercised only within its own terri-
tory, or in some place not subject to the jurisdiction of any other

nation. The ocean is such a place, and any State may unques-
tionably there exercise, on board its own vessels, its right of com-
pelling the military or naval services of its subjects. But whether
it may exercise the same right in respect to the vessels of other
nations, is a question of more difficulty.

. In respect to public commissioned vessels belonging to the State, Former im-
of
their entire immunity from every species and purpose of search P^'^^^^^êu*
'^
,
seamen by
.
is generally conceded. As to private vessels belonging to the Eugland.

subjects of a foreign nation, the right to search them on the high
seas in time of peace, for deserters and other persons liable to
military and naval service, was uniformly asserted by Great

Britain, and as constantly denied by the United States. This
litigation between the two nations, who by the identity of their
origin and language were the most deeply interested in the ques-
tion, formed one of the principal causes of the war between them.
The sources of this controversy might have been dried up by the
substitution of a registry of seamen, and a system of voluntary
enlistment with limited service, for the practice of impressment
(e) Sir L. Jenkins, Works, vol. i. Wheaton, 39; The Antelope (1825),
p. 714. 10 Wheaton, 122; et vide infra, pp.
(/) The Louis (1817), 2 Dods. Ad. 202 et seq.
238; The Marianna Flora (1826), 9
which formerly prevailed in the British navy^ and which can

never bo extended, even to the private ships of a foreign nation,
without provoking hostilities on the part of any maritime State
capable of resisting such a pretension {g) .
Diseussions Tho subjcct was incidentally passed in review, though not

directly treated of, in the negotiations which terminated in the
treaty of Washington, 1842, between the United States and Great
Britain. In a letter addressed by the American negotiator to the
Britisli plenipotentiaryon the 8th August, 1842, it was stated
that no cause had produced, to so great an extent, and for so long
a period, disturbing and irritating influences on the political
relations of the United States and England, as the impressment of
seamen by the British cruisers from American merchant vessels.
From the commencement of the French revolution to the break-
ing out of the war between the two countries in 1812, hardly a
year elapsed without loud complaint and earnest remonstrance.
A deep feeling of opposition to the right claimed, and to the
piactice exercised under it, took possession of the puMic mind of
America; and this feeling, it was well-known, co-operated witli
other causes to produce the state of hostilities which ensued.
At different periods, both before and after the war, negotiations
had taken place between the two governments, with the hope of
finding some means of quieting these complaints. Sometimes the
effectual abolition of the practice had been requested and dis-
cussed; at other times, its temporary suspension; and, at other

times, again, the limitation of its exercise and some security
against its enormous abuses. A common destiny had attended

these efforts: they had all failed. The nearest approach to a
settlement was a convention, proposed in 1803, which had come to
the point of signature, when it was broken off in consequence of the
"
British Government
insisting that the Narrow Seas" should be
expressly excepted out of the sphere over which the contemplated
stipulations against impressment should extend. The American
minister, Mr. King, regarded this exception as quite inadmissible,
and chose rather to abandon the negotiation than to acquiesce in
the doctrine which it proposed to establish.
England asserted the right of impressing British subjects. She
asserted this as a legal exercise of the prerogative of the crown;
which prerogative was alleged to be founded on the English law
of the perpetual and indissoluble allegiance of the subject, and
(</) Edinburgh Review, vol. xi. September 23, 1807. Amerifân State
Avt 1. Canning's Letter to Monroe, Papers, vol. vi. p. 103.
his obligation, under all circutmstances, and for his whole life, to
render military service to the Crown ^vhenever required.
This statement, made in the words of eminent British jurists,
showed at once that the English claim was far broader than the
basis on which it was raised . The law relied on was English law ;
the obligations insisted on were obligations between the crown of

England and its subjects. This law and these obligations, it
was admitted, might be such as England chose they should be.
But then they must be confined to the parties. Impressment of
seamen, out of and beyond the English territory, and from on
board the ships of other nations, was an interference with the
rights of other nations; it went, therefore, further than English
prerogative could legally extend; and was nothing but an attempt
to enforce the peculiar law of England beyond the dominions and
jurisdiction of the crown. The claim asserted an extra-territorial
authority for the law of British prerogative, and assumed to

exercise this extra-territorial authority, to the manifest injury,
-of the citizens and subjects of other States, on board their own
vessels, on the high seas.
Every merchant vessel on those seas was rightfully considered
as part of the territory of the country to which it belonged. The
entry, therefore, into such vessel, by a belligerent Power, was an
act of force, and was, prima faeie, a wrong, a trespass which could
be justified only when done for some purpose allowed to form a
sufficient justification by the law of nations. But the act of a
British cruiser that stopped an American vessel in order to take
therefrom supposed British subjects, offering no justification
therefor under the law of nations, but claiming the right under
the law of England respecting the king's prerogative, could not
be defended. English soil, English territory, English jurisdic-
tion,was the appropriate sphere for the operation of English law.
The ocean was the sphere of the law of nations; and any merchant
vesselon the high seas was, by that law, under the protection of
the laws of her own nation, and might claim immunity, unless
in oases in which that law allows her to be entered or visited .
If this notion of perpetual allegiance, and the consequent power

of the prerogative, were the law of the world; if it formed part of
the conventional code of nations, and was usually practised, like
the right of visiting neutral ships, for the purpose of discovering
and seizing enemy's property; then impressment might be de-
fended as a common right, and there would be no remedy for
the evil until the international code should be altered. But this
wâs by no means the case. There was no such principle incor-
176 RIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION
porated into the code of nations. The doctrine stood only as

English law, not as international law; and English law could not
be oi* force beyond English dominion. Whatever duties or rela-
between the sovereign and his subjects, could
tions that law creates
only be enforced within the realm, or within the proper posses-

sions or territory of the sovereign. There might be quite as
just a prerogative right to the property of subjects as to their
personal services, in an exigency of the State; but no Govern-
ment thought of controlling, by its own laws, the property of its
subjects situated abroad; much less did any Government think
of entering the territory of another Power, for the purpose of
seizing such property and appropriating it to its own use. As

laws, the prerogatives of the crown of England have no obligation
"
on persons or property domiciled or situated abroad. When^
"
therefore," as has been well said, we speak of the right of a State
to bind its own native subjects everywhere, we speak only of its
own claim and exercise of sovereignty over them, when they return
within its own territorial jurisdiction, and not of its right to
compel or require obedience to such laws on the part of other
nations, within their own territorial sovereignty. On the contrary,
every nation has an exclusive right to regulate persons and things
within its own territory, according to its sovereign will and public
polity."
Other But impressment was subject to objections of a much wider
objections to
impressment. range. If it could be justified in its application to those who are
declared to be its only objects, it still remained true that, in itis
exercise, it touched the political rights of other Governments,
and endangered the security of their own native subjects and
citizens. The sovereignty of the State was concerned in main-
taining its exclusive jurisdiction and possession over its merchant
ships on the seas, except so far as the law of nations justifies

intrusion upon that possession for special purposes; and all experi-
ence had shown that no member of a crew, wherever born, was
safe against impressment when a ship was visited.
In the calm and quiet which had succeeded the war of 1812,
a condition so favourable for dispassionate consideration, England
herseK had evidently seen the harshness of impressment, even
when exercised on seamen in her own merchant service; and she
had adopted measures, calculated if not to renounce the power or
to abolish the practice, yet, at least, to supersede its necessity,
by
other means of manning the royal navy, more compatible with
justice and the rights of individuals, and far more conformable
to the principles and sentiments of the age .
BIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CEIMINAL LEGISLATION. 177
Under the&e circumstances, the Government of the United States

had used the occasion of the British minister's pacific mission to
review the whole subject, and to bring it to his notice and to that
of his Government. It had reflected on the past, pondered the
condition of the present, and endeavoured to anticipate, so far as
it might be in its power, the probable future; and the American
negotiator communicated to the British Minister the following,

as th(} result of those deliberations .
The American Government, then, was prepared to say that

the practice of impressing seamen from' American vessels could
not hereafter be allowed to take place That practice was founded
.
on principles which it did not recognise, and was invariably

attended by consequences so unjust, so injurious, and of such
formidable magnitude, as could not be submitted to. In the
early disputes between the two Governments, on this so long
contested topic, the American Secretary of State declared, that
"the simplest rule will be, that the vessel being American shall
be evidence that the seamen on board are such." Fifty years'
experience, the utter failure of many negotiations, and a careful
reconsideration of the whole subject when the passions were laid,
and no existing interest or emergency to bias the judgment, had
convinced the American Government that this was not only the
simplest and best, but the only rule, which could be adopted and
observed, consistently with the rights and honour of the United
States, and the security of their citizens. That rule announced,
therefore, what would hereafter be the principle maintained b}'
their Government. In every regularly documented American
merchant vessel, the crew who navigated it would find their pro-
tection in the flag which was over them (Ji) .
It is hardly possible that this dispute should arise

again The change of .
circumstances
practice ofimpressment fell into complete disuse in England after
the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, and the alterations dispute arose.
in the municipal laws of each country, added to the naturalization
treaty between them, have altered the whole aspect of the ques-
tion (^) .
England no longer claims the perpetual allegiance of
her subjects; and even if she did, it is highly im^probable that she
would at the present day assert the right of taking them out of
foreign vessels on the high seas .
At the beginning of the century Great Britain was engaged in

a gigantic struggle with France, which she maintained to a great
(A) Wheaton, Hisfc. Law of Nations, Pari. Papers, 1842, p. 59.

pp. 737—746. Webster's Letter to (i) See infra, p. 254.
Lord Asliburton, August 8, 1842. See
w. 12
extent at sea. It appears from an Admiralty minute of 1812,

that there were supposed to be upwards of 20,000 British-born
seamen in the American marine; many of them provided with
fraudulent protections (k). Under such circumstances, it is hardly
surprising that the royal prerogative should have been called into
force, for the purpose of seizing such as could be got at. If the
question is to be decided according to the rules of international
law as existing at the present day, Great Britain was perhaps in
the wrong. She claimed to take persons alleged to be her sub-
jects out of the ships of a friendly State on the high seas, and to
force them into her service. This claim was appended to the
right of search; that is, it was only exercised over neutral vessels
in time of war. It was not alleged that the fact of English
seamen being on board gave a British cruiser any right of stopping
and searching the neutral vessel, but there being an admitted right
of entering for the purpose of seizing contraband or enemy's goods,
it was contended that British officers, being rightfully on board,
had also thepower of seizing anyone they found there who owed
allegiance to the British Crown (?). But the claim of England
had in reality nothing to do with the right of search The seamen
.
she seized were neither contraband of war nor enemy's goods; they
were seized simply because they owed allegiance. It so happened
that the only way of catching them was by taking them out of
foreign ships; and as they were not wanted during peaoe, there
was no need for asserting the claim except during war, when the
right of search existed. But these were circumstances which only
accidentally connected impressment with the right of search. The
two have nothing in common. It must, however, be remembered
that international laAV has not always been, and is not even now,
in all respects fixed and definite, and that the views of the present
day are not precisely the same as those held at the beginning of
the nineteenth century (m) .
Caê of The In 1861, the question as to how far a merchant vessel may b^
stopped on the high seas and persons taken out of hei' by the
officers of a foreign Government reappeared in a very different
form. The British mail-steamer Trent sailed from Havana for

St. Thomas on the 7th November, 1861, under charge of a com-
mander in the navy. There were on board as passengers two
persons, Messrs. Slidell and Mason, who were commissioners of
{k) Report of Naturalization Com- §§ 317 seq.

mission, 1869, p. 35, where a history (I)Proclamation of the Prinoe Re-
of the impressment controversy will Annual Reg. 1813, p. 350.
gent, 1813,
be found. Cf. Moore, Digest, vol. ii. (m) Wheaton, ed. Dana, p. 179.
HIGHTS OF CIVIL AND OEIMINAL LEGISLATION. 179
the Confederate States, proceeding to England and France.

About nine miles from Cuba, the Trent was stopped by the San
Jacinto, an American ship of war, the two commissioners, with
their secretaries, were taken out, and the Trent was then allowed
to continue her voyage. The commissioners were imprisoned in
a military fortress in the United Stiates. The British Govern-
ment instantly demanded their restoration, with an apology for
the aggression, and in case of refusal Lord Lyons was directed to
withdraw from Washington (n) Instructions were given to the
.
ambassadors of France, Austria, Prussia, Italy, and Russia, by

theii' respective Governments to sustain the demands of Great
Britain.
It was contended by the United States that the persons seized
and their despatches were to be considered contraband of war and
in the same position as naval and military persons (o), and that the
Trent being a neutral merchant vessel, it was the right of the
8a7i Jacinto, as a belligerent cruiser, to stop her for the purpose
of ascertaining her true national character, and of seizing any
contraband found on board. The detention of the commissioners
was, however, not persisted in, and they were delivered up on
considerations connected with com^plaints previously made by the
Unite<l States as impressment of seamen from' their
to the
vessels (p) Although
. American Government congratulated
the
the captain of the San Jacvnto "for the great public service he
had rendered," and although his acts were approved by mjany
eminent American jurists, the transaction cannot be regarded as
justifiable. The Trent was on a bond fide voyage from one neu-
tral port to another. She was a mail steamer, a class of vessel
peculiarly exempt from molestation, and instead of being cap-
tured and brought before a Prize Court, she was simply stopped
on the high seas, and certain arbitrary acts performed on board
her by the American captain.
One of the reasons alleged by the captain of the San Jacinto for
not bringing in the Trent for adjudication before a Prize Court
was, that he wished to spare the other passengers the inconvenience
(w) Pari. Papers, 18^2, N. America, point of fact, Sir W. Scott's dictum
Tol. Ixii. (No. 5), p. 3. in the former did not concern the
(o) The authority of Vattol was in- case of an ambassador sent to a neutral
voiced; he holds that a belligerent State on board a neutral vessel; and
may prevent his enemy from sending the latter was not applicable to the
ministers to solicit assistance. Eef er- question at issue, as the vessel involved
ence waa also made to passages found was found to have acted as an enemy
in the judgments in The Caroline transport.
(1807), € 0. Rob. 461, and The Oro- (p) Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons,
zembo (1807), 6 0. Rob. 430; but, in 26th Dec. 1861.
12 (2)
of deviating from their voyage. Such a reason was no doubt

humane and honourable, but it cannot be taken us sufficient to set
aside a universal rule of public law, that a ship and cargo are not
lawful prize until condemned by a, competent court, and that
until so condemned a captor has no right to do anything beyond
bringing the ship before the court. Furthermore, there is no

authority to support the contention that persons and despatches,
when found in a neutral vessel and on a voyage to a neutral port,
could ever be seized as contraband (g) In connection with this

.
subject we may refer to Article 47 of the Declaration of London

(1909), which says: "Any individual embodied in the armed
forces of the enemy, who is found qn board a neutral merchant
vessel, may be made
a prisoner of war, even though there be n'o
ground for the capture of the vessel." Under this rule, it i^s
obvious that the envoys of the Southern Confederacy could not
have been forcibly removed from the Tremt.
ConsTilar jy ^\^q laws and institutions of any State mav

municipal
^
jurisdiction. ^ .
i •
iV •
i
•
operate beyond its own territory, and within the territory oi

another State, by special compact between the two States.
Such are the treaties or capitulations by which the consuls and
other commercial agents of one nation are authorized to exercise,
over their own countrymen, a jurisdiction within the territory of
the State where they reside. The nature and extent of this
peculiar jurisdiction depends upon the stipulations of the treaties
between the two States. Among Christian nations, it is gene-
rally confined to the decision of controversies in civil cases arising
between the merchants, seamen, and other subjects of the State
in foreign countries; to the registering^ of wills, contracts, and
other instruments executed in presence of the consul; and to the
administration of the estates of their follow -subjects deceased
within the territorial limits of the consulate.The resident con-
Powers in Turkey, the Barbary States, and
suls of the Christian
other Mohammedan countries, exercise both civil and criminal
jurisdiction over their countrymen, to the exclusion of the local

magistrates and tribunals (r). This jurisdiction is subject, in
civil cases, to an appeal to the superior tribunals of their own
country. The criminal jurisdiction is usually limited to the

infliction ofpecuniary penalties, and in offences of a higher grade
the consular functions are similar to those of a police mag-istrate,
iq) Of. Sir W. Harcourt, Letters of (;•) See Re Tootal's Trusts (1883),
Historicus, pp. 187 seq. See Moore, 2Z Ch..D.ZZ2', Abd-id-Messih \. Fcota
Digest, vol. vii. § 1265. (1887), 13 App. Cas. 431.
or 'juge d' instruction.'He collects the documentary and other

proofs, and sends them, together with the prisoner, home to his
own country for trial (s) .
By the treaty of peace, amity, and commerce, concluded at Treaty
Wang Hiya, 1844, between the United States and the Chinese China and the
" ^'"ited States.
Empire, it is stipulated (Article 21) that citizens of the United
States, who may commit any crime in China, shall be subject to
be tried and punished only by the consul, or other public func-
tionary of the United States thereto authorized, according to the
"
laAvs of the United States." Article 25: All questions in regard
to rights, whether of property or of person, arising between citi-
zens of the United States and in China, shall be subject to the
jurisdiction, and regulated by the authorities, of their own

Government. And all controversies occurring in China, between
citizens of theUnited States and the subjects of any other Govern-
jnent, shall be regulated by the treaties existing between the
United States and such Governments respectively, without
interference on the part of China" {t).
From a very early time, owing to the total difference of habits British
and religious feelings between the Europeans and Asiatics, it was Courts in non-
deemed necessary by their respective Governments to withdraw Christian
Europeans from the authority of the native courts of these States.

In process of time, and with the consent, express or implied, of
the Turkish Government, a general system' of Consular Courts
became established throughout the Sultan's dominions The Otto- .
man Porte gave to the Christian Powers of Europe authority to

administer justice to their own subjects according to their own
laws, but it did not profess to give, nor could it give, to one such
Power any jurisdiction over the subjects of another Power. It
has left those Powers at liberty to deal with each other as they
may think fit; and if the subjects of one country desire to resort
to the tribunals of another, therecan be no objection to their doing
so with the consent of their own Sovereign and that of the Sove-«
reign to whose tribunals they resort (u) This kind of jurisdiction,
.
exercised by the consuls of Christian States in Mohammedan

countries, is to be carefully distinguished from the ordinary
(s) De Steck, Essai sur les Consuls, Piggott, Exterritoriality, the law re-
sect, vii. §§ 30—-40. Pardessus, Droit lating to consular jurisdiction and to
Commercial, pt. vi. tdt. 6, ch. 2, § 2, residence in Oriental countries (1907).
eh. 4, §§ 1, 2, 3. As to English con- (0 See further Wharton, Digest,
suls, see Boyd, The* Merchant Shipping Appendix, § 125.
Laws, Index, tit. Consular officer; (u)The Laconm (1863) {Papayanni
Hall, Foreign Jurisdiction of the v. The Russian Steam Navigation OoS),
British Crown, chap. II.; Sir F. T. 2 Moo. P. O. N. S. 183.
powers exercised by foreign consuls in Christian States {x) . Judi-

cial powers are not necessarily incidental to the office of consul.
These powers depend altogether upon treaty (i/).
In The Lac(Mia{z), a case arising out of a collision between

the Laconia, a steamship belonging to a British subject domiciled
in England, and the ColcMda, a steamship belonging to a Russian
company, Dr. Lushington delivered the judgment of the Privy

Council in the appeal brought from the Consular Court of Con-
stantinople. He
said that though in general no State could claim
jurisdiction within the territory of another sovereign State, ir-

respective of treaty, yet in Oriental countries a privileged jurisdic-
tion might arise through constant usage, knowingly acquiesced
in by the local authorities. At first grave differences in religion
had necessitated the exclusion of British subjects from the native
courts; in time and with the progress of commerce, and Western
nations having the same interest in abstaining from Mussulman
tribunals, recourse was had to the Consular Courts; finally, the
system became general. The acquiescence of the' Ottoman Govern-
ment proved its consent. The exercise of such a jurisdiction in
foreign countries was provided for by the Foreign Jurisdiction

Act, 6 & 7 Vict. 0. 94, s. 1, and was regulated by the Orders in
Council passed in pursuance of that Act.

The numerous Orders
in Council and other provisions for regu-
lating the British Consular Courts in Turkey, were repealed and

consolidated by an Order in Council, dated August 8th, 1899 (a).
The position of British subjects in China is very similar to that
which they occupied in Turkey, and consular courts are estab-
much the same powers as those in
lished in those countries with
Turkey (&). The

jurisdiction exercised by England in these
Eastern countries regulated by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act
is
"
of 1890, which recites that by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage,
sufferance, and other lawful means. Her Majesty hath jurisdiction
"
within divers foreign countries"; and enacts that Her Majesty
may hold, exercise, or enjoy any jurisdiction which Her Majesty
now hath or may at any time hereafter have, within a foreign
country, in the same and as ample a manner as if Her Majesty
(a?) Messina v. Petrooochino (1872), voL xxi. 835.

L. E. 4 P. C. 158; Dent v. Smith (b) See Order in Cbuncil, 9fcli March,
(1869), L. E. 4 Q. B. 445. 1865. Hertslet, Commercial Treaties,
(y) Dainese v. Hale, 1 Otto, 13; 91 vol. xii. p. 281. Phillimore, vol. ii.
U. S. 13; Mahoney v. TJ. S,, 10 Wall. § 276, p. 314. He Tootal's Trusts
62. (1883), 23 Oh. D. 332; Abd-ul-Messih
(2) Supra. v. Farra (1887), 13 App. O. 431.
{a) Hertslet, Commercial Treaties,
had acquired that jurisdiction by the cession or conquest of

"
territoiy (c).
The authority of tlie Consular Courts of the United States is

derived from Acts of Congress passed in 1848, 1860 and 1870.
But in every case the power to pass such legislative measures,
whether British, American, French, or those of any other country,
depends on treaties entered into and customs acquiesced in by the
local sovereigns. This system of consular jurisdiction {d) origi-
nating in Turkey (including her former vassal State, Egypt)
came extended in the same manner to other non-Christian
to be
countries, such as China, Japan, Korea, Persia, Siam, Morocco,

Muscat.
In Egypt the consular system was replaced in 1876 by a system

of mixed tribunals, usually described as international courts,
whose judges are in part natives and in part foreigners. The
foreign members of the courts are appointed by the Egyptian
9,dministration, on the recommendation of their respective
Governments. These international tribunals included three
courts of first instance, sitting at Alexandria, Cairo and Zagazig,
and a Court of Appeal at Alexandria. In Decemher, 1914 —
owing to the fact that the Sultan of Turkey and the Khedive of
Egypt joined the enemies of the Allies in the Great War Turkish
—
suzerainty over Egypt was abolished, and the country was for-
mally declared a British protectorate. After making tlie necessary
adjustments wdiich this change involved, the British Government
informed the newly-appointed Sultan of Egypt that with regard .
to the judicial administration of the country they had for some

time been of the opinion that the system of capitulations no longer
harmonized with the development of Egypt and that a revision
wôuld be effected at the close of the war .
It is to be noted that before Turkey openly became a belligerent,

the Sublime Porte denounced the capitulations. No doubt diffi-
culties, anomalies, and abuses were incidental to the system of con-
sular jurisdiction. But this unilateral repudiation of conventional
and customary obligations on the part of the Ottoman Government
was undoubtedly an illegitimate proceeding. In view of estab-
lished arrangements, such changê ought to have been made after
negotiation with and with the consent of the other Powers con-
cerned.
(c) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 37, s. 1. see Sir H. Jenkyns, British Eule and
(d) As to the origin of the system, Jurisdiction beyond the Seas (1902).
(e), whose civilization and progress

In the case of Japan in-
spired the Christian States with confidence, the extra-territorial
privileges and immunities of consuls were abolished in 1899 by

means of treaties. In other countries the system of consular
jurisdiction is more or less being relaxed in favour of the local
government.
Independence Every sovereign State

"^
is independent
^ of every other in the'^
of the State as .
^ . . ^, . . ,
to its judicial exercisc oi its judicial power.

power. This general position must, of course, be qualified by the excep-
tions to its application arising out of express compact, such as
conventions with foreign States, and acts of confederation, by
which the State may be united in a league with other States for
some common purpose. By the stipulations of these compacts it
may part with certain portions of its judicial power, or may
modify its exercise with a view to the attainment of the object of
the treaty or act of union.
Exceptions. Subject to these exceptions, the judicial power of every State

is co-extensive with its legislative power. At the same time it
does not embrace those cases in which the municipal institutions
of another nation operate within the territory. Such are the
cases of a foreign sovereign, or his public minister, fleet or army,
coming Avithin the territorial limits of another State, which, as

already observed, are, in general, exempt from the operation of
the local laws.
Extent of the J Tho judicial power of every independent State, then, extends,
overcrimiDal with tho qualifications mentioned, —
offences.
1. To the punishment of all offences against the municipal
laws of the State, by whomsoever committed, within the territory.

2. To the punishment of all euch offences, by whomsoever com-
mitted, on board its public and private vessels on the high 5«t3as,
and on board its public vessels in fôreign ports.

3. To the punishment of all such offences by its subjects,
wheresoever committed .
4. To
the punishment of piracy and other offences against the
law of nations, by whomsoever and wheresoever' committed.
camiot punish an offence against its
It is evident that a State
municipal laws committed within the territory of another State,

unless by its own citizens; nor can it arrest the persons or pro-
perty of the supposed offender within that territory: but it may
(e) Cf. Imperial Japanese Government v. The P, ^' 0. Co., (1895) A. C. 644.
arrest its own citizens in a place which is not within the jurisdici
tion of any other nation, as the high seas, and punish them for
offences committed within such a place, or within the territory
of a foreign State.
By tho Common Law of England, which has been adopted, in

this respect, in the United States, criminal offences are considered
as altogether local, and are justiciable only by the courts oD that
country where the offence committed (/) But this principle is
is .
peculiar to the jurisprudence of Great Britain and the United

States; and even in these two countries it has been frequently
disregarded by the positive legislation of each, in the enactment of
statutes, under which offences committed by a subject or citizen,
within tho territorial limits of a foreign State, have been made
punishable? in the courts of that country to which the party owes
allegiance, and whose laws he is bound to obey. There is some
contrariety in the ojDinions of different public jurists on this ques-
tion but the preponderance of their authority is greatly in favour
;
of the jurisdiction of the courts of the offender's country, in such

a case, wherever such jurisdiction is exprcbsly conferred upon those
courts, by the local laws of that country. This doctrine is also
full}' confirmed by the international usage and constant legisla-

tion of the different States of the European continent, by which
crimes in general, or certain specified offences against the muni-
cipal code, committed by a citizen or subject in a foreign country,
arc made punishable in the courts of his own (g).
The cases in which English Courts have jurisdiction to try Jurisdiction
oft'ences committed abroad
{h), are exceptions to the general rule Courteoyer
that crimes are local in their character, that is, thev are offences crimes *"
« , oi •
1
•
1 I
•
1 1
committed
against the law oi the otate in which they are committed; but they abroad.
may also be and frequently are offences against the law of the
State to which the offender owes allegiance (i) The following .
are the principal exceptions to the general rule: Political offences,

such as treason (k) administering unlawful oaths, and forging
;
government documents (Z). As these acts must necessarily be

intended to take effect in the country against which they are
(/) Of. Macleod v. Attorney-Gene- 55.

ral for New South Wales, (1891) {k) 35 Henry VIII. c. 2. As to
App. C. 455. what is treason, see Sir James Stephen,
Foelix, Droit International Prive,

(<7) Digest of Criminal Law, ch. vi.; and
510—532. See American Jurist, U?. v. Lynch, (1903) 1 K. B. 444
§§
vol. xxii. pp. 381 386. — (where a British subject was tried
(A) Of. Foote, Priv. Int. Jurisp. here for treason committed in South
(1914), pp. 470 seq.; Cobbett, Cases, Africa),
vol. i.
pp. 225 !ieq. (0 52 Geo. III. c. 104, s. 7. Whar-
Macleod y'. Att.-Gen. for New
{%) ton, Conflict of Laws, § 916.
South Wales (1891), 60 L. J. P. C.
devised, they may perhaps not be looked upon as a real exception.

But homicide and bigamy (m) abroad are undoubted exceptions^
and also certain statutory offences under the Foreign Enlistment
Act, the Commissioners for Oaths Act, 1889, and the Explosive
Substances Act, 1883 \n) . A
British subject who commits murder
or manslaughter abroad on land, whether within the King's domi-
nions or without, and whether he kills a British subject or not, can
be tried in England or Ireland wherever he may be apprehended .
This is not to prevent liis being tried elsewhere (o) Offences .
against property or person committed at any place, 'ashore or

afloat, out of His Majesty's dominions, by any master, seaman
or apprentice, who, at the time when the offence is committed, or
within three months previously, has been employed in any British
ship, may be tried in England .(p).
Varying With regard to criminal jurisdiction, the States of the world
practices
in different have by no means adopted the same practice. Some countries, like
States.
Great Britain and the United States, recognise the territorial
principle, subject to such modifications and extensions as may be
made by legislative enactments. Other countries, e.g., Russia,
Italy, Norway, Austria, some of the German States and some of
the Swiss cantons, claim a general criminal jurisdiction over their
subjects, irrespectively of their place of residence and no matter
against whom the offence was committed. Others, again, claim a
greater or lesser jurisdiction over offences committed even by
foreigners on foreign territory; of these, one group of States (e.g.y
France, Germanj^, Austria, Italy) limit the claim to serious crimes
against the State; another group {e.g., Russia, Greece, Mexico)
extend it to serious offences against their respective subjects. And
so on with the different claims of other States (g) . Such offenders
could not, of course, be tried land punished, unless they came within
the territory of the aggrieved State. Moreover, the claims of
each State are not necessarily recognised by the others.
Aninteresting case illustrating the claim to exercise jurisdic-
tion over an extra-territorial offence committed by a foreigner is
Cutting's Case (1886) (r). In 1886, Mr. Cutting, an American,
who had before resided intermittently in Mexico, published in a
(m) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 57. (o) 24 &

25 Vict. c. 100, s. 9.
(n) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 267 (the (p) 17 &
18 Vict. c. 104, s. 267.
Merchant Shipping Act, extended by (q) Cf the Report of the American
.
53 & 54 Vict. c. 37, Foreign Juris- Department of State on Extra-terri-

diction Act) and see 33 & 34 Vict.
; tovial Crime and the Cutting Case,
c. 90, s. 4 (Foreign Enlistment Act), pp. 38—53.
46 Vict. c. 3 (The Explosive Sub- Wharton, Digest, vol.
stances Act), and 52 Vict. c. 10 (The
(r)
49; vol. ii.
—
pp. 439 442;
i.
pp. 48,
Moore,
Commissioners for Oaths Act). Digest, vol. ii.
§§ 200—202.
EIGHTS OE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION. 187
newspaper circulating in Texas a libel on a Mexican citizen.

Criminal proceedings were instituted in the Mexican Courts; and
later Mr. Cutting having been found in Mexican territory was
arrested and imprisoned. This action purported to be in accord-
ance with the Mexican Penal Code, which empowered the local
courts to try offences against Mexican citizens, even when com-
mitted abroad. The United States Government, however, de-
manded the release of their citizen. The Secretary of State
pointed out that the newspaper had not been published in Mexico,
and that Mexico could not assume jurisdiction over the author of
the libel published in the United States. The Federal and State
Governments would themselves mete out justice for wrongs done
within their jurisdiction, and they would not allow their preroga-
tive to be usurped by Mexico, or allow a citizen of the United
States to be tried elsewhere for acts done in the United States.
Further, by the law of nations no punishment could be inflicted
on a foreigner save conformably to the sanctions of justice held by
all civilized nations, e.g., the right to have the accusation examined
by an impartial an explanation of the alleged facts to the
court,
accused, the opportunity of having counsel and preparing the
defence, permission to go at large on bail where the alleged offence
isnot of a very grave character, the production on oath of evidence
supporting the charge with the right to cross-examine and bring
evidence in reply; and in the present case all these sanctions were
disregarded. To American demand the Mexican Govern-
the
ment replied that the offence was punishable under the local law,
and that the national Government could not interfere with the
ordinary course of law. Eventually, however, the Mexican
Government induced the prosecutor to withdraw from the case,
and so Mr. Cutting was released.
Laws of trade and navigation cannot affect foreigners, beyond Laws of trade
the territorial limits of the State, but they are binding upon its tion.
citizens, wherever they may be. Thus, offences against the laws
of a State, prohibiting or regulating any particular traffic, may be
punished by tribunals, when committed by its

its citizens, in
whatever place; but if committed by foreigners, such offences can
only be thus punished when committed within the territory of

the State, or on board of its vessels, in some place not within thg
jurisdiction ofany other State.
The public jurists are divided upon the question, how far a Extkadition
sovereign State is
obliged up persons, whether its own
to deliver
subjects or foreigners, charged Avith or convicted of crimes com-

mitted in another country, upon the demand of a foreign State,

or of its officers of justice. Some of these writers maintain the
doctrine, that, according to the law and usage of nations, every,
sovereign State is obliged to refuse an asylum to individuals
accused of crimes affecting the general peace and security of
society, and whose extradition is demanded by the Government of
that country within whose jurisdiction the crime has been com-
mitted. Such is the opinion of Grotius, Heineccius, Burlamaqui,
Vattel, Rutherf orth, Schmelzing, and Kent (s) According to .
Pufendorf, Voet, Martens, Kliiber, Leyser, Kluit, Saalfeld,

Schmaltz, Mittermaier, and Heffter, on the other hand, the extra-
dition of fugitives from justice is a matter of imperfect obligation
only; and though it may be habitually practised by certain

States, as the result of natural comity and convenience, requires
to be confirmed and regulated by special compact, in order to give
it the force of an international law '(f). And the last-mentioned
writer considers the very fact of the existence of so many special
treaties respecting thismatter as conclusive evidence that there is
no sucli general usage among nations, constituting a perfect obli-
gation, and having the force of law properly so called. Even
under systems of confederated States, such as the North American
Union and the former Germanic Confederation^ this obligation is
limited to the cases and conditions mentioned in the federal
compacts {u) .
The negative doctrine that, independent of special compact, no

Stateis bound to deliver up fugitives from justice
upon the
demand of a foreign State, was maintained at an early period by
the United States Government, and is confirmed by a considerable
preponderance of judicial authority in the American courts of

justice, both State and Federal (ii?)
.
(s) Grotius, De
Jur. Bel. ac Pac, § 40. Schmaltz, Europaisches V61-
lib. §§ 3—5. Heineccius,
ii. cap. xi.
kerrecht, p. 160. Mittermaier, Das
Praelect. in Grot. j. t. Burlamaqui, deutsche Straf verfahren, Theil i. § 59,
tome ii. pt. iv. ch. 3, §§ 23—29. pp. 314—319. Heffter, Das Euro-
Vattel, liv. ii. ch. 0, §§ 76, 77. Ruther- paische Volkerrecht, § 63.
forth, Inst, of Nat. Law, vol. ii. ch. 9, (w) Mittermaier, ibid.
12.
Schmelzing, Systematischer (a;) See the communication of Jef-
&.rundriss des praktischen Europais- ferson to the French envoy Genet,
Chen Volkerrechts, § 161. Kent, Sept. 12th, 1793. The decision of
Comm., vol. i. pp. 36, 37 (5th ed.). Chancellor Kent, In re Washburn, 4
{t) Pufendorf, Elementa, lib. viii. Johnson, Ch. Rep. 166, is counter-
, cap. 3, §§ 23, 24. Voet, De Stat. balanced by that of Tilghman, C. J.,
§ 11, cap. 1, No. 6. Martens, Droit in Respub. v. Beacon, 10 Sergeant &
des Gens, liv. iii. ch. 3, § 101. Kluber, Rawle, 125; by that of Parker, C. J.,
Droit des Gens, pt. ii. tit. 1, ch. 2, in Respub. v. Green, 17 Mas. 515—
§ 66. Leyser, Meditationes ad Pan- 548 and by that of the Supreme Court
;
deet. Med. 10. Kluit, De Deditione in Holmes v. Jennison (1840), 14

Profugorum, § 1, p. 7. Saalfield, Peters, 540.
Handbuch des positiven Volkerrechts,
The constitution of the United States (Article 4, s. 2), pro- Extradition

''
vid(>s that a person charged in any State with treason, felony, or Constitution,
other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another
State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State
from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State
having jurisdiction of the crime."
It is still a debated question whether the surrender of fugitives. Obligation of
except under a treaty, is an absolute international duty. One or depends on

two writers {y) endeavour to show that the existence of the right ^^'"^^^y-
to demand extradition is not denied by the majority of the earlier
jurists. But most

of the quotations cited from the works of the
latter do not support such a contention; they tend, on the contrary,
to emphasize the view that extradition is a natural right or moral
duty, rather than a legal right or duty. The weight of modern

authority, too, inclines towards treating it as a matter of comity
or moral obligation {z) In such a matter as this, if -any rules
.
can be laid down at all, they must be founded only on the practice
of nations. A State is not likely to change its law or practice in
this respect, because it is not in accordance with the theories of
text-writers.
unknown in Ancient Egypt,

Treaties of extradition were not
China, Greece, and Home
{a). In modern times the majority of
extradition treaties date from the nineteenth century, indeed from
the second half. The extension of international intercourse and
commercial relationships, the improvements in communication and
transport, added to the more definite recognition of State sove-
reignty and the growing insistence on the territorial principle in
criminal jurisdiction, have rendered inevitable the practice of
extradition. The earlier treaties on the subject were, unlike those
of the present time, concerned with the surrender of political
offenders rather than that of ordinary criminals.
The law England has apparently undergone a change on

of Practice of
this point during the nineteenth century. In some of the older

"
cases it is laid down by the judges that the government may
send a prisoner to answer for a crime wherever committed" (6),
(y) E.g., Sir E. Clarke, Treatise on seq. The opinions of various Ameri-
the Law of Extradition (1904), can jurists and statesmen will be found
chap. i. in S. T. Spear, The Law of Extra-
ct-) Phillimore, vol. i. § 367. Heff- dition (Albany, 1885), chap. i.
ter,Droit International, p. 128. Moles- {a) Cf. Phillipson, Int. Law and
wortli, Foreign Jurisdiction, p. 37. Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome.
Calvo, vol. ii. §§ 325, 402. Creasy, vol. i. pp. 358 seq.
First Platform of International Law, (b) East India Co. v. Campbell
§ 208, &c. Hall, International Law, (1749), 1 Ves. 247.
p. 57 (5th ed.). Moore, Digest, §§ 580
In Lord Loughborough's time, the crew of a Dutch ship mastered

the vessel, ran away with her, and brought her into Deal; the
question arose whether the English Courts could seize them and
send them to Holland. was held that thej could ;(c). So late
It
as 1827 the Provincial Court of Appeals for Lower Canada held
that a fugitive accused of larceny in Vermont (U. S.), who escaped
into Canada, could be surrendered to the United States, although
there was then no treaty on the subject (^). There seems to be
no doubt that this would not now be done. The constitutional
doctrine in England is, that the Crown may make treaties with
foreign States for the extradition of criminals; but those treaties
can only be carried into effect by Act of Parliament, for tho
executive has no power, without statutory authority, to seize an
alien here and deliver him to a foreign Power. Lord Denman said
in the House of Lords that he believed all Westminster Hall, in-
cluding the judicial bench, were unanimous in holding the opinion
that in this country there was no right of delivering up; indeed, no
means of securing persons accused of crimies committed in foreign
countries (e) . It may thus be regarded as certain that England
will not at present surrender fugitives except under a treaty.
Nevertheless, she does not hesitate to ask other countries for fugi-
tives from herself. Thus, in 1874, the Spanish Government, at
the request of England, gave up Austin Bidwell, one of the Bank
forgers, without there being at the time any treaty between tha
two countries (/). The Eoyal Commission on extradition (1878)
suggested that a statutory power of surrendering fugitive crimi-

nals, irrespectively of the existence of any treaty, should be created
in England (^). Whilst the Extradition Acts, 1870—1873, apply
in the case of countries with which Great Britain has extradition
treaties (and she has such treaties with practically all civilized
(c) Mtire V. Kaye (1811), 4 Taunt. in the Argentine Republic, in 1892, at

34. a date when the extradition treaty
(cV) In re Fisher (1827), Stuart, concluded between that country and
Lower Canada Hep. 245. Great Britain in 1889 (Hertslet, Com.
(e) Forsyth, Cases and Opinions, Treaties, xix. p. 94) had not been
p. 369. And see Earl Russell to Mr. ratified. On ratification, the treaty waa
Adams, 12th June, 1862; U. S. Dipl. held by the Argentine Courts to be
Cor. 1862, p. 111. retroactive in its operation. In the
(/) Clarke, Extradition (4th ed.), course of the debate in the House of
p. 74, note. Commons, a former Chief Commis-
(^r) Report, 1878. Pari. Papers, Cd. sioner of the Metropolitan Police
2039. Further defects in the English asserted that it was often easier to
law of extradition were brought to obtain the surrender of a prisonecr
light in the case of Dr. Hertz: see from a country with which there was
Hansard, 4th series, xxxi. p. 446 no extradition treaty than from a
(March 5, 1895); and see the same country with which a treaty had been
volume, pp. 454 et seq., for the pro- concluded. On tlie English law with
ceedings relative to the extradition of regard to the subject, see Sir F. T.
Jabez Balfour, who had taken refuge Piggott, Extradition (1910).
ioreigii countries), the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, applies to

certain foreign countries in which the Crown then exercised
foreign jurisdiction, e.g.^ Japan, China, Turkey, Egypt, Cyprus,

Korea, Persia, Morocco, Zanzibar, Siam, &c.
The practice of the United States has not always been uniform . Practice of
the United
In 1791, the Governor of South Carolina made a request that the
States.
President should demand the surrender of certain persons from
Florida (then Spanish territory), who had committed crimes in
South Carolina, and then fled to Florida. Mr. Jefferson said
"
respecting this, The laws of the United States, like tiho&e of
England, receive every fugitive, and no authority has been given
to our executives to give them up. .If, then, the United
. .
States could not deliver up to Florida a fugitive from the laws of

his country, we camiot claim as a right the delivery of fugitives
"
from us Mr. Monroe, as Secretary of State, in his instruc-
Qi).
tions to the American Commissioners at Ghent, in 1814, says,
"
Offenders, even conspirators, cannot be pursued by one Power
into the territory of another, nor are thjey delivered up by the
latter, except in compliance with treaties, or by favour "(^).

These passages show that, in the opinion of the writers, the Execu-
tive were neither bound, nor able to surrender fugitives at the
time, in the absence of treaty or special legislation The opinion .
•deliveredby Mr. Legare, Attorney-General, in 1841 is to the

same effect (/c). In 1864 a somewhat different opinion was Case of
^^^^^^"®^-
adopted. Arguelles, the Governor of a district in Cuba, wrong-
fully sold certain negroes into slavery while in his charge, with
the aid of forged papers, and then escaped to New York. There
was at the time no treaty between Spain and America, but Spain
asked for the surrender of Arguelles as a matter of comity, and the
United States complied. The senate thereupon requested the
President to inform them under what authority of law or treaty
he had surrendered Arguelles . Mr Seward prepared an elaborate
.
defence of the affair, in which he examined the state of inter-

national law when not regulated by treaty. After citing various
"
authorities (I), he came to the conclusion, upon the plainest
reason, and a uniform concurrence of authority, that the United
States, in its relations to foreign nations, certainly possesses the
authority to surrender to the pursuing justice of a foreign State,
(70 Jefferson, Works (ed. 1854), (Jc) Opinions of Attorneys-General,

Tol. iii. p. 290. vol. p. 661.
iii.
(0 See Holmes v. Jennison (1840), Wlieaton, § 115. Halleck, cli. vii.

{I)
14 Peters, 549. § 28. Story, Conflict of Laws, § 626.
U. S. V. Davis (1873), 2 Sumner, 486.
a fugitive criminal found within our territory" (m). However

this may be, it is generally admitted in the United States that this
unauthorized surrender of Arguelles constituted a breach of
American constitutional law and custom, and as such the act has
been unhesitatingly condemned (ji) .
Case of Carl j^ 1873, the earlier rule of refusing to grant extradition without
a treaty was reverted to in a case where the law should have been
pushed to its furthest limits to obtain the conviction of the

offende]'. In that year Carl Vogt, a German subject, was accused
of robbery, arson, and murder in Belgium, and escaped to the
United States. There was at the time a treaty with Germany,
but none with Belgium. Both these countries applied for the
fugitive, but the United States refused to give him up to either.
The application of Germany was refused on the ground that the
crimes were not committed within her jurisdiction, and that of
Belgium on the ground of therei being no treaty (o). In giving
"
an opinion on this case, the Attorney-General said: Some writers
have contended that there is a reciprocal obligation upon nations
to surrender fugitives from justice, but it now seems to be gene-
rally agreed that this is altogether a mjatter of comity. It is

to be presumed, where there are treaties upon the subject, that
fugitives are to be surrendered only in cases and upon the terms
specified in such treaties" (p).
Extradition French jurists are of opinion that the right of sending fugitive
criminals to the country where their crime was conmiitted is
inherent in every Government, and exists independently of all

treaties. Treaties are deemed to regulate the mode in which the
right is to be exercised, and not to create it (g). A circular of the

Minister of Justice, issued in 1841, states that most civilized
countries, except England andÂmerica, would surrender notorious
criminals Avithout being bound to do so by treaty (r) It may be .
added that even Great Britain and the United States are prepared
to take advantage of this principle, adopted by France and most
other States, when there are no existing extradition treaties with
them, and to demand the surrender of fugitive criminals on the
ground of comity, when they themselves would, in like circum-
stances, refuse on such grounds to comply with a demand made by
(m) U. S. Dipl. Cor. 1864, pt. iv. 300.

p. 40. (p) Opinions of Attorneys-General
(w) On the Arguelles Case, see also (U. S.), vol. xiv. p. 288. Wharton,
J. B. Moore, Treatise on Extradition Digest, § 269.
(Boston, 1891), vol. i. pp. 33 seq.; {q) Mouton, Les Lois penales de la
Spear, Extradition, pp. 1 se^?'.; Clarke, France, torn. i.
p. 9.
Extradition, pp. 72 seq. (r) Dalloz, Jurisp. Gen. (1841),
(o) U. S. Dipl. Cor. 1873, pp. 81, p. 440.
other States.In 1893, the United States Government obtained

from Costa Rica the surrender of a fugitive named Weeks (accused
of embezzlement within the United States), although there was
no treaty of extradition between the two countries (s) .
It is thus evident that the practice of nations does not furnish. Practice of
^°
a definite rule on the sub j ect It may therefore be assumed that uSform
.
the surrender of criminals is not at present looked upon as an

absolute international duty. Every Stat© may refuse to harbour
fugitives if it pleases; but if it prefers to receive and protect them,
other States have no remedy but to enter into treaties with it to
regulats future cases.

It seems to be agreed that extradition should be confined to What
1 1 11 •
i 1
•
1 o 1 criminals are
grave crimes, such as murder, robbery with violence, lorgcry, and subject to
those offences which it is the common interest of all nations to extradition,
suppress. Some Avriters suggest certain classes of acts that should

not create a liability to extradition; for example: (1) Crimes or
offences of a purely political character; (2) any offence com'mitted
in furthering civil war, insurrection or political commotion, which,
if committed between belligerents, would not be a crime; (3) de-
sertions from, or evasions of, military or naval service; (4) offences
which, hy reason of the lapse of time or any other cause, the

demanding nation cannot lawfully punish (^). long list of A
extraditable crimes is contained in the Extradition Act of England
(1870); and others iwere added by the Extradition and Slave
Trade Acts of 1873.
It is an almost universal rule that no State will surrender Political
political ref ugees

(tf ) . But
the hospitality of a State is so
if ^'^^^^ês.
abused by such refugees, that the safety of its neighbours

becomes imperilled, it then becomes its duty to adopt such
measures as will control them, and make their residence harmless
to other States (x) After the attempt to assassinate Napoleon III.
.
on the 10th of January, 1858, France represented that the plot had
been formed in England, and asked that England should provide
for the punishment of such offences. Lord Palmerston accord-
ingly introduced a Bill for the punishment of conspiracies formed
in England to commit murder beyond Her Majesty's dominions,
but the excited state of public opinion at the timê caused its
(s) Moore, Digest, vol. iv. pp. 253 As to what gives a political character
seq. to crime, see In re Castioni, (1890)
(t) See Field, International Code, 1 Q. B. 165; In re Meunier, (1894)
§ 214, notes, vehere the provisions of 2 Q. B. 415. Of. Calvo, Droit int.,
the principal existing treaties are vol. ii. § 1034.
analysed. {x) Bluntschli, Le Droit inter-
(w) Forsyth, Cases and Opinions, national codifie, § 396.
p. 371. Woolsey, Int. Law, § 79.
w. 13
rejection (^). Sardinia at the same time passed a law punish-

Foreign ing such acts when committed in her territory {z). In 1888, one
police agents.
Schrocêr, and again in 1889, one Wohlgemuth, German police
agents, engaged in watching German subjects on Swiss soil, were
expelled from Switzerland, on the ground that by their actions
and conduct they had disturbed the peace in that country. Ger-
many protested, and was supported by Russia and Austria, and,
in the more recent incident, by Italy. It was urged, on the
German part, that Switzerland had no right to avail herself of the
protection of her neutrality to further, by toleration and support
in her territory, acts against a,friendly neighbour which, in the
case of another State, might lead to rupture and war. Tho
Federal Government replied that its neutrality does not diminish
itssovereign rights, but seemed disposed to seek legislative aid to
the end that it might itself better control foreigners residing in
Switzerland-(a) .
Political The Swiss Extradition Law of 1892 lays down that, in general,
offences.
political criminals are not liable to extradition; but if the offeno^^.
in question is characterized more by the marks of an ordinary
crime than of a political offence, then they are liable to surrender,
subject to the opinion of the Supreme Court of Justice.
There is no consensus of opinion as to the definition of a political
offence. One or two English cases may be referred to. In In re
Castioni (1891) (b), a Swiss subject was, at the instance of the
SAviss Government, arrested here on a charge of murder. In a
political disturbance (1890) in the canton of Ticino, due to alleged
abuses of administration which the Government refused to remedy,
Castioni and others seized an arsenal, took possession of arms,
overcame the police, forced their way into the municipal palace,
and in the scuffle Castioni killed a councillor. A provisional
government was formed there by the insurgents, but was soon put
down, whereupon Castioni fled to England. The Divisional Court
held that crimes, otherwise extraditable, became political offences
if they were incidental to and formed part of a political disturb-
ance; that Avithin this category fell the act of the prisoner, who
had no private spite against the victim; and that the act was done
in furtherance of the rising. Hence the prisoner was set at
liberty (c). In the later case of In re Meunier (1894) (d) the
(y) Annual Reg. 1858, pp. 5, 33, (^>) 1 Q. B. D. 149.

202. Annuaire des deux Mondes, (c) As to the view of a political
1857-8, pp. 32, 110, 420. offence adopted by the Court, of.
(c) Annuaire des deux Mondes, Stephen, Hist, of drim. Law, vol. ii.
1857-8, p. 216. p. 71.
(fl) Annual Eegister, 1888. The (d) 2 Q. B. D. 415.
Times, May, June, July, 1889.
prisoner was an anarchist who had caused explosions in Paris, re-

sulting in the death of two persons. The Court held that in order
to make an offence a political one there must be two or more parties
in the State, each seeking to impose the government of its choice
on the other, and committing an act of violence solely in further-
ance of that object. These conditions did not apply to the
present case, as the person sought to be extradited was hostile to
all government, and his efforts were primarily directed against
the general body of citizens. Hence the offence was not of a
political character and
;
the accused was surrendered to the French
authorities.
In order to indicate the prevailing view amongst international
jurists, the rules adopted at Oxford (1880) by the Institute of
International Law, and modified at Geneva (1892), may be hero
given. "Article 13. Extradition is inadmissible for purely
political crimes or offences. Nor can it be admitted for unlawful
acts of a mixed character or connected with political crimes or
offences, also called relative political offences, unless in the caso
of crimes of great gravity from the point of view of morality and
of the common law {i.e., common as opposed to political), such
as murder, manslaughter, poisoning, mutilation, grave wounds
inflicted wilfully with premeditation, attempts at crimes of that
kind, outrages to property by arson, explosion or flooding, and

grave robbery, especially when committed with arms and violence.
So far as concerns acts committed in the course of an insurrection
or of a civil war by one of the parties engaged in the struggle and
in the interest of its cause, they cannot give occasion to extradition
unless they are acts of odious barbarism or vandalism forbidden
by the laws and then only when the civil war is at an end.
of war,
Article 14. Criminal acts directed against the bases of all social
Lorganization, and not only against a certain State or a certain form

of government, are not considered political offences in the applica-
tion of the preceding rules. Article 15. In any case, extradition
for crimes having the characters both of political and common law
crime ought not to be granted unless the demanding State gives
the assurance that the person surrendered shall not be tried by
extraordinary courts" (e).
By Article X. of the treaty concluded at Washington on the TheAsh-

0th August, 1842, between the United States and Great Britain, Treaty,
"
it was agreed that Her Britannic Majesty and the United States
(e) Trans, by Westlake, Int. Law, text in Amiuaire de I'lnstitut de droit

vol. i. (1904), pp. 246, 247. Original international, vol. xii. p. 182.
13(2)
shall, upon mutual requisitions by them or their ministers, officers,

or authorities, respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons
who, being charged with the crime of murder, or assault with

intent to commit murder, piracy, or arson, or robbery, or
or
forgerj-, or the utterance of forged paper, committed within the

jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum, or shall be found
within the territories of the other: —provided, that this shall only
be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the
laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be
found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial,
if the crime or offence had there been committed; and the respec-
tive judges and other magistrates of the two Governments shall

have power, jurisdiction, and authority, upon complaint made
under oath, to issue a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive
or person so charged, that he may be brought before such judg*es
or other magistrates respectively, to the end that the evidence of
criminality may be heard and considered; and if, on such hearing,

the evidence be deemed sufficient to sustain the charge, it shall be
the duty of the examining judge or magistrate to certify the
same to the proper executive authority, that a warrant may issue
for the surrender of such fugitive. The expense of such appre-
hension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by the party
who makes the requisition and receives the fugitive."
Construction Tho construction of this treaty has given rise to some diffi-
rea y.
g^j^-j^g^ j|. j^g^g })qqj^ tield that piracy in it does not include piracy
jure gentium, but is confined to piracy by municipal law. As

pirates jure gentiWn can be tried anywhere, it was considered that
there was no need to give them up[(/). In another case the
Lord Chief Justice said, "We must assume that the terms em'-
ployed are used in a sense which they would have in the law of both
countries, and not in a sense wholly peculiar to some local law in
one of them." And, therefore, where certain acts were made
forgery by the law of New York, but did not amount to forgery
in England, or by the general law of the United States, the
fugitive accused of such acts was not delivered up (^). If tho

evidence presents several views of the case, on any one of which,
ifadopted, there may be a conviction, it has been held in Canada
that the prisoner may be extradited (h). It has also been deter-
(/) In re Tirnan, 5 B. & S. 643; 10 Canada Practice Rep. 215. As to

L. T. N. S. 449. Cockburn, C. J., murder, aee Anderson's Case, Ann.
dissented from the opinion of the Reg. 1861, p. 520. As to construction
majority. See also the case of The of treaty with France, see The Lennie
Chesapeake (1863), ParL Papers, N. Mutineers (1876), Pari. Papers, N.
America, No. 10 (1876), p. 37. America, 1876 (No. 1), p. 97.
{g) In re Windsor (1865), 6 B. & {h) li. v. Gould (1869), 20 Upper
S. 527; In re Trueman Smith, 4: U-p-per Canada C. P. 154.
mined in Canada that the extradition treatj contains the whole

law of surrender between the United States and Canada (i). The
offence must also have been committed' within the jurisdiction of
the country demanding the surrender ot the fugitive. In 1858,
Thomas Allsop, a British subject, was charged as an accessory
before tho fact to the murder of a Frenchman in Paris, and
escaped to the United States. He could have been tried for this
in England (k), but the law officers held that his surrender could
not bo demanded from America under the treaty, since he was
not charged with a crime committed within British jurisdic-
tion (/). But where a person was charged with murder on the
high seas, on board a British ship, this was held to be within
British jurisdiction, and the prisoner was accordingly surrendered
by the United States (m) .
In 1870, an Extradition Act was passed in England (n), which Extradition

" ^
provides i7iter alia, that A fugitive criminal shall not be sur- '
rendered to a foreign State unless provision is made by the law

of that State, or by arrangement, that the fugitive shall not, until
he has been restored or had an opportunity of returning to Her
Majesty's dominions, be detained or tried in that foreign State
for any offence committed prior to his surrender, other than the
extradition crime proved by the facts on which the surrender
"
is grounded In February, 1875, a person named Law-
(o). Case of
^^^^®^<^®*
rence escaped from the United States, and sailed for England.
The American Government requested that he should be arrested
on his arrival on a charge of forgery. This was done, and he Avas
accordingly sent back.. Before the trial Her Majesty's Govern-
ment were informed that he was also to be tried on a charge of
smuggling, an offence not included in the treaty. Lord Derby,

the Foreign Secretary, thereupon instructed the British Minister
in America to protest if Lawrence was tried for any crime but
that for which he had been extradited./ Mr. Secretary Fish con-
tended that neither by the general law of extradition, nor the
practice of both countries, could such a proviso be implied in the
treaty (p). He cited the cases of Von Aernam (^), Paxton (r),
(») H. V. Tuhhee, 1 Upper Canaxia was supplemented by the Acts of 1873,

Prac. Eep. 98. 1895, and 1907.)
(A) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 9; and (o) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 52, s. 3, sub-
24 & 25 Vict. c. 94, s. 1. sect. (2).
{V) Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on (^) Mr. Fish to Col. Hoffmann,
Constitutional Law, p. 368. And see Pari. Papers, N. America, 1876
Opinions of Attorneys-General (U. S.), (No. 1), p. 80.
vol. viii. 215. (^q) (1854), 4 Upper Canada Eep.
(m) In re Bennett, 11 L. T. N. S. 288.
488. (r) (1866), 10 Lower Canada Jur.
in) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 52. (This Act 212.
Caldwell (s), and Burley (t), to sho^V thia,t, under the treaty, crimi-
nals had been extradited for one offence and tried for another and ;
he contended that the Act of 1870, being subsequent to the treaty,

and made by only one party, could not incorporate any new terms
Case of into it (u) Lord Derby declined to recede, and refused to give
.
Winslow.
up various other American fugitives, including one Winslow,
whose surrender had been asked for, unless the United States
would agree to try them for no other offences but those they were
extradited for His lordship' quoted the case of The Lennie Muti-
.
neers (x), where it was held that a prisoner delivered up under the
French Extradition Treaty for murder, could not be tried in
England for being an accessory after the fact. The discussion
ended without any conclusion being arrived at; Mr. Fish inform-
ing Lord Derby that Lawrence would not be tried for anything
but forgery, the offence for which he was surrendered («/) .
Rauscher'
Case.
A
case of great interest and importance in this connection was
decided by the Supremie Court of the United States in Octobei',
1886; and definite principles, on which American judicial opinion
had not previously been unanimous, were laid down. The de-
fendant being charged with murder on board an American vessel
on the high seas fled to England, and, on demand, was surren-
dered on that charge. The Circuit Court of the United States
for the Southern District of New York, in which he was tried,
did not proceed against him for murder, but upon an indictment
under § 5347, Eevised Statutes, charging him with cruel jand'
unusual punishment of the ni'an of whose murder he was before
accused, such punishment consisting of the identical acts proved
in the extradition proceedings, but not constituting an offence
(1871), 8 Blatchford, C. C. 131.

(s) countries. The provisions of tlie same
(1864), 1 Upper Canada L. J.
(0 Art. 10 and of the Cionvention were
(N. S.) 20. to apply to persons convicted of the
(u) Pari. Papers, N. America, 1876 specified crimes, but whose sentence
(No. 3). had not been executed. No fugitive
4th May, 1876.
(a;) Pari. Papers, criminal was to be surrendered if
N. America, 1876 (No. 1), p. 97. See demanded in respect of a crime deemed
36 & 37 Vict. c. 60, s. 3. to be of a political character, or if his
(p) Mr. Fish to Mr. Pierrepont, surrender should be, in fact, demanded
Aug. 5th, 1876, Pari. Papers, N. with a view to try or punish him for
America, 1877 (No. 1), p. 5. A Con- a crime of a political character.
vention between Great Britain and the (Pari. Papers, United States (No. 2),
United States was signed at London, 1888.) But notwithstanding the last-
25th June, 1886. The provisions of mentioned provision, the ratification of
Art. 10 of the 1842 Treaty were the Convention was refused by the
extended to manslaughter, burglary, Senate, owing, apparently, to appre-
embezzlement, or larceny of the value hensions entertained by certain per-
of 50 dollars, or 101. and upwards, and sons, who seemed to exercise an im-
"malicious injuries to property, where^ portant influence in American politics,
by the life of any person shall be that the extended list of extraditable
endangered, if such injuries constitute offences would prove inconvenient for
"
a crime according to. the laws of both themselves or their friends.
provided for in the Asliburton Treaty. The judges of the Circuit

Court, being divided in opinion, certified to the Supreme Court
for its judgment whether this could be done. It was laid down
in the opinion of the Court, delivered by Miller, J., in which
tiie cases
upon the subject and the opinions of writers are ex-
amined and reviewed: (1) That, prior to treaties, and apart from
them, there was no well-defined obligation on one country to
deliver up fugitives from justiee to another; and though such
deliverv was often made, it was upon the principle of comity,
and within the discretion of the government whose action was

invoked; and has never been recognised as among those obliga-
tions of one government towards another which rest upon estab-
lished principles of international law. (2) That a treaty to which
the United States is a party is a laAv of the land, of which all
Courts, state and national, are to take judicial notice, and by the
provisions of which tlney are to be governed, so far as they are
capable of judicial enforcement. (3) That it is the better opinion
that in any question of extradition which caix arise between the
Unit<3d States and a foreign nation the extradition must be nego-
tiated through the Federal Government, and not by that of a
State, though the demand may he for a crime committed against
the laws of that State. sound construction of the
(4) That, on a
Ashburton Treaty, and Acts of Congress on the subject, Bevised
Statutes, §§ 5272, 5275, the defendant could not be lawfully
tried foi- any other offence than murder, beca,u&e a person who'
has been brought within the jurisdiction by virtue of procieed-

ings under an extradition treaty can only he tried for one of the
offences described in that treaty, and for the offence with which
he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition, until a reason-
able time and opportunity have been given him, after his release
or trial upon such charge, to return to the country from whose
asylum he had been forcibly tak'en under those proceedings. (5)

That the circumstance thajt the sam-e evidence might be sufficient
to convict for the minor offence Avhich was produced before the
committing magistrate to support the charge of murder did not

justifj^ a departure from the prinqiple of the treaty, the minor
charge being an offence for which the treaty made no provision.
Gray, J., concurred upon the simple ground that by the Act of
Congress of Srd March, 1869, c. 141, § 1 (§ 5275, Revised
Statutes), the political department of the Government had clearly
manifested its will, in the form of an express law, that an accused
person should be tried only for the orime specified in the warrant
of extradition, and should be allowed a reasonable time to depart
out of the United States before he could be arrested or detained

for another offence. He
expressed no opinion upon the broader
question, which he considered a question of comity, within the
domain of diplomacy.
Waite, C. J., dissented. The prisoner having been brought
within the jurisdiction was triable there. Whether he ought to
be tried for an offence other than that for which he had beien
delivered was no part of his defence, but a* matter for diplomacy.
§ 5275 of the Revised Sjtatut'es only enabled the Federal Govern-
niicnt toregain possession of the prisoner if they should desire to
keep their faith with Great Britain in respect of the surrender {z).
Ker's Case. In another case, decided in December of the same year, where
the defendant was not surrendered by tlie Government of Peaû,
to which country he had fled, bu|t was arrested in Peru by the
United States messenger of his own mere motion, it was held by
the Supreme Court that the case was not cognizable by that Court
at all, for the defendant had failed to establish that any treaty
with the United States oonf erred upon him a right of asylum in
a foreign country, and the Court, therefore, gave no opinion upon
the question whether, having thus been forcibly removed, the
prisoner could resist trial in the State Court (a) .
French The French Courts have down

as a principle of inter-
laid it
decision.
national law, that a prisoner whose extradition has been obtained
cannot be tried for any crimes but those mentioned in the demand
for the surrender (6).
It may be added that in the case of extradition between States
of the American Union, surrendered fugitives may be tried for
crimes other than those for which they were extradited {c) .
Treaty
between By the convention concluded at Washington on the 9th
France and November, 1843, between the United States and France, it was
the United
States, agreed as follows:
" —
Article 1 That the high contracting parties
.
shall, on requisitions made in their name, through the medium

of their respective diplomatic agents, dêliver up to justice persons
who, being accused of the crimes enumerated in the next follow-
ing Article, committed within the jurisdiction of the requiring
party, shall seek an asylum or shall be found within the territories
of the other: Provided, that this shall be done only when the fact
(2) U. 8. V. Itamcher (1886), 119 pp. 87—91.

U. S. 407. (&) Dalloz, Jurisp. Gen. 1874,
(«) Ker (1886), 119 U. S.
V. Illinois p. 502.
436; of. Be Parisot, 5 T. L. R. 344. (<?) Cf. State of Missouri v. Patter-
And for other recent American cases, son (1893), 116 Missouri, 505 (where
see Clarke, Extradition (4th ed.), several cases are referred to).
of the commission of the crime shall be so established, as that the

laws of the country, in which the fugitive or the person so accused
shall be found, would justify his or lier apprehension and
commitment for trial, if the crime had been there committed.
Article 2. Persons shall be so delivered up who shall be charged,
according to the provisions of this convention, with any of the

following crimes, to wit: murder (comprehending the crimes de-
signated in the French penal code by the terms assassination,
parricide, infanticide, and poisoning), or with
attempt to an
commit murder, or with rape, or with forgery, or with arson, or
with embezzlement by public officers, when the same is punishable
with infamous punishment. Article 3. On the part of the French
Government the surrender shall be made only by authority of the
Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Justice; and on the part of the

Government of the United States, the surrender shall be made
only by the authority of the Executive thereof. Article 4. The
expenses of any detention and delivery, effected in virtue of the
preceding provisions, shall be borne and defrayed by the Govern-
ment in whose name the requisition shall have been maxie.
Article 5. The provisions of the present convention shall not be
applied in any manner to the erimes enumerated in the second
Article, committed anterior to the date thereof, nor to any crime
or offence of a purely political character."
The following additional Article to the above convention was Additional
'^^ ^^ ®"
concluded between the contracting parties at Washington on the
24th February, 1845, and subsequently ratified: "The crime of
robbery, defining the same to be the felonious and forcible taking
from the person of another, of goods or money, to any value, by
violence or putting him in fear; and the crime of burglary, de-
fining the same to be, breaking and entering by night into a

mansion-house of another, with intent to commit felony; and
the corresponding crimes included under the French law in the
words 'vol qualifie crime,' not being embraced in the second
Article of the convention of extradition concluded between the
United States and France on the 9th of November, 1843, it is
agreed by the present Article, between the high contracting
parties, that persons charged with those crimes shall be respec-
tively delivered up, in conformity with tlie first Article of the
said convention; and the present Article, when ratified by 'the
parties, shall constitute a part of the said convention, and shall

have the same force as if it had been originally inserted in the
same" (d).
(d) The treaties of France with other countries up to 1874 are collected in
Billot, De I'Extradition, pp. 471—571.
Extradition
treaties.
Ill the
negotiation of treaties, stipulating for the extradition,
of persons accused or convicted of specified crimes, certain rule&
are generally followed, and especially by constitutional Govern-
ments. The principle underlying these rules is, that a State
should never authorize the extradition of its own citizens or
subjects, or of jêrsons accused or convicted of political or purely

local crimes, or of slight offences, but should confine the provi-
sion to such acts as are, by common accord, regarded as grave
crimes (e).
The delivering up by one State of deserters from tlie military
or naval service of another also depends entirely upon mutual
comity, or upon special compact between different nations (/).

Surrender of In countries whose jurisprudence is founded on the civil law,
its own
subjects by a crimes committed abroad by subjects can be punished at home.
State.
Such States, therefore, usually decline to surrender their own
subjects (^). But where the common law prevails, crimes are
regarded as local, and punishable only by the laws of the place
where they were committed. In this case the surrender of sub-
'
jects for crimes committed abroad is absolutely necessary if the

offenders are to be punished at all. British Courts have no juris-
diction, except in cases of treason, homicide, or bigumy, and thq
statutory offences enumerated on a previous page (h), to try British
subjects for offences committed in foreign countries. There-
fore, unless England agrees to surrender her subjects accused of
other offences abroad, they will escape scot free. This actually
Case of
Wilson. happened in a case in 1877. A British subject having been
accused of larceny in
Switzerland, escaped to England. The
Swiss Government applied for his extradition, under their treaty
with England made in 1874. In February, 1875, an Order in
Council had been issued pursuant to the Extradition Act, 1870,
declaring that the Act applied to Siwitzerland (^) But the Order .
also contained this clause: "No Swiss shall be delivered up by

Switzerland to the Government of the United Kingdom, and no
subject of the United Kingdom shall be delivered up by the
Government thereof to Switzerland." Counsel for the Swiss
Government contended that the terms of this clause were not
imperative, but merely meant that neither Government should
be bound to deliver up its own subjects. The Court, however.
(e) Ortolan, Regies Internationales dition (4th ed. 1903), pp. 208 seq.
de la Mer, t. p. 340.
i. As to Germany, see Clarke, Extra-
(/) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. dition (2nd ed.), p. 66.
lib. i. cap. 22. Note to Duponceau's (A) See ante, p. 185.
Transl. p. 174. (i) London Gazette, 1875, vol. i.
{g) As to France, see Billot, De p. 702.

I'Extradition, p. €4; Clarke, Extra-
came to the conclusion that the clause was imperative, and that
under it each Government could not surrender its own subjects.
The prisoner was therefore discharged (k) Lord Chief Justice .
Cockburn characterised this as a blot on our syistem of extmdi-

tion. Both England and the United States are willing to sur-
render their own subjects (l), but Continental nations, as a rule,
are not. The only means of insuring the punishment of all
extraditable offendjers is either for Continental nations to sur-

render their own subjects, or for England and America to makq
their treaties with the Continental Sta:t6S non-reciprocal; that
is,that they should agree to surrender their own subjects, while
allowing the Continental Stivtos to keep theirs. The Royal

Commission on Extradition suggest that reciprocity in this
matter should no longer be insisted upon, whether the criminal
be a British subject or not. If he 'has broken the laws of a
foreign country, his liability to be tried by them ought not to

depend upon his nationality (m). The only real ground for
refusing to surrender subjects is when they are not likely to be
fairly treated by tliie State demianding them; and this does not
apply to most civilized States.
The convenience of trying crimes in the country where they
were committed is obvious. It is very much easier to transport
the criminal to the place of his offence, than to carry a.11 the
witnesses and proofs to some other country where the trial is to
be held.
An arrangement nmdie under the British Extradition Acts is not
confined to the extradition of subjects of the sovereign State with
which it is made, but will, in general, apply to persons of other
nationalities committing offences within that State if their extra-
dition requested by that State (n)
is Thus, one Ganz, an .
Austrian by birth, but a naturalised citizen of the United States,

having been accused of an offence committed in Holland, it was
held that he was amenable to the law of the State where the crime
Aâs committed, and that he was extraditable, under the extradi-
tion treaty existing between Great Britain and Holland (o) .
A
criminal sentence pronounced mider the municipal law in Extra-
one State can have no direct legal effect in another. If it is a territorial
*=•
operation or
(A) H. V. Wilson (1877), 3 Q. B. D. ford, C. C. 160.

42. (m) Eeport of Ck>ininission, 1878.
(0 Burley's Case (1864), 1 Upp. ParL Papers, cd. 2039.
Can. L. J. (N. S.) 20. Cf. Pari. (m) R. v. Ganz (1882), 9 Q. B. D.
Papers, 1876, N. America (No. 3), 93.
p. 12. Per Cockburn, C. J., in In (o) Tie Ganz (1882), 9 Q. B. D.
re Windsor (1865), 6 B. & S. 527; îP 93.
farte Von Aernam (1854), 3 Blatch-
204 RIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CEIMINAL LEGISLATION.
a criminal sentence of conviction, it cannot be executed without the limits

sentence.
of tiie State in which pronounced u'pon the person or pro-
it is
perty of the offender; and if he is convicted of an infamous crime,

attended with civil disqualifications in his own country, such a
sentence can have no legal effect in another independent State (p) .
But a valid sentence, whether of conviction or acquittal, pro-

nounced in one State, may have certain indirect and collateral
effects in other States. If pronounced under the municipal law
in the State where the supposed crime was committed, or to w'hich
the supposed offender owed allegiance, the sentence, either of con-
viction or acquittal, would, of course, be an effectual bar {exceptio
rei j'udicatce,) to a prosecution in any other State. If pronounced
in another foreign State than that where the offence is
alleged
to have been committed, or to which the party owed allegiance-,
the sentence Avould be a nullity, and of no avail to protect him
against a prosecution in any other State having jurisdiction over
the offence (g) .
The judicial power of every State extends to the punishment

of certain offences against the law of nations, among which is
piracy.
Piracy under Piracy is defined by the text writers to be the offence of de-
the law of
nations. predating on the seas, without being authorized by any sovereign
State, or with commissions from different sovereigns at war w ith
each other (r) .
Ingredients "Piracy," said Sir Charles Hedges, Judge of the Admiralty

of piracy. ''
Court, to the Grand Jury, in 1696, is only a sea term for robbery,
piracy being a robbery committed: within the jurisdiction of the
Ad;miralty. ... If the mariners of any ship shall violently dis-
possess the master, and afterwards carry away the ship itself, or
any of the goods, or tackle, apparel, or furniture, with a felonious
intention in any place where the Lord Admiral hath, or pretends
"
to have, jurisdiction, this is also robbery and piracy (s) "I appre- .
hend," said Dr. Lushington, "that in the administration of our

criminal law, generally speaking, lall ipersons are held to be pirates
who are found guilty of piratical laots; and piratical acts are
robbery and murder on the high seas. ... It was never deemed
(^) Martens, Pr6cis, &c., liv. iii. the case of United States v. Smith
ch. 3, § 86. Kliiber, Droit des Gens (1820), 5 Wheaton, 157.
Moderne de I'Europe, pt. ii. tit. 1, (s) R. V. Dawson and others, 13
ch. 2, §§ 64, 65. Foelix, Droit Inter- State Trials, 454, approved of in
national Priv6, § 565. Attorney -General for Hong Kong v.
{q) See Rex v. Hutchinson (1678), Kwoh-a-Sing (1873), L. E. 5 P. C.
3 Keble, 785. 199.
(y) See authorities cited in note to
EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION. 20^
neoe&sarj to inquire whether the parties so convicted had intended

"
to rob or to murder on the high seas indiscriminately (^). In
the case then before the Couft it was urged that the acts com-
plained of had been committed in a bay, and not on the high

seas,and were therefore not legally piratical. To this Dr. Lush-
"
ington replied, the ships were carried away and navigated by
the very same persons who originally seized them!. I 'consider
the possession at sea to have been a piratical possession, and the
carrying away the ships on the high seas to have been piratical
acts" (m). An offence committed pn the high seas is not piracy
gentium so long as the ship pn which it is committed remains
j<iire
subject to the authority ^f the State to which it belongis. An

essential ingredient of piracy is throwing off this authority.
The officers and crew of an armed vessel commissioned against CommiHsioned
^^^^^ ^^'
one nation, and depredating upon another, are not liable to be
treated as pirates in thus exceeding their authority. The State
by whom the commission is granted, being responsible to other
nations for what is done by its commissioned cruisers, has the
exclusive jurisdiction to try and punish all offences committed
under colour of its authority {x) .
The offence of depredating under commissions from different
sovereigns at war with each other is clearly piratical, since the

authority conferred by one is repugnant to the other; but it has
been doubted how far it may be lawful to cruise under commisi-
eions different sovereigns allied against a common enemy.
from
The better opinion, however, seems to be, that although it might
not amount to the crime of piracy, still it would be irregular and
illegal, because the two co-belligerents may have adopted diffe-
rent rules of conduct respecting neutrals, or may be separately
bound by engagements unknoAvn to the party {y) .
Pirates being the common enemies of all mankind, and :all Piracy triable-
^^^^^^
nations having an equal interest in their apprehension and punish-
ment, they may be la^vfully captured on the high seas by the
vessels of State, and brought within its territorial
any particular
jurisdiction for trial in its tribunals (2;). It is held by some?
(t) The Magellan Pirates (1853),

1 tinguishes between a pirate who is a
Spinks, 81. Phillimore, vol. i. p. 424. highwayman, and sets up for robbing,
(w) 16 Jurist, 1145. either having no commission at all,
(a?) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub.,
or else hath two or three, and a lawful
lib. i. cap. 17. man of war that exceeds his commis-
vol. ii. p. 595.
Rutherforth, Inst.,
sion." —Works, vol. ii. p. 714.
(y) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub, {z) "Every man, by the usage of
lib. i.
cap. 17, p. 130, Duponceau's our European nations, is justiciable in
Transl. tom. ii. Valin, Com-
p. 236. the place where the crime is com-
mentaire sur I'Ord. de la Marine. mitt^: so are pirates, being reputed
" The " out of the protection of all laws and
law," says Sir L. Jenkins, dis-
writers that only the warships of a State may lawfully capture
pirates . But this contention is untenable for piracy is an offence

;
against mankind in general, and any vessel capable of seizing a
pirate and restoring peace and order on the soa has not odily iji
principle a right, but is even undar an obligation, to do so.
^^^^ proposition, however, must be confined to piracy as de-
between^^^^
piracy by the fined by the law of nations, and cannot be extended to offences
°°^
and piracy which aix> made piracy by munijcipal legislation. Piracy under
under the law of nations may be tried and punished in the courts of
municipal
etatutes. justice of any nation, hj whomsoever and wheresoever committed;
but piracy created by 'municipal statute can only be tried by that
State within whose territorial jurisdiction, and on board of whose
was committed. There are certain
vessels, the offence thus created
actswhich are considered piracy, by the internal laws of a State,
to which the law of nations does not attach the same signification .
It is not by force of the international law that those who commit

these acts are tried and punished, but in consequence of special
laws which assimilate them to pirates, and which can only be
applied by the State which has enacted them, and then with
reference to its own subjects, and in places within its own juris-
diction. The crimes of murder and robbery committed by
foreigners, on board of a foreign vessel, on the high seas, are not
justiciable in the tribunals of another country than that to Avhioh
the vessel belongs; but if committed on board of a vessel not at
the time belonging, in fact as well as right, to any foreign Power
or its subjects, but in possession of a crew acting in defiance of
all law, and acknowledging obedience to no flag whatsoever, these
crimes may be punished as piracy under the law of nations in the

Courts of any nation having custody of the offenders (a) .
Tnaurjênts When an insurrection or rebellion has broken out in any State,

carrying on
war at sea. the rebel cruisers may be treated as pirates by the established'
if the rebel Government has not been
Government, recognised as
a belligerent by the parent State, or by foreign nations; but this
right ceases to exist on the recognition of the rebels as belli-
gerents (h). During the American War of Independence, an Act
was passed by the English parliament, the object of which wa^
privileges, and to be tried in what U. S. V. KUntock (1820), 5

—
ports soever they may be taken." Sir
(fl)
Wheaton, 144; U. S. v. Pirates (1820),
L. Jenkins, Works, ib. See Sir L. 5 Wheaton, 184.
Jenkins' Charge to the Grand Jury at (6) Hose V. Ilimely (1808), 4
the Admiralty Sessions in Southwark, Oranch, 272; The Prize Gaicses (1862),
18th Feb. 1680; Marsden, Adm. Cas., 2 Black. 273; Miller v. V. S. (1870),
p. 255. 11 Wallace, 268. See ante, p. 41
et seq.
to declare that the legal status of tlie revfolted Americans was that
of felons or pirates, but as a matter of fact none of the prisoners
were so treated (c) . The American Civil War assumed such
gigantic proportions at the outset, that the^re was very little time
during which it could be doubted whether it was actually a civil
war or only a partial insurrection, and thfe President's proclama-
tion of the 19th April, 1861, declaring the Confederate ports
blockaded, settled the point, by virtually recognising the South as

belligerents. From that time the duly commissioned Southern
cruisers became entitled to the lights of war, and ceased tio be
pirates .
When rebels cannot produce a regular commission from their Rebels
Oovernment, the question of whether they are pirates becomes to a commission,

great extent one of intention. If their acts are not done with a
piratical intent, but with an honest intention to assist in the war,
they cannot be treated as pirates. But it is not beaause they

assume the character of belligerents, that they can thereby protect
themselves from the consequences of acts really piratical (d) If .
their acts are at first unauthorized, but are subsequently avowed
by the insurgent Government, this may or may not take them out
of the category of pirates. A
irecognition of bielligerency does
not imply that other acts than those of war will be recognised,
and any past proceedings is not an act of war (e).
the avowal of
A casewhich gave rise to considerable discussion, and caused The case of
great excitement at the time, occurred during the Neapolitan in-

surrection of 1857. The Cagliari, a Sardinian merchant steamer,
running between Genoa and Tunis, left Genoa, on one of her

regular voyages, on the 25th June, 1857, with thirty-three pas-
sengers, a crew of thirty-two men, and a cargo consisting partly
of firearms. While on the high seas on the same evening, about
twenty-five of her passengers suddenly produced concealed arms,
took forcible possession of the ship, placed the master and some
of the other passengers and crew under restraint, and took the
ship to Ponga, a Neapolitan fortress and prison on an island. The

mutineers landed at Ponga, and, overpowering the garrison, took
possession of the fortress, and liberated 300 prisoners. Thus
reinforced, they committed other excesses, and then proceeded in
the Cagliftri to Sapri, where they were soon after all killed or
taken prisoners by the Neapolitan troops. The master then re-
Co) 17 Geo. III. c. 9. (e) See judgment of Mr. Justice

(d) In re Tirnan, 5 B. & S. 643; 10 Wilson in Burley's Case, ParL Papers,
L. T. N. S. 449; U. S. v. KUntoch N. America, 1876 (No. 3), p. 19;
(1820), 5 Wheaton, 149. Wharton, Digest, § 380, p. 20; and
see the five sections there following.
sumed his authority over the Cagliari, and left Sapri, announcing
his intention of going to Naples, and informing the Neapolitan
Government of what had occurred. About twelve miles west of
Capri, on the high seas, the Cagliari fell in with two Neapolitan
cruisers,who boarded her, and not deeming the explanations of
the captain satisfactory, took possession of the ship and conveyed
her to Naples. The ship was condemned as prize by a Neapolitan
Prize Court, and the crew were imprisoned. The Cagliari at the
time of her capture carried the Sardinian flag, and on receiving
the news of this event, the Siardinian Government demanded the
release of the ship and her crew. Naples refused, on the ground
that the vessel had been engaged in warlike acts against the
country, and that the master and crew had assisted in these acts.
Among the crew were two British subjects, named Watts land
Park, who acted as engineers. England demanded their release,
but it was not until they had been confined for ten months that
Naples surrendered them, and then only upon the ground of
yielding to superior force. The ship and the rest of the crew^
were afterwards surrendered on the same ground to a British
consul —no notice being taken of Sardinia —ând were sent by the
consul to Genoa. The right of Sardinia to claim their release
was never admitted by Naples.
After this, the Superior Prize Court of Naples decided that the
Cagliari was rightly seized on the high seas, as having been
engaged in acts which were partly warlike and partly piratical,
with the fault of her master and crew.
The British law officers were of opinion that the seizure was,
under the circumstances, justifiable, but that there was no ground
for the condemnation, or for the imprisonment of the two British
subjects. They sa,id, ''We forbear frbm enlarging upon the

serious consequences which would, in our opinion, result to every
maritime State, and to none more than Great Britain, from it
being held that nothing short of complete legal proof of guilt
or the actual commission of crime, at the moment 'of captuire,
will justify a national ship of war in capturing a vessel under
such circumstances as those in which the Cagliari was captured."
There was no doubt the ship, had been concerned in the insurrec-
tionary movement, and the captors could not be expected to insti-
tute a full inquiry on the high seas, for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the actual crew found on board had participated in this
or not.
The case, however, was materially altered when it came before
the Prize Court at Naples. The evidence clearly showed that
EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION. 209.
the captain and crew had acted under compulsion, and that the
owners of the ship were entirely innocent Nor was any com-
.
plicity proved against the two English engineers. Naples ought,

therefore, to have immediately surrendered the ship to Sardinia,
and liberated the crew. The only justifiable grounds for such a
seizure were on the supposition that the Cagliari was a rebal
vessel, and not entitled to carry the Siardinian flag. An insur-

rection may be carried on by sea as well as by land, and the
Government may capture ships of its revolted subjects on the high
seas. But as no war existed at the time, Naples had no belli-
g;erent right of search, or of bringing* foreign vessels for adjudi-
cation before a Prize Court. A
Prize Court was not the proper
tribunal to hear the case. If the Cagliar,i was to be adjudicated
on at all, it should have been before a municipal Court, and heir
crew should have been tried as rebels or pirates. As it .wa«
proved that she was entitled to oa):ry the Sardinian flag, ever|y,
claim to her detention thereupon disappeared, since no ship of
a foreign State can be seized on the high seas during peace. An
indemnity of £3,000 was paid to England on behalf of Watts

and Park, but no compensation was made to the Sardinian
Government (/) .
Another case occurred in 1873. The Virginius was registered The case of
^^'' ^^î7t«i«*.
United States in 1870. She then left the United
as a vessel of the
States and made several voyages without returning there, but she
preserved her American papers, and carried the American flag-

when in foreign ports. In October, 1873, and while an insurrec-
tion was raging in Cuba, she cleared from Kingston, in Jamaica,
witli her crew and about 108 passengers. Certain arms and
ammunition she had brought into Kingston we,re seized and for-
feited under the customs laws, and she left that port apparently
without any arms. She sailed from Kingston ostensibly for Port
Limon, in Costa Rica, but in reality p,l*ooeeded towards Cub,a.
While on the high sea^, and flying the American flag, she WiUs
chased by a Spanish ship of war, and being captured was carried
into Santiago de Cuba On arriving there the Spanish authorities
.
tried the passengers and crew by court-martial, and shot thirty-

seven of them. Of these sixteen were Britigfli sulbjects.. It
appeared that the majority of the passengers and crew were

Cubans, and that their real intention was to asisist in the Cubiaai
insurrection. But some of them, including some of the British
(/) See ParL Papers, 1857. Cor- p. 209. Annual Eeg. 1858, pp. 63—
respondence respecting the Cayliari. 66, and p. 181.
Annuaire des deux mondes, 1857-8,
w. 14
210 BIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION.
subjects who were

shot, had shipped on the supposition that the
Virghiius was going on a bond fide voyage to Costa Kica. When
these executions became known, England and America promptly
interfered, and called upon the Spanish Government to prevent
any further slaughter of their subjects. Matters became very
serious between Spain and the United States, and at one time
war seemed imminent. Spain, however, wâs willing to make
reasonable concessions, and at a conference held at Washington,
she agreed to restore the Virginius and the survivors of her pas'-
sengers and crew, and to salute the United States flag, unless before
the 25th December, 1873, Spain could prove to the satisfaction of
the American Government that the Virginius was not entitled to
carry their flag. The ship was accordingly given up to a United
States ship of war, with the survivors, but it being shown before
the appointed time that the Virginius was not legally entitled to
the American flag, the salute was dispensed with. England also
demanded and obtained compensation for the families of the exe-
cuted British subjects (g). The Virginius was not a pirate. She
was, no doubt, on her way to assist in an insurrection, but at the
time she was captured she was on the high seas, and had not as
yet committed any overt acts implicating her in the revolt. Spain
was entitled, perhaps, to treat her own subjects as she pleased,
but the execution of foreigners found on board a foreign ship,
upon the mere supposition that they were going to assist rebels,
was wholly unjustifiable.
The case of Qno of the most curious cases occurred in 1877 ofP the coast
The Huascar. t-i-i •
it t •
it-.-
of Peru. Pierola, an msuxgent leader, seized upon the Peruvian
turret ship Hu/ismr, and established himself on board with all his
adherents. The revolt had no basis of operation on land, and
consequently could not by any possibility amount to a war. The
Kuasoar cruised about the coast, and stopped several British ships,
in one case demanding any despatches there might be for th^
Peruvian Government, in another asking if there were any troops
on board, in another seizing on a quantity of coal. A British
subject was also detained on board, and compelled to act as
engineer. No actual violence was resorted to, as no resistance
was in any case offered, but the demands were made by ofiicerB
armed with swords and pistols. The British admiral {h) com-
manding on the Pacific station, on hearing of these acts, called
upon the Huascar to surrender, and offered, if this was done
{(j)See ParL Papers. Correspond- Keg. 1873, p. 253. U. S. Dipl. Cor.

ence the Virginius (Cd.
respecting 1874.
991), Spain (No. 3), 1874. Annual (A) Rear-Admiral De Horsey.
without resistance, to land the crew at some neutral place within

reasonable distance. The Huascar refused, and thereupon the
admiral attacked her, not fa«r from the shore, with two Eng'lish
wooden vessels, the Shah and the Amethyst. Great gallantry

was displayed on both sides in the action, but no lives were losit.
After a time the Huascar retired into shallow water, and an
expedition was fitted out from ^the British ships to blow her upi
at night with a torpedo. <She, however, eluded this, and shojrtly
after sur,rendered to the Peruvian Goyernment. That Govern-
ment had previously disclaimed all connection with, or responsi-
bility for, the acts of the Huascar. In the discussion in Parlia-
ment upon this case, the AttOirney-General said': " The ship had
committed acts which made her an enemy of Great Britain; and
that, therefore, the admiral in command of the Shah was justified
in the course which he took The Hufisdar was not in a position
.
to claim belligerent rights, in that she Avias a ship in the hanjds

of insurgents who had not reached a position entitling them to
say that they were, or were likely to be, able to supplant the
Government against which they had rebelled, and to conduct the
affairs of the country. As a matter of fact, the Huascar was
simply a rover of the sea, and she had comlnitted acts' which en-
titled Admiral De Horsey, in comtuand of one of her Majesty's
ships, to make war upon her. W. Harcourt had asked in

Sir
the House, whether, if the Humcw had been taken by the admiral,
he (the Attorney-General) would have advised a prosecution for
piracy against the crew. In strictness they were pirates, and

might have been treated as such, but it was one thing to assert
that they had been guilty of acts of piracy, and another to advise
that they should be tried fo,r their lives and hanged at New gate.
This vessel, the Huascar, was under no commission of any sort.
She was roving the seas without a commission, having been taken
possession of by a mutinous crew. What right had the
. . .
Hujasmr to stop a British meirchant vessel and demand to see

whether she had any .despatches on board?" He concluded tha^t
the reasons given by ,the admiral for his acts were perfectly juis(t
and proper {i) . The Peruvian Government expressed their in-
tention of asking reparation from England (k) but as the law ;
officers gave it as their opinion that Admiral De Horsey 's pro-
ceedings were in law justifiable, and as the Lords of the Admiralty,

although of opinion that 'it would have been better first to en-
(0 See the Times, Aug. 13th, 1877, 1877, on this subject, No. 369.
p. 7 Hansard, 3rd series, vol. ccxxxvi.
; (k) ParL Papers, 1877, Peru (No. 1),
pp. 787 seq. And see Pari. Papers, p. 18.
14(2)
deavour to obtain redress mqans of remonstrances, nevertheless

by,
approved of what he did, it did not seem probable that England

would accord any reparation to Peru (I) Nor was any due. The
.
Peruvian Government had expressly disclaimed all connection with

the vessel, and refused to be responsible for her acts. Nor Avere
they, indeeki, capable of controlling her. As soon, therefore, as
she had molested British commerce, there was no other couitee
open to the British admiral but to, take the matter into his owîi
hands.
Insurgents With regard to the position of insurgentswhose belligerency
gerency. is unrecognised, there is some differeiice of opinion. Thus, in
the case of the United States v. The Ambrose Light (1885) (?nj),
itwas held that a vessel found on the high &eas in the Imnds otf
insurgents whose belligerency, was not recognised by any sove-
reign Stateis technically a piratioal vessel, so that any State not
immediately affected may lawfully seize and condemn her. This

view is by no means widely accepted (^). The better opinion,
conformably to principle and actual usage, is that insurgent vessels,
acting for political objects and not molesting the ships and sub-
jects of other nations, are not piratical. Thus, in 188,7, the
Montezuma, a Spanish vessel, was seized by Cuban insurgents,
and attacked Spanish imerchantmen in the Rio de la Plata Spain .
requested the Brazilian Government to regiard her as a pirate;

but it was held that a vessel in the possession of insurgents con-
fining their hostile operations to the State against which the
insurrectionis directed could not be treated as a pirate by a
foreign Power (o) A similar ,view was adopted by Great Britain,

.
Franco and Germany when the Spanish Government declared to

be piratical the Spanish squadron ^t Carthagena that had been
seized by insurgents. In 1893, when a part of the Brazilian fleet
rebelled and attacked forts and batteries in the harbour of Rio de
Janeiro, the commanders of the British, American, French, Italian,
and Portuguese naval forces there notified the insurgent admiral
that they would not interfere with his operations, provided no in-
jury was done to the lives and property of their respective country-
men in the city. Again in 1905, a Russian warship, the Kniaz
PotemMn, was seized by her crew, in connection with a revolu^
tionary movement in Russia, and afterwards entered a Roumanian
port. The insurgents were refused "provisions, but they were not
treated as pirates.
(0 Pari. Papers, 1877, Peru (No. 1), pp. 465 seq.

pp. 14, 24. (o) Scott, Cases, p. 351, note; Snow,
(w) 25 Fed. Eep. 408. Cases, pp. 20O seq. Cf. Calvo, vol. i.
(w) Of. Wharton, Digest, vol. iii. § 502.
The African slave-trade, though prohibited by the municipal Slave-trade,
laws of most nations, and declared to be piracy, by the statutes of i)rohibited by

Great Britain (1821) and the United Stiates (1820), and sinoei
^^^^10*11^*
the treaty of 1841, Avith Great Britain, by Austria, Prussia, and
Russia, is not such by the general international law; and its
interdiction cannot be enforced by the exercise of tbe ordinary
right of visitation and searcb. -Tbat right does not exist, in
time of peace, independently of special com|pact (p) .
The African
slave-trade, once considered not only a lawful,
but desirable branch of commerce, a participation in which was
made the object of wars, negotiations, and treaties between diffe-
rent European States, is now 'denounced as an odious crime by the
almost universal consent of nations. This branch of commerce
was, in the first instance, successively prohibited by the municipal
laws of Denmark, the United States, and Great Britain, to their
own subjects. Its final abolition was stipulated by the treaties
of Paris, Kiel, and Ghent, in 1814, confirmed by the declaration
of the Congress of Vienna of the 8th of February, 1815, an!d
reiteratedby the additiona^l Article annexed to the treaty of peace
concluded at Paris on the 20th November, 1815 (g). The acces-
sion of Spain and Portugal to the principle of the abolition waa
finally obtained by the treaties between Great Britain and those

Powers of the 23rd September, 1817, and the 22nd January, 1815.
And by a convention concluded with Brazil in 1826, it was made
piratical for the subjects of that country to be engagjed in the)
trade after the year 1830.
By the treaties of the 30th November, 1831, and 22nd May, Treaties to
1833, between France and Great Britain, to which nearly all the S!?rade.^
maritime Powers of Europe subsequently acceded, the mutual
right of search was conceded, within certain geoigraphioal limits,
as a means of suppressing the slave-trade. The provisions of
these treaties were extended to a wider range by the Quintuple
Treaty, concluded on the 20th December, 1841, between the five

great European Powers, and subsequently ratified between them,
except by France, which Power still remained only bound by
her treaties of 1831 and 1833 with Great Britain. By the treaty
concluded at Washington, the 9th August, 1842, between the
United States and Great Britain, referring to the 10th Article of
the Treaty of Ghent, by which it had been agreed that both the
contracting parties should use their best endeavours to promote
(j>) Le Louis (1817), 2 Dods. Ad. {q) See Hertslet, Map of Europe by
210; La Jeune Eugenie, 10 Wheaton, Treaty, vol. i. pp. 60, 695.
66.
the entire abolition of the traffic in slaves, it was provided,
Article 8, that "the parties mutually stipulate that each shall
prepare, equip, and maintain in service, on the coast of Africa,

a sufficient and adequate squadron, or naval force of vessels, of
suitable numbers and descriptions, to carry in all not less than
eighty guns, to enforce, separately and respectively, the laws,

rights, and obligations of each of the two countries, for the sup-
pression of the slave-trade, the ©aid squadrons to be indep,endent
of each other, but the two Governments stipulating, nevertheless,
to give such orders to the officerscommanding their reopective
them most effectually to act in concert and'
forces, as shall enable
co-operation, upon mutual consultation, as exigencies may arise,

for the attainment of the true object of this Article; copies of all
such orders to be communicated by each Government to the other,
respectively." By the Treaty of the 29th May, 1845, between
France and Great Britain, new stipulations were entered into be-
tween the two Powers, by which a joint co-operation of their naval
forces on the coast of Africa, for the suppression of the slave-trade,
was substituted for the mutual right of search, provided by the
previous treaties of 1831 and 1833.
By the middle of the nineteenth century Great Britain had
concluded some fifty treaties for the suppression of the slave-
trade (ri)
.
Treaty of By a treaty concluded between England and the United States

1862 between
England and on the 7th April, 1862, it was agreed that the high contracting
the United
States. parties mutually consent that those ships of their respective
navies, which shall be provided with special instructions, may
visit such merchant vessels of the two nations as may upon reason-
able grounds be suspected of having been fitted out for, or beinjg
engaged in the slave-trade. This right of search is only to be

exercised by authorized vessels of war, and only as regards mer-
chant vessels; nor may it be put in force within the lim:ibs of a
settlement or port, or within the territorial waters of the othen
party. The mode in which the search is to be conducted, and
the geographical limits within which the right may be enforced,
are defined by the treaty (namely, within 200 miles of the African
coast and 30 leagues of the coast of Cuba). On February 17th,
1863, a further provision was made which extended this reciprocal
right of search to waters within 3/) leagues of the islands of Mada-
gascar, Porto Rico, and Santo Domingo (s) . An additional con-

vention concluded on the 3<rd June, 1870, abolished certain courts
(r) Cf. Phillimore, vol. i. § 308. (s) U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. xii.
p. 279.
that had been established in Africa to adjudicate on vessels alleged

to be slavers, and provides that suspected vessels shall be
brought
before the nearest Prize Court of their own country, or handed over
to one of its cruisers, if one should be near the scene of capture.
Instructions for the ships of each country employed in this ser-
vice are annexed to the treaty (t).
By Article 9 of the General Act of the Berlin Conference, General Act
which was signed at Berlin 26th February, 1885, Great Britain, Conference.
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the
United States (w), France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Eussia, Sweden and Norway, and Turkey, solemnly declared that
trading in slaves is forbidden in conformity with the principles
of international law as recognised by those Powers, and that the
operations, which, by sea or land, furnish slaves to trade, ought

likewise to be forbidden. And each of the Powers bound itself
to employ all the means at its disposal for putting an end to this
trade, and for punishing those who engage in it. This declara-
tion was followed up by an Anti-Slavery Conference held, at the
suggestion of Great Britain (x), at Brussels, in 1890, at which

all the above enumerated Powers, together with the Congo State,
Persia and Zanzibar, were represented. The General Act of the

Conference, ratified eventually by all the Powers there present,
contains in a hundred Articles an elaborate series of regulations
for "counteracting" the slave-trade in the interior of Africa,
for repressing it at sea, for liberating escaped slaves, and for
preventing the introduction of gunpowder and firearms into dis-

tricts infested by the slave-raiders (y) .
As
a result of the Brussels Conference, and the numerous con-
ventions concluded to prevent and punish those who engage in
the slave-trade, it may now be said that the traffic, though not
piracy jure gentium and not condemned by the customary law
of nations, is contrary to written international law.
Long before the definitive international convention of 1890 Decisions of
was established, the general concert of nations to extinguish the American

Courts.
traffic gave rise to the opinion, that, though once tolerated, and
even protected and encouraged by the laws of every maritime
country, it ought henceforth to be considered as interdicted by
the international code of Europe and America. This opinion
(0 vol. xvi. p. 777.

Il>icL Treaty, Nos. 20 and 22. See Brit.
00 But vide supra, j). 100. ParL Papers, Treaty Series, No. 7
(a;) Brit. Pari. Papers, Africa, No. 7 (1892). Supplement to the American ^
(1890). Journal of International Law, vol. iii.

(y) Hertslet, Map of Africa by (1909), pp. 29 seq.
firstreceived judicial countenance from the judgment of the

Lords of Appeal in Prize Causes, pronounced in the case of an
American vessel, the AmSdie, in 1807, the trade having been
previously abolished by the municipal laws of the United States
and of Great Britain. The judgment of the Court was delivered
The Amedie. by Sir William Grant, in the following terms (2;): "This ship
—
must be considered as being employed, at the time of capture, in
carrying slaves from the coast of Africa to a Spanish colony.
,We think that this was evidently the original plan and purpose
of the voyage, notwithstanding the pretence set up to veil the true
intention. The claimant, however, who is an American, com-
plains of the capture, and demands from us the restitution of
property, of which he alleges that he has been unjustly dis-
possessed. In all the former cases of this kind which have come
before this Court, the slave-trade was liable to considerations
very different from those which belong to it now. It had, ait

that time, been prohibited (so far as respected carrying slaves
to the colonies of foreign nations) by America, but by our cxwia
laws it was still allowed. It appeared to us, therefore, difficult
to consider the prohibitory, law of America in any other light
than as one of those municipal regulations of a foreign State 0(f
which this Court could not take any cognizance. But by thfe
alteration which has since taken place, the question stands on
different grounds, and is open to the application of very different
principles. The slave-trade has since been totally abolished by

this country, and our legislature has pronounced it to be contrary
to the principles of justice and humanity. Whatever we might
think, as individuals, before, we could not, sitting as judges in
a British court of justice, regard the trade in that light while our
own laws permitted it. But we can now assert that this trade
cannot, abstractedly speaking, have a legitimate existence. When

'
I say abstractedly speaking,' I mean that this country has no

right to control any foreign legislature that may think fit tia
dissent from this doctrine, and to permit to its own subjects the
prosecution of this trade; but we have now a right to affirm that
prima fade the trade is illegal, and thus to throw on cljaimants
the burden of proof, that, in respect of them, by the autho,ri:ty
of their own laws, it is otherwise. As the case now stands, wê
think we are entitled to say that a claimant can have no right,
upon principles of universal law, to claim the restitution in a
^ (z) The decisions of tliis case and immediately relating- to the slave-
subsequent cases are here given, as trade,
they possess a wider interest than that
Prize Court of human beings carried as slaves. He must show

some right that has been violated by the capture, some property
of which he has been dispossessed, to which he oug'ht to be restored.
In this case, the laws of the claimant's country allow of no pro-
perty such as he claims. There can, therefore, be no right to
restitution. The consequence is, that the judgment must be
"
affirmed {a).
In the case of The Fortima, determined in 1811, in the High The Fort una.
Court of Admiralty, Lord Stowell, in delivering the judgment

"
of the Court, stated that an American ship, quasi American, was
entitled, upon proof, to immediate restitution but she might
;
forfeit, as other neutral ships might, that title, by various acts of
misconduct, by violations of belligerent rights most clearly and
universally recognised. But though the Prizd Court looked

primarily to violations of belligerent rights as grounds of confisca-
tion in vessels not actually belonging to the enemy, it had extended
itself agood deal beyond considerations of that description only.
It had been established by recent decisions of the Supreme Court,
that the Court of Prize, though properly a Court purely of the
law of nations, has a right to notice the municipal law of this
countr}^ in the case of a British vessel which, in the course of a
prize-proceeding, appears to have been trading in violation of
that law, and to reject a claim for her on that account. Thait
principle had been incorporated into the prize-law of this country

Avithiif the last twenty years, and seemed now fully incorporated.
A late decision in the case of The Amedie seem'ed to have gone

the length of establishing a principle, that any trade contrary to
the general law of nations, although not tending to, or accompanied
with, any infraction of the law of that country whose tribunals were
called upon to consider it, might subject the vessels employed in
that trade to confiscation. The Amedie was an American ship,
employed in carrying on the slave-trade a trade which this
;
country, since its own abandonment of it, had deemed repugnant

to the law of nations, to justice, and humanity; though without
presuming so to consider and treat it where it occurs in the practice

of the subjects of a State which continued to tolerate and protect
itby its own municipal regulations; but it put upon the parties the
burden of showing that it was so tolerated and protected, and in
failure of producing such proof, proceeded to condemnation, as
it did in the case of that vessel. How far that judgment has been
universally concurred in and approved is not for me to inquire.
(a) The Amedie (1807), 1 Acton, 240.

If there be those of it, I certainly am not at liberty

who disapprove
to includemyself in that number, because the decisions of that
Court bind authoritatively the conscience of this; its decisions
must be conformed to, and its principles practically adopted The .
principle laid down in that case appears to be, that the slave-trade,
carried on by a vessel belonging to a subject of the United States,-
is a trade which, being unprotected by the domestic regulations of
their legislature and government, subjects the vessel engaged in
it to a sentence of condemnation. If the ship should therefbre
turn out to be an American, actually so employed it matters not, —
in my opinion, in what stage of the employment, whether in the
inception, or the prosecution, or the consummation of it the case

—
of The Amedie will bind the conscience of this Court to the effect
"
of compelling it to pronounce a sentence of confiscation (h).
The Diana. In a subsequent case, that of The Diana, Lord Stowell limited
the application of the doctrine invented by Sir W. Grant, to the
special circumstances which distinguished the case of The Amedie.
The Diana was a Swedish vessel, captured by a British cruiser on
the coast of Africa whilst actually engaged in carrying slaves to
the Swedish West India possessions. The vessel and cargo were
restored to the Swedish owner, on the ground that Sweden had not
then prohibited the trade by law or convention, and still continued
to tolerate it in practice. It was stated by Lord Stowell, in de-
livering the judgment of the High Court of Admiralty in this

case, thatEngland had abolished the trade as unjust and criminal;
but she claimed no right of enforcing that prohibition against the
subjects of those States which had not adopted the same opinion;
and England did not mean to set herself up as the legislator and
custos morum for the whole world, or presume to interfere with
the commercial regulations of other States. The principle of the
case of The Amedie was, that where the municipal law of the
country to which the parties belonged had prohibited the trade^

British tribunals would hold it to be iUegal upon general prin-
ciples of j ustice and humanity but they w'lOuld respect the property
;
of persons engaged in it under the sanction of the laws of their
own country (c) .
The above three cases arose during the continuance of the war,
and whilst the laws and treaties prohibiting the slave-trade were
incidentally executed through the exercise of the belligerent right

of visitation and search.
The Louis. In the case of The Diana, Lord Stowell had sought to distin-
ct) The Fortuna (1811), 1 Dods. (c) The Diana (1812), 1 Dods. Ad.
Ad. Rep. 81. Rep. 95.
guish the circumstances of that case from those of The Amediey so

as to raise a distinction between the case of the .subjects of a
country which had already prohibited the slave-trade, and that

of those whoseGovernments still continued to tolerate it. At last
came the case of the French vessel called the Louis, captured after
the general peace, by a British cruiser, and condemned in 'the
inferior Court of Admiralty. Lord Stowell reversed the sentence
in 1817, discarding altogether the authority of The Amedie as a
precedent, both upon general reasoning, which went to shake that

case to its very foundations, and upon the special ground, that even
admitting that the trade had been actually prohibited by the muni-
cipal laws of France (which was doubtful), the right of visitation
and search (being an exclusively belligerent right) could not con-
sistently with thelaw of nations be exercised, in time of peace, to
enforce that prohibition by the British Courts upon the property
of French subjects. In delivering the judgment of the High Court
of Admiralty in this case. Lord Stowell held that the slave-trade,
though unjust and condemned by the statute law of England,

was not piracy, nor was it a crime by the universal law of nations.
A court of justice, in the administration of law, must look to the
legal standard of morality
—
a standard which, upon a question
of this nature, must be found in the law of nations as fixed and
evidenced by general, ancient, and admitted practice, by treaties,
and by the general tenor of the laws, ordinances, and formal
transactions ef civilized States; and looking to these authorities,
he found a difficulty in maintaining that the transaction was
legally criminal. To make it piracy or a crime by the universal
law of nations, it must have been so considered and treated in
practice by all civilized States, or made so by virtue of a general

convention. The slave-trade, on the contrary, had been carried on
by all nations, including Great Britain, until a very recent period,
and was still carried ,on by Spain and Portugal,, and not yet entirely
prohibited by France. It was not, therefore, a criminal act by
the consuetudinary law of nations and every nation, independently
;
of special compact, retained a legal right to carry it on. No nation

could exercise the right of visitation and* search upon the common
and unappropriated parts of the ocean, except upon the belligerent
claim .No one nation had a right to force its way to the liberation
of Africa by trampling on the independence of other States or to ;
procure an eminent good by means that are unlaviûl; or to press

forward to a great pxinciple by breaking through other great prin-
ciples that -stand in the way. The right of visitation and search
on the high seas did not exist in time of peace. If it belonged to-
one nation equally belonged to all, and would lead to gigantic

it
mischief and universal war. Other nations had refused to accede

to the British proposal of a reciprocal right of search in the African,
seas, and it would require an express convention to give the right

of search in time of peace {d) .
Madrato v. The leading principles of this judgment were confirmed in 1820

Wiiies.
Court of King's Bench, in the case of Madrazo v. Witles,
i^y ^Yia
in which the point of the illegality of the slave-trade, under the
general law of nations, came incidentally in question.

The Court
held that the British statutes against the slave-trade were applic-
able to British subjects only. The British Parliament could not
prevent the subjects of other States from carrying on the trade

out of the limits of the British dominions If a ship be .acting
.
contrary to the .general law of nations, she is thereby subject to

condemnation; but it was impossible to say that the slave-trade
iscontrary to the law of nations. It was, until lately, carried on
by all the nations of Europe; and a practice so sanctioned could
only be rendered illegal on the principles of international law,
by the consent of all the Powers. Many States had so consented,
but others had not; and the adjudged cases had gone no farther
than to establish the rule, that ships belonging to countries that
had prohibited the trade were liable to capture and condemnation,
if found engaged in it (e).
The Jnteiope. A
similar course of reasoning was adopted by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Spanish and Portuguese
vessels captured by American cruisers Kvhilst the trade was still
tolerated by the laws of Spain and Portugal. It was stated, in
the judgment of the Court, that it could hardly be denied that the
slave-trade rwas contrary to the law of nature. That every man
had a natural right to the fruits of his own labour, was generally-
admitted; and that no other person could rightfully deprive him
of those fruits, and appropriate them aigainst his will, seemed to
be the necessary result of this admission. But, from the earliest
times, war had existed, and war conferred rights in which all had
acquiesced. Among the most enlightened nations of antiquity one
of these rights was, that the victor might enslave the vanquished.
That (which was the usage of all nations could not be pronounced
repugnant to the law of nations, \vhich was certainly to be tried by
the test of general usage. That which had received the assent of
(d) The Louis (1817), 2 Dods. Ad. 29 L. J. C. P. 348; R. v. Zuhiefa

Eep. 210. (1843), 1 C. & K. 215; Pinner v.
(e) Madrazo v. Willes (1820), 3 Arnold, O. M. & R. 613; Esposito v.
Barn. & Aid. 353. See also Santos Boioden (1857), 7 E. & B. 703.
V. Illidge (1859), 6 0. B. N. S. Ml;
allmust be the law of all. Slavery, then, had its origin ^n force;
but as the world had agreed that it was a legitimate result of force,
the state of things which was thus produced by general consent
could not be jDronounced unlawful. Throughout Christendom this
harsh rule had been exploded, and war was no longer considered
as giving a right to enslave captives. But this triumph had not
been universal. The parties to the modern law of nations do not
propagate their principles 'by force; and Africa had not yet adopted
them. Throughout the whole extent of that immense continent,
so fai- as we know its history, it is still the law of nations tha;t
prisoners are slaves. The question then was, could those who had
renounced this law be permitted to participate in its effects by
purchasing the human beings who are its victims? Whatever
might be the answer of a moralist to this question, a jurist must
search for its legal solution in those principles which are sanc-
tioned by the usages, the national acts, and the general assent, of
that portion of the world of which he considers himself a part,
and to whose law the appeal is made . If we resort to this standard
as the test of international law, the question must be considered
as decided in favour of the legality of the trade. Both Europe
and America embarked in and for nearly two centuries it was
it;
carried on without opposition and without censure A j urist could .
not say that a practice thus supported was illegal, and that those
engaged in it might be punished, either personally or by depriva-
tion of property. In this commerce, thus sanctioned by universal
assent, every nation had an equal right to engage. No principle
of general law was more universally acknowledged than the perfect
equality of nations. Eussia and Geneva have equal rights. It

results from no one can rightfully impose a
this equality, that
rule on another. Each
legislates for itself, but its legislation can
operate on itself alone. A right, then, which was vested in all by
the consent of all, could be divested only by consent; and this
trade, in which all had participated, must remain lawful to those
who could not be induced to relinquish it. As no nation could
pz'escribe a rule for others, no one could make a law of nations;
and this traffic remained lawful to those whose governments had
not forbidden it. If it was consistent with the law of nations, it
could not in itself be piracy It could be made so only by statute
.
;
and the obligation of the statute could not transcend the legislative
power of the State which might enact it. If the trade was neither
repugnant to the law of nations, nor piratical, it was almost super-
fluous to say in that Court that the right of bringing in for adjudi-
cation in time of peace, even where the vessel belonged to a nation
which had prohibited the trade, could not exist. The Courts of
justice of no country executed the penal laws of another; and the
course of policy of the American Government on the subject of
visitation and search, would decide any case against the captors
in which that right had been exercised by an American cruiser,
on the vessel of a foreign nation not violating the municipal laws
of the United States. It followed that a foreign vessel engaged
in the African slave-trade, captured on the high seas in time of
peace, by an American and brought in for adjudication,
cruiser,
would be restored to the original owners (/) .
Buron v. Tho Subsequent case of Burcm Denman

(^), places the matter
v.
Benman.
^^^^ ^^^^ clearer light. A
treaty was entered into between Com-
mander Denman, of H.M.S. Wanderer, and King Sciacca, the
sovereign of Gallinas, a territory near Sierra Leone, for the aboli-
tion of slavery in his dominions. Acting upon this treaty, Com-
mander Denman destroyed certain barracoons of the slave dealers,
and liberated the slaves, whom he conveyed to Sierra Leone. Some
of these slaves belonged to Buron, the plaintiff. Baron Parke, in
summing up, directed the jury, that the proceedings of Colmmander

Denman, at the time of their execution, had been wrongful, and
would have entitled the plaintiff to recover for the loss of his goods
and islaves, were it not that the defendant had acted under the
authority of a political treaty, which had been subsequently ratified
by the home Government, whereby his acts had become acts of
State, for which the Government, and not its officer, was respon-
sible.
These cases establish beyond controversy, that the tribunals of

England recognise the right of property of the owner in the slave,
so long as the slave is in the country by the law of which the
ow^ner's right is upheld (/^). It has also been held in a recent
case in the Supreme Court of the United States, that a promissory
note given as the price of slaves in a State where slavery was at
the time lawful, could be enforced after the abolition of slavery
throughout the Union {i) .
Fugitive Another question which has caused great difficulty with regard
slaves.
^Q slaves is that of their position after quitting a country where
they are held in bondage, and then returning to it. No one wdll
deny that a islave is justified in escaping from his master, if he
can do so without having recourse to violence, and no country
(/) The Antelope (1825), 10 v. Cochrane (1824), 2 B. & C. 448.

Wlieaton, 66. See TAci /S'âvers^ 2 Wal- (A) Eeport of Oomm. on Fugitive
lace, 350. Slaves, 1875, p. 64.
{g) (1848), 3 Exch. 167, and State (0 Boyce v. Tabb, 18 Wallace, 546.
Trials, N. S. vi. 526; and see Forbes
would give him up to his owner in such a case. It has, however,

been asserted, that when a slave has once set foot on British soil,
he becomes at once and for ever a free man, and that his owner's
rights thereupon cease to exist. Such a position cannot be sup-
ported. The law of England recognises the right of an owner in
^ slave-owning State over his slaves, and therefore British law
cannot impress the quality of freedom upon a slave who has vio-
lated his master's right, so as to make the slave able to continue
free on his return to the owner's country. In a case decided, by Case of the
Lord Stowell, Grace, a slave in i\.ntigua, accompanied her mistress ^^^^® Grace,
to England, and then returned Iwith her to Antigua. She ^was
there seizedby the waiter of the Customs, as forfeited for having
been imported into the island, contrary to a statute prohibiting
the further importation of slaves. Her owner put in a claim for
her, and Lord Stowell decided in his favour, on the ground that
while in England she was free, but that her liberty had been placed
"
into a sort of parenthesis," and as she had returned to Antigua,
her owner's rights over her revived, and he was therefore entitled
to her (k). Lord Chief Justice Cockburn expressed his approval
(?); and the same principle is to be found in other
of this decision
cases (m). Mr. Justice Story also expressed his concurrence with
this judgment (n), and the decisions of the American Courts are
to the same effect (o) .
The mode in which the questionmost likely to present itself Slaves

is
at the present time, is by slaves escaping on to the ships of war of

gh^s of^war.
foreign States. To give back a slave to his master, knowing that
he will be maltreated, and made to suffer for having attempted
to regain his liberty, is repugnant to the feelings of human nature;
and yet to protect him and carry him off to some country .where
slavery does not exist, is a violation of his owner's rights. The British
instructions of the Admiralty to the commanders of British ships
*^ ^ :A.diniralty
_
instructions.
of war, recommend that as a rule fugitive slaves should not be
"
received on board, but the commanders are instructed that In any
case inwhich you have received a fugitive slave into your ship,
and taken him under the protection of the British flag, whether
within or beyond the territorial waters of any State, you will not
admit or entertain any demand made upon you for his surrender,
on the ground of slavery. No rule is, or can be laid do"^vn, as to
(k) The Slave Grace, 2 Ha^g. Ad. B. & C. 448; Williams v. Brown, 3
131. Bos. & Pul. 69.
(0 See Eeport on Fugitive Slaves, {n) Life of Story, vol. i. p. 552.
1875, p. xlviii. (o) Strader v. Graham, 10 Howard,
(w) Forbes v. Cochrane (1824), 2 52; Bred Scot v. Sandford (1856), 19
Howard, 393.
General Act when a fugitive is to be received on board or not." And now by

of the
Brussels the terms of the General Act of the Brussels Conference, any slave
Conference. who may have taken refuge on board a ship of war flying the flag
of one of the signatory Powers, within the maritime zone there
defined, shall be immediately and definitely freed. Such freedom^
however, is not to withdraw him from the competent jurisdiction
if he has committed a crime or offence at comtoon law .
By another
Article of the Act
further provided that any fugitive slavey
it is
claiming on the African continent the protection of the signatory

Powers shall obtain it, and be received in the camps and stations
officially established by them, or on board Government vessels
plying on the lakes and rivers. Private stations and vessels ara
only permitted to exercise the right of asylum subject to the
previous sanction of the State (p) .
Slave in the While slavery existed in some of the States of the Am:erican
31J
Unit ediStates.
Union, it was held by the Supreme Court, that laws made by any
of the States to prevent or even to assist, the arrest of fugitivei
slaves, were unconstitutional and void (g) However, the Civil

.
War resulted in the total abolition of slavery throughout the

Union. The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides
that, "1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce
this Article by appropriate legislation" (r).
Extent of the II. The

judicial power of every State extends to all civil pro-
as*to propeTtJ ccedings,
in rem, relating to real or personal property within the
within the
territory.
territory
This follows, in respect to real property, as a necessary conse-
quence of the rule relating to the application of the hx locirei sitce.
As every thing relating to the tenure, title, and transfer of real
property (* immobilia ') is regulated by the local law, so also the
proceedings in Courts of justice relating to that species of pro-

perty, such as the rules of evidence and of prescription, the forms
of action and pleadings, must necessarily be governed by the same
law (s) .
Distinction A similar rule applies to all civil proceedings in rem, respecting

between the
(j>) The subject

is fully considered {q) Prigg v. Penmylvania, 16
in the Report of the Royal Oonunission Peters, 539, 622.
on Fugitive Slaves, 1875; and see Arts, (r) Thirteenth Amendment to the
vii., xxi., xxviii. of the General
Act Constitution of the U. S. See Memor
of the Brussels Conference; Hertslet, v. Happersett, 21 Wallace, 162.
Map of Africa by Treaty, No. 22. (s) Vide supra, p. 134.

personal iDroperty ('mobilia') within the territory, which must rule of

also be regulated by the, local law, with this qualification, that the rule of
prc'wdure as
foreigji laws may furnish the rule of decision in cases where they
appl}', whilst the forms of process and rules of evidence and pre- cases in rem.
scription are still governed by the lex fori. Thus the lex domicilii
forms the law in respect to a testament of personal property or
succession ab intestato, if the will is made, or the party on whom
the succession devolves resides, in a foreign country; whilst at
the same time the lex fori of the State in ^whose tribunals the
suit is pending determines the forms of process and the rules
of evidence and prescription.
Though the distribution of the personal effects of an intestate Succession to
is to be made according to the law of the place where the deceased
P^^^^^^^^ ^^
Avas domiciled, it does not therefore follow that the distribution intestato.
is in all cases to be made by

the tribunals of that place to the
exclusion of those of the country where the property is situate.
Whether the tribunal of the State where the property lies is to
decree distribution, or to remit the property abroad, is a matter

of judicial discretion to be exercised according to the circum-
stances. duty of every Government to protect its own
It is the
citizens in the recovery of their debtsand other just claims; and
in the case of a solvent estate it would be an unreasonable and
useless comity to send the funds abroad, and the resident creditor
after them. But if the estate be insolvent, it ought not to be
sequestered for the exclusive benefit of the subjects of the State
where it lies. In all civilized countries, foreigners, in such a case,
are entitled to prove their debts and share in the distribution {t).
Though the forms in which a testament of personal property Foreignivill,

made in a foreign country is to be executed are regulated by the Jj^to eff™in
lex domiciliij such a testament cannot be carried into effect in the another
State where the property lies, until, in the language of the law
of England, probate has been obtained in the proper tribunal of
'
such State, or, in the language of the civilians, it has been homo-
logated,' or registered, in such tribunal (ii) .
So also a foreign executor, constituted such by the will of the
testator, cannot exercise his authority in another State without
taking out letters of administration in the proper local court.

Nor can the administrator of a succession ah intestato, appointed
ex officio under the laws of a foreign State, interfere with the
Kent, Commentaries on Ameri-

(t) pp. 66i seq. Williams, Executors and
can Law (5th ed.), vol. ii. pp. 431, Administrators (1905), vol. i. p. 271.
432, and the case^ there cited. Footo, (w) Armstrong v. Lear, 12 Wheaton,
Priv. Int. Jurisp. (1914), pp. 271 seq. 169. Code Qvil, liv. iii. tit. 2, Art.
Dicey, Conflict of Laws (1908), 1000. Foote, p. 267.
W. 15
personal property in another State belonging to the succession,

without having his authority confirmed by the local tribunal.
Probate of If the testator died without leaving any personal property in
wills in
England. England, generally speaking, his will need not be proved in any
Court of Probate in England {x) But if a foreign executor
.
should find necessary to institute a suit in this country, to re-

it
cover a debt due to his testator, ho must then prove the will here,
or a personal representative must be constituted by the Court of
Probate here to administer ad litem {y) The English Court of
.
Probate generally follows the decision of the foreign court, when

a will proved abroad also requires probate in England. The
Court should, however, be satisfied, either that the will was valid
by the law of the testator's domicile, or that a court of the foreign
country has acted upon it, and given it efficiency (z).
Conclusive- The judgment or sentence of a foreign tribunal of competent

ness of
foreign
jurisdiction proceeding in r&m, such as the sentences of Prize
sentences Courts under the law of nations, or Admiralty and Exchequer,
in rem.
or other revenue courts, under the municipal law, are conclusive
as to the proprietary interest in, and title to, the thing in question,
wherever the same comes incidentally in controversy in another
State (a).
Whatever doubts may exist as to the conclusiveness of foreign
sentences in respect of facts collaterally involved in the judgment,
the peace of the civilized world, and the general security and
convenience of commerce, obviously require that full and complete
effect should be given to such sentences, wherever the title to the
specific property, which has been once determined in a competent

tribunal, is again drawn in question in any other court or country.
English and The English courts endeavour to uphold all decisions of foreign
American
decisions. tribunals, when such decisions have been rightly obtained. Mr.
Justice Story lays down the rule as regards foreign judgments
in rem in very explicit terms. He says the judgment is conclusive
"
when there have been proceedings in rem as to movable property
within the jurisdiction of the court pronouncing the judgment (h).
Whatever it settles as to the right or title, or whatever disposition
{x) Williams, Executors and Ad- In the goods of Des Ilais (1865), 34
ministrators (1905), vol. i. p. 269; L. J. P.M. & A. 58; Foote, pp. 273
Jauncey v. Sealey (1686), 1 Vernon, seq. With regard to the probate in
3^7. England of Scotch and Irish wills, see
(y) Williams, Executors, ibid.; 21 & 22 Vict. c. b^, 8. 12; 20 & 21
Attorney-General v. Bowens (1838), Vict. c. 79, s. 95; Foote, pp. 277, 278.
4 M. & W. 193; Price v. Bewhurst (a) Foote, pp. 537 seq.
(1837), 4 M. & Ov. 80. (b) Rose V. Himely (1808), 4
iz) Williams, Executors and Ad- Cranch, 241.
ministrators (1905), vol. i. p. 338.
EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND OEIMINAL LEGISLATION. 227
it makes of the property by sale, revendication, transfer, or other

act, will be held valid in every other country where the question
comes directly or indirectly in judgment before any other foreign
tribunal. But always to be understood
this doctrine, however, is
with this limitation, that the judgment has been obtained hmid
fide and without fraud; for if fraud has intervened, it will doubt-
less avoid the force and validity of the sentence (c). So it must
appear that there have been regular proceedings to found the
judgment or decree; and that the parties in interest in rent have
had notice or an opportunity to appear and defend their interests,
either personally or by their proper representatives, before it was
pronounced; for the common justice of all nations requires that

no condemnation should be pronounced before the party has an
opportunity to be heard" (d). "We think the inquiry is," said
Mr. Justice Blackburn, in giving an opinion in the House of
Lords (e), "first, whether the subject-matter was so situated as
to be within the lawful control of, the State, under the authority
of which the court sits; and, secondly, whether the sovereign
authority of that State has conferr-ed on the court jurisdiction to

decide as to the disposition of the thing, and the court has acted
within its jurisdiction. If these conditions are fulfilled, the ad-
judication is conclusive against all the world." The judgment
is binding even though it appears that the foreign court based its
decision on a mistaken idea of English law (/) .
How faj- a bankruptcy declared under the laws of one country Transfer of
will affect the real and personal property of the bankrupt situate
unXr^forei^
in another State, is a question of which the usage of nations, and bankrupt
the opinions of civilians, furnish no satisfactory solution. Even
as between co-ordinate States, belonging to the same common
empire, has been doubted how far the assignment under the
it
bankrupt laws of one country will operate a transfer of propertj'

in another. In respect to real property, which generally has
some indelible characteristics impressed upon it by the local law,
these difiiculties are enhanced in those cases where the lex loci rei
siice requires some formal act to be done by the bankrupt or his
attorney, specially constituted, in the place where the property
lies, in order to consummate the transfer. In those countries
(c) Williams V. Amroyd (1813), 7 Hector (1875), L. R. 19 Eq. 334;

Oranch, 423. Cf. Foote, pp. 520, 541. Ahoulof v. Oppenheimer (1882), 10
{d) Story, Conflict of Laws, § 592. Q. B. D. 295.
Boyd, The Merchant Shipping Laws, (e) Castrique v. Imrie (1870), L. K.
p. 459. Monroe v. Douglas, 4 Sand- 4 H. L. 429.
ford, 126; Sawyer v. Maine Fire Ins. (/) Ibid. p. 414.
€o., 12 Massachusetts, 298; Collins v.
15 (2)
where the theory of the English bankrupt system, that the assign-
ment transfers all the property of the bankrupt, wherever situate,
is admitted in practice, the local tribunals would probably be
ancillar}' to the execution of the assignment by compelling the

bankrupt, or his attorney, to execute such formal acts as are
required b}^ the local laws to complete the conveyance {g).
The
practice of the English Court of Chancery in assuming
jurisdiction incidentally over questions affecting the title to lands
in the British colonies, in the exercise of its jurisdiction in
personam, where the part}^ resides in England, and thus com-

pelling him, indirectly, to give effect tO' its decrees as to real
property situate out of its local jurisdiction, seems very question-
able on principle, unless where it is restrained to the case of a
party who has fraudulently obtained an undue advantage over

other creditors
by judicial proceedings instituted without
personal notice to the defendant Qi) .
But whatever effect may, in general, be attributed to the assign-

ment ill bankruptcy as to property situate in another State, it is
evident that it cannot operate where one creditor has fairly
obtained by legal diligence a specific lien and right of preference,
under the laws of the country where the property is situate {i) .
Extent of the HT- The judicial power of every State may be extended to
judicial
power over
foreigners
Qî
... controversies respecting
r o personal
r ris^hts
o and contracts, or
injuries to the person or property, when the party resides within
...
wTthin^he ^^^ territory, wherever the cause of action may have originated .
territory. This general principle is entirely independent of the rule of

decision which is to govern the tribunal. The rule of decision
may bo the law of the country where the judge is sitting", or it may
bo the law of a foreign State in cases where it applies; but that
does not affect the question of jurisdiction, which depends, or may
be mad(^ to depend, exclusively upon the residence of the party.
Depends upon The operation of the general rule of international law, as to
^^^^^ jurisdiction, extending to all persons who owe even a tem-
i^ûlatôns
porary allegiance to the State, may be limited by the positive
institutions of any particular country. It is the duty, as well as
the right, of every nation to administer justice to its own citizens;
but there is no uniform and constant practice of nations, as to
(g) See Lord Eldon's observations 40, per Lord Selborne, L. 0.; Eoote,
in Selkrigg v. Davis (1814), 2 Eose, Priv. Int. Jurisp. pp. 178 seq.
291, at p. 311; Ban-field v. Solomon, (z) Kent, Comment, on American
9 Vesey, 77; Re Levy' s Trusts (1885), Law, vol. ii. pp. 405—408 (5th ed.);
30 Ch. D. 119. ^ ^
Banco de Portugal v. Waddell (1880),
(A) See, as to this practice, Ewing 6 App. Cas. 161.
V. Orr-Etving (1883), 9 App. Cas. 34,
taking cognizance of controversies between foreigners. It may

be assumed or declined, at the discretion of each State, guided by
such motives as may influence its juridical policy. All real and
possessory actions may be brought, and indeed must be brought,
in the place where the property lies; but the law of England, Law of
and of other countries wdiere the English common law forms the ^^^ca ^^^
basis of the local jurisprudence, considers all personal actions,
whether arising ex delicto or ex contract it, as transitory; and
permits them to be brought in the domestic forum, whoever may
be the parties, and wherever the cause of action may originate.
This rule supported by a legal fiction, which supposes the
is
injury to have been inflicted, or the contract to have been made,

within the local jurisdiction. In the countries which have
modelled their municipal jurisprudence upon the Roman civil
'
law^, the maxim of that code, actor sequitur forum rei,' is gene-
rally followed, and personal actions must therefore be brought in
the tribunals of the place where the defendant has acquired n fixed
domicile.
Under the French Civil Code, foreigners who have established French law.
their domicile in the country by special license (' autorisation ') of
the sovereign authority, are entitled to all civil rights, and, among
others, to that of suing in the local tribunals as French subjects.
Under other circumstances, these tribunals have jurisdiction
where foreigners are parties in the following cases only: —
1. Where the contract is made in France, or elsewhere,
between foreigners and French subjects.
2. In commercial matters, on all contracts made in France,
with whomsoever made, where the parties have elected a domicile,
in which they are liable to be sued, either by the express terms of
the contract, or by necessary implication resulting from its nature.
3. Where
foreigners voluntarily submit their controversies to
the decision of the French tribunals, by waiving a plea to the
jurisdiction.
In all other cases, where foreigners not domiciled in France
by special license of the king are concerned, the French tribunals
decline jurisdiction, even when the contract is made in France (k).
Some this jurisprudence, which deprives a
writers consider
foreigner, not domiciled in France, of the faculty of bringing a

suit in the French tribunals against another foreigner, as incon-
(k) Code Civil, Art. 13,14,15. Code p. 2. Valin, Sur I'Ord. de la Marine,
de Commerce, Art. 631. Discussions torn. pp. 113, 253, 254. Pardessus,
i.
sur le Code Civil, torn. i. p. 48. Po- Droit Commercial, Pt. VI. tit. 7, ch. 1,
thier, Procedure Civile, Partie I. ch. i. § 1.
eistent with the European law of nations. The Roman law had
recognised the principle, that all contracts the most usual among
men arise from the law of nations, 'ex jure gentium'; in other
words, these contracts are valid, whether made between foreigners,
or between foreigners and citizens, or between citizens of the same
State. This principle has been incorporated into the modern law
of nations, which recognises the right of foreigners to contract
within the territorial limits of another State. This right neces-
sarily draws after it the authority of the local tribunals to enforce
the contracts thus made, w^hether the suit is brought by foreigners
or by citizens (I).
Proceedings The which prevails in some countries, of proceeding
practice
against absent
parties. against absent parties, who are not only foreigners, but have not
acquired a domicile within the territory, by means of some formal
public notice, like that of the viis dt modis of the Roman civil
law, without actual personal notice of the suit, cannot be reconciled
with the principles of international justice (m). So far, indeed,
as it merely affects the specific property of the absent debtor
within the territory, attaching it for the benefit of a particular

creditor, who is thus permitted to gain a preference by superior
diligence, or for the general benefit of all the creditors who come
in within a certain fixed period, and claim the benefit of a rateable
distribution, such a practice may be tolerated; and in the adminis-
tration of international bankrupt law it is frequently allowed to
give a preference to the attaching creditor, against the law of what

is termed the locus coneursiis creditorum, which is the place of
the debtor's domicile.
Distinction Where the tribunal has jurisdiction, the rule of decision is the
between the
rule of
law applicable to the case, whether it be the municipal or a
decision and
foreign code; but the rule of proceeding is generally determined
rule of pro-
ceeding, in by the lex fori of the place where the suit is pending. But it is
cases of not always easy to distinguish the rule of decision from the rule
contract.
of proceeding. It may, however, be stated in general, that what-
ever belongs to the obligation of the contract is regulated by the
lex domicilii, or the lex loci contractus, and whatever belongs to
the remedy for enforcing the contract is regulated by the lex
fori {ri).
(I) Foelix, Droit International Prive, English Courts, under an Act of the
§§ 122, 123. English Legislature, were autJiorised,
(m) Cf. Schibsby v. W
estenholz and indeed bound, to exercise a juris-
(1870), L. R. 6 Q. B. 155; but see diction which English judges did not
Sirdar Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote, believe that foreign Courts would
(1894) A. 0. 670. The former of admit to be within the proper autho-
these cases is said by Professor Dicey rity of the British Sovereign." Con-
to afford an example of legislative and flictof Laws, p. 29, n.
"
judicial excess of authority. The (w) See p. 148, ante.
If the tribunal is called

upon to apply to the case the law of the
country where it sits, as between persons domiciled in that country,
no difficulty can possibly arise. As the obligation of the contract
and the remedy to enforce it are both derived from the municipal
law, the rule of decision and the rule of proceeding must be sought
in the same code In other cases it is necessary to distinguish with
.
accuracy between the obligation and the remedy.

The obligation of the contract, then, may be said to consist of
the following parts: —
1. The personal
capacity of the parties to contract.
2. The will of the and con-
parties expressed, as to the terms
ditions of the contract.
3. The external form of the contract.
The personal capacity of parties to contract depends upon those
personal qualities which are annexed to their civil condition, by
the municipal law of their owm State, and which travel with them
w^herever they go, and attach to them in whatever foreign country
they are temporarily resident. Such are the privileges and dis-
abilities conferred by the lex domicilii in respect to majority and
minority, marriage and divorce, sanity or lunacy, and which deter-

mine the capacity or incapacity of parties to contract, indepen-
dently of the law of the place where the contract is made, or that
of the place where it is sought to be enforced.
It is only those universal personal qualities, which the laws of
nations concur in considering as essentially affecting
all civilized
the capacity to contract, which are exclusively regulated by the

lex domicilii, and not those particular prohibitions or disabilities,
which are arbitrary in their nature and founded upon local policy ;
such as the prohibition in some countries of noblemen and

ecclesiastics from engaging in trade and forming commercial con-
tracts. The qualities of a major or minor, of a married or single
woman, &c., are universal personal qualities, which, with all the
incidents belonging to them, are ascertained by the lex domicilii,
but which are also everywhere recognised as forming essential
ingredients in the capacity to contract (o).
How far bankruptcy ought to be considered as a privilege or Bankruptcy,
disability of this nature, and thus be restricted in its operation to

the territor}^ of that State, under whose bankrupt code the pro-
ceedings take place, is, as already stated, a question of difficulty

in respect to w4iich no constant and uniform usage prevails among
(o) Pardessus, Droit Commercial, Coo/ce's Trusts (1887), 56 L. J. Ch.

Pt. VI. tit. 7, ch. 2, § 1. Cooper v. €37; Viditz v. O'Hagan, (1900) 2 Ch.
Cooper (1888), 13 App. Caa. 88; lie 87.
?m EIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION.
nations. Supposing the bankrupt code of any country to form

a part of the obligation of every contract made in that country
with its citizens, and that every such contract is subject to the
implied condition, that the debtor may be discharged from his
obligation in the manner prescribed by the bankrupt laws, it
would seem, on principle, that a certificate of discharge ought to

be effectual in the tribunals of any other State where the creditor
may bring his suit. If, on the other hand, the bankrupt code
merely forms a part of the remedy for a breach of the contract,

it belongs to the lex fori, which cannot operate extra-territorially
within the jurisdiction of any other State having the exclusive

light of regulating the proceedings in its own courts of justice;
still less can it have such an operation where it is a mere partial
modification of the remedy, such as an exemption from arrest, and
imprisonment of the debtor's person on a cessio honoriim. Such an

exemption being and to be adminis-
strictly local in its nature,
by the tribunals of the State creating it,
tered, in all its details,
cannot form a law for those of any foreign State. But if the
exemption from arrest and imprisonment, instead of being merely
contingent upon the failure of the debtor to perform his obligation
through insolvency, enters into and forms an essential ingredient
in the original contract itself, by the law of the country where it
is made, it cannot be enforced in any other State by the
pro-
hibited means. Thus by the law of France, and other countries
' '
where the contrainte par corps is limited to commercial debts,

an ordinary debt contracted in that country by its subjects cannot
be enforced by means of personal arrest in any other State,
althougli the lex fori may authoris-e imprisonment for every
description of debts (p).
Remedy for There is no doubt of the general rule that when an action is
wrongs
committed brought in one country for acts which have taken place in another,
in a foreign the rights and merits of the case are to be decided by the law of
country.
the place where the acts occurred. There is, however, a limitation
to the rule when the case is one, not of contract, but of tort. The
civil liability arising out of a wrong derives its birth from the
law of the place where the wrong was committed, and its character
is determined by that law; but in order that a wrong' committed
abroad should give a remedy in England, it is essential that the

wrong should be of such a character that it would give a cause of
action if committed in England :(g). Thus a collision occurred
(jj) Melan v. The Dnhe of Filz- Ex. 108.

James (1797), 1 B. & P. 131. See {q) The Halley (1867), L. II. 2
Frith V. Wollaston (1852), 21 L. J. P. O. 193; PhilUjis v. Eyre (1870),
in the Scheldt between a British ship and a Norwegian barque, in

which the latter was damaged by the fault of the British ship.
By the law of Belgium, the British ship was compelled to tafce
a pilot on board while navigating the Scheldt, but, though the
pilotage was compulsory, the law of Belgium did not free the
master from responsibility while the ship was in the pilot's charge.
By the law of England, a master is not responsible for damage
occasioned by the fault or incapacity of a qualified pilot, when the
employment of such a pilot is compulsory by law (r) It being .
proved that the collision occurred through the fault of the pilot
on board the British ship, the Privy Council refused to hold tho
owner liable in England, although he might be so in Belgium (s) .
Tho obligation of the contract consists of the will of the parties, Obligation of
^ contract.
expressed as to its terms and conditions .
Tho
interpretation of these depends, of course, upon the lex
loci contractus, asdo also the nature and extent of those implied
conditions which are annexed to the contract by the loeal law or
usage (t). Thus, the rate of interest, unless fixed by the parties,
isallowed by the law as damages for the detention of the debt,
and the proceedings to recover these damages may strictly be
considered as a part of the remedy. The rate of interest is, how-
ever, regulated by the law of the place where the contract is made,
unless, indeed, it appears that the parties had in view the law of
some other country . In that
case, the lawful rate of interest of
the place of payment, or to which the loan has reference, by
security being taken upon property there situate, will be controlled

by the lex loci contractus (u) .
The external form of the contract constitutes an essential part Form of a

contract.
of its obligation.
This must be regulated by the law of the place of celebration or
performance (lex loci celehratioms or solutionis) of the contract,
which determines whether it must be in writing, or under seal,
or executed with certain formalities before a notary, or other
public officer, and how attested. A
want of compliance with these
requisites renders the contract void ah initio, and being void by the
L. R. 6 Q. B. 28; The M. Moxham P. C. 193. See also Smith v. Condry

(1876), 1 P. D. Ill; Chartered Bank (1843), 1 Howard, 28, where similar
of India v. N
etherlaiids India Steam principles were applied in America.
Navigation Co. (1883), 10 Q. B. D. (0 See p. 148, ante.
521, 530, 537. {u) Kent, Comm. on American. Law,
(r) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 388. vol. ii.
p. 459 (5th ed.). FcbHx, Droit
See Boyd, The Merchant Shipping International Prive, § 85. Foote,
Laws, p. 345. pp. 372, 408, 425.
(s) The Halley (1867), L. E. 2
law of the place, it cannot be carried into offect in any other State >
But a mere fiscal regulation does not operate extra-territorially;
and therefore the want of a stamp, required by the local law to be
impressed on an instrument, cannot be objected where it is sought
to be enforced in the tribunals of another country.
There is an essential difference between the form of the contract
and the extrinsic evidence by which the contract is to be proved.
Thus the lex loci contractus may require certain contracts to be
in writing, and attested in a particular manner, and a want of
compliance with these forms will render them entirely void But .
if these forms are actually complied with, the extrinsic evidence^
by which the existence and terms of the contract are to be proved

in a foreign tribunal, regulated by the lex fori {x)
is .
Conclusiye- The most eminent public jurists concur in asserting the prin-
nesg of foreign
judgments in ciple, that a final judgment, rendered in a personal action, in the
personal courts of competent jurisdiction of one State, ought to have the
actions.
conclusive effect of a res CDd^judicata, in every other State, wherever
it ispleaded in bar of another action for the same cause (y) .
But no sovereign
bound, unless by special compact, to execute
is
within his dominions a judgment rendered by the tribunals of

another State; and if execution be sought by suit upon the judg-
ment or otherwise, the tribunal in which the suit is brought, or

from which execution is sought, is, on principle, at liberty to
examine into the merits of such judgment, and to give effect to
it or not, as may be found just and equitable (z). The general
comity, utility, and convenience of nations have, however, estab-
lished a usage among most civilized States, by which the final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are re-

ciprocally carried into execution, under certain regulations and
restrictions, which differ in different countries (a) .
English law By the law of England, the judgment of a foreign tribunal of

as to foreign
judgments. competent jurisdiction, is conclusive where the same matter comes
incidentally in controversy between the same parties; and full
effect is given to the exeeptio rei judicata, m here it is pleaded in
bar of a new suit for the same cause of action. A foreign judg-
ment is
prima facie evidence, where the party claiming the benefit
of it applies to the English Courts to enforce it, and it lies on the
defendant to impeach the justice of it, or to show that it was
irregularly obtained. If this is not shown, it is received as evi-
(a;) Nelson, 257—261 ; Foote, pp. 351 Das Deutsche Bundesrecht, § 366.
aeq. (2;) Kent, Comm., vol. ii. p. 119
iy) Vattel, liv. ch. vii. §§ 84, 85.
ii. (6th ed.).
Martens, Droit des Gens, §§ 93, 94, («) FcElix, §§ 292—311.
95. Kliiber, Droit des Gens, § 59.
dence of a debt, for which a new judgement is rendered in the

English Court, and execution awarded. But if it appears by the
record of the proceedings, on which the original judgment was
founded, that it was unjustly or fraudulently obtained, without
actual personal notice to the party affected by it; or if it is clearly
and unequivocally shown, by extrinsic evidence, that the judgment
has manifestly proceeded upon false premises or inadequate
reasons, or upon a palpable mistake of local or foreign law; it
will not be enforced by the English tribunals '(&).
A foreign judgment in personam, to be recognised in England,

must be final and conclusive between the parties litigating the
same issue in England, and must be for a debt or a definite sum of
money. And the plaintiff in England cannot, when he relies on
the foreign judgment as his cause of action, obtain a greater
benefit here than the foreign judgment gave him abroad. In an
action on a foreign judgment not impeached for fraud, the original
cause of action is not reinvestigated here, if the judgment was
pronounced by a competent tribunal having jurisdiction over the
litigating parties; and a foreign judgment, subject as above, will
be regarded in an English Court as final and conclusive, though
it is subject to an
appeal, and though an appeal against it is
actually pending in the foreign country where it was given. For
the Courts of this country do not sit to hear appeals from foreign
tribunals, and if the judgment of a foreign Court is erroneous, the
regular mode, provided by every system of jurisprudence, of pro-
curing it to be examined and reversed, or re-heard, ought to be
followed. But no judgment
will be recognised in England which
was obtained bj' the fraud of the party relying on it here; or if
the foreign Court, although it affected to decide on the merits,
was, in view of English law, without jurisdiction (c).
The same jurisprudence prevails in the United States of American
America, in respect to judgments and decrees rendered by the
tribunals of a State foreign to the Union. As between the dif-
ferent States of the Union itself, a judgment obtained in one State
has the same credit and effect in all the other States, which it has
{b) Frankland v. MoGusty (1830), 122; Re Trufort (1887), 36 Oh. D.

1 Knapp, P. O. 274; Novelli v. Rossi 600; Aboulof v. Oppenheimer (1882),
(1831), 2 Barn. & Adol. 757; Becquet 10 Q. B. D. 295; Voinet v. Barrett
V. M'Oarthy (1831), 3 Barn. & Adol. (1885), 55 L. J. Q. B. 39; Godard
951. V. Gray (1870), L. R. 6 Q. B. 139;
{c) Dicey, Conflict of Laws, pp. 411 Schibsby v. Westenholz (1870), L. R.
seq. Re Henderson, Nouvion v. Free- 6 Q. B. 155; Nelson, Private Inter-
nmn (1887), 15 App. Cas. 1 ;
Hawks- national Law, pp. 338 et seq. ; Foote,
jord V. Gi-ffard (1886), 12 App. Oas, pp. 510 seq., and cases there cited.
by tlio laws of that State where it was obtained; that is, it has
the conclusive effect of a domestic judgment (d)).
^^^^ ^^^^' ^^ France restrains the operation of foreign judgments
France
within narrower limits. Judgments obtained in a foreign
country against French subjects are not conclusive, either Avhere
the same matter comes again incidentally in controversy, or where
a direct suit is brought to enforce the judgment in the French
tribunals. And this want of comity is even carried so far, that,
where a French subject commences a suit in a foreign tribunal,
and judgment is rendered against him, the exception of lis pnita
is not admitted as a bar to a new action
by the same party, in the
tribunals of his own country. If the judgment in question has
been obtained against a foreigner, subject to the jurisdiction of
the tribunal where it was pronounced, it is conclusive in bar of a
ncAV action in the French tribunals, between the same parties.
But the party who seeks to enforce it must bring a new suit upon
it, in which the judg'ment is prima facie evidence only; the defen-
dant being permitted to contest the merits, and to show^ not only
that it was irregularly obtained, but that it is unjust and
illegal (e).
The executionof foreign judgments in personam is reciprocally
allowed, by the law and usage of the European continent in
general, except Spain, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Norway, France,
and the countries whose legislation is based on the French civil
code (/) .
Foreign A decree of divorce obtained in a foreign country, by a fraudu-

ivorces.
^Qy^t evasion of the laws of the State to which the parties belong,
would seem, on principle, to be clearly void in the country of their
domicile, where the marriage took place, though valid under the
law^s of the country where the divorce was obtained. Such are
divorces obtained by parties going into another country for the
sole purpose of obtaining a dissolution of the nuptial contract,
for causes not allowed by the laws of their own country, or where
those laws do not permit a divorce a vinculo for any cause what-
ever. This subject has been thrown into almost inextricable
confusion, by the contrariety of decisions betwêen the tribunals of
England and Scotland; tlie Courts of the former refusing to recog-
{d) Mills V. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 7, ch. 2, § 2, No. 1488.

pp. 481
—
484; Hampton v. M'Gonnel,
tit. Merlin,
Repertoire, torn. vi. tit. Jtcgement.
3 Wheaton, 234. Story (Bigelow, Questions de Droit, torn. iii. tit. Juge-
ed. 8), p. 829, note («). ment. Toullier, Droit Civil Franâis,
(e) Code Civil, Arts. 2123, 2128. torn. x. Nos. 76—86.
Code de Procedure Civil, Art. 546. (/) Foelix, Droit International Prive,
Pardessus, Droit C<>nmiercial, Pt. VI. U 293—311.
RIGHTS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LEGISLATION. 2d7
nise divorces a vvnculo pronounced by the Scottish tribunals,

between English subjects who had not acquired a bond fide per-
manent domicile in Scotland; whilst the Scottish Courts persist in
granting such divorces in cases w4iere, by the law of England,
Ireland, and the colonies connected with the United Kingdom, the
authority of parliament alone is competent to dissolve the mar-
riage, so as to enable either party, during the lifetime of the
other, again to contract lawful wêdlock {g) .
In Warrender Warrender (1835), the House of Lords, sit-

v.
ting as a Court of Appeal in a caê coming from Scotland, and

oonsidering itself boujid to administer the law of Scotland, deter-
mined that the Scottish Courts had, by, the law of that country,
a rightful jurisdiction to decree a divorce between parties actually
domiciled in Scotland, notwithstanding the marriage was con-
tracte<.l in England. But the Court did not decide what effect such
a divorce would have, if brought directly in question in an English
court of justice (/^).
In the United States, the rule appears to be conclusively
settled that the lex loci of the State in which the parties are bond
fide domiciled, gives jurisdiction to the local courts to decree a

divorce, for any cause r.ecognised as sufficiênt by the local law,
without regard to the law of that State where the marriage was
originally contracted (i) This, of course, excludes such divorces
.
as are obtained in fraudulent evasion of the laws of one State, by

parties removing into another for tlie solp purpose of procuring
a divorce (k).
A marriage is regarded in England as indissoluble by a foreign Validity of a
Court when it is an English domiciled marriage ab initio down ^'^ô'î^
to the time of the foreign decree. And where the domicile of the England,
husband English at the time of the sentence in the foreign
is
Court, such sentence is ineffective in England'. But the English

Courts will recognise as valid the decision of a foreign tribunal
dissolving a marriage celebrated in England between a man, domi-
ciled at the date of themarriage and thenceforward till the date
of the decree in the country where such tribunal exercises juris-
diction, and an Englishwoman, although the sentence is for a cause
by the law of England. And a domicile of the hus-

insufficient
band acquired after marriage but before decree, and without
{y) Tovey v.Lindsay (1813), 1 9 Bligh, 89; ^S. C, 2 Clark &Fin. 488.
Dow, 117, 124;Lolley's Case (1812), (0 Dorsey v. Borsey, Chandler's
2 Olark «fe Fin. 567. See Fergusson's Law Reporter, vol. i.
p. 287.
Reports of Decisions in the Consis- (Jc) Kent, Comm., ii.
p. 107
vol.
torial Courts of Scotland, passim. (5th ed.). Story, p. 308, note (o).
(A) Warrender \. Warrender (1835),
ulterior motive, is probably enough to found the foreign juris-

diction so that the foreign sentence may be allowed here. When
neither the domicile or place of celebration is or has been English,
a sentence pronounced by a Court of the matrimonial domicile will
be deemed of effect here, and a sentence of a Court of the place of
celebration is sufficient if so regarded by the law of the domicile.
A foreign sentence in a matrimonial cause, as any other foreign
judgment, is vitiated by fraud or collusion (?) .
Divorce Tho Only fair and satisfactory rule to adopt as regards juris-
decided in the
î^îon is to insist upon the parties in all cases referring their
couiitry of matrimonial differences to the Courts of the country in which they
are domiciled. Different oomimunities have different views and
laws respecting matrimonial obligations, and a different estimate
of the causes that should justify divorce. It is both just and
reasonable, therefore, that the differences of married people should

be adjusted in accordance with the laws of the community to which
they belong, and dealt with by the tribunals which alone can
administer those laws. An adherence to this principle will pre-
clude the scandal which arises ;when a man and woman are held
to be man and wife in one coujitry-, and strangers in another (;m) .
Though there can be no doubt of the soundness of this principle,,

itcannot, unfortunately, be considered as absolutely established in
English law (n); but after the decision of the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier (o), it may
be assumed that the House of Lords will, when the opportunity is
afforded them, overrule the judgment of the Court of Appeal in
Niboyet v. Nihoyet. In the former case the Privy Council decided

that tho permanent domicile of the spouses within a territory is
necessary to give to its Courts jurisdiction so to divorce a vinculo,
that its decree to that effect shall, by the general law of nations,
possess extra-territorial aathority. Nor would it, even if firmly

established, in every case prevent collision between the courts of
different countries, because there would still, in each case, remain
the fact of domicile to be established; and as all countries do nob
adopt the same rules of evidence, the evidence on this question
(J) Harvey v. Farnve (1880), there cited.

8 App.
Cas. 43; Turner v. Thompson (1888), (m) Wilson v. Wilson (1872), L. R.
13 P. D. 37; Dolphin v. Robins (1859), 2 P. & D. 442.
7 H. L. C. 391; Scott v. Att.-Gen. (jj) Niboyet v. Niboyet (1878), 4
(1886), 11 P. D. 128; Brigys v. Briqgs P. D. 1.
(1880), 5 P. D. 163; Lolley's Cuse (o) (1895) A. C. 517. In Army tag e

(1812), R. & Ry. 237. See also Green v. Army tag e,(1898) P. 178, Barnes,
V. Green, (1893) P. 89; The King v. J., treated 7V«7>oye^ v. iV»^>oye^ as bein^
Barl Russell, (1901) A. O. 446. Cf. no longer law.
Eoote, pp. 109 seq., and the cases
might be very different in one country from what it would be in

another {p) .
Their lordships further held, in Le Alesurier v. Le Mesurier, Domicile

that a so-called "matrimonial domicile," said to be created by a Iti^ê^^r^dic-
band fide residence of the spouses within the territory, of a less tion to
degree of permanence than is required to fix their true domicile,

cannot be recognised as creating such jurisdiction. This ruling
ma}^ be considered as setting at rest the doubts expressed by Lord
Colonsay in the House of Lords in 1868 as to whether a domicile
for all purposes is necessary to give a foreign Court such juris-
diction as will ensure the recognition of the divorce in England (g) .
It was not necessary to decide the point, because in the case before
the Court the domicile of the parties was English; the husband'
had committed adultery in England, and both parties had then
gone to Scotland, and remained forty days there, simply to givo
the Scotch Court jurisdiction. The divorce was therefore an eva-
" "
sion of English law. The result is," said Lord Westbury, that
a sentence of divorce under such circumstances may be binding in
Scotland, although of no validity in the territory of England.
.... But this disgraceful anomaly can only be removed by the
"
Legislature (r). The present state of the law as evolved out of a
long series of contests between the English and Scotch Courts is
summed up by Professor Dicey as follows: "The Scotch Courts,
as represented by the House of Lords, would appear to have sur-
rendered the claim to dissolve the marriage of persons not domiciled
in Scotland, or at least to look with great doubt on the doctrine
that either the locus delicti or residence for forty days gives juris-
diction in matters of divorce (s) As the English Courts
have now conceded that an English marriage may be dissolved by
the tribunals of any country where the parties are domiciled at
the time of their divorce (^), it follows that a Scotch divorce will
bo held valid in England if the parties to the marriage are at the
time of the divorce domiciled in Scotland, and unless they are so
domiciled will in general not be held valid" (u).
An interesting case regarding the effect to be attributed to the Case of the
second marriage of a woman in Germany, who had been previously Bibesco.

married in France, where divorce was not then permitted, occurred
(p) Wilson V. Wilson (1872), L. E. Cas. 43, 56.

2 P. & D. 442. (r) Shmvv. Gould (186S), L. E. 3
{q) Shaw V. Gould (1868), L. E. 3 H. L. at p. 88.

H. L. 96. See also Brodie v. Brodie (s) Pitt v. Pitt (1864), 4 Macq. 627;
(1861), 2 Sw. & Tr. 259; Shaw v. Jack w. Jack {U%2), 14: !>. Am \ Ringer
Att.-Gen. (1870), L. E. 2 P. & D. v. Churchill (1840), 2 D. 302.
156; Briggs v. Briggs (1880), 5 P. D. (0 âter v. Bater, (1906) P. 209
163; Harvey v. Farnie (1880), 5 P. D. (C. A.).
153, 157; 6 P. D. 35, 50, 61; 8 App. (w) Conflict of Laws, p. 800.
in 1875. The Princess de Bauffremont was married in France to

'
a Frenchman, and in August, 1874, obtained a se|)aration de
corps' from the French Courts. In May, 1875, she was .natu-
ralized at Saxe-Altenburg, and became a subject of the German
Em23ire. She then domiciled herself near Dresden, and in October,
1875, married the Prince Bibesco, at Berlin, according to the laws
of Germany. The opinion of Prof. Holtzendorff, of Munich, was"
asked as to the effect of this second marriage, and he fully con-
siders the subject in his reply (cc). By the law of Germany,,
naturalization will not be conferred unless the applicant is capable
of contracting by the law of his own country (?/). This refers
to a general incapacity to contract, and the incapacity of a French
subject to marry after a 'separation de corps' is a special in-
capacity, a,nd one not contemplated in the German law. Henca
the naturalization of the Princess was valid in Germany. The
French code {z) provides, without any limitation, that the quality
of French subject is lost by naturalization abroad, and by the
' '
common law of Germany a separation de corps is looked upon as

equivalent to a divorce {a). Thus Prof. Holtzendorff argued that
the Princess, having rightfully ceased to be a French, and having
become a German subject, also acquired the right of marrying
again, and that the marriage was certainly valid in Germany.
Whether the marriage would be recognised in France appears
to bo an open question, but there is some authority for supposing
that it would {h).
Scott V. And in a case where the husband and wife, both domiciled in
At f.- Gen.
Ireland, were married in that country, and there resided for about
two years, and subsequently acquired a domicile at the Cape, and
the wife was divorced from her husband by a sentence of the
proper Court at the Cape, and later came to England with the
intention of remaining here, and contracted a marriage here; it
was held by the English Court that this s-econd marriage was valid,
although the law prevailing in the colony prohibited the re-mar-
riage of a guilty party as long as the innocent party remained
unmarried (as the facts were) For, it was said, the wife having
.
become by the foreign divorce an unmarried person, she was free

to acquire, and had acquired, a new domicile, by which her capacity
to re-marry was to be regulated {c) .
(x) See Revue de Droit Inter- vorce, § 11, p. 350. Story, § 214.
national, 1876, p. 205. (c) Scott v. Att.-Gen. (1886), 11
(y) Law of 1st June, 1870. P. D. 128; and see Warier v. Warier
(z) Code CivU, Art. 17. (1890), 15 P. D. 152; Story, p. 117,
(a) Schulte, Handbuch des Katho- note (a); Moore v. Hegeman, 92
lishchen Eherechts (ed. 1855), p. 596. N. Y. 521; Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y.
(J) Merlin, Questions de Droit, Di- 602.
241
CHAPTER III.
NATIONAL CHARACTER AND DOMICILE.
Questions relating to national character and domicile are of Distinctions
such importance in private international law, and have so fre- national
quently arisen since Wheaton published the last additions to his (^haracter^
1 c 1 p 1 1 1 domicile, and
text, that some account oi the present state oi the law on these allegiance.
points seems necessary. The question of domicile as it affects

the property of merchants during war is considered in a subsequent
part of this work (a). It has been distinguished from domicile
jure gentium during peace (6).

It is necessary at the outset to distinguish clearly what is meant
by the terms national character and domicile. The distinction

was explained by Lord Westbury in the House of Lords as fol-
lows: —
"
The law of England, and of almost all civilized countries,
ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or
conditions; one, by virtue of which he becomes the subject of some

particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance, N
and which may be called his political status; another, by virtue of
Avhich he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some
particular country, and as such is possessed of certain municipal

rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is
the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite
different from his political status. The political status may depend
on different laws in different countries; whereas the civil status is
governed universally by one single principle, namely, that of
domicile, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose
of determining civil status (c). For it is on this basis that the
personal rights of the party, that is to say, the law which deter-
mines his majority or minority, his marriage succession, testacy

or intestacy must depend" (d). The political status of the in-
dividual is called his national character, his civil status is referred
to by the term domicile. Domicile and residence are two distinct
(a) See post, pp. 443 seq. of Laws (1908), Appendix, Note 7,
(b) Per Dr. Lushington in Hodgson pp. 740 seq., on commercial domicile
V. Be Beauchesne (1858), 12 Moo. in time of war.
P. O, 313. The two are very dif- (c) It is the criterion in English
ferent; the distinction between them and American law, and in that of
has been demonstrated, and they have many other countries, but not in all.
been accurately and carefully con- {d) TJdny v. TJdny (1869), L. K.
trasted by Professor Dicey, Conflict 1 Sc. & Div. 457.
W. 16
242 NATIONAL CHARACTER AND DOMICILE.
things. Kesidence is a matter of fact, although it is difficult to

define what amounts to it (e), but domicile is an idea of law. It
is a relation which the law creates between an individual and a
particular country in which the individual is said to have his

domicile (/). National character is also an idea of law, but it is
quite distinct from domicile. A
person may be invested with the
national character of one country and be domiciled in another (g).
Allegiance is a term synonynious with national character. By

it is understood the obligations of fidelity and obedience, which an
individual owes to the State whose national character he bears {h).
Definitions of remarkable that no definition of domicile has as yet been

It is
"
omicie.
universally accepted (^). It has been said to be A residence at a
particular place accompanied with positive or presumptive proof
"
of an intention to remain there for an unlimited time (k). This
explains what constitutes a domicile, perhaps better than it can
otherwise be expressed, but is not strictly a definition. The actual
fact of residence makes it probable the party is domiciled there,
but on the other hand a person may be domiciled in a country he
seldom visits. In its ordinary acceptation a person's domicile
means the country where he lives and has his home (Z), and if
he has been married and has not been separated from his wife,
the country of his domicile will probably be the one where his
wife lives —that
where his chief establishment for the purposes
is,
of habitation is. But the presumption thus created may be re-

pelled by evidence that it was not the person's intention to remain
there for an indefinite time (m). Two ingredients are essential to
domicile. There must be the fact that an abode which can in some
shape or other be considered a home exists in the country, and

there must be the intention that this abode shall not cease to be the
home within any definite period. The domicile of a wife during
(e) Walcot
V. Botfield (1854), Kay, his text (p. 82) runs as follows: "The
.534; Foxwell (1876), 3 Ch. D.
King v. domicile of any person is, in general,
520; Briggs v. Briggs (1880), L. R. the place or country which is in fact
5 P. D. 163. I his permanent home, but is in some
(/) Bell V. Kennedy (1868), L. R. cases the place or country wJiich,
1 Sc. & Div. 307; Abd-ul-Messih v. whether it be in fact his home or not,
Farra (1887), 13 App. Cas. 431, 439. is determined to be his home as a
(5-) Per Lord Chancellor Hatherley rule of law." Of. Foote, p. 48.
in TJdny v. TJdny (1869), L. R. 1 Sc. (k) Guyer v.
Daniel, 1 Binney, 349,
6 Div. 452; Re Grove (1887), 40 note; Mitchell v. U. S., 21 WaHace,
Ch. D. 216. Cf. Foote, Priv. Int. 352.
Jurisp. (1914), pp. 21, 62. (0 Story, Conflict of Laws, § 41;
(h) Foote, ibid, and see Oraignish v. Reimtt, (1892)
(0 Maltass v. Maltass (1844), 1 3 Ch. 180.
Robertson, 74. Dicey, Conflict o£ Laws (m) Forbes v. Forbes (1854), Kay,
(1908), Appendix, Note 6, pp. 731— 364; Aitchison v. Dixon (1870), L. R.
740, criticises the various definitions 10 Eq. 589; D'Etchegoyen v. D'FAche-
of domicile. The one he adopts in goyen (1888), 13 P. D. 132.
NATIONAL CHARACTER AND DOMICILE. 243
coverture is that of her husband (n) and the

fact that the hus-
;
band and wife live

apart by agreement, without being judicially
separated, does not enable the wife to acquire a separate domicile.
It is an open question whether, even after a judicial separation, a
wife can acquire a domicile different from that of her husband (o).
It is a settled principle that no man shall be without a domicile, Domicile of
and to secure this result the law attributes to every individual as origin and of
clioicG
soon as he is born the domicile of his father, if the child be legiti-
mate, and the domicile of the mother if the child be illegitimate or
posthumous {p). This has been called the domicile of origin, and
is involuntary. The mother of fatherless infants has a power of
changing their domicile vested in her for their welfare (g) Other .
domiciles, including domicile by operation of law, as on marriage,

are domiciles of choice. For as soon as an individual is stii juris ^
it iscompetent to him to elect and assume another domicile, the
continuance of which depends upon his act and will. When another
put on, the domicile of origin is for that purpose relin-
-domicile is
quished, and remains in abeyance during the continuance of the

domicile of choice; but as the domicile of origin is the creature of
law, and independent of the will of the party, it would be incon-
sistent with the principles on which by law created and
it is
ascribed, to suppose that it is capable of being by the act of the

party entirely obliterated and extinguished. It revives and exists
whenever there is no other domicile, and it does not require to be
regained or reconstituted animo et facto, in the manner which is
necessary for the acquisition of a domicile of choice .
Domicile of choice is a conclusion or inference which the law Domicile of
derives from the fact of a man

fixing voluntarily his sole or chief
residence in a particular place, with an intention of continuing to
(«) Story, § 46; Firebrace v. Fire- her original domicile where the mar-
brace (1878), 47 L. J. P. D. & M. 41; riage was celebrated and its validity
Harvey v. Farnie (1880), 8 App. das. recognised may be deemed to have a
43, 50, 51. domicile in her own country for the
(o) Dolphin v. Robins (1859), 7 purpose of supporting a petition. Of.
H. of L. 390, per Lord Kingsdown at Stathatos v. StatJmtos, (1913) P. 46;
p. 420. Le Sueurv. Le Sueur
(1876), Be MonUiigu v. De Montaigu, (1913)
1 P. D. 139, is apparently in contra- P. 154.
diction to this, but Sir R. Phillimore (^) As to an illegitimate child, see
was there careful to say that the peti- Urquhart v. Butterfield (1887), 37
'^
tioner's bond fide domicile, so far Oh. D. 357 (C. A.); as to a posthu-
as the law allows it, ia in this country." mous child, see Van Matre v. Sanhey
It is to be noted that in Ogden v. (1893), 39 Amer. State Rep. 196. But
Ogden, (1908) P. 46, C. A. at p. 82, if the paternity of the illegitimate
It was suggested that if the country child is determined, by acknowledg-
of the husband's domicile refuses to ment or otherwise, it acquires the
recognise the validity of a marriago, domicile of the father; see i?« JFn<7/^#'.s
and consequently declines to hear a Trusts (1856), 2 K. & J. 595.
divorce petition against him, a wife (7) In re Beaumont, (1893) 3 Oh.
who has been left in the country of 490.
16(2)
reside there for an unlimited time. This is a description of the

circumstances which create or constitute a domicile, not a definition
of the term. There must be a residence freely chosen and not
prescribed or dictated by any external necessity, such as the duties
of office, the demands of creditors, or the relief from illness; and it
must bo residence fixed, not for a limited period or particular
purpose, but general and indefinite in its future contemplation It .
is true that residence originally temporary, or intended for a limited
period, may afterwards become general and unlimited, and in such

a case, so soon as the change of purpose or animiis manendi can
be inferred, the fact of domicile is established.
The domicile of origin may be extinguished by act of law, as,
for example, by sentence of death or exile for life, which puts an
end to the status civilis of the criminal; but it cannot be destroyed
by the will or act of the party.
Domicile of choice, as it is gained animo et facto, so it may be
put an end to in the same manner. When put an end to the
domicile of origin revives and continues until the individual
acquires another domicile of choice. Suppose a natural born
Englishman to settle in Holland and acquire a Dutch domicile.
After a time he quits Holland and travels in France or Italy
without settling anywhere. As soon as he quits Holland, his
English domicile of origin revives, and continues till he acquires
another domicile of choice (r) .
Change of What is a 'man's domicile is a question of fact; the consequences

domicile.
of being invested with it, when ascertained, are a question of law.
The intention of a person to acquire a domicile of choice must be
collected from various indicia incapable of precise definition (s).
When a domicile has been acquired it is presumed to continue
until it is shown to be renounced, and when a change is alleged,
the burden of proof rests upon the party making the allegation (t) .
Mere length of residence in a foreign country will not of itself

confer a new domicile, but it raises a presumption that it was the
intention of the party to acquire such domicile (u). This pre-
sumption may be rebutted by evidence showing that there was not
See judgment of Lord Weafcbury

(r) 353; and see In re de Almida, W. N.
in Udny v. Udny (1869), L. R. 1 (1901) 142. Of. Foote, pp. 55 seq.,
Sc. & Div. 457 —
9; Lauderdale Peer- 60 seq.
age Case (1885), 10 App. Cas. 692; (t) Desmare v. U. 8., 3 Otto, 605;
Bradford v. Young (1884), 29 Oh. D. Groohenden Fuller (1859), 1 Sw. &
v.
617, 623; IRe Marrett (1887), 36 Ch. D. Tr. 442; Mitchell v. V. S., 21 Wallace,
400; Be Cooke's Trusts (1887), 56 350.
L. J. Oh. 637; Urguhart v. Butter- (u) Brunei v. Brunei (1871), L. R.
field (1887), 37 Oh. D. 357, 381. 12 Eq. 300.
(*) Forbes v. Forbes (1854), Kay,
eucli an intention. It may also be presumed that a person is less

likely to relinquish a domicile of origin than a domicile of choice ;
greater proof of intention is required in the former than in the

latter case (x) This is so especially when the party is connected
.
with the country of his domicile of origin by some specific ties,

such as being a peer of the realm, or serving in some public
capacity, such as the army or civil service (|/) .
To change his domicile of person a must choose a new

domicile—the word " choose " origin
indicates that the act voluntary is
on his part— he must choose a new domicile by fixing his sole or

principal residence in a new country with the intention of residing
there for a period not limited as to time (z) To change a domicile
.
of choice it need only be relinquished, without any new domicile of

choice being necessarily chosen.
The intention required for a change of domicile, as distinguished intention to
from the action embodying it, is not necessarily an intention to ^^*^^?

change a civil status; an intention to cease to be subject
that is,
to the laws of one country, and to place oneself under the laws of
another. It is sufficient to work the change, if there be an inten-
tion to settle in a new country as a permanent home. If this
intention exists, and is sufficiently carried into effect by acts,
certain legal consequences follow, whether such consequences were
intended or not, and perhaps even though the person in question
may have intended the exact contrary. To prove such intention
(in the absence of any express declaration), the evidence must
lead to the inference that if the question had been formally sub-
mitted to the person whose domicile was in question, he would have
expressed his wish in favour of a change (a) .
There a strong presumption against an American or European Residence in

is
. .... . ..
acquiring a domicile in a country with political, social, and.
religious institutions in radical conflict with Western ideas. And
extemtonal
community.
.
as domicile is the relation which the law creates between an in-

dividual and a particular locality, residence in a foreign State as
a privileged member of an exterritorial community, although it
Bell V. Kennedy (1868), L. R.

(jc) (y) Hamilton v. Dallas (1875), 1
1 So. &
Div. 307; Shaw v. Shaw, 98 Ch. D. 257; Hodgson v. De Beau-
Maasaclmsetts, 158; Whicker v. Hume chesne (1858), 12 Moo. P. C. 285;
(1858), 7 H. of L. Cas. 124; Lauder- Sharpe v. Crispin (1869), L. R. 1
dale Peerage (1885), 10 App. C^. P. & M. 611; Niboyet v. Niboyet
692; Re Marrett (1887), 36 Ch. D. (1878), 3 P. D. 52.
400; Briggs v. Briggs (1880), 5 P. D. {z) King v. Foxwell (1876), 3
163; Conchav, Concha,(\mT) II k^^. Ch. D. 520.
Cas. 541, 563; Ex parte Cunningham (a) Douglas y. Douglas (1871), Li.'R-
(1884), 13 Q. B. D. 418; JEx parte 12 Eq. 644—5; Haldane v. Eckford
Barne (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 522. (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. 631.
Wharton, Conflict of Laws, ^ 55.
246 NATIONAL CHAEACTEK AND DOMICILE.
might be a residential domicile acquired else-

effectual to destroy
where, by English law to create a new domicile of

is ineffectual
choice, even though such residence be of a person enjoying, or

among a community enjoying, the de faoto protection of the
Crown (6).
According to the French code the domicile of every Frenchman
" "
est le lieu ou il a son principal etablissement (c).
Acquisition of Domicile depends almost entirely upon the will of the indi-
domicile and
national
vidual. He is invested with a domicile of origin at his birth, and
character. this is involuntary, but he may by his own act change this and
cause it to be inoperative while the new domicile subsists, by locat-
ing himself in any country he pleases with the intention of settling

there. National character, on the other hand, depends upon the
will of the State. To divest himself of the national character he
acquired at the time of his birth, an individual must in many cases
obtain the consent of his own Government, and to acquire a new
national character the consent of the country of his adoption is
always necessary (d) .
Incidents of National character confers benefits, and imposes duties on the

national
character.
individual. It entitles him to the protection of his country
wherever he may be, but it requires him to fulfil the duties of
supporting the State, or defending it against its enemies. The
extent to which States will protect their subjects, or claim their
allegiance when abroad, depends entirely upon the discretion and

municipal laws of each. A Government can always refuse to
protect one of its subjects, if it considers that his conduct has

shown an intention of renouncing all ties and fulfilling no duties
towards his country. It may, also, in case he comes within its
jurisdiction, force him to fulfil any obligations incurred before he
quitted it. If he has acquired another national character, without
his native State renouncing its authority over him, the claims of
each State to him can only be determined by treaty, if any exist, or
by diplomatic action between the Governments concerned (e).

Permanent The fact of establishing a permanent residence in a foreign
residence in
foreign
country, without being naturalized in it, places a person in a
countries. different position towards his native country from that he occupies
(b) Be Tootal's Trusts (1883), 23 (e) This subject is fully considered

Ch. D. 532; Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra in the Report of the Naturalization
(1887), 13 App. Cas. 431; Ahdallah v. Commission, 1869, and Sir A. Cock-
Richards (1888), 4 T. L. R. 622. burn on Nationality. The Report is,
(c) Code Civil, Art. 102.
to a great extent, reprinted in the
Id) Westlake, Priv. Int. Law (1912), U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence,
pp. 377 seq. Dicey (1908), pp. 166 1873. Appendix, Wharton, Digest,
aeq. Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbour §§ 181, 182.
(1830), 3 Peters, 125.
NATIONAL CPIARACTEll AND DOMICILE. 247
while only quitting it as a traveller. He does not thereby lose the

right to its protection, but it renders the invocation of it less
reasonable. He cannot claim to be exempt from taxes and other
burdens not imposed on a simple stranger, and he has no ground
of complaint if its municipal laws invest him with both the benefits
and disabilities of a native (/) If the country is invaded, and his
.
23roperty is injured or destroyed by some act of war, he has no

claim to any special protection from his native country so long
as his j)osition is no worse than that of the other inhabitants.
Numerous applications were made to England to protect the pro-
perty of British subjects resident in France from the requisitions
of the Franco-German war of 1870-71, but Lord Granville replied,
that such British subjects must bear the same burdens as the other
inhabitants (^).
Down to the year 1870, England invariably denied the right of Expatriation
her subjects to expatriate themselves; the maxim was nemo potest ^ *
Encland^
exuere patriam.' She placed no restrictions whatever on ©migra-
tion, but maintained that her subjects carried their national
character withthem Avhercver they went, and were always liable to
bo treated as subjects on their return (/^). This claim has now
been abandoned. It is expressly provided by Act of Parliament,
that "Any British subject who has at any time before, or may at
any time after the passing of this Act, when in any foreign State
and not under any disability, voluntarily become naturalized in
such State, shall from and after the time of his so having become
naturalized in that foreign State, be deemed to have ceased to be
a British subject and be regarded as an alien." It is also pro-?
vided that if naturalized abroad before the
passing of the Act, he
yet wishes to remain a British subject, he shall make a declaration
to that effect, and take the oath of allegiance, and ho will then be
deemed to have been continually a British subject, except in the
State where he was naturalized, as long as he remains a subject
of it (i). Natural born British subjects include not only persons Who are
born in British dominions, but also the children and grand-children ^^™
g^dS^
of British subjects, born out of the ligeance of his Majesty, unless subjects,
the father was at the time of the child's birth outlawed or attainted
for treason. Such persons are, therefore, entitled to claim British
(/) Phillimore, voL ii.

p. 6. 33 & 34 Vict. c. 14, s. 6. This Act
(g) Annual Register, 1871 ;
Pub. must now be read subject to the
Docts. p. 259. British Nationality and Status of
(/() As to the impressment of sea- Aliens Act, 1914 (which came into
men, see ante, p. 174. force Jan. 1, 1915).
(0 The Naturalization Act, 1870,
protection unless they have been naturalized in some other country,

or unlesii they have ceased to be British subjects by reason of that
part of his Majesty's once dominions in which they continue resi-

dent ceasing to belong to the Crown of England by division of
succession, as Hanover in 183,7, or by reason of the operation of
concluded between his Majesty and some foreign State,
3inj treaty
orthrough the operation of any cession of any part of his Majesty's
dominions and the provisions made in that behalf (k) But if .
they were born abroad and have thereby beconie the subjects of
some other State, it seems that England will not protect them
against that State (I).
Law of the The question of expatriation is one of vital importance in the

United
United States. It was estimated in 1868 that upwards of six
States as to
expatriation .
million persons had emigrated to that country since 1790, and that
they and their descendants numbered more than twenty mil-

lions(m) The position of the Government was, therefore, most
.
anomalous if that number of its subjects were to owe allegiance

to foreign States, and it is remarkable that under such circum-
stances the law should have so long continued doubtful. The
Executive Government had always claimed an unlimited right of
expatriation for the subjects of all other countries, but when the
question presented itself in the Supreme Court, not one of the
judges affirmed, while several denied, the right for its own citi-
zens (?^). To remedy this an Act of Congress was passed in 1868,
"
which provides that Any declaration, instruction, order, or
decision of any officer of the United States, which denies, restricts,
impairs, or questions the right of expatriation is declared incon-

"
sistent with the fundamental principles of the Republic (o) This .
Act is, however, only declaratory, and no provision is made in it
respecting what is to be considered an act of expatriation. It

furnishes no rule for the Executive to determine whether person
a
is still an American citizen or not, although it subsequently
"
declares that All naturalized citizens of the United States, while
in foreign countries, are entitled to, and shall receive from, the
(Jc)7 Anne, c. 5, s. 3; 4 Geo. II. (n) Opinions of Attorneys-General,

c. 21, 8. 1; 13 Geo. III. c. 21, s. 1. vol. viii. p. 139. Kent, Oomm. vol. ii.
Isaacson v. Durant (1886), 17 Q. B. D. p. 49. Inglls v. Sailors' Snug Har-

54; De G&er v. Stone (1882), 22 Gh. D. bour (1830), 3 Peters, 125. Of. Moore,
243; Re Willoughbij (1885), 30 Oh. D. Digest, vol. iii. § 532; and see ibid.
324. Of. Foote, pp. 9 seq. § 431, for the earlier American
(I) Lord Russell to Sir J. Orampton, authorities.
9tli July, 1862. Naturalization Comm. (o) Act of July, 1868, c. 249, s. 1.
Rep. p. 74. U. S. Revised

Statutes, tit. xxv.
(w) Report of U. S. Committee on Citizenship, sec. 1999.
Foreign Affairs, 1868.
NATIONAL CHARACTER AND DOMICILE. • 249
Government the same protection of persons and property which

is accorded to native-born citizens" {p).
Two laws exist for determining who is a citizen. The Act of who are
Congress of the 10th of February, 1855, provides that "persons UnSstateT

heretofore born, and hereafter to be born, out of the limits and
jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were, or shall be
at the time of their birth, citizens of the United States, shall be
deemed and considered, and are hereby declared to be citizens of
the United States: Provided, however, that the rights of citizen-
ship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided in
the United States" (g). The Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution declares "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
"
of the United States (r).
The law thus states distinctly who are citizens, but the right of United
expatriation being admitted, it becomes a matter of difficulty to citizens

determine when individuals cease to be citizens, or at all events abroad,
when they cease to be entitled to the protection of the United

States.
" "
The American citizen," said Chief Justice Marshall, who
goes into a foreign country, although he owes local and temporary
allegiance to that country, yet, if he performs no other act chang-
ing his position, is entitled to the protection of our Government;
and if without the violation of any municipal law, he should be
oppressed unjustly, he would have a right to claim that protec-
tion, and the interposition of the American Govicrnment in his
favour would be considered a justifiable interposition. But his
situation is completely changed, where, by his own act, he has
made himself the subject of a foreign Power. Although this act
may not be sufficient to rescue him from punishment for any
crime committed against the United States, a point not intended
to be decided, yet it certainly places him out of the protection of
the United States while within the territory of the sovereign to
whom he has sworn allegiance" (s).
In 1873, Mr. Fish, the Secretary of State, issued instructions to
the American Minister in France, in which, after quoting the
above dictum of Chief Justice Marshall, he thus explains the
(p) Ibid. s. 2; sec. 2000. As to (Washington, 1907). See w/^^. P- 252.

naturalization in the United States, (§') U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. x.
Congress has passed several Acts, be- p. ©04.
ginning with that of 1790. The present (r) Eatified, 20th June, 1808. U. S.
law was laid down in 1906; Statutes Statutes at Large, vol. xv. p. 706.
at Large, vol. xxxiv. p. 596. Of. (s) (The OJmrming Betsey) Murray
F. Van Dyne, Treatise on the Law of v. The Oharming Betsey (1804), 2
Naturalization of the United States Oranch, 119.
250 NATIONAL CHAEACTER AND DOMICILE.
principles upon which the American Government now acts in

"
protecting its subjectsabroad. If on the one hand the Govern-
ment assumes the duty of protecting" his rights and privileges, on
the other hand the citizen is supposed to be ever ready to place his
fortune and even his life at its service, should the public neces-
sities demand such a sacrifice. If, instead of doing this, he
permanently withdraws his person from the national jurisdiction;

if he places: his property where it cannot be made to contribute to
the national necessities; if his children are born and reared upon a
foreign soil, with no purpose of returning to submit to the juris-

diction of the United States, then, in accordance with the principles
laid down by Chief Justice Marshall, and recognised in the 14th
Amendment, and in the Act of 1868, he has so far expatriated

himself as to relieve this Government from the obligation of inter-
ference for his protection.
"
Each case as it arises must be decided oq its own merits. In
each the main fact to be determined will be this, has there been—
such a practical expatriation as removes the individual from the
jurisdiction of the United States?
"
If there has not been, the applicant will be entitled to pro-
"
tection (t).
What Although the American Government may refuse to protect any
amounts to
expatriation
individual citizen who abroad without an apparent intention of
is
an
-of
American returning, it does not follow that such a person is necessarily ex-,
citizen. patriated. If he is naturalized abroad this will amount to an act
of expatriation, and the same effect may be attributed to the
acceptance; of public or military employment in a foreign State

without naturalization. Naturalization is without doubt the
highest, but not the only evidence of expatriation {u) But the .
mere fact of residence abroad without an intention of returning

does not of itself amount to an act of expatriation {x) .
Not until 1907 did the United States Government definitely

lay down by an Act the conditions under which an American
citizen shall be held to have expatriated himself. Thus the law
"
of 1907 says: (1) That any American citizen shall be deemed
to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any
foreign State in conformity with its laws, or when he has taken

an oath of allegiance to any foreign State. (2) When any natura-
lized citizen shall have resided for two years in the foreign State^
(t) Mr. Fish to Mr. Washburne, vol. xiv. p. 2%.

28th June, 1873. U. S. Dipl. Cor. (a;)Ibid. vol. ix. p. 359. But see
1873, p. 259. See also ibid., 1875, next paragraph as to the residence
p. 489 and p. 563. abroad of naturalized citizens of the
(w) Opinions of Att.-Gen. (U. S.), United States.
from which he came, or for five years in anj other foreign State,
it shall be
presumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen,
and the place of his general abode shall be deenied his place of
residence during the said years. Provided, however, that such
piresumption may be overcome on the presentation of satisfactory,
evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the tliiited States,
u,nder such rules and regulations as the Department of the State
may prescribe; and provided, also, that no American citizen shall

be allowed to expatriate himself when his country is at war."
The Act thus prescribes four means of effecting expatriation, viz.,
by naturalization in a foreign State, by taking the oath of allegi-
ance to a foreign Stat«, by residence of a naturalized citizen of the
United States in a foreign country, by the marriage of an Ameri-
can woman to a foreigner. In addition to these four modes, a
may be mentioned, viz., desertion from the army or navy (y).
fifth
At one time few States allowed their respective citizens to Expatriation
expatriate tliemselves; now nearly all them to do

countries allow' g^^^tes
so, but the permission is discretionary and does not proceed from
any obligatory rule of international law. The Argentine Republic

appears to be a conspicuous exception, in that it does not allow its
citizens to put off their nationality. In the case of Eussia and
Turkey, before expatriation can be duly effected the permission of
the authorities must be obtained.
A Frenchman may, by the law of France, divest himself of his
nationality in several ways, amongst which are the following:

—
by naturalization abroad; by accepting a public office under a
foreign Government without permission of his own Government;
by accepting military service under a foreign Government without
the authorization of his own Government, but here he remains
subject to penalties to which he may be liable by French law.

(Emigration Avith a view to evading military service will also
subject the emigrant to penalties if he returns to France within a
certain period.)
German nationality may be lost: —by express deprivation for
not performing military service; by residing abroad and failing to
return when notified in time of war; by ten years' uninterrupted
residence abroad without registering at a German consulate; by
entering the service of a foreign State and not renouncing it on

demand of the home Government.
In Austria citizens who emigrate with permission are deemed
to be foreigners; those who do so without leave lose their Austrian
(y) Cf. Van Dyne, Treat, on the Law of Naturalization, chap. 5; Moore,
Digest, vol. iii. §§ 466 seq.
^262 NATIONAL CHAEACTER AND DOMICILE.
citizenship, but their rights as naturalized aliens appear to be

disregarded.
A Hungarian loses his nationality by release from his ullegi-
ance, or by unauthorized continuous absence for ten years.
Italian citizenship is lost by renouncing it and emigrating, by
naturalization in a foreign country without permission, and by
entering foreign military service.

Spanish nationality is lost by naturalization with leave of the
Spanish Government; naturalization without leave will not neces-
sarily relieve a Spaniard of obligations to Spain. (In the
majority of countries naturalization abroad liberates the emigrant
from obligations towards his mother country (z).)
American Certificates of naturalization are issued in America when the

BAturaHzr-^* requirements for becoming a citizen have been complied with.
tion. No provision was made, however, for a uniform system of regis-
tration of such certificates, and as there are about 3,000 Federal
and State courts that had power to grant them, great difficulties
sometimes arose in proving naturalization, which is, in the United
States, a judicial act. But when a certificate, valid on the face
of it, and founded on the decree of a compietent court, was pro-
duced, it could not be questioned exoept through judicial proceed-
ings instituted for the purpose {a) .
—
By the Act of 1906 it was provided as follows: (1) An alien
"
desiring to be naturalized in the United States shall declare on
oath before the clerk of any court authorized by this Act to natura-
lize aliens, or hisauthorized deputy, in the district in which such
alien resides, two years at least prior to his admission, and after
he has reached the age of eighteen years, that it is his band fide
intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce
for ever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
State, or sovereignty, and particularly, by name, to the prince,
potentate, State, or sovereignty, of which the alien may at the
time be citizen or subject." (2) After the lapse of two years, but
not more than seven years, from the diate of this declaration, he
must file a petition attested by the affidavits of at least two credible
"
witnesses, being citizens of the United States, stating that he is
not a disbeliever in or opposed to organized government or a
member of or affiliated with any organization or body of persons
teaching disbelief in or opposed to organized government, a
(a) Of. Hall, Foreign Jurisdiction, seq.

§ 23; Moore, Digest, vol. iii. §§ 441 (a) See case of the Kastellans.
seq.; Hall, Int. Law (1909), pp. 227 U. S. Dipl. Cor. 1875, p. 577.
NATIONAL CHARACTER AND DOMICILE. 25^
polygamist. or believer in the practice of polygani,y, and . . .
that it is his intention to reside permanently in the United

States. ..." (3) Further, he must "declare in open court that
he will support the Constitution of the United States"; prove
"
that he has resided continuously within the United States five
years at least, and within the State or territory where such court
is at the time held one year at least, and that during that time he
has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the
principles of the Constitution of the United States ."; and, . .
finally, that he renounces any hereditary title or order of nobility

which he may have held in the country of his origin. Another
section lays down that if a naturalized alien returns to his native
countrj' or takes up permanent residence in a foreign country

within years after his certificate of citizenship was issued, it
five
will bo deemed prima facie evidence that he did not originally

intend to become a permanent citizen of the United States, and so,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, will operate to cancel
his certificate.
Only "white persons" and "persons of African descent" are

capable of naturalization in the United States Chinese, Japanese,
;
•Burmese, Hawaiians, and American Indians are excluded (6).

Alien women, married or unmarried, may be naturalized on
the same conditions as men. The naturalization of the husband
" "
confers citizenship also on the wife, if she is a white person or
"of African descent"; the naturalization of the father extends
"
the same privileges to his minor children dwelling in the United
States." Before 1907 the status of an Amêrican woman married
'
toan alien was not clearly determined. Now, by sect. 3 of the

Act of 1907, "any American woman who marries a foreigner
shall take the nationality of her husband. At the termination of
the marital relation she may resume her American citizenship,
if abroad, by registering as an American citizen within one year
with a consul of the United States, or by returning to reside in

the United States, or if residing in the United States at the
termination of the marital relation, by continuing to reside
therein." As to an alien woman becoming naturalized by
"
maniage, sect. 4 says that any foreign woman who acquires
American citizenship, by marriage to an American, shall be
assumed to retain the same after the termination of the marital
relation if she continue to reside in the United States, unless she
makes formal renunciation thereof before a court having juris-
diction to naturalize aliens, or if she resides abroad she may
(6) Cf. Moore, Digest, voL iii. § 383.
retain her citizenship by registering as such before a United States

consul within one year after the teiTuination of such marital
relation."
Naturaliza- Such is the present state of the law in England and America (c) .
tion Treaty
between
England and
America. jo
The probability of future disputies between the two countries on
the subiect of alleo:iance was reduced to a minimum, by j a conven-
tion concluded between them on the 13th May, 1870, by which it

^
was agreed that citizens of either country naturalized us citizens

or subjects of the other, were to be treated in all respects as citizens
or subjects of such country. This naturalization might, however,
be renounced, and the former nationality of the individual resumed
on compliance with certain f ormalities (cl) Treaties more or
.
less similar exist between the United States and most other civi-
lized countries (e).
Former The claims of both England and America, before the laws of
between^ ^^ch assumed their present shape, either to protect their subjects
England and or to require their services when abroad, have caused endless
the allegiance disoussions. In 1848 and 1866, Irish agitators resorted to the
subjects
United States for the purpose of organizing plots against the
British Government. The Habeas Corpus Act was suspended on
both occasions, and several persons w'ere arrested in Ireland on
suspicion of having been concerned in treasonable acts either in the
United States or in Ireland. Of the right of England to punish
her subjects for treason, wherever comtaitted, there could be no
doubt; nor could the right to punish native-born Americans for
acts against the Government committed in the British Isles be
disputed (/) . The cases which presented any difficulty were those
of native-born British subjects who had been naturalized in
America, and had only conspired there without committing overt
acts in Great Britain. At that time the doctrine of perpetual
allegiance was strongly insisted on in England. The maxim
' '
nemo potest exuere patriam was considered a fundamental one

in English law. The United States maintainjed that their natura-
lized citizens were to all intents and purposes as much entitled to
(c) In 1873 the President addressed (d) The Naturalization Act, 1872,
a series of questions on this subject Schedule. Also U.S. Statutes at
t-o the heads of the various American Large, vol. xvi.
p. 775.
State departments. The past and the (e) See Analysis of U. S. Naturali-
then existing American law is fully zation Treaties. U. S. Dipl. Oor.
discussed in the answers. See U. S. 1873, p. 1274. Wharton, Digest, § 171,
Dipl. Cor. 1873, pp. 1150 et seg. See pp. 309, 310.
further, Wharton, Digest, §§ 171— (/) Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, 10th
200. The present law was enacted March, 1867. U. S. Dipl. Cor. 1867,
in 1906; U. S. Statutes at Large, p. 74.
vol. xxxiv. pp. 595 seq.
protection abroad as native-born Americans (^), and that such

persons could not, therefor^, be arbitrarily imprisoned under a
suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, but were entitled to a trial.
To this Lord Palmerston replied, that native-born British sub-
jects who were naturalized abroad and returned to the United
Kingdom, were as amenable law as any other subjects
to British
of her Majesty {h). In the cases of Warren and Oostello, tried
in Ireland, in 1867, the judges refused a jury demedietate linguce,
on the ground that, although the prisoners had been naturalized in
America, they had been native-born British subjects, and, being
once under the allegiance of the British sovereign, they remained
so for ever (^) . Most of the piersons arrested who could prove
their naturalization in America w^re, however, liberated at the
request of the American Government, unless treasonable acts were
proved to have been committed by them in Ireland (k) .
During the American Civil War the protection of England was British
frequentl}' demanded against conscription in the United States Amedca"^
. . ....
army. Lord Lyons was instructed that there is no rule or prin- during the
ciple of international law which prohibits thie Government of any
Civil War
country from requiring aliens resident within its territories to

serve in the militia or police of the country, or to contribute to the
support of such establishments (Z) But her Majesty's Govern-

.
ment would not consent to British subjects being compelled to

serve in the armies of either party, where, besides the ordinary
incidents of battle, they would be exposed to be treated as traitors
or rebels in a quarrel in which, as aliens, they had no concern; and
on their return to England would incur the penalties imposed on
British subjects for having taken part in the war (m). All who
could prove their British nationality were accordingly exempted
from military service (^). But if a British subject had become
naturalized in America, England refused to protect him so long
as he remained there (o). Individuals who had declared their
intention of becoming naturalized, but had not completed the
necessary formalities, were also treated as aliens, and
exempted (p); but her Majesty's Government declined to inter-
fere in their behalf if they had voted at elections, or in any other
(g) Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Bancroft, (m) To Lord Lyons, No. 349, 7th
28th Oct. 1848. Hertslet, State Papers, Oct. 1861. Pari. Papers, N. America
vol. xlvii. p. 1236. (No. 13), 1864, p. 34.
(h) 16th August, 1849. (w) Lord Lyons, No. 379, 29th July,
(i) Report of Naturalization Com- 1861.
mission, 1868, p. 49 and p. 90. (o) To Lord Lyons, No. 259, 7th
(^) Ibid. pp. 48 et seq^ June, 1862.
Q) To Lord Lyons, No. 76, April (p) Mr. Seward to Mr. Stuart, Aug.
4th, 1861. 20th, 1862.
way exercised any of the exclusive privileges of a citizen (^). In

"
1868 an Act of Congress was passed, specially including in-
"
tended citiz-ens in a further enrolment of the militia (r); and a
proclamation of the President allowed sixty-live days to such

persons to leave the country, o^r become liable to be enrolled by
remaining. To this Great Britain acquiesced, the period allowed
for departure hieing deemed sufficient (s) It was regarded as an.
established principle that a Government might, by an ex post facto

law, include in its conscription any persons permanently resident
in its territory, provided it allowed them reasonable time and
facilities for departure on the promulgation of such a law (t).
Prussian The Prussian militarj^ laws, which have now been introduced
throughout the Germaai empire (w), declare that every German
subject is liable to military service, and cannot have that service
performed by deputy (x). The right to emigrate is, however,
not restricted, except as regards the performance of military ser-
vice (•2/). Permission to emigrate may be obtained, but this
permission, when granted, destroys the quality of Prussian or
German subject (z) It is not to be granted to males between
.
the ages of seventeen and twenty-five, without a certificate from

the military commission of their district, or to actual soldiers or
officersbefore their discharge, or to persons convoked for military
service (^). If anyone does emigrate without permission, and
to avoid performing his military service, he becotmes liable to a
fine or imprisonment, nor does the infliction of the penalty relieve
him from performing the military duties (6).
Numerous cases have occurred of Prussians evading these duties
by going abroad, and then returning to Prussia and claiming t0i

be under the protection of some foreign State. Johann Knocke,
a native-born Prussian, was naturalized in America, and on re-
turning to Prussia claimed exemption from military servioe. Mr.
Wheaton, then American Minister at Berlin, told him that as
long as ho was in any other country but Prussia he would be pror
"
tected, but having returned to the country of your birth, your
(5') Consular Circular from Mr. those by her Majesty's

entertained
Stuart, No. 99, 25th July, 1862. Government. Wharton, Digest, § 202.
(r) U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. xii. (w) Constitution of the Empire,
p. 731. Art. 61. Hertslet, Map of Europe,
(s) To Lord Lyons, No. 485, 31st vol. iii.
p. 1947.
Aug. 1863. (x) Art. 57.
{t) Pari. Papers, 1863, N. America (y) Prussian Constitution, 1860,
(No. 13), p. 34. To Lord Lyons, tit. i. Art. i.
No. 293, 27th Nov. 1862. As regards (z) Law

of 31st Dec. 1842, § 15.
this matter of military service there («) Ibid. § 17.
was, apparently, no difference between (b) Penal Code, April 14th, 1851.
the views of the United States and
NATIONAL CHARACTER AND DOMICII-E. 257
native domicile and national character revert (so long as you

remain in Prussian dominions), and you are bound to obey the
"
laws as if you had never emigrated (c). This rule was observed
in similar cases until 1859, when the United States endeavoured to
"
protect Hofer from the conscription. Mr. Cass asserted that the
moment a foreigner becomies naturalized, his allegiance to his
native country is severed for ever'' {d). This pretension, how-
ever, was not persisted in, nor did it meet with the approval of all
American jurists (e). And the rule now established in America
is that, if a subject of a foreign State has lef't military duty
accrued due and unperformed, he may lawfully be held to it if he
return after naturalization, but that he is not liable for subsequent
duty; for duty, that is, which was not then owing by him when
he left the foreign country (/). During the civil war, it being
found that many persons quitted the United States to escape the
conscription there, and then applied to that Government to save
them from serving in the Prussian army, Mr. Judd, American
Minister in Prussia, Avas instructed not to interfere on behalf of
such "worthless citizens" {g). On the 22nd February, 1868, a
treaty was signed between the United States and the North
German Confederation, containing terms similar to that between
the United States and England, except that residence for five years
in the country adopted is required in order to entitle the individual
to its protection (/i) . Other treaties have been at various times
concluded with separate German sovereignties. Owing to the
events of 1870 —71,
the existing treaties were, apart from other
defects, not co-extensive with the limits of the German Empire,
and their revision, on the basis of extending the North German
treaty, with some explanation, to the whole empire, was desired
by the United States Government. But the response at Berlin was
not, it would appear, altogether in accordance with American
feeling {%) .
England has acted upon similar principles respecting Prussians British

*^
v/lio have claimed exemption on the ground of being British sub- pj-ugîa^
jects. In 1862, Mr. Crossthwaite, her Majesty's Consul at

Cologne, who had naturalized himself in Prussia, was informed bj'
(o) U. S. Senate Documents, 1859— (/) Wharton, Digest, §§ 181, 182.

60, vol. ii. p. 6. See other cases, *7>ifZ. {g) U. S. Dipl. Cor. 1863, Pt. II.
pp. 9—57, p. 1364; and Naturaliza- p. 1020.
tion Comm. Kep. p. 53. {h) U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. xv.
{d) Ibid. p. 133. p. 615; and see Nat. Comm. Rep.
(e) Halleck, Int. Law (1908), vol. i. p. 149.
pp. 440 seq. (0 Wharton, Digest, §§ 178, 179.
w. 17
her Majesty's Government that his sons were liable to military

service while they remained in Prussia (/c).
Conditions of A foreigner is not permitted to naturalize himself in Germany
naturaliza-
tion in (where the privilege is granted only by the high administrative
Germany. authorities) unless (1) by the law of his former country he is
his own
permitted to change his nationality; (2) by the law of
country he is capable of contracting, or if incapable, has obtained
the consent of his parent or guardian; (3) unless his conduct has
been irreproachable; (4) unless he will be received and find an
abode at the place where he proposes to settle; (5) and unless he
will be able to live so as to support himself and family. The
privileges resulting from naturalization of the husband extend to
his wifeand to children under the parental power (/).
Naturaliza- In order to be naturalized in France an alien must, as a rule, be
tion in
France. of full age and get permission to become domiciled; after three
years' domicile he may obtain a certificate of naturalization.

Other methods French citizenship are (1) by ten
of acquiring
years' continuous residence; or (2) by marriage with a

French-
woman and one year's authorized domicile; or (3) by rendering
important service to the State and one year's authorized domicile.
The effects of naturalization apply also to infant children, who
may, however, within one year after attaining their majority,
renounce French nationality (m) .
The rules of naturalization such as o'btain in Great Britain,

the United States, Germany, France, and other countries, are not
universally adopted with the same particularity and the same
sharp distinctions. In some States, for example, the naturaliza-
tion laws impose the local nationality on those who become domi-
ciled therein or acquire landed property there, regardless of any
expressed intention on their part to renounce their former allegi-

ance {n) .
Imperfect The cases of Martin Koszta and Simon Tousig were instances
naturaliza-
tion and of Austrian subjects leaving their country, and claiming the pro-
domicile. tection of the United States, after having only declared their
Cases of
Martin Koszta intention of being naturalized in America. Koszta was a Hun-
and Simon
garian refugee of 1848-9. He went to Turkey and was
Tousio".
imprisoned there, but released on condition of leaving the country.
He then went to America and declared his intention of being
(A;) Naturalization Comm. Rep. (w) As to the methods and effects

p. 73. of naturalization in foreign countries,
(?) Nationality Law of 1st June, cf. British Parliamentary Papers,
1870. See Eevue de Droit Int. 1876, Nationality and Naturalization,
p. 206. Miscell., 1893, No. 3; 1894, No. 1;
(m) Code Civil, I. i. 8, 12. 1895, No. 1.
NATIONAL CHAEACTER AND DOMICILE. 259
naturalized. In 1853 he went to Smyrna, and obtained from the

United States Consul a travelling pass, stating he was entitled to
American protection. While there, he was seized by some persons
in the pay of Austria, who took him out in a boat and threw him
into the sea, whence he was picked up by the Hussar, an Austrian
ship of war. The American Consul demanded his release, but

this being refused, an American ship of war, the St. Louis, was
sent to takehim by force if his detention was still insisted on.
The matter was compromised by Koszta being shipped off to the
United States, while Austria reserved the right to proceed against
him if he returned to Turkey. Mr. Marcy, the Secretary of
State, in his despatch to the Austrian Government, justly affirmed
that whether Koszta was entitled to American protection or not,
Austria had no right to seize him upon Turkish soil, and in spite
of the protests of the Turkish Government (o) Simon Tousig Case of
.
on returning to Austria was arrested for offences committed before Tousig.

he had left that country. Mr. Marcy declined to interfere for
him, on the ground that "having onoe been subject to the laws
of Austria, and while under her jurisdiction violated those laws,
his withdrawal from that jurisdiction and acquiring a different
national character would not exempt him from their operation
whenever he again chose to place himself under them"(p').
Another case occurred in 1873. Francois A. Heinrich was born Case of
in Nevv York of Austrian parents, who were not naturalized in
Hemnch.
the United States, and three or four years after his birth he was
taken to Austria. On becoming of age he claimed to be exempt
from serving in the Austrian army, but the United States declined
to interfere on his behalf, as he was held to have expatriated
himseli'(5).
The law Frenchman to perform mili- Military

of France requires every
and imposes a penalty on anyone who Fra^^^^
tary service in person (r),
emigrates without having served his time in the army. The
requirements of universal service have been the guiding principle
in modifications of the law which now enforces French citizenship
on those born within the territory of the Eepublic with a greater
rigour than is to be found in the corresponding laws of any other
State. By comparatively recent legislation, every individual who Laws of 28th
June, 1889,
(o) State Papers, vol. xliv. pp. 925 p. 929. Cf. Moore, Digest, vol. iii.
—1042. Wheaton (Dana), p. 146. p. 838.
Westlake, § 54. Cf. Moore, Digest, (g) U. S. Dipl. Cor. 1873, p. 78.
vol. (r) Law of 27th July, 1872,
§§ 490, 491; Wharton, Digest,
iii. tit. i.
vol. §§ 175, 198.
ii.
§ 1.
(p) Wheaton (Lawrence), App.
17(2)
and 23rd July, hus been born inFrance of a foreigner, and who, at the time of
his majority, is domiciled in France, is a Frenchman; unless,
during the year that follows his majority, as regulated by French

law, he has declined to be French, and has proved that he has
preserved the nationality of his parents by a certificate in due
form £rom his Government, which will remain annexed to his
declaration; and unless he has also produced, if there is occasion so
to do, a certificate proving that he has complied with the call to
serve under the flag in compliance with the military laws of his
country, always excepting cases provided for in treaties (s) .
See Hall, Eoreign Jurisdiction throughout the civilized

of
(«)
—
the British Grown, pp. 56 60,
nationality
world). The latter may be supple-
Oogordan, La Nationality; and P. mented by the more recent works of
Webster, The Law of Naturalization P. E. Lehr, ,La Nationalite dans les
in the United States of America and principaux Etats du Globe (Paris,
in other Countries (Boston, 1895). 1909), and Sir F. T. Piggott, Nation-
(This latter book contains an exceed- ality, &c., 2 vols. (1907).
ingly useful synopsis of the laws of
261
CHAPTER IV.
RIGHTS OF EQUALITY.
Sovereign States, possessing legal personality as members of Legal

the society of nations, enjoy equality, before international law. ofStetes.
All such States, irrespective of their size, population, and power,
possess the same legal rights and obligations, and are therefore
expected to recognise the legal equality of each other. It was in
this sense that Vattel said that a small republic is as much a sove-
reign State as the most powerful republic '(a); and Chief Justice
"
Marshall said: Eussia and Geneva have equal rights. It results
from this equality that no one can rightfully impose a rule on
another" (&).
From the political point of view it cannot, of course, be said
that all the States of the world are equal. Thus, in Europe the
Concert of the six great Powers, and on the American continent
the United States, exercise a leadership which, in each case, is
real and possesses the greatest weight, though it is not determined
by The more important position in the councils

definite rules.
by these seven great Powers, together with!

of the Avorld, held
Japan, was emphasized by the fact that they assembled at the

remarkable Naval Conference in London, where it was attempted
to modify and consolidate a great portion of the law of naval war-

fare. (It is true that for certain reasons Spain and Holland were
invited to this Conference, but they did not attend as great
Powers.) Not long ago the European Concert might have been
regarded as occupying a position of distinct superiority with
regard to the States of the world generally; but considering recent
events, such as the extraordinary rise of Japan, the establishment
of the Chinese Republic, the holding of the Hague Conferenoes,
at the latter ofwhich forty-four States were represented and pos-
sessed equal power to vote on the resolutions submitted, it may be
it is a World Concert that has come into being.
said that
The equality of sovereign States may be modified by positive Equality of
compact, or by consent implied from constant usage, so as to ^^^^g^b
entitle one State to superiority over another in respect to certain compact and
usage.
(a) Droit des Gens, Prelim. § 18. (6) The Antelope (1825), 10
Wheaton, 66, at p. 122.
262 EIGHTS OF EQUALITY.
external objects, such as rank, titles, and other ceremonial distinc-

tions.
Royal Thus, by international practice, certain States, including the

honours.
great empires, kingdoms, and •republics, enjoy what are called
'royal honours.' These royal honours entitle the States that
possess them to precedence over all others which do not enjoy the
same rank, with the exclusive right of sending to other States
public ministers of the first rank, as ambassadors, together with

certain other distinctive titles and ceremonies .
Only in recent times has the United States exercised the right
in certain cases of conferring on her public ministers to foreign,
courts the rank of ambassadors, and of receiving at Washington
ministers of a corresponding dignity. She is now represented by
ambassadors in several States of the world, including Great
Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy.
(Similarly Great Britain sends ambassadors extraordinary and
plenipotentiary to nine Powers.) This step was not taken in the
United States without much debate, and with grave apprehensions
as to its consequence. "The Department," wrote the vSecretary
of State, January 31st, 1884, "cannot, in justice to its ministers
abroad, ask Congress to give them higher rank with their present
salaries; neither could it with propriety appeal to Congress for an
allowance commensurate with the necessary mode of life of an
ambassador." And, July 2nd, 1885, Mr. Bayard informed Mr.
Phelps that the question of sending and receiving ambassadors
"
had been frequently considered, but that the inconvenience which
in a simple social democracy might attend the reception of an
"
extraordinary foreign privileged class had hitherto been found
an insuperable bar (c).
Precedence Among the princes who enjoy this rank, the Catholic Powers
among conceded the precedence to the Pope, or sovereign pontiff; but
princes and
States enjoy- Russia, and the Protestant States of Europe considered him as
ing royal
honours. bishop of Eome only, and a sovereign prince in Italy, and such of
them as enjoy royal honours refused him the precedence. But in
1870 the temporal power of the Pope was abolished, and his
legates or nuncios are no longer public ministers \d) .
The Emperor of Germany, under the former constitution of the

empire, was entitled to precedence over all other temporal princes,
as the supposed successor of Charlemagne and of the Caesars in the
(c) Vattel, Droit des Gens, torn. i. des Gens Moderne, pt. ii. tit. i. ch. 3,
liv.ii. ch. 3, § 38. Martens, Precis du §§ 91, 92. Heffter, § 28. Wharton,
Droit des Gens Moderne de I'Europe, Digest, 2nd ed. § 88.
liv.iii. ch. 2, § 129. Kluber, Droit (d) See supra, p. 56.
EIGHTS OF EQUALITY. 263
empire of the West; but since the dissolution of the late Germanic
constitution, and the abdication of the titles and prerogatives of
its head by the
Emperor of Austria, the precedence of this
sovereign over other princes of the same rank Avas considered
questionable (e) .
The various contests between crowned heads for precedence are

matter of curious historical research as illustrative of European
manners at different periods; but the practical importance of these
discussions has been greatly diminished by the progress of civiliza-
tion, which no longer permit's the serious interests of mankind to
be sacrificed to such vain pretensions.
The commonly assigned to what were called the The great
text-writers
^®P^^1^<^«-
'great republics,' which were entitled to royal honours, a rank
inferior to crowned heads of that class; and the United Nether-
lands, Venice, and Switzerland, certainly did formerly yield the

precedence to emperors and reigning kings, though they contested
it with the electors and other inferior
princes entitled to royal
honours. But disputes of this sort have commonly been deter-
mined by the relative power of the contending parties, rather
than by any general rule derived from the form of government.
Cromwell knew how to make the dignity and equality of the
English Commonwealth respected by the crowned heads of
Europe; and in the different treaties between the French Eepublic
and other Powers, it was expressly stipulated that the same cere-
monial as to rank and etiquette should be observed between them
and France which had subsisted before the revolution (/) .
Those monarchical sovereigns who are not crowned heads, but Monarchs not
who enjoy royal honours, concede the precedence on all occasions ^^<^^®^.
to emperors and kings. sovereigns.
Monarchical sovereigns who do not enjoy royal honours yield
the precedence to those princes who are entitled to these honours.
Semi-sovereign or dependent States rank below sovereign
States {g) .
Semi-sovereign States, and those under the protection or
(e) Martens, § 132. Kliiber, § 95. Germany," though French diplomatic

This claim was always contested by language speaks of sa Majeste I'Em-
England. 24 Hen. 8, c. 12. It was as pereur d'Allemagne; the correct title
" The " The
Emperor," not Emperor is Seine Majestat der Deutsche Kaiser,
of Germany," that the Hapsburgs and that is the " German Emperor."
their predecessors claimed to occupy (/) Treaty of Campo Formio, Art.
the same position in the secular as the 23, and of Luneville, Art. 17, with
Pope in the spiritual world. The Austria. Treaties of Basle with Prussia
Empire of Austria is in no sense the and Spain. Schoell, Histoire des
successor of the Holy Eoman Empire Traites de Paix, tom. i. p. 610 (ed.
dissolved by Napoleon in 18(>6. (See Bruxelles).
Bryce, The Holy Eoman Empire.) In {g) Kluber, § 98.
there " no of
strictness is Emperor
264 RIGHTS OF EQUALITY.
suzerainty of another sovereign State, necessarily rank below that

State on which they are dependent. But where third parties are
concerned, their relative rank must be determined by other
considerations; and they may even take preoedenoe of States

completely sovereign, 'as was the case with the electors under the
former constitution of the Germanic empire, in respect to other
princes not entitled to royal honours {h).
These different points respecting the relative rank of sovereigns
and States have never been determined by any positive regulation
or international compact: they rest on usage and general acquies-
cence. An abortive attempt was made at the Congress of Vienna
to classify the different States of Europe, with a view to determine
their relative rank. At the sittings of the 10th December, 1814,
the plenijDotentiaries of the eight Powers who signed the treaty
of peace at Paris, named a committee to which this subject was
referred. At the sitting of the 9th February, 1815, the report of
the committee, which proposed to establish three classes of Powers,
relatively to the rank of their respective ministers, was discussed
by the Congress; but doubts liaving arisen respecting this classi-
fication, and especially as to the rank assigned to the great
republics, the question was indefinitely postponed, and a regula-

tion established determining merely the relative rank of the
diplomatic agents of crowned heads X^).
Usage'of the Where the rank between different States is equal or undeter-
'
altera at.'
mined, different expedients have been resorted to for the purpose of
avoiding a contest, and at the same time reserving the respective}
rights and pretensions of the parties. Among these is what is
'
called the usage of the by which the rank and places

alternat,'
of different Powers are changed from time to time, either in a
certain regular order, or one determined by lot. Thus, in drawing
up public treaties and conventions, it is the usage of certain Powers

to alternate, both in the preamble and the signatures, so that each
Power occupies, in the copy intended to be delivered to it, the first
place. The regulation of the Congress of Vienna, above referred
to, provides that in acts and treaties between those Powers which
admit the 'alternat,' the order to be observed by the different
ministers shall be determined
by lot '(k) .
Alpl
Alphabetical Another expedient which has frequently been adopted to avoid
ordei
ier.
controversies respecting the order of signatures to treaties and
(A) Heffter, Das Europaische Vol- gresses, torn. viii. pp. 98, 102, 108,
kerrecht, § 28, No. iii. 116. See infra, p. 332.
(i) Kliiber, Acten des Wiener Con- (/;) Annexe, xvii. a I'Acte du Con-
gres de Vienne, Art. 7.
'
RIGHTS OF EQUALITY. 265
other public ucts, is that of signing in the order assigned by the

French alphabet to the respectiv-e Powers represented by their
ministers (Z). This device was made use of, for example, at the
last Hague Conference, where the Powers, through their delegates,
signed the various conventions in alphabetical order, which was

also the order of the places they occupied at the Congress.
The primitive equality of nations authorizes each nation to Language
make use of its own language
in treating with others, and this aromatic
right is still, in certain degree, preserved in the practice of some intercourse.

-a
States. But general convenience early suggested the use of the

Latin language in the diplomatic intercourse between the dif-
ferent nations of Europe. Towards the end of the fifteenth
century, the preponderance of Spain contributed to the general
diffusion of the Castilian tongue as the ordinary medium of
political correspondence. This, again, was superseded by the

language of France, which, since the age of Louis XIV., has
become the almost universal diplomatic idiom of the civilized
world. Those States which still retain the use of their national
language in treaties and diplomatic correspondence, usually annex
to the papers transmitted by them a translation in the language
of the opposite party, Avherever it is understood that this comity
will be reciprocated. Such is the usage of the Germanic Powers,
of Spain, and the Italian courts. Those States which have a
common language, generally use it in their transactions with each
other. is the case between the German Empire and its
Such
different members, and between the respective members them-
selves; between the different States of Italy; and between Great
Britain and the United States of America .
All sovereign princes or States may assume whatever titles of Titles of
dignity they think fit, and may exact from their own subjects princes^rnd
these marks of honour. But their recognition by other States States.
is not a matter of strict right, especially in the case of new titles

of higher dignity, assumed by sovereigns. Thus, the royal title
of King of Prussia, which was assumed by Frederick I. in 1701,
was acknowledged by the Emperor of Germany, and subse-
first
quently by the other princes and States of Europe. It was not

acknowledged by the Pope until the reign of Frederick William II.
in 1786, and by the Teutonic knights until 1792, this once
famous military order still retaining the shadow of its antiquated
claims to the Duchy of Prussia until that period (m). So, also,
(I) Kliiber, Uebersicht der diplo-

—
Nations, vol. ii. pp. 245 248. Kliiber,
matischen Verhandlungen des Wiener Droit des Gens Moderne de I'Europe,
Congresses, § 164. pt. ii. tit. i. ch. 2, § 107, note (c),
(m) Ward, History of the Law of
266 EIGHTS OF EQUALITY.
the title of Emperor of all the E-ussias, which was taken by the
Czar, Peter the Great, in 1701, was successively acknowledged
bj Prussia, the United Netherlands, and Sweden in 1723, by
Denmark by Turkey in 1739, by the emperor and the
in 1732,
empire in 1745-6, by France in 1745, by Spain in 1750, and by

the Eepublic of Poland in 1764. In the recognition of this title
by France, a reservation of the right of precedence claimed by
that crown was insisted on, and a stipulation entered into by
'
Russia in the form of a Reversale,' that this change of title

should make no alteration in the ceremonies observed between
the two courts. On the accession of the Empress Catherine II.
in 1762, she refused to renew the stipulation in that form, but
declared that the imperial title should make no change in the
ceremonial observed between the two courts. This declaration
was answered by the court of Versailles in a counter declaration,
renewing the recognition of that title, upon the express condition,

that, if any alteration should be made by the court of St. Peters-
burg in the rules previously observed by the two courts as to
rank and precedence, the French Crown would resume its ancient
style, and cease to give the title of Imperial to that of Russia (n) .
The title of Emperor, from the historical associations with

which it is connected, was formerly; considered the most eminent
and honourable among all sovereign titles; but it was never
regarded by other crowned heads as conferring, except in the
single ease of the former Emperor of Germany, any prerogative
or precedence over those princes.
Maritime The usage of nations has established certain maritime cere-

ceremomals.
be observed, either on the ocean or those parts of the sea
i^ônials to
over which a sort of supremacy was claimed by a particular State.

Among these is the salute by striking the flag or the sails, or
by firing a certain number of guns on approaching a fleet or a ship

of war, or entering a fortified port or harbour.
Ever}^ sovereign State has the exclusive right, in virtue of its

independence and equality, to regulate the maritime ceremonial
to be observed by its own vessels towards each other, or towards
those of another nation, on the high seas, or within its own
territorial jurisdiction. It has a similar right to regulate the
ceremonial to be observed within its own exclusive jurisdiction
by the vessels of all nations, as well with respect to each other, as
towards its own fortresses and ships of war, and the reciprocal
[n] Flassan, Hiatoire de la Diplomatie Franâise, torn. vi. liv. iii. pp. 328
— 364.
RIGHTS OF EQUALITY. 267
honours to be rendered by the latter to foreign ships. Tlhese

regulations are established either by its own municipal ordinances,
or by reciprocal treaties with other maritime Pawers (o).
Where the dominion claimed by the State was contested by
foreign nations, as in the case of Great Britain in tbe Narrow Seas,
the maritime honours to be rendered by its flag were also th.©
subject of contention. The disputes on this subject have not un-
frequentl}' formed the motives or pretexts for war between the
Powers asserting these pretensions, and those by whom they were
resisted. The maritime honours required by Denmark, in con-
sequence of the supremacy claimed by that Power over the Sound
and Belts, at the entrance of the Baltic Sea, have been regulated
and modified by different treaties with other States, and especially
by the convention of the 15th of January, 1829, between Russia
and Denmark, suppressing most of the formalities required by
former treaties. This convention is to continue in force until a
general regulation shall be established among all the maritime

Powers of Europe, according to the protocol of the Congress of
Aix-la-Chapelle, signed on the 9th November, 1818, by the terms
of which it was agreed, by the ministers of the five great Powers,
Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Eussia, that the

existing regulations observed by them should be referred to the
ministerial conferences at London, and that the other maritime
Powers should be invited to communicate their views of the sub-
ject in order to form some such general regulation (/?) .
(o) Bynkershoek, De Dominio Maris, (p) J. H. W. ScJhlegel, Staatsrecht

cap. 2, 4. Martens, Precis du Droit des Konigreichs Danemark, 1 Theil,
des Gens Moderne de I'Europe, liv. iv. p. 412. Martens, Nouveau Recueil,
ch. 4, § 159. Kliiber, Droit des Gens torn. viii. p. 73. Ortolan, Diplomatie
Moderne de I'Europe, pt. ii. tit. 1, de la Mer, t. i. liv. 2, ch. 15. With
ch. 3, §§ 117—122. See U. S. Dipl. regard to the rules relating to mili-
Oor. 1872, p. 202, where the United tary and maritime ceremonial, cf. also
States complained of the Canadian flag Phillimore, vol. ii. pt. v. chap, 5;
being hoisted over the Union flag, on Calvo, Droit Int., vol. i. §§ 231 seq.;
board a United States vessel captured Halleck, Int. Law (1893), vol. i.
for violating the fishing laws. chap. 5.
268 RIGHTS OF PROPERTY.
CHAPTEE V.
RIGHTS OF PROPERTY.
National The exclusive right of every independent State to its territory

^ ^^^ other property, is founded upon the title originally acquired
r^^htT
by occupancy, conquest, or cession, and subsequently confirmed
by the presumption arising from the lapse of time, or by treaties
and other compacts with foreign States.
Public and This exclusive right includes the public property or domain
private
of the State, and thosie things belonging to private individuals, or
property.
bodies corporate, within its territorial limits.
Eminent The right of the State to its public property or domain is
domain.
absolute, and excludes that of its own subjects as well as other
nations. The national proprietary
right, in respect to those things
belonging to private individuals, or bodies corporate, within its
territorial limits, is absolute, so far as it excludes that of other
nations; but, in respect to the members of the State, it is para-

mount only, and forms what is called the eminent domain (a);
that is, the right, in case of necessity or for the public safety, of
disposing of all the property of every kind within the limits of

the State.
Prescription. The earlier writers on natural law have questioned how far that
peculiar species of presumption, arising from the lapse of time,
which is called prescription (&), is justly applicable, as between
nation and nation; but the constant and approved practice of
nations shows that, by whatever name it be called, the uninter-
rupted possession of territory, or other property, for a certain

length of time, by one State, excludes the claim of every other;
in the same manner as, by the law of nature and the municipal
code of every civilized nation, a similar possession by an individual
excludes the claim of every other person to the article of property
(a) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i. over a territory through continuous
eh. 20, §§ 235,244. Rutherforth, Inst. and undisturbed exercise of sove-
of Natural Law, vol. ii. ch. 9, § 6. reignty over it during such a period
Heffter, Das Europaische Volkei'recht, as is necessary to create under the
§§ 64, 59, 70. influence of historical development the
(6) Oppenheim, International Law general conviction that the present
(1912), vol. i. § 242, defines prescrip- condition of things is in conformity
" the with international order."
tion as acquisition of sovereignty
EIGHTS OF PEOPERTY. 269
in question. This rule is founded ,upon the supposition, con-

firmed hj constant expierience, that every person will naturally
seek to enjoy that which belongs to him; and the inference fairly
to be drawn from his silence and neglect, of the original defect
of his title, or his intention to relinquish it;(c).
Some modern writers have denied that la, valid title to territorial
property may be grounded on presumption (d) but the great ;
majority of jurists and publicists accept it as a principle that is

essential to the maintenance of international order and stability.
The rules of international law, however, have not prescribed any
definite time limit that is to operate as a bar to any claims to terri-
tory in the possession of a State. But in the case of disputes, an
agreement sometimes made by the contestants as to the mini-

is
mum period giving a prescriptive right. Thus, in the boundary

dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, the treaty of
Washington (1897) laid down the following rule for the guidance
of the arbitral tribunal: ''Adverse holding or prescription during
a period of fifty years shall make a good title. The arbitrators
may deem exclusive political control of a district, as well as actual
settlement thereof, sufficient to constitute adverse holding or to
make title by prescription" (e). It may be added, by way of ^-
Committee of
judicial authority, that in a case before the Judicial
the Privy Council it was held that Conception Bay in Newfound-
land must be considered to have become by prescription part of
British territory, on the ground that Great Britain had in fact
long exercised dominion over it, and the acquiescence of other

nations showed her exclusive occupation of it {/) .
The almost aU the nations of Europe to the territory Conquest and

title of
now possessed by them, in that quarter of the world, was originally confirm^ by
derived from conquest, which has been subsequently confirmed by compact and
long possession and international compacts, to which all the time^^
European States have successively become parties. Their claim
by them in the New World, discovered by
to the possessions held
Columbus and other adventurers, and to the territories which they
(c) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ao Pac. title, while the former too often resort
lib. ii. cap, 4. Pufendorf, Jus Naturae to arms for the settlement of such
et Gentium, lib. iv. cap. 12. Vattel, differences.
Droit des Gens, tome i. liv. ii. ch. 11. (d) For example, Heffter, § 12:
Eutherforth, Inst, of Natural Law, Kluber, §§ 6, 125; G. F. de Martens,
vol. i. ch. 8; vol. ii. ch. 9, §§ 3, 6. Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 70, 71.
Calvo (Droit International, vol. i. (e) Hall, Int. Law, p. 118; Moore.
§ 211) thinks acquisition by prescrip- Digest, vol. i.
§ 88.
tion more necessary for States than (/) The IHreot United States Cable
individuals. The latter can appeal to Co. v. The Anglo-American Telegraph
courts of law to decide upon their Co. (1877), L. R. 2 App. C. 394.
270 RIGHTS OF PEOPERTY.
have acquired on the continents and islands of Africa and Asia,

was originally derived from discovery, or conquest and coloniza-
tion, and has since been confirmed in the same manner, by positive
compact. Independently of these sources of the general

title,
consent of mankind has
established the principle, that long and
uninterrupted possession by one nation excludes the claim of every
other. Whether this general consent be considered as an implied
contract, or as positive law, all nations are equally bound by it;,

since all are parties to it, since none can safely disregard it with-
out impugning its own title to its possessions, and since it is
founded upon mutual utility, and tends to promote the general
welfare of mankind.
J*apal
Bull of The Spaniards and Portuguese took the lead among the nations
1493.
of Europe, in the splendid maritime discoveries in the East and the
West, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. According to

the European ideas of that age, the heathen nations of the other
quarters of the globe were the lawful spoil and prey of their
civilized conquerors, and as between the Christian Powers them-
selves, the Sovereign Pontiff was the supreme arbiter of conflicting
claims. Hence the famous bull, issued by Pope Alexander VI.,
in 1493, by which he granted to the united crowns of Castile and
Arragon all lands discovered, and to be discovered, beyond a line
drawn from pole to pole, one hundred leagues west from the
Azores, or Western Islands, under which Spain has since claimed
to exclude all other European nations from the possession and use,
not only of the lands but of the seas in the ISTew World west of that
line. Independent of this papal grant, the right of prior dis-
covery was the foundation upon which the different European
nations, by whom conquests and settlements were successively
made on the American continent, rested their respective claims
to appropriate its territory to the exclusive use of each nation.
Even Spain did not found her pretension solely on the papal grant .
Portugal asserted a title derived from discovery and conquest to a

portion of South America; taking care to keep to the eastward of
the lino traced by the Pope, by which the globe seemed to be
divided between these two great monarchies. On the other hand,
Great Britain, France, and Holland disregarded the pretended
authority of the'papal see, and pushed their discoveries, conquests,
and settlements, both in the East and West Indies; until conflict-
ing with the paramount claims of Spain and Portugal, they
produced bloody and destructive wars between the different mari-
time Powers of Europe. But there was one thing in which they
all agreed, that of almost entirely disregarding the right of the
RIGHTS OF PROPERTY. 271
nativ'j inhabitants of these regions. Thus the bull o£ Pope

Alexander VI. reserved from the grant to Spain all lands, which
had been previously occupied by any other Christian nation; and
the patent granted by Henry VII. of England to John Cabot and
his sons, authorized them "to seek out and discover all islands,
regions, and provinces whatsoever, that may belong to heathens

and infidels"; and "to subdue, occupy, and possess these terri-
tories, as his vassals and lieutenants." In the same manner, the
grant from Queen Elizabeth to Sir Humphrey Gilbert empowers
him to "discover such remote heathen and barbarous lands, coun-
tries, and territories, not actually possessed by any Christian
prince or people, and to hold, occupy, and enjoy the same, with all
their commodities, jurisdictions, and royalties." It thus became a
maxim of policy and of law, that the right of the native Indians
was subordinate to that of the first Christian discoverer, whose
paramount claim excluded that of every other civilized nation,
and gradually extinguished that of the natives. In the various
wars, treaties, and negotiations, to which the conflicting preten-
sions of the different States of Christendom to territory on the
American continents have given rise, the primitive title of the
Indians has been entirely overlooked, or left to be disposed of by
the States within whose limits tljey happened to fall, by the
stipulations of the treaties between the different European Powers.

Their has thus been almost entirely extinguished by force of
title
arms, or by voluntary compact, as the progress of cultivation

gradually compelled the savage tenant of the forest to yield to the
superior power and skill of his civilized invader (^).
In the dispute which took place in 1790, between Great Britain Dispute
and Spain, relative to Nootka Sound, the latter claimed all the ^^r^rBritain
north-western coast of America as far north as Prince William's and Spain,
Sound, in latitude 61°, upon the ground of prior discovery and Nootkf
Sound.
long possession, confirmed by the eighth article of the Treaty of
Utrecht, referring to the state of possession in the time of his
Catholic Majesty Charles II. This claim was contested by the
British Government, upon the principle that the earth is the
common inheritance of mankind, of which each individual and
each nation has a right to appropriate a share, by occupation and
cultivation. This dispute was terminated by a convention be-
tween the two Powers, stipulating that their respective subjects
should not be disturbed in their navigation and fisheries in the
I (g) Johnson v. Mcintosh (1823), 8 Wheaton, 571—605.

272 EIGHTS OF PEOPERTY.
Pacific Ocean or the South Seas, or in landing on the coasts of

those seas, not already occupied, for the purpose of carrying on
their commerce with the natives of the country, or of making
settlements there, subject to the following provisions: —
That the British navigation and fishery should not be made
1 .
the pretext for illicit trade with the Spanish settlements, and that
British subjects should not navigate or fish within the space of
ten murine leagues from any part of the coasts already occupied
by Spain.
2. That in all parts of the north-western coasts of North
America, or of the islands adjacent, situated to the north of the

parts of the said coast already occupied by Spain, wherever the
subjects of either of the two Powers should have made settlements
since the month of April, 1789, or should thereafter make any,
the subjects of the other should have free access, and should carry
on their trade without any disturbance or molestation.
That with respect to the eastern and western coasts of South
3.
America, and the adjacent islands, no settlement should be

formed thereafter, by the respective subjects, in such parts of those
coasts as are situated to the south of those parts of the same coasts,
and of the adjacent islands already occupied by Spain; provided
that the respective subjects should retain the liberty of landing
on the coasts and islands so situated, for the purposes of their
fishery, and of erecting huts and other temporary buildings, for
those purposes onlj {h).
Controversy ukasc of the Emperor Alexander of Russia, of the 4-16th

By an
IJnitedVtates September, 1821, an exclusive territorial right on the north-west
and Eussia, coast of America was asserted as belonging to the Russian Empire,
north-western from Bchring's Straits to the 51st degree of north latitude, and
coast of
jj^ ^j-^g Aleutian Islands, on the east coast of Siberia, and the
America.
Kurile Islands, from the same straits to the South Cape in the
Island of Ooroop, in 45° 51' north latitude. The navigation
and fishery of all other nations were prohibited in the islands,
ports, and gulfs, within the above limits; and every foreign
vessel was forbidden to touch at any of the Russian establish-
ments above enumerated, or even to approach them, within a less
distance than 100 Italian miles, under penalty of confiscation of
the cargo. The proprietary rights of Russia to the extent of the
north-west coast of America, specified in this decree, were rested
(h) Annual Eegister for 1790 (State Oregon and California, p. 466; Proofs
Papers), pp. 285—305; 1791, pp. 208, and Illustrations, K. No. 1.
214, 222—227. Greenhow, History of
upon the three bases said to be required by the general law of

nations and immemorial usage; that is, upon the title of first
discovery; upon the title of first occupation; and, in the last

place, upon that which results from a peaceable and uncontested
possession of more than half a century. It was added, that the
extent of sea, of which the Russian possessions on the continents
of Asia and America form the limits, comprehended all the con-
ditions which were ordinarily attached to closed seas ('mers
fermees'); and the Russian Government might consequently deem
itselfauthorized to exercise upon this sea the right of sovereignty,
and especially that of entirely interdicting the entrance of
foreigners. But it preferred only to assert its essential rights, by
measures adapted to prevent contraband trade within the chartered
limits of the American Russian Company.
All these grounds were contested, in point of fact as well as
right,by the American Government. The Secretary of State,
Mr. John Q. Adams, in his reply to the communication of the
Russian Minister at Washington, stated, that from the period of
the existence of the United States as an independent nation, their
vessels had freely navigated these seas, and the right to navigate
them was a part of that independence; as was also the right of
their citizens to trade, even in arms and munitions of war, with
the aboriginal natives of the north-west coast of America, who
were not under the territorial jurisdiction of other nations. He
denied the Russian claim to any part of America south
totall}'
of the 55th degree of north latitude, on the ground that this
parallel was declared, in the charter of the Russian American

Company, to be the southern limit of the discoveries made by the
Russians in 1799; since which period they had made no discoveries
or establishments south of that line, on the coast claimed by them-
With regard Russian Government might
to the suggestion, that the
justly exercise sovereignty over the northern Pacific Ocean, as mare

clausUTriy because it claimed territories both on the Asiatic and
American coasts of that ocean, Mr. Adams merely observed, that
the distance between those coasts on the parallel of 51 degrees, was
not less than four thousand miles ; and he concluded by expressing
the persuasion of the American Government, that the citizens

of the United States would remain unmolested in the prosecution
of their laAvful commerce, and that no effect would be given to a
prohibition, manifestly incompatible with their rights (i).
(i) Annual Register, vol. Ixiv. pp. 576 —584. Correspondence between Mr.
Secretary Adams and Mr. Poletiea.
w.
'
18
Convention of The negotiations on this subject were finally terminated by a

the United convention between the two Governments, signed at Petersburg,
qu the 5-17th April, 1824, which stipulated that the subjects
Statesând
of either Power should not be disturbed in resorting to the coasts
for the purposes of navigation and fishing, or of trading with the
natives at points of the coast not already occupied. But United
States citizens were not to resort to any point where there was a
Kussian establishment without the permission of the governor,
and vice versa. No United States establishments were to be
formed north of 54° 40', and no Russian establishments south of
that latitude. During a term of ten years (Article 4) from the
signature of the Convention, the vessels of either party might
frequent the inland seas, gulfs and creeks of the coastline assigned
to the other party for the purpose of fishing and trading with the
natives.
Convention of Great Britain had also formally protested against the claims
Great Brit^^n ^^^^ principles set forth in the Russian ukase of 1821, imme-
and Russia,
diately on its promulgation, and subsequently at the Congress of
Verona. The controversy, as between the British and Russian
Governments, was finally closed by a convention signed at Peters-
burg, February 16-28, 1825, which also established a permanent
boundary between the territories respectively claimed by them on
the continent and islands of North-western America.
This treaty contained stipulations similar to those between the
United States and Russia, the line of demarcation being drawn
from the southernmost point of Prince of Wales's Island in latitude
54'^ 40' eastwards to Portland Channel, and along the middle of
that inlet to latitude 56°, whence it should follow the summit of
the mountains bordering the coast, within 10 leagues north-west-
ward to Mount St. Elias, and thence north along the 141st
meridian west from Greenwich to the frozen ocean. The term
of ten years for trading by vessels of either party in the harbours
or creeks of the other, was also inserted in this treaty, but trading
with the natives in liquors, fire-arms, powder, or warlike stores,
was prohibited (k) .
Expiration of When the ten years period of the United States' treaty expired,
îCTi^dîn^^^^
^^^^ Russian Government claimed the right of excluding American
United States vessels from that part of the coast on which the United States had
agreed to form no establishments. A lengthy discussion took
place on the construction of the treaty (Z), but for a very long time
(k) British and Foreign State (I) Mr. Forsyth's letter to Mr.
Papers, vol. xii. (1824—1825). Green- Dallas, Nov, 3, 1837. Congress Docu-
how, Hist, of Oregon, &c., p. 469; ments, Sess. 1838-9, vol. i.
p. 36.
Proofs I. No. 5.
RIGHTS OF PROPEETY. 275
no definite understanding was arrived at. Finally the question

was set at rest for ever by the purchase by the United States of
the whole territory of Alaska from Russia, in 1867, for the sum
of 7,200,000 dollars, there being after that no possibility of any
dispute as to boundary between the two countries.
The Alaska boundary question, however, was destined to be Alaska

raised as between the United States and Great Britain in a very
question^
acute form, which was settled only recently. From' the first days
of the American occupation of Alaska, the British and Canadian
Governments were insistent in urging upon the United States the
necessity of having the boundary line, which had been left in
ambiguity by the treaty of 1825, authoritatively marked out.
Nothing, however, was done, and much friction and inconvenience
was theresult. In 1897, the discovery of gold on the Yukon River,
in British Columbia, attracted a multitude of settlers to what had
hitherto been one of the most deserted quarters of the North-
American continent. It was then realised that the United States
claimed a boundary line which entirely shut off the mining districts
from the sea. This claim, fortified by acts of occupation, was
based on the contention that under the treaty of 1825, it was
meant that there should remain in the exclusive possession of
Russia a continuous fringe or ,strip of coast on the mainland not
exceeding ten marine leagues in width separating the British pos-
sessionsfrom the bays, ports, inlets, havens and waters of the
ocean This interpretation of the Srd and 4th Articles of the treaty
.
was strongly contested by the Canadians, who, with the support

of the British Government, maintained that the boundary line,
whether running along the crests of the mountains, or in the
absence of mountains, at a distance of ten marine leagues from the
ocean, was intended to be traced across the bays and inlets, and
not to run round them. There was also a dispute as to .what was
"
the channel called the Portland Channel" in the 3,rd Article of
the treaty of 1825, and as to the course to be taken by the southern
boundary line of American territory from its commencement to the

entrance of Portland Channel.
In 1899, a temporary modus vivendi was arrived at, and after
prolonged negotiations- a convention was signed at Washington on
Jan. 24, 1903, for the appointment of a tribunal consisting of
—
"six impartial jurists of repute" three to be appointed by each
Power —:who were to " consider judicially " the questions submitted
to them with regard to the disputed boundary arising out of the
treaty of 1825, which they were thus practically asked to con-
18(2)
strue. The case was argued at great length in London during

September and October of the same year, and the award was
delivered on October 20. The tribunal found that the point of
commencement of the line of demarcation was Cape Muron, and
that the Portland Channel was the channel which ran from about
55° 56' N. L., and passed to the north of Pearce and Wales
Islands. These islands were thus awarded to Great Britain, but
the little islands to the west of them, Sitklan and Kannaghunut,
fell to the United States. The tribunal further gave to the United
States a continuous strip of coast on the mainland, holding this to
"
be the true construction of a line parallel to the sinuosities of the
coast,and distant therefrom not more than ten marine leagues."

The award was signed only by Lord Alverstone, L. C. J., and the
three American commissioners, the two Canadian representatives
declining to do so; but under the terms of the treaty a bare

majority was sufficient (-mi) .
On April 21, 1906, Great Britain and the United States entered
into a convention, providing for the appointment of a joint com-
mission in order to determine and mark out by visible landmarks
that portion of the boundary line which, under the Convention of
• 1825, had been defined as following the 141st meridian, from its
point of intersection with a certain line drawn parallel to the coast
to the frozen ocean.
Claim of the The claim of the United States to the territory between the
S'thfOregon E-ocky Mountains and the Pacific Ocean, and between the 42nd
territory. degree and 54th degree and 40th minutes of north latitude, was
rested by them upon the following grounds: —
1. The first discovery of the mouth of the river Columbia by
Captain Gray, of Boston, in 1792; the first discovery of the
sources of that river, and the exploration of its course to the sea,
by Captains Lewis and Clarke in 1805 6; and the establishment

—
of the first posts and settlements in the territory in question by
citizens of the United States.
2. The
virtual recognition by the British Government of the
title of the United States in the restitution of the settlement of
Astoria or Fort George, at the mouth of the Columbia River,

which had been captured by the British during the war between
the two countries, and which was restored in virtue of the
first Article of the treaty of Ghent, 1814, stipulating that
(m) British and Foreign State p. 21; Oobbefct, Cases, vol. i.

pp. 96
Papers, vol. xcvi. (1902—1903). Cf. seq.
Wharton, Digest, vol. ii. Art. 131a,
EIGHTS OF PROPERTY. 277
''
and possessions whatever, taken by either
all territory, places,
party from the other during the war," &c., "shall be restored
without delay." This restitution was made, without any reser-
vation or exception whatsoever, communicated at the time to the
American Government.
St. The acquisition by the United States of all the titles of
Spain, which were derived from the discovery of the coasts
titles
of the region in question, by Spanish subjects, before they had

been seen by the people of any other civilized nation. By the
1819, between the United States and
Sird Article of the treaty of
Spain, the boundary line between the two countries west of the
Mississippi, was established from the mouth of the river Sabine,
to certain points on the Red Eiver and the Arkansas, and
running
along the parallel of 42 degrees north of the South Sea; his
"
Catholic Majesty ceding to the United States all his rights,
claims, and pretensions to any territories east and north of the

said line;and" renouncing "for himself, his heirs and successors,
all claim to the said territories for ever." The boundary thus
agreed on with Spain was confirmed by the treaty of 1828, between
the United States and Mexico, which had, in the meantime, become
independent of Spain.
4. Upon the ground of contiguity, which would
give to the
United States a stronger right to those territories than could be
"
advanced by any other Power. If," said Mr. Gallatin, on behalf
"
of the American Government, a few trading factories on the
shores of Hudson's Bay have been considered by Great Britain
as giving an exclusive right of occupancy as far as the Eocky
Mountains; if the infant settlements on the more southern Atlantic
shores justified a claim thence to the South Seas, and which was
actually enforced to the Mississippi; that of the millions of Ameri-

can citizens already within reach of those seas, cannot consistently
be rejected. It will not be denied that the extent of contiguous
country to which an actual settlement gives a prior right, must
depend, in a considerable degree, on the magnitude and population
of that settlement, and on the facility with which the vacant
adjacent land may, within a short time, be occupied, settled, and
cultivated by such population, compared with the probability of
itsbeing occupied and settled from any other quarter. This doc-
trinewas admitted to its fullest extent by Great Britain, as
appeared by all her charters, extending from the Atlantic to the
Pacific, given to colonies established then only on the borders of the
Atlantic. How much
more natural and stronger the claim, when
made by a nation whose population extended to the central parts
of the continent, and whose dominions were by all acknowledged to

extend to the Eocky Mountains."
The exclusive claim of the United States was opposed by Great
Britain on the following grounds: —
1. That the Columbia was not discovered
Claims of
by Gray, who had
England.
only entered its mouth, discovered four years previously by Lieu-
tenant Mears of the British navy; and that the exploration of the
interior borders of the Columbia by Lewis and Clarke could not
be considered as confirming the claim of the United States, because,
if not before, at least in the same and subsequent years, the British
Northwest Company had, by means of their agents, already estab-

lished their posts on the head waters or main branch of the river.
2. That the restitution of Astoria, in 1818, was
accompanied
by express reservations of the claim of Great Britain to that terri-
tory, upon which the American settlement must be considered an
encroachment.
3. That the titles to the territory in question, derived by the
United States from Spain through the treaty of 1819, amounted
to nothing more than the rights secured to
Spain equally with
Great Britain by the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790: namely,
to settle inany part of those countries, to navigate and! fish in their
waters, and to trade with the natives.
4. That the charters granted by British
sovereigns to colonies
on the Atlantic coasts were nothing more than cessions to the
grantees of whatever rights the grantor might consider himself
to possess, and could not be considered as
binding the subjects
of any other nation, or as part of the law of nations, until they
had been confirmed by treaties.
Negotiation During the negotiation of 1827, the British plenipotentiaries,
of 1827.
Messrs. Huskisson and Addington, presented the claims of their
Government in respect to the territory in question in a statement,
of which the following is a summary .
"
Great Britain claims no exclusive sovereignty over any por-
tion of the territory on the Pacific, between the 42nd and the
49th parallels of latitude. Her present claim, not in respect to
any part, but to the whole, is limited to a right of joint occupancy,
in common with other States, leaving the right of exclusive
dominion in abeyance; and her pretensions tend to the mere main-
tenance of her own rights, in resistance to the exclusive character
of the pretensions of the United States.
"
The rights of Great Britain are recorded and defined in the
Convention of 1790. They embrace the right to navigate the
waters of those countries, to settle in and over any part of them,
and to trade with the inhabitants and occupiers of the same.

These rights have been peaceably exercised ever since the date
of that convention; that is, for a period of nearly forty years.
Under that convention, valuable British interests have grown up
in those countries. It is admitted that the United States possess
the same rights, although they have been exercised by them only
in a single instance, and have not, since the year 1813,, been exer-
cised at all; but beyond those rights they possess none.
"
In the interior of the territory in question, the subjects of
Great Britain have had, for many years, numerous settlements
and trading-posts; several of these posts are on the tributary waters
of the Columbia; several upon the Columbia itself; some to the
northward, and others to the southward of that river. And they
navigate the Columbia as the sole channel for the conveyance of
their produce to the British stations nearest to the sea, and for its
shipment thence to Great Britain; it is also by the Columbia and

its tributary streams that these posts and settlements receive their
annual supplies from Great Britain.

*'
To the interests and establishments which British industry
and enterprise have created. Great Britain owes protection; that
protection will be given, both as regards settlement, and freedom
of trade and navigation, with every attention not to infringe the
co-ordinate rights of the United States; it being the desire of the
British Government, so long as the joint occupancy continues, to
regulate its own obligations by the same rules which govern the
obligations of every other occupying party" (n).

By the 3rd Article of the Convention between the United States Conventions
" ^^
and Great Britain, in 1818, was
agreed, that any country that ^^^^
it
may be claimed by either party, on the north-west coast of

America, westward of the Stony Mountains, shall, together with
its harbours, bays, and creeks, and the navigation of all rivers
within the same, be free and open, for the term of ten years from
the date of the signature of the present Convention, to the vessels,
citizens,and subjects of the two Powers; it being well understood
that this agreement is not to be construed to the prejudice of any
claim which either of the two high contracting parties may have
to any part of the said country, nor shall it be taken to affect the
claims of any other Power or State to any part of the said country;
the only object of the high contracting parties, in that respectj
being to prevent disputes and differences amongst themselves,"
(n) Conf^ress Documents, 20th Cong, and 1st Sess. No. 199. Greenhow,
Proofs and Illustrations, H.
In 1827, another Convention was concluded between the two

pîrties, by which it was agreed: —
"Article 1. All the j)rovisions of the third Article of the Con-
vention concluded between the United States of America and
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland, on the 20th of October, 1818, shall be, and they are
hereby further indefinitely extended and continued in force, in
the same manner as if all the provisions of the said Article were
herein specifically recited.
''Article 2. It shull be competent, however, to either of the
contracting parties, in case either should think fit at any time

after the 20th of October, 1828, on giving due notice of twelve
months to the other contracting party, to annul and abrogate this
Convention; and it shall, in such case, be accordingly entirely
annulled and abrogated, after the expiration of the said term of
notice.
"Article 3. Nothing contained in this Convention, or in the
third Article of the Convention of the 20th of October, 1818,
hereby continued in force, shall be construed to impair, or in any

manner affect, the claims which either of the contracting parties
may have to any part of the country westward of the Stony or

"
Rocky Mountains (o).
Treaty of The notification provided for by the Convention having been
1846.
given b}^ the American Government, new discussions took place
between the two Governments, which were terminated by a treaty
concluded ut Washington, in 1846. By the first Article of that
treaty it stipulated, that from the point on the 49th parallel of

was
north latitude, where the boundary laid down in existing treaties
and conventions between the United States and Great Britain
terminates, the line of boundary shall be continued westward along
the said 49th parallel of north latitude to the middle of the channel
whicli separates the continent from Vancouver's Island, and thence
southerly through the middle of the said channel, and of Fuca

Straits, to the Pacific Ocean; provided, however, that the naviga-
tion of the whole of the said channel and straits, south of the 49th
parallel of north latitude, remain free and open to both parties.

The second Article stipulated for the free navigation of the
Columbia River by the Hudson's Bay Company, and the British
subjects trading with them, from the 49th degree of north latitude
to the ocean. The third Article provided that the possessory
rights of the Hudson's Bay Company, and of all other British
(o) Elliot, American Diplomatic CJode, vol. i.

pp. 282
— 330.
IITGHTS OF PROPEETY. 281
subjects, to the territory south of the parallel of the 49th degroe

of north latitude, should be respected {p) .
The treaty of 1846 did not, however, completely settle the Arbitration
question. It was only terminated in 1872 by being submitted to Jêforethe

the award of the German Emperor as arbitrator. The 34th Emperor.
Articlo of the Treaty of Washington, 8th of May, 1871, after
referring to the Treaty of 1846, and stating that the Commis-

sioners appointed to determine that portion of the boundary which
runs southerly through the middle of the channel separating
Vancouver's Island from the Continent, and of Fuca Straits to the
"
Pacific Ocean, were unable to agree, provides tliat the respective
claims of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, and the

Government of the United States, shall be submitted to the arbi-
tration and award of His Majesty the German Emperor, who,
having regard to the above-mentioned Article of the said Treaty,
shall decide thereupon finally, and without appeal, which of these
claims is most in accordance with the true interpretation of the
Treatyof June 1846 "(g).
15,
Great Britain contended that the boundary line should be run
through the Rosario Strait, while the United States asserted that it
should be run through the Canal de Haro. The position of the
boundary was a matter of considerable importance, not only in
assigning several islands tothe successful party, but also in
settling the rights of ownership over the navigable channels

between Vancouver's Island and the mainland. The whole ques-
tion turned upon the interpretation to be put on the existing
treaties. Cases and counter-cases were submitted by each Govern-
ment to th3 German Emperor, and on the 21st October, 1872, His
Imperial Majesty awarded that "The claim of the Government
of the United States, viz., that the line of boundary between the
dominions of Her Britannic Majesty and the United States should
be run through the Canal of Haro, is most in accordance witl^ the
"
true interpretation of the Treaty of 1846 (r).
In 1885, the Powers assembled at the Conference of Berlin, that Occupations

is, all the maritime States of Europe and the United States (s), A^^can coast
being desirous to obviate the misunderstanding and disputes which The West
^*"*^^^
might in future arise from new acts of occupation on the coast of Conference.
(p) United States Statutes at Large, (q) Pari. Papers, N. America, No. 3
Tol. ix. pp. 109, 869. As to the Oregon (1873), p. 1. See Appendix C.
•controversy, see Moore, Digest, vol. i. (r) Pari. Papers, N. America, No. 9
§§ 80, 81, 104; vol. V. § 835. Sir T. (1873), p. 3. See Cushing, The Treaty
Twiss, The Law of Nations, vol. i. of Washington, p. 203.
§§ 125, 126; Ibid. The Oregon Ques- (s) As to the position of the
tion (1846). U. S. A., see p. 97, ante.
282 EIGHTS OF PROPERTY.
Africa, discussed and adopted a declaration introducing into inter-

national relations certain uniform rules with reference to future
occupations of that coast. Any Power taking possession of a

tract of land outsideany possessions had before
is to give notice
it
to the other signatory Powers, in order to enable them, if need be,

to make good any claims of their own; and the signatory Powers
recognise the obligation to insure the establishment of authority

in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the African
continent sufficient to protect existing rights, and, as the case may
be, freedom of trade and of transit under the conditions agreed
upon in .the General Act(^).
Maritime The maritime territory of every State extends to the ports,

teeeitorial
juei8dicti0n. harbours, bays, mouths of rivers, and adjacent parts of the sea
enclosed by headlands belonging to the same State. The general
usage of nations superadds to this extent of territorial jurisdiction

a distance of a marine league, or as far as a cannon shot will reach
from the shore along all the coasts of the State. Within these
limits, its rights of property and territorial jurisdiction are abso-
lute,and exclude those of every other nation {u) .
The Case The extent and nature of the jurisdiction of a State over its
of The
Francon'xa. territorial waters have been much discussed in recent times. In
the well-known case of The Franccmia the Court held that it had
no jurisdiction over a criminal offence committed by a foreigner
on board a foreign ship which was on the open sea but within
three miles of the coast of England. The difficulty and doubt
surrounding the question is shown by the fact that of the fourteen
judges who attended during the arguments in The Franconia

seven pronounced against the jurisdiction, while six claimed it.
One who agreed with the majority died before judgment was
delivered (x) The decision, therefore, could not bo considered
.
and the question has now been set at

as altogether satisfactory,
rest, as far as English law concerned, by an A;ct of Parliament
is
known as the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878 (y).

"
Territorial
By this Act, after reciting that the rightful jurisdiction of
Waters
(0 Arts. 34, 35. Hertslet, Map of cli. 23, § 289. Valin, Comm. sur
Africa by Treaty, p. 20; for notifica- I'Ordonnance de la Marine, liv. v.
tions under Art. 35, see ibid. pp. 10, tit. 1. Azuni, Diritto Marit. pt. i.
47, 315, 327, 358, 772, 811, lOltJ, 1068', cap. 2, Art. 3, § 15. Galiani, Dei
1069. Cf British State Papers, Africa,
. Doveri dei Principi Neutrali in Tempo
No. 4 (1885), p. 312. di Guerra, liv. i. Life and Works of
(w) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. Sir L. Jenkins, vol. ii. p. 780.
lib. ii. cap. 3, § x. Bynkershoek, (x) JR. V. Keyn (The Franconia)
Qusest. Jur. Pub. lib. i. cap. 8. De (1876), 2 Ex. D. 63.
Dominio Maris, cap. 2. Vattel, liv. i. (y) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 73.
Her Majesty, her heirs and and has always

successors, extends Jurisdiction
extended over the open seas adjacent to the coasts of the United
Kingdom, and of all other parts of Her Majesty's dominions to
such distance as is necessary for the defence and security of such
dominions" (z), it is enacted (amongst other things) that, "An
offence committed by a person, whether he is or is not a subject
of Her Majesty, on the open sea within the territorial waters of
Her Majesty's dominions, is an offence within the jurisdiction of
the Admiral, although it may have been committed on board or
by means of a foreign ship, and the person who committed such
" '
offence may be arrested, tried, and punished accordingly." The

territorial waters of Her Majesty's dominions,' in reference to the
sea, means such part of the sea adjacent to the coast of the United
Kingdom, or the coast of some other part of Her Majesty's
dominions, as is deemed by international law to b;e within the
territorial sovereignty of Her Majesty; and for the purpose of any
offence declared by this Act to be within the jurisdiction of the
Admiral, any part of the open sea within one marine league of
the coast measured from low-water mark shall be deemed to be
open sea within the territorial waters of Her Majesty's

dominions."
Other States may in time adopt a similar course, and claim as Extension of
^
their own the three-mile belt of sea for all purposes of jurisdiction, ]^,eir""^^
and it is not improbable that in course of time the limit may be
extended still further. Norway claims four miles. Spain has,
on more than one occasion, put forward a claim to exercise mari-
time jurisdiction at a distance of two leagues, or six nautical miles
from the Spanish coast. Other nations have, however, resisted
this claim. In 1874, Lord Derby intimated to the Spanish
Government that their pretensions would not be submitted to by
Great Britain, and that any attempt to carry them out would lead
to very serious consequences («) Mr. Fish also stated, on the
.
part of the United States Government, "We have always under-

stood andasserted that, pursuant to public law, no nation can
rightfully claim jurisdiction at sea beyond a marine league from

its coast" (&). The extent of teri'itorial waters was incidentally
a disputed point before the Suez Canal Commission which sat at
Paris in 1885 The original draft of Article V. of the Convention
.
"
read in the territorial waters of Egypt," for which the British
{z) See Beg. v. J)udlei/ (1884), 14 2otliDec. 1874; U. S. Dipl. Cor. 1875,
Q. B. D. 273, 281, per Lord Oole- p. 641.
ridge, L. O. J. (b) U. S. Dipl. Cor. 1875, p. 649;
(a) Lord Derby to Mr. Watson, Wharton, Digest, § 32.
284 EIGHTS OF PEOPEETY.
amendment: of three marine miles from the ports of access of the

canal was afterwards substituted. Commenting on this amend-
" "
ment M. de Freycinet wrote, This limit (namely, three marine
miles) "is borrowed from the traditions of international law;
nevertheless, it should be observed that at the time when this limit
A\^s and when it came into usage, it represented

established,
approximately cannon range. Since then, the range of cannon
having increased, it would be natural to extend proportionately
the zone of territorial waters." But the French Government,
willing to be conci-liatory, waived their contention (c).
Extent of the The term ''coasts" includes the natural appendages of the
"^^
Jw.'^'"'*^* territory which rise out of the water, although these islands are
not of sufficient firmness to be inhabited or fortified; but it does
not properly comprehend all the shoals which form sunken con-
tinuations of the land perpetually covered with water. The rule
of Inw on this subject is 'terrae dominium ubi finitur armorum
'
vis ;
and since the introduction of firearms, that distance has
usually been recognised to be about tliree miles from the shore.

In a case before Sir W. Scott (Lord Stowell) respecting the
legality of a capture alleged to be made within the neutral terri-
tory of the United States, at the mouth of the river Mississippi,
a question arose as to what was to be deemed the shore, since •
there are a number of littlemud islands, composed of earth and

trees drifted dowai by the river, wdiich form a kind of jDortico to
the main land. was contended that these were not to be con-
It
sidered as any part of the American territory that they were a—
"
sort of no man's land," not of consistency enough to support the
purposes of life, uninhabited, and resorted to only for shooting and
taking birds' nests. It was argued that the line of territory was
to be taken only from the Balize, which is a fort raised on made
land by the former Spanish possessors. But the learned judge
was of a different opinion, and determined that the protection of
the territory was to be reckoned from these islands, and that they
are the natural appendages of the coast on which they border,
and from which indeed they were formed. Their elements were
derived immediately from the territory, and on the principle of
alluvium and increment, on which so much' is to be found in the
(c) Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 1 be considered territorial for all pur-
(1888); infm, p. 321. A majority of poses. Cf. Annuaire de I'lnstitut de
the members of the Institut de Droit Droit International, vol. xiii. p. 329.
International at the Paris meeting of See Hall, International Law (5th ed.),
1894 resolved that a zone of six marine p. 155.
miles from low-water mark ought to
EIGHTS OF PROPERTr. 285
'
books of law, Quod vis fluminis de tuo prgedio detraxerit, et vicino
praedio attulerit, palam tuum remanet/ even if it had been carried
over to an adjoining territory. Whether they were composed of

earth or solid rock would not vary the right of dominion, for the
right of dominion does not depend upon the texture of the soil (d) .
The exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the British crown over tj^q .
King-'s
the enclosed parts of the sea along the coasts of the island of Great Chambers.'
Britain has immemorially extended to those bays called the

'King's Chambers'; i.e., portions of the sea cut off by lines
drawn from one promontory to another. Likewise Great Britain
holds Conception Bay (in Newfoundland), which has an entrance
twenty miles wide, to constitute part of British territory. A
similar jurisdiction is also asserted by the United States over the
Delawâre Bay, which is eighteen miles wdde; Chesapeake Bay,
which is tw'elve miles wide at its entrance; Cape Cod Bay, thirty-
two miles wide; and other bays and estuaries forming portions of
their territory (e). Similarly Erance claims to exercise exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the Bay of Cancale, whose entrance is seven-
teen miles wide. It has been claimed by some jurists that inlets
having an entrance more than ten miles wide cannot be held to

be territorial. There is no unanimity of opinion on the question.
Thus the Law, representing the views of
Institute of International
leading jurists, decided in favour of twelve miles, subject to greater

extent of jurisdiction established by long-continued usage. Thus,
"
Article 3 of the Kules adopted in 1894 says: For bays the terri-
torial sea follows the sinuosities of the coast, except that it in
measured from a straight line drawn across the bay at the place
nearest the opening towards the sea, where the distance between
the two sides of the bay is twelve miles in width, at least unless a
"
continuous and secular usage has sanctioned a greater width (/).
The case of TAe Direct United States Cable Co. v. The Anglo-
American Telegraph Co. {g) may be referred to. This involved
the position of Conception Bay in Newfoundland; and Lord
Blackburn delivered the judgment of the Privy Council. It was
observed that the authority of the English common law on tho
question was slender and vague the test suggested by Sir Edward
;
Coke and Sir Matthew Hale was indefinite. In Reg. v. Cunning-

ham (h), where it was necessary to decide whether a certain spot
(d) The Anna (1805), 5 C. Hob. ganean (1885), Scott, Oases, p. 143,
385 (o). and other cases there cited.
(e) Cf. Moore, Digest, vol. i. (/) Annuaire de I'lnstitut de Droit
pp. 735 seq. See the case of The Int., vol. xiii. p. 329.
Grange (1793), Opinions of U. S. {g) (1877), L. R. 2 App. 0. 394.
Att.-Gen., vol. i. p. 32; The Alle- (h) (1859), Bell, Or. 0. 86.
in the Bristol Channel was within the countj of Glamorgan, it

was held that the whole of the inland sea between Glamorgan and
Somerset was to be considered as being within those counties by
whose shores it was bounded. Whether a branch of the sea was
to bo treated as part of the adjoining territory depended on estab-
lished usage. As to the law of nations, said Lord Blackburn, it
was universally agreed that harbours, estuaries, and land-locked
bays belonged to the territory of the nation that possessed the
shores roundthem but there was no agreement as to the meaning
;
" "
of for this purpose. Different suggestions had been made,
bay
e.g., defensibility from the shore, a width of cannon-shot from
shore to shore {i.e., three miles), some suggested six miles, others
.ten miles; thus therewas no agreement among text- writers. Lord
Blackburn held, then, that in the present case the principle of
exercise of dominion and acquiescence therein by other nations
may bo applied as the determining factor; and accordingly

Conception Bay may be said to have become by prescription part
of the exclusive territory of Great Britain (^).
The former
' '
It appears from Sir Leoline Jenkins, that both in the reigns
Hovering
Acts." of James I. and of Charles II. the security of British commerce
was provided for by express prohibitions against the roving or

hovering of foreign ships of war so near the neutral coasts and
harbours of Great Britain as to disturb or threaten vessels home-
ward or outward bound; and that captures by such foreign
cruisers, even of their enemies' vessels, would be restored by the
Court of Admiralty if made within the King's Chambers. So
**
also the British Hovering Acts," passed in 1736 (9 Geo. II.
cap. 35) and 1784 (24 Geo. III. cap. 47), assume, for certain
revenue purposes, a jurisdiction of four leagues from the coasts,
by prohibiting foreign goods to be transhipped within that dis-
tance without payment of duties. A
similar provision is con-
tained in the revenue laws of the United States (embodied in the
Act of 1799); and both these provisions have been declared by
judicial authority, in each country, to be consistent with the law
and usage of nations (/c).
Customs The British "Hovering Acts" have been long since repealed.
legislation at
the present The present Customs legislation makes a distinction as regards the
time. extent of jurisdiction claimed for revenue purposes, between ships
(t) See (supra, p. 268. vol. i. p. 75; Opinions of U. S. Atfc.-
(/b)Life and Works of Sir L. Jen- Gen., vol. i. p. 32. Le Louis (1817),
kins, vol. ii. pp. 727, 728, 780. 2 Dods. Ad. 245; Church v. Hubbard
Opinion of the United States Attorney- (1804), 2 Oranch, 187. Cf. Vattel,
General on the capture of the British Droit des Gens, liv. i. ch. 22, § 281;
ship Grange in the Delaware Bay, Moore, Digest, vol. i. § 151; Piggott,
1793. Waite, American State Papers, Nationality, vol. ii. pp. 40 seq.
EIGHTS OF PEOPEETY. 287
belonging to British subjects and ships belonging to foreigners.

"
Thus it is now enacted that If any ship or boat shall be found or
discovered to have been within any port, bay, harbour, river, or
creek of the United Kingdom, or the Channel Islands, or within
three leagues of the coast thereof, if belonging wholly or in part
to British subjects, or having half the persons on board subjects
of Her Majesty, or within one league if not British, having false
bulkheads, &c.," she shall be liable to forfeiture, or to be dealt
with as the statute directs. The distinction is also maintained for
individuals; thus every person found to have been on board a
"
ship liable to forfeiture, within three leagues of the coast if a
British subject, or within one league if a foreigner," shall forfeit
a sum not exceeding lOOL (l). Any officer of Customs may go
on board any ship after clearance outwards within one league of
the coast oi the United Kingdom, and demand the ship's clearance,
which the master must produce, or be liable to a penalty of
oOOL (m).
The
right of fishing in the waters adjacent to the coasts of any ^^^^^
^*
nation, within its territorial limits, belongs exclusively to the

subjects of the State. The exercise of this right, between Great Convention
Britain and France, was regulated by a convention concluded Great Britain
between these two Powers, in 1839; by the 9th Article of which andFrance.j
it is
provided, that French subjects shall enjoy the exclusive right
of fishing along the whole extent of the coasts of France, within
the distance of three geographical miles from the shore, at low-
water mark, and that British subjects shall enjoy the same exclu-
sive right along the whole extent of the coasts of the British
Islands, within thesame distance; it being understood, that upon
that part of the coasts of France lying between Cape Carteret
and the point of Monga, the exclusive right of French subjects
shall only extend to the fishery within the limits mentioned in
the first Article of the Convention; it being also understood, that
the distance of three miles,* limiting the exclusive right of fishing
upon the coasts of the two countries, shall be measured, in respect

to bays of which the opening shall not exceed ten miles, by a
straight line drawn from one cape to the other (?^).
By the treaty of 1783, recognising the independence of the Convention
United States, Great Britain permitted American fishermen to GreirBrltain
and the
United States.
(I) The Customs Consolidation Act, towhat is a clearance, see Pari. Papers,
1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 36), s. 179. 1873, N. America (No. 2), p. 113.
(m) The Customs Consolidation Act, (w) Annales Maritimes et Coloniales,
1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 36), s. 134. As 1839, I-^* Partie, p. 861.
fish on the Grand Bank and other banks and coasts of Newfound-
land, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and on the coasts, bays, and
creeks of other British possessions in North America; and also
to land for the purpose of drying- their nets and curing fish in the
unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks of Nova Scotia, the Magdalen
Islands, and Labrador, as long as the same should remain un-
settled. After the war of 1812 the question arose whether thesa
concessions had been abrogated by the war. The United States
urged that the concessions made in 1783 were not new, but
amounted merely to a confirmation of the rights which American
citizens had previously enjoyed, so that the war could not affect
them. Great Britain claimed that such fishing rights depended
solelyon convention, which was liable to be abrogated by war, and
that the concessions made in 1783 were only temporary. After
a good deal of negotiation between the two Governments, a new
treaty was concluded between them in 1818. After reciting that
"
differences have arisen respecting the liberty claimed by the
United States, for the inhabitants thereof to take, dry, and cure
fish, on certain coasts, bays, harbours, and creeks, of his Britannic
Majesty's dominions in America," it was agreed between the con-

tracting parties, "that the inhabitants of the said United States
shall have, forever, in common with the subjects of his Britannic
Majesty, the liberty to take fish of every kind on that part of the
southern coast of Newfoundland, which extends from Cape Ray
to the Eameau Islands, on the western and northern coast of
Newfoundland, from the said Cape Ray to the Quirpon Islands;
on the shores of the Magdalen Islands; and also on the coasts^
bays, harbours, and creeks, from Mount Joly, on the southern
coast of Labrador, to and through the Straits of Belleisle, and
thence northwardly indefinitely along the coast; without prejudice,
however, to any of the exclusive rights of the Hudson Bay Com-
pany. And that the American fishermen shall also have liberty,
forever, to dry and cure fish in

any of the unsettled bays, harbours,
and creeks, of the southern part of jthe coast of Newfoundland,
here above described, and of the coast of Labrador; but so soon as
the same, or any portion thereof, shall be settled, it shall not be
lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such portion so
settled, without previous agreement for such purpose with the
inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground. And the
United States hereby renounce forever any liberty heretofore en-
joyed or claimed by the inhabitants thereof, to take, dry, or cure
fish, on or within three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays,
creeks, or harbours, of his Britannic Majesty's dominions in

AmericB, not included within the above-mentioned limits. Pro-

vided, however, that the American fishermen shall be admitted
to enter such bays or harbours, for the purpose of shelter, and of
repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of obtaining

water, and for no other purpose whatever. But they shall be
under such restrictions -as
may be necessary to prevent their taking,
drying, or curing fish therein, or in any other manner whatever
abusing the privileges hereby reserved to them" (o).
Another treaty was negotiated in 1854 on the basis of re- Treaty of
^^^^•
ciprocity, that is, the subjects of each State were permitted to fish
in the waters of the other, and the produce was admitted into both
countries free of duty. This treaty came to an end in 1866,
through notice of terminating it being given by the United States;
and the question was for a time regulated by the Treaty of Treaty of
Washington. By Article XVIII. of the latter convention, the isn. ^'^^•*^^'
inhabitants of the United States had, in addition to their rights
under the treaty of 1818, in common with British subjects, for
the term of ten years from the date when the treaty came into
force, and further, until after two years' notice of terminating the
treaty should be given either party, the liberty to take fish of
by
every kind, except shell-fish, on the sea-coasts and shores, and in
the bays, harbours, and creeks of the Provinces of Quebec, Nova
Scotia, and New Brunswick, and the Colony of Prince Edward's
Island, and of the several Islands thereunto adjacent, without
being restricted to any distance from the shore; with permission to
land upon the said coasts and shores and islands, and also upon the
Magdalen Islands, for the purpose of drying their nets and curing
their fish. This only applied to sea-fishing; salmon and other
river-fishing being reserved exclusively for British fishermen.
Article XIX. gave to British subjects corresponding rights, on
the same terms, on the eastern sea-coasts and shores of the- United
States north of the 39th parallel of N. lat. As long as the
treaty was in force, fish-oil and fish of all kinds (except fish of the
inland lakes, and of the rivers falling into them, and except fish
preserved in oil), being the produce of Canadian or United States
were to be admitted into each country, respectively, free
fisheries,
of duty (p) It being asserted that this treaty gave a greater
.
advantage to American than to British subjects, a Commission was

appointed to settle what compensation, if any, should be paid by
the United States to England; and on the 23rd of November,
(o) British and Foreign State (;;) The Treaty of Washington, 1871,
Papers, vol. vi. (1818—1819); Elliot, Arts, xviii. xix. xxi. See 35 & 3(>
Diplomatic Code, vol. i. p. 281. Viet. c. 45. See also Appendix C.
W. 19
1877, the Commission, which met at Halifax, awarded that the

sum of 5,500,000 dollars in gold be so paid. Some difficulties
were raised by the United States as to complying with the award ;
but the money was ultimately paid (g).

The later abrogation by the United States of the fishery articles
of the Treaty of Washington ,(r), subjected the relations between
the two countries to the stipulation of the Convention of 1818.
The provisions of this Convention relating to the right of exclusion
were construed very strictly by the Canadian Government; and
friction arising between tKe Dominion, Great Britain, and the
United States, commissioners were appointed by the respective
Governments with a view to arriving at an amicable settlement (s) .
Draft Treaty, On 15th February, 1888, a provisional treaty, known as the

Chamberlain-Bayard treaty, was signed at Washington. By
this treaty it was provided that Great Britain and the United
States should appoint a mixed commission to delimit, as in the
now stating treaty specified, the waters of Canada and Newfound-
land as to which the United States, by the Treaty of 1818, had
renounced all liberty to take, cure, or dry fish. The three marine
miles mentioned in the 1818 Convention were to be measured
seaward from low-water mark; but in every bay, creek, or harbour,
not otherwise specially provided for, such miles were to be
measured seaward from a straight line drawn across such waters in
the part nearest the entrance at the first point where the width does
not exceed ten miles. There were other provisions similar in
principle to those contained in the Treaty of 1871. The pleni-
potentiaries exchanged protocols establishing a modus vivendi for
two years (t). On 21st August, 1888, the United States Senate,
.
by the Republican majority, refused to ratify the treaty (w); so

that the provisions of the convention of 1818 remained applicable.
Further ^^ ^ result of the conoessions granted to American fishermen
fishery in 1818, disputes arose between Newfoundland (which had
between received responsible government in 1855) and the United States;
^^d^th^^^*^^^
so that Great Britain became involved in them. A provisional
United States. Settlement was made in 1890, by the Bond-Blaine Convention, but,
at the instance of Canada, Great Britain did not ratify it. In
1893 the Newfoundland Legislature passed the Foreign Fishing
Vessels Act, which imposed various prohibitions on foreign fish-
es) See London Gazette, l€th Nov. bury, The Times, 22nd Feb. 1888;
1878, Supplement. Ibid. 17th Feb. 1888; Annual licgis-
(r) Wharton, Digest, p. 64. ter, 1888.
(s)Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Salis- (u) British and Foreign State
bury,The Times, 3rd March, 1888. Papers, vol. Ixxix. (1887—1888);
(0 Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Salis- Annual Register, 1888, p. 406.
ing vessels, but did not interfere with rights established by treaty,.
In 1902 the provisional Bond-Hay Treaty viâs agreed upon, but
being "amended to death" by the United States Senate, it was
deemed to be rejected. Newfoundland then passed further Acts,
in 1905 and in 1906, imposing restrictions on foreign fishermen,
whereupon the United States protested and Great Britain inter-

vened. In October, 1906, a modus vivendi for the following
season was established between Great Britain and the United
States, the Newfoundland Act of 1906 being suspended and that
of 1905 modified. Negotiations were afterwards renewed (June,
1907), when the American Government proposed a "reference of
pending questions under the treaty of 1818 to arbitration before
the Hague Tribunal" (which had been constituted by the Hague
Peace Conference of 1899). In the meantime, the modiis vivendi,
slightly altered, was renewed, though another was adopted in
August, 1908 (v).
There was also a long-standing dispute between Great Britain Fishery
and France with regard to fishing rights and incidental matters between
on the Newfoundland shore, arising out of the interpretation to Great Britain
be placed on Article 13 of the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, and on

the arrangements made by the Treaty of Versailles, 1783 {x). In
1890, after much negotiation, a modus vivendi between Great
Britain and France was arranged, though it failed to satisfy
Newfoundland. Eventually, by the Anglo-French Convention
(1904), France gave up certain rights conferred by the Treaty
of Utrecht and later treaties, but retained the right to fish during
the fishing season, equally with British subjects, in the territorial
waters of Newfoundland, and to enter any port or harbour and
obtain supplies, subject to the local regulations. In return for
the abandonment of the former rights. Great Britain agreed to
indemnif}' France, in respect of any loss suffered by her fisher-
men, to an amount to be determined by an arbitral tribunal.
Besides those bays, gulfs, straits, mouths of rivers, and estuaries Claims to
which are enclosed by capes and headlands belonging to the terri- ^^ the^sea
^
X
tory of the State, a jurisdiction and right of property over certain the ground of
^^^
other portions of the sea have been claimed by different nations,
(v) Cf. British and Foreig-n State Hague Court of Arbitration (Sept.
—
Papers, vol. Ixxxiii. (1890 1891); 1910), to which the question of the
Pari. Papers, United States, No. 1 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries was
(1906); Pari. Papers, Newfoundland, submitted, see Amer. Journ. of Int.
1907. See also Cobbett, Cases, vol. i. Law, vol. iv. (1910), pp. 948 seq.
pp. 153 seq., and other references Lord Derby to the Governor of
{x)
there cited. For the decision of the Newfoundland, June 12, 1884.
19 (2)
on the ground of immemorial use. Such, for example, was the

sovereignty formerly claimed by the Eepublic of Venice over the
Adriatic. The maritime supremacy claimed by Great Britain
over what are called the Narrow Seas has generally been asserted
merely by requiring certain honours to tlie British flag in those
seas, which have been rendered or refused by other nations, accord-
ing to circumstances; but the claim itself has never been sanctioned
by general acquiescence (^), and is now no longer valid, if it has
not, indeed, already been abandoned {z) .
Straits. Straits are passages communicating from one sea to another.

If the navigation of the two ©eas thus connected is free, the
navigation of the channel by which they are connected ought also

to be free. Even if such strait be bounded on both sides by the
territory of the same sovereign, and is at the same time so narrow
as to be commanded by cannon shot from both shores, the exclusive
territorial jurisdiction of that sovereign over such strait is con-
trolled by the right communicate with the
of other nations to
seas thus connected. Such right may, however, be modified by
special compact, adopting those regulations which are indis-
pensably necessary to the security of the State whose interior
waters thus form the channel of communication between different
seas, the navigation of which is free to other nations. Thus the
passage of the strait may remain free to the private merchant
vessels of those nations
having a right to navigate the seas it con-
armed ships in time of peace.
nects, whilst it is shut to all foreign
In 1879 the United States Grovernment repudiated the exclusive
claim to the Straits of Magellan; two years later Chile and the
Argentine Republic concluded a treaty whereby the Straits were
"
neutralized," and free navigation was guaranteed to all nations.
If a narrow two different States,
strait separates the territory of
it isnot subject to the exclusive sovereignty of either, but belongs
to both, the boundary line running through the mid-channel.
The Black So long as the shores of the Black Sea were exclusively possessed
Sea, the *
Bosphorus, by Turkey, that sea might with propriety be considered a

mare
and the clausum
'
and there seems no reason to question the right of the

;
Dardanelles.
Ottoman Porte to exclude other nations from navigating the
passage which connects it with the Mediterranean, both shores of
this passage being at the same time portions of the Turkish terri-
tory; but since the territorial acquisitions made by Russia, and
(y) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i. Hist. Law of Nations, pp. 154 — 157.
ch. 23, § 289. Martens, Precis du Kluber, § 132.
Droit des Gens Moderne de I'Europe, {z) Cf. Oppenheim, International
liv. ii. ch. 1, § 42. Edinburgh Review, Law, vol. i.
§§ 191, 195.
vol. xi. Art. 1, pp. 17—19. Wheaton,
the commercial establishments formed by her on the shores o£ the

Euxine, both that Empire and the other maritime Powers have
become entitled to participate in the commerce of the Black Sea,
and consequently to the free navigation of the Dardanelles and
the Bosphorus. This right was expressly recognised by the
seventh Article of the Treaty of Adrianople, concluded in 1829,
between Russia and the Porte, both as to Russian vessels and
those of other European States in amity with Turkey (a).
The right of foreign vessels to navigate the interior waters of
Turkey, which connect the Black Sea with the Mediterrajiean,
does not extend to ships of war.The ancient rule of the Otto-
man Empire, established for its own security, by which the
entry of foreign vessels of war into the canal of Constantinople,
including the Strait of the Dardanelles and that of the Black Sea,
has been at all times prohibited, was expressly recognised by the
treaty concluded at London the 13th July, 1841, between the five
great European Powers and the Ottoman Porte (6).

By the first Article of this treaty, the Sultan declared his firm
resolution to maintain, in future, the principle invariably estabr
lished as the ancient rule of his empire; and that so long as the
Porte should be at peace, he w;ould admit no foreign vessel ojf
war into the said Straits. The five Powers, on the .other hand,
engaged to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform
to the above-mentioned pTinciple. By the second Article it was
provided, that, in declaring the inviolability of this ancient rule
of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan reserved the faculty of
granting, as heretofore, firmans allowing the passage to light-
armed vessels employed according to usage, in the service of the
diplomatic legations of friendly Powers. By the third Article,
the Sultan also reserved the faculty of notifying this treaty to aU
the Powers in amity with the Sublime Porte, and of inviting them
to accede to it (c) .
The treaty of 1841 was revised by the Treaty of Paris, 1856 (d), Treaty of
but the principles contained in the former treaty were re-estab- ^"^'
lished with very slight changes. The Sultan, however, agreed to
permit the passage of light ships of war, which the contracting
parties were authorized to station at the mouths of the Danube, in
order to secure the execution of the regulations relative to the
liberty of that river (e) The Treaty of Paris provided for the
.
(a) Martens, Nouveau Recueil, torn. (<?) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations,
viii. p. 143. pp. 583—585.
(6) T. E. Holland, European Con- (d) Art. x. Hertslet, Map of
cert in the Eastern Question (1885), Europe by Treaty, vol. ii. p. 1255.
pp. 95 seq. (e) Art. iii. Ibid. p. 1268.
"
neutralization of the Black Sea, by excluding from' it ships of war

of every flag. Eussia and Turkey also agreed not to establish any
military-maritime arsenals on its coasts (/) .
London ^
In 1870 Eussia seized upon the opportunity afforded her by the
^
1871.
Franco-Prussian war to obtain the abrogation of these latter pro-
visions, and a declaration was then made by the Powers assembled
"
at the Congress of London that the principle of the closing of
the Straits, such as it has been established, is ^maintained," but that
"
power should be given to the Sultan to open the Straits in time
of peace to the vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers, in
case the Sublime Porte should judge it necessary in order to secure
"
the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, 1856 (g).
The abrogation of the Article in the Treaty of Paris preventing
the building of arsenals, also gave both Turkey and Eussia the
power of forming such establishments on the coasts of the Black

"
Sea. Article III. of this convention declares that The Black
Sea remains open, as heretofore, to the mercantile marine of all
nations."
Berlin The Treaty of Berlin contains no express mention of the Darda-
Congress.
nelles, but in the 18th Protocol Lord Salisbury declared on behalf
of England "that the obligations of her Britannic Majesty re-
lating to the closing of the Straits, do not go further than an

engagement with the Sultan to respect in this matter his Majesty's
independent determinations in conformity with the spirit of exist-
ing treaties." The plenipotentiaries of Eussia declared, in reply,
" "
that without being able exactly to appreciate the meaning of
"
Lord Salisbury's proposition, in their opinion, the principle of
the closing of the Straits is a European principle," and that exist-
ing stipulations are binding on the part of all the Powers, "not
only as regards the Sultan, but also as regards all the Powers
"
signatory to these transactions (h). The intention of the British
declaration was, apparently, to reserve liberty to British ships of
war to enter the Straits with the consent of the Porte.
During the Eusso-Japanese war, 1904, Eussia attempted to

evade her obligations, by sending through the Straits cruisers (e.g.y
the Smolensk and the Petersburg) belonging to her Black Sea
Volunteer Fleet, flying the commercial flag, and afterwards em-
(/) Arts, xi., xiii, Cf. British and denouncing the Black Sea clauses of
Foreign State Papers, vol. xlvi. (1855 the Treaty of Paris. Cf. British and
—1856). Foreign State Papers, vol. Ixi. (1870
(g) Art. ii. of Convention of 13th —1871).
March, 1871. Hertslet, Map of Europe (A) Holland, European Concert,
by Treaty, vol. iii. p. 1921; and see p. 226.
ibid. p. 1892, for the Eussian Note
ploying them in restraint of neutral trade. A

strong protest was
made by Great Britain, some of .whose merchantmen had been
seized by the converted cruisers, on the ground, inter alia, that such
proceedings constituted a violation of the Treaty of Paris and

the Straits convention. Accordingly, Eussia abandoned her
project.
In 1912, during the Turco-Italian war, the free navigation by
neutral merchantmen was for a time impeded by mines laid by
Turkey in the Dardanelles to check the advance of the Italian
fleet towards Constantinople. After protests from neutral Powers,
however, the mines were removed, and the right to peaceful navi-
gation was restored.
The supremacy asserted by the King of Denmark over the Banish

^
Sound and the two Belts which form the outlet of the Baltic Sea ovl/the^
into the ocean, is rested by the Danish public jurists upon imme-
.. "Til ' n
morial prescription, sanctioned by a long succession of treaties with
• • 1
f^^^^^^t^^
l'"6 JDGltJS.
other Powers. According to these writers, the Danish claim of

sovereignty has been exercised from the earliest times beneficially
for the protection of commerce against pirates and other enemies
by means of guard-ships, and against the perils of the sea by the

establishment of lights and land-marks. The Danes continued
for several centuries masters of the coasts on both sides of the
Sound, the province of Scandia not having been ceded to Sweden
until the treaty of Rbeskild in 1658, confirmed by that of 1660,
it ;which it was stipulated that Sweden should never lay claim to
the Sound tolls in consequence of the cession, but should content

herself with a compensation for keeping up the lighthouses on the
coast of Scandia. The exclusive right of Denmark was recognised
as early as 1368, by a treaty with the Hanseatic republics, and by
that of 1490, with Henry VII. of England, which prohibits
English vessels from passing the Great Belt as weU as the Sound,
unless in case of unavoidable necessity in which case they were to
;
pay the same duties at Wyborg as if they had passed the Sound
at Elsinore. The treaty concluded at Spire, in 1544, with the
Emperor Charles V., which has commonly been referred to as;
the origin, or at least the first recognition, of the Danish claim to
the Sound tolls, merely stipulates, in general terms, that the mer-
chants of the Low Countries frequenting the ports of Denmark
should pay the same duties as formerly.
The treaty concluded at Christianople, in 1645, between Den-
mark and the united provinces of the Netherlands, is the earliest
convention with any foreign Power by which the amount of duties
to be levied on the passage of the Sound and Belts was definitely

ascertained. A
tariff of specific duties on certain articles therein
enumerated was annexed to this treaty, and it was stipulated that

"
goods not mentioned in the list should pay, according to mer-
cantile usage, and what has been practised from ancient times."
A treaty was concluded between the two countries at Copenhagen,
in 1701, by which the obscurity in that of Christianople, as to the
non-specified articles, was meant to be cleared up. By the third
Article of the new treaty it was declared, that as to the goods not
"
specified in the former treaty, The Sound duties are to be paid
according to their value; that is, they are to be valued according
to the place from whence they come, and one per centum of their
value to be paid." These two treaties of 1645 and 1701, are
constantly referred to in all subsequent treaties, as furnishing the
standard by which the rates of these duties were to be measured as
' '
to privileged nations Those not privileged paid according to

.
a more ancient tariff for the specified articles, and one and a
quarter per cent, on unspecified articles (^).
Convention of By the arrangement concluded at London and Elsinore, in 1841,

between Denmark and Great Britain, the tariff of duties levied on
the passage of the Sound and Belts was revised, the duties on
non-enumerated articles were made specific, and others reduced
in amount, whilst some of the abuses which had crept into the
manner of levying the duties in general were corrected. The
benefit of this arrangement, which was to subsist for the term of
ten years, was extended to all other nations privileged by
treaty (/c) ,
Abolition of The rights relating to the navigation of these Straits were

dues^^^ afterwards permanently settled. In 1857, a treaty was entered
into by Denmark with Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France,
Hanover, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Oldenburg, the Netherlands,
Prussia, Russia, Sweden, and Norway, and the Hanse Towns, by
which the King of Denmark agreed (Article I.) not to levy any
dues or charges upon any ships belonging to any of the contracting
"
States that passed through the Belts or the Sound, whether they
simplj^ traverse Danish waters, or whether they may be obliged
by casualties, or by commercial operations, to anchor or lie to
therein. No vessel whatever shall henceforward be subjected
under any pretext, to any detention or impediment whatever, in
(i) Schlegel, Staatsrecht des

Konig- (7c) Scherer, Der Sundzoll, seine
reichsDanemark, 1 Th. kap. 7, §§ 27 Geschichte, sein jetziger Bestand und
— 29. Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, —
seine Sta-atsrechtlich ^politische Lo-
pp. 158—161. sung, Beiiage Nr. 8—9.
the passage of the Sound or of the Belts; but His Majesty the
King of Denmark the right of
expressly reserves to himself
regulating by special arrangements, not involving visit or deten-
tion, the treatment in regard to duties and customs, of vessels
belonging to Powers which are not parties to the present treaty."

By Article II. Denmark was to preserve and maintain all exist-
ing lighthouses, buoys, &c., and to change or set up such new ones
as might become necessary. Pilotage was to be optional, and
pilotage charges the same as for Danish vessels. fixed rate of A
transit duties on goods was to be established, not exceeding
16 skillings Danish per 500 lbs. Danish. As compensation, the
contracting parties engaged, by Article IV., to pay a total sum of
30,476,325 rigs-dollars to Denmark, the sum being assessed in
certain proportions among the contracting parties, each party
being responsible only for the share placed to its own charge.
Separate treaties to the same effect were signed by Denmark with
the United States and with Sardinia in 1857, with Portugal and
the two Sicilies in 1858, with Turkey in 1859, and with Spain in
1860(0.
The Baltic Sea has sometimes been considered by the maritime Whether the
the ^^}^^^ ^^^
'
Powers bordering° on its coasts as mare clausum ag-ainst

°
'-
, ,
18
<
mare
exercise of hostilities upon its waters by other States, whilst the clausum '
?
Baltic Powers are at peace. This principle was proclaimed in

the treaties of armed neutrality in 1780 and 1800, and by the
treaty of 1794, between Denmark and Sweden, guaranteeing the
tranquillity of that sea. In the Russian declaration of war
against Great Britain of 1807, the inviolability of that sea and
the reciprocal guarantees of the Powers that border upon it
(guarantees said to have been contracted with the knowledge of
the British Government) were stated as aggravations of the British
proceedings in entering the Sound and attacking the Danish
capital in that year. In the British answer to this declaration it
was denied that Great Britain had at any time acquiesced in the
principlesupon which the inviolability of the Baltic is main-
tained; however she might, at particular periods, have forborne,
for special reasons influencing her conduct at the time, to act in
contradiction to them. Such forbearance never could have applied
but to a state of peace and real neutrality in the north; and she
could not be expected to recur to it after France had been suffered,
by the conquest of Prussia, to establish herself in full sovereignty
(0 See Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii. p. 1301. State Papers,
vol. xlvii. p. 24. .
along the whole coast, from Dantzic to Liibeck (m) That the .
Baltic cannot be considered a closed sea was implicitly recognised
by the Powers that signed the Treaty of Copenhagen, 1857, and

the subsequent treaties.
Controversy The controversy, how far the open sea or main ocean, beyond
^
d?Siorfof ^^® immediate vicinity of the coasts, may be appropriated by one
the seas. nation to the exclusion of others, which onoo exercised the pens
of the ablest and most learned European jurists, can no longer be
considered open. Grotius, in his treatise on the Law of Peace and
War, hardly admits more than the possibility of appropriating
the waters immediately contiguous, though he adduces a number
of quotations from ancient authors, showing that a broader preten-
sion has been sometimes sanctioned by usage and opinion. But
he never intimates that anything more than a limited portion could
'
be thus claimed; and he uniformly speaks of 'pars,' or portus

maris,' always confining his view to the effect of the neighbouring
land in giving a jurisdiction and property of this sort (ji) He had .
previously taken the lead in maintaining the common right of

mankind to the free navigation, commerce, and fisheries of the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, against the -exclusive claims of Spain
and Portugal, founded on the right of previous discovery, con-
firmed by possession and the papal grants. The treatise De Mare
'
'
Libero was published in 1609. The claim' of sovereignty asserted,

by the kings of England over the British seas was supported by
'
Albericus Gentilis in his Advocatio Hispanica' in 1613 (o). In

1635, Selden published his 'Mare Clausum,' in which the general
principles maintained by Grotius are called in question, and the
claim' of England more fully vindicated than by Gentilis. The
first book of Selden's celebrated treatise is devoted to the proposi-
tion that the sea may be made property, which he attempts to
show, not by reasoning, but by collecting a multitude of quotations

from ancient authors, in the style of Grotius, but with much less
selection. He nowhere grapples with the arguments by which such
a vague and extensive dominion is shown to be repugnant to the
law of nations And in the second part, which indeed is the main
.
object of his work, he has recourse only to proof's of usage and of

positive compact, in order to show that Great Britain is entitled to
the sovereignty of what are called the Narrow Seas. Father Paul
(m) Annual Register, vol. xlix.; (o) Cf. Phillipson, Article on Gen-
State Papers, p. 773. tills in Great Jurists of the World
(w) De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. lib. ii. (1913), pp. 113, 122 seq. and Article
cap. 3, §§ 8
— 13. on Bynkershoek, ibid.
;
pp. 398 seq.
Sarpi, the celebrated historian of the Council of Trent, also wrote

a vindication of the claim of the Eepublio of Venice to the sove-
reignty of the Adriatic (p) By nker shock examined the general

.
question, in the earliest of his published works, with the vigour

and acumen which distinguish all his writings. He admits
that certain portions of the sea may be susceptible of exclusive
dominion, though he denies the claim of the English crown to the
British seas on the ground of the want of uninterrupted possession.
He asserts that there was no instance, at the time when he wrote,
in which the sea was subject to any particular sovereign, where
the surrounding territory did not also belong to him (g) .
Pufendorf lays down, that in a narrow sea the dominion belongs

it
to the sovereigns of the surrounding land, and is distributed, where

there are several such sovereigns, according to the rules applicable
toneighbouring proprietors on a lake or river, supposing no com-
pact has been made, "as is pretended," he says, "by Great
Britain"; but he expresses himself with a sort of indignation at
the idea that the main ocean can ever be appropriated (r) The .
authority of Vattel would be full and explicit to the same purpose,

were it not weakened by the concession, that though the exclusive
right of navigation or fishery in the sea cannot be claimed by one
nation on the ground of immemorial use, nor lost to others by
non-user, on the principle of prescription, yet it may be thus
established where the non-user assumes the nature of a consent or
tacitagreement, and thus becomes a title in favour of one nation
against another (s) .
On reviewing this celebrated controversy it may be affirmed, Eeviewofthe

that if those public jurists who have asserted the exclusive right of controversy.
property in any particular nation over portions of the sea, have

failed in assigning sufficient grounds for such a claim, so also the
arguments alleged by their opponents for the contrary; opinion

must often appear vague, futile, and inconclusive. There are only
two decisive reasons applicable to the question The first is physi-
.
caland material, which alone would be sufficient; but when coupled

with the second reason, which is purely moral, will be found
conclusive of the whole controversy. (1) Those things which are
{p) Paolo Sarpi, Del Dominio del (s) Droit des Gens, liv. i. cli. 23,
Mare Adriatico (Venet. 1676). §§ 279—286. As to the maritime
(q) De Dominio Maris, Opera police which may be exercised by any
Minora, Dissert V., first publish^ in particular nation, on the high seas, for
1702. Ibid. cap. vii. ad finem. Of. the punishment of offences committed
Phillipson, Article on Bynkershoek, ut on board its own vessels, or the sup-
sup. pp. 398 seq. pression of piracy and the African
(/•) De Jure Naturae et Gentium, slave trade, vide supra, pt. ii. ch. ii.
Ub. iv. cap. 5, § 7. pp. 172, 204.

.300 RIGHTS OF PROPERTY.
originally the common property of all mankind, can only become

the exclusive property of a particular individual or society of men,
by means of possession. In order to establish the claim of a,
particular nation to a right of property in the sea, that nation

must obtain and keep possession of it, which is impossible. (2) In
the second place, the sea is an element which belongs equally to all
men, like the air. No nation, then, has the right to appropriate
it,even though it might be physically possible to do so. It is
thus demonstrated, that the sea cannot become the exclusive pro-
perty of any nation. And, consequently, the use of the sea for
these purposes remains open and common to all mankind (t).
The Behring Claims to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over portions of the
Sea dispute,
q^q^^ qq^ or high seas
—that is, the parts of the ocean lying outside
the territorial limits of the maritime nations of the world —

lingered on till the first quarter of the nineteenth century It was .
the Behring Sea controversy that brought matters to a head. In

1821, when Alaska and the Aleutian Archipelago belonged to
Russia, the prohibited foreign vessels from
Emperor Alexander I.
approaching within a hundred Italian miles of the Alaskan and

Siberian coasts and islands belonging to Russia, on the ground
that the seas in question constituted a mare clausum by reason of
first discovery and possession of the adjacent shores. Great
Britain and the United States regarded these waters as part of the
open sea, and at once protested against the claim to such maritime
dominion. It has already been pointed out that Mr. Adams, the
United States Secretary of State, denied the existence of an
"exclusive territorial jurisdiction" on the part of Russia, and
demanded for American citizens freedom from molestation "be-
yond the ordinary distance to which the territorial jurisdiction

extends," viz., three miles from low-water mark. As a result of
the representations made by the United States and Great Britain,
Russia abandoned her pretensions, and entered into conventions
to that effect with the two countries in 1824 and 1825 respec-
^tively (u) .
In 1867 Alaska became American territory (a;) In 1870 .
the Alaska Commercial Company acquired by lease from the

American Government the islands of St. Paul and St. George
for the purpose of carrying on the fur-seal fishery. The com-
pany's operations were soon extended, and the thriving industry
began to attract Canadian vessels, which did not confine themselves
(t) Ortolan, R^glee Internationales (u) See supra, pp. 272 seq.
et Diplomatie de la Mer, torn. i.
(x) See stcpra, p. 274.
pp. 120—126.
to the limits that had been imposed by the United States on her
citizens. Onthe complaint of the American sealers, the United
States authorities seized, in 1886, three Canadian schooners while
fishing about seventy miles from shore, and brought them before
the District Court at Sitka for breaking the law which prohibited
the killing of fur-seals, without authorization, "within Alaska
territory or the waters thereof." The vessels and cargoes were

confiscated and the crews sentenced to imprisonment, the judge
having held that the territorial waters of Alaska comprised an

extensive area 1,500 miles by 700 miles. Great Britain's protest
resulted in the release of the vessels and crew, though after much
delay. In 1887 seizures and protests were again made. In 1889

an Act of Congress was passed applying the previous prohibition
"
to all the dominions of the United States in the waters of
Behring Sea"; and soon afterwards more British vessels were

captured. Protests and negotiations followed, but proved fruit-
less. Accordingly Great Britain declared that further seizures
would be resisted by force. In 1891 a modus mvendi was
arranged, with a view to referring the question to arbitration; and
the following year a treaty was concluded at Washington, whereby
seven arbitrators were to be appointed, two by each of the con-
tending States, and one each by France, Italy, and Scandinavia.
The arbitrators met at Paris and gave their award August 15th,
1893. They found that though Eussia claimed extensive juris-
diction by the Czar's ukase of 1821, she admitted soon afterwards
that her jurisdiction should be limited to the reaph of cannon-shot
from the shore, and no longer asserted or exercised exclusive juris-
diction in the Behring Sea, or in the seal fisheries, beyond tlie
ordinary limit of territorial waters. They found, too, that Great

Britain had not recognised the earlier Eussian claim; and that,
after 1867, the United States had no right of protection or pro-
perty in the fur-seals found outside the three-mile limit. Thus
the findings were in favour of Great Britain on all the points of
international law involved. Further, in order to prevent the
extermination of the seals, rules were drawn up, which proved
ineffective to a large extent because Japan and Eussia failed to
agree to similar regulations. In 1911, however, the four Powers

agreed to suspend pelagic sealing for fifteen years. From our
present point of view, then, the main result of the Behring Sea
arbitrationis the definitive recognition of the freedom of the high
seas. In accordance therewith, the Ajnerican representative was

authorized to declare, in the case of an arbitration with Eussia-,
**
1902, that the Government of the United States claims, neither
in Behring Sea nor in its other bordering waiters, an extent of

jurisdiction greater than a marine league from its shores" {y).
Territorial Wehave already seen that, by the generally approved usage of

waters.
nations, which forms the basis of international law, the maritime
territory of every State extends: (1)To the ports, harbours, bays,
mouths of aidjaoent parts of the sea inclosed by head-
rivers, and
lands, belonging to the same State. (2) To the distance of a
marine league along all the coasts of the State. (3) To the straits
and sounds, bounded on both sides of the territory of the same
State, so narrow as to be commanded by cannon-shot from both
shores, and communicating from one sea to another {z) .
Ports, mouths The reasons which forbid the assertion of an exclusive pro-
of rivers, &c.
prietary right to the sea in general, will be found inapplieable to
the particular portions of that element included in the above
designations.
1 .
Thus, in respect to those portions of the sea which form the
ports, harbours, ba,js, and mouths of rivers of any State where
the tide ebbs and flows, its exclusive right of property, as well as
sovereignty, in these waters, may well be maintained, consistently

with both the reasons above mentioned, as applicable to the sea in
general. The State possessing the adjacent territory, by which
these waters are partially surrounded and inclosed, has that
physical power of constantly acting upon them', and, at the same
time, of excluding, at its pleasure, the action of any other State
or person, which, as we have already seen, constitutes possession.
These waters cannot be considered, from the necessity of the case,
to be subject to the common use of all mankind, any more than
the adjacent land, which has already been appropriated by a
particular people. Neither the material nor the moral obstacle,

to the exercise of the exclusive rights of property and dominion,
exists in this case. Consequently, the State, within whose terri-
torial limits these waters are included, has the right of
excluding
every other nation from their use. The exercise of this right may
be modified by compact, express or implied; but its existence is
founded upon the mutual independence of nations, which entitles
every State to judge for itself as to the manner in which the right
is to be exercised, subject to the equal reciprocal rights of all other
(y) Moore, Digest, vol. i. 828. contained in the British Pari. Papers,
For the Behring Sea controversy,
p.
see —
1886 1898; and in the account of
ibid. vol. i. § 172; Cobbett, Cases, the Proceedings of the Arbitration at
voU i. pp. 124 seq. Official documents Paris, in 15 vols.
are to be found in the correspondenoe (2;) Vide supra, p. 278.
EIGHTS OF PKOPERTY. 303
States to establish similar regulations, in respect to their own

waters (a) .
2. It may, perhaps, be thought that these considerations do not The marine

^®*^®-
apply, with the same force, to those portions of the sea, which wash
the coasts of any particular State, within the distance of a marine
league, or as far as a cannon-shot will reach from' the shore. The

physical power of exercising an exclusive property and jurisdic-
tion, and of excluding the action of other nations within these
limits, exists to a certain degree; but the moral power may,
perhaps, seem to extend no further than to exclude the action of

other nations to the injury of the State by which this right is
•claimed. It is upon this ground that is founded the acknowledged
immunity of a neutral §tate from the exercise of acts of hostility,

hy one belligerent Power against another, within those limits.
This claim has, however, been sometimes extended to exclude other
nations from the innocent use of the waters washing the shores of a
particular State, in peace and in war; as, for example, for the
purpose of participating in the fishery, which is generally appro-
priated to the subjects of the State within that distance of the
coasts. This exclusive claim is sanctioned both by usage and
convention, and must be considered as forming a part of the
positive law of nations (b).
3 . As and sounds, bounded on both sides by the
to straits Straits and
^^"^'^^•
same State, so narrow as to be commanded by
territory of the
oannon-shot from both shores, and communicating- from one sea
to another, we have already seen that the territorial sovereignty
ma,j be limited, by the right of other nations to navigate the seas
thus connected. The physical power which the State, bordering
on both sides the sound or strait, has of appropriating its waters,
and of excluding other nations from their use, is here encountered
by the moral obstacle arising from the right of other nations to

communicate with each other. If the Straits of Gibraltar, for
example, were bounded on both sides by the possessions of the
same nation, and if they were sufficiently narrow to be commanded
by cannon-shot from both shores, this passage would not be the
less freelyopen to all nations; since the navigation, both of the
Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, is free to all. Thus
it has already been stated that the navigation of the Dardanelles
and the Bosphorus, by which the Mediterranean and Black Seas

are connected together, is free to all nations, subject to those regu-
(a) Vide supra, pt. ii. ch. 2, pp. Gens Moderne de I'Europe, § 153.
282 seq. Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i. c. 23,
(6) Martens, Precis du Droit des § 287.
304 EIGHTS OF PKOPEETY.
lations which are indispensably necessary for the security of the

Ottomaji Empire. In the negotiations which preceded the signa-
ture of the treaty of intervention, of the 15th of July;, 1840, it
was proposed, on the part of Russia, that an article should be
inserted in the treaty, recognising the permanent rule of the
Ottoman Empire, that, whilst that empire is at peace, the Straits^
both of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, are considered as shut
against the ships of war of all nations. To this proposition it
was replied, on the part of the British Government, that its
opinion respecting the navigation of these Straits by the ships of
war of foreign nations rested upon a general and fundamental
principle of international law. Every State is considered as
having territorial jurisdiction over the sea which washes its shores^
as far as three miles from low-water mark; arid, consequently,
any strait which is bounded on both sides by the territory of the

same sovereign, and which is not more than six miles wide, lies
within the territorial jurisdiction of that sovereign. But the
Bosphorus and Dardanelles are bounded on both sides by the
territory of the Sultan, and are in m'ost parts less than six miles
wide; consequently his territorial jurisdiction extends over both
those Straits, and he has a right to exclude all foreign ships of
war from those Straits, if he should think proper so to do., By the
Treaty of 1809, Great Britain acknowledged this right on the
part of the Sultan, and promised to acquiesce in the enforcement
of it; and was but just that Russia should make the same
it
engagement. The British Government was of opinion, that the

exclusion of all foreign ships of war from the two Straits would be
more conducive to the maintenance of peace, than an understand-
ing that the Strait in question should be a general thoroughfare,
open, at all times, to ships of war of all countries; but whilst it was
willing to acknowledge by treaty, as a general principle and as a
standing rule, that the two Straits should be closed for all ships
of war, it was of opinion, that if, for a particular emergency, one
of those Straits should be open for one party, the other ought, at
the same time, to be open for other parties, in order that there
should be the same parity between the condition of the two Straits,
when open and shut; and, therefore, the British Government
would expect that, in that part of the proposed Convention which
should allot to each Power its appropriate share of the measures
of execution, it should be stipulated, that if it should become
necessary for a Russian force to enter the Bosphorus, a British

same time, enter the Dardanelles.
force should, at the
The Dar- It was accordingly declared, in the 4th Article of the Conven-
danelles.
tion, that the co-operation destined to plaoe the Straits of tho

Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and the Ottoman capital under
the temporary safeguard of the contracting parties, against all
aggression of Mehemet Ali, should be considered only as a measure

of exception, adopted at the express request of the Sultan, and
solely for his defence, in the single case above mentioned; but
it was agreed that such measure should not derogate, in any
degree, from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue
of which it had, at all times, been prohibited for ships of war
of foreign Powers to enter those Straits. And the Sultan, on the
one hand, declared that, excepting the contingency above men-
tioned, it was his firm resolution to maintain, in future, this
•
principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire,

and, so long as the Porte should be at peace, to admit no foreign
ship of war into these Straits; on the other hand, the four Powers
engaged to respect this determination, and to conform to the above-
mentioned principle.
This rule, and the engagement to respect it, as we have already
seen, were subsequently incorporated into the treaty of the 13th
July, 1841, between the five great European Powers and the
Ottoman Porte; and as the right of the private merchant vessels
of all nations, in amity with the Porte, to navigate the interior
waters of the Empire, which connect the Mediterranean and Bladk
Seas, was recognised by the Treaty of Adrianople, in 1829, be-
—
tween Russia and the Porte, the two principles the one excluding
foreign ships of war, and the other admitting foreign merchant
vessels to navigate those waters —
may be considered as permanently
incorporated into the public law of Europe (c) These principles
.
were again affirmed by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, the London

Conference of 1871, and the Treaty of Berlin, 1878.
The territory of the State includes the lakes, seas, and rivers, Rivers
^ enclosed within its limits.
entirely The rivers which flow throus^h
'^ ^^^'^^^^^
^ . . part of the
the territory also form a part of the domain, from their sources territory of
® ^ ®'
to their mouths, or as far as they flow within the territory, in-
eluding the bays or estuaries formed by their junction with the

sea. Where a navigable river forms the boundary of conterminous
'
States, the middle of the channel, or thalweg,' is generally taken

as the line of separation between the two States, the presumption
of lav/ being that the right of navigation is common to both; but
this presumption may be destroyed by actual proof of prior occu-
(c) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, pp. 577 —583. See ante, pp. 292 seq.
w. 20
pancy and long undisturbed possession, giving to one of the
riparian proprietors the exclusive title to the entire river (d) .
Right of
Things of which the use is inexhaustible, such as the sea and
innocent
running water, cannot be so appropriated as to exclude others
passage on
any manner which does not occasion
rivers flowing: from using these elements in
through
different a loss or inconvenience to the proprietor. This is what is called
States.
an 'innocent use.' Thus we have seen that the jurisdiction pos-
sessed by one nation over sounds, straits, and other arms of the
sea leading through its own territory to that of another, or to
other seas common to all nations, does not exclude others from the
right of innocent passage through these communications. The

same principle applicable to rivers flowing from one State
is
through the territory of another into the sea, or into the territory
of a third State. The right of navigating, for commercial pur-
poses, a river which flows through the territories of different States,
is common to all the nations inhabiting the different parts of ita
banks; but this right of innocent passage being what the text-
'
writers call animperfect right,' its exercise is necessarily modified'

by the safety and convenience of the State affected by it, and can
only be effectually secured by mutual convention regulating the
mode of its exercise (0) There is by no means unanimity of
.
'
opinion, however, among jurists as the right of

to innocent
passage.' Many assert it; but there are not a few who deny it as
a matter of strict law (/) . On the whole, modern views and prac-
tice, as a French writer freedom of navigation, subject
says, favour
to such precautionary measures as may be necessary to safeguard
the riparian States, and to their respective rights of jurisdiction,
police, customs regulations, &c. (g).

Incidental Itseems that this right draws after it the incidental right of
right to use
the banks of using all the means which are necessary to the secure enjoyment
the rivers. of the principal right itself. Thus the Eoman law, which con-
sidered navigable rivers as public or common property, declared
that the right to the use of the shores was incident to that of the
water; and that the right to navigate a river involved the right to
(^) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i.

(e) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.
eh. 22, § 266. Martens, Precis du lib. ii.
cap. 2, §§ 12—14; cap. 3,
Droit des Gens Moderne de I'Europe, §§ 7—12. Vattel, Droit des Gens,
liv. ii. ch.
1, § Heffter, Das
39. liv. ii. ch. 9, §§ 126—130; ch. 10,
Europaische Volkerrecht, §§ 66—77. §§ 132—134. Pufendorf, De Jur.
Cf. Btittemirth v. St. Louis Bridqe Naturae et Gentium, lib. iii. cap. 3,
Co. (1888), 123 Illinois, 535; Scott, §§ 3—6.
Cases, p. 121; and Iowa v. Illinois (/) Of. Westlake, Int. Law, vol. i.
(1893), 147 U. S. 1, where the phrase
" middle of the " (1904), pp. 158
—
9, where the opposing
Mississippi Eiver authorities are tabulated.
was taken to mean the " middle of {g) H. Bonfils, Droit Int. Public,
" or " thread of the
the main channel ^ 524.
stream."
moor vessels to its banks, to lade and unlade cargoes, &c. The
public jurists apply this principle of the Roman civil law to the
same case between nations, and infer the right to use the adjacent
land for these purposes, as means necessary to the attainment of
the end for which the free navigation of the water is permitted (h) .
The incidental right, like the principal right itself, is imperfect These rights
in its nature, and the mutual convenience of both parties must be

'^^® ^™^
consulted in its exercise .
Those who are interested in the enjoyment of these rights may Modification
^
renounce them entirely, or consent to modify them in such manner ^ compact.
as mutual convenience and policy may dictate. A remarkable
instance of such a renunciation found in the Treaty of West-
is
phalia, 1648, confirmed by subsequent treaties, by which the

navigation of the river Scheldt was closed to the Belgic provinces,
in favour of the Dutch. The forcible opening of this navigation
by the French on the occupation of Belgium by the arms of the

French Republic, in 1792, in violation of these treaties, was one .
of the principal ostensible causes of the war between France on

one side, and Great Britain and Holland on the other. By the
Treaties of Vienna, the Belgic provinces were united to Holland
under the same sovereign, and the navigation of the Scheldt was
placed on the same footing of freedom with that of the Rhine and
other great European rivers. And by the Treaty of 1831, for
the separation of Holland from Belgium, the free navigation of
the Scheldt was, in like manner, secured, subject to certain duties,
to be collected by the Dutch Government (i) .
Onthe 16th July, 1863,, a treaty was entered into between Redemption
Belgium and most of the European Powers, by which Belgium tolls,
agreed to suppress the tolls on the Scheldt. Holland had re-
nounced her claims to the tolls on the 12th of May of the same
year, in consideration of an indemnity paid to her by Belgium (k) .
The suppression of the tolls was to apply to every flag, and they
were never to be re-established. Belgium also agreed to abolish
tonnage dues in her ports, and to reduce the pilotage rates pre-
viously charged; but this was only to apply to countries which
were parties to the treaty (I). As a compensation, the signatory
Powers agreed to indemnify Belgium against the claims she had
become liable to, under the treaty with Holland, and to pay her a
(A) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. (i) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations,
lib.ii.
cap. 2, § 15. Pufendorf, De pp. 282—284, 552.
Jur. Naturae et Gentium, lib. iii. (k) Plertslet, Map of Europe by-
cap. 3, § 8.Vattel, Droit des Gens, Treaty, vol. ii. p. 1532.
liv. ii. ch. 9, § 129. (0 The United States was not a
party.
20(2)
total sum, assessed in certain proportions among the contracting

parties {m) .
Treaties of By the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, the commercial navigation

Vienna
of rivers, which separate different States, or flow through their
respecting
respective territories, was declared to be entirely free in their whole
the great
European
course, from the point where each river becomes navigable to its
mouth; provided that the regulations relating to the police of the
navigation should be observed, which regulations were to be uni-
form, and as favourable as possible to the commerce of all
nations (n) .
By the Annexe xvi. to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna,

''
the free navigation of the Rhine is confirmed in its whole course,
from the point where it becomes navigable to the sea, ascending or
descending"; and detailed regulations are provided respecting the
navigation of that river, and the Necker, the Main, the Moselle,
the Meuse, and the Scheldt, which are declared in like manner to
be free from the point where each of these rivers becomes navigable
to its mouth. Similar regulations respecting the free navigation
of the Elbe were established among the Powers interested in the
commerce of that river, by an Act signed at Dresden the 12th
December, 1821. And the stipulations between the different
Powers interested in the free navigation of the Vistula and other
rivers of ancient Poland contained in the treaty of the 3,rd May,
1815, between Austria and Russia, and of the same date between
Russia and Prussia, to which last Austria subsequently acceded,
are confirmed by the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna. The
same treaty also extends the general principles adopted by the
congress relating to the navigation of rivers to that of the Po (o) .
Navigation of These principles were applied to the Danube by the Treaty of

the Danube.
Paris, 1856 (p). It was then declared that "The navigation of
the Danube cannot be subjected to any impediment or charge not
expressly provided for by the stipulations contained in the follow-
ing Articles; in consequence there shall not be levied any toll
founded solely upon the fact of the navigation of the river, nor any
duty upon the goods which may be on board of vessels. The
regulations of police and of quarantine to be established for the
safety of the States separated or traversed by that river, shall be
so framed as to facilitate, as much as possible, the passage of
(m) Hertslet, Map of Europe by torn. ii.

pp. 224—239, 298. Acte
Treaty, vol. ii. p. 1550. Final, Art. 14, 118, 96.
(w) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, (p) Art. XV. Hertslet, Map of
pp. 498—501. Europe by Treaty, vol. ii. p. 1257.
(o) Mayer, Corpus Juris Germanici,
vessels. With the exception of such regulations, no obstacle what-

ever shall be opposed to free navigation." A
European Commis-
sion was then appointed to manage the navigation of the river,
and to carry out the works necessary for this purpose (g) .
In 1865, a public Act was promulgated by the parties to the Neutrality of

Treaty of Paris, by which all the works of the Danube Commis- theC^^^s^^
sion, together with its members and servants, were declared neutral »ôn.
in case of war. This principle was re-affirmed in the Treaty of
London, 1871 ;
but the right of Turkey, as territorial Power,' to
send vessels of war into the river was maintained (r) . When war
broke out between Russia and Turkey in 1877, some stoppage of
the navigation became inevitable, as the lower part of the river
was at first the actual seat of war. Both Austria and England
addressed notes on the subject to the Governments of Russia and
Turkey. It was admitted that the incidents of war might cause
temporary obstacles to the navigation of the Danube; but a demand
was made that this exceptional situation should not be invoked as
a precedent to the prejudice of the liberty of navigation, and that
the measures restricting this liberty, which might become indis-
pensable, should be regulated on international principles, and

should not overstep the limits traced by the most imperious neces-
sity . As
soon as the circumstances of the war permitted, the
belligerents were immediately to restore the freedom of naviga-
tion (s). To this both parties replied, that they would confine
their restrictions on the freedom of neutral commerce to the
narrowest limits that the necessities of the war would admit, and
that these restrictions would be removed as soon as possible (t).
Throughout the discussion it was admitted that the existing

international arrangements did not imply the absolute neutrality
of the river way. The works of the Danube Commission could
alone claim this exemption from the effects of war.
—
By Articles 52 57 of the Treaty of Berlin, all fortresses on
the Danube, from the Iron Gates downwards, were to be razed,
and no new ones erected, and no vessel of war, exclept light police
and customs vessels, is to navigate the river below the same point.
Roumania is added to the European Commission, and the functions!
of the Commission are extended to Galatz. By a treaty signed in
London, 10th March, 1883,, between the signatories to the Berlin
Treaty, the duration of the Commission was prolonged to
(q) Art. xvii. (s) Pari. Papers, Turkey (No. 25),

(r) Pari. Papers, Turkey (No. 29), 1877, pp. 236, 294.
1878, p. 25. Hertslet, Map, vol. iii. (0 Ibid. Turkey (No. 26), 1877,
p. 1922. pp. 26, 113.
24th April, 1904, and its authority was extended to Ibraila,

which is the limit to which great ships are able to ascend (u) .
An agreement of 1904 provided for the continuance of the powers

of the Commission for successive periods of three years' duration,
but gave to each of the eight States rdpresented on it the right
to determine it by an intimation to be made a year before the
conclusion of a triennial period.
Navigation of The
interpretation of the above stipulations respecting the free
the Rhine.
navigation of the Rhine, gave rise to a controversy between the
kingdom of the Netherlands and the other States interested in the
commerce of that river. The Dutch Government claimed the ex-
clusive right of regulating and imposing duties upon the trade,
within its own territory, at the places where the different branches
into which the Rhine divides itself fall into the sea. The (expres-
"
sion in the Treaties of Paris and Vienna
jusqu'a mer," to the
la
"
sea, was said to be different in its import from the term dans la
mer," into the sea; and, besides, it was added, if the upper States
upon the terms of the treaties they must be con-
insist so strictly
tented with the course of the proper Rhine itself. The mass of
waters brought down by that river, dividing itself a short distance
above Nimeguen, is carried to the sea through three principal
channels, the Waal, the Leek, and the Yssel; the first descending
by Gorcum, where it changes its name for that of the Meuse; the
second approaching the sea at Rotterdam; and the third, taking a
northerly course by Zutphen and De venter, empties itself into
Zuyderzee. None of these channels, however, is called the Rhine;
that name is preserved to a small stream which leaves the Leek
at Wyck, takes itsby the learned retreats of Utrecht and
course
Leyden, gradually dispersing and losing its waters among the
sandy downs at Kulwyck. The proper Rhine being thus useless
for the purposes of navigation, the Leek was substituted for it by
common consent of the Powers interested in the question; and the
Government of the Netherlands afterwards consented that the
Waal, as being better adapted to the purposes of navigation, should
be substituted for the Leek. But it was insisted by that Govern-
ment that the Waal terminates at Gorcum, to which the tide
ascends, and where, consequently, the Rhine terminates; all that

remains of that branch of the river from Gorcum to Helvoetsluya
and the mouth of the Meuse is an arm of the sea, inclosed within
the territory of the kingdom, and consequently subject to any
regulations which its Government may think fit to establish.
(t() Pari. Papers, 1883, Danube, No. 5; Holland, p. 233.

On the other side, it was contended by the Powers interested

in the navigation of the river, that the stipulations in the Treaty
of Paris, in 1814, by which the sovereignty of the House of Orange
over Holland was revived, with an accession of territory, and the
navigation of the Rhine was, at the same time, declared to be free

"
from the point where it becomes navigable to the sea," 'were
inseparably connected in the intentions of the allied Powers who
were parties to the treaty. The intentions thus disclosed were
afterwards carried into by the Congress of Vienna, which
effect
determined the union of Belgium to Holland, and confirmed the

freedom of the navigation of the Rhine, as a condition annexed
to this augmentation of territory which had been accepted by the
Government of the Netherlands. The right to the free naviga-
tion of the river, it was said, draws after it, by necessary implica-
tion, the innocent use of the different waters which unite it -with the
" "
sea; and the expression to the sea was, in this respect, equivalent
"
to the term into the sea," since the pretension of the Netherlands
to levy unlimited duties upon its principal passage into the sea
would render wholly useless to other States the privilege of navi-
gating the river within the Dutch territory (x) .
After a long and tedious negotiation, this question was finally The Rhine,
settled by the convention concluded at Mayence, the 31st of March, of
^nvention
1831, between all the riparian States of the Rhine, by which the
navigation of the river was declared free from the point where it
becomes navigable into the sea ("bis in die See"), including its
two principal outlets or mouths in the kingdom of the Netherlands,

the Leek and the Waal, passing by Rotterdam and Briel through
the first-named watercourse, and by Dordrecht and Helvoetsluys
through the latter, with the use of the artificial communication by

the canal of Voorne with Helvoetsluys By the terms of this treaty
.
the Government of the Netherlands stipulates, in case the passages

by the main sea by Briel or Helvoetsluys should at any time
become innavigable, through natural or artificial causes, to indicate
other watercourses for the navigation and commerce of the riparian
States, equal in convenience to those which may be open to the
navigation and commerce of its own subjects. The convention
also provides minute regulations of police and fixed toll-duties on
vessels and merchandise passing through the Netherlands terri-
tory to or from the sea, and also by the different ports of the upper
riparian States on the Rhine (y) .
(x) Annual Register (1826), vol. (y) Martens, Nouveau Rccueil, torn.
Ixviii. pp. 259—363. ix. p. 252.
Navigation B}^ the Treaty of Peace concluded at Paris in 1763(, between

of the
Mississippi. France, Spain, and Great Britain, the province of Canada was
ceded to Great Britain by France, and that of Florida to the same
Power b}' Spain, and the boundary between the French and British
possessions in North America was ascertained by a line drawn
through the middle of the river Mississippi from its source to the
Iberville, and from thence through the latter river and the lakes
of Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea. The right of navi-
gating the Mississippi was at the same time secured to the subjects
of Great Britain from its source to the sea, and the passages in
and out of its mouth, without being stopped, or visited, or sub-
jected to the payment of any duty whatsoever. The provinoe
of Louisiana was soon afterwards ceded by France to Spain; and
by the Treaty of Paris, 1783, Florida was retroceded to Spain by

Great Britain. The independence of the United States was
acknowledged, and the right of navigating the Mississippi was"
secured to the citizens of the United States and the subjects of
Great Britain by the separate treaty between these Powers. But
Spain having become thus possessed of both banks of the
Mississippi at its mouth, and a considerable distance above its
mouth, claimed its exclusive navigation below the point where
the southern boundary of the United States struck the river. This
claim was resisted, and the right to participate in the navigation
of the river from its source to the sea was insisted on by the United
States, under the treaties of 1763 and 1783, as well as by the

law of nature and nations. The dispute was terminated by the
Treaty of San Lorenzo el Real, in 1795, by the 4th Article of
which his Catholic Majesty agreed that the navigation of the
Mississippi, in its whole length, from its source to the ocean,
should be free to the citizens of the United States: and by the
22nd Article, they were permitted to deposit their goods at the
port of New Orleans, and to export them from thence, witliout
paying any other duty than the hire of the warehouses. The sub-
sequent acquisition of Louisiana and Florida by the United States
having included within their territory the whole river from its
source to the Gulf of Mexico, and the stipulation in the treaty of
1783, securing to British subjects a right to participate in its
navigation, not having been renewed by the Treaty of Ghent in
1814, the right of navigating the Mississippi is now vested ex-
clusively in the United States.
Claim of the The right of the United States to participate with Spain in the
United States.
navigation of the river Mississippi, was rested by the American
Government on the sentiment written in deep characters on the
heart of man, that the ocean is free to all men, and its rivers to
all their inhabitants. This natural right was found to be uni-

versally acknowledged and protected in all tracts of country, united
under the same political society, by lading the navigable rivers
open to all their inhabitants. When these rivers enter the limits
of another society, if the right of the upper inhabitants to descend
the stream was in any case obstructed, it was an act of force by a
stronger society against a weaker, condemned by the judgment of
mankind. The then recent case of the attempt of the Emperor
Joseph II. to open the navigation of the Scheldt from Antwerp to
the sea was considered as a striking proof of the general union of
sentiment on this point, as it was believed that Amsterdam had
scarcely an advocate out of Holland, and even there her pretensions
were advocated on the ground of treaties, and not of natural right.
This sentiment of right in favour of the upper inhabitants must
become stronger in the proportion which their extent of country
bears to the lower. The United States held 600,000 square miles
of inhabitable territory on the Mississippi and its branches, and
this river,with its branches, afforded many thousands of miles of
navigable waters penetrating this territory in all its parts. The
inhabitable territory of Spain below their boundary and bordering
on the which alone could pretend any fear of being incom-
river,
moded by their use of the river,was not the thousandth part of
that extent. This vast portion of the territory of the United
States had no other outlet for its productions, and these productions
were of the bulkiest kind. And, in truth, their passage down the
river might not only be innocent, as to the Spanish subjects on
the river, but would not fail to enrich them far beyond their actual
condition. The real interests, then, of the inhabitants, upper and
lower, concurred in fact with their respective rights.
If the appeal was to the law of nature and nations, as expressed Legal view of
* ^^'^-i*^-
by writers on the subject, it was agreed by them, that even if the
river, where passes between Florida and Louisiana, were the
it
exclusive property of Spain, still an innocent passage along it was a

natural right in those inhabiting its borders above. It would,
' '
indeed, be what those writers call an imperfect right, because

the modification of its exercise depends, in a considerable degree,
on the convenience of the nation through which they were to pass.
But it was still a right, as real as any other right, however weU.
defined; and were it to be refused, or to be so shackled by regu-
lations not necessary for the peace or safety of the inhabitants, as'
to render its use impracticable to them, it would then be an injury,

of which they should be entitled to demand redress. The right of
314 EIGHTS OF PKOPERTY.
the upper inhabitants to use this navigation was the counterpart

to that of those possessing the shores below, and founded in the
same natural relations with the soil and water. And the line at
which their respective rights met was to be advanced or withdrawn,
so as to equalize the inconveniences resulting to each party from
the exercise of the right by the other. This estimate was to bie
fairly made with a mutual disposition to make equal sacrifices, and
the numbers on each side ought to have their due weight in the
estimate. Spain held so very small a tract of habitable land on
either side below our boundary, that might in fact be considered
it
as a strait in the sea; for though was eighty leagues from the
it
American southern boundary to the mouth of the river, yet it was

only here and there in spots and slips that the land rises above the
level of the water in times of inundation. There were then, and
ever must be, so few inhabitants on her part of the river, that
the freest use of its navigation might be admitted to Americans
without annoyance to the former (z) .
It was essential to the interests of both parties that the navi-
gation of the river should be free to both, on the footing on which

it ^vâs defined by the Treaty of Paris, viz., through its whole
length. The channel of the Mississippi was remarkably winding,

crossing and recrossing perpetually from one side to the other of
the general bed of the river. Within the elbows thus made by the
channel, there was generally an eddy setting upwards, and it
was b}^ taking advantage of these eddies, and constantly crossing
from one to another of them, that boats were enabled to ascend the
river. Without this right the navigation of the whole river would
be impracticable both to the Americans and Spaniards.
It was a principle that the right to a thing gives a right to
the means without which it could not be used, that is to say, that
the means follow the end. Thus a right to navigate a river draws
to it a right to moor vessels to its shores, to land on them in cases
of distress, or for other necessary purpoises, &c. This principle
was founded in natural reason, was evidenced by the common
sense of mankind, and declared by the writers before quoted.
The Roman law, which, like other municipal laws, placed
the navigation of their rivers on the footing of nature, as to their
own citizens, by declaring them public, declared also that the right
to the use of the shores was incident to that of the water (a). The
(2) The authorities referred to on lib. iii. —

cap. 3, §§ 3 6. Wolff, Insti-
this head were the following: Grrotius, tutiones, §§ 310 312. —
Vattel, liv. i.
De Jur. Bel, ac Pac. lib. ii.
cap. 2, 292; liv. i.
§§ 123—139.
§§ 11—13; c. 3, §§ 7—12. Pufendorf, (a) Inst. liv. ii. t. 1, §§ 1—5.
laws of every country probably did the same. This must have
been so understood between France and Great Britain at the Treaty
of Paris, where a right was ceded to British subjects to navigate
the whole river, and expressly that part between the island of New
Orleans and the western bank, without stipulating a word about
the use of the shores, though both of them belonged then to France,
and were to belong immediately to Spain. Had not the use of
the shores been considered as incident to that of the water, it would
have been expressly stipulated, since its necessity was too obvious
to have escaped either party. Accordingly all British subjects
used the shores habitually for the purposes necessary to the naviga-
tion of the river; and when a Spanish governor undertook at one
time to forbid this, and even cut loose the vessels fastened to the
shores, a British vessel went immediately, moored itself opposite

the town of New Orleans, and set out guards with orders to fire
on such as might attempt to disturb her moorings. The governor
acquiesced, the right was constantly exercised afterwards, and no
interruption ever offered.
This incidental right extends even beyond the shores, when
circumstances render it necessary to the exercise of the principal
right; as in the case of a vessel damaged, where the mere shore
could not be a safe deposit for her cargo till she could be repaired,
she may remove into safe ground off the river. The Roman law
was here quoted too, because it gave a good idea both of the extent
and the limitations of this right (b).
The relative position of the United States and Great Britain Navigation
in respect to the navigation of the great northern lakes and the ^**^®
river St. Lawrence, appears to be similar to that of the United
States and Spain, previously to the cession of Louisiana and
Florida, in respect of the Mississippi; the United States being
in possession of the southern shores of the lakes and the river
St. La wren 00 where their northern boundary linei
to the point
strikes the river,and Great Britain, of the northern shores of
the lakes and the river in its whole extent to the sea,, a;s well as
of the southern banks of the river, from the latitude 45° north
to its mouth.
The claim of the people of the United States, of a right to
navigate the St. Lavnênce to and from the sea, was, in 1826,
the subject of discussion between the American and British
Governments.
Mr. Jefferson's Instructions to 1792. Waite, State Papers, vol. x.

U.
(6)
S. Ministers in Spain, March 18, pp.
—
135 140.
Tbe On the part of the United States Government, this right was
^^^^^ ^^ the same grounds of natural right and obvious
Controversy
between necessity which had formerly been urged in respect to the river
and the Mississippi. The dispute betweendifferent European Powers
United States,
respecting the navigation of the Scheldt, in 1784, was also referred
to in the correspondence on this subject, and the case of tha^t
river was distinguished from that of the St. Lawrence by its
peculiar circumstances. Among others, it is known to have been

alleged by the Dutch, that the whole course of the two branches
of this river which passed within the dominions of Holland wae
entirely artificial that it owed its existence to the skill and labour
;
of Dutchmen; that its banks had been erected and maintained

by them at a great expense. Hence, probably, the motive for
that stipulation in the Treaty of Westphalia, that the lower
Scheldt, with the canals of Sas and Swin, and other mouths of
the sea adjoining them, should be kept closed on the side belonging
to Holland.But the case of the St. Lawrence was totalty diffe-
rent, and the principles on which its free navigation was main-
tained by the United States had recently received an unequivocal
confirmation in the solemn Act of the principal States of Europe.
In the treaties concluded at the Congress of Vienna, it had been
stipulated that the navigatioA of the Rhine, the Necker, the
Main, the Moselle, the Maes, and the Scheldt, should be free
to all nations. These stipulations, to which Great Britain was
a party, might be considered as an indication of the present
judgment of
Europe upon the general question. The importance
of the present claim might be estimated by the fact, that the
inhabitants of at least eight States of the American Union, besides
the territory of Michigan, had an immediate interest in it, besides
the prospective interests of other parts connected with this river
and the inland seas through which it communicates with the ocean .
The right of this great and growing population to the use of this
its only natural outlet to the ocean, was supported by the same
principles and authorities which had been urged by Mr. Jeffer-
son in the negotiation with Spain respecting the navigation of
the river Mississippi. The present claim was also fortified by
the consideration that this navigation was, before the war of the
American Bevolution, the common property of all the British
having been acquired from

subjects inhabiting this continent,
France by the united exertions of the mother country and the
colonies, in the war of 1756. The claim of the United States
to the free navigation of the St. Lawrence was of the same nature
with that of Great Britain to the navigation of the Mississippi,
EIGHTS OF PROPEETY. 317
as recognised by the 7th Article of the Treaty of Paris, 1763.,

when the mouth and lower shores of that river were held by another
Power. The claim, whilst necessary to the United States, was
not injurious to Great Britain, nor could it violate any of her
just rights (c).
On the part of the British Government, the claim was con- The British
^ ^^^'
sidered as involving the question whether a perfect right to the
free navigation of the river St. Lawrence could be maintained
according to the principles and practice of the law of nations.

The liberty of passage to be enjoyed by one nation through
the dominions of another was treated by the most eminent writers
on public law as a qualified, occasional exception to the para-
mount rights of property. They made no distinction between the
right of passage by a river, flowing from the possessions of one
nation through those of another, to the ocean, and the same right
to be enjoyed by means of any highway, whether of land or
water, generally accessible to the inhabitants of the earth. The

right of passage, then, must hold good for other purposes, besides
—
those of trade for objects of war as well as for objects of peace
—for all nations, no less than for any nation in particular, and
be attached to artificial as well as to natural highways. The
principle could not, therefore, be insisted on by the American
Government, unless it was prepared to apply the same principle
by reciprocity, in favour of British subjects, to the navigation

of the Mississippi and the Hudson, access to which from Canada
might be ôbtained by a few miles of land-carriage, or by the

artificial communications created by the canals of New York and
Ohio. Hence the necessity which has been felt by the writers
on public law, of controlling the operation of a principle so ex-
tensive and dangerous, by the
right of transit to
restricting
purposes of innocent utility, to be exclusively determined by the
local sovereign. Hence the right in question is termed by them
an imperfect right. But there was nothing in these writers, or
in the stipulations of the Treaties of Vienna, respecting the navi-
gation of the great rivers of Germany, to countenance the

American doctrine of an absolute natural right. These stipula-
tions were the result of mutual consent, founded on considerations
of mutual interest growing out of the relative situation of the
different States concerned in this navigation. The same observa-
tion would apply to the various conventional regulations which
had been, at different periods, applied to the navigation of the
(c) American Paper on the Naviga- Documents, Session 1827 —1828, No.
tion of the St. Lawrence; Congress 43, Jp. 34.
river Mississippi. As to any supposed right derived from the

simultaneous acquisition of the St. Lawrence by the British and
American people, it could not be allowed to have survived the
treaty of 1783, by which the independence of the United States
was acknowledged, and a partition of the British dominions in
North America was made between the new Government and that
of the mother country {d) .
The American To this argument it was replied, on the part of the Unitcfd
reply.
States, that, if the St. Lawrence were regarded as a strait con-
necting navigable seas, as it ought properly to be, there would
be less controversy. The principle on which the right to navi-
gate straits depends, is, that they are accessorial to those seas
which they unite, and the right of navigating which is not exclu-
sive, but common

to all nations; the right to navigate the seas
drawing that
after of passing the straits.
it The United States
and Great Britain have between them the exclusive right of navi-
gating the lakes. The St. Lawrence connects them with the
ocean. The
right to navigate both (the lakes and the ocean)
includes that of passing from one to the other through the natural
link. Was it then xeasonable or just that one of the two co-
proprietors of the lakes should altogether exclude his associate

from the use of a common bounty of nature, necessary to the full
enjoyment of them? The distinction between the right of passage,
claimed by one nation through the territories of another, on land,
and that on navigable water, though not always clearly marked
by the writens on public law, has a manifest existence in the
nature of things. In the former case the passage can hardly
ever take place, especially if it be of numerous bodies, without
some detriment or inconvenience to the State whose territory is
traversed. But in the case of a passage on water no such injury
is sustained. The American Government did not mean to con-
tend for any principle, the benefit of which, in analogous circum-
stances, it would deny to Great Britain. If, therefore, in the
further progress of discovery, a connection should be developed
between the river Mississippi and Upper Canada, similar to that
which exists between the United States and the St. Lawrence,
the American Government would be always ready to apply, in
respect to the Mississippi, the same ^principles it contended for
in respect to the St. Lawrence. But the case of rivers, which
rise and debouch altogether within the limits of the same nation,
ought not to be confounded with those which, having their sources
{d) British Paper on the Navigation of the St. Lawrence; Session 1827 —
28, No. 43, p. 41.
EIGHTS OF PKOPEETY. 319
and navigable portions of their streams in States above, finally
discharge themselves within the limits of other States below. In

the former case, the question as to opening the navigation to
other nations depended upon the same considerations which might
influence the regulation of other commercial intercourse with
foreign States, and was to be exclusively determined by the local
sovereign. But in respect to the latter, the free navigation of
tlio river was a natural right in the
upper inhabitants, of which
they could not be entirely deprived by the arbitrary caprice of
the lower State. Nor was the fact of subjecting the use of thia
right to treaty regulations, as was proposed at Vienna to be done
in respect to the navigation of the European rivers, sufficient to
prove that the origin of the right was conventional, and not
natural. It often happened to be highly convenient, if not some-
times indispensable, to avoid controversies by prescribing certain
rules for the enjoyment of a natural right. The law of nature,
though sufficiently intelligible in its great outlines and general

purposes, does not always reach every minute detail which is
called forby the complicated wants and varieties of modern navi-
gation and commerce. Hence the right of navigating the ocean
itself, in many instances, principally incident to a state of war,
is subjected, by innumerable treaties, to various regulations.
These regulations —the transactions of Vienna, and other analo-
gous
—
stipulations ^should be regarded only as the spontaneous
homage of man to the paramount Lawgiver of the universe, by
delivering his great works from the artificial shackles and selfish
contrivances to which they have been arbitrarily and unjustly
subjected (e).
The controversy was provisionally settled by the Reciprocity Reciprocity-
^^^^^^^^ ^^^*-
Treaty of June 5, 1854, of which Article 4 gave to the inhabitants
of the United States the right to navigate the river St. Lawrence
and the canals in Canada as a means of communication between
the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Ocean, subject to the same tolls
and assessments imposed on British subjects. British subjects
obtained a similar right of navigating Lake Michigan and the
"
State canals. This treaty, however, was made terminable on

notice; and in 1866 the United States thus renounced it. few A
years later the questionwas definitely settled by the Treaty of
Washington, May 8, 1871, which declared (Article xxvi.) that
"The navigation of the river St. Lawrence, ascending and de- Treaty of
scending, from the 45th parallel of north latitude, where it ceases i87i,a8tothe
St.Lawrence.
(e) Mr. Secretary Clay's letter to Mr. Gallatin, June 19, 1826. Session
1827—1828, No. 43, p. 18.
to form the boundary between the two countries, from, to, and
into the sea, shall for ever remain free and open for the purposes
of commerce to the citizens of the United States, subject to any
laws and regulations of Great Britain, or of the Dominion .of
Canada, not inconsistent with such privilege of free naviga-
tion" (/). In 1909 a treaty between the two Powers was con-
cluded, regulating the navigation and use of boundary waters {g).
African By the General Act of the Berlin Conference, 1885, the trade
rivers.
^^ ^^l nations, except in so far as any independent sovereign State
may neglect to apply this principle within its territory, is to
enjoy complete freedom in the basin of the Congo, its mouth and
circumjacent regions, extending to the Indian Ocean and the
Zambesi. The signatory parties bind themselves to respect the
neutrality of the same free trade zone, so long as ',the ruling
Powei" in any territory within it shall fulfil the duties which
neutrality requires; and in case any such Power shall be engaged

in war, the signatory Powers bind themselves to use their good
offices to the end that any territory within' the free trade zone,
belonging to either belligerent,may be placed, in effect, in very

much the same position as though it were neutral territory. The
navigation of the Congo is to remain free for the m;}rchant ships

of all nations equally. The provisions of the Act of Navigation
arc to remain in force in time of war. Consequently all nations,
whether neutral or belligerent, are to be always free, for the
purposes of trade, to navigate the Congo and the territorial waters

fronting the embouchure of the river, except in so far as concerns
the transport of articles intended for a belligerent and, in virtue
of the law of nations, regarded as contraband of war. Provisions
of a like nature were made in respect of the navigation of the
Niger (/i).
International The Scientific progress of the world has added another mode of
canals
water communication, viz., by international canals, which has
given rise to very important questions of international law. The
Suez Canal, between the continents of Africa and Asia, has long-
been an accomplished fact, and a successful commercial specu-
lation; whilst the Panama Canal, between North and South
America, after a somewhat chequered career of the project, was
(/) Treaty of Washing-

Art. xxvi. pp. 239 seq.
See Appendix C. Map of i\.frica by
ton, 1871. (A) Hertslet,
{g) American Journal of Inter- Treaty, p. 20. British Pari. Papers,
national Law, Supplement, vol. iv. Africa, No. 4 (1885), pp. 308, 311.
opened to commerco on August 15, 1914 (^). In the former of

these cases the works are the property of a commercial corpora-
tion, and are situated entirely within the territories of the State
where they are located. But their importance as maritime high-
ways for the whole world is, and will be, enormous, while their
value to the actual States where they are situated is merely con-
fined to such local prosperity as may be derived from the transit
of passengers and goods through the canals. Thus the question
of keeping these waterways open at all times, and under all cir-
cumstances, becomes one of paramount importance to countries
that have no direct connection with the States where the canals
are situated. In theory, Egypt and the newly constituted Re-
public of Panama ought respectively to have absolute control
over the Suez and Panama Canals; but the interests of other coun-
tries in these works are so vast and far-reaching, that it is found
practically impossible to admit any such rights. The Suez Canal
was made chiefly with French capital, while about three-fifths of
the traffic passing through it is English (k) and the maintenance
;
of the military connection between England and India makes the

•canal far more important to England than to any other country.
The United States consider that the Panama Canal would render
their Western seaboard much more liable to attack by a European
countrj' than it now is; and on this ground they consider them-
selves to have a most important interest in its control, although
the canal is hundreds of miles from the nearest point of their
territory.
It is impossible to lay down any general rule to meet all such
cases as these. The situation of the waterway and the States
whose commercial or other interests require its maintenance must
all bo considered.
The considerations noticed in the preceding paragraphs induced The Suez
the British Government, in 1875, to purchase from the Khedive
of Egypt a large number of shares in the Suez Canal, which the
latter in his private capacity of shareholder. The Turko-
owned
Russian War of 1887 gave rise to apprehensions lest either of the
belligerents should endeavour to close the canal, or commit acts of
hostility in or near it; and strong opinions were expressed in
the British Parliament to the effect that Great Britain would insist
(*) During the first six months of of 4,979 vessels, with a gross tonnage
operation, ending Feb. 14, 1915, 496 of 19,758,040, which passed through
vessels (excluding canal vessels and the canal, 2,902, with a gross tonnage
launches) passed through tlie canal, of 11,887,170, were British (Sfcates-
with a tonnage of 2,367,244. man's Year Book, 1915).
(k) In the year 1913, out of a total
w. 21
canal being kept open. M. de Lesseps, the engineer of the

Oil tlio
canal and president of the company, on 10th May, 1877, laid

before Lord Derby a proposal for its neutralization. His lordship
declined to accept the scheme as put forward by M. de Lesseps,
but ho "intimated to the Russian ambassador that an attempt to
blockade, or otherwise to interfere with the canal or its approaches,
would bo regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a menace to
India, and as a grave injury to the commerce of the world."
"Any such step would be incompatible with the maintenance by
Her Majesty's Government of an attitude of passive neutrality."
"
Her Majesty's Government will expect that the Porte and the
Khedive will on their side abstain from impeding the navigation
of the canal, or adopting any measures likely to injure the canal
or its approaches, and they are firmly determined not to permit
the canal to be made the scene of any combat, or other warlike
operations" (Z).
One main object of the British occupation of Egypt in 1882
was to protect the canal against injury; and in August of that
year, British war vessels and transports entered the canal, which
was thereafter used as the British base of operations, and was
patrolled by armed boats and launches belonging to Her Majesty's
ships. Thes>3 acts, however, were done under the authority of the
Khedive, and in his interest {m) .
Early in 1883, Lord Granville had proposed to the Powers that

the canal should be neutralized (?2). By a declaration, ^vhich
was signed at London on the 17th March, 1885, by Lord Gran-
ville and the ambassadors of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France,
Italy, and Eussia, and, on the last day but one of the same
month, by Musurus Pasha on behalf of Turkey, after reciting
that the Powers had agreed to recognise the urgent necessity for
negotiating with the object of sanctioning, by a Conventional

Act, the establishment of a definite regulation guaranteeing at
all times, and for all Powers, the freedom of the Suez Canal, it is
declared that has been agreed between the seven Governments

it
that a commission composed of delegates named by the said

Governments shall meet at Paris on the 30th March to preparo
and draw up this Act, taking for its basis the circular in whicli,'
Lord Granville had made the proposal above mentioned (o).
The sittings of the commission terminated in the summer of the
(V) Lord Derby

to Lord Lyons, (w) ParL Papers, Egypt, No. 2
letli May, 1877. Pari. Papers, Egypt, (1882).
No. 1 (1877). (o) Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 6
(m) Ante, pp. 57 seq. (1885); Holland, European Concert,
pp. 194, 195.
saiiKiyear. A
general agreement upon many points had been
arrived at, but there were some on which a difference of opinion
still remained; the principal divergence being in reference to the
question of superintendence to insure the execution of the treaty.
After protracted negotiations between the two (Jovernments (the
cliietpoints in dispute being the one specified above, the extent
—
of the area to be neutralized the French Government wishing to
include the "approaches" to the canal, a strip of land on either
side ofit, and a large part of the territorial waters of Egypt, while
Great Britain Avas desirous of confining the treaty to the canal
itself, and its —

immediate ports ând as to how far the territorial
rulers, the Sultan, and the Khedive, should be left unfettered to
take such measures as they might think fit for defending the
canal from attack) a draft convention was signed by M. Flourens
and Mr. Egerton at Paris on the 24th October, 1887. The draft
was communicated by the French Government to the other Powers,
and after much correspondence, the Convention, which, as amended
to suit Turkey, had been approved in the previous July by Great
Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy,

Spain and;
the Netherlands, was finally signed at Constantinople
on the 29th October, 1888, by the representatives of all those
Powers and Turkey, the ratifications being exchanged in the fol-
lowing December (p) .
The effect of the Treaty of Constantinople, or, as it was

commonly called, the Suez Canal Convention, is to open the canal
in time of war as in time of peace to every vessel of commerce or
of war, without distinction of flag, and to free it from the exercise
of the right of blockade. But in time of war, the canal, as respects
the ships of belligerents, will be in a position analogous to that of a
neutral port. No acts of hostility may be committed within the
limits of the canal or its ports of access, or within a distance of'
three miles therefrom. The warships of a belligerent may not use
the canal to embark or disembark troops (a prohibition that is not
to apply, however, to the landing of unarmed invalid soldiers at
the hospitals of Suez and Port Said) (g), or to revictual or take
in stores, or to remain in the canal or its ports of access foir more
than twenty -four hours, except in case of necessity as provided;
and prizes are subject to the same restrictions. If vessels of
different belligerents are in the canal or ports of access at the same
time, a period of twenty-four hours must intervene between the

departure of any vessel belonging to one belligerent and that of
(??) Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 2 (</) Cf. Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 1
(18b9). (1888).
21(2)
any belonging to the other.

vessel Men-of-war may not be
stationed inside the canal; but each Power that is not a belligerent
may station two warships in the ports of Suez or Port Said. The
agents in Egypt of the signatory Powers are to watch over the

execution of the treaty, the necessary measures for insuring which
are to be taken by the Egyptian Government. In case tho
Egyptian Government should not have sufficient means at its dis-
posal, it is to call upon the Imperial Ottoman Government, which

is totake the necessary measures, giving notice to the signatory
Powers, and concerting, if necessary, with them on the subject.
The provisions as to belligerent vessels and the landing of troops,
the stationing of war vessels, and superintendence, are not to
interfere with the measures which the Sultan and the Khedive
may find it necessary to take for securing, by their own forces, the
defence of Egypt, and the maintenance of public order, or occasion
any obstacle to the measures which the Imperial Ottoman Govern-
ment may think it necessary to take in order to insure by its own
forces tho defence of its other possessions situated on the eastern
coast of the Red Sea. Though measures to be taken in either ,of
these respects are not to interfere with the free use of the canal,
none of the contracting parties are to endeavour to obtain, with
respect to the canal, territorial or commercial advantages or privi-
leges. The rights of Turkey as the territorial Power are reserved,
and, with the exception of the obligations expressly provided by
the treaty, the sovereign rights of the Sultan, and the rights and
immunities of the Khedive, are in no way affected.
Great Britain in signing the convention reserved to herself
liberty of action, in view of the transitional state of Egypt at tho

time. But in the Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco
(Article VI.), contained in the Anglo-French Agreement, 1904,
she notified her acceptance of the stipulations contained in tho
Canal Convention, though she had observed them before then (r) .
Panama In 1846, a treaty was ratified between the United States and
^^^^
the Eepublic of Colombia (then called New Granada), by which
a right of transit over the Isthmus of Panama was given to the
United States, and the free transit over the Isthmus "from the
one to the other sea" guaranteed by both the contracting Powers.
As a consequence of this treaty, the Panama Railroad was built
by American capital, and completed in 1855. In 1849, the United
States entered into another treaty with Nicaragua for the con-
(r) See Appendix D.

structioR of a ship canal from Grey town (San Juan) on the

Atlantic side to the Pacific coast,
by way of the lake of Nicaragua;
and the idea of carrying out this work appears to have been
seriously entertained at the time. But the question was compli-
cated by England claiming la protectorate over the Mosquito
Indians, in whose territory the Atlantic end of the canal woujd
of necessity be placed. The United States declined to admit the
validity of this claim, but disputes were for the time being avoided
by a treaty, 1850 (known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty), that was
agreed whereby the proposed canal was placed under the joint
to,
protection of England and the United States. By Article I. of

"
this treaty, both these Governments declare that neither the one
nor the other will ever obtain or maintain for itself any oxclusive?
control over the said ship canal; agreeing that neither will ever;
erect or maintain any fortifiqations commanding the same, or in
the vicinity thereof, or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume
or exercise any dominion over, Nicaragua, Costa Kica, the
Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America." Nor was either

"
Government take advantage of any intimacy or use any alli-
to
ance, connection, or influence, that either may possess with any

State or Government through whose territory the canal may pass
for the purpose of acquiring or holding, directly or indirectly, for
the citizens or subjects of the one, any rights or advantages in
regard to commerce or navigation through the said canal which

shall not be offered on the same terms to the citizens or subjects
of the other." By Article II., it was provided that, in case of
war hetween the contracting parties, vessels of either traversing the
canal should be exempt from blockade, detention, or capture by
the other. By Article V., the contracting parties further engage
that when the said canal shall have been completed, they will
protect it from interruption, seizure, or unjust confiscation, and

that they will guarantee the neutrality, so that the said canal 'may
for ever be open and free, and the capital invested therein secure."
But this protection might be withdrawn after six months' notice
by were of opinion that the Canal

either party, if either or both
Company were making vexatious regulations, or unduly favouring

the trade of one party to the prejudice of the other. By Article
VIII., Great Britain and the United States also agreed to extend
their protection to any other communications across the isthmus,
whether by railway or canal.
The attempt of M. de Lesseps to construct a canal across the
Isthmus of Panama, and its tragic failure, are matters of recent
*
history. During the course of the ojDerations the United States

showed a constant apprehension lest the canal, when completed,
should fall under the control of any European Power or combina-
tion of Powers. At a crisis in the affairs of the company, when it
seemed possible that the French Government might be induced to
afford financial or official assistance, the United States Senate
23assed a resolution to the effect that the American Government

would look with serious concern and disapproval upon any con-
nection of any EurojDcan Government with the construction or
control of any ship canal across the Isthmus of Darien or Central
America, and must regard any such connection or control as in-
jurious to the just rights of the United States, and a menace to
their welfare (s) .
For some years the project of constructing a ship canal was in

abeyance, but it was revived by the United States to whom the
severance of their Atlantic and Pacific sea-boards by the whole
length of the South American continent was growing more and

more intolerable in view of their annexation of the Hawaian
Islands, and the prospective expansion of American influence and
commerce in the Pacific. Finally, the Government resolved upon
the construction of a canal either across the Isthmus of Panama,
or through the territory of Nicaragua. But before taking any
further steps it was resolved to obtain a fuller control over the
canal when completed thaia was permissible under the terms of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty. In 1901 a treaty was negotiated be-

tween Mr. Hay and Lord Paunoefote, then British Ambassador
at Washington, by the 1st Article of which the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, therein described as the Convention of April 19th, 1850,

was declared be superseded. By the 2nd Article it was agreed
to
that a canal might be constructed under the auspices of the United
States Government, either directly at its own cost or by a gift or
loan of money to individuals or corporations, or
through subscrip-
tion to or purchase of stock or shares; and that, subject to the
provisions of the present treaty, the said Government should have'

and enjoy all rights incident to such construction, as well as the
exclusive right of providing regulations for the management of
the canal. The Srd Article adopted, as the basis of the neutraliza-
tion of the canal, rules borrowed from the Convention of Constanti-
nople of October ^Sth, 1888, for the free navigation of the Suez
Canal. Of these the most important was the first one: ''That—
(s) See The Times, Jan. 8th, 1889.
EIGHTS OF PKOPEETY. 327
the canal shall be free and open to vessels of commjerce and .war
of all nations observing these rules on the terms of entire equality,
so that there shall be no discriminations against any such nation or
its citizens or subjects in respect of the conditions or charges of
traffic or otherwise: such conditions and charges of traffic to be just
and equitable." It was further agreed that no change in the
territorial sovereignty or international relations of the country or*
countries traversed by the canal should affect the general principle

of neutralization or the obligation of the contracting parties.
The treaty was ratified by the Senate on the 16th of December,
1901 (t). The Panama route was ultimately decided upon, but
the Colombian Government showed themselves unwilling to carry
out the provisions of the treaty of 1841, under which the United
States claimed the right to construct a canal. On November 5th,
19031, a revolution on the Isthmus, by which the inhabitants of
the adjacent territory declared themselves independent of the
Colombian Government, resulted in the proclamation of the
Republic of Panama, whose existence was recognised with remark-
able promptitude by the United States; and when President
Roosevelt sent his message to Congress on December 7th, he was
in a position to lay before the Senate a treaty (known as the Hay-
Varilla Treaty) with the new Republic for the building of a canal
"
across the Isthmus of Panama. He stated that there is granted
to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation, and control
of a strip ten miles wide and extending three nautical miles into
the sea at either terminal, with all lands lying outside of the
zone necessary for the construction of the canal or for its auxiliary
works, and \vith the islands in the Bay of Panama." In con-
sideration of this grant, an immediate payment of ten million
dollars was to be made, and after the lapse of nine years an annual
payment of a quarter of a million dollars.

The question as to whether the United States is entitled to erect
fortifications at the entrances to the Panama Canal appears to have

given some controversy. By the treaty of 1903. with
rise to
Panama, the United States acquired the right of fortification; but

in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty nothing is said of such a right.
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty expressly prohibited the erection of
fortifications, and the first draft of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty
contained a clause to the same effect. This clause was, however,
(t) The negotiations which led to details would be out of place in these
the eventual ratification of the Hay- pages. See Pari. Papers, United
Pauncefote Treaty form a curious No. 1
States, (1900) [Cd. 30]; and
chapter in diplomatic history, but the Annual Register, 1900, p. 418.
»328 RIGHTS OF PROPEliTY.
deliberately omitted from the final form of the latter treaty, which
superseded the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. In the absence of an
express exemption it would seem, therefore, that the United States
may erect fortifications; for when it was intended, in the case of
the Suez Canal, to forbid such a proceeding, express clauses were
inserted to that effect {ii) .
(m) For arguments for and against (1909), pp. 354 seq., 885 seq.) vol. iv.
the fortification of the Panama Canal, (1910), pp. 324 seq.
see Amer. Journ. of Int. Law, vol. iii.
329
PAET THIRD.
INTERNATIONAL EIGHTS OF STATES IN THEIR PACIFIC

EELATIONS.
CHAPTEE I.
RIGHTS OF LEGATION.
There is no circumstance which, marks more distinctly the Usage of
progress of modern civilization than the institution of permanent a^p^âtic

diplomatic missions between different States. The rights of am-
missions,
bassadors were known, and, in some degree, respected by the classic

nations of antiquity {x). During the middle ages they were less
distinctly recognised, and was not until the seventeenth century:
it
that they were firmly established. The institution of resident

permanent legations at all the European courts took place subse-
quently to the Peace of Westphalia (1648), and was rendered
expedient by the increasing interest of the different States in each
other's affairs, growing out of more extensive commercial and
political relations,and more refined speculations respecting the

balance of power, giving them the right of mutual inspection as to
all transactions by which that balance might be affected. Hence
the rights of legation have become definitely ascertained and in-
corporated into the international code .
Every independent State has a right to send public ministers Eight to send
1
which
•
1
•
it
1
•
••11-
to, and receive ministers from, any other sovereign State with ^}^^ obliga-
and amity. No
desires to maintain the relations of peace
P 1 •
T.T
^^^^
public
^ receive
^"^^«^»-
State, strictly speaking, is obliged, by the positive law of nations,
to send or receive public ministers, although the usage and comity
of nations seem to have established a sort of reciprocal duty in this
respect. It is evident, however, that this cannot be more than

an imperfect obligation, and must be modified by the nature and
(ic) Cf. Phillipson, Int. Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Kome,
vol. i. ch. 13.
330 RIGHTS OF LEGATION
importance of the relations to be maintained between different

States by means of diplomatic intercourse (a) .
Rights of How far the rights of legation belong to dependent or semi-

legation, to
what States sovereign States must depend upon the nature of their peculiar
belonging. relation to the superior State under whose protection they are
placed. Thus, by the treaty concluded at Kinardgi, in 1774, be-

tween Russia and the Porte, the provinces of Moldavia and
Wallachia, placed under the protection of the former Power,
obtained the right of sending charges d'affaires of the Greek com-
munion to represent them at the Court of Constantinople (6).
So also of confederated States,; their right of sending public
ministers to each other, or to foreign States, depends upon the
peculiar nature and constitution of the union by which they are

bound together. Under the constitution of the former German
Empire, and that of the Germanic Confederation, this right was
preserved to all the princes and States composing the federal
union (c). Such was also the former constitution of the United
Provinces of the Low Countries, and such is now that of the.
Swiss Confederation. By the constitution of the United States of
America every State is expressly prohibited from entering, without
the consent of Congress, into any treaty, alliance, or confederation,
with any other State of the Union, or with a foreign State, or from
entering, without the same consent, into any agreement or compact
with another State, or with a foreign Power. The original power
of sending and receiving public ministers is essentially modified,
if itbe not entirely taken away, by this prohibition (d) .
How affected The question, to what department of the Government belongs

by civil war
or contest the right of sending and receiving public ministers, also depends
for the
upon the municipal constitution of the State. In monarchies,
sovereignty.
whether absolute or constitutional, this prerogative usually resides
in the sovereign. In republics, it is Vested either in the chief
magistrate, or in a senate or council, conjointly with, or exclusive;
of, such magistrate. In the case of a revolution, civil war, or other
(a) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iv. therefore the right of sending diplo-
ch. 5, §§ 56—65. Rutherforth, Insti- matic representatives to the Porte, and
tutes, vol. ii. b. ii. ch. 9, § 20. to other countries, on the same terms
Martens, Precis du Droit dos Gens as other independent States. See
Moderne de I'Europe, liv. vii. ch. 1, Treaty of Berlin, Art. 43.
§§ 187—190. (6") It is now merged in that of the
(b) Vattel, liv. iv. ch. 5, § 60. German Empire.
Kliiber, Droit des Gens Moderne de {d) Heffter, Das Europaische Vol-
I'Europe, st. 2, tit. 2, ch. 3, § 175. kerrecht, § 200. Merlin, Repertoire,
Merlin, Repertoire, tit. Ministre Pub- tit. Ministre Publiqne, sect. ii. § 1,
liqiie, sect. ii. § 1, No. 3, 4. Rou- No. 5. As to the reception of the
mania, these united provinces are
as, Dutch ambassadors in the sixteenth
now now acquired complete
called, has century, see Motley, Life of John
independence, which is recognised by Barneveld (1874), vol. i. ch. 1.
the Treaty of Berlin. This State Ivas
EIGHTS OF LEGATION. 331
contest for the sovereignty, although, strictly speaking, the nation

has the exclusive right of determining in whom the legitimate
authority of the country resides, yet foreign States must of neces-
sity judge for themselves whether they will recognise the Govern-
ment de facto, by sending to, and receiving ambassadors from, it;
or whether they will continue tlieir accustomed diplomatic rela-

tions with the prince whom they choose to regard as the legitimate
sovereign, or suspend altogether these relations with the nation in

question. So, also, where an empire is severed by the revolt of a
province or colony declaring and maintaining its independence,
foreign States are governed by expediency in determining whether
they will eommence diplomatic intercourse with the new State,
or wait for its recognition by the metropolitan country (e).
For the jDurpose of avoiding the difficulties which might arise
from a formal and positive decision of these questions, diplomatic
agents are frequently substituted, who are clothed with the powers,
and enjoy the immunities, of ministers, though they are not in-
vested with the representative character, nor entitled to diplo-
matic honours.
It was on this footing that Messrs. Slidell and Mason, the Communi-
emissaries of the Confederate States, who were seized on board ^^^^^^^
^
the Trent, were sent to Europe (/). During the continuance of a
rebellion, although foreign States may refuse to recognise the
insurgents in any way, or to enter into regular diplomatic inter-

course with them, it s-ometimes becomes necessary for the protection
of their own commerce and subjects, that foreign States should
communicate with the rebel authorities. Lord Russell has laid
"
it down Her Majesty's Government hold it to be an un-
that
doubted principle of international law, that when the persons or
the property of the subjects or citizens of a State are injured by a
de facto Government, the State so aggrieved has a right to claim
from the de facto Government redress and reparation; and also
that in cases of apprehended losses or injury to their subjects.
States may lawfully enter into communication with de facto
Governments to provide for the temporary security of the persons
and property of their subjects" {g).
As no State is under a perfect obligation to receive ministers Conditional
^
from another, it may annex such conditions to their reception as fQêLn^^
it thinks fit; but when once received, they are in all other respects ministers.
(e) Vide supra, Pt. I. ch. 2, pp. 38 1862 (No. 5), p. 34. See ante,Ft. II.
seq. Merlin, Repertoire, tit. Ministre ch. 2, p. 178.
Pnblique, sect. ii. § 6. (g) Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, 26th
(/) Wheaton (Lawrence), p. 378, Nov. 1861. U. S. Dipl. Cor. 18G2,
n. 118. Pari. Papers, N. America, p. 8.
332 EIGHTS OF LEGATION.
entitled to the privileges annexed by the law of nations to their
public character. Thus some Governments have established it as

a rule not to receive one of their own native subjects as a minister
from a foreign Power; and a Government may receive one of its
own subjects under the express condition that he shall continue
amenable to the local laws and jurisdiction. So also one court
may refuse to receive a particular individual as minister from
another court, alleging the motives on which such refusal is
grounded Qi) .
Classification The primitive law of nations makes no other distinction be-

of public
ministers.
tween the different classes of public ministers, than that which
arises from' the nature of their functions; but the modern usage
of Europe having introduced into the voluntary law of nations
certain distinctions in this respect, which, for want of exact defi-
nition, became the perpetual source of controversies, uniform rules
were at last adopted by the Congress of Vienna (1815), and that
of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), which put an end to those disputes.
By the rules thus established, public ministers are divided into

the four following classes:
1 Ambassadors, and papal legates ,or nuncios (^)
. .
2. Envoys, 'ministers, or others accredited to sovereigns (' aupres

des souverains').
3,. Ministers resident accredited to sovereigns.
4. Charges d'affaires accredited to the minister of foreign

affairs {]{,)
.
(h) Bynkershoek, De Foro Lega- "Celle des charges d'affaires accr6-

torum, cap. 11, § 10. Martens, Manuel dites aupres des ministres charges des
affaires etrangeres.
Diplomatique, ch. 1, § 6. Merlin,
Repertoire, tit. Ministre Publique, "Art. 2. Les ambassadeurs, 16gats
sect. iii. § 5. A
recent instance of ou nonces, ont seuls le caractere re-
the exercise of this right occurred in presentatif.
1891, when the Chinese Government "Art. 3. Les employes diploma-
refused to accept as Minister of the tiques en mission extraordinaire, n'ont,
United States at Pekin a gentleman h ce titre, aucune superiorite de rang.
who had used strong language in the "Art. 4. Les employes diploma-
Senate on the occasion of the Chinese tiques prendront rang, entre eux, dans
Exclusion Bill; Annual Register, 1891. chaque classe, d'apr^s la date de la
notification officielle de leur arrivee.
(i) Since the abolition of the Pope's
"Le present r^glement n'apportera
temporal power, 1870, papal legates aucune
and nuncios have necessarily lost their innovation relativement aux
character of public ministers. representans du Pape.
' ' "Art. 5. II sera determine dans
(Jc) The r^giement of the Con-
chaque 6tat une mode uniforme pour
gress of Vienna of the 19th of March,
1815, provides:
— la reception des employes diploma-
tiques de chaque classe.
"Art. 1. Les employes diploma- "Art. 6. Les liens de parente ou
tiques sont partages en trois classes: d'alliance de famille entre les cours, ne
" Celle des
ambassadeurs, l%ats ou donnent aucun rang a leurs employes
nonces ; diplomatiques.
"Oelle des envoyes, ministres, ou "II en est de meme des alliancesi
autresaccr6ditcs aupres des souverains; politiques.
Ambassadors and lOther public ministers of the first class are Ambassadors,
exclusively entitled to what is called the representative character^

being considered as peculiarly representing the sovereign or State
by whom they are delegated, and entitled to the same honours to
which their constituent would be entitled, were he personally pre-
sent. This must, however, be taken in a general sense, as indi-
cating the sort of honours to which they are entitled; but the exact
ceremonial to be observed towards this class of ministers depends
upon usage, which has fluctuated at different periods of European
history. There is a slight shade of difference between ambassadors
ordinary and extraordinary; the former designation being exclu-
sively applied to those sent on permanent missions, the latter to
those employed on a particular or extraordinary occasion, though
it is sometimes extended to those
residing at a foreign court for
an indeterminate period (I) .
The right of sending ambassadors is exclusively confined to

crowned heads, the great republics, and other States entitled to
royal honours (m') .
All other public ministers are destitute of that particular cha- Ministers of
second
racter which is supposed to be derived from representing generally
*^^
the person and dignity of the sovereign. They represent him
only in respect to the particular business committed to their charge
which they are accredited (n)
at the court to .
Ministers of the second class are envoys, envoys extraordinary,

and ministers plenipotentiary, while those of the pope are called
internuncios (o) .
So far as the relative rank of diplomatic agents may be deter- Diplomatic

^^^^*
mined by the nature of their respective functions, there is no ^^^^^
essential difference first class and
between public ministers of the
those of the second. Both are accredited by the sovereign, or
supreme executive power of the State, to a foreign sovereign. The
"Art. 7. Dans lea actes ou traites cr6dit6s aupr^s d'elles, formeront, par
entre plusieurs puissances, qui admet- rapport k leur rang, une classe inter-
tent I'alternat, le sort decidera, entre mldiaire entre les ministres du second
les ministres, de I'ordre qui devra etre ordre et les charges d'affaires." State
suivi dans les signatures." Martens, Papers, vol. v. p. 1090.
Nouv. Eec. ii. 449. Q) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iv.
The protocol of the Congress of Aix- —
ch. 6, §§ 70 79. Martens, Precis du
la-Chapelle of the 21st November, Droit des Gens Moderne de I'Europe,
1818, declares: liv. vii. ch. 9, § 192. Martens, Manuel
"Pour 6viter les discussions des- Diplomatique, ch. 1, § 9.
agreables qui pourraient avoir lieu k (m) Martens, Precis, &c., liv. vii.
I'avenir sur un point d'etiquette dip- ch, 2, § 198. Vide ante,Yt. II. ch. 4,
lomatique, que I'annexe du recez do p. 262.
Vienne, par lequel les questions de (w) Martens, Manuel Diplomatique,
rang ont 6te reglees, ne parait pas ch. 1, § 10.
avoir prcvu, il est arrete entre les cinq (o) Ibid.
cours, que les ministres residens, ac-
334 RIGHTS OF LEGATION.
distinction between ambassadors and envoys was originally
grounded upon the supposition, that the former are authorized to

negotiate directly with the sovereign himself; whilst the latter,
although accredited to him, are only authorized to treat with the
minister of foreign affairs or other person empoiwered by the
sovereign. The authority to treat directly with the sovereign
was supposed to involve a higher degree of confidence, and to
entitle the person, on whom it was conferred, to the honours duo
to the highest This distinction, so far

rank of public ministers.
as it is founded upon any essential difference between the functions
of the two classes of diplomatic agents, is more apparent than real.
The usage of all times, and especially the more recent times, autho-
rizes public ministers of every class to confer, on all -suitable
occasions, with the sovereign at whose court they are accredited,

on the political relations between the two States. But even at
those periods when the etiquette of European courts confined this
privilege to ambassadors, such verbal conferences with the sove-

reign were never considered as binding official acts. Negotiations
were then, as now, conducted and concluded with the minister of
foreign affairs, and it is through him that the determinations of
the sovereign are made known to foreign ministers of every class.
If this observation be applicable as between States, according to
whose constitutions of government negotiations may, under cer-
tain circumstances, be conducted directly between their respective
sovereigns, it is still more applicable to representative Govern-

ments, whether constitutional monarchies or republics. In the
former, the sovereign acts, or is supposed to act, only through bis
responsible ministers, and can only bind the State and pledge the
national faith through their agency. In the latter, the supreme
executive magistrate cannot be supposed to have any relations with
a foreign sovereign, such as would require or authorize direct
negotiations between them respecting the mutual interests of the

two States (p) .
Ministers of In the thir4 class are included ministers, ministers resident,

class. residents, and ministers charges d'affaires, accredited to sove-
reigns (g) .
Charges d'affaires, accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs

of the court at which they reside, are either charges d'affaires ad
hoc, who are originally sent and accredited by their Governments,
(p) Pinheiro-Ferreira, Notes to (q) Martens, Precis, &e., liv. vii.
Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, eh. 2, § 194.

torn. ii. Notes 12, 14.
or charges d'affaires ad interiM, substituted in the place of the

minister of their respective nations during his absence (r) .
According to the rule prescribed by the Congress of Vienna, Precedence,

and which has since been generally adopted, public ministers take
rank between themselves, in each class, according to the date of the
official notification of their arrival at the court to which they are
accredited (s) .
The same decision of the Congress of Vienna has also abolished

all distinctions of rank between public ministers, arising from
consanguinity and family or f)olitical relations between their

different courts (if).
A State which has a right to send public ministers of different

classes, may determine for itself what rank it chooses to confer
upon its diplomatic agents; but usage generally requires that

those who maintain permanent missions near the Government of
each other should send and receive ministers of equal rank. One
minister may represent his sovereign at different courts, and a
State may send several ministers to the same court. A minister or
ministers may also have full powers to treat with foreign States,
as at a Congress of different nations, without being accredited to
any particular court (u) .
Consuls, and other commercial agents, not being accredited to Consuls,
the sovereign or minister of foreign affairs, are not, in general,

considered as public ministers; but the consuls maintained by the
Christian Powers of Europe and America in Mohammedan
countries and in the Orient are accredited and treated as public-
ministers (tt)
.
Every diplomatic agent, in order to be received in that charac- Letters of

credence.
ter, and to enjoy the privileges and honours attached to his rank,
must be furnished with a letter of credence// In the case of aji
ambassador, envoy, or minister, of any of the first three classes,
this letter of credence is addressed by the sovereign, or other chief
magistrate of his own State to the sovereign or State to whom
(;•) Martens, Manuel Diplomatique, Wi3quefort, De I'Arabassaxieur, liv. i.
ch. 1, § 11. § 1, p. The Great Powers are

€3.
(s) Eecez du Congr^s de Vienne du represented in Egypt by ministers
19 Mars, 1815, Art. 4. See ante, bearing the title of "Agent Diplo-
p. 332, n. matique and Consul-General." Lord
(t) Ibid. Art. 6. Kitchener was described as the British
(w) Martens, Precis, &c., liv. vii. Agent, Consul-General, and Minister
ch. 2, §§ 199 204. — Plenipotentiary. After Egypt was de-
(v) (5f Bynkershoek, De Foro Com- clared a British Protectorate during
.
petent. Legat. cap. 10, §§ 4 6.

— the Great War, a High Commissioner
Martens, Manuel Diplomatique, ch. 1, was appointed, De3. 18, 1914.
§ 13. Vattel, liv. ii. ch. 2, § 34.
336 RIGHTS OF LEGATION
tho minister is delegated. In the case of a charge d'affaires, it is

addressed bj the secretary, or minister of state charged with tho
department of foreign affairs, to the minister of foreign affairs
'
of the other Government It may be in the form of a
. cabinet
letter,' but is more generally in that of a 'letter of council.'
If tho latter, it is signed by the sovereign or chief magistrate, and
sealed with the great seal of state. The minister is furnished
witli an authenticated copy, to be delivered to the minister of
foreign affairs, on asking an audience for the purpose of delivering
the original to the sovereign, or other chief magistrate of the
State to whom he is sent. The letter of credence states the general
object of his mission, and requests that full faith and credit may
be given to what he shall say on the part of his court {x) .
Full power. 'X'ho full power, authorizing the minister to negotiate, be

may
inserted in the letter of credence, but it is more usually drawn up
in the form of letters-patent. In general, ministers sent to a
Congress are not provided with a letter of credence, but only with
a full power, of which they reciprocally exchange copies with each
other, or deposit them in the hands of the mediating Power or
presiding minister {y) .
Instructions. Tho instructions of the minister are for his own direction only,
and not to be communicated Government to which he is
to the
accredited, unless he is ordered by his own Government to com-

municate them in extenso, or partially; or unless, in the exercise
of his discretion, he deems it expedient to make such a com-
munication (z) .
Communica- Some States refuse to receive communications from foreign

tion of
instructions. ministers, either on all or on particular topics, unless a copy is at
the same time given to their own minister. In 1825, Canning
was informed that the Russian ambassador was about to read him
a despatch from St. Petersburg, relating to British policy in
South America, but that he would not leave him a copy. At the
interview Canning declined to allow the reading of the despatch
to commence if no copy would be left, on the ground that he could
not, at a single hearing, take in the full bearing of the document,
nor weigh its expressions sufficiently to return a suitable reply (a) .
Passport. A
public minister, proceeding to his destined post in time of
peace requires no other protection than a passport from his own
(a;) Martens, Precis, &c., liv. vii. (z) Manuel Diplomatique, ch. 2,
ch. 3, § 202. Wicquefort, De TAm- § 16.
bassadeur, liv. i. § 15. (a) Calvo, Droit International (2nd
(y) Wicquefort, liv. i. § 16. Mar- ed.), vol. i. § 430, p. 550; and see
tens, Precis, &c., liv. vii. ch. 3, § 204. Stapleton, George Canning and his
Manuel Diplomatique, ch. 2, § 17. Times, p. 429.
RIGHTS OF LEGATION. 337
Government; In time of war, he must be provided with a safe

conduct, or passport, from the Government of the State with which
his own country is in hostility, to enable him to travel securely
through its territories (&).
It is the duty of every public minister, on arriving at hisi Duties of a

destined post, to notify his arrival to the 'minister of foreign affairs public .
If the foreign minister is of the first class, this .notification ia arriving at
usually communicated by a secretary of embassy or legation, or

lî^post.
other persop attached to the mission, who hands to the minister of
foreign affairs a copy of the letter of credence, at the same tinie

requesting an audience of the sovereign for his principal.
Ministers of the second and third classes generally notify their
arrival by letter to the minister of foreign affairs, requesting himi
to take the orders of the sovereign, as to the delivery of their letters
of credence. Charges d'affaires, who are not accredited to the
sovereign, notify their arrival in the same manner, at the same
time requesting an audience of the minister of foreign affairs
for the purpose of delivering their letters of credence.
Ambassadors, and other ministers of the first class, are en- Audience of
titled to a public audience of the sovereign; but this ceremony the sovereign,
is not necessary to enable them to enter on their functions, and, magistrate,
together with the ceremony of the entry, which was
solemn
formerly practised with respect to this class of ministers, is now
usually dispensed with, and they are received in a private audience,
in the same manner as other ministers. At this audience, the
letter of credencedelivered, and the minister pronounces a
is
complimentary discourse, to which the sovereign replies. In

republican States, the foreign minister is received in a similar
manner, by the chief executive magistrate or council, charged
with the foreign affairs of the nation (c) .
The usage of civilized nations has established a certain eti-

Diplomatic
quette, to be observed by the members of the diplomatic corps, etiquette,
resident at the same court, towards each other, and towards the
memberri of the Government to which they are accredited. The
duties which comity requires to be observed, in this respect,
belong rather to the code of manners than of laws, and can hardly
be made the subject of positive sanction; but there are certain
established rules in respect to them, the non-observance of which
may be attended with inconvenience in the performance of more

serious and important duties. Such are the visits of etiquette,
(6) Vattel, liv. iv. ch. 7, § 85. FranQaise, torn. v. p. 246.

Manuel ch. 2, § 19. Martens, Manuel Diplomatique,
Diplomatique,
Flassan, Histoire de la Diplomatie
(o)
ch. 4, —
§§ 33 30.
w. 22
which the diplomatic ceremonial of Europe requires to be ren-

dered and reciprocated, between public ministers resident at the
same court (<7).
Privileges of From the moment a public minister enters the territory of the
a public
minister.
State to which he is sent, during the time of his residence, and
until he leaves the country, he is entitled to an entire exemption
from the local jurisdiction, both civil and criminal. Repre-
senting the rights, interests, and dignity of the sovereign or State
by whom he is delegated, his persouj is sacred and inviolable^^
To give a more lively idea of this complete exemption from the
local jurisdiction, the fiction of extra-territoriality has been in-
vented (e), by which the minister, though actually in a foreign
country, is supposed still toremain within the territory of his
own He continues still subject to the laws of his own
sovereign.
country, which govern his personal status and rights of property,
whether derived from contract, inheritance, or testament. His
children born abroad are considered as natives. This exemption
from the local laws and jurisdiction is founded upon mutual
utility,growing out of the necessity that public ministers should
be entirely independent of the local authority, in order to fulfil
the duties of their mission. The act of sending the minister on
the one hand, and of receiving him on the other, amounts to a
tacitcompact between the two States that he shall be subject
only to the authority of his own nation (/).
The passports or safe conduct, granted by his own Govern-
ment in time of peace, or by the Government to which he is sent
in time of war, are sufficient evidence of his public character
for this purpose (^).
Inviolability Halleck draws a distinction between the inviolability and the

and exterri-
exterritoriality of a public minister. He says: "The former is
toriality.
not a consequence of the latter, but the latter was invented for
the purpose of giving security to the former. The mere fact of
a public minister being regarded as a foreigner, resident in a
(d) Manuel Diplomatique, ch. 4, In»t. vol. ii. b. ii. ch. 9, § 20. Wic-
§ 37. quefort, De
I'Ambassadeur, liv. i. § 27.
(e) There a dijfferenoe of opinion
is Bynkershoek, De Jure Competent.
among jurists as to the present-day Legat. cap. 5, 8. Vattel, Droit dee
usefulness and applicability of the Gene, liv. iv. ch. 7, §§ 81—125.
theory of exterritoriality. For tabu- Martens, Precis, liv. vii. ch. 5, §§ 214
lated references on the question, see —218. Kluber, Droit des Gens
A. S. Hershey, Essentials of Inter- Moderne de PEurope, Pt. II. tit. 2,
national Public Law (New York, § 203. Foelix, Droit International
1912), pp. 285, 286. Priv6, § 184. Wheaton, Hist. Law of
(/) Grotiufl, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. Nations, pp. 237 243. —
lib. ii. cap. 18, §§ 1—6. Butherforth, (g) Vattel, liv. iv. ch. 7, § 83.
foreign country, would not, of necessarily exempt him from

itself,
local jurisdiction The
true basis of all diplomatic privi-
lege consists in the idea of inviolability v^hich international j uris-
prudence attaches to his person and his offioe, and from which
it cannot be severed. This idea of inviolability is an inherent
and essential quality of the public minister, and the office cannot
exist without it. International law has conferred it upon the
State or sovereign which he represents, and to divest him of that
quality is to divest him of his office, as the two are ins/eparable .
Not so with respect to the fiction of extra-territoriality. So far

as thatis not necessary to the exercise of his functions, or, in other
words, to secure his inviolability, it is not an essential quality

of the public minister, and therefore may be dispensed with by
renouncement or otherwise" {h).
The attack on the Chinese Legations and the murder of Baron
von Ketteler (1900) stand happily alone of recent years as a viola-
tion of the immunity of diplomatic agents on the part of a nation
claiming to be regarded as civilised. But in 1799 the French

plenipotentiaries to the Congress of Rastadt were brutally mur-
dered in cold blood by Austrian hussars (i).
This immunity extends, not only to the person of the minister, Exemption
but to his family and suite, secretaries of legation and other secre-* .^^^*j^^.^^^^
taries, his servants, moveable effects, and the house in which he
resides (7i:).
The absolute
exterritoriality of a minister's house was disputed
Minister's
llOllSG
in comparatively recent times by the French Government. In
April, 1867, one Mickilchenkorff, a Russian subject, appeared
at the Russian embassy in Paris, and made a demand, which was
refused Thereupon he assaulted one of the attaches with adagger,
.
wounded him, and injured two other persons who came to the
rescue. The police, being applied to, entered the house and
removed the culprit, who was afterwards brought before the Cour
d' Assises. The Russian ambassador, who was absent when the
crime was committed, on his return demanded that the prisoner
should be sent to Russia, on the ground that the act having been
-committed in his 'hotel,' the French courts had no jurisdiction,
(A) Halleck, Int. Law, ed. Sir (0 Alison, vol. iv. sect. 27, p. 228.
O. S. Baker (1908), vol. i. pp. 359, {k) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.
360. (In the last sentence the word lib. cap. xviii. §§ 8, 9.
ii. Bynker-
"*'
not " in the phrase " so far as that shock, De Foro Oompetent. Legat.
is not necessary," is omitted from the cap. 13, § 5; cap. 15, 20. Vattel,
1908 edition, though it is found in liv. iv. ch. 8, § 113; ch. 9, §§ 117—
the The omission
is
first edition, 1801.
obviously due to inadvertence; so
123.
§§ 215
Martens, Precis,
—227; ch.
liv.
§§
vii.
234 —ch.237.
5,
that the negative is retained here.) Foelix, §§ 184 — 186.

9,
22(2)
and the case must be tried in Eussia. The French Government

refused to give up the prisoner, urging that the principle of ex-
territorialitj did not cover the case of a stranger entering

the
minister's house, and there committing a crime; and that even
themselves had in this particular case waived
if it did, the parties
the privilege hy summoning the local police. The Russian Gov-

ernment finally admitted the jurisdiction of the French court,
and the prisoner was dulj tried by the local law (I) Again, in
.
1896, a Chinese refugee having been induced to enter the Chinese

ambassador's residence in London, was kept there under arrest,
with a view to sending him back to his own country for trial.
But the British Government insisted on his release.
The minister's person is in general entirely exempt both from
the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the country where he resides.
To this general exemption, there may be the following excep-
tions: —
Exceptions to 1. This exemption from the jurisdiction of the local tribu-
the general
^^^^ and authorities does not apply to the contentious j urisdiction
exemption. whicli may be conferred on those tribunals by the minister volun-
tarily making himself a party to a suit at law (m) .
Suits by and It has been held in England that an ambassador, having no

"real property in the country, and having done nothing to disen-
*1^rt*
title him. to the general privileges of his office, cannot, while he
remains such ambassador, be sued in England against his will,

although the suit may arise out of commercial transactions by
him here, and although neither his person nor his goods are touched
by the suit(^). But if the ambassador appears and submits
. to the jurisdiction, the action can then be proceeded with (o).
The constitution of the United States vests the exclusive juris-
"
diction of all suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other
public their domestics, or domestic servants, or

ministers, or
against consuls or vice-consuls," in the courts of the United States,
to the exclusion of the State courts (p) If an ambassador con-
.
tracts debts which he refuses to pay, and if he also refuses to

submit to the jurisdiction, creditors have no remedy but to apply
(0 Calvo, Droit International, vol. i.

(o) Taylor v. Best (1854), 14 0. B.
§ 571. 521 Gladstone v. Musurus Bey (1862),
;
(m) Bynkershoek, cap. 16, §§ 13— 1 H. & M. 495. And see U. 8. v.

15. Vattel, liv. iv. ch. 8, § 111. Hand, 2 Washington O. C. 435; Par-
•
Martens, Precis, liv. vii. ch. 5, § 216. Mnson v. Potter (1885), 16 Q. B. D.
Merlin, Eep. tit. Ministre, s. 5, § 4, 152.
No. 10. (p) U. S. Revised Statutes, tit. xiii.
(w) Magdalena Steam Navigr. Co. w. ch. 12, sec. 711. U. S. v. Ravara
Martin (1859), 2 E. & E. 94. Cf. (1793), 2 Dallas, 297; Cohens v. F^>-
Maoartn&y v. Garhutt (1890), 24 ginia, 6 Wheaton, 407; St. Luke's
Q. B. D. 368. Hospital v. Barhley, 3 Blatchford, 259.
to Minister for Foreign Affairs of the ambassador's own

the
country (g). The immunity of an ambassador from process in

the English courts extends not merely, to the time during which
he is accredited to the Sovereign, but to such a reasonable period
after he has presented his letters of recall as is necessary to enable
him to wind up his official business and prepare for his return to
his own country, and he is not deprived of the immunity by reason
that his successor is duly accredited before that period haa
elapsed (r) .
In 1888, an application was made to a Queen's Bench Divi- Ministers in
sional Court in England to set aside service of process which had cou^ntries.
been ejSected in Paris upon one General Blanco, the minister of

Venezuela, accredited and received in France in that character.
The court discharged the order upon other grounds, and gave no
judgment on this point. Baron Huddleston, however, expressed
an opinion that the privilege of ambassadors was confined by the
municipal law to representatives of foreign States resident lat
Her Majesty's Court. Mr. Justice Manisty, on the other hand,
thought that the principle laid down by Grotius
''
omnis coactio —
a legato adesse debet," as recognised in Magdalena Stemm Nam-
gaticni Co. y. Martin— v/ould be violated by compelling (in effect)
a foreign minister to a foreign country to appear and defend
himself here (s).
The immunities of ambassadors in England are partially defined Foreign
by a statute of the reign of Queen Anne, which recites that England.

"
Whereas several turbulent and disorderly persons having in a
most outrageous manner insulted the person of his Excellency
Andrew Artemonowitz Mattueof ambassador extraordinary of his
,
Czarish Majesty, Emperor of Great Russia, by arresting him and

taking him by violence out of his coach in the public street, andj
detaining him
in custody for several hours, in contempt of the
protection granted by Her Majesty, contrary to the law of nations,

and in prejudice of the rights and privileges which ambassadors
and other public ministers, authorized and received as such, have
at all times been thereby possessed of, and ought to be kept sacred
and inviolable"; it was therefore enacted, "That all writs and
processes that shall at any time hereafter be sued forth or prose-
cuted, whereby the person of any ambassador, or other public
minister of any foreign prince or State ... or the domestick or
domestick servant of aûy such ambassador, or other public minister,
(g) Calvo, Droit International, vol. i. others, (1894) 2 Q. B. 352.

§ 575. (s) New Chile Co. v. Blanco (1888),
(r) Musurus Bey v. Gadban and 4 T. L. R. 346.
may be arrested or imprisoned, or his or their gôods or chattels

may be distrained, seized or attached, shall be deemed or adjudged
to be utterly null and void to all intents, constructions, and pur-
"
poses whatsoever (t). But no merchant or trader who puts him-
self into the service of an ambassador, shall have the benefit of
the Act, and every ambassador's servant must be registered to
entitle him to exemption from process (u) If the ambassador .
.
himself engage in trade, he does not thereby forfeit the privilege
conferred by the statute {x) .
2. If he is a citizen or subject of the country to which he is sent,
and that oountry has not renounced authority over him, he

its
remains still subject to its jurisdiction (^,). But it may be ques-

tionable whether his reception as a minister from' another Power,
without any express reservation as to his previous allegiance, ought
not to be considered as a renunciation of this claim, since such
reception implies a tacit oonvention between the two States that he
shall be entirely exempt from' the local jurisdiction (z).
3. If he is at the same time in the service of the Power who;
receives him as a minister, as has sometimes happened among the
German courts, he continues still subject to the local jurisdic-
tion (a) .
Immunity 4. In case of offences committed by public ministers affecting-

from criminal .
p o a
-, i t p i
• '
i
jurisdiction, the existence and safety oi the State where they reside, ii the
danger is urgent, their persons and papers may be seized, and

they may be sent out of the country. In all other cases, it appears
to be the established usage of nations to request their recall by-
their own sovereign, which, if unreasonably refused by him, would
unquestionably authorize the offended State to send away the

offender. There may be other cases which might, under circum-
stances of sufficient aggravation, warrant the State thus offended
in proceeding against an ambassador as a public enemy, or in in-
flicting punishment upon his person if justice should be refused

by his own sovereign. But the circumstances which would autho-
proceeding are hardly capable of precise definition, nor
rize such a
can any general rule be collected from the examples to be found
(0 7 Anne, c. 12, sec. 3. (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 152, 162.

(u) Ibid. sec. 5. (z) Bynkershoek, cap. 11. Vattel,
(x) Barbuit's case (17Z7), Gas. tem^. liv. iv. ch. 8, § 112. The principle
Talbot, 281 ; Taylor v. Best (1854), supported in the text has been estab-
14 C B. 481. Foote, Priv. Int. lished by a noted English case,
Jurisp. pp. 172 seq. Macartney v. Garbutt (1890), 24
(y) Except in any respect directly Q. B. D. 368.
relating to the performance of his (a) Martens, Manuel Diplomatique,
public functions. ParJdnson v. Potter ch. 3, § 23.
in the history of nations where public ministers have thrown off

their public character and plotted against the safety of the State
to which they were accredited. These anomalous exceptions to
the general rule resolve themselves into the paramount right of
self-preservation and necessity. Grotius distinguishes here be-

tween what may be done in the way of self-defence and what
may be done in the way of punishment. Though the law of
nations will not allow an ambassador's life to be taken away as
a punishment for a crime after it has been committed, yet this law
does not oblige the State to suffer him to use violence without
endeavouring to resist it (&').
Several instances are to be found in history of ambassadors being Instances of
seized and sent out of the country. The Bishop of 'Ross, am- of ambas-^^^"
bassador of of Scots, was imprisoned and then sadors.
Mary Queen
banished from England, for conspiring against the sovereign,
while the Duke of Norfolk and other conspirators were tried and
executed In 1584, Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in
(e).
England, was ordered to quit the realm for conspiring to introduce
foreign troops and dethrone Queen Elizabeth (^d) That he was .
not liable to be put to death for his offence "was the opinion of
Gentilis and Hotman, to whom the case was referred. In 1654, De
Bass, the French minister, was ordered to depart from the country
in twenty-four hours, on a charge of conspiracy against the life
of Cromwell (e). In 1717, Gyllenborg, the Swedish ambassador,
contrived a plot to dethrone George I. He âs arrested, his cabinet
broken open and searched, and his papers seized. Sweden arrested
the British minister at Stockholm by way of reprisal. The Regent
of France interposed his good offices, and the two ambassadors
were shortly afterwards exchanged (/) The arrest of Gyllenborg
.
was necessary as a measure of self-defence, but on no principle of

international law can the arrest of the British minister by Sweden
be made justifiable. For similar reasons, Cellamare, Spanish am-
bassador in France, was, in 1718, arrested, his papers seized, and
himself conducted to the frontier by a military escort (g) .
(b) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. (c) Froude, Hist, of England, vol. x.
lib. ii. cap. 18, § 4. Eutherforth, pp. 222 et seq. (ed. 1866).
Inst. vol. ii. b. ii. ch. 9, § 20. Byn- (d) Ibid. vol. xi. p. 623.
kershoek, De Foro Competent. Legat. (e) Phillimore, vol. ii. § 164.
cap. 17, 18, 19. Vattel, liv. iv. ch. 7, (/) Mahon, Hist, of England, vol. i.
§§ 94—102. Martens, Precis, liv. vii. pp. 388 seq. Cf. C. de Martens,
ch. 5, § 218. Ward, Hist, of the Law Causes Cel^bres, vol.i. p. 97.
of Nations, vol. ii. ch. 17, pp. 291— (g) Mahon, Hist, of Eng. vol. i.
334. Wheaton, Hist, of Law of p. 484. Cf. De Martens, Causes C61e-
Nations, pp. 250 — ^254. bres, i. pp. 139 seq.
Ill1792, the recall of Genet, the French minister in the United

States, was insisted on because he fitted out privateers with 'a
view to preying on British commerce, and set up Prize Courts on
American territory for adjudicating on British vessels captured
—
by French cruisers these being acts in violation of the neutrality
of the United States {h) At the same time the recall of
.
Governor Morris was requested by the French Government on

the ground that he had taken part in intrigues on behalf of the
monarchical party in France. In 1804, Yrujo, minister of Spain
to theUnited States, caused great annoyance to the President and
ministers by intemperate conduct in diplomatic intercourse, and
more particularly by endeavouring, and claiming the right to
endeavour, by a pecuniary recompense, to induce a newspaper
editor to forward his views and insert articles from him impeaching
the conduct of the President. His recall was demanded, and the
King intimated that his minister had received his royal permission
to return to Spain at the season which would be convenient for a
safe passage. Yrujo, however, after the lapse of many months,
being about to present himself at Washington to attend the
meeting of Congress, a letter of remonstrance was addressed to
him. He replied, in a letter the tone of which departs from the
usual style of diplomatic correspondence, that he had not come to
Washington to form plots, to excite conspiracies, or to promote any
attempts against the United States Government, and as he had not
directly or indirectly committed any acts of that tendency, which
alo7ie, ashe said, could justify the tenour and object of the letter
of remonstrance, he should live where he pleased and stay where
he pleased, taking no orders but from his Catholic Majesty. This
letter received ;io answer, but a copy of the whole correspondence!
was transmitted toSpain to be laid before the Government. The
Spanish Secretary replied supporting his minister. It is not clear
how the matter ended (i) .
So recently as 1848, Sir H. Bulwer, the British ambassador in

Spain, had his passports returned, and was requested by the
Government to leave Spanish territory. Certain disturbances had
taken place in various parts of Spain, and the Government, without
the least justification, persuaded themselves that Sir H. Bulwer
had lent his assistance to the disaffected. This proceeding caused
diplomatic arrangements to be suspended between the two countries
(A) See Moore, Digest, vol. iv. (i) Wharton, Digest, § 84, p. €05;
639. § 106, Appendix; Moore, Digest,
vol. iv. pp. 508 seq.
during two years, and the dispute was only settled by the mediation
of the King of the Belgians (k).
In the autumn of 1888, Lord Sackville, the British minister at
Washington, received a letter, purporting to come from a citizen
in California of British birth, asking advice as to which way the
fwriter should vote at the approaching Presidential election. The
letter also contained reflections upon the sincerity of the Senate
in its rejection of the Fisheries Treaty (I), and upon the subse-
quent conduct of the Government. Lord Sackville replied in a
letter which he marked "private," and indicated that the then
Government were favourably disposed towards Great Britain. He
spoke of the opening of the questions with Canada since the re-
"
jection of the treaty as unfortunate." This letter was construed
as sanctioning the reflection cast by Lord Sackville' s correspondent
upon the Senate and Government, and as an unwarrantable inter-

ference in the domestic affairs of the United States. It seemed,
indeed, to Mr. Bayard to threaten the dignity, security, and inde-

pendent sovereignty of the United States, and Lord Sackville
having also, as it was alleged, though without the slightest founda-
tion, spoken slightingly of the President and Senate in intervie\\^s
with reporters, the attention of the British Government was called
to the facts, and Lord Sackville's passports were sent to him (m').
Lord Salisbury, communicating with the American minister on
the subject, considered it ''hardly practicable to lay down the
principle that a diplomatic representative was prohibited from ex-
pressing, even privately, any opinion on the events passing in the
country to which he was accredited." The language imputed to
Lord Sackville in the interviews with newspaper reporters was
different,and must be taken to have been intended for publication,
and Lord Salisbury awaited Lord Sackville's explanation, and a
copy of the expressions actually used by him. Before these could
arrive the passports had been sent (n) .
Diplomatic intercourse with Lord Sackville was terminated on

30tli of October, but the copies of the
correspondence, and news-
papers containing reports of the interviews complained of, were
not communicated to Lord Salisbury till the 8th December. In
his letter forwarding these documents the American minister
wrote: — "In asking from Her Majesty's Government the recall
or withdrawal of its minister, upon a representation of the general
(A) Calvo, Droit International, The Times, 1st November, 1888.

vol. i. § 581. (n) Parliamentary Papers, United
(0 289.
^nte, p. States, No. 3 (1888); The Times, 7th
(m) Mr. Bayard to the President, November, 1888.
purport of the letter and statements above mentioned, the

Government of the United States assumed that such request would
be sufficient for that purpose, whatever considerations the reason
for it might afterwards demand and receive." In his reply, Lord
Salisbury combated this statement of the law and usage, and main-
tained that although it was open to anj Government to terminate
itsdiplomatic relations with any particular minister of any other
State, it has no claim to demand that the other State shall make
instrument of that proceeding, lor concur in it, unless
itself the
on sufficient reasons, duly produced, of the justice of the

satisfied
demand. With regard to the complaint which had been made by

Mr. Bayard, that Lord Sackville had made public no denial of
the statements imputed to him by the reporters. Lord Sackville
stated to Lord Salisbury that Mr. Bayard, as Secretary of State,
was in possession of his disclaimer, and that any communication
through the press could only have led to unseemly and undigni-
fied controversy (o) The British Government contented itself
.
by treating the conduct of the President and his secretary as per-

sonal to themselves, due to political exigencies arising out of the
Presidential campaign, and left the legation in charge of the First
Secretary till after the formal installation .of the new President
in the following year (oo) .
If it appears that the ambassador has not fully entered upon

his functions, either by his credentials not having been presented',
or by his not having been fully invested with the character by,
his own country, he cannot then claim the inviolability attached
to regular ambassadors (p) .
Personal The wife and family, servants and suite, of the minister, par-
exemption
extending to ticipate in the inviolability attached to his public character. The
his family, secretaries of embassy and legation are especially entitled, as offi-
secretaries,
servants, &c. cial persons, to the privileges of the diplomatic corpjS, in respect
to their exemption from the local jurisdiction (g).

The municipal laws of some, and the usages of most nations,
require an official list of the domestic servants of foreign ministers
to bo communicated to the secretary or minister of foreign affairs.
(o) Parliamentary Papers, United Howell, State Trials, 460.

States, No. 4 (1888) ; The Times, 14th (g) Grotius, lib. ii. cap. 18, § 8.
January, 1888. Bynkershoek, cap. 15, 20. Vattel,
(oo) Of. the case of Dr. Dumba liv. iv. ch. 9, §§ 120—123. Martens,
(Sept. 1915). Precis, liv. vii. ch. 5, § 219; ch. 9,
(p) See case of Marquis de la Chet- §§ 234—237. Fcelix, § 184. Taijlor
ardie; Oalvo, Droit International, V. Best (1854), 14 O. B. 487; Bupont
vol. i. § 561. Case of Da Sa; 5 v. Pichon (1805), 4 Dallas, 300.
in order to entitle them to the benefit of this exemption (r) . But

this requirement not always observed (s)
is .
It follows from the principle of the extra-territoriality of the
minister, his family, and other persons attached to the leg'ation,

or belonging to his suite, and their exemption from the local laws
and jurisdiction of the country where they reside, that the civilj
and criminal jurisdiction over these persons rests with the nainister,
to be exercised according to the laws and usages,of hisiown country.
In respect to civil jurisdiction, both contentious and voluntary,
this rule is, with some exceptions, follo'wed in the practice cf
nations. But in respect to criminal offences committed by his
domestics, although in strictness the minister has a right to try
and punish them, the modern usage merely authorizes him to
arrest and send them for trial to their -own country. He may,
also, in the exercise of his discretion, discharge them from his
service, or deliver them up for trial under the laws of the State
where he he may renounce any other privilege to which
resides; as
he is the
entitled
by public law (t).
The personal effects or movables belonging to the minister, Exemption of
within the territory of the Sitate where he resides, are entire],y house and
exempt from the local jurisdiction; so, also, of his dwelling!- Property,
house {u) But any other real property,
. or immovables, of which
he may be possessed within the foreig^n territory, is subject to its
laws and jurisdiction. Kor is the personal property of which he
may be possessed as a merchant carrying on trade, or in a fiduciary
character, as an executor, &c., exempt from the operation of the
local laws (x).
question, how far the personal effects of a public minister Wheaton's
The
*^^ ^'
are liable to be seized or detained, in order to enforce the perform- ^
anoe on his part of the contract of hiring of a dWelling-house, in-

habited by him, was discussed between the American and Prussian
Governments in Wheaton's case (183^9). According to the
"
Prussian Civil Code the lessor is entitled, as a security for thq
rent and other demands arising under the contract, to the rights
'
of a Pfandglaubiger '
[^.e.,a creditor whose rights are secured
(r) Blaekstone, Commentaries, vol. i.

Eepertoire, tit. Ministre Publique,
ch. 7. LL. of the United States, sect. vi.
vol. ch. 9, § 26.
i.
(u) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.
(s) Cf. In re Baiz (1889), 135 U. S. lib. i.
cap. 18, § 9; Bynkershoek, De
403; V. 8. V. Liddle (1808), 2 Wash. For. Legat. cap. ix. §§ 9, 10. Vattel,
C. C. 205. Droit des Gens, liv. iv. ch. 8, § 114.
(0 Bynkershoek, cap. 15, 20. Vattel, (x) Vattel, liv. iv. ch. 8, §§ 113—
liv. iv. ch. 9, § 124. Rutherfortih, 115. Martens, Precis, liv. vii. ch. 8,
Inst. vol. ii. b. ii. ch. 9, § 20. Kliiber, § 217. Kluber, Pt. II. tit. 2, ch. 3,
Pt. II. tit. 2, §§ 212—214. Merlin, § 210. Merlin, sect. v. § iv. No. 6.
by hypothecation] upon the goods brought by the tenant upon the

"
premises, and there remaining at the expiration of the lease (y).
Under this law the proprietor of the house in which the minister
of the United States accredited at the court of Berlin resided,
claimed the right of detaining the goods of the minister found on
the j)remises at the expiration of the lease in order to secure the
payment of damages alleged to be due on account of injuries done

to the house during the contract. The Prussian Governmenit
decided that the general exemj)tion, under the law of nations, of
the personal property of foreign ministers from the local jurisdic-
tion, did not extend to this case, where, it was contended, the right
of detention was created by, the contract itself, and by the legal
effect given to it by the local law. The American minister main-
was contrary to the principle
tained, however, that such a decision
of diplomatic immunity, inasmuch as it placed diplomatic agents
on the same footing with the subjects of the country. The pub-
licists who have
referred to this case appear to support the argu-
ments of the United States minister (0) .
Duties and The person and personal effects of the minister are not liable
taxes.
to taxation He is exempt from the payment of duties on the im-
.
portation of articles for his own personal use and that of his
family. But exemption is, at present, by the usage of

this latter
most nations, limited a fixed sum during the continuance of the
to
mission. He is liable to the payment of tolls and postages. The
house in which he resides, though exempt from the quartering of
troops, subject to taxation, in common with the other real
is
property of the country, whether it belongs to him or to his Gov-

ernment (.a). And though, in general, his house is inviolable,
and cannot be entered, without his permission, by police, custom--
house, or excise officers, yet the abuse of this privilege, by which

it was converted in some countries into an asylum for fugitiveis
from justice, has caused it to be very much restrained by the recent
usage of nations (6).

Messengers The practice of nations has also extended the inviolability of
and couriers.
public ministers to the messengers and couriers, sent with
despatches to or from the legations established in different coun-
tries. They are exempt from every species of visit and search.
(y) Allgemeines Landrecht fur die (a) Macartney v. Garbutt (1890),

Preusc:ischen Staaten, Pt. I. tit. 21, 24 Q. B. D. 368.
§ 395; tit. 30, § 1. {b) Vattel, liv. iv. ch. 9, §§ 117,
(2) Cf. Moore, Digest, vol. iv. 118. Martens, Precis, liv. vii. ch. 5,
§ 663. For a review of the con- § 220. Manuel Diplomatique, ch. 3,
troversy, see Fcelix, Revue du droit §§ 30, 31. Merlin, Repertoire, tit.
franâis et etranger, ii. 31. Minisfre Tublique, sect. v. § 5, Nos. 2,
3.
in passing through the territories of those Powers with whom

their own Government is in amity. For the purpose of giving
effect to this exemption,
thejj must be provided with passports
from their own Government, attesting their official character';
'
and, in the case of despatches sent by sea, the vessel or aviso ,'
must also be providod with a commission or pass. In time of war,

a special arrangement, by means of a cartel or flag of truce, fur-
nished with passports, not only from their own Government, but
from its enemy, is necessary, for the purpose of securing these
despatch vessels from interruption, as between the belligerent
Powers. But an ambassador, or other public minister, resident
in a neutral country for the purpose of preserving the relations
of peace and amity between the neutral State and his own Govern-
ment, has a right freely to send his despatches in a neutral vessel,
which cannot lawfully be interrupted by the cruisers of a Power
at war with his own country (c)
^
.
The opinion of public jurists appears to be somewhat divided Public

minister
upon the question of the respect and protection to which a public p^ssm^
minister is entitled, in pa^ssing through the territories of a State through the
other than that to which he is accredited. The inviolability of another^State
ambassadors, under the law of nations, understood by Grotius tâ-a that to
is
which he is '^
and Bynkershoek, among others, as binding only on those to whom accredited,

they are sent, and by whom they are received {d) Wicquef ort, .
in particular, who has ever been considered as the stoutest cham-
pion of ambassadorial rights, asserts that the assassination of the

ministers of the French king, Francis I., in the territories of the
Emperor Charles V., though an atrocious murder, was no. breach

of the law of nations, as to the privileges pf ambassadors It might .
be regarded as a violation of the right of innocent passage, aggra-

vated by the circumstance of the dignified character of the persons
—
on whom the crime was committed and might even be considered
a just cause of war against the emperor, without involving, the
question of protection in the character of ambassador, which arises
exclusively from a legal presumption which can only exist between
the sovereigns from and to whom he is sent (e) .
Vattel, on the other hand, states that passports are necessary Opinion of
^^**®^'
to an ambassador, in passing through different territories on his
way to his destined post, in order to make known his public

character. It is true that the sovereign to whom he is sent is more
(<?) Vattel, liv. 123.

iv. ch. 9, § lib. ii.
cap. 18, § 5. Bynkershoek, De
Martens, Precis, 250.
liv. vii. ch. 13, § Foro Oomp. Legat. cap. ix. § 7.
The Caroline (1807), 6 C. Eob. 466. (e) Wicquef ort, De I'Ambassadeur,
(rf) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. liv. i. § 29, pp. 433—439.
especiallj bound to cause to be respected the rights attached to

that character; but he is not the less entitled to be treated, in the
territory of a third Power, with the respect due to the envoy o£ a

friendlj sovereign. He is, above all, entitled to enjoy complete
personal security; to injure and insult him would be to injure and
insult his sovereign and entire nation; to arrest him, or commit
any other act of violence against his person, would be to infringe

the rights of legation which belong to every sovereig*n. Francis I.
was therefore fully justified in complaining of the assa,ssination of
his ambassadors, and, as Charles V. refused satisfaction, in de-
"
claring war against him. If an innocent passage, with complete
security, is duo to a private individual, with still more reason is
it due to the
public minister of a sovereign, who is executing the
orders of his master, and travelling on the business of his nation.
I say an innocent passage; for if the journey of the minister is
liable to just suspicion, a;s to its motives and objects; if the
sovereign, through whose territories he is about to pass, has reason

to apprehend that he may, abuse the liberty of entering them for
sinister purposes, he may refuse the passage. But he cannot
maltreat him, or suffer others to maltreat him. If he has not suffi-
cient reasons for refusing the passage, he may take such pre-
cautions as are necessary to prevent the privilege being abused
by the minister "(/) .
He afterwards limits this right of passage to the ambassadors

of sovereigns, with whom the State, through which the attempt to
pass is made, is at the time in the relation of peace and amity;

and adduces, in support of this limitation of the right, the case of
Marshal Belle-Isle, French ambassador at the Prussian court, in
1744 (France and Great Britain being then at war), who, in
attempting to pass through Hanover, was arrested and carried off
a^prisoner to England {g) .
Of Bynker- y^'Bynkershock maintains that ambassadors, passing through the

shoek.
territories of another State than that to which they are accredited,
are amenable to the local jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, in
the same manner with other aliens, who owe a temporary alle-
giance to the State?) He interprets the edict of the States-General,

"
of 1679, exempting from arrest the persons, domestics, and
effects of ambassadors ('hier te lande komende, residerende of
passerende ')," as extending only to those public ministers actually

accredited to their High Mightinesses. He considers the last-
mentioned term 'passerende' as referring not to those who,
(/) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iv. (^) Ch. de Martens, Causes Celebres
cli. 7,§§ 84, 85. du Droit des Gens, tome i. p. 310.
coming from abroad, merely, pass through the territories of the

State in order to proceed to another country, but to those only who
arc about to leave the Sitate where they have been reisident as
ministers accredited to its Government (h).
This appears to Merlin to be a forced interpretation. ''The Of Merlin,
' '
word 'passer' in French, like passerende in Dutch," says he,

"
was never used to designate a person returning from a given
place; but is applicable to one who, having arrived at that place,
does not stop there, but proceeds on to another. We
must, there-
fore, conclude that the law in question attributes to ambassadors,
who merely pass through the United Provinces, the same inde-
pendence with those who are there resident. If it be objected,
as Bynkershoek does object, that the States-General (that is, the
authors of this very law) caused to be arrested, in 1717, the Baron
do Gortz, ambassador of Sweden at the court of London, at the
request of George I., against the security of whose crown he had
been plotting, the answer to this example is furnished by Bynker-
shoek himself. 'The only reason,' says he, 'alleged by the
States-General for this proceeding was, that this ambassador had
not presented to them his letters of credence.' This reason (con-
tinues Merlin) is not the less conclusive for being the only one
alleged by the States-General. \ When it is said that an ambassa-

dor is entitled, in the territories through which he merely passes,
to the independence belonging to his public character, it must
be understood with this qualification, that he travels as an am-
bassador; that is to say, after having caused himself to be an-
nounced as such, and having obtained permission to pass in that
character. This permission places the sovereign, by whom it has
been granted, under the same obligation as if the public minister
had been accredited to and received by him. Without this per-
mission, the ambassador must be considered as an ordinary
traveller, and there is nothing to prevent his being arrested for
the same causes which would justify the arrest of a private indi-
vidual \i).
To these observations of the learned and accurate Merlin it
may be added, that the inviolability of a public minister in this

case depends upon the same principle with that of his sovereign,
coming into the territory of a friendly State by the permission,
express or implied, of the local Government. Both are equally

entitled to the protection of that Government, against every act
(A) Bynkershoek, De For. Legat. (i) Merlin, Eepertoire, tit. Ministre

cap. ix. Wheaton, Hist. Law of Publique, sect. v. § 3, Nos. 4, 12.
Nations, p. 243.
of violence and every species of restraint, inconsistent with their

sacred character. We
have used the term 'permission, express
'
or implied because a public minister accredited to one country

;
who enters the territory of another, making* known his official

character in the usual manner, is as much entitled to avail himself
of the permission which is implied from the absence of any pro-
hibition, as would be the sovereign himself in a similar case (k).
Freedom of A
minister resident in a foreign country is entitled to the
religious
privilege of religious worship in his own private chapel, according
worship.
to the peculiar forms of his national faith, although it may noit
be generally tolerated by the laws of the State where he resides.
Even since the epoch of the Reformation, this privilege has been
secured, by convention or usage, between the Catholic and Pro-
testant nations of Europe. It is also enjoyed by the public
ministers and consuls from the Christian Powers in Mohammedan
and Oriental countries. The increasing spirit of religious free-
dom and liberality has gradually extended this privilege to the
establishment, in most countries, of public chapels, attached to
the different foreign embassies, in which not only foreigners of
the same nation, but even natives of the country of the same
religion, are allowed the free exercise of their peculiar worship.
This does not, in general, extend to public processions, the use
of bells, or other external rites celebrated beyond the walls of
the chapel (I).
Consuls not Consuls are not public ministers. Whatever protection they
entitled to the
may be entitled to in the discharge of their official duties, and
privileges of whatever special privileges may be conferred upon them by the
ministers
ôcsl laws and usagcs, or by international compact, they are not
entitled, by the general laws of nations, to the peculiar immu-
nities of ambassadors No State is bound to permit the residence
.
of foreign consuls, unless it has stipulated by convention to receive

them. They are to be approved and admitted by the local sov'e-
reign, and, if guilty of illegal or improper conduct, are liable ta
(k) Vide supra, Pt. ii. ch. 2, p. 151. can case, Wilson vi Blanco (1889), 5<>
Later Jurists and publicists are also N. Y. Sup. Ct)urt, 582, and the English
divided as to whether ambassadors case, New Chile Gold Mining Co. v.
enjoy inviolability in third States. On Blanco (1888) ; in both cases the prin-
the whole the main current of opinion ciple of immunity against civil
is against absolute inviolability (cf. suitswas recognised in the case of a
Annuaire de I'Institut de droit inter- Venezuelan minister to the French
national, vol. xiv. p. !339), and in E-epublic.
favour of limited immunity, i.e., con- •
(0 Vattel, liv. iv. ch. 7, § 104.

ditional on the ambassador's good be- Martens, Precis, liv. vii. ch. 6, §§ 222
haviour and innocent passage through —226. Kluber, Droit des Gens
the territory of the third State, when Moderne de I'Europe, Pt. II. tit. ii.
it is at peace with each of the other ch. 3, §§ 215, 216.

two States concerned. Cf. the Ameri-
have the exequatur, which is granted them, withdrawn, and may

be punished by the laws of the State where they reside, or sent
back to their own country, at the discretion of the Government
which they have offended. In civil and criminal cases, they are
subje<)t to the local law in the same manner with other foreign
residents owing a temporary allegiance to the State (m') . None
the less, they enjoy certain privileges and immunities not pos-
sessed by private persons. Moreover, the special class of consuls
sent by the European and United States Governments to non-
Christian countries are usually granted, either by treaty or through
long-established usage, the rights and immunities of diplomatic
agents.
Sir Kobert Phillimore says: "The privileges of consuls [i.e., Privileges of
^^"^^ ^'
other than those last mentioned], so far as they are derived from
the country to which they are sent, are, generally speaking, an
exemption from any personal tax, and generally from the liability
to have soldiers quartered in their houses. They are usually
allowed to grant passports to the subjects of their own country,
living within the range of their consulate, but not to foreigners.
As a general rule, the muniments and papers of the consulate are
inviolable, and under no pretext to be seized or examined by the
local authorities" (n). There have been numerous judicial deci-
sions on this subject. The general result of the English, American,
and French cases establishes tha't consuls have certain privileges,
but that they arc not diplomatic officers, and that they cannot claim
any of the immunities accorded specially to members of the diplo-
matic service (o).
A remarkable case of the withdrawal of a consul's exequatur Case of
took place in America in 1861. In order to protect British com-

merce, Her Majesty's Government were desirous that the Con-
federates should observe the last three Articles of the Declaration
of Paris, and accordingly Mr. Bunch, the British Consul at
Charleston, was instructed to communicate this desire of Her
Majesty's Government to the Confederate authorities. The United
States thereupon demanded that Mr. Bunch should be remov;ed
from his office, on the ground that the law of the United States
(m) Wicquefort, De I'ximbassadeur, (o) Viveash v. Becker (1814), 3

liv. i.
§ 5. Bynkershoek, cap. 10. M. & S. 284; ClarJc v. Cretico (1808),
Martens, Precis, liv. iv. ch. 3, § 148. 1 Taunt. 186; Aspinwall v. Queen's
Kent, Comment, vol. i. pp. 43—45 Proctor (1839), 2 Curteis, 241; xS'orew-
(5th €d.). Foelix, Droit Int. Prive, sen v. Reg., 11 Moo. P. O. 141; The
§ 191. Octavie, 33 L. J. Adm. 115; Davis v.
(w) Phillimore, vol. ii. § 248. Fynn, Packhard, 7 Peters, 276; St. Luke's
The British Consul Abroad, p. 17. Hospital v. Barkley, 3 Blatchford, 259.
Cf. Calvo, Droit Int. vol. ii. § 485.
W. 23
prohibited any person, not specially appointed, from counselling',

advising, &c., in any political correspondence with the Government
of any foreign State, in relation to any disputes or controversies
with the United States, and that Mr. Bunch ought to have known
of this law, and to have communicated it to his Government before
obeying their instructions. It was also urged that the proper

agents to make known
the wishes of a foreign Government were
its diplomatic and not its consular officers. On these grounds
Mr. Bunch's exequatur was withdrawn (;p).
Termination The mission of a foreign minister resident at a foreign court,
mission^ ^1' ^^ ^ congress of ambassadors, may terminate during his life in

one of the following modes :
—
By the expiration of the period fixed for the duration of the
1 .
mission; or, where the minister is eonstituted ad interim only, by

the return of the ordinary minister to his post. In either of these
cases, a formal recall is unnecessary .
2. When
the object of the mission is fulfilled, as in the case of
embassies of mere ceremony; or where the mission is special, and
tbo object of the negotiation is attained or has failed.
3. By the recall of the minister.
4. By the decease or abdication of his own sovereign, or the
sovereign to whom he is accredited. In either of these cases it is
necessary that his letters of credence should be renewed; which, in

the former instance, is sometimes done in the letter of notification
written by the successor of the deceased sovereign to the foreign
prince at whose court the minister resides. In the latter case he is
provided with new letters of credence; but where there is reason
to believe that the mission will be suspended for a short time only,
a negotiation already commenced may be continued with the same
minister confidentially sub spe rati.
5 . When the minister, on account of any violation of the law
of nations, or any important incident in the course of his negotia-
tion assumes on himself the responsibility of declaring his mission
,
terminated .
6. When, on account of the minister's (misconduct or the

measures of his Government, the court at which he resides thinks
fit to send him away without waiting for his recall.
7. By a change in the diplomatic rank of the minister.

8. By the outbreak of hostilities or declaration of war between
the minister's own country and that to which he is accredited.
(jt?)
Mr. Adams to Earl Russell, 21st Nov. 1861. U. S. Dipl. Cor., 1862, p. 1.
When, by any of the circumstances above mentioned, the

minister is suspended from his functions, and in whatever manner
his mission is terminated, he still remains entitled to all the privi-
leges of his Ipublic character until his return to his own country (g) .
A
formal letter of recall must be sent to the minister by hisi Letter of
^^^^n
Government: 1. Where the object of his mission has been accom-
'
plished, or has failed; 2. Where he is recalled from motives which

do not affect the friendly relations of the two Governments.
In these two cases, nearly the same formalities are observed as
on the arrival of the minister . He delivers a copy of his letter
of recall to the minister of foreign affairs, and asks an audience)
of the sovereign, for the purpose of taking leave. At this audi-
ence the minister delivers the original of his letter of recall to the
sovereign, with a complimentary address adapted to the occasion.
If the minister is recalled on account of a misunderstanding be-
tween the two Governments, the peculiar circumstances of the
case must determine whether a formal letter of recall is to be sent
to him, or whether he may quit the residence without waiting for
it; whether the minister is to demand, and whether the sovtereign
is to grant him, an audience of leave.
Where
the diplomatic rank of the minister is raised or lowered,
as wliero an envoy becomes an ambassador, or an ambassador has
fulfilled his functions as such, and is to remain as a minister of the
second or third class, he presents his letter of recall, and a letter of
credence in his new character.
Where terminated by the death of the minister,
the mission is
his body is to be decently interred, or it

may be sent hom|e foj-
interment; but the external religious ceremonies to be observed
on this occasion depend upon the laws and usages of the place.
The secretary of legation, or, if there be no secretary, the minister
of some allied Power, is to place the seals upon his effects, and
the local authorities have no right to interfere, unless in case otf
necessity. All questions respecting the succession ab intestato

to the minister's movable property, or the validity of his testament,
are to be determined by the laws of his own country. His eff!ects
may be removed from the country where he resided, without the
' ' ' '
payment of any droit d'aubaine or detraction (r) .
Although in strictness the personal privileges of the minister

expire with the termination of his mission by death, the custom of
(q) Martens, Manuel Diplomatique, semble, of an ambassador, dying domi-

ch. 7, § 59; ch. 2, § 15. Precis, oiled in England, is not exempt from
liv. vii. ch. 9, § 232. Vattel, liv. iv. the payment of legacy duty. Att.-
ch. 9, § 126. Gen. v. Kent (186(2), 31 L. J. Ex.
(r) But the estate of an attache, or, 391.
23 (2)
nations entitles the widow and family of the deceased minister,
together with their domestics, to a continuance, for a limited
period, of the same immunities which they enjoyed during his

lifetime.
It was formerly the usage of certain courts to give presents to
foreign ministers on their recall, and on other special occasions.
Some Governments prohibit their ministers from receiving such
presents. Such was formerly the rule observed by the Venetian
Republic, and such is now the law of the United States (s) .
Martens, Precis, liv. vii. ch. 10, ch. §§ 60

— 65. Moore,
(s)
§§ 240
—245. Manuel Diplomatique,
7,
vol. iv. § 651.
Digest..
357
CHAPTER II.
RIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES —ARBITRATION.

The power of negotiating and contracting public treaties be- Power of
tween nation and nation exists in full vigour in every sovereign contracting
State v^hich has not parted with this portion of its sovereignty,, how limited
or mo i e .
or agreed to modify its exercise by compact with other States .
Semi-sovereign or dependent States have, in general, only a

limited faculty of contracting in this manner; and even sovereign
and independent States may restrain or modify this faculty by
treaties of alliance or confederation with others . Thus the several
States of the North American Unionare expressly prohibited
from entering into any treaty with foreign Powers, or with each
other, without the consent of the Congress; whilst the sovereign
members of the Germanic Confederation formerly retained the
power of concluding treaties of alliance and commerce, not incon-
sistent with the fundamental laws of the Confederation (a) .
The constitution or fundamental law of every particular State

must determine in whom is vested the power of negotiating and
contracting treaties with foreign Powers. In absolute, and even
in constitutional monarchies, it is usually vested in the reigning
sovereign. In republics, the chief magistrate, senate, or executive

council is entrusted with the exercise of this sovereign power.
No particular form of words is essential to the conclusion and Form of

treaty.
validity of a binding compact between nations.
The mutual consent of the contracting parties may be given
expressly or tacitly; and in the first case, either verbally or in
writing. It may be expressed by an instrument signed by the

plenipotentiaries of both parties, or by a declaration, and counter
declaration, or in the form of letters or notes exchanged between
them. But modern usage requires that verbal agreements should
be, as soon as possible, reduced to writing in order to avoid
disputes; and all mere verbal communications preceding the final

signature of a written convention are considered as merged in the
(«) See Pt. I. eh. 2, pp. 74 et seq.

358 RIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TEE ATIES—ARBITRATION.
instrument itself. The consent of the parties may be given tacitly,

in the case of an agreement made under an imperfect authority, by
acting under it as if duly concluded (h).

Cartels, There are certain compacts between nations which are concluded,
truces, and
capitulations. not in virtue of any special authority, but in the exercise of a
general implied power confided to certain public agents, as inci-
dental to their official stations. Such are the official acts of
.
generals and admirals, suspending or limiting the exercise of hos-

tilities "within the sphere of their respective military or naval
commands, by means of special licences to trade, of cartels for the
exchange of prisoners, of truces for the suspension of arms, or

capitulations for the surrender of a fortress, city, or province.
These conventions do not, in general, require the ratification of the
supreme power of the State, unless such a ratification be expressly
reserved in the act itself (c) .
Sponsions. Such acts or engagements, when made without authority, or

exceeding the limits of the authority under which they purport
to be made, may be called 'sponsions.' These conventions must
be confirmed by express or by tacit ratification. The former is
given in positive terms, and with the usual formis; the latter is
implied from the fact of acting under the agreement as if bound

by its stipulations. Mere silence is not sufficient to infer a ratifi-
cation by either party, though good faith requires that the party
refusing it should notify its determination to the other party, in

order to prevent the latter from carrying its own part of the
agreement into effect. If, however, it has been totally or partially

executed by either party, acting in good faith upon the supposition
that the agent ,was duly authorized, the party thus acting is entitled
to be indemnified or replaced in his former situation (d) .
Full power
and ratifica- As to other public treaties: in order to enable a public minister
tion.
or other diplomatic agent to conclude and sign a treaty with the
Government to which he is accredited, he must be furnished with
'
a full power,' independent of his general letter of credence.

Opinions of him Pufendorf, consider treaties and con-
Grotius and Grotius, and after
Pufendorf. ventions, thus negotiated and signed, as binding upon the sovereign
in whose name they are concluded, in the same manner as any other
contract made by a duly authorized agent binds his principal, ac-
(b) Martens, Precis, liv. ii. ch. 2, (c) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.
§§ 49, 51, 65. Heffter, § 87. lib. cap. 22, §§ 6—8.
iii. Vattel,
The Roman civilians arranged all Droit des Gens, liv. ii. ch.-14, § 207.
international contracts into three (^d) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.
'
classes: (1) 'Pactiones'; (2) Spon- lib. ii. lib. iii.
siones'; (3)
'
Foedera.' The latter §§ 1 — cap. Vattel,
3.
15, 16;
§
Droit
cap. 22,
des Gens,
were considered the most solemn. liv. ii. ch. 14, §§ 209—212. Ruther-
Gains, Comm. iii. § 94. forth, Iiist. bk. ii. ch. 9, § 21.
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES— ARBITRATION. 359
cording to the general rules of civil jurisprudence. Grotius makes

a distinction between the procuration which is communicated to
the other contracting party, and the instructions which are known
only to the principal and his agent. According to him, the sove-
reign is bound by the acts of his ambassador, within the limits of
his patent full-power, although the latter may have transcended
or violated his secret instructions (e) .
This opinion of the earlier public jurists, founded upon the

analogies of the Eoman law respecting the contract of mandate or
commission, has been contested by more recent writers.
Bynkershoek lays down the true principles applicable to this Oi Bynkers-
subject, with the clearness and practical precision which distin-
guish the writings of that great public jurist (/). He propounds
the question, whether the sovereign is bound by the acts of his
minister, contrary to his secret instructions. According to him, if
the question were to be determined by the ordinary rules of private
law, it is certain that the principal is not bound where the agent
exceeds his power. But in the case of an ambassador, we must
distinguish between the general full-power which he exhibits to
the sovereign to whom he is accredited, and his special instructions,
which he may, and generally does, retain, as a secret between his
own sovereign and himself. He refers to the opinion of Albericus
Gen tills (g), and that of Grotius above cited, that if the minister
has not exceeded the authority given in his patent credentials,
the sovereign is bound to ratify, although the minister may have
deviated from his secret instructions. Bynkershoek admits that
if the credentials are special, and describe the particulars of the
authority conferred on the minister, the sovereign is bound to
ratify whatever is concluded in pursuance of this authority. But
the credentials given to plenipotentiaries are rarely special, stiiJ
more rarely does the secret authority contradict the public full-
power, and most rarely of all does a minister disregard his secret
instructions (h) . But what if he should disregard them ? Is the
sovereign bound to ratify in pursuance of the promise contained in
the full-power ? According to Bynkershoek, the usage of nations,
at the time when he wrote, required a ratification by the sovereign
to give validity to treaties concluded by his minister, in every
instance, except in the very rare case where the entire instructions
were contained in the patent full-power. He controverts the posi-
(e) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. (g) Gentilis, De Jure Belli, lib. ill.
lib. ii. cap. xi. § 12. Pufendorf, De cap. xiv.
Jur. Naturae efc Gent. lib. iii. cap. ix, (A) Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub.
§ 2. lib. ii. cap, vii.
(/) Qusest. Jur. Pub. lib. ii.

cap. vii.
360 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES— ARBITEATION.
tion of Wicquefort (^), condemning the conduct of those princes

who had refused to ratify the acts of their ministers on the ground
of their contravening secret instructions. The analogies of the
Roman law, and the usages of the Roman people, were not to he
considered as an unerring guide in this matter, since time liad
gradually worked a change in the usage of nations, which consti-
tutes the law of nations; and Wicquefort himself, in another
passage, had admitted the necessity of a ratification to give validity
to the acts of a minister under his full-power (k). Bynkershoek'
does not, however, deny that, if the minister has acted precisely in
conformity with his patent full-power, which may be special, or
his secret instructions, which are always special, even the sovereign
is bound to ratify his acts, and subjects himself to the imputation
of bad faith if he refuses. But if the minister exceed his authority,
or undertake to treat points not contained in his full-power and'
instructions, the sovereign is fully justified in delaying, or even

refusing, his ratification. The peculiar circumstances of each par-
ticular case must determine whether the rule or the exception
ought to be applied (I) .
Of Vattel. Vattel the sovereign as bound by the acts of his

considers
minister, within the limits of his credentials, unless the power of
ratifying be expressly reserved, according to the practice already
established at the time when he wrote.
"
Sovereigns treat with each other through the medium of their
attorneys or agents, who are invested with sufficient powers for
the purpose, and are called plenipotentiaries. To their
commonly
office we may apply all the rules of natural law Uvhich respect
things done by commission. The rights of the agent are deter-

mined by the instructions that are given him. He must not deviate
from them; but every promise which he makes, within the terms
of his commission, and within the extent of his powers, binds his
constituent.
"
A.t present, in order to avoid all danger and difficulty, princes
reserve to themselves the power of ratifying what has been con-

cluded in their name by their ministers. The full-power is but a
procuration cum libera.
If this procuration were to have its full
effect, they could not be too circumspect in giving it. But as

princes cannot be compelled to fulfil their engagements, otherwise
than by force of arms, it is customary to place no dependence on'
their treaties, until they have agreed to and ratified them. Thus,
(*) Wicquefort, I'Ambassadeur et ses (A) Bynkershoek, QusBst. Jur. Pub.

Fonctions, liv. ii. § 15. lib. ii. cap. vii.
(0 Ibid.
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TEEATIES— ARBITEATION. 361
as every agreement made by the minister remains invalid until

sanctioned by the ratification of the prince, there is less danger in
giving the minister a full-power. But before a sovereign can
honourably refuse to ratify that which has been concluded in virtue
of a full-power, he must have strong and solid reasons, and, in
particular, he must show that his minister has deviated from his
instructions" (m).
The slightest reflection will show how wide is the difference
between the power given by sovereigns to their ministers to nego-
tiate treaties respecting vast and complicated international con-
cerns, and that given by an individual to his agent or attorney

to contract with another in his name respecting mere private
affairs. The acts of public ministers full powers have
under such
been considered from very early times as subject to ratification {n).
The reason on which this practice is founded is clearly ex- Of Sir E.
plained by a veteran diplomat, whose long experience gives addi-

"
tional weight to his authority. The forms in which one State
negotiates with another," says Sir Robert Adair, "requiring, for
the sake of the business itself, that the powers to transact it should
be as extensive and general as words can render them, it is usual
so to draw them up, even to a promise to ratify; although, in
practice, the non-ratification of preliminaries is never considered
to be a contravention of the law of nations. The reason is plain.
A plenipotentiary, to obtain credit with a State on an equality
with his master, must be invested with powers to do, and agree
to, all that could be done and agreed to by his master himself,
even to the alienating the best part of his territories. But the
exercise of these vast powers, always under the understood control
of non-ratification, is regulated by his instructions" (o).
The exposition of the approved practice of nations, from which Of Kliiber.
alone the law of nations applicable to this matter can be deduced,

conclusively shows that a full power, however general, and even
(w) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. ii. ratifications, at a period of the world
<5li. 12, § 156. like that of Justinian, which invented
(m) One of the earliest recorded ex- nothing, but only collected and fol-
amples of practice was given in
tliis lowed the precedents of the preceding
the treaty of peace concluded, in 561, ages, is conclusive to show that this
by the Eoman Emperor Justinian, with sanction was then deemed necessary by
Cosroes I., King of Persia. Both the the general usage of nations to give
preliminaries and the definitive treaty, validity to treaties concluded under
signed by the respective plenipoten- full powers. On
negotiation and the
tiaries, were subsequently ratified by conclusion of treaties in ancient times,
the two monarchs, and the ratifica- see Phillipson, Int. Law and Custom
tions formally exchanged. Barbeyrao, of Ancient Greece and Eome, vol. i.
Histoire des anciens traites, partie ii. —
pp. 375 419.
p. 295. (o) Adair, Mission to the Court of
It has been very justly observed that Vienna, p. 54.
this example of the exchange of formal
362 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—AEBITRATION.
extending to a promise to ratify, does not involve the obligation

of ratifying in a case where the plenipotentiary has deviated
from his instructions. Yet the contrary doctrine inferred, as we
have seen, by the earlier public jurists, from the analogies of
private law in respect to the obligation of contracts, concluded
hy procuration, is countenanced by a modern writer of no incon-
siderable merit. Kliiber asserts that "public treaties can only
be concluded in a valid manner by the ruler of the State, who
represents it towards foreig'n nations, either immediately by him-

self, orthrough the agency lof plenipotentiaries, and in a manner
conformable to the constitutional laws of the State. A treaty
concluded by such a plenipotentiary is valid, provided he has not
transcended his patent full power; and a subsequent ratification
is onl}^ required in the case where it is expressly reserved in the
full power, or stipulated in the treaty itself, as is usually the case

at present in all those conventions which are not, such as military
arrangements are, of urgent necessity. The ratification by one
of the contracting parties does not bind the other party to give
his in return. Except in the case of special stipulations, a treaty
is deemed to take effect from the time of the signature, and not
from that of the ratification. A simple sponsion, an engage-

ment entered into for the State, whether made by the represen-
tative of the State or his agent, unless he has full authority for
making it, is not binding, except so far as it is ratified by the

State. The question whether a treaty, made in the name of the
State, by the chief of the Government with the enemy, while the
former isa prisoner of war, is binding on the State, or whetheii"
it is to bo regarded even as a sponsion, has given rise to serious
"
disputes (p).
Of Martens. Martens concurs with Kliiber so far as to admit, that what he

"
calls the universal law of nations, does not require a special
ratification to render obligatory the engagement of a minister
acting within the limits of his full power, on the faith of which
the other contracting party has entered into negotiation with him,
even if the minister has transcended his secret instructions." But
"
he very correctly adds, that the positive law of nations, con-
sidering the necessity of giving to negotiators very extensive full

powers, has required a special ratification so as not to expose the
State to the irreparable injury which the inadvertence or bad
faith of a subordinate authority might occasion it; so that treaties
are only relied on when ratified. But the reason of this usage^
(2?) Kliiber, Droit des Gens Moderne de I'Europe, § 142.

EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—AEBITRATION. 363
which may be traced back to the remotest time, sufficiently shows,

that if one of the two parties duly offers his ratification, the other
party cannot refuse his in return, except so far as his agent may
have transcended the limits of his instructions, and consequently
is liable to punishment; and that, at least regularly, it does not
depend upon the unlimited discretion of one nation to refuse its
ratification by alleging mere reasons of convenience" (g).
Martens remarks, in a note to the third edition of his work,
published after Kliiber's had appeared, that the latter is of a
contrary opinion, as to the obligation of one party to exchange
when proposed by the other; "and as he (Kliiber)
ratifications
considers the ratification as necessary only where it is reserved
in the full power, or in the treaty itself (which is
a>t present
rarely omitted), it seems that this author deduces from this

reservation the right of arbitrarily refusing the ratification, which
I doubt" (r).
This observation of Martens appears to be founded on a mis-
apprehension of the meaning of Kliiber. Although he has not,
perhaps, guarded his meaning with sufficient caution, further ex-
amination has convinced us that neither Kliiber, nor any other
institutional writer, has laid down so lax a principle, as that
the ratification of a treaty, concluded in conformity with a full
power, may be refused at the mere caprice of one of the con-

tracting parties, and without assigning strong and solid reasons
for such refusal.
"
The expressions used by Vattel, that before a sovereign can
honourably refuse to ratify that which has been concluded in virtue

of a full power, he must have strong and solid reasons, and, in
particular, he must show that his minister has deviated from

his instructions," may seem to imply that he considered isuch
deviation as a necessary ingredient in the strong and solid reasons

to be alleged for refusing to ratify. But several classes of cases
may be enumerated, in which, it is conceived, such refusal might
be justified, even where the minister had not transcended lOr
violated his instructions. Among these the following may be
mentioned: —
1. Treaties be avoided, even subsequent to ratification,
may Justification
upon the ground of the impossibility, physical or moral, of ful- ratify,
filling their stipulations. Physical impossibility is where the

is disabled from fulfilling it for want
party making the stipulation
of the necessary physical means depending on himself. Moral
{q) Martens, Precis, § 48. (r) Martens, Precis (3rd ed.), note f.
364 RIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES— ARBITRATION.
impossibility is where the execution of the engagement would

affect injuriously the rights of third parties. It follows, in both
cases, that if the impossibility of fulfilling the treaty arises, or is

discovered previous to the exchange of ratifications, it may be
refused on this ground.
2. Upon the ground of mutual error in the parties respecting
a matter of fact, which, had it been known in its true circum-
stances, would have prevented the conclusion of the treaty. Here,
also, if the error be discovered previous to the ratification, it may
be withheld upon this ground.
3. In case of a change of circumstances, on which the validity

of the treaty is made to depend, either by an express stipulation
{clausula rebus sic stantibus), or by the nature of the treaty
itself. As
such a change of circumstances would avoid the treaty,
even after ratification, so if it take place previous to the ratifica-
tion, it will afford a strong and solid reason for withholding that
sanction .
When treaties Every treaty is binding on the contracting parties from the
egm o m .
^^^^ ^| it contains an express stipulation to
^^^ signature, unless
the contrary. The exchange of ratifications has a retroactive
effect, confirming the treaty from its date (a) .
The intervention European Powers

in 1840 of four of the great
in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, affords a remark-
able example of a treaty concluded by plenipotentiaries, which
was not only held to be completely binding between the con-
tracting parties, but the execution of which was actually com-
menced before the exchange of ratifications. Such was the case
with the Convention 15th July, 1840, between Great
of the
Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey. In the secret
protocol annexed to the treaty, it was stated that, on account of
the distance which separated the respective courts from each other,
the interests of humanity, and weighty considerations of Euro-
pean policy, the plenipotentiaries, in virtue of their full powers,

had agreed that the preliminary measures should be immediately
carried into execution, and without waiting for the exchange of
ratifications, consenting formally by the present act, and with
the assent of their courts, to the immediate execution of those
measures.
(s) Martens, Pr6cis, § 48. Essai FEurope, § 48. Heffter, Das Euro-
concernant les Armateurs, § 48. paische Volkerrecht, § 87.
Kliiber, Droit des Gens Moderne de
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TEEATIES—ARBITRATION. 365
This anomalous case may, at first sight, seem to contradict

the principles above stated, as to the necessity of a previous rati-
fication, to give complete effect to a treaty concluded by plenipo-
tentiaries. But further reflection will show the obvious distinc-
tion which exists between a declaration of the plenipotentiaries,
authorized by the instructions of their respective courts, dis-
pensing by mutual consent with the previous ratification;
and a demand by one of the contracting parties, that the treaty
should be carried into execution without waiting for the rati-
fication of the other party (t).
The municipal constitution of every particular State deter- The treaty-
mines in whom resides the authority to ratify treaties negotiated

dependent^n'^
and concluded with foreign Powers, so as to render them obli- the muDicipal
,
gatory upon the nation.

.
".
Til 1
•
In absolute monarchies, it is the pre-

• •
1
constitution.
rogative of the sovereign himself to confirm the act of his

plenipotentiary by his final sanction. In certain limited or
constitutional monarchies, the consent of the legislative power
of the nation is, in some cases, required for that puipoise. In
some republics, as in that of the United States of America, the
advice and consent of the Senate are essential, to enable the chief
executive magistrate to pledge the national faith in this form.
In all these cases, it is, consequently, an implied condition in
negotiating with foreign Powers, that the treaties concluded by
the executive government shall be subject to ratification in the
manner prescribed by the fundamental laws of the State.
"He who contracts with another," says Ulpian, "knows, or
ought to know, his condition." ("Qui cum alio contrahit, vel

est, vel debet esse non ignarus conditionis ejus" (u).) But, in
practice, the full powers given by the Government of the United
States to their plenipotentiaries always expressly reserve the rati-
fication of the treaties concluded by them, by the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate.
The treaty, when thus ratified, is obligatory upon the contracting Auxiliary
States, independently of the auxiliary legislative measures, which mfasuresf
far neces-
may be necessary on the part of either, in order to carry it into ^°^
complete Where, indeed, such auxiliary legislation becomes
effect. validity of a
^^^ ^'
necessary, in consequence of some limitation upon the treaty-
making power, expressed in the fundamental laws of the Sta;te,
or necessarily implied from the distribution of its constitutional,
powers
—such, for example, as a prohibition of alienating the
(t) Martens, Nouveau Recueil Gene- Question, pp. 90 seq,

ral, tome j. p. .163. Cf. Holland, (w) L. 19, D. de div. R. J. 50, 17.
European Concert on the Eastern
366 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TEEATIES—AEBITEATION.
national domain — then the treaty may be considered as imperfect

in its obligation, until the national assent has been given in the|
forms required by the municipal constitution. A general power
to make
treaties of peace neoessarilj, implies a power to dedide
the terms on which they shall be made; and, among these, may
properly be included the cession of the public territory and other
property, as well* as of private property included in the eminent
domain annexed to the national sovereignty.If there be no limi-
tation expressed in the fundamental laws of the State, or neces-
sarily implied from the distribution of its constitutional authorities
on the treaty-making power in this respect, it necessarily extends'
to the alienation of public and private property, when deemted
necessary or expedient {x) .
Commercial which have the effect of altering the

treaties,
existing laws of trade and navigation of the contracting parties,

may require the sanction of the legislative power in each State
for their execution. Thus the commercial treaty of Utrecht, be-
tween France and Great Britain, by which the trade between the
two countries was to be placed on the footing of reciprocity, was
—
never carried into effect the British Parliament having rejected
the Bill which was brought in for the purpose of modifying the
existing laws of trade and navigation, so as to adapt them to the

stipulations of the treaty (?^,). In treaties requiring the appro-
priation of moneys for their execution, it is the usual practice of
the British Government to stipulate that the king will recommend
to parliament to make the gr^mt necessary for that purpose Under .
the Constitution of the United States, by which treaties made and

ratified by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
"
are declared to be the supreme law of the land," it seems to be
understood that the Congress is bound to redeem the national faith
thus pledged, and to pass the laws necessary to carry the treaty into
effect {z) .
American The Supreme Court of the United States has laid down as a
Courts on
commence- principle of international law that, respecting the rights of either
nient of
Government under it, a treaty is considered concluded and binding
treaties.
from the date of its signature. In this regard the exchange of
ratifications has, as stated in the text, a retroactive effect, con-
firming the treaty from its date. But a different rule previails
where the treaty operates on individual rights. The principle of
{x) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. (y) Lord Mahon, History of Eng-
lib. iii. cap. 20, § 7. Vattel, Droit land from the Peace of Utrecht, vol. i.
des Gens, liv. i. ch. 20, § 244; ch. 2, p. 24.
§§ 262—265. Kent, Comment, on {z) Kent, Comment, vol. i.
p. 285
American law, vol. i.
p. 164 (5th ed.). (5th ed.).
RIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—ARBITRATION. 367
relation does not apply to rights of this character, which were

vested before the treaty was ratified. In so far as it affects them,
it is not considered as concluded until there is an 'exchange of
ratifications {a). The reason of the rule is this. In America a
treaty is something more than a contract, for the Federal Constitu-
tion declares it to be the law of the land. 'If so, before it can
become a law, the Senate, in whom- rests the authority to ratify
it, must agree to it. But the Senate is not required to adojpt or
reject it as a whole, but may modify or amend it; thus in 1897 the
Senate rejected a proposed treaty with Great Britain providing
for the reference of future disputes between the parties to a court?
of arbitration, and in 1900 in a treaty relating to the Panama
Canal it introduced amendments which Great Britain did not
accept. As the individual citizen on whose rights of property it
operates has no means of knowing anything of it while before the
Senate, it would be wrong in principle to hold him bound by it,
as the law of the land, until it was ratified and
proclaimed. And
to construe the law, so as to make the ratification of the treaty
relate back to its signing, thereby divesting a title already vested,
would be manifestly unjust (&).
By the general principles of private jurisprudence, recognised Freedom of'

bv most, if not all, civilized countries, a contract obtained bv Vioi- ^^'^^®^*' ^^w
*' ^ lar necessary
.
lence is void. Freedom of consent essential to the validity of to the validity

is
of treaties.
every agreement, and contracts obtained under duress are void,
because the general welfare of society requires that they should
be so. If they were binding, the timid would constantly be forced
by threats, or by violence, into a surrender of their just rights.
The notoriety of the rule that such engagements are void, makes
the attempt to extort them among the rarest of human crimes On .
the other hand, the welfare of society requires that the engage-
ments entered into by a nation under such duress as is implied by
the defeat of its military forces, the distress of its
people, and the
occupation of its territories by an enemy, should be held binding;
for if they were not, wars could only be terminated by the utter
subjugation and ruin of the weaker party. Nor does inadequacy

of consideration, or inequality in the conditions of a treaty between
nations, such as might be sufiicient to set atside a contract as
between private individuals on the ground of gross inequality or
(«) U. 8. V. Arredondo (1832), 6 lace, 34. See also U. S. v. Reynes

Peters, 735. (1850), 9 148, 289; Foster
Howard,
(b) Haver v. Yaker (1869), 9 Wal- v. Neilson (1829), 2 Peters, 314.
368 RIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—ARBITRATION.
enormous lesion, form a sufficient reason for refusing to execute the
treaty (c).
Kiuds of General compacts between nations may be divided into what

international
treaties.
are called transitory (dispositivê or executed) conventions, and
treaties properly so termed (sometimes called
executory conven-
tions) The first are perpetual in their nature, so that, being once
.
carried into effect, they subsist independent of any change in the
sovereignty and form of government of the contracting parties;

and although their operation may, in some cases, be suspended
during war, they revive on the return of peace without any express
stipulation. Such are treaties of cession, boundary, or exchange
of territory, or those which create a permanent servitude in favour
of one nation within the territory of another (i^)The second
.
class includes treaties relating to friendship and alliance, commerce

and navigation, extradition, guarantee, &c.
Transitory Thus the treaty of peace of 1783,, between Great Britain and
conventions
perpetual. the United States, by which the independence of the latter was
acknowledged, prohibited future confiscations of property; and the

Treat}^ of 1794, between the same parties, confirmed the titles of
British subjects holding lands in the United States, and of
American citizens holding lands in Great Britain, which might
otherwise be forfeited for alienage. Under these stipulations, tho
Supremo Court of the United States determined that the title both
of British natural subjects and of corporations to lands in America
was protected by the treaty of peace, and confirmed by the Treaty
of 1794, so that it could not be forfeited by any intermediate
legislative act, or other proceeding, for alienage. Even supposing
tho treaties were abrogated by the war which broke out between
the two countries in 1812, it would not follow that the rights of
property already vested under those treaties could be divested by

supervening hostilities. The extinction of the treaties would no
more extinguish the title to real property acquired or secured
under their stipulations than the repeal of a municipal law affects
rights of property vested under its provisions (e) But inde- .
pendent of this incontestable principle, on which the security of

all property rests, the Court was not inclined to admit the doctrine,
that treaties become, by war between the two contracting parties,
(c) Senior, Edinburgh Rev. No. ch. 12, § 192. Martens, Precis, liv. ii.
CLVI. Art. 1. Martens, Precis, liv. ii. ch. 2, § 58.
ch. 2, §§ 50, 52. Grotius, De Jur. (e) Chirac v. Chirac 2
Bel. ac Pac. lib. ii. sect. xiv. §§ 4 12.— Wheaton, 277.
(1817),
(d) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. ii.

ipso facto extinguished, if not revived by an express or implied

renewal on the return of peace. Whatever might be the latitude
of doctrine laid down by elementary writers on the law of nations,
dealing in general terms in relation to the subject, it was satisfied

that the doctrine contended for was not universally true. There
might be treaties of such a nature as to their object and import, as

that war would necessarily put an end to them; but where treaties
contemplated a permanent arrangement of territory, and other
national rights, or in their terms were meant to provide for the
event of an intervening war, it would be against every principle
of just interpretation to hold them extinguished by war. If such
were the law, even the Treaty of 1783, so far as it fixed the limits
of the United States, and acknowledged their independence, would
be gone, and they would have had again to struggle for both,
upon original revolutionary principles. Such a construction was
never asserted, and would be so monstrous as to supersede all
reasoning. The Court, therefore, concluded that treaties stipu-
lating for permanent rights and general arrangements, and pro-
fessing to aim at perpetuity, and to deal with the case of war as
well as of peace, do not cease on the occurrence of war, but are,
at most, only suspended while it lasts; and unless they are waived
by the parties, or new and repugnant stipulations are made,

revive upon the return of peace (/) .
By the third Article of the treaty of peace of 1783, between the Controversy
United States and Great Britain, it was "agreed that the people êtweenthe
TT 1 •
o( • •
of the United States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the right British
11-1
American and
to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank, and on all the other
respecdnff^the
Banks of Newfoundland; also, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and rights of
at all other places in the sea, where the inhabitants of both coun- coasts of the
British
tries used, at any time heretofore, to fish; and also that the inhabi-
.
1 Ti 1 ^ n dominions m
tants of the United States shall have liberty to take fish of every North
kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fisher- r;™®^^^^;
..
, /.
Effect of war
men shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island), on transitory
and on the coasts, bays, and creeks of all other of his Britannic
also
^reatieT^^^^^^
Majesty's dominions in America; and that tlie American fisher-

men shall have liberty to dry and cure
fish in any of the unsettled
bays, harbours, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands,

and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled; but as
soon as the same, or either of them shall be settled, it shall not be
(/) The Society for the Propagation Chancery, as to American citizens hold-
of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. The ing lands in Great Britain under the
Town of New Haven (1823), 8 Treaty of 1794, in Sutton v. Sutton
Wheaton, 464. The same principle (1830), 1 R. & M. 663.
was asserted by the English Ct>urt of
W. 24
370 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—AEBITRATION.
lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement,
without a ]3revious agreement for that purpose with the inhabi-
tants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground."
Negfotiation During the negotiation at Ghent, in 1814, the British pleni-
at Ghent. "
potentiaries gave notice that their Government did not intend
to grant to the United States, gratuitously, the privileges for-
merly granted by treaty to them of fishing within the limits of

the British sovereignty, and of using the shores of the British
with the British fisheries." In
territories for purposes connected
answer to this declaration the American plenipotentiaries stated
tliat they were "not authorized to bring into discussion any of
the rights or liberties which the United States have heretofore
enjoyed in relation thereto; from their nature, and from the

peculiar character of the Treaty of 1783, by which they were
recognized, no further stipulation has been deemed necessary by
the Government of the United States to entitle them to the full
enjoyment of them all."

The treaty of peace concluded at Ghent, in 1814, therefore,
contained no stipulation on the subject; and the British Govern-
ment subsequently expressed its intention to exclude the Ameri-
can fishing vessels from the liberty of fishing within one marine
league of the shores of the British territories in North America,
and from that of drying and curing their fish on the unsettled
parts of those territories,- and, with the consent of the inhabitants,
within those parts which had become settled since the peace of
1783.
Argument of In discussing this question, the American minister in London,
Mr. J. Q.
Adams. Mr. J. Q. Adams, stated^ that from the time the settlement in
North xlmerica, constituting the United States, was made, until
their separation from Great Britain and their establishment as
distinct sovereignties, these liberties of fishing, and of drying
and curing fish, had been enjoyed by them, in common with the
other subjects of the British Empire. In point of principle,
they were pre-eminently entitled to the enjoyment; and in point
of fact, they had enjoyed more of them than any other portion of
the empire; their settlement of the neighbouring country having
naturally led to the discovery and improvement of these fisheries;

and theirproximity to the places where they were prosecuted
having led them to the discovery of the most advantageous fishing
grounds, and given them facilities in the pursuit of their occu-
pation in those regions which the remoter parts of the empiro
could not possess. It might be added, that they had contributed
their full share, and more than their share, in securing the con-
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—ARBITRATION. 371
quest from France of the provinces on the coasts of which these

fisherieswere situated.
was doubtless upon considerations such as these that an
It
express stipulation was inserted in the Treaty of 1783, recog-

nising the rights and liberties which had always been enjoyed
by the people of the United States in these fisheries, and declaring
that they should continue to enjoy the right of fishing on the
Grand Bank, and other places of common jurisdiction, and have
the liberty of fishing, and drying and curing their fish, within the
exclusive British jurisdiction on the North American coasts, to
whicJi they had been accustomed whilst they formed a part of
the British nation. This stipulation was a part of that treaty by
which his Majesty acknowledged the United States as free,
sovereign, and independent States, and that he treated with them
as such.
Effect of war.
prove that this treaty was not, in
It could not be necessary to
its general provisions, one of those which, by the common under-
standing and usage of civilized nations, is considered as annulled

by a subsequent war between the isame parties. To suppose that
it is, would
imply the inconsistency and absurdity of a sovereign
and independent State, liable to forfeit its right of sovereignty
by the act of exercising it on a declaration of war. But the very
words of the treaty attested that the sovereignty and independ-
ence of the United States were not considered as grants from
his Majesty. They were taken and expressed as existing before
the treaty was made, and as then only first formally recognised
by Great Britain.
same nature were the rights and liberties in the
Precisely of the
fisheries.They were, in no respect, grants from the King of
Great Britain to the United States; but the acknowledgment
of them as rights and liberties enjoyed before the separation of
the two countries, and which it was mutually agreed should con-
tinue to be enjoyed under the new relations which were to subsist
between them, constituted the essence of the article concerning
the fisheries. The very peculiarity of the stipulation was an evi-
dence that it was not, on eitherside, understood or intended as a
grant from one sovereign State to another. Had it been so under-

stood, neither could the United States have claimed, nor would
Great Britain have granted, gratuitously, any such concession.
There was nothing, either in the state of things, or in the disposi-
tion of the parties, which could have led to such a stipulation on
the part of Great Britain, as on the ground of a grant, without an
.equivalent .
24 (2)
372 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TKEATIES—ARBIOÂTION.
bj the Treaty of 1783 was one of the con-

If the stipulation
ditions hy which his Majesty acknowledged the sovereignty and
independence of the United States; if it was the mere recognition
of rights and liberties previously existing and enjoyed, it was —
neither a privilege gratuitously granted, nor liable to be forfeited
by the mere existence of a subsequent war If it was not forfeited

.
by the war, neither could it be impaired by the declaration of

Great Britain at Ghent, that she did not intend to renew the grant .
Where there had been no gratuitous concession, there could bo,

none to renew; the rights and liberties of the United States could
not be caqioelled by the declaration of the British intentions.
Nothing could abrogate them but a renunciation by the United
States themselves (g) .
Argument of In the answer of the British Government to this comnmnica-

Bathurst ^'^^^^j ^^ ^^'^^ stated that Great Britainhad always considered the
libertj^ formerly enjoyed by the United States, of fishing within
British limits and using British territory, as derived from the
3rd Article of the Treaty of 1783, and from that alone; and that
tho claim of an independent State to occupy and use, at its dis-
cretion, any portion of the territory of another, Avithout compen-
sation or corresponding indulgence, could not rest on any other
foundation than conventional stipulation. It was unnecessary to
inquire into the motives which might have originally influenced
Great Britain in conceding such liberties to the United States,
or whether other articles of the treaty did or did not, in fact, afford
an equivalent for them, because all the stipulations profess to be
founded on reciprocal advantage and mutual convenience. If the
United States derived from that^reaty privileges, from which
other independent nations not admitted by treaty were excluded,
the duration of the privileges must depend on the duration of the
instrument by which they were granted; and if the war abro-
gated the treaty, it determined the privileges. It had been urged,
indeed, on the part of the United States, that the Treaty of 1783
was of a peculiar character, and that, because it contained a recog-
nition of American independence, it could not be abrogated by
a subsequent war between the parties. To a position of this novel
nature Great Britain could not accede. She knew of no exception
to the rule, that all treaties are put an end to by a subsequent
war between the same parties; she could not, therefore, consent to
gi\e her diplomatic relations with one State a different degree
of permanency from that on which her connection with all other
(^) Mr. J. Q. Adams to Lord State Papers, fol. ed. 1834, vol. iv.
Bathurst, Sept. 25, 1815. American p. 352.
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TEE ATIES—ARBITRATION. 373
States depended. Nor could she consider any one State at liberty
to assign to a treaty made with her such a peculiarity of charac-
ter as should make it, as to duration, an exception to all other
found, on a peculiarity thus assumed, an irre-
treaties, in order to
vocable title to indulgences which had all the features of tem-
porary concessions.
It was by no means unusual for treaties containing recognitions
and acknowledgments of title, in the nature of perpetual obligation,
to contain, likewise, grants of privileges liable to revocation. The
Treaty of 1783, like many others, contained provisions of diffe- \
rent character; some in their own nature irrevocable, the others
merely temporary. If it were thence inferred that, because some

advantages specified in that treaty would not be put an end to by
the war, therefore all the other advantages were intended to be
equallj' permanent, it must first be shown that the advantages

themselves are of the same, or at least of a similar character; for
the character of one advantage, recognised or conceded by treaty,
can have no connection with the character of another, though
conceded by the same instrument, unless it arises out of a strict
and necessary connection between the advantages themselves. But
what necessary connection could there be between a right to inde-
pendence and a liberty to fish within British jurisdiction, or to
use British territory ? Liberties within British limits were as
capable of being exercised by a dependent as by an independent

State; and could not, therefore, be the necessary consequence of
independence.
The independence of a State could not be correctly said to be
granted by a treaty, but to be lacknowledged by one. In the
Treaty of 1783/^ the independence of the United States was cer-
tainly acknowledged, not merely by the consent to make the treaty,

but by the previous consent to enter into the provisional Articles,
executed in 1782. Their independence might have been acknow-
ledged, without either the treaty or the provisional Articles; but
by "whatever mode acknowledged, the acknowledgment was, in its
own nature, 'irrevocable.A power of revoking, or even of modi-
fying would be destructive of the thing itself; and, therefore,
it,
all such power was necessarily renounced when the acknowledg-
ment was made. The war could not put an end to it, for the
reason justly assigned by the American minister; because a nation
could not forfeit its sovereignty by the act of exercising it; and
for the further reason that Great Britain, when she declared war
against the United States, gave them, by that very act, a new
recognition of their independence.
^'^4 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—ARBITRATION. .
The
rights acknowledged by the Treaty of 1783 were not only
distinguishable from the liberties conceded by the same treaty, in
the foundation on which they stand, but
they were carefully dis-
tinguished in the wording of the treaty. In the 1st Article, Great
Britain acknowledged an independence already
expressly recog-
nised by the other Powers of Europe, and by herself in her consent
to enter into the provisional Articles of 1782. In the 3rd Article,
Great Britain acknowledged the right of the United States to take
fish on the Banks of Newfoundland and other
places, from which
Great Britain had no right to exclude any independent nation.
But they were to have the liberty to cure and dry them in certain
unsettled places within the British territory. If the liberties thus
granted were to be as perpetual and indefeasible as the rights

previously recognised, it was difficult to conceive that the American
plenipotentiaries would have admitted a variation of language so

adapted to produce a different impression; and, above all, that they
should have admitted so strange ,a restriction of a perpetual and
indefeasible right as that with which the Article concludes, which
left a right so practical and so beneficial as this was admitted to
be, dependent on the wiil of British subjects, proprietors, or pos-

sessors of the soil, to prohibit its exercise altogether.
' '
It was, therefore, surely obvious that the word was,

right
throughout the treaty, used as applicable to what the United States
were to enjoy in virtue of a recognised independence; and the
' '
word liberty to what threy were to enjoy as concessions strictly

dependent on the treaty itself {h).
Reply of The American minister, in his reply to this argument, dis-

Mr. Adamt
avowed every pretence of claiming for the diplomatic relations
between the United States and Great Britain a degree of perma-
nency different from that of the same relations between either of
the parties and all other Powers. He disclaimed all pretence of
assigning to any treaty between the two nations any peculiarity
not founded in the nature of the treaty itself. But he submitted
to the candour of the British Government whether the Treaty of
1783 was not, from the very nature of its subject-'matter, and
from the rel'itions previously existing between the parties to it,
peculiar ? Whether it was a treaty which could have been made
between Great Britain and any other nation ? And if not, whether
the whole scope and object of its stipulations were not expressly
intended to establish a new and permanent state of diplomatic
relations between the two countries, which would not and could not
(70 Earl Bathurst to Mr. J. Q. State Papers, fol. ed. 1834, vol. iv.
Adams, Oct. 30, 1815. American p. 354.
RIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—AEBITRATION. ^575
be annulled by the mere fact of a subsequent war ? And he made

this appeal with the more confidence, because the British note
admitted that treaties often contained recognitions in the nature of
perpetual obligation; and because it implicitly admitted that the
whole Treaty of 1783 is of this character, with the exception of
the Article concerning the navigation of the Mississippi, and a
small part of the Article concerning the fisheries .
''
The position, that Great Britain knows of no exception to
the rule, that all treaties are put an end to by a
subsequent war,'"
appeared to the American minister not only novel, but unwarranted
by any of the received authorities upon the law of nations unsanc-
;
tioned by the practice and usages of sovereign States; suited, in

its tendency, to multiply the incitements to war, and to weaken
the ties of peace between independent nations; and not easily

reconciled with the admission that treaties not unusually contain,
together with articles of a temporary character, liable to revocation,

"
recognitions and acknowledgments in the nature of perpetual
obligation."
A recognition or acknowledgment of title, stipulated by con-
vention, was as much a part of the treaty as any other Article; and
if all treaties are
abrogated by war, the recognitions and acknow-
ledgments contained in them must necessarily be null and void,
as much as any other part of the treaty .
If there were no exception to the rule, that war puts an end

to all treaties between the parties to it, what could be the
purpose
or meaningof those Articles which, in almost all treaties of com-
merce, were provided expressly for the contingency of war, and

which during the peace are without operation ? For example, the
10th Article of the .Treaty of 1794, between the United States
"
and Great Britain, stipulated that Neither the debts due from
individuals of the one nation to individuals of the other, nor shares,
nor moneys, which they may have in the public funds, or in ,the
public or private banks, shall ever, in any event of war, or national
differences, be sequestered or confiscated." If war put an end to
all treaties,what could the parties to this engagement intend by
making formally an Article of the treaty ? According to the
it
principle laid down, excluding aU exception, by the British note,

the moment a war broke out between the two countries this stipu-
lation became a dead letter, and either State
might have seques-;
tered or confiscated those specified properties, without any violation
of compact between the two nations.
The American minister believed that there were many excep-
tions to the rule by which the treaties between nations are mutually
376 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TEEATIES—AEBITRATION.
considered as terminated by the intervention of a war; that these

exceptions extend to all engagements contracted with the under-
standing that they are to operate equally in war and peace, or
exclusively during war; to all engagements by which the parties
superada the sanction of a formal compact to principles dictated
by the eternal laws of morality and humanity; and, finally, to all
engagements, which, according to the expression of the British
note, are in the nature of perpetual obligation. To the first and
second of these classes might be referred the 10th Article of the
Treaty of 1794, and all treaties or Articles of treaties stipulating
the abolition of the slave trade. The treaty of peace of 1783
belongs to the third class.
The reasoning of the British note seemed to confine this per-
petuity of obligation to recognitions and acknowledgments of title,

and to consider its perpetual nature as resulting from the subject--'
matter of the contract, and not from the engagement of the con-t
tractor. While Great Britain left the United States unmolested
in the enjoyment of all the advantages, rights and liberties stipu^
lated in their behalf in the jTreaty of 1783, it was immaterial
whether she founded her conduct upon the mere fact that the
United States are in possession of such rights, or whether she
was governed by good faith and respect for her own engagements.
But if she contested any of these rights, it was to her engagements
only that the United States could appeal, as the rule for settling
the question of right. If this appeal were rejected, it ceased to
be a discussion of right; and this observation applied as strongly,
to the recognition of independence and the boundary line, in the
Treaty of 1783, as to the fisheries. It was truly observed in the

British note, that in that treaty the independence of the United
States was not granted, but acknowledged; and it was added, that
it might have been acknowledged without any treaty, and that the
acknowledgment, in whatever mode, would have been irrevocable.

But the independence of the United States was precisely the ques-
tion upon which a previous war between them and Great Britain
had been waged. Other nations might acknowledge their inde-
j)®^^^^^^® without a treaty, because they had no right or claim of
right to contestit; but this acknowledgment, to be binding upon
Great Britain, could have been made only by treaty, because it

included the dissolution of one social compact between the parties,
as well as the formation of another. Peace could exist between
the two nations only by the mutual pledge of faith to the new
social relations established between them; and hence it was that
the stipulations to that treaty were in the nature of perpetual
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—ARBITEATION. 377
obligation, and not liable to be forfeited by a subsequent war, or

by any declaration of tbe will of either party, without the assent
of the other (i) .
The above analysis of the correspondence which took place re- Result of this
lating to this subject, has been inserted as illustrative of the general ênce^^^"
question, how far treaties are abrogated by war between the parties
to them; but the particular controversy itself Avas finally settled
between the two countries on the basis of compromise, by the
convention of 1818, in which the liberty claimed by the United
States in respect to the fishery within the British jurisdiction and
territory,was confined to certain geographical limits (k).
Treaties, properly so called, or fcedera, are those of friendship Treaties, the

and alliance, commerce and navigation, guarantee, extradition,
&c., which, even if perpetual in terms, expire of course:
—
in certain
^JJ^^^ceases
1. In case either of the contracting loses its existence

parties
as an independent State.
2. Where the internal constitution of government of either
State ischanged as to render the treaty inapplicable under
so
circumstances different from those with a view to which it was
concluded.
Here the distinction laid down by institutional writers between
'real' and 'personal' treaties becomes important. The first bind
the contracting parties independently of any change in the sove-
reignty, or in the rulers of the State. The latter include only
ti-eaties of mere personal alliance, such as are expressly made
with a view to the person of the actual ruler or reigning sovereign,

and tliough they bind the State during his existence, expire with
his natural life or his public connection with the State (^).
3. In case of war between the contracting parties; unless certain
stipulations were made expressly with a view to a rupture, such

as the period of time allowed to the respective subjects to retire
witli their effects, or other limitations of the general rights of
war. Such is the stipulation contained in the 10th Article of
the Treaty of 1794, between Great Britain and the United States,
— providing that private debts and shares or moneyis in the public
funds, or in public or private banks belonging to private indi-
viduals, should never, in the event of war, be sequestered or con-
fiscated. There can be no doubt that the obligation of this Article
would not be impaired by a supervening war, being the very con-
(0 Mr. J. Q. Adams to Lord Castle- (k) Vide ante, pt. ii. ch. v. p. 287.
reagh, Jan. 22, 1816. American State (V) Vide ante, pt. i. ch. 2, p. 45.
Papers, fol. ed. 1834, vol. iv. p. 356.
378 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—AEBITKATION
tiiigency meant to be provided for, and that it must remain in

full force until mutually agreed to be rescinded (m) .
4. Treaties expire by their own limitation, unless revived by
express agreement, or when their stipulations are fulfilled by the

respective parties, or when a total change of circumstances renders
them no longer obligatory.
Treaties Most international compacts, and especially treaties of peace,
revived and
confirmed on are of a mixed character, and contain Articles of both kinds, which
the renewal renders it frequently difficult to distinguish between those stipu-
of peace.
lationswhich are perpetual in their nature, and such as are ex-
tinguished by war between the contracting parties, or by such
changes of circumstances as affect the being of either party, and
thus render the compact inapplicable to the new condition of
things. It is for this reason, and from abundance of caution,
that stipulations are frequently inserted in treaties of peace, ex-
pressly reviving and confirming the treaties formerly subsisting

between the contracting parties, and containing stipulations of
a permanent character, or in some other mode excluding the con-
clusion that the obligation of such antecedent treaties is meant
to be waived by either party. The reiterated confirmations of
the treaties of Westphalia and Utrecht, in almost every subse-
quent treaty of peace or commerce between the same parties, con-

stituted a sort of written code of conventional law, by which the
distribution of power and territory among the principal Euro-
pean States was perma,nently settled, until violently disturbed
by the partition of Poland and the wars of the French Eevolution .
The arrangements of territory and political relations substituted

by the treaties of Vienna for 'the ancient conventional law of
Europe, and doubtless intended to be of a similar permanent
character, have already undergone, in consequence of the French,
Polish, and Belgic revolutions of 1830, very important modifica-
tions (oi) .
Treaties of The convention of guaranty (or guarantee) is one of the most

g-uaranty. usual international contracts. It is an engagement by which
one State promises to aid another where it is
interrupted, or threat-
ened to be disturbed, in the peaceable enjoyment of its
rights by
a third Power. It may be applied to every
species of right and
obligation that can exist between nations; to the possession and
boundaries of territories, the sovereignty of the State, its consti-
tution of government, the right of succession, &c.; but it is most
(w) Vattel, liv. iii. ch. 10, § 175. (n) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations,
Kent, Comment, on American Law, pp. 435 —445, 538 551
vol. i.
p. 175 (5th ed.).
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES -AEBITRATION . 379
conimonlj applied to treaties of peace. The guaranty may also

be contained in a distinct and separate convention, or included
among the stipulations annexed to the principal treaty intended

to be guaranteed. It then becomes an accessory obligation (o).
The guaranty may be stipulated by a third Power not a party,
to the principal treaty, by one of the contracting parties in favour
of another, or mutually between all the parties. Thus, by the
treaty of peace concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, the eight
high contracting parties mutually guaranteed to each other all
the stipulations of the treaty.
The guaranteeing party is bound nothing more than to render
to
the assistance stipulated. If itprove he is not obliged
insufficient,
to indemnify the Power to whom his aid has been promised.
Nor is he bound to interfere to the prejudice of the just rights
of a third party, or in violation of a previous treaty rendering
the guaranty inapplicable in a particular case. Guaranties
apply only to rights and possessions existing at the time they are
stipulated. It was upon these grounds that Louis XV. declared,
in 1741, in favour of the Elector of Bavaria against Maria
Theresa, the heiress of the Emperor Charles VI., although the
court of France had previously guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction
of that Emperor, regulating the succession to his hereditary
States. Andwas upon similar grounds that France refused
it
Treaty of Alliance of 1756 with Austria, in respect

to fulfil the
to the pretensions of the latter Power upon Bavaria, in 1778,
which threatened to produce a war with Eussia. Whatever doubts
may be suggested as to the application of these principles to the
above cases, there can be none respecting the principles them-
selves, which are recognised by all the text writers (p) .
' '
These writers make a distinction between a surety and a

'guarantee.' Thus Vattel lays
down, that where the matter
it
relates to things which another may do or give as well as he who

makes the original promise, as, for instance, the payment of a
sum of money, it is safer to demand a surety ('caution') than a
guarantee ('garant'). For the surety is bound to make good
the promise in default of the principal; whereas the guarantee
isonly obliged to use his best endeavours to obtain a performance
of the promise from him who has made it (q) .
(o) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. ii. Flassan, Histoire do la Diplomatie
ch. 16, §§ 235—239. Kluber, Droit Frauvaise, torn. vii. p. 195.
des Gens Moderne de I'Europ©, Pt. II. (g) Vattel, § 239. See Hertslet,
tit. ii. sect. 1, ch. 2, §§ 157, 158. Map of Europe by Treaty, Index, tit.
Martens, Precis, § 63. Guaranty.
(^) Vattel, liv. ii. ch. 16, § 238.
When several States join to guarantee a certain condition of
things, e.g., the independence and neutrality of another State,

it is
important to determine the extent of the liability imposed
on the guarantors. The liability may be a "joint" or "collec-
tive" liability; or it may be a "separate," "several," or "indi-
vidual" liability. Thus in the treaties of 1831 and 1839, Great
Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria guaranteed the
neutrality and independence of Belgium; and the liability of
the signatory Powers has always been considered to be an indi-
vidual liability, though the expression was not specifically adopted
in the Convention. On the other hand, the neutralisation treaty
relating to Luxemburg, 1867, was only a collective guarantee,
imposing, therefore, a narrower responsibility on the contracting

parties (viz., the above five Powers, together with Italy and
Holland). The result of this distinction is, that should any State
violate or to violate the neutrality of Belgium, each
attempt
guarantor individually bound to intervene, whether the co-
is
guarantors intervene or not; but should an attempt be made on

the territory of Luxemburg, each guarantor in the treaty of 1867
is not necessarily bound to intervene unless the co-guarantors
join to take united action {r).
Treaties of Treaties of alliance may be either defensive or offensive. In

alliance.
the the engagements of the ally extend only to a war
first case,
really and truly defensive; to a war of aggression first com-

menced, in point of fact, against the other contracting party. In
the second, the ally engages generally to co-operate in hostilities
against a specified Power, or against any Power with whom the

other party may be engaged in war.
An alliance may also be both offensive and defensive.
Distinction General alliances are to be distinguished from treaties of limited
between
general succour and subsidy. Where one State stipulates to furnish to
alliance and
another a limited succour of troops, ships of war, money, or pro-
treaties of
limited visions, without any promise looking to an eventual engagement
succour and
in general hostilities, such a treaty does not
subsidy. necessarily render
the party furnishing this limited succour the
enemy of the oppo-
site belligerent. It only becomes such, so far as
respects the
auxiliary forces thus supplied; in all other respects it remains
neutral. Such, for example, had long been the accustomed rela-
tions of the confederated Cantons of Switzerland with the other
European Powers (s) .
(r) Cf. Phillipson, International (s) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii.
Law and the Great War (1915), pp. 18 ch. 6, §§ 79—82.
seq.
Grotius and the other text writers hold that the casus foederis Oastis
fcedenji
of a defensive alliance does not apply to the case of a war mani- alliance,
festl}' unjust, that is, to a war of aggression on the part of the

Powe]' claiming the benefit of the alliance. And it is even said
to be a tacit condition annexed to
every treaty made in time of
peace, stipulating to afford succour in time of war, that the stipu-
lation is applicable only to a just war. To promise assistance in
an unjust war would be an obligation to commit injustice, and no
such contract is valid. But, it is added, this tacit restriction in the
terms of a general alliance can be applied only to a manifest case
of unjust aggression on the part of the other contracting party,
and cannot be used as a pretext to elude the performance of a
positive and unequivocal engagement, without justly exposing the
ally to the imputation of bad faith. In doubtful cases, *the pre-
sumption ought rather to be in favour of our confederate, and of
the justice of his quarrel (t).
The application of these general principles must depend upon

the nature and terms of the particular guaranties contained in the
treaty in question This will best be illustrated by specific

.
examples.
ThuS; the States-General of Holland were engaged, previously Alliance
to the war of 1756 between France and Gr<?at Britain, in three îêirBritain
different guaranties and defensive treaties with the latter Power. «nd Holland.
The first was the original defensive alliance,

forming the basis of
all the subsequent compacts between the two countries, concluded
at Westminster in 1678. In the preamble to this treaty, the pre-
servation of each other's dominions was stated as the cause of
making it; stipulated a mutual guaranty of all they already

and it
"
enjoyed, or might thereafter acquire by treaties of peace, in
Europe only." They further guaranteed all treaties which were

at that time made, or might thereafter conjointly be made, with
any other Power. They stipulated also to defend and preserve
each other in the possession of all towns and fortresses which did
at that time belong, or should in future belong, to either of them ;
and, that for this purpose, when either nation was attacked or
molested, the other should immediately succour it with a certain
number of troops and ships, and should be obliged to break with the
aggressor in two months after the party that was already at war
should require it; and that they should then act conjointly, with
(t) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. cap. 9. Vattel, Droit des Gens, li v. ii.
lib. ii. cap. 15, 13; cap. 25, § 4.
§ ch. 12, § 168; liv. iii. ch. 6, §§ 86—96.
Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. lib. i.
382 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TEEATIES—ARBITRATION.
all their forces, to bring the common enemy to a reasonable accom-

modation.
The second defensive alliance then subsisting between Great
Britain and Holland was that stipulated by the treaties of barrier
and succession, of 1709 and 1713, by which the Dutch barrier on
the side of Flanders was guaranteed on the one part, and the
Protestant succession to the British crown on the other ;
and it was
mutually stipulated, that, in case either party should be attacked,
the other should furnish, at the requisition of the injured party,
certain specified succours; and if the danger should be such as to
require a greater force, the other ally should be obliged to augment

his succours, and ultimately to act with all his power in open war
against the aggressor.

The third and last defensive alliance between the same Powers
was the treaty concluded at the Hague in 1717, to which France
was also a party. The object of this treaty was declared to be
the preservation of each other reciprocally, and the possession of
their dominions, as established by the Treaty of Utrecht. The
contracting parties stipulated to defend all and each of the Articles
of the said treaty, as far as they relate to the contracting parties
respectively, or each of them in particular and they guarantee all

;
the kingdoms, provinces, states, rights, and advantages, which each

of the parties at the signing of that treaty possessed,
confining this
guaranty to Europe only. The succours stipulated by this treaty
were similar to those above mentioned; first, interposition of good
offices, then a certain number of forces, and lastly, declaration of
war. This treaty was renewed by the quadruple alliance of 1718,
and by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748.
Argument of Itwas alleged on the part of the British court, that the States-
Oovernment. Grcneral had refused to comply with the terms of these treaties,
although Minorca, a possession in Europe which had been secured
to Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht, wasfattacked
by France.
Two answers were given by the Dutch Government to the
demand of the stipulated succours: —
1. That Great Britain was the
aggressor in the war; and that,
unless she had been first attacked by France, the casus
fcederis
did not arise.
2. That admitting that France was the aggressor in
Europe,
was only in consequence of the hostilities previously com-
3'et it
menced in America, which were expressly excepted from the terms
of the guaranties.
Reply of Lord To the first of these objections it was irresistibly replied by the
iverpoo .
^y^^. -j^^^^ Liverpool, that although the treaties which contained

EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—AEBITRATION. 383
these guaranties were called defensive treaties only, yet the words-
of them, and particularly that of 1678, which was the basis of all
the rest, by no means expressed the point clearly in the sense of
the objection, since they guaranteed "all the rights and posses-
" "
sions of both parties against all kings, princes, republics, and
" "
states ;
so that if either should be attacked or molested by hostile
act, or open war, or in any other manner disturbed in the posses-
sion of his states, territories, rights, immunities, and freedom of
commerce," was then declared what should be done in defence

it
of these objects of the guaranty, by the ally who was not at war,
but it was nowhere mentioned as necessary that the attack of these
"
should be the first injury or attack. Nor," continues Lord Liver-
"
pool, doth this loose manner of expression appear to have been
an omission or inaccuracy. They who framed these guaranties
certainly chose to leave this question, without any further explana-
tion, to that good faith which must ultimately decide upon all
contracts between sovereign States. It is not presumed that they
hereby meant, that either party should be obliged to support every

act of violence or injustice which his ally might be
prompted to
commit through views of interest or ambition; but, on the other
hand, they were cautious of affording too frequent opportunities
to pretend that the case of the guaranties did not exist, and ,o£
eluding thereby the principal intention of the alliance; both these

inconveniences were equally to be avoided; and they wisely thought
fit to guard against the latter, no less than the former". They
knew that in every war between civilized nations, each party
endeavours to throw upon the other the odium and guilt of the
first act of provocation and aggression; and that the worst of causes
was never without its excuse. They foresaw that this alone would
unavoidably give sufficient occasion to endless cavils and disputes,
whenever the infidelity of an ally inclined him to avail himself of
them. To have confined, therefore, the case of the guaranty by a
more minute description of it, and under closer restrictions of form,
would have subjected to still greater uncertainty a point which,
from the nature of the thing itself, was already too liable to
doubt: —
they were sensible that the cases would be infinitely
various; that the motives to self-defence, though just, might not
always be apparent; that an artful enemy might disguise thie
most alarming preparatiojis and that an injured nation might
;
be necessitated to commit even a preventive hostility, before the

danger which caused it could be publicly known. Upon such
considerations, these negotiators wisely thought proper to give
the greatest latitude to this question, and to leave it open to a fair
384 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—ARBITRATION.
and liberal cojistruction, such as might be expected from f riends,

whose interests these treaties were supposed to have for ever
united" {u).
His lordship's answer to the niext objection, that the hostilities^
commenced by France in Europe, Avere only in consequence of
hostilities previously com'menced in America, seems equally satis-
factory, and will serve to illustrate the good faith by which these
"
contracts ought to be interpreted. If the reasoning on which this
objection is founded was admitted, it would alone be sufficient to

destroy the effects of every guaranty, and to extinguish the confi-
dence which nations mutually place in each other, on the faith
of defensive alliances; it points out to the enemy a certain method
of avoiding the inconvenience of such an alliance; it shows him
where he ought to begin his attack. Let only the first effort be
made upon some place not included in the guaranty, and, after
that, he may its very object, without any
pursue his views against
apprehension of the consequence. Let France first attack some
little spot belonging to Holland, in America, and her barrier would
be no longer guaranteed. To argue in this manner is to trifle
with the most solemn engagements. The proper object of guar-

anties is the preservation of some particular country to some par-
• ticular Power. The treaties above mentioned promise the defence
of the dominions of each party in Europe, simply and absolutel3^
whenever they are attacked or molested. If, in the present war
the first attack was made out of Europe, it is manifest that long-
ago an attack hath been made in Europe; and that is, beyond a
doubt, the case of these guaranties.

"Let us try, however, if we cannot discover what hath once
been the opinion of Holland upon a point of this nature. It hath
already been observed that the defensive alliance between England
and Holland, of 1678, is but a copy of the first twelve Articles
of the French Treaty of 1662. Soon after Holland had concluded
this last alliance with France, she became engaged in a war with
England. The attack then began, as in the present case, out of
Europe, on the coast of Guinea; and the cause of the war was also
—
the same a disputed right to certain possessions out of the bounds
of Europe, some in Africa, and others in the East Indies. Hoe-
tilities having continued for some time in those parts, they after-
[
wards commenced also in Europe. Immediately upon this,

Holland declared that the case of that guaranty did exist, and
demanded the succours which were stipulated. I need not produce
(w) Earl of Liverpool, Discourse on Great Britain in respect to Neutral

the Conduct of the Government of Nations (1st ed. 1757).
RIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES -ARBITRATION. 385
the memorials of their ministers to prove this; history sufficiently

informs us that France acknowledged the claim, granted the
succours, and entered even into open vâr in the defence of her ally.
Here, then, we have the sentiments of Holland on the same Article,
in a case minutely parallel. The conduct of France also pleads
in favour of the same opinion, though her concession, in this
respect, checked at that time her youthful monarch in the first essay
of his ambition, delayed for some months his entrance into the
Spanish provinces, and brought on him the enmity of Eng-

land" (ic).
The nature and extent of the obligations contracted by treaties Alliance
of defensive alliance and guaranty, will be further illustrated by êtween
1--1 r-i -r.-- iT^
the case of the treaties subsisting between Great Britain and Por-
Great Britain
and Portugal.
tugal, which has been before alluded to for another purpose (y).
The treaty of alliance, originally concluded between these Powers
in 1642, immediately after the revolt of the Portuguese nation
against Spain, and the establishment of the House of Braganza

on the throne, was renewed, in 1654, by the Protector, Cromwell,
and again confirmed by the Treaty of 1661, between Charles II.
and Alfonso VI., for the marriage of the former prince with
Catharine of Braganza. This last-mentioned treaty fixes the aid
to be given, and declares that Great Britain will succour Portugal
''on all occasions, when that country is attacked." By a secret
Article, Charles II., in consideration of the cession of Tangier and
"
Bombay, binds himseK to defend the colonies and conquests of
Portugal against all enemies, present or future." In 1703., another
treaty of defensiveand perpetual alliance was concluded at Lisbon,
between Great Britain and the States-General on the one side, and
the King of Portugal on the other; the guaranties contained in
which were again confirmed by the treaties of peace at Utrecht,
between Portugal and France, in 1713/, and between Portugal
and Spain, in 1715. On the emigration of the Portuguese royal
familj^ to Brazil, in 1807, a convention was concluded between
Great Britain and Portugal, by which the latter kingdom was
guaranteed to the lawful heir of the House of Braganza, and the
British Government promised never to recognise any other ruler.
By the more recent treaty between the" two Powers, concluded at

Rio Janeiro, in 1810, it was declared that the two Powers have
agreed on an alliance for defence, and reciprocal guaranty against
every hostile attack, conformably to the treaties already subsisting
between them, the stipulations of which shall remain in f uU force,
(x) Earl of Liverpool, Discourse, (y) Vide ante, pt. ii. oh. 1, p. 101.
p. 86.
V/. 25
386 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TEEATIES—AEBITEATION.
and are renewed by the present treaty in their fullest and most
extensive interpretation." This treaty confirms the stipulation of
Great Britain to acknowledge no other sovereign of Portugal but
the heir of the House of Braganza. The Treaty of Vienna, of the
22nd January, 1815, between Great Britain and Portugal, con-
tains thefollowing Article:
—
''The treaty of alliance at Rio
Janeiro, of the 19th February, 1810, being founded on temporary
circumstances, which have happily ceased to exist, the said treaty
is hereby declared to be of no effect; without prejudice, however,
to the ancient treaties of alliance, friendship, and guaranty, which
have so long and so happily subsisted between the two crowns, and
which are hereby renewed by the high contracting parties, and
acknowledged to be of full force and effect."
Casm foederis Sucli was the nature of the compacts of alliance and guaranty
alliance. Subsisting between Great Britain and Portugal, at the time when
the interference of Spain in the affairs of the latter kingdom com-
pelled the British Government to interfere, for the protection of

the Portuguese nation against the hostile designs of the Spanish
court. In addition to the grounds stated in the British Parliament,
to justify this counteracting interference, it was urged, in a very
able article on the affairs of Portugal, contemporaneously pub-
lished in the Edinburgh Review, that although, in general, an
alliance for defence and guaranty does not impose any obligation,
nor, indeed, give any warrant to interfere in intestine divisions,
the peculiar circumstances of the case did constitute the casus
foederis contemplated by the treaties in question. A
defensive
alliance is a contract between several States, by which they agree
to aid each other in their defensive (or, in other words, in .their
just) wars against other States. Morally speaking, no other

species of alliance is just, because no other species of war can be
just. The simplest case of defensive war is, where our ally is
openly invaded with military force, by a Power to whom she has
given no just cause of war. If France or Spain, for instance, had
marched an army into Portugal to subvert its constitutional
government, the duty of England would have been too evident to
render a statement of it necessary. But this was not the only case
to which the treaties were applicable. If troops were assembled
and preparations made, with the manifest purpose of aggression
against an ally; if his subjects were instigated to revolt, and
his soldiers to mutiny; if insurgents on his territory were supplied
with money, with arms, and with military stores; if, at the same
tim-, his authority were treated as a usurpation, and all partici-
pation in the protection granted to other foreigners refused to the
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—AEBITEATION. 387
well-affected part of his subjects, while those who proclaimed their
hostility to his person were received as the most favoured strangers ;
in such a combination of circumstances, it could not be doubted

that the case foreseen by defensive alliances would arise, and that
he would be entitled to claim that succour, either general or specific,
for which his alliances had stipulated. The wrong would be
as complete, and the danger might be as great, as if his territory
were invaded by a foreign force. The mode chosen by his enemy_
might even be more effectual, and more certainly destructive, than
open war. Whether the attack made on him be open or secret, or
if it bo equally unjust, and
expose him to the same peril, he is
equally authorized to call for aid. All contracts, under the law of
nations, are interpreted as extending to every case manifestly and
certainly parallel to those cases for which they provide by express
words. In that law, which has no tribunal but the ;conscience of
mankind, there is no distinction between the evasion and the vio-
lation of a contract. It requires aid against disguised as much as
against avowed injustice; and
does not fall into so gross an
it
absurdity as to make the obligation to succour less where Jthe

danger is greater. The only rule for the interpretation of de-
fensive alliances seems to be, that every wrong which gives to one
ally a just cause of war entitles him to succour from the other ally.
The right to aid is a secondary right, incident to that of repelling
injustice by force. Wherever he may morally employ his own
strength that purpose, he may, with reason, demand the
for
auxiliar}' strength of his ally (z) Fraud neither gives nor takes
.
away any right. Had France, in the year 1715, assembled

squadrons in her harbours and troops on her coasts; had she
prompted and distributed writings against the legitimate govern-
ment of George I.; had she received with open arms battalions
of deserters from his troops, and furnished the army of the Earl
of Mar with pay and arms when he proclaimed the Pretender;
Great Britain, after demand and refusal of reparation, would have
had a perfect right to declare war against France, and, conse-
quently, as complete a title to the succour which the States-General
were bound to furnish, by their treaties of alliance and guaranty of
the succession of the House of Hanover, as if the pretended king,
James III., at the head of the French army, were marching on
London. The war would be equally defensive on the part of
England, and the obligation equally incumbent on Holland. It
(z) Vattel's reasoning is still more conclusive in a case of guaranty ;

liv. iii.
<5h, G, J 91.
25 (2)
388 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—AKBITRATION.
would show a more than ordinary defect of understanding, to

confound a war defensive in its principles with a war defensive
in its operations. Where attack is the bestmode of providing'
for the defence of a State, the war is defensive in principle,,
though the operations are offensive. Where the war is unneces-
sary to safety, its offensive character is not altered, because thei
wrongdoer is reduced to defensive warfare. So a State, against
which dangerous wrong is manifestly meditated, may prevent it
by striking the first blow, without thereby waging a war in its

principle offensive. Accordingly, it is not every attack made on
a State that will entitle it to aid under a defensive allianae; for
if that State had given just cause of war to the invader, the war
would not be, ondefensive in principle (a)

its part, .
Alliance
between
A
recent example of a treaty of guarantee is that which was
Great Britain concluded between Great Britain and Japan in 1902, in which the
and Japan.
contracting parties mutually guaranteed the territorial independ-
ence of China and Korea. They further undertook that if either
were assailed by more than one foreign Power on any question
of dispute arising in Asia, the other would come to her assist-
ance (6). Thus, Article 2 says: If either Great Britain or Japan
in the defence of their respective interests as above described
[viz., inreference to China and Korea], should become involved

in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party
will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent
other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.
Article 3 If in the above event any other Power or Powers should
:
join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting

Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in
common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.
The Great The Great War of 1914 furnishes examples of the operation of
War of 1914.
treaties of alliance. Thus the Austro-German alliance, entered
into in 1879 by Bismarck and Andrassy, provided to this effect:
Should, contrary to the hope and ag'ainst the sincere wish of the
two High Contracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked
by another Power, the High Contracting Parties are bound to
stand by each other with the whole of the armed forces of their
Empires, and, in consequence thereof, only to conclude peace
jointly or in agreement. The two parties, holding that Russia
was the first to commence active hostilities, took common action
(a) Vattel, liv. iii. ch. 6, § 90. treaty of 1905 she established a pro-
(b) Annual Register, 1902, p. 58. tectorate over the latter country; and
It has already been pointed out (see in 1910 annexed it. The Anglo-
supra, p. 68) that in 1904 Japan Japanese alliance was renewed in
guaranteed the integrity of Korea, August, 1905, and replaced by a fresh
subject to certain reservations; by a agreement, July, 1911.
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—ARBITllATION. 389
against her. On the other hand, Italj^, having been bound to
Germanj and Austria by a defensive alliance (1882), did not hold

that Russia was the aggressor; and accordingly elected to remain
neutral, on theground that the emus foederis did not in this case
applj.
Again, Japan, in accordance with the above-mentioned Anglo-
Japanese treaty of alliance, 1902, delivered an ultimatum to
Germany (August 15, 1914), calling upon her to evacuate the
port of Kiaochau, and to withdraw or dismantle her warships in
Japanese and Chinese waters. No reply having been received,

Japan declared war on Germany;.
The execution of a treaty was sometimes secured by hostages Hostages for

°^
given by one party to the other. The most recent and remark- of treaties.
able example of this practice occurred at the peace of Aix-la-
Chapelle, in 1748, where the restitution of Cape Breton, in North

America, by Great Britain to France, was secured by several
British peers sent as hostages to Paris (c) .
Public treaties are to be interpreted like other laws and con- Interpreta-
tracts. Such
the inevitable imperfection and ambiguity of all
is
treaties.
human language, that the mere Avords alone of any writing,
literally expounded, will go a very little way towards explaining
its meaning. Certain technical rules of interpretation have, there-
fore, been adopted by writers on ethics and public law, to explain
the meaning of international compacts, in cases of doubt. These
rules are fully expounded by Grotius and his commentators; and
the reader is referred especially to the principles laid down by
Vattel and Rutherforth, as containing the most complete view of
this important subject (cZ).
The dispute between England and the United States respect- Rules for
ing the settlement of the north-west boundary between the Union tion..
and Canada, turned on the interpretation to be put upon existing
treaties. England submitted to the German Emperor, who was
appointed arbitrator, the following rules of interpretation:
—
1 The words of a treaty are to be taken to be used in the sense
.
in which they were commonly used at the time when the treaty
was entered into.
2. In interpreting any expressions in a treaty, regard must be
had to the context and spirit of the whole treaty.
(c) Vattel, liv. ii. cli. §§ 245 De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.

(d) Grotius,
— 2<U. 16,
lib. ii. Vattel, liv. ii. ch. 17.
cap. 16.
Rutherforth, Inst. b. ii. ch. 7.
390 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—AEBITEATION.
3. The
interpretation should be drawn from the connection
and relation of the different parts.
4. The interpretation should be suitable to the reason of the
treaty.
6. Treaties are to be interpreted in a favourable, rather than
an odious sense.
6. Whatever interpretation tends to change the existing state
of things at the time the treaty was made is to be ranked in tho
class of odious things (e) .
Mediation. Negotiations are sometimes conducted under the mediation of a

third Power, spontaneously tendering its good offices for that
purpose, or upon the request of one or both of the litigating

Powers, or in virtue of a previous stipulation for that purpose.
If the mediation is spontaneously, offered, it may be refused by
either party; but if it is the result of a previous agreement between
the two parties, it cannot be refused without a breach of good
faith. When accepted by both parties, it becomes the right and
the duty of the mediating Power to interpose its advice, with a
view to the adjustment of their differences. It thus becomes a
party to the negotiation, but has no authority to constrain either
party to adopt its opinion. Nor is it obliged to guarantee the per-
formance of the treaty concluded under its mediation, though,
in point of fact, it frequently does so (/) .
"
The Treaty of It was stipulated at the Treaty of Paris (1856), that If there
^"^'
should arise between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the
other signing Powers, any misunderstanding which might en-
danger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte and

each of such Powers, before having recourse to the use of force,
shall afford the other contracting parties the opportunity of pre-
"
venting such an extremity by means of their mediation (^).
At a Conference of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris,
their Plenipotentiaries, in a protocol dated 14th April, 1856,
"
expressed in the name of their Governments, the wish that
States between which any serious misunderstanding may arise,
should, before appealing to arms, have recourse, as far as circum-
stances might allow, to the good offices of a friendly Power.
(e) Pari. Papers, N. America, 1873 quently inserted in commercial treaties,

(No. 3), pp. 6
—
9. Vattel, liv. ii. see Whitney v. Robertson (1887), 124
ch. 17, §§ 271, 285—287, 301; ch. 18, U. S. 190.
§ 305; and see ante, pp. 280 seq. (/) Kliiber, Droit des Gens Moderne
For a case relating to the interpreta- de FEurope, pt. ii. tit. 2, § 1; ch. 2,
tion of treaties generally, and in par- § 160.
ticular to .the interpretation of the {g) Art. viii. See Hertslet, Map of
"most favoured nation clause" frc- Europe, vol. ii. p. 1255.
The Plenipotentiaries hope tliat the governments not represented

at the which has inspired
Congress will unite in the sentiment
the wish recorded in the present protocol" (Ji).
Nevertheless, it can hardlj be said that Wars have been less
frequent since these declarations, even among the Powers actually
making them. The protocol was invoked to prevent the Dano-
German war of 1864, and the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, but
without effect. The Conference which met at Constantinople in
1876 attempted to settle the dispute between Russia and Turkey
in a peaceable manner, but it failed to bring about such a result.
Lord Granville, in 1870, appealed to France and Prussia to have
recourse to mediation, but
in vain (i) Even after hostilities
.
had commenced. Her Majesty's Government assured France that

"
if at any time recourse should be had to their good offices, they
would be freely given and zealously exerted" (k). There have

been several recent cases of successful mediation; for example,
the mediation of the Pope between Germany and Spain, 1885;
that of Spain between Italyand Colombia, 1888; that of Portugal
between Great Britain and Brazil, 1895; that of the Great Powers
between Greece and Turkey, 1897; that of the United States
between Russia and Japan, 1905, resulting in the Treaty of Ports-
mouth .
A ffreat of international disputes and differences have Intke-

number
m 1 -11 P 11 NATIONAL
the past been amicably settled not only by means ot negotia- aebiteation.
•
tion, mediation, and good offices, but also by arbitration. (Z).

The theory and practice of arbitration lare, indeed, as old as in-
ternational relationships. There are many records of inter-
state arbitration in ancient Greece, and some in Rome (m) In .
the Middle Ages we find monarchs, jurists, and ecclesiastics,
especially the Pope, acting as arbitrators 'between princes and

communities. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the prac-
tice became much less frequent, and in the seventeenth and
eighteenth very rare. From time to time jurists, philosophers,

and publicists took up the question, and suggested various schemes
(A) 7&i<^. p. 1279. party, 6 vols. (Washington, 1899);

(i) Annual Eegister, 1870.
Pub. Phillipson, Studies in International
Documents, p. 204. Law (1908), pp. 1—49; A. de Lapra-
Pub. et N. Kecueil des
(Jc) Annual Eegister, 1871.
delle Politis,
Documents, p. 248. Arbitrages Internationaux (Paris,
(I) On the subject of arbitration, 1905, &c.).
see W. E. Darby, International Ti-i- (m) Cf. Phillipson, Int. Law and
bunals (1904); J. B. Moore, History Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome,
of the International Arbitrations to vol. ii. chaps, xx., xxi.
which the United States has been a
392 RIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—AEBITEATION.
for settling disputes by means of arbitral tribunals. Towards

the end of the eighteenth this pacific movement received
century
a noteworthy impetus by the Jay treaty of 1794, between
England and the United States,whereby several questions were
to be submitted to arbitrators; and after the Napoleonic wars it
made greater progress. Such associations as the Society of
Friends and the Ame.rican Peace Association, the London Peace
Society, exerted saluta.ry influence in the isame direction.
In
England men like Cobden advocated arbitration, though they
found opponents in the House of Commons.
Arbitration From about the middle of the nineteenth century States beîn
Treaties. .
to show a tendency to enter into general arbitration treaties, that
is, relating not to specific points of difference, but to all kinds of

controversies, present or future, arising out of such comprehensive
subjects as commerce or navigation. Since 1862 compromise
and
clauses were agreed to between Great Britain on the one part,
Italy, Greece, Portugal, Mexico, Uruguay respectively on the

other; between Belgium on the one hand, and Italy, Greece,
Sweden, Norway, and Denmark respectively on the other; between
Spain and Sweden and Norway; between Denmark and
Venezuela; between Italy and Montenegro; between France and
Korea; between Austria-Hungary and Siam; and many other
cases. In the treaty of peace concluded at Guadalupe-Hidalgo
(1848), between the United Stetes and Mexico, the principle of
permanent arbitration ^vas established between the two parties
as to any differences that might arise between them. Other States
soon entered into treaties of general arbitration, e.g., Belgium
with Venezuela (1884), with Ecuador (1887); Switzerland with
San Salvador and Ecuador (1888); Spain with Honduras and
Colombia (1894). The leading Powers did not manifest the same
readiness to bind themselves in this manner; attempts were, in
truth,made by Great Brit/ain and the United States in 1897, but
they did not prove successful. It may also be mentioned that
by the 11th Article of the General Act of the Berlin Conference,
1885, the signatory Powers declared that in case a serious disagree-
ment originating on the subject thereof, or in the limits of the
territories mentioned in Article 1 (the Congo Basin and circum-
jacent regiojQs), and placed under the free trade system, shall arise
between any of them, or the Powers which may become parties
to the Act, these Powers bind themselves, before
appealing to
arms, to have recourse to the mediation of one or more of the
friendly Powers, a;id in a similar case reserve to themselves the
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TEEATIES- ARBITEATION. 393
option of having recourse to arbitration (n) . It has been esti-

mated that from the Jaj, treaty in 1794 to the ejid of the nine-
teenth cejiturj there were 228 cases of "formal" arbitration,
of which 137 came after the famous Geneva Arbitration of 1872.
Great Britain was a partj in 81 of these; United States, 62;
France, 28; Prussia and Germany, 17; Kussia, 8(o). During
the same period there were also some 250 instances of informal
arbitration, namely, by Boards or Commissions. Since the Hague
Peace Conference arbitration treaties have multiplied enor-
mously; thus, between 1900 and 1908, there were 67 treaties of
this kind (p) .
A few important cases of arbitration that took place before Instances of

the Hague Peace Conference may be referred to. large varietyA priorTo^^^
of questions were involved, e.g.y the delimitation of boundaries, the Hague
territorial waters, the rights and obligations of neutrality, and in
particular the responsibility of a neutral Power for hostilities

committed within its territory by a belligerent, the right to seizd
vessels and cqnfiscate cargoes, the effects of declaration of war, the
nature of contraband g'oods, questions relating to slavery, the
force of res adjudicata, and many other matters.
The by mixed Anglo-American commission, under
arbitration
the treaty of 1794, had some influence on later procedure, which
tended to become more judicial ajid less diplomatic. Many points
connected with some of the subjects enumerated in the previouai
paragraph were dealt with. Soon afterwards, the United States
endeavoured to apply the principles of the Jay treaty in its rela-
tions with other countries, e.g.y with Spain (1802), resulting
eventually in the cession of Florida (1819); with France (1813),

for the cession of Louisiana.
A
dispute between Great Britain and the United States as to
the interpretation of Article 1 of the Treaty of Ghent (1814),
was submitted to Alexander I. of Russia; the question of belli-
gerent occupation was also involved.
William I. of HoUand acted as arbitrator in the North-Eastern
frontier dispute between Great Britain and the United States.
His decision was, however, rejected (1831), because he suggested
•a line that went beyond the terms of the reference.
A
British claim for compensation against France for block-
ading the coast of Portendic without giving notification to the
owners of British vessels trading there in gum, &c., was referred
(m) Of. Art. viii. of the Treaty of Tribunals (1904), pp. 769 seq.
J*arifi.
(p) Cf. American Journ. of Int.
(o) Of. W. E. Darby, International Law, vol. ii. pp. 824 seq.
to the King of Prussia, who decided (1843) in favour of the

claimants.
In 1844 Queen Victoria gave a decision in a dispute between
France and Mexico, the former claiming indemnitj for the ex-
pulsion of French subjects from Mexico, the latter for the capture
of Mexican warships after the fall of Fort Ulloa. The claims of
both parties were dismissed, on the ground that the acts of both
were justified bj the state of war between them.
In 1845 Great 'Britain complained that a fortnight's notice
given bj the Argentine Eepublic, during the war with Uruguay,,
as to the closure of its ports, was too short, and demanded com-
pensation in respect of six vessels which were refused admittance

to Buenos Ayres. The President of Chile decided that the
measures were justified by the exigencies of war.
In 1814, during the war between Great Britain and the United
States, an American privateer, the General Armstrong, fired upon
British boats in a Portuguese port, but was soon fired at in return
and destroyed within the limits of the port. The United States
claimed indemnity from Portugal for not intervening as a neutraL
The matter was settled in 1851 by Louis Napoleon.
The mixed Commission of London, 1853 1885, adjusted dif-—
ferences between Great Britain and the United States, in refer-
ence to various claims and counterclaims arising out of the
"Florida Bonds" dispute, the MacLeod case, the Creole case.
Several differences due to arrests and seizures of private pro-
perty were decided by arbitration; thus the claim of the United

States in respect of the American brig Macedonian, that was
seized by Chile in her war with Peru (1821), was upheld by the
King of the Belgians (1863); the same arbitrator settled the dis-
pute between Great Britain and Brazil, in respect of H.M.S.
Forte; the case of the packe(t Costa Rica (1897), involving a
British subject's claim against the Netherlands, was referred to
Russia.
Questions of occupation and title arising in the Delagoa Bay
case (1875), between Great Britain and Portugal, were referred
to the French Government.
The subject of neutrality received elaborate treatment in the
famous Alabama case (1872), between Great Britain and the
United States, submitted to arbitration under the Treaty of Wash-
ington, May, 1871 (q).
Another arbitral award of great importance was given in the
Behring Sea case (1893<) (r).
(<7) See vifra, p. 677. (r) See stipra, p. 300.
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES— ARBITRATION. 395
Tho British-Venezuelan boundary dispute, dating from 1841,

was settled in 1899, through the intervention of the United States.
In the year 1898 the Emperor Nicholas II. of Russia invited The Hague
tlioStates of the world to send representatives to a ConferoinoQ
fnceî89^^^^'
which should consider how best to check the progressive increase
of military and naval armaments, study any possible means ;of
effecting their eventual reduction, and devise means for averting

armed conflicts between States by the employment of pacific
methods for settling international disputes (s) The invitation
.
was accepted by twenty-six States, of which twenty were Euro-

pean, four Asiatic, and two American: Great Britain, Austria,
Belgium, China, Denmark, Spain, the United States, Mexico,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Monte-
negro, Holland, Persia, Portugal, Eoumania, Russia, Serbia,
Siam, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and Bulgaria.
From the 18th of May to the 29th of July the International Peace
Conference, as it was designated, held continual session at the
Hague, the members being divided for greater convenience into

three commissions to deal with the various topics propounded.
The labours of the Conference with regard to formulating a
scheme for the gradual reduction of existing armaments and for
checking any further increase were doomed to failure from the
first. But it did not separate until some highly important con-
ventions and declarations dealing with the amelioration of the
laws and customs of war had been concluded and executed. These
will find their place in the later pages of this book. The most
"
striking success, however, of the Conference was the Convention
for the pacific settlement of international disputes" which waa
agreed to by the delegates of all the Powers represented, and was

subsequently ratified by their respective Governments.
In accordance with a wish expressed by the delegates at the The Hague
Conference of 1899, a second Conference of the Powers assembled ence,î907.^^'
at the Hague on June 15, 1907, and continued its sittings till
October 18. On this occasion forty -four States (out of the fifty-
seven claiming sovereignty) were represented. The work was
divided out among four committees, which considered respectively
international arbitration and cognate questions, the law of war on
land, tho law of naval war, and prize law. The final Act comprised
thirteen Conventions, one declaration, three wishes {voewx), and
several recommendations. For the present we are concerned with
(s) Rescript of the Czar, August 24, 1898.

the first two Conventions; the first, containing ninety-seven

Articles, deals with the pacific settlement of international dis-
—
putes, and is a revision with numerous additions of the Conven-
—
tion oL' 1899 on the same subject; the second, consisting of seven
Articles, deals with the employment of force for the recovery of
contract debts. The
Convention, after expressing the engage-
first
ment o£ the signatory parties to endeavour to settle international

differences by pacific means (Article 1) goes on to deal Avith good
offices and mediation, international commissions of inquiry, and
international arbitration.
Good offices In case of serious disagreement or dispute, tlie contracting
and media-
tion. Powers agree to resort to mediation before appealing to arms
(Article 2). Other Powers may offer their good offices, either
before or after the outbreak of hostilities; and such offer is not to
be considered an unfriendly act (Article 3«). Good offices and
mediation have the character of advice only, and never have binding
force (Article 6). The acceptance of mediation does not neces-
with mobilisation (Article 7). Apart from this
sarily interfere
a special method of mediation
is recommended, whereby each con-
tending State chooses another Power as mediator, and the two

mediators then control all negotiations for adjusting the dispute,
to the exclusion of the States at variance, for a period of thirty
days (Article 8) (t).

International In international differences on questions of fact, involving
commissions
of inquirj .
neither the honour nor the vital interests of the parties, the disi-
putants,who have not been able to come to an agreement by diplo-

matic means, should set up an international commission for
examining and reporting on the facts (Article 9). It is to be
constituted by special agreement defining the subject-matter and
scope of the inquiry and the powers of the commissioners, who will
—
be appointed if not agreed upon otherwise in the way provided —
for the appointment of the court of arbitration (Articles 10 12).
—
Rules are suggested for regulating the procedure to be followed in
conducting such inquiries (Articles IS 36)
—
The report is limited
.
to a statement of facts, and does not possess the character of an

arbitral award; it leaves to the parties entire freedom as to the
effect to be given to the statement (Article 3i5).
International International arbitration has for its object the settlement of
arbitration.
differences between States by judges of their own choice, and on
the basis of respect for law. Recourse to arbitration implies an
This special method of media-

{t) it has not yet been tried. Cf. F. W.
tion due to the suggestion of one
is Holls,The Peace Conference at the
of the United States delegates, but Hague (New York, 1900), pp. 187 seq.
engagement to submit in good faith to the award (Article 3i7).

The signatory Powers recognise it to be the most effective and most
equitable means of settling disputes, when diplomacy has failed,
in questions of a legal nature, especially on the interpretation or
application of treaties; and recommend its adoption so far as
circumstances permit. The Powers may conclude special agree-
ments for the purpose of extending compulsory arbitration so far
as it is possible (Articles 3;8 40).
—
For some time the establishment of a permanent arbitral tri- The Perma-
bunal was advocated by jurists and publicists. It* was to some the Hague,
extent realized at the first Conf erenoe, 1899 and in 1907 improve-
;
ments in its organization and procedure were made. The Conven-

tion declares With tlie object of facilitating an immediate recourse
:
to arbitration for international differences, which it has not been
possible to settle by diplomacy, the contracting Powers undertake

to maintain the permanent court of arbitration, as established by
the first Peace Conference, accessible at all times, and acting, unless
otherwise stipulated by the parties, in accordance with the rules of
procedure inserted in the present Convention (Article 41). The
permanent court is competent for all arbitration cases, unless the
parties agree to institute a special tribunal (Article 42). Its
organization comprises an international bureau, serving as the

registry of the court, and conducting the administrative business
(Article 43,); a permanent administrative council (consisting of
the diplomatic agents of the signatory Powers accredited to the
Hague, with the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs as President),

which is charged with the direction and control of the bureau
(Article 49); and a court of arbitration. The arbitrators are to
be selected thus: each contracting Power selects four persons of
known competence, and of the highest moral reputation; such
persons are appointed for six years, ,and are inscribed on ;a list
notified to all the contracting Powers. When recourse to the
court is desired, the arbitrators are to be chosen from this list
(Article 44). If the parties fail to agree on the composition of

the tribunal, each appoints two arbitrators, chosen from the list,
who choose an umpire; failing an agreement as to the umpire, he
ischosen by a third Power agreed upon by the parties. Should
they not agree on this subject, each party selects a different Power,
and the umpire is then chosen by the two nominated Powers. If,
within two months, these two Powers cannot them'selves come to
an agreement, each presents two candidates taken from' the list of
members of the permanent court, exclusive of the members selected
by the parties and not being nationals of either of them, and from
398 RIGHTS or NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES— ARBITRATION.
among such candidates an umpire is chosen by lot (Article 45).

The court having been constituted, the parties send to the bureau
the text of their compromis (the preliminary agreement stating
the points at issue and indicating the procedure to be followed),
and the names whereupon the bureau makes the
of the arbitrators;
necessary arrangements for the meeting at the date fixed by the

parties. The members of the tribunal, in the exercise of their
duties and out of their own country, enjoy diplomatic privileges
and immunities (Article 46) All signatory Powers should remind
.
disputants that the permanent court is open to them (Article 48),

to which non-contracting Powers, too, may, by agreement, have
recourse (Article 47).
The Hague The parties draw up the eow.prom/is by mutual agreement, but
Procedure. the court may do so if requested by them'. If all other attempts
to reach an agreement fail, it may be settled by the court at the
request of one party in certain cases where the dispute is covered'

:
by a general arbitration treaty (-made or renewed after the Con-

vention) providing for a compromis and not precluding its settle-
ment by the Court; and where the dispute arises out of contract
debts claimed by one party as due to its subjects, with regard to
which an offer of arbitration has been accepted, unless the settle-
ment of theoompromis has otherwise been provided for (Article
53<). In such cases the compronds is settled by a commission
comprising five members selected in the same manner as an arbitral
court (Article 54); and, unless otherwise agreed, such commission
afterwards becomes the court of arbitration (Article 58). Provi-
sion is also made for replacing arbitrators who have died or re-
signed (Article 59); for the place of meeting (Article 60); the
languages to be used (Article 61); matters of pleading, evidence,
—
and discussion (Articles 63^' 77); for the secrecy of the proceed-
ings and decision by a majority (w), against which there is no
appeal; the effects of the award and the question of expenses
(m) It may be mentioned that several was -made. When the award was
years before the Hague Conferences, a published, Mr. Evarts, the American
question was raised under the Treaty Foreign Secretary, raised an objection
of Washington between England and to its validity on the ground
(among
the United States as to the effect to others) that only two out of the three
be given to an award in which only a arbitrators had concurred in it. Lord
majority of the arbitrators concurred, Salisbury declined to give any weight
and when no provision had been made to this objection, and asserted it to
for this in the agreement of reference. be a principle of international law
The treaty had constituted four boards that, in arbitrations of a public nature,
of arbitrators. As regards three of the majority of the arbitrators binds
these boards, it was provided that the the minority, unless the contrary be
votes of a majority should be conclu- expressed. [Lord Salisbury to Mr.
sive; but as regards the fourth, viz., Welsh, 7th Nov. 1878. See Supple-
the one to meet at Halifax and decide ment to London Gazette, 16th Nov.
the fishery question, no such provision 1878.]
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TEEATIES—AEBITRATION. 399
(Articles 78 85).
— There are additional rules for facilitating"
arbitration in disputes admitting of a summary procedure (Articles
36—90).
Finally, the Convention contains provisions for ratification by General pro-
the contracting parties, how it is to be notified and registered
(Articles 91, 92); for adherence thereto by non-signatory Powers

that were invited to the second Peace Conference, and even Powers
that were not invited (subject to agreement between the contract-
ing Powers) (Articles 93i, 94); and for the denunciation of the
Convention (Article 96).
The development of international arbitration since 1899 con- Instances of
stitutesone of the most remarkable features of modern inter- ^[ncTthe^"

national law and practice. The disputes that have since been Hague
settledby this pacific method are not numerous, but they are of great
importance. In October, 1902, it brought to a satisfactory termi-
nation a long-standing pecuniary dispute between the United
"
States and Mexico with regard to the Pious Fund of the Cali-
fornias," a great Roman Catholic missionary charity founded
during the closing years of the sixteenth century. This was the
first case submitted to a court of arbitration set up under the Hague
Convention of 1899. The award affirmed the applicability of the

principle of res judicaUi in international law {x) .
In February, 1904, it pronounced judgment on the preferential

claims made against Venezuela by Great Britain, Germany, and
Italy, arising out of the pacific blockade of December, 1902. The
award, however, has been described as bad, both legally and
morally, inasmuch as it decided in favour of claimants who had
used force as against those who had not done so {y) .
In 1905 came the Japanese house tax case, in reference to the

perpetual leases of European Powers in Japan. The award of the
court was to the effect that these leases confer an immunity on all
"
the lands and buildings thereon from all imposts, taxes, charges,
contributions, or conditions whatsoever other than those expressly

stipulated in the leases in question" {z).
The Muscat Dhows case (between Great Britain and France)
was decided in the same year (a) .
There have been similar instances of arbitration since the second

Hague Conference, 1907. Thus in 1909 a dispute between France
(a;) British and Foreign State in Amer. Journ. of Int. Law, vol. ii.
Papers, vol. xcv. (1901—2); Moore, (1908), pp. 902 seq. Of. Moore,
International Arbitrations, vol. ii. Digest, § 967.
1349 seq.; Cobbett, Cases, vol. i. (2) Amer. Journ. of Int. Law,
pp. 23 seq. vol. ii. (1908), pp. 911 seq.
(y) The text of the award is given (a) Ibid. pp. 923 seq.
400 EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES -AKBITRATION.
and Germany, arising out of the French military occupation of

Casablanca in Morocco, was submitted to an arbitral tribunal. The
German consul and his staff had aided deserters from the French
army, of whom three were German subjects, in an unsuccessful
attempt to escape. It was held that in these circumstances the
rights of the military occupant are superior to the consular right
of protection (&). It is to be noted that in this case, as in the
North Sea incident, 1904, the arbitrators were called upon to
decide not merely questions of fact but also of law .
In October, 1909, the Maritime Boundary case, between Norway

and Sweden, was decided. The case of the North Atlantic coast
fisheries (c) was investigated by the Hague Court (June 1 —
August 12, 1910), which, by its award (September 6), put an end
to a controversy that existed between Great Britain and the United
States for some seventy years. The answers given to the questions
submitted were favourable to the United States; but British sove-
reignty over the shores and waters, as to which the United States
had acquired special rights, remained. It was also decided that
" "
bays in the treaty of 1818 meant gmgraphioal bays regardless
" "
of their size or depth, but the headland theory was not dealt
with. In England the result of the arbitration was in several
quarters regarded as unsatisfactory.
On October 25, 1910, was decided also the Orinoco Steamship
Company case, between the United States and Venezuela. The
effect of the award was
to annul the judgm'ent previously pro-
nounced by another international tribunal {d) .
This was immediately followed by the Sanarhar case, between

Great Britain and France (e) An Indian law student, Savarkar,
.
was ordered to be extradited from London to India on the ground

that he had committed political offences in the latter country. The
vessel on which he was placed having reached Marseilles, he escaped
and swam ashore. He was, however, arrested by a French police
officer and handed over to the English police. The French Govern-
ment claimed that the British Government was not entitled to bring
a political fugitive within its jurisdiction without due consent
from the proper authorities, and that as soon as the vessel in ques-
— —
tion being a imerchantman entered French waters. Great Britain
lost her jurisdiction over the prisoner. The award of the Hague
court has been criticised on the ground that it derogated from the
(h) Amer. Journ. of Int. Law, vol. iv.(1910), pp. 948 seq.
vol. iii. (1909), pp. 698—701, 755— {d) lbid.\o\.\. (1911), pp. 230 s^^.
760. (e) See Amer. Journ. of Int. Law,
(c) Cf. Amer. Journ. of Int. Law, vol. v. (1911), pp. 520—523.
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES—AEBITEATION. 401
principle of territoriality, in not calling upon Great Britain to

restore the prisoner to the French authorities.
•There were other instances of international arbitration, e.g., the
Chamizal arbitration between the United States and Mexico
(June, 1911) (/), the Canevaro case between Italy and Peru (May,
1912 (^), the question of the payment of certain indemnity as
between Russia and Turkey (November, 1912) {h), the case of
the French mail steamer Carthage between France and Italy, and
that of the French mail steamer Mammiba between France and
Italy (May, l^m{i).
Besides these, there has been a considerable number of recent
cases of arbitration decided by tribunals other than that of the
Hague.
With regard to the scope of arbitration, there has never been Scope of
arbitration.
and there is not now unanimity
of opinion. Apart from' express
conventions stipulating submission to an arbitral tribunal in the
case of certain disputes, no State is bound to refer its grievance to
arbitrators. Those that are ready to go to arbitration on some
questions are not necessarily ready to do so on others. Some of the
smaller States, indeed, have undertaken to submit all their differ-
ences in this way {e.g., Holland and Denmark); others {e.g.,
Brazil, Argentina, Chile) all differences save those affecting their
respective constitutions. But most Powers prefer to limit arbitra-
tion to disputes of a legal character (and this is the view taken, as
above stated, in Article 3,8 of the Hague Convention), and to
exclude, in their treaties of arbitration, questions involving
national honour, independence, vital interests, and matters affect-
ing the interests of third Powers. Thus, by the terms of an agree-

ment entered into betweenEngland and France in October, 1903;,
all differences of a judicial order, or such as relate to the interpreta-
tion of the treaties existing between the parties which it may not be
possible to settle by means of diplomacy, are to be submitted to

"
the Hague tribunal, on condition, however, that they do not in-
volve either the vital interests or the independenoe or honour of the
two contracting parties, and that they do not affect the interests of
a third Power." Similar agreements have been entered into be-
tween several Powers {Tc). Thus limited, it is probable that the
Hague tribunal will fill a gradually increasing role of usefulness,
and will save much of that friction which constantly militates
(/) Ibid. p. 782. (0 Ibid. vol. vii. (1913), pp. 623,

ig) Ibid. vol. vi. (1912), p. 746. 629.
(/c) For several examples
(A) Ibid. vol. vii. (1913), pp. 178 of these,
seq. see Araer. Journ. of Int. Law, vol. ii.
(1908), Supplement, pp. 296 seq.
W 26
EIGHTS OF NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES— AEBITRATION.
"
against international goodwill. The fact that questions of vital
interest" or "involving national honour" are excluded from its
jurisdictionmust largely limit its scope, and it cannot be accepted

as offeringany reasonable probability of acting as a check on
popular passions when once excited. But by showing that it is
possible in smaller matters to submit to a pacific solution without
a sacrifice of national self-esteem, it may eventually help to render
opinion more and more averse to the arbitrament of war,

publi(^
and prepare it to accept an adverse decision in the spirit of re-
signation which society enforces upon a civil litigant.
In recent times, remarkable efforts have been made to introduce

compulsory arbitration. In 1890 the Pan-American Conference
adopted it as a "principle of American international law," and
arrived at a project for a general treaty of compulsory arbitration;
but it was not ratified. The question was discussed at the first
Hague Conference, 1899. It was suggested that pecuniary claims
and controversies arising out of several kinds of treaties might be
compulsorily referred to an arbitral tribunal. Most of the dele-
gates were in favour of the proposal, but the German representative
opposed and so it was dropped. This, however, did not preclude
it,
States from entering into treaties of obligatory arbitration; and
many, indeed, were entered into. At the second Hague Conference

the matter was brought forward again. A large number of sub-
jectswere proposed as being suitable for compulsory arbitration;
•
the majority of the States accepted the project, but the opposition
included two great Powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary; ac-
cordingly the scheme fell through once more. However, the Con-
ference declared, in its final Act, its admission of the principle of
compulsory arbitration, and that certain kinds of disputes, espe-

cially such as arisefrom the interpretation or application of
treaties, might well be submitted without restriction to compulsory
arbitration.
Moreover, a progressive movement in this direction was defi-

"
nitely made by the second Convention (1907), viz., the Conven-
tion respecting the limitation of the employment of force for the
recovery of contract debts." Article

1 says: The contracting
Powers agree not to armed force for the recover}-
have recourse to
of contract debts claimed from the Government of one country by
the Government of another country as being due to its nationals.
This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor State
refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after
accepting the offer, prevents smj compromis from being agreed on.
or, after the arbitration, fails to submit to the aWard. Article 2

made provision for the procedure (which is assimilated to that of
the first Convention), and for the effect of the award.
By Juno 30, 1908, which was the final date fixed for signing
the Convention, thirty-four out of the forty -four States repre-
sented had given their signatures, and some of them with reserva-
tions. Most of the leading States of Europe and America signed
and also ratified this Convention, which may, therefore, be regarded
as binding upon them.
It will have been seen that the so-called Permanent Court of Proposed
Arbitration established by the Hague Conferences is not, strictly iîS^^V
speaking, a Court; it is rather a panel or list of judges from which Court,
courts may be constituted as required. Obviously, the constituting

of each particular court for every case that arises means delay and
expense, and involves a cumbrous, uncertain process; also, harmony

and continuity between the successive arbitral courts could not be
ensured. To make good this defect, an attempt was made at the
"
second Hague Conference to set up une Cour de Justice Arbi-
"
trale (a court of arbitral justice). A draft convention was pre-
pared, which prescribed its organization, jurisdiction, and proce-

dure. Judges of known capacity and character were to be ap-
pointed by their respective countries for a period of twelve years,
and were to receive an annual salary. They were to meet in
session once a year at the Hague, and were to nominate annually a
special delegation of three of their number (and three others as
deputy delegates) . This delegation wasperform the functions

to
of a commission of inquiry, to settle the compromis if the con-
tending parties agree, and in certain cases even at the request of

one party, and was made competent to decide certain cases.
The plan failed, because the States could not agree on the con-
stitution of the court. The
principle of equality was invoked,
whereby several of the smaller Powers claimed that each State — •
—
the least equally with the greatest should be entitled to nominate
a judge. The applicability of this principle to conditions such as
these was naturally scouted by somo of the greater Powers (I).
(I) Bibliographical references to listsof Hershey, Essentials of Int.

arbitration and relative subjects will Public Law (1912), pp. 340 seq.
be found in the excellently compiled
26(2)
:04 COMMENCEMENT OF WAR,
PAET FOUETH.
INTEENATIONAL EIGHTS OF STATES IN THEIR HOSTILE

RELATIONS.
CHAPTER I
COMMENCEMENT OF WAR, AND ITS IMMEDIATE EFFECTS.
Redress by The independent societies of men, called States, acknowledge

orcible means
)etween no common arbiter or judge, except such as are constituted by
lations.
special compact. The law hy which they are governed, or profess
to be governed, is deficient in those positive sanctions which are
annexed to the municipal code of each distinct society. Every
State has therefbre a right to resort to force, as the only means
of redress for injuries inflicted upon it by othelrs, in the sajne
manner as individuals would be entitled to that remedy were they
not subject to the laws of civil society. Each State is also en-
titled to judge for itself what are the nature and extent of the
injurieswhich will justify such a mea,ns of redress.

'orcible
Among the various modes of terminating the differences
leans short
f actual between nations, by forcible means short of actual war, are the
'âr.
following:
—
1. By laying an embargo or sequestration on the ships land
goods, or other property of the offending nation, found A\ithin
the territory of the injured State. (This is sometimes described
' ' ' ' * '
as embargo, in contradistinction to pacific or civil

hostile
embargo, whereby a State compels, in certain circumstances, its

own merchantmen to remain in port).
2. taking forcible possession of the thing in controversy,
By
by securing to yourself by force, and refusing to the other nation,
the enjoyment of the right drawn in question.
3. By exercising the right of vindictive retaliation
('retorsio
facti '), or of amicable retaliation ('retorsion de droit ');
by which
last, the one nation applies, in its transactions with the other,.
AND ITS IMMEDIATE EFFECTS. 40
the same rule of conduct by which that other is governed under

similar circumstances.
Thus, before the outbreak of the Uusso-Japanose war in 1904,
Russia made regulations excluding Japanese fishermen from the
waters of Saghalien, which was then Russian territory. Ac-
cordingly Japan retorted by threatening to impose differential
—
duties on Russian imports- a proceeding which brought abouti
the withdrawal of the obnoxious regulations (a) .
4. By making reprisals upon the persons and things belonging

to the offending nation, until a satisfactory reparation is made
for the alleged injury (6).
This last seems to extend to every species of forcible melans Reprisals,
for procuring redress, short of tactual war, and, of course, to
include all the others above enumerated. Reprisals are negative,
when a State refuses to fulfil a perfect obligation which it has
contracted, or to permit another nation to enjoy a right which it
claims (c) They are positive, when they consist in seizing the
.
persons and effects belonging to -the other nation, in order to obtain

satisfaction {d) .
Reprisals are also either general or fecial. They are general,

when* a State which has received, or suppose(s it has received,
an injury from another nation, delivers commissions to its officers
and subjects to take the persons and property belonging to the
other nation, wherever the same /may be found. It is, according
to present usage, the first step which is usually taken at the com-
mencement of a public war, ;and may be considered as amounting
to a declaration of hostilities, unless satisfaction is made by the
offending State. Special reprisals are, where letters of marque
were formerly granted, in time of peace, to particular individuals
who had suffered an injury from the government or subjects of
another nation (e) .
iJleprisals are to be granted only in case of a clear and open

denial of justice.^ The right 'of granting them is vested in the
sovereign or supreme power of the State, and, in former times,
was regulated by treaties and by the municipal ordinances of
different nations. Thus, in England, the statute of 4 Hen. V.,
"
cap. 7, declares, That if any subjects of the realm are oppressed
in time of peace by any foreigners, the king will grant marque
{a) For other examples of retalia- (c) Of, the case of the Silesian loan,
tion in kind, see Moore, DigestI, infra, p. 418.
vol. vii. § 1090. {d) Kluber, § 234, note (c).
(h) Vattel, liv. ii. ch. 18. Kliiber, (e) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub.
Droit des Gens Moderne de I'Europe, lib. i.
(Duponceau's Transl. p. 182,
§ 234. note).
406 CX)MMENCEMENT OF WAR,
ill duo form to that feel tliemselves grieved;" which form is

all
specially pointed out, and directed to be observed in the statute.

So also, in France, the celebrated marine ordinance of Louis XIV .
of 1681, prescribed the forms to be observed for obtaining special

letters of marque hy French subjects against those of other
nations. But these special reprisals in time of peace have entirely
fallen into disuse (/) .
Effect of
reprisals.
Any of these acts of reprisal, or resort to forcible means of
redress between nations, may assume the character of war in case
adequate satisfaction refused by the offending State.

is ''Re-
prisals," says Vattel, "are used between nation and nation, in

order to do themselves justice when they cannot otherwise obtain
it. If a nation ha,s taken possession of what belongs to another,
if it refuses to pay a debt, to repair an injury, or give adequate
satisfaction for it, the latter may seize something belonging to
the former, and apply it to its own advantage, till it obtains pay-
ment of what is due, together with interest and damages; or keep
it as a pledge till the offending nation has refused ample satis-
faction. The effects thus seized are preserved, while there is any
hope of obtaining satisfaction or justice. As soon as that hope
disappears they are confiscated, and then reprisals are accom-
plished. If the two nations, upon this ground of quarrel, come
to an open rupture, satisfaction is considered as refused from the
moment that war is declared, or hostilities commenced; and then,
"
also, the effects seized may be confiscated (^) .
Embargo Thus, where an embargo was laid on Dutch property in the

previous to n • •
o i i r. t
•
declaration of ports ol (jrreat Britain, on the rupture ol the peace oi Amiens,

hostilities.
^j^1803, under such circumstances as were considered by the
British Government as constituting a hostile aggression on the
part of Holland, Sir W. Scott (Lord Stowell), in delivering his

"
judgment in this case, said, that the seizure was at first equivo-
cal; and if the matter in dispute had terminated in reconciliation,
the seizure would have been converted into a mere civil embargo,
so terminated. Such would have been the retroactive effect of
that course of circumstances. On the contrary, if the transaction
end in hostility, the retroactive effect is exactly the other way.
It impresses the direct hostile character upon the original seizure;

it isdeclared to be no embargo; it is no longer an equivocal act,
subject to two interpretations; there is a declaration of the animus
(/) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. ii. Martens, Essai concernant les Arma-
eh. 18, §§ 342—346. Bynlcershoek, teurs, § 4.
Qusest. Jur.- Pub. lib. i. cap. 24. (ff) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. ii.
Martens, Precis, liv. viii. ch. 2, § 260. ch. 18, § 342.

by which it is done; that it was done hostili animo, and it is to be

considered as a hostile measure, ab initio, against persons guilty
of injuries which they refuse to redeem, by any amicable alteration
of their measures. This is the necessary course, if no particular
compact intepvenes for the restoration of such property, taken
"
before a formal declaration of hostilities (^) .
The recourse to reprisals by Great Britain in the Don Pacifico Case of Don
affair was not a I'acifico.
very dignified proceeding, and ended in some-
thing like a farce. Don Pacifico, a native of Gibraltar, and con-
sequently a British subject, went to reside at Athens, and while
there, in 1849, a mob, aided, it was said, by Greek soldiers, broke
into and plundered his house. Pacifico did not
apply to the Greek
tribunals for redress, but invoked the aid of England. On the
refusal of Greece to grant compensation, the British fleet was
ordered to lay an embargo on all Greek vessels in Greek ports.
France offered her mediation, but Greece was practically com-
pelled to accept the terms imposed by England. Three commis-
sioners were appointed to examine Pacifico's claims. These had
now swollen to £21,295 Is. 4d., and the commissioners, after
duly examining them, awarded him £150! (^). The English
Foreign Secretary defended these proceedings by alleging that to
have recourse to the Greek tribunals was at that time ridiculous,
and that no justice could be expected from them. Sir R. Philli-
"
more, however, thinks that the evidence of this was not of that
overwhelming character which alone could warrant an exception
from the well-known and valuable rule of international law^ upon
questions of this description" (k), viz., the rule that application
must first be made to the local courts.
In 1884 France, in her operations against Tonquin, felt ag- Other cases
" ^^P^^^* •
grieved against China, because she permitted Chinese bands to

take part with the enemy. The French Government, not desiring
to adopt the extreme measure of war, ordered the bombardment of
Foo-chow, and took possession of certain localities on the Chinese
island of Formosa. In 1895, Great Britain seized the port of
Corinto, in Nicaragua, and levied the customs duties there, until
reparation was made for injuries inflicted on British subjects. In
1901, France seized the custom-house at Mitylene, in order to
induce Turkey to satisfy certain contractual claims on the part of
(//) The Boedes Lust (1804), 5 C. (1907) now applies; see m/m, p. 423.
Rob. 246. Cf. The Gertruyda, 2 C. (?:) Correspondence respecting M.
Rob. 219; The Theresa Bonita, 4 C. Pacifico's claims. Pari. Papers, 1851;
Rob. 236. With regard to the status Annual Register (1850), p. 281.
of enemy merchantmen, at the outbreak (Jc) Phillimore, vol. iii. p. 41 (2nd
of hostilities, the Hague Convention ed.).
COMMENCEMENT OF WAE,
French subjects. In 1908, Holland seized two Venezuelan gun-

boats to exact reparation for various grievances, after having un-
successfully tried diplomatic methods.
Another means of bringing pressure to bear on a recalcitrant

"
State is that known as pacific blockade," whereby the aggrieved
Power blockades the latter' s coast or ports in time of peace, without
the intention of making war. The earliest affair of this kind was
the blockade, in 1814, of Norwegian ports by English and Swedish
ships. In 1827, Great Britain, France and Russia blockaded the
coasts of Greece occupied by Turkish forces. Later, France
blockaded the Tagus in 183>1; in 1833, France and Great Britain
blockaded the ports of Holland; in 1833, France blockaded
Mexico; from 183)8 to 1848, France and Great Britain blockaded
the ports of the Argentine Republic; in 1850, Great Britain
blockaded Greek ports; in 1860, the King of Piedmont joined
the revolutionary government in Naples in blockading Sicilian
ports held by the King of Naples. In 1861, a British ship, th©

Prince of Wales, was wrecked on the Brazilian coast, and the
English consul came to the conclusion that the wreck had been
plundered, and some of the sailors murdered. Compensation was
demanded by England, and, on its refusal, a British ship of war
blockaded Rio de Janeiro for six days, and five Brazilian ships
were captured. These were shortly afterwards restored, and the
sum of £3^,200 paid by Brazil under protest. International rela-
tions were suspended between England and Brazil until 1865,
when the affair was settled by the mediation of the King of
Portugal (/). In 1879, Chile blockaded the coast of Bolivia; in
" "
1880, the naval demonstration by the six Great Powers at
Dulcigno would have become a pacific blockade if Turkey had
delayed giving up that town to Montenegro (^) and, in 1886, ;
the Great PoAvers, with the exception of France, blockaded

parts
of the Greek coast (n). In 1897, an endeavour was made by the
same Powers, this time including France, to localise the Cretan
insurrection and to prevent the landing of Greek
troops on that
island. Ships from their various navies blockaded it for this
purpose, and effectually prevented the landing of reinforccmenta
for Colonel Vassos and the supply of arms or stores to the insur-
gents. Greece, within a very few days, went to war with Turkey,
and had events taken a course different from what actually
hap-
(0 Calvo, vol. ii. § 605. («) Ante,]y. 119; post, -p. 772, which
(w) Wharton, Digest, § 364. see for the conditions of the blockade.
pened, it is difficult to see how Powers professedly neutral could

have forbidden one belligerent access to the territory of another.
The whole incident is an illustration of the difficulties attending
pacific blockade; and in a more recent instance, when in December,

1902, the fleets of Great Britain and Germany instituted a pacific
blockade of the ports of Venezuela, the sinking of Venezuelan
ships by the latter Power was an act of war which would fully
have justified Venezuela in having recourse to retaliatory measures
which would not have been confined to the German fleet. The
legality of thus instituting a blockade in time of peace has been
much disputed (o) It will be observed that the practice of the
.
Great European Powers is in its favour; but great irritation, partly

due, no doubt, to sensitiveness on the score of the Monroe doctrine,
was caused in the United States by the Venezuela blockade.
The modern view as to the conditions under which the estab-
lishment of a blockade without war permissible is expressed in
is
the rules adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1887 :
(1) Ships under a foreign flag may enter freely notwithstanding

the blockade. (2) The pacific blockade must be officially declared
and and maintained by a sufficient force. (3) The ships
notified,
of the blockaded Power which do not respect such a blockade may
be sequestered; and when the blockade is at an end they must be
restored to their owners with their cargoes, but without indemnity
on any ground (p) .
^
"
There is yet another measure," says Sir E. Phillimore, ''par- Right of
^^^^^y-
taking also of a belligerent character, though exercised, strictly
speaking, in time of peace, called by the French le droit d'angarie.
It is an act of the State by which foreign -as well as
priviadê
domestic vessels which happen to be within the jurisdiction of the
State are seized upon and compelled to transport soldiers, ammu-
nition, or other instruments of war; in other words, to become
parties against their will to carrying on direct hostilities against

a Power with whom they are at peace" (g).
During the Franco-German war of 1870, the German troops

seized upon six English vessels in the Seine, and scuttled them in
order to block the passage of the river, and so prevent the approach
of French gunboats. Prince Bismarck admitted their destruction,
(o) Wharton, loc. cit. Papers (1914), pp. 572 seq. ; A. E.

{j>) Annuaire de I'lnstitut de Droit Hogan, Pacific Blockade (Oxford,
Int. vol. ix. (1887), p. 300. On the 1908); Calvo, Droit Int. vol. iii.
subject of pacific blockade, see West- §§ 1832 seq.
lake, Pacific Blockade, in his Ck)llected {q) Phillimore, vol. iii. p. 49.
410 CX)MMENCEMENT OF WAR,
and pay the value according to equitable estimation He

offered to .
"
contended that the measure in question, however exceptional in
its nature, did not overstep the bounds of international warlike
usages. A
pressing danger was at hand, and every other means
of averting it was wanting; the case was therefore one of necessity,
which even in time of peace may render the employment or de-
struction of foreign property admissible, under reservation of in-
demnification." The German Chancellor then quoted the above
passage from Sir R. Phillimore's work (r). The English ship-
owners were afterwards compensated for their loss.
Further, the Hague Regulations on neutrality specifically re-

cognise this right of angary, in allowing a belligerent to utilize,
in case of necessity, railway material belonging to neutrals, sub-
ject to the payment of compensation (s). Other neutral property

is also liable to be used, or even destroyed by a belligerent, if
military necessity demand (if).
Right of The right of making war, as well as of authorizing reprisals,

making war or other acts of vindictive retaliation, belongs in every civilized
in whom
vested. nation to the supreme power of the State. The exercise of tliis
right is regulated by the fundamental laws or municipal constitu-
tion in each country, and may be delegated to its inferior autho-
rities inremote possessions, or even to a commercial corporation —
such, for example, as the former British East India Company
—
exercising, under the authority of the State, sovereign rights in
respect to foreign nations (u) .
Public or
solemn war.
A contest by force between independent sovereign States is
called a public war. If it is declared in form, or duly commenced,
it entitles both the belligerent
parties to all the rights of Avar
against each other. The voluntary or positive law of nations
makes no distinction in this respect between a just and an unjust
"
war. The justice of war in general or of a certain war in par-
ticular, are questions of the gravest importance and of the most
but they belong to the domain of international ethics
vital interest,
"
or morality rather than to that of international law
(a^). war A
in form, or duly commenced, is to be considered, as to its "effects,
as just on both sides. Whatever is permitted,
by the laws of war,
(r) Annual Register (1870), p. 110; tens, Precis, liv. viii. ch. 2, §§ 260,
(1871), p. 257. 264. See ante, p. 32.
(s) Hague Convention (1907), (x) Hershey, Int. Law and Diplo-
No. V: Art. 19. macy of the Russo-Japanese War
(t) See infra, p. 653. (1906), p. 67.
(w) Vattel, liv. iii. ch. 1, § 4. Mar-
to one of the belligerent parties, is equally permitted to the

other {y) .
A *
perfect
'
war is is at war with another

where one whole nation Perfect or
^^
nation, and all the members of both nations are authorized to ^^^^
commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every,
case and under every circumstance permitted by the general laws
of war. An imperfect war is limited as to places, persons, and
' '
things (2;). The latter may arise, not necessarily through the
sanction of law, but through the exigencies of policy or in conse-
—
quence of a special engagement. Thus as an instance of limita-
—
tion with regard to locality in the Turco-Italian war, 1911, Italy
at first declared her intention not to land troops in any part of the
Ottoman Empire except Cyrenaica and Tripolitana, and to con-
fine her naval operations to certain specified objects; but eventually
departures were made from this declaration {a) .
A civil war between the different members of the same society

' '
iswhat Grotius calls a mixed war; it is, according to him, public

on the side of the established government, and private on the part
of the people resisting its authority. But the general usage of
nations regards such a war as entitling both the contending parties
to all the rights of war as against each other, and even as respects
neutral nations (&).
It seems to be now settled that it is unnecessary in order to Civil war.
constitute a war, that both 'parties should be acknowledged as
independent nations or sovereign States. war may exist where A

one of the belligerents claims sovereign rights as against the
other ((?) Whether the struggle is a war, or is not, is to be deter-
.
mined, not from the relation of the combatants to each other, but
from the mode in which it is carried on. Certain tests may be
applied to determine whether insurgents are to be considered a;s
possessing the status of belligerency. the tests are the"Among
existence of a de facto political organization of the insurgents sufii-
cient in character, population, and resources to constitute it, if left
to itself, a State among nations capable of
discharging the duties
of a State; the actual
employment of military forces on each side,
acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war . . .
;
and, at sea, employment by the insurgents of commissioned
(y) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. (a) Cf. Sir T. Barclay, The Turco-
ch. 12. Kutherforth, Inst. bk. ii. Italian War (1907), p. 96.
ch. 9, § 15. {b) Vide ante, pt. i. ch. 2, pp. 39
(2) Such were the limited hostilities et seq.
authorized by the United States (c) The Prize Causes (1862), 2
against France in 1798. Cf. Bus v. Black. 666; Rose v. Himely (1808),
Tingy, 4 Dall. 37. 4 Oranch, 272.
412 COMMENCEMENT OF WAR,
cruisers,and the exercise by the parent government of the rights

of blockade of insurgent ports against neutral commerce, and of
stopping and searching neutral vessels at sea. If all these elements

exist, thecondition of things is undoubtedly war; and it may be
"
war before they are all ripened into activity {d). 'As President
"
Grant said in his Message of June 13, 1870: The question of
belligerency one of fact not to be decided by sympathies for or

is
prejudices against either party. The relations between the parent

State and the insurgents must amount, in fact, to war in the sense
of international law" (e).
During the Civil War, the United States Government treated the
Confederates as belligerents in all matters relating to the war.
President Lincoln proclaimed (April 19, 1861) a blockade of the
Southern ports. Thus their territory was for the time being con-
sidered as enemy territory, and the subjects of the rebellious States
as alien enemies (/). But this was only a belligerent status. The
union was declared to be indissoluble, and the Confederate States,
while endeavouring to leave it, never legally ceased to be
within their subjects citizens of the Union (^).
it, or It was,
however, necessary to accord a de facto existence to the Confede-

rate government, in certain matters not strictly rights of war.
Thus the Supreme Court held, that where land was sold to the
rebel government, and was then captured by the United States, it
became the property of the United States, thus recognising the
validitj^ of a sale from the owner to the Confederate jgovern-
ment (h) Again, contracts payable in Confederate notes were
.
enforced, and the parties compelled to pay at the real, and not the
nominal, value of the notes, at the time when payment was due.
The notes were treated as a currency imposed upon the community
by irresistible force (^) .
Declaration
of war, how
A
formal declaration of war to the enemy was once considered
far necessary. necessary to legalize hostilities between nations. It was uniformly
practised by the ancient Romans, and by the States of modern
Europe until about the middle of the seventeenth century. The
latest example of this kind was the declaration of war by France
against Spain, at Brussels, in 163(5, by heralds at arms, according
(d) Wheaton (ed. Dana), note 15, 646.

p. 34. (A) U 8., Lyon et al. v.
. Huckabee
(e) Moore, Digest, vol. i. p. 194. (1872), 16 Wallace, 414.
(/) Thorington v. Smith (1868), 8 (i) The Confederate Note case, 19
Wallace, 10; Mrs. Alexander's Cotton Wallace, 556; Thorington v. Smith
(1864), 2 Wallace, 404. (1868), 8 Wallace, 1; Hardner v.
C^) Texas v. White (1868), 7 Wal- Woodruf, 15 Wallace, 448.
lace, 726 J White v. Hart, 13 Wallace,
AND ITS IMMEDIATE EFFECTS. 4V^
to the forms observed during the middle ages In the seventeienth

.
centurj formal declarations were not regarded as essential. Grotius

declared, indeed, that a public proclamation must be made; but
own time and right down to modern times the rule laid down
in his
by him was not observed by belligerents. The policy adopted

depended on the circumstances of each case. From the eighteenth
century previous notifications became exceptional. In 1754 war
commenced between England and France, but it was not until two ,
years later that the formal declaration was made. In 1787 Austria
began hostilities against Turkey, and did not openly proclaim a
state of war until several months had elapsed. It has been esti-
mated that of some 120 wars that took place between 1700 and
1872 there were barely ten cases in which a formal declaration
preceded hostilities (k). In the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, however, it became customary to publish a manifesto, witliin
the territory of the State declaring war, announcing the existence
of hostilities and the motives for commencing them. This pub-
lication may be necessary for the instruction and direction of the
subjects of the belligerent State in respect to their intercourse with
the enemy, and regarding certain effects which the voluntary law
of nations attributes to war in form. Without such a declaration,
it might be difficult to distinguish in a treaty of peace those acts
which are to be accounted lawful effects of war, from those which
either nation may consider as naked wrongs, and for which they
may, under certain circumstances, claim reparation (I).

Apart from the conclusions to be drawn from actual practice,
there has by no means been unanimity of opinion among jurists
and publicists. On the whole. Continental writers urged the
necessity of a previous declaration, "pour legitimer I'etat do
guerre," as one jurist says('m). The British view was contrary
to this. Thus Lord Stowell held that a war might properly exist
without a prior notification, which constituted merely the formal
evidence of a fact. "A declaration of war by one country," ho
"
said, was not a mere challenge to be accepted or refused at plea-
sure by the other. On the contrary, it served to show the existence
of actual hostilities on one side at least; and hence put the other
party also into a state of war, even though he might think proper
"
to acton the defensive only (n).
Major-Gen. J. F. Maurice, Hos-

(k) Eutherforth, Inst. b. ii. ch. 9, § 10.
tilitieewithout Declaration of War Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. 4,
(London, 1883). §56. Kliiber, Droit des Gens Moderne
(0 Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. de I'Europe, §§ 238, 239.
lib. i. cap. 3, § 4. Byntershoek, (m) Calvo, Droit Int. vol. iii. p. 40.
Jur. Pub. lib. i. cap. 2. (n) The Eliza Ann (1813), 1 Dods.
No declara- A civil war is never declared, it becomes such by its accidents —

tion of a civil
war. the number, power, and organization of the persons who originate
"
and carry it on. The American Civil War sprang forth suddenly
"
from the parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of war (o).
Recent The. Crimean war was preceded by every possible formality
examples.
between England and Russia. In 1870, war was formally de-
clared by France on July 19th, and the first hostilities, with the
exception of a skirmish of outposts, took place at Saarbriick on

August 2nd; but in 1877 the Russian troops entered Turkish terri-
tory some hours before any declaration of war was issued (p) .
The France and China were com-

hostilities of 1884-5 between
menced and continued without any formal declaration of war.
But early in 1885 Great Britain decided to regard the French noti-
fication of the blockade of Formosa as tantamount to a declaration
so far as concerned the rights and duties of neutrals (g) In 1884, .
the French admiral, under cover of a nominal state of peace,;

passed, without opposition, the forts and obstructions in the Min
river, and subsequently availed himself of the position thus ob-
tained to destroy the Chinese vessels and arsenal at Foochow,
bombard and fire the neighbouring villages, and take the forts in
flank and rear. This conduct was deservedly the subject of much
hostile criticism in the European press. In 1885, the Serbian
army invaded Bulgaria without any previous declaration of war;
and the war between China and Japan began with the sinking of a
British merchant steamer laden with Chinese troops, the Kow-
shing% on July 25th, 1894, by a Japanese cruiser; early in the

following month Japan made a formal declaration of war. In
1897, Greek irregulars crossed the Turkish frontier on April 8th,
and after several engagements, Turkey declared war on the 17th
of that month. In 1898, the Spanish Cortes formally recognised
a state of war on April 24th, and on the next day the Amerioan
Congress voted that war had existed between the United States
and Spain from April 21st, for on that day the President had pro-
claimed the blockade of the Cuban coast, and on the 23/rd he had
issued a proclamation calling for 125,000 volunteers to serve for
two years or for the war. On October 10th, 1899, the Transvaal
Government presented the British agent with an ultimatum, and
on the evening of the following day, the time allowed for the with-
drawal of the British troops from the frontier districts having
244. Cf. The Nayade,

4 C. Rob. 253; Black. 669.
The Success, Dods. 133; The Teu-
1 {p) Phillimore, vol. iii. § 64; Pari,
tonia (1870), L. R. 4 P. O. 179. Papers. Turkey, 1877 (No. 26), p. 86.
(o) The Prize Causes (1802), 2 l^q) See p. 775, qwst.
expired, the Boer burghers crossed Laing's Nek into Natal. On

the 17th of June, 1900, the allied fleets bombarded and took the
Taku forts, while the nations to which they belonged were still at
peace with China. The Tsung-li-yamen treated this as a declara-
tion of war, and ordered all the foreign ministers to quit Pekin
within twenty-four hours, a request with which events rendered
it
impossible to comply; from that date the Chinese regular army
was ranged by the side of the Boxers. In the Russo-Japanese war,
1904, Japan attacked the Russian fleets at Chemulpo and at Port
Arthur on February 8, two days before she formally proclaimed
war. Russia thereupon accused the Japanese of treacherous con-
duct; but as there had been no surprise attack, the charge was
hardly maintainable. Diplomatic relations between the two

Powers had been going on fruitlessly since the preceding July,
and were severed on February 6, by the Japanese note declaring
"
that the Imperial Government of Japan reserve to themselves the
right to take such independent action as they may deem best to

consolidate and defend their menaced position, as well as to protect
their established rights and legitimate interests." A
few hours
before the delivery of this note, however, the Japanese captured a
Russian cruiser, as the Russian fleet appeared on February 4 be- ^
tween Port Arthur and the Japanese coast (r) .
We have seen above that it had become customary to issue a The Hague
^'^^®^' ^^^^7.
general manifesto, in order to fix the date from which would begin
the liabilities of neutrals, &c. But this practice was uncertain,
and was a matter of courtesy rather than of legal obligation. Ac-
cordingly, the Hague Conference of 1907 took up the question,
and laid down definite rules in its third Convention, which is now
binding on belligerents. Article 1 The contracting Powers re-
:
cognise that hostilities between them must not commence without

a previous and explicit warning, in the form of either a declaration
of war giving reasons, or an ultimatum with a conditional declara-
tion of war. Article 2 The existence of a" state of war must be
:
notified to the neutral Powers without delay, and shall not be held
to affect them until after the receipt of a notification, which may,
however, be given by telegraph. Nevertheless, neutral Powers
may not rely, on the absence of notification, if it be established
beyond doubt that they we;re in fact aware of the existence of a

state of war. Article ^ Article 1 of the present Convention shall
:
take effect in case of war between two or more of the contracting
(r) Cf S. Takahashi, International

. 761 Hershey, The Int. Law and
;
Law applied to the Russo-Japanese Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War

War (London, 1908), pp. 8, 14, 15, (1906), chap. i.
Powers. Article 2 applies as between a belligerent Power which

is a party to the Convention and neutral Powers which are also
parties to the Convention.

Wo see from Article 1 that a formal declaration is not essential ;
an ultimatum may be substituted therefor. If one State makes

certain demands on another, together with an intimation that
failing a satisfactory reply by a certain time it will proceed to
protect its interests, this is an ultimatum implying a conditional
notification of war; so that if the demands are not satisfied, or if no
answer be returned, further declaration of war is not necessary,
as it will be considered to have commenced at the time indicated.
Moreover, it appears that it is not necessary to allow any definite

interval to elapse between the declaration and the actual Opening
of hostile operations; a delay of twenty-four hours was suggested
at the Conference, was not approved. None the less, the
but it
rule must be interpreted as condemning sudden surprise and

treachery.
These rules were followed in the Turco-Italian war, 1911, when
Italy, after alleging certain grievances, sent by telegraph an ulti-
matum to Turkey, demanding a reply within twenty-four hours
of its receipt. An
answer was despatched at once; but as it wa«
regarded as unsatisfactory, Italy immediately forwarded a decla-
ration of war to Turkey and a notification to neutrals, and began
hostilities without delay.
Similarly, in the Great War of 1914, Austria-Hungary des-
patched an ultimatum to Serbia, which involved a complicated
and extraordinary issue, and demanded a reply within forty-eight
hours. The reply received was considered "inadequate," and the
Austro-Hungarian minister at once left Serbian territory.- Shortly

"
afterwards the following announcement was made in Vienna: The
Royal Government of Serbia not a
having given satisfactory reply
to the note presented to it by the Austro-Hungarian minister in
Belgrade on July 23,, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government
ofAustria-Hungary finds it necessary itself to safeguard its rights
and interests, and to have recourse for this purpose to -force of
arms. Austria-Hungary, therefore, considers itself from this
moment in a state of war with Serbia." Germany, desiring ta
proceed against France through Belgium, demanded an unmolested
passage from the latter in an ultimatum, to which a reply was ex-
pected within twelve hours (August 2) Great Britain called upon
.
Germany to respect her treaty obligations with regard to the

neutralization of Belgium; and afterwards was compelled to send
her an ultimatum, to which a satisfactory reply was demanded
by midnight of the same day (August 4). Japan delivered an

ultimatum to Germany on August 15; and as no reply was re-
ceived, declared war on August 23 (s).
As no declaration, or other notice to the enemy, of the existence Enemy's

of war, is —
necessary, in order to legalize hostilities though now the foundîn the
commencement of hostilities without a declaration or ultimatum territory on
would amount to a breach of international law —and as the pro- the corn-
mencement of
^^
perty of the enemy is, in general, liable to .seizure and confiscation nabieto^^
would seem to follow as a consequence, that the
as prize of war, it confiscation.
property belonging to him and found within the territory of the

belligerent State at the commencement of hostilities, is liable to
the same fate with his other property wheresoever situated. But
there is a great diversity of opinions upon this subject among
institutional writers, and the tendency of modern usage between
nations seems to be to exempt such property from the operations of
war.
One of the exceptions to the general rule, laid down by the
text writers, which subjects all the property of the enemy to
capture, respects property locally situated within the jurisdiction
of a neutral State; but this exemption is referred to the right of
the neutral State, not to any privilege which the situation gives
to the hostile owner. Does reason, or the approved practice of
nations, suggest any other exception ?
With the Eomans, who considered it lawful to enslave, or even Earlier views
^^ ^^^^ ^^^'
to killan enemy found within the territory of the State on the
breaking out of war, it would very naturally follow that his pro-
perty found in the same situation would become the spoil of the
first taker. Grotius, whose great work on the laws of war and Grotius.
peace appeared in 1625, adopts as the basis of his opinion upon

this question the rules of the Roman law, but qualifies them by
the more humane sentiments which began to prevail in the inter-
course of mankind at the time he wrote. In respect to debts, due
to private persons, he considers the right to demand them as sus-
pended only during the war, and reviving with the peace (^).
Bynkershoek, who wrote about the year 1737, adopts the same ^Ji^kershoek.
rules, and follows them to all their consequences. He holds that,

as no declaration of war to the enemy is necessary, no notice is
necessary to legalize the capture of his property, unless he has, by
express compact, reserved the right to withdraw it on the breaking
(s) Cf. Phillipson, Int. Law and (0 Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.
the Great War (1915), chaps, i., iii. lib. iii.cap. 20, § 16.
w. 27
418 COMMENCEMENT OF WAE,
out of hostilities. This rule he extends to things in action, as

debts and credits, as well as to things in possession. He adduces,
in confirmation of this doctrine, a variety of examples from the
conduct of different States, embracing a period of something more
than a century, beginning in the year 1556 and ending in 1657.
But he acknowledges that the right had been questioned, and
especially by the States-General of Holland; and he adduces no
precedent of its exercise later than the year 1667, seventy years
before his publication {u) Against the ancient examples cited
.
by him, there the negative usage of the subsequent period of

is
nearl}^ a century and a half previous to the wars of the French

Revolution .
The Silesian
Loan, 1753.
During all this period, the only exception to be found is the case
of the Silesian loan, in 1753. In the argument of the English
civilians against the reprisals made by the King of Prussia in
that case, on account of the capture of Prussian vessels by the
"
cruisers of Great Britain, it is stated that it would not be easy
to find an instance where a prince had thought fit to make reprisals
upon a debt due from himself to private men. There is a confi-

dence that this will not be done. private A man
money to lends
a prinoe upon an engagement of honour; because a prince cannot
be compelled, like other men, by a court of justice. So scrupu-
lously did England and France adhere to this public faith, that
even during the war" (alluding to the war terminated by the
"
peace of Aix-la-Chapelle), they suffered no inquiry to be made
whether any part of the public debt was due to the subjects of the
enemy, though certain many English had money in the French
it is
"
funds, and many French had money in ours {x).
Opinion of who wrote about twenty years after Bynkershoek, after
Vattel.
Vattel,
laying down the general principle, that the property of the enemy
is liable to seizure and confiscation,
qualifies it by the exception
of real property ('les immeubles') held by the
enemy's subjects
within the belligerent State, which, having been
acquired by the
consent of the sovereign, is to be considered as on the same
footing
with the property of his own subjects, and not liable to confiscation
jure belli. But he adds that the rents and profits may be seques-
trated, in order to prevent their being remitted to the As
enemy.
(w) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. Vattel calls the report of the Eng-
lish civilians " un
^
lib. cap. 2, 7.
,i.
excellent morceau
{x) On the Silesian Loan contro- de droit des Gens" (liv. ii. ch. 7,
versy, see Wheaton, Hist. Law of § 34, note («)); and Montesquieu
Nations, pp. 206 seq.; Martens, Causes terms it " une reponse sans "
replique
Cel^bres, vol. ii. pp. 1 seq.; Cobbett, (CEuvres, torn. vi. p. 445).
Cases, vol. i. p. 334.
to debts, and other things in action, he holds that war gives ^the
same right to them as to the other property belonging to the enemy .
He then quotes the example referred to by Grotius, of the hundred

talents due by the Thebans to the Thessalians, of which Alexander
had become master by right of conquest, but which lie remitted to
the Thessalians as an act of favour; and proceeds to state, that
*'
the sovereign has naturally the same right over what his subjects
may be indebted to the enemy; therefore he may confiscate debts
of this nature, if the term of payment happen in time of war, or
at least he may prohibit his subjects from paying while the war
lasts . But at present, the advantage and safety of commerce have
induced sovereigns of Europe to relax from this rigour.
all the
And custom has been generally received, he who should

as this
act contrary to it would injure the public faith; since foreigners
have confided in his .subjects only in the firm persuasion that the
general usage would be observed. The State does not even touch
the sums which it owes to the enemy; everywhere, in case of war,
the funds confided to the public are exempt from seizure and
confiscation."In another passage, Vattel gives the reason of this
exemption. "In reprisals, the property of subjects is seized, as
well as that belonging to the isovereign or State. Everything
which belongs to the nation is liable to reprisals as soon as it can
be seized, provided be not a deposit confided to the public faith.
it
This deposit, being found in our hands only on account of that

confidence which the proprietor has reposed in our good faith,
ought to be respected even in case of open war. Such is the usage

in France, in England, and elsewhere, in respect to money placed
"
by foreigners in the public funds." Again, he says: The sove-
reign declaring war can detain neither those subjects of the enemy
who Avere within his dominions at the time of the declaration, nor
their effects. They came into his country on the public faith; by
permitting them to enter his territories, and continue there, he has
tacitly promised them liberty and perfect security for their return.
He ought, then, to allow them a reasonable time to retire with their
effects, and if they remain beyond the time fixed, he may treat
them as enemies; but only as enemies disarmed" {y).
It appears, then, to be the modern rule of international usage, The modern
that property of the enemy found within the territory of the belli-
gerent State, or debts due to his subjects by the Government or
individuals, at the commencement of hostilities, are not liable to
(y) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. ii. ch. 18, § 344; liv. iii. ch. 4, § 63; ch. 5,
^§ 73—77.
27(2)
be seized and confiscated as prize of war. This rule is frequently

enforced by treaty stipulations, but unless it be thus enforced, it
cannot be considered as an inflexible, though an established, rule.
" "
The rule," as has been observed, like other precepts of morality,
of humanity, and even of wisdom, is addressed to the judgment
—
of the sovereign it is a guide which he follows or abandons at his
will; and although it cannot be disregarded by him without
obloquy, yet may it be disregarded. It is not an immutable rule

of law, but depends on political considerations, which may con-
tinually vary" {z).

Rule of these considerations is the conduct
observed by the
Among
reciprocity.
enemy. If he confiscates property found within his territory, or
debts due to our subjects on the breaking out of war, it would
certainl;^ be just, and it may, under certain circumstances, be
upon his subjects by a similar proceeding. This

politic, to retort
principle of reciprocity operates in many cases of international

law. It is stated by Sir W. Scott to be the constant practice of
Great Britain, on the breaking out of war, to condemn property
seized before the war, if the enemy condemns, and to restore if the
'* "
enemy restores. a principle sanctioned by that
It is," says he,
great foundation of the law of England, Magna Charta itself,

which prescribes, that, at the commencement of a war, the enemy's
merchants shall be kept and treated as our own merchants are
kept and treated in their country" (a). And it is also stated in
the report of the English civilians, in 1753, before referred to, in
order to enforce their argument that the King of Prussia could
"
not justly extend his reprisals to the Silesian loan, that French
ships and effects, wrongfully taken, after the Spanish war, and
before the French war, have, during the heat of the war with
France, and since, been restored by sentence of your Majesty's
courts to the French owners. No such ships or effects ever were
attempted to be confiscated as enemy's property, here, during the

war; because, had it not been for the wrong first done, these effects
would not have been in your Majesty's dominions."
Droits of The ancient law of England seems thus to have surpassed in
Admiralty. In some earlier maritime wars com-
liberality its later practice.
menced by that country, it has been the constant usage to seize
and condemn as droits of admiralty (perquisites of the Crown) the
property of the enemy found in its ports at the breaking out of
hostilities, and this practice does not
appear to have been influ-
(z) Chief Justice Marshall, in (a) The Santa Cruz (1798), 1 C.

Brown v. United States (1814), 8 Rob. 64. Magna Carta, Art. 41.
Cranch, 110.
enced by the corresponding conduct of the enemy in that respect.

As has been observed by an English writer, commenting on the
"
judgment of Sir W. Scott in the case of the Dutch ships, there
seems something of subtlety in the distinction between the virtual
and the actual declaration of hostilities, and in the device of
giving to the actual declaration a retrospective efficacy, in order to
"
cover the defect of the virtual declaration previously implied (6).
During the war between Great Britain and the United States, jiroicn v.
-^^^^^^
which commenced in 1812, was determined by the American
it
^"^^^^^^
Supreme Court, that the enemy's property, found within the terri-
tory of the United States on the declaration of war, could not be
seized and condemned as prize of war, without some legislative
act expressly authorizing its confiscation. The court held that the
law of Congress declaring war was not such an act. That decla-
by its own
ration did not, operation, so vest the property of the
enemy in the Government, as to support judicial proceedings for
its seizure and confiscation. It vested only a right to confiscate,
the assertion of which depended on the will of the sovereign power.
The universal practice of forbearing to seize and confiscate debts
and and the recognition of their revival on the restoration
credits,
of peace, would seem to prove that war did not in itself work an
absolute confiscation, but that it simply conferred the right of
confiscation. Between debts contracted under the faith of the
territorial law,and property acquired in the course of trade on
the faith of the same law, reason drew no distinction' and ;
although, in practice, vessels with their cargoes found in port at

the declaration of war may have been seized, it was not believed
that modern usage would sanction the seizure of the goods of an
enemy on land, which w.ere acquired in peace in the course of
trade. Such a proceeding was rare, and would be deemed a harsh
exercise of the rights ,of war. But although the practice in this
respect might not be uniform, that circumstance did not essentially
affect the question whether such property vested in the sovereign
by the mere declaration of war, or remained subject to a right of

confiscation, the exercise of which depended upon the national
will.
After referring to the views of Bynkershoek and Vattel, to

the effect that war did not necessarily transfer to the belligerent
enemy property found within his jurisdiction, the court held that
themodern rule was that tangible property belonging to an enemy,
and found in the country at the commencement of war, ought not
(&) Chitty, Law of Nations, ch. 3, p. 80.

to be immediately confiscated. In almost everj commercial treaty

an was inserted, stipulating for the right to withdraw such
article
l^roperty (c) The general opinion, then, was that though war
.
gave a right to confiscate, it did not in itself imply confiscation.

As to the bearing on the question of the United States Constitu-
tion, a construction ought not lightly to be admitted, which would
give to a declaration of war an effect in this country it did not
possess elsewhere, and which would fetter the exercise of that
entire discretion respecting enemy's property, which might enable
the Government to apply to the enemy the rule which he applied
to us. The constitutional and other legal provisions on the sub-
ject were not contrary to the general principle indicated. The
question of confiscation was to be determined by the legislature,
rather than by the executive or judiciary; and in the present case
there was no act of Congress directing the confiscation of enemy
property within the territory at the outbreak of the war (d) .
From about the middle of the nineteenth century, the practice

of immediately sequestering enemy merchant vessels found in a
belligerent port on the outbreak of war began to fall into disuse.
It became customary to allow them a certain length of time for
Permitted making their departure. Thus, on the outbreak of the Crimean
departure of
vessels in War, Eussia permitted Turkish vessels to leave her ports on the
enemy ports
at outbreak
ground that a similar indulgence had been granted to Russian
of war. vessels by Turkey. .When England and France took part in the
war, they allowed Russian vessels in their ports six weeks to
Earlier
practice.
complete their cargoes and depart. This exemption from the
effects of the war was afterwards extended to all Russian
ships
that put to sea before the 15th of May, 1854. Russia also allowed
English and French vessels a period of six weeks for departure,

and for vessels in the White Sea the period of six weeks com-
menced from the date when the navigation was opened. A similar
principle was followed in the Franco- Austrian war of 1859, the
Danish war in 1862, the war of 1866 between Austria and Prussia,
the Franco-German war, 1870, the Russo-Turkish war, 1877, the
Spanish-American war, 1898, when Spanish merchantmen in
American ports were allowed a month for loading their cargoes
and clearing (e), and in the Russo-Japanese war. Thus the prac-
(c) For lists of these treaties, see the United States Supreme Court in-
Hall, International Law (4th ed.), terpreted the President's proclamation
pp. 409, 410, 457. as extending the immunity to mer-
(rf) Broion v. United States (1814), chantmen that had left American ports
8 Cranch, 123. even before the war began. See also
(p) Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, The Panama (1899), 175 U. S. 535;
vol. xxi. p. 1075. Cf. The Buena The Perlro (1899), 175 U. S. 354.
Ventura (1899), 175 U. S. 388, where
tice became frequent, though the underlying principle was not a

result of legal sanction.
An attempt, however, was made in 1907 by the Hague Con- The Hague
ferenco (sixth Convention) to lay down definite provisions on the ^'^^®*
subject. Some of these are progressive, whilst others are reac-

tionary, as will be seen from the following Articles. Article 1 :
When a merchant ship belonging to one of the belligerent Powers

is found, at the commencement of hostilities, in an enemy port, it
it desirable thatit should be allowed to depart freely, either imme-
diately or after a reasonable term of grace, and to proceed, after

being furnished with a pass, straight to its port of destination or
to some other port indicated to it. The same rule shall apply in
the case of a ship which, having left its port of departure before
the commencement of the war, has entered an enemy port in igno-
rance of hostilities. Article 2 A
merchant ship which, owing to
:
circumstances beyond its control ('force majeure') may have been

unable to leave the enemy port within the period contemplated in
the preceding Article, or which was not allowed to leave, may not
be confiscated. The belligerent may merely detain it, on condition
of restoring it war without payment of compensation, or
after the
he may requisition on payment of compensation. Article 3
it :
Enemy merchant ships which left their last port of departure

before the commencement of the war, and are encountered on the
high seas while still ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities, may

not be confiscated. They are merely liable to be detained on condi-
tion that they are restored after the war without payment of com-
pensation; or to be requisitioned, or even destroyed, on payment

oFcompensation, but in such case provision must be made for the
safety of the persons on board as well as the preservation of 'the
ship's papers. After touching at a port in their own country, or
at a neutral port, such ships are subject to the laws and customs
of naval war. Article 4 Enemy cargo on board the vessels re-
:
ferred to in Articles 1 and 2 is likewise liable to be detained, and

restored after the war without indemnity, or to be requisitioned
on payment of indemnity, with or without the ship. The same
rule applies in the case of cargo on board the vessels referred to
in Article 3. Article 5: The present Convention does not refer
to merchant ships whose construction indicates that they are in-
tended to be converted into warships (/) .
Thus, the above provisions abolish the right of confiscation, but

do not impose an obligation to grant a term of grace at all. Ger-
(/) Hague Conf. 1907, Convent, vi. Arts. 1—5.

many and Eussia entered reservations against Article S, on tho

ground that only States holding naval stations in different parts
of the world would be able to take such vessels into port; other
States would have to destroy them and so encumber themselves
with pecuniary liabilities. The United States refused to sign
the Convention because she held it to be retrogressive. Objection
was also taken to the clause making ignorance of the outbreak of
the war a condition of immunity (g) .
Practice in the The practice adopted in the Great War, 1914, may here bo
of 1914. noted. Great Britain allowed enemy merchantmen under 6,000
tons in burden ten days to load or unload and depart from British
ports (/^). But as the new rule was merely a "desirable" one,
that is, optional, this permission was granted subject to reciprocity
of treatment. Germany failed to give the necessary undertaking;

hence her vessels found within the British jurisdiction at the
beginning of the war were liable to seizure. Austria-Hungary
agreed to reciprocal treatment, and so received the benefit under the
regulations.
The Chile, a German merchantman, arrived in Cardiff, August
4 the war broke out soon afterwards on the same day. She was
;
seized by the Customs officers; and the Prize Court, in view of

the fact that Germany had given no assurance of reciprocal treat-
ment, made an order for her detention (September 4) {i).
Another German Vessel, the Perkeo, was seized at sea on the
outbreak of war; so that Article 3 applied. But owing to Ger-
many's reservation, she was not entitled to the benefit of it; there-
fore the vessel was condemned.
In the case of The Moiv^, a German vessel was seized, August
5, immediately after the outbreak ,of the war, in the Firth of
Forth. The enemy owner claimed immunity under Article 1, on
" "
the ground that the ship was in port after the hostilities began.,
The Court held that the word " port " in the Article does not mean
fiscal port, but must be taken in its commercial sense. Hence the
vessel having been captured outside the port of Leith was liable
to condemnation, and not merely to detention {k).
Debts due to In respect to debts due to an enemy, previously to the commenco-

enemy.
the law of Great Britain pursued a policy of
>j^q^^ of hostilities,
a more liberal, or at least of a wiser character, than in

respect to
(g) Of. J. B. Scott, The Hague (0 The Chile (1914), 31 T. L. E. 3.

Peace Conferences, 2 vols. (Baltimore, The Moxoe (1914), 31 T. L. R.
(k)
1909), vol. p. 568.
ii. 46.
(Ji) Order in Council, Aug. 4, 1914.
droits of admiralty. A maritime Power, which has an over-

whelming naval superiority, may haVe an interest, or may suppose
it has an interest, in asserting tho right of confiscating' enemy'is.
property, seized hefore an ,actual declaration of wiar; but a nation

which; by the extent of its capital, must generally be the creditor
of every other commercial country, can certainly haVe no interest
in confiscating debts due tx) an enemy, since that enemy might, in
almost every instance, retaliate with much more injurious effect.
Hence, though the prerogative of confiscating such debts, and com-
pelling their payment to the crown, still theoretically exists, it is
seldom or never practically exerted. The right of the original
creditor to sue for the recovery of the debt is not extinguished;
it is only suspended during the war, and revives, in full force, on
the restoration of peace (l).

Such, too, is the law and practice of the United States. The Practice of
^
debts due by American citizens to British subjects before the war gtates^^
of the Eevolution, and not actually confiscated, were judicially
considered as revived, together with the right to sue for their
recovery on the restoration of peace between the tVo countries.
The impediments which had existed to the collection of British
debts, under the local laws of the different States of the Confedera-
tion,were stipulated to be removed by the treaty of peace, in 1783;
but this stipulation proving ineffectual for the complete indemni-
fication of the creditors, the controversybetween the two countries
on was finally adjusted by the payment of a sum
this subject
en hloc by the Government of the United States, for the use of
the British creditors. The commercial treaty of 1794 also con-
tained an express declaration, that it was unjust and impolitic that
private contracts should be impaired by national differences; with
"
a mutual stipulation, that neither the debts due from individuals
of the one nation to individuals of the other, nor shares, nor moneys
which they may have in the public funds, or in the public or private
banks, shall ever, in any event of war, or national differences, be
sequestered or confiscated" (m).
On the commencement of hostilities between France and Great Of England
Britain, in 1793, the former Power sequestrated the debts and
other property belonging to the subjects of her enemy, which action
was by a countervailing measure on the part of the
retaliated
British Government. By the additional Articles to the treaty of
peace between the two Powers, concluded at Paris, in April, 1814,
Furtado v. Rogers (1802), 3 Bos.

(I) nora de los Dolores, Edw. Ad. 60.
& Pul. 191; Ex parte Boussmaher (m) Ware v. Hilton (1798), 3 Dall.
(1806), 12 Ves. 71; The Nuesira Sig- 199.
the sequestrations were removed on both sides, and commissaries

were appointed to liquidate the claims of British subjects for th©
value of their property unduly confiscated by the French autho-
rities, and also for the total or partial loss of the debts due to«
them, or other property unduly retained under sequestration, sub-

sequently to 1792. The engagement thus extorted f rom ^France
may be considered as a severe application of the rights of conquest
to a fallen enemy, rather than a measure of even-handed justice;
since it does not appear that French property, seized in the ports
of Great Britain and at sea, in anticipation of hostilities, and
subsequently condemned as droits of admiralty, was restored to

the original owners under this treaty, on the return of peace be-
tween the two countries (n) .
Of England So, also, on the rupture between Great Britain and Denmark,
in 1807, the Danish ships and other property, which had been
seized in the British ports and on the high seas, before the actual
declaration of hostilities, were condemned as droits of admiralty
by the retrospective operation of the declaration. The Danish

Government issued an ordinance, retaliating this seizure by seques-
trating all debts due from Danish to British subjects, and causing
them to be paid into the Danish royal treasury. The English
Court of King's Bench determined that this ordinance was not
a legal defence to a suit in England for such a debt, not being
conformable to the usage of nations; the text writers having con-
demned the practice, and no instance having occurred of the exer-
cise of the right, except the ordinance in question, for upwards of
a century. The soundness of this judgment may well be ques-

tioned. It has been justly observed, that between debts con-
tracted under the faith of laws, and property acquired on the faith
of the same laws, reason draws no
distinction; and the right of the
sovereign to confiscate debts is precisely the same with the right
to confiscate other property found within the country on the
breaking out of the war. Both require some special act expressing
the sovereign will, and both depend, not on any inflexible rule of
international law, but on political considerations by which the
judgment of the sovereign may be guided (o).

Public and Some writers have drawn a distinction between debts due from,
pnva e e ts.
^ subject of one belligerent to a subject of the other, and debts due
from a belligerent State to the subjects of the other. It is said
that there exists a right to confiscate the former, while the latter
(??) Martens, Nouveau Recueil, (o) Wol^ v. Oxholm (1817), 6 M.

torn. ii. p. 16. & S. 92; Brown v. United States-
(1814), 8 Craneh, 110.
are to be exempt. The Confederate States acted upon this dis-

tinction, and confiscated all property and all rights, credits and
interests held within the confederacy, by or for any alien enemy,

except public stocks and securities. Lord Eussell strongly pro-
tested against this as being an act as unusual as it Was unjust (p).'
Many of the individual inhabitants of the South carried this prin-

ciple further, and repudiated all their debts due to citizens of the
Northern States (g) But this is the only instance in recent times
.
of such measures having been adopted, and it is an example that

seems unlikely to be imitated. The confiscation of private debts
of any sort, besides exposing the State doing so to retaliation, only
cripples the enemy in a very indirect way. It has no effect at all
on the military or naval operations of the war, and cannot, there-
fore,be justified on any principle.
One the immediate consequences of the commencement of

of Teadingwith
,.,...,. T
the interdiction
hostilities is,
'
o ^^
commercial intercourse be-
oi all
•
1
•
-L
'''H^ ENEMY.
tween the subjects of the States at War without the license of their
respective governments. In Sir W. Scott's judgment, in the case
of The Hoop, this is stated to be a principle of universal law, and I'/ie Hoop.
not peculiar to the maritime jurisprudence of England. It is laid
down by Bynkershoek as a universal principle of law. "There
"
can be no doubt," says that writer, that, from the nature of war
itself, all commercial intercourse ceases between enemies.
Although there be no special interdiction of such intercourse, as is
often the case, commerce is forbidden by the mere operation of the
law of war. Declarations of war themselves sufficiently manifest
it, for they enjoin on every subject to attack the subjects of the
other prince, seize on their goods, and do them all the harm in their
power. The utility, however, of merchants, and the mutual wants

of nations, have almost got the better of the law of war, as to com-
merce. Hence it is alternately permitted and forbidden in time
of war, as princes think it most for the interests of their subjects.
A commercial nation is anxious to trade, and accommodates the
laws of war to the greater or lesser want that it may be in of the
goods of others. Thus, sometimes a mutual commerce is permitted
generally; sometimes as to certain merchandises only, while others
are prohibited; and sometimes it is prohibited altogether. But in
whatever manner it maybe permitted, whether generally or
specially, it is always, in my opinion, so far a suspension of the
(p) Pari. Papers, 1832. Correspond- (q) Draper, Hist, of American Civil
ence relating to Civil War, p. 108. War, vol. i. p. 537.
laws of war; and in this manner there is partly war and partly
peace between the subjects of both countries" (r).
It appears from these passages to have been the law of Holland .
Valin states it to have been the law of France, whether the trade
was attempted to be carried on in national or in neutral vessels; and
itappears from a case cited (in The Hoop) to have been the law
of Spain; and it may without rashness be affirmed to be a general
principle of law in most of the countries in Europe (s) .
g^j^. Scott proceeds to state two grounds upon which this

^^
C^'oj^^sof
sort of communication is forbidden. The first is, that "by the
law and constitution of Great Britain the sovereign alone has the
power of declaring war and peace. He alone, therefore, who has
the power of entirely removing the state of war, has the power of
removing it in part, by permitting, where he sees proper, that

commercial intercourse which is a partial suspension of the war.
There may be occasions on which such an intercourse may be
highly expedient; but it is not for individuals to determine on
the expediency of such occasions, on their own notions of com-
merce merely, and possibly on g'rounds of private advantage, not
very reconcilable with the general interests of the Stete. It is
for the State alone, on more enlarged views of policy, and of all
the circumstances that may be connected with such an intercourse,
to determine when
be permitted, and under what regula-
it shall
tions. No
principle ought to be held more sacred than that this
intercourse cannot subsist on any, other
footing than that of the
direct permission of the State. Who can be insensible to the
consequences that might follow, if every person in time of war
had a rig4it to carry on a commercial intercourse with the enemy,
and, under colour of that, had the means of carrying on any other
species of intercourse he might think fit? The inconvenience to
.
the public might be extreme; and where is the inconvenience

on the other side, that the merchant should be compelled, in such
a situation of the two countries, to carry on his trade between them
(if necessary) under the eye and control of the government
charged, with the care of the public safety ?

"
Another principle of law, of a less politic nature, but equally
general in its reception and direct in its application, forbids this
sort of communication, as
fundamentally inconsistent with the
relation existing between the two belligerent and that
countries;
is, the total inability to sustain any contract, an by appeal to the
(r) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. («) Valin, Comm. sur FOrdonn. de
lib. i.
cap. 3. la Marine, liv. iii. tit.6, Art. 3.
tribunals of the one country, on the part of the subjects of the

other. In the law of almost every country, the character of alien
enemy carries with it a disability to sue, or to sustain, in the lan-
guage of the civilians, a persona stanM in judicio. state in A

which contracts cannot be enforced, cannot be a state of legal
commerce. If the parties who are to contract have no right to
compel the performance of the contract, nor even to appear in a
court of justice for that purpose, can there be a stronger proof
that the law imposes a legal inability to contract? To such trans-
actions it gives no sanction they have no legal existence and the
; ;
whole of such commerce is and

attempted without its protection,
against its Bynkershoek expresses himself with force

authority.
upon this argument, in his first book, chapter VII., where ho
lays down that the legality ,of commerce and the mutual use of
courts of justice are inseparable. He says that, in this respect,
cases of commerce are undistinguishable from any other kinds of
'
case : But if the enemy be once permitted to bring actions, it is

difficult to distinguish from what causes they may arise; nor have
I been able to observe that this distinction has ever been carried
"
into practice.'
Sir W , Scott then notices the constant current of decision in
the British Courts of Prize, where the rule had been rigidly
enforced in cases where acts of parliament had, on different occa-
sions,been made to relax the Navigation Law, and other revenue
laws; where the government had authorized, under the sanction
of an act of parliament, a homeward trade from the enemy's pos-
sessions, but had not specifically protected an outward trade to
the same, though intimately connected with that homeward trade,
and almost necessary to its existence; where strong claims, not
merely of convenience, but of necessity, excused it on the part of
the individual; where cargoes had been laden before the war, but
the parties had not used all possible diligence to countermand
the voyage, after the first notice of hostilities; and where it had
been enforced, not only against British subjects, but also against
those ofits allies in the war, upon the supposition that the rule
was founded upon a universal principle, which States aUied in

war had a right to notice and apply mutually to each other's
subjects.
Such, according to this eminent judge, are the general princi-
ples of the rule under which the public law of Europe, and the
municipal law of its different States, have interdicted all com-
merce with an enemy. It is thus sanctioned by the double
authority of public and of private jurisprudence; and is founded

both upon the sound and salutary principle forbidding all inter-
course with an enemy, unless by permission of the sovereign or
State,and upon the doctrine that he who is hostis who has no ' '
—
persona standi in judicio, no means of enforcing contracts,
—
cannot make contracts, unless by such permission (^).
Decisions of The same principles were applied by the American courts of
the American
Courts, as to justice to the intercourse of their citizens with the enemy, on the
trading with
the public breaking out of the war (1812) between the United States and
enemy. Great Britain. A case occurred in which a citizen had purchased
The Rapid. a quantity of goods within the British territory, a long time
previous to the declaration of hostilities, and had deposited them

on an island near the frontier; upon the breaking out of hostili-
ties, his agents had hired a vessel to proceed to the place of de-
posit, and bring away the goods; on her return she was captured,
and, with the cargo, condemned as prize of war. It was contended
for the claimant that this was not a trading, within the meaning
of the cases cited to support the condemnation; that, on the
breaking out of wâr, every citizen had a right, and itwas the
interest of the community to permit its members, to withdraw
property purchased before the war, and lying in the enemy's
country. But the Supreme Court determined, that whatever
relaxation of the strict rights of war the more mitigated and mild
practice ofmodern times might have established, there had been

none on The universal sense of nations had acknow-
this subject.
ledged the demoralizing effects which would result from the

admission of individual intercourse between the States at war.
The whole nation is embarked in one common bottom, and must
be reconciled to one common fate. Every individual of the on©
nation must acknowledge every individual of the other nation
as hisown enemy, because he is the enemy of his country. This
being the duty of the citizen, what is the consequence of a breach
of that duty? The law of prize is a part of the law of nations.
By it a hostile character is attached to trade, independent of the
character of the trader who pursues or directs it. Condemnation

to the captor is equally the fate of the enemy's property, and of
that found engaged in an anti-neutral trade. But a citizen or
ally may be engaged in a hostile trade, and thereby involve his
property in the fate of those in whose cause he embarks. This
liability of the property of a citizen to condemnation, as prize of
war, may likewise be accounted for on other considerations.
Every thing that issues from a hostile country is, prima fade.
(0 The Hoop (1799), 1 O. Eob. 196.

the property of the enemy, and it is incumbent upon the claimant

to support the negative of the proposition. But if the claimant
be a citizen, or an ally, at the same time that he makes out his
interest he confesses the commission of an offence, which, under
a well-known rule of the municipal law, deprives him of his
right to prosecute his claim. Nor did this doctrine rest upon
abstract reasoning only; it was supported by the practice of the
most enlightened, perhaps it might be said, of all commercial
nations; and it afforded the Court full confidence in their judg-
ment in this case, that they found, upon recurring to the records
of the Court of Appeals in Prize Causes, established during the
war of the Revolution, that, in various cases, it was reasoned
upon as the established law of that Court. Certain it was, that
it was the law of England before the American Revolution, and
therefore formed a part of the admiralty and maritime jurisdic-

tion conferred upon the United States Courts by their Federal
Constitution. Whether the trading, in that case, was such as,
in the eye of the prize law, subjects the property to capture and
depended on the legal force of the term.

confiscation, If by
*
law of prize, were meant that signifiaation of

trading,' in the
the term which consists in negotiation or contract, the case would
certainly not come under the penalty of the rule. But the object,
policy, and spirit of the rule are intended to cut off all communi-
cation, or actual locomotive intercourse between individuals of
the States at war. Negotiation o.r contract had, therefore, no
necessary connection with the offence. Intercourse inconsistent
witii actual hostility, is the offence against which the rule is
directed; and by substituting this term for that of trading ivitJi

the enemy, an answer was given to the argument, that this was
not a trading within the meaning of the cases cited. Whether,
on the breaking out of war, a citizen has a right to remove to his
own country, with his property, or not, the claimant certainly
had not a right to leave his own country for the purpose of
bringing home his propertyfrom an enemy's country. As to the
claim for the vessel, it was held to be founded upon no pretext
whatever; for the undertaking was altogether voluntary and in-
excusable {u).
So where hostilities had broken out, and the vessel in question, TheAiex-
with a full knowledge of the war, and unpressed by any peculiar

danger, changed her course and sought an enemy's port, where she
traded and took in a cargo, it was determined to be a cause of con-
(u) The Rapid (1814), 8 Cranch, 155.

fiscation. If such aii act could be justified, it would be in vain

to prohibit trade with an enemy. The subsequent traffic in the
enemy's country, by which her return cargo was obtained, con-
nected itself with a voluntary sailing for a hostile port; nor did
the circumstance that she was carriedby force into one part of the
enemy's dominions, when her actual destination was another, break
the chain. The conduct of this ship was much less to be defended
than that of the Rapid (x) .
The St.
Lawrence. So, also, where goods were purchased some time before the war,
by the agent of an American citizen in Great Britain, but not
shipped until nearly a year after the declaration of hostilities, they
were pronounced liable to confiscation. Supposing a citizen had
a right, on the breaking out of hostilities, to withdraw froin the
enemy's country his property purchased before the war (on which
the Court gave no opinion), such right toust be exercised with duo
diligence, and within a reasonable time after a knowledge of hos-

tilities. To admit a citizen to withdraw property from a hostile
country a long time after the commencement of war, upon the
pretext of its having been purchased before the war, would lead
to the most injurious consequences, and hold out temptations to
every species of fraudulent and illegal traffic with the enemy. To

such an unlimited extent the right could not exist (y) .
Quitting In December, 1863, the Gray Jacket sailed from Mobile Bay,
hostile
territory at a Confederate port at that time blockaded by the Federal fleets,
the outbreak
of war.
and the next day was captured on the high seas by a Federal
cruiser. The owner of the Gray Jacket asserted that he was
endeavouring to quit the rebel States with the ship and as much >
property as he could take in her, in order to repair to one of the

loyal States. The Court below, however, condemned the ship as
prize. The Supreme Court, on appeal, said, the liability of the
property was irrespective of the status domicilii, guilt or innocence
of the owner. If it came from enemy territory, it bore the impress
of enemy property. If it belonged to a loyal citizen of the country
of the captors, it was nevertheless as much liable to condemnation
as if owned by a citizen or subject of the hostile country or by the
hostile Government itself. The only qualification of these rules
is,that where, upon the breaking out of hostilities, or as soon after
as possible, the owner escapes with such property as he can take
:with him, or in good faith thus early removes his property with a
view of putting it beyond the dominion of the hostile power, the
(x) The Alexander (1814), 8 Cranch, (y) The St. Lawrence, 8 Oranch,
169. 434; S. 0., 9 Cranch, 120.
joropert}' in such cases is exempt from the liability which would

otherwise attend it. TheGray. Jacket having only sailed in
December, 1863/, whereas the war broke out in April, 1861, her
removal was held to be too late, and she was condemned as prize {z) .
In another case, the vessel, owned by citizens of the United The Joseph.
States, sailed from thence before the war, with a cargo or freight,
on a voyage to Liverpool and the north of Europe, and thence back
to the United States. She arrived in Liverpool, there discharged
her cargo, and took in another at Hull, and sailed for St. Peters-
burg under a British license, granted the 8th June, 1812, autho-
rizing the export of mahogany to Russia, and the importation of a
return cargo to England. On her arrival at St. Petersburg, she
received news of the war, and sailed to London with a Russian
cargo, consigned to British merchants; Avintered in Sweden, and,
in the spring of 1813, sailed under convoy of a British man-of-war
for England, where she arrived and delivered her cargo, and sailed
for the United States in ballast, under a British license, and was
captured near Boston Lighthouse. The Court stated, in deliver-

ing its judgment, that, after the decisions above cited, it was Hot
to be contended that the sailing with a cargo or freight, from
Russia to the enemy's country, after a full knowledge of the war,
did not amount to such a trading with the enemy as to subject
both vessel and cargo to condemnation, as prize of war, had they
been captured whilst proceeding on that voyage. As to the alleged
necessity of undertaking that voyage to enable the master, out of
the freight, to discharge his expenses at St. Petersburg, coun-
tenanced, as the master declared, by the opinion of the United
States minister there, that, by undertaking such a voyage, he
would no law of his own country although those considera-
violate ;
*
tions, iffounded in truth, presented a case of peculiar hardship,

yet they afforded no legal excuse which it was competent for the
Court to admit as the basis of its decision. The counsel for the
claimant seemed to be aware of the insufficiency of this ground,
and had applied their strength to show that the vessel was not
taken in delicto, having finished the offensive voyage in which she
was engaged in the enemy's country, and having been captured
on her return home in ballast. It was not denied that, if she had
been taken in the same voyage in Avhich the offence was committed,
she would be considered as still in delicto, and subject to confisca-
tion; but it was contended that her voyage terminated at the
enemy's port, and that she was, on her return, on a new voyage.
(,r) The Gray Jacket (1866), 5 Wallace, 342, 369.

W. 28
But the Court said, that even admitting that the outward and
homeward voyage could be separated, so as to render them two
distinct voyages, still, it could not be denied that the termini of
the homeward voyage were St. Petersburg and the United States.
The continuity of such a voyage could not he broken by a voluntary
deviation of the master, for the purpose of carrying on an inter-
mediate trade. That the going from the neutral to the enemy's
country was not undertaken as a new voyage, was admitted by the
claimants, who alleged that it was undertaken as subsidiary to the
voyage home. It was, in short, a voyage from the neutral country,
by the way of the enemy's country; and, consequently, the vessel,
(luring any part of that voyage, if seized for any conduct sub-
jecting her to confiscation as prize of war, was seized in delicto (a).
Strictness of We have seen what is the rule of public and municipal law on
the rule.
this subject, and what are the sanctions by which it is guarded.
Various attempts have been made to evade its operation, and to
escape penalties; but its inflexible rigour has defeated all these
its
attempts. The apparent exceptions to the rule, far from weakening

its force, confirm and strengthen it. They all resolve themselves
into cases where the trading was with a neutral, or the circum-
stances were considered as implying a license, or the trading was
not consummated until the enemy had ceased to be such. In all
other cases, an express license from the Government is held to be

necessary to legalize commercial intercourse with the enemy (&).
The Mashona. The case of The Mashona, which occurred in the South African
"
war, is a more recent confirmation of the general rule. This is a
suit," said the Cape Supreme Court, "for the condemnation of
the British ship Mashona and a portion of her cargo as prize by
reason of her having been engaged, at the time of her capture, in
trading with the Queen's enemies. The cargo in question was
shipped at New York for conveyance to Delagoa Bay, and was
consigned to various persons resident in the South African Re-
public, with which State Great Britain was at war at the time of
such shipment. There is no que.stion of contraband or of the rights
of neutrals, the simple question being whether, at the time of her
capture at Port Elizabeth, the Mashona, which is admitted to be

a British ship, was engaged in carrying cargo for, and trading
with, the Queen's enemies. The law is clear that one of the imme-
diate consequences of the commencement of hostilities is the inter-
(«) The Joseph (1814), 8 Cranch, 251. See Wheaton's Reports, vol. ii.,
451. App. note 34; Wheaton on
(«), p.
(b) The Franklin (1805), 6 C. Rob. Captures, 220. Mitchell v.U S., 21
.
127; The Madonna delle Grade, 4 C. Wallace, 350; Radich v. Hutchins, 5

Rob. 195; The Jufrow Catharina, 5 Otto, 210.
C. Rob. 141; The Abby, 5 C. Rob.
diction of all commercial intercourse between the subjects of the

States at war without the license of their respective Governments.
.... The prohibition applies to all persons domiciled within the
hostile State. If a war breaks out, a foreign merchant carrying on
trade in a belligerent country has a reasonable time aUowed him
for transferring himself and property to another country. If he
does not avail himself of the opportunity, he is treated, 'for the
pui-poses of the trade, as a subject of the Power under whose domi-

nion he carries it on, and as an enemy of those with whom th!at
Power is at war" (c).
With regard to the above-mentioned licenses, the adverse belli- LicenseB.
gerent party may justly consider such documents of protection

as per se a ground of capture and confiscation; but the maritime
tribunals of the State, under whose authority they are issued, are
bound to consider them as lawful relaxations of the ordinary state
of war. A license isan act proceeding from the sovereign autho-
rity of the State, which alone is competent to decide on all the
considerations of political and commercial expediency, by which
such an exception from the ordinary consequences of war must be
controlled. Licenses, being high acts of sovereignty, are neces-
sarily stricti juris, and must not be carried further than the inten-
tion of the authority which grants them may be supposed to
extend . Not
that they are to be construed with pedantic accuracy,
or that every small deviation should be held to vitiate their fair
effect. An excess in the quantity of goods permitted might not
be considered as noxious to any extent, but a variation in their
quality or substance might be more significant, because a liberty
assumed of importing one species of goods, under a license to
import another, might lead to very dangerous consequences. The
limitations of time, persons, and places, specified in the license,
are also material. The great principle in these cases is, that sub-
jects are not to trade with the enemy, nor the enemy's subjects
with the -belligerent State, without the special permission of the
Government; and a material object of the control which the
Government exercises over such a trade is, that it may judge of
the fitness of the persons, and under what restrictions of time and
place such an exemption from the ordinary laws of war may be

extended. Such are the general principles laid down by Sir W.
Scott for the interpretation of these documents; but Grotius lays
(c) The Mashomi (1900), 10 Cape Cf. also the judgment of the Court .
Times L. E. 450; Journal of the of Appeal in Janson v. Briefontein

Society of Comparative Legislation, Mine^ Co., (1902) App. C. 484.
N. S. vol. ii. (1900), pp. 326—341.
28(2)'
down the general rule, that safe-conducts, of which these licenses

are a species, are to be liberally construed — '
laxa quam stricta
interpretatio admittenda est.' And during the Napoleonic wars,

licenses were eventually interpreted with great liberality in the
British Courts of Prize {d) .
Authority It was made a question in some cases in those Courts, how far
to grant
theso documents could protect against British capture, on account
of the nature and extent of the authority of the persons by whom
they were issued. The leading case on this subject is that of

The, Hope, an American ship, laden with corn and flour, captured
whilst proceeding from the United States to the ports of the
Peninsula occupied by the British troops, and claimed as protected
by an instrument granted by the British consul at Boston, accom-
panied by a certified copy of a letter from the admiral on .the
Halifax station. In pronouncing judgment in this case. Sir W.
Scott observed that the instrument of protection, in order to be
effectual, must come from those who have a competent authority
to grant such a protection, but that the papers in question came
from persons who were vested with no such authority. To exempt
the property of enemies from the effect of hostilities is a very high
act of sovereign authority; if at any time delegated to persons
in a subordinate station, it must be exercised either by those who
have a special commission granted to them for the particular busi-
' '
ness, and who, in legal language, are called mandatories or ;
by persons in whom such a power is vested in virtue of any situa-

tion to which it may be considered incidental. It was quite clear
that no consul in any country, particularly in an enemy's country,
'
is vested with any such power in virtue of his station. Ei rei

non preeponitur,' and, therefore, his acts in relation to it are not
binding. Neither does the admiral, on any station, possess such
authority. He has, indeed, power relative to the ships under his
immediate command, and can restrain them from' committing acts
of hostility; but he cannot go beyond that; he cannot grant a
safeguard of this kind beyond the limits of his own station. The
protections, therefore, which had been set up did not result from
any power incidental to the situation of the persons by whom
they had been granted; and it was not pretended that any such
power was specially entrusted to them for the particular occasion.
If the instruments which had been relied upon by the claimants
were to be considered as the naked acts of those persons, then they
were, in every point of view, totally invalid. But the question
(d) Chitty, Law of Nations, ch. 7. Kent, Commentaries on American Law-^

(5th ed.), vol. i. p. 163, not-e (&).
was, whether the British Government had taken any steps to

ratify these proceedings, and thus to convert them into valid acts
of state; for persons not having full power may make what, in
law, are termed sponsian&s, or, in diplomatic language, treaties

sub spe which a subsequent ratification may give validity:
rati, to
'
mandato sequiparatur.' The learned judge proceeded

ratihabitio
to show that the British Governm'ent had confirmed the acts of its
officers, by the Order in Council of the 26th October, 1813., and
accordingly decreed restitution of the property (e) In the case .
of The Reward (/), before the Lords of Appeal, the principle of

this judgment was substantially confirmed; but in that of The
Charles, and other similar cases, where certificates or passports
of the same kind, signed by Admiral Sawyer, and also by the
Spanish minister in the United States, had been used for voyages
from thence to the Spanish West Indies, the Lords of Appeal
held that these documents, not being included within the terms
of the confirmatory Order in Council, did not afford protection.
In the cases of passports granted by the British minister in the
United States, permitting American vessels to sail with provi-
sionsfrom thence to the island of St. Bartholomew, but not con-
firmed by an Order in Council, the Lords condemned in all the
cases not expressly included ^within the terms of the Order in
Council, by which certain descriptions of licenses granted by the

minister had been confirmed (g)..
A be vitiated by fraudulent conduct in obtaining it.
license may Vitiation of
licenses.
The misrepresentation or suppression of material facts renders the
and exposes the property it is invoked to protect to
license a nullity,
certain condemnation (h). A license must also be used in the
manner intended by the grantor. "It is a mistake to suppose
that the right of user may not be prejudiced by a construction of
the grant that is merely erroneous. It is absolutely essential that
the will of the grantor shall be observed; so that that only shall
be done which he intended to permit; whatever he did not mean
to permit is absolutely interdicted. Hence the party who uses
the license, engages, not only for fair intentions, but for an accu-
rate interpretation and execution of the grant" (^). In America
it was determined that under the i^ct of the 13lth July, 1861, the
(e) The Hope (1813), 1 Dods. Ad. (h) Duer, Marine Insurance, I.
226. p. 598. The Cosmopolite, 4 C. Rob. 11 ;
(/) The Reward (1814), 1 Dods. The Clio. 6 C. Rob. 69. Halleck, Int.
Ad., Appendix D. Law (1908), vol. ii. p. 376.
(^) The Charles (1814), Stewart, («) Duer, Marine Insurance, I.
Vice-Adm. Rep. 367. See also p. 598. Fandi/ck y. Whifmore,! 'East,
TJsparichu v. Noble (1811), 13 East, 475.
332.
4^8 COMMENCEMENT OF WAE,
President was the only functionary who could grant a license

enemy. All other licenses were held to be void,
to trade with the
and therefore ships licensed by any one else were oondenmed;
and the persons acting under any but the President's licenses
were held to be trading with the enemy (k) .
Relaxation of These principles arestill applicable to war except when belli-

rules against
trade with the gerents have, of their own accord, chosen to modify them by regu-
enemy. lations for the guidance of their subjects in any particular case.
During the Crimean war, England, France, and Russia all per-
mitted their respective subjects to trade with the enemy, provided
the trade was carried on through the medium of a neutral flag (l).
This relaxation of the rules of international law only applied to
that particular war. England at the same time prohibited her
subjects from dealing with any securities issued by the Russian
Government during the war. Such an act was made a misde-
meanour (m) At the outbreak of the Franco-German war. Franco
.
permitted German vessels that had left Germany before the de-
claration of war, and were destined to carry goods to French ports,
to proceed to such ports and discharge the goods, but German
vessels which, under the same circumstances, were destined for
neutral ports were held to be liable to capture as prize (n).
Extent of The law of nations prohibits all intercourse between subjects of
prohibition of
intercourse the two belligerents which is inconsistent with the state of war
between between their countries. This includes any act of voluntary sub-
enemies.
mission to the enemy, or receiving his protection; any act or con-
tract which tends to increase his resources, and every kind of
trading or commercial dealing or intercourse, whether by trans-
mission of or goods, or orders for the delivery of either,
money
between the two countries, directly or indirectly, or through the
intervention of third persons or partnerships, or by contracts in
any form looking to, or involving such transmission, or by insur-
ances upon trade by or with the enemy. Beyond this the pro-
hibition does not extend (o) It does not apply to transactions
.
which are to take place entirely in the territory of one belligerent.

Thus, where a creditor residing in one of the States at war has an
agent in the other State, to whom a debtor could pay the money,
(k) The Sea Lion (1866), 5 Wal- Pt. I. pp. 246, 251.
lace, 630;The Owachita Cotton (1867), (o) K&rshaw v. Kelsey (1868), 100
6 Wallace, 521; M'Kee v. U. 8. (1868), Massachusetts, 572; Jecher v. Mont-
8 Wallace, 167; The Reform^ 3 Wal- gomery (1851), 13 Howard, 498;
lace, 617. Ranger v. Ahhott (1867), 6 WaUaoe,
(0 Kent, ed. by Abdy (2nd ed.), 535; Montgomery v. V . 8. (1844), 15
p. 190. Wallace, 395; 8neU v. Dtmght, 120
(m) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 123. Massachusetts, 9.
(ji) Archives Diplomatiques, 1871-2,
which agent was appointed before the war broke out, the payment
by the debtor to such agent is lawful. It does not follow that the
agent, if he receives the money, will violate the law by remitting
it to his principal (p) .
If a debt beween enemies contracted during the war, it cannot Debts

is
be sued for when the war over (g) but when debts have been gêmies
is ;
contracted before war breaks out, the existence of the war does not
extinguish the debts, it simply suspends the remedy of the cre-
ditor (r). If the debts are not confiscated during the war, the
right to enforce payment revives with peace (s) As the creditor .
cannot sue for his debt during the war, it has been held in America
that a statute of limitations does not run against the creditor while
the war lasts (^). But there is no exception in this respect in
the English Statute of Limitations (u) In a case where the
.
parties had agreed in their contract that no suit or action should

be sustainable unless commenced within twelve months after a
certain event should occur, the Court held, that as this contract was
followed by a war, by which the parties became enemies, the plain-
tiff was relieved from his disability to sue within the twelve
months (x).
^
Another result of war is, that a contract between a belligerent Contracts

*
subject and a neutral cannot, so long as the war lasts, be performed to be per^''^
if the belligerent subject has agreed to carry it out in the enemy's formed in
country. Before the outbreak of the war between France and country.
Germany in 1870, a German vessel was chartered by a British The Teutonia.
subject to carry a cargo of nitrate of soda (contraband of war) from

Pisagua to Cork, Cowes, or Falmouth, and then to receive order.;
to proceed toany safe port in Great Britain, or on the continent
between Havre and Hamburg. On arriving at Falmouth the
master received orders to go to Dunkirk, and started for that port.
Shortly before arriving there, he was told by a French pilot that
war had broken out between France and Germany, and thereupon
he sailed to Dover to obtain accurate information. He had
appeared Dunkirk on the 16th of July, 1870, and war wae
off
actually declared on the 19th. At Dover he refused to give up

the cargo unless the freight was paid. The ship was therefore
(p) Ward V. Smith (18&8), 7 Wal- Wallace, 537.

Isuie, 452; U. S. y. Grossmaijer (18<y9), {t) Hanger v. Abbott (1867), G
9 Wallace, 75. Wallace, 532; The Protector (1871),
{q) Willison V. Palersou (1817), 7 12 Wallace, 700; U. S. v. Witeij, 11
Taunton, 439. Wallace, 508.
(r) Ware V. Hilton (nm), 3 BaWas, (w) He Wahl v. Braune, 25 L. J.
199; Upton, Maritime Law, p. 42. Ex. 343, 345.
(s) Manning, by Amos (ed. 1875), {x) Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co.
p. 176; Hanger v. Abbott (1867), 6 (1871), 13 Wallace, 158.
sued by the consignees of the cargo. The Privy Council held that
he was justified in putting back to Dover, and had been guilty of
no improper delay or deviation from the voyage. As war was
declared, his vessel, being German, could not go to Dunkirk, and
he was therefore not bound to carry out his contract in that respect.
In this particular case the Court allowed the master the freight
from Pisagua to Dover, because Dunkirk was not the only port
stipulated for in the charter party, -and delivery at Dover was
within the terms of the contract. They declined to decide whether
the freight would have been earned if no other port but Dunkirk
had been mentioned {y) .
Trade with Not Only is such intercourse with the enemy, on the part of
Subjects of the belligerent State, prohibited and punished with
enemT'^''.''
lawful on the confiscation in the Prize Courts of their own country, but,
subjects. during a conjoint war, no subject of an ally may trade with the
common enemy, without being liable to the forfeiture, in the
Prize Courts of the ally, of his property engaged in such trade.
This rule is a corollary of the other; a/nd is founded upon thb
principle that such trade is forbidden to the subjects of the co-
belligerent by the municipal law of his own country, by the
universal law of nations, and by the express or implied terms of
the treaty of alliance subsisting between the allied Powers. And,
as the former rule can be relaxed only by the permission of the
sovereign power of the State, so this can be relaxed only by the
permission of the allied nations, according to their mutual agree-
ment. Adeclaration of hostilities naturally carries with it an
interdiction of all commercial intercourse Where one State only
.
is at war, this interdiction

may be relaxed, as to its own subjects,
without injuring any other Sitate; but when allied nations are
pursuing a common cause against a common enemy, there is an
implied, if not an express contract, that neither of the co-belli-
gerent States shall do anything to defeat the common object.
If one State allows its subjects to carry on an uninterrupted trade
with the enemy, the consequence will be, that it will supply aid
and comfort to the enemy, which may be injurious to the common
cause. It should seem that it is not enough, therefore, to
satisfy
the Prize Court of one of the allied States, to say that the other
has allowed this practice to its own subjects; it should also be
shown, either that the practice is of such a nature as cannot inter-
(y) The Teut(ynia (1870), L. E. 4 L. E. 3 A. & E. 597; The F<itria

P. 0. 171. See also The San Roman, (1871), L. E. 3 A. & E. 436.
L. E. 3 A. & E. 583; The Express,
fere with the oommon

operations, or that it has the allowance of
the other confederate State (z) .
In reference to this question a prize decision of special interest

was delivered by the President (Sir S. Evans) on March 22,
1915 (a). Before the Great War broke out a French company
contracted to sell to German purchasers some silver lead, f.o.b.
at Ergasberia in Greece, and chartered a Greek vessel, the Pana-
riellos, to take it to Newcastle. During the loading hostilities
began, and a few days later the vessel sailed for Newcastle; but
having been diverted to Swansea, she was there arrested, and the
lead was seized. The Crown demanded condemnation of the
proceeds of the sale of the lead on the ground that the transaction
in question amounted to trading with the enemy on the part of
allied subjects, who were under the same obligations in this
respect as British citizens.
The President, in the course of his considered judgment, first
stated certain general principles applicable to trading with the
enemy: (1) On the outbreak of war, all commercial intercourse

—
save what is allowed by the head of the State between citizenia—
of the belligerents ipso facto becomes illegal. (2) If a belli-
gerent has allies, the citizens of all the allied States are under the
same obligations to each allied State as its own subjects would
be to a single belligerent State, as regards intercourse with the
enemy. (3) Where such illegal intercourse is proved between
allied citizens and the enemy, their property engaged in such
intercourse, whether ship or cargo, is subject to capture by any
allied belligerent, and is subject to condemnation in that belli-
gerent's own Prize Courts. (4) Where such intercourse in fact

takes place, the property of the persons engaged in it is confiscable
whether they were acting honestly and bond fide or not. After
referring to various oases (h) in support of the propositions he
"
advanced, he emphasised that whatever intercourse with an
enemy is prohibited by international law, no relaxation whatever
can be allowed by one State in favour of its citizens which can
affect the confederate State, unless expressly sanctioned by the
latter." Applying these principles to the facts proved, the Presi-
dent condemned the proceeds as lawful prize.
It follows as a corollaryfrom the principle, interdicting all Contracts
commercial and other pacific intercourse with the public enemy, enemy pro-
hibited,
(z) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. (6) The Hoop (1799), 1 O. Eob.
lib. i. cap. 10; The Neptunus, 6 C. 190; The Cosmopolite (1801), 4 C.
Rob. 403; 4 C. Rob. 251. Rob. 8; and the American cases, The
(a) The Panariellos {Cargo ex) Rapid (1814), 8 Cranch, 155; and The
(March 15, 22, 1915), 31 T. L. R. 326. Julia (1814), 8 Oranch, 181.
that every species of private contract made with his subjects

during the war is unlawful The rule thus deduced is applicable
.
to insurance on enemy's property and trade; to the drawing and
negotiating of bills of exchange between subjects of the Powers

at war; to the remission of funds, in
money or bills, to the enemy's
country; to commercial partnerships entered into between the
subjects of the two countries, after the declaration of war, or
existing previous to the declaration; which last are dissolved by
the mere force and act of the war itsalf ,
aUhough, as to other con-
tracts, it only suspends the remedy (c) .
Persons Grotius, in the second chapter of his third book, where he is

domiciled in
the enemy's treating of the liability of the property of subjects for the in-
country liable juries committed by the State to other communities, lays down
to reprisals, "
and acts of that b]^ the law of nations, all the subjects of the offending
war.
State, who are such from a permanent cause, whether natives, or
View of
Grotius. emigrants from another country, are liable to reprisals, but not
so those who
are only travelling or sojourning for a little time; —
"
for reprisals," says he, have been introduced as a species of
charge imposed in order to pay the debts of the public; from
which are exempt those who are only temporarily subject to
the laws. Ambassadors and their goods are, however, excepted
from this liability of subjects, but not those sent to an enemy."
In the fourth chapter of the same book, where he is treating o!f
the right of killing and doing other bodily harm to enemies, in
what he calls 'solemn war,' he holds that this right extends, ''not
only to those who bear arms, or are subjects of the author of the
war, but to all those who are found within the enemy's territory.
In fact, ao we have reason to fear the hostile intentions even of
strangers who
are within the enemy's territory at the time, that
is sufficient to render the right of which we are
speaking appli-
cable even to them in a general war. In which respect there is
a distinction between war and reprisals, which last, as we have
seen, are a kind of contribution paid by the subjects for the debts
of the State "(^).
Criticism of Barbeyrac, in a note collating these passages, observes, that
Barbeyrac.
"the late M. Cocceius, in a dissertation which I have already
cited, De Jure Belli in Amicos, rejects this distinction, and
(c)Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. Bowden (1857), 7 E. & B. 785; The

lib. cap. 21 (Duponceau's Transl.
i. William Bagaley (1866), 5 Wallace.
p. 165, Note). Kent, Commentaries 377.
on American Law, vol. i. pp. 67, 68 (rt!) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.
(5th ed.). Griswold v. Waddington lib. iii.
cap. ii. § 7, No. 1. Ihid.
(1818), 16 Johnson, 438; Esposito v. lib. iii.
cap. iv. §§ 6 7. —
insists that even those foreigners who have not been allowed time
to retire ought to be considered as adhering to the enemy, and for
that reason justly exposed to acts of hostility. In order to supply
this pretended defect, he afterwards distinguishes foreigners, who
remain in the country, from those who only transiently pass
through it, and are constrained by sickness or the necessity of
their affairs. But this is alone sufficient to show that, in this
place, as in many others, he criticized our author without under-
standing him. In the following paragraph, Grotius manifestly
distinguishes from the foreigners of whom he has just spoken
those who are the permanent subjects of the enemy, by whom
he doubtless understands, as the learned Gronovius has already
explained, those who are 'domiciled' in the country. Our author
explains his own meaning in the second chapter of this book, in
speaking of reprisals, w4iich he allows against this species of
foreigners, whilst he does not grant them against those who only
pass through the country, or are temporarily resident in it" (e).
Whatever may be the extent of the claims of a man's native Trade or war
ô""<^"^-
country upon his political allegiance, there can be no doubt that
the natural-born subject of one country may become assimilated
to the citizens of another, in time of peace, for the purposes of
trade, and may become entitled to all the commercial privileges
attached to his acquired domicile. On the other hand, if war-
breaks out between his adopted country and his native country,
or any other, his property becomes liable to reprisals in the same
manner as the effects of those who owe a permanent allegiance^
to the enemy State.
As to what species of residence constitutes such a domicile Species of

as will render the party liable to reprisals, the text writers are constitutina-
and details
deficient in definitions Their defects are supplied ^^^^ domicile,
.
by the precedents furnished by the British Prize Courts, which,

if they have not applied the principle with undue severity in the
case of neutrals, have certainly not mitigated it in its application

to that of British subjects resident in the enemy's country on
the commencement of hostilities.
In the judgment of the Lords of Appeal in Prize Causes, upon

the cases arising out of the capture from the Dutch of the island
of St. Eustatius by Admiral Eodney, delivered in 1785, by Lord
"
Camden, he stated that if a man went into a foreign country
upon a visit, to travel for health, to settle a particular business,
(e) Grotius, par Barbeyrac, in loc. See on this point Whiting, War Powers
under the Constitution of the United States, p. 334.
444 •
COMMENCEMENT OF WAR,
or the like, he thought it would be hard to seize upon his goodfe;
but a residence, not attended with these circumstances, ought to

be considered as a permanent residence." In applying the evi-
dence and the law to the resident foreigners in St. Eustatius, he
"
said, that in every point of view, they ought to be considered
resident subjects. Their persons, their lives, their industry, were
employed for the benefit of the State under whose protection
they lived; and if war broke out, they, continuing to reside there,
and the like, equally with
paid their proportion of taxes, imposts,
natural-born subjects, and no doubt come within that descrip-
tion" (/).
"
Time," says Sir W. Scott, is the grand ingredient in consti-
''
The Harmony.
tuting domicile. In most cases it is unavoidably conclusive.

It is
not unfrequently said that if a person comes only for a special

purpose, that shall not fix a domicile. This is not to be taken
in an unqualified latitude, and without some respect to the time
which such a purpose may or shall occupy; for if the purpose .bo
of such a nature as may probably, or does ac'tually, detain the)

person for a great length of time, a general residence might grow
upon the special purpose. A
special purpose may lead a man to
a country, where it shall detain him the whole of his life. Against
such a long residence, the plea of an original special purpose
could not be averred; it must be inferred in such a case that other
purposes forced themselves upon him, and mixed themselves with
the original design, and impressed upon him the character of the
country where he resided. Supposing a man comes into a belli-

gerent country at or before the beginning of the war, it is cer-
tainly reasonable not to bind him too soon to an acquired character,
and to allowhim a fair time to disentangle himself; but if he
continues to reside during a good part of the war, -contributing
by the payment of taxes and other means to the strength of that
country, he could not plead his special purpose with any effect
against the rights of hostility. If he could, there would be no
sufficient guard against the frauds and abuses of masked,
pre-
tended, original, and sole purposes of a long-continued residence.
There is a time which will ©stop such a plea; no rule can fix the
time a priori, but such a rule there must be. In proof of the
efficacy of mere time, it is not impertinent to remark that the same
quantity of business, which would not fix a domicile in a certain

quantity of time, would nevertheless have that effect if distributed
(/) MS. Proceedings of the Com- States; Opinion of Mr. W. Pinkney,

missioners under the Treaty of 1794, in the case of The Betsey.
between Great Britain and the United
over a larger space of time. This matter is to be taken in the

compound ratio of the time and the occupation, with a great pre-
ponderance on the article of time: be the occupation what it may,

it cannot happen, with but few exceptions, that mere length of
time shall not constitute a domicile" {g).
In the case of The Indian Chief, determined in 1800, Mr. The Indian
Johnson, a citizen of the United States, domiciled in England, had

engaged in a mercantile enterprise to the British East Indies, a
trade prohibited to British subjects, but allowed to American
citizens under the commercial treaty of 1794, between the United
States and Great Britain. The vessel came into a British port
on its return voyage, and was seized as engaged in illicit trade.
Mr. Johnson, having then left England, was held not to be a
British subject at the time of capture, and restitution was decreed.
In delivering his judgment in this case. Sir W. Scott said,
"
Taking it Mr. Johnson,
to be clear that the national character of
as a British merchant, was founded in residence only, that it was
acquired by residence, and rested on that circumstance alone, it
must be held, that, from the moment he turned his back on the
country where he had resided on his way to his own country, ho
was in the act of resuming his original character, and must be
considered as an American. The character that is gained by
by non-residence. It is an adventitious character,
residence, ceases
and no longer adheres to him from the moment that he puts
himself in motion, bond fide, to quit the country, sine animo
revertendi'' {h).
The native character easily reverts, and it requires fewer cir- The native
cumstances to constitute domicile, in the case of a native subject, easily reverts.
than to impress the national character on one who is originally of
another country. Thus, the property of a Frenchman who had
been residing, and was probably naturalized, in the United States,
but who had returned to St. Domingo, and shipped from thence
the produce of that island to France, was condemned in the High
Court of Admiralty (i) .
In The Indian Chirf, the case of Mr. Dutilth is referred to hy

the claimant's comisf 1 as having obtained restitution, though at
the time of sailing be was resident in the enemy's country; but the
decision of the Lords ox Appeal, in 1800, is mentioned by Sir C.
([/) The Harmony (1800), 2 0. Rob. same rule is also adopted in the prize
324. law of France, Oode des Prises, torn. i.
(A) The Indian Chief (1800), 3 C. pp. 92, 139, 303, and by the American
Rob. 12. Prize Courts. The Bos Bermanoa
(0 La Virginie, 5 0. Rob. 99. The (1817)^2 Wheaton, 76.
Robinson, in which different portions of Mr. Dutilth's property

were condemned or restored, according to the circumstances of his
residence at the time of capture.
The Diana. The case of The T>iona, decided by Sir W. Scott, in 1803., is also
full of instruction on this subject. During the war which com-
menced in 1795 between Great Britain and Holland, the colony
of Demerara surrendered to the British arms, and by the treaty of
Amiens it was restored to the Dutch. That treaty contained an
Article allowing the inhabitants, of whatever country they might
be, a term of three years, to be computed from the notification of

the treaty, for the purpose of disposing of their effects acquired
before or during the war, in which term they might have the free
enjoyment of their property. Previous to the declaration of war

against Holland, in 1803*, the Diana and several other vessels,;
laden with colonial produce, were captured on a voyage from
Demerara to Holland. Immediately after the declaration, and
before the expiration of the three years from the notification of
the treaty of Amiens, Demerara again surrendered to Great
Britain. Claims to the captured property were filed by original
British subjects, inhabitants of Demerara, some of whom had
settled in the colony while it was in possession of Great Britain ;
others before that event. The cause came on for hearing after
it had again become a British colony.
Sir W. Scott decreed restitution to those British subjects who
had settled in the colony while in British possession, but con-
demned the property of those who had settled there before that
time. He held that those of the first class, by settling in Demerara
while belonging to Great Britain, afforded a presumption of their
intending to return, if the island should be transferred to a foreign
power, which presumption, recognised by the treaty, relieved those
claimants from the necessity of proving such intention. He
thought it reasonable that they should be admitted to their jus
postliminii, and he held them entitled to the protection of British
subjects. But he was clearly of opinion that "mere recency of
establishment would not avail, if the intention of
making a per-
manent residence there was fixed upon the party. The case of
Mr. Whitehill fully established this point. He had arrived at
St. Eustatius only a day or two before Admiral
Rodney and the
British forces made their appearance; but it was
proved that he-
had gone to establish himself there, and his property was con-
demned. Here recency, therefore, would not be sufficient."
But the property of those claimants who had settled in Demerara
before that colony came into the possession of Great Britain was
"
oondemned. Having settled without any faith in British pos-
"
session, itcannot be supposed," he said, that they would have
relinquished their residence because that possession had ceased.

They had passed from one sovereignty wdth indifference, and if
they may be supposed to have looked again to a connection with

this country, they must have viewed it as a circumstance that was
in no degree likely to affect their intention of remaining there.
On the situation of persons settled there previous to the time of
British possession, I feel myself obliged to pronounce, that they
must be considered in the same light as persons resident in
Amsterdam. It must be understood, however, that if there were
among these any who were actually removing, and that fact is
properly ascertained, their goods may be capable of restitution.
All that I mean to express is, that there must be evidence of an
intention to remove on the part of those who settled prior to
"
British possession, the presumption not being in their favour (k).
The case of The Ocean, determined in 1804, was a claim re- Case of
lating to British subjects settled in foreign States in time of remaWn*'-

amity, and taking early measures to withdraw themselves on the from the
breaking out of war. It appeared that the claimant had been
countr/oii
settled as a partner in a house of trade in Holland, but that he the breaking
^
. . .
out of war.
had made arrangements for the dissolution of the partnership, and ^^^^ q^^^^^
was prevented from removing personally only by the violent de-
tention of all British subjects who happened to be within the
territories of the enemy at the breaking out of the war. In this
"
case Sir W. Scott said: It would, I think, be going farther than
the law requires, to conclude this person by his former occupation,
and b} his present constrained residence in France, so as not to
admit him to have taken himself out of the effect of supervening
hostilities, by the means which he had used for his removal. On

sufficient proof being made of the property, I shall be disposed
to hold him entitled to restitution" (I).
In a note to this case, Sir 0. Robinson states that the situation

of British subjects wishing to remove from the enemy's country
on the event of a war, but prevented by the sudden occurrence of
hostilities from taking measures sufficiently early to obtain resti-
tution, formed not unfrequently a case of considerable hardship in
the Prize Court. He
advises persons so situated, on their actual
removal, to make application to Government for a special pass,
rather than to trust valuable property to the effect of a mere
intention to remove, dubious as that intention may frequently
(70 The Dianu (1803), 5 O. Eob. 60. (I) The Ocean (1804), 5 C. Kob. 91.
appear under the circumstanoes that prevent itfrom being carried

into execution. And Sir W. Scott, in the case of The Dree
Gebroeders (m), observes, "that pretences of withdrawing funds
are at all times to be watched with considerable jealousy; but. when
the transaction appears to have been conducted bond fide with
that view, and to be directed only to the removal of property,
.which the accidents of war may have lodged in the belligerent
country, cases of this kind are entitled to be treated with some
indulgence." But in a subsequent case, where an indulgence was
allowed by the Court for the withdrawal of British property under
restitu-
peculiar circumstances, he intimated that the decree of
was not to be understood as in any
tion, in that particular case,
degree relaxing the necessity of obtaining a license, wherever

property is to be withdrawn from the enemy's country (n).
The same principles, as to the effect of domicile, or commer-
Decisions of
the American
courts. cial inhabitancy in the enemy's country, were adopted by the
The Venus. prize tribunals of the United States, during the war with Great
Britain. The rule was applied to the case of native British
subjects, who had emigrated to the United States long before
the war, and became naturalized citizens under the laws of the
Union, as well as to native citizens residing in Great Britain at
the time of the declaration. The naturalized citizens in ques-
tion had, long prior to the jdeola^ration of war, returned to their
native country, where they were domiciled ajid engaged in trade
at the time the shipments in question were made. The goods
were shipped before they had a knowledge of the war. At the
time of the capture, one of the claimajits was yet in the enemy's
country, but had, since he heard of the capture, expressed his
anxiety to return to the United States, but had been prevented
by various causes set forth in his affidavit Another had actually
.
returned some time after the capture, and a third was still in
the enemy's country.
In pronouncing its judgment in this case, the Supreme Court

stated that, there being no dispute as to the facts upon which
the domicile of the claimants was asserted, the questions of law
to be considered were two: First, by what means, and to what,
extent, a national character may be impressed upon a person,
different from that which permanent allegiance gives him; and.
secondly, what are the legal consequences to which this acquired

character may expose him, in the event of a war taking place
(m) (1802), 4 C. Rob. 234. (w) The Jufrow Catharina (1804V

C. Rob. 141.
between the country of his residence and that of his birth, or

that in which he had been naturalized.
Upon the first of these questions, the opinions of the text Domicile
writers and the decisions of the British Courts of Prize already from°^"^^'
cited, were referred to; but it was added that, in deciding allegiance,
whether a person has obtained the right of an acquired domi-

was not to be expected that much, if any assistance, should
cile, it
be derived from mere elementary writers on the law of nations.
They can only lay down the general principles of law; and it
becomes the duty of courts of justice to establish rules for the
proper application of those principles. The question, whether

the person to be affected by the right of domicile has sufficiently
made known his intention of fixing himself permanently in the
foreign country, must depend upon all the circumstances of the
case. If he has made no express declaration on the subject, and
his secret intention is to be discovered, his acts must be attended
to as affording the most satisfactory evidence of his intention.
On this ground the courts of England have decided, that a person
who removes to a foreign country, settles himself there, and en-
gages in the trade of the country, furnishes by these acts such

evidences of an intention permanently to reside there, as to stamp
him with the national character of the State where he resides. In
questions on this subject, the chief point to be considered is the
animus manendi; and courts are to devise such reasonable rules
of evidence as may establish the fact of intention. If it suffi-
ciently appears that the intention of removing was to make a

permanent settlement, or for an indefinite time, the right of domi-
by residence even of a few days. This was one
cile is acquired-
of the rules of the British Prize Courts, and' it appeared to bo
perfectly reasonable. Another was that a neutral or subject,

found residing in a foreign country, is presumed to be there
animo manendi ; and if a State at war should bring his national
character into question, it lies upon him to explain the circum-
stances of his residence. Ajs to some other rules of the Prize
Courts of England, particularly those which fix the national
character of a person, on the ground of constructive residence
or the peculiar nature of his trade, the Court was not called upon
to give an opinion at that time; because, in the present case, it
was admitted that the claimants had acquired a right of domicile

in Groat Britain at the time of the breaking out of the war
between that country and the United States.
The next question was, what are the consequences to which Effect of
this acquired domicile may legally expose the person entitled foWnState
w. 29
to it, war taking place between the government

in the event of p,
under which he resides and that to which he owes permanent

allegiance. A
neutral, in this situation, if he should engage
in open hostilities with the other belligerent, would be con-
sidered and treated as an enemy. A citizen of the other
belligerent could not be so considered, because

he could not, by
act of render himself, strictly speaking, an enemy,
any hostility,
he cannot
contrary to his permanent allegiance; but although
be considered an enemy, in the ,strict sense of the word, yet he
is deemed such with reference to the seizure of so much of hia
as is connected with
property concerned in the enemy's trade,
his residence. It is found adhering to the enemy; he is himself
unless he
adhering to the enemy, although not criminally so,
engages in acts of hostilit^y against his native country, or perhaps
refuses, when required by his country, to return. The same rule,
as to property engaged in the commerce of the enemy, applies to
neutrals, and for the same reason. The convqrse of this rule in-
evitably applies to the subject of a belligerent State
domiciled in
a neutral country; he is deemed a neutral by both belligerents,
with reference to the trade which he carries on with the adverse
belligerent, and with the rest of the :world.
Renunciation But this national character which a man requires by residence
of domicile.
may be thrown offat pleasure, by a return to his native country,
or even by turning his back on the country in which he resided,
on his way The reasonableness of this rule can hardly
to another.
be disputed. Having once acquired a national character, by resi-
dence in a foreign country, he ought to be bound by all the conse-
quenc-es of it until he has thrown it off, either by an actual return
to his native country, or to that where he was naturalizied, or
by commencing his removal, bond fid^, and without an intention

of returning. If anything short of actual removal be admitted
to work a change in the national character acquired by residence,
it seems perfectly reasonable that the evidence of a bond fide
intention should be such as to leave no doubt Ol^ its sincerity.

Mere declarations of such an intention ought never to be relied
upon, when contradicted, or at least rendered doubtful, by a con-

tinuance of that residence which impressed the character. They
may have been made to deceive;
or, if sincerely made, they may
never be executed. Even
the party himself ought not to be bound
by them, because he may afterwards find reason to change his

dêtermination,and ought to be permitted to do so. But when
he accompanies these declarations by acts which speak a lan-
guage not to be mistaken, and can hardly fail to be consummated
by actual removal, the strongest evidence is afforded which the

nature of such a case can furnish. And is not proper that the
it
Courts of a belligerent nation should deny, to any person the right

to use a character so equivocal as to put it in his power to claim
whichever may best suit his purpose, when it is called in question ?
If his property be taken trading "with the enemy, shall he bio
allowed to shield it from confiscation by alleging that he had
intended to remove from the enemy's country to his own, then
neutral, and therefore that, as a neutral, the trade was to him
lawful? If war exists between the country of his residence and
his native country, and his property be seized by the former or
by the latter, shall he be heard to say, in the former case, that he

was a domiciled subject in the country of the captor; and in the
latter, that he was a native subject of the country of that captor
also, because he had declared an intention to resume his native

character, and thus to parry the belligerent rights of both? It
was to guard against such inconsistencies, and against the frauds
which such pretensions, if tolerated, would sanction, that the rule
above mentioned had been adopted. Upon what sound principle
could a distinction be framed between- the case of a neutral, and
the subject of one belligerent domiciled in the country of the other,
at the breaking out of the war? The property of each, found
engaged in the commerce of their adopted country, belonged to
them, before the war, in the character of subjects of that country,

so long as they continued to retain their domicile; and when war
takes place between that country and any other, by which the two
nations and all their subjects become enemies to each other, it
follows that this property, which was once the property of a friend,
belongs now to him who, in referencce to that property, .is an

enemy. (
^
This doctrine of the common-law Courts and prize tribunals Effect of

of England is founded, like that mentioned under the first head,
foêi^^
upon international law, and was believed to be strongly supported domicile,
by reason and justice. And why, it might be confidently asked,
should not the property of enemy's subjects be exposed to the law
of reprisals and of war, so long as the owner retains his acquired
domicile, or, in the words of Grotius, continues a permanent resi-

dence in the country of the enemy ?
They were before, and con-
tinue after the war, bound by such residence to the society of which
they were members, subject to the laws of the State, and owing a
•qualified allegiance thereto. They are obliged to defend it (with
^n exception of such subject with relation to his native country),
in return for the protection it affords them, and the privileges
29(2)
which the laws bestow upon them as subjects. The property of

such persons, equally with that of the native subjects in their
locality is to be considered as the goods of the nation, in regard to
other States. It belongs in some sort to the State, from the right
>vhich the State has over the goods of its* citizens, which make a
part of the sum total of its riches and augment its power (o) .
"
In reprisals," says Vattel, "we seize on the property of the sub-
ject, just as on that of the sovereign; everything that belongs to
the nation is subject to reprisals, wherever it can be seized, with
"
the exception of a deposit intrusted to the public faith (p). Now,
if a permanent residence constitutes the person a subject of the
country' where he is settled, so long as he continues to reside there,

and subjects his property to the law of reprisals, as a part of the
propert;^- of the nation, it would seem difficult to maintain that the

same consequences would not follow, in the case of an open and
public war, whether between the adopted and native countries of
persons so domiciled, or between the former and any other nation.
If, then, nothing but an actual removal, or a bond fide beginning
to remove, could change a national character acquired by domicile;
and if, at the time of the inception of the voyage, as well as at
the time of capture, the property belonged to such domiciled
person, in his character of a subject; what was there that did or
ought to exempt it from capture by the cruisers of his native
country, if, at the time of capture, he continues to reside in the
country of the adverse belligerent?

Time for It was contended that a native or naturalized
election to subject of one
change country, who is surprised in the country where he was domiciled,
domicile not
allowed. by a declaration of war, ought to have time to make his election
to continue there, or to remove to the country to which he owes
permanent allegiance; and that, until such election be made, his
property ought to be protected from capture by the cruisers of the
latter. This doctrine was believed to be as unfounded in reason
and justice, as it clearly was in law. In the first place it was
founded upon a presumption that the person will certainly remove,
before it can possibly be known whether he may elect to do so or
not. It was said, that the
presumption ought to be made, because,
upon receiving information of the war, it would be his duty to
return home. This position was denied. It was his duty to
commit no acts of hostility against his native country, and to
return to her assistance when required to do so; nor would any
just nation, regarding the mild principles of the law of nations,.
(o) Vattel, liv. ch. 14, § 182.

i.
(^) Liv. ii. ch. 18, § 344.
require him to take arms against his native country, or refuse

permission to him to withdraw whenever he wished to do so, unless
under peculiar circumstances, which, by such removal, at a critical
period, might endanger the public safety. The conventional law

'
of nations was in conformity with these principles. It is not

uncommon to stipulate in treaties, that the subjects of each party^
shall be allowed to remove with their property, or to remain un-
molested. Such a stipulation does not coerce those subjects to
remove or remain. They are left free to choose for themselves; and,
when they have made their election, may claim the right of enjoy-
ing it, under the treaty. But until the election is made, their
former character continues unchanged. Until this election is made,
if the claimant's property found upon the high seas, engaged in the
commerce of his adopted country, should be permitted by the
cruisers of the other belligerent to pass free, under a notion that
he may elect to remove upon notice of the war, and should arrive
safe; what is to be done, in case the owner of it should elect tq
remain where he is? For if captured, and brought immediately
to adjudication, it must, upon this doctrine, be acquitted, until
the election to remain ismade and known. In short, the point
contended for would apply the doctrine of relation to cases where
the party claiming the benefit of it may gain all and can lose
nothing. If he, after the capture, should find it for his interest
to remain where he is domiciled, his property, embarked before
his election was made, and if he finds it best to return, it

is safe;
is safe, of course. whether he goes or stays. This

It is safe,
doctrine producing such contradictory consequences was not only
unsupported by any authority, but would violate principles long

and well established in the Prize Courts of England, and which
ought not, without strong reasons which may render them in-
applicable to America, to be disregarded by the Court. The rule
there was, that the character of property during war cannot be
changed in transitu, by any act of the party, subseqaent to the

capture. The rule indeed went further: as to the correctness of
which, in its greatest extension, no judgment needed then to be
given; but might safely be affirmed, that the change could not
it
and ought not to be effected by an election of the owner and

shipper,made subsequent to the capture, and more especially after
a knowledge of the capture is obtained by the owner. Observe
the consequences. The capture is made and known. The owner
is allowed to deliberate whether it is his intention to remain a
subject of his adopted or of his native country. If the capture

be made by the former, then he elects to become a subject of that
'
country; by the latter, then a subject of that. Could such a

if
privileged situation be tolerated by either belligerent? Could any

system of law be correct which places an individual, who adheres
to one belligerent, and down to the period of his election to remove,
contributes to increase her wealth, in so anomalous a situation as
to be clothed with the privileges of a neutral as to both belli-
gerents? This notion about a temporary state of neutrality

impressed upon a subject of one of the belligerents, and the con-
sequent exemption of his property from capture by either, until
he has had notice of the war and made his election, was altogether
a novel theory, and seemed from the course of the argument to owe
its origin to a supposed hardship to which the contrary doctrine
expo.ses him.But if the reasoning employed on the subject was

correct, no such hardship could exist; for if before the election
is made, his property on the ocean is liable to capture by the
cruisers of his native and deserted country, it is not only free from
capture by those of his adopted country, but is under its protection.

This privilege is supposed to be equal to the disadvantage, and is
therefore just. The double privilege claimed seems too unreason-
Merchants
rcsidiiio" in
the East.
able to be granted (q)
The national
America
. .
.
derived from that of the country in which they reside.

is
ox
character of merchants residins: in Europe and
In the eastern parts of the world, European persons, trading under

the shelter and protection of the factories founded there, take their
national character from that association under which they live and
carry on their trade: this distinction arises from the nature and
habits of the countries. In the western part of the world, alien
merchants mix in the society of the natives; access and inter-
mixture are permitted, and they become incorporated to nearly
the full extent. But in the east, from almost the oldest times, an
immiscible character has been kept up; foreigners are not admitted
into the general body and mass of the nation; they continue
strangers and sojourners, as all their fathers were. Thus, with
respect to establishments in Turkey, the British Courts of Prize,
during war with
Holland, determined that a merchant, carrying on
trade at Smyrna, under the protection of the Dutch
consul, was
to bo considered a Dutchman, and condemned his as
property
belonging to an enemy. And
thus in China, and generally
throughout the east, persons admitted into a factory are not known
in their OAvn peculiar national character: and not
being permitted
(q) The Venus (1814), 8 Oranch, 54; U. S. v. Guillem (1850), 11

253; The Mary and 8i<san, 1 Wheaton, Howard, 47,
to assume the character of the

country, are considered only in the
character of that association or factory.
But these principles are considered not to be applicable to the
vast territories occupied by the British in Hindostan; because,
as Sir W.
Scott observes, "though the sovereignty of the Mogul
is
occasionally brought forward for the purposes of policy, it
hardly exists otherwise than as a phantom: it is not applied in
any way for the regulation of their establishments. Great Britain
exercises the power of declaring war and peace, which is among
the strongest marks of actual sovereignty; and if the high and
empyrean sovereignty of the Mogul is sometimes brought down

from the clouds, as it were, for the purposes of policy, it by no
means interferes with the actual authority which that country,
and the East India Company, a creature of that country, exer-
cise there with full effect. Merchants residing there are hence
"
considered as British subjects (r) .
In general, the national character of a person, as neutral or House of

^
enemy, is determined by that of his domicile; but the property enêmy'V
of a person may acquire a hostile character, independently pf country,
his national character, derived from personal residence. Thus,
the property of a house of trade established in the enemy's
country is considered liable to capture and condemnation as prize.

This rule does not apply to cases arising at the commencement
of a war, in reference to persons who, during peace, had habitually
carried on trade in the enemy's country, though not resident
there,and are therefore entitled to time to withdraw from that
commerce. But if a person enters into a house of trade in the
enemy's country, or continues that eonnection during the war,
he cannot protect .himself by mere residence in a neutral
country (s) .
The converse
of this rule of the British Prize Courts, which Converse of
has also been adopted by those of America, is not extended to *^^^^®-
the case of a merchant residing in a hostile country, and having
a share in a house of trade in a neutral country. Kesidence in
a neutral country will not protect his share in a house established
in the enemy's country, though residence in the enemy's country .
will condemn his share in a- house established in a neutral country.

It is impossible not to see, in this want of reciprocity, strong
(r) The Indian Chief (1800), 3 C. JongeKlassina (1804), 5 O. Kob. 297;

Bob. 12. The Antonia Johanna (1816), 1
(s) The Vigilantia, 1 O. Eob. 1; Wheaton, 159; The Freundschaft
The Susa (1799), 2 O. Eob. 255; The <1819), 4 Wheaton, 105.
Portland (1800), 3 O. Eob. 41; The
marks of the iârtialitj towards the interests of captors, which

is
perhaps inseparable from a prize code framed by judicial legis-
lation in a belligerent country, and adapted to encourage its naval
exertions (^).
Produce of The produce of an enemy's colony, or other territory, is to be
the enemy's
territory
considered as hostile property ,so long as it belongs to the owner
coiinidered as in other
ho^tile, so
of the soil, whatever may be his national character
long as it respects, or wherever may be his place of residence.
belongs to the This rule of the British Prize Courts was adopted by the
owDer of the
soil, whatever Supreme Court of the United States during the war (1812) with
may be his
national Great Britain, in the following case(i*). The island of Santa
character or
personal
Cruz, belonging to the King of Denmark, had been subdued
domicile. during the European war by the arms of his Britannic Majesty.
One Bentzon, an officer of the Danish Government, and a proprie-
tor of land in the island, withdrew from the island on its
surrender, and had since resided in Denmark. The property of

the inhabitants being secured to them by the capitulation, he
still retained his estate in the island under the management of
an agent, Avho shipped thirty hogsheads of sugar, the produce of
that estate, on board a British ship, and consigned to a com-
mercial house in London, on account and risk of the owner. On
her passage the vessel was captured by an American privateer,
and brought in for adjudication. The sugars were condemned
in the Court below as prize of war, and the sentence of condemna-
tion was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court.
The Thirty In pronouncing its judgment, the Court stated that some doubt
Hogsheads of
Sugar.
had been suggested whether Santa Cruz, while in the possession
of Great Britain, could properly be considered as a British island.
But for this doubt there could be no foundation. Although
acquisitions, made during war, are not considered as permanent,
until confirmed by treaty, yet to every commercial and belli-
gerent purpose they are considered as a part of the domain of

the conqueror, so long as he retains the possession and
govern-
ment of them. The island of Santa Cruz, after its capitulation,
remained a British island until it was restored to Denmark.
The question was, whether the produce of a plantation in that
island, by the proprietor himself, who was a Dane
shipped
residing in Denmark, must be considered as British, and there-
fore enemy's property. In arguing this question the counsel for
the claimants had made two points: (1) that the case
did, not come
(<) Chief Justice Marshall, in The (u) The Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar
Venus (1814), 8 Cranch, 253. {Bentzon v. Boyle) (1815), 9 Cranch,
191.
within the rule applicable to shipments from an enemy's country,

•even as laiddown in the British Courts of Admiralty; (2) that
the rule had not been rightly laid down in those Courts, an\l
consequently would not be adopted in those of the United States.

1 . Did the rule laid down in the British Courts of Admiralty Examination
embrace this case? It appeared to the Court that the case of cases by the
The Phoenix was precisely in point. In that case a vessel wa^ American
•captured in a voyage from Surinam to Holland, and a part of Court,
the cargo Avas claimed by persons residing in Germany, then a

neutral country, as the produce of their estates in Surinam. The
•counsel for the captors considered the law of the case as entirely
settled. The counsel for the claimants did not controvert this
position. They admitted it, but endeavoured to extricate their
case from the general principle by giving it the protection of
the Treaty of Amiens. In pronouncing his judgment. Sir
William Scott laid down the general rule thus: "Certainly
nothing can be more decided and fixed, as the principle of this

Oourt, and of the Supreme Court, upon very solemn argument
there, than that the possession of the soil does impjcss upon the
•owner the character of the country, so far as the produce of that
plantation is concerned, in its transportation to any other country,

whatever the local residence of the owner may be. This has
been so repeatedly decided, both in this and the Superior Court,
that it is no longer open to discussion. No question can be made
upon the point of law at this day" (x).
Afterwards, in the case of The Vrow Anna Catharina, Sir
William Scott laid down
the rule, and stated its reason: "It
"
cannot be doubted," said he, that there are transactions so radi-
cally and fundamentally national as to impress the national

character, independent of peace or war, and the local residence
•of the parties. The produce of a person's own plantation in
the colony of the enemy, though shipped in time of peace, is liable
to be considered as the property of the enemy, by reason that the
proprietor has incorporated himself with the permanent interests

of the nation as a holder of the soil, and is to be taken as a part
of that country in that particular transaction, independent of
his own personal residence and occupation "(?/) .
was contended that this rule, laid down with so much pre-
It
cision, did not embrace Mr. Bentzon's claim, because he had
"
not incorporated himself with the permanent interests of the
(x) The Phoenix (1803), 5 C. Eob. (p) The Vrow Amm Catharina
21. (1806), 5 C. Eob. 167.
nation." He acquired the property while Santa Cruz was a

Danish colony, and he withdrew from the island when it became
British .
This distinction did not appear to the Court to be a sound

one. The identification of the national character of the owner
with that of the soil, in the particular transaction, not placed
is
on the dispositions with which he acquirês the soil, or on hii

general national character. The acquisition of land in Santa
Cruz bound the claimant, so far as respects that land, to the fate
of Santa Cruz, whatever its destiny might be. While that island
belonged to Denmark, the produce of the soil, while unsold, was,,

according to this rule, Danish property, whatever might be tho
general national character of the particular proprietor. When the
island became British, the soil and its produce, while that produce
remained unsold, were British. The general commercial or
political character of Mr. Bentzori could not, according to this
rule, affect that particular transaction. Although incorporated^

so far as respects his general national character, with the perma-
nent interests of Denmark, he was incorporated, so far as respected
his plantation in Santa Cruz, with the permanent interests of"
Santa Cruz, which was at that time British; and though, as a,
Dane, he was at war with Great Britain, and an enemy, yet as a
proprietor of land in Santa Cruz, he was no enemy: he could
ship his produce to Great Britain in perfect safety.
2. The case was therefore certainly within the rule as laid
down by the British Prize Courts. The next inquiry was, how
far that rule will be adopted in this country?
Adoption of rp|-^g i^^^r of nations is the
great source from which we derive
rule in those rules, respecting belligerent and neutral rights, which aro-
menca.
recognised by all and commercial States throughout
civilized
Europe and America. This law

is in part unwritten, and in
part
conventional. To ascertain that which is unwritten, we resort
to the great principles of reason and justice: but, as these princi-
ples will be differently understood by different nations under

different circumstances, we consider them as being, in some degree,
fixed and rendered stable by a series of judicial decisions. The
decisions of the Courts of every country, so far as they are founded
upon a law common to every country, will be received, not as

authority, but with respect. The decisions of the Courts of
every country show how the law of nations, in the given case, is
understood in that country, and will be considered in adopting
the rule which is to prevail in this. Without taking a compara-
tive view of the justice or fairness of the rules established in the
British Prize Courts, and of those established in the Courts of

other nations, there were circumstances not to be excluded from
consideration, which give to those rules a claim to our considera-
tion that we cannot entirely, disregard. The United States
having, at one time, formed a component part of the British

empire, their prize law was our prize law. When we separated,
it continued to be our prize law, so far as it was adapted to our
circumstances, and was not varied bj the power which was capable
of changing it. It would not be advanced, in consequence of this
former relation between the two countries, that anj obvious mis-
construction of public law made bj the British Courts is entitled
to more respect than the recent ;rules of other countries. But a
case professing to be decided entirely on ancient principles, will
not bo entirely disregarded, unless it be very unreasonable, or be
founded on a construction rejected by other nations.
The rule laid down in The Phoenix was said to be a recent
rule, because a case solemnly decided before the Lords Commis-
sioners, in 1783, isquoted in the margin as its authority. But
that case was not suggested to have been determined contrary to
former practice or former opinions. Nor did the Court perceive
any reason for supposing it to be contrary to the rule of other
nations in a similar case.
The opinion that ownership of the soil does, in some degree,
connect the owner with the property, so far as respects that soil,
was an opinion which certainly prevailed very extensively. It
was not an unreasonable opinion. Personal property may follow
the person anywhere; and its character, if found on the ocean,
may depend on the domicile of the owner. But land is fixed.

Wherever the owner may reside, that land is hostile or friendly
according to the condition of the country in which it is placed. It
was no extravagant perversion of principle, nor was it a violent
offence to the course of human opinion to say, that the proprietor,
so far as respects his interest in the land, partakes of its character,
and that its produce, while the owner remains unchanged, is subject
to the same disabilities {z).
So, also, in general, and unless under special circumstances, Î^^^^^^^^^j. ^f

the character of ships depends on the national character of the ships,
owner, as ascertained by his domicile; but if a vessel is navigating

under the flag and pass of a foreign country, she is to be con-
sidered as bearing the national character of the country under
(z) Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar {Bentzon v. Boyle) (1815), 9 Cranch, 191.

whoso flag she sails: she makes a part of its navigation,

and is
in every respect liable to be considered as a vessel of the country ;
for ships have a peculiar character impressed upon them by the
to the
special nature of their documents, and are always held
character with which they are so invested, to the exclusion of any
claims of interest which persons resident in neutral countries may
actualh' have in them. But where the cargo is laden on board in
time of peace, and documented as foreign property in the same
manner with the ship, with the view of avoiding alien duties, the
sailing under the foreign flag and pass is not held conclusive as
to the cargo. A distinction is made between the ship, which is
held bound by the character imposed upon it by the authority of

the Government from which all the documents issue, and the goods,
whoso character has no such dependence upon the authority of the
State. In time of war a more strict principle may be necessary;
but where the transaction takes place in peace, and without any
expectation of war, the cargo ought not to be involved in the
condemnation of the vessel, which, under these circumstances, is
considered as incorporated into the navigation of that country
whose flag and pass she bears (a).
The Declaration of London, 1909 (the outcome of a conference
of the leading maritime Powers, 1908 —
1909), affirms the estab-
lished test of the flag. Thus Article 57 says, that subject to the
provisions respecting transfer of flag (&), the neutral or enemy
character of a vessel is determined by the flag which she has the
right to fly.
The flag as An exceptional case was decided by the French Prize Court
evidence of
ship's (the Conseil des Prises) in 1872, in which the flag carried by the
nationality. vessel was held not to be conclusive as to her national character.
The Palme was, in 1871, captured by a French cruiser, on a voyage
from Accra to Bremen. She carried the German flag, and was
therefore prima facie lawful prize. Evidence was produced which
showed that the Palme was a German-built vessel; that in 1866
she was sold to the Societe du Commerce des Missions Protes-
tantes, a Swiss corporation; and that she still belonged to the
Societe at the time of capture,though she then carried the German
flag. It also appeared that the Swiss Federal Council did not"
permit Swiss subjects to fly the Federal flag, and that France
had, in 1854, refused to acknowledge any Swiss maritime flag.
Thus, the Societe being compelled to sail its ship under some flag,
(a) The Vigilantia, 1 C. Rob. 1; Ad. 131.

The Vroiv Annu Cathar'ma (1806), 5 (&) Se infra J p. 572.
C. Rob. 161; The Success, 1 Dods.
that of Germany had been retained. In order to do this, the ship

was nominally assigned to an agent of the Societe at Bremen, while
the real owners were the Societe itself. Under these circumstances,
the vessel being in reality owned by Swiss, and consequently
neutral subjects, the Conseil des Prises held that she was not a.
German vessel, and therefore restored her to the owners, reversing
the decree of the Court below (c) .
By the law of England, no ship shall be deemed to be a British Ownership of

^^ ^^ ^ ^^^"
ship unless she belongs wholly to owners of the following descrip-
tion: —1. Natural born British subjects. 2. Persons made deni-
zens or naturalized, by letters of denization, or by Act of Parlia-
ment, or the proper authority in any British possession. 3 Bodies .
corporate established under, and subject to the laws of, and having
their principal place of business in the United Kingdom or some
British possession (d) If any person uses the British flag and
.
assumes the British national character on board any ship owned

in whole or in part by any persons not entitled by law to own
British ships, for the purpose of making such ship appear to be
a British ship, such ship shall be forfeited to His Majesty, unless
such assumption has been made for the purpose of escaping capture
by an enemy, by a foreign ship of war in exercise of some belli-
or
gerent right; and in any proceeding for enforcing any such for-
feiture, the burden of proving a title to use the British flag and
assume the British national character shall lie upon the person
using and assuming the same (e) When a ship has become for-
.
feited for such an offence, she may seized by the Crown whenever
be
she returns within British jurisdiction, and even if transferred
to a bond fide purchaser (/) .
We have already seen that no commercial intercourse can be

.
Sailing under
the eneniv 8
lawfully carried on between the subjects of States at war with license,
each other, except by the special permission of their respective

Governments. As such intercourse can only be legalized in the
subjects of one belligerent State by a license from their own
Government, it is evident that the use of such a license from the
enemy must be illegal unless authorized by their own Govern-
ment; for it is the sovereign power of the State alone which is
competent to act on the considerations of policy by which such
(c) Dalloz, Jurisprudence G6n6rale (e) 57 & 58 Vict. c. 00, s. 69; and
(1872), Pt. III. p. 94. see Scrutton, p. 55; R. v. Seberff,
(d) 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 1; and L. E. 1 O. C. E. 264.
see Scrutton, Merchant Shipping Act, (/) The Annandale, 2 P. D. 218.
1891, p. 8.
462 COMMENCEMENT OF WAIL
an exception from the ordinary consequences of war must be con-

trolled. And this principle is applicable not only to a license
protecting a direct commercial intercourse with the enemy, but to
a voyage to a country in alliance ,with the enemy, or even to a
neutral port; for the very act of purchasing or procuring the
license from the enemy is an intercourse with him prohibited by
the laws of war; and even supposing it to be gratuitously issued,
it must be for the special purpose of furthering the enemy's in-
terests, by securing supplies necessary to prosecute the war, to

which the subjects of the belligerent State have no right to lend
their aidby sailing under these documents of protection {g).
The Con- Tho continental view asto the effect of war on commercial
and Art. 23(h) intercourse has, on the whole, been contrary to that of the Anglo-
of the Hague American Courts; that is, commercial intercourse was not regarded
Regulations.
as being necessarily prohibited on the outbreak of war, but its
interdiction depended on special provisions to that effect. More-
over, it has recently been held on the continent that this latter
doctrine was adopted by the representatives of the States of the
world assembled at the Hague, 1907, inasmuch as a right to
appear in Court on the part of an enemy alien was alleged to have
been recognised. The Article in question, 23j (h), says that it is
forbidden to declare extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in
a court of law the right or rights of action of the
subjects of the
hostile party. The wide sense claimed for this rule
by continental
writers could not possibly have been accepted the British dele-
by
gates, inview of the long-established rule of English common law.
On more than one occasion, however, the British Foreign Office
clearly intimated that Article 23. (h) concerns only the
obligations
of an invading commander Qi) and this ;
interpretation was sup-
ported by United States authorities, including General Davis, one
of the American plenipotentiaries at the Hague Conference {i) .
Illustrations With regard to the immediate effects of war on commercial

fumihhed
during the intercourse, the
Anglo-American principle expounded above re-
Gr«ât War, ceivednumerous illustrations in the Great War, 1914. (It
1914. may
be added that owing to wide difference of
opinion and diversity
of practice among the States of the world, these
principles cannot
be regarded as universal or even
general principles of inter-
{g) The Julia, 8 Cranch, 181; The Volkerreoht und Bundesstaatsrecht,

Aurora, 8 Cranch, 203; The Ariadne, vol. V. (1911),
pp. 389—391. See also,
2 Wheaton, 143; The Caledonia, 4 infra, p. 466, the decision of the Court
Wheaton, 100. of Appeal.
(A) Of. a communication made by (0 See Amer. Journ. of Int. Law,
the Foreign Office; in Zeitschrift fiir vol. ii. (1908), p. 70.
national law; they depend, rather, on the provisions of municipal
jurisprudence.)
As soon as the war broke out (Aug. 4), a rapid succession of
British Proclamations, Acts, Orders, and regulations appeared (Jc) .
**
Prohibitions were imposed on trading with alien enemies." An
officialannouncement (Aug. 22), interpreting the Proclamation
(of Aug. 5), adopted the test of commercial or war domicile for
determining enemy or neutral character. Thus a foreign trader,
though an enemy subject, residing and carrying on business in
neutral territory, was not to be considered an alien enemy; so that
" "
the interdiction of trading with alien enemies did not apply to
him. Trading with a branch firm in a friendly country, when
the principal house of business was in enemy territory, was in
general permitted, so long as no transactions with the principal

house were involved. Commercial contracts made before the war
with firms or persons in enemy territory were not to be executed
during the war, and payments under them were not to be made,
except for goods already delivered and services already rendered.
Dividends accrued due to alien enemies since the outbreak of war
were not to be paid; such as were declared before the war were
sequestered during the war. Transfers of shares and debentures
from enemy aliens to friendly or neutral subjects were not to
be registered. Indulgences at firet permitted were soon discon-
tinued by later Proclamations, which forbade the discharge of
debts due to persons in the eHemy country before the war, the
acceptance, payment, or dealing with negotiable instruments held
by or on behalf of an enemy, the making or honouring of contracts
of insurance and re-insurance with or for the benefit of the enemy.
The making of certain payments was licensed by departmental
Orders, which were meant to benefit British merchants. great A
many, other regulations were enforced; indeed, their multiplicity
and complexity were well-nigh overwhelming.
The interpretation of the term "alien enemy" gave rise to Meaning of
doubt and difficulty. Different definitions were attached thereto

'^g^^»>
in different contexts. Thus, the Aliens Kestriction Order
(August 5) defined it ajs "an alien whose
in the broad sense
sovereign or State war with His Majesty." The Patents,

is at
<fec. Amendment Act, August 28, adopted the commercial appli-
cation, and so considered also as alien enemies British companies

controlled by or wholly or mainly carried on for the benefit of
{Jc) Seo Manual of Emergency Phillipson, Int. Law and the Great
Legislation (1914), ed. A. Pulling; War (1915), pp. lOO seq.
whilst
enefny subjects. Again, the Proclamation of September 9,
or bodies
including under the designation of "enemy," persons
of persons resident or carrying on business in the enemy country,
expressly excluded persons of enemy nationality who neither

reside nor carry on business in the enemy country, and declared
only such companies as were incorporated in an enemy country

to be vested with enemy character.
In Ingle v. Continmtal Insurance Company of Mannheim {I),

it was held that the defendant company was not an "alien
"
enemy for the purpose of enforcing a policy of insurance
effected before the war through underwriters employed by the
company in this country. The principle governing the decision
was that the company was not divided from us, as regards this
business, by the "war line," which alone, and not neoessarily
domicile or nationality, was the test of enemy character, at least
for commercial purposes.
In Duncan, Fox d Co. v. Schrempt and Bonke(m), goods

were shipped before the war, under a contract between two British
firms, and were to be delivered at Hamburg. The buyers refused,
after the outbreak of war, to accept the tender of the doeuments
or to pay for the goods. It was held that ,the refusal was
justified.
In Arriorduct Manufacturing Co. v. Defries d Co. (^^), an
English company, the bulk of whose shareholders were alien
enemies, sued for the price of goods. The defendants contended
that the action was not maintainable, as the majority of the share-
holders in the plaintiff company were alien enemies. But the
Court held that as it was registered here according to English law
it was an English company, and therefore was not debarred from
suing.
A similar point arose
in The Continental Tyre and Rubber Co.
V. Thomas Tilling (o). The plaintiff company a branch of a —
—
German parent company was registered here; the greater part of
its shares were held by the German company, and all the rest,
except one, by Germans resident in this country. The plaintiff

company sued for the price of goods sold and delivered before the
war; but the defendants pleaded that the payment would be
illegal, as it would enure to 'the benefit of alien enemies. The
Court held, however, that if nationality were the criterion, the
plaintiff company
was English; and the transaction was not for-
(0 (1914), 31 T. L. R. 41. («) (1914), 31 T. L. R. 69.

(m) (1914), 31 T. L. R. 66. (o) (1914), 31 T. L. R. 77.
bidden by any Act or Proclamation. Besides, the case could be

decided on a broader ground: the purchase by a British subject of
goods from an alien enemy was not against public policy, where
the vendor and the disposition of the price to be paid were under
the control of the laws of this country; it was sending the monej^
to the enemy country that would benefit the enemy. This decision
was upheld in the Court of Appeal, Buckley, L. J., dis-
senting (p) .
In several cases the question of the locus standi of alien enemies Zocus standi
arose. The plaintiff in Princess TJium and Taxis v. Moffitt (q), l{^l^^'^^
sought to restrain the defendant from continuing certain alleged
libels; but the defendant urged that the plaintiff, being an alien
enemy, was not entitled to relief in our courts. Held, that the
plaintiff having duly registered herself, came under the King's
protection, and acquired the right to enforce her claim.
'
In Robinson d Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. of Mann-
hemi (r)., the defendants pleaded that as they were alien enemies
they were debarred from appearing in the courts here during the
war, and asked that proceedings against them ©hould be stayed.
The Court held that to suspend a subject's right of suit against
an alien enemy is to injure a British subject and favour an alien
enemy, so that the object and reason of the suspensory rule would
be defeated, by turning a disability into a relief. Hence an alien
•
enemy could appear as a defendant.
The question of the locus standi of an enemy claimant
came before the Prize Court in- the case of The Moiae {s) An .
enemy owner of the vessel claimed exemption from capture under

the sixth Convention of the Hague (1907). The President, in
the course of his judgment, pointed out that no rule of inter-
national law gave an enemy shipowner the right to appear in our
Prize Courts to support a claim to immunity from capture. But
the Court being empowered to regulate its practice in accordance
with the demands of justice and equity, decided to allow an alien
enemy to appear and support his claim when he considered himself
entitled to any protection, privilege, or relief under any of the
Hague Conventions of 1907.
The whole question of the locus standi of enemy aliens formed
the subject of an authoritative judicial decision of the Court of
(p) See Phillipson, Int. Law and {q) (1914), 31 T. L. K. 24.

the Great War, pp. 107, 108, where (r) (1914), 31 T. L. E. 20.
the dissenting judgment is shown to (s) (1914), 31 T. L. R. 46.
be the more rational view.
W. 30
466 COMMENCEMENT OF WAK,
the unanimous
Appeal (0. The Lord Chief Justice, delivering *'
when
judgment of the Court, said, that the term alien enemy,"
useil in regard to civil rights and obligations, does not mean merely
a person of enemy nationality, but applies also to a British or
neutral subject voluntarily resident in enemy territory. The test
is not nationality, but the place of carrying on business (?^).
Hence, for the puirpose of enforcing civil rights, a person of British

or neutral nationality may be regarded as a subject of an eneniy
State; and conversely, a person of enemy nationality may be

regarded as a subject of the Crown (x). Alien enemies have
no
they are here by permission and under the pro-
civil rights, unless
tection of the Crown. Under the old common law an alien enemy's
goods or debts found within the realm were liable to confisca-

tion (y) Whether the right of confiscation was exercised or not,
.
there was no doubt that it existed {z) In early days, however,

.
the severity of the rule was relaxed in favour of those who had
the King's permission to come here. The decision in the recent
case Princess Thum and Taxis v. Mojfitt (a) was right, because
the plaintiff, being an enemy alien, was resident here by tacit
permission of the Crown.

As to the bearing on these questions of Article 23. (h) of the
Hague Kegulations (1907), the old rule of the English common

law is not thereby affected. The clause forbids a declaration
abolishing, suspending, &c. the right of enemy subjects to institute
legal proceedings. But in England there is no room for such a
declaration; for by the existing English law the outbreak of war
operates ipso facto to suspend an alien enemy's right of action.
And this was recognised by German jurists. Moreover, the con-
text shows that the paragraph refers only to the conduct of an
army and its commander in the field and in occupied territory.

In 1911 the Foreign Office publicly stated that it had no concern
with municipal law.
Is an alien enemy liable to be sued during the war? It is con-
trary to public policy to allow an alien enemy an immunity from

paying just debts or demands due to British or neutral subjects.
This view was rightly adopted in a recent case (b). Therefore,
(0 Porter v. Freundenberg, ^c. Attorney-General v. Wheeden (1699),

(1915), 31 T. L. K. 162. Parker's Reports, 267; Antoine v.
(w) Cf Janson v. Brief ontein Mines
.
Morshead (1815), € Taunt. 238.
(1902), App. O. 484. (a) See supra, p. 465.
(a;) Ibid, per Lord Lindley. (b) Robinson ^ Co. v. Continental
(y) Halo, Pleas of the Crown, I. 95. Ins. Co. of Mannheim (1914), 31
iz) Cf. Wolf V. Oxholm (1817), 6 T. L. R. 20; cf. supra,
y > i'
p. 46-5.
M. & S. 102, per Lord Ellenborough;
as an alien enemy may be sued, he may appear and be heard in his

defence. If he is brought at the suit of a party before a Court
of Justice, he must have the right to submit his answer to the
Court. To deny himthat right would be a denial of justice, con-
trary to the fundamental principles guiding the King's Courts

in the administration of justice. If judgment is given against
him, he is entitled, too, to resort to the Court of Appeal, so that

an error, if any, may be rectified. On the other hand, where notice
of appeal had been given before the war by a person, who on the
outbreak of war becomes an alien enemy, the hearing of his appeal
must be suspended until the conclusion of peace (c) .
(c) In a later case decided during the fact that an alien enemy is in-
the Great War (September 29th, 1915), terned does not deprive him of the
Schaffenius v. Goldberg, 50 L. J. right to sue.
Notes of Cases, 483, it was held that
30(2)
468 EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE.
CHAPTER II.
RIGHTS OF WAE, AS BETWEEN ENEMIES —LAND WARFARE.

Rights of war In general it may be stated that the rights of war, in respect
against an
enemy. to the enemy, are to be measured by the object of the war. Until
that object is attained, the belligerent has, strictly speaking, a
right to use every means necessary to accomplish the end for

which he has taken up arms, so long as the means adopted is not
contrary to existing law or repugnant to the general sense of
mankind. We have already seen that the practice of the ancient
world, and even the opinion of some modern writers on public
law, made no distinction as to the mesans to be employed for this
purpose. Even such institutional writers as Bynkershoek and
Wolf, who lived in the most learned and not least civilized countries
of Europe, at thecommencement of the eighteenth century, assert
the broad principle, that everything done against an enemy is
lawful; that he may be destroyed, though unarmed avnd defence-
less;that fraud, and even poison, m^j be employed against him;
and that an unlimited right is acquired by the victor to his person
and property. Such, however, was not the sentiment and practice
of enlightened Europe at the period when they wrote, since Girotius
had long before inculcated milder and more humane principles,
which Vattel subsequently enforced and illustrated, and which are
adopted by the unanimous concurrence of all the public jurists of
the present age (a) .
Limits to the The law of nature has not precisely determined how far ^n
rights of war
against the
individual is allowed to make use of force, either to defend himself
person of an
against an attempted injury, or to obtain reparation when refused
enemy.
by the aggressor, or to bring an offender to punishment. can We
only collect, from this law, the general rule, that such use of force
as is necessary for obtaining these ends is not forbidden. The
same principle applies to the conduct of
sovereign States existing
in a state of natural independence with
respect to each other. No
(«) Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub. cap. 4, §§ 5—7. Vattel, Droit
lib. iii.
lib. i. cap. 1. Wolfius, Jus. Gent. des Gens, liv. iii. ch. 8
§ 878. Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pae.
BIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE. 4B9
use of force lawful, except so far as it is necessary.

is bel- A
ligerent has, therefore, no right to take away the lives of those
subjects of the enemy whom he can subdue by any other means.
Those who are actually in arms, and continuje to resist, may be
lawfully killed; but the inhabitants of the enemy's country who
are not in arms, or who, being in a^rms, submit and surrender
themselves, may not be slain, because their destruction is not

necessary for obtaining the just ends of war. Those ends may
be accomplished by making prisoners of those who are taken in
arms, or compelling them to give security that they will not bear
arms against the victor for a limited period, or during the continu-
ance of the war. The killing of prisoners can only be justifiable
in those extreme cases where resistance on their part, or on the
who come to their rescue, renders it impossible to
part of others
keep them. Both reason and general opinion concur in showing
that nothing but the strongest necessity will justify such an
act (6).
From the immense armies

a,t present maintained by most Tendency iu
European States, there seems to be little prospect of their resorting ^^rfare

to anything but hostilities for the settlement of their differences.
But there is a very widespread desire to alleviate the horrors of
war as much as possible, and to confine its operation to disabling
the enemy without inflicting unnecessary suffering upon him.
Civilization has a double effect upon war. It tends to make men
more humane, but it also enables them to devise more terrible
engines of destruction. The result is that while civilized nations

are continually adopting more and more terrible weapons for de-
fending themselves or attacking others, they are at the same time

endeavouring to establish rules of international law which shall
make the use of their weapons as consistent with humanity as the
nature of things will permit.
War is an abnormal condition of States, but it is not, for that Fundamental
P " P *
reason, a condition of unrestrained lawlessness and license. Not

everything may be done that impetuous fury may dictate. War is
primarily a relation between States and Governments, represeinted
in the conflict by definite military and naval forces; it is only
secondarily a relation between the respective subjects individually.

Peaceable and inoffensive inhabitants taking no part in the con-
testshould be immune from attack. Neither person nor property
should be injured or damaged, if the legitimate purpose of the
of
belligerent is not thereby clearly promoted, and the overcoming
(6) Rutherforth, Inst. b. ii. ch. 9, § 15. See post, pp. 476 seq.
470 RIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WÂREARE.
his enemy not facilitated. The instruments of warfare should

be such as do not inflict unneceesarj or superfluous injury or
damage. The object of a belligierent is obviously attained if he
puts hors de combat the adversary; the infliction of unnecessary
suffering is not indispensable to achieve this object. The prin-
ciple of humanity condemns all instruments and methods of
warfare that involve gratuitous cruelty, savagery, or treachery;
reprobates, therefore, the ill-treatment of the helpless and
it the
disarmed, including the wounded and prisoners, the aged and

feeble, women and children. The principle of chivalry calls for
the maintenance of pledged faith, the fulfilment of promises and
engagements, the manifestation of generosity at a moment of

triumph .
When Where, however, one of the belligerents persistently disregards

^^^ principles and prescriptions of the laws and usages of war, the
jusSfiable.
other is then entitled to adopt measures of reprisal, to compel the
law -breaking combatant to discontinue his conduct, and to exact
reparation Such measures of retaliation may be proceedings that
.
are either different in kind from or more severe than those sanc-
tioned by law and custom for regular and legitimate warfare.
They should be resorted to only on the authority of the Govern-
ment or the commander after the truth of the enemy's guilt has
been established, and after the enemy has been called upon to put
a stop to his misconduct. They should not be applied merely in
a spirit of vindictiveness for their purpose is to obtain redress or
;
ensure compliance with established rules. They ought not to be

widely disproportionate to the offences committed; and, in general,
they should not be incompatible with the conceptions of justice
and humanity (c) .
Some
of the fundamental principles of warfare set forth above
were recognised by the Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868. It
observed, in its preamble, that the progress of civilization should
have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of
war, and laid down that the only legitimate object which States
should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the mili-
tary power of the enemy.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the movement for

mitigating the severities of warfare and regularizing its proceed-
ings by way of establishing a written code of law gathered force.
(c) Cf. the rules of the Instit. of Arts. 85, 86; in Annuaire de Flnstit.
Int. Law drawn up at Oxford, 1880, de Droit Int. vol. v. p. 174.
EIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE. 471
In 1874, a Conference, attended by delegates from all the coun- Brussels

^^^
tries ofEurope, assembled at Brussels, on the invitation of the 1874^^^°^*
Emperor of Eussia, for the purpose of discussing a project of
international rules on the laws and usages of war series of rules . A
on warfare on land was agreed to, but no international compact
was entered into. " A
careful consideration of the whole matter,"
wrote Lord Derby, "has convinced Her Majesty's Government
that it is their duty firmly to repudiate, on behalf of Great Britain
and her allies in any future war, any project for altering the
principles of international law upon which this country has
hitherto acted, and above all to refuse to be a
party to any agree-
ment the effect of which would be to facilitate aggressive wars,
and to paralyse the patriotic efforts of an invaded p-eople" (d).
Nevertheless, though not absolutely binding, the rules were of
great value in exhibiting the prevailing ideas in a definite
form (e) ;
and many of them found a place in the Manuals of
War issued by most civilized Governments for the instruction of
their officers in the field (/) .
At Hague Peace Conference of 1899, the representatives of Hague Con-

the
all the States there assembled, with the
exception of China, signed [ggg^^mf
a Convention conderning the laws and customs of land warfare,
which was based to a large extent on the Declaration of Brussels.
It allowed the adhesion of non-signatory Powers and denunciation
by any one of the signatories on a year's notice to the Netherlands
Government {g) The Convention comprised a systematized body
.
of regulations, and required the parties thereto to issue instructions

to their land forces in conformity with these regulations .
The Second Hague •Conference, 1907, reaffirmed this require-

ment, and re-established the Regulations (incorporating in them
various improvements and additions) in its Fourth Convention,
of which the preliminary Articles are as follows :
—
1. The contracting Powers shall issue instructions to their
armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regula-
tions respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed
to the present Convention.
2. The provisions contained in the Regulations referred to in
Article 1, as well as in the.present Convention, do not apply except
between contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents
are parties to the Convention.
{(l) Lord Derby to Lord A. Loftus, Papers, Miscellaneous (No. 1), 1875.
20th January, 1875. Hertslet, Map of (/) Maine, Int. Law, lect. X. p. 176.
Europe, vol. iii. p. 1970. {g) Parliamentary Papers, Miscella-
(e) The whole of the proceedings of neous, No. 1 (1899) [(M. 9534].
the Conference will be found in Pari.
472 EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFAKE.
3. A
belligerent partj that violates the provisions of the said
Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensa-
tion. It shall be responsible for all acts com'mitted by persons
forming part of its armed forces.
4. The present Convention,

duly ratified, shall replace, as be-
tween the contracting Powers, the Convention of the 29th July,
1899, respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.' The
Convention of 1899 remains in fore© as between the Powers which
signed it, but which do not ratify the present Convention (h).
Persons All the members of the enemy State may lawfully be treated as
exempt from
acts of enemies in a public war; but it does not therefore follow, that all
hostility.
these enemies may be lawfully treated alike; though we may law-
fully destroy some of them, it does not therefore follow, that we

may lawfully destroy all. For the general rule, derived from the
natural law, is still the same, that no use of force against an
enemy lawful, unless it is necessary to accomplish the purposes
is
of war. The custom

of civilized nations, founded upon this prin-
ciple, has therefore exempted the persons of the sovereign and his
•family, the members of the civil government (though modern
views would sanction the capture of the latter and their treatment
as prisoners of war, inasmuch as the administration of the
enemy
State would be disorganized, and its military capacity
indirectly
diminished), women and children, cultivators of the earth, artisans,
labourers, merchants, men of science and and, generally,
letters,
all other public or
private individuals engaged in the ordinary civil
pursuits of life, from the direct effect of military operations,
unless actually taken in arms, or some misconduct
guilty of in
violation of the usages of war,
hy which they forfeit their
immunity (^) .
In earlier times the unarmed inhabitants of an invaded

country
were liable to be treated very much like the armed
combatants;'
practices varied according as the commanders were chivalrous or
ferocious and cruel. Mitigations were
repeatedly urged by coun-
cils and writers; thus it was
urged that ecclesiastics, merchants,
farmers, shepherds, and all peaceful inhabitants should not be
attacked, and that the women and children of even infidel nations
should not be subjected to violence. In the Years' War
Thirty
the belligerent
proceedings were marked by an atrocious and retro-
(A) Hague Conf. (1907), 4th Con-

vent. Arts. 1 i.— ch. 8, §§
145—147,159. Kluber, Droit
des Gens Moderne de I'Europe, Pt. II.
(0 Euther forth, Inst. b. ii. ch. 9, tit. 2, sect. 2, eh.
1, §§ 245—247.
§ 15. Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii.
RIGHTS OF WxVR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE. 473
gressive character. owing to the influence of jurists like

Later,
came to be repugnant to the conscience
Grotius, excesses in warfare
of mankind; and, with the establishment of standing armies and
development of military organization and discipline, various re-

laxations were gradually introduced. Thus, a distinction grew
up between armed forces and non-combatants; and by the begin-
ning of the eighteenth century it became a generally recognised
rule that the civilian sections of a country, if they did not partici-
pate in the fighting, were to be exempt from deliberate attack.

Next, the conception spread that war was primarily a relation
between States, and not necessarily between their respective sub-
jects individually. Eousseau's exposition of this doctrine (k)
exerted some influence for good.
In the wars of the nineteenth century we find this progressive

principle applied. Wellington, in his campaigns, refrained from
making direct war on civilians. In the American Civil War,
generals like McLellan and Lee called upon their men to respect
the persons, property, and honour of the civil population. In 1866,
Prince Frederick Charles proclaimied, on invading Saxony, that
liis war was not with the people, but with the Government. In
the Franco-Prussian war, the King of Prussia proclaimed, August,
1870: "I make war against French soldiers, not against French
citizens. The latter will therefore continue to enjoy security for
their persons and property, so long as they, themselves shall not,
l)y hostile attempts against the German troops, deprive me of the

right of affording them my protection." Instructions to the same
•effect were issued in the war between China and
Japan, 1895, and
in that between Eussiaand Japan, 1904. Similarly, in the South
African war, General Buller and Lord Eoberts issued proclama-
tions promising security to non-combatants if they played no
part in the military operations (I) . We

may recall, too, the De-
claration of St. Petersburg, 1868 (already referred to), which
emphasized that the only object of belligerent operations is to

weaken the military forces of the enemy .
The effect of a state of war, lawfully declared to exist, is to Lawful

place all the subjects of each belligerent Power in a state of mutual
hostility. The usage of nations has modified this maxim by
legalizing such acts of hostility only as are comtnitted by those
who are authorized by the express or implied command of the
State. Such are the regularly commissioned naval and military
(k) Oontrat Social, Bk. I. chap. iv. on Land (London, 1911), pp. 35 seq.,
(l) Cf. J. M. Spaight, War Eights and the references there cited.
474 EIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE.
forces of the nation, and all others called out in its defence, or
spontaneously defending themselves in cases of urgent necessity,,

without any express authority for that purpose. Cicero tells us^
in his Offices, that by the Roman fecial law, no person oould law-
fully engage in battle with the public enemy, without being

regularly enrolled and taking the military oath. This was a regu-
lation sanctioned both by policy and religion. The horrors of war
would indeed be greatly aggravated, if every individual of the
belligerent States was allowed to plunder and slay indiscriminately
the enemy's subjects without being in any manner accountable
for his conduct. Hence it is that in land wars, irregular bands of
marauders are liable to be treated as lawless banditti, not entitled
to the protection of the mitigated usages of war as practised by
civilized nations (w) .
The Hague Regulations of 1907 specify the qualifications of

belligerents as follows:
—
"
status of Tho laws, rights, and duties of
war apply not only to armies,
^le
but also to militia and volunteer corps, fulfilling the following
conditions: —
(1) To be commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates; (2) To have a fixed distinctive emblem recog-
nisable at a distance; (3) To carry armte openly; and (4) To-
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war. In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute'
the army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomina-
' " '
tion army {n).

"
Lev}- en m,a,se. Tho population of a territory which has not been
occupied who,
on the enemy's approach, spontaneously take up arms to resist the
invading troops without having had time to organize themselves
in accordance with Article 1, sha,ll be
regarded as belligerents
if they carry arms openly, and if they respect the laws and customs
of war" (o).
"
The armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of com-
batants and non-combatants. In case of capture by the enemy
both have a right to be treated as prisoners of war " {p).
[The non-combatants here referred to include those who carry

out auxiliary services, e.g., driving baggage wagons,
working field
telegraphs, orderlies, clerks, bandsman, members of the Red Cross
service, tho veterinary service, army chaplains, &c.]
These rules were in practice recognised long before the
Hague
(w) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. Hague Conference of 1907, Fourth
ch. 15, §§ 223—228. Kluber, Droit des Convention, Article 1).
Gens Moderne de TEurope, § 267. (o) H. C. (1907) iv 2
(;0 H. C. (1907), iv. 1 (that is, the {p) H. C. (1907)' iv'. 3*.
RIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAX J) WARFARE. 475
Conferences. But Franco -Germaji war the Germans paid

in the
little heed to them.They required every captured combatant to
prove he was a French soldier by showing; that he belonged to an
organized corps, and that he was called out by an order from the
proper authority addressed to him personally; otherwise he was
liable to be treated as a "war criminal," and not as a prisoner of
war. Moreover, every combatant was required to wear an irremov-
able distinctive uniform or badge, clearly distinguishable at rifle
—
distance an exorbitant demand in days of long-distance firing.
The Germans, too, refused for some time to recognise the belli-
gerent status of the French National Guard, and an authorized
class of francs-tireurs, though they were duly commissioned by
their Government. Sherman's practice in the American Civil
War was more in accordance with recognised principles. He con-
sidered as lawful belligerents all voluntary, irregular, or detached
bodies of troops, provided they were of sufficient strength and were
commanded by a leader appointed by the military authorities.
Countries possessing large regular armies, e.g.^ Germany, have
discountenanced levies en masse. The Article arrived at thus
constitutes a compromise between the greater and the smaller
continental Powers. Levies en masse are as old as war itself.
Notable instances of spontaneous risings, on the approach of the
enemy, occurred in Russia (1700) against Charles XII., in Prussia
(1807) during the Napoleonic wars, in Spain (1808-12), in Russia
(1812), in Prussia (1813). Examples occurred also in the Boer
War, and at Niou-tsia-toun in the Busso- Japanese war.
custom and the express
It is to be noted that, despite established
sanction of the
Hague Begulations, the German official manual of
the laws of war on land {Kriegsbra,uch im Lmidkriege) issued —

conformably to the requirement of the Hague Conference —
demands not only that arms should be carried openly and the laws
and usages of war respected, but also that such levies should possess
the further qualifications usual for the organized military forces.
Further, at the beginning of the Great War, 1914, the Germans

in their hostilities against Belgium' refused to recognise the bel-
ligerent capacity of the Civic Guard and other combatants who

satisfied the requirements of international law. Many of these
were unjustifiably shot on the ground that they had committed
"war treason" (Kriegsverrath) (q).
acts of
The Germans in Belgium alleged that the civil population par-

ticipated in the hostilities, and as a result great numbers of
(q) CI. Phillipson, Int. Law and the Great War, pp. 122 seq.
civilians were put to death. The Belgian Government, however,

denied the truth of these allegations, and pointed out that circulars
had been issued to the 2,700 com'munes in Belgium, emphasizing
the duties of the civil population, in accordance with the provisions
of the Hague Regulations (r) .
Guerilla war. There is no rule of international law prohibiting guerilla war-

fare. Guerilla fighters must be regarded by the enemy as
legitimate combatants if they fulfil the four conditions laid down

in the first Article of the Convention quoted above.
Use of semi Whether semi-barbarous or coloured troops may be used in war

barbarous
troops. against white or civilized races depends also on their fulfilment
of the same conditions. The employment of savage troops is
certain or highly probable that they will not
illegitimate, if it is
remain subject to military discipline, and that they will get out-of-
hand and act contrary to the established laws and customs of war.
The melancholy effects of using bands of ruarauders and undis-
ciplined troops were seen, for example, in the Russo-Turkish war,
on which an indelible stain was fixed by the atrocities committed
by Cossacks and Bulgarians in the service of Russia, and by
Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks in that of Turkey. The employ-
ment of the Turcos by France in 1859 and 1870, of the negroes in
the American Civil War and in the Spanish-American war, 1898,
of the Kafiirs in the Anglo-Boer war, was by no means unlawful,
whatever be said against it on grounds of policy. In the
may
Russo-Japanese war, Japan used the Manchurian bands of Chun-
"
chuses, whom the Russians described as barbarianis, criminals,
and pillagers"; but the Japanese authorities claimed that their
use was covered by the Hague Regulations. In the Great War of
1914 the Turcos and Indian troops were properly employed, not-
withstanding the remonstrances of the Germans. However,
whatever may be said about "savage" and "barbarian" troops,
the war of 1914 showed that the worst excesses of cannibals and
scalp-hunting savages seem less atrocious than the many unspeak-
able horrors perpetrated by German s.oldiers (s).
Pbisoners According to the law of war, as still practised

OF WAR.
by savage nations,
prisoners taken in w^r are put to death. Among the more
polished
nations of antiquity, this practice gradually gave way to that of
making slaves of them. For this, again, was substituted that of
(r) See Phillipson, Int. Law and employment of semi-civilized troops,

the Great War, pp. 122 seq. cf. Spaight, War Eights on Land,
(s) See Phillipson, Int. Law and pp. 65 seq.
the Great War, qmssim. As to the
RIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE. 477
ransoming, which continued through the feudal wars of the middle

ages, when the practice proved a source of enrichment to doughty
wan'iors. Those who were not ransomed were frequently sub-
jected to dreadful treatment.Whatever mitigations were intro-
duced were due to the influence of chivalry, the Church, and
jurists. Arrangements came to be made between the belligerent
States themselves for the ransom of their respective prisoners of
war In the seventeenth century we find numerous treaties of this
.
kind, which usually fixed a scale. The latest instance is that of

1780 between England and France, when an English admiral or a
French marshal was valued at sixty men, lower ranks were assessed
proportionately, and a man was estimated at a pound sterling (t) .
The present usage of exchanging prisoners was not firmly estab-

lished in Europe until some time in the course of the seventeenth
century. Even in modern times, this usage was not obligatory

among nations who chose to insist upon a ransom for the prisoners
taken by thetn, or to leave their own countrymen in the enemy's
hands until the termination of the war. Cartels for the mutual
exchange of prisoners of war are regulated by special convention
between the belligerent States, according to their respective
interests and views of- policy. Sometimes prisoners of war are
permitted, by capitulation, to return to their own country, upon
condition not to serve again during the war, or until duly
exchanged; and officers are frequently released upon their parole
subject to the same condition. Good faith and humanity ought
to preside over the execution of these compacts, which are designed
to mitigate the evils of war, without defeating its legitimate
purposes. By the modern usage of nations, commissaries are

permitted the respective belligerent countries, to
to reside in
negotiate and carry into effect the arrangements necessary for this
object. Breach of good faith in these transactions can be punished
only by withholding from the party guilty of such violation the ^
advantages stipulated by the cartel; or, in cases which may be

supposed to warrant such a resort, bj reprisals or vi&dictive
retaliation (w) .
The treatment of prisoners of war was regulated by the provi- The Hague
^^^'
sions of the Brussels Declaration of 1874, which were adopted,
(t) Cf. Manning, Law of Nations, respondence between M. Otto, French

bk. iv. chap. viii. Commissary of Prisoners in England,
(u) Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac. and the British Transport Board, 1801,
lib. iii. cap. 7, §§ 8, 9; cap. 11, §§ 9 Annual Register, vol. xliv. p. 265.
—13. Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. Wheaton, Hist. Law
ch. 8, § 153. C. Robinson's Adra.
(Stat-e Papers.)
of Nations, pp. 162 — 164.
Rep. vol. iii. Note, Appendix A. Cor-
with additions and modifications, bj the Hague Conference of

1899. The rules of the latter, again, were, with certain emenda-
tions, adopted by the Hague Conference of 1907; so that the
regulations of the second Conference now constitute the law

governing the subject.
Treatmeut of "
Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government,
war. but not in that of the individuals or corps who captured them.
They must be humanely treated. All their personal belongings,
except arms, horses, and military papers, remain their pro-
perty" {x).
In earlier times prisoners of war were in the power of the

individual captors, as has already been seen in the observations on
the former practice of ransom . In some quarters it is claimed that
a commander is entitled to put prisoners to death in case of impera-
when their presence is dangerous to the exist-
tive necessity, e.g.^
ence of the captors and there is no means of keeping them {y\) .
But the better and weightier opinion of to-day is contrary to this

view. To violate the dictates of humanity (as Hall remarks) {z)
is a greater evil than to increase the strength of the enemy That .
is, if prisoners cannot be kept, they ought to be liberated. The

Boers did so in the South African war; and the British did the
same in the Crimean war.
Further, measures of reprisal ought not to be taken against
prisoners of war because of illegitimate acts committed by the
enemy, unless, perhaps, the acts in question are directed against
the prisoners taken from the other belligerent. This amounts
to retaliation in kind, which should not be resorted to if other
means avail to cause the enemy to discontinue his reprehensible
conduct.
If men are taken prisoners in the act of committing, or who had

committed, violations of international law, they are not properly
entitled to the privileges and treatment accorded to honourable
prisoners of war. The fact that they acted under orders cannot
furnish a valid excuse; for if such shifting of responsibility be
admitted, then we arrive at the conclusion that millions of men,
including responsible officers of the higher command, are to be
held free from blame no matter what atrocious deeds they have
perpetrated; and that only one person is answerable, namely, the
{x) H. O. (1907), iv. 4. Landkriege), p. 16.

(y) See Bluntschli, Das Moderne (r) International Law (1909),
Volkerrocht, § 580; and the German p. 397.
Official Manual (Kriegsbrauch im
monarch or president of the belligerent State, as the case may be.

This is a conclusion which neither reason nor humanity can accept .
During the Great War, a number of German officers and men were
on one occasion rescued from a destroyed submarine, which had
attacked and sunk without warning British merchantmen, and
had fired torpedoes at ships carrying non-combatants, neutrals, and
women. Such conduct is illegitimate, and is clearly a breach of
existing law. Accordingly, the Board of Admiralty announced
— —
(March 8, 1915) and justifiably so that these prisoners would
be debarred from certain privileges and courtesies that are extended
to honourable combatants. Again, a German prisoner captured
by the French was conclusively proved to have committed outrages
on French wounded and robbed fallen men, and was therefore' shot
as a criminal. Similarly, German airmen having fallen into the
hands of the Russians after throwing bombs on the open town of
Libau were informed that thej were liable to be treated as common
outlaws (a) We add that by way of retaliation for tho
—may
.
British treatment was far from harshness ^ôf the sub-

which —
marine prisoners, the German authorities selected an equal number
of British prisoners (for the most part officers of distinguished
families) and subjected them to a rigorous kind of incarceration.

This was rather an exhibition of vindictiveness than a justifiable
retort .
"
Prisoners of war may be interned in a town, fortress, camp, or internment,
any other locality, and bound not to go beyond certain fixed limits;
but they can only be confined as an indispensable measure of
safety, and only while the circumstances which necessitate the
measure continue to exist" (6).
"
The State may utilize the labour of prisoners of war, other Labour of .
l^"^^"^^^-
than according to their rank and aptitude. Their tasks
officers,
shall not be excessive, and shall have nothing to do with the mili-
tary operations. Prisoners may be authorized to work for the

public service, for private persons, or on their own account. Work
done for the State be paid for according to the tariffs in
shall
force for soldiers of the national army employed on similar tasks;
or, if there are no such tariffs in force, at rates proportional to the
work executed. When the work is for other branches of the public
service or for private persons, the conditions shall be settled in
agreement with the military authorities. The wages of the

prisoners shall go towards improving their position, and the
(a) See Phillipson, Int. Law and conditions of internment in England

the Great War, pp. 259 seq. and Germany during the Great War,
(b) H. O. (1907), iv. 5. As to see Phillipson, p. 256.
480 EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WAEFARE.
balance shall be paid them at the time of their release, after

deducting the cost of their maintenance" (c).
The exemption of officers from forced labour was an amendment
adopted bj the Hague Conference of 1907. The Japanese had
already adopted the practice in regard to Russian officers in
1904. (d).
May prisoners be emplojed in the construction of fortifications?

Prof. Holland holds that such work may be carried out, if at a
distance from the scene of hostilities (e) . The late Prof. Westlake
thought otherwise (/), and this appears to be the better opinion.
Such services as are of a neutral character, e.g., those connected
with military hospitals and ambulances, may properly be imposed.
The most suitable kinds of labour are those resorted to by Russia
in the case of her prisoners taken in the'iGrreat War. Thus, it was
announced that they were employed in different kinds of out-of-
door labour, e.g., working on railways, making roads, building
houses, planting trees, felling timber, ploughing and harvesting,
constructing drainage works, &c.
"
Maintenance The Government into whose hands prisoners of war have fallen
prisoners.
^^ bound to maintain them. Failing a special agreement between
the belligerents, prisoners of war shall be treated as regards food,
quarters, and clothing, on the same footing as the troops of the

Government which has captured them" (g).
*'
Discipline. Prisoners of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations, and
orders in force in the army of the State into whose hands they
have fallen. Any act of insubordination warrants the adoption, as
regards them, of such measures of severity as may be necessary.
Escaped prisoners, recaptured before they have succeeded in re-
joining their army, or before quitting the territory occupied by
the army that captured them, are liable to disciplinary punish-
ment. Prisoners who, after succeeding in escaping, are again
taken prisoners, are not liable to any punishment for the previous
flight" w.
The disciplinary punishment here referred to cannot be said to
include the extreme penalty of death, though it might well be
inflicted where the offence committed involved a serious plot, or
riot, or rebellion. Such force as is found necessary may be em-

ployed to prevent the escape of a prisoner; and for this purpose
violence resulting in the fugitive prisoner's death may be applied,
(c) H. O. (1907), iv. 6. (e) The Laws of War on Land

(d) Of. Ariga, La guerre russo- (1908), § 27.
japonaise au point de vue de droit (/) Int. Law, vol. ii. p. 64.
international (Paris, 1907), p. 114. (^) H. C. (1907), iv. 7.
(70 Ibid. 8.
EIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES— LAND WARFARE. 481
if less severemeasures prove inadequate. In the case of prisoners

who have expressly undertaken not to escape, the German Manual
allows the death penalty for a breach of parole.
''
Every prisoner of war, if questioned, is bound to declare his Declaration

true name and rank, and if he disresârds this rule he is liable to a ^* ^^"^ ^^^
name.
curtailment of the advantages accorded to the prisoners of war of
"
his class (^).
Obviously, prisoners are not bound to furnish information on

matters other than their rank and identity. It would be unlawful
to inflict punishment or hardships on those prisoners who refuse
to give such information.
"
Prisoners of war may be set at liberty on parole if the laws of Release on
^'
their country authorize it, and, in such a case, they are bound, on ^^^^
their personal honour, scrupulously to fulfil, both as regards their
own Government and the Government by which they were made
prisoners, the engagements they have contracted. In such cases,
their own Government is bound neither to require of nor acoept
from them any service incompatible with the parole given " (k).
The conditions of the parole are a matter of arrangement be-
tween the captor and the prisoner. "The usual terms are," as
Westlake says, "that the prisoner, unless exchanged, will not
serve during the existing war against the captor or his allies
engaged in the same war; and this is understood to refer only to-
active service in the field, and not to debar the paroled prisoner
from performing military or administrative duties of any kind
at places not within the seat of actual hostilities" (l). Thus the
French Ofiicial Manual allows prisoners released on such a parole
to be employed in their country in instructing recruits in depots,
in working on fortified places that are not besieged, in maintaining
public order, in fighting against other enemies, in fulfilling civil
functions or diplomatic missions.
"
A
prisoner of war cannot be forced to accept his liberty on
parole; similarly the hostile Government is not obliged to assent
"
to the prisoner's request to be set at liberty on parole (m) .
"
Any prisoner of war, who is liberated on parole and recaptured Breach of
bearing arms against the Government to whom he had pledged

P^*^^®-
his honour, or against the allies of that Government, forfeits his
right to be treated as a prisoner of war, and may be brought before

the Courts" (71).
(0 Ibid. 9. (m) Ibid. 11.

(A-) Ibid. 10. (n) Ibid. 12.
(0 Op. cif. p. 65.
w. 31
The Courts mentioned here refer to the military Courts (o).
Exchange of It was stated above that in practice of ransom

modern times the
prisoners. was replaced by that of exchange. Prisoners were exchanged in
the American Civil War, in the Franco-Grerman war; and, to a
very small extent, in the Spanish-American war, Anglo-Boer war,

Russo-Japanese war, and in the Great War, 1914, as between
Great Britain and Germany (where a few wounded soldiers were
involved, who were manifestly incapacitated from taking any fur-
ther part in hostilities). It cannot be said, therefore, that the
practice of exchange now exists, save in a very limited and sporadic

form .
"
Army Individuals who follow an army without directly belonging to
followers.
it, such as newspaper correspondents and reporters, sutlers, con-
tractors, who fall into the enemy's hands, and whom the latter
thinks fit to detain, have a right to be treated as prisoners of war,
provided they can produce a certificate from the military autho-

rities of the army they were accompanying" (p).
This Article raises the question as to what persons may be made
prisoners of war. Certain persons, belonging to the class of non-
combatants, are indicated. Others we have mentioned above in
connection with Article 3. It is held by some writers that persons
whose services are requisitioned by an army temporarily e.g.y —
—
guides, messengers ought not to be made prisoners of war at all;
for it would be difficult if not impossible to provide them with
permits on account of the chance and temporary character of their

employment, to which they are for the time being compelled.
Leading members of the enemy Government, wherever found,
whether armed or unarmed, may no doubt be taken prisoners, on
the ground that their capture would tend to reduce the enemy's
resistance. The German Manual goes further, and allows the
seizure of all persons whose liberty may be a source of danger to
the opposing belligerent, e.g., influential journalists, political per-
sonages, priests who might rouse the population. This practice,

which was adopted by the Germans in Belgium and France during
the Great War, is not only did they arrest the
unjustifiable;
persons indicated, they also seized large numbers of leading citi-
zens and transported them to Germany. Press correspondents,
though they are not expressly protected like the members of the
medical and Bed Cross service, ought not to be treated as strictly
as ordinary prisoners of war. The captor ought to adopt no
(o) For practices in recent wars War Rights on Land, pp. 2&0 seq.
with regard to parole, Bee Spaight, (p) H. C. (1907), iv. 13.
EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES— LAND WARFARE. 483
other measures against them but those necessary for preventing

their escape. In recent wars thej have not infrequently been
allowed to return by a circuitous route (q) .
"
A
Bureau for information relative to prisoners of war is insti- Bureau of
iîformation.
tuted, on the commencement of hostilities, in each of the belli-
gerent States, and, when necessary, in the neutral countries on

whoso territory belligerents have been received. This Bureau is
intended to answer all inquiries about the prisoners, to receive
from the various services concerned full information respecting
internments and transfers, releases on parole, exchanges, escapes,
admissions into hospital, deaths, as well as all other information
necessary to enable it to make out and keep up to date an individual
return for each prisoner of war. The Bureau must state in this
return the regimental number, name and surname, age, place of
origin, rank, unit, wounds, date and place of capture, internment,
wounding, and death, as well as any observations of a special
character.The individual return shall be sent to the Government
of the other belligerent after the conclusion of peace. It is also
the duty of the Information Bureau to receive and collect all
objects of personal use, valuables, letters, &c., found on the battle-

fields or left by prisoners who have been released on parole, or
exchanged, or who have escaped, or died in hospital or ambulance,

and to transmit them to those interested" (r).
"
Relief societies for prisoners of war, which are regularly con- Relief
^°^^^ ^^^'
stituted in accordance with the law of the country with the object
of serving as the intermediary for charity, shall receive from the
belligerents for themselves and their duly accredited agents every
facility, within the bounds of military requirements and adminis-
trative regulations, for the effective accomplishment of their
humane task. Delegates of these societies may be admitted to the
places of internment for the distribution of relief, as also to the
halting places of repatriated prisoners, if furnished with a personal
permit by the military authorities, and on giving an engagement
in writing to comply with all their regulations for order and
police" (s).
"
The Information Bureau shall have the privilege of free pos- Free postage,
tage. Letters, money orders, and valuables, as well as postal parcels

destined for the prisoners of war, or despatched by them, shall be
free of all postal charges, both in the countries of origin and
.destination, as well as in those they pass through. Gifts aud
(g) For the practice of Japan in chap. v.

the Russo-Japanese war, cf. Takahaah I, (r) H, C. (1907), iv. 14.
Int. Law applied to the R.-J. War, (s) Ibid. 15.
31 (2)
relief inkind for prisoners of war shall be admitted free of all

import and other duties, as well as of payments for carriage by
the Government railways" (t).
The Article makes no provision for the censorship of correspon-
dence; but, obviously, prisoners' letters are subject to censorship.
The practice was in force in previous wars and in the Great War
;
of 1914 it assumed elaborate proportions.

of "
Payment Officers taken prisoners shall receive the same rate of pay as
officers.
officersof corresponding rank in the country where they arc^
"
detained, the amount to be repaid by their Government {u).
Such repayment is clearly subject to the stipulations arrived at
in the treaty of peace. Thus in the Treaty of Portsmouth it was
provided (Article 13) that Russia should repay Japan the differ-
ence between the actual amount so expended by Japan and the
actual amount similarly expended by Russia.
"
Freedom of Prisoners of war shall enjoy every latitude in the exercise of
worship.
their religion, including attendance at their own church services,
provided only they comply with the regulations for order and
police issued by the military authorities" (x).
"
WUls. The wills of prisoners of war are received or drawn up on the
Death same conditions as for soldiers of the national army. The same
certificates.
rules shall be observed regarding death certificates, as well as for
the burial of prisoners of war, due regard being paid to their
"
grade and rank (^).
"
Repatriation. After the conclusion of peace the repatriation of prisoners of
war shall take place as speedily as possible" (z).
The sick and It has long been an established usage of war that sick or
WOUNDED.
wounded combatants should not be illtreated by the enemy.
Various measures of alleviation were from time to time introduced;
and religious bodies came to undertake regularly the task of tend-
ing those who were disabled by wounds or by disease. Treaties
were also frequently concluded between States to ensure aid and
protection to soldiers disabled in war between the signatory
parties. The eighteenth century witnessed a progressive step,,

inasmuch as belligerents began to tend the adversary's wounded,
irrespectively of treaty obligations .
About the middle of the nineteenth century began a movement

in several countries in Europe with the object of setting up an
international medical and sanitary organization. In 1863 a semi-
(0 H. C. (1907), iv. 16. (y) Ibid. 19.

(u) Ibid. 17. (z) Ibid. 20.
Co;) Ibid. 18.
RIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE. 485
officialConference was held at Geneva, where it was proposed that

every country should establish aid societies, and that medical
services should be marked by a distinctive emblem and neutralized.
At the invitation of the Swiss Government, representatives of Geneva
°^^^^ ^^^^
sixteen States met at Geneva (1864) and produced the Geneva
Convention, to which other States afterwards acceded. Belli-
gerents were thereby required to protect the sick and wounded

regardless of their nationality, and to send them back to their own
country when they recovered and were unfit for further service.
As a compliment to Switzerland, the distinctive device adopted
was a red cross on a white ground, which was formed by reversing
the Swiss colours; and the use of this emblem rendered inviolable
hospitals, ambulances, their material and staff. In 1868 a further

Convention was arrived at, applying these rules to naval warfare.
In course of time, improvements were found necessary, and in
1899 the subject was considered at the Hague Conference.
In 1906, the delegates of thirty-five Powers assembled in
Switzerland, and established a considerably amended Convention,
which is now binding on all the States that have signed and ratified
it;though the Convention of 1864 remains obligatory on those

Powers that have not acceded to that of 1906, provided, of course,
they are signatories of the earlier Convention. It may be confi-
dently assumed, however, that the provisions laid down will, by-
reason of their world-wide recognition, possess binding force even
in the case of such States as have not yet signified their formal
adherence thereto. The principles of this Convention were applied
to naval warfare by the second Hague Conference, 1907. The
latter will be dealt with later for the present we may consider the
;
provisions for land warfare contained in the Geneva Convention,

1906. Article 21 of the Fourth Convention of the Hague Con-
ference, 1907, says: "The obligations of belligerents with regard
"
to the sick and wounded are governed by the Geneva Convention
[that is, that of 1864 or 1906 as the case may be].

"Officers and soldiers, and other persons officially attached to Treatment of
armies, shall be respected and cared for by the belligerent in whose ^^^^^Jj^^"^
power they are, without distinction of nationality.
Nevertheless, a belligerent who is compelled to abandon sick
and wounded to the enemy shall, as far as military exigencies
permit, leave with them a portion of his medical personnel and

material to aid in caring for them." (Article 1.)
The important point in this Article is to determine the meaning
of "sick and wounded," in order to know when protection is
demanded. It is clear that the expression applies only to those
486 RIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE.
who, through sickness or wounds, are no longer able to continue

fighting. Those who continue despite wounds are considered as
active combatants, and are liable to be attacked as such.
"
Subject to the treatment provided for them in pursuance of the
preceding Article, the sick and wounded of an army who fall into
the hands of the other belligerent are prisoners of war, and the
general rules of international law concerning prisoners are
applicable to them.
Belligerents are, however, free to arrange with one another such
exceptions and mitigations with regard to the treatment of the
sick and wounded prisoners as they may deem expedient. In par-
ticular, they will be at liberty to agree:
—
(1) to restore to one another the wounded left on the field after a
battle ;
(2) to repatriate the sick and wounded whom' they do not wish
to retain as prisoners after rendering them' fit for removal
or after their recovery;
(3) to hand over to a neutral State, with the latter' s consent, the
enemy's sick and wounded to be interned by the neutral

State until the end of hostilities." (Article 2.)
The three suggestions made in this Article are, obviously, not
intended to be exhaustive. Subject to the fundamental principles
of the Convention the opposing commanders are free to come to
whatever arrangements they deem fit, in order to advance the in-
terests of the sick and wounded. As the sick and wounded are
prisoners of war, and, therefore, as such, liable to rather severe

treatment, the commanders may, then, well agree to mitigate
mutually some of the attendant rigours.
"After each engagement the commander in possession of the
field shalltake measures to' search for the wounded, and to ensure
protection against pillage and maltreatment, both for the wounded

and the dead.
He shall see to it that a careful examination of the bodies is
made before the dead are buried or cremated." (Article 3.)
"
The dead. Every modern war has seen wounded men left untended
. . .
after battle, in agony from wounds, pain, and thirst, perishing of

exhaustion, of starvation, of the violence of marauders, of the chill
of frost or the heat of accidentally kindled fires No international
.
agreement will ever make such things as these utterly impos-

sible" (<?). In certain circumstances it may not be possible to
take up the casualties after a conflict, e.g.^ when a belligerent
(a) Spaight, War Rights on Land, p. 427.

EIGHTS OF WAK AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE. 487
holds a strategic position and whose defence works he guards so

jealously that he will not permit the enemy's search-parties to
approach his line, for fear that they might at the sam:e time gain
valuable information. Many instances of this kind occurred in
the South African war and in the Russo-Japanese war. As to thte
collectionand disposal of the dead, the regulations issued by the

Japanese authorities in the latter war marked a humane and en-
lightened departure (&) So far as possible, the m'ode of burial

.
should be that in force in the country of the deceased. Thus the

Japanese buried the Russian dead and performed appropriate
obsequies, although cremation is the regular practice in their own
country .
"
Each belligerent shall, as soon as possible, send to the autho- Exchange of
information.
rities of the country or army to which they belong the military
identification marks or tokens found on the dead, and a list of the
names of the sick or wounded collected by him.
The belligerents shall keep each other mutually informed of
any internments and transfers, as well as of admissions into hos-
pital and deaths among the sick and wounded in their hands.
Thej^ shall collect all the articles of personal use, valuables, letters,
&c., found on the field of battle or left by the sick or wounded who
have died in the medical establishments or units, in order that such
articles may be transmitted to the persons interested by the autho-
rities of their own country." (Article 4.)
The obligation laid down in this Article refers, clearly, to the
sick, wounded, and fallen belonging to the enemy, for the duties
of a belligerent towards his own sick, wounded, and fallen are
prescribed by his own municipal law and military regulations.

There are few wars in which combatants have not sheltered
themselves behind wounded enemy soldiers; though there is no
express injunction on the point in any convention, the practice is
a violation of recognised usage and a cowardly breach of the
dictates of humanity.
Again, to simulate sickness or wounds for a hostile purpose is
not a legitimate ruse of war, and is punishable as a war crime.
"
The competent military authority may make an appeal to the
charitable zeal of the inhabitants to collect and take care of, under
his direction, the sick and wounded of armies, granting to those
who respond to the appeal special protection and certain immu-
nities." (Article 5.)
(6) Cf. Hershey, Russo-Japanese War, pp. 291 seq.; Ariga, La guerre
russo-japonaise, pp. 154 seq.
This Article a suggestion which comlnanders may, in

is also
their discretion, carry out. Supervision is necessary to prevent

pillage and espionage.
"
Medical units Mobile medical units (that say, those which are intended
is to
inviolable.
to accompany armies in the and the fixed establishments of
field)
the medical service shall be respected and protected by the belli-
gerents." (Article 6.)
The expressions used in this Article replaced the terms
'ambulances' and '-military hospitals' respectively, which were
adopted by the Geneva Convention of 1864. Despite the distinc-
tion made in Article 6, it is difficult to draw a sharp line of de-
marcation between mobile medical units and fixed establishments.
Prof. Holland, who was one of the British representatives at
"
Geneva, says that mobile medical units include all organizations
which follow the troops on the field of battle (described in the
British army as 'bearer companies' or 'field hospitals'); while
'fixed establishments,' which might perhaps have been better
' ' ' ' '
described as fixed units,' would cover stationary or general

hospitals (whether actually movable or not), placed on a line of
communications, or at a base" (c).
"
When pro- The protection to which medical units and establishments are
tection ceases.
entitled ceases if they are used to commit acts injurious to the
enemy." (Article 7.)

"
The following facts are not considered to be of such a nature as
to deprive a medical unit or establishment of the protection
guaranteed by Article 7:
—
That the personnel of the unit or of the establishment is
(1)
armed, and that it uses its arms for its own defence or for that of
the sick and wounded under its charge .
(2) That in default of armed orderlies the unit or establishment

isguarded by a picket or by sentinels duly authorized.
(3) That arms or cartridges taken from the wounded and not
yet handed over to the proper authority are found in the unit or
establishment." (Article 8.)
From the above it is clear that a medical unit, though it is not
entitled to adopt measures of offence, is permitted to defend itself,
if attacked,without thereby being deprived of the right of respect
and protection. Thus, in the Russo-Japanese war, a Japanese
sanitary corps having been attacked by a band of retreating
Russians, charged the assailants and even made them prisoners {d).
(<?) Laws of War on Land (1908), (d) Cf. Ariga, La guerre russo-
p. 30. Of. Spaight, op. cit. p. 437. japonaise, pp. 207 seq.
The meaning of the second proviso in the Article is that if the

sentinels cannot produce a due authority they are liable to be
taken as prisoners of war (conformably to the following xlrticle) ;
if they can, then they are to be released.

"
The personnel engaged exclusively in the collection, transport, Personnel,
and treatment of the sick and wounded, as well as in the adminis-
tration of medical units and establishments, and the chaplains
attached to armies, shall be respected and protected under all
circumstances. If they fall into the hands of the enemy, they shall
not be treated as prisoners of war.
These provisions apply to the personnel of the guard of medical
units and establishments under the circumstances indicated in
Articles (2)." (Article 9.)
' '
The use in this Article of the word

exclusively indicates that
protection will not be extended to soldiers who are detailed tem-
porarily to assist as sick orderlies. Those who give only occasional
help are liable, if captured, to be treated as prisoners of war.
The immunity conferred on the regular and permanent personnel
is conditional on their not
participating in operations hostile to
the enemy's interests,, including such acts as the transmission of
letters or messages.
The personnel of voluntary aid societies,, duly recognised and Aid societies,
authorized by their Government, who are employed in the medical

units and establishments of armies, is placed on the same footing as
the personnel referred to in the preceding Article, provided always
that the said personnel shall be subject to military law and regula-
tions .
"
Each State shall notify to the other, either in time of peace or
at the commencement of or during the course of hostilities, but in
any case before actually employing them,, the names of the societies
which it has authorized, under its responsibility, to render assist-
ance to the regular medical service of its armies." (Article 10.)
"
This Article makes it quite clear that Red Cross, or aid,
societies, unless affiliated to the regular medical organization of
one or the other belligerent, and subject to its military law, enjoy
none of the benefits conferred by the Convention. ... It makes
no difference whether or not they are recognised by the Government
of the State to which they belong, as available when needed for
service with its own armies" (e).
"A. recognised society of a neutral country can only afford the

assistance of its medical personnel and units to a belligerent with
(e) Holland, op. cit. § 51.

the previous consent of its own Government and the authorization

of the belligerent concerned.
A belligerent who accepts such assistance is bound to notify the
fact to the adversary before making any use of it." (Article 11.)
Obviously this Article imposes no obligation on the other bel-
ligerent to allow passage to neutral aid societies intending to join
the enemy. Thus in the Anglo-Boer war Great Britain refused
to accede to the application of several foreign ambulances for
permission to join her enemy, because an ambulance that had
before then obtained leave was found to be the bearer of messages
to Boer combatants. Similarly in 1896 Italy refused to allow a
Russian Red Cross Society to proceed to Abyssinia. Neutral aid
societies are bound to assist the belligerents impartially. But the
nature and the extent of the assistance depend obviously on the
needs of the particular belligerent. In recent wars there have
been several instances where a neutral Red Cross Society was de-
barred from sending aid to a belligerent whom it intended to serve ^
because it was unable to render similar assistance to the other (/) .
"
The persons designated in Articles 0, 10, and 11, shall continue^
after they have fallen into the hands of the enemy, to carry on
their duties under his direction.
Rights of the When their assistance is no longer indispensable, they shall be
personnel.
sent back to their army or to their country at such time and by
such route as may be compatible with military exigencies.
They shall then take with them such effects, instruments, arms,,
and horses as are their private property." (Article 12.)
Under the old Convention, the personnel could, in the circum-
stances indicated in this Article, withdraw at once, though special
engagements were sometimes concluded to secure a continuation

of their services; but under the present Convention the persons,
designated who fall into the enemy's hands may be compelled by

him to continue their duties, so long as their services are indis-
pensable Whilst the material of voluntary aid societies is liable

to bo requisitioned (in accordance with Article 16), that of the
personnel is inviolable.
"
The enemy shall secure to the persons mentioned in Article 9,,
while in his hands, the same allowances and the same pay as are
granted to the persons holding the same rank in his own army."
(Article 13.)
This Article does not apply to persons associated to voluntary
aid societies.
(/) Of. Spaight, p. 443.

"
If mobile medical units fall into the hands of the enemy they Material,
shall retain their material, including their teams, irrespectively of
the means of transport and the drivers employed .
Nevertheless, the competent military authority shall have the

right to use the material for the treatment of the sick and wounded .
It shall be restored under the conditions laid down for the medical
personnel, and so far as possible at th© same time." (Article 14.)
The units mentioned in this Article "are to retain their mate-
of its character, i.e., although portions of
rial, &c., irrespectively
ithave been borrowed from military units or obtained by requisi-
"
tion from the inhabitants of the country (^). captor is not A
necessarily debarred, under this provision, from using in case of
necessity some of the material of a medical unit for the benefit
of his own wounded.
"
The buildings and material of fixed establishments remain sub-
ject to the laws of war, but may not be diverted from their purpose
so long as they are necessary for the sick and wounded.
Nevertheless, the commanders of troops in the field may dispose Liability of

of them, in case of urgent military necessity, provided they make
^^J^^î'^'*
previous arrangements for the welfare of the sick and wounded who
"
are found there." (Article 15.)

It is clear here that when a belligerent militarily occupies terri-
tory of the enemy, fixed establishments pass with it to the invader.

They are liable to confiscation; but not to diversion from their
purpose, if they contain sick and wounded, unless military exi-
gencies demand, and then only if other provision is made. Civil
hospitals, even if belonging to the State, would, unlike these mili-
tary establishments, be free from confiscation.
"
The material of voluntary aid societies which are admitted to
the privileges of the Convention under the conditions herein
prescribed, considered private property, and, as such, is to be
is
respected, under all circumstances, saving only the right of requisi-
tion as recognised for belligerents in accordance with the laws

and usages of war." (Article 16.)
"Medical stores, drugs, &c., except those held by a mobile
medical unit or a convoy of evacuation, are noit protected by the
Convention, and are subject to seizure just like any other army
property" (h).
"Convoys of evacuation shall be treated like mobile medical Convoys of
units, subject to the following special provisions:

—
(1) A belligerent intercepting a convoy may break it up if
(g) Holland, op. cit. § 55. (A) Spaight, op. cit. p. 449. See
ibid, for practices in recent wars.
492 EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WAREAEE.
militarj exigencies demand, provided he takes charge of the sick

and wounded who are in it.
(2) In this case, the obligation to send back the medical per-
sonnel, provided for in Article 12, shall be extended to the entire
militarj personnel detailed for the transport or the protection

of the convoy and furnished with an authority in due form to
that effect.
The obligation to restore the medical material provided for in
Article 14 shall apply to railway trains and boats used in internal
navigation, which are specially arranged for evacuation, as well

as to th(3 material belonging to the medical service for fitting up
ordinary vehicles, trains, and boats.

Military vehicles, other than those of the medical service, may
be captured with their teams.
The civilian personnel and the various means of transport ob-
tained by requisition,, including railway material and boats used
for convoys, shall be subject to the general rules of international
law." (Article 17.)
In the sense contemplated by this Article convoys of evacuation
are convoys of sick and wounded in course of conveyance, by rail,
road, or river. Under the earlier Convention they enjoyed an

"absolute neutrality." To make the requisitioned personnel and
material subject to international law implies that they may be
requisitioned by the belligerent into whose hands they fall. A
'mixed' train, one consisting not only of sick and wounded,
i.e.,
but also of military persons and material, is not considered a
'
convoy of evacuation, and therefore cannot claim protection Thus .
in 1904 the Japanese at Port Arthur fired on a train flying the

Red Cross flag, on the ground that it contained military persons,
besides sick and wounded (i) . A belligerent may stop a suspected
hospital train, and may fire a warning shot to compel it to stop (k) .
The emblem "

As a compliment to Switzerland, the heraldic emblem of the
Cross. Red Cross on a white gi'ound, formed by reversing the Federal
colours, is retained as the emblem and distinctive sign of the
medical service of armies." (Article 18.)
from the expressions used in this Article that the Red
It is clear
Cross emblem has no religious significance. It was thereby
intended to conciliate the susceptibilities and allay the suspicions
of Mohammedan countries. Turkey uses for the protection of her
ambulances the device of the Red Crescent; and Persia uses the
Lion and Sun.
(i) See Ariga, op. cit. § 48; Her- (Jc) Of. the suggestions of Ariga,
ehey, Eusso-Japaneee War, p. 302. loc. cit.
EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WAEFARE. 493
"
With the permission of the competent military authority this
emblem shall be shown on the flags and armlets (brassards), as
well as on all the material belonging to the medical service."
(Article 19.)
''
The personnel protected in pursuance of Articles 9 (par. 1),
10, and 11, shall wear, fixed to the left arm, an armlet (brassard)
with a Red Cross on a white ground, delivered and stamped by the
competent military authority and accompanied by a certificate of
identity in the case of persons who are attached to the medical

service of armies, but who have not a military uniform."
(Article 20.)
It will be noted that there are no regulations respecting the
size of the flag, the brassard, and the Red Cross. In any case the
Red Cross should be visible. The armlet
is not always indispen-
sable to confer
immunity, seeing that it need not be worn by those
employed only temporarily in the medical service, e.g., pickets,
guards, litter-bearers.
"
The distinctive flag of the Convention shall be hoisted only over The Eed
Cross flag,
those medical units and establishments which are entitled to be
respected under the Convention and with the consent of the mili-
tary authority. It should be accompanied by the national flag of
the belligerent to whom' the unit or establishment belongs.
Nevertheless, medical units which have fallen into the hands of

the enemy, so long as they are in. that situation, shall not fly any
other flag than that of the Red Cross." (Article 21.)
It is evident from this provision that the Red Cross flag must
not be allowed to over civil hoiSpitals or any buildings and
fly
ambulances except those that are here specified. But in recent
wars, civil hospitals, particularly those in bombarded towns, have
usually hoisted the Geneva flag. No provision has been made for
the use of a visible sign at night.
It would seem that persons wearing the armlet, who approach
a position or works that the enemy is anxioius to conceal, may be
ordered to halt either by shouting to them or firing a warning shot,
and, if they do not halt in spite of the perceptible signals, may be
shot at, or, in the alternative, captured and detained (I).
"
The medical units belonging to neutral countries which may be
authorized to afford their services under the conditions laid down
in Article 11 shall fly, along with the flag of the Convention, the
national flag of the belligerent to whose army they are attached .
(Z) Cf. Ariga, La guerre russo-japonaise, pp. 189 seq.

494 RIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE.
The provisions of the second paragraph of the preceding Article

are applicable to them." (Article 22.)
"
The emblem of the Red Cross on a white ground and the words
' ' ' '
E-ed Cross or Geneva Cross shall not be used, either in time

of peace or in time of war, except to proitect or to indicate the
medical units and establishments and the personnel and material
protected by the Convention." (Article 23.)
(This Article was not accepted bj Great Britain.)
"
Application The provisions of the present Convention are binding only upon
and carrying
out of the the contracting Powers in the case of war between two or more of
Convention. them. These provisions shall cease to be binding from the moment
when one of the belligerent Powers is not a party to the Con-
vention." (Article 24.)
"
The commanders-in-chief
of belligerent armies shall arrange
the details for carrying out the preceding Articles, as well as for
cases not provided for, in accordance with the instructions of their
respective Governments and in conformity with the general prin-

ciples of the present Convention." (Article 25.)
"
The signatory Governments will take the necessary measures to
instruct their troops, especially the personnel protected, in the
provisions of the present Convention, and to bring them to the

notice of the civil population." (Article 26.)
'*
Prevention of The signatory Governments, in countries the legislation of
abuses and
irifractioiJi!i.
which is not at pressnt adequate for the purpose, undertake to
adopt or to propoise to their legislative bodies such measures as may
be necessary to prevent at all timies the employment of the emblem
or the name of Red Cross or Geneva Cross by private individuals
or by than those entitled to do so under the present
societies other
Convention, and in particular for commercial purposes as a trade

mark or trading mark.
The prohibition of the employment of the emblem or the names
in question shall come into operation from the date fixed by each
legislature, and at the latest five yeats after the present Convention
comes into force. From that date it shall no longer be lawful to
adopt a trade mark or trading mark contrary to this prohibition."
(Article 27.)
(This Article was not accepted by Great Britain.)
*'
The signatory Governments also undertake to adopt, or to pro-
pose to their legislative bodies, should their military law be in-

measures necessary for the repression
sufiicient for the purpose, the
in time of war of individual acts of pillage and maltreatment of
the sick and wounded of armies, as well as for the punishment,
as an unlawful employment of military insignia, of the improper
use of the E,©d Cross flag and armlet (brassard) by officers and
soldiers or private individuals not protected by the present Con-
vention .
They communicate to on© another, through the Swiss

shall
Federal Council, the provisions relative to these measures of
repression at the latest within five years from' the ratification of the
present Convention." (Articlei'28.)
(This Article was not accepted by Great Britain. Whilst the
British delegates expressed their sympathy with the provisions of
Articles 23, 27and 28, they did not accept them, because they were
unable to guarantee that the legislature would enact them.)
—
The remaining Articles (29 33) relate to the ratification of the
Convention, to its denunciation, and to, the subsequent adhesion
of Powers not originally parties thereto. Article 31 lays down,
as has already been pointed out, that the Convention of 1864
applies to such of its signatories as do not ratify the present

Convention (m) .
In former times nearly all methods conceivable were considered Means of

INJURING THE
legitimate by a belligerent in his efforts to overcome or destroy ENEMY ON
LAND.
his enemy. Gradually relaxations were introduced, through the
influence of religion, the writings of jurists and others, the grow-
ing sense of humanity the peoples of the world, and the
among
humaner practices of generous and chivalrous commanders. Thus
limitations were gradually im^posed on the means of injuring the
enemy, and so definite customs and usages became generally recog-

nised and established. Now we have a considerable body of
conventional law on the subject; though the customary law is to
be taken as supplementing it where necessary. The Hague Eegu-
lations and Declarations as well as the St. Petersburg Declaration
apply here.
"The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy Means
" ^^"^'*^^
is not unlimited (w) .
'*
Considering that the progress of civilization should have the
effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war that ;
the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accom-
plish during war is to weaken the military forces of the ene^my;

that for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible
number of men; that this object would be exceeded by the employ-
(w) As to various infractions of the the Great War, pp. 245 seq.
Geneva Convention during the Great (w) Hague Regulations (1907),
War, &©e Phillipson, Int. Law and iv. 22. .
496 EIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFAEE.
ment of arms which needlessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled

men, or render their death inevitable; that the employment of such
arms would therefore be contrary to the laws of humanity; the
contracting parties engage mutually to renounce in case of war
among themselves the employment by their military or naval
troops of any projectile of a weight less than 400 grammes (about
13 J ounces), which is either explosive or
charged with fulminating
or inflammable substances" (o).
The three following Hague Declarations deal with aircraft pro-

jectiles, asphyxiating gases, and expanding bullets: —
"
The contracting Powers agree to prohibit, for a period extend-
ing to the close of the Third Peace Conference, the discharge of
projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other new methods
of a similar nature" (p).
"
The contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of pro-
jectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or
"
deleterious gases (g) .
"
The contracting parties agree to abstain from the use of bullets
which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets
with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core, or
is pierced with incisions" (r).
Special Besides the prohibitions contained in the Declaration of St.

pio 1 itions.
Ptitersburg, the Hague Declarations, and any others that may
have been or be laid down, the Hague Regulations (1907)
may
particularly forbid combatants to have recourse to the following
proceedings:
—
"
(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons;
(b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the
hostile nation or army;
(c) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms,
or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at
discretion ;
(d) To declare that no quarter will be given;

(e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause
superfluous injury;
(f ) To make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag,
or of military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as also
the distinctive signs of the Geneva Convention;
(g) To destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such
(o) Declaration of St. Petersburg, (p) Hague Declar. (1907) (1).

186i8. (q) Hague Declar. (1899) (2).
(r) Hague Declar. (1899) (3).
EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE. 497'
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the

necessities of war;
(h) To declare extinguished, suspended, or inadmissible in a
court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the
hostile party.
Abelligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of

the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed
against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's

service before the commencement of the war" (s).
"Ruses of war and the employment of measures necessary for Ruses of war.
obtaining information about the enemy and the country are con-
sidered lawful" (t).
It is clear from the foregoing that the instruments and methods Methods of
of warfare that a belligerent may adopt are restricted. Inter- restricted.
nationaFi^^ proclaims that the only object of war as such is to

overcome the armed forces of the enemy;. The infliction of death
and agony as an end in itself, the illtreatment of combatants who
have already been disarmed, are, therefore, illegitimate. Simi-
larly, the use of projectiles and arms which not only effectively
disable the enemy, but lalso entail unnecessary suffering, is contrary
to war law. The fundamental principle throughout warfare is
that no greater force, no greater severity should be applied than
is absolutely necessary to gain ascendancy over the adversary.
' '
The plea of military necessity cannot prevail over specific pro-
hibitions imposed by law, written or customary.
The Hague Rules sometimes speak of military necessity by Military
way of exception; but the German Official Manual sets it up as ^^^^^^^^^y.
the predominating factor in warlike procedure, to which all the

established mitigations of warfare, all considerations of humanity
and fairness are subservient. The instructions contained in the
Kriegshrauch are inconsistent with the rules we have set forth,
when they state that the German armies must, in order to be
efficient, do their utmost to annihilate the enemy to demolish his —

material possessions, to crush his physical power, to destroy his
—
intellectual and moral resources in a word, to bring about his
entire demoralization. Officers are warned against the humani-
tarian tendencies of the time. The Manual declares that it is
the combatants' own interest that dictates the imposition of restric-
(s) Hague Regul. (1907), iv. 23, (0 Ibid. Art. 2i.

a—h.
W .
32
498 RIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE.
and cunning. German writers

tions on the use of violence, terror,
'
frequently distinguish between Kriegsmanier,' the custom or

'
usage of war which imports relaxations, and Kriegsraison,' the

necessity of war which disregards restrictions when their observ-
ance would interfere with military operations. Thus their maxim
' '
is Kriegsraison geht vor Kriegsmanier (Necessity of war takes

precedence of usage of war); that is, when a case of 'necessity'
is thought to have arisen, the laws of war lose their binding force.
These doctrines are clearly unjustifiable; their application in the

Great War of 1914 aroused the indignation of the civilized
world {u) .
Explosive In 1863 the Russian military authorities invented a bullet that

exploded when fired on a hard surface, and later it was modified so
as to explode when impinging on a soft substance. However, the
Russian Government undertook to abstain from the use of such
projectiles, if the other European Powers engaged to do the same.
A Conference comprising representatives from theEuropean States
and from Brazil met at St. Petersburg in 1868, and produced the
Declaration referred to above. There have been many wars since
that d^te, but explosive bullets have regularly been avoided by
belligerents. Though the United States and Spain were not

parties to the Declaration, explosive bullets were not used by them
in their war of 1898. However, it was reserved for German troops
in 1914 —according to evidence advanced by the Belgian autho-
rities — ^to have recourse to the prohibited bullet {x) .
Expanding Similarly, the use of expanding bullets is illegal The notorious.
dum-dum —
bullet so called from the name of the works near
Calcutta where it was manufactured —was intended to be used by
Great Britain only against certain tribes of fanatical savages whose
wild onslaughts could not be effectively arrested by the ordinary
kind of bullets. Great Britain was not a party to the Declaration
of 1899 forbidding their use (though she acceded in 1907); never-
theless she did not use them' in the South African war. In the
war of 1914, again, the Belgian authorities accused the German
army of employing expanding bullets; whilst the British Govern-
ment, in reply to German charges, publicly denied that they had
been used by British or French troops, and maintained, on the
contrary, that both in France and in Togoland German soldiers
(u) Of. Phillipson, Int. Law and Krieg«brauch im Landkriê, see an

tthe Great War, pp. 133 seq. On Article by A. Merignliac, in Revue
*
Kriegsraison,' &c., see Westlake, Col- gonerale de droit int. public, vol. xiv.
lected Papers (1914), pp. 243, 244; (1907), pp. 197 seq.
and for a full (examination of thej (x) Of. Phillipson, op. cit. pp. 200,
extravagant views set forth in the 201.
had been supplied with soft-core bullets having thin envelopes

which did not entirely cover the core {y) .
The Hague Declaration, No. 1, prohibiting the use of aircraft Aircraft pro-
""^^ ^ ^^*
projectiles, was first made in 1899 at the Hague Conference for a
term of five years, and was ratified by nearly all the States repre-
sented, notable exceptions being Great Britain and the United
States. This Declaration having expired by the efflux of time,
a similar prohibition was declared at the second Hague Conference
in 1907, when it was signed and ratified by both Great Britain and
the United States. More than a third of the Powers represented,
however, did not sign it, among which are France, Russia, Japan,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden. Accordingly, the Declaration
of 1907, prohibiting the discharge of projectiles from balloons, &c.,
cannot be considered a binding rule of international law, except as
between the signatory parties themselves. None the less, there
are several restrictions imposed by general rules, written and cus-
tomary, on the employment of such projectiles. These will be

presently considered, when we deal with the question of bombard-
ment {z) .
The Declaration against the use of shells for the "sole object" Poisonous
of diffusing noxious gases was accepted by nearly all the Powers
represented at the Hague Conference of 1899. Great Britain

and the United States were again exceptions, though the former
signified her adhesion in 1907. There can be no doubt that this
"
rule now possesses binding force generally. The expression sole
"^
object is to be noted. Bursting shells, the fumes of which are
only incidentally injurious, are not, of course, prohibited. The

prohibition applies when it is the sole —
purpose and we may
reasonably add, the umin purpose
—of the enemy to diffuse as-
phyxiating gases. It appears that during the Crimean war, the

American Civil War, and the Pranco-German war, suggestions
were made by individuals as to the use of such gases, but were
not entertained . The use of this barbarous instrument of warfare
was reserved for the year 1915, when the German armies employed
it systematically, and thereby and agony on many
inflicted death
men.
The employment of poisoned weapons has at all times been held ^^^^^
to be an illegitimate and outrageous practice. Apart from this,
the use of poison is condemned by modern conventional law; nor
{y) Ibid.^^.^Qlseq. The use com- pagnet, La guerre sud-africaine,

plained of was, no doubt, exceptional ; pp. Ill, 112; and in the Russo-
as was also the case in the South see op. cit.
Japanese war, Ariga,
African war, when complaints were p. 246.
made against the Boers; see F. Des- {z) See infra, p. 622.
32 (2)
was it tolerated by the older customary law. In the Anglo-Boer

war and in the Eusso- Japanese war there were reports, which were
not definitely verified, that streams and wells were poisoned by
belligerent forces. In April and May, 1915, reports came from
South-West Africa that in the war there between the German
colonial troops and the Union forces under General Botha, the
former resorted to the deliberate poisoning of wells. To cut off
the enemy's water supply is not an illegitimate proceeding, but to
poison it savours of treachery and is unlawful. From the pro-

hibition of Article 23a and the condemnation of deleterious gases,
we may reasonably infer that the wilful spreading of contagious
diseases is similarly illegal.
Treacherous
conduct. .....
ijij^g treachery spoken of in Article 23b "includes not only
.
assassination of individuals, but also by implication any offer for

.
' "
an individual dead or alive' {a). In the Chinese- Japanese war,
the Chinese authorities offered a reward for the heads of three
Japanese generals. This is the only instance in modern warfare

thatwas countenanced by the authorities of a belligerent. The
test of treacherous conduct in general is the assumption of a false
character whereby the person assuming it deceives his enemy and
so is able to commit a hostile act which he could not have done had
he avoided the false pretences. "Modern international law dis-
tinguishes between dashes made at a ruler or commander by an
little band of individuals who come as
individual or a open enemies,
and similar attempts made by those who disguise their enemy
character. A man who steals secretly into the opposing camp in
the dark, and makes alone or with others a sudden attack in
uniform upon the tent of king or general, is a brave and devoted
soldier. A man who obtains admission to the same tent disguised
as a pedlar, and stabs its occupant when lured into a false security,
is a vile assassin, and the
attempt to procure such a murder is as
criminal as the murder itself" (6). To pretend to surrender and
then attack the enemy is an act of treachery, as is also to
approach
under a flag of truce and then commit a hostile act. War law
" "
condemns this stab-in-the-back style of fighting. But, as was
pointed out in a British Army Order during the Boer war, 1900,
treacherous conduct is not to be confounded with
military sur-
ambushes, or stratagems, which are permissible.
prises,
Ruses of war. Kuses of War generally, and stratagems adopted for intelligence
work in particular, are permitted by Article 24. But this must be
taken subject to the prohibition of treachery, and tsubject to
(a) Holland, op. cit. § 76. International Law (London, 1913),

{b) T. J. Lawrence, Principles of pp. i553, 554.
Article 23f which condemns the improper use of a flag of truce,

,
of the national flag, of the military uniform' and insignia of the
enemy, and the distinctive signs of the Geneva Convention. All

stratagems and devices adopted by a belligerent for the purpose of
obtaining an advantage over the enemy by misleading him and
putting guard are allovâble, if they are merely exhibitions
of! his
of astuteness and strategic and tactical
ingenuity and are not
tainted by a treacherous element or breach of good faith, and do
not involve the violation of any rule either express or tacit. In
ever}^ war, various kinds of tricks are carried out that fall within
making a sudden surprise, laying a trap, pre-

this provision, e.g.,
tending that an attack or retirement is being* prepared, raising

clouds of dust or lighting many fires in order to make a small
force seem larger than it really setting up dummy guns or
is,
laying dummy mines, building bridges and other works not in-
tended to be used, sending bogus messages, despatches, and news-
papers with the object that they may be intercepted by the enemy
and so deceive him, using the enemy's signals, imitating the bugle-
calls and words of command, calling upon men to surrender with
a threat that if they refuse they will be annihilated by approaching
forces which in fact are not there, threatening to bombard a
defended town when the guns have not really arrived, and so on,
Belligerents are ever ready to put into practice the ancient maxim,
"Where lion-skin runs short, patch up with fox-skin." But
where there is an obligation to speak the truth and keep faith, any
ruse involving a breach of such obligation is improper, e.g., de-
claring that a truce had been established when such was not the
case, violating a safe conduct, demanding an armistice and break-
ing it by surprise, &c. (c) . Good faith is indispensable in warfare.
Its entire disregard would render possible the perpetration of
greater and greater horrors and villainy.
As to Article 23f forbidding the improper use of the enemy's Use of enemy
,
flag or uniform, &c., the main difficulty is to determine when such uuSorm.
use is proper and when improper. (The improper use of the flag
of truce, which is also mentioned in this Article, will be considered
presently (^) ) The old rule was that it was justifiable to use
.
the distinctive emblems of an enemy for the purpose of effecting

an evasion or for luring his forces into action, but before attacking
it was obligatory to reveal the true colours (e). The prevailing
the British official manual

(c) Cf. {d) Sec infra, p. 517.
of war law, entitled Land Warfare As to the assumption of enemy
(e)
(ed. by Ool. Edmonds and Prof. colours in maritime warfare, see m/r«,
Oppenheim). p. 579.
502 EIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WAEFARE.
view at the present time condemns the use of the hostile flag or
uniform during a combat, and for purposes of approach.
Article 23f by no means settles the question; so that each case
must necessarily be judged on its merits, and determined con-
formably to the basic principles of war law,
special regard being
paid to the element of bona If troops can get no other
fides.
clothing, in the course of a conflict, but the uniforms of thieir,

enemy, they may legitimately put on the latter, provided that such
modifications are made, ei.g., by removing any distinctive badges,
that the enemy will not confuse the present wearers with members
of their own side (/) .
Again, it would be an abuse of the Red
Cross flag to attach it to wagons or transports that carry anything
other than medical or sanitary stores, for combatants to assume the
badge when they do not belong to the Red Cross service, or for
buildings to fly the flag when they are used as military depots,
observatories, or places of refuge for combatants (g) .
Quarter.
Generally speaking, a belligerent is obliged to grant quarter to
those who offer themselves as prisoners of war. We have already
pointed out that claims of "military necessity "—factitious and
—
ubiquitous as they are cannot justify the destruction of men
who have been taken prisoners. But in the case of those who lay
down their arms and appeal to the adversary for mercy, quarter
must be given where it is practicable. "The admitted case in
which it is not practicable is that which occurs during the continu-
ance of fighting, when the achievement of victory would be
hindered and even endangered by stopping to give quarter instead
of cutting down the enemy and rushing on, not to mention that
during fighting it is often impracticable so to secure prisoners as

to prevent their return to the combat. Hence it is especially diffi-
cult to avoid ruthless slaughter in the storm' of a
place or position,
but the rule formerly dictated by military pride that those are not
entitled to quarter who insult a* superior force
by defending a
place after a breach has been made and the counterscarp thrown in,
or who defend an ill-fortified plape at all against a
superior force,
"
is entirely obsolete and condemned There is no uniform
(^) .
method of indicating surrender. The most usual way is by hoist-

ing the white flag, especiajly when a detachment or group is
concerned; sometimes white handkerchiefs are raised, arms thrown
down, hands held up, the butt end of the gun raised, &c.
(/) For practices in recent wars, see Cross during the Great War, gee
Spaight, pp. 106 seq.; Ariga, §§ 67, Phillipson, ,op. oit. p. 209.
€8. (A) Westlake, Int. Law (1913),
ig) For cases of abuse of the Red vol. ii. p. 83.
Wo have already referred to illegal bullets,asphyxiating gases, Prohibited

'
and to the general pronouncement in the Declaration of St. Peters-
burg. The latter is reinforced by Article 23e, which forbids the

use of arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause super-
fluous injury. These prohibited instruments of warfare no doubt
include such things as glass, nails, irregularly shaped bits of iron;
and some writers hold that red-hot shot is also included Explo-
.
sivehand grenades are not prohibited; they were used in the

Crimean war, the American Civil War, and in the Eusso- Japanese
war; and they were constantly employed in the Great War of
1914.
With regard to Article 23h, which forbids a belligerent to Enemy's legal
declare extinguished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law a<Sions.
the rights and actions of enemy subjects, we have already shown
above (i) that it refers to a commander in the field or in military
occupation of the enemy territory. It cannot, therefore, impose
an international obligation possessing general applicability. This
being so, the clause as it stands is defective in wording.
Further, a belligerent may not compel enemy subjects to take Services of
part in operations directed against their own country. The opera- g^^^^j-g
tions referred to are clearly of a more comprehensive character
than 'military operations.' They would include services in all
kinds of works that are imtnediately or that will be subsequently
useful to the belligerent in the carrying on of his war. Obviously,
therefore, it is unlawful to force enemy subjects to build fortifica-
tions, to dig trenches, to manufacture munitions or other war
*
material, to repair arms, to give information as to the enemy's
forces, to act as guides. Where the services,. however, are for the
benefit of the occupied territory and the community in general,
they may be demanded; e.g., carrying provisions, repairing roads
and bridges (unless these are of exclusively or even predominantly
military application), tending the wounded, burying the dead, &c.
It is held in some quarters that the construction of fortifications at
a distance from the scene of hostilities would not fall within the
prohibition. But such fortifications might soon become the centre
of hostilities. It would seem, therefore, that they are likewise
covered by the Article. It is only compulsory service that is for-
bidden; voluntary service may lawfully be accepted.

In connection with the services of enemy subjects, it may be Inciting
added that, notwithstanding the absence of a written provision, it soldiers to

^^^sert, &o.
is a rule of the customary law of nations that to incite the enemy's
(0 See supra, pp. 462, 466. :

troops to treason, desertion, or other disloyaltyj is illegitimate;

but to stir up rebellion in the enemy's country is not generally
considered unlawful, though many jurists condemn the practice.
Enemy's Next we came to Article 23g, which involves the difficult ques-
property.
tions as to the destruction and seizure of enemy's property. It
proclaims, in general terms, that enemy's property, whether public
or private, is to be respected, unless military exigencies demand
otherwise. This provision must be read in conjunction with
Article 43 (k), which says that private property must not be con-
fiscated. The latter Article, however, refers to the proceedings
of an armyin military occupation of the enemy territory, whilst
the former relates to the conduct of hostilities proper.
Devastation In times a belligerent claimed the right to devastate, with-
esivlj
and destruc-
tion. out any restriction, his enemy's territory and destroy his property,
either as an end in itself or as a means to the attainment of his
own end, viz., that for v^hich he made war. Grotius condemned
this practice of unrestricted destruction, and held that devastation
may bo resorted to only when it is calculated to reduce the enemy
to sue for peace, that is when a definite military advantage is
derived thereby (I). At the end of the seventeenth century Bel-
gium' ana Piedmont were devastated. Louis XIV., however,

sought to justify his destruction on the ground that it was a defen-
sive measure necessary for the protection of his frontiers; but all
Europe, as Vattel says, resounded with invectives and reproaches.

Later, the practice of devastation came to be associated with the
efforts to achieve certain strategical objects. Vattel, writing in
the middle of the eighteenth century, describes the sacking of
towns and villages, when committed without necessity, as savage
and monstrous excesses^ He says, such necessity may arise in
three cases: to chastise an unjust and barbarous nation for the
purpose of checking its brutality and protecting ourselves from its

depredations to make a barrier for covering a frontier against an
;
enemy who cannot be stopped in any other way in the prosecution ;
of field operations or carrying out siege works (ml) Gradually .
practice tended to follow the mitigations expounded by theory.

Thus, in 1799, when the Duke of York proposed to destroy the
dykes in Holland and flood the country, his proposal was pro-
tested against on the ground that the act would be contrary to the
laws of war if it were not advantageous to his military forces or
detrimental to those of the enemy. The necessity of military
(^) See infra, p. 531. (;«) Droit des Gens, iii. 8, 142;
(0 De Jut. Bel. ac Pac. ill. 12, 1. iii. 9, 166—172.
operations was more and more recognised as the determining factor

of thvo propriety of devastation (n). Accordingly, the destruction,
in 1813, of Newark and York by
the American troops, and that of
public buildings in Washington in 1814 by the British, being un-

necessary from the military point of view, were illegitinaate .
The British measures against the United States were attempted

to be justified as acts of retaliation for similar excesses on the part
of the American forces on the frontiers of Canada. The answer
of the United States Government emphasized that the system of
devastation, which had been practised by the British forces, was
manifestly contrary to the usages of civilized warfare; it referred
to the wanton desolation that had been committed by the British
naval forces in 1813, at Ha vre-de -Grace and Georgetown and
other places in the Chesapeake Bay; and stigmatized the destruc-
tion of the public buildings in Washington as an act unexampled
in the wars of modern Europe. Moreover, it was stated that the
destruction of justified by the officers who ordered it,
Newark was
on the ground that became necessary in the military operations
it
there, but that it was disavowed by the American Government,

which sought to punish the persons responsible for it, and was
prepared to make reparation. Finally, it was declared that such
practice of desolation was contrary to the views and practices of
the United States, revolting to humanity, and repugnant to the
sentiments and usages of the civilized world (o) In the debate
.
in the House of Commons, April 11, 1815, Sir James Mackintosh

described the British naval proceedings as disgraceful. He ob-
served that it was a violation of all decent courtesy to direct an
expedition deliberately against palaces of government, halls of
muniments of
legislation, tribunals of justice, repositories of the
property and of the records of history
—
ôbjects exempted among
civilized nations from the ravages of war, and secured, as far as
possible, even from' its accidental operation, because they contri-

bute nothing to the means of hostility, but are consecrated to
purposes of peace, and minister to the comlnon and perpetual
interest of all human society. It seemed to him an aggravation
•of this atrocious measure, that ministers had endeavoured to
justify the destruction of a distinguished capital, as a retaliation

for some acts of violence of inferior American officers, unautho-
rized and disavowed by their Government, against some insignifi-
(n) Of. De Martens, Precis, § 280; (o) Admiral Cochrane to Mr. Secre-
Kluber, Pt. II. tit. 2, sect. 2, ch. 1, tary Monroe, Aug. 18, 1814, and the
:§§ 262—265. reply, Sept. 6, 1814, in American
State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 693, 694.
506 EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WAEFAEE.
cant village in Upper Canada. To make such retaliation just^

there must always be clear proof of the outrage; in general, alsa
sufficient evidence that the adverse Government had refused to
make due reparation for it; and lastly, some proportion of the
punishment to the offence. But here the excessive destruction
committed, falsely called retaliation, was a monstrous iniquity (p) .
Ravaging the The fundamental principle of war law, then, authorizes us to

territory use against an enemy such a degree of violence, and such only, as-
when lawful.
The same
^^^^ |^^, necessary to secure the object of hostilities.
general rule, which determines how far it is lawful to destroy the
persons of enemies, will serve as a guide in judging how far it is^
lawrful to ravage or lay waste their country. If this be necessary^
in order to accomplish the just ends of war, it may be lawfully
done, but not otherwise. Thus, if the progress of an enemy cannot
be stopped, nor our own frontier secured, or if the approaches to
a town intended to be attacked cannot be made without laying
waste the intermediate territory, the extreme case may justify
a resort to measures not warranted by the ordinary purposes of
war. When the exigencies of offence or defence demand that
certain enemy property be destroyed or damaged, such destruction
or damage is considered necessary by the law of war and therefore
legitimate. The German Manual expresses the rule in a positive

and in a negative form: No damage must be done, not even the
most which is not necessitated by military reasons. Every
trivial,
damage, even the very greatest, is justifiable, if war demands it or

if it is a consequence of the proper prosecution of war (g) Thu& .
military necessity would apparently justify the devastation of

entire districts and large areas. But to destroy for the mere
purpose of inflicting pecuniary loss is unlawful; gratuitous ravage-
is not warranted by military necessity. Necessity must be
rationally construed. It must not be potential or prospective;
it must, in order to operate as a justification, be direct and
immediate. If modern usage has sanctioned any other exo3p-
tional grounds for severity, they will be found in the right of"
reprisals, or vindictive retaliation. The whole international code

is founded upon reciprocity. The rules it prescribes are observed
by one nation, in confidence that they will be so by others.

Where, then, the established usages of war are violated by an
enemy, and there are no other means of restraining his excesses,.
retaliation may justly be resorted to by the suffering nation, in
(jp) Hansard, vol. XXX. pp. 526, 527. {q) Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege^.
p. 54.
EIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WAEFARE. 507
order to compel the enemy to return to the observance of the law

which he has violated.
The devastation of his own territory has sometimes been resorted Ravaging
tGrritorv .
to bj a belligerent, for the purpose of impeding the advance of the

enemy, and this is perfectly justifiable. Thus, Peter the Great
contributed to his victory over Charles XII. at Pultawa by laying
waste eighty square leagues of Russian territory that lay in the
path of the Swedish army. In 1812, the Eussians caused the
destruction of Napoleon's army by burning down Moscow (r) .
The ravaging of Georgia and Carolina by General Sherman during

the American Civil War, like that of the Shenandoah Valley by
General Sheridan, was perhaps a necessary military operation on
the part of the Federal troops, and it certainly tended to bring
thewar to a more rapid conclusion (s) A similar policy of devas-
.
was carried out by the British in the former Boer B/cpublics.

tation
Whole regions were laid waste to prevent their being used as a
baseby the enemy, the non-combatant families having first been
removed from them and sent to concentration camps. However,
this doctrine of military necessity is obviously liable to terrible
abuse. No doubt the German armies operating in Belgium during
' '
the Great War, 1914, would appeal to this military necessity to

justify their conduct. But no one can admit that military neces-
sity justified the conversion of Belgium into a shambles and a

desert .
Apart from the necessary devastation of territory and destruc-

tion of property, there remains the question of seizing or con-
fiscating property, movable and immovable. This is dealt with

later, in reference to military occupation (f ) .
It has already been pointed out that war is primarily, if not Sieges and
BOMBAR13 —
exclusively, hostilities directed against the arm'ed forces of a belli- ment3.
gerent State; and that, therefore, non-combatants are not to be

deliberately or carelessly subjected to attack. This principle
underlies the Hague Regulations concerning sieges and bombard-
ments .
'*
The attack or bombardment, by any means whatever, of towns, Undefended
which are undefended is pro- P '^^^^v
villages, dwellings, or buildings
hibited" (u).
(r) Calvo, ii. § 893. The Law of War between Belligerents

(s) North American Review, April, (Chicago, 1908), pp. 77 seq.
1872, p. 405. Of. Spaight, War (0 See infrcf, p. 531.
Rights, pp. 133 seq.; P. Bordwell, (u) Art. 25.
At tho Brussels Conference of 1874 the representatives of the

' '
States who were present agreed that only fortified places should
be liable to siege; but in 1899, at the first Hague Conference, this
expression was replaced, at the instance of the German delegate,
by more ambiguous on© 'defended,' on the ground that tho
tlie
requirement implied in the former would unduly restrict the action

of armies in the field. A place that is merely occupied by troops,
though not actually defended, would fall within the terms of this
Article. The German Official Manual lays down that military
necessity justifies bombardment of an occupied locality not only
when its occupation has been devised for defensive purposes, but
also when it is intended to guard a passage, to defend approaches,
to protect a retreat, to prepare or cover a tactical movement, or to
procure provisions (v). Several open towns, both French and
German, were subjected to bombardment in the Franco-German
war because they defended themselves. To offer a defence is not
being open for the enemy to enter if he wishes or if he is able
otherwise. An undefended town that shares in the defence of a
fortified town would probably be regarded as liable to attack.
Further, it may be that military necessity would be held to justify
the bombardment of an open town which is near a fortress, and

which is of military use to the defenders of the latter. Article 25,
it is to be noted, applies also to the use of aircraft bombs. The
words *by any means whatever' were specially added in 1907 to
the corresponding Article of 1899, with that intention.
"
Previous The commandcr of an attacking force must, before commencing
warning. cases of assault, do all in his
^ bombardment, except in power to
warn the authorities" (x).
The warning is, of course, required in order that non-combatants
and their property may be removed to a place of safety. The
word 'assault' refers to a surprise attack. A usage may now be
'
said to be growing up in favour of the free exit of useless mouths.'

When a belligerent proposes to reduce a town by bombardment,
and not by famine, his refusal to permit the civilian population to
leave it would be tantamount to inflicting suffering on persons who
are hj the fundamental principles of war law immune from hos-
tilities. Thus, in the Franco-German war, the Germans allowed
the departure of non-combatants from Strassburg, as they resolved
to carry the town by assault; they refused it in the case of Paris
which they proposed to reduce by famine. There is no fixed
(v) Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege, p. 21. (jx) Art. 26.

interval between the notification and the commencement of the

bombardment; the amount allowed will naturally depend on the
circumstances of each case. If, after due warning, the women,
children, and other non-combatants do not depart, the investing

commander cannot then be held responsible for any injury they
may suffer {y) .
"
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps should be taken Protected
"^ ^°^^'
to spare, as far as possible, buildings devoted to religion, art,
science, and charity, historic monuments, hospitals, and places

where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not
used at the same time for military purposes. It is the duty of the
besieged to indicate these buildings or places by some special
visible signs, which shall previously be notified to the
assailants" {z).
The character of the special sign required by this Article is not
determined for land warfare, as it has been determined for naval
bombardment. Hence, in the former case, an arrangement between
the belligerents would be necessary. Military hospitals, as we
have seen, are specifically protected by the Geneva Convention; so
that the hospitals referred to in this Article are civil hospitals If .
hospitals are deliberately set up in parts of the town which it is of

vital importance for the assailants to shell, the responsibility for
damage to them and injury to the inmates must fall on the de-
fenders. In the Franco-German war, cathedrals, churches, hos-
pitals, historic and artistic buildings, libraries —including the great
—
library of Strassburg suffered dreadfully. In several other wars
before that and since, these protected monuments and buildings
were spared; but in the Great War, 1914, merciless destruction
appears to have been the rule followed regularly by the Gei^man
forces in Belgium and France. The cathedrals of Malines and
Termondo were deliberately attacked, the famous Cloth Hall of
Ypres was intentionally demolished; the wilful destruction of
Reims Cathedral and the university and library of Louvain
aroused the indignation of the entire world. Hospitals, museums,
and other protected buildings were not spared {a) .
"
The giving up to pillage of a town or place, even when taken by
assault, is forbidden" (&).
We shall later on deal more fully with this subject in connection
with Article 47, which prohibits pillage generally (c) .
(y) For the terrible and lawless {z) Art. 27.

bombardment by the Grermans of Bel- («) See Phillipson, loc. cit.
gian and French towns and villages, (6) Art. 28.

see Phillipson, Int. Law and the Great (o) See infra, p. 533.
War, pp. 162 seq.
Spies and International law does not prohibit a belligerent fromi obtaining
espionage.
any information he deems to be necessary about the enemy, the
enemy's country, his preparations, measures of offence and defence,
military resources, strategic plans, &c. But to carry out this
purpose no method may be adopted that involves a violation of
any of the Hague Rules or any rule of customary law. So far
as the field of operations is concerned, such information may be
procured not only by the usual moans of reconnoitring, but by
intercepting messages, questioning prisoners of war, 'bribing
enem^'- soldiers and civilians (a practice that is allowed by military
usage, though reprobated by many writers), using secret agents

and spies.
Definition of
Espionage is defined by the Hague Eegulations {d) as the act
espionage.
of a soldier or civilian who, proceeding clandestinely or on false
pretences, obtains or seeks to obtain information in the zone of

operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating
it to the hostile
party. In order that a charge of espionage (in
the sense contemplated by international law) may be maintained,
three points must be established: firstly, the stealthy character of
the act or false pretences; secondly, that it was comtnitted within
the zone of belligerent operations; thirdly, an intention to cotai-
municate it to the adverse party. If the act is committed or
attempted without secrecy or false pretences or outside the zone
it may none the less be
of operations, regarded as a serious offence
(a 'war crime') by the belligerent into whose hands the offender
falls. from the definition that soldiers not in disguise
It follows
who have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile army
to obtain information cannot be regarded as spies.
Similarly,
the following are not considered spies soldiers or civilians carry-
:
ing out their mission openly, charged with the delivery of

despatches destined either for their own army or for that of the
enemy; persons sent in balloons to deliver despatches, and gene-
rally to maintain communication between the various parts of an
army or a territory; and others similarly engaged. It is obvious
that a soldier would not be carrying out his mission openly if he
divested himself of his uniform and put on civilian dress.
Balloonist?. Aquestion arose during the Franco-German war as to what
treatment persons should receive who ascended in balloons in order
to reconnoitre the enemy's forces. Those who were captured by
the Germans were imprisoned in fortresses, and brought to trial
by a council of war. But the German practice was condemned at
id) Art. 29.

EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WAEFARE. 511
the time; many jurists and publicists held that such balloonists if
taptured should be treated as prisoners of war; and the new provi-

sion of the Hague is in accordance with this view. The declaration
made by a Russian admiral, soon after the commencement of the
Russo-Japanese war, that newspaper correspondents sending wire-

lessmessages from neutral steamers were liable to be treated as
spies was clearly untenable.
A well-known case relating to this subject is that of Major Case of
Andre. John Andre, born in London (1751), of French-Swiss âjorAudre.
descent, joined the British army in Canada and became aide-de-
camp to General Sir Henry Clinton. Benedict Arnold, an Ameri-
can commandant, having undertaken to surrender a certain fortress
to the British forces, Andre was sent by Clinton to make the
necessary arrangements for carrying out this engagement. Andre
met Arnold near the Hudson on the night of September 20, 1780;
then Andro put on civilian clothes, and by means of a passport
giveji tohim by Arnold in the name of John Anderson he was to
pass through the American lines. Approaching the British lines,
he was captured and handed over to the American military autho-
rities. A court-martial summoned by Washington convicted him
"
of espionage, and declared that agreeably to the laws and usages
of nations he ought to suffer death." He was hanged October 2,
1780; but in this country he was considered a martyr. According
to the provision indicated above, his offence could not now have
been regarded as espionage, as he was not seeking information; it
might, however, have been considered a Svar crime' or 'war
treason.'
We may conveniently refer here to the
Lody case. Lody, a TheLody
^^^^'
German subject, was charged (October 30, 1914) before a General
Court Martial in London with attempting to give information to
the German authorities with regard to the defences and war pre-
parations of Great Britain. As the offence was committed in

—
Edinburgh and Dublin places beyond the zone of operations
'
of a belligerent
'
—
it was described as a
*
war crime or war

' '
treason.' The accused was found guilty, condemned to death, and

shot .
A person found guilty of espionage may be hanged or shot; but Penalty,

smaller punishments are sometimes imposed. Where a death sen-
tence is pronounced, it is generally carried out by shooting. In
earlier times a spy caught in the act was liable to be shot on the
spot without any trial. Now the Hague Regulations (e) require
a previous trial.
(e) Art. 30.
''A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, i&
subsequently captured by the enemy, is to be treated as a prisoner

of war, and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of
espionage" (/).
Non-hostile Grotius has devoted a whole chapter of his great work to prove,,
inteecouese
BETWEEN by the consenting testimony of all ages and nations, that good
BELLIGEEENTS.
faith ought to be observed towards an enemy. And even Byn-
kershoek, who holds that every other sort of fraud may be prac-
tised towards him, prohibits perfidy, upon the ground that his.
character of enemy ceases by the compact with him, so far as the
"
terms of that compact extend. I allow of any kind o,f deceit,"
says he, "perfidy alone excepted, not because anything is unlaw-
ful against an enemy, but because when our faith has been pledged
to him, so far as the promise extends, he ceases to be an
enemy."
Indeed, without this mitigation, the horrors of war would be
and interminable in duration. The usage of
indefinite in extent
Commercia civilized nations has therefore introduced certaincommercia belli,,
belli.
by which the violence of war may be allayed, so far as is consistent
with its objects and purposes, and something of a pacific inter-
course may be kept up, which may lead, in time, to an adjustment
of differences, and ultimately to peace (g) .
Truce or There are various modes in which the extreme rigour of the
armistice.
rights of war may be relaxed at the pleasure of the respective
belligerent parties .
Among these is that of a suspension of hos-
tilities, by means of a truce or armistice. This may be either

general or special. If it be general in its application to all
hostilities in every place, and is to endure for a very
long or in-
definite period, it amounts in effect to a temporary peace, except
that it leaves undecided the controversy in whioh the war
originated. Such were the truces formerly concluded between the
Christian Powers and the Turks. Such, too, was the armistice
concluded, in 1609, between Spain and her revolted provinces in
the Netherlands. A
partial truce is limited to certain places,
such as the suspension ofhostilities, which may take place between
two contending armies, or between a besieged fortress and the
army by which it is invested (h) .
(/) Art. 31. As to spying which (g) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub.
does not amount to espionage in the lib. i.
cap. 1. The Daifje (1800), 3
international law sense, see infra, C. Eob. 139.
p. 528. Qi) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii.
ch. 16, §§ 235, 236.
The power to conclude a universal armistice or suspension of Power to

hostilities is not necessarily implied in the ordinary official autho- armistice,
rity of the general or admiral commanding" in chief the military or

naval forces of the State. The conclusion Oif such a general truoe
requires either the previous special authority of the supreme power
of the State, or a subsequent ratification by such power {i).
A partial truce or limited suspension of hostilities may be con-
cluded betwe€n the military and naval officers of the respective
belligerent States, without any special authority for that purpose,
where, from the nature and extent of their commands, such an
authority necessarily implied as essential to the fulfilment of
is
their official duties (k).
A suspension of hostilities binds the contracting parties, and all Period of its
.
T 1 , .
T .
p. 1
• • •
operation.
acting immediately under their direction, irom the time it is
concluded; but it must be duly promulgated in order to have a
force of legal obligation with regard to the other subjects of the
belligerent States; so that if, before such notification, they have

committed any act of hostility, they are not personally responsible,
unless their ignorance be imputable to their own fault or negli-
gence. But as the supreme power of the State is bound to fulfil its
own engagements, or those made by

authority, express or im-
its
plied, the Government

of the captor is bound, in the case of a
suspension of hostilities by sea, to restore all prizes made in contra-

vention of the armistice. To prevent the disputes and difficulties
arising from such
questions, it is usual to stipulate in the con-
vention of armistice, as in treaties of peace, a pnosped:ive period
within which hostilities are to cease, with a due regard to the
situation and distance of places (l).
general maxims
Rules for
Besides the applicable to the interpretation of
all international compacts, there are some rules peculiarly appli- conventio^f
cable to conventions for the suspension of hostilities. The first of ^^ ^rnee.

these rules, as laid down by Vattel, is that each party may do
within his own territory, or within the limits prescribed by the
armistice, whatever he could do in time of peace. Thus either of
the belligerent parties may levy and march troops, collect provi-
sions and other munitions of war, receive reinforcements from his
allies, or repair the fortifications of a place not actually besieged.
The second rule is, that neither party can take advantage of th(e
(0 Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pae. (k) Vide ante,- Pt. III. ch. 2,
lib. cap. 22, § 8; see Barbeyrac's
iii. pp. 357 seq.
(J) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac
note thereon. Vattel, Droit des Gens, Pac.
liv. iii. ch. 16, §§ 233—238. lib. iii. cap. 21, § 5. Vattel, Droit
des Gens, liv. iii. ch. 16, § 239.
w . 33
truce to execute, without peril to himself, what the continuance of

hostilities might have disabled him from doing'. Such an act
would be a fraudulent violation of the armistice. For example,
between the com'mander of a fortified town
in the case of a truce
and the army besieging it, neither party is at liberty to continue
works, constructed either for attack or defence, or to erect new
fortifications for such purposes. Nor can the garrison avail itself
of the truce to introduce provisions or succours into the town,
through the passages or in any other manner which the besieging

army would have been competent to obstruct and prevent, had
hostilities not been interrupted by the armistice. The third rule
stated bj Vattel is rather a corollary from the preceding rules
than a distinct principle capable of any separate application As .
the truce merely suspends hostilities without terminating the war,

all things are to remain in their antecedent state in the places, the
possession of which was specially contested at the time of the

conclusion of the armistice (m) .
It is obvious that the contracting parties may, by express com-

pact, derogate in any and every respect from' these general
conditions.
Recom- î the expiration of the period stipulated in the truce, hostilities
^ ^
mencement of / i o •
as a matter oi course, without any new declaration oi

-,
hostilities on recommence
the expiration
^^^^ g^|. ^f ^j^g truce has been concluded for an indefinite, or for '
01 truce.
a very long period, good faith and humanity concur in requiring
previous notice to be given to the enemy of an intention to ter-
minate what he may justly regard as equivalent to a treaty of
peace. Such was the duty inculcated by the Fecial college upon
the Komans, at the expiration of a long truce which they had made
with the people of Veii. That people had recom'menced hostilities
before the expiration of the time limited in the truce. Still it
was held necessary for the Romans to send heralds and demand
satisfaction before renewing the war (n) .
Capitulations Capitulations for the surrender of troops, fortresses, and par-

ticular districts of country, fall naturally within the
render of scope of the
forteessê^^ general powers entrusted to military and naval commanders.
Stipulations between the governor of a besieged place, and the
general or admiral commanding the forces by which it is invested,
if necessarily connected with the surrender, do not require the
(m) Droit des Gens, liv. iii.

Vatfcel, Romans, see Wheaton, Hist. Law of
ch. §§ 245—251.
16, Nations, pp. 20—25; Phillipson, Int.
(w) Liv. Hist. lib. iv. cap. 30. As Law and Custom of Ancient Greece
to the laws of war observed by the and Rome, vol. ii. pp. 223 seq.
subsequent sanction of their respective sovereigns. Such are the

usual stipulations for the security of the religion and privileges of
the inhabitants, that the garrison shall not bear arms ugainst the
conquerors for a limited period, and other like clauses properly

incident to the particular nature of the transaction. But if the
commander of the fortified town undertakes to stipula-te for the
perpetual cession of that place, or enters into other engagem'ents

not fairly within the scope of his implied authority, his promise
amounts to a mere 'sponsion' (o).
The celebrated convention made by the Roman consuls with the Convention of
^^^
Samnites, at the Caudine Forks, was of this nature. The conduct ô^jj-g^^
of the Eoman senate in disavowing this ignominious compact, is
approved by Grotius and Vattel, who hold that the Samnites were ^
not entitled to be placed in statu, quo^ because they must have

known that the Eoman consujls were wholly unauthorized to make
such a convention. This consideration seems sufficient to justify
the Eomans
in acting on this occasion according to their uniform
uncompromising policy, by delivering up to the Samnites the

authors of the treaty, and persevering in the war until this
formidable enemy was finally subjugated (p).
The convention concluded at Closter-Seven, during the Seven Convention
^^'
Years' War, between the Duke of Cumberland, commander of the geven.^
British forces in .Hanover, and Marshal Richelieu, commanding
the French army, for a suspension of arms in the north of Ger-
many, is one of the most remarkable treaties of this kind recorded

in modern history. It does not appear, from the discussions which
took place between the two Governments on this occasion, that
there was any disagreement between them as to the true principles
of international law applicable to such transactions. The conduct,
if not the language of both parties, implies a mutual admission
that the convention was of a nature to require ratification, as
exceeding the ordinary powers of mere military commanders in
respect to mere military capitulations. The same remark may be
applied to the convention signed at El Arish, in 1800, for the Convention of
evacuation of Egypt by the French army; although the position

of the two Governments, as to the convention of Closter-Seven,
was reversed in that of El Arish, the British Government refusing
in the first instance to permit the execution of the latter treaty on
the ground of the defect in Sir Sidney Smith's powers. Instruc-
tions had been despatched to his superior officer (as well as to
(o) Vide ante, Pt. III. ch. 2, p. 358. Cf. Phillipson, op. oit. vol. ii. pp. 293
{p) See the account given by Livy seq.
of this remarkable transaction, lib. ix.
33 (2)
himself) forbidding him to enter into anj arrangement of the kind.

These instructions were notified to General Kleber, who was there-
fore aware that the agreement was null ah initio. Sir Sidnej
Smith, however, promised that he would endeavour to secure its
acceptanoo bj his Government; but General Kleber at once re-
sumed hostilities. The British Government afterwards directed
that the convention should be carried out, as the French general
had signed it believing that Sir Sidnej Smith was competent to
conclude it. This was not done, owing to the determination of the
new French commander, General Menou, to continue hostilities.
In these compacts, time is material: indeed it may be said to be
of the very essence of the contract. If anything occurs to render
its immediate execution impracticable, it becomes of no effect, or
at least is subject to be varied by ftesh negotiation (g).
Capitulation The
city of 'Manila and all the Philippine Islands surrendered
to the English in 1762. By Article 1 of the Capitulation it wag
"
stipulated, That all the effects and possessions of the inhabitants
of Manila and its dependencies shall be secured to them, under the
protection of His Britannic Majesty, with the same liberty they

have heretofore enjoyed." Article 4 empowered the inhabitants
to GSLYvy on all sorts of comlnerce as British subjects. Spanish A
man-of-war, the ScmUssima Trinidad^ sailed from Manila, 1st
August, 1762, before the date of the capitulation, but being
damaged by storm put back to Manila to refit, and was captured
by H.M. ships Argo and Panther near the island of Capult, one
of the Philippines, 30th October, 1762. The Scmtissima Trinidad
and her cargo were subsequently condemned in the Admiralty
Court as lawful prize to the Argo and F anther. On an appeal
interposed in the name of an inhabitant of Manila, the Lords
declared that the capitulation ought to be construed liberally in
favour of the claimant, but that there was no room for doubt. The
agreement to preserve the city of Manila from the plunderer and
the inhabitants in their effects and possessions, for a price to be
paid, is manifestly ransoming what fell under the power of the

conqueror in consequence of the place having been taken by storm,
but can have no relation to any effects or possessions in other parts
of the world, not under the power of the conqueror, nor subject to
the fate of the place. Further, even if the ship had not begun
her voyage before the surrender, sailing a Spanish man-of-war
{q) Flassan, Histoire de la Diplo- —34. Pari. Hist. vol. xxv. pp. 587
matie Fran(jaise, torn. vi. pp. 97—107. seq. Of. De Garden, Hist, de traites
Annual Register, vol. i. pp. 209—213, de paix, vi. 210 —
214, 288; De Mar-
228—234; vol. xlii. p. 219, pp. 223— tens, Recueil, vii. 1; Hall, Inter-^
233. State Papers, vol. xliii. pp. 28 national Law (1909), pp. 548, 549,
EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE. 517
was not carrying on com'merce as British subjects. And the
appeal was dismissed (r) .
With regard to flags of truce, capitulations, and armistices, the

Hague Regulations contain the following provisions:
—
"
A person is considered as bearing a flag of truce who is autho- Flags of
^"®*
rized by one of the belligerents to enter into comlnunication with
the other, and who carries a white flag. He has a right to inviola-
bilitj, as have also the trumpeter, bugler,

or drummer, the flag-
bearer, interpreter, who may accompany him" (s).

and
"
The commander to whom a flag of truce is sent is not obliged to
receive it in all circumstances He can take all steps necessary to
.
prevent the envoy taking advantage of his mission to obtain in-

formation. In case of abuse he has the right to detain the envoy
"
temporarily (t).
"
The envoy loses
his rights of inviolability if it is proved beyond
doubt that he has taken advantage of his privileged position to
provoke or commit an act of treachery" (u).
"
Capitulations agreed on between the contracting parties must Capitulations,
be in accordance with the rules of military honour. When once

settled they must be scrupulously observed by both parties" (x).
"An armistice suspends military operations by mutual agree- Armistices,
ment between the belligerent parties. If its duration is not flxed,

the belligerent parties may resume operations at any time, pro-
vided alv^ys that the enemjy is warned within the time agreed
"
upon, in accordance with the terms of the armistice (y).
"
An armistice be general or local. The first suspends all
may
military operations of the belligerent States everywhere; the
second only those between certain fractions of the belligerent
armies, and within a fixed radius" (z).
"An armistice must be notified ofiicially, and in good time, to
the competent authorities and the troops. Hostilities are sus-
"
pended immediately after the notification, or on a fixed date (a).
"It is for the contracting parties to settle in the terms of th^
armistice what communications may be held, in the theatre of war,
"
with and between the populations (6).
The communications mentioned here refer to intercourse, on
the one hand between the inhabitants of the occupied part of a
country and those in the unoccupied part, and on the other between
(r) The Santissima Trinidad, alias («) Ibid. Art. 34.

El Poderoso (1762), Marsden, Adm. {x) Ibid. Art. 35.
Oases, 162. (y) Ibid. Art. 36.
(s) Hague Regulations (1907), {z) Ibid. Art. 37.
Art. 32. {a) Ibid. Art. 38.
(0 Ibid. Art. 33. (6) Ibid. Art. 39.
the forces of each belligerent and the inhabitants of the part held
bj the other. "This prohibition is rendered necessary; by the

principle that an armistice suspends fighting but does not affect
the state of war. ... In the absence of a special provision, the
invading belligerent's vâr rights as against the population con-
tinue unchanged. He can raise requisitions, billet his soldiers,
demand services in kind and even levy contributions, and his
general martial law regulations remain in full force. And war

conditions still hold good as regards the mutual relations of the
inhabitants of the districts held by the two belligcTents. In the
absence of special conditions in the protocol, the conclusion of the
armistice does not free the inhabitants of the occupied territory
from' the obligation of holding no intercourse with the people in the
other belligerent's zone of authority. They m'ay be treated as
spies or war-traitors if they offend, just as if hostilities
continued" (c).
"Any serious violation of the armistice by one of the parties
gives the other party the right to denounce it, and even, in case of
"
urgency, to recommence hostilities at once (d).
On account of the indefiniteness of the expressions serious
'
' ' '

viola.tion and urgency (the latter being on all-fours with the
indefinite 'military necessity') the retaliatory proceedings indi-
cated in this Article are practically left to the discretion of the
party aggrieved.
"A violation of the terms of the armistice by individuals acting
on their own initiative only entitles the injured party to demand
the punishment of the offenders, and, if necessary, indemnity for
the losses sustained" (e).
Passports, Passports, safe-conducts, and licenses, are documents granted in

safe -con-
ducts, and war to protect persons and property from the general operation of
licenses.
hostilities,,The competency of the authority to issue them
depends on the general principles already noticed. This sovereign
authority may be vested in military and naval commanders, or in
certain civil officers, either expressly, or by inevitable implication
from the nature and extent of their general trust. Such documents
are to be interpreted by the same rules of liberality and good faith
with other acts of the sovereign Power (/) .
Licenses to Thus a license granted by the belligerent State to its own sub-
trade with
the enemy. jects, or to the subjects of its enemy, to carry on a trade interdicted
(c) Spaight, op. cit. pp. 245, 246. (/) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.
(d) Hague Eegulations (1907), lib. iii.
cap. 21, § 14. Vattel, Droit
Art. 40. des Gens, liv. iii. ch. 17, §§ 265—277.
(e) Ibid. Art. 41.
by war, operates as a dispensation with the laws of war, so far as

its terms can be fairly construed to extend. Similarly, the contract
made for the ransom of enemy's property, taken at sea, is
generally carried into effect by means of a safe-conduct granted
by the captors, permitting the captured vessel and cargo to proceed
to a designated port, within a limited time {g) .
In early warfare the invasion of an army into enemy territor} Military

was freq.uently followed by pillage and destruction, or by appro-
"
priation of anything that could be seized. The troops lived on
the country which they ate up like locusts" (h). Grotius refers
to the general practice of his day, when such seizure, plunder, and
confiscation on the part of an invader were considered permissible;
but he points out, in reference to the mitigations of belligerent
practice advocated by him and other jurists, that the conduct of the
invading army should not be unrestricted, but that no more should
be done or taken than was absolutely necessary for its security.
In the wars of the eighteenth century certain disciplinary measures
were sometimes adopted by commanders to restrain the licence of
their troops; and not infrequently lawless looting was replaced by
the practice of demanding requisitions. Military proceedings
varied considerably, however; the older methods of 'self-help'
and indiscriminate devastation were not forgotten. Occupation of
territory was claimed to confer sovereignty over it and its popula-
tion. In the middle of the eighteenth century, Vattel, a reformer
in so many institutions of the law of nations, declined to admit
this exaggerated doctrine, and insisted that sovereignty could not
arise until the invading belligerent had completely ousted the
enemy and had definitely acquired the territory by conquest or by

a treaty of cession (^) . This principle, together with its necessary
implications, gradually gained ground. Commanders like Wel-
lington did much to prevent plunder and licence. The develop-
ment of standing armies and the consequent elaboration of military
law and discipline helped on the progressive movement, which was
facilitated, too, by the noteworthy work of Heffter (1844) (/c).
From' about the middle of the nineteenth century. States began to
issue instructions to their armies in the field. Then international
conferences — ofiicial conferences of States like the Brussels Con-
{g) On licenses to trade with the (i) Droit d^ Gens, liv. iii. §§ 197,
enemy, see supra, p. 435; and on ran- 198.
som contracts, see infra, p. 587. {k) A. W. Heffter, Das Europaischo
(A) Lawrence, op. cit. p. 431. Volkerrecht der Gegenwart.
ference (1874), and unofficial assemblies of leading jurists like

the Institute of International Law (1880)— took up the question.
Their productions paved the way for the Hague Conferences of
1899 and 1907, whose provisions constitute now the written law
on the subject.
When "
Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed
territory is
considered under the authority of the hostile army.
occupied. The occupationapplies only to the territory where such autho-
"
rity has been established and can be exercised (1).
It is clear from^ the above Article that a particular locality
cannot be deemed to be militarily occupied if the assumed
authority not supported by a force capable of maintaining it.
is
A merely temporary existence of such force is, therefore, in-

adequate; for as soon as it ceases to be effective in a given plaoe.
there military occupation ceases with it. An invading com-
mander's proclamation will not in itself suffice; it may amount
' '
to no more than a paper occupation, just as the notification of a

naval blockade that cannot effectively be realized results in nothing
more than a 'paper blockade.' Similarly, presumptions of a
'constructive' occupation, as distinguished ftom' an actual, are
insufficient. Occupation is not necessarily consequent on invasion;
for the invaders may soon afterwards be repulsed and driven out of
the country. They cannot be said to have gained a permanent
footing there, until they have ousted the national forces from' the
invaded territory.
Occupation Further, just as invasion must be accompanied by certain essen-
and conquest.
tial conditions in order that it may be transformed into occupation,
so must military occupation be accompanied by certain necessary
conditions in order that it may ripen into conquest. Formerly, as
we have pointed out above, the invader assumed the larger rights
of an occupant, and the occupant assumed the still larger rights of
a conqueror. But now there is a line of demarcation between these
stages. Conquest or complete subjugation implies the permanent
subjection of the occupied country to the sovereign of the occupy-
ing forces, with the intention that this territory shall be annexed
to the dominions of the new sovereign and shall henceforth be
considered as a constituent portion thereof; that is, conquest
' '
depends on firm possession together with the intention and the

capacity to hold the territory so acquired.
Occupa- The rights of occupancy, then, cannot be co-extensive with those
tion and
sovereignty.
of sovereignty. They are due to the military exigencies of the
(0 Hague Regulations (1907), Art. 42.

invader, and consequently are only provisional. The local in-

habitants do not owe the occupant even temporary allegiance;
and the national character of the locality is not legally changed.
This view has long been adopted by British Courts. Thus, in
The Gerasimo (1857) (m), the Privy Council pointed out that
in order to convert a friendly or neutral territory into enemy terri-
tory, it was not sufficient that the territory in question should be

under hostile occupation and subjected to the control of a hostile
Power; some additional proceeding was necessary, e.g., cession or
conquest, whereby the territory was incorporated with and made
part of the dominions of the invader {n) This principle was
.
adopted not only in the British Prize Courts, but also in the Courts
of common law (o) Lord Stowell emphasized the distinction
.
between a hostile occupation and possession clothed with a legal

right by cession or conquest, or confirmed by lapse of time (p) .
It was held, too, in the French Courts {q) that a crime committed
by a Frenchman in Spanish territory which was at the time

occupied by the French forces was a crime committed in foreign
territory.
Som<3 decisions of the American Courts adopted a different point
of view. Thus the Supreme Court held that when a portion of
the American Union is occupied by a public enemy, that portion
is to bo deemed a foreign country in respect of revenue laws, and
that goods imported into it are not imported into the Union^ (r) .
On the other hand, when the forces of the Union occupy a foreign
tenitory, such territory comes under the sovereignty of the Union,
but does not become part of the United States, although foreign
nations are bound to regard it as such. It is to be governed by
military law, as regulated by public law. This is due to the
fact that the President has power to m'ake war, and subject thg
enemy's country, but only in a military sense. But he has no
power to enlarge the boundaries of the Union which can be done
—
only by Congress, the treaty-making power (s) In another case .
the Supreme Court decided that the island of Santa Cruz, which
was Danish territory then occupied by Great Britain, was to be
considered British, and therefore as possessing enemy character
for all the purposes of the war then existing between Great Britain
(m) 11 Moo. P. O. 88. {q) Villasseque's Case (1818), Or-

{n) Of. The Fama (1804), 5 C. Rob. tolan, i. 324.
115; The Manilla, 1 Edw. 1; The {r) C^. /S'. v. i2/ce (1819), 4 Wheaton,
Santa Anna, 1 Edw. 180. 246.
Donaldson v. Thompson (1808),
(o) (,?) Fleming v.Page (1850), 9
1 Camp. 429; Hagedorn v. Bell, 1 Howard, 615; Neeley v. HenJcel
M. & S. 450. (1900), 180 U. S. Rep. 109. But see
{p^ The Bolletta, 1 Edw. 171. The Circassian (1864), 2 Wall. 135.
and the United States (t) Whatever advantages this American

.
view may possess in regard to the question of commercial inter-

course in war, it is incompatible with the fundamental distinction
— which implies an indispensable conception between military —
occupation and conquest, that is between temporary possession
and permanent acquisition.
Authority of Article 43 of the Haûe Reg-ulations defines in very general

the military . « i -i- i •
i» i
occupant. terms authority of the military occupant: the authority ol the

th(i
Martial law.
legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his power to re-
establish and assure as far as possible public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force
in the country (u) .
* '
The words public order and safety do not represent exactly

the meaning of the original 'I'ordre et la vie publics,' which refer
also to the entire social and commercial life of the community.
As the population does not owe the occupying commander alle-
giance, and as his authority based merely on military necessity

is
and so is provisional, it follows that, unless military exigencies
imperatively demand otherwise, he must administer the existing''

territorial law,and must not interfere with the existing rights and
obligations of the inhabitants, and in particular must not infringe
the provision laid down in Article 23h. If, owing to the state of
occupation and the special circumstances arising therefrom, he

finds certain judicial and administrative modifications in-
dispensable, he must see to it that they are not incompatible with

the rules of international law and the dictates of honour and
justice. The totality of these modifications constitutes the super-
imposed martial law. Martial law applied by the commander to
the belligerent forces and others found within the line of military
.
operations, as well as to inhabitants of invaded or occupied terri-

tory, be distinguished from the martial law proclaimed by a
may
sovereign in a country threatened with invasion, and also from
military law.
Military law. Military law consists of the rules and regulations made by
the legislative authority of the State for the government of its
naval or military forces, and it exists both in time of peace and in
time of war. Though a man is a soldier, he remains a citizen^
and so is subject to the ordinary civil jurisprudence. But as a
(0 Bentzon v. Boyle (The Thirty (w) H. E. Art. 43.

Hogsheads of 8ugar), 9 Qranch, 191.
soldier he has further responsibilities; for he is also subject, always

and everywhere, to this special military code. In England mili-
tary law consists of the Army Act, the King's Regulations and
Orders for the Army, and Army Orders. This body of law is
sanctioned and brought into existence from year to year by the
annual Army Act. Military courts-martial are of three kinds,
which possess different powers: (1) regimental, consisting of at
least three members; (2) district, also three at least; and (3) gene-
ral, which must contain at least nine members in the United
Kingdom, India, Malta, and Gibraltar, but elsewhere not less than
five. But these military courts are to be distinguished from the
courts convened by a comtaander in the field or in occupied
territory (x) .
According to English law, when the country is in a state of Martial law

actual war, or a state of riot, insurrection or rebellion, the Crown i^^
and its ministers are entitled to make whatever arrangements and
take whatever precautions are considered necessary in addition to
the existing law or in substitution for it. The governing prin-
ciple is found in the maxim, which has universal applicability^
—
the safety of the commonwealth is the supreme law. Accordingly,
the Crown is empowered, apart from the provisions of the written
law, to adopt these exceptional measures and employ the necessary
force in order to restore peace and order. The exercise of this
right and the application of this unusual force are covered by the
term martial law. In time of peace the Crown is not entitled to
issue commissions to try civilians by courts-martial. At other
times, even after the proclamation of martial law, the ordinary
tribunals remain and continue their work. The proclamation
simply gives power to the military authorities to take exceptional
measures for dealing expeditiously with those resisting the autho-
rity of the Government or aiding or abetting rebels or the enemy.
The acts of the military authorities may not be questioned by the
ordinary courts of justice, whilst martial law is in force (y). But
on the conclusion of the state of war or rebellion, martial law ceases
to operate, and then any seemingly illegitimate proceeding of the
militarj^ authorities may be inquired into by the ordinary Courts.
In order to meet this contingency, however, and obviate any diffi-
culties that may thus arise, Acts of Indemnity are passed by the
legislature, for the purpose of protecting the authorities who have
acted in good faith, and possibly for providing compensation to
(a;) Of. Tilonko v. The Att.-Gen. (y) Of. Van Reenen's Case, (1904)
of Natal, (1907) A. O. 93, 461. 8 A. 0. 114.
innocent persons who may have suffered through the military

action .
Martial law is Martial law in this sense

is merely a greater or less cessation,
from' necessity, of municipal law; and what necessity requires it

b'^^niSssit^^
justifies {z). Under it, a man in actual armed resistance may be
put on the spot by anyone acting under the orders of com-
to death
petent authority; or, if arrested, may be tried in any manner

which such authority shall direct. But if there be an abuse of the
power so given, and acts are done under it, not bond fide to suppress
rebellion and in self-defence, but to gratify malice or in the caprice
of tyranny, then for such acts the party doing them is
responsible (a) . "The
only principle," says Sir James Mac-
"
kintosh, on which the law of England tolerates what is called
'
'martial law is necessity. Its introduction can be justified only
by necessity; its continuance requires precisely the same justifica-

tion of necessity; and if it survives the necessity, in which alone
it rests,for a single minute, it becomes instantly a mere exercise
of lawless violence. When foreign invasion or civil war rendeirs
it impossible for courts of law to sit, or to enforce the execution of
their judgments, it becomes necessary to find some rude substitute

for them, and to employ for that purpose the military, which is
the only remaining force in the community. While the laws are
silenced by the noise of arms, the rulers of the armêd force must
punish they can those crimes which threaten their
as equitably as
own safety and that of society, but no longer; every moment
beyond is usurpation. As soon as the laws can act, every other
mode of punishing supposed crimes is itself an enormous crime.
If argument be not enough on
—
this subject if, indeed, the miere
statement be not the evidence of its own truth I appeal to the —
highest and most venerable authority known to our law." He then
quotes Sir Matthew Hale (6), and cites the case of the Duke ojf
Lancaster, who was executed when taken

prisoner at the battle of
Boroughbridge, 1322, and proceeds: "No other doctrine has ever
been maintained in this country since the solemn parliamentary,
condemnation of the usurpation of Charles I., which he was him-
self compelled to sanction in the Petition of Right" (c).
If in foreign invasion or civil war the courts of law are actually
closed, and it is then impossible to administer criminal justice
according to law, then, on the theatre of actual military operations,
(is) Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on (J)) Hale, Pleas of the Grown,
Constitutional Law, p. 201. pp. 499, 500.
(a) Ibid. p. 214. Finlason, Mar- (c) Sir J. Mackintosh, Miscellaneous
tial Law (London, 1867). Works, p. 734 (London, 1851).
RIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—Lx\ND WARFARE. 525
where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a sub-

stitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the
safety of the army and society; as no power is left but the military,
it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have
their free course, and where actual war is raging, acts done by
the military authorities are not justiciable by the ordinary

tribunals (d). As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its dura-
tion; for, if this govetnm'ent is continued after the courts are re-
instated, it is a gross usutpation of power. Martial rule ought to
never exist where the courts are open, and in the propei* and un-
obstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It should ulso be confined
to the locality of actual war or insurrection; but the fact that for
some purposes some tribu,nals have been permitted to pursue their
ordinary course in a district in which martial law has been pro-
claimed is not conclusive that war is not raging (e) .
When the actual seat of war is at a distance from the country, Proclama-
it is generally considered that a proclamation of martial law in the Partial law.
country is not necessary. The rules and orders issued under

statutory sanction or by virtue of the King's prerogative are re-
garded as sufficient to meet the needs of the existing conditions.

It may well be, however, that when England is at war outside
her domains, English territory (or certain vital parts of it) may
be regarded as being assimilated to the zone of operations, so as
to justify a proclamation of martial law. The modern methods
of rapid communication and transport, the essential multiplicity
of prepai-ations, the uncmising relationships between the home
Government and the military and naval forces, the presence of
large numbers of alien enemies afford support to such a view.
Moreover, it was held in Marais' ca&e (/) that, in consequence of
such state of war, martial law may bo applied in places that ar,e
beyond the range of active hostilities. And conformably to this
view, the Lod^j case (involving the offence of spying) was taken
before a court-martial (October 30, 1914).
Whilst the British and American practice is to introduce this Ijeclaration
Or St'î'P oi"
exceptional system of martial law by a formal proclamation, in siege.'
continental practice it usually comes into being by a declaration

' '
of a state of siege,' or state of wair.' Thus, before the outbreak

of the Great WaT of 1914, and when were deemed in
hostilities
Germany to be imminent, the Kaiser decreed a state of war in
(d) Ex parte Marais, (1902) A. C. den, 12 Johnson, 234; Luther v.
109. Borden (1849), 7 Howard,

42; Ex
(e) Ex 'parte Milligan (1867), 4 parte Marais, (1902) A. O. 109.
Wallace, 127. See also Smith v. Shaia, (/) (1902) A. C. 109.
12 Johnson, 257; MoConnell v. Ramp-
conformity with Article 68 of the German Constitution. The

Article says: ''The Erape-ror may, if the public safety in the
federal territory is threatened, declare every part thereof in a
state of war. Until the issue of an Impefrial law regulating the
prescriptions, the form of notice,- and the effects of such declaration,
the provisions of the Prussian law, June 4, 1851, hold good."
Following such declaration, the military authorities at once

adopted various measuTes for protecting the frontiers, for safe-
guarding communications and transports, &c.
Martial law
In October, 1864, duTing the Civil War, Lambdin P. Milligan,
during the
American a citizen of the United States, and an inhabitant of Indiana, was
civil war.
artested, while athome, by order of the Federal general command-
Milligan's
case. ing the military district of Indiana. Though not a military
person, he was sent to Indianapolis, and brought before a military
commission sitting there, tried on certain charges of conspiring
against the Government, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged.
The question, which was brought before the Suprem'e Court, was
whether the military commission had jurisdiction legally to try
and sentence him'. In Indiana the Federal authority was not
opposed by force, and its courts were always open to hear criminal
accusations and redress grievances. But a powerful secret associa-

tion, which plotted insurrection and armed co-operation with the
rebels, existed in the State. On, the question as to whether, under
fiuch circumstances. Congress had power to appoint a military
com'mission to try and condemn citizens, not being military

—
persons that is, whether martial law could be proclaimed the
—
judges of the Supreme Court differed. But, they were unanimous
in holding that, as this power had not been distinctly exercised,
Milligan, being a citizen not connected with the military service,

could not be tried, convicted, and sentenced otherwise than by the
ordinary courts of law (^) .
Martial law
in France.
A somewhat similar case was decided in France in 1832. A
Geoff, Off s royal order, dated the 6th of June, 1832, had put Paris in a state
case. of siege, and under it military commissions were appointed, which
tried and convicted several persons. One Geoffrey was declared
guilty of an attack with intent to subvert the Government, and
was condemned to death. He appealed to the Court of Cassation.
This Court held that Geoffroy not being a military person, or
subject to military authority, the military commission had n,o
jurisdiction over him, an,d its ^ntence was accordingly

annulled (JfC)
.
(gr) Ex "parte Milligan (1867), 4 (Ji) Forsyth, Cases and Opinions,

WaUace, 5—142. p. 483. See on this subject Mr. Field's
EIGHTS OF WAK AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WAEFARE. 527
So far as this country is concerned, martial law has on swerial

occasions been, proclaimed in Ireland and in some of the British
colonies for the suppression of rebellions or other serious disturb-
ances. A recent instance is its proclamation in South Africa,
where a rebellion amongst certain Boer forces broke out, during'
the Great War, against the British Government.
Martial law in the field or in occupied territory has been defined Martial law
"^ e e .
to be, the will of the commanding officer of an armed force, or of a
geographical military department, expressed in time of war within

the limits of his military jurisdiction, as necessity demands and
prudence dictates, restrained or enlarged by the orders of his mili-

tary chief or supreme executive ruler (^) As was said in an .
American case: "Martial law is the law of military necessity in

the actual presence of war. It is administered by the general of
the army, and is under his supreme control" (k). The Duke of
Wellington described it in the House of Lords as being "neither
more nor less than the will of the general who commands the
army." But he pointed out that the general must lay down the
regulations and limits in accordance with which his will is to be
carried out (1) The laws of war (when that expression is not
.
used as a generic term) are the laws which govern the conduct of
belligerents towards each other and other nations, flagrante
hello (m) .
Military government is the government imposed by a
successful belligerent, either over a foreign province or over a
district retaken from insurgents^ treated as belligerents. This
supersedes, as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law, and
continues until the war or rebellion is terminated, and a regular
civil
authority instituted (n)
is .
Though the martial law of a commander is not reall}^ law at all
in the ordinary sense of the term, it does not on that acaount
justify military oppression. Its stringency will, of course, depend

on the particular circumstances of each case; for example, on the
amount of danger to which the military forces under the coim-
mander are exposed, and, in occupied territory, on the coinduct of
the local inhabitants; but in every case it should be administered
argument in McCardale's case. Ibid. ported in 2 State Trials, New Series,

p. 491. And his argument in Milli- p. 395, note, and also note to p. 976
gan's case, published separately, with of the same volume.
an appendix (New York, 1866); also {Jc) V 8. v. Biehelman (1875), 92
.
in 4 Wallace, 4. Phillipps v. Eyre, U. S. 520.

L. R. 6 Q. B. 1. Law Magazine, Nov. (I) Hansard, 3rd series, vol. cxv.
1871, p. 170. p. 880.
(i) Ex
parte MilKgan, 4 Wallace, 14 {m) Argument in Ex parte Milli-
(argument). Opinions of Attys.-Gen. gan (1867), 4 Wallace, 14.
(U. S.), vol. viii. p. 367. And see (w) Argument in Ex parte 3Iilli-
Bedreechund v. Elphinstone, as re- gan (1867), 4 Wallace, pp. 141, 142.
in accordance with the universally recognised fundamental prin-
ciples ofhumanity and honour, fairness and justice (o).

War crimes.
Infringements of this martial law are reg-arded as war crimes.*
'
As a rule no penalty should be inflicted on offenders withojut pre-

vious inquiry and condemnation by a court-martial consisting of
a number of officers convened for the purpose German authorities .
'
speak also of a special kind of war crime, which they call war
treason' (* Kriegsverrath').
The German Manual defines it as
the act of injuring or endangering the belligerent's interests by.
deceit, or "by sending messages to the opposing army with regard
to the position, movements, plans, &c. of the belligerent, whether
'
in the field or in occupation (p) The use of the expression war

.
'
treason as applied to the nationals of the enemy is, in certain
respects, unjustifiable; but whatever terminology be adopted,

the
consequences of the offence are the same. Thus certain acts com-
mitted openly by members of the enemy's armed forces are legiti-
' '
mate, but are regarded as acts of war treason if attempted or

done in occupied territory or within the belligerent's lines, either
by enemy civilians or by enemy soldiers in disguise. Examples
of such acts are the destruction of bridges, lines of communication,
telegraphs, or telephones, wrecking military trains, cutting oft'

water supply, setting free captured colleagues, bribing the belli-
gerent's forces to surrender or desert, circulating proclamations
or making promises calculated to imperil or damage the
belligerent, &c. An instance may be referred to that occurred in
the Kusso- Japanese war, 1904. Two Japanese officers, having
disguised themselves as Chinamen, attempted to blow up a rail-
way bridge in Manchuria, in the rear of the Russian forces. They
were captured in the attempt, and their identity was discovered.
Accordingly, a Russian court-martial condemned them to death,
and they were shot. Had they, undisguised, made the same
attempt, they would have been treated, if captured, as prisoners
of war.
' ' '
As to war crimes (apart from war treason ')

their number is
naturally indefinite, depending as they do on the number of acts

ordered to be done or forbidden to be done in the moi^tial law
proclamation or regulations of the invading or occupying com-
mander. Thus, in the x\nglo-Boer v/ar, the British military au-
thorities proclaimed the following to be offences against their
martial law: — Being in possession of arms, ammunition, &c.,
(o) Cf. Bluntschli, Volkerrecht, (p) Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege,

§§ 542, 543, 5i6, 548. p. 60.
EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE. 529
travelling without a permit, sending prohibited goods, holding-

meetings other than those allowed, using seditious language,
spreading alarmist reports, overcharging for goods, wearing uni-
forms without due authority, going out-of-doors between certain
hours, injuring military animals or stores, being in possession,
without a permit, of horses, vehicles, cycles, &c., hindering those
in execution of military orders, trespassing on defence works {q) .
Sucli ofi'ences, together with several others, were specified in the
Japanese regulations made in the Russo-Japanese war (r) Simi- .
larly, lists of offences were drawn up by German commanders occu-

pying French and Belgian territory during the Great War, 1914.
Not only were delinquencies like the above punished with very
severe penalties (usually death), but certain injunctions were also
laid down which exceeded in their rigour and extravagance the
martial law^ regulations of previous belligerents, and were incom-
patible with the provisions and the spirit of the Hague Code. An
order, for example, compelling inhabitants to keep their houses
open all night was dreadfully abused by the occupying forces; an
order compelling inhabitants to salute German soldiers, and per-
mitting the latter, in case of default, to exact respect by any

method, is outrageously arbitrary and arrogant, for it cannot bo
justified by any considerations of military necessity (s).
In recent wars the occupying commander has usually retained Occupation
the services of the local judges and functionaries (other than local law.
political officials) for the general judicial and administrative work

of the locality. But he is not obliged to do so. The practice
facilitates the maintenance of the laws prevailing there, especially
the civil and criminal jurisprudence. These laws ought not to be
interfered with, unless they are contrary to the martial law en-
forced, which, of course, will be considered by the occupant to be
predominant. In the Franco-German war, 1870-1871, the French
municipal officials were retained, but the Government officials re-
fused to remain in office under the invaders. Similarly the
Germans retained to some extent the local authorities in Belgium,
1914-1915, but recalcitrant officials and those complaining of high-
handed conduct were treated with the utmost severity, and in some
cases were carried off, and incarcerated in German fortresses.
In general, the acts of the occupant possess legal validity, and
cannot be abrogated by the subsequent Government. But this
rule does not necessarily apply to acts that exceed the occupant's
{q) Cf. Papers relative to Martial (r) See Ariga, op. cit. pp. 379 seq.
Law in South Africa (Cd. 981). (s) See Phillipson, Int. Law and
the Great War, pp. 225 seq.
w. 34
powers (c.^., alienation of the domains of the State or the sove-

'
reign), to sentences for 'war treason' and war crimes,' to acts of

a political character, and to those that operate beyond the period
of occupation. When occupation ceases, no reparation is legally
due for what has already been carried out. Thus, on the con-
clusion of the Franco-German war,
certain persons claimed that
they ought to be permitted to complete contracts (for felling

timber in the State forests) made with the German authorities
then in occupation of the localities concerned; but the restored
French Government rejected the claim on the ground that the
termination of the occupation annulled the continuing rights
derived from or through the occupant {t) .
"
Unlawful A
belligerent is forbidden to compel the population of occupied
information.
territory to give information about the army of the other belli-
gerent or about his means of defence" (u).
We have already seen that Article 23h prohibited the compul-
' '
sion of enemy subjects to take part in the operations of war

against their own country; and we have pointed out that the
' '
expression operations of war has a wider significance than such

an expression as 'military operations.' Article 44, then, consti-
tutes an extension, or rather a particular application of Article 23h.
AVhether these two Articles taken together exclude the employ-
' '
ment of forced guides has been doubted in some quarters (x) .
But there can be no rational ground for doubt when we consider

the purport of the Articles, which forbid the forced employment
of enemy nationals not oiily as combatants, but also as co-operators
in any proceedings which are intended to contribute to the defeat
of their own country.
To this end the accurate information of a
guide may be quite as important as the accurate firing of a battery.
However, should the services of an enemy guide be obtained,
whether voluntarily or under compulsion, he will be liable to the
supreme penalty, in accordance with established custom, if he
deliberately misleads the belligerent's forces.
It may be mentioned that reservations
against Article 44 were
made by several leading Powers, viz., Germany, Eussia, Austria-
Hungary, and Japan. But Article 23h is binding on them; and
its terms are sufficiently wide to cover the case of compelled guides.
"
Oath of It is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory
riance.
to take an oath of allegiance to the hostile Power" (ij
(0 Cf. Hall, Int. Law (1909), (a;) Of. Holland, Laws of War on
pp. 483, 484. Land (1908), p. 53.
00 H. E. (1907), Art. 44. (y) H. E. (1907), Art. 45.
Some writers hold that officials who are retained in their offices
by the occupying commander may be required to take an oath of

fidelity. There is, perhaps, nothing illegitimate in this require-
ment, provided the operation of the oath is confined strictly to the
period of lawful occupation and to such services as the officials
may rightfully be called upon to render. The same considerations
might conceivably apply to the inhabitants in general in the occu-
pied territory, but there is a greater danger in their case that the
two provisoes mentioned may not be fully complied with by the
occupant. On the other hand, an oath of neutrality is not neces-
sarily forbidden by this Article; to require it would not be to
superimpose further obligations, for the inhabitants are bound,
in any case, to observe the duties of neutrality. In the Anglo-
Boer war such an oath was administered by both belligerents (z) .
Certain reasons, however,

may also be urged against the adminis-
tration of this oath, too; for the occupant may come to regard a
system of imposing oaths on the inhabitants as tantamount to a

system of effective occupation. If occupation ceases to be effec-
tive de facto, exacted oaths and promises cannot make
good the
deficiency .
"
Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private Family
^'^"'^^*
property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be
respected.
Private property not be confiscated" (a). Private
may
In earlier days it was a generally recognised rule that from the
moment one State was at war with another it had a right to seize
on all the enemy's property of whatever kind and wherever found
and own use or to that of the captors By
to appropriate it to its .
the ancient law of nations, even things that were classed as res
sac7'ae were not exempt from capture and confiscation; thus Cicero,
in his fourth oration against Verres, says that victory made all the
sacred things of the Syracusans profane^ and so subject to appro-
priation or destruction, as the case may be. But in modern times,
as has already been pointed out, the principle grew up that no use
of force against an enemy is legitimate unless it is absolutely
necessary to accomplish the purposes of war. Accordingly, by

the modern usage of nations, which acquired the force of law,
temples of religion, public edifices devoted to civil purposes only,

monuments of art, repositories of science, and similar institutions
(z) Of. Proclamations of F. M. Lord op. clt., p. 372.

Hoberts (Cd. 426), p. 23; Spaighfc, (a) H. E. (1907), Art. 46.
34(2)
were exempted from the general operations of war. Private pro-

perty also came to be regarded as immune from confiscation, with
the exception of such as might become booty in special cases, when
taken from enemies in the field or in besieged towns, and of mili-
tary contributions levied upon the inhabitants of the hostile
territory. This exemption was taken to extend even to the case
of an absolute and unqualified conquest of the enemy's country.
In ancient times, both the movable and the immovable property
of the vanquished passed to the conqueror. Such was the Roman
law of war, often asserted with unrelenting severity; and such was
the fate of the Roman provinces subdued by the northern bar-
barians, on the decline and fall of the western empire. A large
portion, from one-third to two-thirds, of the lands belonging to
the vanquished provincials was confiscated and partitioned among
their conquerors. The last example in Europe of such a conquest
was that of England, by William of Normandy. Since that
period, among the civilized nations of Christendom, conquest, even
when confirmed by a treaty peace, has not been followed by a
general or partial transmutation of landed property. The pro-
perty belonging to the Government of the vanquished nation passes
which also takes the place of the former
to the victorious State,
sovereign in regard to the eminent domain. In other respects,

private rights were long considered to be unaffected by con-
quest (&).
Article 46 of the Hague Regulations demands respect on the
part of a belligerent for the personal and proprietary rights of
the inhabitants of occupied territory. But this general provision
is subject to various exceptions; for "by the
prohibition of con-
fiscation it is onlymeant that private property cannot by any
regulation of the invader be taken from' its owner for no other
reason than that he is an enemy" (e). These exceptions are duo
to considerations of 'military necessity,' and the chief — Re-
aro:^
quisitions and contributions for the support of the invading armies

or as an indemnity for the expenses of maintaining order in, and
continuing the administration of, the occupied territory; destruc-

tion of property demanded imperatively by the exigencies of
offence or defence; private property consisting of war material and
means of transport; use and adaptation of property for the army's
needs which cannot otherwise be satisfied; reprisals; confiscations.
(b) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. Precis, liv. viii. eh. iv. §§ 279 —
282.
oh. 9, § 13. Kliiber, Droit des Gens (ic) Westlake, Int. Law, vol. ii.
Moderne de I'Europe, Pt. II. tit. 2, (1913), p. 103.
sect. 2, eh. 1, §§ 250—253. Martens,
EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE.
seizures, and fines by way of penalty for offences against the
occupying commander's martial law regulations. Private pro-

perty will not be regarded as being exempt from the operations of
war if its owners do not obey the laws of war An invader protects
.
non-combatants and their property so long as they take no part

in the struggle. As soon as they relinquish this character, the
reasons which restrained the invader cease, and he may then punish
such individuals by seizing their property, or, if this cannot be
discovered and secured, their offence may be visited upon the com-
munity to which they belong if the community as a whole can
reasonably be held responsible for the delinquency.

Formerly, another exception was made to the immunity of
private property. If it was such that it ministered directly to the
strength of the enemy, and its possession alone enabled him to
supply himself with the munitions of war, and to continue the
struggle, it was considered to be subject to confiscation. Thus
during the American Civil War cotton was the mainstay of the
Confederates; without it they could not have continued the re-
bellion. The Supreme Court therefore decided that it could
lawfully be captured by the Federal troops, notwithstanding that
"
it was strictly The whole doctrine of con-
private property (d).
"
fiscation," said the Supreme Court in a recent case, upon is built
the foundation that it is an instrument of coercion, which, by
depriving an enemy of property within reach of his power,
whether within his territory or without, impairs his ability to
resist the confiscating Q-overnment, while at the same time it
furnishes to that G-overnment means for carrying on the war.

Hence any property which the enemy can use, either by actual
appropriation or by the exercise of control over its owner, or
which the adherents of the enemy have the power of devoting to the
"
enemy's use, is aproper subject of confiscation (e).
"Pillage is formally forbidden" (/). Pillage.
We have already seen that Article 28 prohibits the pillage of a
town or locality, even when taken by assault; for in former times
a successful assault was regarded as bestowing on the assailants a
right to loot. The pillage spoken of in Article 47 refers to booty
that is not permitted. Such permissible booty or spoil of war
taken on the field of battle
comprises horses, batteries, carts, arms,
equipment, munitions, army stores and supplies, the war chest,
State papers in the possession of captured officers, &c. But private
(d) Mrs. Alexander's Cotton (1864), Wallace, 93.

2 Wallace, 429; U. S. v. Fadelford, (e) Miller v. V. 8.,\\ Wallace, 306.
9 Wallace, 540; Hay craft v. V. S., 22 (/) H. R. (1907), Art. 47.
property may not be thus taken as booty (^), unless it be arms,

munitions, pieces of equipment, &c. (h). It is for municipal law
to determine in whom the ownership of permissible booty is vested:
so far as is concerned, it goes to the Crown.
Great Britain
Unfortunately, the practice of pillage has obtained more or less
in all wars; it has reappeared in 1914, when German troops had
constant recourse to it in a most shameful and heartless manner (^) .
Its extent depends on the policy of commanders ^tnanifested by

—
tacit —
consent or connivance and on the character of imilitary
discipline .
"
Occupant If, in the territory occupied, the occupant collects the taxes,
collecting
taxes. dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State, he shall do so, as
far as possible, in accordance with the rules of assessment and inci-
dence in force, and he shall in consequence be bound to defray the
expenses of the administration of the occupied territory to the
same extent as the legitimate Government was so bound" (^).
This Article does not necessarily give the occupying commander
a right to collect the taxes, nor does it forbid him to do so. It
simply imposes certain limitations on him, if he decides to have
recourse to such collection. The qualifying expression 'imposed
'
for the benefit of the State excludes the rates and charges inci-
dental to local government. These may not be collected by the
occupant himself; he may, however, superintend their expenditure
in order to prevent their being utilized for hostile purposes. The
national revenue collected by him must be on the scale in force at
the time of invasion, and must be devoted primarily to defray
the expenses of his public administration; if any surplus rdmains
it may be used for his own necessary
purposes. He is not entitled
to raise new taxes, or to raise existing taxes before they are due; in
case of necessity, a permissible substitute is contributions and
requisitions. He is not bound to observe the prevailing mode of

collecting the State taxes, if the officials of the old Government
have fled or refuse to serve .
Contribu- "
If, in addition to the taxes mentioned in the preceding Article,
tions.
the occupant levies other money contributions in the occupied
territory, this shall only be for the needs of the army or of the
administration of such territory" {I).
(g) Of. supra, H. R. Arts. 4, 14, (h) See also infra. Art. 53.
and Geneva Convention, Art. 4, which (i) Of. Phillipson, Int. Law and the
relate tothe private property of Great War, pp. 162 seq., 220, 229 seg.
prisoners, of the sick and wounded, (k) li. R. Art. 48.
and to medical material. (0 H. R. (1907), Art. 49.
EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LxiND WAEFARE. 535
It is clear from this Article that contributions may b© raised

onlj for two purposes, which are necessarily inseparable from the
legitimate activities ;and objects ,of the occupant He may not raise .
them, therefore, with a view to with a view

self -enrichment, or
to crippling the financial resources of his
enemy and so compelling
him to submit, or by way of exacting a war indemnity. He may
not raise more than the needs of the army warrant such needs —
arising when its own supplies fail, or when unforeseen operations
"
have to be executed. may It sometimes be
justifiable to levy a
money contribution on one place, in order to spend it on the pur-
chase of requisitions in another place. The burden of the war
may thus be more equitably distributed, falling on the inhabitants
generally, rather than upon individual owners of property which
"
may be required (w) .
"No contribution shall be collected except under a written order,

and on the responsibility of a com'mander -in-chief.
This collection shall only be effected, as far as possible, in
accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence of the taxes
in force .
For every contribution a receipt shall be given to the contribu-

"
tors (n). ;
"
The
receipt mentioned in this Article is intended as evidence
that money, goods, or services have been exacted, but implies, in
itself, no promise to pay on the part, of the occupant. He does
not even thereby bind his Government, if victorious, to stipulate
in the Treaty of Peace that the receipts shall be honoured by the
Government of the territory which has been under occupation.
A Swiss proposal, making it obligatory to honour the receipts
mentioned in this and the following Article, was indeed delibe-
rately rejected at the first Hague Conference. An occupant may,
of course, incur a greater liability by the form which he chooses to
give to his receipts, or under the terms of a general proclamation

which he has issued" (o).
"
Neither requisitions in kind nor services shall be demanded Requisitions,
from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the

army of occupation .
They shall be in proportion to the resources
of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the inhabi-
tants in the obligation of taking part in military operations against
their own country.
Such requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the
authority of the commander in the locality occupied .
(m) Holland, The Laws of War on (w) H. E. Art. 51.

Land, § 109. (o) Holland, op. cit. § 111.
Supplies in kind shall, as far as passible, be paid for in cash;

if not a receipt shall be given, and the payment of the amount due
,
shall be made as soon as possible" (p).

This Article imposes a limit —
though it is not clearly defined
—
on the requisitioning licence of belligerents. In the first place,
the amount and kind of requisitions depend on the actual needs
of the army in occupation; secondly, no more must be demanded
than the resources of the particular locality can meet the inhabi- —
tants must not be deprived of their means of subsistence. Requi-
sitions are generally collected through the medium' of the local
municipal authorities, as a safeguard against plundering. The

* '
requisitions in kind include not only provisions, but other neces-

saries of the army, such as means of transport, clothing, &c.
Demands for large quantities of articles of luxury, such as wines,
liqueurs, cigars, &c., are unjustifiable. The 'services' refer to

the work of artisans and labourers (ê\.g.,, smiths, farriers, drivers,
carpenters), and to that of occupiers of houses where troops are

quartered but in no case must the occupant demand services of a
;
military character, or such as are closely related to his belligerent
operations. One of the weakest points of this Article is the

indefiniteness with regard to the payment for supplies and ser-
vices (g) .
'•
Treatment of Xn army of occupation may only take possession of cash, funds,
*
^ , . and which are strictly the property of the

realizable securities
State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores, and supplies,

and, generally, all such movable property of the State as may be
used for military operations.
Military All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air', adapted
for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or
things (apart from cases governed by maritime law), depots of

all kinds of war material, may be seized even
arms, and, generally,
though they belong to private persons, but they must be restored
and compensation fixed when peace is made" (r).
Wo have already referred to the devastation of territory and
destruction of property, public or private, when necessity demands,
in the general operations of a belligerent in the field. The same
considerations apply to the case of occupation. The first para-
graph of this Article refers to confiscation, the second
merely to
sequestration. The expression 'realizable securities'
—the gene-
(p) H. R. Art. 52. by the Germans in the Great War, see

For examples of exorbitant con-
(iq) Phillipson, op. cit. pp. 235 seq.
tributions and requisitions demanded (r) H. R. Art. 53.
rally accepted translation of the original

'
valeurs exigibles
'
has—
given rise to some difference of opinion. (In German it has been
'
officially rendered eintreibbare Forderungen/ suable claims.) It
is, however, generally agreed that the occupant may appropriate

and realize securities 'payable to bearer.' As to debts, the occu-
pant is entitled to forbid payments to the former Government,

but hemay not compel the payment to him of debts that have not
—
become due for to do so would involve an unjustifiable interfer-
ence with private rights. In the case of debts that are due or
become due to the original sovereign during the occupation, nearly
all jurists hold that the
occupant cannot take the debt itself viz., ,
the capital; some maintain, too, that he may not even appropriate
the interest due on such debts, whilst others contend that he may
lawfully do so. Occupation is not conquest, and sovereignty is

not thereby acquired. The power to recover debts due to a State
is incidental to the exercise of legitimate sovereignty alone.
The appliances mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 53 Things

liable
as being subject to sequestration (notwithstanding that they are
private property) include railway plant, telegraphs, telephones,

steamers, horses, carts, and other means of communication. All
these appliances, together with private property that can serve as
wâr material (such as arms, ammunition, leather, cloth, saddles,
&c.) may be seized and used; but as they are to be eventually

restored and compensation is to be paid, it would, seem that an
obligation to give receipts for them is implied. It will be for the
treaty of peace to settle which party is to pay this compensation.

In 1870-1 the Germans destroyed arms proper belonging to private
fjersons; but ornamental and hunting weapons they sequestered,
and gave receipts for them. Private property, other than means
of transport and war material, may not be seized at all. The funds
of saving banks over which the State has partial control are not
liable to seizure if they belong in reality to private depositors.
Similarly, State insurance or pension funds, of which the State

is simply the trustee, are entitled to immunity. In 1870 the
Germans refrained from seizing the funds of the Banque Nationale
de France on the ground that it was a private institution (s) ;
but in 1914 they did not observe this rule in Belgium, where they
confiscated the funds of certain branches of the Belgian National
Bank, whose private character was apparent, as well as the funds
of the Caisse d'Epargne et de Ketraite, an institution conducted
(s) Cf. P. Schiemann, Rechtslage der O'fentlichen Banken in Kriegsfalle

(Greifswald, 1902), p. 76.
by the Post Office authorities, but containing the savings of

working people (t).
Submarine "
cables.
Submarine cables connecting an occupied territory with a
neutral territory shall not be seized or destroyed except in case of
absolute necessity. They must likewise be restored and compensa-
tion arranged for at the conclusion of peace" {u).
This is a new Article added in 1907., In connection with this

subject the rules arrived at by the Institute of International Law
may be referred to: (1) A
submarine cable connecting two neutral
territories is inviolable. (2) A cable connecting the territories of
two belligerents or of two parts of the territory of one of ,the
belligerents may be cut anywhere, except in the territorial waters
or the neutralized waters of a neutral State. (3) A cable con-
necting a neutral territory with the territory of one of the belli-

gerents may not under any circumstances be cut in the territorial
or neutralized waters of a neutral State. In the high sea, this
kind of cable may be cut only if an effective blockade exists and
within the limits of the line of the blockade, and the cable must be
restored with the least possible delay it may always be cut on the
;
territory or in the territorial waters of an enemy, up to a distance

of three marine miles from low -water mark(cc). As to rules (1)
and (2) there has been general agi'eement; the more difficult case
of rule (3) is now provided for by Article 54, which allows the
cutting of a cable joining the occupied territory to a neutral

country, if military exigencies demand. Destruction merely with
the object of inflicting pecuniary loss on the enemy, and not
warranted by strategic or tactical operations, is illegitimate. When
destruction is legitimate and it is resorted to, indemnity must be
paid after the peace. For some time there has been difference of
opinion as to whether a belligerent might cut in the open sea a
cable joining a neutral country with enemy territory the right —
to cut the shore end of such a cable not having been disputed.
There is, however, nothing in Article 54 prohibiting!
it, subject
to the demands of military necessity and to subsequent compensa-

tion. In 1899, in the Spanish-Amferican war, the United States
naval forces cut, within Spanish territorial waters, the Hong-Kong
— Manila cable belonging to a British company, but refused to
admit a legal obligation to pay indemnity. In 1882, in the Chile-
(0 See Phillipson, op. cit. pp. 228, International, vol. xix. p. 331. On
229. submarine cables generally, see Phil-
(u) H. E. (1907), Art. 54. lipson, Studies in International Law
(ip) Annuaire de I'Institut de Droit (1908), pp. 55 seq.
Peru war, Chile similarly cut the cable of a British company, and
afterwards paid compensation.
"
The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator Immovable
and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and property.
agricultural undertakings belonging to the hostile State and
situated in the occupied country. It nmst protect the capital of
these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules
of usufruct" (y).
A usufructuary is a person who has a special interest in property,

i-ii
which he must
,.m use
,
such a manner as
jj^-'-j^
not to
impair its corpit^.
Occupant as
usufructuary.
According to the above provision, then, an occupant may not

appropriate or alienate public immovable property, as he is not
entitled to exercise the rights of sovereignty until the occupied
territory has been duly annexed; he may appropriate only the

produce. The 'rules of usufruct' mentioned in the Article may
differ more or le^s in different Sta,te6, though the fundamental
conception be the same. If there is a difference between those
of the occupying commander's State and those of the occupied
territory, which are to be applied by the occupant ? The Article

does not answer this question. Some jurists are in favour of the
occupant's law (0), others hold that the local law is to be applied.
The latter contention appears to be the more reasonable, inasmuch
as Article 43, defining the general authority of the occupant, calls
upon him to respect the prevailing laws of the country, unless he

is absolutely prevented from doing so. One cannot conceive any
insuperable hindrance to the application of the laws of usufruct
obtaining in the occupied country. Article 55, then, gives the
occupant the right, for example, to collect the rents and dues in
respect of State immovables maturing during the occupation; so
that the old Government, when restored, will not be entitled to
disregard the payment of such rents and dues and demand them a
second time. The occupant, too, may fell timber ripe for cutting;
but purchasers are obliged to remove it before the occupation comes
to an end, as the restored Government may legitimately forbid it,
despite previous contracts with the occupant. If timber not fit

for cutting be sold, the purchaser's title will not be recognised by
the former Government.
In the case of movable property taken on land, it wâs usually Jus post-
held that if it could be identified its imtaediate recapture, or within
a period of twenty -four hours, restored it to its former owner.
(y) H. E. Art. 55. (^) Cf. Bluntschli, § 646.

Now such property is immune from seizure unless it belongs to

the State, or of a military character, or is needed for military
it is
operations. A different rule is applied to real property, or im-

movables. The original owner of this species of property is
entitled towhat is called the benefit of postliminy, and the title
acquired in war must be confirmed by a treaty of peace before it
can be considered as completely valid. This rule cannot be fre-
quently applied to the case of mere private property, which by
the general usage of modern nations is exempt from confiscation.
It only becomes practically important in questions arising out of
alienations of real property, belonging to the Government, made
by the opposite belligerent, while in the military occupation of

the country. Such a title must be expressly confirmed by the
treaty of peace, or by the general operation of the cession of terri-
tory made by the enemy in such treaty. Until such confirmation,
itcontinues liable to be divested by the jus postliminii. The pur-
chaser of any portion of the national domain takes it at the peril
of being evicted by the original sovereign owner when he is
restored to the possession of his dominions (a) .
"
Churches, The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated
works of art,
&c. to religious worship, charity, and education, the arts and sciences,
even when belonging to the State, shall be treated as private
property.
All seizure of, destruction or wilfuldamage done to institutions
of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science is
forbidden, and should be 'made the subject of legal pro-
"
ceedings (&).
This Article does not prohibit an occupant from using State or
municipal buildings for purposes required by military necessity;
so that, in the absence of other accommodation, he is permitted,
for example, to turn schools into barracks, churches into hospitals,
&c. He must not wilfully damage these buildings and their con-
tents, unless it be imperatively demanded by military operations;
but in no case is he entitled to
appropriate or carry off such
contents.
The case of In connection with this subject, a very interesting case is fur-
art acquired nished by the proceedings of the allies in 1815 with regard
to the foreign works of art that had been accumulated in
De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.

(o) Grotius, plicated with that of civil revolution,
lib. cap. 6, § 4; cap. 9, § 13.
iii. and a change of internal government
Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. eh. 13, recognised by the nation itself and by-
§§ 197—200, 210, 212. Kluber, Droit foreign States, a modification of the
des Gens Moderne de I'Europe, §§ 256 rule may be required in its practical
— 258. Martens, Precis, liv. viii. ch. 4, application. Vtde ante, Pt. I. ch. 2,
§ 282, a. pp. 48 et seq.
Where the case of conquest is com- (6) H. R. Art. b%.
the Louvre. But here the distinction between illegitimate by

France
appropriation during military occupation and- legitimate Napoleonic

•appropriation by cession and treaty was not observed. The wars.
invasion of France by the allied Powers of Europe, in 1815,
Avas followed by the forcible restitution of the pictures, statues,
and other monuments of art, collected from different con-
quered countries during the wars of the French Revolution, and
Lord
deposited in the museum of the Louvre. The grounds upon which
Castle-
this measure was adopted were fully explained in a note delivered
by the British minister. Lord Castlereagh, to the ministers of

the other allied Powers at Paris, on the 11th September, 1815. It
was there stated that representations had been laid before the
Congress, assembled in that capital, from the Pope, the Grand
Duke of Tuscany, the King of the Netherlands, claiming, through
the intervention of the allied Powers, the restoration of the statues,
pictures, and other works of art, of which their respective States

had been successively stripped by the late revolutionary Govern-
ment of France, contrary to ©very principle of justice, and to the
usages of modern warfare. The note went on to say that it was
now the second time that the Powers of Europe had been com-
pelled, in vindication of their own liberties and for the settlement
of the world, to invade France, and twice their armies had pos-
sessed themselves of the capital of the State, in which these,
the spoils of the greater part of Europe, were accumulated. The
legitimate sovereign of France had as often, under the protection

of those armies, been enabled to resume his throne, and to mediate
for his people a peace with the allies, to the marked indulgence
of which neither their conduct to their own monarch, nor towards
other States, had given them' just pretensions to aspire. That
the purest sentiments of regard for Louis XVIII. deference for
,
his ancient and illustrious house, and respect for his misfortunes',
had invariably guided the allied councils, had been proved beyond
a question, by their having, in 1814, framed the treaty of Paris
on the basis of preserving to France its complete integrity; and
still more, after their late disappointment, by the endeavours they
were again making, ultimately to combine the substantial interests
of France with such an adequate system of temporary precaution
as might satisfy what they owed tO' the security of their o,wn
subjects. But it would be the height of weaknesis, as well as of
injustice, and in its effects much more likely to mislead than to
bring back the people of France to moral and peaceful habits, if
the allied sovereigns, to whom the world was anxiously looking up
for protection and repose, were to deny that principle of integrity'
in its just and liberal application to other natio,ns, their allies
(more especiallj to the feeble and the helpless), which thej were
about, for a second time, tO\ concede to a nation against which they
had had occasion so long to contend in war. Upon what principle
could France, at the close of the war, expect to sit down with the
same extent of possessions which she held before the revolution,
and same time, to retain the ornamental spoils of all
desire, at the
other countries ? Was there anj possible doubt of the issue of the
contest, or of the power of the allies to effectuate what justice and
policy required? If not, upon what principle would they deprive

France of her late territorial acquisitions, and preserve to her the
spoliations consisting of objects of art appertaining to those terri-
tories, which all modern conquerors had invariably respected, as
inseparable'from the country to which they belonged? These

remarks were amplified by a variety of considerations of political
expediency, not necessary to be recapitulated, and the note con-
cluded by declaring that, in applying a remedy to this offensive
evil, it did not appear that any middle line could be adopted which
did not go to recognise a variety of spoliations, under the cover of
treaties, if possible, more flagrant in their character than the acts
of undisguised rapine by which these remains were, in general,
brought together. The principle of property regulated by the
claims of the territories from whence these works were taken, is
the surestand only guide to justice; and perhaps there was nothing
whicli would more tend to settle the public mind of Europe at
day, than such a homage on the part of the King of France,

this to
a principle of virtue, conciliation, and peace (c) .
In the debate which took place in the House of Com'mons, on the

20th of February, 1816, on the Peace with France, Sir Samuel
Horn illy, speaking incidentally of this proceeding, stated that he
was by no means satisfied of its justice. It was not true that the
works of art deposited in the museum of the Louvre had all bben
carried away as the spoils of war; many, and the most valuable of
them, had become the property of France by express treaty stipu-
lations;and it was no answer to say that those treaties had been
made necessary by unjust aggressions and unprincipled wars;
because there would be an end of all faith between nations, if
treatieswere to be held not to be binding, because the wars out of
which they arose were unjust, especially as there could be no
competent judge to decide upon the justice of the war, but the
nation itself. By whom', too, was it that this supposed act of
(c) Martens, Nouveau Recueil, torn. ii.

p. 632.
justice and this "great moral lesson," as it was called, had been
read? the very Powers who had, at different times, abetted
Bj
France in these her unjust wars. Among other articles carried
from' Paris, under the pretence of restoring them to their rightful
owners, were the celebrated Corinthian horses which had been
brought from Venice; but how strange an act of justice was this
to give them back their statues, but not to restore to them those far
more valuable possessions, their territory and their republic, which
were, at the same time, wrested from the Venetians But the !
reason of this was obvious: the city and the territory of Venice
had been transferred to Austria by the treaty of Campo Formio,
but the horses had remained the trophy of France; and Austria,,
whilst she was thus hypocritically reading this moral lesson to
nations, not only quietly retained the rich and unjust spoils she
had got, but restored those splendid works of art, not to the Venice
which had been despoiled of them, the ancient, independent, re-
—
publican Venice; but to Austrian Venice ^to that country which,
in defiance of all the principles she pretended to be acting on, she
still retained as part of her own dominions {d) .
"
No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, may be inflicted Collective or
on the population on account of the acts of individuals for which penalties,

it cannot be considered as collectively responsible" (e).
This Article impliedly sanctions the infliction of pecuniary

penalties, or fines, and other penalties on a community for acts
and omissions for which it is clearly answerable. These acts and
omissions refer not only to breaches of war law, but also to in-
fringements of the occupying commander's proclamations or
martial law regulations, as well as to failure to supply legitimate
contributions and requisitions. Moreover, where reprisals are
permissible collective penalties may be imposed. Occupying com-
manders have usually held a town or village jointly responsible
for damage done to railways, bridges, telegraphs, &c., in the
neighbourhood. To saddle a community with responsibility of

this kind is unjustifiable, if the damage was committed by
unknown individuals without the cognizance of the community,
and when the community was unable to prevent the commission
of the act. It is the occupant's business to maintain the public

order, and, above all, to secure the observance of his martial law
Cd) Life of Romilly, edited by his (e) H. R. Art. 50.

sons, vol. ii. p. 404.
544 EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WxVRFARE.
regulations. It is unlawful to hold innocent persons responsible

for the misconduct of others beyond their control. To say that it
isa frequent practice is simply to say that an elementary principle
of reason and justice is honoured in the breach rather than in the
observance .
Hostag-es. This brings us to the question of hostages, on which there is by

no means unanimous agreement. In earlier times hostages were
given by one party or by both parties as a guarantee that a con-
vention or a promise would be observed. The practice of seizing
hostages has also been adopted by occupying comtnanders, as a
guarantee that the fellow-citizens of the arrested persons would
refrain from doing certain things prohibited and would carry out
certain things ordered to be done. In 1870-1 the Germans habi-
tually seized hostages, including mayors, councillors, priests, uni-
versity professors, and other leading citizens, who were to be put
to death in case of disobedience on the part of their townsmen No .
doubt such measures of intimidation and repression contributed

much to the ultimate victory of the invaders. These proceedings
were repeated, in a perem|ptory and systematic manner, by the
Germans whenever they entered i;Qto occupation of Belgian and
French towns and villages during the war of 1914-1915. Many
*
hostages were shot, many were held in oppressive and humiliating
confinement, many were carried off to Germany (/) They were .
treated far worse than prisoners of war. The Hague Rules do not
include innocent citizens among the persons liable to be captured
as prisoners of war. The Hague Regulations, it is true, have no
specific provision ivith regard to hostages; but their seizure and
the presumption of vicarious responsibility as well as the prin-
ciple of terrorism and application of psychological pressure are

contrary to the fundamental conceptions of humanity, conscience,
fairness, and justice that are frequently appealed to in the inter-
national conventions of the Hague. The practice is akin to that
of brigandage and blackmail, and is repugnant to all honourable
men. International law does not sanction the abnegation of
honour even in the severest warfare. In the Franco-German war,
and in the Anglo-Boer war, too {g), the Germans and the British
seized hostages and placed them' on military trains as a safeguard
against wrecking or damage to bridges, &c. This practice is

almost as indefensible as using inhabitants as a shield to the firing
(/) Cf .
Phillipson, Int. Law and {g) Of. White Paper, Proclamations
the Great War, pp. 238 seq. issued by F. M. Lord Roberts in South
Africa (Cd. 426), 1900, p. 11.
EIGHTS OF WAK AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—LAND WARFARE. 545
line Qi) .
Besides, it is to be remembered that trains may lawfully
be wrecked and bridges damaged by qualified combatants even
—
if they proceed singly who —
mânag-e to cross the lines so that in ;
such a case the arrested hostages would be made to suffer for the
legitimate acts of a belligerent .
(Ji) Several cases of this practice occurred in the Great War; see PhilHp-
son, op. cit. pp. 195, 253, 254.
W. 05
546 RIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE.
CHAPTEE III.
RIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES —MARITIME WARFARE.

La-wful The naval forces of maritime States consist of two classes of
bkllioeeent8
IN NAVAL vessels: firstly, fighting' vessels (' vaisseaux de combat'), including
WAE.
battleships, cruisers, torpedo boats, destroyers, and submarines;
and secondly, auxiliary vessels (' vaisseaux auxiliaires '), including
repairing ships, supply ships, despatch boats,

colliers, transports,
&c. At the
Hague Conference, 1907, Lord Reay, one of the repre-
sentatives of Great Britain, proposed such a classification for the
acceptance of the other delegates, and suggested that the second

class, viz., auxiliary vessels, should be accorded the same belli-
gerent status as regular fighting ships. The obvious objection,

however, was made that the proposal was incompatible with the
principles of 'unneutral service.' Though this distinction has
not received the recognition of written international law, it none
the less exists as a fact.
Non-com- It must probably be considered as a remliant of the barbarous
missioned
captors. practices of those ages when maritime war and piracy were synony-
mous, that captures made by private armed vessels without a
commission, not merely in self-defence, but even by attacking the
enem3^ were considered lawful, not indeed for the purpose of
vesting the enemy's property thus seized in the captors, but to
prevent their conduct from' being regarded as piratical, either by
their own Government or by the other belligerent State (a) . Pro-
perty thus seized was condemned to the Government as prize of
war, or, as these captures were technically called, 'droits of ad-
miralty.' The same principle is now made
applied to the captures
by armed vessels commissioned against one
Power, when war
breaks out with another; the captures made from that other are
condemned, not to the captors, but to the Government (&).
(a) See Sir L. Jenkins' Charge to (1801), 40. Rob. 72; The Georgiana, 1
the Grand Jury at the Admiralty Ses- Dods. Ad. 3&7. Spark, Diplomatio
sions in Southwark, 18th Feb. 1€«0. Correspondence, vol. i. p. 443.
Marsden, Adm. Ciases, p. 256. Wheaton's Rep. vol. ii. Appendix,
(6) Brown, Oiv. and Adm. Law, Note I. p. 7.
vol. ii. p. 526, Appendix. The Abigail
RIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE. 54'
The practice of cruising with private armed vessels commis- Privateers,
sioned by the State by means of letters of marque, was formerly

sanctioned by the laws of every maritime nation, as a legfitimate
means of destroying the commerce of an enemy. The practice,
however, was justly arraigned as liable to gross abuses, -as tending
to encourage a spirit of lawless depredation, and as being in
glaring contradiction to the more mitigated modes of warfare

practised by land. Powerful efforts were made by humane and
enlightened individuals to suppress it, as inconsistent with the
liberal spirit of the age. The treaty negotiated by Franklin,
between the United States and Prussia, in 1785, by which it was
stipulated that, in case of war, neither Power should commission
privateers to depredate upon the commerce of the other, furnished
an example worthy of applause and imitation. But this stipula-
tion was not revived on the renewal of the treaty, in 1799; and it
was feared that, so long as maritime captures of private property
were tolerated, this particular mode of injuring the enemy's com-
merce would continue to be practised, especially where it afforded
the means of countervailing the superiority of the public marine
of an enemy (c) .
The practice privateering was resorted to during the

of Abolition of
Napoleonic wars. But as the system was liable to gross abuses

and licentious conduct, and involved serious disadvantages in the
case of neutral commerce, public opinion gradually turned against
it. In 1854, at the commencement of the Crimean war, the allies.
Great Britain and France, decided to discontinue the issuing of
letters of marque to private owners, and to use in their naval opera-
tions against the enemy only public armed vessels. On the con-
clusion of the war, the Declaration of Paris (signed by the
plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia,

Russia, Turkey, and Sardinia) laid down, inter alia, that "priva-
teering is and remains abolished" (Article 1). Nearly all mari-
time States afterwards expressed their adhesion to the Declaration.
The United States was a notable exception; she refused to sign it,
unless the right to capture private property other than contraband
were abrogated. Nor did Spain and Mexico accept the Article
against privateering. During the American Civil War of 1861,
Congress authorized the President to issue letters of marque, but
he did not avail himself of this power. The Confederates offered
marque to foreigners, but the restrictive legislation
their letters of
{o) Vatt^l, liv. ill. ch. 15, § 229. 15. North American Review, vol. ii.
Franklin, Works, vol. ii.
pp. 447, 530. (N. S.) pp. 166—196. Wheaton, Hist.
Edinburgh Review, vol. iii.
pp. 13
— I^w of Nations, p. 308.
35 (2)
of the maritime Powers, and the threat of the United States to
treat such vessels as pirates, prevented their being accepted. The

Confederate vessels were commissioned as of their regular navy {d) .
In the Spanish-American war of 1898, the United States Govern-

"
ment issued a proclamation stating its intention to adhere to
the rules of the Declaration of Paris." The Spanish Government,
while accepting the three last Articles of the Declaration, main-
tained their right to issue letters of marque, but postponed the
authorization of privateers, and contented itself with the organiza-
tion of a service of auxiliary cruisers. The utter collapse of the
Spanish naval power, and the consequent cessation of hostilities,
prevented further developments (e) In 1886, Japan signed the
.
Declaration of Paris. At the second Hague Conference, 1907,

Spain notified her adhesion to it.
The Declaration of Paris is now a firmly established part of
international law and is regarded as possessing universal applica-
bility, although it has not obtained the formal adhesion of a few
States. During the Great War of 1914 it was urged in some
quarters in Great Britain that she should denounce the Declara-
tion, on the ground that, among other reasons, Germany had
had recourse to a species of privateering, inasmtich as she had
converted merchantmen into warships on the high seas. But such
conversion, as we shall see presently, is not equivalent to priva-
teering. Moreover, in The Marie Glaeser (/), a case of maritime

capture that came before the Prize Court soon after the outbreak
of the war, the President declared, when a question was raised as
to the Declaration of Paris, that the Court would regard it as pos-
sessing binding force and as an acknowledged part of inter-
national law. .
'.
Enlistment of
Privateering was definitely and formally abolished by the
navy. Declaration of Paris, 1856; but after that date States not infre-
quently resorted to the practice of enlisting for purposes of war
vesselsbelonging to private persons. Thus, in July, 1870, at
the commencement of the Franco-German war, Prussia, being
weaker than France in naval resources, endeavoured to make good
the deficiency by inviting private owners to place their merchant-
men at the service of the Government, with the object of equipping
them and utilizing them in belligerent operations against the
adversary. These vessels were intended to constitute a volunteer
navy. Their officers and crews were in the first instance to be
(d) Wheaton, by Dana, n. 17-3. (/) The Marie Glaeser (1914), 31

(e) See Hertslet, Commercial Trea- .
T. L. R. 8.
ties, xxi. pp. 836, 1075.
RIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES -MARITIME WARFARE. 549
provided by the owners, but were to be under naval discipline and

naval command; and the vessels were to fij the naval flag. For
the time being, then, the vessels were to be regarded as units o£ the
naval forces, and the officers and crew as combatants. The
German Government offered the owners certain sums for the hire
of their ships, and an indemnity in case they were captured or
destroyed, as well as premiums if they destroyed enemy vessels or

took prizes. France denounced the scheme as being equivalent to
privateering and thus contrary to the Declaration of Paris, and
made an appeal to Great Britain. The British Government sub-
mitted the question to its law officers, who held that there was a
''substantial difference" between the German proposal and the
practice abolished by the first Article of the said Declaration, so

that no opposition could properly be offered to the Prussian
decree (/). The mattet was taken up by some of the leading pub-
licists and
jurists of the day, but no ag'reement was arrived at.
However, the German project came practically to nothing, for none
of the invited vessels assumed hostilities .
But the movement to raise auxiliary fleets in time of war by
incorporating suitable merchantmen temporarily in the navy was

by no means dead. In 1877 when war appeared imminent be-
tween Great Britain and Kussia, the Russian Government accepted
the offer of a patriotic association to establish a Volunteer Fleet.
The vessels were to be purchased by private subscription, and
placed under the command of the imperial navy during the
threatened war. The difference between the two Powers was
settled by the Treaty of Berlin; but the Russian Volunteer Fleet
remained, and is still in existence. It receives a subsidy from the
Government on certain conditions as to strength and efficiency its ;
ships may in time of peace carry the mercantile flag and may
engage in commerce, but they are in the main employed in the
public service, e.g.^ in carrying convicts, soldiers, officials, and
stores between Petrograd or Odessa and the Russian possessions in
the Far East The commander and one other officer of each vessel
.
are appointed by the State, and their crews (who may also be
supplied by the Government) are subject to naval training and

discipline. In time of war the naval flag is assumed.
Later, some of the leading maritime Powers adopted another
method for recruiting their navies. Thus, in 1887, Great Britain
entered into arrangements with the great shipping companies,
which, in return for annual subsidies, were to place at the disposal
{(j) British Pari. Papers, Franco-German War, No. 1 (1871), p. 22.

550 EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MAEITIME WAEFAEE.
of the Admiralty fast vessels, at a fixed price and on short notice,

for service as cruisers or transports in time of war. The Govern-
ment undertook to provide from the Royal Naval Reserve half the
number of the seamen, and also to place the necessary equipment
on board {h) . In 1891 the United States (^) made similar arrange-
ments with American shipowners, and made good use of such
auxiliary cruisers in the war with Spain, 1898. The same system,
with modifications in details, was adopted by other naval Powers;
for example, France, Germany, Italy, Japan. The British
arrangements mentioned above have since been discontinued, with
the exception of the agreemênt with the Cunard Company; and
another plan was adopted by which subsidies were granted to the
Company on condition that the vessels it built were previously
approved by the Goveirnment.

Are vessels of this character entitled to be regarded as legitimate
belligerents? Like the militia and volunteer corps of land war-
fare, they are lawful belligerents if they are taken over and com-
missioned by the State, if they operate under its responsibility
and observe (like the regular warships) the laws and custpms of
war.
In July, 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war, the Peterhurg
and the Smolensk, two vessels of the Russian Volunteer Fleet,
in the guise of merchantmen flying the mercantile flag passed from
the Black Sea through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles into the
Mediterranean, and proceeded via the Suez Canal to the Red Sea.
After leaving Suez they mounted guns, hoisted the naval flag, and
began to intercept neutral commerce. Several vessels wer^ stopped,
amongst which was the German steamship Prinz Heinrich ; several
of her mail bags were taken from her (though they were afterwards
placed on board the British vessel Persia and sent on to their

destination). Matters came to a head when the British S.S.
Malacca was seized by the Peterhurg (July 13) on the ground
that she was engaged in contraband trade; though, in fact, her
cargo consisted of arms and ammunition belonging to the British

Government and destined for Hong-Kong and Singapore. How-
ever, a prize crew was put on board the Malacca ; she was taken to
Port Said, where her passengers and crew were disembarked, and
then sent to Libau for adjudication. When reports of these pro-
ceedings reached this country, the British Government sent a
protest to Russia, and demanded the release of the Malacca on the
(70 British Pari. Papers, Subven- (i) Of.Moore, Digest, vol. vii.
tion of Merchant Steamers for State p. 542. See also The Rita (1899),
Purposes, 1887. 89 Fed. Rep. 763.
RIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE. 551
grounds that she did not carry contraband, and that the Peterhurg
and the S'niolensk could not lawfully exercise the right of capture,
inasnxuch as they were not ships of war;, but if they were, then
Eussia had violated several international agreements, whereby the
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were closed to men-of-war. Eussia
receded from her position, liberated the Malacca after a perfunc-
tory examination of her cargo, and agreed to forbid her Volunteer
Fleet to exercise belligerent rights in the future, on the ground
that the belligerent s,tatus of such vessels was not yet recognised by
international law
(; ) As a result of this incident the second Hague
.
Conference, 1907, considered the question of the conversion of

merchantmen, and arrived at a number of rules thereon: —
"
No merchant ship converted into a warship shall have the The Hague
(1)
rights and duties appertaining to vessels possessing that status relative to^
unless it is placed under the direct authority, imlnediate control, the conversion
1 -1 -T P -r»
1 1n n' ' of merchant
and responsibility oi the rower whose nag it nies. ships into
(2) Merchant ships converted into warships must bear the ex-
^â^^îps-
ternal marks which distinguish the warships of their nationality .
(3) The commander must be in the service of the State and duly
commissioned by the proper authorities. His name must appear
on the list of the officers of the fighting fleet.
(4) The crew must be subject to military discipline.
(5) Every merchant ship converted into a warship is bound to
observe, in its operations, the laws and customs of war.
(6) A belligerent who converts a merchant ship into a warship
must, as soon as possible, announce such conversion in the list of
"
its warships (k).
This Convention was signed by practically
all the Powers repre-
sented at the Hague. A

notable excepti.on was the United States,
which refused to be a signatory thereto for the same reason that
she declined previously to accept in a formal manner the Declara-
tion of Paris —for the United States
Government has throughout
been anxious to abolish, along with the practice of privateering,
the right to capture private enemy property of a non-contraband
character. Though her signature was withheld from the Con-
vention, the United States will undoubtedly observe in practice
the definite and authoritative regulations laid down.
A
striking deficiency of the seventh Convention is the absence of Place
of
conversion.
a rule as to the jplace fwhere mterchajiitmen may be converlted.
(/) On the Malacca case, see T. J. Japanese War (1905), pp. 40 seq.;
Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Parliamentary Debates (1904), 4th
Far East (1904), pp. 202 seq.; F. E. series, vol. cxxxviii. pp. 1433, 1479.
Smith and N. W. Sibley, International (k) Hague Convention, No. VII.
Law as interpreted during the Eusso- (1907), Arts. 1
— 6.
There was a difference of opinion both at the Hague Conference

(1907) and at the London Naval Conference (1909) among the
States including the Great Powers. Great Britain, the United
States, Japan, and other Powers contended that the conversion of
merchantmen into warships should be effected only in the ports of
the country to which the merchantmen belonged or in ports occu-
pied by that country's armed forces. On the other hand, a number

of Powers, including France, Germany, and Russia, claimed the
right to convert also on the high seas. Moreover, somie even

advocated permission to convert in neutral ports or neutral terri-
torial waters. The latter course is clearly inadmissible, as being
contrary to the well-established fundamental principles of neu-
trality. On general principles, however, it is obviously legitimate
for a belligerent to effect conversion in its own waters or in those of
the enemy, or of an ally. As to the high seas, the conclusion
cannot bo inferred so readily. If the practice be there per*mitted
without restriction, neutral interests will
thereby be jeopardised;,
for neutral States are entitled to know beforehand their position
with regard to belligerent interference with their trade, and by
what vessels such interference will be exercised. Further, if con-
version on the high seas be allowed, the right of reconversion
would presumably be also claimed; so that a vessel might be
—
subjected to a series of arbitrary transformations âccording to
—
her object and position which would be inconsistent with the
fundamental requirement as to definite belligerent status. War
law forbids intermittent belligerency on sea as well as on land.
The question of converting merchantmen on the high seas remains,
then, unsettled. If an agreement thereon be arrived at in the
future, it is very probable that the suggestions of the delegates of
three Powers will be embodied. Thus, at the London Naval Con-
ference (1908-1909) Great Britain proposed that the
right of con-
version on the high seas should be restricted "to the case of vessels
which had been specifically and publicly designated by the
respec-
tive Governments as suitable for the
purpose," and which appeared
on their navy lists; and that such vessels, while in neutral
ports,
should be subjected to the same treatment as
belligerent men-of-
war (Z). Italy suggested at the Hague Conference that
(1907)
conversion should be limited to merchantmen that left the terri-
torial waters of their own
country before the outbreak of war.
Finally, Austria proposed at the same time that if conversion be
allowed, reconversion should be prohibited in the same war.
(0 British Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 4 (1909), p.

'
:
31.
EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE. 553
The practice of conversion on the high seas was reported to have

taken place during the Great War. Thus, soon after the com'-
mencement of hostilities, a German liner, the Yaterland, after
leaving the Uni,ted States with a number of German reservists,

was said to have converted herself, when outside the American
territorial waters, into a cruiser for the purpose of capturing or
destroying the enemy merchantmen. It was also reported that

the United States Government despatched a warship to ascertain
whether the alleged conversion had involved a breach of American
neutrality.
Converted merchantmen are to be distinguished from a class Defensively

may be described as defensively armed chantmen^"
of mercantile vessels which
merchantmen. Of these much was heal-d during the Great War.
Unlike the former, they are not commissioned and continue to
trade or carry passengers; but with a view purely and sim|ply to
•adopting measures of self-defence in case of unjustifiable attack,
they are provided with a number of guns . The legitimacy of this
practice was denied in Germany.

During the Napoleonic wars the British merchant service usually
carried guns for defensive purposes. The vessels of the East
India Company and the Hudson Bay Company were furnished
with adequate armament (m) Even as late as the middle of the
.
nineteenth century, merchantmen engaged in the opium trade took

similar precautions for self-defence. After this the practice fell
into disuse; but quite recently it was reintroduced. In 1913 the
British Admiralty stated that some forty vessels had been armed
"with two 4"7-inch guns each,and provision would soon afterwards
be made for thirty more. The Admiralty supplied the guns and
ammunition, and provided for the training of the guns' crews.
The guns were mounted only in the stern, so that pursuers alone
might be fired at. These vessels^ it was emphasized, did not
possess belligerent status, and could not take part in offensive
operations. They would offer resistance only to the enemy's armed
merchantmen.
Exception was taken to these proceedings in somfe countries,
especially in Germany, where it was contended that such measures
of self-defence were illegitimate and exposed the crew to the treat-
'
ment of criminals,' .unless they were duly enrolled in the naval,

forces of their country. In 1913, liowever, the Institute of Inter-
national Law considered the measures to be permissible. It would
(m) Of. James, Naval History.

554 EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MAKITIME WARFARE.
follow, then, that the crews of defensively armed merchantmen^

if captured by the enemy after having offered resistance, are en~
war; so that they forfeit the

titled to be treated as prisoners of
right of release accorded to the crew of a captured mer-

which is
chantman by the eleventh Convention of the Hague Conference^

1907.
Soon after the commencement of the Great War, the German
Government complained to the United States that British mer-
chantmen were furnished with 6-inch guns, and so were placed in
the position of warships. But the American Government even-
vessels of belligerents would be
tually decided that the merchant
admitted in its ports, on the ground that to carry armament and
ammunition for purely defensive purposes did not constitute them
warships, if the guns were not larger than 6 -inch and were not
mounted forward.
We may add that on May 7, 1915, the great liner Lusitania
was torpedoed by a German submarine (which resulted in the loss
of more than 1,100 innocent persons, including a large number of
neutrals) the German Government held, inter alia, that the vessel
;
was armed, and therefore was in the position of a warship. This

allegation was denied by the British Admiralty, and was later
disproved at a public inquiry/.
The sick, We have already set forth the rules of international law relating
wouNDEBAND ^^ ^j^g treatment of the sick and wounded in land warfare. In the
SHTPWBECKED. , ^ T 1 OOA
case of maritime warfare further rules are necessary. In 1899
the first Hague Conference established a Convention for adapting
the principles of the Geneva Convention (1864) to naval war; and
in 1907 the second Hague Conference revised, improved, and
enlargedit, on the basis of the new Geneva Convention of 1906,
and embodied the results in its tenth Convention. The principal

provisions are as follows:
—
Military
^
"Military hospital ships, that is to say, ships constructed or
shfps. adiapted by States specially and solely with a view of aiding the
sick, wounded, and shipwrecked, the names of which have been
communicated to the belligerent Powers at the commencement or
during the course of hostilities, and in any case before they are
employed, shall be respected, and cannot be captured while hos-

tilities last.
These ships, moreover, are not in the same position as warships

"
with regard to their stay in a neutral port {n).
(n) Hague Convention (1907), No. X. Art. 1.

EIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE. 556
This Article requires the commiinication of the names of hos-

pital ships to belligereints it says nothing of such communication
;
i:o neutral States. But as the Article confers on these ships im-
munity from the imposed on warships in neutral ports,
restriction
viz., a maximum stay of twenty -four hours, it might prevent

inconvenience and suspicion if the names were notified also to
neutrals.
It must be recorded that during the Great War this fundamental

provision of the Convention was, according to a report of the
British Admiralty, violated by Germany, in that one of her
submarines fired a torpedo (February 1, 1915) at— but missed
—
the British hospital ship Astuîas, some fifteen miles off the Havre
lightship . A
similar attack was made on another hospital ship, the
St. Andrew. It was emphasized that both hospital ships had
carefully fulfilled the requirements of the Convention, and were

clearly recognisable by night as well as by day .
"
Hospital ships equip'ped wholly or in part at the expense of Private
^
private persons or officially recognised relief societies shall be like- ^-^^^^
wise respected and exempt from capture, if the belligerent Power
to whom they belong has given them an official commission and
has notified their names to the hostile Power at the commencement
of or during hostilities; and in any case before they are employed.
These ships must be provided with a document from the proper
authorities declaring that the vessels have been under their control
while fitting out and on final departure" (o).
It was thought that the exemption granted by this Article
would induce private owners of yachts and other suitable craft to
place them
at the disposal of the medical service .
"
Hospital ships equipped iwhoUy or in part at the cost of private Neutral
persons or officially recognised societies of neutral countries shall gi^Tps.^
be respected and exempt frona capture, on condition that they
are placed under the control of one of the belligerents, with the
previous consent of their own Government and with the authoriza-

tion of the belligerent himfeelf and that the latter has notified
,
their name to his adversary at the comlnenoemient of or during

hostilities, and in any case before they are employed" (p).
"
The ships mentioned in Articles 1, 2, and 3, shall afford relief Their duties
and assistance to the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked of the belli-

gerents without distinction of nationality.
The Governments undertake not to use these ships for any
military purpose.
(o) Ibid. Art. 2. (p) Art. 3.

556 EIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE.
Theso vessels must in no wise hamper the movements of the

combatants .
During and after an engagement they will act at their own

risk and 23eril.
. The belligerents shall have the right to control and search them;
thej may decline their assistance, order them off, impose upon
them a certain course, and put a commissioner on board; they may,
even detain them if serious circumstances require it.
As far as possible the belligerents shall enter in the log book of

the hospital ships the orders which they give them" {q).
Distinctive "
signs.
Military hospital ships shall be distinguished by being painted
white outside with a horizontal band of green about a mietre and
a half (about five feet) in breadth .
'
The ships mentioned in Articles 2 and 3 shall be distinguished

by being painted white outside with a horizontal band of red about
a metro and a half in breadth .
The boats of the ships above mentioned, as also small craft which
may be used for hospital work, shall be distinguished by similar

painting.
All hospital ships shall make themselves known by hoisting,
with their national flag, the white flag with a red cross provided
by the Geneva Convention; and further, if they belong to a neutral
State, by flying at the mainmast the national flag of the belligerent
under whose control thej are placed .
Hospital ships which under the terms of Article 4 are detained

by the enemy must haul down the national flag of the belligerent
to whom: they belong.
The ships and boats above mentioned which wish to assure by
night the freedom' from interference to which they are entitled,
must, subject to the assent of the belligerent they are accompany-
ing, take the necessary measures to render their special painting
"
sufiiciently plain (r) .
It has already been pointed out above, in connection with the

Geneva Convention as applied to land warfare, that
Turkey re-
served the right to use the Eed Crescent and Persia the Lion and
Sun, instead of the Red Cross.
"
The
idistinguishing signs referred to in Article 5 can only be
used, whether in time of peace or of war, for protecting or indi-
cating the ships therein mentioned" (s).
The British delegates did not accept this Article, on the ground
iq) Art. 4. (0 Art. 6, (s) Art. 6.

that they could not undertake that their legislature would pass
an Act conformably thereto. We
have already seen that for the
same reasons the British representatives did not accept Article 28
of the Geneva Convention of 1906.
''
In the case of a
fiffht on 'board a warship, the sick wards shall ^^^Y ™^?
be respected
in, Ml
and spared as far as possible.
^^^ matenal.
,
These sick wards and the material belonging to them remain

subject to the laws of war; they cannot, however, be used for any,
purpose other than that for which they were originally intended,
so long as they are required for the sick and wounded.
The commander into whose power they have fallen, may, how-
ever, in case of serious military necessity, apply them to other
purposes, after first seeing that the sick and wounded on board are
"
properly provided for (^).
"
The protection
to which hospital ships and sick wards are Innocent
entitled ceases if they are used to commit acts harmful to the
enemy.
The fact of the staff of the said ships and sick wards being armed
for maintaining order and defending the sick and wounded, and
the presence of wireless telegraphy apparatus on board, are not
"
sufficient reasons for withdrawing protection (m) .
In order to illustrate the application of this Article, two in-

teresting cases may be referred to, one that occurred in the Eusso-
Japanese war (1905), and the other in the Great War (1915).
After the Eusso-Japaneee war broke out, the Orel (described in
the Japanese official documents as the Aryol), a steamship belong-
ing to the Russian Volunteer Fleet, was chartered by the Russian

Red Cross Society for use as a hospital ship In accordance with
.
the existing requirements (Article 2 of the third Convention of

the Hague (1899), now replaced by the tenth Convention, 1907),
her nam<i was notified to the Japanese Government, which accord-
ingly recognised her exemption. During the battle of Tsushima
she was captured by a Japanese cruiser, and sent in for adjudica-
tion on the ground of having assisted in the warlike operations of
the enemy (Article 4 of the 1899 Convention provided that hos-
pital ships were not to be used for a military purpoise). It was

proved before the Sasebo Prize Court that a few days before the
—
battle the vessel had received on board prisoners not being sick
—
and wounded ^from the British steamer Oldhamia, which had
{t) Art. 7. Of. Geneva Convention (m) Art. 8. Of. Geneva Convention
(1906), Arts. 6, 15, supra. (1906), Arts. 7, 8, supra.
558 EIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES- -MARITIME WARFARE.
been captured by a Russian cruiser that she carried material for

;
military use; and had performed reconnoitring services. Accord-

ingly the Court condemned both the vessel and the cargo (x).
The Ophelia (,?/), purporting to b© a German hospital ship, was
captured on October 18, 1914, owing to suspicions aroused by her
conduct. Up to the time of the war she was a merchant vessel, and
on August 3 (the day before the outbreak of hostilities) she was in
the port of London, and on the following^ day she proceeded to
Hamburg. On September 11 the German Government issued a

certificate declaring her to be a hospital ship. On October 18 she
was heard to Accordingly she was
have received code messages.
signalled to stop, and the commander of the Meteor boarded her,
and received some ship's papers; but several documents had
been thrown overboard before his arrival. In consequence of this,
the Ophelia was ordered to haul down her flag, and was taken in
for adjudication. The President, in the course of his judgment,
said that the records of hospital ships should be clean; but, if they
are not preserved, their destruction raises a presumption of guilty
practices {z) Such vessels are liable to search, in accordance with

.
the express terms of the tenth Convention of 1907; but if those in
charge can with impunity destroy the documents and records im-
mediately before a searching ofiicer makes his visit, the right of
search becomes to a great extent nugatory. The evidence having
compelled the President to come to the conclusions that, firstly,

the Ophelia, was not constructed, adapted, or used for the special
and sole purpose of affording aid and relief to the sick, wounded,
and shipwrecked, and, secondly, that she was adapted and used as
a signalling ship for military purposes, he therefore held that she
forfeited the protection claimed under the Convention, and so
condemned her as lawful prize.
**
Belligerents may appeal to the charity of the commanders of

Private vessels
wounded on neutral merchantmen, yachts, or boats to take on board and tend

^*'^*''
the sick and wounded.
Vessels responding to this appeal, as well as the vessels which

have of their own accord rescued sick, wounded, or shipwrecked
men, shall enjoy special protection and certain immunities. In
no case can they be captured for having such persons on board;
but, subject to any undertaking that may have been given to them;
(ar) The Orel (or The AryoV) (1905), (2;) The case of The Johanna Emilie
Takahashi, Int. Law applied to the (1854), Spinks, 14, at p. 20, was re-
R.-J. War (1908), pp. 620 seq. ferred to with regard to the spoliation
(y) The Ophelia (May 21, 1915), of documents.
T. L. R. 452j (1915) P. 129.
EIGHTS OF WAK AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MAEITIME WARFARE. 559
they remain liable to capture for any violations of neutrality they

"
may have committed (a).
*'
The religious, medical, and hospital staff of any captured ship The medical
®*
is inviolable, and its members may not be made prisoners of war. ^**^ .
. . . captured
On leaving the ship they take with them' the objects and sur'gical vessels.
instruments which are their property.

This staff shall continue to discharge its duties while necessary,
and may afterwards leave when the commander-in-chief considers
it possible.
The
belligerents must secure to the said staff that has fallen into
their hands the same allowances and the same pay as are granted
"
to the persons holding the same rank in their own nav;y, (&).
"
Sailors and soldiers land other persons officially attached to fleets! Wounded
or armies who are taken board when sick or wounded, whatever be onStured
their nationality, shall be respected and tended by the captors "(c). vessels.
"
Any warship belonging to a belligerent may demand the sur- Surrender of
^^'^^^ ^ ^'
render of the sick, wounded, or shipwrecked who are on board '
military hospital ships, hospital ships belonging to relief societies

or to private individuals, merchant ships, yachts, and boats, what-
ever the nationality of such vessels "(d).
Great Britain accepted this Article on condition that it was
"
understood to apply only to the case of combatants rescued during
or after a naval engagement in which they have taken part" (e).
"
If sick, wounded, or shipwrecked persons are taken on board a Wounded, &c.
neutral warship every possible precaution must be taken that they

^J^gjJ-^^^
do not again take part in the operations of war" (/).
It would follow that such persons taken on board a neutral war-
ship are not to be handed over to either of the contending belli-

gerents, but that they should be interned or released on parole by
the neutral Government.
"
The wounded, or shipwrecked of one of the belligerents Treatment of
sick,
who fall into the power of the other belligerent are prisoners of mounded, &c.
war. The captor must decide, according to circumstances, whether
to keep them, send them to a port of his own country, to a neutral
port, or even to an enemy port. In this last case, prisoners thus

repatriated may not serve again while the war lasts" (g).
The last provision of this Article as it stands, open to criti-
is,
cism, on the ground that it empowers a belligerent to send back
(a) Hague Oonvention (1907), tion (1906), Art. 1, supra.

No. X. Art, 9. Of. Geneva Conven- (d) Art. 12.
tion (1906), Art. 5, supra. (e) Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 6
(b) Art. 10. Of. Geneva Conven- (1908), p. 148.
tion (1906), Arts. 9, 12, 13, supra. (/) Art. 13.
(o) Art. 11. Of. Geneva Conven- (g) Art. 14.
the enemy wounded or sliip\Vrecked to their own country under
compulsory parole. It is to be noted that it is a neutral warship

and not a neutral merchantman or other vessel that is placed in a
position analogous to that of neutral territory which enjoys
inviolability .
Those landed "

at a neutral
The wounded, or shipwrecked, who are landed at a neutral
sick,
port. port with the consent of the local authorities, must, in default
of an arrangement to the contrary between the neutral State and
the belligerent States, be guarded by the neutral State so as to
prevent them from again taking part in the operations of the war.
The expenses of tending them in hospital and interning them
shall be borneby the State to which the sick, wounded, or ship-
"
wrecked persons belong {h).
' '
If, in the above Article, the word (debarques) be con-

landed
strued strictly, it may well be inferred that the provision laid down
does not apply to men who swim to the neutral shore or escape from
a wreck. Further, the Article does not say definitely by whom
the landing of the wounded and shipwrecked is effected It seems .
to imply that it will be done by a belligerent vessel; hence if the
landing is carried o;it by a neutral vessel the Article is inapplic-

able. Thus, on one occasion during the Great War when British
survivors of destroyed vessels were landed in Holland by neutral
ships, the Dutch Government liberated them. Had these sur-

vivors been taken on board a neutral warship, the same course could
not have been adopted; for Article 13 would operate to prevent
their release.
Belligerents' "After each engagement, the two belligerents shall, so far as

duties after
each engage- military interests permit, take measures to search for the sick,
ment.
wounded, and shipwrecked, and protect them, as well as the dead,
and protect them' from pillage and ill-treatment.
They whether by land or sea, or crema-
shall see that the burial,
tion of the dead, shall be preceded by a careful examination of the
"
bodies (^).
"
Each belligerent shall send, as early as possible, to the' autho-
rities of their country, navy or army, the military marks or docu-
ments of identity found on the dead and a list of the names of the
sick and wounded picked up by him.
The belligerents shall keep each other informed as to the admis-

sions into hospitals and deaths which have occurred among the
sick and wounded in their hands. They shall collect all the objects
(A) Art. 15. (0 Art. 16. Cf. Geneva Conven-

tion (1906), Art. 3, supra.
of personal use, valuables, letters, &c., which are found in the
captured ships, or which have been left by the sick and wounded
who died in hospital, in order to have them forwarded to the
"
persons concerned by the authorities of their own country (Icj.
In December, 1904, a conference of maritime Powers was held Hospital
at the Hague, and a Convention was established, whereby it was
port^du^s.
agreed that hospital ships complying with the conditions of
all
Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the third Convention of the Hague Con-

ference, 1899 (but now the corresponding conditions of the tenth
"
Convention of 1907) shall be exempted, in time of war, in the
ports of the contracting parties, from' all dues and taxes levied on
ships for the benefit of the State." This Convention has been
accepted by twenty-five States; but Great Britain did not take
part in the Conference of 1904, on the ground that special legis-
lation would be needed to carry out its provisions, although the
British Minister at the Hague stated that his Government was
favourably disposed towards the proposal (I) .
International law, conventional and customary, imposes certain Restrictions

restrictions on the maritime capture of belligerents. We
have capture.
already dealt with some very important cases, viz., the position
of enemy merchant vessels on the outbreak of war, the immunity
conferred on enemy ships by means of licenses, and the position
of hospital ships. Other exceptions to the ordinary right of cap-
ture relate to the following: —
Mail boats and postal correspond-
ence; coastal fishing boats and small boats employed in local trade;
vesselscharged with religious, scientific, or philanthropic missions;
the crews of captured enemy merchantmen; cartel ships; non-
contraband enemy private property found on board neutral vessels .
In addition to these, there are one or two minor relaxations .
From time to time, States entered into engagements whereby Mail boat*
they agreed to exempt from capture, in time of war, each other's corr^pon-
mail boats. These agreements were rare, and involved but few device.
States, e.g., Great Britain, the United States, France, Holland,
and Belgium. They were concluded with the proviso that each
contracting party might terminate them by giving notice to the
other. It was, however, generally felt that conventions of this
kind would hardly prove strong enough in time of war to prot;ect
(7c) Art. 17. Of. Geneva Conven- Peace Conferences and other Inter-
tion (1906), Art. 4, supra. national Conferences (1909), pp. 392
(0 Of. A. P. Higgins, The Hague —394.
w. 36
662 . RIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE.
vessels carrying overseas correspondence. Accordingly, the efforts

of StatcH to establish a relaxation with regard to this subject
were directed to secure immunity rather for the correspondence
itselfthan for the boats conveying it. Sometimes neutrals en-
deavoured to obtain for their mail boats exemptions from visit and
search on the part of belligerents; but an unqualified immunity!
was never granted, though there were cases in which belligerents
of interference.
agreed to modify in certain particulars their right
Thus, on the outbreak of the Spanish-American war, 1898, the
President of the United States declared in his proclamation that
"
neutral mail boats would not be interfered with except on the
clearest grounds of suspicion of a violation of law in respect of
contraband or blockade." Similarly, on the occasion of the Anglo-
Boer war, the British Government announced such concessions.
A German mail steamer, the Bundesrath, was stopped (December,
1899) on her voyage to Lorenzo Marques, in Delagoa Bay, by a
British cruiser and brought into Durban on suspicion of carrying
'
contraband; but her mails were released and sent on by another

vessel. In the controversy that followed, the German Government
did not appeal to any established rule or custom of international
law with regard to the exemption of mail steamers, but held
merely that was desirable that such vessels should not be
it
arrested (w). In the Russo-Japanese war (1904), the Smolensk,

a vessel belonging to the Russian Volunteer Fleet (to which we
have already referred), stopped the German steamship Prinz
Heinrich in the Red Sea and remt)ved a number of her mail bags;
those intended for Japan were confiscated, but the others were
after much delay placed on board the British vessel, the Persia,
and sent on to their destination (n) Other belligerent nations at
.
times adopted the same course; the exemption, however, was never
conceded de jure, but only by way of grace.
The Hague Conference up the question, and in its
of 1907 took
eleventh Convention laid down two
Articles which substitute
clearly defined compulsory provisions for rules that had been more
or less optional and precarious: —
"
The postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whether
official or private in character, found on board a nentral or enemy
ship is inviolable. If the ship is detained the correspondence must
be forwarded by the captor with the least possible delay.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not apply, in
(w) Pari. Papers (1900), Africa, (n) Of. Lawrence, War and Neu-
No. 1. trality in the Far East, pp. 109 seq.
case of violation of blockade, to correspondence proceeding to or

from a blockaded port" (o).
"
The inviolability of postal correspondence does not exempt a
neutral mail ship from the laws and customs of maritime war
respecting neutral merchant ships in general. The ship, however,

may not be searched except when absolutely necessary, and then
"
only with as much consideration and expedition as possible (p).
It is clear, then, that if the mail boat is an enemy vessel, she
may be captured as a prize. If she is a neutral vessel, she is liable

to visit and search, when it isabsolutely necessary for the belli-
gerent to exercise his right; and it is for the belligerent himteelf
to determine when to exercise it. Thus the possibility of arbitrary
treatment that existed before the Convention was made was not
altogether removed by it.
Enemy coastal fishing boats were for a long time considered to Coastal
^ ^"^
be exempt from capture, so long as they did not participate in any
way in the hostilities. In 1798, Sir W. Scott (Lord Stowell)
held that the rule was merely one of comity (q) though a few ;
years later it was contended by the French Government that it was

an established and compulsory rule of the law of nations. In
1899 the question was examined by the American Supreme Court
in the case ofThe Paquete Hahana and The Lola (r) These were .
two fishing boats, sailing under the Spa'nish flag, which were seized
off the coast of Cuba by United
States cruisers engaged in the
blockade of the north coast of that island. The conduct of both
boats was innocent. Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the judgment
of the majority of the Court in favour of the fishing boats, observed
that there was an ancient usage among civilized nations conferring
exemption from capture on coast fishing vessels. This usage was

shown by various early and ordinances, compila-
treaties, edicts,
tions of maritime customs, and later by the practice of the United
States during her wars. During the wars of the French Revolu-
tion there had, indeed, been an interruption of the usage as between
Great Britain and France; but the interruption was only tem-
porary, for the exemption was restored by Orders in Council of
1806 and 1810. Since then such immunity was recognised by
all nations. Thus,' in the war between Japan and China, 1894,
a Japanese ordinance specifically exempted ''all boats engaged in
coast fisheries." It may, then, be said that at the present day by
the general consent of nations, and independently of treaties or
(o) Hague Convention (1907), (q) The Young Jacob and Johanna
No. XI. Art. 1. (1798), 1 O. Rob. 20.
(p) Art. 2. (r) 175 U. S. Rep. 677.
36(2) ;
other public acts, it is an established rule of international law that

these vessels together with their implements and supplies, cargoes
and crews, are exempt from capture if thej are unarmed and are
honestly engaged in their peaceful calling of catching and bringing
in fresh fish But if coast fishermen or their vessels are employed
.
for a warlike purpose, or in such a waj as to give aid or informa-

tion to the enemy, and also if military, or naval operations create
an imperative necessity inconsistent with immunity, then the
exemption does not apply Nor does it apply to the case of vessels
.
employed on the high seas in taking whales, seals, cod, or other

fish which are not brought fresh to market, but are salted or
otherwise cured and made a regular article of commerce.

The Japanese acted in accordance with these doctrines during
the Russo-Japanese war. Thus, their Prize Courts condemned the
Lesnilc in 1904, on the ground that she was a Russian deep sea
fishing vessel (s); and the Xo/'w? in 1905, which was a fishing
vessel thathad been engaged in police duty {t) .
The principles enunciated above were embodied in Article 3 of

the eleventh Convention of the Hague (1907): —
"
employed exclusively in coast fisheries or small boats
Vessels
employed in local trade, together with their appliances, rigging,
tackle, and cargo, are exempt from capture.

This exemption ceases as soon as they participate in any manner
in hostilities.
The contracting parties bind themselves not to take advantage
of the harmless character of the said boats in order to use them for
"
military purposes while preserving their peaceful appearance (w).
'
The expression 'coast fisheries was not defined. As it is well

known that fishermen do not necessarily confine their fishing to-
the waters adjacent to their own coasts, we must infer that the
' '
word coast applies to any coast where the fishermen are entitled
to pursue their industry. Further, the phrase 'small boats em-
'
ployed in local trade cannot properly be held to apply to coasting

steamers. Owing to the indefiniteness of these expressions, the
Article certainly needs some amendment.
Certain Prize Court cases have been mentioned that occurred
before the Hague Convention was brought into existence. A case
that came before the British Prize Court during the Great War
may he referred to (a?). On August 5, H.M.S. Princess Royal
(s) Takahashi, Int. Law applied Oonventian

to (w) Hague (1&07),
the R.-J. War, p. 595. No. XI. Art. 3.
(0 Takahashi, p. 593. (a:) The Berlin (1914), 31 T. L. R.

38.
seized the Berlin, a GeT*man sailing cutter, in the North Sea, at a

distanci^ of some five hundred miles from Emden, her home port,
and at a distance of about eighty miles from the coast of Scotland.
On board were found a cargo of fish and materials for curing*.
Her condemnation was demanded, on the ground that she was not
entitled to exemption because of her size and distance from the
coast where she was seized. The President, after setting forth
the judgment of the American Supreme Court in The Paquete
Habcma. and The Lola (as given above), and referring to the
practice of- the Japanese Courts, observed that in Great Britain
there appeared to be no decided case which considered such exemp-
tion to be derived from the law of nations (|/)) But after the lapse
.
of a century it has become an established rule, apart from Con-
ventions, that fishing vessels pursuing their industry near the coast
—not —
necessarily in territorial waters are free from' capture, if
they are employed only in such peaceable work as their industry
properly involves. But the Berlin did not satisfy this test. Her
size, equipment and voyage showed she was a deep sea fishing
vessel, engaged in a commercial enterprise, which formed part of
the trade of the enemy country, so that she was subject to capture.
Accordingly both the ship and the cargo were condemned.

"
Ships charged with religious, scientific, or philanthropic njis- Ships charged
"
exempt from capture {z).
sions are equally
îous^ scien-
The immunity conferred by this Article on these classes of tific, or
vessels dates back to the middle of the eighteenth century, and missions!'^^^^
for a long time it was regarded as being derived from an obligatory
rule of the usage of nations. The right is accom^panied, of course,
by the reciprocal obligation to preserve an innocent character;

so that protection ceases if any of these vessels take part in hos-
tilities or otherwise aid the military or naval operations of the
enemy. It has been customary for such vessels to obtain a safe-

conduct from the hostile Government; and it is advisable to con-
tinue this practice, though the Convention does not demand it.
In 1801, when Great Britain and France were at war. Com-
mander Flinders, who was commissioned to circumnavigate
Australia, obtained a passport from' the French Government.
Whilst at Sydney he exchanged his vessel, the Investigator, which
had been found unseaworthy, for the Cumberland. In 1803 his
vesselwas detained and he and his crew were m'ade prisoners of
war at Port Louis in Mauritius (then a French colony), on the
(y) Cf. The Young Jacob and (2) Hague Convention (1907),
Johanna (1798), 1 O. Rob. 20; The No. XI. Art. 4.
Liesbet Van den Toll, 5 O. Rob. 283.
ground that the Cumberland was not the vessel that had obtained
the passport, and that she had entered Port Louis in suspicious
circumstanoes. He was released on parole in 1810; and the same
year Mauritius capitulated to the British and the explorer's ship
was retaken (a) .
A case that arose during tho Great War may be referred to In .
March, 1915, the German Govornment protested against the

seizure bj British cruisers of the German steamer Flakat, which
had been ordered by the Governor of Tsing-tao to transport the
women and children from there to Tientsin, before the siege of
Tsing-tao began. It was urged that the capture was a violation of
international law, on the ground that the vessel was entrusted
with a humanitarian mission.
To this Edward Grey replied (through the
contention. Sir
medium of American Embassy) that Article 4 of the eleventh
the
Convention does not apply to the case in question; this was made
clear in the official report of the deliberations at the Hague (&).
"
In the view of his Majesty's Government the conveyance of
women and children from a fortress which was about to be
besieged (an action which would have the effect of increasing the
fortress) cannot be regarded as a philan-
power of resistance of the
thropic mission within the meaning of the Article; and it would
indeed appear that the Flakat might more properly be considered
as being employed on a service connected with the operations of
war." Sir Edward Grey added that the protest was all the more
astonishing inasmuch as a German submarine torpedoed, without
notice, the French vessel Amiral Ganteaume, which was conveying
refugees to England
—no opportunity having been given to the
passengers to escape in the ship's boats; whilst the Flakat was
taken into a British port, the refugees were forwarded to their
destination, and the vessel was brought before a Prize Court,
where the owners are permitted to put forward their claims.
Cartel ships. Cartel ships are vessels used in services relating to the exchange
of prisoners of war, or other special services agreed upon between
the belligerents. They should be furnished with permits from the
enemy Government
—
not necessarily the supreme authority {c) —
whereby they would enjoy immunity from capture whilst proceed-
ing to their appointed services, performing them, or returning
from them. The mere intention to act as a cartel ship does not
(a) Cf. M. Flinders, Voyage to of the Seventh Plenary Meeting.

Terra Australis,
vol. ii. chaps, ill. seq. (o) Cf. The Carolina (1807), 6 C.
(6) Of. Sub-Annexe 10 to Protocol Rob. 336.
suffice; a vessel has no pass indicating* permission to carry out

if
such intention she remains liable to capture. Either public or

private vessels may be employed for the purpose. But if they
engage in mercantile traffic, carry despatches or passengers, per-
form hostile acts, or otherwise abuse their position, their immunity
isforfeited (d). This subject has not been determined by written
international law; it depends entirely on the usage of nations.
During the war between Great Britain and Holland, two Dutch
vessels proceeding from' the Texel to Flushing were captured by
the British. Their condemnation was opposed on the ground that
they were on their way to take on board exchanged prisoners for

conveyance to
England. Sir W. Scott held that cartel ships were
protected both whilst carrying prisoners and on their return

voyage. Though the vessels in question were not at the time of
capture engaged in this service, and it was the actual employment,
not the future intention, on which immunity was based, yet pro-
tection might be extended to vessels that had already entered on
their functions by equipping themselves for the employment, and
were shown to have an honest intention to carry out the object
thus indicated (e).
"
When
an empty merchant ship is captured by a belligerent, The crews
such of its crew as are nationals of a neutral State are not made Jêrch^Jmen
prisoners of war. captured by
a belligerent.
rule applies in the case of the captain and officers, who
The same
are likewise nationals of a neutral State, if they promise formally
"
in writing not to serve on an enemy ship while the war lasts (/).
"
Thecaptain, officers, and members of the crew, when nationals
of the enemy State, are not made prisoners of war, on condition that
they bind themselves, on the faith of a formal written promise,
not to undertake, while hostilities last, any sei^îce connected with
the operations of the war" (g).
*'
The names of the persons retaining their liberty under the con-
ditions laid down in Article 5, paragraph 2, and in Article 6, are
notified by the belligerent captor to the other belligerent. The
latter is forbidden knowingly to employ the said persons" (h).
"
The provisions
of the three preceding Articles do not apply to
ships taking part in hostilities" (i).
Oi. The Venus (1SU)„4:C. Boh.

(^d) (/) Hague Convention (1907),
355; La Rosine (1800), 2 C. Rob. 372. No. XI. Art. 5.
(e) The Duifjie (1800), 3 O. Rob. {g) Art. 6.
139. Cf. La Glaire (1804), 5 C. Rob. (A) Art. 7.
198. (0 Art. 8.
568 EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MAEITIME WAEFARE.
The above Articles introduce an innovation in international

law. Before the Convention was established it was a well recog-
nised rule that officers and crews of whatever nationalitj who were
found on captured enemy merchant vessels were prisoners of war."
From time to time, however, opinions to the contrary were ad-
vanced. Thus, during the Franco-German war, 1870, Count
Bismarck maintained that the treatment by the French of the
crews of merchant vessels as prisoners of war was not in conformity
with international usage. He cited against the French contention
the decree of Berlin, November 18, 1806, in which Napoleon
assigned as a reason for the establishment of the continental
blockade that England rejected the law of nations as generally
"
practised, and took as prisoners of war les equipages des vaisseaux
de commerce et des navires marchands." However this may be,

the practice of the French in 1870 and of the British earlier was
more in accordance with general usage than that claimed by
Bismarck. The rule was justified on the ground that the services
of such men might at any time be enlisted by the enemy for his
transports, or supply ships, or even for his fighting navy(/c).
Now a distinction is drawn in maritime war between duly enrolled
combatants and non-combatants, by analogy with that long recog-
nised in land warfare. The immunity conferred by the new
regulations would, of course, be forfeited if the merchantmen
depart from their innocent character, engage in hostilities, or offer
resistance to an enemy cruiser.
Mabitime The progress of civilization has slowly, but constantly, tended (in
CAPTUBE
AND ENEMY theory) to soften the extreme severity of the operations of war by
CHARACTER
land; but it still remains unrelaxed in respect of maritime warfare,
in which the private property of the enemy taken at sea or afloat in
and confiscation, subject, however, to the
port, is liable to capture
already mentioned exemptions relative to enemy merchant vessels
on the outbreak of war, hospital ships, fishing vessels, cartel ships,
&c., and to the exemption introduced by the Declaration of Paris.
Distinction This inequality in the operation of the laws ef war, by land and by,
between
private pro- sea, was justified by alleging the former usage of considering
perty taken
at sea and private property when captured in cities taken by storm, as booty ;
that taken on and the fact that contributions are levied upon territories occupied
land.
by a hostile army, in lieu of a general confiscation of the property
(Jc) Cf. Heffter, Le droit int. de TEurope (1883), note by Geffcken to

§ 126, p. 289.
belonging to the inhabitants; and that the object of wars by land

being conquest, or the acquisition of territory to be exchangêd
as an equivalent for other territory lost, the regard of the victor
for those who are to be or have been his subjects, naturally restrains
him from the exercise of his extreme rights in this particular;
whereas, the object of maritime wars is the destruction of the
enemy's commerce and navigation, the sources and sinews of his
naval power —
which object can only be attained by the capture
and confiscation of private property.
The strictness of the rule subjecting the enemy's property on Enemy's
*
the high seas to confiscation was somewhat modified by the De-
êutral^flaff
olaration of Paris, 1856, which provides, in its second Article,
"
that the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of
contraband of war" (l). Almôst all civilized Powers are parties
to this Declaration. At the time of the Spanish-American war,
1898, neither Spain nor the United States had acceded to it; but
a Royal Decree, issued by the Queen Regent of Spain, declared
"
that her Government, guided by the principles of international
law, intends to observe" the second Article of the Declaration of
Paris, and the President of the United States issued a proclama-
tion to the same effect (m) At the second Hague Conference,
.
1907, Spain formally notified her adhesion to the Declaration.

The indiscriminate seizure of private property on land would Capture of
cause the most terrible hardship, without conferring any cor-

perlyon^the
responding advantage on the invader. It cannot be effected with- ^^S^
^âs.
out in some measure relaxing military discipline, and is sure to be

accompanied by violence and outrage. On the other hand, the
capture of merchant vessels is usually a bloodless act, most mer-
chant vessels being incapable of resisting a ship of war. Again,
property on land consists of endless varieties, much of it being
absolutely useless for any hostile purpose, while property at sea
is almost
always purely merchandise, and thus is part of the
enemy's strength. It is, moreover, embarked voluntarily, and
with a knowledge of the risk incurred, and its loss can be covered
by insurance (n). An invader on land can levy contributions or
a war indemnity from a vanquished country, he can occupy part of
its territory and appropriate its rates and taxes, and
by these and
other methods, he can enfeeble the enemy and terminate the war.
(0 Cf. infra, pp. 702 seg., as to (m) Hertslet, Map of Europe,

the maxims " free ships free goods," vol. p. 1282. Commercial Treaties,
ii.
and "enemy ships enemy goods," and xxi. pp. 836, 1075.
the liability of neutral commerce in (») Cf. Wheaton, ed. Dana, n. 171.
time of war.
But in a maritime war, a belligerent has none of these resources,

and his main instrument of coercion is crippling the enemy's com-
merce (o). If war at sea were to be restricted to the naval forces,
a country possessing a powerful fleet would have very little advan-
tage over a country with a small fleet or with none at all. If the
enemy kept war in port, a powerful fleet, being unable
his ships of
to operate againstcommerce, would have little or no occu-
pation (p). The United States proposed to add to the Declaration
of Paris a clause exempting all private property on the high seas
from seizure by public armed vessels of the other belligerent,
except it be contraband; but this proposal was not acceded to (q).

Nor does it seem likely, for the reasons stated above, that maritime
nations will forgo their rights in this respect.
On the other hand, the enormous extension of railways, the
increase of the practice of marine insurance, and the dependence
of the greatest naval Power in the world upon an ocean-borne food
supply, have deprived many of the older arguments in favour of the
retention of the claim to capture private property at sea of their
force, while at the same time it has inclined many persons in Great
Britain, more especially those interested in shipping, to look
favourably on a proposed abandonment of the claim. A nation
which could blockade and harass its enemy's coasts, cut him off
from his colonies, interdict the transport of his troops by water,
and dominate by the guns of its fleet many most important strate-
gical positions, would remain no mean ally and no contemptible
foe, even apart from' the power, as illustrated in Egypt in 1881,
and in the South African war (1900), of making its base of opera-
tions wherever ships can float, and of transporting its armies to
whatever striking point was required. The preponderating im-
portance of the commerce of Great Britain, and the protection
afforded under the neutral flag by the Declaration of Paris, also
materially affect the consideration of this question as a matter of

policy (r) It may be answered, again, that French predominance
.
on the sea in 1870-71, as against Germany, was undisputed, but

little harm was on German commerce; and the depreda-
inflicted
tions of the Alabama, by the other side, were mainly
so often cited
possible because British ports all over the world, and British coal-
ing stations all over the world, were open to her for refuge, for
coaling, as a base of operations, and even to refit.
(o) Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, (r) Maine, Int. Law, lect. VI.;
liv. iii. ch. ii. Ileffter, Geffeken, note 2, § 139; Law-
{p) Field, Int. Oode (2nd ed.), rence, Essays on some disputed Ques-
p. ^27. tions in modern International Law
{q) HaUeck, ch. xx. § 3. (1885), vii.
EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MAEITIME WAEFAEE. 671
The United States gave expression to the principle of exemption

of private property at sea from capture, for which it has long con-
tended, in its treaty with Italy of 26th February, 1871. The

maritime code of the latter country enunciates the same principle,
on the condition of reciprocity. In the Austro-Prussian war of
1866, the principle of inviolability was adhered to by both parties.
Germany proclaimed the same principle in 1870. The minister
of the United States was instructed to express the gratification of
his Government; but the position of Prussia, though consistent
with former policy, was no sacrifice of Prussian interests. The
proclamation was not conditional upon reciprocity; but France
captured German trading ships, and the Germans abandoned their
proclamation in January, 1871 (s). The majority of European
jurists have condemned the practice. Thus the Institute of Inter-
national Law has on more than one occasion {e.g., in 1875 and in
1882) passed resolutions in favour of the inviolability of private

property. At the first Hague Conference, 1899, the delegates of
the United States submitted a proposal to the same effect, but the
Conference then considered the question to be beyond its com-
—
petence, though it expressed a wish the fifth vceu of its Final
Act —that
the Conference of 1907 should take up the subject.
However, at the second Hague Conference the proposal to confer
immunity of innocent enemy property from maritime capture

received twenty-one votes in the affirmative and eleven in the
negative, whilst twelve States did not vote. The opponents in-
cluded some of the great maritime Powers, e.g., Great Britain,
France, Russia, Japan, so that the proposal (so strenuously backed
by the United States) was considered to have failed (t) .
At the London Naval Conference (1908-1909), attended by the Enemy

^^*'^*^*®*'-
leading maritime Powers of the world, the question of enemy
character was discussed; but owing to the lack of unanimous
opinion the representatives, only a few general rules

among
—
—
which are obviously inadequate ^were arrived at, and embodied
in the Declaration of London. This Declaration was not ratified
by the parties; so that it could not in every particular that is,
all —
beyond the well-established customary law of nations be con-
—
sidered as binding. During the Great War of 1914-1915 it was
subjected to many modifications at the hands of the belligerents;
(s) See Heffter, Geffcken, § 139, {t) As to the capture of private

note 2 G, for an able consideration of property at sea, see further, Oobbett.
the whole question. Oases, vol. ii. (1913;, pp. 134 seq.,
and the references there" cited.
572 EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MAEITIME WAEFARE.
and where such specific modifications were not announced, the

provisions of the Declaration were presumed to have been accepted.
However, the rules of the Declaration of London are still of im-
portance, whether in regard to the question of enemy character or
in regard to the other subjects it deals with, because, in the first
place, most of the provisions laid down are nothing more than a
deliberately written expression of old-established principles, and,
in the second place, the others represent the consensus of modern
international opinion .
"
Test of the to the provisions respecting transfer to another flag {u)
Subject
flag.
the neutral or onemy character of a vessel is determined by the
flag which she is entitled to fly.
The case where a neutral vessel is engaged in a trade which is
closed in time of peace, remains outside the scope of, and is in no
wise affected by, this rule" {x).
The official report on the Declaration of London (of the contents
of which it is regarded as the authoritative interpretation) observes
in reference to this provision: "Article 57 safeguards the provi-
sions respecting transfer to another flag, as to which it is sufficient
to refer to Articles 55 and 56 (jy) ;
a vessel may well have the right
to fly a neutral flag, from' the point of view of the law of the
country to which she claimte to belong, but may be regarded as an
enemy vessel by a belligerent, because the transfer in virtue of

which she has hoisted the neutral flag, is annulled by Article 55 or
by Article 56" {z).

''
The neutral or enemy character of goods found on board an
enemy vessel is determined by the neutral or enemy character of

"
the owner {a).
The found in the fact that the enemy
difficulty of this Article is
character of the owner was not determined by the Declaration;
nor has it been determined by any other international Convention.
It has alreadybeen pointed out that in this respect the competing
ownership are nationality on the one hand, and
tests of hostile
trade or war domicile on the other. The former criterion has
usually been applied in France (&), Germany, Austria, Italy,
Russia (c) the latter has regularly been applied in Great Britain
;
(w) See infra, p. 576. (a) Declar. of London (1909),

Ix) Declar. of London (1909), Art. 58.
Art. 57. (6) Of. Le Hardy v. LaVoltigeante
(t/) See infra, p. 578. (1799), in A. de Pistoye etO. Duverdy,
(z) Eeport on the Declar. of London, Traite des Prises Maritimes, 2 vols,
in Higgins, The Hague Conferences (Paris, 1859), vol. i. p. 321; F. Snow,
and other International Oonferences Cases (1893), p. 337.
(1909), p. 560. (c) Cf. Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 5
(1909).
and the United States, and also in a modified form in Japan,

Spain, Holland {d) We have already considered the doctrine of
.
commercial domicile, as established by earlier British practice,

constantly affirmed in the British and American Courts (e), and
reaffirmed during the Great War by the British Prize Courts,
and the numerous Acts, Proclamations, Orders, Regulations, and
other forms of
emergency legislation. To the considerations
already advanced we may add the concise summary of the Anglo-
American doctrine, which was embodied in a Memorandum pre-
pared for the use of the British delegates at the London Naval
Conference, 1908-9: —
"1. The principle adopted by the British Courts has been to
owner as the dominant factor in deciding
treat the domicile of the
whether property captured in time of war is enemy property; but
for this purpose the principle is not limited in all respects to the
domicil(3 of origin or residence, and is applied in the
following
way:—
"
(a) A person domiciled in a neutral country, but having a house
of trade in an enemy country is deemed to acquire a
commercial domicile in the enemy country in respect of
transactions originating there but the other property of
;
such owner not affected thereby.

is
"(b) A commercial domicile not being the domicile of nation-

ality is terminated when actual steps are taken bond
fide to abandon such domicile for a different one sine
cmimo r evert endi.
'2. This principle applies equally to the cases of an individual,

a partnership, or a corporation, residence in the two latter cases
being understood to mean the place whence the business is con-

trolled .
"3. In case of a partnership where one or more of the partners

is domiciled in enemy territory,
property not liable to be seized as
enemy property on other grounds is presumed to be divided pro-
portionally between the partners, and the share attributed to a
partner domiciled in enemy territory is deemed to be enem}'
property" (ee).
Obviouslj^ these doctrines are not affected by Article 58 of the

Declaration of London. They lay down the principle of hostile
association as the determining factor of enemy character. The
Article simply lays down that the enemy character of the goods
(d) Ibid. (ee) Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 4

(e) See supra, pp. 443 seq. (1909), p. 11.
574 EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES- MARITIME WARFARE.
depends on the enemy character of the owner; and it does not say
on what the enemy character of the owner is to depend.
As no agreement was reached at the London Naval Conference
with regard to one definite criterion of the enemy character of
goods, an effort was made to effect a compromise between the con-
flicting principles as indicated above. Thus it was proposed, on
the one hand, that the character of goods found on board an enemy
vessel should be determined by the owner's nationality, or, in
case of lack of or double nationality, by his domicile; and, on the
other, that the character of goods belonging to a trading corpora-

tion should be determined by the character of the territory in
which the headquarters is situated. This proposal, however, was
not successful.
"
Presumption In the absence of proof of the neutral character of goods found
of enemy
character. on board an enemy Vessel, they are presumed to be enemiy
goods" (/).
Here we have nothing more than an enunciation of the old
rule(^).
Transfers "
The enemy character of goods on board an enemy vessel con-
made in
traJisitu. tinues until they reach theit destination, notwithstanding any
transf el" effected after the outbreak of hostilities while the goods
are being foTwarded.
If, however, prior to the capture, a former neutral owner exer-
cises, on the bankruptcy of an existing enemy owner, a recognised
legal right to recover the goods, they regain their neutral
"
character (h).
It is often a matter of difficulty for a Prize Court to determine
to whom property captured at sea actually belongs. The general
rule is that if goods are shipped on account and at the risk of the
consignee, they are considered his goods during the voyage. In

such a case delivery of the goods to the master is a delivery to the
consignee (^) In time of peace the parties may of course agree
.
to any terms they please, as to whose risk the property should be

at during the voyage, but in time of war, or in contemplation of
war^ the rule of Prize Courts is, that property which has a hostile
character at the commencement of the voyage, cannot change that
character by assignment while it is in transitu, so as to protect it
(/) Declar. of London (1909), Art. 60.

Art. 59. (0 The Packet de Bilboa (1799), 2
(g) Cf. The Josephine (1801), 4 C. O. Rob. 133. According to the French
Rob. 25; The Frances (1814), 8 practice, the shipper is allowed to take
Cranch, 354; The Carlos F. Hoses such risk; cf. Les Trois Freres, Pis-
(1899), 177 U. S. 655. toye let Duveidy, 357; Snow, Oases,
(A) Declar. of London (1909), p. 348.
EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE. 575
from capture (k) . Unless such a rule were adopted, all property
passing between a neutral and a belligierent would be colourably
assigned to the neutral, and the belligerent right of capture would
be comparatively worthless. It is therefore the duty of a Prize
Court to ascertain in whom the property was vested at the outset
of the voyage, and in this inquiry all equitable liens on enemy 'iS
property are disregarded, and all revelations of risk to neutral

consignors are held to be fraudulent (I). During the Great War,
1914, the Prize Court heard the case of The Marie Glaeser, in-
volving British and neutral clainDs on a captured vessel. There Neutral
—
were three kinds of claimants ^shareholders, mortgagees, and
capblreT
persons claiming for brokerage and necessaries. The President, vessels.
in the course of his judgment, said that under the old practice the
flag determined the fate of the whole ship in case of capture; a

shareholder was bound by the character of the ship. Maritime
liens, too, were not recognised by the Prize Court. But to British
merchants who had before the war supplied necessaries to a cap-
tured vessel, the Crown of its bounty might make grants out of the
proceeds of the sale of prizes, according to the merits of each
particular case. Claims under mortgages held by British or neu-
tral subjects are untenable (m) . A
mortgage is no more valid
against captors than is a bottomry bond or other maritime lien.
The American Courts have held that neutral mortgages on enemy
vessels arc to be treated in prize proceedings only as liens, liable
to be overridden by the superior claims of the captors (n). Deci-
sions to the same effect have been pronounced in the French (o)
and in the Japanese Prize Courts (p) Both the captor and the
.
Court have regard only to the outward character of the vessel, and
must disregard rights depending on private agreement. There-
fore, both in principle and in practice the claims of mortgagees of
enemy ships cannot prevail as against the rights of the captors (q) .
On the other hand, enemy's liens on neutral property are equally
disregarded, being held not to confer such an enemy character on

the ship or goods as to subject them to confiscation (r). If, how-
ever, the shipment, as well as the contract, laying the risk on the
neutral consignor, were both made in time of peace and are proved
(^) The Francis (1813), 1 Gallison, Carlos F. Roses (1899), 177 U. S. 655.
445; The Vrow Margaretha (1799), 1 (o) Of. Le Turner (1870), Barboux,
O. Rob. 336. Jurisprudence du Oonseil des Prises,
(Z) The Josephine (1801), 4 C. Rob. 1870—1, p. 76.
75 The Tobago (1804), 5 C. Rob. 218
; ;
The Nigretia (1905), Takahashi,
(??)
The Marianna (1805), 6 O. Rob. 24; p. 552; The Russia (1904), ibid. p. 557.
The Ida, 1 Spinks, 26. {q) The Marie Glaeser (1914), 31
(w) Cf. The Aina (1854), Spinks, 8. T. L. R. 8.
in) The Hampton (1866), 5 Wall. (r) The Ariel (1857), 11 Moo. P. C.
372: The Battle, 6 Wall. 498: The 119.
to have been bond fide, and not in contemplation of war, the

ownership which was in the neutral consignor at the beginning
of the voyage remains in him until its termination, and the goods
will not be condemned (s) During the Great War, 1914, the
.
Prize Court heard a case (The Miramichi) in which goods were

shipped bj a neutral seller to an enemy buyer on a British vessel,
before the outbreak of the war, though not in anticipation of it.
The goods were seized on' their way to the enemy, and two days
later thebuyers refused to accept the documents, on which money
had been advanced by neutral persons. It was held that where
goods are contracted to be sold and are shipped before the war
and not in anticipation of it, and are seized in transit to the enemy
during hostilities, they are not liable to condemnation, unless
under the contract the property in the goods has by that time
passed to the enemy. The determining criterion of ownership is
the intention of the parties, and not the incidence of risk. As
the ownership of the goods in question remained at the time of
seizure in the neutral seller, they were ordered to be released (t) .
Nor are goods condemned when shipped by an enemy during war,

if it is proved beyond all doubt that they were shipped absolutely
at the risk of a neutral consignee. Such transactions are, how-
ever, carefully scrutinized in a Prize Court (ii) The only case .
in which the right of stoppage in transitu can be exercised during

war is in the expectation, confirmed
by the event, of the insolvencj"
of the consignee {x) .
Sale of ships The from belligerents to neutrals during war

transfer of ships
gerents'to always
'^'^ looked upon very suspiciously, and clear proof of bona
neutrals.
fiês is required to save the ship from condemnation (y). Thus,
a British ship alleged to have been sold to a neutral after hostilities
had broken out between England and Holland was captured while
trading between Guernsey and Amsterdam under the command of
her former master, who had also been the owner. She was con-
demned as prize for trading with the enemy, the transfer being
deemed colourable and void (z) But if the sale of a ship by a
.
belligerent to a neutral be absolute and bond fide, and attested bj-
appropriate evidence, it isthen permitted, either during war or

in contemplation of it, and whether she is lying in an enemy or a
(s) The Atlas (1801), 3 O. Rob. 299. Rob. 324; Oppenheim y.Russel, 3 Boa.
(0 The Miramichi (1914), 31 & Pul. 484.
T. L. R. 72. (y) The Ariel (1857), 11 Moo. P. C.
(w) The Aurora (1802), 4 C. Rob. 119.
219. (2) The Omnibus (1805), 6 C. Rob.
{x) The Constantia (1807), 6 C. 71; The Odin (1799), 1 O. Rob. 252.
RIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES- MARITIME WARFARE. 677
neutral port {a). All interest of the vendor in the ship must be
completely divested, and there must be no agreement to reconvey
her on the conclusion of the war; but the mere non-payment of
part of the price is not conclusive evidence of itself that the

vendor's interest is not entirely transferred (&). transfer of a A
vessel effected whilst she was in a blockaded port (c), or whilst she
vv-as in transitu unless the purchaser had taken possession of her
before capture (d), is regarded as invalid. It is for the claimant
to prove that the transfer is genuine, and any circumstance of
suspicion must be satisfactorily accounted for by him (e). Vessels

of war lying in neutral ports cannot be sold by their belligerent
owners at any time during the war, even after the vessels had
been dismantled. If so sold, a ship of war, even though purchased
in good faith, and fitted up as a merchant vessel, remains liable to
capture by the other belligerent as long as the war lasts (/) And .
the same rule would no doubt apply to vessels that had been con-
verted into warships, even though afterwards reconverted. Cap-
ture as prize overrides all previous liens (^), and it gives the captor
all the owner's rights when the voyage began {h). Even a bond
fide mortgagee, a subject of the captor's country, is not entitled
to have his mortgage paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the
'
' '
•
prize {i). ^
^
:
•! i i
I
| | j
These principles summarize the long-established British prac-

tice (k), with which the America^n practice almost entirely
agrees (Z) In continental countries, however, certain modifica-
.
tions of these rules appear. Thus, in France and Russia the trans-
fer of enemy vessels to neutrajs is held to be invalid unless it be
unconditional and effected before the outbreak of war. In Holland
all fide transfers are recognised, on condition that they are
bond
not made in a blockaded port. Spain and other countries follow
generally the Anglo-American doctrines, subject, however, to
The Baltica (1857), 11 Moo. P.

(a) Steamer iVfl!ssaw,Blatchford, Prize Cas.
O. 141; The Benedict, Spinks, 314; 665; The Ida (1854), 1 Spinks, 35.
The Rapid (1814), Spinks, 80. (A) The Sally Magee, 3 Wallace,
{b) The Ariel(l%51), II M.OO.V.O. 451.
129; The SecJis Geschwistern, 4 O. (*) The Hampton, 5 Wallace, 372;
Rob. 100. Le Turner (1870), Barboux, Jurisp. du
(c) The General Hamilton (1805), Oonseil des Prises, 1870 71, p. 75; —
6 C. Rob. 62. The Aina (1854), 1 Spinks, 19.
(d) Of. The Baltioa (1857), 11 Moo. (k) Of. the Memorandum prepared
P. O. 141. for the use of the British Delegates at
(e) Butten v. The Queen, 11 Moo. the London Naval Oonference; Pari.
P. O. 271; The Soglasie, Spinks, 104. Papers, Miscell. (1909), No. 4.
(/) The Georgia, 7 Wallace, 32; cf. (0 Of. The Sally Magee, 3 Wall.
The Minerva, 6 O. Rob. 396. 451; The Benito Estenger (1899), 176
(f7) The Battle,^ Wallace, 498;
The U. S. 6^.
w. 37
some qualifications (m). In consequence of all these differences,

an effort was made by the London Naval Conference, 1908-1909,
to arrive at an agreement. As a result, some provisions on the
subject were embodied in the Declaration of London (1909), the
effect of which will be —
if this part of the Declaration be even-
—
tually ratified to modify to some extent the Anglo-American
practice.
"
Transfers The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, effected
under the
Declaration before the outbreak of hostilities, is valid, unless it is proved that
of London.
such transfer was made in order to evade the consequences to which
an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed. There is, however, a pre-
sumption that the transfer is void, if the bill of sale is not on
board a vessel which has lost her belligerent nationality less than
sixty days before the outbreak of hostilities. This presumption
may be rebutted.
There an absolute presumption of the validity of a transfer
is
effected more than

thirty days before the outbreak of hostilities if
it is unconditional, complete, and in conformity with the laws of
the countries concerned, and if its effect is such that neither the
control of the vessel nor the profits arising from her employment
remain in the same hands as before the transfer. If, however, the
vessel lost her belligerent nationality less than sixty days before
the outbreak of hostilities, and if the bill of sale is not on board,
the capture of the Vessel gives no right to damages" {n).
*'
The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, effected after
the outbreak of hostilities, is void unless it is proved that such
transfer was not made in order to evade the consequences to which
an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed.
There is, however, an absolute presumption that a transfer is
void —
(1) If the transfer has been made during a voyage or in a
blockaded port.
(2) If a right to repurchase or recover the vessel has been
reserved to the vendor.
(3) If the requirements of the municipal law governing the

right to fly the flag under which the Vessel is sailing have not been
fulfllled"(o).
(w) Cf. Pari. Papers, Miscell. British Delegates at the London Naval
(1909), No. 5. Conference, Pari. Papers, Miscell.
(w) Declar. of London. (1909), (1909), No. 4, pp. 99 seq.; and the
Art. 55. Report annexed to the Declaration of
(o) Ibid. Art. 56. See the Memo- London, in Higgins, op. cit. pp. 600
randum prepared for the use of the seq.
RIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES -MARITIME WARFARE. 579
During the Great War of 1914 striking instances of transfers Instances
occurred. Thus, the German warships, the Goeben and the a'reaifwat.
— —
Breslau flying from their pursuers were ostensibly transferred
to Turkey, which was a neutral at the time of the alleged trans-
action. Even if the transfer were genuine and the conveyance
complete and unconditional (the circumstances clearly showed the
contrary), the validity of the act none the less remained question-
able on other grounds. Again, German merchantmen were pro-
posed to be transferred to the United States flag; and in order that
the last condition of Article 56 might be fulfilled. Congress
attempted to pass a Bill for facilitating and validating transactions

of this kind. But even if such legislative authority had been
obtained, it could not necessarily have rendered valid the transfer
of vessels made with a view to escaping' from the consequences
to which they were liable. In October, 1914, the Brindilla, an
American oil-tank steamship, was brought before the Prize Court
of Halifax (Nova Scotia), on the ground that she was transferred
to the American flag by German owners contrary to Article oQ
of the Declaration of London. Similarly, exception was taken to
the transfer to the American Registry of the Dacia, a vessel of
the Hamburg- American fleet. The British Government intimated
that the sale was illegitimate, and the vessel was liable to seizure,
if bound either for a German port or for Rotterdam, which is
from a geographical point of view virtually a German port. Even-

tually, however, the vessel was captured by a French cruiser, and
condemned at Brest.
The object of belligerents is to enfeeble and overcome the enemy; The capture
and among the means resorted to in naval war in order to attain tion of prizes,
this object is the destruction or seizure of enemy vessels and the
confiscation of enemy goods found on them. Subject to the
exceptions that have been enumerated above, all public vessels of
the are liable to attack, seizure, or destruction by the belli- *
enemy
gerent warships either on the high seas or in the ports and waters
of either belligerent, but not in neutral or neutralized ports and
waters .
The question has sometimes arisen whether a belligerent vessel Use of false
5 -T colours.
may assume false colours at any time, m order to facilitate an
n, , . .
attack or capture or an escape. It is generally agreed that a war-
ship may hoist a false flag or effect some other disguise

in
an enemy vessel with the of drawing it into
approaching object
action, or when pursuing an enemy ship, or when endeavouring to
37 (2)
escape. On the other hand, before beginning the actual attack

the true colours should be shown. In earlier times such disguise
was common; and it has always been recognised as legitimate.
Thus, Nelson, lying in Vait off Barcelona for Spanish ships, dis-
played the French flag for some time in the hope of luring them
out; and the legality of his procedure was not questioned. During
the Great War, 1914, the German cruiser, the Emden, frequently
assumed the enemy's flag, and even disguised herself by erecting
a dummy funnel during her notable career of commerce-
destroying.
May merchantmen fly false colours in order to evade the enemy
cruisers? During the war of 1914 the Lusiiania, for example,
assumed the United States flag, and thus eluded German warships.
Whereupon Germany accused Great Britain of violating inter-
national law. It is true that under ordinary conditions a mer-
chantman is not entitled to fly a neutral flag but maritime custom
;
allows for the purpose of escaping from an enemy. The follow-

it
ing statement on the subject was issued by, the British Foreign
Oflioe, J'ebruary 7, 1914: "The use of the neutral flag is, with
certain limitations, well established in practice as a 'ruse de
guerre.' The only the case of a merchantman of wearing
effect in
a flag other than her national flag is to compel the enemy to follow
the ordinary obligations of naval warfare, and to satisfy himself
as to the nationality of the vessel and of the character of her
cargo by examination before capturing her and taking her into a
Prize Court for adjudication. The British Government has con-
sidered the use of British coloursby a. foreign vessel legitimate
for the purpose of escaping capture. It is recognised in the
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 69 (1), and in the instructions-
to British consuls, 1914. No breach of international law i&
thereby committed." In an American Note, February 12, to the-
British Government a distinction is drawn between the occasional
use of neutral flags, and "the explicit sanction by a belligerent

Government for its merchant ships generally to fly the flag of a
neutral Power within certain portions of the high seas "; and it is
"
pointed out that such general misuse of a neutral's flag
jeopardizes the vessels of a neutral visiting* those waters."
Title tD The title to property lawfully taken in war may, upon general
captured in principles, be considered as immediately divested from the original
war.
owner, and transferred to the captor. This general principle is
modified by the positive law of nations, in its application both to
personal and real property. As to personal property or moveables,
the title— under the former usage of nations was, in general,, —
considered as lost to the former proprietor as soon as the enemy

acquired a firm possession; which, as a general rule, was considered
as taking place after the lapse of twenty -four hours, or after the
booty was carried into a place of safety, infra prcesidia, of the

captor (p).
Property of the enemy taken on land is usually called booty. Booty and
while that captured on the high seas, with the exception of armed P"^®*
vessels, has acquired the name of prize (g) There is a very .
important distinction between them as regards the mode in which

the captor acquires a title to the captured property Booty belongs .
to the captor as soon as he has acquired a firm possession of it. No

adjudication of any court is necessary to establish his title (r).
On the other hand, a title to prize is acquired, as a general rule,
only after the property has been condemned by a competent

court (s) .
By the modern usage of nations neither the twenty -four
hours' possession, nor the bringing the prize infra prcesidia, is
sufficient to change the property in the case of a maritime capture.
Until the capture becomes invested with the character of prize by
a sentence of condemnation, the right of property is in abeyance,
or in a state of legal sequestration (t) If condemnation follows .
capture, the effects of condemnation relate back to the date of cap-

ture (u) Abandonment of the prize or loss of possession puts an
.
end to the effects resulting from the original capture; so that any-
one who subsequently acquires possession is regarded as the sole
captor (x) . The enemy's armed vessels are not subject to the
adjudication of a Prize Court. Ships and their cargoes are not

invariably prize. Thus during the American Civil War a ship
captured in a river by a detached naval force in boats was held
not to be a maritime prize, or to be condemned as such (y) .
The primary title to all property taken in war, whether on land Prize and
or at sea, is in the sovereign (2;) The law of .
England on this
point has been thus stated by Lord Brougham:

— "That prize prim^HlyTo^
is the sovereign,
clearly and distinctly the property of the Crown, that the sovereign
(j») Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. (t) Tudor, Leading Cases on Mari-
lib. ill. leap. 6, § 3; cap. 9, § 14. time Law, pp. 1092, 1093. Calvo, ii.
KlUber, Droit des Gens Moderne de § 1236.
TEurope, § 254. Vattel, Droit des (u) Andersen v. Marten^ (1908)
Gens, liv. iii. ch. 13, § 196; ch. 14, A. O. 334.
§ 209. Heffter, Daa Europaische Vol- {x) The Diligentia (1814), 1 Dods.
kerrecht, § 136. 404.
{q) Genoa and its Dependencies, 2 (y) The Cotton Plant, 10 Wallace,
Dods. Ad. 446. 577.
(r) Lamar Browne, 2 Otto, 195.
v. (2) Phillimore, vol. iii. § cxxx.
(s) Opinions of Att.-Gen. (U. S.) Calvo, ii. 1237.
§ Halleck, ch. xxx.
vol. iii. p. 379. Field, International § 3. And see the Manila Prize Cases,
Code, § 896. Goss v. Withers, 2 Bur- 188 U. S. Eep. 254.
rows, 693.
in this country, the executive Government in all countries in whom

is vested the power of levying the forces of the State, and of
making war and peace, is alone possessed of all property in prize,

is a principle not to be disputed. It is equally incontestable that
the Crown possesses this property pleno jure absolutely and wholly
without control; that it may deal with it entirely at its pleasure,
may keep it for its own use, may abandon or restore it to the
enemy, or, finally, may distribute it in whole or in part among the

persons instrumental in its capture, making that distribution
according to whatever scheme and under whatever regulations and
conditions it sees fit. It is equally clear, and it follows from the
two former propositions, that the title of a party claiming prize
must needs in all cases be the act of the Crown, by which the royal
pleasure to grant the prize shall have been signified to the subject;
whether, even in that case, the same paramount and transcendent
power of the Crown might not enure to the effect of preserving to
His Majesty the right of modifying or altogether revoking the
grant is a question which has never yet arisen, and which, when it
does arise, will be found never to have been determined in the nega-
tive. But this, at all events, is clear, that when the Crown, by an
act of grace and bounty, parts, for certain purposes, and subject
to certain modifications, with the property in prize, it by that act
plainly intention that the prize shall continue subject

signifies its
to the power of the Crown, and as it was before the act was done.
''
This doctrine has been frequently recognised in cases where
the question- has arisen subsequently to the capture, and before
condemnation but the same principle was afterwards extended in
;
The Eisebe. the casc of The Elsehe{a), in which, after final adjudication in
the Court below, but pending an appeal, the Crown thought
proper, for reasons of State and public safety, to restore the prize
at the expense of the captors. In other words, it was then deter-
mined, and that too upon a solemn and most able argument, and by
a judge the most learned and eminent of his time, the present
Lord Stowell, that when the Crown saw fit to restore the capture,
the captors, who had run the risk and suffered the loss, who had,
moreover, borne the charge of bringing the prize into port, and the
further costs of proceeding in the Admiralty to adjudication, and
had even undergone additional expenses in contesting their claim
upon appeal, were altogether without a remedy. Says Lord . . .
'
Stowell , It is admitted on the part of the captors
. . : . . .
that their claim rests wholly on the Order of Council, the Pro-
(a) (1804), 5 C. Rob. 173.

clamation, and the Prize Act. It is not, as it cannot be, denied

that, independent of these instruments, the whole subject-matter is
in the hands of the Crown, as well in point of interest as in point
of authority. Prize is altogether a creature of the Crown. No
man has, or can have, any interest but what he takes as the mere
gift of the Crown; beyond the extent of that gift he has nothing.
This the principle of law on the subject, and founded on the
is
wisest reasons. The right of making war and peace is exclusively

in the Crown. The acquisitions of war belong to the Crown, and
the disposal of these acquisitions may be of the utmost importance
for the purposes both of war and peace. This is no peculiar
doctrine of our constitution; it is universally received as a neces-
sary principle of public jurisprudence by all writers on the

"
subject, Bello parta cedunt reipuhlicce' (6).
After the condemnation of a prize, it was the usual practice
to sell it and to divide the wh'ole or part of the proceeds among the
officers and crew of the vessel that had captured it (c) The .
making payments has been considered by many to be

of such
indefensible. A reform in this direction was made in the United
States, where prize-money was abolished in 1899 (cZ). At the '
second Hague Conference, 1907, the French delegate suggested

that the practice should be generally abrogated, but no conclusion
was arrived at. In Great Britain, by an Order in Council, August
28, 1914, the grant of prize proceeds to officers and crew was
replaced by the award of prize bounty or head money to the officers
and crev/ of a warship that takes or destroys an enemy armed
ship. The amount to be distributed is a,t the rate at 61. for
each person on board the enemy ship at the beginning of the
engagement.
The captured vessel becomes a "prize" only after the captor How capture
^® ® ®^ ® •
has taken effective possession of her animo retmendi ; but the

possession that is necessary may be either actual or constructive.
The attacking commander usually takes possession of the arrested
vessel by sending on board one of his officers and a portion of his
crew. If this is not practicable, the captor may order the
captured
vessel to lower her flag and follow a course as directed by him
(e) .
Thus, in 1801 Sir W.

Scott emphasized that the test as to whether
a captured vessel becomes a prize does not necessarily depend on
(6) Alexander v. The Duke of Wei- (c) Cf., so far as Great Britain is
lington, 2 Russell & Mylne, 54. Lord concerned, the Naval Prize Act, 1864.
Stowell's remarks are to be found in {d) Of. Moore, Digest, vol. iii.
The Elsebe (1804), 5 O. Rob. 173. p. 543.
(e) Of. The Eeroules, 2 Dods. 362.
' '
the sending of a prize master on board, but on the fact that the
vessel passes under the actual control of the captor (/) .
Joint capture ^
capture may be either ''separate" or "joint." A joint cap-
ture msij be made by two or more vessels of the same belligerent,
or by a vessel or vessels of a belligerent in co-operation with a
vessel or vessels of an ally, or, again, by naval forces and land
forces (^). In order to establish a claim of joint capture the
burden of proof will lie on the claimants (h) All parties who .
have been instrumental in capturing property are entitled to share

in the proceeds as joint captors. In naval warfare there was a
distinction between the rights of privateers and those of public
ships with regard to joint capture. public ship, when in sight A

at the time the prize is taken, is considered as constructively;
assisting,and therefore entitled to share in the capture, while a

privateer under similar circumstances was not regarded as a joint
captor, unless she directly contributed to the seizure (i) . This was
founded upon the fact that privateers, being fitted out for private
gain, were not bound to put their commissions in use on every
discovery of the enemy, whereas public ships, being under a
constant obligation to attack when the enemy oomes in sight, are
presumed to be there animo capiendi (k) As a rule, when ships
.
are associated in the same enterprise and under the same superior
officer, all are entitled to share as joint captors, it being then only
necessary to prove what ships actually formed part of the fleet at

the time of capture (I) If, however, a part of the fleet is detached
.
on a separate service, or if the detached vessels are out of the scene

of the common operations for the time, the prize then belongs to
the actual captors alone (m) During the Crimean war, France
.
and England agreed that a joint capture made by the naval forces
of both countries should be adjudicated on in the country of the
highest naval officer concerned in the capture, and that in the case
of a capture made by the cruiser of one nation, in sight of a
cruiser of the other, such cruiser having thus contributed to the
(/) The Edward and Manj (1801), (h) Halleck, ch. xxx. § 7. The
3 O. Rob. 305. Santa Brigada (1800), 3 C. Rob. 52.
(^) The Dordrecht (1799), 2 C. (0 The Guillaiime Tell, Edw. Ad.
Rob. 55; La Bellone, 2 Dods. 343. 6; The Forsigheid, 3 O. Rob. 311. Cf.
(A) Of. TAe Jo/m, 1 Dods. 363; and Halleck, ch. xxx. § 11; Phillimore,
for Great Britain, see the Naval Prize vol. iii. § 898.
Act, 1864, s. 36. (m) Phillimore, vol. iii. § 398. The
(0 Phillimore, vol. iii. § 388; The Forsigheid, .3 O. Rob. 311; The
Dordrecht, 2 O. Rob. 55; Talbot v. Augusta, Marsden, Adm. Cases, 167.
Three Briggs, 1 Dallas, 103; The For- Ships of war are entitled to share in
sigheid, 3 O. Rob. "311. And see The all captures made by their tenders:
~'
Mangrove Prize Money (1902), 188 j . The Carl (1855), Spinks, 238.
U. S. Rep. 720.
RIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE. 585
intimidation of the enemy, the adjudication thereof should belong

to the jurisdiction of the actual captor (n).
The on land are not the same as those of
riffhts of ioint captors Joint capture
naval captors.
i '
1 11 ^ 1 •
Joint captors are those who have assisted, or are

of booty,
taken to have assisted, the actual captors bj conveying encourage-

ment to them, or intimidation to the enemy. On land the union
of the joint captor with the actual captor under the command of
the same officer, alone constitutes the bond of association which the
law recognises as a title to joint sharing. Community of enter-
prise does not constitute association, and is equally insufficient as a
ground for joint sharing, if the bond of union, though originally
well constituted, has ceased to be in force at the time of the capture.
The distinctions between captures on land and captures at sea tend
to show that in considering joint capture of booty, a wider applica-
tion than is recognised in prize cases must be allowed to the term
"co-operation," concerted action on a vaster scale than is feasible

at sea being indispensable to a campaign. The rule of sight, too,
which prevails at sea, is inapplicable on land. The general rule
for the distribution of booty, to be adhered to as far as possible,
in accordance with naval prize decisions, is the rule of actual
capture. The association entitling to joint sharing must be

military, and not political, and must be under the immediate
command of the same commander. The co-operation which is
necessary as a title to joint sharing, is a co-pperation tending
directly to produce the capture in question (o) .
On the completion of a capture it is the duty of the captor to Duties of

bring his prize, as soon as his other duties permit it, before a com-
^^P*<^^^-
petent court (p) .Since the property in a prize is in abeyance

•until a competent court has pronounced, upon the capture, it is the
interest of all parties to obtain a judicial decree as soon as possible.

As the custody of the prize remains with the captor, it therefore
lies upon him to bring it before the Court. But if prevented by
imperious circumstances from bringing it to his own country, ho
may be excused for taking it to a foreign port, oir for selling it,
provided he afterwards reasonably subjects its proceeds to the
Court (g) By unreasonable delay in bringing in the prize for
.
adjudication, or by other misconduct, the captor may forfeit all his

right of prize, and in this case the prize is condemned to the State,
(n) Convention of 20th May, 1854. Report of Commissioners to inquire

As to the proceedings of joint captors into the distribution of Army Prize,
in the Admiralty Court, see the Naval 1864; and Alexmtder v. The Duhe of
Prize Act, 1864, Appendix B. Wellington, 2 State Trials, N. S. 763;
(o) The Banda and Kirwee Booty, 2 Russ. & My. 35.
L. R. 1 A. & E. 109, where the law {p) Phillimore, vol. iii. § 341.
respecting capture of property by land (^) Halleck, ch. xxx. § 5. The
;and eea is fully discussed. See also Peacock (1802), 4 C. Rob. 192.
if the capture was originally laJ\vf ul (r) . If the capture was made
entirely without probable cause, the captor is liable for costs, and
for the damages resulting from the illegal seizure, and the latter
are decreed to the injured owner (s).
Destruction of
"Sometimes," says Chancellor Kent, "circumstances will not
prizes at sea.
permit property captured at sea to be sent into port; and the captor
in such cases may destroy it, or permit the original owner to
"
ransom it (t). If the vessel belong to the enemy, and the captor
cannot retain possession of her or bring her into port, in con-
sequence of exceptional circumstances e.g., her unseaworthi-
—
ness, existence of infectious disease, Ifack of fuel or of a priza
crew, stress of weather, imminent danger of recapture, serious
danger to the success of naval operations he is then justi-
—
fied in selling or destroying her, but it is his duty to preserve
her papers and as much of the cargo as he can secure. The Con-
federate cruisers burnt many of their prizes at seai during the
Civil War, as their own ports were all blockaded by the Federal
fleets: and though this was not a proceeding to be approved of, it
was not a violation of intern aftional law (u) At the conclusion
.
of the war the Federal Government wished to proceed against
Captain Semmes of the Alahctma for burning and destroying ships

and cargoes belonging to American citizens. They could not
indict him for high treason as he had been treated as a prisoner of
war. But no proceedings were actually taken. Mr. Bolles, tho
law officer to whom the case was referred, gaye it as his opinion
that Captain Semmes had done no more than the United States
had themselves done to England in the war of 1812-14. During
lliat war orders had been given that no prize should be manned or
preserved unless circumstances should render her safe arrival

morally certain. No prizes were to be ransomed, and almost all
were to be destroyed. Mr. Bolles also pointed out that it might be
policy of the Union to pursue a similar course in some future war,
and therefore he deemed it improper to prosecute a person who had,
under orders, simply followed an example previously set by the
G-overnment {x) .
(r) The Bothnea, 2 Gallison, 78; Art. 64, which provides for the pay-
The Triton, 4 0. Rob. 78; Miller v. ment of compensation to neutral
The Resolution (1781), 2 Dallas, 1. owners when the seizure was shown to
Phillimore, vol. iii. § 381. be unjustifiable.
is) Halleck, ch. xxx. § 29. Philli- (0 Kent, by Abdy, p. 276.
more, vol. iii. § 452. Bel Col v. (w) Bernard, Neutrality of England
Arnold (1796), 3 Dallas, 333; The during Civil War, p. 419. Lushing-
Anna Maria (1817), 2 Wheaton, 327; ton, Manual of Naval Prize Law,
The Ostsee (1856), 5 Moo. P. C. 150. § 101.
The rule as to the responsibility of (x) Atlantic Monthly, July, 1866,
captors is now specifically affirmed in p. 89. Pari. Papers, 1873 (No. 2),.
the Declaration of London, 1999, p. 92.
Destruction
During the Eusso-Turkish war of 1877 Eussia was alleged to
have made a practice of sending out fast steamers from Odessa, vessels by
which, while they avoided the Turkish cruisers, captured Turkish ^^^^^JJ^
merchantmen, burnt them on the spot, and then set the crews adrift
in boats. If this was true, it was an, undeniable violation of inter-
national law\ It was, moreover, an act of wanton and unnecessary
cruelty to burn the ships and then expose the lives of their crews
in open boats, and it was an act which could only influence the war
by exasperating the other side, and inducing it to retaliate by

similar measures {y) .
During the War, German submarines unjustifiably

Great
destroyed Britishmerchantmen without warning, and, of course,
without making any provision for the safety of the passengers and
crew. The destruction of vessels such as the Falaha and the
Lusitania (in the case of the latter 1,200 innocent persons, includ-
ing many neutral passengers, being lost) aroused universal indig-
nation.
The destruction of enemy prizes must be distinguished from
that of neutral prizes . The latter case will be considered later (z) .
According to the practice of some States, a captor may release Ransom of

a prize on terms of ransom, embodied in a ransom-bill, whereby the
property
master of the captured vessel covenants to pay the captor a certain
sum within a given time. This undertaking
generally carriedis
out b}^ means of a safe-conduct, empowering the master to take

his vessel to a port of his own country or to any other port desig-
nated by a prescribed course and within a limited period. Unless
prohibited by the law of the captor's own country, this document
furnishes a complete legal protection against the cruisers of the
same nation, or its allies, during the period, and within the
geographical limits, prescribed by its terms. This protection
results from the general authority to capture, which is delegated
by the belligerent State to its commissioned cruisers, and which
involves the power to ransom captured property, when judged
advantageous If the ransomed vessel is lost by the perils of the

.
sea, before her arrival, the obligation to pay the sum stipulated
for her ransom is not thereby extinguished. The captor guaran-
tees the captured vessel against being interrupted in its course, or
retaken, by other cruisers of his nation, or its allies, but he does

not insure against losses by the perils of the seas. Even where
it is expressly agreed that the loss of the vessel by these perils
(2/) See Pari. Papers, Turkey 15th Dec. 1877.

(No. 1), 1878, p. 313; and The Times, (z) See infra, p. 799. .
shall discharge the captured from the payment of the ransom,

this clause is restricted to the case of a total loss on the high seas,
and is not extended to shipwreck or stranding, which might afford
the master a temptation fraudulently to cast away his vessel, in

order to save the most valuable part of the cargo, and 'avoid the
payment of the ransom. Where the ransomed vessel, having ex-

ceeded the time or deviated from the course prescribed by the
ransom-bill,is retaken, the' debtors of the ransom are discharged
from their obligation, which is merged in the prize, and the amount
is deducted from the net proceeds thereof, and paid to the first
captor, whilst the residue is paid to the second captor. So if the
captor, after having ransomed a vessel belonging to the enemy, is
himself taken by the enemy, together with the ransom-bill, of

which he is the bearer, this ransom-bill becomes a part of the
capture made by the enemy; and the persons of the hostile nation,
who were debtors of the ransom, are thereby discharged from their
obligation. The death of the hostage taken for the faithful per-
formance of the contract on the part of the captured does not
discharge the contract; for the captor trusts to him' as a collateral
security only, and by losing it does not also lose his original secu-
rity, unless there is an express agreement to that effect (a) .
Sir William Scott states, in the case of The Hmp, that as to

ransoms, which are contracts arising ex jure belli, and tolerated
as such, the enemy was not permitted to sue in the British courts
of justice in his own proper person for the payment of the ransom,
even before British subjects were prohibited in 1781 from ransom-
ing enemy's property (6); but the payment was enforced by an
action brought by the imprisoned hostage in the courts of his own
country for the recovery of his freedom. But the effect of such a
contract, like that of every other which may be lawfully entered
into between belligerents, is to suspend the character of enemy so
far as respects the parties to the ransom-bill; and consequently,
the technical objection of thewant of a persona standi in judicio
cannot, on principle, prevent a suit being brought by the captor
directly on the ransom-bill. And this appears to be the practice
in the maritime courts of
many European countries (c).
British law Sometimes the ^^rant of ransom by belligerent captors and the
of ransom. . .
, , i , ,
entering into ransom contracts by captured vessels are regulated
(a) Pothier, Trait6 de Propriete, ss. —

16 19. See also Martens, Recueil,
Nos. 134—137. Valin, Sur I'Ordon- vol. iv. p. 304.
nance, liv. iii. tit. 9; des Prises, (<?) The Hoop (1799), 1 0. Rob.
Art. 19. Traits des Prises, ch. 11, 201. See Lord Mansfield's judgment
Nos. 1 — 3. in the case of Ricord v. Bettenhatn
(b) 22 Geo. III. e. 25; cf. 33 Geo. (1765), 3 Burr. 1734. Of. Furtado v.
III. c. 66, ss. 36—39; 43 Geo. III. Rogers, 3 3- & P. 191. See also
c. 160, ss. 33—36; 45 Geo. Ill, c. 72, Pothier, Propriet-e, Nos. 136, 137.
EIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWiÊN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE. 589
or prohibited by special provisions of municipal law. Thus, in

Great Britain, whilst it is forbidden to captors to grant ransom, the
giving ransom contracts is governed by the Naval Prize

p]'actic8 of
Act, 1864, which gives power to His Majesty in Council to make
such orders as may seem expedient for prohibiting or allowing the
ransom of British ships taken as prize by the enemy. If any
person ransoms or agrees to ransom any ship or goods in contra-
vention of such orders, he may on conviction be fined any sum not
exceeding 500/! by the Admiralty Court {d). Somewhat similar
restrictions are imposed by the laws of the Baltic Powers. In
France ransom is allowed in case of imperative necessity. In
the United States there is no legislative enactment prohibiting
the practice (e) .
As to ships and goods captured at sea, and afterwards recap- Recaptures

tured, rules are adopted somiewhat different from those which are
applicable to other personal property.. These rules depend upon
the nature of the different classes of cases to which they are to be
applied. Thus the recapture may be made either from a pirate;

from a captor, clothed with a lawful commission, but not an
enemy; or, lastly, from an enemy.
1 In the first case, there can be no doubt the property ought to Recaptures
.
be restored to the original owner; for as pirates have no lawful ^ôm pirates,
right to make captures, the property has not been divested. The
owner has merely been deprived of his possession, to which he is
restored hj the recapture. For the service thus rendered to him,
the recaptor is entitled to a remuneration in the nature of
salvage (/) .
Thus, by the Marine Ordinance of Louis XIV., of 1681, liv. iii.,
tit. 9, des Prises, art. 10, it

is provided, that the ships a,nd effects
of the subjects or allies of France, retaken from' pirates, and

claimed within a year and a day after being reported at the
Admiralty, shall be restored to the owner, upon payment of one-
third of the value of the vessel and goods, as salvage. And the
(d) 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 45. opus habent postliminio; quia jus gen-
(e) Of. Maisonnaire v. Keating tium illis non concedit, ut jus dominii
(1815), 2 Gallison, 337; Miller v. The mufcarepossint." Of. Demosthenes, De

Besolution (1781), 2 Dallas, 15. Haloimeso, 2, where Demosthenes re-
(/) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. futes the pretension of Philip, who
lib. iii. cap. 9, § 17. Loccenius, De claimed the island of Halonnesus on
Jur. Marit. lib. ii. c. 2, No. 4. Brown, the ground that he had captured it
Civ. and Adm. Law, vol. ii. c. 3, from pirates, who had themselves
p. 461. Dig. De capt. ©t postl. revers.: taken it from Athens.
" Ea
quae piratse nobis eripuerunt, non
590 EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE.
same is the law of Great Britain, but there is no doubt th^t the
municipal law of any particular State may ordain a different
rule as to its own subjects. Thus the former usage of Holland
and Venice gave the whole property to the retakers, on the prin-
ciple of public utility; as does that of Spain, if the property has
been in the possession of the pirates twenty -four honrs {g) .
Opinions of
Valin and
Valin, in his commentary upon the above Article of the French
Pothier. Ordinance, is of opinion that if the recapture be made by a
foreigner, whois the subject of a State, the law of which gives
to the recap tors the whole of the property, it could not be restored
to the former owner: and he cites, in supp,ort of this opinion, a
decree of the Parliament of Bordeaux, in favour of a Dutch sub-
ject, who had retaken a French vessel from pirates (h). To this
interpretation Pothier objects that the laws of Holland having no
power over Frenchmen and their property within the territory of
France, the French subject could not thereby be deprived of the
property in his vessel, which was not divested by the piratical
capture according to the law of nations, and that it ought conse--
quently to be restored to him upon payment of the salvage
prescribed by the ordinance (i).
Under the term 'allies' in this Article are included neutrals;

and Valin holds that the property of the subjects of friendly
Powers, retaken from pirates by French captors, ought not to be
restored to them upon the payment of salvage, if the law of their
own country gives it wholly to the retakers; otherwise there would
be a defect of reciprocity, which would offend against that impar-
tial justice due from one State to another (k).
Recapture 2. If the property be retaken from a captor clothed with ^

of neutral
lawful commission, but not an enemy, there would still be as
property.
little doubt that it must be restored to the original owner. For
the act of taking being in itself a wrongful act, could not change
the property, which must still remain in him.
If, however, the neutral vessel thus recaptured were laden with
contraband goods destined to an enemy of the first captor, it may,
perhaps, be doubted whether they should be restored, inasmuch
as they were liable to be confiscated as prize of war to the first
captor. Martens states the case of a Dutch ship, captured by the

British, under the rule of the war of 1756, and recaptured by the
French, which was adjudged to be restored by the Council of
(g) Grotius, par Barbeyrac, liv. 3, (i) Pothier, Traits de Propriete,

ch. 9, § xvi. No. 1, and note. No. 101.
(A) Valin, Comm. sur I'Ord. liv. 3, (Jc) Valin, Comm. sur I'Ord. liv. 3,
tit. 9, Art. 10. tit. 9, Art. 10.
BIGHTS OF WAK AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MAEITIME WARFARE. 591
Prizes, upon the ground that the Dutch vessel could not have been
justly condemned in the British Prize Courts. But if the case
had been that of a trade, considered contraband by the law of
nations and treaties, the original owner would not have been
entitled to restitution (I) .
In general, no salvage due for the recapture of neutral vessels No salvage on

is
and goods, upon the principle that the liberation of a boncE fidei neTt?al^^ °^
neutral from the hands of the enemy of the captor is no beneficial property,
service to the neutral, inasmuch as the same enemy would be com-
pelled by the tribunals of his own country to make restitution of

the property thus unjustly seized.
It was upon French Council of Prizes The
this principle that the case of
^ ^
determined, in 1800, that the American ship Statira, captured by ^^"'.
a British, and recaptured by a French, cruiser, should be restored

cargo was condemned as contra-
to the original owner,, although the
band or enemy's property. The sentence of the Court was founded
upon the conclusions of M. Portalis, who stated that the recapture
of foreign neutral vessels by French cruisers, whether public ships
or privateers, gave no title to the retakers. The French prize
code only applied to French vessels and goods recaptured from'
the enemy. According to the universal law of nations, a neutral
vessel ought to be respected by all nations. If she is unjustly
seized by the any one belligerent nation, this is no
cruisers of
reason why another should become an accomplice in this act of
injustice, or should endeavour to profit by it. From' this maxim
it followed as a corollary that a foreign vessel, asserted to be
neutral, and recaptured by a French cruiser from the enemy,
ought to be restored on
due proof of its neutrality. But, it might
be asked, why treat a foreign vessel with more favour in this case
than a French vessel? The reason was obvious. On the supposi-
tion on which the regulations relating to this matter were founded,
the French ship fallen into the hands of the enemy would have been
lost for ever, if ithad not been retaken; consequently the recapture
is a prize taken from the enemy. If the case, however, be that of
a foreign vessel, asserted to be neutral, the seizure of this vessel
by the enemy does not render it ipso facto the property of the
enemy, since its confiscation has not yet been pronounced by the
competent judge; until that judgment has been pronounced, the
vessel thus navigating under the neutral flag loses neither its
national character nor its rights. Although it has been seized as
(I) Martens, Essai sur lea Prises et les Reprises, § 52. Code des Prises,
an. 1784, torn. ii.
prize of war, it may ultimately be restored to the original owner .

Under such circumstances, the recapture of this vessel cannot
transfer the property to the recaptor. The question of neutrality
remains entire, and must be determined, before such a transmuta-
tion of property can take place. Such was the language of all
public jurists, and such was the general usage of all civilized
nations. It followed that the vessel in question was not confiscable
by the mere fact of its having been captured by the enemy.

Before such a sentence could be pronounced, the French tribunal
must do what the enemy's tribunal would have done; it must
determine the question of neutrality; and that being determined
in favour of the claimant, restitution would follow of course {m) .
Exception To this general rule, however, an important exception has been

when above quoted from the Code de&
ship made, founded on the r
' principle
r u
might have
been con- Prises, in the case where the vessel or cargo recaptured was practi-
liable to be confiscated by the enemy. In that case, it is
enemy"^^^*^^ cally
immaterial whether the property be justly liable to be thus
confiscated according to the law of nations since that can m'ake no
;
difi:erence in the meritorious nature of the service rendered to the^
original owner by the recaptor. For the ground upon which

salvage refused by the general rule, is, that the Prize Court of
is
the captor's country will duly respect the obligations of that law;
a presumption which, in the wars of civilized States, as they are
usually carried on, each belligerent nation is bound to entertain

in its dealings with neutrals. But if, in point of fact, those
obligations are not duly observed by those tribunals, and, in con-
sequence, neutral property is unjustly subjected to confiscation
in them, a substantial benefit is conferred upon the original owner
in rescuing his property from this peril, which ought to be re-
munerated by the payment of salvage. It was upon this principle
that the Courts of Admiralty, both of Great Britain and the
United States, during the maritime war which was terminated by
the peace of Amiens, pronounced salvage to be due upon neutral
•
property retaken from French cruisers. During the revolution in

France, great irregularity and confusion had arisen in the prize
code formerly adopted, and had crept into the tribunals of that
country, by which neutral property was liable to condemnation
upon grounds both unjust and unknown to the law of nations.
The recapture of neutral property which might have been exposed
to confiscation by means of this irregularity and confusion, was,
therefore, considered by the American and British courts of prize,
(w) Decision relative a la prise du navire Le Statira, 6 Thermidor, an. 8,

pp. 2-4.
and was accordingly remunerated by the

as a meritorious service,
payment These abuses were corrected under the

of salvage {n) .
consular government, and so long as the decisions of the Council

of Prizes were conducted by that just and learned magistrate,
M. Portalis, there was no particular ground of complaint on the
part of neutral nations as to the practical administration of the
prize code until the promulgation of the Berlin decree in 1806.
This measure caused the exception to the rule as to salvage to be
revived in the practice of the British Courts of Adimiralty, which
again adjudged salvage to be paid for the recapture of neutral
property that was liable to condemnation under that decree (o).
It is true that the decree had remained practically inoperative
upon American property, until the condemnation of the cargo

of the Horizon by the Council of Prizes, in October, 1807; and,
therefore,it may perhaps be thought, in strictness, that the English
Court of Admiralty ought not to have decreed salvage in the case of

the Sansom, more especially as the convention of 1800, between
the United States and France, was still in force, the terms of which
were entirely inconsistent with the provisions of the Berlin decree.
But as the cargo of the Horizon was condemned in obedience to
the imperial rescript of the 18th September, 1807, having been
taken before the capture of the Sansom, whether that rescript
be considered as an interpretation of a doubtful point in the
original decree, or as a declaration of an anterior and positive pro-
vision, there can be no doubt the Scmspm would have been con-
demned under consequently a substantial benefit was rendered
it;
to the neutral owner by the recapture, and salvage was due on
the principle of the exception to the general rule.
3. Lastly, the recapture may be made from an enemy. Recapture
from an
The jus postliminii was a fiction of the Eoman law, by which euemj.
persons or things taken by the enemy were held to be restored to
their former state, when coming again under the power of the
nation to which they formerly belonged It was applied not only
,
to free persons, but also to slaves; and to real property and

certain moveables, such as ships of war and private vessels, except
fishing and pleasure boats. These things, therefore, when re-

taken, were restored to the original proprietor, as if they had
never been out of his control and possession (p). Grotius attests,
(w) The War OnsJcan (1799), 2 C. 410; The Acteon, Edw. Ad. 254.
Rob. 299; The Eleonora Catherina, 4 (??) Inst. i.Dig. 49. 15. 2.
12;
O. Rob. 156; The Carlotta (1803), 5 " Navibus onerariis
atquo
longis
O. Rob. 54; The Huntress, 6 C. Rob. propter belli usum postliminium est,
104; Talbot v. Seeman (1801), 1 non piscatoriis aut si quas actuarias
Oanch, 1; S. C, 4 Dallas, 34, voluptatis causa paraverunt."
(o) The Sansom (1807), 6 C. Rob.
w. 38
and his authority is supported by that of the Consolato del

Mare (g), that by the ancient maritime law
of Europe, if the
thing captured were carried infra prcesidia of the eneimy, the jus
postlmdnii was considered as forfeited, and the former owne;r was
not entitled to restitution. Grotius also states, that by the more
recent law established the European nations, a possession
among
of twenty-four hours was deemed sufficient to divest the property
of the original proprietor, even if the captured thing had not been
carried infra prcesidia (r) And Loccenius considers the rule of
.
twenty -four hours' possession as the general law of Christendom

at the time when he wrote (s) So, also, Bynkershoek states the
.
general maritime law to be, that if a ship or goods be carried infra
prcesidia of the enemy, or of his ally, or of a neutral, the title of

the original proprietor is completely divested {t) .
Buleof Sir W. Scott, in delivering the judgtaent of the English Court

amicable
of Admiralty, in the case of The Santa Cruz and other Portuguese
retaliation, <
reciprocity, vessels recaptured, in1796 and 1797, from the common enemy by
applied to
recaptures
a British cruiser, stated that owing to the different practices of
of the pro-
States with regard to recapture there appeared to be no general
perty of
allies. rule. might be that the original owner is divested of his
It
titleby the immediate possession of the captor, or the rule of
pernoctation and twenty-four hours' possession, or bringing the
property infra the passing of a sentence of condemna-
prcesidift, or
tion; but, in fact, there isno uniform rule of practice. Nations

concur in principles, indeed, so far as to require firm' and secure
possession; but these rules of evidence respecting that possession
are so discordant,and lead to such opposite conclusions, that the
mere unity of principle forms no uniform rule to regulate the
general practice. It would be absurd for Great Britain to lay it
down as a general rule that a bringing infra prcesidia —though
—
probably the true rule should in all cases of recapture be deemed
necessary to divest the original proprietor of his right; for such
a rule might prove unjust to British subjects, if other nations
adopted the criterion, say, of immediate possession. In these
circumstances it would be a liberal and rational proceeding to
apply in the first instance the rule of that country to which the
(g) A private collection of mari- lib. iii. cap. 6, § 3. Consolato del

time rules derived from practice in Mare, cap. 287, § 1. Wheaton, Rep.
the Mediterranean. Certain of its vol. V. Appendix, p. 56. Ayala, De
elements had been applied in the latter Jur. Bel. ac Pac. cap. v. Wheaton,
part of the thirteenth century by the Hist. Law of Nations, p. 45.
sea consuls of Barcelona. After suc- (s) Loccenius, De JureMarit. lib. ii.
cessive enlargemeints, the compilation cap. 4, § 4.
was published in Barcelona, 1494. {t) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub.
(r) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. lib. i. (cap. 5.
recaptured property belongs. Failing reciprocal treatment, re-

dress must be sought by retaliatory measures. Each State has
its law of usage, if not its ordinances; but should a case be found
where a country has no rule at all on the subject, then the recap-
turing country must of necessity apply its own rule. As to the
maritime law of England, it adopts a liberal rule of restitution
or salvage with respect to the recaptured property of its own sub-
jects, and gives the benefit of that rule to its allies, unless they act
towards British property on a less liljeral principle. In such a case
it
adopts their rule, and treats them according tjo their own measure
of justice. This principle of reciprocity operates in other cases
of maritime law (w) .
The law of the United States proceeds on the same principle of American
reciprocity, as to the restitution of vessels or goods belonging to thlr^tde^?

friendly foreign nations, and recaptured from the enemy by our reciprocity as
ships of war. By the Act of Congress of the 3rd March, 1800, of thepro-
ch. xiv. § 3, provided that the vessels or goods of persons
it is
F^.^^^P^
permanently resident within the territory and under the protec- nations, re-
tion of any foreign Government in amity with the United States,
anênemy*'^'''^
and retaken by their vessels, shall be restored to the owner, he
paying, for salvage, such portion of the value thereof, as by the

law and usage of such foreign Governments shall be required
of any vessel or goods of the United States under like circum-
stances of recapture; and where no such law or usage shall be
known, the same salvage shall be allowed as is provided in the
case of the recapture of the property of persons resident within,
or mider the protection of the United States. Provided that no
such vessel or goods shall be restored to such former owner, in any
case where the same shall have been condemned as prize by com-
petent authority, before the recapture; nor in any case, where by
the law and usage of such foreign Government, the vessels or goods
of citizens of the United States would not be restored in like
circumstances .
It becomes then material to ascertain

what is the law of different Laws of
maritime nations on the subject of recaptures; and this must be countrfe^sas
sought for either in the prize code and judicial decisions of each to recaptures,
country, or in the treaties by which they are bound to each other.
The present British law of military or prize salvage was estab- British law.
lished by the statutes of the 43rd Geo. III. ch. 160, and the
45th Geo. III. ch. 72, which provide that any vessel or goods
(u) The Santa Cruz (1798), 1 C. recapture of property by a crew, in-

Rob. 50. Of. The Two Friends (1799), eluding neutrals.
1 O. Rob. 271, which involved the
38(2)
therein, belonging to British subjects, and taken by the enemy

as prize, which shall be retaken, shall be restored to the former
owners, upon payment for salvage of one-eighth part of the value
thereof, if retaken by his Majesty's ships; and if retaken by any
privateer (x), or other ship or vessel under his Majesty's protec-
tion, of one-sixth part of such value. And if the same shall have
been retaken by the joint operation of his Majesty's ships and
privateers, then the proper court shall order such salvage to be
paid as shall be deemed fit and reasonable. But if the vessel so
retaken shall appear to have been set forth by the enemy as a ship
of war, then the same shall not be restored to the former owners,
but shall be adjudged lawful prize for the benefit of the
captors (y) .
Amerioan The Act of Congress of the 3rd March, 1800, ch. xiv. §§ 1,2,
law.
provides that, in qase of recaptures of vessels or goods belonging
to persons resident within, or under the protection of the United
States, the same not having been condemned as prize by competent

authority, before the recapture, shall be restored on payment of
salvage of one-eighth of the value if recaptured by a public ship ;
and if the re(iaptured vessel shall appear to have been set forth
and armed as a vessel of war before such capture, or afterwards,
and before the recapture, then the salvage to be one moiety of the
value. If the recaptured vessel previously belonged to the Govern-
ment of the United States and be unarmed, the salvage is one-
sixth, if recaptured by a private vessel, and one-twelfth, if recap-
tured by a public ship if armed, then the salvage to be one moiety.
;
if recaptured by a private vessel, and one-fourth if recaptured
by a public ship. In respect to public armed ships, the cargo

pays the same rate of salvage as the vessel, by the express words
of the Act; but in respect to private vessels, the rate of salvage
(probably by some unintentional omission in the Act) is the same

on the cargo, whether the vessel be armed or unarmed (z) .
It will be perceived, that there is a material difference between

the American and British laws on this subject; the Act of Parlia-
ment continuing the jus postliminii for ever between the original
owners and recap tors, even if there has been a previous sentence of
condemnation, unless the vessel retaken appears to have been set
forth by the enemy as a ship of war; whilst the Act of Congress
(a;) Privateering is now abolished, modifications. See also The Progress,

by the Declaration of Paris, 1856. Edw. Ad. 210, as to the valuation of
(y) These Acts are now repealed a prize.
"
(27 & 28 Vict. c. 23), and the Naval (z)Of. The Adeline (1815), 9
Prize Act, 1864 (27 & 28 Vict. c. 25), Cranch, 244. See U. S. Revised
re-enacts their provisions with some Statutes, tit. Prize.
continues the jus postliminii until the property is divested by a

sentence of condemnation in a competent court, and no longer;
which was also the maritime law of England, until the statute
stepped in, and, as to British subjects, revived the jus postliminii
of the original owner.
Under the French law on the subject of recaptures, if a French French law.
vessel be retaken from the enemy after being in his hands more
than twenty -four hours, it is good prize to the recap tor; but if
retaken before twenty -four hours have elapsed, it is restored to the
owner, with the cargo, upon the payment of one-third the value
for salvage, in case of recapture by a privateer, and one-thirtieth
in case of recapture by a public ship. But in case of recapture
by a public ship, after twenty -four hours' possession, the vessel
and cargo are restored on a salvage of one-tenth.
Although the letter of the ordinances, previous to the Revolu-
tion, condemned as good prize French property recaptured after
being twenty-four hours in possession of the enemy, whether the
same be retaken by public or private armed vessels; yet it seems
to have been the constant practice in France to restore such pro-
perty when recaptured by the king's ships (^). The reservation
contained in the ordinance of the 15th of June, 1779, by which
property recaptured after twenty-four hours' possession by the
enemy, was condemned to the Crown, which reserved to itself the
right of granting to the recaptors such reward as it thought fit,

made the salvage discretionary in every case, it being regulated
by the king in Council according to circumstances (&).
France applies her own rule to the recapture of the property
of her allies. Thus, the Council of Prizes decided on the 9th
February, 1801, as to two Spanish vessels recaptured by a French
privateer after the twenty-four hours had elapsed, that they should
be condemned as good prize by the recaptor. Had the recapture
been made by a public ship, whether before or after twenty-four
hours' possession by the enemy, the property would have been
restored to the original owner, according to the usage with respect
to French subjects, and on account of the intimate relation sub-
sisting between the two Powers (c).
The French law also restores, on payment of salvage, even after
twenty-four hours' possession by the enemy, in cases where the
(a) Valin, Sur I'Ord. liv. iii. tit. 9, (6) Emerigon, Traite des Assurances,
Art. 3. Traite des Prises, ch. 0, § 1, torn.i.
p. 497.
No. 8, § 88. Pothier, Traits de Pro- (c) Traits de Propriety,
Pothier,
priete, No. 97. Emerigon, Traite des No. 100. Em6rigon, torn. i. p. 499.
Assurances, torn. i. p. 497. Azuni, Droit Maritime de I'Europe,
Partie ii. ch. 4, § 11.
enemy leaves the prize a derelict, or where it reverts to the original
proprietor in consequence of the perils of the seas, without a

military recapture. Thus the Marine Ordinance of Louis XIV.,
of 1681, liv. iii. tit. 9, art. 9, provides that, "if the vessel,
without being recaptured, is abandoned by the enemy, or if in con-
sequence of storms or other accident, it comes into the possession
of our subjects, before it has been carried into an enemy's port
(avant qu'il ait ete conduit dans aucun port ennemi); it shall be
restored to the proprietor, who may claim the same within a year
and a day, although it has been more than twenty-four hours in
the possession of the enemy." Pothier is of opinion that the above
words, "avant qu'il ait ete conduit dans aucun port ennemi,"
are to be understood, not as restricting the right of restitution to
the particular case mentioned of a vessel abandoned by the enemy
before being carried into port, which case is mentioned merely as
an example of what ordinarily happens, "parceque c'est le cas
ordinaire auquel un vaisseau echappe a I'ennemi qui I'a pris, ne
pouvant pas guere lui echapper lorsqu'il a ete conduit dans ses
ports" (d). But Valin holds, that the terms of the ordinance are
to be literally construed, and that the right of the original pro-
prietor is completely divested by the carrying into an enemy'a

port. He is also of opinion that this species of salvage is to be
likened to the case of shipwreck, and that the recaptors are entitled
to one-third of the value of the property saved (e) Azuni contends .
that the rule of salvage in this case not regulated by the

is
ordinance, but is discretionary, to be proportioned to the nature

and extent of the service performed, which can never be equal to
the rescue of property from the hands of the enemy by military
force, or to the recovery of goods lost by shipwreck (/) Emerigon.
opposed to Valin on this question (g)

is also .
Spanish law. Spain formerly adopted the law of France as to recaptures,

having borrowed its prize code from that country ever since the
accession of the house of Bourbon to the Spanish throne. In the
case of The San Jago (mentioned by Lord Stowell in that of
The Santa- Cruz), the Spanish law was applied, upon the principle
of reciprocity, as the rule of British recapture of Spanish property.
But by the subsequent Spanish prize ordinance of the 20th of
June, 1801, Article 38, it was modified as to the property of
friendly nations it being provided that when the recaptured ship
;
Traits de {g) Emerigon, Traite d©s Assur-

(d) Pothier,
No. 99.
Propriete,
—
ances, torn. i. pp. 504 505. He cites
((?) Valin, Sur I'Ord. loc. cit. in support of his opinion the Consolato
(/) Azuni, Droit Maritime, Partie ii. del Mare, cap. 287 j and Targa, cap. 46,
ch. 4, §§ 8, 9. No. 10.
EIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFxVRE. 599
is not laden for enemy's account,it shall be restored, if recaptured
by public vessels, for one-eighth, if by privateers for one-sixth

salvage: provided that the nation to which such property belongs
has adopted, or agrees to adopt, a similar conduct towards Spain.
The ancient rule is preserved as to recaptures of Spanish property ;
it being restored without salvage, if recaptured by a king's ship

before or after twenty -four hours' possession; and if recaptured
by a privateer within that time, upon payment of one-half for
salvage; if recaptured after that time, it is condemned to the
recaptors. The Spanish law has the same provisions with the
French in cases of captured property becoming derelict, or revert-
ing to the possession of the former owners by
civil salvage .
Portugal adopted the French and Spanish law of recaptures, Portuguese

in her ordinances of 1704 and 1796. But in May, 1797, after 1*^-
the Santa Cruz was taken, and before the judgment of the
English High Court of Admiralty was pronounced in that case,
Portugal revoked hor former rule by which twenty-four hours'
possession by the enemy divested the property of the former owner,
and allowed restitution after that time, on salvage of one-eighth,
if the capture was by a public ship, and one-fifth if by a privateer.
In The Santa Cruz and its fellow cases. Sir W. Scott distinguished
between recaptures made before and since the ordinance of May,
1797 condemning the former where the property had been twenty-
;
four hours in the enemy's possession, and restoring the latter upon
payment of the salvage established by the Portuguese ordinance.
The ancient law of Holland regulated restitution on the pay- Dutch law.
ment of salvage at different rates, according to the length of time
the property had been in the enemy's possession (/i) .
The ancient law of Denmark condemned after twenty-four Danish law.

hours' possession by the enemy, and restored, if the property had
been a le«s time in the enemy's possession, upon paying a moiety
of the value as salvage. But the ordinance of the 28th March,
1810, restored Danish or allied property without regard to the
length of time it might have been in the enemy's possession, upon
payment of one-third the value.
By the Swedish ordinance of 1788, it is provided, that the rates Swedish law.
of salvage on Swedish property shall be one-half the value, without
regard to the length of time it may have been in the enemy's

possession .
What constitutes a "setting forth as a vessel of war" has been What con-
St'li'Ill'Pfl A,
determined by the British Courts of Prize, in cases arising under "getting-
(A) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. lib. i. cap. 5.

600 BIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE.
forth as a the clause in the Act Thus it has been settled

of Parliament.
war," under that where a ship was originally armed for the slave-trade, and
the Prize Act.
after capture an additional number of men were put on board,
but there was no commission of war, and no additional arming, it
was not a setting forth as a vessel of war under the Act (i). But
a commission of war is decisive if there be guns on board (/c) .
And where the vessel, after the capture, has been fitted out as a
privateer, it is conclusive against her, although when recaptured,

she LS navigating as a mere merchant ship; for where the former
character of a captured vessel had been obliteratedby her con-
version into a ship of war, the legislature meant to look no
further, but considered the title of the former owner for ever
extinguished (/) Where it appeared that the vessel had been

.
engaged in the military service of the enemy, under the direction

of his minister of the marine, it was held as a sufficient proof of a
setting forth as a vessel of war (m) So where the vessel is

.
armed, and is employed in the public military service of the enemy

by those who have competent authority so to employ it, although
it be not regularly commissioned (n) But the mere employment
.
in the enemy's military service is not sufficient; but if there be a

fair semblance of authority in the person directing the vessel to
be so employed, and nothing upon the face of the proceedings to
invalidate it, the Court will presume that he is duly authorized;
and the commander of a single ship may be presumed to be vested
with this authority as commander of a squadron (o) .
Recapture It is no objection to an allowance of salvage on a recapture,

^^^^ ^^ ^^^ made by a non-commissioned vessel; it is the duty of
oomi^ôned
vessel.
every citizen to assist his fellow-citizens in war, and to retake
their property out of the enemy's possession; and no commission
is necessary to give a person so employed a title to the reward
which the law allots to that meritorious act of duty {p) And if .
a convoying ship recaptures one of the convoy, which has been

previously captured by the enemy, the recaptors are entitled to
salvage {q) But a mere rescue of a ship engaged in the same
.
common enterprise gives no right to salvage (r) .
Actual resrjue
^^ entitle a party to salvage, as upon a recapture, there must
nwjessaryfor have been an actual or constructive capture; for military salvage
salvage for
will not be allowed in any case where the property has not been
recapture.
(0 The Horatio (1806), 6 0. Rob. {o) The Georgiana, 1 Dods. Ad. 397.
320. ip) The Helen (1801), 3 C. Rob.
(A-) The Ceylon, 1 Dods. Ad. 105. 224.
(0 The Actif, Edw. Ad. 185. (q) The Wight (1804), 5 C. Rob.
(m) The Santa Brlgada (1800), 3 O. 315.
Rob. %6. (0 The Belle, Edw. Ad. Q6.
(n) The Ceylon, 1 Dods. Ad. 105.
actually rescued from the enemy (s) But . it is not necessary that
the enemy should have actual possession; it is sufficient if the
property is completely under the dominion of the enemy (t) If, .
however, a vessel be captured going in distress into an enemy's

port, and is thereby saved, it is merely a case of civil and
not of
military salvage {u) But to constitute a recapture, it is not

.
necessary that the recaptors should have a bodily and actual posses-
sion; it is sufficient if the prize be actually rescued from the grasp
of the hostile captor (x) Where a hostile ship is captured, and

.
afterwards recaptured by the enemy, and again recaptured from

the enemy, the original captors are not entitled to restitution on
paying salvage, but the last captors are entitled to the whole rights
of prize; for, by the first recapture, the right of the original
captors is entirely divested (y) Where the original captors have

.
abandoned their prize, and it is subsequently captured by other

parties, the latter are solely entitled to the property {z) But if .
the abandonment be involuntary, and produced by the terror of

superior force, and especially if produced by the act of the second
eaptors, the rights of the original captors are completely re-
vived (a). And where the enemy has captured a ship, and after-
wards deserted the captured vessel, and it is then recaptured, this
is not to be considered as a case of derelict; for the original owner
never had the animus delinquendi, and therefore it is to be restored

on payment of salvage; but as it is not strictly a recapture within
the Prize Act, the rate of salvage is discretionary (h). But if the
abandonment by the enemy be produced by the terror of hostile
force, it is a recapture within the terms of the Act (c) Where the .
captors abandon their prize, and it is afterwards brought into

port by neutral salvors, it has been held that the neutral Court of
Admiralty has jurisdiction to decree salvage, but cannot restore
the property to the original belligerent owners; for by the capture,
the captors acquired such a right of property as no neutral nation
'Can justly impugn or destroy, and, consequently, the proceeds,
(after deducting salvage,) belong to the original captors; and neu-

tral nations ought not to inquire into the validity of a capture
(5) The Franklin (1801), 4 C. Eob. I'Ord. torn. ii. pp. 257—259; Traite
147. des Prises, ch. 0, § 1. Pothier, Traite
(t) The Edward and Mary (1801), de Propri6t6, No. 99.
3 C. Eob. 305; The Pensamento (z) The Lord Nelson, 'Edw. Ad. 79;
Feliz (1809), Edw. Ad. 116. The Diligentia (1814), 1 Dods. Ad.
(w) The Franklin (1801), 4 O. Eob. 404.
147. (a) The Mary (1817), 2 Wheaton,
(x) The Edward and Mary (1801), 123.
-3 C. Eob. 305. (6) The John and Jane (1802), 4 0.
(y) 4 O. Eob. note a; The
217, Eob. 216.
J.strea, 1 Wheaton, 125; Valin, Sur (c) TAe 6âê (1806), 6 0. Eob. 273.
602 EIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WÂRFARE.
between belligerents (d) But if the captors make a donation of

.
the captured vessel to a neutral crew, the latter are entitled to a

remuneration as salvors; but after deducting salvage the remain-
ing proceeds will be decreed to the original owner (e). And it
seems to be a general rule, liable to but few exceptions, that the
rights of capture are completely divested by a hostile recapture,
escape, or voluntary discharge of the captured vessel (/). And the
same principle seems applicable to a hostile rescue, but if .the
rescue bo made by the neutral crew of a neutral ship, it may be
doubtful how far such an illegal act, which involves the penalty]
of confiscation, would be held, in the Prize Courts of the captor's
country, to divest his original right in case of a subsequent
recapture.
Case of An
interesting illustration of the law respecting the rescue of a
St^Fierre Captured neutral ship by part of her own crew occurred during
the American Civil War. The Emily, St. Pierre, a British ship,
was on a voyage from Calcutta with orders to make the coast of
South Carolina, and ascertain whether it was still under blockade.
If so, she was to go to New Brunswick; if not, she was to enter
Charlestown harbour. She had no contraband on board. While
heading for Charlestown, and about ton or twelve miles from shore,
she was seized by one of the blockading cruisers, on the 18th
March, 1862. Her crew were taken out, except the master, cook,,
and steward, who were kept on board to give evidence before a
Prize Court. Two officers and thirteen men were put on boai-d^
and ordered to take her to Philadelphia . On their way thither, the
three prisoners rose against their captors, disarmed, and secured
them, and, with the assistance of three or four of the prize crew,
who volunteered to lend a hand rather than remain confined, but
who were all landsmen, managed to take her to Liverpool. Mr.
Adams demanded the restitution of this vessel, and cited the cases
of The Catherina Elizabeth {g) and The Dispatch (^), as evidence
of Lord Stowell's condemnation of such a proceeding. Lord
Eussell, however, declined to seize the ship and give her up to the
United States, on the ground that Her Majesty's Government had
no jurisdiction or legal power to take or to acquire possession of
her, or to interfere with her owners in relation to their property
in her (^). "Acts of forcible resistance," said his Lordship, "to
(^) The Mary Ford (1796), 3 Dallas, The Diligentiu (1814), 1 Dods. Ad.
188. 404.
(e) The Adventure {UU),^CTQJiQ\ij {g) (1804), 5 O. Rob. 232.
227. (A) (1801), 3 C. Rob. 278.
(/) Hudson V. Guestier (1810), 4 (i) Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, 7th
Cranch, 293; S. C, 6 Cranch, 281; May, 1862. U. S. Dipl. Oor. 1862,
p. 87.
RIGPITS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE. 603
the rights of belligerents, when lawfully exercised over neutral

merchant ships on the high seas, such, for instance, as rescue from
inter-
capture, however cognizable or punishable as offences against
national law, in the Prize Courts of the captor administering such
law, are not cognizable by the municipal law of England, and
cannot by that law be punished either by confiscation of the ship,
or by any other penalty; and Her Majesty's Government cannot
raise in an English court the question of the validity of the
capture of the Emily St. Pierre, or of the subsequent rescue and
recapture of that vessel, for such recapture is not an offence against
the municipal law of this country" (^). The discussion (^nded
by its being discovered that in 1800 England had asked the United
States to do precisely the same thing, and that the American
Government had refused to comply on the very grounds put for-
ward by Lord Eussell (k) It may therefore be taken as a settled
.
point, that if a neutral vessel is captured by a belligerent cruiser,

and before condemnation she manages to escape and reach her own
country, the neutral Government is not bound to surrender her
to that of the captor.
As to recaptors, although their right to salvage is extinguished Salvage on
by a subsequent hostile recapture and regular sentence of con- cap^ture^^"

demnation, divesting the original owners of their property, yet if
the vessel be restored upon such recapture, and resume her voyage,
either in consequence of a judicial acquittal, or a release by the
sovereign Power, the recaptors are redintegrated in their right of

salvage (I) And recaptors and salvors have a legal interest in
.
the property, which cannot be divested by other subjects, without

an adjudication in a competent court; and it is not for the Govern-
ment's ships or officers, or for other persons, upon the ground of
superior authority, to dispossess them without cause (m).
In all cases of salvage where the rate is not ascertained by posi- Rate of
tive law, it is in the discretion of the Court, as well salvage,

upon recaptures
as in other cases {n). And where, upon a recapture, the parties
have entitled themselves to a military salvage, under the Prize
Act, the Court may also award them, in addition, a civil salvage,
if they have subsequently rendered extraordinary services in rescu-
ing the vessel in distress from the perils of the seas (o) .
(0 See note (i), previous page. (w) Talbot v. Seeman (1801), 1

(/t)U. S. Dipl. Cor. 1862, p. 113. Cranch, 1; 3 C. Rob. 308. Bynkers-
(0 The Charlotte Caroline, 1 Dods. hoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub, lib. i. cap. 5.
Ad. 192. (o) The Louisa, 1 Dods. Ad. 317;
(w) The BlendenhaU (1814), 1 JecJcer v. Montgomery (1851), 13
Dods. Ad. 414. Howard, 515.
Peize couets. The validity of maritime captures must be determined in a

Their
court of the captor's Government, sitting either in his own country
or in that of an ally. This rule of jurisdiction applies, whether
the captured property be carried into a port of the captor's
country, into that of an ally, or into a, neutral port.
Condemna- Kespecting the first case, there can be no doubt. In the second
in ^^^^'
where the property is carried into the port of an ally, there
perVl^nff
the ports of isnothing to prevent the Government of the country, although it
^'
cannot itself condemn, from permitting the exercise of that final
act of hostility, the condemnation of the property of one belli-
gereiit to the other; there is a common interest between the tWiO

Governments, and both may be presumed to authorize any measures
conducing to give effect to their arms, and to consider each other's
ports as mutually subservient. Such an adjudication is therefore
sufficient, in regard to property taken in the course of the opera-
tions of a comlnon war.
Property But where the property is carried into a neutral port, it may
a neutral appear, on principle, more doubtful whether the validity of a cap-
port, tnre can be determined even-by a Court of Prize established in the
captor's country; and the reasoning of Sir W. Scott, in the case

of The Henrick and Maria, is certainly very cogent, as tending
to show the irregularity of the practice but he considered that the
;
English Court of Admiralty had gone too far in its own practice
of condemning captured vessels lying in neutral ports, to recall it
to the proper purity of the original principle. In delivering the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in the same case. Sir Willianl
Grant Great Britain was concluded by her own
also held that
iriAêterate practice, and that neutral merchants were sufficiently
warranted in purchasing under such a sentence of condemnation,

by the constant adjudications of the British tribunals {p). The
same rule has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United
States, as being justifiable on principles of convenience to belli-
gerents as well as neutrals; and though the prize was in fact
within a neutral jurisdiction, it was still to be considered as under
the control of the captor, whose possession is considered as that of
his sovereign (g) This rule is now confirmed by Article 23 of
.
the thirteenth Convention of the Hague Conference, 1907, which

provides that a neutral Power may allow prizes to enter its ports
(^) The Henrich and Maria (1799), Qusest. Jur. Pub. lib. i. cap. 5 (Du-
4 C. Rob. 43; 6 C. Rob. 138, note (a). ponceau's Transl. Note, p. 38). Kent,
(^q) See also The Polka, 1 Spinks, Commentaries on American Law, vol. i.
57; and the American cases, Hudson p. 103. Wheaton, Hist. Law of
V. Guestier (1810), 4 Cranch, 293; The Nations, p. 321.
Invincible, 2 Gall. 39. Bynkershoek,
and waters when they are brought there to be sequestrated pending

the decision of a Prize Court.
This jurisdiction of the national courts of the captor, to deter- Jurisdiction
mine the validity of captures made in war under the authority of ^^ ^^^^
captor
his Government, is exclusive of the judicial authority of every how far
other country, with three exceptions only: —
1. Where the capture
is made within the territorial limits of a neutral State. 2. Where
it is made by armed vessels fitted out within the neutral terri-
tory (r), 3 Where the prize was abandoned by the captor, and
.
is the subject of a salvage claim made

by neutrals (s).
In either of the first two cases, the judicial tribunals of the
neutral State have jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
captures thus made, and to vindicate its neutrality by restoring the

property of its own subjects, or of other States in amity with it,
to the original owners. These exceptions to the exclusive juris-
diction of the national courts of the captor have been extended by
the municipal regulations of some countries to the restitution of
the property of their own subjects, in all cases where the same
has been unlawfully captured, and afterwards brought into their
ports: thus assuming to the neutral tribunal the jurisdiction of
the question of prize or no prize, wherever the captured property
is brought within the neutral territory. Such a regulation is con-
tained in the marine ordinance of Louis XIV., of 1681, and its
justice is vindicated by Valin, upon the ground that this is done
by way of compensation for the privilege of asylum granted to
the captor and his prizes in the neutral port. There can be no
doubt that such a condition may be expressly annexed by the
neutral State to the privilege of bringing belligerent prizes into
its ports,which it may grant or refuse at its pleasure, provided
it be done impartially to all the belligerent Powers; but such a
condition is not implied in a mere general permission to enter
the neutral ports. The captor, who avails himself of such a per-
mission, does not thereby lose the military possession of the cap-
tured property, which gives to the Prize Courts of his own country
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of the capture.
This jurisdiction may be exercised either whilst the captured pro-
perty is lying in the neutral port, or the prize may be carried
thence infra prcesidia of the captor's country where the tribunal
is sitting. In either case, the claim of any neutral proprietor,
even a subject of the State into whose ports the captured vessel or
(r) The Estrella (1819), 4 Wheaton, (1822), 7 Wheaton, 471.

298; The Santissima Trinidad (1822), (s) The Mary Ford (1796), 3 Dall.
7 Wheaton, 283; The Gran Para 188.
goods may have been carried, must, in general, be asserted in the

Prize Court of the belligerent country, which alone has jurisdic-
tion of the question of prize or no prize (t).
Condemna- This jurisdiction cannot be exercised by a delegated authority
tion by con-
sular tribunal in the neutral country, such as a consular tribunal sitting in the-
sitting in the neutral port, and acting in pursuance of instructions from the
neutral
country. captor's State. Such a judicial authority, in the matter of prize
of war, cannot be conceded by the neutral State to the agents of
a belligerent Power within its own territory, where even the neu-
tral Government itself has no right to exercise such a jurisdiction,
except in cases where its own neutral jurisdiction and sovereignty

have been violated by the capture. A
sentence of condemnation,
pronounced by a belligerent consul in a neutral port, is, therefore,

considered as insufficient to transfer the property in vessels or goods
captured as prize of war, and carried into such port for adjudica-
tion (?f).
In 1793, during the war between Great Britain and ^France,
Genet, the newly-appointed" Minister of the French Eepublic,
—
attempted âmong other acts in contravention of American neu-
trality — toset up consular Prize Courts within the territory of the
United States, for the purpose of trying and condemning British

vessels captured by French cruisers. Washington demanded and
secured his recall {x).
Responsi- The jurisdiction of the court of the capturing nation is conclu-
bility of the sive upon the question of property in the captured thing. Its
captor's
Government sentence forecloses all controversy respecting the validity of the
for the acts of
its commis- capture, as between claimant and captors, and those claiming
sioned under them, and terminates all ordinary judicial inquiry upon the
cruisers ani
courts. subject-matter. But where the responsibility of the captors ceases,
that of the State begins. It is responsible to other States for the
acts of the captors under its commission, the moment these acts
are confirmed by the definitive sentence of the tribunals which it
has appointed to determine the validity of captures in war.

Unjust Grotius states that a judicial sentence plainly against right
sentence of a
(" in re minime dubia "), to the prejudice of a foreigner, entitles
foreign court,
ground of his nation to obtain reparation by reprisals:
" —
For the authority
reprisals. " "
of the judge (says he) is not of the same force against
strangers
as against subjects. Here is the difference: subjects are bound up
and concluded by the sentence of the judge, though it be unjust,
(t) Valin, Comment, sur I'Ordon. de (w) The Flad Oyen (1799), 1 O.
la Des Prises,
Marine, liv. iii. tit. 9, Rob. 135.
Art. 15; tom. ii. p. 274. Lampredi, (^x) Cf. Moore, Digest, vol. iv.
Trattato del Commercio de' Popoli pp. 486, 487.
Noutrali in Tempo de Guerra, p. 228.
SO that they cannot lawfully oppose its execution, nor by force

recover their own right, on account of the controlling efficacy of
that authority under which they live. But strangers have coercive
power [that is, of reprisals], though it be not lawful to use it so
long as they can obtain their right in the ordinary course of

justice" (|f/).
So, also, Bynkershoek, in treating the same subject, puts an

unjust judgment upon the same footing with naked violence, in
authorizing reprisals on the part of the State whose subjects have
been thus injured by the tribunals of another State. And Vattel,
in enumerating the different modes in which justice may be re-
"a judgment mani-
fused, so as to authorize reprisals, mentions
festl}'' unjust and partial"; and though he states what is
undeniable, that the judgments of the ordinary tribunals ought
not to be called in question upon frivolous or doubtful grounds,
yet he is manifestly far from attributing to them that sanctity
which would absolutely preclude foreigners from seeking redress
against them (z).
These principles are sanctioned by the authority of numerous
treaties between the different Powers of Europe regulating the
subject of reprisals, and declaring that they shall not be granted
unless in case of the denial of justice. An unjust sentence must
certainly be considered a denial of justice, unless the mere privi-

lege of being heard before condemnation is all that is included in
the idea of justice (a).
Another means adopted by a neutral State in order to protect
its subjects' interests in view of what it considers an incorrect
decision is Thus, in 1879, during the war between
intervention.
Chile and Peru, a German vessel was condemned by a Peruvian
Court; whereupon the German Government, regarding the con-
demnation as unjustifiable, intervened and obtained the release
of the vessel.
Even supposingthat unjust judgments of municipal tribunals Distinction
do not form a ground of reprisals, there is evidently a wide jûnîpai
distinction in this respect between the ordinary tribunals of the tribunai>^ and
State, proceeding under the municipal law as their rule of decision, prize,
and prize tribunals, appointed by its authority, and professing to
administer the law of nations to foreigners as well as subjects.
The ordinary municipal tribunals acquire jurisdiction over the
(y) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. liv. ii. ch. 18, §350.
lib. iii. cap. 2, § 5, No. 1.
(a) For such an instance of repri-
(z) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. sals, see the case of the Silesian Loan,
lib. i. cap, 24. Vattel, Droit des Gens, infra, p. 611.
—
person or property of a foreigner by his consent êither express
by the fact of his voluntarily bringing the suit, or implied by the
fact of his bringing his person or property within the territory.'
But when Courts of Prize exercise their jurisdiction over vessels
captured at sea, the property of foreigners is brought by force

within the territory of the State by which those tribunals are
constituted. By natural law, the tribunals of the captor's country
are no more the rightful exclusive judges of captures in war, made
on the high seas from under the neutral flag', than are the tribunals
of the neutral country. The equality of nations would, on prin-
ciple, seem to forbid the exercise of a jurisdiction thus acquired
by force and violence, and administered by tribunals which cannot

be impartial between the litigating parties, because created by
the sovereign of the one to judge the other. Such, however, is the
actual constitution of the tribunals, in which, by the positive inter-
national law, is vested the exclusive jurisdiction of prizes taken in
war. But the imperfection of the voluntary law of nations, in
itspresent state, cannot oppose an effectual bar to the daim' of a
neutral Government seeking indemnity for its subjects who have
been unjustly deprived of their property, under the erroneous ad-
ministration of that law. The institution of these tribunals, so
far from exempting, or being intended to exem|pt, the sovereign
of the belligerent nation from responsibility for the acts of his
commissioned cruisers, is designed to ascertain and fix that
responsibility. Those cruisers are responsible only to the sove-
reign whose commissions they bear. So long as seizures are
regularly made upon apparent grounds of just suspicion, and fol-
lowed hj prompt adjudication in the usual mode, and until the
acts of the captors are confirmed by the sovereign in the sentences
of the tribunals appointed by him to adjudicate in matters of
prize, the neutral has no ground of complaint, and what he suffers

is the inevitable result of the belligerent right of capture. But
the moment the decision of the tribunal of the last resort has been
pronounced, (supposing it not to be warranted by the facts of the
case, and by the law of nations applied to those facts,) and justice
has been thus finally denied, the capture and the condemnation
become the acts of the State, for which the sovereign is responsible
to the Government of the claimant. There is nothing more irregu-
lar in maintaining that the sovereign is responsible towards foreign
States for the acts of his tribunals, than in maintaining that ho
isresponsible for his own acts, which, in the intercourse of nations,
are constantly made the ground of complaint, of reprisals, and
even of war. No greater sanctity can be imputed to the proceed-
ings of prize tribunals, even by the most extravag-ant theory of

the conclusiveness of their sentences, than is justly attributed to
the acts of the sovereign himself. But those acts, however bind-
ing upon his own subjects, if they are not conformable to the
public law of the world, cannot be considered as binding upon the
subjects of other States . A
wrong done to them forms an equally
just subject of complaint on the part of their Government, whether
it proceeds from the direct agency of the sovereign himself, or is
inflicted by the instrumentality of his tribunals. The tribunals

of a State are but a part, and only a subordinate part, of the
Government of that State. But the right of redress against in-
jurious acts of the whole Government, of the supreme authority,
incontestably exists in foreign States, whose subjects have suffered
by those acts. Much more clearly then must it exist, when those
acts proceed from persons, authorities, or tribunals, responsible to
their own sovereign, but irresponsible to a foreign Government,
otherwise than by its action on their sovereign.
These principles, so reasonable in themselves, are also supported
by the authority of the writers on public law, and by historical
examples.
''
The exclusive right of the State, to which the captors belong', Opinion of
^^^^êrfortb.
to adjudicate upon the captures made by them;," says Eutherforth,
"is founded upon another; that is, its right to inspect into the
conduct of the captors, both because they are members of it^ and
because it is responsible to all other States for what they do in war;
since what they do in war is done either undel* its general or its
special comlnission. The captors are therefore obliged, on account

of the jurisdiction which the State has oyer their persons, to bring
such ships or goods as they seize in the main ocean into their own
ports,and they cannot acquire property in them until the State
has determined whether they were lawfully taken or not. The
right which their own State has to determine this matter is so
far an exclusive one, tha^t no other State can claim to judge of
their conduct until it has been thoroughly examined into by their
own; both because no other State has jurisdiction over their

persons, and likewise because no other State is answerable for what
they do. But the State to whi^ch the captors belong, whilst it is
thus examining into the conduct of its own members, and
deciding whether the ships or goods which they have seized are law-
fully taken or not, is determining a question between its own
members and the foreigners who claim the property; and this
controversy did not arise within its own territory, but in the main
ocean. The right, therefore, which it exercises is not civil juris-
w. 39
diction; and the civil law, peculiar to its own territory,,

which is
is not the law by which it

ought to proceed. Neither the place
where the controversy arose, nor the parties who are concerned in
it, are subject to this law. The only law by which this cantr'o-
versy can be determined, is the law of neiture, applied to the
collective bodies of civil societies, that is, the law of nations;,
unless, indeed, there have beenany particular treaties made be-

tween the two which
States, to the captors atid the other claimants
belong, mutually binding them to depart from such rights as the
law of nations would otherwise haVe supported. Where such
treaties have been made, they are a law to the two States, as far
as they extend, and members of them', in their inter-
to all the
course with one another. The State, therefore, to which the
captors belong, in determining what might or might not be law-
fully taken, is to judge by these particular treaties, and by the
law of nations, taken together. This right of the State, to which
the captors belong, to judge exclusively, is not a complete juris-
diction. The captors, who are its own members, are bound to
submit to its sentence, though this sentence should happen to be
erroneous, because it has a complete jurisdiction over their persons.
But the other parties to the controversy, as they are members of
another State, are only bound to submit to its sentence so far as
this sentence is agreeable to the law of nations, or to particular
treaties; because it has no jurisdiction over them, either in
respect of their persons, or of the things that are the subject of
the controversy. If justice, therefore, is not done to them, they
may apply to their own State for a remedy; which may, consis-
tently with the law of nations, give them a remedy, either by
solemn war or reprisals. In order to determine when their right
to applj'- to their own State begins, we must inquire when the
exclusive right of the other State to judge in this controversy
ends. As this exclusive right is nothing else but the right of the
State, towhich the captors belong, to examine into the conduct of

its own members before it becomes answerable for what they have
done, such exclusive right cannot end until their conduct has been
thoroughly examined. Natural equity will not allow that the State
should be answerable for their acts, until those acts are examined
by all the ways which the State has appointed for this purpose.
Since, therefore, it is usual in maritime countries to establish not
only inferior courts of marine, to judge what is and what is not
lawful prize, but likewise superior courts of review, to which the
parties may appeal, if they think themselves aggrieved by the
inferior courts; the subjects of a neutral State can have no right
to apply to their own State for a remedy against an erroneouis

sentence of an inf erio,r court, till they have appealed to the superior
court, or to the several superior courts, if there are more courts of
this sort than one, and till the sentence has been confirmed in all of
them For these courts are so many means appointed by the State,
,
to which the captors belong, to examine into their conduct; and,

till their conduct has been examined
by all these means, the State's
exclusive right of judging continues. After the sentence of the
inferior court has been thus confirmed, the foreign claimants may
apply to their own State for a remedy, if they think them!selves

aggrieved; but the law of nations will not entitle them to a remedy,
unless they have been actually aggrieved. When the matter is
carried thus far, the two States become the parties in the contro-
versy. And since the law of nature, whether it is applied to

individuals or civil societies, abhors the use of force till force
becomes necessary, the supreme rulers of the neutral State, before
they proceed to solemn war or to reprisals, ought to apply to the
supremo julers of the other State, both to satisfy themselves that
they have been rightly informed, and likewise to try whether the
controversy cannot be adjusted by more gentle methods "'(6).
In celebrated ;report made to the British Government, in Report on
th(3
1753, upon the case of the reprisals granted by the King of J^ân'Ses
Prussia, on account of captures made by the cruisers of Great
Britain of the property of his subjects, the exclusive jurisdiction
of the captor's count;ry over captures made in war, by its commis-
sioned cruisers, is asserted; and it is laid down that "the law of
nations, founded upon justice, equity, convenience, and the reason
of the thing, does not allow of reprisals, except in case of violent
injuries, directed or supported by the State, and justice absolutely

'
denied in re minime dubia,' by all the tribunals, and afterwards

"
by the prince; plainly showing that, in the opinion of the
eminent persons by whom that paper was drawn up, if justice be
denied in a clear case, by all the tribunals, and afterwards by the
prince, it forms a lawful ground of reprisals against the nation
by whose commissioned cruisers and tribunals the injury is com-
mitted And that Vattel was of the same opinion, is evident from
.
the manner in which he quotes this paper to support his own doc-
trine, that the sentences of the tribunals ought not to be made the
ground of complaint by the State against whose subjects they
''
are pronounced, excepting the case of a refusal of justice,
(6) Rutherforth, Inst. vol. ii. b. ii. ch. 9, § 19.
39(2)
palpable and evident injustice, a manifest violation of rules and

forms," &c. (c).
In the case above referred to, the King of Prussia (then neutral)
had undertaken to set up within his own dominions a commission
to re-examine the sentences pronounced against his subjects in
the British Prize Courts; a proceeding regarded by the authors of
"
the report to the British Government as an innovation, which was
never attempted in any count,ry of the world before. Prize or no
prize must be determined by Courts of Admiralty belonging to
the Power whose subjects made the captu;re." But the report pro-
"
ceeds to state, that every foreign prince in amityj has a right to
demand that justice should be done to his sujbjects in these courts,
according to the law of nations, or particular treaties, where they
are subsisting. If 'in re minime dubia,' these courts proceed'
upon foundations directly opposite to the law of nations, or sub-
sisting treaties, the neutral State has a right to complain of such
determination."
The King of Prussia did complain of the determinations of the
British tribunals, and made reprisals by stopping the interest upon
a loan due to British subjects, and secured by hypothecation upon
the revenues of Silesia, until he actually obtained from' the British
Government an indemnity for the Prussian vessels unjustly cap-
tured and condemned. The proceedings of the British tribunals,
though they were asserted by the British Government to be the
only legitimate mode of determining the validity of captures made
in war, were not considered as excluding the demand of Prussia
for redress upon the Government itself (d) .
Mixed com-
imssion under
treaty of 1794.
-^ _^.. - -i - •
-ii
So, also, under the treaty of 1794, between the United States
and Great Britain, a mixed commission was appointed to determine
the claim of American citizens, arising from the capture of their
property by British cruisers, during the existing war with France,

according to justice, equity, and the law of nations. In the course
of the proceedings of this board, objections were made, on the part
of the British Government, against the commissioners proceeding
to hear and determine any case where the sentence of condemna-
tion had been affirmed by the Lords of Appeal in Prize Causes,
upon the ground that full and entire credit was to be given to their
final sentence; inasmuch as, according to the general law of nations,
it was to be presumed that justice had been administered by this,
the competent and supreme tribunal in matters of prize. But this
(o) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. ii.

—
pp. 206 ^217; O. de Martens, Causes
ch. 7, § 84. C^lebres de Droit des Gens, 2 vols.
(d) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, (Leipzig, 1827), vol. ii. p. 97.
objection was overruled by the board, upon the grounds and prin-
ciples already stated, and a full and sutisfactory indemnity was
awarded in many cases whea:e there had been a final sentence of
condemnation.
In 1871 a mixed commission was appointed to determine
British claims arising out of the alleged wrongful judgments pro-
nounced against British vessels by the United States Prize Courts
during the American Civil War (e).
Many other instancesmight be mentioned of arrangements Conclusive-
between States, by which mixed commissions have been appointed decisioiS^^*

to hear and determine the claims of the subjects of neutral Powers,
arising out of captures in war, not for the purpose of revising the
sentences of the competent Courts of Prize, as between the captors
and captured, but for the purpose of providing an adequate in-
demnity between State and State, in cases where satisfactory
compensation had not been received in the ordinary course of
justice. Although the theory of public law treats prize tribunals,
established by and sitting in the belligerent country, exactly as if
they were established by and sitting in the neutral country, and as

if they always adjudicated conformably to the international law
common to both ; yet it is well known that, in practice, such tribu-

nals do take for their guide the prize ordinances and instructions
issued by the belligerent sovereign, without stopping to inquire
whether they are consistent with the paramount rule. If, there-
fore, the final sentences of these tribunals were to be considered
as absolutely conclusive, so as to preclude all inquiry into their
meritsrthe obvious consequence would be to invest the belligerent

State with legislative power over the rights of neutrals, and to
prevent them from showing that the ordinances and instructions,

under which the sentences have been pronounced, are repugnant
to that law by which foreigners alone are bound.
These principles received confirmation in the negotiation Danish
between the American and Danish Governments respecting the JJJj^^treaty
captures of American vessels and cargoes made by the cruisers of 1830.
of Denmark during the last war between that Power and Great
Britain. In the course of this negotiation, it was objected by the
Danish ministers that the validity of these captures had been
finally determined in the competent Prize Court of the belligerent
country, and could not be again drawn in question. On the part
of the American Government it was admitted that the jurisdiction
(e) Cf. The Betsey, in Moore, In- Moore, ibid. vol. iv. 3928; The Sir
ternational Arbitrations, vol. iii. 2838;
The Springbok (1866), 5 Wallace, 1;
of the tribunals of the capturing nation was conclusivo and com-
plete upon the question of prize or no prize, so as to transfer the

property in the things condemned from the original owner to the
captors, or those claiming under them; that the final sentence of
those tribunals is conclusive as to the change of property operated
by and cannot be again incidentally drawn in question in any]

it,
other judicial forum; and that it has the effect of closing for ever
all private controversy between the captors and the captured. The
demand which the United States made upon the Danish Govern-
ment was not for a judicial revision and reversal of the sentences
pronounced by its tribunals, but for the indemnity to which the
American citizens were entitled in consequence of the denial of
justice by the tribunals in the last resort, and of the responsibility
thus incurred by the Danish Government for the acts of its cruisers
and tribunals. The Danish Government was, of course, free to
adopt any measures it might think proper, to satisfy, itself of the
injustice of those sentences, one of the most natural of which would
be a re-examination and discussion of the cases complained of,
conducted by an impartial tribunal under the sanction of the two
Governments, not for the purpose of disturbing the question of
the specific property which had been irrevocably condemned,
title to
or of reviving the controversy between the individual captors and

claimants which had been for ever terminated, but for the purpose
of determining between Government and Government whether in-
justice had been done by the tribunals of one Power against the
citizens of the other, and of determining what indemnity ought to
be granted to the latter. The accuracy of this distinction was
acquiesced in.
by the Danish ministers, and a treaty concluded, by
which a satisfactory indemnity was provided for the American
claimants (/) .
Municipal As Prize Courts are municipal and not international tribunals,

laws adminis-
tered in it is a question of great nicety how far they are bound to enforce
Prize Courts. a municipal law against foreigners when that municipal law is
contrary to the law of nations. In a case before Lord Stowell, it
was argued that the Orders in Council of 1807 and 1809 (issued
as a reply to Napoleon's Berlin Decree, 1806, and his Milan
Decree, 1807) were a violation of international law, and that he
therefore was bound to disregard them. His lordship was of
opinion that as the Orders in Council were retaliatory they did not
"
contravene the law of nations, but he added, I have no hesitation
in saying that they would cease to be just if they ceased to be
(/) Martens, Nouveau Recueil, torn. viii. p. 350.

retaliatory; and they would cease to be retaliatory from the

moment enemy retracts, in a sincere manner, those measures of
the
"
his which they were intended to retaliate (^) In another .
case (h), Stowell pointed out that it was the duty of a Prize Court
not to pronounce occasional and shifting opinions to serve present
purposes of particular national interest, but to administer impar-
tially that justicewhich international law holds out without dis-
tinction to independent States, and to claim nothing for one
belligerent which would not in like circumstances be conceded to

the other {i). Similarly, in 1854, Dr. Lushington observed that
it was incumbent on a Prize Court to preserve undiminished the
rights of neutral States, without derogating from the rights of

belligerent Powers, as both are sanctioned by the law of
nations (A;). Sir E. Phillimore is of opinion "that it has never
been the doctrine of the British Prize Courts that, because they sit
under the authority of the Crown, the Crown has authority to
"
prescribe to them rules which violate international law {l). How-
ever reasonable such opinions may be, there is no doubt that a Prize
Court, being really a municipal institution, would be bound to
take cognizance of and observe the enactments and orders of the
sovereign authority of its State, even if they were in conflict with

principles of international law . An example is found in the above-
mentioned retaliatory Orders in Council. The law administered
by such tribunals is based on custom, statutes, and special regula-
tions issued by their Government; but every Government is, as a
rule, bound, in drawing up these statutes and regulations, to con-

form to the established principles of international law.
The prize jurisdiction in Great Britain is assigned to the Pro-
bate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court, from
which appeal lies to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
The unsuccessful Naval Prize Bill, 1911, intended, inter alia, to
substitute a special Supreme Court as the appellate tribunal, from
which a further appeal would lie to the International Prize Court
proposed by the Hague Conference, 1907.
The present procedure of the British Prize Court is regulated by
rules made by the Privy Council under the Naval Prize Act, 1864,
and the Prize Courts Act, 1894; but the President of the Court is
empowered to make supplementary rules of procedure when and
as necessity arises. On August 5, 1914, an Order in Council was
{g) The Fox (1811), Edw. Ad. 312. 5 Moo. P. O. 150; The Snipe, Edw.
(A) The Maria (1799), 1 O. Rob. Ad. 381.
350. (Jc) The Leucade (1854), Spinks,
(0 Cf. also The Recovery (1807), 217.
6 0. Rob. 341, 348; rê Os/see(1856), (I) Phillimore, vol. iii. § 436.
issued whereby certain antiquated lelements were removed, and

the procedure assimilated to that of an ordinary civil action. In
some countries Prize Courts are presided over by administrative
officials rather than by judges, so that their
procedure hardly
assumes a strictly judicial form (m).
The pro- Prize Courts being municipal tribunals, various drawbacks and
national Prize disadvantages
—
^from the point of view of international law in- —
Court.
evitably arise. As they are called upon to determine the validity
of captures effected by subjects of their own countries, there is
naturally a leaning in favour of the captors. Moreover as has

—
—
already been pointed out they are bound to observe the practice
prescribed for them by their own sovereign authority, and to
depart from the prevailing rules of international law when ordered
to do so by the same authority. In order to remedy these imper-
fections (which are, of course, more flagrant and more serious in
some countries than in others), proposals have from time to time
been made for the establishment of an international prize court.
One of these proposals was advanced as early as 1759. In 1887
a more practicable project was set forth by the Institute of Inter-
national Law. Twenty years later the second Hague Conference
fully considered the question, and eventually drew up the remark-
able project embodied in the twelfth Convention. The main dif-
ficulty thatwas felt was as to the law such a court would apply,
seeing that on many matters of naval warfare there is a difference
of opinion as well as of practice among some of the leading mari-
time Powers of the world. Accordingly, an effort was made at the
—
London Naval Conference, 1908 9, to come to an agreement on
those questions. The result of the deliberations the Declaration —
of London, 1909 — did
not, however, receive the ratification of
all the States represented. Furthermore, the Prize Court Con-
vention, which was originally signed by thirty-eight States
(though in ten cases with a, reservation as to the constitution of
the Court), failed altogether of ratification. Hence the scheme
remains purely theoretical; but as it will sooner or later be taken
up again for practical application, a brief analysis of it is .desirable.
Provision is made
for its applicability to belligerents who are
parties to it, for the time of coming into force, for its revision or
denunciation (7^) . A protocol of 1910 provides that States unable
(w) The American system closely seq. For the Japanese system, see
Trembles the British. For other Takahashi,ip. 528.
systems, cf.Phillimore, vol. iii. pp.658 (w) Hague Convention (1907),
No. XII., Arts. 51 sea.
EIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MAEITIME WARFARE. 617
hj their constitution to appeal from their Supreme Courts to an

-external tribunal may bring simply a claim for compensation,
without overriding the decision of their Courts.
The Court is to hear appeals, on questions of either fact or law. Jurisdiction
from the national Prize Courts (1) when the judgment of the natbnarPrize
latter affects the property of a neutral Power or individual; Court.
(2) when it affects even enemy property but relates to (a) cargo
on board a neutral ship, or (b) an enemy ship captured in the
territorial waters of a neutral Power which has not made the
capture the subject of a diplomatic claim, or (c) enemy property

alleged to have been captured contrary to a convention subsisting-)
between the belligerents or some enactment of the captor's
State (o) If the national Court pronounces a capture to be null,
.
then the appeal will lie only on the question of damages; so that
the International Court cannot interfere with a decree of resti-
tution (p). The decrees of the International Court are to be
binding on the parties, and to be carried out as expeditiously as
possible (q).
An appeal may be brought (1) by a neutral Power, if the Who may
^
judgment of the national Prize Court injuriously affects its pro- ^peli.
perty or that of its nationals, or if the capture is alleged to have
taken place in its territorial ;waters; (2) by a neutral person, if
such judgment affects his property, unless his own State forbids
the appeal or undertakes it in his place; (3) by an enemy person,
if such judgment affects his property, and if was made
the capture
on a neutral vessel, or was contrary to some convention between
the belligerents or enactment of the captor's State; but where
the capture involves a violation of neutral waters, only the neutral
"State may appeal (r) . The appeal may be brought either from
the national Court of instance or after one appeal, as pro-
first
vided by the captor's law; but if no judgment is delivered within

two years, the case may be then taken direct to the International
Oourt (s).
The International Court is to apply, first, the provisions of any What law is
Televant treaty existing between the parties; then, the recognised

rules of international law relative to the issue; finally, the general
principles of justice and equity. Where the ground of appeal is

the violation of an enactment issued by the captor's State, the
Court must enforce such enactment. The Court may disregard
failure to comply with the procedure laid down by the laws of the
(o) Ibid., Art. 3. (r) Art. 4.

(p) Art. 8. (s) Art. 6.
': , iq) Art. 9.
captor when it holds them to be unjust or inequitable ,in their
consequences (t). Court confirms the capture of a vessel or

If the
cargo, they are to be disposed of in accordance with the captor's

law. pronounces the capture to be null, then it shall order
If it
restoration fix the amount of damages, if any; but if the prize

and
has been sold or destroyed, it shall determine the amount of com-
pensation to be paid to the owners (u) .
Constitution The Court is to be composed of fifteen competent judges of high

character, of whom nine will form a quorum. In order to con-
stitute it, each signatory Power is to appoint a judge and a
deputy judge (x). Both are appointed for six years. Provision
is madefor cases of absence, resignation or death, and for rank,
precedence, oath of office, and immunities (?/). From the body of

thesenominated judges the Court is to be constituted thus: The
judges appointed by Great Britain, the United States, France,
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Kussia, Italy and Japan are to be
permanent members of the Court, whilst the other seven judges
sit according to a prescribed rota (z) But if it happens, under .
the rota, that a belligerent State has not a judge in the Court, then
one of the judges may be withdrawn by lot, and its own in-
cluded («). No person may sit as judge who has been a party
to the sentence pronounced in the national Court; and no judge or
deputy judge may, during his term of office, act for any party
before the International Court (6). belligerent captor, or a A
neutral Power being a party to the proceedings, may appoint a
naval officer of high rank to sit as assessor, but with no voice in
the decision (c) . Provision is made for the election of the Presi-
dent and Vice-President (d) .
The judges may not be paid by their own Government or by

any other Power, but only out of a common fund (e). The Court
is to sit at The Hague, and may not sit elsewhere except in case
of compulsion (' force majeure '), and then only if the belligerents-
consent (/) . The 'ministerial functions of the Court are to be

performed by the Administrative Council and the International
Bureau (g). The Court shall determine what languages may be
used, but in all cases the official language of the national Court
which has heard the case before may be used (h) The parties .
(0 Art. 7. (d) Art. 19.

(ti) Art. 8. (e) Art. 20.
(cc) Arts. 14, 10. (/) Art. 21.
Oj) Arts. 11, 12, 16. (ff) Arte. 22, 23, 27. Of. Hague
(z) Art. 15. Convention (1907), No. I. Art. 49,
(a) Art. 16. supra, on the International Court of
(b) Art. 17. Arbitration.
(c) Art. 18. (A) Art. 24.
may appoint agents and advocates to act for them and plead their
cause (i) .
Provision is made for the mode and time

entering the Procedure,
of
appeal (k), service of notices and procuring of evidence (/), for

written pleadings and oral discussions (m) After the close of.
the pleadings, the Court is to fix a day for a public sitting, when
the parties state their view of the case both as to the law and the
facts {n) .
party A may demand that discussion be held in
private (o) All questions are decided in private by a majority of
.
the judges present (p); the judgment must state the reasons on
which it is based (g), and must be delivered in open court (r).
Each party bears its own costs; but the party against whom the
Court decides must pay in addition the costs of the trial {s) .
The Court may draw up further rules of procedure and make modi-
fications in the rules contained in the Convention; these must be
notified to the contracting Powers (t) .
For a long time there was a difference of opinion with regard to naval bom-
some of the fundamental questions of naval bombardment Most ^^î^mbnt. .
jurists and publicists contended that the destruction of open and

undefended coast towns, and the exaction of enormous ransoms by
threats of bombardment were reprehensible proceedings; but in
—
some quarters considering frequent naval practices ^they were —
regarded as permissible operations for bringing pressure to bear
on the enemy with a view to overcome him. The conflicting views
related to thefundamental principle of warfare whether any kind —
and any amount of injury and damage may be inflicted on the
enemy, or only that kind and to that extent which will manifestly
contribute to the defeat of the military and naval forces. In 1896
the subject of naval bombardment was considered by the Institute
of International Law, which drew up a number of progressiva
rules. It was then agreed by the leading international jurists that
the basic principles of bombardment on land should apply to bom-
bardment on Two
of the Articles arrived at indicate the pre-
sea.
vailing juristic opinion. Article 4 says that conformably to the

general principles that had been formulated, the naval bombard-
ment of an open town is inadmissible, save for the purpose of
(0 Arts. 25, 26. (q) Art. 44.

ik) Art. 28. (r) Art. 45.
(0 Art. 27. (s) Art. 46.
(m) Art. 34. (t) Arts. 49, 50. The full t^xt will
(w) Art. 35. be found in a convenient form in
(o) Art. 39. Higgins, 02?. cH. pp. 407 seq.
Ip) Art. 43.
obtaining by requisitions or contributions what is necessary for

the fleet, and for the purpose of destroying sheds, military erec-
tions, depots of war munitions or of warships in port. An open
town that defends itself against the entrance of troops or of dis-
embarked marines may be bombarded for the purpose of protect-
ing such disembarkation and covering their operations if resistance
continues. Bombardment of which the object is merely to extract
a ransom, or force submission by attacks on the peaceful inhabi-
tants and their property, is forbidden. Article 5 declares that an
open town may not be bombarded simply because it is the capital

of the State or the seat of the Government, or because it is occupied
by troops or is ordinarily a garrison {u) .
The Hague In 1899 the matter came before the first Hague Conference; no
Rules.
agreement was reached, though a desire was expressed that a sub-
sequent Conference should consider the question. Accordingly,
in 1907, a Convention (the ninth) was established, whereby a
compromise was effected between the claims of military necessity

and thosf) of humanity The rules are as follows
. :
—
''
Undefended The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns,
towns.
villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden.
A place may not be bombarded solely on the ground that auto-
"
matic submarine contact mines are anchored off the harbour {v).
The most important word of this Article, viz., 'undefended,'
was not defined. Attempts were, indeed, made; but they failed on
account of the difficulty that was experienced in drawing a dis-
tinction between the defence of a coast and of a town near the coast.
The second paragraph of the Article, however, limits the denotation
of the term,by specifying a particular proceeding which shall not
be deemed to amount to a measure of defence. The representatives
of several States were unable to accept this limitation, on the
ground that anchoring mines off the harbour is a means of defence.

Accordingly, reservations were entered against the second para-
graph by Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Japan, and
China. The simplest way to determine whether a place is un-
defended supply an answer to the question: Is it left open for
is to
the forces to enter, if they should succeed in reaching it?

enemy
Special exceptions to the general rule formulated in the first para-
graph are given in the ensuing Articles.
Military
works, &c.
"Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of
arms or war material, workshops or plant which could be utilized for
(m) Of. Annuaire de I'Institut de (t?) Hague Convention (1^07),

Droit International (1896), pp. 313 No. IX. Art. 1.
—315.
the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and ships of war in harbour,
are not, however, included in this prohibition. The commander
of a naval force destroy them by artillery, after a summons
maj
followed by a reasonable interval of time, if all other means are
impossible, and when the local authorities have not themselves
destroyed them within the time fixed.
The commander incurs no responsibility for any unavoidable
damage that may be caused by a bombardment in such
circumstances.
If for military reasons immediate action is necessary, and no
delay can be allowed to the enemy, it is nevertheless understood

that the prohibition to bombard the undefended town holds good,
a^ in the case given in the first paragraph, and that the commander
shall take all due measures in order that the town may suffer as
"
little harm as possible {x).
An instance showing the application of this Article occurred in
the Turco-Italian war, February 25, 1912. An Italian comman-
der having surprised, at dawn, a Turkish gun-boat and a torpedo-
boat in the port of Beirut, demanded their surrender. The demand
was at the same time notified to the Governor and the consular
authorities, and an interval of time (till 9 o'clock a.m.) was
allowed for compliance therewith. When the interval expired,
the Turkish vessels were again called upon, by signal, to surrender.
As no reply was given, they wetre fired at; the attacked vessels
retuxned the fire, but they were destroyed by the bombarding
squadron. Some of the assailant's shells missed their objective,
exploded on the quay, killed and injured several persons and
damaged a number of buildings. Having iregard to those facts,

it is clear that under the above Article the Italian -comtnander
incurred no responsibility for the injury and damage which he had
unavoidably caused.
"If the local authorities, on a formal summons being made to Refusing to
them, decline to comply with requisitions for provisions or supplies rSsL^ns.
necessary for the immediate use of the naval force before the place
in question, the bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages,
dwellings, or buildings may be commenced after due notice has

been given.
Such requisitions shall be proportional to the resources of the
place. They shall be demanded only in the name of the com-

mander of the said naval force, and they shall, as far as possible,
"
be paid for in ready money; if not, receipts shall be given {y).
{x) Art. 2. (y) Art. 3.

622 RIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE.
{This Article allows too heavy a price to be paid for refusal to

fulfil demand for requisitions.
readily the
**
The bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwel-
lings, or buildings, on account of failure to pay money contribu-
tions, is forbidden" {z).
Thus the old practice of exacting ransom from coast towns is
prohibited.
"
Protected In bombardment by naval forces all necessary measures must
buildings. be taken by the commander to spare as far as possible buildings
dedicated to public worship, art, science, or charitable purposes,
historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick or
wounded are collected, provided that they are not used at the
time for military pulrposes.
It is the duty of the inhabitants to indicate such monuments,
buildings, or places by which shall consist of large

visible signs,
stiffrectangular panels divided di,agonally into two painted tri-
angular portions, the upper portion black, the lower portion
white" {a).
''
Unless military exigencies render it impossible, the officer in
command of an attacking naval force must, before commencing
"
the bombardment, do all in his power to warn the authorities (6) .
"It is forbidden to give over to pillage a town or place even

where taken by assault" (c).
Aerial bom- In the Great War of 1914 the use of aircraft bombs was remark-
bardment.
ably extensive and systematic. Much unnecessary havoc was
thereby wrought, and many non-combatant innocent persons were
killed by bombs hurled from German aircraft. Unfortunately,
there are few positive and specific rules on the subject of aerial
hostilities.In 1899, at the first Hague Conference, the following
''
Declaration was signed: The contracting Powers agree to pro-
hibit for a term of five years the discharge of projectiles and
explosives from balloons or by other new methods of a similar

nature." It has already been pointed out (c?) that at the second
Hague Conference, 1907, many States agreed to forbid for a period
extending to the close of the third Conference the discharge of
projectiles and explosives from aircraft, and that as several leading
Powers refused to sign this provision it cannot be considered to
possess binding force.

In order, therefore, to arrive at some regulative principles, it is
(2) Art. 4. (c) Art. 7.

(«) Art. 5. (d) See stt/pra, p. 499.
(6) Art. 6.
HIGHTS OF WAE AS BETWEEN ENEMIES—MARITIME WARFARE. 623
iieces&arj to consider the established laws of warfare in general,

and the Hague Conventions as to land and naval bombardment in
" "
particular. We must also appeal to the laws of humanity and
"
the dictates of the public conscience," which were frequently
referred to and recognised at the Hague Conferences and other
international congresses. Having regard, then, to the existing
law of war, we may say that it is unlawful for aerial belligerents
to destroy deliberately, or carelessly, churches, hospitals, historic
monuments, science and art buildings and other places protected

in land or sea warfare, to make reckless attacks on centres of popu-
lation, to inflict superfluous injury (e.^., by poisonous gases), to
destroy or kill for the sake of destroying or killing and irrespec-

tively of definite military objects to be attained, to terrorize the
population, to drop bombs indiscriminately. The fundamental
criterion of the legitimacy of belligerent operations throughout is,
Do they manifestly subserve military interests ? (e) .
Maritime mines were used, for defensive purposes, during the Submarine
—
American Civil War, 1862 1865, and ships of the Northerners
were sunk bj these dreadful instruments of warfare. They were
used also in the Franco-German war, 1870-1871, in the Russo-
Turkish war, 1878, in the Spanish- American war, 1898, and in
the R-usso- Japanese war, 1904-5. But in no previous war have
mines been used so extensively and with such disastrous results
to combatants and neutrals alike as in the Great War, 1914-1915.
The sufferings that were indiscriminately inflicted by this means The Mines
^^^^^ ^®"-
in the Russo-Japanese war showed the civilized world that it was
absolutely necessary to lay down regulations on the subject.

Accordingly, the second Hague Conference, 1907, after much dis-
cussion, drew up the rules contained in its eighth Convention.

*'
In the preamble the Conference declared that it was inspired by
the principle of the freedom of the sea^ as the common highway;
of all nations," and stated that its intention was to diminish the
rigours of warfare and protect peaceful commerce. This aim,

however, was not realized, because, on the one hand, the regulations
as they stand are intrinsically unsatisfactory, and, on the other,
they were made only provisional.

—
Thus apart from the usual
clause as to the applicability of the Convention only between con-
tracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are
(e) For examples of licentious con- Int. Law and the Great War, pp. 177
duct on the part of belligerent airmen seq.
during the Great War, see Phillipson,
parties (/)
—Article 11 says that it shall remain in force for seven
years, dating from the sixtieth day after the date of the firsit
deposit of ratifications, and provides for its denunciation by any

signatory Power; and by Article 12 the contracting parties agreed
to reopen the question six months before the expiry of the serven
years, if not settled by the third Peace Conference. The follow-
ing are the rules :
—
"
Prohibitions. It is forbidden (1) to lay unanchored automatic contact mines,.
unless they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at
most after the person who laid them has ceased to control th^m;
(2) to lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become
harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings;
(3) to use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have
mark" {g).
missed their ,
As no means has been devised to exercise effective control over

unanchored mines, a more rational solution of the difficulty would
have been to adopt the proposal of the British delegates to pro-
hibit their employment.
entirely Further, the experience of
previous wars has shown that even those mines that are anchored
are liable to break adrift from their moorings At the Conference .
it was proposed that the use of anchored mines should be forbidden
in all cases except for purposes of defence; but the proposal failed
owing to disagreement regarding the definition of attack and

defence .
"
It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and
ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commer-

cialshipping" {h).
' '
It is obvious that the word sole renders the Article ineffective;

for a naval commander will hardly ever be at a loss to allege some
other object.
"
Precautions When
anchored automatic contact mines are employed, every
to be taken.
possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful
shipping. The belligerents undertake to do their utmost to render
these mines harmless after a limited time has elapsed, and, should
the mines cease to be under observation, to notify the danger zones
as soon as military exigencies permit, by a notice to mariners,
which must also be communicated to the Governments through
the diplomatic channel" {i). .
This rule, too, is to a large extent nugatory, owing to the in-

"
definiteness of the phrase military exigencies," and owing to the
(/) Hague Convention (1907), (A) Art. 2.

No. VIII. Art. 7. (0 Art. 3.
ig) Art. 1.
RIGHTS OF WAR AS BETWEEN ENEMIES— MARITIME WARFARE. 625
omission to impose a time limit within which such mines are to

become innocuous.
''
The contracting Powers which do not at present own perfected
mines of the description contemplated in the present Convention,
and w^hich, consequently, could not at present carry out the rules
laid down in Articles 1 and 3, undertake to convert the material of
their mines as soon as possible so as to bring it into conformity
"
with the foregoing requirements (k).
Grave defects in Articles 1 and 3 have been pointed out. The
provisions contained in the last cited Article intensify the in-
effectiveness of these Articles 1 and 3 .
"
Neutral Powers which lay automatic contact mines off their Neutral
coasts must observe the same rules and take the same precautions ^^ês.
as are imposed on belligerents. The neutral Powers must give

notice to mariners in advance of the places where automatic con-
tact mines have been laid. This notice must be communicated at
"
once to the Governments through the diplomatic channel (?).
"
At the close of the war, the contracting Powers undertake to do Removal at
^ ^^^'
theirutmost to remove the mines which they have laid, each
Power removing its own mines. As regards anchored automatic
contact mines laid by one of the belligerents off the coast of the
other, their position must be notified to the other party by the
Power that laid them, and each Power must proceed with the least
"
possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters (m).
The most conspicuous failure of this Mines Convention is the The British
absence of provisions restricting in some definite manner the lay- §ecfaratiou"at
ing of mines on the high seas, for the protection of neutral the Hague,
merchantmen which are entitled to sail there. At the Hague
Conference the British delegates proposed, not only that un-
anchored mines or any other mines that do not become harmless
as soon as they get loose should be forbidden, but also that none
should be permitted except in the territorial waters of the belli-
gerents or within a distance of ten miles from the shore batteries
of a naval station. These proposals were opposed by certain
States .
However, after the present Convention had been voted on,
one of the British representatives emphasized, in a noteworthy
statement, that there are binding rules of international law on the
subject apart from the few regulations laid down by the Con-
"
ference. "... The British delegation," he said, desires to
declare that it cannot regard this arrangement as furnishing a final
solution of the question, but only as marking a stage in inter-
(^) Art. 6. (0 Art. 4. (m) Art. 5.
w. 40
national legislation on the subject. It does not consider that
adequate account has been taken in the Convention of the right of

neutrals to protection, nor of humanitarian sentiments which can-
not be neglected; it has done all that is possible to bring the
Conference to share its views, but its efforts in this direction have
remained without The high seas
result. are a great inter-
. . .
national highway. If in the present state of international law

and custom belligerents are permitted to fight their battles there,
it is none the less incumbent on them to do nothing which might,
long after their departure from a particular place, render this
highway dangerous to neutrals who have an equal right to use it .
We declare without hesitation that the right of the neutral to
security of navigation of the high seas ought to take precedence of

the transitory right of the belligerent to employ these seas as the
scene of the operations of war." After pointing out the serious
results of mine-laying and the necessity to restrict the practice
in the interests of the civilized world, he added, in reference to the
"
Convention that had been arrived at: A& this constitutes
. . .
only a partial and insufficient solution of the problem, it cannot

... be regarded as a complete exposition of international law on
the subject. Therefore the legitimacy of a given act cannot be
presumed for the mere reason that the Convention has not for-
bidden it"(w).
Reply of the To these observations the German delegate. Baron Marschall
delegation.
^^^ Bieberstein, replied in a speech which was no less remarkable.
He acknowledged that there are general principles applicable to
the question in addition to those expressed in written provisions,
but he at the same time insisted on the exigencies of military
necessity.
*'
A
belligerent," he said, "who lays mines assumes a
very heavy responsibility towards neutrals and peaceful shipping.
On that point we are all agreed. No one will resort to such means
unless for military reasons of an absolutely urgent character. But
military acts are not governed solely by principles of international

law. There are other factors. Conscience, good sense, and the
sentiment of duty imposed by principles of humanity will be the
surest guides for the conduct of sailors, and will constitute the
most efteetive guarantee against abuses. The officers of the
German navy, I loudly proclaim
it, will always fulfil in the
which emanate from the unwritten law

strictest fashion the duties
of humanity and civilization. I have no need to tell you that I
entirely recognise the importance of the codification of rules to be
(«) Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 4 (1908), p. 54.

followed in war. But it would be well not to issue rules the strict
observance of which might be rendered impossible bj the force
of things. It is of the first importance that the international
maritime law which we desire to create should only contain clauses
the execution of which is possible from a military point of view,
even in exceptional circumstances. ... As to the sentiments of
humanity and civilization, I cannot admit that there is any
Government or country which is superior in these sentiments to
"
that which I have the honour to represent (o).
The old extravagant claims of military necessity need not be Mine-laying
further considered here (p^ Suffice it to say that the very edifice ^^r.
.
—
of international law was erected and on broad foundations ap-
proved by the ethical and juridical consciousness of mankind for

—
the YQTj purpose of setting limits to the arbitrary assumptions of
military necessity and the licentious conduct of combatants. How-

ever this may be, the high professions made by, the German
delegation at the Hague Conference were not carried out during

the Great War. Thus, on August 23, 1914, the British Admiralty
stated that the Germans laid mines indiscriminately upon the
ordinary trade routes; that they were laid not in the interests of
any definite military scheme, but on the chance of sinking
individual British vessels. A largenumber of ships were
destroyed, including many belonging to neutral States. The
German authorities issued no information with regard to the mines
they laid and their localities, and adopted no measures for protect-
ing neutral shipping.
As this conduct on the part of Germany was persisted in, the
British Admiralty announced on October 2, 1914, that Great
Britain was compelled in her self-defence and by way of retalia-
tion to sow mines in the southern waters of the North Sea. Their
position was indicated, and regulations were issued to ensure the

safety of neutral vessels. Similarly, Russia for the same reasons
soon afterwards resorted to the use of mines in the Baltic, and
notified the dangerous areas. On November 2, the Admiralty
again drew" attention to the increasingly lawless mine-laying by
the Germans, frequently carried out under a neutral flag by
traAvlersand other protected vessels; and accordingly gave notice
that the whole of the North Sea was to be considered a military'
area (^) •
(o) Ibid. (q) See more fuUy, Phillipson, ibid,

(jp)See Phillipson, Int. Law and pp. 378 seq.
the Great War, pp. 129, 134 seq.
40 (2)
628 EIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRAL^.
CHAPTER IV.
RIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS.
Conception There Greek or Latin languag'e that pre-

are no words in the
OF Neu-
TEALTTY. cisely answer to the English expressions, 'neutral' and 'neu-
'
trality.' The terms 'neutralis,' neutralitas,' which are used by

some [modern writers, are barbaristas, not to be met with in any
classical author. The Roman civilians and historians make use
' '
of the words amici,' medii,' 'pacati,' 'sooii,' which are very

inadequate to express what we understand by neutrals, and they
have no substantive whatever corresponding to neutrality. The
cause of this deficiency is obvious. According to the laws of war,
observed even by the most civilized nations of antiquity, the right
of one nation to remain at peace, whilst other neighbouring
nations were engaged in war, was not admitted to exist. He who
was not an ally was an enemy and as no intermediate relation was
;
known, so no word had been invented to express such relation.

The modern public jurists, who wrote in the Latin langua^ge,
were consequently driven to the necessity of inventing terms to
express those international rela,tions which were unknown to the
Pagan nations of antiquity, and which had grown out of a milder
dispensation, struggling against the inveterate customs of the dark
ages which preceded the revival of letters. Grotius terms neutrals
' ' '
medii,' middle men (a) Bynkershoek, in treating of the sub-

.
ject of neutrality, says:

" —
Nôn hostes appello, qui neutrarum
partium sunt, nee ex foedere his illisve quicquam debent;, si quid
debeant, foederati sunt, non simpliciter a,mici" ("I call neutrals
('non hostes ') those who take part with neither of the belligerent
Powers, and who are not bound to either by any alliance. If they
are so bound, they are no longer neutrajs but allies ") (6).
Different Two species of neutrality were usually recognised by inter-
species of national law: or and
firstly, natural,
perfect neutrality;
neutrality.
secondly, imperfect, qualified, or conventional neutrality. From
the modern point of view, this distinction is scarcely applicable
(«) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pae. hostes. We shall hereafter see that
lib. iii. cap. 9. this definition is merely applicable to
(h) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. that species of neutrality which was
lib. i. cap. 9; De Statu belli inter non not modified by special compact.
RIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS. 629
in actual practice (66); but the difference between the two kinds
maj be indicated for the sake of throwing light on the recent

development of 'the cjonoepition of neutrality.
Natural, or perfect neutralitj, is that which everj sovereign Perfect
^^^^ ^* ^'
State has a right, independent of positive compact, to observe in
respect to the wars in which other States maj be engaged.

The right of everj independent State to remain at peace, whilst
other States are engaged in war, is an incontestable attribute of
sovereignty. It is, however, obviously impossible that neutral

nations should be wholly unaffected by the existence of war be-
tween those communities with whom they continue to maintain
their accustomed relations of friendship and commerce. The
rights of neutrality are connected with corresponding duties.
Among these duties is that of impartiality between the contending
parties. The neutral is the common friend of both parties, and
consequently is not at liberty to favour one party to the detriment
of the other (c). Bynkershoek states it to be ''the duty of neu-
trals to be every way careful not to interfere in the war, and to do
'
equal and exact justice to both parties. Bello se non interpo-

" "
nant,' that is to say, as to what relates to the war, let them not
prefer one party to the other, and this is the only proper' conduct
for neutrals. A
neutral has nothing to do with the justice or
injustice of the war; it is not for him to sit as judge between his
friends, who are at war with each other, and to grant or refuse
more or less to the one or the other, a^ he thinks that their cause
ismore or less just or unjust. If I a^m a neutral, I ought not to
be useful to the one, in order that I may hurt the other" (tl).
"
These, Bynkershoek adds, are the duties applicable to the con-
dition of those Powers who are not bound by any alliance, but are
'
in a state of perfect neutrality.These I merely call friends,' in
order to distinguish them from confederates and allies" (e).
Imperfect, qualified, or conventional neutrality, is that which Imperfect
is modified by special compact. neutrality.
The public law of Europe affords several examples of this species

of neutrality.
1 . Thus the political independence of the confederated Cantons

Neutrality
of Switzerland, which had so long existed in fact, was first formally the Swiss
^
recognised by the Germanic Empire, of which they originally tion.
constituted an integral portion, at the peace of Westphalia, 1648.
(bb) See infra, p. 639. (d) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub.

(c)Bynkershoek, Qussst. Jur. Pub. lib. i.
cap. 9.
lib. i. cap. 9. Vafctel, Droit des Gens, (e) Ibid.
Uv. iii. ch. 7, §§ 103—110.
630 RIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS.
The Swiss Cantons had observed a prudent neutrality during' the

Thirty Years' War, and from this period to the war of the
French
Revolution, their neutrality had been, with some slight exceptions,
respected by the bordering States. But this neutrality
was quali-
fied by the special compaict existing between the Confederation, or
the separate Cantons, and foreign States, forming treaties of
alliance or capitulations for the enlistment of Swiss troops in the

service of those States. The policy of respecting the neutrality
of Switzerland was mutually felt by the two great monarchies of
France and Austria, during their long contest for supremacy under
the houses of Bourbon and Hapsburg (/) .
Switzerland
During the wars of the French Revolution the neutrality of
during wars
of French Switzerland was alternately violated by both the great contending
parties, and her once peaceful valleys became the bloody
revolution. scene of
hostilities between the French, Austrian, and Russian armies. The
expulsion of the allied forces, and the subsequent withdrawal of the
French army of occupation, were followed by violent internal
dissensions, which were composed by the mediation of
finally
Bonaparte as first consul of the French Republic, in 1803. A
treaty of alliance was simultaneously concluded between the Re-
public and the Helvetic Confederation. According to the stipu-
lations of this treaty, the neutrality of Switzerland was reoognised
by France, whilst the Confederation stipulated not to grant a

passage through its territories to the armies of France, and to
oppose such passage by force of arms in case of its being attempted.
The Confederation also engagied to permit the enlisting of eight
thousand Swiss troops for the service of France, in addition to the
sixteen thousand troops to be furnished according* to the capitu-
lation signed on the same day with the tiêaty. It was, at the
same time, expressly djeclared that its alliance, being merely de-
fensive, should not, in any respect, hie construed to prejudice the
neutrality of Switzerland {g) .
Proposal of When the allied armies advanced to invade the French territory,
the allies to
Switzerland in 1813, the Austrian corps under Prince Schwartzenbierg passed
through the territory of Switzerland, and crossed the Rhine at

in 1815.
three different plaaes, at Basle, Lauffenberg, and Schaffhausen,

without opposition on the part of the federal troops. The per-
petual neutrality of Switzerland was, nevertheless, recognised by
the finalAct of the Congress of Vienna, March 20th, 1815 {h)\
but on the return of Napoleon from the Island of Elba, the allied
(/) Of. Thiers, Histoire du Consulat Paix, torn. ii. ch. 33, p. 339.
et de I'Empire, torn. i. liv. 3, p. 182. (Ji) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations,
{g) Schoell, Histoire des Traites de p. 493.
EIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS. 631
Powers invited the Confederation to accede to the general coali-

tion against France. In the official note deliviered by their
ministers to the Diet at Zurich, on the 6th of Maj^, 1815, it was
stated, that although the allied Powers lexpected that Switzerland
would not hesitate to unite with them in acoomplishirig' the
common object of alliance, which was to prevent the re-establish-
ment of the usurped revolutionary authority in Francie, yet they
were far from proposing to Switzerland the development of a
military force disproportioned to her resourdes and to the usages
of her people. They respected the military system of a nation,
which, uninfluenced by the spirit of ambition, armed for the single
purpose of defending its independenoe and its
tranquillity. The
allied Powers well knew the importance attached by Switzerland
to the maintenance of the principle of her neutrality and it was ;
not with the purpose of violating this principle, but with the view
of accelerating the epoch when it might become applicable in an
advantageous and permanent manner, that they proposed to the

Confederation to assume an attitude and to adopt energetic
measures, proportioned to the extraordinary circumstances of the
moment without at the s^me time forming a rule for the future (^) .
In the answer of the Diet to this note, dated the 12th May, 1815, Bî^lyoi
the
Swiss Diet.
it was declared, that the relations which Switzerland maintained
with the allied Pdwers, and with them only, could leave no dou,bt
as to her views and intentions. She would persist in them vdth
that constancy and fidelity which had at all times distinguished
the Swiss character. Twenty -two small republics, united to-
gether for their security and the maintenance of their indepen-

dence, must seek for their national strength in the principle of
their Confederation. This resulted inevitably from the nature of
things, geographical position, the constitution, and the
the
character of the Swiss people. A
consequence of this principle
was the neutrality of Switzerland, recognised as the basis of its
future relations with all other States. It followed from' the same
principle, that the most efficacious participation of Switzerland
in the great struggle which was about to take place must neoes-
sarily consist in the defence of her frontiers. In adopting this

course, she did not separate herself from the common cause of the
allied Powers, which thus became her own national cause. The
defence of a frontier fifty leagues in length, serving as a point
d'appni for the movements of two armies, was in itself a co-
operation not only real, but alsio of the highest importance.
(0 Martens, Nouveau Recueil, torn. ii. p. 166.

632 EIGHTS OF WAE AS TO NEUTRALS.
More than thirtj thousand men had already been levied for this
purpose. Determined to maintain this development of her forces,
Switzerland had a right to expect from the favourable disposition
of the allied Powers, that, so long as she did not claim their assist-
ance, their armies would respect the integrity of her territory.

Assurances to this effeet on their part were absolutely necessary in
order to tranquillize the Swiss people, and engage them to support
wîth fortitude the burden of an armament so considerable (k).
On the 20th of May, 1815, a convention was concluded at
Zurich, to regulate the accession of Switzerland to the general
alliance between Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, 'and Russia; by
which the allied Powers stipulated, that, in case of urgency, where
the common interest rendered necessary a temporary passage across
ajiy part of the Swiss territory, recourse should be had to the
authority of the Diet for that purpose. The left wing of thei
allied army accordingly passed the Ehine between Basle and
Rheinfelden, and entered France through the territory of
Switzerland (Z) .
Declaxation On the re-establishment of the general peace, a declaration was

of 1815 as
to Swiss signed at Paris, on the 20th November, 1815, by the four allied
neutrality. Powers and France, by which these five Powers formally recog-
nised the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, and guaranteed the
integrity and inviolability of her territory within its new limits,

as established by the final Act of the Congress of Vienna, and by the
Treaty of Paris of the above date. They also declared that the
neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland, and her independence
of all foreign influence, were conformable to the true interests of
the policy of all Europe, and that no inference unfavourable to the
rights of Switzerland, in respect to her neutrality, ought to be
drawn from the circumstances which had led to the passage of a
part of the allied forces across the Helvetic territory. This pas-
sage, freely granted by the Cantons in the convention of the 20th
May, was the necessary result of the entire adherence of Switzer-
land to the principles manifested by the allied Powers in the
treaty
of alliance of the 25th March (m) .
Neutrality of At the second Peace of Paris, 1815, the allied Powers

agreed
part of Savoy. that the neutrality of Switzerland should be extended to a
portion
of Savoy, at that time a part of the In
kingdom of Sardinia {n) .
1860, Savoy was transferred by Sardinia to France. By the

second Article of the Treaty of Transfer it was provided "that
(^) Martens, torn. ii. p. 170. (n) Art. iii. Hertslet, Map of
(0 Ibid. Europe, vol. i.
p. 346.
(m) Martens, torn. iv. p. 186.
his Majesty the King of Sardinia cannot transfer the neutralized
parts of Savoy, except on the conditions upon which he himself

possesses them, and that it will appertain to his Majesty tlie
Emperor of the French to come to a,n understanding on this
subject, both with the Powers represented at the Congress of

Vienna, and with the Swiss Confederation, and to give them the
guaranties required by the stipulations referred to in this
Article (o) No such understanding was, however, arrived at (p)
. .
At the outbreak Franco-German war, the Swiss Government

of the
declared that Switzerland would maintain and defend during that
war her neutrality and the integrity of her territory by all the
means in her power; and that if violence was offered to that
neutrality she would energetically repulse every aggression. With
reference to the neutralized parts of Savoy, the Swiss Government
reminded the Powers that Switzerland had a right to occupy that
territory, and that the right would be exercised in accordance with
the treaties respecting it, should circumstances require its exercise
for the defence of Swiss neutrality (q) The French Minister,
.
"
the Due de Grammont, replied that he had not rejected nor even
eontested the right so claimed by Switzerland, but had confined
himself to declaring that, under the eventualities referred to, it
would have to be made the subject of special arrangement between
the two Governments" (/*). The question did not arise, as the
war did not extend to that part of France It may be added that
.
in 1883 the obligation of France with regard to the conventional
neutrality of her acquired portion of SaVoy was recognised, when

the French Government, having Qommenced the construction of
fortifications there not far from Geneva, discontinued the works
owing tc' the protest of the Swiss Federal Council (s) .
2. The geographical position of Belgium, forming a natural Neutrality of
barrier between France on the one side, and Germany and Holland
on the other, would seem to render the independence and neutrality
of Belgium essential to the preservation of peace between the latter
Powers, as is that of Switzerland to its maintenance between,
France and Austria. Belgium covers the most vulnerable point
of the northern frontier of France against invasion from Prussia,
whilst it protects the entrance of Germany against the armies
of France, on a frontier less strongly fortified than that of the
Ehine from Basle to Mayence. But so long as the Low Countries
(o) Ibid. vol. ii. p. 1430.

(r) Archives Diplomatiques, 1871
— 2,
(p) Calvo, vol. ii. § 1046. Pt. I. p. 262.
Ig) Note of Swiss Government, (s) Annual Register, 1883, pp. 269,
18th July, 1870. 270.
belonged to the house of Austria, either of the Spanish or the

German branch, these provinces had been, for successive ages, the
battle-ground on v^^hich the great contending Powers of Europe
struggled for the supremacy. The security of the independence
of Holland against the encroachments of France was provided for
by the barrier-treaties concluded at Utrecht, in 1713, and at

Antwerp, in 1715, between Austria, Great Britain, and Holland,
by which the fortified towns on the southern frontier of the Aus-
trian Netherlands were to be permanently garrisoned with Dutch
troops. The kingdom of the Netherlands was created by the

Congress of Vienna, in 1815, for the purpose of forming a barrier
for Germany against France; and on the dissolution of that king-
dom into its original component parts, the perpetual neutrality of
Belgium was guaranteed by the five great European Powers, and
made an essential condition of the recognition of her independence,
in the treaties for the separation of Belgium from Holland (t) .
Belgian In 1870, special treaties were entered into by England with

neutrality
in 1870. France and Prussia for the maintenance lOf the neutrality of Bel-
gium during the war, each of the belligerents binding itself to co-
operate with England in case this neutrality was violated by the

other These treaties were to last during the wa^, and for twelve
.
months after the ratification of any treaty of peace (u).

Belgian In the summer of 1914 the solemnly guaranteed neutrality of
neutrality
in 1914. Belgium was violated; Belgium, mindful of her obligations,
offered a wonderful resistance to the invaders; and Great Britain,
one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, was obliged to go to
war in defence of the violated territory (x) .
Neutrality
of Cracow.
3 . We
have already seen that by the final Act of the Congress
of Vienna, 1815, Article 6, the city of Cracow, with its territory,
was declared to be a perpetually free, independent, and neutral
State, under the joint protection of Austria, Prussia, and
Eussia (y). The neutrality, thus created by special compact, and
guaranteed by the three protecting Powers, was made dependent
upon the reciprocal obligation of the city of Cracow' not to afford
an asylum, or protection, to fugitives from justice, or military
deserters belonging to the territories of those Powers. How far
the neutrality of the free and independent State thus created was
actually respected by the protecting Powers, or how far the suc-
cessive temporary occupations of its territory by their military
(t) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, (x) See Phillipson, Int. Law and
p. 552. the Great War, pp. 1 seq.
(w) Hertslet, Map of Europe, (y) Vide supra, Pt. I. eh. 2, p. 52.
vol. iii. pp. 1886—1891.
forces, and how far their repeated forcible interference in its in-
ternal affairs, were justified bj the non-fulfilment of the above
obligation on the part of Cracow, or bj other circumstances au-

thorizing such interference according to the general principles of
international law, were questions which gave rise to diplomatic
discussions between the great Euiôpean Powers, contracting
parties to the treaties of Vienna, but which are foreign to the

present object (2;). The subsequent annexation of Cracow by
Austria (1846) has already been referred to (a).
4. The Duchy of part of the German Neutrality of
Luxemburg formed
I^^^^mburg.
Confederation, and on the dissolution of that Confederacy in 1867,
the King of Holland happened to be the Grand Duke. Either
France or Prussia would have viewed with jealousy and concern the
possession of the fortress of the city of Luxemburg by the other.
It was provided by the treaty of London, 11th May, 1867, that
the Grand Duchy was to be perpetually neutralized, under the
guaranty of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. The

Grand Duke was which
to see to the demolition of the fortress,
was not to be was the city to be occupied by any armed
rebuilt, nor
forces. In the war of 1870-1871, Count Bismarck complained of
the non-observance by Luxemburg of the obligations of a, neutral;
in respect of which complaint it was maintained by Count Beust.
the Austrian minister, that the question of whether anything had
been done by a neutralized State to disentitle it to the protection
and benefit of its neutrality, wâs one for the consideration of all
the signatory Pow ers, and did not rest upon the decision of one of
the belligerent Powers (&).
5. By the second Article of the treaty of 14th November, 1863, NeutraUty of
^"
by the second Article of the Protocol of 25th January, 1864, and p°^^
by the second Article of the treaty with Greece of the 29th March,
1864, the Courts of Great Britain, FravQce, and Russia, in their
character of guaranteeing Powers of Greece, declare, with the
assent of the Courts of Austria and Prussia, that the islands of
Corfu and Paxo, as well as their dependencies, shall, after their
union with the Hellenic kingdom, enjoy the advantag"es of
perpetual neutrality {0) .
The permanent neutrality of Switzerland, Belgium, Luxem- Conventional
burg, has thus been solemnly recognised as part of the public law neutrality.
Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations,

(s)
—
pp. 441 445.
sey, Int. Law, § 103.
(o) Holland, European Concert,
(a) See sttpra, p. 52. pp. 49—54. Calvo, iii. p. 452.
(6) Calvo, iii. § 2313, p. 450; Wool-
636 EIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS;.
of Europe (d) But the conventional neutrality thus created differs

.
essentially from that natural or perfect neutrality which every

State has a right to observe,, independent of special compact, in
respect to the wars in which other States may be engaged. The

consequences of the latter species of neutrality only arise in case
of hostilities. It does not exist in time of peace, during which
the State is at liberty to contract any eventual engagements it
thinks fit as to political relations with other States. A permanent
neutral State, on the other hand, by accepting this condition of
its political existence, is bound to avoid in time of peaoe every
engagement which might prevent its observing the duties of neu-

trality in time of war. As an independent State, it may lawfully
exercise, in its intercourse with other States, all the attributes of
external sovereignty. It may form treaties of amity, and even of
alliance with other States; provided it does not thereby incur
obligations, which, though perfectly lawful in time of peace, would

prevent its fulfilling the duties of neutrality in time of war.
Under this distinction, treaties of offensive alliance, applicable to a
specific case of war between any two or more Powers, or guaran-

teeing their possessions, are of course interdicted to the perma-
nently neutral State. But this interdiction does not extend to
defensive alliances formed with other neutral States for the main-
tenance of the neutrality of the contracting parties against any
Power by which it might be threatened with violation (e).
Neutral The question remains, whether this restriction on the sovereign
obliorations.
power of the permanently neutral State is confined to political
alliances and guaranties, or whether it extends to treaties of com-
merce and navigation with other States. Here it again becomes
necessary to distinguish between the two cases of natural and
perfect or qualified and conventional neutrality. In the case of
ordinary neutrality, the neutral State is at liberty to regulate its
commercial relations with other States according to its own view
of its national interests, provided this liberty be not exercised so
as to affect that impartiality which the neutral is bound to observe
towards the respective belligerent Powers. Vattel states that the
impartiality which a neutral nation is bound to observe relates
solely to the war. "In whatever does not relate to the war, a
neutral and impartial nation will not refuse to one of the belli-
gerent parties, on account of its present quarrel, what it grants to
(d) In 1907 a treaty was entered respects different from that in the case
into at Christiania whereby the lead- of Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxem-
ing- European Powers guaranteed the burg.
integrity of Norway; but the neu- (e) Arendt, Essai sur la Neutralite
tralization in thia case was in many de la Belgique, pp. 87 95. —
EIGHTS OF WAE AS TO NEUTRALS. 637
the other. This does not deprive the neutral of the liberty of
making the advantage of the State the rule of its condudt in its
negotiations, its friendly connections, and its commerce. When

this reason induces it to give preferences in things w^hich are at
the free disposal of the possessor, the neutral nation only makes
Uiseof its right, and is not chargeable with' partiality. But to
refuse any of these things to one of the belligerent parties, merely
because he is at war with the other, and in order to favour the
would be departing from the line of strict neutrality^' (/).
latter,
These general principles must be modified in their application
to a permanently neutral State. The liberty of regulating* its
commercial relations with other foreign States, according to its
own views of its national interests, which is an essential attribute
of national independence, does not authorize the permanently
neutral State to contract oblig'ations in time of peace inconsistent
with its peculiar duties in time of war {g) .
Neutrality was also liable, formerly, to be modified by ante- Neutrality

^
cedent engagements, by which th-e neutral was bound to one of the ûiiited
Thus the neutral could be bound by treaty, alliance with
parties to the war.
. « .
, p 1 1 IT • •
1
one of the
previous to the war, to furnish one of the belligerent parties with belligerent
a limited succour in money, troops, ships, or munitions of war, or P^^*^^^-
to open his ports to the armed vessels of his ally, with their prizes .
The fulfilment of such an obligation did not necessarily forfeit

his neutral character, nor render him the enemy of the other belli-
gerent nation, because it was not deemed to constitute him the
general associate of its enemy (Ji) .
How far a neutrality, thus limited, might be tolerated bj the

opposite belligerent, often depended more upon considerations of
policy than of strict right. Thus, where Denmark, in consequence
of a previous treaty of defensive alliance, furnished limited suc-
cours in ships and troops to the Empress Catharine II. of Russia,
in the war of 1788 against Sweden, the abstract right orf the
Danish court to remain neutral, except so far a:s regarded the
stipulated succours, was scarcely contested by Sweden and the
allied mediating Powers. But it is evident, from the history of
these transactions, that if the war had continued, the neutrality
of Denmark would not have been tolerated by these Powers, unless
she had withheld from her ally the succours stipulated by the
(/) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. §§ 101—105. As to the

liv. iii. ch. 6,
ch. 7, § 104. general principles to be applied to such
(g) See also ante, pp. 380 seq. treaties, and when the casus foederis
\K) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. arises, vide supra,, Pt. III. ch. 2,
lib. i. cap. ix. Vattel, Droit des Gens, p. 380.
638 EIGHTS OF WAK AS TO NEUTRALS.
treaty of 1773, or Russia had consented to dispense with its
fulfilment (^) .
Right to "There remains," sajs Sir R. Phillimore (in his work issued
make such "
in 1854-1861), the grave question whether a State has any right
treaties.
to stipulate, in time of peace, that, when the time of war arrives, it
will do the act of a belligerent and yet claim the immunity of a
neutral." The learned author concludes that a State has no right
to enter into such a stipulation, and then to claim neutrality while
fulfilling it (k) . The more recent development of the law' of neu-

trality, especially as witnessed in the Hague Conventions, has
assumed a course contrary to the earlier practice; so that neutral
States are now forbidden to furnish aid to a belligerent in any
circumstances whatever.
Qualified Another case of qualified neutrality was deemed to arise out of
neutrality
arising out treaty stipulations antecedent to the cammencement of hostilities,
of antecedent
treaty stipu-
by Avhich the neutral may be bound to admit the vessels o| war of
lations, one of the belligerent parties, with their prizes, into his ports,
admitting the
armed vessels whilst those of the other may be entirely excluded, or only ad-
and prizes of mitted under limitations and restrictions.
one belli-
Thus, by the treaty
gerent into of amity and commerce of 1778, between the United States and
the neutral
ports, whilst
France, the latter secured to herself two special privileges in the
those of the American ports: firstly, admission for her privateers, with their
other are
excluded. prizes, to the exclusion of her enemies; secondly, admission for her
public ships of war, in case of urgent necessity, to refresh, victual,
repair, &c., but not exclusively of other nations at war with her.
Under these stipulations, the United States, not being expressly
bound to exclude the public ships oif the enemies of France, granted
an asylum to British vessels and those of other Powers at war with
her. Great Britain and Holland still complained of the exclusive
privileges allowed to France in respect to her privateers and prizes,

whilst France herself was not satisfied with the interpretation
of the treaty by which the public ships of her enemies were ad-
mitted into the American ports. To the former, it was answered
by the American Government, that they enjoyed a perfect equality,
qualified only by the exclusive admission of the priva teers and
prizes of France, which was the effect of a treaty made long before,
for valuable considerations, not with a view to circumstances such as
had occurred in the war of the French Revolution, nor against any,
nation in particular, but against all nations in general, and which
(t) Annual Register, vol. xxx, theil, pp. 118—195.

pp. 181, 182. State Papers, p. 292. (/fc) Phillimore, vol. iii. § 146. Oalvo,
Eggers, Leben von Bemstorf, 2 Ab- vol. iii. p. 452.
EIGHTS OF WAE AS TO NEUTEALS. 639
might, therefore, be observed withoiut giving just offence to

anv (I) .
Onthe other hand, the minister of France asserted the right of Fundamental
arming and equipping vessels for war, and of enlisting men, within n^trSity^*
the neutral territory of the United States. Examining this ques-
tion under the law of nations and the general usage of mankind,
the American Government produced proofs, from the most en-
lightened and approved writers on the subject, that a neutral nation
must, in respect to the war, observe an exact impartiality towards
the belligerent parties; that favours to the one, to the prejudice/
of the other, would import a fraudulent neutrality, of which no
nation would be the dupe; that no succour ought to be given to
either, unless stipulated by treaty, in men, arms, or anything else,
direetly serving for war; that the ri,ght of raising troops being
one of the rights of sovereignty, and consequently appertaining
exclusively to the nation itself, no foreign Power can levy men
within the territory without its consent; that, finally, the Treaty
of 1778, making it unlawful for the enemies of France to arm in
the United States, could not be construed affirmatively into a per-
mission to the French to arm in those ports, the treaty being
express as to the prohibition, but silent as to the permission (m).
The above considerations indicate the effects of conventional Neutrality

neutralization of States, the fundamental principles of the law waefaee.
of neutrality and certain distinctions that were formerly current,
e.g., between perfect and imperfect neutrality. Nowadays the

reciprocal rights and duties existing between belligerents and
neutrals depend partly on customary law, but more particularly on
the Hague Eegulations and the Declaration of London, which
together constitute a code of international law on the subject.

' '
Under this present system the distinctions between perfect and
* ' ' ' '
imperfect or qualified neutrality, and that between favour-

* ' '
able,' benevolent,' or armed neutrality, possess neither legal

significance nor practical importance. For the sake of conveni-
ence, we may in the ensuing exposition divide the rights and duties
of neutrality into those relating to land warfare and those relating
to maritime war. Throughout it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween the rights and duties appertaining to States and those
relating to individuals. We shall find, for example, that in-
(l) Mr. Jefferson's Letter to Mr. (w) Mr. JefiPeraon's Letter to Mr.
Hammond and Mr. Van Berckel, Sept. G. Morris, the United States minister
9,1793; Waite, American State Papers, to prance, Aug. 16, 1793; Waite,
vol. i. pp. 169, 172. American State Papers, vol. i. p. 140.
Cf. Moore, Digest, vol. vii. § 1293.
640 EIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS.
dividuals are not necessarily debarred from doing many things

which are positively prohibited in the case of States.
Neutral "The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable" {n).
territory- "
inviolable. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys, whether
of munitions of war or of supplies, across the territory of a neutral
Power "(o).
"
A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in
Articles 2 to 4 to occur in its territory. It is not bound to punish
acts in violation of neutrality unless such acts have been committed
"
on its own territory (p).
"
The fact that a neutral Power repels, even by force, attempts
"
to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act (g).
The rights of war may be exercised only within the territory

of the belligerent Powers, upon the high seas, or in a territory
belonging to no one. Hence it follows, that hostilities cannot

lawfully be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the
neutral State, which is the common friend of both parties (r) .
This exemption extends to the passage of an army or fleet

through the
neutral through the limits of the territorial jurisdiction, which can hardly
territory. be considered an innocent passage, such as one nation has a right
to demand from another; and, even if it were such an innocent
passage, it was regarded as one of those imperfect rights, the
which depends upon the consent of the proprietor, and
exercise of
which cannot be compelled against his wiU. Formerly it was
held that it might be granted or withheld, at the discretion of the
neutral State; but its being granted was no ground of complaint
on the part of the other belligerent Power, provided the same
privilege was granted to him, unless there were sufficient reasons
for withholding it(s). Now the prohibition is absolute.
A
neutral State may not allow passage to a belligerent even if
there had been a treaty between them stipulating such a right.
Thus during the Anglo-Boer war, the Portuguese Government
refused for some time to allow British persons and goods to pass
through Portuguese territory in East Africa, in spite of the Anglo-
Portuguese treaty of 1891. Eventually Portugal gave permis-
sion, and notified this to the Transvaal Government, alleging the
necessity to fulfil a previously arranged undertaking that depended
(n) Hague Convention (1907), lib. i. cap. 8. Martens, Des Prises et

No. V. Art. 1. Reprises, ch. '2, § 18.
(o) Art. 2. (s) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii.
Ip) Art. 5. ch. 7, §§ 119—131. Grotius, De Jur.
iq) Art. 10. Bel. ac Pac. lib. ii. cap. 2, § 13.
(r) Bynker&hoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. The Ttvee Gebroeders (1801), 3 O.
Rob. 353.
on reciprocity. The Transvaal Government urged in reply — and

rightlj" so — that such a treaty cannot be applied, in time of war,
by a neutral State to the detriment of a third party for the obli-

;
gations of neutrality must cause it to be suspended for the duration
of war.
If a belligerent violates neutral territory, and the neutral State
does not or cannot take effective measures to expel them, the other
belligerent is entitled to enter the territory and prevent the viola-
tion from operating
to his disadvantage. Reasons of self-pre-
servation justify an entry into neutral territory, when as
may —
Daniel Webster, the American Secretary of State, put it in 1841 —
"
there necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, and
is a
"
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation
(though the last condition as to there being no moment for

deliberation is
perhaps superfluously stringent) (t).
"
Belligerents are forbidden (a) to erect on the territory of a Wireless
neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station, or other apparatus gtatfonf on
iêutral
for purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on land
th(3
or sea; (b) to use any installation of this kind established by them

before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for purely mili- ^
tary purposes, and which has not been opened for the service of
"
public messages (u).
"
A neutrjal Power is not bound to forbid or restrict the use on
behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables, or of
wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it, or to companies or
"
private individuals
>
(a;).
The Report Hague Committee points out that there is no
of the
"
contradiction between the two foregoing Articles. Article 3 con-
templates the installation of a station or an apparatus by the

belligerent parties on the territory of the neutral State, or the
use of a station or apparatus installed by them there during peace,
for an exclusively military purpose and without being opened
to the public. Article 8, on the other hand, refers to an apparatus
used for the public service, and administered either by the neutral
State or by a company or individuals."
In November, 1914, Great Britain and France protested against
the alleged useby Germany of the wireless installations in Ecuador
and Colombia. The Charge d' Affaires of the Colombian Legation
replied that on September 1 his Government had issued a decree
to safeguard the neutrality of the Republic with regard to the
(t) Of. the case of The Caroline (w) Hague Genvention (1907),
(1841), Moore, Digest, vol. ii. § 217; No. V. Art. 3.
Snow, Oases, p. 177. (x) Art. 8.
w. 41
working of the wireless stations at Cartagena and Santa Marta;

that the contracts under which they were installed stipulated the
observance of neutrality; and that on September 11 another decree
demanded proof of their innocent operations.
"
Export of A
neutral Power is not l>ound to prevent the export or transit,
arms, &c.
on behalf of either belligerent, of arms, munitions of war, or, in
"
general, of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet {y) ,
Duty of
*'
A neutral Power must apply impartially to the belligerents
every restriction or prohibition which it may

impartiality. enact in regard to
the matters referred to in Articles 7 and 8. The neutral Power
shall see that the same obligation is observed by companies or
private owners of telegraph or telephone cables or wireless tele-

''
graphy apparatus (z).

Loans to In connection with Article 7, quoted above, we may refer to the
belligerents
question of war loans raised in neutral countries for the use of the
by neutrals.
belligerents. It has happened, not infrequently, that neutral sub-
jects who sympathize with a belligerent have raised loans for the
purpose of assisting him in the war. In connection with the Greek
War of Independence, the Law Ofiicers of the Crown gave an
opinion in 1823 to the effect that such subscriptions for the use of
one of two belligerents, entered into by individual subjects of a
neutral, are inconsistent with that neutrality, and contrary to the
law of nations. Such subscriptions, however, would not give the
other belligerent the right to consider this as an act of hostility,
although, if carried to any considerable extent, they might afford

a just ground of complaint. If a loan is purely commercial, and
real interest be charged for the money, it is then no infringement
of neutrality (a) In 1842, American citizens advanced funds
.
to the Government of Texas, then independent. Mexico protested,

but the American Government pointed out that the loan was not
unlawful, and added that there were acts which no State undertook
to prevent.In the Crimean war, money was raised for Russia in
Germany and Holland, despite the protest of France; in the
Franco-German war a French loan and a German loan were
issued in London; and in the Russo-Japanese war, 1904, Japan
raised funds in England and Germany, and Russia in France and
Germany. In 1873, Mr. Gladstone expressed a strong disapproval
in the House of Commons of a gratuitous loan then being raised in
(y) Art. 7. As to the export of (a) See Phillimore, vol. iii. Ap-
arms, anununition, &c., see further the pendix, p. 928. See Be Wutz v.
corresponding provision in reference Hendricks (1824), Moore, Com. Pleas,
to maritime warfare, infra, p. 664. 586.
(z) Art. 9.
England for the Spanish Pretender, Don Carlos (b). A neutral

Statei3 not obliged to prohibit its subjects from taking stock in
loans issuedby a belligerent in the ordinary way of business.

But sometimes Governments have seen fit to lay restrictions on
their citizens in order to fulfil strictly the duties of neutrality.
Thus, soon after the outbreak of the Great War, 1914, the United
"
States Government announced that loans by American bankers
to any foreign nation which is at war was inconsistent with the
true spirit of neutrality." This announcement was subjected to
much adverse criticism in America; it was agreed that a national
loan would be inadmissible, but it was contended that loans by
individual subjects are not inconsistent with true neutrality. The
"
United States Secretary of State, however, observed: .A . .
war loan, if offered for popular subscription in the United States,

would be taken up chiefly by those who are in sympathy with the
'belligerent seeking the loan. The result would be that great
numbers of the American people might become more earnest
partisans, having a material interest in the success of the belli-
gerent iwhose bonds they hold;" and he added that the prohibi-
tion to participate in such transactions affects all the belligerents
alike, so that it is in conformity with the fundamental principles

of neutrality (o). \
"
Corps of combatants must not be formed, nor recruiting agen- Levying of
cies opened, on the territory of a neutral Power, on behalf of the troops,
"
belligerents (d).
"
A neutral Power will not incur responsibility merely from the
fact that persons cross the frontier individually in order to place
"
themselves at the service of one of the belligerents (e).
This Article does not apply to a belligerent State's subjects who
proceed to their country for the purpose of fulfilling their military
duties.
Vattel states that the impartiality, which a neutral nation ought Nentral
to observe between the belligerent parties, consists of two points: •'"l^^w^lr^'
(1) the neutral State must give no assistance where there is no consists,
previous stipulation to give it; nor voluntarily furnish troops,

"
arms, ammunition, or anything of direct use in war. I do not
say to give assistance equally ; but to give no assistance : for it

would be absurd that a State should assist at the same time two
(b) The Times, 25th April, 1873. lished by the State Department, Jan.
(«?) Communication made by Mr. 24, 1915 (The Times, Jan. 26, p. 10).
Bryan, the United States Secretary of (d) Art. 4.
State, to the Chairman of the Senate (e) Art. 6.
Committee on Foreign Relations, pub-
41 (2)
enemies. And besides, it would be impossible to do it with

equality: the same things, the like number of troops, the like
quantity of arms, of munitions, &c., furnished under different
"
circumstances, are no longer equivalent succours." (2) In what-
ever does not relate to the war, the neutral State must not refuse
to one of the parties, merely because he is at war with the other,
what it grants to that other" (/).
Arming aûl These principles were appealed to by the American Government^
equipping
vessels, and when its neutrality was attempted to be violated on the commence-
men ment of the M. Genet, the French
enli«ting
within the European war, in 1793, by
neutral terri- Minister accredited to the United States. As soon as he arrived at
tory, by either commenced arm and equip and
Charleston, he to vessels, enlist
belligerent,
unlawful. men within United States territory. Thereupon the British
Minister protested to the American Government, which undertook
to preveixt such proceedings, despite the existence of a treaty made
with France, 1778, allowing the latter to fit out vessels and deposit
prizes in- the ports of the United States. The American autho-
rities stated that if the neutral Power might not, consistently with
its neutrality, furnish men to either party for their aid in war, as
little could either enrol them in the neutral territory. The autho-
rity both of Wolf and Vattel was appealed to in order to show,
that the levying of troops is an exclusive prerogative of sove-
reignty, which no foreign Power can lawfully exercise within the

territory of another State, without its express permission. The
testimony of these and other writers on the law and usage of
nations was sufficient to show, that the United States, in pro-
hibiting all the belligerent Powers from equipping, arming, and
manning vessels of war in their ports, had exercised a right and
a duty with justice and moderation {g).
Prohibition The same principles were afterwards incorporated in a law of
enforced by
American Congress passed in 1794, and revised and re-enacted in 1818, by
municipal which it is declared to be a misdemeanour for any person, within
statutes.
the jurisdiction of the United States, to augment the force of any
armed belonging
vessel, to one foreign Power at war with another
Power, with which they are at peace; or to prepare any military
expedition against the territories of any foreign nation with Which
they are at peace; or to hire or enlist troops or seamen for foreign
military or naval service; or to be concerned in fitting out any
vessel, to cruise or commit hostilities in foreign service, against
(/) Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. 7, August 10, 1793; American State
§ 104. Papers, vol. i. pp. 47, 116, 148, 150.
{g^ Jefiferson, Secretary of State, to Cf. swpra, p. 344.
the United States Minister to France,
a nation at peace with them: and the vessel, in this latter case, is
made subject to forfeiture. The President is also authorized to
employ force to compel any foreign vessel to depart, which by the
law of nations or by treaties ought not to remain within the United
States, and to employ generally the public force in enforcing the
duties of neutrality prescribed by the law {h) .
With regard to enlisting, it has been held by the American

Courts that it is not an offence under the Act of 1818 to leave the
United States with intent to enlist in foreign service, or to trans-
port persons out of the country with their own consent, with aiiil
intention of such enlistment. To constitute an offence within the
Act, such persons must be hired or retained in America to go
abroad with an intention so to enlist (^) .
The example of America was soon followed by Great Britain, British
in the Act of Parliament 59 Geo. III. c. 69, entitled, "An Act EnlSfment
^^^^
to prevent the Enlisting or Engagement of His Majesty's Sub-
and the Fitting out or Equipping
jects to serve in foreign Service,
inHis Majesty's Dominions Vessels for warlike purposes, without
His Majesty's Licence." The previous statutes, 9 and 29 Geo. II.,
enacted for the purpose of preventing the formation of Jacobite
armies in France and Spain, made it a capital offence to enter
the service of a foreign State. The 59 Geo. III. c. 69, commonly
called theForeign Enlistment Act, provided a less severe punish-
ment, and also supplied a defect in the former law, by introducing
"
after the words king, prince, state, or potentate," the words
"
colony or district assuming the powers of a government," in
order to reach the case of those who entered the service of un-
acknowledged as well as of acknowledged States. The Act also

provided for preventing and punishing the offence of fitting out
armed vessels, or supplying them with warlike stores, upon which
the former law had been entirely silent.
In the debates which took place in Parliament upon the enact- Debates on
ment of the last-mentioned Act in 1819, and on the motion for 1819.
its repeal in 1823, it was not denied by Sir J. Mackintosh and
other members who opposed the bill that the sovereign power of
every State might interfere to prevent its subjects from engaging
in the wars of other States, by which its own peace might be
endangered, or its political and commercial interests affected. It

was, however, insisted that the principles of neutrality only re-
(A) Rev. Stat. §§ 5281—5291; Kent, (0 U. S. v. Kazinski, 2 Sprague, 7.

Conun. on American Law, vol. i. p. 123 Cf. Opinions of Attorneys-General
(5th ed.). Of. Hoyt v. Gelston, 3 (U. S.), vol. vii. p. 367.
Wheaton, 246; S. C, 4 Curtis, 228.
646 EIGHTS OF WAE AS TO NEUTKALS.
quired the British legislature to maintain the laws in being, but

could not command it to change any law, and least of all to alter
the existing laws for the evident advantage of one of the belli-
gerent parties. Those who assisted insurgent States, however

meritorious the cause in which they were engaged, were in a much
worse situation than those who assisted recognised Governments,
as they could not lawfully be reclaimed as prisoners of war, and
might, as engaged in what was called rebellion, be treated as

rebels. The proposed new law would go to alter the relative
risks, and operate as a law of favour to one of the belligerent
parties. To this argument it was replied by Mr. Canning, that

when peace was concluded between Great Britain and Spain, in
1814, an Article was introduced into the treaty by which the
former Power stipulated not to furnish any succours to what were
then denominated the revolted colonies of Spain. In process of
time, as those colonies became more powerful, a question arose
of a very difficult nature, to be decided on a due consideration of
their de jure relation to Spain on the one hand, and their de facto
independence on the other. The law of nations afforded no precise

rule as to the course which, under circumstances so peculiar as the
transition of colonies from their allegiance to the parent State,
ought to be pursued by foreign Powers. It was difficult to know

how far the statute law or the common law was applicable ,to
colonies so situated. It became necessary, therefore, in the Act of
1819, to treat the colonies as actually independent of Spain; and
to prohibit mutually, and with respect to both, the aid which had
been hitherto prohibited with respect to one only It was in order
.
and impartial effect to the provisions of the treaty with'

to give full
Spain, which prohibited the exportation of arms and ammunition

to the colonies, but did not prohibit their exportation to Spain,
that the Act of Parliament declared that the prohibition should
be mutual. When, however, from the tide of events flowing from
the proceedings of the Congress of Verona, war became probable
between France and Spain, became necessary to review these
it
relations. It was obvious that if war actually broke out, the

British Government must either extend to France the prohibition
which already existed with respect to Spain, or remove from Spain
the prohibition to which she was then subject, provided they meant
to place the two countries on an equal footing. So far as the
exportation of arms and ammunition was concerned, it was in
the power of the Crown to remove any inequality between the
belligerent parties, simply by an Order in Council. Such an order
was consequently issued, and the prohibition of exporting arms
EIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS.. 647
and ammunition to Spain was removed. By this measure the

British Government offered a guaranty of their bond fide neu-
trality. The mere appearance of neutrality might have been pro-

served by the extension of the prohibition to France, instead of
the removal of the prohibition from Spain; but it would have
been a prohibition of words only, and not at all in fact; for th.^
immediate vicinity of the Belgic ports to France would have
rendered the prohibition of direct exportation to France totally
nugatory. The repeal of the Act of 1819 would have, not the
same, but a corresponding effect to that which would have been
produced by an Order in Council prohibiting the exportation of
arms and ammunition to France. It would be a repeal in words
only as respects France, but in fact respecting Spain; and would
occasion an inequality of operation in favour of Spain, incon-
sistent with an impartial neutrality. The example of the
American Government was referred to, as vindicating the justice
and policy of preventing the subjects of a neutral country from
enlisting in the service of any belligeiênt Power, and of pro-
hibiting the equipment in its ports of armaments in aid of such
Power. Such was the conduct of that Government under the
presidency of Washington, and the secretaryship of Jefferson:
and such was more recently the conduct of the American legis-
lature in revising their neutrality statutes in 1818, when the
Congress extended the provisions of the Act of 1794 to the case

of such unacknowledged States as the South American colonies
of Spain, which had not been provided for in the original law {k) .
The controversy relating to the " Alabama claims " having shown
the weakness of the Act of 1819, a more stringent Foreign En-
listment Act was passed in 1870. It goes beyond the provisions
of the American Neutrality Laws; for it forbids British subjects
to enlist or accept a commission without license in the service of
any foreign State at war with a friendly State, whether the en-
gagement is made within or without His Majesty's dominions (/).
The requirements of both the British and the American legis-
lation on the subject are much more comprehensive and restrictive
than those laid down by international law.
"
A neutral Power which receives
in its territory troops belong- Internment of
ing armies shall intern them, as far as possible, ^^^&®'6"*8-

to the belligerent
at a distance from the theatre of war.
(Je) Annual Register, vol. Ixi. p. 71. vol. v. p. 34.

Canning, Speeches, vol. iv. p. 150; (J) See further infra, pp. 674 seq.
It maJ keep them in camps, and even confine them in fortresses

or in places set apart for this purpose.
It shall decide whether officers may be left at liberty on giving

their parole not to leave the neutral territory without per-
"
mission (m).
"
In the absence of a special Convention, the neutral Power shall
supply the interned with the food, clothing, and relief which the
dictates of huma;Qity prescribe. At the conclusion of peace, the
"
expenses caused by the internment shall be made good (n).
Under the customary law of nations, and independently of
special treaties on the subject, a neutral State was not obliged to
admit within its territory bodies of troops belonging to the belli-
gerents. If it accorded them admission it was entitled to disarm
and intern them till the end of the war In order to regulate their
.
maintenance and repayment of expenses incurred, it was usual to

draw up a special Convention between the neutral State and the
belligerent State to which the admitted troops belonged. A note-
worthy instance is that of 1871, when 85,000 French troops the
—
rest of the ill-fated army of General Bourbaki — escaped into
Switzerland from the pursuit of General von Manteuffel. An
agreement was then concluded between their commander, General
Clinchant (who had succeeded Bourbaki after the latter had shot
himself) and the Swiss authorities. The French army thereby
undertook to surrender all arms, equipment, artillery-material,
munitions of war (except the officers' arms and horses) which —
were to be restored to France at the end of the war and to pay the —
expenses incurred by Switzerland. In the same war, many French
troops crossed over the Belgian frontier; they were likewise dis-
armed and interned. In this case no engagement was concluded
as to reimbursement for the cost of their maintenance.
It is to be observed that a neutral Power remains, under the

above Articles, entitled to refuse admission to fugitive combatants.
It may refuse or consent to receive them, as it deems fit but which- ;
ever course adopts in the case of one belligerent, the same course
it
will, through the duty of impartiality, have to be taken in the

case of the other belligerent.
To the customary rule requiring the restoration of property

brought by the interned, an exception may be made in regard to
material liable to deteriorate or too expensive to keep (e.g., a large
number of horses). Such property may be sold by the neutral
(w) Hague Convention (1&07), tions (1899), Art. 57.

No. V. Art. 11. Cf. Hague Regula- (w) Art. 12.
RIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS. 64J^
Government, and the proceeds should then be deducted from the

cost of internment (o) .
Where appears clearly that troops crossed over by mistake

it
into neutral territory, they o,ught to be permitted to leave at onoe,

after having made good any damage doine.
"
A neutral Power thatreceives escaped prisoners of war shall Prisoners of
leave them at liberty. allows them to remain in its territofry

If it
it may assign them a place of residence.

The same rule applies to prisoners o| war brought by troops
"
taking refuge in the territory of a neutral Power (p).
The German Manual lays down that prisoners who escape to a
neutral country must be interned there (q) but the new regula- ;
tion of the Hague (1907) overrides this provision, which is
scarcely consistent with usage or principle. During the Franco-

German war escaped French officers and soldiers were allowed by
Luxemburg to pass freely through its territory. Bismarck pro-
tested but the non-interference of Luxemburg was not a contra-
;
vention of the law of neutrality. As to prisoners of war brought

by fugitive troo_gs, there was formerly a difference of opinion;
some held that they should be interned, others that they should be
liberated. The provision made in Article 13 is unimpeachable on
the ground of fairness and justice. In 1871 the Swiss Government
set free the Prussian prisoners who were in the hands of General
Clinchant's fugitive army, and also sent back to France an equal
number of interned French troops.
''
A neutral Power may authorize the passage into its territory of
Sick and
the sick and wounded belonging to the belligereait armies, on

<;ondition that the trainsand other means of transport by which
they are conveyed shall carry neither personnel nor war material.
In such a case the neutral Power is bound to take whatever
measures of safety and control are necessary for the purpose.
The sick or wounded of one belligerent brought under these
'Conditions into neutral territory by the other belligerent must be
so guarded by the neutral Power as to ensure their taking no further
part in the military operations. The same duty shall devolve
on the neutral Power with regard to the sick and wounded of the
"
other army who may be committed to its care (r).
"
The Geneva Convention applies to sick and wounded interned
"
in neutral territory (s).
(o) Such a rule is expressly laid (g) Kriegsbraueh, p. 09.

down in the German Manual, Kri^s- (r) Art. 14.
brauch im Landkriege, p. 70. (s) Art. 15.
(p) Art. 13.
With regard to the passage of the sick and wounded through

neutral territory, there was no definite rule before the provision
of the Hague Conference was made. During the Franco-German
war, German evacuations were allowed to pass through Switzer-
land, but not through Belgium. The permission of the latter
was refused, owing to the protest of France; the French authorities
urged that to allow trains to proceed through Belgium and Luxem-
burg to Germany would free lines and enable the enemy to bring
up forces and war material (t). It is to be noted that under the
present rules sick and wounded prisoners brought by fugitive
troops into neutral territory are to be liberated, whilst those
brought by a convoy of evax3uation are to be interned. This differ-
ence of treatment is based on the ground that in the former case
the fugitive troops might, but for the asTylu'm sought, be captured
by the adversary and their prisoners therefore taken away from-

them, whilst in the latter case the sick and wounded were brought
voluntarily by their own side.
"
Neutral The nationals of a State which is not taking part in the war
"
persons. ^re considered to be neutrals (u).
''
Neutral subjects taking part in hostilities on behalf of one
belligerent are liable to be treated by the other belligerent in every
respect as if they were enemy subjects, and their own Gpvernment
has no right t,o object to their being so tlêated. Neutral subjects
resident in the territory tof a belligerent are, equally with the other
inhabitants of the oountry, liable to suffer in person and property
through the events of the war; and their Governments acquire
thereby no right to claim compensation on their behalf. Such
compensation, if not awarded by the special piôvisions of a treaty,
is given only as a matter of grace and favour. They are, for
instance, liable to be removed from their homes or even to be
banished from the country, on suspicion of misconduct towards
an occupying army, or for reasons of strategic convenience" (ic).
Proposals put forward at the Hague t|0 secure protection for neutral
inhabitants of an invaded country were rejected, because of the
great difficulties that would be involved in the attempt to draw a

clear line of demarcation between them and the enemy subjects.
From the point of view of practice, the essential criterion with —
—
regard to treatment is not personality, but locality. If neutral
subjects choose to remain in the belligerent territory, they thus
(0 Of. Kri^sbrauch im Landkriege, (x) Holland, The Laws of War oft
p. 73. Land, § 136.

(w) Art. 16.
identify themselves, in the eyes of the invader, with the nationals

of the enemy, and so are equally liable to suffer the misfortunes
of war.
During the Spanish-American war, when the bombardment of

San Juan (Porto Rico) by the United States forces haxi become
imminent, the neutral consuls in the city proposed toset apart a
neutral zone for the use of the foreign residents. Hostilities
ceasing, however, before the American forces reached San Juan,

the proposal was not carried out. But the law of nations does not
empower neutral consuls to neutralize a part of the theatre of war,

without the consent of both belligerents.
In the Anglo-Boer war (1900) many neutral inhabitants who
suffered through the British invasion, e.g., by being compelled to
leave South Africa on account of the military exigencies of the
invaders, received compensation; but the British Government

offered it as an act of g^ra.ce only, and not through legal obliga-
tion («/) .
"
A neutral cannot claim the benefit of his neutrality: (a) if he Acts of
commits hostile acts against a belligerent; (b) if he commits acts

persons.
in favour of a belligerent, particularly if he voluntarily enlists in
the ranks of the armed force of one of the parties .
In such cases the neutral shall not be more severely treated by

the belligerent as against whom he has abandoned his neutrality
than a national of the other belligerent State could be for the same
act" {a).
"
The following acts shaU not be considered as acts committed in
favour of one belligerent within the meaning of Article 17 (b) :
(a) the furnishing- of supplies or the making of loans to one of the

belligerents, provided that the person so doing lives neither in the
ten'itory of the other party nor in the territory occupied by him,
and that the supplies do not come from these territories; (b) ser-
"
vices rendered in matters of police or civil administration (&).
It Avas made clear in the Report of the Hague Committee that
Article 17 (a) does not preclude newspapers or other journals from
making commentaries on the war, even though they are unfavour-

able to one of the belligerents; and, conversely, that Article 17 (b)
does not debar newspapers or individuals from expressing their
sympathy with one of the contending parties.
Further, the Report thus illustrates the application of
''
Articles 17 (b) and 18 (a) : In case of a war between State A. and
(jy) British and Foreign State («) Art. 17.

Papers, vol. xciv. p. 645; Cobbett), (6) Art. 18.
Cases, vol. ii. pp. 264 seq.
662 EIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTEALS.
State B.,if a neutral Tesiding in A., or the territory occupied by
A., were to furnish supplies to B., or subscribe to a loan issue^d

by B., he w,ould by so doing commit an act in favour of B.^
falling under the terms ,of Article 17 (b), and he would lose;, in
A.'s eyes, his quality iof a neutral as a result of the sale or loan.
It would be the same the neutral, without being resident in A.,
if
or in the territory occupied by A., were to deli\êr to B. supplies
coming from A., or from the territory occupied by A."

In the Franco-German war, the neutral diplomatic agents resi-
dent in Paris during the siege protested agaînst the German inter-
ference with their despatches destined for neutral countries, and
urged that it constituted a breach of the right of legation.

Bismarck replied that if the despa4:ches were not subjected to
censorship, important information of a military character might
pass out of the besieged city to the detriment of Prussia; aad the
rights of neutral diplomatic agents who chose to remain in Paris
could not be allowed to prevail over the supreme interests of a
belligerent- The German Manual lays down that neutral States
are entitled to continue without hindrance their diplomatic rela-
tions with belligerents on condition that considerations of military
necessity do not raise temporary obstacles to their doing so (c) .
This rule is not inconsistent with war law; but the difficulty here,
as everywhere else, is to dete-rmine fairly and reasonably the
significance of 'military necessity.'

The above Articles 16, 17, 18, were adopted by the Hague
Conference from among twelve Articles proposed by Germany;
but the German policy was opposed by Great Britain, France,
Bussia, Japan, and Holland. Even these three Articles were
not ratified by Great Britain. Objection was offered by these
States to the German project, on the ground that it sought to
make the principle of nationality, instead of that of domicile, the
criterion of status within belligerent territory, and that it accorded
100 great immunity to neutrals. By way of compensating to some
extent for the rejected Articles, the Conference (1907) adopted the
following 'Voeux'
—resolutions embodying pious aspirations:-^
"
That in case of war the competent authorities, civil and mili-
tary, should make it their special duty to ensure and safeguard the
maintenance of pacific relations, more pa;rticularly of a commercial
and industrial nature, between the inhabitants of the belligerent
States and neutral countries.
That the Powers should regulate by special Conventions the
(<?) Kriegsbrauch im Landkrieg-e, p. 75.

position, as regards military obligations, of foreigners residing

within their territory."
"
Railway material coming from the territory of neutral Powers, Neutral
whether belonging to those Powers, or to companies or private per-
railwây'"'
sons, and recognisable as such, shall not be requisitioned or utilized material,
by a belligerent except when and to the extent that it is absolutely
necessary. It shall be sent back as soon as possible to the country

of its origin.
A neutral Power may likewise, in case of necessity, retain and
utilize to a corresponding extent railway material coming from
the territory of th'e belligerent Power.
Compensation shall be paid
by one party or the other in pro-
"
portion to the materialused and to the period of usage {d).
This Article, relating to the so-called right of angary (to
which wo have already referred in regard to the immediate effects
of the outbreak of war) (e), deals only with the use by a belli-
gerent of neutral ^railway material. As a supplement to this

written provision, the following customary rule of international
''
law may be given: Property of neutrals of other kinds found in
territory which is the scene of hostilities, even though not placed!
by them at the disposal of the enemy, is liable to be taken posses-
sion of, or even destroyed, for strategic reasons by either belli-
gerent; but compensation must in this case be made by the

belligerent so acting to the neutral owners for the loss they have
sustained" (/).
Two
notable examples of the exercise of this right of angary
occurred in the Franco-German war. One of these viz., the —
seizure and sinking by the Germans of six British colliers in the
Seine —has already been mentioned {g) . The other case was the
seizure by the Germans of a large quantity of rolling stock belong-
ing to the Swiss Central Railway. This was used for some time, on
the same ground of military necessity. Again, the right of angary
was exemplified in a striking manner in the Great War, 1914.
Four warships lying in course of construction in British dockyards,
and destined for Chile and Turkey '(which was at the time neu-
tral), were taken over by the British Government, who promised
to pay full compensation.
The principles of the customary law of neutrality in maritime Neutrality

IN MAEITIMB
War on waefaee.
(d) Art. 19. (/) Holland, The Laws of
(e) See supra, p. 409. Land, § 140.
(^) See supra, p. 409.
warfare have been consolidated and in some respects enlarg'ed by

the thirteenth Convention of the Hague Conference (1907). The
preamble states that it is desirable that neutral Powers should lay-

down enactments regulating the consequences of the status
specific
of neutrality, that the p'rovisions thus adopted aire to be marked
by and tha^t in cases w^here the present Con-

strict impartiality,
vention the general principles of inteirnational laW apply.

is silent
Fundamental "
Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral
principles.
Powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters,
from any act which "would, if knowingly permitted by any Power,
"
constitute a violation of neutrality (h).
In case of violation of neutral teijritory or neutral waters by a
belligerent the neutral Government is entitled to seek reparation .
There is no specific provision to this effect in the Convention, but

the right obviously exists by implication. Moreovejr, it is the
neutral's duty to obtain reparation, if the violation was detri-
mental to the other belligerent; for acquiescence or indifference
might be construed as connivance, and theiêfore as an offence to
the injured belligerent.
"
Any act of hostility, including capture and the exercise of the
right of search, committed by belligerent warships in the terri-
torial waters of a neutral Powar, constitutes a violation of
"
neutrality and is strictly forbidden (i).
"
When
a ship has been captured in the territorial waters of a
neutral Power, such Power must, if the prize is still within its
jurisdiction, employ the means at its disposal to release the prize
with its officers and crew, and to intern the prize crew. If the
prize is not within the jurisdiction of the neutral Power, the captor
Government must, on the demand of the neutral Power, liberate
"
the prize with its officers and crew (k).
Captures Not only are all captures made by the belligerent cruisers
within the
maritime within the limits of the maritime territorial jurisdiction abso-
territorial
lutely illegal and void, but captures made by armed vessels
jurisdiction,
or by vessels stationed in a bay or river, or in the mouth of a river, or in the
stationed
within or
harbour of a neutral State, for the purpose of exercising the
it,
hovering on rights of war from this station, are also invalid. Thus, where a
the coasts.
British privateer stationed itself within the river
Mississippi,
in the neutral territory of the United States, for the
purpose of
exercising the rights of war from the river, by standing off and on,
obtaining information at the Balize, and overhauling vessels in
(h) Hague Convention(1&07), fare, Art. 1, supra, p. 640.

No. XIII. Art. Of. the fifth Con-
1. (0 Art. 2.
vention (1907), relating to land war- (A) Art. 3.
the course down the river, and made the capture in question within
three English miles of the alluvial islands formed at its mouth,
restitution of the captured vessel was decreed by Sir W. Scott (l).
So, also, where a belligerent ship, lying within neutral territory,
made a capture with her boats out of the neutral territory, the
capture was held to be invalid; for though the hostile force em-
ployed was applied to the captured vessel lying out of the territory,
yet no such use of a neutral territory for the purposes of wa^r is
to be permitted. This prohibition is not to be extended to remote
uses, such as procuring provisioins and refreshments, which the law

of nations universally tolerates; but no proximate acts of war axe
in any manner to be allowed to originate on neutral ground (m) .
In 1863, during the Civil War, the United States merchant-ship case of The
Chesapeake, while on a voyage from New York to Portland, was Chesapeake.
seized upon by a number of her passengers, who killed and

wounded some of the crew, and put the rest on shore.. They ran
the vessel to several small ports in Noiva Scotia, representing her
as the Confederate war-steamer Retribution, and finally aban-
doned her off Sambro, a port of Nova Scotia. The Chesapeake
was there found and captured by a United States ship-of -war, and
taken to Halifax. There were then on boiard two British subjects
who had been employed by the passengers as engineers; and Wade,
one of the ringleaders, was discoyered on board a small schooner
lying near where the Chesapeake had been abandoned. The three
men were made prisoners, and conveyed to Halifax. In the dis-
cussion resulting from this case, the United States disclaimed any
intention of exercising jurisdiction in the wat6,rs of Nova Scotia,
"
and explained that their naval authorities had acted under the
influence of a patriotic and commendable zeal to bring to punish-
ment outlaws who had and dignity of
oiffended against the peace
both countries" (n). was admitted that these acts were, in
It
"
strictness of law, a violation of the law of nations, and of the
friendly relations existing between the two countries." This was

deemed a satisfactory explanation by Her Majesty's Government.
England was entitled to look upon this capture as, prima facie, a
belligerent act. The Civil War was flagrant at the time, and the
Chesapeake had been originally seized by persons representing
themselves as acting on behalf of the Confederates. As a matter
of fact, they failed to produce any valid belligerent commission;
but this did not give the United States any right to capture the
(0 The Anna (1805), 5 O. Rob. 373. (n) Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons, 9th
(m) The Twee Gehroeders (1800), Jan. 1864.
3 O. Rob. 162.
ship in British waters. Beyond seizing the vessel, the passengers

had committed no piratical acts. They were thus entitled to prove
themselves belligerents if they could, and their failure to do this
laid them open to the charge of piracy. The United States de-
manded the extradition of the persons captured with the vessel,
but the British Government insisted on their being first released
and set upon British soil, and they managed to escape before they
could be re-arrested. The
ship itself was restored to the owners.
Some of the parties concerned afterwards appeared in Canada, and
were apprehended, but the Court decided that they could not be
extradited (o) .
Capture of In 1864, a flagrant violation of neutral jurisdiction was com-

the Florida.
mitted by a United States ship-of-war. The Florida, the well-
known Confederate cruiser, entered the port of Bahia, in Brazil,
to obtain provisions and coals, and to effect some necessary repairs;
and while there the Wachusett, a Federal man-of-war, also entered
the port. anthorities took all necessary measures
The Brazilian
to prevent a conflict, and assigned a berth in the harbour to oach
ship. During the night, and while a large part of the Florida's
crew were on shore, the Wachusett steamed across the harbour,
fastened a cable to the Florida, towed her out to sea, 'and es-oaped
from the pursuit of the local forces. The Brazilian Government
demanded an explanation and reparation. Mr. Seward admitted
"
that the President would disavow and regret the proceedings at
Bahia," but he persisted in maintaining that the Florid,a was a
pirate, and "that the harbouring and supplying piratical ships
and their crews in Brazilian ports were wrongs and injiUries for
which Brazil justly owes reparation to the United States." The
captured crew of the Florida were, however, set at liberty, and the
*'
vessel herself sank in Hampton Boads by an unforeseen accident
which cast no responsibility upon the United States" (p). The
absurdity of calling the Florida a pirate at that period of the war
is manifest; but had she been the most atrocious of pirates,
her capture under such circumstances would have been wholly

unjustifiable.
The Rtje- In 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war, a Russian torpedo-
shitelni.
Hostilities boat, the Rt/eshitelni, escaped from Fort Arthur (then besieged
by Japan) and took refuge in the Chinese port of Chefoo. Two
in neutral
territory.
Japanese destroyers went in pursuit, waited outside the harbour
for a few hours, and then entered it. The Japanese officers alleged
(o) See Pari. Papers, 1876, N. (p) Pari. Papers, 1873, N. America
America (No. 10). Whcaton, ed. Dana, (No. 2), pp. 176—178.
note 207.
that the vessel had been allowed to take there a supply of coal, and
that no measures had been adopted to dismantle her. The Rus-
sian and the Chinese officers, on the cojitrary, maintained that
steps had been taken for interning her. However this maj be, a
Japanese party boajrded the Russian vessel and called upon her
commander either to surrender or put to sea within an hour. Both
alternatives were refused, whereupon an unsuccessful attempt was
made to blow her up, a struggle followed, then she was seized by
the Japanese and carried off. Protests were made by both Russia
and China. In reply, the Japanese Government contended that
as the war was waged in or near Chinese territory, such territory
became conditionally neutral; but as Russia did not respect its
neutrality, she made it for the time being belligerent territory.
Moreover, Japan held that Russia had violated Chinese neutrality
on several occasions; and that the Ryeshitelni had remained fully
armed and manned to the end, and had been the first to commence
hostilities in the harbour. Thus, the case was different from that
ai the Florida, because the neutrality of Brazil was unconditional,
and the port of Bahia was far from the theatre of war. Notwith-
standing these contentions, it appears that the Russians were not
the aggressors in the -port of Chefoo; nor was Chinese territory
conditionally neutral; sq that the Japanese action was a violation

of neutrality. Even if China had permitted the acts alleged, and
had not proceeded to dismantle the Ryeshitelni, the Japanese
commander ought first to have called upon the Chinese authorities
to disarm her and adopt measures for internment. If the latter
had failed to take steps after a reasonable interval, the Japanese
would have been entitled to seize her. A further point arises from
this case: Is a belligerent vessel entitled to fight in neutral waters,
if sheattacked there by the enemy? When the attack becomes
is
imminent, the former should first appeal to the neutral Govern-

ment for protection; then if effective protection is not granted,
measures of self-defence are legitimate and do not per se consti-
tute a violation of neutrality (g) .
The latter point, together with the question of a, neutral's The Genera/
responsibility for hostilities committed within its territory, came -^^'^^ô^^Q-
up in the case of the General Armstrong. In 1814, during the responsibility.
war between Great Britain and the United States, an American

privateer, the Gen,eral Armstrong, attacked British vessels that
(5-) On the case of The Ryeshitelni, pp. 291 seq. ; Hershey, Russo-Japanese
see Takahashi, pp. 437 seq.; Smith War, pp. 260 seq.; Cobbett, Cases,
and Sibley, op. cit. pp. 116 seq.; vol. ii. pp. 295 seq.
Lawrence, War and Neutrality,
w. 42
had just entered the port of Fayal, in Portuguese territory, but

was fired at in return and destroyed within the limits of the port.
The United States Government thereupon demanded indemnity
from Portugal, on the ground that she was responsible for the
loss of the vessel, as she had not interfered to prevent the British
action and protect her neutrality. In 1851 the dispute was sub-
mitted to Louis Napoleon, then President of the French Republic.
In his award the following year he declared that a neutral Power is
bound to make good a belligerent's loss incui-red within the neutral
jurisdiction through the action of the enemy, if the neutral takes
no steps to prevent it. But in the present case Portugal was
absolved from liability, inasmuch as the General Armstrong did
not appeal for protection at the time, and replied to the attack.
The United States, however, was not satisfied with the award,
-
because she did not consider the alleged facts on which it was
"
based to have been clearly proved. The principle of the decision
must certainly be confined to cases where the vessel attacked has
reason to believe that effectual protection can be reasonably effected
by the neutral, and makes a fair choice to take the chances of the
"
combat rather than to appeal to. neutral protection (r).
Vessels
Although the immunity of the neutral territory from the exer-
chased into
the neutral cise of any act of hostility is generally admitted, yet an exception
territory, to it has been attempted to be raised in the case of a hostile vessel
and there
captured. met on high seas and pursued; which it is said may, in thte
the-
pursuit, be chased within the limits of a neutral territory. The

only text-writer of authority who has maintained this anomalous
principle is Bynkershoek (s) He admits that be had never seen
.
it mentioned in the writings of the public ju^rists, or among any

of the European nations, the Dutch only excepted; thus leaving
the inference open, that even if reasona,ble in itself, such a practice
never rested upon authority, nor was sanctioned by general usage.
The extreme caution, too, with which he guards this license to
belligerents, can hardly be reconciled with the pjractical exercise
of it; for how is an enemy to be putrsued in a hostile manner
within the jurisdiction of a friendly Power, without imminent
danger of injuring the subjects and property of the latter? Dum '
f ervet opus
'
—
in the heat and animation excited against the flying
foe, there is too much reason to presume that little regard will be
(r) Moore, Digest, vol. ii. § 210. bated by several other public jurists;
Cf Calvo, Droit International,
. vol. iv. Azuni, Diritto Maritimo, Pt. I. c. 4,
§ 2662. Art. 1. Valin, Traits des Prises, ch, 4,
(s) Qusest. Jur. Pub. lib. i.
cap. 8. § 3, No. 4, Art. 1. D'Habreu, Sobre
This opinion of Bynkershoek, in which las Prisas, Pt. I. ch. 4, § 15.
Cosaregis seems to concur, is repro-
paid to the consequences that may ensue to the neutral. There is,
then, no exception to the rule, that every voluntary entrance into
neutral territory, with hostile purposes, is absolutely unlawful.
"When the fact is established," says Sir W. Scott, ''it overrules
every other consideration. The capture is done away; the pro-
perty must be restored, notwithstanding that it may actually
belong to the enemy" (t).
Though the duty of the captor's country to make restitution claim on the
it is
of the property thus captured within the territorial jurisdiction of of

S^^^^^^
the neutral State, yet it is a rule of the Prize Courts to restore to neutral terri-
the individual claimant, in such a case, only on the application of
^nct?oned w
the neutral Government whose territory has been thus violated .
*ê neutral
This rule is founded upon the principle, that the neutral State
alone has been injured by the capture, and that the hostile claimant
has no right to appear for the purpose of suggesting the invalidity
of the capture {u) .
The Supreme Court of the United States has more recently deter-
mined that neither an enemy nor a neutral acting the part of an
enemy can demand restitution on the sole ground of capture in
neutral waters. This fact alone will not prevent condemnation if
done without intent to violate neutral j urisdiotion (a;) Lord .
''
Stowell also said long ago, It is a known principle of this Court
that the privilege of
territory; will not it&elf enure to the protection
of property, unless the State from which that protection is due
"
steps forward to assert the right {y).
Where a capture of enemy's property is made within neutral Restitution
territory, or by armaments unlawfully fitted out within the same, state o?^"*^^^
it isthe right as well as the duty of the neutral State, where the property
property thus taken comes into its possession, to restore it to the witMuîts
original owners. This restitution is erenerally made through the jîrisdiction,
„,.!-, .. or otherwise
agency oi the courts oi admiralty and maritime j urisdiction in violation
..P. .
Traces of the exercise of such a jurisdiction are found at a very traiit%^^""

early period in the writings of Sir Leoline Jenkins, who was Captures
^
Judge of the English High Court of Admiralty in the reigns of King's
'
Charles II. and James II. In a letter to the king in council, dated Chambers.'
October 11, 1675, relating to a French privateer seized at Harwich
with her prize (a Hamburg vessel bound to London), Sir Leoline
states several questions arising in the case, among which was
(0 The Vrow Anna Catharina {x) The Adela (1867), 6 Wallace,

(1801)), 5 C. Rob. 15. 266.
(«) Case of The Etrusco (1795), 3 (y) The Purissima Concepcion
C. Rob. note; The Anne, 3 Wheaton, (1805), 6 C. Rob. 45. See also The
447. Sir William Peel (1866), 5 Wallace,
517.
42 (2)
660 EIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRAL&.
".Whether this Hamburgher, being taken within one of your

(z), and being bound for one
Majesty's chambers of your ports,
ought not to be set free by your Majesty's authority, notwith-
standing he were, if taken upon the high seas out of those

chambers, a lawful prize. I do humbly conceive he ought to be set
free, upon a full and clear proof that he was within one of the
king's chambers at the time of the seizure, which he, in his first
memorial, sets forth to have been eight leagues at sea, over against
Harwich. King James (of blessed memory) his direction, by
proclamation, March 2nd, 1604, being that and sub-
all officers
jects, by sea and land, and succour all

shall rescue merchants and
others, as shall fall within the danger of such as shall await the
coasts, in so near places to the hinderanoe of trade outward and
homeward; and all foreign ships, when they are within the king's
chambers, being understood to be within the places intended in
those directions, must be in safety and indemnity, or else when
they are surprised must be restored to it, otherwise they have

not the protection worthy of your Majesty, and of the ancient
reputation of those places. But this being a point not lately;
settledby any determination, (that I know of, in case where the
king's chambers precisely, and under that name, came in ques-
tion,) is of thatimportance as to deserve your Majesty's declara-
tion and assertion of that right of the crown by an act of State in
Council, your Majesty's coasts being now so much infested with
foreign men-of-war, that there will be frequent use of such a
"
decision (a).
Whatever doubts there may be as to the extent of the territorial
jurisdiction thus asserted, as entitled to the neutral immunity,

there can be none as to the sense entertained by this eminent
civilian respecting the right and the duty of the neutral sovereign
to make restitution where his territory is violated.
Extent of When the maritime war commenced in Europe, in 1793, the
the neutral
American Government, which had determined to remain neutral,,
jurisdiction
along the found it necessary to define the extent of the line of territorial
coasts and
protection claimed by the United States on their coasts, for
within the the
bays and of effect to their neutral and duties. It was
rivers.
purpose giving rights
stated on this occasion, that Governments and writers on public
law had been much divided in opinion as to the distance from tlie
sea-coast within which a neutral nation might reasonably claim a
right to prohibit the exercise of hostilities. The character of

the
coast of the United States, remarkable in considerable parts of it
" "
(z) King's Chambers referred to coast,
(a) Life and Works of Sir L. Jen-
parts of the sea contained within
lines
drawn between promontories along the kins, vol. ii. p. 727.
for admitting no vessel of size to pass near tJie shore, it was thought
would entitle them in reason to as broad a margin of protected
navigation as any nation whatever. The Government, however,
did not propose, at that time, and without amicable conmaunica-
tions with the foreign Powers interested in that navigation, to
fix on the distance to which they might ultimately insist on the
right of protection. President Washington gave instructions to
the executive officers to consider it as restrained, for the present,
to the distance of one sea league, or three geographical miles,
from the sea -shores. This distance, it was supposed, could admit
of no opposition, being recognised by treaties between the United
States and some of the Powers with which they were connected
in commercial intercourse, and not being more extensive than was
claimed by any of them on their own coasts. As to the bays and
rivers,they had always been considered as portions of the terri-
tory, both under the laws of the former colonial Government and
of the present union, and their immunity from belligerent opera-
tions was sanctioned by the general law and usage of nations. The
2oth Article of the treaty of 1794, between Great Britain and the
United States, stipulated that "neither of the said parties shall
permit the ships or goods belonging to the citizens or subjects of
the other to be taken within cannon-shot of the coast, nor in any of
the bays, ports, or rivers, of their territories, by ships of war, or
others, having commissions from any prince, republic, or State
whatever. But in case it should so happen, the party whose terri-
torial rights shall thus have been violated, shall use his utmost
endeavours to obtain from the offending party full and ample
satisfaction for the vessel or vessels so taken, whether the same be
vessels of war or merchant vessels." Previously to this treaty
with Great Britain, the United States were bound by treaties with
three of the belligerent nations (France, Prussia, and Holland) to
"
protect and defend, by all the means in their power," the vessels
and nations in their ports or waters, or on the seas
effects of those
near their shores, and to recover and restore the same to the right
owner when taken from them. But they were not bound to make
compensation if all the means in their power were used, and failed
in their effect. Though they had, when the war commenced, no
similar treaty with Great Britain, it was the President's opinion
that they should apply to that nation the same rule which, under
this Article, was to govern the others above mentioned; and even
extend it to captures made on the high seas, and brought into the
American ports, if made by vessels which had been armed within
them. In the constitutional arrangement of the different autho^
American Federal Union, doubts were at first

rities of the enter-
tained whether it belonged to the executive Government, or the
judiciary department, to perform the duty of inquiring into cap-

tures made within the neutral territory, or by armed vessels
originall} equipped or the force of which had been augmented

within the same, and of making restitution to the injured party.
But it has been long since settled that this duty appropriately
belongs to the federal tribunals acting as courts of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction (&).
Limitations It has been judicially determined that this peculiar jurisdiction
of the neutral
to inquire into the validity of captures made in violation of the
jurisdiction
to restore will be exercised only for the purpose of restor-
neutral immunity
in cases of
illegal ing the specific property, when voluntarily brought within the
capture.
territory, and does not extend to the infliction of vindictive
damages, as in ordinary cases of maritime injuries. And it seems
to be doubtful whether this jurisdiction will be exercised where the
property has been once carried infra prcesidm of the captor' a

country, and there regularly condenmed in a competent Court of
Prize However this may be in cases where the property has come
.
into the hands of a bond fide purchaser, without notice of the

unlawfulness of the capture, it has been determined that the
neutral court of admiralty will restore it to the original owner,
where it is found in the hands of the captor himself, claiming
under the sentence of condemnation. But the illegal equipment
will not affect the validity of a capture, made after the cruise to
which the outfit had been applied is actually terminated (c) .
Prize Courts
in neutral
''
A Prize Court may not be established by a belligerent on
"
territory. neutral territory or on a vessel in neutral waters (d).
In 1799, during the war between Great Britain and France, a
British vessel, the Flad Oyen, was seized by a French privateer,
and taken into the port of Bergen, in Norway, where a French
Consular Court purported to condemn her. She was then sold to
a neutral purchaser, but was afterwards recaptured by the British.
The original owner thereupon claimed restitution, on the ground
that the transfer was invalid because the vessel had not been con-
(6) Mr. Jefferson's Letter to M. (o) The Amistad de Rues (1820), 5

Genet, Nov. 8, 1793; Waite, State Wheaton, 385; La Nereyda (1823), 8
Papers, vol. vi. p. 195. Opinion of Wheaton, 108; The Fanny (1824), 9
the Attorney-General on the capture Wheaton, 658; The Arrogante Bar-
of the British ship Grange, May 14, oelones (1822), 7 Wheaton, 519; The
1793; ihid. vol. i. p. 75. Mr. Jeffer- Santissima Trinidad (1822) 7 Wheaton,
,
son's Letter to Mr. Hammond, Sept. 5, 283.

1793; ihid. vol. i. p. 165. Wheatoin's (d) Hague Convention (1907),
Reports, vol. iv. p. 65, note (a). No. XIII. Art. 4.
demned a competent Prize Court.

b)" An order was made for
restitution, subject to thepayment of salvage to the reoaptors.
In the course of judgment, Sir W. Scott observed that the estab-
lishment of a Prize Tribunal in a neutral country was not only
contrary to the usage of nations, but it was also inconsistent witli
general principles
— ^for prize proceedings being always in rem,
it was necessarily presumed that the body and substance of the
thing in question was in the country of the belligerent captor (e).
The claim of France to set up Courts of Prize in the United
States was discussed in The Betsey (/), a vessel captured by a
French privateer and sent into Baltimore for adjudication. The
Supreme Court held that no foreign Power could rightfully erect
any Court of Judicature within the United States unless by force
of a treaty, and that no foreign consul could adjudicate upon a
prize (g). But now, by virtue of Article 4 of the Hague Conven-

up Prize Courts in neutral territory is
tion, the prohibition to set
absolute, and cannot be modified by treaty.
A sentence of condemnation will not be invalidated merely by
the fact that it was pronounced in the courts of a co-belligerent
or an ally (h).
Further, according to Anglo-American practice, a sentence of
co]idemnation passed by the courts of the belligerent captor was
considered valid, even though the prize was in a neutral port at the
time judgment was pronounced (^). And the legitimacy of thi5
practice is endorsed by the Hague Convention (k) .
''
Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a Neutral

base of naval operations against their adversaries; and in p£ir- base of
ticular they may not erect wireless telegraphy stations or any operations,
apparatus for the purpose of communicating with the belligerent

"
forces on land or sea (l).
It is obvious that this Article does not apply to such act-s as —
according to the other rules of neutrality are infringements of
—
law even when they are committed once. Certain acts are speci-
(e) The Flad Oyen (1799), 1 0. (0 Of. the British cases, The Hen-
Rob. 135. rick and Maria, 4 C. Rob. 43; The
(/) (1794), 1 Curtis, 74; S. C, 3 Polka, Spinks, 57; and the American
Dallas, 6. cases, Hudson v. Guestier (1810), 4
{g) We
have already referred to the Oranch, 293; The Invincible (1814),
case of the French minister Genet who 2 Gall. 39.
attempted to establish Consular Prize (Jc) No. XIII. (1907), Art. 23, infra,
Courts in the United States, supra, p. 695.
pp. 344, 644. (0 Ibid. Art. 5. Cf. the corre-
(A) Cf. Oddy v. Bovill (1802), 2 spending^ provision for land warfare,
East, 473; The Christopher (1799), 2 Hague Convention (1907), No. V.
C. Rob. 210. Art. 3.
664 RIGHTS OP WAR AS TO NEUTRALS,.
fically prohibited;so that no question can arise with regard to

them. There are various other acts which, committed, say, once
or twice, may be comparatively harmless; but if repeated fre-
quently by one belligerent may well be to the detriment of the

other belligerent. The minimum number
of repetitions constitu-
ting the offence cannot, of course, be determined. The essential

criterion is continued use —
that is, the continued use of a place
makes it a base. "It is suggested that the words [base of opera-
tions] should be used to cover cases where acts, which neutrals need
not prohibit when done to a slight extent or for a short time, have
taken place on such a scale or for so long a time as to turn them
into occurrences highly beneficial to the belligerent in pursuit of
his warlike ends. For instance, a brief visit to a neutral port is
quite allowable, but a lengthy stay for purposes of rest and refit-
ment should be forbidden; or a prize may be taken in and kept for
a short period, but if the port is filled with prizes and they ara
left in safety there for an indefinite time, it should be regarded as
a base of operations" (m).
"
Supply The supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, of warships,
^*
7*^ 1
& supplies, or war material of any kind whatever, by a neutral Power
"
to a belligerent Power, is forbidden (n).
"
Aneutral Power is not bound to prevent the export or transit,
on behalf of either belligerent, of arms, munitions of war, or, in
general, of anything that could be of any use to an army or
fleet" (o).
The prohibition of Article 6 is unconditional. Formerly, and
almost to the end of the eighteenth century, both opinion and
practice allowed a neutral State to furnish troops or ships to one
of the belligerents, in fulfilment of treaty obligations, without
affecting its neutrality. Thus, in 1788, during the war between

Eussia and Sweden, Denmark sent naval and military forces to
Russia in pursuance of a previously concluded treaty, announced
that she was still at peace with Sweden, and that the latter had no
cause for complaint as the aid furnished to Russia did not exceed
what had been agreed upon. Sweden, however, protesting and
other Powers threatening to intervene, Denmark withdrew her
forcesand undertook, with the consent of Russia, to do nothing
further in the conflict {p) .
(m) Lawrence, Principles of Inter- fcion (1907).

national Law (1913), p. 619. (^) De Martens, Causes Cel^bres,
(w) Art. 6. vol. iii. p. 478; Annual Register
(o) Art. 7. This is an exact repe- (1788), p. 292; Cobbett, Cases, vol. ii.
tition of Art. 7 of the fifth Oonven- p. 302.
In 1825, during the war between Spain and Mexico, Sweden

former six warships, but the offer was refused.
offered to sell the
Three of the ships were then sold bond fide to local purchasers,
who resold them to an English firm. Before the vessels were
despatched, it was found that they had been bought for Mexicto,
whereupon Spain protested; and eventually the contract was
rescinded (q) .
During the American Civil War, Great Britain stopped the sale
of her surplus warships, lest they might be bought, indirectly, by
one of the belligerents (r) .
In 1870, the United States Ordnance Department continued to

sell arms and munitions of war to agents of the French Grovern-
ment after the war with Prussia had begun. The American
Government sought to defend the action on the ground that it was
the result of a national policy adopted before the war; but it is
generally agreed that such a defence is untenable. The deter-

mining factor is the existence of hostilities, not a neutral State's
previously adopted policy (s) .
During the Eusso- Japanese war, the Argentine Government

withdrew its offer to sell warships to a certain agent, on discovering
that he, acting ostensibly for Turkey, was in reality acting for
one of the belligerents {t) .
When arms, munitions of war, &c., are sold to a belligerent by
private firms, their Government is not obliged to interfere with the

sale. Thus, in the Husso- Japanese war, German manufacturers
exported large quantities of arms and ammunition to the belli-
gerents; and simila,rly in the recent Balkan wars. The question
^rose again in the Gxeat War of 1914. Protests were made in
certain quarters against American exports of war munitions to
belligerents. In answer thereto, Mr. Bryan, the United States
Secretary of State, made the following statement in January,
1915, to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
"
tions: There is no power in the Executive to prevent the sale of
•ammunition to belligerents. The duty of a neutral to restrict
trade in munitions of war has never been imposed by international
law or by municipal statute. It has never been the policy of this
Government to prevent the shipment of arms or ammunition into
belligerent territory, except in the case of neighbouring American
Eepublics, and then only when civil strife prevailed." He added
(q) De Martens, op. cit. vol. v. (5) Cf. Wharton, Digest, vol. iii.
p. 229; Cobbett, p. 303. pp. 512 seq.; Moore, Digest, vol. vii.
(r) Pari. Papers (1873), North § 1309.
America, No. 2, p. 104. {i) Takahashi, p. 486.
that the Department of State did its utmost to secure equal treat-
ment, in this respect, to all the belligerents {u) .
"
Fitting out A neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its dis-
or arming
vessels in posal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel within its
neutral
jurisdiction which it has rea.son to believe is intended to cruise, or
territory.
engage in hostile Power with which that
opera.tions, against a
Government is at pea,ce. bound to display the same
It is also
vigilance to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any

vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, whick
has been adapted entirely or partly within the said jurisdiction for
"
use in war (x).
This Article involves most important questions of neutrality,,
which bristle with difficulties; and the tetms of the Article leave
"
some of these difficulties unsolved. Thus, the expressions fitting
" " " " "
out and arming are not defined. Does fitting out apply to
partial equipment as well as to ordinarily full equipment? If so,,

when may partial equipment be said to exist, in contradistinction
to non-equipment? Does "arming" refer to such a complete
armament as puts the vessel in a position to engage in hostilities
at once, or does it apply also to the placing of a few weapons on
"
board? Again, the Article says intended to cruise," &c. How is
the intent to be definitely determined? The Article, too, requires
every Government to use the "means a;t i,ts disposal" to prevent

the arming, &c.; but the words "mea,n8 at its disposal" are no-
"
clearer than that ominous expression so far as military exigencies
permit" (which we have so often seen in provisions relating to

land warfare) . It will be observed presently that this Article is
practically a reproduction of the first rule of the Treaty of Wash-

ington (1871) In order to show the bearings of the Article on the
.
international law of neutrality and on the legislative measures

enacted b}^ States for ensuring their neutral character, it is neces-
sary to consider the subject at some length.
Neutrality America has the credit of being the first country that by posi-
Laws of die
tive legislation sought to restrain its subjects within the strict
United States.
limits of neutrality.It has been already shown (y) that, in 1793,,
France demanded from the United States certain exclusive privi-
leges under the treaties of 1778, with respect to her privateers,
and ships of war, which the latter deemed inconsistent with the^
law of nations, and not warranted by the terms of the treaties.
America was determined to remain neutral, and on the 22nd
(m) The Times, Jan. 26, 1915, p. 10. No. XIII. Art. 8.
(ic) Hague Convention (1907), (ij) See supra, p. 644.
RIGHTS OF WAE AS TO NEUTRALS. 667
April, 1793, a Proclamation of Neutrality was issued, warning

American citizens carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings
which might tend to contravene the neutral disposition of their
country. Any citizen who committed a breach of the law of
nations would not be protected by his Government (z) In spite .
of this a French agent, M. Guinet, landed at Charleston in April,

commenced organizing a system of privateering, and endeavoured
in various ways to stir up the inhabitants of the States to assist
France (a) A French Prize Court was established at Charles-
.
ton, and an English vessel, the Grange, was seized in the Delaware
river. The British Minister in America, Mr. Hammond, remon-
strated against these violations of neutrality, and on the 5th of
June received an answer from Mr. Jefferson, admitting' the justice
of his remonstrance, and stating that measures would be taken
to prevent such occurrences (&). A
collection of rules, declaring
the original equipping and arming of vessels in the United States,
by either belligerent for warlike purposes, to be unlawful, was

drawn up, and issued to the collectors of customs. Violations of
neutrality, however, continued. In October a French Vice-Consul
at Boston, M. Duplaine, obtained the rescue by force of a vessel
detained by the Marshal. The United States withdrew his exe-
quatur, but the grand jury of Philadelphia refused to find a true
billagainst him (c) It was therefore deemed necessary to legis-
.
lateon the subject, and accordingly the Act of the 5th of June,
1794, was passed (d) This Act was substantially the same as
.
the one afterwards passed in 1818, and the latter, notwithstanding

all that has since happened, still remains the law of America (e).
It will, however, be necessary to notice some of the leading

American decisions on both the Acts, and on the general subject.
A prosecution for being concerned in fitting out and arming a American
privateer,was set on foot soon after the passing of the Act of ^^^^'
1794 Les Jumeaux was originally a British ship employed on Guinet '{Zes
.
the coast of Guinea. She entered Philadelphia in 1794 with a •^^^^«*'^)-

cargo of sugar and coffee, and at
tha^t time was owned entirely by
French subjects. Originally she had ten portholes on each side,
but only four altogether were open when she entered Philadelphia.
While there her owners caused her to be repaired, re-opened her
twenty ports, and fitted her up as a ship of war. Orders were
(z) American State Papers, vol. i.

p. 23.
p. 140. (d) United States Statutes at
(a) Rep. Neutrality Commission, Large, Third Cong. Sess. I. eh. 50.
186«, p. 18. (e) United States Revised Statutes,
(6) Jefferson, Works, vol. iii. p. 571. §§ 5281—5291. See supra, p. 644.
(c) Rep. Neutrality Coram 1868,
. See Appendix A.
668 EIGHTS OF WAE AS TO NEUTEALS.
given bv the United S;tates' authorities that she should be dis-

mantled of her extra armaments and reduced to the condition
she was in when she first came. She thus quitted Philadelphia
in her original condition, but lower down the river took on board
some guns and a number of men. A pilot boat also attempted
to convey some more war material to her, but was stopped by the
local authorities. A militia force was then sent in pursuit of
Les Jumeaux, but she avoided detention, partly by artifice and
partly by threatening an armed resisT:ance. One Guinet, who
had been chiefly concerned in fitting her out, was then indicted
for a breach of section 3 of the Act. The Judge ruled that the
third section was meant to include all cases of vessels armed in
American ports by one of the belligerent Powers, to cruise against
another belligerent Power at peace with the United States. Con-
verting a ship from her original destination with intent to commit
hostilities; or, in other words, converting a merchant ship into
a vessel of war, must be deemed an original outfit; for the Act
would, otherwise, become nugatory and inoperative. It is the
conversion from the peaceable use to the warlike purpose that
constitutes the offence. Guinet was found guilty (/).
Talbot V. In 1795, one Ballard, a Virginian, obtained the assignment of
ansen.
^ power to Command a certain ship, given by the French Admiral
in the United States, and authenticated by the French consul at
Charleston. This ship, Uami de la Liberie, was American
owned, and was armed and equipped in the United States.
Ballard renounced his Virginian citizenship, but was not natural-
ized elsewhere. He took command
L'ami de la Liberie, and
of
sailing under the French flag, captured a Dutch brig the Mag-
dalena, and brought her to Charleston for adjudication. The
Court held that he was still an American citizen, and that the
authority under which he sailed was invalid; that the capture of
a vessel of a country at peace with the United States, made by a
vessel fitted out in one of their ports, and commanded by one
of their citizens, was illegal, and that if the captured vessel was
brought within American jurisdiction, the District Courts, upon

a libel for tortious seizure, might inquire into the facts, and
decree restitution. Accordingly the ship was restored with
The Alfred. damages (^). On the other hand, where a prize was made by a
vesselwhich had left the United States with equipments partially
adapted for war, but which were such as were frequently carried
(/) U. S. V. Guinet (Les Jumeaux) (^) Talbot v. Jansen {The Mag-

(1795), 2 Dallas, 328. dalena) (1797), 1 Curtis, 128; S. C,
3 Dallas, 133.
by merchantmen, and where her full equipment had been com-

pleted in French territory, the Court declined to restore the prize.
It was held to be no violation of neutrality to sell such a ship to
a foreigner Qi) The Court also refused to restore a prize cap-
.
tured by a French privateer, which had been simply repaired in

an American port, and had not augmented her force there (i) .
But where a French privateer secretly increased her crew at New

Orleans by taking on board several Americans, and then captured
the Alerta, a Spanish brig, and sent her to New Orleans as a port
of necessity, the Court restored the prize to her owner (k) .
Whenever it was proved that a capture was made jure belli on Captures
the high seas, by a duly commissioned vessel of war which had violation of
in no way violated American neutrality, the Courts refused to neutrality,
"
interpose. It is no part of the duty of a neutral nation," said
"
Chief Justice Story, to interpose upon the mere footing of the
law of nations, to settle all the rights and wrongs which may grow
out of a capture between belligerents The captors are
amenable to their own Government
exclusively for any excess or
irregularity in their proceedings "(/) This also was held to
.
extend to the acts of privateers done under their war powers (m) .
Nor would the title by which a foreign sovereign owned a ship of

war be inquired into (n). But it was firmly settled that if cap-
tures were made in violation of American neutrality, the property
might be restored (even if there had been no Foreign Enlistment

Act) brought within the territory of the Union (o)
if Even after .
a regular condemnation in a Prize Court of the captor's country,

the Court restored the prize, because she was still ownod and con-
trolled by the original wrong-doer (p) .
In order that a violation of neutrality should be committed, two What

^
elements were deemed necessary. In the first place the ship must vioiaUon of
have been wholly or in part equipped or manned, or she must have neutrality,
augmented her force within the jurisdiction of the United States.
In the second place she must have been so equipped or manned
with the intent that she should cruise against the commerce of a
(h) The Alfred {Moodie v. The (n) The Exchange (1812), 7 Oranch,
Alfred^ (1796), 1 Ourtis, 234; S. C, 116. See ante, pp. 152 et seq.
3 Dallas, 307. (a) The Gran Para (1822), 7
(i) The Phoebe Ann {Moodie v.
The Wheaton, 471; 5 Ourtis, 302; La Cou-
PhcBbe Ann) (17%), 1 Curtis, 237; cepeion (1821), 6 Wheaton, 235; The
3 Dallas, 319. Bella Corrunes (1821), 6 Wheaton,
(Jc) The Alerta ^ Cargo v. Bias, 3 152; The Estrella (1819), 4 Wheaton,
Curtis, 379. 298.
(J) La Amistad de Rues (1820), 5 (;?) The Arrogante Barcelones
Wheaton, 385. (1822), 7 Wheaton, 496; The Nereyda
(m) The Invincible (1816), 1 (1823), 8 Wheaton, 108.
Wheaton, 238.
State at peace with the United States. Unless both the fact and
the intent existed together, there was no offence against the law.
The simple fact of an armed vessel having been equipped in, and
sent to a belligerent did not, of itself,
from the United States
necessarily constitute a breach of the Act, or of the law of
nations (q) Thus, if a ship of war was built and fitted out in
.
America, and was then bond fide sold, purely as a commercial

speculation to a belligerent, there would be no intent that she
should cruise against friendly commerce, and thus no breach of
neutrality would be committed. Ships of war and arms are
-
articles of commerce (r), and neutrals are entitled to continue

their ordinary commerce with belligerents, subject to the risk of
their goods being captured if they are contraband. No State
prohibits its subjects from trading in contraband. It only leaves
such goods to their fate, captures them on
if either belligerent
u. S. V. the way to the other. In 1828, the Bolivar, a vessel of 70 tons,
Qmncey.
sailed from Baltimore for St. Thomas, under the command of
one Quincey, and with Armstrong, her owner, on board. At
St. Thomas, Armstrong fitted her out as a privateer to cruise
under the Buenos Ayres flag against Brazil. Quincey continued
to command her and made some prizes. He then returned to
America, and was prosecuted for being concerned in fitting out
the BoUvar. The Court held it to be not necessary, in order to
convict Quincey, that the jury should find that the Bolivar was
armed, or in a condition to commit hostilities during the voyage
from Baltimore to St. Thomas. But if the jury believed that the
owner and equipper went to St. Thomas in search of funds, and
without a present intention of employing her as a privateer, or
even if they wished so to employ her, but the fulfilment of their
wish depended on their being able to procure funds at St. Thomas
"
for her equipment, the defendant Quincey was not guilty. The
offence," said the Court, "consists principally in the intention
with which the preparations were made. These preparations,
according to the very terms of the Act, must be made within the
limits of the United States, and it is equally necessary that the
intention with respect to the employment of the vessel should be
formed before she leaves the United States. And this must be a
fixed intention, not conditional or contingent, depending on some
future arrangements. . . . The law does not prohibit armed
vessels belonging to citizens of the United States from sailing
•
(v) The Santissima Trinidad (1822), (r) But as to ships of war, certain
7 Wheaton, 283. reservations are now necessary ;
see
supra, pp. 666 seq.; infra, p. 676.
out of our ports; it only requires the owner to give security that
such vessels should not be employed by them to commit hostilities
"
against foreign Powers at peace with the United States (s).
The American Act declares that " if any person shall, within Whether
the limits of the United States, fit out and arm, or attempt to arming^âre^
fit out and- arm, or procure to be fitted out and armed," any vessel necessary
to
constitute
. •
1 CI 1 1 n 1-
to cruise against the commerce of a friendly State, he shall be the ofifence.
guilty of a misdemeanour. In 1866, the Meteor, a vessel alleged

to be for the Chilean service in the war between Chile and Spain,
was libelled in the District Court. She had been originally built
for the Federal Government, but the Civil War having ended,
she was sold instead to Chile.She was built to carry eleven or
twelve guns, but these had not been mounted, and she was when
libelledan unarmed ship of war. The counsel for the claimant
contended that as she had not been out and armed in the
fitted
United States, she must be released. But the Court declined to
adopt this interpretation of the statute, and judgment was given
against the ship This decision was not reviewed by the Supreme
.
Court, and it has since been much questioned {t).
Story's pronouncement in The Santissima Trinidad (mentioned

above) that the law of nations does not prohibit the sale of an
armed vessel to a belligerent purchaser, and the doctrine of
'intent' embodied in the American Act of Neutrality and ex-
pounded in the cases just cited, are now no longer tenable (u),
''In considering this question," says an American writer very
"
aptly, it should be remembered that, by the introduction of
steam as the motive power of ships, and of iron and steel as the
material of their construction, the conditions of maritime warfare
have been very radically changed. What might have been a
reasonable rule as applied in the time of sailing ships might now
in the age of swift ironclads, be intolerably oppressive. In the
cases of Santissima Trinidad, U.S. v. Quincey, and The Meteor,
the Courts were dealing with small sailing vessels, which had been
converted into privateers, the possession of which by one or the
other belligerent Power made very little difference in the general
result of the struggle, whereas the possession of an iron-clad ship
might well turn the scale one way or the other, as indeed it did
in the war between Chile and Peru in 1880 — 1881. This great
(s) TJ. 8. V. Quince^ (1832), 6 Neutrality Conun. p. 37. And see

Peters, 445; 10 Curtis, 189. Rep. Pari. Papers, 1873 (No. 2), p. 39.
Neut. Comm. p. 29. (u) Cf. the first Rule of the Treaty
(0 U. S. V. The Meteor (1866), of Washington, infra, p. 676, and
Scott, Oases, p. 711. Cf. Rep. of Art. 8 of the thirteenth Convention
of the Hague (1907), supra, p. 666.
672 BIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS.
power of inflicting injury upon one of the belligerents, it is fair

to say, ought not to be permitted to neutral citizens, and the
neutral nation is alone in the position to restrain them In view .
of these facts, it is believed that the doctrine set up by the United

*
States Neutrality Act and the Federal Courts, that the intent'
of the owner or shipbuilder is the criterion by which his guilt
or innocence is to be judged, is wholly inadequate; it would not
for a moment stand the test of due diligence as applied by the
Geneva Tribunal" (a?).
The difficulty of distinguishing between the bond fide sale of
a ship, and the organizing of a hostile expedition in her territory,
has induced England to prohibit altogether the sale of such ships
by her subjects to belligerents. This prohibition fully satisfies
the requirements of Article 8 of the thirteenth Convention of the
Hague (1907) (f/).

Breaches of Notwithstanding the decisive terms of the American Neutrality
Neutrality
Law, various filibustering expeditions were from time to time
Law.
organized in the United States against Spain. In 1806, a certain
Miranda fitted out an expedition in New York, and sailed against
Caracas. He was met by two Spanish men-of-war, and was
defeated, and took refuge at Grenada; ten of his followers were
condemned to death as pirates. The American Government had
taken no steps to prevent the expedition (z). In 1817, Don Luis
de Onis, Spanish minister to the United States, began a series
of complaints respecting the fitting out of American privateers
to cruise against Spanish commerce. He referred to numerous
instances of privateers issuing from Baltimore and New
Orleans (a). On the 16th of January, he complained of a Spanish
schooner that was captured off Balize at a little more than musket-
shot from the land, by the Jupiter, a j>rivateer fitted out in
America. On the 10th of February, he referred to five othej:
privateers that took Spanish prizes, and on several other occasions

he addressed similar remonstrances to the American Govern-
ment (b) . In their replies to these communications, the United
States Government expressed its readiness to make inquiries into
the matter, and referred the Spanish minister to the law courts.
The correspondence closes with the following statement by Don
Luis, written on the 16th of November, 1818: "Whatever may —
(x) Snow, Cases, p. 437, note. See (a) Reasons of Sir A. Oockburn as
infra, p. 676. to Geneva Award. Pari. Papers, 1873
(y) Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, (No. 2), p. 54.
sect. 8. (b) Ibid. p. 55, See also Appendix
(z) Wheaton, ed. Dana, p. 558. Rep. to British Case at Geneva, vol. iii.
of Neutrality Coram, p. 25. pp. 99—106.
be the foresight, wisdom, and justice conspicuous in the laws of

the United States, it is universally notorious that a system of
pillage and aggression has been organized in several parts of the

Union against the vessels and property of the Spanish nation;
and it is equally so that all the legal suits hitherto instituted by
His Catholic Majesty's consuls, in the courts of their respective
districts, for its prevention, or the recovery of the property, when
brought into this country, have been and are completely un-
still
availing" (c). This letter was accompanied by a list of thirty

privateers belonging to New Orleans, Charleston, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, and New York, with a formidable list of prizes made
by them. The proceedings in the law courts failed in most cases

from the impossibility of procuring evidence. Cruising against
Spanish commerce was so profitable that few people would come
forward and testify to the violations of the law. Nevertheless
it was enforced in the courts whenever evidence could be got, and
numerous prizes taken by these privateers were restored to their

owners (d) In the meantime Spanish commerce had suffered
.
immensely. The dispute was finally adjusted by certain Ameri-

can claims on account of prizes made by French privateers, and
condemned by French consuls in Spain, and other matters, being
set off against the demands of Spain for reparation, in a treaty
dated 22nd February, 1819 (e).
In 1849, Lopez, a Spanish adventurer, planned an attack on Cuban

Cuba, with the object of annexing it to the United States. The expeditions.
President issued a proclamation calling upon every officer of the
Government to use every effort in his power to arrest any person
concerned in this expedition. Nevertheless, Lopez left New
Orleans on the 7th of May, 1850, in a steamer, accompanied by
two other vessels, with about 500 men on board. He landed at
Cardenas in Cuba, but was driven off by the Spanish troops, and
escaped back to the United States. He was then arrested and
brought to trial, but as the judge refused to allow delay to pro-
cure evidence, he was discharged amid the cheers of a large crowd;
he was again prosecuted at New Orleans, in July, 1850, and a
true bill was found against him, but the Government failed to
make out their case. On the 3rd of August, 1851, he again
started from New Orleans, with an expedition of 400 men; this
(o) British
Appendix, vol. iii. p. 131. U. 8. v. Beyburn, 6 Peters, 352.
(d) Wheaton, ed. Dana, p. 558. The (e) U. S. Statutes at Large,
Santa Maria, 7 Wheaton, 490; The vol. viii. p. 258.
Monte Allegre (1822), 7 Wheaton, 520;
w. 43
time he was overpowered bj the Spaniards, and executed at

Havana (/) .
In 1869, Cuba again became the destination of hostile expe-

ditions, organized in the Union. Mr. Fish, the American foreign
secretary, admitted "with regret that an unlawful expedition

did succeed in escaping from the United States, and landing on
the shores of Cuba." In the following jear, a notorious vessel,
the Hornet, was permitted to leave New York for Cuba; she was
seized several times before getting there bj both British and
American authorities, but finally managed to effect her purpose
of landing an expedition in the island (g).
Enforcement In 1896, however, shortly before the war which finally severed
of neutrality.
Cuba from Spain, the United States authorities were prompt to
seize a steamer which had been armed and fitted out in American
waters for the purpose of a hostile expedition to Cuba (h) .
Fenian
Further, to the United States must be imputed certain con-
organizations
in United
—
traventions of neutrality from the point of view of international
States. —
law and municipal law alike in regard to the hostile Irish
organizations that were permitted to be established in American
' '
territory. In 1865 the Fenian Brotherhood declared that they

were "virtually at war" with England (^). They threatened to
invade Canada, and soon afterwards sent over the frontier some
800 or 900 men, who were driven back by a Canadian detachment.
In 1868, again, the Fenian leader, O'Neill, marched in review
through Philadelphia with three regiments in uniform. In 1870
two expeditions crossed into Canada, but, being repulsed, fled
back to American territory, where they were disarmed by the
Union troops. Some of the leaders were fined and imprisoned,
but were released two or three months after (k) .
English neu- The history of the law of England on the subject must next be
trality laws.
considered. In 1721, on the occasion of a complaint being made
by the Swedish minister that certain ships of war had been built
in England, and sold to the Czar, the judges were ordered to
attend the House of Lords and deliver their opinions on the ques-
tion, whether the King of England had power to prohibit the
building of ships of war, or of great force, for foreigners, and
they answered that the king had no power to prohibit the
same (2). In 1819 the Foreign Enlistment Act was
(/) Pari. Papers, 1873 (No. 2), (i) The Irish American, Eeb. 11,
pp. 62, 63. Rep. of Neutrality Oomm. 1865.
1868, p. 34. (7c) Pari. Papers, N. America
(g) British Counter-case at Geneva, (1873), No. 2, p. 66.
p. 46. (0 Eortescue's Reports, p. 388.
(h) The Three Friends (1896), 166 Pari. Papers, N. America, No. 4
U. S. Rep. 1. (1872), p. 146.
which has already been referred to (m) Up to the American

.
Civil War, it had been occasionally invoked to prevent the enlist-

ment and despatch of soldiers from the country as well as the
equipment of ships, but the cases when it was put into force at
all are very few (n) .
In 1827, four vessels, under Count Saldanha, sailed from Ply- TheTerceira
mouth, ostensibly for Brazil, but in reality to operate agâinst

Don Miguel in Terceira. A
small force was sent in pursuit, and
intercepted them off Port Praya. Count Saldanha remonstrated
against being interfered with, but the British commander insisted
upon conducting the expedition back to Europe. Another expe-
dition that had sailed from London was afterwards similarly
stopped (o).
In 1835, the Foreign Enlistment Act was suspended, and
British subjects were allowed to enlist in a Spanish Legion, under
Sir De Lacy Evans, for the purpose of assisting the Queen of
Spain. But this was done in pursuance of the Quadruple Alliance
treaty, by which England agreed to assist the Queen of Spain (p) .
In 1846, three vessels preparing in British ports to sail against

Ecuador were seized and condemned. In 1867, a vessel alleged
to bo fitting out for the Portuguese rebels was seized, but released.
A different class of cases arose in the American Civil War, and Violations of
these are the only ones of any material importance, at the present
tralitydmSg
time. In these the ground of complaint was the fitting out of American
armed vessels for the Confederates in British ports. The depre- The Geneva
dations on American commerce caused by Confederate cruisers, Arbitration,
some of which had been fitted out in violation of British neu-

trality, caused great irritation in the Union. very prolonged A
discussion was entered into, with the view of making England pay
for thedamage done by those vessels, and the matter was finally
referred to arbitration by the treaty of Washington, 1871 (g).
The causes of complaint put forward by the United States Govern-
ment are thus summarised by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn (r).
"1. That by reason of want of due diligence on the part of Causes of
*^^
the British Government, vessels were allowed to be fitted out and ^^^^
'
equipped, in ports of the United Kingdom, in order to their being

employed in making war against the United States, and having
been so equipped, were allowed to quit such ports for that purpose.
(w) See ante, p. 645. (o) See Phillimore, iii. § 166.

(w) They are collected in a memo- (p) See ante, p. 127.
randum, by Lord Tent«rden, to the (q) See Appendix O.
Neutrality Laws Commission Report, (r) Pari. Papers, 1873, N. America
1868, pp. 38, 39, the substance of (No. 2), p. 7.
which is given above.
43(2)
"2. That vessels, fitted out and equipped for the before-men-
tioned purpose, in contravention of the Foreig'n Enlistment Act,
and being therefore liable to seizure under the Act, having gone
forth from British ports, but having afterwards returned to them,
were not seized as thej ought to have been, but, having been
allowed hospitality in such ports, were suffered to go forth again
to resume their warfare against the commerce of the United
States.
"3. That undue favour was shown in British ports to ships of
war of the Confederate Sitates, in respect of the time these ships
were permitted to remain in such ports, or of the amount of coal
with which thej were permitted to be supplied.
"4. That vessels of the Confederate States were allowed to
make British ports the base of naval operations against the ships
and commerce of the United States."
Rules of the In order to assist the arbitrators in coming to a decision, three
Treaty of
Washington . general rules "were introduced into the treaty, and, with these rules
before them, the arbitrators were directed to determine as to each
"
vessel whether Great Britain has, by any act or omission, failed
to fulfil any of the duties set forth in such rules, or recognised
by the principles of international law not inconsistent with such
rules." The rules were as follows: —
"A neutral Government is bound—
"1st. To
use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming,
or equipping within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has
reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on
war against a Power with which it is at peace; and also to use
like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any
vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel
having been specially adapted in whole or in part within such

jurisdiction, to warlike use (s).
"2nd. Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of
its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the
other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of mili-
tary supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.
"3rd. To exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters,
and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any, vio-
lation of the foregoing obligations and duties" (t).
The rides as These rules are the weak point in the whole matter. It is stated
regards inter- in the treaty "that Her Majesty's Government cannot assent to
national law.
(s) Of. Hague Convention (1907), (0 Treaty of Washington, 1871,

No. XIII. Art. 8, supra, p. 666. Art. vi. See Appendix O.
the foregoing rules as a statement of the principles of inter-

national law which were in force at the time when the claims
mentioned in Article I. arose, but that Her Majesty's Govern-
ment, in order to evince its desire of strengthening the friendly
relations between the two countries, and of making satisfactory
provision for the future, agrees that, in deciding the questions

between the two countries arising out of those claims, the
arbitrators should assume that Her Majesty's Government had
undertaken to act upon the principles set forth in these rules.
And the High Contracting Parties agree to observe these rules as
between themselves in future, and to bring them to the knowledge
of other maritime Powers, and to invite them to accede to them."
Thus England agreed that her liabilities should be judged of by
rules which she admits were not in force at the time the acts she
is
charged with were done. Another fault of the treaty lay in
its
containing no definition of "due diligence;" so that the arbi-
trators were thrown upon general principles to ascribe a meaning
to the term.
The chief cases heard by the arbitrators were as follows: — The Alabama,
The Alabama, known at first as No. 290, was built at Liverpool,
and was launched on the 15th May, 1862. She was beyond doubt
intended as a vessel of war. On the 23rd June, Mr. Adams,
American minister in England, wrote to Lord Russell that she
was about to depart, and enter the service of the Confederates.
On the 30th of June, the Law Officers of the Crown advised,
"
that if sufficient evidence can be obtained to justify proceedings
under the Foreign Enlistment Act, such proceedings should be
taken as early as possible." Up to the 15th of July, the Com-
missioners of Customs were of opinion that there was not sufficient
evidence produced to justify the seizure of the vessel. On the
other hand, Mr. Collier (afterwards Lord Monkswell) advised on
the 16th, that the vessel should be seized, and on the 23rd he gave
another opinion to the same effect. Further evid'ence was then
produced, and the opinion of the law officers was again asked, but
owing to the illness of the Queen's Advocate, to whom the evidence
was first sent, their opinion advising the detention of the vessel
was not made known till the 31st July, and on the 29th the
Alabama sailed unarmed from Liverpool. On the following day
a tug left Liverpool with thirty or forty men on board, and these
she transferred to the Alabama off Moelfra Bay. Two British
vessels, the Bahama and the Agrippina, afterwards cleared from
Liverpool and London with the armaments for the Alabama, and
they joined her at the Azores, where she was fully equipped as a
vessel of war. It must be added that the British authorities had

no knowledge at the time of the connection between these vessels
and the Alabama (u) .
Upon these facts the unanimously decided that

arbitrators
Great Britain "failed due diligence," and that "after the
to use
escape of the vessel, the measures taken for its pursuit and arrest
were so imperfect as to lead to no result, and therefore cannot be
considered sufficient to release Great Britain from the respon-
sibility already incurred." And a further ground for the decision
"
was, that the ship was on several occasions freely admitted into
the ports of colonies of Great Britain, instead of being proceeded
against as it have been" (x).

ought to
The Florida. The facts relating to the Florida are similar. She was built at
Liverpool as a ship of war under the name of the Oreto, and she
left Liverpool .unarmed . The authorities thought she was built for
the Italian Government, and she cleared for Palermo and Jamaica
in ballast. Eepresentations as to her real destination were made
to the Government by the American consul a,t Liverpool, and by
Mr. Adams, but as these were unaccompanied by what was deemed
sufficient evidence for her seizure, she was allowed to go free.
Even her crew were not aware of her real destination, and on her
arrival at Nassau, most of them insisted on being discharged.
After considerable discussion, she was seized at the Bahamas, and
proceedings were taken in the Vice-Admiralty Conrt for her con-
demnation. She wa,s, however, discharged, the judge being of
opinion that, although she had been fitted out in British territory,
yet, as she had shipped no munitions of war in the colony, and as
there was no evidence that she had been transferred to a belligerent,
he could not condemn her. In this he was mistaken. Fitted out,
equipped, or armed, within British dominions, in contravention of
the statute, a vessel becomes at once forfeited by the effect of the
statute,and becomes liable to be condemned bj proceedings in remif
taken before any competent court within whosie jurisdiction she
may be (y) The Florida (or Oreto) ought therefore to have been
.
condemned at the Bahamas. On being released, she proceeded to

Green Caj, a desert island sixty miles south of Nassau. In th,o
meantime, her armaments had been made at Liverpool, but they
were conveyed by train to Hartlepool, whence they were shipped,
and at the time it was unknown in England that these armaments
(w) See Argument of the United («) Pari. Papers, N. America, 1873
States. Pari. Papers, N. America, (No. 2), p. 3.
1872 (No. 12), pp. 59—70, from which (y) Pari. Papers, N. America, 1873
all the facts but the last have been (No. 2), p. 140.
taken.
were intended for the Florida. It was tho.ught they were simply
contraband of war; however, they were shipped on board the
Prince Alfred at Hartlepool, and transferred to the Florida at
Green Cay. At Nassau she had enlisted some men for her crew,
but not having a full complement, she went to Cardenas, in Cuba,
and endeavoured to enlist others there. This was prevented by
the authorities, and she then sailed for th|e port of Mobile, which
she contrived to enter by eluding the blockading cruisers. She
remained Mobile more than four months, and then issued as a
at
Confederate ship of war; she was afterwards admitted into several
British ports, and trea^ted as a belligerent cruiser. With regard
to this vessel, the tribunal, majority of four to one, decided
by a,
that England had failed in her duties in not preventing the ship
from leaving Liverpool, in allowing her to enlist men at Nassau,
and to be armed at Green Cay, and in afterwards receiving her
in British ports (z) .
These two Alabama and the

vessels, the were the only
Florida., other vessels
iîvo^êd.
two vessels of war built in Great Britain and actually em-
for,
ployed in, the service of the Confederates during the whole Civil
War. Four others were intended to be built a,nd equipped, but
were arrested while in the course of construction. Four merchant
vessels, though not adapted for warlike purposes, were converted
into vessels of war by ha,ving guns put on board, but out o:f the
—
jurisdiction of the British Government ^two of them in Con-
—
federate ports and this by reason of the impossibility of getting
ships of war built owing to the a,ctive vigilance of the autho^

rities(<7). It is impossible, from wa^nt of spaoe, to go into the
details relating to the other ships; it was only as regards these
two, the Alabama and the Florida^ and their tenders, and partially
as regards the Shenandoah, that the tribunal condemned England
to pay the United States a sum of ^15,500,000 in gold, as
indemnity- for the ravages committed on American commerce.

Numerous other claims were put in by the United States, such as
damages for the cost of pursuing the Southern cruisers, for the
prospective earnings of the ships destroyed, and for the double
loss incurred by the owners of the ships and ajlso by their insurers,
but these were rejected by the tribunal.
What are known as the indirect claims were dismissed by the Indirect
arbitrators at the outset of th^ proceedings. They were for:

uniTeVstates.
(1) The enhanced rates of insurance in the United States, occa-
sioned by the cruisers in question. (2) The transfer of the maritime
(z) Pari. Papers, N. America, 1873 (a) Pari. Papers, N. America, 1873
(No. 2), p. 3. (No. 2), p. 106.
commerce This was a very sore

of the United States to England.
point, but on no possible ground

could England have been called
upon to pay damages under such a head. (3) The prolongation of

the Civil War (6).
"
Certain ques- Some questions of law that Wjere involved in the Alabama
inThe^'ciDTva claims" case may be notêd. Firstly, with regard to the inter-
*
Arbitration,
pretation of the term due diligence,' the United States maintained
that it implied a diligence proportionate to the dignity and ability
of the Power called upon to exercise it, and commensurate with
the emergency or the magnitude of the results of negligence. On
"
the other hand, Great Britain contended that it meant the
measure of care which any Government was under an international
obligation to use for a given purpose"; and that no distinction
could be drawn between one Power and another in respect of
dignity or ability. Failing a clear determination of the measure
of diligence either by usage or by agreement, it must depend on
the amount of care usually manifested by a civilized Government
in matters relating to its own security and that of the governed.
The Arbitral Court, however, held that the amount of diligence
"
necessary is in exact proportion to the risks to which either of the
belligerents may be exposed from a failure to fulfil the obligations
of neutrality." Secondly, with regard to the relation between
international law and national legislation, the United States urged
that the obligation of a neutral State was prescribed primarily
by international law, which must prevail over municipal law if

there be a conflict between the two. Great Britain acknowledged
the principle as a general rule, but contended that in considering
the steps taken by a Government it is necessary to take into account
the provisions and limitations imposed by municipal law;, so long
as they are not obviously unreasonable or inadequate. The Courts
however, decided that municipal restrictions cannot be an excuse
for failure to exercise due diligence. Thirdly, Great Britain held
that vessels constructed or adapted for war in neutral territory and
found under the neutral flag were in the position of contraband;
and that when a belligerent has commissioned a vessel, she be-
comes invested with the status of a public warship, and so enjoys
the various recognised immunities of warships. But the United
States denied that the construction of warships in neutral territory
amounted merely to a sale of contraband, and expressed the vicAV
that it constituted the preparation of an instrumentality of war;
nor could an offending vessel be absolved from responsibility by
(b) Argument of the United States. Pari. Papers, N. America (No. 12),
1872, p. 165.
EIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS. 68i
reason of its having been subsequently commissioned by a belli-
gerent Power. The Court 'accepted the American contention;;

though the ruling is not regarded generally as a correct statement
of the law Lastly, the United States maintained that the grant-
.
ing of excessive hospitality to belligerent vessels in regard to coal

supply and duration of stay was evidence that the neutral territory^
was used as a base of operations. But Great Britain held that to
constitute a place a base of operations, there must be a continuous
use, or a use as a point of departure as well as of return. The
questions relating to the supply of fuel and provisions, to repairs
and duration of stay are now regulated by the Haûe Eules (c) .
The controversy between Great Britain and the United States, Royal Com-
^*
.
° from the fittinsr
resulting
,
° out of certain Confederate cruisers in ôTJ^^
1868 on neu-
^ ^
British ports, drew attention to some defects in the Foreign Enlist- trality laws.
ment Act of 1819. Accordingly, a Eoyal Commission was

appointed in 1868 to inquire into the working of the Act. This
Commission suggested several alterations in the law. They added
in their report: "In making the foregoing recomlnendations, we
have not felt ourselves bound to conside'r whether we were exceed-
ing what could actually be requited by international law, but we
are of opinion that if those recommendations should be adopted,
the municipal law of this realm available for the enforcement of
neutrality will derive increased efficiency., and will^ so far as we can

see, have been brought into full conformity with your Majesty's
international obligations "(<?) In accordance with this report,
.
a new Foreign Enlistment Act was passed in 1870 (e) Foreign .
Very malerial changes were thus introduced, and the hands of f ^f ^J^yô'*^
the executive greatly strengthened. It is now an offence to build
or cause to be built, ol: to equip or despatch, or to cause or allow to
be despatched, any ship, with intent or knowledge, ot having
reasonable cause to believe that the same will be employed in the
service of any foreign State at war with any friendly State (/) .
Thus, all question as to intent is now done away with. If the

Secretary of State, or the chief executive authority in any place,
is satisfied that there is reasonable and
probable cause for believing
(e)On the " Alabama claims " and the American point of view) Gushing,
tlieGeneva Arbito-ation, see Case of Treaty of Washington ; and of the
Great Britain (with Appendix) Pari. ; arbitration proceedings, Moore, Inter-
Papers, N. America (1872); Case of national Arbitrations, vol. i. 495 seq.;
United States; Papers relating to the (Jobbett, Cases, pp. 320 seq.
Treaty of Washington, 1872—3. For (d) Eeport of Neutrality Laws
convenient summaries of the contro- Commission, p. 7.
I8618,
versy, see (from the British point of (e) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 90. See Ap-
view) Bernard, The Neutrality of pendix A.
Great Britain during the American (/) Section 8.
Civil War (London, 1870), and (from
that a ship in Her Majesty's dominions is being built or equipped
contrary to the Act, and is about to be taken beyond such

dominions, they may seize and search the ship, and detain it until
condemned or released by a court of law. The owner may apply
to the Court of Admiralty for its release, but it is then incumbent
on him to prove that the Act has not been contravened a —
reversal of ordinary procedure which assumes a man innocent until
he has been proved guilty {g) These a;re certainly great changes,
.
but whether they are as great improvements is not so certain. The

Act goes far beyond what international law requires. It creates
— —
a neAv crime that of building and makes British subjects liable
to penalties for certain acts which are lawful by the law of nations,
and by all other municipal laws. It places the shipbuilding trade
of this country at a disadvantage, as compared with that of the
rest of the world (h) .
Cases under The Act has been put in force several times since it was passed.
the Act —
The Gauntlet. During the Franco-German war, a French vessel of war captured
a Prussian ship in the English Channel, and manned her with a
prize crew. The prize was driven into the Downs by stress of
weather, and while there, the French consul at Dover engaged a
steam-tug to tow the prize to Dunkirk Roads. The tug did so,
and OR her return was proceeded against for a violation of the
Act. The Privy Council (reversing the decision of the Admiralty
Court) held, that towing the prize into French waters was
despatching a ship within the meaning of section 8, and accord-
ingly condemned the tug to the Crown (i) .
The Inter- In another case during the same war, an English company con-
national,
tracted with the French Government to lay down some telegraph
lines on the French coast. They were to complete the communica-
tion between Dunkirk and Verdun. The company shipped the
wires on to a specially constructed vessel, but when she was about
to start the Secretary of State seized her. Tho ship was, how-
ever, releasedby the Admiralty Court, it being proved that the
undertaking was of a purely commercial character, and that though
Franco might partially use the lines for military purposes, this
would not divest the transaction of its primary comtnercial
character (k) .
The Salvador. It is an offence against the Act to supply a vessel to

insurgents.
Thus, a British vessel employed as a transport or store-ship in the
service of the Cuban insurgents, who, though not
recognised as
(ff)Section 23. (0 The Gauntlet, L. R. 4 P. 0. 184.

(h) Report of Neutrality Laws (Jc) The International (1871), L.R.
Oomm. pp. 9 and 10. 3 A. & E. 321.
belligerents, had formed themselves into a body of people acting

together, and undertaking and conducting hostilities, was con-
demned bj the Privy Council, under the Act of 1819 (l).
In 1886, one Sandoval was indicted under the 8th and 11th The Justuia.
sections of the Act. It appeared that Sandoval was a foreigner,

but that while residing in England, he purchased at Sheffield two
Krupp guns, and at Birmingham a quantity of ammunition, and
that he then caused the guns and ammunition to be shipped on
board a trading ship for Antwerp, where they arrived, and where
at the same time arrived the J(ustitia, which had been purchased
also in England by another person in the name of that other's
valet The JnsUtia was then loaded at Antwerp with the guns and
.
ammunition. She took on board a number of generals and

Sandoval, who asserted himself to be the commander, and sailed
with "machinery for mines," and papers for Trinidad. Not
being permitted to enter port at Trinidad, she sailed towards
Grenada, and then the valet executed a transfer of the ship to one
of the generals, whereupon the British flag was hauled down, and
the Venezuelan flag hoisted, the guns were mounted, the boasts
swung out-board, and boats full of armed men taken in tow. The
Justitia —re-named the Liberata—^proceeded along the Venezuelan
coast, had an engagement with a Venezuelan war-vessel, fired at
some forts and a custom-house, and finally went to St. Domingo,
where she was seized by the authorities. The object appeared
to be to assist certain persons who were engaged in a rebellion
against the Venezuelan Government. The indictment under sect. 8

was clearly not sustainable; but the jury found that Sandoval,
when he purchased the arms and ammunition in England, knew
and expressly intended that they should form part of a naval expe-
dition which was being prepared to proceed
against a foreign
friendly State, and that the purpose intended at the time of the
respective purchases was to assist in a hostile expedition against a
foreign friendly State. Upon these findings, a verdict of guilty
was directed against Sandoval, and judgment accordingly. An
application for a new trial failed, and the prisoner was afterwards
sentenced to fine and imprisonment (m) .
In the case of Reg. v. Jameson and others, arising out of the The Jameson
notorious Eaid, the Court held, on sect. 11 of the ^^^^•
J'oreign Enlist-
ment Act, that if there be an unlawful preparation of an expedition
by some person within Her Majesty's dominions, any British sub-
(0 The Salvador (1870), L. R. 3 (m) Reg. w. Sandoval, 5^1^. T. 62Q;

P. C. 218. And see Burton v. Pin- 16 Cox, C. C. 206; 3 T. L. R. 411,
herton, L. R. 2 Ex. 340. 436, 498.
ject who such preparation will be guilty of an offence

assists in
even though he renders the assistance from a place outside Her
Majesty's dominions (n). It will be remembered that Dr. Jame-
son, Sir John Willoughby, 'and others of the officers proceeded
against were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment for their
invasion of the Transvaal territory.
Enforcing There can be no doubt that the Act of 1870 is in excess of what
when in ex- international law requires as the duty of a neutral. Thus, the
cess of inter-
question arises whether a belligerent can claim, as of right, th;e
putting in force of such a municipal law in his behalf, and make
the omission to do so a ground of grievance. Lord Chief Justice
Cockburn answers this as follows: "When a — Government makes
its municipal law more stringent than the obligations of inter-
national law would require, it does so, not for the benefit of
foreign States, but for its own protection, lest the acts of its
subjects in overstepping the confines, oftentimes doubtful, of strict
right, in transactions of which a few circumstances, more or less,
may alter the character, should compromise its relations with other
nations. . . . Now
quite clear that the obligations of
it is
the neutral State spring out of, and are determined by, the prin-
ciples and rules of international law, independently of the

municipal law of the neutral. They would exist exactly the same,
though the neutral State had no municipal law to enable it to
enforce the duties of neutrality on its subjects. It would obviously
afford no answer on the part of a neutral Government to a com-
plaint of a belligerent of an infraction of neutrality that its

municipal law was insufficient to enable it to ensure the observance
of neutrality by its subjects; the reason being that international
law, not the municipal law of the particular country, gives the
only measure of international rights and obligations. While,
therefore, on the one hand, the municipal law, if not co-extensive
with the international law, will afford no excuse to the neutral^
so neither on the other, if in excess of what international obliga-
tions exact, will it afford any right to the belligerent which
international law would fail to give him" (o). Both belligerents
must of course be treated equally in this respect. Partiality
towards one will give the other a ground of complaint.
In 1883, during the tension produced between France and
China by affairs in Tonquin, the German Government refused to
allow three war vessels built at Stettin for the Chinese Govern-
(«) Eeff. v. Jameson, (1H96) 2 Q.B. (o) Reasons for dissenting from
425. Geneva Award. Pari. Papers, N.
America, 1873 (No. 2), p. 29.
ment tosail (;p) In February, 1904, on the outbreak of hostilities

.
between Russia and Japan, Germany, contrary to her previous

practice, issued a proclamation of neutrality.
It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast line separating Distinction
commercial transactions in munitions of war, and the organizing commercial
of hostile expeditions. International law is necessarily incapable and hostile
of being defined and laid down with the precision attainable by
municipal law. The question is one of intent with regard to the

destination or use of any vessel involved It is the duty therefore
.
of a neutral Government to exercise due diligence in ascertaining

the real character and purpose of the transaction. The essential
elements of a hostile expedition are difficult to define. There
must be, in the first place, a combination of men organized on
neutral territory; secondly, there must be an arrangement for
the use of armament; thirdly, there must be an intention to
proceed against a friendly State (q) Bernard thus describes the

.
nature of a hostile enterprise: ''If at the time of its departure

—
there be the means of doing any act of war if those means, or
any of them, have been procured and put together in the neutral
port— and if there be the intention to use them (which may always
be taken for granted when they are in the hands of the belli-
gerents), the neutral port may be justly said to serve as a base
or point of departure for a hostile expedition" (r).
In 1870, during the Franco-German war, a French steamer,
the Lafayette, left New Yorkwith a large number of French
conscripts on board, together with a cargo of munitions of war
destined for France. The Prussian Government protested against
the permitted departure of the vessel; but the United States
Government declined to interfere on the ground that the conscripts
did not constitute an organized force, and that the munitions of
war were simply contraband, whose despatch by subjects a neutral
Power is not bound to prevent.
In November, 1898, in a port of the United States, a body of Wiborg v.
^^*^^» 'S';^^^*.
men went on board a tug loaded with arms, and were taken by
it thirty or forty miles and out to sea they met a steamer outside
;
the three-mile limit prior arrangement, boarded her with the

by
arms, opened the boxes and distributed the arms among them-
selves; they drilled to some extent, were apparently officered,
and then, as preconcerted, disembarked to effect an armed landing
on the coast of Cuba, then belonging to Spain, with which country
Annual Register, 1883, p. 366.

(j)) (r) M. Bernard, Neutrality of Great
{q] Of. H. Taylor, Treatise on Britain, p. 399.
International Law (1901), p. 679.
the United States were at peace It was held that this constituted
.
a military expedition or enterprise within the provisions of the
Neutrality Act (s) .
Due diligence A Government is not responsible for every possible hostile act
that may take place in its territory. ,S'o long as it takes all
reasonable precautions to prevent hostile acts, and exercises due
diligence in enforcing these precautions, a belligerent has no just
ground of complaint, even if its neutrality is violated The dif- .
"
ficulty is to ascertain what constitutes "due diligence." The
maximum of precaution," says M. Tetens, "in this case, is to
maintain and enforce the observance of neutrality in vessels and
cargoes, with the same diligence and exactness as are exercised
in inquiries and other proceedings relative to taxes, or imposts
and customs He who does as much to prevent a wrong meditated
.
against another, as he does for his own protection, satisfies every

just and reasonable expectation on the part of that other" (t).
It is advisable during war for a neutral to make special regula-
tions for his subjects, but this cannot be demanded by a belli-
gerent as a matter of right. All he can demand is, that the

neutral, by whatever means he thinks proper, should, bond fide^
do his best to prevent violations of his neutrality.
"
Impartiality A neutral Power must apply to the two belligerents impartially
of neutral
Power. the conditions, restrictions, or prohibitions issued by it in regard
Belliarerent
to the admission into its ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters, of
neutral ports. belligerent warships or of their prizes.
Nevertheless, a neutral Power may forbid any particular belli-
gerent vessel which h-as failed to conform to the orders and regu-
lations made by it, or which has violated neutrality, to enter its
"
ports and roadsteads (u).
This Article does not, of course, interfere with the right of a
neutral State to prohibit belligerent warships generally from enter-
ing its ports.
Right of An opinion is expressed by some earlier jurists, that belligerent

asylum in
neutral ports cruisers not only are entitled to seek an asylum and
hospitality
dependent on in neutral ports, but have a right to bring in and sell their
the consent prizes
of the neutral within those ports. But there seems to be nothing in the estab-
State.
lished principles of the customary law of nations that can prevent
the neutral State from withholding the exercise of this
privilege
"
(s) Wiborg v. United States (18%), diligence advanced before the Greneva
163 U. S. Rep. 632. Arbitration Tribunal, supra, p. 650 .
{f) See Reddie, Researches in Mari- (w) Hague Convention (1907),

time and International Law, vol. ii. No. XIII. Art. 9.
p. 203. Of. the arguments as to "due
impartially from all the belligerent Powers; or even from granting

it to one of them, and refusing it to others, where stipulated by
treaties existing previous to the war. The usage of nations, as

testified in their marine ordinances, sufficiently shows that this is
a rightful exercise of the sovereign authority which every State

possesses, to regulate the police of its own sea-ports, and to pre-
serve the public peace within its own territory. But the absence
of a positive prohibition implies a permission to enter the neutral
ports for the purposes of asylum and hospitality {x) Thus, in .
The Exchange v. McFadden (1812), Chief Justice Marshall, de-

livering the judgment of the American Supreme Court, said that
the jurisdiction of every nation within its own territory is of
necessity exclusive and absolute, and is subject to no limitation

save that imposed by itself. Hence it may for reasons of State
close all or any of its ports against vessels of war generally, and
for this purpose express notice is usually given. In default of
such prohibition the ports of a friendly nation are considered to be
open to the public ships of all Powers with which it is at peace (t/) .
On the outbreak of a maritime war, neutral States generally English rules,

make some rules on this subject. During the American Civil War,
England prohibited all ships of war and privateers of either party
from using any port or waters subject to British jurisdiction, as a
station or place of resort for any warlike purpose, or for obtaining
any facilities of warlike equipment; and no vessel of war or

privateer of one belligerent was to be permitted to leave any
British port, from which any vessel of the other belligerent
(whether a ship of war or a merchant vessel) should have pre-
viously departed, until twenty -four hours after the departure of the
latter. Any ship of war or privateer of either belligerent entering
British waters was to be required to depart within twenty-four
hours, except in case of stress of weather, or of requiring repairs,
or necessaries for the crew. As soon as she was repaired, or had
obtained her necessary stores, she was to be required to depart
forthwith. Nothing but provisions requisite for the subsistence
of the crew, and so much coal as would carry the ship to the
nearest port of her own country, or to some nearer destination, were
to be supplied to ships of war or privateers; the coal only to be
supplied once in three months to the same ship, unless this was
relaxed by special permission (z) Similar rules were put in force
.
(x) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. (y) The Exchange v. McFadden

lib.i. cap. 15. Vattel, liv. iii. ch. 7, (1812), 7 Oranch, 116.
§ 132. Valin, Conun. sur I'Ordonn. {z) Earl Eussell to the Admiralty,
de la Marine, torn. ii. p. 272. &;c. London Gazette, Dec. 15th, 1863.
688 EIGHTS OF WAE AS TO NEUTEALS.
during Franco-German war, 1870-1 {a), in the Spanish-

the
American war of 1898, and in the Eusso- Japanese war of 1904.
The rule in this latter case limited the supply of coal to "so much
only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the nearest port of
"
her own country, or to some nearer named neutral destination (&) .
And the 1904 regulations marked a further advance over their
predecessors in that they made it clear that the Foreign Enlistment

Act extended to all the dominions of His Majesty, including the
adjacent territorial waters, and that the rule compelling them to
leave British waters within twenty-four hours Avas specifically
applied to those vessels which were then in port, instead of only

to those which might come into port after the issue of the pro-
clamation (c) The hostilities between France and China in
.
1884-5 were conducted without any formal declaration of war.

Complaints were made in Parliament that, although the French
operations were chiefly injurious to British merchants, the French
warships were suffered to use Hong Kong as, practically, their
base of operations. Early in 1885, however, Great Britain decided
to regard the French notification of the blockade of Formosa as
equivalent to a declaration of war. Permission to refit was, con-

sequently, denied to the Triomphante when she arrived at Hong
Kong; but she was allowed, as were other ships in like circum-
stances, to take on board sufficient coal to carry her to the nearest
French port, Saigon (d) .
Rules of other The

practices of other countries varied considerably. Thus,
during the American Civil War France prohibited all ships of war
or privateers of either party from remaining in her ports with
prizes for more than twenty -four hours, except in case of imminent
perils of the sea. No prize goods were permitted to be sold in
French territory (e). Prussia remained content with ordering her
subjects not to engage in the equipment of privateers, and to obey
the general rules of international law (/) The Belgian rule com-
.
manded all privateers to depart immediately, unless prevented by

absolute necessity. The Dutch regulation was the same. Neither
country made any provision as regards ships of war (g) In the .
subsequent wars between Brazil and Paraguay, and Spain and

Chile, Holland prohibited ships of war or privateers, with prizes,
(a) Lord Granville to Admiralty, see an article in the Revue de Droit

&c. London Gazette, 19th July, 1870. International (1903), p. 488, by Taka-
"
(6) London Gazette, Peb. 11th, hashi, Hostilites entre la France et
1904. la Chine."
(o) See, for the whole proclamation, (e) Rep. Neutrality Laws Comni.
Appendix A. 1868, p. 69.
(d) The Times, •29th Dec. 1884; (/) Ibid. p. 70.
Annual Register, 1885, p. 331. And ((/) Ibid. p. 70.
EIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTEALS. 689
from entering or refitting' in her harbours, unless overtaken

by
evident necessity. Ships of war without prizes might, however,
remain an unlimited time in Dutch harbours, and provide them-
selves with an unlimited supply of coal, the Government reserving
to themselves the right of limiting their stay to twenty-four hours,
should this be deemed advisable . When ships of both parties were
in any harbour at the same time, one was not to be allowed to
depart until twenty-four hours after the other (h) Japan adopted .
what was practically the British twenty -four hours' rule, as far
back as 1870 (i). In the Russo-Japanese war the Scandinavian
countries closed some of their ports and inlets to both belligerents'
warships, with the exception of hospital ships and vessels in dis-

tress. There was thus no uniform practice established, but the
rule that when two hostile ships of war meet in a neutral port, the
local authorities were to detain one till twenty-four hours after
the departure of the other, was very general in practice. It was
found to be a very reasonable rule; and with the almost universal
use of steam on ships of war, the limit of twenty-four hours gave
ample time for the vessel that started first to get out of reach of
the other if desirous of doing so.
The rule of twenty-four hours' stay and that of twenty-four Neutral

hours' interval now form part of the conventional law of nations "^^^ ^* ^*
which, as we shall see presently, has replaced the former varying

usages by a uniform system. In the meantime, suffice it to say
that, in regard to the reception or exclusion of belligerent warships
on the part of neutral Powers, the essential point exemplified in —
recent practice and now explicitly required by Article 9 of the
thirteenth Convention of the Hague
— is that whatever regulations
are made shall be applied to the belligerents concerned with strict
impartiality .
"
The neutrality of a Power is not affected by the mere passage
through its territorial waters of warships or prizes belonging to
"
belligerents (k).
As to straits connecting two open seas, there is ^ widespread
opinion that they ought never to be closed. The present Article
left the question open, which depends therefore on the general law
of nations.
"
A. neutral Power may allow belligerent warships to employ its
"
licensed pilots (I).
(A) Ibid. p. 63. ac) No. XIII. (1907), Art. 10.

(t) Takahashi, in the Eevue de (l) Art. 11.
Droit International, 1901, p. 264.
w. 44
No obligation, of course, lies on the neutral State to supplj

pilots. It would seem, on principle, that neutral pilots employed
by belligerent warships should confine their services to the neutral
territorial waters.
"
Twenty-four In default of special provisions to the contrary in the legislation
ours 8 ay.
^^ ^ neutral Power, belligerent warships are forbidden to remain
in the ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of the said Power
for .more than twenty-four hours, except in the cases covered by
"
the present convention (m).
"
If a Power which has been informed of the outbreak of hos-
tilitieslearns that a belligerent warship is in one of its ports or
roadsteads, or in its territorial waters, it must notify the said ship

to depart within twenty -four hours or within the time prescribed
"
by the local law (n).
"
A belligerent warship may not prolong its stay in a neutral port
beyond the time permitted except on account of damage or stress
of weather. It must depart as soon as the cause of the delay is at
an end. The regulations as to the length of time which suoih
vessels may remain in neutral ports, roadsteads, or waters, do not
apply to warships .devoted exclusively to religious, scientific, or

"
philanthropic purposes (o).
'
" "
The rule of twenty-four hours' stay is knovm in international
practice for about half a century. It was first adopted by Great
Britain in 1862, in order to prevent an abuse of neutral

hospitality; and it was enforced by the United
subsequently
States as well as by Great Britain. The rule was then adopted
also by other maritime Powers, e.g., Italy, Scandinavia, Holland,
Denmark; but it was not at first formally recognised by Franoe,

Germany, and Russia., The Suez Canal Convention, 1888, and
the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 1901, as to the Panama Canal made
provision for a twenty -four hours' stay, save in case of distress.

In 1904, on the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan, China
issued neutrality regulations, including the twenty -four hours'
rule subject to specified exceptions. At this time the Mandjur.o.
Russian warship, was stationed at Shanghai. Accordingly, Japan
requested China to insist on the departure of the vessel, or to
disarm and intern her. She was therefore disniantled and her
crew were sent back to Russia, after giving an undertaking to take
no part in the hostilities against Japan (p) China took similar
.
measures, at the instance of Japan, in the case of Russian trans-
Cm) Art. 12.

-
(i^) Crf. Takahashi, pp. 418 seq.;

(n) Art. 13. Cobbett, Cases, p. 350.
(o) Art. 14.
ports and had taken refuge at Woosung (q)

colliers that Ger- .
many, adopted the practice as against Russian warships enter-

too,
ing Kiao-chow; thus, the Novik, being seaworthy, was required

to leave within twentj-four hours, whilst the Czarevitch and other
vessels, being unseaworthj, were dismantled and interned with

their crews till the end of the war (r) . France acted likewise in
the case of the Russian cruiser Dicma that sought asjlum at
Saigon.
It is to be noted that Article 12 draws no distiuiCtion bet 'ween
belligerent warships that are on the way to the scene of the war
and those that seek refuge to escape capture. Moreover, the
Article provides the limit of twenty-four hours only in case the
legislation of the neutral State has not determined otherwise. Such

legislation may therefore allow a longer stay to belligerent war-
ships; but having regard to recent practice, it is probable that a
sojourn of twenty -four hours will become the invariable rule.
"
In default of special provisions to the contrary in the legislation Number of
of a neutral Power, the maximum number of warships belonging
ârsHpsî
to a belligerent which may be in one of the ports or roadsteads of neutral ports,
that Power simultaneously shall be three" (s).
"When warships belonging to both belligerents are present The rule of
^^^
simultaneously in a neutral port or roadstead, a period of not less ^^J'
than twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of the interval,
ship belonging to one belligerent and the departure of the ship
belonging to the other.
The order of departure is determined by the order of arrival,
unless the ship that arrived first is so circumstanced that an exten-
sion of its stay is permissible.
A belligerent warship may not leave a neutral port or roadstead
until twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship
"
flying the flag of its adversary (t).
This rule of twenty -four hours' interval dates from the middle
of the eighteenth century. Like the rule of twenty -four hours'
stay, itwas adopted by Great Britain in the American Civil War —
for example, in the case of the Tuscarora and the Nashville and —
Avas incorporated in the Suez Canal Convention (1888), as well as
in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (1901) between Great Britain and
the United States relative to the Panama Canal. It is to be
observed that the interval is not limited by the Article to twenty-
four hours . It is only the minimum amount that is fixed The .
(q) Ibid. pp. 435 seq. (s) Art. 15.

(r) Ibid. pp. 447 seq. As to in- (t) Art. 16.
ternment, see infra. Art. 24.
44 (2)
neutral Power may therefore allow a longer period according to

the circumstances of each case, provided impartial treatment is
meted out to both belligerents.
Repairs in "In neutral ports and roadsteads belligerent warships may carry
neutra ports.
^^^ ^^|^^ ^^^j^ repairs as are absolutely necessary to render them
seaworthy, and may not add in any manner whatever to their
fighting force. The local authorities of the neutral Power shall
decide what repairs are necessary, and these must be carri.ed out
"
with the least possible delay (u).
This Article draws no distinction between unseaworthiness
caused by fighting and that brought about by other means, e.g.^
'acts of God.' It constitutes, in a sense, an exception to the rule
that neutrals may not assist belligerent ships of war in carrying on
their warlike operations. Although such ships of war may not
purchase arms or ammunition, or recruit men, in the neutral port>
yet they maybe repaired and provisioned in it This is in reality

.
assisting the belligerent; for the cruiser in fact refits herself for
war by repairing her engines, quite as much as by repairing her

gun-carriages. But she is allowed to do the one and not the
other (v) .The reason for permitting her to be refitted seems to
be, that unless this were allowed she might be unable to leave the
neutral port. It would be inhuman to compel her to go to sea
without provisions, or in an unseaworthy state; yet the neutral
State, in permitting her to enter its harbour, does not bargain that
she shall remain there for a prolonged or for an indefinite period.
During the Eusso-Japanese war, two Russian warships, the

Askold and the Grozovoi, having suffered in an engagement, pro-
ceeded to the port of Shanghai, August 13, 1904. Here they
exceeded the length of time fixed by the local regulations, but
claimed a longer stay in order to effect repairs Japan protested
.
against using a neutral port as an asylum after defeat and carry-

ing out repairs for warlike purposes, and therefore called upon
China to give them a limited time for necessary repairs or to dis-
mantle and intern them if they remained thereafter. As these
demands were not satisfactorily fulfilled, Japan despatched an
ultimatum to China, requiring the immediate disarmament of
the vessels, the cessation of military repairs, and the internment
of the vessels and crews. These requirements were eventually
complied with (x) .
In the same war, a Russian auxiliary cruiser, the Lena, entered

San Francisco harbour in order to repair her engines and boilers .
(w) Art. 17. p. 400.

(v) Bernard, Neutrality of England, (a;) Takahashi, pp. 429 seg^
The American naval authorities inspected the vessel and found

that the repairs would take six weeks and would restore her fight-
ing power. Accordingly, it was decided to allow the repairs
subject to the vessel's disarmament and internment till the end of
the war (?/).
Again, the Eussian cruisers, Aurora, Oleg, and Zamtchug,

having put into Manila, after the battle of Tsushima, requested
a prolonged stay for repairing injuries suffered in an engagement.
Permission was refused, and the vessels were detained till the
conclusion of the war {z) .
"
Belligerent warships may not make use of neutral ports, road- Increase of
*
steads, or territorial waters for replenishing or increasing their ^^^
supplies of war material or their armament, "or for completing
"
their crews (a).
This Article is substantially a reproduction of the latter part
of the second rule in the Treaty of Washington (&).

"
Belligerent warships may only reviotual in neutral ports or Supplying
roadsteads to bring up their supplies to the peace standard. andûeL^
Similarly these vessels may only take sufficient fuel to enable
them to reach the nearest port in theirown country. They may,
however, fill
up their bunkers built to carry fuel, in neutral coun-
tries which have adopted this method of determining the amount
of fuel to be supplied.
law of the neutral Power, the ships
If, in accordance with the
are not supplied with coal within twenty-four hours of their
arrival, the duration of their permitted stay is extended by
"
twenty-four hours (c).
"
Belligerent warships which have taken fuel in a port belonging
to a neutral Power may not replenish their supply in a port of
"
thesame Power within the succeeding three months {d).
Formerly a neutral Power was not required by the law of
nations to impose restrictions on belligerent warships with regard
to the purchase of provisions, coal, and other supplies other than
arms and munitions of war. So long as the neutral supplied
both parties equally, neither had any right to complain (e) .
A new departure was made by Great Britain during the

American Civil War, when, as we have seen, the belligerent war-
ships were permitted to receive only provisions necessary for the
(y) Ibid. p. 455. {d) Art. 20.

(c) Takahashi, p. 452;
Hershey, (e) Cf. Ortolan, Diplomatie de la
Russo-Japanese War, pp. 209 seq. Mer, torn. ii. p. 283. British Oounter-
(») Art. 18. case at Geneva; Pari. Papers, N.
lb) See su^ra, p. 676. America (IST^), No. 4, p. 13.
io) Art. 19.
subsistence of the crew, and such an amount of coal as would
carry them to the nearest port of their own country or to

some
nearer destination; and they were prohibited from obtaining,
without special permission, a further supply from any British
port within three months. Other Powers adopted this practice,
in some cases with certain modifications. In the Russo-Jjapanese
war the British regulations were made more stringent, whilst the
French rules allowed much latitude. The Dutch regulations,
with regard to the use of the ports of the Netherlands Indies,
prohibited, inter alia, a stay longer than twenty-four hours, as
well as the taking of more provisions or fuel than was necessary
to carry the vessel to the nearest port of her country, no further
supply being allowed within three months (/) Accordingly,
.
when the Terek, a Russian cruiser, entered the port of Batavia

in June, 1905, she was permitted to remain the length of time
fixedand ship coal. The amount taken in the twenty-four hours
was not enough for navigating the vessel, and as an extended
stay was refused, and the commander declined to leave the port
with so little coal, she was disarmed and detained till the end
of the war {g) .
At the Hague Conference there was much difference of opinion

on the subject of fuel supply to belligerent warships in neutral
ports. Great Britain, backed by the United States, Japan, and
other Powers, advocated the practice that had been adopted by
several States for half a century, whereby (as we have seen) so
much fuel should be allowed as would take the vessel to the nearest
"
port of her own country, or some nearer named neutral des-
tination." But France, Germany, and Russia urged that belli-
gerent vessels should be allowed to ship a normal peace supply.
"The result," says an able American international jurist, "was-
a compromise which cannot be regarded as satisfactory. The
supply of coal in any quantity in neutral waters to a modern
battle fleet or warship engaged on an errand of destruction would
seem to be a violation of the fundamental principles of neutrality.
But the discussion of this question is usually coloured by a sense
of national interest. Thus, the main source of the Continental
opposition to the limitation or prohibition of the supply of coal to
belligerent warships in neutral ports lies in the fact that most
of these States are poorly supplied with coaling stations as com-
pared with Great Britain. But, whatever the motive, there can
(/) For the regulations of various (Foreign Eelations), 58th Congress,

States, see U. S. House Documents .
—
3rd Session, 1904 5, pp. 14 seq.
(g) Takahashi, p. 457.
be no doubt tbat British practice in this matter approaches most

nearly the ideal or theoretical requirements" {h).
"
A
prize may only be brought into a neutral port on account Prizes in
^^^ ^* ^^^ ^'
of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or provisions.
It mu«t leave as soon as the circumstances which justified its
entry. are at an end. If it does not, the neutral Power must

order it to leave at once; should it fail to obey, the neutral Power
must employ the means at its disposal to release it with its officers
"
and crew and to intern the prize crew (^).
"
A neutral Power must, similarly, release a prize brought into
one of its ports under circumstances other than those referred
"
to in Article 21 (A;).
''
A neutral Power may allow prizes to enter its ports and road-
steads, whether under convoy or not, when they are brought there
to be sequestratedpending the decision of a Prize Court. It may
have the prize taken to another of its ports.
If the prize is convoyed by a warship, the prize crew may go
on board the convoying ship.
If the prize is not under convoy, the prize crew are left at
Hberty"(0.
According customary law of nations a neutral State was
to the Prizes
permitted, though not obliged, to admit the prizes taken by British ports,
belligerents in its ports, and keep them there until they were
condiemned and sold. In the earlier part of the nineteenth cen-
tury there was not infxequently, in this respect, considerable
abuse of the rights and obligations of neutrality. To remedy
this condition of things, neutral States made from time to time
restrictive regulations, which were by no means uniform. A
definite policy of exclusion was then adopted by Great Britain.
During the American Civil War a captor, who brought his prizes
into British waters, was to be requested to depart and remove
such prizes immediately. A vessel bond fide converted into a
ship of war was, however, not to be deemed a prize. In case of
stress of weather, or other extreme and unavoidable necessity, the
necessary time for removing the prize was to be allowed If the .
prize Avas not removed by the prescribed time, or if the capture

was made in violation of British jurisdiction, the prize was to
be detained until Her Majesty's pleasure should be made known.
Cargoes were to be subject to the same rules as prizes (m). A
(Ji) Hershey, Essentials of Inter- (Jc) Art. 22.
national Public Law (1912), p. 473 (0 Art. 23.
note. Xm) Circular to Governors of
(J) Hague Convention (1907), Colonies, 2nd June, 1864.
No. XIII. Art. 21.
subsequent order provided that no ship of war of either belligerent

should be allowed tcr remain in a British port for the purjDOse
of being dismantled or sold {n) .
During the Franco-German war of 1870 — 1, armed ships of

either partj were interdicted from carrying prizes made by them
into the ports, harbours, roadsteads, or waters of the United
Kingdom, orany of Her Majesty's colonies or possessions abroad.

A similar rule was made in 1898 and 1904 (o).
The British practice of prohibiting the entry of belligerent
prizes, except in case of distress, is followed by several States,
e.g., Italy, Japan. Other Powers, such as France, Spain, Brazil,
retain the earlier rule of twenty-four hours' stay, which was
embodied, too, in the Suez Canal Convention (1888), and the
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in regard to the Panama Canal (1901).
Article 23 of the thirteenth Convention leaves it to the discretion
of a neutral Power as to whether prizes may remain in its ports
pending adjudication. It was thought at the Hague Conference
that the application of this Article would obviate or minimize
the destruction of prizes. Whether this object be ever realised
or not, there is no doubt that the provision is not only contrary
to the previous predominating practice, but is also objectionable
on principle (p) .
Prizes fitted Prizes are frequently armed and fitted out as vessels of war.
out as ships
of war. After condemnation there is no doubt that the captors may so
dispose of the prize; but if this is done before condemnation,
although it infringes the owner's rights, it does not seem a settled

point what view of the matter neutrals should take, as to admit-
ting the ship into their ports. The neutral may inquire into the
antecedents of the ship, and if she proves to be an uncondemned
prize may detain her, if orders have been given that prizes are
not to enter the neutral po,rts (g), but it is uncertain whether the
omission of this inquiry is a violation of neutrality, and will
give any ground of complaint to the other belligerent. In 1863,
the United States merchant-ship Conrad was captured by the
The Tusca- Alabama. Her name was changed to the Tuscaloosa, and an
loosa
officer and ten men, with two rifle twelve-pounder
guns, were put
on board, but her cargo of wool was not unshipped. She was
then taken to the Cape of Good Hope, and the captain of the
(jn) London Gazette, 9tli Sept. 1864. (^) Cf. Higgins, The Hague Con-
(o) Lord Granville to Admiralty, ferences, pp. 478 seq.
&c. London Gazette, 19tli July, 1870. {q) Opinion of Law Officers of the
Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, xxi. Crown. British Appendix to ca«se at
p. 834. Lord Lansdowne to Admiralty. Geneva, vol. ii. p. 323.
London Gazette, Feb. 10th, 1904.
Alabama requested that she should be admitted into Simon's Bay

as a tender of his vessel —in other words, as a ship of war. The
United States Consul protested agâinst her admission on the
ground that she had not been duly condemned, and that, being
a prize, she was debarred from entering British ports under the
neutrality regulations. The Attorney-General of the Colony,
however, gave as his opinion that she had been sufficiently set
it
forth as a vessel of war to justify the local authorities in admit-
ting her as such, and that her real character could only be deter-
mined in the courts of the captor's country. She was, therefore,
allowed to enter the port and obtain provisions. On the 26th
December, 1863, the Tuscaloosa again put into Simon's Bay,
and was this time seized by the local authorities. This, however,
was considered unjustifiable by the home Government. Whatever
the character of the ship might have been during her first visit,
she was treated as a ship of war, and was, therefore, entitled to
expect the same treatment again, unless she received due warning
that a different course would be pursued. Accordingly, orders
were sent out to release and deliver her up to some Confederate
officer, but in point of fact she was detained by the local autho-
rities till the conclusion of the war, and then delivered up to the
United States (r) .
"
internment
notwithstanding the notification of the neutral Power, a
If,
belligerent warship does not leave a port where it is not entitled vessels,
to remain, the neutral Power is entitled to take such measures
as considers necessary to render the ship incapable af putting
it
to sea so long as the war lasts, and the commanding officer of

the ship must facilitate the execution of such measures.
When a belligerent ship is detained by a neutral Power, thei
and crew are likewise detained.

officers
The officers and crew so detained may be left in the ship or

kept either on another vessel or on land, and may be subjeated
to such restrictions as it may appear necessary to impose upon
them. A sufficient number of men must, however, be always
left on board for looking after the vessel.
Theofficers may be left at liberty on giving their word not
"
to quit the neutral territory without permission (s).
Various instances of internment have already been given which
followed substantially these rules, though the cases in question
arose before the Hague Convention was established.
(r) Pari. Papers, 1873, N. America duty of internment in land warfare)

<No. 2), pp. 201—204. Arts.11—13 of the fifth Convention
{s) Hague Ct)nvention (1907), (1907), supra, p. 648.
No. XIII. Art. 24. Of. (as to the
698 RIGHTS OF WAIiAS TO NEUTRALS.
"
Due A Power is bound to exercise such vigilance as the
neutral
diligence.
means at its disposal allow to prevent any violation of the pro-
visions of the above Articles occurring in its ports or roadsteads,
"
or in its waters (0-
We have already referred to the question of due diligence in
connection with the third rule of the Treaty of Washington and
with the national neutrality legislation.
"
Exercise of The exercise by a neutral Power of the rights laid down in the
neutral rights
not unfriendly present Convention can under no circumstances be considered as
'act. an unfriendly act by one or other belligerent who has accepted
"
the Articles relating thereto {tt).
''
Communica- The contracting Powers shall comtuunicate to each other in
tion of
due course all statutes, orders, and other provisions regulating
municipal
provisions. in their respective countries the position of belligerent warships
in their ports and waters, by means of a communication addressed
to the Government of the Netherlands, and forwarded imme-
diately by that Government to the other contracting Powers" {u).
Article 28 contains the usual proviso that the rules of the Con-
vention apply only to the signatory parties, and then only if all
the belligerents in a particular war are parties to the Convention .
It must be admitted that this thirteenth Convention concerning

the rights and obligations attaching to the status of neutrality in
maritime war marks a distinctly progressive stage in the modern
development of international law. Some of the most conspicuous
defects we have already pointed out, e.g., in Articles 12, 19, 23.
But the chief drawback is that, whilst the rights of neutral Powers
are definitely affirmed, their obligations are not sufficiently de-
cisive, inasmuch as the fulfilment of them rests too much on
discretionary power. However, the Great War of 1914-1915 has

shown that with but one exception all the neutral maritime Powers
of the world —though not many were left neutral —sought to per-
form the obligations imposed on them by international law {x).
Neuteal Having considered the law of neutrality as between State and

COMMEEOE AND
BELLIQEEENT State, we have now to deal with the law of neutrality as bietween
BiaHIS. States and individuals. This brings us to the questions of neutral
commerce in relation to belligerent rights, contraband, unneutral
service, blockade, and visit and search.
Neutral The unlawfulness of belligerent captures, made within the terri-
vessels on the
high seas.
(t) Art. 25. {x) Of. Phillipson, Int. Law and

Itt) Art. 26. the Great War, passim, especially
(w) Art. 27. chapters xvi. seq.
torial jurisdiction of a neutral State, is incontestably established

on principle, usage, and convention. Does this immunity of the
neutral territory from the
exercise of acts of hostility within its
limits, extend to the vessels of the nation on the high seas, and
without the jurisdiction of any other State?
We have already seen, that both the public and priva^te vessels
of every independent nation on the high seas, and without the
territorial limits of any other State, are subject to the munioipal
jurisdiction of the State to which they belong (^). This juris-
diction is exclusive, only so far as respects offences against the
municipal laws of the State to which the vessel belongs. It
excludes the exercise of the jurisdiction of every other State under

its municipal laws, but it does not exclude the exercise of the
jurisdiction of other nations, as to crimes under international law;

such as piracy, and other offences, which all nations have a,n equal
right to judge and to punish. Does it, then, exclude the exercise
of the belligerent right of capturing enemy's property?
This right of capture is confessedly such a right as may be
exercised within the territory of the belligerent State, within the
enemy's territory, or in a place belonging to no one; in short,

in any place except the territory of a neutral State . Is the vessel
of a neutral nation on the high seas such a place?
A distinction has been here made between the public and the Distinction
private vessels of a nation. In respect to

public vessels, it is p^bUcând
its
universally admitted, that neither the right of visit and search, of private
capture, nor any other belligerent right, can be exercised on board

such a vessel on the high seas. A public vessel, belonging to an
independent sovereign,, is exempt from every species of visit and
search, even within the territorial jurisdiction of another State;
a fortiori, must it be exempt from the exercise of belligerent
rights on the ocean, which belongs exclusively to no one nation {z).
In respect to private vessels, it has been said the case is different.
They form no part of the neutral territory, and, when within the
territory of another State, are not exempt from the local jurisdic-
tion. That portion of the ocean which is temporarily occupied
by them forms no part of the neutral territory ;
nor does the vessel
itself, which is a moveable thing, the property of private
individuals, form any part of the territory of that Power to whose
subjects it belongs. The jurisdiction which that Power may law-
fully exercise over the vessel on the high seas, is a jurisdiction over
the persons and property of its citizens; it is not a territorial juris-
(y) Vide ante, Pt. II. ch. 2, pp. 163 (s) Vide ante, Pt. II. ch. 2, pp. 170
seq. seq.
diction. Being upon the ocean^ it is a place where no particular

nation has jurisdiction; and where, consequentlj, all nations may
equally exercise their international rights (a) .
Earlier usage Under the usage and practice of belligerent nations,

earlier
of nations as
to enemy goods in neutral vessels were subjected to capture and
enemy's
goods in condemnation as prize of war (6) This constant and universal
.
neutral
usage was only interrupted by treaty stipulations, forming a
temporary conventional law between the parties thereto (c) .
Enemy goods The regulations and practice of certain maritime nations at

on neutral
different periods not only considered the goods of an enemy, laden
in the ships of a friend, liable to capture, but doomed to confisca-
tion the neutral vessel on board of which these goods were laden.
This practice was sought to be justified upon a supposed analogy
with that provision of the Roman law which involved the vehicle
of prohibited commodities in the confiscation pronounced against
the prohibited goods themselves {d) .
Thus, by the marine ordinance of Louis XIV., of 1681, all

vessels laden with enemy's goods were declared lawful prize of
war. The contrary rule had been adopted by the preceding prize
' '
ordinances of France, and was again revived by the reglement

of 1744, by which it was declared, that "in case there should be
found on board of neutral whatever nation, goods or
vessels, of
effectsbelonging to his
Majesty's enemies, the goods or effects
shall be good prize, and the vessel shall be restored." Valin, in
his commentary upon the ordinance, admits that the more rigid
rule, which continued to prevail in the French prize tribunals

from 1681 to 1744, was peculiar to the jurisprudence of France
and Spain; but that the usage of other nations was only to con-
fiscate the goods of the enemy (e).
Goods of a
friend on
Although by the general usage of nations, independently of
board the treaty stipulations, the goods of an enemy, found on board the
ships of an
ships of a friend, were liable to capture and condemnation, yet
enemy.
(a) Rutherforth, Inst. vol. ii. b. ii. pp. 65, 115—119, 200—206. Albericus
ch. 9, § 19. Azuni, Diritto Maritimo, Gentilis, Hisp. Advoc. lib. i. cap. 27.
Pt. II. oh. 3, Art. 2. Letter of Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. lib. iii.
American Envoys at Paids to M. de cap. 6, §§ 6, 26j cap. 1, § 5, Note 6.
Talleyrand, January, 1798. Waite, Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. lib. i.
American State Papers, vol. iv. p. 34. cap. 14. Vattel, Droit des Gens,
(&) As to enemy goods under a liv. iii. ch.
7, § 115. Heineccius, De
neutral flag, see supra, p. 569. We Nav. ob vect. cap. 2, § 9. Locceniusi,
have already referred to the Silesian De Jure Marit. lib. ii. cap. 4, § 12.
Loan controversy (1752), where the Azuni, Diritto Marit. Pt. II. ch. 3,
Prussian argument, that the capture Arts. 1, 2.
of enemy goods on neutral vessels was (d) Barbeyrac, Note to Grotius,
contrary to the law of nations, was cap. 6, § 6, Note 1.
lib. iii.
easily disposed of by the British reply. (e) Valin, Comm. liv. iii. tit. 9;
(c) Ck)nsolato del Mare, cap. 273. Des Prises, Art. 7. Wheaton, Hist,
Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, —
Law of Nations, pp. Ill 114.
the converse rule, which subjected to confiscation the goods of a

friend, on board the vessels of an
enemj, is manifestly contrary, to
reason and justice. It maj, indeed, afford, as Grotius has stated,
a presumption that the goods are enemy property; but it is such
a presumption as will readily yield to contrary proof, and not of
'
that class of presumptions which the civilians call presumptiones
juris et de jure,' and which are conclusive upon the party.

But however unreasonable and unjust this maxim may be, it was
incorporated into the prize codes of certain nations, and enforced
by them ut different periods. Thus, by the French ordinances
of 1538, 1543, and 1584, the goods of a friend, laden on board the
ships of an enemy, were declared good and lawful prize. The

contrary- was provided by the subsequent declaration of 1650;
but by the marine ordinance of Louis XIV., of 1681, the former
rule was again established. Valin and Pothier are able to find
no better argument in support of this rule, than that those who
place their goods on board enemy vessels thereby favour the com-
merce of the enemy, and by this act are considered in law as
submitting themselves to abide the fate of the vessel; and Valin
"
asks, How can it be that the goods of friends and allies, found
in an enemy
ship, should not be liable to confiscation, whilst even
"
those of subjects are liable to it? To which Pothier himself
furnishes the proper answer, that if the king's subjects place their
goods on board enemy vessels they contravene the law which inter-
dicts to them all commercial intercourse with the enemy, and
deserve to lose their property for this violation of the law* (/).
The fallacy of the argument by which this rule is attempted to
be supported, consists in assuming, what requires to be proved,
that, by the act of placing his goods on board an enemy vessel, the
neutral submits himself to abide the fate of the vessel; for it
cannot bo pretended that the goods are subjected to capture and
confiscation ex re, since their character of neutral property exempts
them from this liability. Nor can it be shown that they a;re
thus liable ex delicto, unless it be first proved that the act of
placing them on board is an offence against the law of nations. It
•
is therefore with reason that Bynkershoek concludes that this rule,
where merely established by the prize ordinances of a belligerent

Power, cannot be defended on sound principles. Where, indeed,
it made by special compact the equivalent for the converse
is
maxim, that 'free ships make free goods,' this relaxation of belli-
(/) Valin, Comm. liv. iii. tit. 9; Des Prises, Art. 7. Pothier, Traite de
Propriete, No. 9€.
gerent pretensions muy be fairly coupled with a corresponding

'
concession by the neutral, that enemy ships should make enemy
goods.' These two maxims have been, in fact, commonly, thus

coupled in the vurious treaties on the subject, with a view to
simplify the judicial inquiries into the proprietary interest of
the ship and cargo, by resolving them into the mere question of
the national character of the ship.
The two The two maxims are not, however, inseparable. The primitive
maxims, of
law, independently of international compact, rests on the simple
'
free ships
'
free goods
and '
enemy principle, that war gives a right to capture the goods of an enemy,
ships enemy but gives no right to capture the goods of a friend. The right to
goods,' not
necessarily capture enemy property has no limit but of the plaê where the
connected.
goods are found, which, if neutral, will protect them from capture.
We have already seen that a neutral vessel on the high seas is not
such a place. But neutral property should be exempt from cap-
ture, except where the conduct of the neutral gives to the belli-
gerent a right to treat his property as enemy property, e.g., in
case of contraband trading, breach of blockade, &c. The neutral
Hag should constitute no protection to enemy property, and the
enemy flag should impart no hostile character to neutral property.
States, however, have changed this simple and natural principle
of the law of nations by mutual compact, according as they be-
'
lieved it to be for their interest; but the one maxim, that frae
ships make free goods,' does not necessarily imply the converse
'
proposition, that enemy ships make enemy goods.' The stipula-

tion, that neutral bottoms shall make neutral goods, is a concession
made by the belligerent to the neutral, and gives to the neutral
flag a capacity not given to it by the primitive law of nations.

On the other hand, the stipulation subjecting neutral property,
found in the vessel of an enemy, to confiscation as prize of war,
is a concession made by the neutral to the
belligerent, and takes
from the neutral a privilege he possessed under the pre-existing
law of nations; but neither reason nor usage renders the two
concessions so indissoluble, that the one cannot exist without the
other .
It was upon these grounds that the Supreme Court of the United
States determined that tlie Treaty of 1795, between them and
Spain, which stipulated that free ships should make free goods,
did not necessarily imply the converse proposition, that enemy
ships should make enemy goods, the treaty being silent as to the
latter; and that, consequently, the goods of a Spanish subject,
found on board the vessel of an enemy of the United States, were
not liable to confiscation as prize of war. And although it was
alleged, that the prize law of Spain would subject the property,
of American citizens to condemnation, when found on board the
vessels of her enemy, the court refused to condemn Spanish pro-
perty found on board a vessel of their enemy, on the principle of
reciprocity; because the American Government had not mani-
fested its will to retaliate upon Spain; and until this will was
manifested by some legislative act, the court was bound by the
general law of nations constituting a part of the law of the
landC^r).
The law established by treaties, in respect to the rule now in Conventional
question, fluctuated at different periods, according to the flue- i^êe ships
tuating policy and interests of the different maritime States of free goods.'
Europe. It was much more flexible than the consuetudinary law;
but there was a great preponderance of treaties in favour of the
maxim, 'free ships free goods,' sometimes, but not always, con-
' '
nected with the correlative maxim, enemy ships enemy goods ;
so that it may be said that for about two centuries there was a,
constant tendency to establish, by compact, the principle that the

neutralit}^ of the ship should exempt the cargo, even if enemy
property, from capture and confiscation as prize of war. The
capitulation granted by the Ottoman Porte to Henry IV. of
Franco, in 1604, has commonly been supposed to form the
earliest example of a relaxation of the primitive rule of the mari-
time law of nations, as recognised by the Consolato del Mare, by.
which the goods of an enemy, found on board the ships of a friend,
were liable to capture and confiscation as prize of war. But a
more careful examination of this instrument will show, that it
was not a reciprocal compact between France and Turkey, in-
tended to establish the more liberal maxim of 'free ships free
'
goods but was a gratuitous concession, on the part of the Sultan,

;
of a special privilege, by which the goods of French subjects placed

on board the vessels of his enemies, and the goods of his enemies
placed on board French vessels, were both exempted from capture
by Turkish cruisers (/^) .
It became, at an early period, an object of interest with Treaties of
Holland, a great commercial and navigating country, whose this subject,
permanent policy was essentially pacific, to obtain a relaxation

of the severe rules which had been previously observed in mar;i-
time warfare. The States-General of the United Provinces
having complained of the provisions in the French ordinance of
{g) The Nereide (18],5), 9 Oranch, (70 Flassan, Histoire de la Diplo-

388. matie Fran9aise, torn. ii. p. 226.
Henry 1538, a treaty of commerce was concluded between

II.,
France and the Republic, in 1646, by which the operation of the
ordinance, so far as respected the capture and confiscation of neu-
tral vessels for carrying enemy property, was suspended; but it
was then found impossible to obtain any relaxation as to the
in neutral vessels. This con-
liability to capture of enemy property
cession the United Provinces obtained from Spain by the Treaty
of 1650; from France by the treaty of alliance of 1662; and by
the commercial treaty signed at the same time with the peace at
Nimiguen in 1678, confirmed by the treaty of Ryswick in 1697.

The same stipulation was continued in the treaty of the Pyrenees
between France and Spain in 1659. The rule of 'free ships free
'
goods w^s coupled, in these treaties, with its correlative maxim,

'enemy ships enemy goods.' The same concession was obtained
by Holland from England, in 1668 and 1674, as the price of an

alliance between the two countries against the ambitious designs
of Louis XIV. These treaties gave rise, in the war which com-
menced in 1756 between France and Great Britain, to a remark-
able controversy between the British and Dutch Governments, in
which it wms contended, on the one side, that Great Britain had
violated the rights of neutral commerce, and on the other, that
the States-General had not fulfilled the guaranty which consti-
tuted the equivalent for the concession made to the neutral flag,
in derogation of the pre-existing law of nations (i).
Portuguese A commerce and navigation was concluded between

treaty of
treaty.
England and Portugal in 1654, by which the principle of 'free
'
ships free goods,' coupled with the correlative maxim of enemy

ships enemy goods,' was adopted between the contracting parties.
This stipulation continued to form the conventional law between
the two nations, also closely connected by political alliance, until
the revision of this treaty in 1810, when the stipulation in ques-
tion was omitted, and was not renewed.
Union of the The principle that the character of the vessel should determine
two maxims
in treaties. that of the cargo was adopted by the treaties of Utrecht of 1713,
subsequently confirmed by those of 1721 and 1739, between Great
(i) Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, of Great Britain in respect to Neutral

torn. vi. pt. i. p. 342. Flassan, Htis- Nations during the present War,"
toire de la Diplomatie Fran9aise, which contains a very full and in-
tom. iii. p. 451. A pamphlest was structive discussion of the question of
published on the occasion of this neutral navigation, both as resting on
controversy between the British and the primitive law of nations and on
Dutch Governments, by the elder Lord treaties. London, 8vo. 1757. 2nd ed.
Liverpool (then Mr. Jenkinson), en- 1794; 3rd ed. 1801.
" A Discourse on the Conduct
titled,
Britain and Spain, by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748,

and of Paris in 1763, between Great Britain, France, and
Spnin (k).
Such was the and conventional law Armed
state of the consuetudinary
prev'ailing the principal maritime Powers of Europe, when 0/178O. ^

among
the declaration of independence by the British North American
now constituting the United States, gave rise to a mari-
colonies,
time war between Great Britain and France. With a view to
conciliate those Powers that remained neutral in this war, the
cabinet of Versailles issued, on the 26th of July, 1778, an ordi-
nance or instruction to the French cruisers, prohibiting the
capture of neutral vessels, even when bound to or from enemy
ports, unless laden in whole or in part with contraband articles
destined for the enemy's use; reserving the right to revoke this
concession, unless the enemy should adopt a reciprocal measure
within six months. The British Government, far from adopting
any such measure, issued in March, 1780, an order in council
suspending the special stipulations respecting neutral commerce

and navigation contained in the treaty of alliance of 1674 between
Great Britain and the United Provinces, on the alleged ground that
the States-General had refused to fulfil the reciprocal conditions
of the treaty. Immediately after this order in council, the
Empress Catharine II. of Russia communicated to the different

belligerent and neutral Powers the famous declaration of neu-
which were acceded to by France, Spain,
trality, the principles of
and the United States of America, as belligerent; and by Den-
mark, Sweden, Prussia, Holland, the Emperor of Germany,
Portugal, and Naples, as neutral Powers. By this declaration,
which afterwards became the basis of the armed neutrality of the
Baltic Powers, the rule that free ships make free goods was
adopted, without the previously associated maxim that enemy ships

should make enemy goods. The British Government answered
"
this declaration principles generally acknow-
by appealing to the
ledged as the law of nations, being the only law between Powers
where no treaties subsist"; and to the "tenor of its different en-
gagements with other Powers, where those engagements had
altered the primitive law by mutual stipulations, according to
the will and convenience of the contracting parties." Circumstances
rendered it convenient for the British Government to dissemble
its resentment towards Russia, and the other northern Powers, and
the war was terminated without any formal adjustment of this
(Z;) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, pp. 120 — 125.

w. 45
dispute between Great Britain, and the other

members of the
armed neutrality (I) .
Treaties By the treaties peace concluded at Versailles in .1783,

of
uniting the
maxims not between Great Britain,. France, and Spain, the treaties of Utrecht
renewed. were once more revived and confirmed. This confirmation was
again reiterated in the commercial treaty of 1786, between Great
Britain and France, by which .the two kindred maxims were once
more associated. In the negotiations at Lisle in 1797, it was
proposed by the British plenipotentiary. Lord Malmesbury, to
renew all the former treaties between the two countries con-
firmatory of those of Utrecht. This proposition was objected
to by the French ministers, for several reasons foreign to the
present subject; to which Lord Malmesbury replied that these

treaties were become the law of nations, and that infinite con-
fusion would result from their not being renewed. It is probable,
however, that his lordship meant to refer to the territorial arrange-
ments rather than to the commercial stipulations contained in
these treaties. Be this as it may, the fact is, that they were not
renewed, either by the treaty of Amiens in 1802, or by that
of Paris in 1814.
Practice
During the protracted wars of the French Revolution all the
during the
French belligerent Powers began by discarding in practice not only the
principles of the armed neutrality, but even the generally re-
Revolution.
ceived maxims of international law, by which the rights of

neutral commerce in time of war had been previously regulated.
"Hussia," says Von Martens, "made common cause with Great
Britain and with Prussia, to induce Denmark and Sweden to
renounce all intercourse with France, and especially to prohibit
their carrying goods to that country. The incompatibility of

this pretension with the principles established by Russia in 1780,
was veiled pretext, that in a war like that against revolu-
by the
tionary France, the rights of neutrality did not come in question."
France, on her part, revived the severity of her ancietnt priza
code,by decreeing not only the capture and condemnation of the
goods of her enemies found on board neutral vessels, but even of
the vessels themselves laden with goods of British growth, pro-
duce, and manufacture.
Armed But in the further progress of the war, the principles which had
Neutrality
of 1800.
formed the basis of the Armed Neutrality of the northern Powers
in 1780, were revived by a new maritime confederacy between
(I) Flassan, Diplomatie Francjaise, Papers, pp.

—356;
345 vol. xxiv.
torn. vii. pp. 183, 273. Annual 300. Wheaton, Hist. Law of
294— 305.
p.
Register, vol. xxiii. p. 205, State Nations, pp.
Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, formed in 1800, to which Prussia

acceded. This league was soon dissolved by the naval power of
Great Britain and the death of the Emperor Paul; and the prin-
ciple now in question was expressly relinquished by Russia in
the convention signed at St. Petersburg in 1801, between that
Power and the British Government, and subsequently acceded to
by Denmark and Sweden. In 1807, in consequence of the stipu-
lations contained in the treaty of Tilsit between Russia and
France, a declaration was issued by the Russian Court, in which

the principles of the armed neutrality were proclaimed anew, and
the convention of 1801 was annulled by the Emperor Alexander.
In 1812, a treaty of alliance against France was signed by Great
Britain and Russia; but no convention respecting the freedom of
neutral commerce and navigation was concluded between these two
Powers (m) .
The maritime law of nations that regulated the intercourse of The inter-
the European States was adopted by the United States during the
of'sm-oU^'^
war of their revolution. The American Courts of Prize then acted adopted by
upon the generally received principles of European public law, modified'by
that enemy property in neutral vessels was liable to, whilst neutral treaty,
property in an enemy's vessel was exempt from, capture and con-

fiscation; until Congress issued an ordinance recognising the
maxims of the armed neutrality of 1780, on condition that they
should be reciprocally acknowledged by the other belligerent
Powers. In the instructions given by Congress, in 1784, to their
ministers appointed to treat with the different European Courts,
the same principles were proposed as the basis of negotiation by
which the independence of the United States was to be recognised.
During the wars of the French Revolution, the United States,
being neutral, admitted that the immunity of their flag did not
extend to cover enemy property, as a principle founded in the
customary law and established usage of nations, though they
sought every opportunity of substituting forit the opposite maxim
* '
of free ships free goods by conventional arrangements with such

nations as were disposed to adopt that amendment of the law. In
the course of the correspondence which took place between the
minister of the French Republic and the Government of the United
States, the latter affirmed that it could not be doubted that, by
the general law of nations, the goods of a friend found in the vessel
of an enemy were free, and the goods of an enemy found in the
vessel of a friend were lawful prize. It was true that several
(m) Wheaton, Hist. Law of -Nations, pp. 397

—
101.
45 (2)
nations, desirous of avoiding the inconvenience of having their

vessels stopped at sea, overhauled, carried into port, and detained,
under pretence of having enemy goods on board, had in many
instances introduced by special treaties the principle that enemy
ships should make enemy goods, and friendly ships friendly goods
— a principle much less embarrassing to commerce, and equal to
all parties in point of gain and loss; but this was altogether the
effect of particular treaties, controlling in special cases the general
principle of the law of nations, and therefore taking effect between
such nations only as had so agreed to control it. England had
generally determined to adhere to the rigorous principle, having
in no instance, so far as was recollected, agreed to the modification
of letting the property of the goods follow that of the vessel, except
in the single one of her treaties with France. The United States
had adopted this modification in their treaties with France, with
the United Netherlands, and with Prussia; and therefore, as to
those Powers, American vessels covered the goods of their enemies,
and the United States lost their goods when in the vessels of the
enemies of those Powers. With Great Britain, Spain, Portugal,
and Austria, the United States had then no treaties; and therefore
had nothing to oppose them in acting according to the general law
of nations, that enemy goods were lawful prize though found in
the ships of a friend (n) .
Conflict in By the treaty of 1794 between the United States and Great
provisions of it was stipulated that vessels, captured on
treaties with Britain, Article 17,
England and suspicion of having on board enemy property or contraband of
with France.
war, should be carried to the nearest port for adjudication, and
that part of the cargo only which consisted of enemy property,
or contraband for the enemy's use, should be made prize, and
the vessel be at liberty to proceed with the remainder of her cargo.
In the treaty of 1778, between France and the United States, the
rule of 'free ships free goods' had been stipulated; and, as we
have already seen, France complained that her goods were taken
out of American vessels without resistance by the United States,
who, it was alleged, had abandoned by their treaty with Great
Britain their antecedent engagements to France, recognising the

principles of the armed neutrality.
To these complaints the American Giovernment replied that
when the treaty of 1778 was concluded, the armed neutrality had
not been formed, and oonsequently the state of things on which
(n) Mr. Jefferson's Letter to M. Mr. R. R. Livingston, American Min-

Genet, July 24, 1793. Waite, Ameri- ister at Paris, Sept. 9, 1801. Jefferson,
can State Papers, vol. i. p. 134. See Memoirs, vol. iii. p. 489.
also President Jefferson's Letter to
that treaty operated was regulated by the pre-existing law of

nations, independently of the principles of the armed neutrality.
By that law, free ships did not make
free goods, nor enemy ships
enemy goo,ds. The stipulation, therefore, in the treaty of 1778

formed an exception t>o a general rule, which retained its obligation
in all cases where not changed by compact. Had the treaty of
1794 between the United States and Great Britain not been
formed, or had it entirely omitted any stipulation on the subject,
the belligerent right would still have existed. The treaty did not
concede a new right, but only mitigated the practical exercise of
a right already acknowledged to exist. The desire of establishing
universally the principle, that neutral ships should make neutral
goods, was felt by no nation more strongly than by the United
States. Itwas an object which they kept in view, and would
pursue by such means as their judgment might dictate. But the
wish to establish a principle was essentially different from an
assumption that it is already established. However siolicitous
America might be to pursue all proper means tending to obtain
the concession of this principle by any or all of the maritime
Powers of Eurppe, she had never conceived the idea of obtaining
that consent by force. The United States would only arm to
defend their own rights: neither their policy nor their interests
permitted them to arm in order to compel a surrender of the rights
of others (o) .
' '
The principle of free ships free goods had been stipulated by Negotiation
^
the treaty of 1785, Article 12, between the United States a.nd American
and Prussian
Prussia, without the correlative maxim of 'enemy ships enemy
IT
goods. It was as follows:
pn it Tfl o
11 one oi the contracting parties
^
. . Governments,
should be engaged in war with any other Power, the free inter-
course and commerce of the subjects or citizens of the party
remaining neuter with the belligerent Powers shall not be
interrupted. On the contrary, in that case, as in full peace, the

vessels of the neutral party may navigate freely to and from the
ports and on the qoasts of the belligerent parties, free vessels'

making free goods, insiomuch that all things shall be adjudged
free which shall be on board any vessel beionging to the neutral
party, although such things belong to an enemy of the other; and

the same freedom shall be extended to persions who shall be on
board a free vessel, although they sbtould be enemies to the other
party, unless they be soldiers in actual service of such enemy."
(o) Letter of the American Envoys 17, 1798. Waite, State Papers,
at Paris, Messrs. Marshall, Pinkney, pp. 38 — 17.
vol. iv.
and Gerry, to M. de Talleyrand, Jan.

American The above treaty having expired, by its own limitation, in 1796,
omitXemle ^ negotiation was commenced by the American and Prussian
of free ships Governments for its renewal. But it was proposed by the former
free goods. ' '
that the Article, recognising the princijDle of free ships free goods
— —
though a most desirable one should be abandoned, because it
was not universally admitted or respected among maritime nations,
and that the ordinary rule of the law of nations should be substi-
tuted, whereby enemy property on neutral vessels was liable to
capture, whilst neutral property on enemy vessels was exempt (p) .
As the view of the Prussian Government differed as to the ordinary

law of nations, the United States suggested that the Article in
question should be merely omitted from the new treaty and not
replaced by another provision, and pointed out that they would
be always ready to adopt the most liberal principles in favour of
neutral commerce in time of war, if there were a reasonable
expectation of seeing them faithfully recognised by others.
Eventually, a treaty was concluded between the two Powers (July

11, 1799), the twelfth Article being as follows: ''Experience
having proved that the principle adopted in the twelfth Article
of the treaty of 1785, according to which 'free ships make free
goods,' has not been sufficiently respected during the last two wars,
and especially in that which still continues, the two contracting
parties propose, after the return of a general peace, to agree, either
separately between themselves, or jointly with other Powers alike
interested, to concert with the great maritime Powers of Europe
such arrangements and such permanent principles, as may serve
to consolidate the liberty and the safety of the neutral navigation
and commerce in future wars. And if, in the interval, either
of the contracting parties should be engaged in war, to which the
other should remain neutral, the ships of war and privateers of the
belligerent Power shall conduct themselves towards the merchant

vessels of the neutral Power as favourably as the course of the
war then existing may permit observing the principles and rules
;
"
of the law of nations generally acknowledged (q). This Article
was re-introduced in the treaty of 1828 between the parties.
Rule in During the war which commenced between the United States
American
Prize Courts. and Great Britain in 1812, the Prize Courts of the former uni-
formly enforced the generally acknowledged rule of international
law, that enemy's goods in neutral vessels are liable to capture and
(j») Mr. Secretary Pickering to Mr. 17, 1797; Mr. Adams to the Prussian
Jolm Quincy Adams, Minister of the negotiators, Oct. 29, 1798.
U. S. at Berlin, July 15, 1797; July (g) American State Papers, fol. ed.
vol. ii.
pp. 251—209.
confiscation, except as to such Powers with, whom the American

Government had stipulated hy subsisting treaties the contrary rule,
that free ships should make free goods.
In their earliest negotiations with the newly established repub- Treaties
lies of South America, the United States proposed the establish- United^tates
'
ment of the principle of free ships free goods,' as between all the and the South
Powers of the North and South American continents. It was republics,

—
declared that the rule of public law ^that the property of an enemy
is liable to capture in the vessels of a friend —
has no foundation in
natural right, and, though it be the established usage of nations,
rests entirely on the abuse of force. No neutral nation, it was
said, was bound to submit to the usage; and though the neutral
may have yielded at one time to the practice, it did not follow that
the right to vindicateby force the security of the neutral flag at
another time was thereby permanently sacrificed. But the neutral
claim to cover enemy property was conceded to be subject to this
qualification: that a belligerent may justly refuse to neutrals the
benefit of this principle, unless admitted also by the enemy for
the protection of the same neutral flag. It was accordingly stipu-
lated, in the treaty between the United States and the Eepublic of
' '
Colombia, that the rule of free ships free goods should be under-
stood "as applying to those Powers only who recognise this prin-
ciple; but if either of the two contracting parties shall be at war

with a third, and the other neutral, the flag of the neutral shiall
cover the property of enemies whose Governments acknowledge

the same principle, and not of others." The same restriction of
the rule had been previously incorporated into the treaty of 1819,
between the United States and Spain, and has been subsequently
inserted in their different treaties with the other South American
Eepublics (r).
It has been decided in the Prize Courts, both of the United Covering
States and of Great Britain, that the privilege of the neutral
j^^^JtrnT*^^
flag of protecting enemy property, whetherstipulated by treaty ships by false
P^P®^^*
or established by municipal ordinances, however comprehensive
may be the terms in which it may be expressed, cannot be inter-
preted to extend to the fraudulent use of that flag to cover enemy
property in the ship, as well as the cargo (s). Thus during the
war of the Revolution (between Great Britain on the one side,
(r) Mr. Secretary Adams's Letter to goods found on board an enemy ship,
Mr. Anderson, American minister to see Wheaton's Rep. vol. ii. Appendix,
the Republic of Colombia, 27th of May, —
Note I. pp. 54 56; and especially
1823. For the practice of the Prize Sir W. Scott's judgment in The For-
Court, as to the allowance or refusal tuna (1802), 4 O. Rob. 278.
of freight on enemies' goods taken on (s) The Citade de Lisboa (1806>),
board neutral ships, and on neutral 6 O. Rob. 358.
and the United States and France on the other), the United States,
recognising the principles of the armed neutrality of 1780
in- —
cluding the rule of
'
free ships free goods
'
exempted by
—an ordi-
nance of Congress all neutral vessels from capture, except such as
were employed in carrying contraband goods, or soldiers, to the
enemy. It was held by the Federal Court of Appeals in prize
causes that this exemption did not extend to a vessel which had
forfeited her privilege by grossly unneutral conduct in taking a
decided part with the enemy, by combining with his subjects to
wrest out of the hands of the United States, jand of France, their
ally, the advantages they had acquired over Great Britain by the
rights of war in the conquest of Dominica. By the capitula-
tion of that island, all commercial intercourse with Great Britain
had been prohibited. In the case in question, the vessel had been
purchased in London, by neutrals, who supplied her with false
and colourable papers, and assumed on themselves the ownership
of the cargo for a voyage from London to Dominica. Had she
been employed in a fair commerce, such as was consistent with the
rights of neutrality, her cargo, though the property of an enemy,
could not be seized as prize of war; because Congress had said, by
their ordinance, that the rights of neutrality should extend pro-
tection to such effects and goods of an enemy. But if the neu-
trality were violated. Congress had not said that such a violated
neutrality would give such protection. Nor could they have said
so, without confounding all the distinctions of right and wrong;;
and Congress did not mean, in their ordinance, to ascertain in
what cases the rights of neutrality should be forfeited, to the
exclusion of all other cases; for the instances not mentioned were
as flagrant as the cases particularised (t) .
By the treaty of 1654, between England and Portugal, it was

"
stipulated (Article 23), That all goods and merchandise of the
said Republic or King, or of their people or subjects, found on
board the ships of the enemies of either, shall be made prize, to-
gether with the ships, and confiscated. But all the goods and
merchandise of the enemies of either on board the ships of either,
or of their people or subjects, shall remain free and untouched."
Rule of Under this stipulation, thus coupling the two opposite maxims
' '
^^^^ ^^^P^ ^^^^ goods,' and enemy ships enemy goods,' it was
°^
enemy gSs
not applicable determined
"\Filf*Tl til A
by the British Prize Courts, that the former provision
goods are
of this Article, which subjected to condemnation the goods of
either nation found on board the ships of the enemy of the other
beforeâr
(0 The Erstern {Darby v. The Erstern) (1782), 2 Dallas, 34.

EIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS. 71ii
contracting party, could not be f,airly applied to the case of pro-

perty shipped before the contemplation of war. Sir W. Scott
(Lord Stowell) observed, in delivering his judgment in this case,
that it did not follow, that beqause Spanish property put on board
a Portuguese ship would be protected in the event of the inter-
ruption of war, therefore Portuguese property on board ^ Spanish
ship should become instantly confiscable on the breaking out of
hostilities with Spain; that, in one c^se, the conduct of the parties
would not have been different, if the event of hostilities had been
known. The cargo was entitled to the protection of the ship,
generally, by this stipulation of the treaty, even if shipped in open
war; and a fortiori, if shipped under circumstances still more
favourable to the neutrality of the transaction. In the other case,
there might be reason to suppose, that the treaty referred only to
goods shipped on board an enemy's vessel, in an avowed hostile

'Character; land that the neutral merchant would have acted diffe-
had been apprised of the character of the vessel at the

rently, if he
time when the goods were put on board (u).
The same principle has been frequently incorporated into treaties The two
iDctween various nations, by which the principle of 'free ships ^f^^'^gaties.
'
free goods' is associated with that of enemy ships enemy goods.'

The treaties of Utreciht expressly recognise it, and it has been also
incorporated into the different treaties between the United States
"
and the South American Republics_, with this qualification, that
it shall always be understood, that the neutral property found on
l)oard such enemy's vessels shall be held and considered as enemy's
property, and as such shall be liable to detention and confiscation,

except such property as was put on board such vessel before the
declaration of war, or even afterwards, if it were done without
the knowledge of it; but the contracting parties agree that two
months having elapsed after the declaration, their citizens shall
not plead ignorance thereof" {x).
It is clear from the above account, that with respect to the The Declara-
treatment of neutral commerce in time of war the practices of i^^q '
belligerents were for a long time divergent, and the practice of

each belligerent varied at different times according to considera-
tions of policy and interest . On the outbreak of the Crimean war
it was evident to the allies, Great Britain and France, that it was
(w) The Mariunna (1805), 5 O. Rob. 1834, with Chile, Art. 13, the term
28. of four months is established for the
{x) Treaty of 1828, between the same purpose; and by that of 1842,
United States and Oolombia, Art. 13. with Ecuador, Art. 16, the term of
By the Treaty of 1831, between the six months.
United St-ates and Mexico; by that of
essential to adopt, on their part, uniform maritime practice. We

have already seen that they agreed to discontinue privateering,
and to use in their naval hostilities against Eussia only publio
warships {y) .
They agreed,they wôuld not seize enemy
too, that
goods in neutral ships or neutral goods in enemy ships; thus each

waived formerly asserted rights. On the conclusion of the wâr
these relaxations of maritime practice, together with other prin-
ciples,were embodied in the Declaration of Paris, 1856. Article 2

"
says: The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception
of contraband of war." Article 3: "Neutral goods, with the
exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the

enemy's flag." The original parties to this international Con-
vention, and
the later accessions, have already been pointed out^ {z).
There no doubt that the principles affirmed in the Declaration
is
now constitute part of general international law, and are even

binding on those States that were not signatories and have not
formally notified their adhesion to it.
CONTEABAND The general freedom of neutral commerce with the respective

OF WAR.
belligerent Powers is subject to certain specific exceptions. Among
these is the trade with the enemy in certain articles called contra-
band of war (a) .
Mean'ng of Contraband of war may be said to comprise such articles as are

contraband.
regarded by the belligerents as being intrinsically objectionable,
on the ground that they will be of assistance to the enemy in the
"
prosecution of hostilities. The notion of contraband connotes
two elements: it concerns objects of a certain kind and with a
certain destination. Cannons, for instance, are carried in a neu-
tral vessel. Are they contraband? That depends: if they are
destined for a neutral Government, no; if destined for an enemy
Government, yes. The trade in certain articles is by no means
generally forbidden during war ;
it is the trade with the enemy in
these articles which and against which the belligerent to
is illicit,
whose detriment it is carried on may protect himself by the

measures allowed by international law" (&). The essential ele-
ments are thus usefulness in war and hostile destination. Here it
is necessary to draw a distinction between articles
regarded as
(y) Cf. supra, p. 547. such forbidden articles was said to be

" contra
(2) Ibid. bannum," hence the word.
(a) The Popes prohibited trade with (&) Report on the Declaration of
infidels in certain London (which constitutes part of the
weapons and munitions of war
articles,
—
e-ff-,
agreement of the London Naval Con-
"merces banno interdictae " trade in — —
ference, 1908 9); see Pari. Papers,
Miscell. No. 4 (1909), pp. 33 seq.
' ' ' '
absolute contraband, and those regarded as conditional,' rela-

tive,' or 'occasional' contraband. The former class includes such
things as are specially adapted and used for warlike purposes, and
are therefore confiscable if found on their way to any part of the
enemy territory. The latter class includes other articles useful

in peace as well as for war, and are subject to seizure if intercepted
on their way to the enemy forces. A
third class of articles is
usually made, comprising only those things that are adapted only
for purposes of peaceful occupation and peaceful conditions. But
whilst there has generally been agreement as to such a threefold
classification, there has never been a consensus of opinion with
regard to the contents or denotation of these classies. Indeed,

there is no subject of international law that has provoked so much
controversy as the question of contraband has aroused during* the

last two or three centuries. With regard to one class otf things
the difiiculty has not been so great. The almost unanimous au-
thority of writers, of prize ordinances, and of treaties, agrees to

enumerate among absolute contraband all warlike instruments, or
materials by their own nature fit to be used in war. Beyond these,
there is some difficulty in reconciling the conflicting authorities
derived from the opinions of public jurists, the fluctuating usage
among nations, and the texts of various conventions that had been
designed to give that usage the fixed form of positive law.
Grotius, in considering this subject, makes a distinction between classification
those things which are useful only for the purposes of war, those ^^ (>rotiu8.
which are not so, and those which are susceptible of indiscriminate
use ill war and
in peace {' res ancipitis usus ') The first he agrees
.
with other text writers in prohibiting neutrals from carrying

all
to the enemy, as well as in permitting the second to be so carried;

the third class, such as money, provisions, ships, and naval stores,
he sometimes prohibits, and at others permits, according to the
existing circumstances of the war (c) .
Vattel makes somewhat of a similar distinction, though he in- Position of

^ ^ "
eludes timber and naval stores among those articles which are
particularly useful for the purposes of war, and are always liable
to capture as contraband; and oonsiders provisions as such only
"
under certain circumstances, when there are hopes of reducing
"
the enemy by famine (^).
Bynkershoek strenuously qontends against admitting into the OfBynker-
listof contraband articles those things which are of promiscuous ^^^^^•
use in peace and in war. He considers the limitation assigned by
(c) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. (d) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii.
lib. iii. cap. 1, § v. 1, 2, 3. ch. 7, § 112.
Grotius to the right of intercepting them, confining it to the case

of necessity, and under the obligation of restitution or indemnifica-
tion, as insufficient to justify the exercise of the right itself. He
concludes that the materials out of which contraband articles may
be formed are not themselves contraband; because if all the
materialsmay be prohibited, out of which something may be
fabricated that for war, the catalogue of contraband goods
is fit
will be almost interminable, since there is hardly any kind of

material out of which something, at least, fit for war may not be
fabricated. The interdiction of so many articles would amount to
a total interdiction of commerce, and might as well be so expressed.
He by stating that it may sometimes
qualifies this general position
"
happen that materials for building ships are prohibited, if the
enemy is in great need of them, and cannot well carry on the war
without them." On this ground he justifies the edict of the States-
General of 1657 against the Portuguese, and that of 1652 against
the English, as exceptions to the general rule that materials for
"
ship-building are not contraband. He also states that provisions
"
are often excepted from the general freedom of neutral commerce
"
when the enemies are besieged by our friends, or are otherwise
pressed by famine" (e).
Valin and Pothier both concur in declaring that provisions
(' munitions de bouche ') are not contraband by the prize law of
France, or the common law of nations, unless in the single case

where they are destined to a besieged or blockaded place (/) .
Naval stores, in his the marine ordinance of

Valin, commentary upon
contraband. Louis XIV., by which only munitions of war were declared to be
contraband, says:
" —
In the war of 1700, pitch and tar were com-
prehended in the list of contraband, because the enemy treated
them as such, except when found on board Swedish ships, these
articlesbeing of the growth and produce of their country. In the
treaty of commerce concluded with the King of Denmark, by
France, the 23rd of August, 1742, pitch and tar were also declared
contraband, together with resin, sail-cloth, hemp and cordage,
masts, and ship-timber. Thus, as to this matter there is no fault
to be found with the conduct of the
English, except where it con-
travenes particular treaties; for in law these things are now con-
traband, and have been so since the beginning of the present
century, which was not the case formerly, as it appears by ancient
treaties, and particularly that of St. Germain, concluded with
(«?) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. (/) Valin, Comment, sur I'Ordon.
lib. i. cap. 10. liv. iii. Des Prises, Art. 11.
tit. 9;
Pothier, Traite de Propriete, No. 104.
England in 1677; the fourth Article of which expressly provides

that the trade in all these articles shall remain free, as well as
in everything necessary to human nourishment, with the exception
of places besieged or blockaded" {g).
In the famous case of the Swedish convoy, determined in the Judgment of
English Court of Admiralty, in 1799, Sir W. Scott (Lord Stowell) aJ'tt nay^^
says: "That tar, pitch, and hemp, going to the enemy's use, are
stores.
liable to be seized as contraband in their own nature, cannot, I
conceive, be doubted under the modern law of nations; though

formerly, when the hostilities of Europe were less naval than they
have since become, they were of a disputable nature, and perhaps
continued so at the time of making that treaty," (that is, the
treaty of 1661, between Great Britain and Sweden, which was still
"
in force when he was pronouncing this judgment) or at least at
the time of making that treaty which is the basis of it, I mean the
treaty in which Whitlock was employed in 1656; for I conceive
*
that Valin expresses the truth of this matter when he says De :
'
droit ces choses,' (speaking of naval stores) sont de contrebande
aujourd'hui,et depuis le commencement de ce siecle, ce qui n'etoit

—
pas autrefois neanmoins;' and Vattel, the best recent writer upon
'
these matters, explicitly admits amongst positive contraband, les

bois, et tout ce qui sert a la construction at a I'armement de vais-
seaux de guerre.' Upon this principle was founded the modern
explanatory Article of the Danish treaty, entered into in 1780, on
the part of Great Britain by a noble lord (Mansfield) then Secre-
tary of State, whose attention had been peculiarly turned to

subjects of this nature. I am, therefore, of opinion, that, although
it might be shown that the nature of these commodities had been
subject to some controversy in the time of Whitlock, when the
fundamental treaty was constructed, and therefore a discreet silence
concerning them was observed in the composition of that treaty,
and of the latter treaty derived from it, yet that the exposition
which the later judgment and practice of Europe had given upon
this subject would, in some degree, affect and supply what the
treaties had been content to leave on that indefinite and disputable
footing, on which the notions then more generally prevailing in

Europe had placed it" Qi).
It seems difficult to read the treaties of 1656 and 1661, between Criticism on
^^^^^ decision,
Great Britain and Sweden, as fairly admitting the interpretation
placed upon them in the above-cited judgment. These treaties,
together with those subsequently concluded between the same
{g) Valin, Comm. sur POrdon. (A) The Maria (1799), 1 O. Rob.
liv. iii. tit. 9; Des Prises, Art. 11. 372.
Powers in 1664 and 1665, all enumerate coined money, provisions,

and munitions of war as contraband between the contracting
parties; and the 'discreet silence' referred to by Lord Stowell is
sufficiently supplied by the treaties of 1664 and 1665, which
"
expressly declared that, where one of the parties shall find itself
at war, commerce and navigation shall be free for the subjects of
that Power which shall not have taken any part in it with the
enemies of the other; and that they shall, consequently, be at
liberty to carry to them directly all the articles which are not
specially excepted by the 11th Article of the treaty concluded at
London in 1661, nor by virtue of this same Article expressly
declared prohibited or contraband, or which are not enemy's pro-
perty." The following Article is still more explicit: ''And to
the end that it may be known to all those who shall read these
presents, what are the goods especially excepted and prohibited,

or regarded as contraband, it has appeared fit to enumerate them
here according to the aforesaid 11th Article of the Treaty of
London. These goods specially designated are the following," &c.
Here follows the enumeration, as in the 11th Article, which makes
no mention of naval stores (i) .
Views of Sir This view seems to be confirmed by the opinion given in 1674,
by Sir Leoline Jenkins, to King Charles II., in the case of a cargo
of naval stores, the produce of Sweden, belonging to an English
subject, taken on board a Swedish vessel, and carried into Ostend

"
by a Spanish privateer. There is not any pretence to make the
pitch and tar belonging to your Majesty's subjects to be con-
traband; these commodities not being enumerated in the 24th
Article of the treaty made between your Majesty and the crown
of Spain, in the year 1667, are consequently declared not to be
contraband in the Article next following. The single objection
that seems to lie against the petitioner in this case is, that this
tar and pitch is found laden, not in an English, but a Swedish
bottom, as by the proofs and documents on board it doth appear;

and, consequently, that the benefit of those Articles in the Spanish
Treaty cannot be claimed here, since they are in favour of ou^
trade in those commodities that shall be found laden in our own,
not in foreign bottoms; but it is not probable that Sweden hath
any treaty of theirs with Spain, that their

suffered or allowed, in
own native commodities, pitch and tar, should be reputed contra-
band. These goods, therefore, if they be not made unfree by
being found in an unfree bottom, cannot be judged by any other
(0 Schlegel, Examen de la Sentence Anglaise, le 11 Juin, 1799, dans

prononcee par le tribunal d'Amiraute I'affaire du convoi Suedois, p. 125.
law than by the general law of nations; and then I am humbly of

opinion, that nothing ought to be judged contraband by that law
in this case, except it be in the case of besieged places, or of a
general notification made by Spain to all the world, that they

will condemn all the pitch and tar they meet with. So that, upon
the whole, your Majesty's gracious intercession for, and protec-
tion to, the petitioner in his claim, will be founded, not upon the
equity and the true meaning of your Majesty's treaty with Spain,
but upon the general law and practice of all nations" (;).
By the treaty of navigation and commerce of Utrecht, between ADglo-French
Great Britain and France, renewed and confirmed by the Treaty navalTiores?
of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, by the Treaty of Paris, in 1763, by
that of Versailles, in 1783, and by the commercial treaty between
France and Great Britain, of 1786, the list of contraband is strictly
confined to munitions of war; and naval stores, provisions, and
all other goods which have, not been worked into the form of any
instrument or furniture for warlike use, by land or by sea, aro
expressly excluded from this list.

'
The subject of the contraband character of naval stores con- England and
tinned a vexed question between Great Britain and the Baltic powers.
Powers, throughout the whole of the eighteenth century. Various Treaty
relaxations of the extreme belligerent pretensions on this subject Gre^t^ritain
had been conceded in favour of the commerce, in articles the ^^^ Russia,
1801
peculiar growth and productions of these States, either by per-
mitting them to be freely carried to the enemy's ports, or by
mitigating the original penalty of confiscation, on their seizure,
to the milder right of preventing the goods being carried to the>
enemy, and applying them to the use of the belligerent, on making

a pecuniary compensation to the neutral owner. This controversy
was at last terminated by the convention between Great Britain
and Eussia, concluded in 1801, to which Denmark and Sweden
subsequently acceded. By the 3rd Article of this treaty it is
''
declared: That, in order to avoid all ambiguity in what ought
to be considered as contraband of war, his Imperial Majesty of
all the Bussias and his Britannic Majesty declare, conformably
to the 11th Article of the treaty of commerce, concluded between
the two crowns on the 10th (21st) February, 1797, that they
acknowledge as such only the following articles, namely, cannons,
mortars, fire-arms, pistols, bombs, grenades, balls, bullets, fire-
locks, flints, matches,powder, saltpetre, sulphur, helmets, pikes,
swords, sword-belts, saddles, and bridles; excepting, however, the
(;) Life and Correspondence of Sir L. Jenkins, vol. ii.

p. 751.
quantity of the said articles which may be necessary for the

defence of the ship and of those who compose the crew; and all
other articles whatever, not enumerated here, shall not be con-
sidered warlike and naval ammunition, nor be subject to confisca-
tion, and of course shall pass freely, without being subject to
the smallest difficulty, unless they be considered as enemy's pro-
perty in the above settled sense. It is also agreed, that what is

stipulated in the present Article shall not be to the prejudice
of the particular stipulations of one or the other crown with other
Powers, by which objects of a similar kind should be reserved,
provided, or permitted."
The object of this convention is declared, in its preamble, to
be the settlement of the differences between the contracting parties,

which had grown out of the armed neutrality, by "an invariable
determination of their principles upon the rights of neutrality, in
their application to their respective monarchies"; which object
was accomplished by the northern Powers yielding the rule of
'
free ships free goods,' whilst Great Britain conceded the points
asserted by them as to contraband, blockades, and the coasting
"
and colonial trade. The 8th Article of the treaty also said: The
principles and measures adopted by the present act shall be alike
applicable to all the maritime wars in which one of the two Powers
may be engaged, whilst the other remains neutral. These stipu-
lations shall consequently be regarded as permanent, and shall
serve for a constant rule to the contracting Powers in matters of
commerce and navigation."
Anglo- The list contained in the convention between
of contraband
treaty of 1803.
Grreat Britain and Eussia, to which Sweden acceded, differed, in
some respects, from that contained in the 11th Article of the
treaty of 1661, between Great Britain and Sweden. In order to
prevent a recurrence of the disputes which had arisen relative to
that Article, a convention was concluded at London between these
two Powers on the 25th of July, 1803, by which the list of con-
traband contained in the convention between Great Britain and
Russia was augmented, with the addition of the articles of coined
money, horses, and the necessary equipments of cavalry, ships of
war, and all manufactured articles serving immediately for their
equipment, all which articles were subjected to confiscation. It
was further stipulated that all naval stores, the produce of either
country, should be subject to the right of pre-emption by the
belligerent party, upon condition of paying an indemnity of ten
per cent, upon the invoice price or current value, with demurrage
and expenses. If bound to a neutral port, and detained upon
suspicion of being bound to an enemy's port, the vessels detained

were to receive an indemnity, unless the belligerent Government
chose to exercise the right of pre-emption; in which case the
owners were to be entitled to receive the price which the goods
would have sold for at their destined port, with demurrage and
expenses (k) .
The doctrine of the British Prize Courts as to provisions and Provisions

naval stores becoming contraband, independently of special treaty
g^Jjê^^wh
stipulations, is laid fully by Sir W. Scott in the case contraband
down very
of The Jonge Margaretha. He there states that the catalogue of treaty .^'^ ^
of contraband had varied very much, and sometimes in such a
manner as to make it difficult to assign the reason of the variations,
owing to particular circumstances, the history of which had not
''
accompanied the history of the decisions. In 1673, when many
unwarrantable rules were laid down by public authority respect-
ing contraband, it was expressly asserted, by a person of great
knowledge and experience in the English Admiralty, that, by its
practice, corn, wine, and oil were liable to be deemed contraband.
In much later times, many sorts of provisions such as butter, —
—
salted fish, and rice have been condemned as contraband. The
modern established rule was, that generally they are not contra-
band, but may become so under circumstances arising out of the
peculiar situation of the war, or the condition of the parties
engaged in it. Among the causes which tend to prevent provisions
from being treated as contraband, one is, that they are of the
growth of the country which exports them. Another circumstance,
to which some indulgence by the practice of nations is shown, is
when the articles are in their native and unmanufactured state.
Thus iron is treated with indulgence, though anchors and other
instruments fabricated out of it are directly contraband. Hemp
is more favourably considered than cordage; and wheat is not
considered so noxious a commodity as any of the final preparations
of it for human use. But the most important distinction is,
whether the articles are destined for the ordinary uses of life or
for military use. The nature and quality of the port to which
the articles were going is a test of the matter of fact to which
the distinction is to be applied. If the port is a general commercial
port, it shall be understood that the articles were going for civil
use, although occasionally a frigate or other ships of war may be
constructed in that port. On the contrary, if the great predomi-
nant character of a port be that of a port of naval equipment, it
(^) Martens, Recueil, tome vii. pp. 150

—281.
w. 46
'722 EIGHTS OF WAE AS TO NEUTRALS.
shall be intended that the articles were going for military use,
although merchant ships resort to the same place, and although
it is possible that the articles might have been applied to civil
consumption for, it being impossible to ascertain the final applica-

;
*
tion of an article ancipitis usus,' it is not an injurious rule which
deduces both ways the final use from the immediate destination;
and the presumption of a hostile use, founded on its destination
to a military port, is very much inflamed, if, at the time when the
articles were going, a considerable armament was notoriously pre-
paring, to which a supply of those articles would be eminently

useful" (Z).
Articles of The distinction, under which articles of promiscuous use were
useTecoJ^rn
considered as contraband, when
destined to a port of naval equip-
contrabaud, mcnt, appears to have been subsequently abandoned by Sir W.
"
to a Scott. In the case of The Charlotte, he states that the character
porToT^
naval equip- of the port is immaterial; since naval stores, if they are to be
considered as contraband, are so without reference to the nature
of the port, and equally, whether bound to a mercantile port only,
or to a port of naval and military equipment. The consequence of
the supply may be nearly the same in either case. If sent to a
mercantile port, they may then be applied to immediate use in the
equipment of privateers, or they may be conveyed from the mer-
cantile to the naval port, and there become subservient to every'
purpose to which they could have been applied if going directly to

a port of naval equipment" (m).
Provisions The doctrinc of the English Courts of Admiralty, as to pro-
traband under visions becoming Contraband under certain circumstances of war,
certain cir-
cumstances
^-^g adopted by the British Government in the instructions ffiven
.
,
of war. to their cruisers on the 8th June', 1793, directing them to stop all
vessels laden wholly or in part with corn., flour, or meal, bound to
any port in France, and to send them into a British port, to bei
purchased by Government!, or to be released, on condition that
the master should give security to dispose of his cargo in the ports
of some country in amity with his Britannic Majesty. This order
was justified, on the ground that, by the modern law of nations, all
provisions are to be considered contraband, and, as such, liable
to confiscation, wherever the
depriving an enemy of these supplies
is one of the means intended to be employed for reducing him to
terms. The actual situation of France (it was said) was noto-
(0 The Jonge Margaretha (1799), TAe Cow wercew (1816), 1 Wheat. 382;
1 O. Eob. 192. This judgment was see infra, p. 755.
followed by the American Courts in (w) TAe CAarôê (1804), 5 C. Rob.
305.
riously such as to lead to the employing this mode of distressing

her by the joint operations of the different Powers' engaged in
the war; and the reasoning which the text-writers applied to all
was more applicable to tb,e present case, in which
cases of this sort,
the distress resultedfrom the unusual mode of war adopted by
the enemy himself, in having armed almost the whole labouring
class of the French nation', for the purpose of comtuencing and
supporting hostilities against almost all European Governments;

but this reasoning wâs most of all applicable to a trade, which was
in a great measure carried on by the then actual rulers of France,
and was no longer to be regarded as a mercantile speculation of
individuals, but as an immediate operation of the very persons
who had declared war, and were then carrying it on against Great
Britain {n) .
This reasoning was resisted by the neutral Powers, Sweden, Doctrine of
Denmark, and especially the United States. The American po^^^g*"^^^

Government insisted, that when two nations go to war, other
nations, who choose to remain at peace, retain their natural right
to pursue their agriculture, manufacturies, and other ordinary voca-
tions; to carry the produce of their industry for exchange to all
countries, belligerent or neutral, as usual; to go and come freely,
without injury or molestation; in short, that the war among
others should be, for neutral nations, as if it did not exist. The
only restriction to this general freedom of commerce, which has
been submitted to by nations at peace, was that of not furnishing
to either party implements m'erely of war, nor any thing whatever
to a place blockaded by its enemy. These implements of war had
been so often enumerated in treaties under the name of contraband,
as to leave little question about them at that day It was sufficient
. Provisions,
to say that corn, flour,and meal, were not of the class of contra^
band, and consequently remained articles of free commerce. The
state of war then existing between Great Britain and France
furnished no legitimate right to either of these belligerent Powers
to interrupt the agriculture of the United States, or the peaceable
exchange of their produce with all nations. If any nation what-

ever had the right to shut against their produce all the ports of the
earth except her own, and those of her friends, she might shut
these also, and thus prevent altogether the export of that
produce (o) .
(w) Mr. Hammond's Letter to Mr. (o) Mr. Jefferson's Letter to Mr. T.
Jefferson, 12th
September, 1793. Pinkney, 7th September, 1793. Waite,
Waite, American State Papers, vol. i. State Papers, vol. i. p. 393.
p. 398.
46(2)
Anglo- In the treaty subsequently concluded between Great Britain

American
treaty of 1794
and the United States, on the 19th November, 1794, it was stipu-
Contraband lated (Article 18), that under the denomination contraband should
articles.
be comprised all arms and implements sierving for the purposes of
"
war, and also timber for ship -building, tar or rosin, copper in
sheets, sails, hemp, and cordage, and gienerally whatever may serve
directly to the vessels, unwrought iron and fir planks

equipment of
only excepted." The Article then goes on to provide, that "whereas
the difficulty of agreeing on the precise cases, in which alone
provisions and other articles, not generally contraband, may be

regarded as such, renders it [expedient to provide against the incon-
veniences and misunderstandings which might thence arise; it is
further agreed, that whenever any such articles, so becoming con-

traband according to the existing law of nations, shall for that
reason be seized, the same shall not be confiscated; but the owners
thereof shall be speedily and completely indemnified; and the
captors, or, in their default, the Government under whose authority

they act, shall pay to the masters or owners of such vessels the
full value of all such articles, with a reasonable mercantile profit
thereon, together with the freight, and also the demurrage incident
to such detention."
British Order The instructions of June, 1793, had been revoked previous to
of April,
the signature of this treaty; but, before its ratification, the British
1795, as to
provisions. Government issued, in April, 1795, an Order in Council, instruct-
ing its cruisers to stop and detain all vessels, laden wholly or in
part with corn, flour, meal, and other articles of provisions, and
bound to any port in Prance, and to send them to such ports as
might be most convenient, in order that such corn, &c., might be
purchased on behalf of the Government.
Legality of This last order was subsequently revoked, and the question of
this order '
its legality became the subject of discussion before the mixed

questioned.
commission, constituted under the treaty to decide upon the claims
of American citizens, by reason of irregular or illegal captures and
condemnations of their vessels and other property, under the
authority of the British Government. The Order in Council was
justified upon two grounds: firstly, that it was made when there
was a prospect of reducing the enemy to terms by famine, and
that, in such a state of things, provisions bound to the ports of the
enemy became so far contraband, as to justify Great Britain in
seizing them upon the terms of paying the invoice price, with a
reasonable mercantile profit thereon, together with freight and
demurrage; secondly, the order was justified by necessity, the
British nation being at that time threatened with a scarcity of the
articles directed to be seized.
The first of these positions was based not only upon the general Opinion of
'^ ^ "poin •
law of nations, but upon the above-quoted Article of the treaty

between Great Britain and America. The evidence adduced of
"
the former was principally the following passage of Vattel Com- :
modities particularly useful in war, and the carrying of which to

an enemy is prohibited, are called contraband goods. Such are
arms, ammunition, timber for ship-building, every kind of naval
stores, horses, and even provisions, in certain junctures, when we
have hopes of reducing the enemy by famine" (p).
In answer to this authority, it was stated that it might be suffi-
cient to say that it was, at best, equivocal and indefinite, as it did

not designate what the junctures are in which it might be held,
that "there are hopes of reducing the enemy by famine"; that it
was entirely consistent with it to affirm, that these hopes must be
builtupon an obvious and palpable chance of effecting the enemy's
reduction by this obnoxious mode of warfare, and that no such
chance is by the law of nations admitted to exist, except in certain
defined cases, such as the actual siege, blockade, or investment of
particular places . This answer would be rendered still more satis-
factory, by comparing the above-quoted passage with the more

precise opinions of other leading writers on international law, by
which might be discovered what Vattel does not profess to explain
—the combination of circumstances to which his principle is
applicable, or is intended to be applied.
But was no necessity for relying wholly on this answer,
there
since Vattel would himself furnish a pretty accurate commentary
on the vague text which he had given. The only instance put by
this writer, which came within the range of his general principle,
was that which he, as well as Grotius, had taken ftom Plutarch.
" "
Demetrius," as Grotius expressed it, held Attica by the swprd.
He haa taken the town of Rhamnus, designing a famine in Athens,
and had almost accomplished his design, when a vessel laden with
provisions attempted to relieve the city." Vattel speaks of this
as of a case in which provisions were contraband (section 17), and
although he did not make use of this example for the declared
purpose of rendering more specific the passage above cited, yet, as
he mentions none other to which it can relate, it is strong evidence
to show that he did not mean to carry the doctrine of special
contraband farther than that example would warrant.
It was also to be observed that, in section 113, he states expressly
that all contraband goods (including, of course, those becoming so
(p) Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. vii. § 112.

726 BIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS.
bj reason of the junctures of which he had been speaking at the

end of section 112) are to be confiscated. But nobody pretended
that Great Britain could rightfully have confiscated the cargoes
taken under the order of 1795; and yet if the seizures made
under that order fell within the opinion expressed by Vattel, the
confiscation of the cargoes seized would have been justifiable. It
had long been settled that all contraband goods are subject to
forfeitureby the law of nations, whether they are so in their own
nature, orbecome so by existing circumstances; and even in early
times, when this rule was not so well established, we find that those
nations who sought an exemption from forfeiture, never claimed
it upon grounds peculiar to any description of contraband, but
upon general reasons, embracing all cases of contraband what-
soever. As it was admitted, then, that the cargoes in question
were not subject to forfeiture as contraband, it was manifest that
the juncture which gave birth to the Order in Council could not
have been such a one as Vattel had in view or, in other words, that
;
the cargoes were not become contraband at all within the true
meaning of his principle, or within any principle known to the
general law of nations.

Opinion of The authority of Grotius was also adduced as countenancing
this position. He divides commodities into three classes, the first
of which he declares to be plainly contraband; the second plainly
not so; and as to the third, he says:
" —
In tertio illo genere usus
ancipitis, distinguendus erit belli status. Nam si tueri me non
possum mittuntur intercipiam, necessitas, ut alibi ex-
nisi quae
posuimus, jus dabit, sed sub onere restitutionis, nisi causa alia
accedat" (In the third class, viz., commodities of ambiguous use,
the circumstances of the war will be taken into account. For if
I cannot protect myself save by intercepting what is sent,
—as elsewhere explained
—gives me the right to interceptnecessity
but it,
under the obligation of restitution, unless there be cause to the

contrary). This "causa alia" is afterwards explained by an
"
example, ut oppidum obsessum tenebam, si portus clauses, et
si
"
jam deditio aut pax expectabatur {e.g., besieging a town, block-
ading a port, and if a surrender or peace was expected) {q).
This opinion of Grotius, as to the third class of goods, did not
appear to proceed at all upon the notion of contraband, but simply

upon that of a pure necessity on the part of the capturing belli-
gerent. He
does not consider the right of seizure as a means of
effecting the reduction of the enemy, but as the indispensable
{q) De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. iii. 5, 3.

means of our own defence. He does not state the seizure upon any-
supposed illegal conduct in the neutral, in attempting to carry
articles of the third class (among which provisions are included),
not bound to a port besieged or blockaded, to be lawful, when made
with the mere view of annoying or reducing the enemy, but solely
when made with a view to our own preservation or defence, under
the pressure of that imperious and unequivocal necessity, which
breaks down the distinctions of property, and upon certain condi-
tions, revives the original right of using things as if they were in
common .
This necessity he explains at large in his second book (cap. ii.

sect. 6), and, in the above-recited passage, he refers expressly to
that explanation. In sections 7, 8, and 9, he lays down the condi-

tions annexed to this right of necessity: (1) it shall not be exer-
cised until all other possible means have been used; (2) nor if the
right owner is under a like necessity; and (3) restitution shall be

made as soon as practicable. In his third book (cap. xvii. sect. 1),
recapitulating what he had before said on this subject, Grotius
further explains this doctrine of necessity, and most explicitly
confirms the construction placed upon the above-cited texts. And
Eutherforth, in commenting on Grotius (lib. iii. cap. 1, sect. 5),
also explainswhat he there says of the right of seizing provisions
upon the ground of necessity; and supposes his meaning to be that
"
the seizure would not be justifiable in that view, unless the
exigency of affairs is such, that we cannot possibly do without

thera"(r).
Bynkershoek also confines the right of seizing goods, not gene- Opinion of
rally contraband of war (and provisions among the rest), to the ^" ^^^ ^^^'
above-mentioned cases (s) .
It appeared, then, that so far as the authority of text-writers

could influence the question, the Order in Council of 1795 could
not be based upon any just notion of contraband; nor could it, in
that view, be justified by the reason of the thing or the approved
usage of nations.
If the mere hope, however apparently well founded, of annoying General
pnncip es.
or reducing an enemy, by intercepting the commerce of neutrals
in articles of provision (which, in themselves, are no more contra-
band than ordinary merchandise), to ports not besieged or block-
aded, would authorize that interruption, it would follow that a
belligerent might at any time prevent, without a siege or blockade,
all trade whatsoever with its enemy; since there is at all times
(r) Rutherforth, Inst. vol. ii. b. ii. (*) Bynkershoek, Queest. Jur. Pub.
ch. 9, § 19. lib. i.
cap. 9.
reason to believe that a nation, having little or no shipping of its

own, might be so materially distressed by preventing all other
nations from trading with it, that such prevention might be a
powerful instrument in bringing it to terms. The principle is
so wide in its nature, that it is, in this respect, incapable of any
boundary. There is no solid distinction, in this view of the prin-

ciple, between provisions and a thousand other articles. Men must
be clothed as well as fed and even the privation of the conveniences
;
of life is severely felt by those to whom habit has rendered them

necessary. A nation, in proportion as it can be debarred its accus-
tomed commercial intercourse with other States, must be enfeebled
and impoverished and if it is allowable to a belligerent to violate
;
the freedom of neutral commerce, in respect to any one article not

contraband in se, upon the expectation of annoying the enemy, or
bringing him to terms by a seizure of that article, and preventing

it reaching his ports, why not, upon the same expectation of annoy-
ance, cut off as far as possible by captures all communication with

the enemy, and thus strike at once effectually at his power and
resources?
An?lo- As to the 18th Article of the Treaty of 1794, between the United
States and Great Britain, it manifestly intended to leave the ques-
treaty of 1794
tion where it found it; the two contracting parties, not being able
to agree upon a definition of the cases in .which provisions and
other articles, not generally contraband, might be regarded as
such (the American Government insisting on confining it to
articles destined to a place actually besieged, blockaded, or in-
vested, whilst the British Government maintained that it ought to
be extended to all cases where there is an expectation of reducing
the enemy by famine), concurred in stipulating, that "whenever
any such articles, so becoming contraband, according to the exist-
ing law of nations, shall for that reason be seized, the same shall
not bo confiscated," but the owners should be completely indemni-
fied in the manner provided for in the Article. When the law of
nations existing at the time the case arises pronounces the articles
contraband, they may for that reason be seized; when otherwise,
they may Each party was thus left as free as the
not be seized.
other to decide whether the law of nations, in the
given case, pro-
nounced them contraband or not, and neither was obliged to be
governed by the opinion of the other. If one party, on a falsie
pretext of being authorized by the law of nations, made a seizure,
the other was at full liberty to contest it, to
appeal to that law,
and, if he thought fit, and war.
to resort to reprisals
Justification As to the second ground upon
^ which the Order in Council was
of the Order
justified, viz., neoessity. Great Britain being, as alleged at the on the ground
time of issuing it, threatened with a scaroity of those articles
-directed to be seized, it was answered that it would not be denied
that extreme necessity might justify such a measure. It was
only important to ascertain whether that necessity then existed,

and upon what terms the right it communicated might be carried
into exercise.
Grotius, and the other text- writers on the subject, concurred in

stating that the necessity must be real and pressing; and that
-even then it does not confer a right of appropriating the goods of
means of relief have been tried
•others, until all other practicable
and found inadequate. It was not to be doubted that there were
other practicable means of averting the calamity apprehended by
Great Britain. The offer of an advantageous market in the dif-
ferent ports of the kingdom, was an obvious expedient for drawing
into them the produce of other nations. Merchants do not require
to be forced into a profitable commerce; they will send their
cargoes where interest invites; and if this inducement is held out

to them in time, it will always produce the effect intended. But
so long as Great Britain offered less for the necessaries of life than
could have been obtained from her enemy, was it not to be
expected that neutral vessels should seek the ports of that enemy,
and pass by her own? Could it be said that, under the mere appre-
hension (not under the actual experience) of scarcity, she wa!s
authorized to have recourse to the forcible means of seizing provi-
sions belonging to neutrals, without attempting those means of
supply which were consistent with the rights of others, and which
were not incompatible with the exigency? After this Order has
been issued and carried into execution, the British Government did
what it should have done before; it offered a bounty upon tbe
importation of the articles of which it was in want. The conse-
quence was that neutrals came with these articles, until at length
the market was found to be overstocked. The same arrangement,
had it been made at an earlier period, would have rendered wholly
useless the order of 1795.
Upon these grounds, a full indemnity was allowed by the com- Decision
^^®
missioners, under the seventh Article of the Treaty of 1794, to 'J^J|^*'''^
the owners of the vessels and cargoes seized under the Orders in
Council, as well for the loss of a market as for the other oonse-
-quences of their detention (t) ,
(0 Proceedings of the Board of Com- the Treaty of 1794. MS. Opinion of

missioners under the seventh article of Mr. W. Pinkney, case of The Neptune.
What goods For more than a century after this period, the question as to"
are contra-
band. what is, and what is not, contraband, could not be answered with
precision. Before the notable achievement of the London Naval
Conference of 1908-1909 (which will be referred to presently),
no complete list of goods which were to be always deemed con-
traband had been drawn up. In 1896 the Institut de Droit
International prepared a set of rules with the object of obtaining
uniformity in international practice. These rules, after condemn-
ing the British doctrine of conditional contraband, proceeded to,
—
declare somewhat inconsistently with this condemnation that
—
articles adaptable equally for purposes of war and peace, which
were bound for an enemy port, might be seized by a belligerent
on payment of indemnity (u) . That which is contraband under
certain circumstances may not be so under others . When an
doubtful use, the determining factor was whether it
article is of
was intended, or would probably be applied, to military purposes.
In England and America, the court before which the goods were
brought inquired into all the circumstances of the case, such as the
destination of the ship, the purposes to which the goods seemed
intended to be applied, the character of the war, and so on, and
condemned or released them upon the evidence (x) If, however,,.
there were any treaty stipulations on the subject, or if the State

before whose courts the goods were brought, issued any definite list
of contraband goods (which became the general practice), the de-
"
cision would, of course, be regulated accordingly. The liability
"
to capture," says Halleck, can only be determined by the rules of
international law, as interpreted and applied by the tribunals of
the belligerent State, to the operations of whose cruisers the neutral
merchant is exposed" (y).
Anglo- The following goods have been held to be contraband under all
American
practice.
circumstances by the English Prize Court, and are enumerated as
such in the Admiralty Manual of Prize Law: arms of all kinds,
and machinery for manufacturing arms, ammunition, and mate-
rials for ammunition,
including lead, sulphate of potash, muriate
of potash, chlorate of potash, and nitrate of soda; gunpowder and
its materials, saltpetre and brimstone; also
guncotton; military
equipments and clothing, and military stores (z) Naval stores,
.
(w) Annuaire de I'Institut de Droit p. 359. Pari. Debates, 26tli May,

International (1896), p. 231. 1861.
(x) Wheaton, ed. Dana, Note 226, (y) Halleck, ch. xxiv. § 19.
Calvo, vol. ii. § 1114. Kent, ed. Abdy, (z) Holland, Admiralty Manual of
Prize Law, 1888.
such as masts («), spars, rudders, and ship timber (6), hemp (c),
cordage, sailcloth (cZ), pitch and tar (e), and copper fit for sheath-
ing vessels (/) . Marine engines, and the component parts thereof,
including screw-propellors, paddle-wheels, cylinders, cranks,
and fire-bars; marine
shafts, boilers, tubes for boilers, boiler plates,
cement, and the materials used in the manufacture of it, as blue
lias and portland cement; iron in any of the following forms:
anchors, rivet-iron, angle-iron, round bars of from' three-

quarters to five-eighths of an inch in diameter, rivets, strips of
iron, sheet plate-iron exceeding one-quarter of an inch, and low-
moor and bowling plates {g) .
The following articles have been held to be contraband when

the circumstances showed that they were probably intended to be
applied to warlike purposes. Provisions and liquors fit for the

consumption of army or navy money, telegraphic materials
(h),
—
such as wire, porous cups, platina, sulphuric acid, and zinc(^);
materials for the construction of a railway
—âs iron bars,
and timber (n).
sleepers (k); coal, hay, horses, rosin (?), tallow (m),
The Proclamation of the President of the United States (13th
June, 1865), removing the restrictions on trade with the Southern
States, declared only the following articles to be contraband:
—
arms, ammunition, all articles from which ammunition is made,
and gray uniforms and cloth (o). The Declaration of Paris, while
permitting the seizure of contraband, in no way defines it. The
instructions to French naval officers during the war with Germany
in 1870-71, enumerate as contraband: cannon, small-arms, swords
and bayonets, projectiles, powder, saltpetre, sulphur, military
accoutrements, and everything made for use in war(p'). Mr.
"
Field, in his International Code, says, Private property of any
person whomsoever, and public property of a neutral nation are
contraband of war, when consisting of articles manufactured for
(a) T/ie Cimrlotte (1804), 5 C. Rob. (A) The Ilaahet (18O0), 2 O. Rob.
305; The Staadt Embden (1798), 10. 182; The Jonge Margaretha (1799),
Rob. 27. 1 O. Rob. 191; The Ranger (1805), 6
(6) The Tivende Brodre (1801), 4 O. Rob. 125.
C. Rob. 33. (0 Pari. Papers, N. America, 1863
(c) The Apollo (1802), 4 O. Rob. (No. 14), p. 5.
161; The Evert (1803), 4 O. Rob. {Jc) Field, Inter. Code (2nd ed.),
354; The Gesellschaft Michael (1802), p. 550.
4 O. Rob. 94. (J) The Nostra Signora de Begona
(d) The Neptunus (18O0), 3 C. Rob. (1804), 5 O. Rob. 98.
108. {m) The Neptunus, 3 O. Rob. 108.
(e) The Jonge Tobias (1799), 1 C. {n) The Twende Brodre (1801), 4
Rob. 329; (T^s Twe4 Jufrowen (1802), C. Rob. 37.
4 C. Rob. 242. (o) Hertslet, Treaties, vol. xii.
(/) TheCharlotte, 5 C. Rob. 305. p. 946.
(^) Holland, loc. cit. Field, In- {p) See Barboux, Jurisp. du Conseil
ternational Code (2Tid ed.), p. 550. des Prises, 1870—71, Appendix, Art. 8.
and primarily used for military purposes in time of war; and

actually destined for the use of the hostile nation in war, but not
otherwise" {q). On the outbreak of the war between Spain and
the United States in 1898, the former country declared the
following articles to be contraband of war:

—
cannon, quickfiring
guns, shells, rifles of all patterns, cutting and thrusting weapons
and arms of precision, bullets, bombs, grenades, fulminates, cap-
sules, fusees, powder, sulphur, dynamite, explosives of all kind,
as well as uniforms, straps, pack-saddles, equipment for artillery
and cavalry, marine engines, and in general all appliances used in
war.
Classification The subject of contraband was discussed before the Supreme
of contraband
Court of America, in a case arising out of the shipment of contra-
goods.
The Peterhoff. band goods from England to Matamoras during the Civil War.
Matamoras is situated on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande,
and was consequently a neutral port. The Court said: "The
classification of goods as contraband or not contraband has much
perplexed text writers and
jurists. A and satis-
strictly accurate
factory- classification is perhaps impracticable; but that which is
best supported by American and English decisions may be said to
divide all merchandise into three classes. (1) Articles manu-
factured and primarily or ordinarily used for military purposes
in time of war. (2) Articles which may be and are used for pur-
poses of war or peace according to circumstances. (3) Articles
exclusively used for peaceful purposes. Merchandise of the first
class,destined to a belligerent country or places occupied by the
army or navy of a belligerent, is always contraband; merchandise
of the second class is contraband only when actually destined to the
military or naval use of a belligerent; while merchandise of the

third class is not contraband at all, though liable to seizure and
condemnation for violation of blockade or siege" (r).
Ulterior A point arose in this case, upon which the courts of England and
destination of
the ffoods. America have arrived at different conclusions. Matamoras, as has
been said, was a Mexican and neutral port. At the time the ship
was captured, the United States had declared all the Confederate
ports blockaded, and a squadron cruised off the mouth of the Rio
Grande to intercept the trade with Galveston, a place on the
opposite side of the river to Matamoras, and in Confederate terri-
tory. The question then arose whether the whole river was
{q) Field, International Ctode, § 859. States Government for a definition of

(r) The Feterhof (1866), 5 Wal- contraband, were referred to this
lace, 58. During the Spanish-Ameri- dictum of Chief Justice Chase. See
can war of 1898, a firm of Liverpool The Times, Feb. 17th, 1904.
merchants applying to the United
blockaded, or whether the blockade only applied to the Confederate

side of it. The Supreme Court held that a blockade is not to be
extended by construction, and that as the United States authorities
had not expressly declared the whole river blocked (whether thej
had power to do so or not was another question), the Mexican side
must be considered open to the commerce of neutrals. But with
regard to the contraband on board the ship, the judgment pro-
ceeded as follows: —
''Contraband merchandise is subject to a
different rule in respect to ulterior destination than that which
applies to merchandise not contraband. The latter is liable to

capture only when a violation of blockade is intended the former ;
when destined to the hostile country, or to the actual military or

naval use of the enemy, whether blockaded or not. The trade of
neutrals with belligerents in articles not contraband is absolutely
free, unless interruptedby blockade; the conveyance by neutrals to
belligerents of contraband articles is always unlawful, and such
articlesmay always be seized during transit at sea. Hence, while
articles, not contraband, might be sent to Matamoras and beyond
to the rebel region, where the communications were not interrupted
by blockade, articles of a contraband character destined, in fact,
to a State in rebellion, or for the use of the rebel military forces,
were liable to capture though primarily destined to Mata-
moras" (s).
Onthe other hand, the Court of Common Pleas, in a case arising Sobbs v.
^^^"*^^-
in England out of the same voyage of the ship, came to the con-
elusion that contraband goods belonging to a neutral are not liable
to seizure, unless in the actual prosecution of a voyage to an
enemy's port. Nor is the rule affected by the fact that the shipper
knows they are intended ultimately to reach an enemy's port (t) .
(s) The Peter ho^ (18^6)^5 Wallaxie, Italian Prize Courts during the war
59. As far back as 1854, in the case of between Italy and Abyssinia; Archives
The Frau Anna Roxvina, the French Diplomatiques (Jan. 1897), p. 81. The
Prize Court had condemned, during judgment is set out in Ruys v. Royal
the Crimean war, part of the cargo of Exchange Assurance Cômpuny, 2 Com.
a Hanoverian ship captured off Cape Cas. 207; L. R. (1897), 2 Q. B. 135.
Rocca, on a voyage from Lisbon to And see on the whole subject an Article
Hamburg, and containing saltpetre, by E. L. de Hart, in the Law Quar-
which was described in the manifest terly Review, vol. xvii. p. 193.
and bills of lading simply as goods. {t) Hobbs v. Henning (1865), 17
The uLtimate destination of the salt- O. B. N. S. 791. But Mr. Justice
petre was adjudged to be Russia, and Willes, a few years later, in delivering
the court laid down the principle that the judgment of the Court of Common
" La contrebande de est saisis- Pleas in Seymour v. The London and
guerre
sable sans pavilion neutre quand elle Provincial Marine Insurance Company,
appartient h. I'ennemi ou quand elle 41 L. J. N. S. C P. 192, another case
est dirigee vers les territoires, les arising out of the same voyage of the
armies ou les flottes de I'ennemi": Peterho-ffy held that the criterion of
Calvo, Droit International, 4th ed., contraband was "the intention that
vol. v. § 2767. See also the case of the goods should in the course of the
The Doelwyh (1896), decided by the same transaction go on to the Con-
This decision was based on the language used by Lord Stowell in

The Imina (w), that goods going to a neutral port cannot come
under the description of contraband.
The Bundes' Early in the South African war (December, 1899, and January,
rath,
1900), the German mail steamer, Bundesrath, and other vessels
(the Herzog and the General) belonging to the German East
African were seized by English men-of-war and detained,
line,
pending search, on suspicion of carrying contraband of war, and of

containing among their passengers men who were on their way to
join the Boer armies. The German Government demanded the
immediate release of the vessels, and claimed through Count Hatz-
feld that there was no justification for taking proceedings before
"
a Prize Court because according to the recognised principles of
international law no question of contraband of war arises in trade
between neutral ports." The destination of these vessels was
Lorenzo Marques, a port belonging to Portugal, and consequently
was notorious that reinforcements both of men and
neutral, but it
material were constantly passing through it to the South African
Republics, which possessed no sea-board of their own. In fact
it presented a very close analogy to the position of Matamoras.
Lord Salisbury upheld the proceedings of the naval officers, and

refused to admit that the destination of the vessel was conclusive
as to the destination of the goods on board, a principle, he said,
"
which cannot apply to contraband of war on board of a neutral
vessel if such contraband was at the time of seizure consigned or
intended to be delivered to an agent of the enemy at a neutral port
or, in fact,destined for the enemy's country." The vessels were
accordingly searched in circumstances of considerable difficulty
owing to the way in which the cargo was stowed, but nothing was
found of an absolutely contraband nature; and though there was
reason to believe that among the passengers on board were a
number of trained artillerymen, German and Flemish, the evidence
as to their destination was not sufficient to justify further action.
The vessels were accordingly released without waiting for the
decision of a Prize Court, and a liberal sum of money was paid by
the British Government as compensation to the
steamship com-
pany. The incident gave rise to some heated language in the
Eeichstag, and Count von Bulow made a long speech on the 19th
of January, in which he took credit for a
complete diplomatic
victory; but it is remarkable that he made no allusion to the
federate States," and that the profits It seems difficult to reconcile this with
should be obtained on delivery there. Hobbs v. Henning.
(«) (1800), 3 O. Rob. 167.
original German contention that a neutral vessel was entitled to

convey without hindrance contraband of war to an enemy so long
as the port at which it was intended to land was a neutral port {x) .
It has already been pointed out that trade in contraband is not a Contraband
breach of neutrality, and is not contrary to international law {xx).
?*^V^^
In every war neutral merchants have traded in contraband, but neutrality,
with the risk of having the goods condemned if captured by the
enemy {y) And in every war belligerents have protested against
.
such trading, especially when it assumed large proportions. In

1793, during the war between Great Britain and France, the
former Power complaining of the sale of munitions of war by
manufacturers in the United States to the French Government,
Jefferson, the American Secretary of State, replied, conformably
to the law of nations: "Our citizens have been always free to
make, vend, and export arms. It is the constant occupation and
livelihood of some of them. To suppress their callings, the only
means, perhaps, of their subsistence, because a war exists in foreign
and distant countries, in which we have no concern, would scarcely
be expected. It would be hard in principle and impossible in prac-
tice. The law of nations, therefore, respecting the rights of those
at peace, does not require from them such an internal disarrange-
ment in their occupations. It is satisfied with the external penalty
pronounced in the President's proclamation, that of confiscation of
such portion of these arms as shall fall into the hands of the
belligerent Powers on their way to the ports of their enemies.
To warned that they will be aban-
this penalty our citizens are
doned" (z). But the trade must be confined to subjects; the
Government itself must not participate in it (a) We have already .
seen that these principles are now embodied in the Hague code (6).
A ship, theoretically considered, may or may not be contraband, gj^- ^g
If on its way to a belligerent port for the purpose of being sold to cou;;raband.
the belligerent, it will be contraband if it is adapted, or readily

adaptable, for warlike use; equally so, doubtless, if it be adapted
for the transportation of troops, or even perhaps of military
material. As most ships may in some way be applied to such
purposes, they are pretty sure to be condemned as contraband.
Thus, where the captain had orders to sell if he could find a good
(x) Pari. Papers, Africa, 1900 Jefferson, Works, vol. iii. p. 558;
(No. 1). Moore, Digest, vol. vii. p. 955. For
(xx) See supra, pp. 664, 665. a similar American statement during
(y) See Letters of Historicus, Oon- the Great War, 1914, see supra,
traband. Pari. Papers, N. America, p. 665.
1873 (No. 2), p. 19; Turkey, 1878 (a) See supra, p. 664.
(No. 1), p. 46. (b) 5th Convention (1907), Art. 7;
(z) Amer. State Papers, I. 69, 147; 13th Convention (1907), Art. 7.
purchaser, but otherwise to seek freight, the ship was con-

demned (c) .
Coals and The immense importance of coals and machinery in the naval
machinery. endless discussions
operations of the present day has given rise to
as to whether they are contraband or not. Writers of the school
of M. Hautefeuille refuse to consider such commodities as con-
traband and the French Government acted on this opinion
{d),
during the war with Germany (g), while Count Bismarck remon-
strated with Great Britain for permitting the export of coal to
"
France (/). Lord Chief Justice Cockburn says, Coal, too, though
'
in its nature ancipitis usus,' yet when intended to contribute to

the motive power of a vessel, must, I think, as well as machinery,
be placed in the same category as masts and sails, which have
always been placed among articles of contraband" {g). But it is
classed, as we have already seen, in the British Admiralty Manual
among articles which are only contraband conditionally upon

destination.
Food. Onthe 20th February, 1885, the French Government gave
Blockade of
Formosa. notice, through the usual diplomatic channels, that it intended to
treat rice bound for the open Chinese ports as contraband of war,
on the ground that the stoppage of large supplies which were being
forwarded to the northern ports of China would materially affect
the Government at Pekin. The Queen's ambassador at Pekin
having refused to recognise this right, the British Government
explained that it would not forcibly resist the seizure of rice, but
that protested against rice being treated generally as contraband
it
irrespective of its final destination, and that the legality of any

seizure must be determined in the first instance by the French
Prize Courts, subject to ulterior diplomatic action. The conclusion
of peace, however, shortly afterwards prevented the question being
further raised Qi) The American minister at Berlin, in a despatch
.
to Mr. Bayard, drew attention to the Anglo-French discussion,

and pointed out that the real principle involved went to the extent
that everything, the want of which might increase the distress of
the civil population of the belligerent country, might be declared
contraband of war. The damage to neutral trade might amount
(c) See American Law Review, (No. 2), p. 15. Jurist, 1859, vol. v.
voL V. p. 371. The Brutus (1804), 5 Pt. II. p. 203. See further Wharton,
C. Rob. 331, n. Digest, § 369.
(d) Hautefeuille, Droits et Devoirs (A) Pari. Papers (1884—5), France,
des Nations Neutres, vol. ii. p. 143. No. 1. In the same war the French
(e) Archives Diplomatiques, 1871 — refused to allow neutral mails to be
72, Pt. I. p. 269. landed at Formosa: Annual Register,
(/) 2 Halleck (Baker), 238, n. 1885, p. 231.
(^) Pari. Papers, N. America, 1873
to destruction, and the advantages intended to be secured to neutrals
by the declaration of 1856 would be practically nullified (^).

In the Russo-Japanese war, 1904, Japan's declaration of her Contraband
contraband policy followed generally the lines marked out by the
Japanese^ war
Anglo-American practice (k) Thus in The Aphrodite, a cargo
.
of Cardiff coal, known to be used for naval purposes, was seized

on its way to Vladivostock, a Russian naval base, and was con-
demned. The vessel shared the same fate, because the whole cargo
was contraband, and a false destination had been given (l) In .
another case. The Scotsman, rice consigned to the same port and
destined for the use of the Russian forces was condemned; con-
demnation was passed also on the vessel, owing to the contraband
nature of the whole cargo, and to the master's connivance (m) .
Again, in The Tacoma, salt beef consigned to the Russo-Chinese

Bank at Vladivostock was condemned, because the bank in question
was closely connected with the Russian Government; the vessel was
confiscated, too, because of connivance and false declaration of
destination (n) .
Russia, however, announced a much more drastic policy. A list

of contraband was
issued, which included not only all articles used
in or intended for warfare, but also coal, rice, provisions, horses,
beasts of burden, raw cotton; and no distinction was drawn
between absolute and conditional contraband. Great Britain and
the United States therefore protested against such indiscriminate
treatment of commodities. The American Secretary of State
urged that the test of contraband was warlike nature, use, and
•destination, and that to disregard this test was to set aside the
inveterate distinction between contraband and non-contraband
trading (o) Russia eventually gave way as to the articles usually

.
considered conditional contraband, but retained coal in the class

of absolute contraband. In 1904 the Russian Prize Court con-
demned the Allanton for having carried coal to Japan she was —
—
captured on her return voyage but the condemnation was un-
had commenced her outward voyage before
justifiable, as the vessel
coal had been declared contraband, and as she was not taken in
delicto {p). The Russian Appeal Court at St. Petersburg re-
versed the decree of condemnation, but held the seizure to have
been legitimate (g) . Soon afterwards another British steamer,
(i) Wharton, Digest, § 370, p. 433. No. 1; Hershey, Russo-Japanese War,

(/<;) Takahashi, pp. 491 seq. pp. 160 seq.; Cobbett, pp. 432 seq.
(J) Ibid. p. 651. {p) See now Art. 38, Declaration
(m) Ibid. p. 691. of London, infra, p. 750.
In) Ibid. p. 701. (§) See Hershey, ibid. p. 171.
(o) Pari. Papers (1905), Russia,
w. 47
'
theKnight Commander, bound from New York to Kobe and

Yokohama with a cargo of provisions, machinery, and railway
material, was captured by a Russian cruiser on the ground that
she carried contraband, and sunk on the ground that it was not
the nearest Russian port (r)
possible to take her to Vladivostock,
.
The British Government protested against the destruction, and

obtained a promise that no more neutral vessels would be destroyed.
A German vessel, the Arabia, carrying flour and railway material
from the United States to Japan, was seized and condemned by
Russia; but the American Government protesting, the sentence
was reversed by a higher court and the vessel and cargo were
released, as there was no proof that the goods were intended for
the use of the Japanese Government (s) .
The question in the Russo-Japanese war — and in

The experience previous all
of contraband
at the Hague
—
wars showed the necessity to arrive at an international agreement
Conference, with iTgard to contraband of war. Accordingly, the question was
1907.
taken up by the second Hague Conference (1907). Great Britain
submitted a proposal to abolish entirely the capture of contraband.
(No doubt she felt that in case of war the blockading power of her
navy would prevent neutral States from augmenting the military
resources of her adversary.) But this proposal met with very
little After much discussion, a list of absolute contraband
favour.
articles was drawn up; but the Conference failed to agree on a
list of conditional contraband, so that no conventional result was
reached .
The Declara- The London Naval Conference of 1908 — 1909 then took up the
tion of
London, 1909. subject, and after a good deal of discussion and compromise
between the representatives of the opposing schools of naval doc-
trine an agreement was eventually arrived at, which is set out in
twenty -three Articles of the Declaration of London (if). The

greater part of the rules laid down
represent the long-established
Anglo-American practice; and where departures are made there-
(r) Hershey, p. 156. of London was subjected to much

Is) Ibid. p. 174. modification during the Great War of
(J) It has already been pointed out 1914, on account of recent develop-
that the Declaration of London was ments and changes with regard to in-
not ratified by Great Britain, so that struments, appliances, and materials
it cannot, in its entirety, be regarded of warfare, and for other reasons.
as part of international law, though a There is no doubt that the main sub-
great portion of it consists of cus- stance of the Declaration, together
tomary rules of the law of nations! with such alterations as were suggested
which are, of course, binding on States by the experience of this war, will
irrespectively of the Declaration. As in the near future be incorporated in
we shall see presently, the Declaration an international Convention.
from, they are usually in favour of neutral countries. The provi-

sions are as follows: —
''
The following articles may, without notice, be treated as con- Absolute
^"^^ '* *°
traband of war, under the name of absolute contraband: (1) Arms
'
of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their dis-
tinctive component parts. (2) Projectiles, charges, and cartridges
of all kinds, and their distinctive component parts. (3) Powder
and explosives specially prepared for use in war, (4) Gun-
mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military waggons, field forges,
and their distinctive component parts. (5) Clothing and equip-
ment of a distinctively military character. (6) All kinds of
harness of a distinctively military character. (7) Saddle, draught,
and pack animals suitable for use in war. (8) Articles of camp
equipment, and their distinctive component parts. (9) Armour
plates. (10) Warships, including boats, and their distinctive
component parts of such a nature that they can be used only on a
vessel of war. (11) Implements and apparatus designed exclu-
sively for the manufacture of munitions of war, for the manufac-
"
ture or repair of arms, or war material for use on land or sea (u).
"
Articles and materials exclusively used for war may be added Notification
° ^ ^ ^^°^'
to the list of absolute contraband by means of a declaration, which
must be notified. Such notification must be addressed to the
Governments of other Powers, or to their representatives accre-
dited to the Power making the declaration. A notification made ,
after the outbreak of hostilities is addressed only to neutral

"
Powers (x).
The official Report, which serves as an authoritative commentary
on the Declaration of London, observes in reference to this provi-
sion: "Certain discoveries or inventions might make the list in
Article 22 insufficient. An addition may be made to it on condi-
tion that concerns articles exclusively used for imr. This addi-
it
tion must be notified to the other Powers, which will take the
necessary measures to inform their subjects of it. In theory,

the notification may be made in time of peace or of war." The!
"
declaration of such additions is only operative for the Power
whicli makes it, in the sense that the article added will be contra-
band only for it, as a belligerent; other States may, of course,
make a similar declaration. ... If a Power claimed to add to

the list of absolute contraband articles not exclusively used for
war, it might expose itself to diplomatic remonstrances, because
(w) Declaration of London (1909), Art. 22. (a;) Art. 23.
47(2)
it would be disregarding an accepted rule. Besides, ther© would

be an eventual resort to the International Prize Court {y) ....
It had been suggested that, in the interest of neutral trade, a period
should elapse between the notification and its enforcement. But
that would be very damaging to the belligerent, whose object is
preciselyto protect himself, since, during that period, the trade

which he thinks dangerous would be free and the effect
in articlefi
of his measures a failure. Account has been taken, in another
form, of the considerations of equity which have been adduoed
(see Article 43)" {z).
'*
Conditional The following articles, susceptible of use in war as well as for
contraband.
purposes of peace, may, without notice, be treated as contraband of
war, under the name of conditional contraband (1) Foodstuffs. :
—
(2) Forage and grain, suitable for feeding animals. (3) Clothing,
fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable for use in war.
(4) Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money. (5) Vehicles
of all kinds available for use in war, and their component parts.,
(6) Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts of
docks and their component parts. (7) Railway material, both
fixed. and rolling stock, and material for telegraphs, wireless tele-
graphs, and telephones. (8) Balloons and flying machines and

their distinctive component parts, together with accessories and
articles recognisable as intended for use in connection with balloons
and flying machines. (10) Powder and
(9) Fuel; lubricants.
explosives not specially prepared for use in war. (11) Barbed
wire and implements for fixing and cutting the same. (12) Horse-
shoes and shoeing materials. (13) Harness and saddlery.
(14) Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of
"
nautical instruments («).
The articles enumerated in this list are
'
conditional
'
contra-
band; i.e., they are contraband in the full sense of the term
(viz., absolute) only if they are destined to the hostile army or
fleet, or to the enemy Government (unless in the latter case it is
clear they are not susceptible for use in the
war). The Report
' '
points out that foodstuffs include all products, solid or liquid,

that are necessary or useful for the sustenance of
'
man; 'paper
money refers only to inconvertible paper money, e.g., banknotes,
and does not include bills of exchange and cheques; engines and
'
boilers are included in No. (6); railway material
'
includes fixed
(y) See supra, p. 616, as to the (1909), pp. 33 seq. The original
International Prize Court, which has French text is in Pari. Papers, Miscall,
no existence yet. No. 5 (1909), pp. 342—377.
(2) Eeport on tlie Declaration of («) Art. 24.
London, Pari. Papers, Miscell. No, 4
material {e.g., rails, sleepers, turntables, parts designed for the

construction of bridges) and rolling stock (e.^., locomotives and
cars) (6).
"
Articles susceptible of use in war as well as for purposes of Notification
peace, other than those enumerated in Articles 22 and 24, may be

added to th(^, list of conditional contraband by means of a declara-
tion, which must be notified in the manner provided for in the

"
second paragraph of Article 23 (c).
"
Power waives, so far as it is concerned, the right to treat
If a Waiver of
as contraband of war an article comprised in any of the classes

enumerated in Articles 22 and 24, it shall announce its intention
by a declaration notified in the manner provided for in the second
"
paragraph of Article 23 {d).
Every State is thus empowered to declare, either in time of peace
or of war, that so far as it is concerned, it will regard any article
or articles in the absolute contraband class as being conditional
contraband, and any article or articles in either class as being
entirely free.
"Articles ^vhich are not susceptible of use in war may not bo The free list,
"
declared contraband of war (e).
"
The following articles may not be declared contraband of
war: — (1) Raw
cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other raAv
materials of the textile industries, and yams of the same. (2) Oil
seeds and nuts; copra. (3) Rubber, resins, gums, and lacs; hops.
(4) Raw hides, horns, bones, and ivory. (5) Natural and artificial
manures, including nitrates and phosphates for agricultural pur-
poses. (6) Metallic ores. (7) Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone,
including marble, bricks, and tiles. (8) Chinaware and
slates,
glass. (9) Paper and paper-making materials. (10) Soap, paint,

and colours, including articles exclusively used in their manufac-
ture, and varnish. (11) Bleachiijg powder, soda ash, caustic soda,
salt cake, ammonia, sulphate of ammonia, and sulphate of copper.
(12) Agricultural, mining, textile, and printing machinery.

(13) Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-of-pearl,
and coral. (14) Clocks and watches, other than chronometers.
(15) Fashion and fancy goods. (16) Feathers of all kinds, hairs,
and bristles. (17) Articles of household furniture and decoration;
"
office furniture and requisites (/).
The Report points out that this list is by no means exhaustive .
It contains specific examples of a class which is generalized by
(6) Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 4 {d) Art. 26.

(1909). (e) Art. 27.
(c) Art. 25. (/) Art. 28.
742 - EIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS.
the previous Article 27; so that commodities not mentioned in

the list are equally free if they are not susceptible of use in war.;
''
Likewise the following may not be treated as contraband of
war: —
(1) Articles serving exclusively for the care of the sick and
wounded. They may, however, in case of urgent military neces-
sity and subject to the payment of compensation, be requisitioned,
if their destination is that specified in Article 30. (2) Articles
intended for the use of the vessel in which they are found, as well
as those intended for the use of her crew and passengers during
the voyage" {g).
With regard to this Article the Report observes: "This does
not refer to hospital ships, which enjoy special immunity under
the Hague Convention of the 18th October, 1907 (/^), but to ordi-
nary merchant vessels, whose cargo includes articles of the kind
mentioned. ... It must, however, be observed that this right of
requisition may not be exercised in all cases. The articles in
question must have the destination speci'fied in Article 30, that

is to say, an enemy destination. Otherwise, the ordinary law pre-
vails: a belligerent could not have the right of requisition as
regards neutral vessels on the high seas Articles intended for the
.
use of the vessel, which might in themselves and by their nature

—
be contraband of war, may not be so treated as, for instance, arms
intended for the defence of the vessel against pirates or for making
signals. The same is true of articles intended for the use of the
crew and passengers during the voyage; the crew here include all
"
persons in the service of the vessel in general {i).
Doctrine of The outbreak of war has always necessarily curtailed the usual
"^
voyage^/ operations of trade, and, as a natural consequence, merchants have
continually endeavoured to avoid the operation of the laws of war,
and to carry on trade in goods liable to capture with as little risk
as possible. One of the chief artifices has been to send goods
destined for a belligerent, to some conveniently situated neutral
port first, with the intention of afterwards forwarding them to

their ultimate destination. To sustain the rights of belligerents
when this is done, Prize Courts have adopted what is called the
principle of "continuous voyage." This has been explained by
Lord Stowell as follows. He says: " It is an inherent and settled
principle in cases in which the same question can have come under
discussion, that the mere touching at any port without importing
id) ^f*- 29. (1909). For changes made in the

(A) Of. Hague Convention, No. X. Great War, see Pulling, Man. of
(1907), Art. 7; see supra, p. 554. Emerg.
& Legis.
e (1914-5).
v j
(0 Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 4
the cargo into the common stock of the country, will not alter the
nature of the voyage, which continues the same in all respects, and
must be considered as a voyage to the country to which the vessel
is actually going for the purpose of delivering the cargo at the
ultimate port" (fc). But in Lord Stowell's time, and down to
the American War, this doctrine had only been applied to
Civil
cases coveredby the rule of 1756 (which prohibited neutrals from
engaging in a belligerent's coasting or colonial trade closed to

them in time of peace), or where an underhand trade was attempted
to be carried on by subjects of one belligerent with the enemy (l).
During the Civil War the American Supreme Court, availing
itself of LordStowell's pronouncement, applied the principle of
continuous voyage to blockade running and the conveyance of con-
traband, and thus created an important innovation in the law of
prize. In the case of The Bermuda, which was captured on a The Bermuda.
"
voyage from England to Nassau, the Court said, Neutral trade
is entitled to protection in our courts. Neutrals in their own
country may sell to belligerents whatever belligerents choose to
buy. The principal exceptions to this rule are, that neutrals must
not sell to one belligerent what they refuse to sell to the other,
and must not furnish soldiers or sailors to either; nor prepare,
nor suffer to be prepared within their territory, armed ships or
'
military or naval expeditions against either. So, too, except goods

contraband of war, or conveyed with intent to violate a blockade,
neutrals may transport to belligerents whatever belligerents may
agree to take. And so, again, neutrals may convey in neutral

ships from one neutral port to another, any goods, whether con-
traband of war or not, if intended for actual delivery at the port
of destination, and to become part of the common stock of the
country or of the port. . . . But if it is intended to affirm (as
was argued by counsel) that a neutral ship may take on a con-
traband cargo ostensibly for a neutral port, but destined in reality
for a belligerent port, either by the same ship or by another,
without becoming liable, from the commencement to the end of
the voyage, to seizure, in order to the confiscation of the cargo,
we do not agree to it It makes no difference whether the
destination to the rebel port was ulterior or direct; nor could the
question of destination be affected by transhipment at Nassau, if

transhipment was intended, for that cduld not break the continuity
ih) The Maria (1805), 5 C. Rob. (l) Bernard, Neutrality of Great

368. And
see The Matchless, 1 Hagg. Britain, p. 311. The Ebenezer (1806),
Ad. 106; The Jonge Pieter (1801), 4 6 O. Rob. 250; The Thomyris, Edw.
O. Rob. 83; The William (1806), 5 17.
0. Rob. 385.
of transportation of the cargo. The interposition of a neutral port,

between neutral departure and belligerent destination, has alwajs
been a favourite resort of contraband carriers and blockade runners .
But them when the ultimate destination is ascer-

it never avails
tained. A transportation from one point to another remains con-

tinuous so long as intent remains unchanged, no matter what
"
stoppages or transhipments intervene (m). Thus a vessel sailing
from a neutral port, or a cargo sent from such a port, with intent
to violate a blockade, was held liable to condemnation from the
very outset of the voyage, no matter to what intermediate ports the

ship might go, provided the ulterior intent was ascertained {n).
The Spring- The case of The Springbok is perhaps the strongest illustration
bok.
of these principles. She was on a voyage from London to Nassau,
with a mixed cargo, consisting partly of contraband goods. While
on the high seas and before arriving at Nassau, she was captured
by a United States cruiser and taken to New York. The District
Court condemned both ship and cargo as prize (o), but the Supreme
Court reversed the decree as regards the ship, there being no suf-
ficient proof that the destination of the cargo to a blockaded port
was known to her owners {p) .

Strong efforts were made to induce
the British Government to intervene on behalf of the shippers, and
considerable correspondence ensued, but finally, after a careful
*' "
perusal of the elaborate and able judgment of the judge in the
District Court, Earl Russell declined to interfere, holding that the
"
evidence goes far to establish that the cargo of the Springbok,
containing a considerable portion of contraband, wâs never really
and bond fide destined for Nassau, but was either destined merely
to call ther0, or to be immediately transhipped after its arrival
there without breaking bulk and without any previous incorpora-
tion into the common stock of that colony,, and then to proceed to
its real destination., being a blockaded port" {q).
Difference In these cases, when the ultimate destination was some Con-
between
federate seaport, there was no doubt that the ship and goods could
carriage by
land and be captured on their way from the interposed neutral port to the
carriage by
blockaded port. The innovation consisted in making the
liability
{m) The Bermuda (1865), 3 Wal- aroused a great deal of controversy;

lace, 551. it was in several
quarters subjected
(w) The Circassiun (1864), 2 Wal- to much criticism see Revue de Droit
;
lace, 135; The Stephen Hart (1863), International (1875), p. 241; Quar-
3 Wallace, 559; The Sqrringbok (1866), terly Law Review (Nov. 1877); Calvo,
6 Wallace, 1. Droit Int. vol. ii. § 1120; Moore,
(o) The Springbok (1866), Blatch- Digest, vol. vii. § 1261.
ford, Prize Cases, 349; 5 Wallace, 1. {q) Earl Russell to Lord Lyons,
(j)) The Springbok (1866), 5 Wal- Feb. 20th, 1864. Pari. Papers, Misc.
lace, 1. The decision in this case (No. 1), (1900) Cd. 34.
extend to the journey from the point of departure to the interposed

port. A
distinction, however, was made when the goods were
finally to reach the belligerent by land. Thus the traffic between
neutral States and Matamoras in Mexico (except in contraband)
was held not to be any violation of the blockade, even if there were
an attempt to supply Texas through Matamoras. In this case the
goods could only reach the Confederates by land, and a blockade
by sea cannot give a belligerent any right to capture goods con-
veyed over land. The result was, that while the blockade lasted,
neutral goods destined to reach the Confederates entirely by sea,
whether in the same ship or another, were liable to seizure during
the whole voyage, whereas if the last part of the journey was to
be performed from a neutral place over land, the goods were not
If contraband, the goods were held liable, whatever
liable at all.
means of transport were adopted (r) Though these new rules
.
were regarded at this period of the American Civil War as only

the law of the United States, yet the action of Lord Salisbury with
regard to the seizure of the Bundesmth and the Herzog and the
General, during the Anglo-Boer war (1900) (s), was an indica-
is concerned the British Government
tion that so far as contraband
was inclined to accept the principles followed by the Courts of the
United States. An examination of the printed correspondence
relating to the cases of The Springbok and The Peterhojf shows
that the Government of that day distinctly refused to make any
diplomatic protest or enter any objection against the decision of

the United States Prize Court (t) .
1909 there was divergence of opinion and practice with TheDeclara-

Till
regard to the doctrine of 'continuous voyage.' In that year the London on
representatives of the maritime States assembled at the London

'continuous
Naval Conference arrived at a compromise on the question with

regard to its application to contraband: the applicability of the
doctrine was allowed in the case of absolute contraband, but re-
pudiated in the case of conditional contraband (with one exception)

and in that of blockade. The following are the Articles relative
to
* '
continuous voyage and destination: —

"
Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be Destination of
destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to contraband,

the armed forces of the enemy. It is immaterial whether the
(r) The Peterhof

(18€6), 5 Wallace, (1900) Cd. 34. For a strongly adverse
35. And
see T/ie Frau Margaretha criticism of the American doctrine of
(1805), 6 C. Rob. 92, and The Zelden continuous voyage, see Hall, Inter-
Rust (1805), 6 O. Rob. 93. national Law (5th ed.), p. 668. And
{s) See supra, p. 734. see also a paper by Sir Travers Twiss,
{t) Pari. Papers, Miscell. (No. 1), Quarterly Law Review (Nov. 1877).
carriage of the goods is direct or entails transhipment or a sub-

"
sequent transport by land (u).
The two essential elements involved in the notion of contraband
are the character of the articles concerned and their destination.
The preceding provisions have dealt with the first point. The
'
second is closely connected with the doctrine of continuous;
voyage.' With regard to the latter, the Memorandum drawn up,

by the British Government for the use of its deleg'ates at the
"
London Naval Conference says: When an adventure includes the
carriage of goods to a neutral port, and thence to an ulterior
' '
destination, the doctrine of continuous voyage consists in treat-

ing for certain purposes the whole journey as one transportation,
with the consequences which would have attached had there been
no interposition of the neutral port. The doctrine is only applic-
able when the whole transportation is made in pursuance of a
single mercantile transaction preconceived from the outset. Thus
it will not be applied where the evidence goes no further than to
show that the goods were sent to the neutral port in the hopes of
finding a market there for delivery elsewhere" (x).
The Report thus comments on the destination of absolute
official
contraband: "The
articles included in the list in Article 22 are
absolute contraband when they are destined for territory belonging
to or occupied by the enemy, or for his armed
military or
naval forces. These articles are liable to capture as soon as a
final destination of this kind can be shown
by the captor to exist .
It is not, therefore, the destination of the vessel which is decisive,

but that of the goods It makes no difference if these goods are on
.
board a vessel which is to discharge them in a neutral port as soon ;
as the captor is able to show that they are to be forwarded from

there by land or sea to an enemy country, that is enough to justify
the capture and subsequent condemnation of the
cargo. The very
principle of continuous voyage, as regards absolute contraband, is
thus established by Article 30. The journey made by the goods
is regarded as a whole" (^).
"
Proof of Proof of the destination specified in Article 30 is complete in
destination of
absolute
i
j> n
v
the lollowmg
•
cases :
—
contraband.
(1) When the goods are documented for discharge in an enemy
port, or for delivery to the armed forces of the enemy.
(2) When the vessel is t6 call at
enemy ports only, or when she
is to touch at an enemy port or join the armed forces of tlie enemy
(w) Declar. of London (1909), Papers, Miscell. No. 4 (1909), p. 7.

^^^" 30. (^) Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 4
(x) British Memorandum, Pari. (1909).
before reaching the neutral port for which the goods in question
"
are documented (z).
It is for the captor to prove, as we see from Article 30, that
the absolute contraband goods intercepted have a hostile destina-
tion. But Article 31 lays down that in certain cases proof of the
destination is conclusive, that the presumption is final and
is,
irrebuttable. These cases are explained by the Report: —

''First case. — The goods are documented for discharge in an
enemy port, that is to say, according to the ship's papers referring
to those goods they are to be discharged there. In this case there is
a real admission, on the part of the interested parties themselves,
of enemy destination.
''Second case. — The vessel is to touch at enemy ports only; or
she is to an enemy port before reaching the neutral port
touch at
for which the goods are documented; so that although these goods,
according to the ship's papers referring to them, are to be dis-

charged in a neutral port, the vessel carrying them is to touch at
an enemy port before arriving at that neutral port. They will be
liable to capture, and the possibility of proving that their neutral
destination is real and in accordance with the intention of the
parties interested is not admitted. The fact that, before reaching

that destination, the vessel will touch at an enemy port, would
occasion too great a risk for the belligerent whose cruiser visits
the vessel. Even without assuming intentional fraud, there might
bo strong temptation for the master of the merchant vessel to
ii
discharge the contraband, for which he would obtain a good price,

or there might be a temptation for the local authorities to requisi-
tion the goods.
"
The same case arises where the vessel is to join the armed
forces of the enemy before arriving at the neutral port.
"
For the sake of simplicity, the provision speaks only of an
enemy port ; it is understood that a port occupied by the eneimf
must be regarded as an enemy port, as follows from the general
"
rule in Article 30 {a).
"
Where a vessel
carrying absolute contraband, her papers are
is
conclusive proof as to the voyage on which she is engaged, unless

she is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers and
"
unable to give adequate reasons to justify such dîation (^).
That is, if the vessel is encountered in such circumstances as
point to the untrustworthy nature of the statements, such state-
iz) Art. 31. (^>) Declar. of London, Art. 32. Cf.

(a) ParL Papers, Misoell. No. 4 Art. 35.
<1909).
merits will not be accepted by the captor as final proof of the
voyage.
"
Destination Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be
contraband destined for the use of the armed forces or of a Government de-
partment of the enemj State, unless in this latter case the circum-
stances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes
of the war in progress. This latter exception does not apply to
a consignment coming under Article 24 (4) "(c).
''
The destination referred to in Article 33 is presumed to exist
if the goods are consigned to enemy authorities, or to a trader
established in the enemy country who, as a matter of common
knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy. similar A

presumption arises goods are consigned to a fortified place
if the
belonging to the enemy, or other place serving as a base for the

armed forces of the enemy. No such presumption, however,
arises in the case of a merchant vessel bound for one of these places
if it is sought to prove that she herself is contraband. In oases^
where the above presumptions do not arise, the destination is

presumed to be innocent. The presumptions set up by this
"
Article may be rebutted (d).
"
Conditional contraband is not liable to capture, except when
found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or
occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy, and
when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port.
The ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to the voyage of
the vessel and the port of discharge of the goods, unless she is found
clearly out of the course indicated by her papers and is unable to.
"
give adequate reasons to justify such deviation (e).
"
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35, conditional con-
traband, if shown to have the destination referred to in Article 33,.
is liable to capture in cases where the enemy country has no sea-
board "(/).
With regard to the above rules the Report adds by way of ex-
"
planatory comment: The rules for conditional contraband differ
from those laid down for absolute contraband in two respects —
(1) there is no question of destination for the enemy in general,
but of destination for the use of his armed forces or Government
departments; (2) the doctrine of continuous voyage is excluded.
Articles 33 and 34 refer to the
first, and Article 35 to the second
principle" (ff).
(c) Art. 33. (/) Art. 36.

(d) Art. 34. (//) In The Kim and other vessels
(e) Art. 35. (1915, 32 T. L. R. 10), the Prize Court
"
As to conditional contraband destined for the armed forces, the

liability to capture is obvious; similarly, if destined for the central
civil authorities of the (that is, excluding local and
enemy State
municipal authorities). So, too, conditional contraband articles
destined for the use of the civil administration of the enemy's
colony, when the colony is far from the theatre of war and in no
way participates in hostilities, would be exempt; because the

enemy could scarcely draw on the resources of such colonial civil
administration for the needs of the war. But gold, silver, or paper
money would not be exempt, because money can be very easily
transmitted.
With regard to the presumption of destination in the case of
conditional contraband (as stated in Article 34), it will not apply
to the merchant vessel herself, unless there is direct proof of her
destination for the use of the armed forces or authorities of the
enemy State. If there is no presumption of hostile destination, the

destination is presumed to be innocent; so that it is for the captor
to prove the illicit nature of the goods intercepted by him. All
presumptions, whether in favour of the captor or against him, are
rebuttable.
Where the statements in the ship's papers are inconsistent with

the actual facts, such as unjustifiable deviation, the papers cease
to be evidence; so that the belligerent cruiser will have to decide
according to the particular circumstances of the case. Similarly,

when search shows the papers to contain false statements. But
the false statements, in order to give the belligerent the right to
capture the vessel, must be material and substantial; a single false

entry, for example, does not necessarily nullify the evidential force
of the papers as a whole {g) .
The case contemplated in Article 36 is obviously rare, but it has

occurred in previous wars, e.g., the Anglo-Boer war, when the
German vessels, the Bundesrath, Herzog, and General were
arrested by British cruisers on suspicion of carrying contraband
from German ports to the Portuguese port of Lorenzo Marques,
and ultimately destined for the enemy territory. The vessels
were afterwards released, as it was found that they had no muni-
tions of war or provisions destined for the enemy Government and
intended for military use. In the diplomatic discussion that fol-
lowed, the British Government urged that its action was justified
by the novel circumstance of the war, which was waged with an
modified the doctrine of continuous ultimate destination is of an enemy

transport, so as to make conditional character and they are intended for
contraband goods liable to capture and the use of the enemy forces,
confiscation when their actual and real (r/) Report on the Declaration, ibid.
inland State whose only communication with the sea was over a
few miles of railway to a neutral port, and contended that the view
as expressed by Bluntschli was applicable to the case: "If ship
or goods are sent to the destination of a neutral port only the better
to come to the aid of the enemy, there will be contraband of war,
and confiscation will be justified {h) Eventually an arrange-
'.'
.
ment was arrived at, and compensation was paid for the detention
of the vessels {i) .
"
Place of A
vessel carrying goods liable to capture as absolute or con-
cap ure.
ditional contraband may be captured on the high seas or in the
territorial waters of the belligerents throughout the whole of her
voyage, even if she is lo touch at a port of call before reaching the
"
hostile destination (k).
"
Time of A vessel may not be captured on the ground that she has carried
capture. contraband on a previous occasion if such carriage is in point of
"
fact at an end (?).
That is, the vessel is not liable to capture on the return voyage;
in other words, the successful accomplishment of the enterprise
purges the vessel of her offence against the belligerent. In The

Imina (m), Sir W. Scott said that to render the vessel liable to
"
capture-, shemust be taken in delicto. Under the present under-
"
standing of the law of nations," he observed, you cannot generally
take the proceeds in the return voyage. From the moment of
quitting port on a hostile destination, indeed, the offence is com-
plete, and it is not necessary to wait till the goods are actually
endeavouring to enter the enemy's port; but beyond that, if the
goods are not taken in de^licto, and in the actual prosecution of
such a voyage, the penalty not now
generally held to attach."/
is
The latter part of this judgment, that the goods must be taken in
the actual voyage to the enemy's port, is now subject to exceptions
The same judge applied a different rule in other cases of con-
traband, carried from Europe to the East Indies, with false papers
and false destination, intended to conceal the real object of the
expedition, where the return cargo, the proceeds of the outward
cargo taken on the return voyage, was held liable to condemna-
tion (n) . The soundness
of these latter decisions, however, was
questionable; for in order to sustain the penalty there must be.

on principle, a delictum at the moment of seizure. To subject
the property to confiscation whilst the offence no longer continues,
would be to extend it indefinitely, not only to the return
voyage,
(A) Droit International (1874), 813. 3 C. Rob. 167.

(m) (1800),
0) Pari. Papers (1900), Africa, («) The Rosalie and Betty (1800),
No. 1. 2 O. Rob. 343; The Nancy (1800), 3
(Ji) Declar. of London, Art. 37. 0. Rob. 122; cf. The Margaret, 1
(0 Art. 38. Acton, 333.
but to all future cargoes of the vessel, which would thus never be
purified from the contagion communicated by the contraband
articles.
" "
Contraband goods are liable to condemnation (o). Penalty for
"
A vessel carrying contraband may be condemned if the contra- Contraband
band, reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or freight, forms
"
more than half the cargo (p).
"
If a vessel carrying contraband is released, the costs and
expenses incurred by the captor in respect of the proceedings in the

national Prize Court and of the custody of the ship and cargo
during the proceedings shall be borne by the ship "(g).

"
Goods which belong to the owner of the contraband and are on
board the same vessel are liable to condemnation" (r).
In earlier times the vessel and her entire contents wero deemed
to be contaminated by the contraband portion of the cargo, and
were therefore subject to confiscation. In the eighteenth century
considerable relaxations were introduced, whereby it became more
or less the practice to grant immunity to the innocent part of the
cargo, as well as to the vessel in certain circumstances, and to take

only the contraband. Under the British practice (which was
followed by the American Courts), where the ship and cargo do
not belong to the same person, the contraband articles only are, in
general, confiscated, and the carrier-master is refused his
freight (s), to which he upon innocent articles which are
is entitled
condemned though in some cases costs have
as enemy's property;
been allowed when the contraband portion of the cargo was very
small (/) But where the ship and the innocent articles of the
.
cargo belong to the owner of the contraband, they are all involved
in the same penalty (u) And even where the ship and the cargo
.
do not belong to the same person, the carriage of contraband,

under the fraudulent circumstances of false papers and false
destination, or if the vessel offer forcible resistance to the captor,
will work a confiscation of the ship as well as the cargo (x) The .
same has likewise been held to be produced by the carriage of

effect
contraband articles in a ship, the owner of which is bound by the

express obligation of the treaties subsisting between his own coun-
try and the capturing country, to refrain from carrying such
articles to the enemy. In such a case, it is said that the ship
(o) Declar. of London, Art. 39. (0 Cf. The Neptunus (1800), 3 C

ip) Art. 40. Rob. 1Q8.
(g) Art. 41. (u) TheStaadt Embden (1798), 1 O.
(r) Art. 42. Rob. 26.
\s) The Oster Risoer,4.0. Rob. 199. (a;) The Jonge Tobias (1799), 1 C.
Rob. 329.
throws off her neutral character, and is liable to be treated at once
as an enemy's vessel, and as a violator of the solemn compacts of

the country to which she belongs {y). Where, however, no contra-
band goodswere condemned in the case of an intercepted ship,
restitution is ordered, the captor is liable to pay compensation for
the loss caused by her detention. But if there were reasonable
ground for suspicion, costs will not be ordered (2;),
and it may be
oven that restitution will be ordered subject to the payment of the
captor's expenses (a).
Practice on the Continent shows some divergence; in some
countries the vessel is condemned only when the whole of her cargo
is contraband: in others, when the contraband portion forms three-
quarters of the entire cargo; in others, again, when any portion

of the cargo is contraband. The French rules of 1870 directed
the ship to be confiscated if more than three-fourths of the cargo
consisted of contraband (&).
It appears, then, that on these points the rules incorporated in
the Declaration of London are a compromise between the Anglo-
American and continental systems.
The Report on the Declaration says, with respect to the pro-
"
It was uni-
portion of the contraband goods on board the vessel:
versally admitted [at the London Naval Conference] that in certain
cases the condemnation of the contraband is not enough, and that
the vessel herself should also be condemned, but opinions differed
as to what these cases were It was decided to fix upon a certain
.
proportion between the contraband and the total cargo. But the
question divides itself into two parts: (1) What shall be the pro-
portion? The solution adopted is the mean between those
proposed, which varied from a quarter to three-quarters.

(2) How shall this proportion be reckoned? Must the contraband
form more than half the cargo in volume, weight, value, or freight?
The adoption of a single fixed standard gives rise to theoretical
objections, and also to practices intended to avoid condemnation
of the vessel in spite of the importance of the cargo. If the
standard of weight or volume is adopted, the master will ship
innocent goods sufficiently bulky or weighty in order that the
(y) The Neutralitet (1801), 3 C. 3 Wallace, 557. As to how far the

Rob. 295; The Ring end e Jacob (1750), shipowner is liable for the act of the
1 0. Rob. 91; The Sarah Christina master in cases of contraband, see
<1799), 1 O. Rob. 237; The Mer- Wheaton's Rep. vol. ii., Appendix,
curius (1799), 1 O. Rob. 288; The Note I. pp. 37, 38.
Franklin (1801), 3 0. Rob. 217; The (z) Of. The Ostsee (1856), 9 Moo.
Edivard (1801), 4 O. Rob. 69; The P. C. 150; The Leucade, î^mk^, 217.
Banger (1805), 6 0. Rob. 125; Car- («) The Ostsee, ibid.
rington v. Merchants' Ins'. Co. (1834), (b) Barboux, Jurisp. du Conseil des
8 Peters, 518; The Bermuda (1865), Prises, 1870—71, Appendix, Art. 6.
volume or weight of the contraband may be less. A similar

remark may be made as regards the standard of value or freight.
The consequence is that, in order to justify condemnation, it
suffices that the contraband should form more than half the cargo
according to any one of the above standards. This may seem
severe; but, on the one hand, any other system would make fraudu-
lent calculations easy, and, on the other, it may be said that the
condemnation of the vessel is justified when the carriage of
contraband formed an important part of her venture a statement —
which applies to all the cases specified" (c).
"'
If a vessel is encountered at sea while ignorant of the outbreak Effect of
of hostilities or of the declaration of contraband affecting her cargo, ôôrance.
the contraband may not be condemned except on payment of com-
pensation; the vessel herself and the remainder of the cargo are
not liable to condemnation or to the costs and expenses referred to
in Article 41. The same rule applies if the master, after be-
coming aware of the outbreak of hostilities or of the declaration
of contraband, has had no opportunity of discharging' the contra-
band A vessel is deemed to be aware of the existence of a state of
.
war or of a declaration of contraband, if she left a neutral port

after the notification of the outbreak of hostilities or of the declara-
tion of contraband made in sufficient time to the Power which
to
such port belongs. A vessel is also deemed to be aware of a state
of war if she left an enemy port after the outbreak of
"
hostilities (d)
The first paragraph of this Article (e) introduces a special form
of the practice of pre-emption, which has long been observed under
the British system. According to the practice of the British
Prize Courts, if there was some doubt as to the contraband nature
of the goods, the captor, instead of confiscating them, agreed to
purchase them at a fair market price, together with a reasonable

profit, and allowed freight to the vessel (/). This procedure was
frequently applied also to absolute contraband goods, if they were
the produce of the country exporting them, and were still in a
raw state (g). The Naval Prize Act of 1864, s. 38, incorporated
this right of pre-emption; and the Manual of Naval Prize
Law of 1888, Article 84, says: "The carriage of goods condi-
tionally contraband, and of such absolutely contraband goods as
(c) Pari. Papers, Misoell. No. 4 p. 423.

(1909). (e) Of. also Art. 29.
(d) Art. 43. Of. the Haûe Con- (/) Cf. Tê Ilaahet (1800), 2 C.
vention, No. VI. (1907), relative to Rob. 179.
the status of enemy merchant ships at ((7) The Sarah Christina (1799), 1
the outbreak of hostilities, sujn-a, O. Rob. 237.

W. 48
are in an unmanufactured and are the produce of the country

state,
exporting them, is usually followed only by the pre-emption of

such goods by the British Government, which then pays freight
to the vessel carrying the goods."
"
Handing over Avessel which has been stopped on the ground that she is carry-
contraband
contraband, and which is not liable to condemnation on account
goods to ing
belligerent of the proportion of contraband on board, may, when the circum-
warship.
stances permit, be allowed to continue her voyage if the master is
willing to hand over the contraband to the belligerent warship.

The delivery of the contraband must be entered by the captor
in the logbook of the vessel stopped, and the master must give the
captor duly certified copies of all relevant papers.

The captor is at liberty to destroy the contraband that has thus
"
been handed over to him {h).
Unneuteal We have seen that contraband trading forbidden by a belli-

is
SBRVICE.
gerent, because it increases the means and resources of the enemy
in the prosecution of his hostilities. That is, contraband trading
assists the enemy
—although the neutral trader undertakes his
enterprise solely for the purpose of acquiring profit for himself.
In so doing he identifies himself with the enemy, but only
indirectly and only to a certain extent; therefore, if he is taken
in the act by the other belligerent, he is liable to the penalties
imposed, which may bring about the loss of his property hazarded
in the adventure. If a neutral, instead of such partial identifica-
tion with the enemy, entirely identifies himself, his acts, and his
possessions with the interests of the enemy, he necessarily becomes
one with the enemy, he divests himself completely of his neutral
character, and in the eyes of the other belligerent becomes himself
an enemy, and so is subject to all the liabilities of an enemy proper.
Between these two cases there is an intermediate position, which
arises out of the performance of what has been described as
'
unneutral service' — 'assistance hostile.' This involves an inter-

ference in the conflict of a character not
merely commercial but
also warlike; so that the here be
penalty will generally severer than
that imposed for contraband commerce;
e.g., whereas in the latter
case the banned goods alone may in certain circumstances be con-
in the former the vessel
fiscated, engaged in the forbidden service
will herself be subject to condemnation. To show the connection
(A) Art. 44. see Phillipson, Int. Law and the Great
Withregard to the contraband War, pp. 340 seq.; Manual of Emer-
policy pursued during the Great War, gency Legislation, passim.
of unneutral service with contraband trading, we may refer to an

American case that occurred in the war between Great Britain and
the United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
Although the general policy of the American Government, in The Com-

''^^^
ity diplomatic negotiations, then aimed to limit the catalogue of
contraband by confining it strictly to munitions of war, excluding
all articles of promiscuous use, in the remarkable case of The
Commercen the Supreme Court of the United States was disposed

toadopt all the principles of Sir W. Scott, as to provisions be-
coming contraband under certain circumstances. But as that was
not the case of a cargo of neiitral property, supposed to be liable
to capture and confiscation as contraband of war, but of a cargo of
enemy's property going for the supply of the enemy's naval and
military forces, and clearly liable to condemnation, the question
was, whether the neutral master was entitled to his freight as in
other cases of the transportation of innocent articles of enemy's
property and it was not essential to the determination of the case

;
' '
to consider under what circumstances articles ancipitis usus

might become contraband. On the actual question before the
Court, it seems there would have been no difference of opinion
among the American judges in the case of an ordinary war; all of
them concurring in the principle, that a neutral, carrying supplies •
for the enemy's naval or military forces, does, under the mildest
interpretation of international law, expose himself to the loss of

freight. But the case was that of a Swedish vessel, captured by
an American cruiser, in the act of carrying a cargo of British pro-
perty, consisting of barley and oats, for the supply of the allied
armies in the Spanish peninsula, the United States being at war
with Great Britain, but at peace with Sweden and the other Powers
allied against France. Under these circumstances a majority of
the judges were of the opinion that the voyage was illegal, and
that the neutral carrier was not entitled to his freight on the cargo
condemned as enemy's property.
It was stated in the judgment of the Court, that it had been
solemnly adjudged in the British Prize Courts, that being engaged

in the transport service of the enemy, or in the conveyance of
military persons in his employment, or the carrying of despatches,

'
Hostile
^^^*
are acts of hostility which subject the property to confiscation. In
these cases, the fact that the voyage was to a neutral port was not
thought to change the character of the transaction. The principle

ef these determinations was asserted to be, that the party must
be deemed to place himself in the service of the enemy State, and
to assist in warding off the pressure of the war, or in favouring
48 (2)
its offensive projects. Now these cases could not be distinguished,

in principle, from that before the Court. Here was a cargo of
provisions exported from the enemy's country,
with the avowed
purpose of supplying the army of the enemy. Without

this
destination, they would not have been permitted to be exported

at all. It was vain to contend that the direct effect of the voyage
was not to aid the British hostilities against the United States.
It might enable the enemy indirectly to operate with more vigour
and promptitude against them, and increase his disposable force.
But it was not the effect of the particular transaction which the
law regards: it was the general tendency of such transactions to
assist the military operations of the enemy, and to tempt devia-
tions from strict neutrality. The destination to a neutral port
could not vary the application of this rule. It was only doing
that indirectly which was directly prohibited. Would it be con-
tended that a neutral might lawfully transport provisions for the
British fleet and army, while it lay at Bordeaux preparing for an
expedition to the United States? Would it be contended that he

might lawfully supply a British fleet stationed on the American
coast? An attempt had been made to distinguish this case from
the ordinary cases of employment in the transport service of the
enemy, on the ground that the war of Great Britain against France
was a war distinct from that against the United States; and that
Swedish subjects had a perfect right to assist the British arms in
respect to the former though not to the latter. But the Court held,
that whatever might be the right of the Swedish sovereign, acting
under his own authority, if a Swedish vessel be engaged in the
actual service of Great Britain, or in carrying stores for the exclu-
sive use of the British armies, she must, to all intents .and pur-
poses, be deemed a British transport. It was perfectly immaterial

in what particular enterprise those armies might, at the time, be
engaged; for the same important benefits were conferred upon the
enemy of the United States, who thereby acquired a greater dis-
posable force to bring into action against them. In The FrieTid-
ship (i), Sir W. Scott, speaking on this subject, declared that
"
it signifies men so conveyed are to be put
nothing, whether the
into action on an immediate expedition or not. The mere shifting
of drafts in detachments, and the conveyance of stores from one
place to another, is an ordinary employment of a transport vessel,
and it is a distinction totally unimportant whether this or that
case may be connected with the immediate active service of the
(0 (1807), 6 O. Rob. 420.

enemy. In removing forces from distant settlements, there may-

be no intention of immediate action but still the general import-
;
ance of having troops conveyed to places where it is convenient that

they should be collected, either for present or future use, is what
constitutes the object and employment of transport vessels." It
was obvious that the learned judge did not deem it material to what
places the stores might be destined; and it must be equally imma-
terial what is the immediate occupation of the enemy's force.
That force always hostile to America, be it where it might.
Avas
To-day it might act against France, to-morrow against the former

country; and the better its commissary department was supplied,
the more life and activity was communicated to all its motions. It
was not therefore material whether there was another distinct war,
in which the enemy of the United States was engaged, or not. It
was sufficient that his armies were everywhere their enemies; and
every assistance offered to them must, directly or indirectly, operate
to their injury.
The Court was, therefore, of opinion that the voyage in which

the vessel was engaged was illicit, and inconsistent with the duties
of neutrality, and that it was a very lenient administration of

justice to confine the penalty to a mere denial of freight (/c).
In 1807, during the war between Great Britain and Holland, Transport
the former captured an American vessel, the Orozemho, which —
perTons.^
chartered by a merchant at Lisbon ostensibly to take a cargo ,to
America —had Dutch military officers of
received on board three
distinction and two was proved that this took
civil officials. It
place with the knowledge of the charterer, and that the vessel had
been specially fitted beforehand for the purpose. Condemnation
was decreed on the ground that the vessel had been let out in the
service of the enemy. In the course of judgment Sir W. Scott
pointed out that in accordance with previous decisions a vessel
hired by the enemy for the conveyance of military persons was to
be regarded as a transport, and therefore liable to confiscation. As
to the number of military persons necessary to subject the vessel
was difficult to define; since fewer persons of
to confiscation, it
high quality and character might be of much more importance

than a much greater number of persons of lower condition. To
carry a veteran general, under some circumstances, might be a
much more noxious act than the conveyance of a whole regiment.
The consequences of such assistance are greater, and therefore the
{k) The Commercen (1816), 1 Wheaton, 382.

to prevent and punish it; nor is it

belligerent has a stronger right
material, in the judgment of the Prize Court, whether the master
be ignorant of the character of the service on which he is engaged.
It is deemed sufficient if there has been an injury arising to the
from the employment in which the vessel is found.
belligerent
If imposition is practised, it operates as force; and if redress is to
be sought against any person, it must be against those who have,
by means either of compulsion or deceit, exposed the property
to
danger; otherwise such opportunities of conveyance

would be con-
stantly used, and itwould be almost impossible, in the greater

number of cases, to prove the privity of the immediate offender (I) .
Transporta- Similarly in The Caroline it was held that a neutral vessel,

tion of mili- which is used as a transport for the enemy's forces, is subject to
tary persons
and de- confiscation, if captured by the opposite belligerent. Nor will
spatches in the fact of her having been impressed by violence into the enemy's
the enemy's
service. service, exemprt: her. The masiter cannot be permitted to aver that
he was an involuntary agent. Were an act of force exercised by
one belligerent Power on a neutral ship or person to be considered
a justification for an act, contrary to the known duties of thie
neutral character, there would be an end of any prohibition under
the law of nations to carry contraband, or to engage in any other
hostile act. If any loss is sustained in such a service, the neutral
yielding to such demands must seek redress from the Government

which has imposed the restraint upon him {m) .
We find a similar practice a century later, when in the Eusso-
Japanese war, 1904, the Japanese captured and condemned the

Nigretia, a British vessel, on a voyage from Shanghai to Vladi-
vostock, on the ground that she had on board two Eussian officers,
who were proceeding, under feigned names and under the pretence
of belonging to the crew, with the connivance of the charterers, to
a naval port of the enemy (n) .
In 1908, in a case arising out of a policy insurance with regard

to the above-mentioned vessel, it was held by the Privy Council
that enemy military persons carried by a neutral vessel are not
contraband of war in the proper sense of the term (o) .
Carriage of
A neutral vessel employed for the transport of merely civil
enemy civil
officials would, it appears, be
officials. equally liable to condemnation, if
they were despatched, with the knowledge of the charterer or
master, on the enemy's public service and at the enemy's public
(0 The Orozembo (1807), 6 O. Rob. (o) Yangtze Insurance Association

430. V. The Indemnity Marine Mutual As-
(w) The Caroline (1802), 4 C. Rob. surance Co., (1908) 1 K. B. 910; 2
256. K. B. 504. Cf. The Trent,
(w) The Nigretia (1904), Takahashi, pp. 178, 331.
p. 639.
expense (p). But it would be otherwise if such persons, or even

military persons, were private passengers travelling at their own
expense (q) .
The fraudulently carrying the despatches of the enemy will also The carriage^
subject the neutral vessel, in which they are transported, to capture Jjes^^^tches
and confiscation. The consequences of such a service are in-
beyond the effect of any contraband that can be
definite, infinitely
conveyed. In 1807, during the war between Great Britain and

France, the British captured a neutral ship, the Atalanta, on
which French despatches were found concealed in a tea chest.
Both ship and cargo were therefore condemned, on the ground
that the carriage of enemy despatches constitutes an engagement
"
in the service of the enemy. The carrying of two or three cargoes
"
of military stores," said Sir W. Scott, is necessarily, an assistance
of a limited nature; but in the transmission of despatches may be
conveyed the entire plan of a campaign, that may defeat all the
plans of the other belligerent in that quarter of the world. It is

true, as it has been said, that one ball might take off a Charles
the Xllth, and might produce the most disastrous effects in a
campaign; but that is a consequence so remote and accidental, that,

in the contemplation of human events, it is a sort of evanescent
quantity of which no account is taken; and the practice has been,

accordingly, that it is in considerable quantities only that the
offence of contraband is contemplated. The case of despatches
is very different; it is impossible to limit a letter to so small a
size as not to be capable of producing the most important con-

sequences. It is a service, therefore, which, in whatever degree
can only be considered in one character as an act of the
it exists, —
most hostile nature. The offence of fraudulently carrying
despatches in the service of the enemy being, then, greater than
that of carrying contraband under any circumstances, it becomes
absolutely necessary, as well as just, to resort to some other

penalty than that inflicted in cases of contraband. The confisca-
tion of the noxious article which constitutes the penalty in contra-
band, Avhere the vessel and cargo do not belong to the same person,
would be ridiculous when applied to despatches There would be .
no freight dependent on their transportation, and therefore this

penalty could not, in the nature of things, be applied. The
vehicle in which they are carried must, therefore, be con-
"
fiscated {r). But when it was proved that the master was not
ip) TheOrozembo (l%m),QO.'Sioh. dum, Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 4
430. (1909), p'. 9.
iq) The Friendship (1807), 6 C. (r) The Atalanta (1808), 6 O. Kob.
Rob. 429. Of. the British Memoran- 440.
aware of the fact that enemy despatches were being carried in his
—
vessel his ignorance not being due to his negligence (s) or that —
he was ignorant of their real nature {t), the penalty of condemna-
tion was not imposed.
Diplomatic But carrying the despatches of an ambassador or other public
minister of the enemy, resident in a neutral country, is an excep-
arexception.
tion to the reasoning on which the above general rule is founded.
" "
They are," said Sir W. Scott in The Caroline, despatches from
persons who
are, in a peculiar manner, the favourite object of the
protection of the law of nations, residing in the neutral country

for the purpose of preserving the relations of amity between that
State and their own Government. On this ground a very material
distinction arises with respect to the right of furnishing the con-
veyance The neutral country has a right to preserve its relations

.
with the enemy, and you are not at liberty to conclude that any
communication between them can partake, in any degree, of the
nature of hostility against you. The limits assigned to the ojyevei-
tions of war against ambassadors, by writers on public law, are,
that the belligerent may exercise his right of war against them,
wherever the character of hostility exists: he may stop the am-
bassador of his enemy on his passage; but when he has arrived in
the neutral country,and taken on himself the functions of his
and has been admitted in his representative character, he
office,
'
becomes a sort of middle man,' entitled to peculiar privileges, as

set apart for the preservation of the relations of
amity and peace,
in maintaining which all nations are, in some degree, interested.
If it be argued that he retains his national character unmixed, and
that even his residence is considered as a residence in his own
country, it is answered that this is a fiction of law, invented for
his further protection only, and as suph a fiction, it is not to be
extended beyond the reasoning on which it depends. It was
intended as a privilege, and cannot be urged to his disadvantage.
Could it be said that he would, on that
principle, be subject to any
of the rights of war in the neutral territory? Certainly not: he is
there for the purpose of carrying on the relations of peace and
amity, for the interests of his own country primarily, but at the
same time for the furtherance and protection of the interests
which the neutral country also has in the continuance of those
relations. It is to be considered also, with regard to this question,
what may be due to the convenience of the neutral State; for its
interests may require that the intercourse of correspondence with
(0 The Susan (1808), 6 O. Rob. 461. (t) The Hajnd (1814), Edw. 228.
the enemy's country should not be altogether interdicted. It
might be thought to amount almost to a declaration, that an am-

bassador from the enemy shall not reside in the neutral vState, if
he declared to be debarred from the only means of communi-
is
cating with his own. For to what useful purpose can he reside
there without the opportunity of such a communication? It is too
much to say that all the business of the two States shall be trans-
acted by the minister of the neutral State resident in the enemy's
country. The practice of nations has allowed to neutral States the
privilege of receiving ministers from the belligerent Powers, and
of an immediate negotiation with them" (u).
These propositions represent pretty accurately what was con-
ceived to be the customary law on the subject. And this customary
law isvalid now, subject to certain modifications introduced by
the —
Hague Code e.g., the rule that a belligerent may seize enemy
sick or wounded found in neutral hospital ships or merchant-
men (x)
— and by the Declaration of London (1909). The latter
deals with the question of unneutral service ('assistance hostile')
generally, and divides the offences into two classes lesser offences
—
and more serious offences.
"
A neutral vessel will be oondeimned and will,
in a general Avay, Declaration
receive the same treatment as a neutral vessel liable to condemna- ^^ unneutral
tion for carriage of contraband :
service.
(a) Lesser
(1) If she is on a voyage specially undertaken with a view to offences.
the transport of individual passengers who are embodied in the

armed forces of the enemy, or with a view to the transmission of
intelligence in the interest of the enemy.

with the knowledge of the owner, the charterer, or the
(2) If,
master, she is transporting a military detachment of the enemy,
or one or more persons who, in the course of the voyage, directly
assist the operations of the enemy.
In the cases specified in the preceding paragraphs, goods belong-
ing to the owner of the vessel are likewise liable to condemnation.
The provisions of the present Article do not apply if the vessel
is encountered at sea while unaware of the outbreak of hostilities, ,
-or the master, after becoming aware of the outbreak of hos-
if
tilities, has had no opportunity of disembarking the passengers.

The vessel is deemed to be aware of the state of war if she left
an enemy port after the outbreak of hostilities, or a neutral port
(w) The Caroline (1807), 6 C. Rob. (x) Hague Convention (1907), No.
461. X. Art. 12; su2yra, p. 559.
after the notification of the outbreak of hostilities made in suf-

time to the Power to which such port belongs" {y\).
ficient
"
The expression a voyage specially undertaken" does not refer
to a voyage made in the ordinary or usual employment of the
vessel, but to departures therefrom, as, for example, when she
deliberately deviates from her course or touches at a point not

ordinarily called at, in order to embark the individual passengers
in question. This Article does not imply that the vessel is exclu-
sively devoted to the service of the enemy (2;). The word ''em-
bodied" gave rise to some difficulty; the London Naval Confer-
ence agreed, after much deliberation, that it shall not refer to
such enemy individuals as are on their way to their country for
the purpose of performing the military service required of them
by their municipal law.
In the second case specified in the Article, the fact that the
persons mentioned are in civilian dress will afford no protection,
if the master or owner was aware of their true character.
Assisting the enemy during the voyage includes such services as-
signalling (a) .
Article 45 thus introduces a certain relaxation of the British

system, in requiring proof that the master or owner was aware of
the character of the persons on board. The former British rule
—
was as we have seen in the case of The Orozembo (b) that proof —
of knowledge or delinquency on the part of the master or owner
was not essential; it was sufficient if the employment of the vessel
involved an injury to the belligerent.
"
(b) More A neutral vessel will be condemned and will, in a general way,
offences.
receive the same treatment as if she were a merchant vessel of the
enemy^:
(1) If she takes a direct part in the hostilities.

(2) If she is under the orders or control of an agent placed
on board by the enemy Government.
(3) If she is in the exclusive employment of the enemy
Government.
(4) If she is exclusively engaged at the time either in the
transport of enemy troops or in the transmission of intelligence
in the interest of the enemy.
In the cases covered by the present Article,
goods belonging to
the owner of the vessel are likewise liable to condemnation
"(c).
(y) Declar. of London (1909), (a) Of. Report on the Declar. of
Art. 45. London, ParL Papers, Miscell. No. 4
{z) The case of exclusive employ- (1909).
ment is dealt with in the following (b) See supra, p. 757.
Article. (c) Art. 46.
The first case mentioned in this Article —as to taking a direct
part in the hostilities —includes various forms of service, e.g.,
laying or removing mines, acting as a scout, or notifying a block-

ading squadron of the approach of vessels. The third case refers
wholly chartered by the enemy Government, for
to a vessel that is
purposes more or less directly related to the war, especially for

transport, e.g., a collier accompanying a fleet, a vessel providing
the enemy's forces with provisions. The fourth case contemplates
permanent service, whereas the service considered in Article 45 was

only temporary service; so that under Article 46, so long as the
"
service laststhe vessel is liable to capture, even if, at the moment
when an enemy cruiser searches her, she is engaged neither in the
transport of troops nor in the transmission of intelligence" {d).
It makes no difference, of course, if the neutral vessel is engaged
in the forbidden service in pursuance of a contract entered into
before the war; for the essential point is not the time of the
contract, but the time of the service done. If a belligerent finds a
neutral vessel, then, committing any of the more serious offences
relating to unneutral service, he may confiscate not only the cargo

belonging to the owner of the vessel, but all enemy goods even
though they are not contraband; furthermore he may, if circum-
stances demand, sink the vessel.
One or two cases that occurred in recent wars (but before the
Declaration of London) may be recalled, in order to illustrate the
above rules. In 1894, during the war between China and Japan,
the Kowshing, a British vessel, was hired by China to transport
troops and war material to Korea. She was encountered by a

Japanese cruiser and, refusing to be taken into a Japanese port, •
was sunk. Protests were made, but the Japanese proceeding was
justifiable, inasmuch as the Kowshing being notified of the state
of war by the Japanese commander —
assuming she was ignorant
of before (for a formal declaration was not then obligatory)
it —
should have undertaken to discontinue her unneutral service (e) .
During the Russo-Japanese war, 1904, in reference to the

Haimiin, a vessel flying the British flag and chartered by a British
war correspondent for the purpose of sending wireless messages to
neutral countries, the Russian authorities declared they would
regard as spies correspondents who sent such messages to the enemy

from certain areas, and Great Britain and the
seize their ships.
United States protesting, Russia took no further action. In the
first place, the sending of such messages could not amount to
(rf) Report on the Declaration, ibid. {e) Cf .

Holland, Studies in Inter-
national Law (Oxford, 1898), p. 126.
764 ^
espionage; secondly, it could not be unneutral service if the mes-
sages were despatched to neutral countries (/)

.
In the same war, a German vessel, the Industrie, was condemned

by the Prize Court, on the ground that, whilst purport-
Japanese
ing to send war intelligence to a newspaper at Chefoo, she was
found sending information to the enemy with regard to the
Japanese naval movements {g) .
Again, in 1905, a French steamship, the Quangnam, took a

cargo of spirits from Saigon to the Russian squadron
in
Kamranh Bay; then proceeding ostensibly to Manila actually
directed her course between Formosa and the Pescadores, and
readied Hatto Channel, where she was seized by a Japanese
cruiser. She was brought before the Japanese Prize Court, and
condemned on the ground that she was employed in the enemy's
service in carrying supplies to his fleet and in reconnoitring on his
behalf (/?.).
"
Enemy com- Any individual embodied in the armed forces of the enemy who
°"
neutral
^^ f ound on board a neutral merchant vessel
may a prisoner be made
vessels. of war, even though there be no ground for the capture of the
"
vessel (i).
This Article introduces a modification of the earlier British
view, as expressed, for example, in the Trent controversy (^^) As .
"
in the case of Article 45, the expiression embodied in the armed
"
forces does not apply to purely civil officials and to persons who
are on their way to take up military service but have not yet
joined their corps. It is difficult to see the ground for differentia-
ting between men enrolled and men proceeding to be enrolled.
The provision savours more of compromise than of logical
consistency.
The vessel will not be subject to capture if, for exami^le, the
persons embodied in the enemy forces came on board as ordinary

passengers and the master was ignorant of their status. But if
the vessel deviated from her ordinary voyage for the purpose of
receiving such persons on board, such deviation will constitute a

presumption of unneutral service, and so will render her liable to
seizure.
During the war between Italy and Turkey, 1912, a French

mail-boat, the Manouha, proceeding from Marseilles to Tunis,
was seized by an Italian cruiser, and taken into Cagliari, on the
(/) On this case, see Takahashi, {g) Takahashi, p. 732.

pp. 387 5eg.; Hershey, Russo-Japanese (A) Ibid. p. 735.
War, pp. 116 seq.; Smith and Sibley, (?) Declar. of London, Art. 47.
Russo-Japanese War, pp. 82 seq. (ii) See supra, pp. 178, 331.
ground that she carried a number of Turkish passengers who were

thought to be military officers on their way to the scene of
hostilities, but who claimed to be in the medical service . The
Erencli Government
protesting, the vessel was released and the
suspected passengers were committed to the charge of the French
consul at Tunis, who undertook to prevent their crossing over
into Tripoli if they were found on enquiry to be combatants.
Subsequently, however, their arrest was shown to be unwarranted,

and Italy paid compensation to France in accordance with an
award of the Hague Court of Arbitration (Jc) .
At the London Naval Conference a proposal was put forward Neuteals

caeeyino on
that a neutral vessel should be regarded as an enemy vessel if she
/= ^
"^
_
TEADE CL08W1
CLOSED
made, with the enemy's authorization, a voyage which she was to them
TO THEM in
IN
TIME OF PEACE.
only permitted to make after the outbreak of hostilities or during
the two preceding months. Had this proposal been accepted by
the Conference, the "rule of the war of 1756" would have been
formally revived, whereby a ship was deemed to lose her neutral

character if she engaged in a trade which had been reserved in
time of peace to the national marine of the enemy (l) . The rule
in question is, nevertheless, considered by Great Britain to be a
constituent element of international law; though in several

quarters a stand has been made against it from time to time Its .
legality has always been contested by the American Government —

from the time the United States acquired their independence right
down to our own day when their delegates at the London Naval
—
Conference strongly opposed it and it appears in its origin to
have been founded on principles different from those that were
later urged in its defence.
During war of 1756, the French Government, finding' the

the
trade with their colonies almost entirely cut off by the maritime
superiority of Great Britain, relaxed their monopoly of that

trade, and allowed the Dutch, then neutral, to carry on the com-
merce betAveen France and her colonies under special licenses or
passes, granted for this particular purpose, excluding at the same
time all other neutrals from the same trade. Many Dutch vessels
so employed were captured by the British cruisers, and, together
were condemned by the Prize Courts, upon the
Avith their cargoes,
(k) Of. Anier. Journ. of Inter. Law, closed to her in time of peace, is out-
vol. vii. (1913), p. 629. side the scope of the rule whereby
(I) Cf Art. 57 of the Declaration
. the character of a vessel is determined
of London, which says that a neutral by the flag she is entitled to fly,
vessel, which is engaged in a trade supra, p. 572.
were in effect incor-

principle, that by such employment they
the commerce
porated into the French navigation, having adopted
and character of the enemy, and identified themselves with his
interests and purposes (m). were, in the judgment of these
They
courts, to be considered like transports in the enemy's service,
and
hence liable to capture and condemnation, upon the same principle
or
with property condemned for carrying military persons
despatches. In these cases the property was considered pro hdc
vice, as enemy's property, as so completely identified with his
interests as to acquire a hostile character {n) So, where a neu-
.
tral is engaged in a trade, which is exclusively confined to the

subjects of any country, in peace and in war, and is interdicted to
all others, and cannot at any time be avowedly carried on in the
name of a foreigner, such a trade is considered so entirely national,
that itmust follow the hostile situation of the country (o) There .
is allthe difference between this principle and the more modem

doctrine which interdicts to neutrals, during war, all trade not
open to them in time of peace, that there is between the granting

by enemy of special licenses to the subjects of the opposite
the
belligerent, protecting their property from capture in a particular

trade which the policy of the enemy induces him to tolerate, and
a general exemption of such trade from capture. The former is
olearly cause of confiscation, whilst the latter has never been
' '
deemed to have such an effect. The rule of the war of 1756

was originally founded upon the former principle: it was suffered
iO lie dormant during the war of the American Revolution; and
wheji revived at the commencement of the war against France

in 1793, was applied, with various relaxations and modifications,
to the prohibition of all neutral traffic with the colonies and upon
the coasts of the enemy. The principle of the rule was frequently
by Sir W. Scott, in his masterly judgments in the

vindicated
High Court of Admiralty and in the writings of other British
public jurists of great learning and ability. But the conclusive-

ness of their reasonings was ably contested by different American
statesmen and failed to procure the acquiescence of neutral Powers
,
in this prohibition of their tradewith the enemy's colonies. The

question continued a fruitful source of contention between Great
Britain and those Powers, until they became her allies or enemies
(m) Of. Berens v. Huoker, 1 W. Bl. (o) The Princessa (1799), 2 O. Rob.
213; Bremer v. Atkins, 1 H. Bl. 165. 62; The Anna Catherina, 4 C. Rob.
(w) See The Immanuel (1799), 2 O. 118; The Rendsborg (1802), 4 O. Rob.
Uob. 186; The Yonge Thomas, 3 O. 121; The Vrow Annu Catherina (1803),
lloh. 232, n. Of. Phillimore, vol. iii. 6G. Rob. 161. Wheaton's Rep. vol. ii.
385. Appendix, p. 29.
at the close of the war but its

; practical importance was afterwards
much diminished by the revolution which has since taken place
in the colonial system of Europe (p).
From timetime the rule has not been enforced even by Great
to
Britain; and the Manual of Naval Prize Law of 1888 expressly

stated that its general application was suspended, and that it
would only be enforced under special instructions (q) As no .
agreement was arrived at on the subject at the Naval Conference

of 1908-1909, it must be considered as being now an open one (r).
Another exception to the general freedom of neutral commerce The law of

in time of war is to be found in the trade to ports or places be- ^^^'Ockade.
sieged or blockaded by one of the belligerent Powers.

A
blockade (that is, a war blockade as distinguished from a Definition,
'pacific blockade') may be defined as "an act of war carried out

by the warships of a belligerent, detailed to prevent access to or
departure from a defined part of the enemy's coast" (s). The

preventive measures are enforced against vessels of all nations.
The earlier text-writers all require that the siege or blockade Views of
should actually exist, and be carried on by an adequate force, and Writers
not merely^ declared by proclamation, in order to render commer-
cial intercourse with the port or place unlawful on the part of
neutrals. Thus Grotius forbids the carrying any thing to
"
besieged or blockaded places, if it might impede the execution of
the belligerent's lawful designs, and if the carriers might have
known of the siege or blockade, as in the case of a town actually
invested, or a port closely blockaded, and when a surrender or
peace already expected to take place" (t). And Bynkershoek,
is
"
in commenting upon this passage, holds it to be unlawful to carry
any thing, whether contraband or not, to a place thus circum-
stanced; since those who are within may be compelled to surrender,
not merely by the direct application of force, but also by the want
of provisions and other necessaries. If, therefore, it should be
lawful to carry to them what they are in need of, the belligerent
might thereby be compelled to raise the siege or blockade, which
would be doing him an injury, and therefore would be unjust.
And because it cannot be known what articles the besieged may
(p) Wheaton's Rep. vol. i. Appen- (1909), p. 100; and Miscell. No. 5
dix, Note iii. See Madison, 'Êxa- (1909), p. 247.
mination of the British doctrine which (s) Of. the British memorandum,
subjects to capture a neutral trade not Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 4 (1909),
open in time of peace." p. 5; see also No. 5 (1909), p. 35.
(q) Art. 141. (t) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.
(r) Of. Pari. Papers, Miscell, No. 4 lib. iii. cap. 1, § 5, note 3.
want, the law forbids, in general terms, carrying anything to

them; otherwise disputes and altercations would arise to which
there would be no end" (u).
Opinion of Bynkershoek appears to have mistaken the true sense of the
Bynkershoek
on blockade. above-cited passage from Grotius, in supposing that the latter
meant to require, as a necessary ingredient in a strict blockade,
that there should be an expectation of peace or of a surrender,
when, in fact, he merely mentions that as an example, by way of
putting the strongest possible case. But that he concurred with
Grotius in requiring a strict and actual siege or blockade, such as
where a town is actually invested with troops, or a port closely
'
blockaded by ships of war (' oppidum obsessum,' portus clauses '),

is evident from his subsequent remarks in the same chapter, upon
the decrees of the States-General against those who should carry
anything to the Spanish camp, the same not being then actually
besieged. He holds the decrees to be perfectly justifiable, so far
as they p^rohibited the carrying of contraband of war to the enemy's
camp; "but, as to other things, whether they were or wore not

lawfully prohibited, depends entirely upon the circumstance of
the place being besieged or not." So also, in commenting upon
the decree of the States-General of the 26th June, 1630 (x), de-
claring the ports of Flanders in a state of blockade, he states

that this decree was for some time not carried into execution by
the actual presence of a sufficient naval force, during which period
certain neutral vessels trading to those ports were captured by the
Dutch cruisers; and that part of their cargoes only which consisted
of contraband articles was condemned, whilst the residue was re-
"
leased with the vessels. It has been asked," says he, "by what
law the contraband goods were condemned under those circum-
stances, and there are those who deny the legality of their con-
demnation. It is evident, hoAvever, that whilst those coasts were
guarded in a lax or remiss manner, the law of blockade, by which

all neutral goods going to or
coming from a blockaded port may
be lawfully captured, might also have been relaxed; but not so
the general law of war, by which contraband
goods, when carried
to an enemy's port, even not blockaded, are liable to
though
confiscation" (^y).
Legal aspect The law of blockade {z) like that of contraband is a

compromise
of blockade
(w) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. ject of blockade. Cf. R. Kleen, Lois
lib. i.
cap. 11. et usages de la neutralite, 2 vols.
(a:) This famous Dutch decree of (Paris, 1898—1900), vol. i. p. 543.
1630 may be regarded as the first sys- (jy) Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations,
tematic attempt at State legislation pp. 138—143.
for the purpose of regulating the sub- The law of blockade was con-
(z)
between the conflicting rights of belligerents and neutrals, viz., running and
the right of the belligerent to injure his foe so as to compel him contraband,
to give up the struggle, and the right of the neutral to carry on his
usual trade with that foe. It is often said that the violation of a
blockade and the transportation of contraband are unlawful, but
this requires some explanation. If by this expression it is in-
tended to imply that such acts are contrary to international law,
in the sense of being criminal or as being acts of disobedience to a
positive rule, the term unlawful is then wrongly used. Neutral

subjects are under no positive duty imposed by the law of nations,
to abstain from blockade running, or from carrying contraband;
and Avith regard to the latter this has been f oi'mallj^ recognised, as
we have seen, by the conventional law drawn up at the Hague
Conference (a) . The acts which amount to such prohibited pro-
ceedings in time of war are perfectly lawful in time of peace, but
the existence of war gives to the belligerents certain rights which
they may enforce against the neutrals who en^-age in these two
transactions. Thus the exportation of a cargo of arms to any
State during peace is indisputably lawful, and it is also permissible
when the State to which the arms are consigned is at war, but in
this cas(} the sender is exposed to the risk of forfeiting his goods
if the other belligerent can capture them on their way:. So it is
with blockade. Its violation only exposes the blockade runner to
the chance of losing his ship and cargo, if he is unsuccessful. It
is no violation of neutrality for a State not to prevent its subjects
from engaging in such traffic; its duty as a neutral consists in

letting them do so at their own risk, and abandoning them to the
Prize Courts of the belligerent w^ho may capture them (b). Pro-
clamations of neutrality usually inform subjects that if they
engage in blockade running or the carriage of contraband they
"
will rightfully incur, and be justly liable to, hostile capture, and
to the penaltiesdenounced by the law of nations in that behalf,"
and that persons venturing on such proceedings will act at their
peril and will in no wise obtain any protection from their sove-
reign (c). Thus these two transactions are only "unlawful" in
the sense that the belligerent may inflict the punishment of con-
fiscation if he can catch the perpetrators in the act. When the act
sidered by the London Naval Confer- (6) ParL Papers, N. America, 1873
ence, 1908—1909, which drew up the (No. 2), p. 109.
fundamental principles of the inter- (c) British Proclamation of Feb.
national law on the subject in a brief 11th, 1904, in reference to the Russo-
code of twenty-one Articles, viz., Arts. Japanese War, Appendix A. See Rep.
1-^21 of the Declaration of London of Neutrality Laws Commission (1868).
(1909). P- 74; and see there other proclama-
(a) See supra, p. 664. tions.
W. 49
the responsibility for it

is completed no penalty can be imposed;
ceases on completion (d). In the foregoing remarks it is assumed
that the neutral States have not enacted any municipal la^
expressly prohibiting
blockade running, &c., and that they ara
not bound by any treaty stipulations on the subjects. The matter
is here discussed only from the point of view of international law
unrestricted by any special arrangement (e) .
Sieges and There an important distinction between sieges and blockades.

is
blockades.
The former are as a rule undertaken with the object of capturing
the place besieged, while the usual object of the latter is to cripple
the resources of the enemy by intercepting his commerce with
neutral States. A city may be, and often is, both besieged and
blockaded at the same time (/) . It is thus evident that neutral
States suffer to a great extent from a blockade, and such an under-
taking has been described as "la plus grave atteinte qui puisse etre
"
portee par la guerre au droit des neutres (g).
Extent of
blockade.
A
blockade being thus an infringement of neutral rights, its
operation is not to be extended further than the actual circum-
stances of the case render it necessary. The Declaration of
London lays down specifically that a blockade must be limited
to the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy (h),
and that the blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports
The Peterhoff. or coasts (j) Thus when the United States declared all the
.
Southern ports blockaded, and a squadron cruised off the mouth

of the Eio Grande to intercept the trade with Texas, the Supreme
Court decided that this blockade was not to be held to apply to the
western side of the Eio Grande, which was in Mexican and
neutral territory (k) . The enemy territory that may be blockaded
includes the enemy's own country, his colonies, his colonial pro-
tectorates, his leased territory, and any territory occupied or
controlledby him, whether the occupation be political or military.
Thus, in the Eusso-Japanese war, Japan declared a blockade of
Chinese territory that had been leased (in 1898) to Eussia.
There is a difference of opinion as to whether the mouth of an
international river may legitimately be blockaded, if the riparian
States are not all belligerents. In the Crimean war, 1854, the
(d) The Helen (1855), L. R. 1 A. ternational (Paris, 1862), torn. ii.

& E. 1; â: parte Chavasse (1865), 11 p. 196. See also P. Fiore, Trattato
Jur. N. S. 4O0; Naylor v. Taylor, di diritto internazionale pubblico,
9B. & 0.718. 3 vols. (Torino, 1884), torn. ii. p. 446.
(e) See on this subject Pari. Papers, {h) Declar. of London (1909),
N. America, 1873 (No. 2), p. 14. Art. 1.
Letters of Plistoricus: Contraband. (0 Ibid. Art. 18.
(/) Calvo, Droit International, (/c)The Peterhof (1866), 5 Wal-
vol. ii.
§ 1139. lace, 35. Cf. The Frail llsabe (1801),
(^g) E. Cauchy, Droit Maritime In- 4 O. Rob. 63; The Luna, Edw. 190.
British and French fleets blockaded the mouth of the Danube,

but Bavaria and Wiirtemberg, which were then neutral, pro- ,
tested. During the Eranco-German war, however, when the

French blockaded the German coast of the North Sea, they
exempted the mouth of the River Ems, which flows partly through
Holland.
With regard to the neutralized — or rather internationalized—
canals of Suez and Panama, there are special treaty stipulations
which exempt them from blockade.
A
maritime blockade is not violated by sending goods to the Interior canal
^*î&**i<*"'
blockaded port, or by bringing them from the same, through the
interior canal navigation or land carriage of the country. A
blockade may be of different descriptions. A
mere maritime
blockade, effected by a force operating only at sea, can have no
operation upon the interior communications of the port. The

legal blockade can extend no further than the actual blockade can
be applied. If the place be not invested on the land side, its
interior communications with other ports cannot be cut off. If the
blockade be rendered imperfect by this rule of construction, it
must be ascribed to its physical inadequacy, by which the extent
of its legal pretensions is unavoidably limited (l) But goods .
shipped in a river, having been previously sent in lighters along

the coast from the blockaded port, with the ship under charter-
party proceeding also from the blockaded port in ballast to take
them on board, were held liable to confiscation. This case is very
different from the preceding, because there the communication
had been by inland navigation, which was in no manner and in no
part of it subject to the blockade (m) .
A
blockade must also be absolute, that is, it must interdict all Impartiality,
•commerce whatever with the blockaded port. It is not legitimate
if it allows to either belligerent a freedom of commerce denied to
the subjects of neutral States (n). This rule is recognised by the

Declaration of London, which says that a blockade must be applied
impartially to the ships of all nations (o) although the com-
;
mander of a blockading force may, if he sees fit, allow a neutral

warship to enter a blockaded port, and afterwards to leave it (p) .
During the Crimean War various orders were issued by the Eng- The FrnncisJca.
lish, French, and Russian Governments, the effect of which was

to permit trade to be carried on by their respective subjects in the
(0 The Comet, Edw. Ad. 32; The (n) The Bolla (1807), 6 O. Rob.
Peterhof (1866), 5 Wallace, 35. 364.
(m) The Neutralitet (1801), 3 C. (o) Declar. of London, Art. 5.
Rob. 297; The Stert (1801), 4 O. Rob. {p) Ibid. Art. 6.
65.
49(2)
Baltic ports, while those ports were blockaded by the English and
French fleets, but which excluded neutrals from such trade.
this blockade a Danish (and neutral) ship was captured by
During
an English cruiser near the entrance of the Gulf of Riga. The
Privy Council held that as the blockade was relaxed in favour of
it was not a legal blockade,
belligerents to the exclusion of neutrals,
and therefore the vessel was improperly seized for attempting to
enter the port of Eiga, and must be restored (g).
Entry on Under the British practice, the stringency of the rule prohibiting
account of
distress.
vessels from entering a blockaded port is only relaxed when the
ship attempting to enter does so from reasons of necessity. She

may be out of provisions or water, or she may be in a leaking
condition, or otherwise in need of immediate repairs, and there is
no other port easy of access. The case, however, must be one of
absolute and uncontrollable necessity and this must be established
;
"
beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing less," says Lord Stowell,
"
than an uncontrollable necessity, which admits of no compromise,
and cannot be resisted," will be held a justification of the offence.
Any would open the door to all sorts
rule less stringent than this
of fraud and attempted evasions of the blockade would be sought
;
to be excused on pretences of distress and danger not warranted by

the facts, but the falsity of which it would be difficult to expose (r) .
The Declaration London says on this point that in circumstances

of
of distress, acknowledged by an officer of the blockading force, a
neutral vessel may enter and leave a blockaded place, provided that
she has neither discharged nor shipped any cargo there (s) This .
provision, then, gives the vessel a right to enter, and then to,
depart, if the distress be established (t).
"
What things To constitute a violation of blockade," said Sir W. Scott,
must be
"three things must be proved: firstly, the existence of an actual
proved to
constitute a the
violation of
blockade; secondly, knowledge of the party supposed to have
blockade. offended; and thirdly, some act of violation, either by going in
or coming out with a
cargo laden after the commencement of
blockade" (u).
Actual pre- 1 . The definition of a lawful
maritime blockade, requiring the
sence of the
actual presence of a maritime force stationed at the entrance of
-blockading-
force.
the port, sufficiently near to
prevent communication as given by
(q) The Franciska (1854), 10 Moo. Rhomba (1858), 12 Moo. P. O. 168.

P. O. 36; Spinks, 111. (s^ Art 7
(r) The Diana (1803), 7 Wallace, (0 Of. The Hiawatha, Blatchford^
369; The Major Barbour, Blatchford, P. O. 15.
Prize Oases, 167; The Forest King, The Betsey Rob.
(w) (1798), 1 O.
Blatchford, P. O. 2; The Panaghia 92.
the text-writers,is confirmed by the authority of numerous modern
treaties,and especially by the Convention of 1801, between Great

Britain and Kussia, intended as a final adjustment of the disputed
points of maritime law, which had given rise to the armed neu-
trality of 1780 and of 1801 {x).
The only exception to the general rule, which requires the actual Temporary
presence of an adequate force to constitute a lawful blockade,
arises out of the circumstance of the occasional temporary absence
of the blockading squadron, produced by accident, as in the case
of a storm, which does not suspend the legal operation of the
blockade {y) The law considers an attempt to take advantage of
.
such an accidental removal a fraudulent attempt to break the

blockade {z) .
The fourth Article of the Declaration of Paris, 1856, says: Effectiveness

" ° ^^ ^ ^^*
Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to
say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the
coast of the This merely put into a formula what
enemy" {a).
was already a principle of the law of nations, but it left the often
"
disputed question of what is a sufficient force" in the same state
as before. This is, in reality, more a question of fact than of law,
and seems almost impossible to lay down any precise rule
it
defining in all cases what is a sufficient force (6). The Declara-

tion of London, 1909, summarizes these principles with regard
to the efficiency of blockades. It reproduces in exactly the same
terms the. provision of the Declaration of Paris (c), and adds that
the question whether a blockade is effective is a question of fact {d)
— to bt) determined by the Courts —
and that a blockade is not con-
sidered to be raised if the blockading forces are temporarily driven
of weather (e)
off b}^ stress The rule requiring the actual presence
.
of a sufficient force to render the operation real and effective is

' ' ' '
directed against the abuse known as paper or cabinet block-

ades, of which examples are found in the Napoleonic wars. The
efficiency of the force present does not necessarily depend on the
number or the position of the blockading vessels; nor need they
—
be stationary the essential criterion is the danger of attempting
(x) The 3rd Art. sect. 4, of this The Columbia (17&9), 1 C. Rob.
convention, declares:
—
"That in order
{z)
154.
to determine w^hat characterizes a (a) Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. ii.
blockaded port, that domination is p. 1283.
given only where there is, by the dis- (6) Calvo, ii. § 1148. Bluntschli,
position of the Power which attacks it § 829.
Avith ships stationary, or sufficiently (c) Declar. of London (1909),
near, an evident danger in entering." Art. 2.
(y) The Fredench Molke (1798), 1 ((I) Art. 3.

O. Rob. 86. (e) Art. 4.
If the blockading forces are withdrawn for any

ingress or egress.
reason other than that of bad weather, the blockade may then be
deemed to be raised; and in order to re-establish it the require-
ments as to declaration and notification (to be considered presently)
must again be fulfiled.
" "
In the eye of the law," said Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, a
blockade is effective if the enemy's ships are in such numbers and
the blockade a matter of danger,
positions as to render running "
some vessels may succeed in getting through (/) Simi- .
although
larly, in a case decided
laterby Supreme Court of the United
the
States, during the Spanish-American war, 1898, it was declared
to be sufficient if the danger was real and apparent, and that the
the number of the
question of effectiveness was not controlled by
blockading forces, and that one modem cruiser is enough as a
matter of law, if it is sufficient in fact for the purpose and renders

itdangerous for other craft to enter the port {g) In the Crimean
.
war, the Kussian port of Eiga was blockaded by one British

cruiser at a distance of over a hundred miles from the town; the
vessel, however, was stationed in a narrow channel which consti-
tuted the only navigable approach to the port. Similarly the
blockade of Buenos Ayres was held to have been efficiently main-
tained when the blockading force was stationed at a distance of
a hundred miles from the town {h) . A blockade is not necessarily
confined to maritime operations. It may be made effectual by
batteries ashore as well as by ships afloat. In the case of an inland
port, the most blockade would be maintained by batteries
effective
commanding the river or inlet by which it may be approached,
supported by a naval force sufficient to warn off innocent and
capture offending vessels attempting to enter (^) The blockade .
of the Confederate ports by the United States was one of the most
extraordinary in history. It extended over a coast line of more

than 3,000 miles, and though, at the outset, the Federal fleet was
not equal to such a gigantic task, foreign Governments recognised
the blockade. As the war progressed the development of the
naval resources of the Northern States enabled them to intercept
most of the trade with the South, and this was one of the chief
causes of their ultimate success {k) The Supreme Court held
.
that this extensive blockade, being once established, and duly noti-
fied, was to be deemed to continue until notice of discontinuance,
(/) Geipel v. Smith, L. R. 7 Q. B. (A) Naylor v. Taylor, 1 Moo. & M.

410. 207.
{g) The Olindo Bodrigues (1898), (i) The Circassian (1864), 2 Wal-
174 U. S. Rep. 510. lace, 149.
(Jc) Wh Baton, ed. Dana, note 232.
in the o£ positive proof of discontinuance by other

absence
evidence. Thus
ships captured for endeavouring to enter or leave
the Confederate ports we;re condemned as prize when their officers
saw, or swore they saw no blockading ships off the ports they were
making for or quitting {I). A
milder rule towards neutrals was
adopted by France in 1870. French naval officers were instructed
that ships approaching a blockaded port were not to be deemed
to intend violating the blockade, until its notification had been
inscribed on their register or ship's papers, by an officer of one of
the ships forming the blockade (m) .
Aquestion respecting the efficiency of a blockade arose during Turkish

the Eusso-Turkish war of 1877. Turkey proclaimed a blockade ^êBkcklea.
of the whole of the coasts of the Black Sea, from Trebizond to
the mouth of the Danube, and maintained it by a force of cruisers
in the Black Sea itself. This force prevented most of the trade
with the Eussian ports from being carried on; but, besides this,
the Porte stationed two cruisers in the Bosphorus, and any vessels
which escaped the Black Sea squadron were captured on arriving
there, and taken before the Prize Court sitting at Constantinople.
A more complete and efficient blockade could not possibly bo
devised, nevertheless it was argued for the owners of the prizes,
that being neutral vessels (mostly Greek), as soon as they had
escaped the Black Sea squadron, they were free, and were no longer
liable to capture. The Turkish Prize Court, however, condemned
the vessels. This case was peculiarly important from the fact
that some of the foreign ambassadors at the Porte had intimated
that if these vessels were not condemned, the blockade would not
be recognised by other countries. To hold that these Greek vessels
were not liable to be captured in the Bosphorus would have been
tantamount to opening the general commerce of the Black Sea
to Greece, and this would have immediately invalidated the whole
blockade (n) .
The blockade of Formosa was notified by France in 1884. Great Blockade of
Britain protested, through its ambassador at Paris, alleging that

the force at the disposal of the French admiral was insufficient.
The blockade was in consequence abandoned till the arrival of
reinforcements (o) .
The blockade of insurgent Haytian ports, proclaimed by Hayti Blockade of

Hayti.
(l) The Baigorry (1864), 2 Wallace, German, Italian and Dutch practice,
480; The Andromeda, 2 Wallace, 481. see ibid. pp. 4, 44, 51.
(w) See Instructions, Art. 7; Bar- (w) See The Times, 15th Dec. 1877,
boux, Jurisp. du Conseil des Prises, p. 6.
1870—71, Appendix. Cf. Pari. Papers, (o) Annual Eegister, 1884, p. 373.
Miscell. No. 5 (1909), p. 30; as to
77e RIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS.
in November, 1888, having ceased to be effective in the July

following, Lord Salisbury notified to the Haytian Government
that it could no longer be respected, and that British vessels
entering or leaving ports in the possession of the insurgents must

not be molested by the Government cruisers {p) .
Knowledge of 2. As a proclamation, or general public notification, is not of

the party.
[^self sufficient to constitute a legal blockade, so neither can a
knowledge of the existence of such a blockade be imputed to the
party, mereli/^ in consequence of such a proclamation or notification.
Not only must an actual blockade exist, but a knowledge of it
must be brought home to the party, in order to show that it has
been violated (g). As, on the one hand, a declaration of blockade
which is not supported by the fact cannot be deemed legally to
exist, so, on the other hand, the duly notified to the party
fact,
on the spot, is him with a knowledge
of itself sufficient to affect
of it; for the public notifications between Governments can be
meant only for the information of individuals; but if the in-
dividualis personally informed, that purpose is still better obtained
than by a public declaration (r) Where the vessel sails from a

.
country lying sufficiently near to the blockaded port to have con-

stant information of the state of the blockade, whether it is con-
tinued or is relaxed, no special jiotice is necessary; for the public
declaration in this case implies notice to the party, after sufficient
time has elapsed to receive the declaration at the port w^hence the
vessel sails (s) . But where the country lies at such a distance
that the inhabitants cannot have this constant information, they
may lawfully send their vessels conjecturally, upon the expecta-

tion of finding the blockade broken up, after it has existed for a
considerable time. In this case, the party has a right to make a
fair inquiry whether the blockade be determined or not, and con-
sequently cannot be involved in the penalties affixed to a violation
of it, unless, upon such
inquiry, he receives notice of the existence
of the blockade (t).
Extent of ''A notice of blockade," says Bernard, "must not be more
notice.
extensive than the blockade itself. A
belligerent cannot be allowed
to proclaim that he has instituted a blockade of all the
ports of
the enemy, within certain when in truth he has
specified limits,
only blockaded some of them. Such a course would introduce all
(p) London Gazette, 12th July, 1889. The Jonge PetroneUa

(s) (1799), 2
iq) The Betsey (1798), 1 O. Rob. 93. O. Rob. 131 :The Calypso (1799), 2
(r) The Merourius (1799), 1 O. Rob. C. Rob. 298.
83. 10.
(0 The Betsey (1798), Rob.
332.
'
the evils of what is termed a paper blockade,' and would be

attended with the grossest injustice to the commerce of neutrals.
Accordingly, a neutral is at liberty to disregard such a notice,
and is not liable to the penalties attending a breach of blockade
for afterwards attempting to enter one of the ports which really
"
are blockaded (u).
With regard to notice, the Declaration of London provides the
following rules:
—
''
A blockade, in order to be binding:, must be declared in accord- Notice under
the Declaxa-
. .
anco with Article 9, and notified in accordance with Articles 11 tion of

and 16" (x). London, 1909.
The declaration and notification Avill, in general, take place

before the actual blockade is enforced; but a blockade runner
cannot rely on the absence of these, if in fact a special or personal
notification has been received by him.
"
A declaration of blockade is made either by the blockading
Power by the naval authorities acting in its name. It specifies
or
(1) the date Avhen the blockade begins; (2) the geographical limits
of the coast-line under blockade; (3) the period within which
"
neutral vessels may come out (^).
No time for departure has been fixed; a period of fifteen daj®
has frequently been allowed, and sometimes a longer delay has
been permitted. In 1902, when the Venezuelan ports were
blockaded by Great Britain and Germany, a fortnight was
granted. In the Spanish-American war, 1898, the United States
allowed thirty days in the case of the Cuban ports.
"
If the operations of the blockading Power, or of the naval autho-
rities acting in its name, are not in conflormity with the particulars
which, in accordance with Article 9 (1) and (2), must be inserted

in the declaration of blockade, the declaration is void, and a
new declaration is necessary in order to make the blockade
"
operative (z).
If, for
example, the declaration specified a certain date for the
commencement of the blockade, and the blockade did not actually
begin till a few days later, then not only was there no blockade at
all during the interval, but also the blockade has no validity even
after it has really begun at that later date; so that a new de^
claration becomes necessary.
"
A
declaration of blockade is notified: (1) to the neutral Powers,
by the blockading Power by means of a communication addressed
(w) Mountague Bernard, Neutrality (x) Declar. of London (1909),

of Gt. Britain, p. 231. Cf. The Fran- Art. 8.
cisica (1854), 10 Moo. P. C. 37; (p) Art. 9.
Spinks, 111. Iz) Art. 10.
to the direct, or to their representatives accredited to

Governments
it; (2) to the local authorities, by the officer commanding the
blockading force. The local authorities will, in turn, inform the

or on the coast-line under
foreign consular officers at the port
"
blockade as soon as possible {a).
This Article effects a compromise between the Anglo-American
practice and the French practice (which was also followed bj
Italy and Spain). Under the former, actual notice was not
indispensable (&) might be presumed from the fact that the
: it
blockade was generally notorious. Under the latter, a special

had to be given to every approaching vessel. In 1899,
notification
the United States Supreme Court recognised the validity of a
de facto blockade that had not been notified (c) but under the ;
Declaration of London this would no longer be possible.

"
The rules as to declaration and notification of blockade apply
to cases where the limits of a blockade are extended, or where a
"
blockade is re-established after having been raised {d).
"
The voluntary raising of a blockade, as well as any restriction in
the limits of a blockade, must be notified in the manner prescribed
by Article 11 "(e).
But effective publicity is, in this case, of greater consequence
than official notification; whereas in the establishment of a
blockade public notification of greater consequence than its
is
(presumed) notoriety. theWhere

blockading belligerent has been
driven off, the rule as to notification of the raising of the blockade
does not, of course, apply to him.
"
The liability of a neutral vessel to capture for breach of
blockade contingent on her knowledge, actual or presumptive^
is
of the blockade "(/).

''
Presumed There are," said Sir W. Scott, in reference to the earlier
British practice, ''two sorts of blockade; one by the simple fact
bbcSfby"^
notification,
only, the other by a notification accompanied with the fact. In
the former case, when the fact ceases otherwise than by accident,
or the shifting of the wind, there is immediately an end of
the blockade; but where the fact is accompanied by a public
notificationfrom the Government of a belligerent country to
neutral Governments, I apprehend, prima facie, the blockade must
be supposed to exist till it has been publicly repealed. It is the
duty, undoubtedly, of a belligerent country, which has made the
(o) Art. 11. Eep. 361.

(b) Cf. The Vrouw Judith (1799), 1 {cC)Art. 12.
C. Eob. 150; The Francisha (1854), (e) Art. 13.
Spinks, 111; 10 Moo. P. O. 37. (/) Art.. 14.
(r) The Adnla (1899), 176 U. S.
notification of blockade, to notify in the same way, and imme-
diately, the discontinuance of it; to suffer the fact to cease, and

to apply the notification again at a distant time, would be a
fraud on neutral nations, and a conduct which we are not to
suppose that any country would pursue. I do not say that a De facto
blockade of this sort may not, in any case, expire de facto ; but I bk)ckade8^
say tliat such a conduct is not hastily to be, presumed agjainst any
iiation and, therefore, till such a case is clearly made out, I shall
;
hold that a blockade by notification is, prima facie, to be presumed

to continue till the notification is revoked" {g). And in another
case he observed: — ''Thea notification to any foreign
effect of
Government would clearly be to include all the individuals of that
nation; it would be nugatory, if individuals were allowed to plead
their ignorance of it; it is the duty of foreign Governments to
communicate the information to their subjects, whose interests
they are bound to protect. I shall hold, therefore, that a neutral
master can never be heard to aver against a notification of blockade
that he is ignorant of it. If he is really ignorant of it, it may be
subject of representation to his own Government, and may raise

a claim of compensation from them, but it can be no plea in the
court of a belligerent. In the case of a blockade de facto only,
it may be otherwise; but this is a case of a blockade
by notifica-
tion. Another distinction between a notified blockade and a
blockade existing de facto only, is, that in the former the act of
sailing for a blockaded place is sufficient to constitute the offence.
It is to be presumed that the notification will be formally revoked,
and that due notice will be given of it; till that is done, the port
is to be considered as closed up, and from the moment of
quitting
port to sail on such a destination, the offence of violating the
blockade is complete, and the property engaged in it subject to
confiscation. It may be different in a blockade existing de facto
only; there no presumption arises as to the continuance, and the

ignorance of the party may be admitted as an excuse for sailing
on a doubtful and provisional destination" (Ji).
In the case of a de facto blockade, the captors were bound to
prove its existence at the time of capture; while in the case of a
notified blockade, the claimants were held liable to proof of dis-
continuance, in order to protect themselves from the penalties of

alleged violation (i) In the case of a notified blockade, a ship
.
hovering near a blockaded port cannot say she was going
Xg) The Ne'ptunus (1799), 1 C. Rob. Rob. 112.

171. (0 The Circassian (1864), 2 Wall.
(A) The Neptunus (1799), 2 O. 150.
continue her
to tho blockading squadron to ask for autlioritj to
voyage (fc).
As blockade
Declaration presumptive knowledge in the case of a notified
to
''
of London on
^^ London provides as follows:— Failing proof
Declaration of
presumptive « i i i ii-i i i
•
i
knowledge. to the contrary, knowledge of the blockade is presumed it the

vessel left a neutral port after the notification of the blockade
made to the Power to which such port belongs, provided that the
"
notification was made in sufficient time (/).
"
A
vessel has left a neutral port subsequently to the notification
of the blockade made to the Powers to which the port belongs.
Was this notification made in sufficient time, that is to say, so as
to reach the port in question, where it had to be published by the
port authorities? a question of fact to be examined.
That is If
it is settled affirmatively, it is natural to suppose that the vessel
was aware of the blockade at the time of her departure. This
presumption however, absolute, and the right to adduce
is not,
proof to the contrary is reserved. It is for the incriminated

vessel to furnish it, by showing that circumstances existed which
explain her ignorance" (m).

Thus, the Declaration of London adopts the Anglo-American
rule as to presumptive knowledge in the case of blockade by
notification, but not in the case of a de facto blockade.

"
Special notifi- If a vessel approaching a blockaded port has no knowledge,
^
of lack of^ actual or presumptive, of the blockade, the notification must be
knowledge. made to the vessel herself by an officer of one of the ships of the
blockading force. This notification should be entered in the
vessel's log-book, and must state the day and hour, and the
geographical position of the vessel at the time.

If through the negligence of the officer commanding the
blockading force no declaration of blockade has been notified to
the local authorities, or, if in the declaration, as notified, no period
has been mentioned within which neutral vessels may come out, a
neutral vessel coming out of the blockaded port must be allowed to
"
pass free (?^).
In the case of a convoyed fleet, the special notification may be

made through the commanding officer of the convoy, who acknow-
ledges receipt of it and causes it to be entered on the log-book of

each vessel. Such notification operates in the same manner as a
(k) The Admiral, 3 Wallace, 603; (w) Report on the Declar. of

The Josephine, 3 Wallace, 83; The London, Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 4
Cheshire, 3 Wallace, 231. (19-09).
(0 Art. 15. (^) Art. 16.
general and formal notification, and tlierefore is binding on each

vessel that receives it.
Where a vessel leaving a blockaded port has received no notice,
owing to the fact that the declaration has notbeen notified to the
local authorities, or if the declaration has been notified but without
specifying the period allowed for departure, then she must be
permitted to pass free. This does not, of course, apply to vessels
that are in the port after having broken the blockade. If a vessel's
lack of notice is due, however, to the negligence or ill-will of the
local authorities, sheremains subject to capture (o) .
A more definite rule as to the notification of an existing blockade Treaty

was frequently provided by conventional stipulations between as^ to notice,
different maritime Power's. Thus, by the 18th Article of the

treaty of 1794, between Great Britain and the United States, it
was declared: "That whereas it frequently happens that vessels
sail for aport or place belonging to an enemy, without knowing
that the same is either besieged, blockaded, or invested, it is agreed
that every vessel so circumstanced may be turned away from such
port or place; but she shall not be detained, nor her cargo, if not
contraband, be confiscated, unless, after notice, she shall again
attempt to enter; but she shall be permitted to go to any other
port or place she may think proper." This stipulation, which is
equivalent to that contained in previous treaties between Great
Britain and the Baltic Powers, having been disregarded by the
naval authorities and prize courts in the West Indies, the attention
of the British Government was called to the subject by an official
communication from the American Government. In consequence
of this communication, instructions were sent out in the year
1804, by the Board of Admiralty, to the naval commanders a,nd
judges of the vice-admiralty courts, not to consider any blockade
of the French West-India islands as existing, unless in respect to
particular ports which were actually invested; and then not to
capture vessels bound to such ports, unless they should previously
have been warned not to enter them. The stipulation in the
treaty intended to be enforced by these instructions seems to be
a correct exposition of the law of nations, and is admitted by the
contracting parties to be a correct exposition of that law, or to

constitute a rule between themselves in place of it. Neither the
law of nations nor the treaty admits of the condemnation of a
neutral vessel for the mere intention to enter a blockaded port,
unconnected with any fact. In the above-cited cases, the fact of
(o) Cf. Report on the Declar. of London, Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 4 (1909).
'82 EIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTEALS.
sailing was coupled with the intention, and the condemnation was
thus founded upon a supposed actual breach of the blockade.
it to be blockaded, was
Sailing for a blockaded port, knowing
there construed into an attempt to enter that port, and was, there-
fore, adjudged a breach of blockade from the departure of the
vessel. But the fact of clearing out for a blockaded port is, in
itself, innocent, unless be accompanied with a knowledge of the

it
blockade. The right to treat the vessel as an enemy, is declared
by Vattel (liv. iii. sect. 177) to be founded on the attempt to

enter; and certainly this attempt must be made by a person know-
ing the fact. The import
of the treaty, and of the instructions
issued in pursuance of the treaty, is, that a vessel cannot be placed
in the situation of one having a notice of the blockade, until she is
warned off. They gave her a right to inquire of the blockading
squadron, had not previously received this warning from
if she
one capable of giving it, and consequently dispensed with her

making that inquiry elsewhere {p).
Cessation of Where an enemy's port was declared in a state of blockade by

blockade.
notification, and at thesame time when the notification was issued
Blockading
force driven news arrived that the blockading squadron had been driven off by
off by hostile
attack.
a superior force of the enemy, the blockade was held by the Prize
Court to be null and defective from the beginning; for it would
be unjust to hold neutral vessels to the observance of a notification,
accompanied by a circumstance that defeated its effect. This

case was, therefore, considered as independent of the presumption
arising from notification in other instances the notification being

;
defeated, it must have been shown that the actual blockade was
again resumed, and the vessel would have been entitled to a
warning, if any such blockade had existed when she arrived off
the port. The mere act of sailing for the port, under the dubious
state of the actual blockade at the time, was deemed insufficient
to fix upon the vessel the penalty for breaking the blockade (g) .
New notice In the above

case, a question was raised whether the notification
necessary in
«uch a case. which had issued was not still operative; but the court was of
opinion that it could not be so considered, and that a neutral
Power was not obliged, under such circumstances, to presume the
continuance of a blockade, nor to act lipon a supposition that the
blockade would be resumed by any other competent force. But
(j)) Fitzsimmons v. The Newport Whea ton's Eep. vol. iii.

Appendix,
Insurance Company (1808), 4 Cranch, p. 11.
185. Mr. Letter to Mr. Secre- The Triheten
Merry's (g) (1805), Q O. Eob.
tary Madison, 12th April, 1804. 65.
in a subsequent case, where it was suggested that the blockading
squadron had actually returned to its former station off the port,
in order to renew the blockade, a question arose whether there
had been that notoriety of the fact, arising from the operation of
time, or other circumstances, which must be taken to have brought
the existence of the blockade to the knowledge of the parties.
Among other modes of resolving this question, a prevailing con-
sideration would have been the length of time in proportion to the
distance of the country from which the vessel sailed. But as
nothing more came out in evidence than that the squadron came
off the port on a certain day,it was held that this would not
restore a blockade which had been thus effectually raised, but that
it must be renewed again by notification, before foreign nations
could be affected with an obligation to observe it. The squadron

might return off the port with different intentions. It might
arrive there as a fleet of observation merely, or for the purpose of
only a qualified blockade. On the other hand, the commander

might attempt to connect the two blockades together; but this is
what could not be done; and, in order to revive the former
blockade, the same form of communication must have been observed
de novo that is necessary to establish an original blockade (r) .
We have already seen that a blockade is deemed to be at an end, Cessation of
firstly, when it is by the blockading Power or

voluntarily raised blockaded
by the commanding officer; when it is not effectively

secondly, ^1^^^^^^+^*
maintained or enforced; and thirdly, when the blockading forces blockading
^^^^^'
have been driven off by the enemy. According to the British
practice, there is a fourth mode, viz., when the blockading forces
occupy the place blockaded. A contrary view, however, was
adopted by the American Supreme Court in The Circassian (s) .
This was a British vessel which, having attempted to run the

blockade of New Orleans after the city had been seized by the
United States forces, was captured and condemned. But as an
indemnity was subsequently awarded to the owners by a Joint
Commission (appointed under the Treaty of Washington) (t), the
force of the judicial decision was, if not entirely destroyed, at least
considerably diminished. But if the occupation is only partial,

the blockade will be deemed to exist. Thus, in the Spanish-
American war, the Aduh (w), a British vessel, was condemned by
the Supreme Court for attempting to run into the blockaded Cuban
(r) The Ilofnung (1805), 6 C. Rob. (t) Of. Moore, Inter. Arbit. vol. iv.
112. 3911; Wharton, Digest, § 359.
(s) (18«4), 2 Wallace, 135. (w) The Adula (1899), 176 U. S.
Rep. 361.
784 RIGHTS OF WAE AS TO NEUTRALS.
it had been seized by the

port of Guantanamo, which, though
American forces, was still in the possession of the Spanish troops.
Some act of 3. Besides the knowledge of the party, some act of violation
Zi^^r^l is essential to a breach of blockade; as either going in or coming
out of the port with a cargo laden after the commencement of the
blockade {x) .
Thus, by the edict of the States-General of Holland, of 1630,

relative to the blockade of the ports of Flanders, it was ordered
that the vessels and goods of neutrals which should be found going
in or coming out of the said ports, or so near thereto as to show
beyond a doubt that they were endeavouring to run into them;
or which, from the documents on board, should appear bound to
the said ports, although they should be found at a distance from
them, should be confiscated, unless they should, voluntarily, before
coming in sight of or being chased by the Dutch ships of war,
change their intention, while the thing was yet undone, and alter
their course. Bynkershoek, in commenting upon this part of the
decree, defends the reasonableness of the provision which affects
vessels found so near to the blockaded ports as to show beyond a
doubt that they were endeavouring to run into them, upon the
ground of legal presumption, with the exception of extreme and
well-proved necessity only. Still more reasonable is the infliction
of the penalty of confiscation, where the intention is expressly
avowed by the papers found on board. The third Article of
the sameedict also subjected to confiscation such vessels and their
cargoes as should come out of the said ports, not having been
forced into them by stress of weather^ although they should be
captured at a distance from them, unless they had, after leaving
the enemy's port, performed their voyage to a port of their own
country, or to some other neutral or free port, in which case they

should be exempt from condemnation; but if, in coming out of
the said ports of Flanders, they should be pursued by the Dutch
ships of war, and chased into another port, such as their own, or
that of their destination, and found on the high seas coming out
of such port, in that case they might be
captured and condemned.
Bynkershoek considers this provision as distinguishing the case
of a vessel having broken the blockade, and afterwards terminated
her voyage by proceeding voluntarily to her destined port, and
that of a vessel chased and compelled to take
refuge; which latter
might still be captured after leaving the port in which she had
(ar) The Betsey (1798), 1 C. Rob. 93.

taken refuge {y) And in general conformity with these prin-

.
ciples are the more modern law and practice (0), though the
Anglo-American doctrines differ in certain respects from those
entertained in various continental countries.
Under the Anglo-American system (though not latterly en- intent to
forced), the sailing of a vessel with a premeditated intent to violate JJ^^^j
a blockade is, ipso facto, a violation of the blockade, and renders
her subject to capture from the moment she leaves the port of
departure; and if a master has actual notice of a blockade he is
not at liberty even to approach the blockaded port for the pur-
pose of making inquiries {a) It is not the mere mental design
.
that subjects the goods to confiscation, but the overt act of starting
for, or proceeding towards the prohibited port with the knowledge
that it is blockaded, and continuing that course up to the time of
capture (6). The intent, however, must exist in order to constitute

the delictum, and it must be gathered from the circumstances of
each ease. It may be inferred from the bills of lading, the
letters and papers on board, the acts and words of the owners and
charterers, or the spoliation of papers. Delay in sailing after
complete loading, or a change of course in order to avoid a man-
of-war, afford good grounds for suspicion (c) Every dissemblance
.
in the ship's papers will be regarded as intended to conceal what

could not safely be disclosed, and to afford evidence that the
destination of the vessel is falsified (d) . The circumstance that
the master was also master of a ship condemned before, will be
noticed by the Court (e). But if the intention be bond fide aban-
doned at the time of capture, the ship will not be condemned;
only in this case very clear and satisfactory proof of a complete
abandonment, of the intent will be required (/). Since a blockade
exposes ships intending to enter the port to the risk of confiscation,
a shipowner who before the blockade contracted to carry goods to
the port (unless restrained by princes, &c.), is entitled to throw up
his contract when the port becomes blockaded (g) . Under the
(y) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. The Andromeda, 2 Wallace, 482; The
lib. i.
cap. 11. Cornelius, 3 Wallace, 214.
(2;) The Welvaart Van Pillaw (d) The Louisa Agnes, Blatchford,
(1799), 2 O. Rob. 138; The Jufrow Prize Cases, 112; The Mentor, Edw.
Maria Schroeder (1800), 3 O. Rob. 147. 207.
(«) The AduU (1899), 176 U. S. {e) The Diana, 7 Wallace, 360; The
Rep. 362. William H. Northrop, Blatchford,
(6) TheJohn Gilpin (l^^),B\aAxih- Prize Cases, 236.
ford, Prize Oases, 291 ; Yeaton v. Fry (/) The John Gilpin (1863), Blatch-
(1809), 5 Cranch, 335. Of. Halleck, ford, Prize Cases, 291.
eh. 23, § 23. {g) Geipel v. S^nith, L. R. 7 Q. B.
(c) The Circassian, 2 Wallace, 135; 404.
The Baigorry (1864), 2 Wallace, 474;
>^^ 50
Continental practice (notably the French), a vessel was not con-

sidered to have committed a breach of blockade until she had made
an attempt to cross the line after receiving a special notification
in the vicinity.
Violation of
respect to violating a blockade by coming
With out with a
blockade by
for although it
cargo, the time of shipment
is very material;
egress.
might be hard to refuse a neutral liberty to retire with a cargo
already laden, and by that act already become neutral property;

yet, after the commencement of a blockade, a neutral cannot be
allowed to interpose, in any way, to assist the exportation of the
property of the enemy Qi) . A
neutral ship departing can only
takeaway a cargo bond fide purchased and delivered before the
commencement of the blockade if she afterwards take on board a
;
cargo, it is a violation of the blockade. But where a ship was

transferred from one neutral merchant to another in a blockaded
port, and sailed out in ballast, she was held not to have violated
the blockade {i) So where goods were sent into the blockaded
.
port before the commencement of the blockade, but reshipped

by order of the neutral proprietor, as found unsaleable, during
the blockade, they were held entitled to restitution. For the same
rule which permits neutrals to withdraw their vessels from a
blockaded port extends also, with equal justice, to merchandise
sent in before the blockade, and withdrawn bond fide by the
neutral proprietor {k) .
Purchase of After the commencement of a blockade, a neutral is no longer

goods in a
blockaded at liberty to make any purchase in that port. Thus, where a ship
port. which had been purchased by a neutral of the enemy in a blockaded
port, and sailed on a voyage to the neutral country, had been
driven by stress of weather into a belligerent port, where she was
seized, she was held liable to condemnation under the general
rule. That the vessel had been purchased out of the proceeds of
the cargo of another vessel, was considered as an
unavailing
circumstance on a question of blockade. If the ship has been
purchased in a blockaded port, that alone is the illegal act, and
it is perfectly immaterial out of what funds the purchase was
effected. The fact that the vessel had terminated her voyage did
not absolve her from the
penalty, because the port into which
she had been driven was not
represented as forming any part of
ih) The Betsey (1798), 1 C. Rob. {k) The Potsdam (1801), 4 O. Rob.
93.
89; Olivera v. Union Insurance Com-
CO The Vrow Judith (1799), 1 O. pany (1818), 3 Wheaton, 183.
Rob. 150.
her original destination. It was therefore impossible to consider

this accident as any discontinuance of the voyage, or as a defeas-
ance of the penalty which had been incurred (I).
The offence incurred by a breach of blockade generally remains Duration of

® *^ ®"^®*
during the voyage ;
but the offence never travels on with the vessel
further than to the end of the return voyage, although if she is
taken in any part of that voyage, she is taken in delicto. This
was deemed reasonable, on the ground that no other opportunity
was afforded to the belligerent cruisers to vindicate the violated
law. But where the blockade has been raised between the time
of sailing and the capture, the penalty does not attach; because
the blockade being gone, the necessity of applying the penalty to
prevent future transgression no longer exists. When the blockade

is raised, is thrown over everything that has been done, and
a veil
the vessel no longer taken in delicto. The delictum may have
is
been completed at one period, but it is by subsequent events done

away (m) .
If the Declaration of London as it now stands should come to be Declaration

definitely established as binding law, then some of the Anglo- ^^ ânge of
American doctrines with regard to the above matters will be capture,
abrogated or modified. Thus, the rule will no longer hold good
that once intent is established a neutral vessel may be seized at
any time after the commencement of her voyage and at any
distance from the blockaded port. Further, the duration of a
vessel's liability for violation of blockade by egress will have to
be limited. As to the range of capture, the Declaration provides
thus: —
"
Neutral vessels
may not be captured for breach of blockade '
except within the area of operations (or radius of action, rayon
d'action') of the warships detailed to render the blockade effec-

tive "(w).
' '
The radius of action consists of the sum total of the zones of

surveillance occupied by the respective blockading vessels that are
distributed according to the configuration of the coast and the
geographical position of the blockaded places, so as to make the

blockade effective. The extent of the radius of action will depend
on the actual circumstances of each case, e.g., the nature and
position of the place blockaded, the character of its means of
defence, the nearness of neutral ports, the number of vessels em-
(l) The Juffrow Maria Schroeder (1799), 2 O. Rob. 128; The Lisette
<1800), 3 C. Rob. 147, n. (1807), 6 O. Rob. 387.
(m) The TVelvaurt Van Pillaw (n) Art. 17.
50 (2)
788 RIGHTS OF WAE AS TO NEUTRALS.
plojed, their distance

from the place blockaded; but in no case
must the range be too large for the effective maintenance of the
blockade (o) .
"
A vessel whicli has broken blockade outwards, or which has
is liable to capture so long
attempted to break blockade inwards,
as she is pursued by a ship of the blockading force. If the pur-
suit is abandoned, or if the blockade is raised, her capture may
"
no longer be effected (p).
The adds by way of commentary: "This vessel
Eeport
must
remain liable to capture so long as she pursued by a ship of the
is
blockading force; and it would not suffice that she be encountered

enemy which did not belong to the
by a cruiser of the blockading
blockading squadron. The question whether or not the pursuit
is abandoned is a question of fact; it does not suffice that the
vessel should take refuge in a neutral port. The ship which is

pursuing her can wait till she leaves it, so that the pursuit is
necessarily suspended, but not abandoned" (g).
The United States accepted this Article subject to the reserva-
"
tion that a pursuit is considered as continued and not abandoned
within the meaning of the Article, even if it is abandoned by one
line of the blockading force to be resumed after an interval by a
ship of the second line, until the limit of the area of the operations
is reached. In certain conditions there might be several lines,
each having its respective zone of pursuit" (r).
*
Continuous "
*
Whatever may be the ulterior destination of a vessel or of her
voyage in-
cargo, she may not be captured for breach of blockade, if at the
"
time she is on her way to a non-blockaded port (s).
We '
have seen that the doctrine of continuous voyage

'
is applied
by the Declaration of London to the case of absolute contraband,
but not to that of conditional contraband. It is also excluded in
"
the case of blockade. The Report adds: It is the true destina-
tion of the vessel which must be considered when a breach of
blockade is in question, and not the ulterior destination of the
cargo. Proof or presumption of the latter is therefore not enough

to justify the capture, for violation of blockade, of a ship actually
bound for an unblockad'ed port. But the cruiser might always
prove that this destination to an unblockaded port is onlj appa-
rent, and that in reality the immediate destination of the vessel
is the blockaded port" (t).
(o) Of. Report on the Declar. of (r) Ibid. No. 5 (1909).

London, ioo. cit.
(s) Declar. of London (1909),
(p) Art. 20. Art. 19.
(q) ParL Papers, Misoell. No. 4 (0 Pari. Papers, Misoell. No. 4
(1909). (1909).
"
A found guilty of breach of blockade is liable to con-
vessel Penalty for
demnation. The cargo
is also condemned, unless it is proved that blockade,
at the time the goods were shipped the shipper neither knew nor Liability of
" cargo.
could have known of the intention to break the blockade (u)
Under the British practice the general rule is that when a ship
is condemned for breach of blockade the cargo follows the same
fate. The owners of the cargo, are bound by the act of the master,
even though the breach of blockade was without their privity, or
contrary to their wishes; though in such a case the owners of the
cargo have their remedy against the master and owners of the
ship (x). When the owners of the cargo knew, or might have
known, of the existence of the blockade when the shipment was
made, the inference of law is irresistible that they were privy toi
violating the blockade. The master is to be treated as the agent
for the cargo as well as for the ship (y) If the goods were shipped
.
before the blockade was or could be known, the owners will be

absolved from liability (2;) Thus Article 21 introduces with
.
—
regard to the
—
cargo a
certain modification of the British rule,
under which knowledge of the existence of the blockade was suf-
from which the intention to break blockade was presumed.
ficient,
But according to the Article the shipper, in order to obtain
exemption for the cargo, must prove simply that he neither knew
nor could have known of the intention of the master to violate
the blockade (a) .
The right of visit and search of neutral vessels at sea is a The eight
^^"
belligerent right, essential to the exercise of the right of capturing search!
enemy's property, contraband of war, and vessels committing a Convoy.
breach of blockade, or an act of unneutral service. Even if the
right of capturing enemy's property be ever so strictly limited,
and the rule of 'free ships free goods' be adopted, the right of
visit and search is essential, in order to determine whether the
ships themselves are neutral, and documented as such, according

to the law of nations and treaties; for, as Bynkershoek observes,
(u) Art. 21. 582. As to how far the acts of the

{x) The James Cook^'B!idw..261; The master ,bind ihe shipowner, see the
Pmiaghia Rhomba (1858), 12 Moo. cases collected in Wheaton's Rep.
P. O. 168. vol. ii. Appendix, pp. 36-—40.
(y) The Panaghia Rhomba (Bal- (2) The ExcJmnge, Edw. 39.
tazzi V. Ryder) (1858), 12 Moo. P. O. (a) As to blockade by means of sub-
168. Of. The Meroicrius, 1 C. Rob. marine mines during the Great War,
80; The Alexander (1801), 4 O. Rob. 1914, and certain modifications of the
93; TAe J<ZoMi5 (1804),5OvRob. 256; ordinary praxjtice of blockade, see
The Exchange, Edw. 39; The James Phillipson, Int. Law and the Great
Cook, Edw. 261; The Wren, 6 Wall. War, pp. 381 seq.
"it is lawful to detain a neutral vessel, in order to ascertain, not

bj the flag merely, which may be fraudulently assumed, but by
the documents themselves on board, whether she is really neutral."
Indeed, it seems that the practice of maritime captures could not
exist without it. Accordingly the text-writers generally concur
in recognising the existence of this right (6).
The Maria. The customary international law on this subject was ably
summed up by Sir W. Scott, in the case ofThe Maria (1799),
where the exercise of the right was attempted to be resisted by the
interposition of a convoy of Swedish ships of war. In delivering
the judgment of the High Court of Admiralty in that memorable
case, the eminent judge laid dow^n the three following principles
of law: —
A belli-
^^^ 1, That the right of visiting and searching merchant ships on
gerent'sright.
the high seas, whatever be the ships, the cargoes, the destinations,
is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of
"
a belligerent nation. I say, be the ships, the cargoes, and the
destinations what they may, because, till they are visited and
searched, does not appear what the ships or the destination are;
it
and for the purpose of ascertaining these points that the

it is
necessity of this right of visitation and search exists. This right

is so clear in principle, that no man can deny it who admits the
right of maritime capture; because if you are not at liberty to

ascertain by sufficient inquiry whether there is property that can
legally be captured, it is impossible to capture. Even those who

contend for the inadmissible rule that 'free ships make free
goods' (c), must admit the exercise of this right at least for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the ships are free ships or not.
The right is equally clear in practice; for practice is uniform and
universal upon the subject. The many European treaties which
refer to this right, refer to it as pre-existing, and merely regulate
the exercise of it. All writers upon the law of nations unani-
mously acknowledge it, without the exception even of Hubner {d)
himself, the great champion of neutral privileges."
2. That the authority of the neutral
sovereign being forcibly
interposed cannot legally vary the rights of a lawfully commis-
.
(*) Bynkershoek, Qusest. Jur. Pub. upon a neutral vessel, but upon a vessel
lib. i. cap. 14. Vattel, Droit des Gens, the character of which is unknown,
liv. iii. ch. 7, § 114.
Martens, Precis, Heffter, § 168,Geffcken, note 3, citing
&c., liv. viii. c. 7, §§ 317, 321. Gal- Hautefeuille.
ham, Dei Doveri d© Principi Neutrali, (o) It is to be noted that this judg-
&c.,p. 458. Lampredi, Del Oommercio ment was delivered more than half a
dePopoliNeutrali,&c. p. 185. Kluber, century before the Declaration of
Droit des Gens Moderne de I'Europe, Paris.
§ 293. It has been well observed that {d) M. Von Hubner, De la saisie
at bottom the right is not exercised des b^timents neutres (1778).
"
sioned belligerent cruiser. Two sovereigns may unquestionably
agree, if they think fit, as in some late instances they have agreed,
by special covenant, that the presence of one of their armed ships
along with their merchant ships shall be mutually understood to
imply that nothing is to be found in that convoy of merchant ships
inconsistent with amity or neutrality; and if they consent to
accept this pledge, no third party has a right to quarrel with it,
any more than any other pledge which they may agree mutually
to accept. But surely no sovereign can legally compel the accept-
ance of such a security by mere force. The only security known to
the law of nations upon this subject, independently of all special
covenant, is the right of personal visitation and search, to be
exercised by those who have the interest in making it."
That the penalty for the violent contravention of this right Long-
3.
is the confiscation of the property so withheld from visit and established
' . practice,
search .For the proof of this I need only refer to Vattel, one of
the most correct, and certainly not the least indulgent, of modern
professors of public law. In book iii. c. 7, sect. 114, he expresses

himself thus: — 'On ne peut empecher
transport des eftets de
le
contrebande, Ton ne
visite pas les vaisseaux neutres.
si On est
done en droit de les visiter. Quelques nations puissantes ont refuse
en differents temps de so soumettre a cette visite. Aujourd'hui
un vaisseau neutre, qui refuseroit de souffrir la visite, se feroit
condamner par cela seul, comme etant de bonne prise.' Vattel is
here to be considered, not as a lawyer merely delivering an opinion,
—
but as a witness asserting a fact the fact that such is the existing
practice of modern Europe. Conformably to this principle, we
find in the celebrated French ordinance of 1681, now in force.
'
Article 12, That every vessel shall be good prize in case of

resistance and combat;' and Valin, in his smaller Commentary,
p. 81, says expressly, that, although the expression is in the con-

junctive, yet that the resistance alone is sufficient. He refers to
the Spanish Ordinance, 1718, evidently copied from it, in which
'
expressed in the disjunctive, in case of resistance or combat.'

it is
And recent instances are at hand and within view, in which it

appears that Spain continues to act upon this principle. The first
time it occurs to my notice on the inquiries I have been able to
make in the institutes of our own country respecting matters of
this nature, except what occurs in the Black Book of the
Admiralty, is in the Order of Council, 1664, Article 12, which
'
directs, That when any ship, met withal by the royal navy or
other ship commissionated, shall fight or make resistance, the
ship and goods shall be adjudged lawful prize.' A similar Article

occurs in the proclamation of 1672. I am, therefore, warranted
in saving that it was the rule, and the undisputed rule, of the
British Admiralty. I will not say that the rule may not have
been broken in upon, in some instances, by considerations of
comity or of policy, by which it may be fit that the administration
of this species of law should be tempered in the hands of those
tribunals which have a right to entertain and apply them for no ;
man ean deny that a Statemay recede from

extreme rights,
its
and that its supreme councils are authorized to determine in what

cases it may be fit to do so, the particular captor having, in no
case, any other right and title than what the State itself would
possess under the same fa-cts of capture. But I stand with confi-
dence upon all principles of reason —upon the distinct authority of
Vattel — upon the institutes of other great maritime countries, as
well as those of our own country, when I venture to lay it down
that, by the law of nations, as now understood, a deliberate and
continued resistance to search, on the part of a neutral vessel, to a
lawful cruiser, is followed by the legal consequence of confisca-
tion "(e).
The Armed The judgment of condemnation pronounced in this case was
of 1800. followed by the treaty of Armed Neutrality, entered into by the
Baltic Powers, in 1800, which league was dissolved by the death
of the Emperor Paul; and the points in controversy between these
Powers and Great Britain were finally adjusted by the Convention
of 5th June, 1801. By the fourth Article of this Convention,
the right of search as to merchant vessels sailing under neutral
convoy was modified by limiting it to public ships of war of the

belligerent party, excluding private armed vessels. Subject to
this modification, the pretension of resisting by means of convoy
the exercise of the belligerent right of search was surrendered by
Russia and the other Northern Powers, and various regulations
were provided to prevent the abuse of that right to the injury of
neutral commerce. As has already been observed, the object of
this treaty is expressly declared
by the contracting parties, in its
preamble, to be the settlement of the differences which had grown
out of the Armed Neutrality by "an invariable determination of
their principles upon the rights of
neutrality in their application
to their respective monarchies." The eighth Article also pro-
vides that "the principles and measures
adopted by the present
Act, shall be alike applicable to all the maritime wars in which
one of the two Powers may be whilst the other remains
engaged,
(e) The Maria (1799), 1 O. Rob. 340.

EIGHTS OF AS TO NEUTRALS. 793
W4R
neutral. These stipulations shall consequently be regarded as
permanent, and shall serve as a constant rule for the contracting
parties in matters of commerce and navigation" (/).
Itwas only by reason of such special Conventions that Great Divergent
'^^®^^-
Britain temporarily recognised the immunity from visit and search
of neutral vessels sailing under their national convoy. When these
'Conventions were rescinded, Great Britain resumed the right of
visit and search in the case of convoyed vessels. But the practice
was rarely enforced, however, after the conclusion of the
Napoleonic wars. Moreover, in 1854, during the Crimean war,

the British Government for the time being waived the right of
search, in order to secure harmonious co-operation with France
which recognised the right of convoy (^). The Declaration of
Paris, 1856, having declared that the neutral flag shall cover enemy
goods other than contraband, the application of the British doc-
trine was considerably restricted but it was not abandoned Great
;
.
Britain has stood almost alone in opposing the right of convoy;

—
Continental practice followed generally by the United States,
though opposed by most of the American publicists has sup-
—
ported it {Ji). At the London Naval Conference, 1908, the British
delegates signified their readiness to admit the right of convoy (^),
-and the Declaration of London (1909) arrived at a solution to this
effect (/^).
In the case of The Maria, the resistance of the convoying ship Forcible
^^si^^^^^^ce by
was held to be a resistance of the whole fleet of merchant vessels
an enemy
imder convoy, and subjected the whole to conflscation. This was master.
a case of neutral property condemned for an attempted resistance

by a neutral armed vessel to the exercise of the right of visit and
search, by a lawfully commissioned belligerent cruiser. But the
forcible resistance by an enemy master will not, in general, affect
neutral property laden on board an enemy's merchant vessel; for
an attempt on his part to rescue his vessel from the possession of
the captor is nothing more than the hostile act of a hostile person,
''
who has a perfect right to make such an attempt. If a neutral
(/) The question arising out of the 1801). "Substance of the Speech of
•case of the Swedish convoy gave rise Lord Grenville in the House of Lords,
to several instructive polemic essays. November 13, 1801 " (London, 1802).
The judgment of Sir W. Scott was Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations,
attacked by Professor J. F. W. pp. 390
—420.
:Schlegel, ofCopenhagen, in a Treatise (g) Cf Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 4
.
on the Visitation of Neutral Ships (1909), p. 25.

under Convoy (transl. London, 1801); (h) Cf. Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 5
and vindicated by Dr. Croke in " Ee- (1909), p. 78.
marks on M. Schlegel's Work " (1801). (i) Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 4
See also " Letters of Sulpicius on the (1909), p. 25.
"
Northern Confederacy (London, (k) See infra, p, 798.
master," says Sir W. Scott, ''attempts a rescue,

or to withdraw
himself from search, he violates a duty which is imposed upon

him the law of nations, to submit to search, and to come in for
by
or cargo; and if he violates
inquiry as to the property of the ship
this obligation by a recurrence to force, the consequence will un-
doubtedly reach the property of his owner; and it would, I think,

extend also to the whole property intrusted to his care, and thus
fraudulently attempted to be withdrawn from the operation of the
rights of war. With an enemy, master
the case is very different;
no duty is violated by such an act on his part lupum auribus
— '
teneo
'
— and if he can withdraw himself he has a right so
to do"(Z).
Neutral goods The question how far a neutral merchant has a right to carry
enemy vessel, his goods on board an armed enemy vessel, and how far his pro-
perty is involved in the consequences of resistance by the enemy

master, was considered both in the British and American Prize
Courts, during the war between Great Britain and the United
States. In a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in 1815, it was determined that a neutral had a right to
charter and place his goods on board a belligerent armed merchant
ship, without forfeiting his neutral character, unless he actually

concurred and participated in the enemy master's resistance to
capture (m) Contemporaneously with this decision of the Ameri-
.
can Court, Sir W. Scott held directly the contrary doctrine, and
decreed salvage for the recapture of neutral Portuguese property,
previously taken by an American cruiser from on board an armed

British vessel, on the ground that the American Prize Courts
might justly have condemned the property, since such hostile

association was evidence of an intention to resist visit and
search {n). In reviewing its former decision, in a subsequent case
decided in 1818, the American Court confirmed it; and, alluding
to the decisions in the
English High Court of Admiralty, stated,
that if a similar case should again occur in that Court, and the
decisions of the American Court should in the meantime have
reached the learned judge, he would be called upon to acknowledge
that the danger of condemnation in the United States Courts was
not as great as he had imagined. In determining the last-men-
tioned case, the American Court distinguished it both from those
where neutral vessels were condemned for the unneutral act of the
convoying vessel, and those where neutral vessels had been con-
(l) The Catherina Elizabeth (1804), 388; Story, J., dissenting.

5 C. Rob. 232. {n) The Fanny (1815), 1 Dods. Ad.
(w) The Nereide (1815), 9 Cranch, 443.
demned for placing themselves under enemy's convoy. With

regard to the first class of cases, it was well known that thej
originated in the capture of the Swedish convoy, at the time when
Great Britain had resolved to throw down the glove to all the
world, on the contested principles of the northern maritime con-
federacy. But, independently of this, there were several considera-
tions which presented an obvious distinction between both classes
of cases and that under consideration.A convoy was an association
for a hostile object. In undertaking it, a State spreads over the
merchant vessels an immunity from search which belongs only to
a national ship; and by joining a convoy, every individual vessel
puts off her pacific character and undertakes for the discharge
of duties which belong only to the military marine. If, then, th(^
association be voluntary, the neutral, in suffering the fate of the
entire convoy, has only to regret his own folly in wedding his
fortune to theirs; or if involved in the resistance of the convoying
ship, he shares the fate to which the leader of his own choice is
liable in case of capture (a) .
The Danish Government issued, in 1810, an ordinance relating Neutral

^^^^^^"^ ^^
to captures, which declared to be good and lawful prize "such
vessels as, notwithstanding their flag is considered neutral, as well convoy.
with regard to Great Britain as the Powers at war with the samc^
nation, still, either in the Atlantic or Baltic, have made use of
English convoy." Under this ordinance, many American neutral
vesselswere captured, and, with their cargoes, condemned in the
Danish Prize Courts for offending against its provisions. In the
course of the discussions which subsequently took place between
the American and Danish Governments respecting the legality of
these condemnations, the principle upon which the ordinance was
grounded was questioned by the United States Government, as

inconsistent with the established rules of international law. It
was contended that to regard the fact of having navigated under
enemy's convoy as, per se, a justifiable cause, not of capture merely,
but of condemnation in the Courts of the other belligerent and —
that without inquiring into the proofs of proprietary interest, or
the circumstances and motives under which the captured vessel
had joined the convoy, or into the legality of the voyage, or the
—
innocence of her conduct in other respects was an unparalleled
belligerent pretension. The American vessels in question were
engaged in their accustomed lawful trade, between Russia and the
United States; they were unarmed, and made no resistance to the
(o) The Atalanta (1818), 3 Wlicaton, 409.

EIGHTS OF WAR AS TO NEUTRALS.
Danish cruisers; they were captured on the return voyage, after

having passed up the Baltic and been subjected to examination by
the Danish cruisers and authorities; and were condemned under an
edict which was unknown, and consequently, as to them, did not
exist when they sailed from Cronstadt, and which, unless it could
be strictly shown to be consistent with the pre-existing law of
nations, must be considered as an unauthorized measure of retro-
spective legislation.
Being found in company with an enemy's convoy might, indeed,
furnish a presumption that the captured vessel and cargo belong
to the enemy; but the presumption isby no means conclusive
—
it will readily yield to countervailing proof. The simple fact,
then, of having navigated under enemy convoy could be considered
as a ground of suspicion only, warranting the captors in sending
in the captured vessel for further examination, but not constituting
in itself a conclusive ground of confiscation. This case is to be
distinguished from sailing under neutral

—
convoy a
proceeding
which tends to impede and defeat the belligerent right of search,
to render every attempt to exercise this lawful right a contest of
violence, to disturb the peace of the world, and to withdraw from

the proper forum the determination of such controversies by
forcibly preventing the exercise of its jurisidiction. But the miere
circum'stance of sailing in company with a belligerent convoy
had no such effect; being an enemy, the belligerent had a right to
resist. The masters of the vessels under his convoy could not be
involved in the consequences of that resistance, because they were
neutral, and had not actually participated in the resistance. It is,
indeed, as legitimate for a neutral vessel to sail under enemy con-
voy, as it is for a neutral vessel to seek shelter in a belligerent
port.
But it might perhaps be said, that as resistance to the right of
search is, by the law and usage of nations, a substantive ground
of condemnation in the case of the master of a single ship, still
more must it be so, where many vessels are associated for the
purpose of defeating the exercise of the same right. In order to
render the two cases stated perfectly analogous, there must have
been an actual resistance on the part of the vessels in question, or,
at least, on the part of the enemy's fleet,
having them at the time
under its protection, so as to connect them inseparably with the
acts of the enemy. Here was no actual resistance on the part of
either, but only a constructive resistance on the part of the neutral
vessels, implied from the fact of their having joined the enemy's
convoy. This, however, was, at most, a mere intention to resist,
never carried into effect, which had never been considered in the
case of a single ship, as involving the penalty of confiscation. But
the resistance of the master of a single ship, which is supposed to
be analogous to the case of convoy, must refer to a neutral master,
whose resistance would, by the established law of nations, involve
both ship and cargo in the penalty of confiscation. The same
principle would not, however, apply to the case of an enemy
master, who has an incontestable right to resist his enemy, and
whose resistance could not affect the neutral owner of the cargo,
unless he was on board, and actually participated in the resist-
ance. Such was, in a similar case, the judgment of Sir W. Scott.
Moreover, to sail under a belligerent convoy is not necessarily
to injure the right of the other belligerent. If any such right is
injured, must
it be the right of visit and search. But that right
is not a substantive and independent right, with which belli-
gerents are invested by the law of nations for the purpose of

wantonly vexing and interrupting the commerce of neutrals. It
is a right growing out of a greater right of capturing enemy's
property, or contraband of war, and to be used, as means to an

end, to enforce the exercise of that right. Here the actual exer-
cise of the right was never in fact opposed, and no injury had
accrued to the belligerent Power (p) .
The negotiationfinally resulted in the conclusion of a treaty,

in 1830, between the United States and Denmark, by which the
latter Powerstipulated to indemnify the American claimants
generally for the seizure of their property by the payment of a
fixed sum en bloc, leaving it to the American Government ,to
apportion it by commissioners appointed by itself, and authorized

to determine "according to the principles of justice, equity, and
the law of nations," with a declaration that the convention, having
no other object than to terminate all the claims, "can never here-
after be invoked, by one party or the other, as a precedent or rule
for the future" (g).
With regard to the question of neutral vessels sailing under British prac-
belligerent convoy, under British practice

—which is warranted ^^ce as to
by general principles and supported by the views of leading vessels under

—
British and American jurists and publicists a neutral vessel that
convoy^^^
had placed herself under the protection of a belligerent armed
ship is liable to detention and enquiry, on the ground of prima
{p) Mr. Wheaton to Count Schim- {q) Martens, Nouveau Reeueil,

melmann, 1828. torn. viii. p. 350. Elliot, American
Diplomatic Code, vol. i. p. 453.
facie hostile association. no other incriminating circumstances

If
would not be
appeared against her, a decree of condemnation
a belligerent whilst she
pronounced. But if she is intercepted hj
is actually under enemy convoy, and after the convoying vessel has
offered or when the convoying vessel is offering resistance to that

belligerent, then she may be condemned on the ground of manifest
hostile association and because of her intention to resist the right
of visit and search (r) .
Declaration
gy\ the Declaration of London (1909), provision is made for
of London on
convoy.
, , „
the right of convoy
, „
and ior resistance
.
, ,
to search:
,
—
"
Neutral vessels under convoy of their national flag are exempt
from search. The commander of a convoy gives, in writing, at
the request of the commander of a belligerent warship, all infor-
mation as to the character of the vessels and their cargoes, which
"
could be obtained by search (s).
The exemption conferred by this Article is conditional on the
convoying commander's assurance of the innocent character of the
vessel and cargo under convoy The very act of convoying vessels
.
necessarily implies a guarantee on the part of the neutral Govern-

ment concerned that the vessels in question will take no advantage
of the protection thus accorded them, for the purpose of doing
anything inconsistent with neutrality, e.g., to carry contraband,

to render unneutral service, to attempt to break blockade. The
neutral Government is therefore called upon to exercise due super-
vision throughout in order to prevent all abuse of convoy, and to
instruct the commander of the convoy accordingly {t) .
"
If the commander of the belligerent warship has reason to
suspect that the confidence of the commander of the convoy has

been abused, he communicates his suspicions to him. In such a
case it is for the commander of the convoy alone to investigate
the matter. He must record the result of such investigation in a
report, of which a copy is handed to the officer of the warship. If,

in the opinion of the commander of the convoy, the facts shown in
the report justify the capture of one or more vessels, the
protection
of the convoy must be withdrawn from such vessels "
(u)..
The commander of the convoy may, but he is not obliged to,
allow the of the cruiser to be present at the investigation.
officer
In case of difference of opinion between the two officers, e.g., as
(/•) Of. the dissenting judgment of (s) Declar. of London (1909),

Story, J., in The Nereide (1815), 9 Art. 61.
Cranch, 388, at pp. 445, 453, 454; The (t) Of. Report on the Declaration,
Nanct/ (1892), 27 O. C. 99; The Sea Pari. Papers, Miscell. No. 4 (1909).
N^mph (1901), 36 O. C. 369. («) Art. 62.
to conditional contraband, the character of the port to which con-

ditional contraband is destined, the officer of the cruiser may make
a protest and leave the question to be settled by diplomatic means .
"
The situation is
altogether different if a
convoyed vessel is
found beyond the possibility of dispute to be carrying contraband.
The vessel has no longer a right to protection, since the condition
upon which such protection depends has not been fulfilled. She
has deceived her own Government, and has tried to deceive the
belligerent. She must therefore be treated as a neutral merchant
vessel which, in the ordinary way, encounters a belligerent cruiser
and is visited and searched by her. She cannot complain at being
treated thus rigorously, since there is in her case an aggravation of
the offence, committed by a carrier of contraband" (x).
The position and liability of enemy merchantmen encountered Destruction
at sea by belligerent warships have already been considered (;//) .

prizes.
As to neutral vessels met with by a belligerent, where certain
have been committed or are suspected of having been
offences
—
committed by them e.g., the carriage of contraband, unneutral
service, breach of blockade, resistance to search, use of fraudulent
papers
—they are liable to seizure. Under the British
practice
they are to be then sent in for adjudication, as without due con-
demnation change of ownership does not take place. But should
it be found impossible to send them in, they are, as a general rule,
to be released (2). In cases of emergency, however, or in bond
fide mistake (a), their destruction is not deemed to be unlawful;
but in these cases, since the owners of ship and cargo have not
been divested of their property by judicial determination, com-
pensation is paid to them (?>). This practice has been adopted by
certain other countries, for example, Holland and Japan (c) ;
but adoption in time of peace has sometimes been followed by a

regime in time of war (d). The majority of the great
different
maritime Powers, e.g., France, Germany, Russia, the United
States, are in favour of the more rigorous course of destroying
neutral prizes at sea, if they cannot be brought in without risk
to the captor. Thus, in the Russo-Japanese war, Russia, in
(x) Eeport, loo. cit. (b) The Felicity (1819), 2 Dods.

\y) See swpra, p. 586. 381.
(2) The Leucade (1854), Spinks, (o) See Pari. Papers, Miscall. No. 5
217. Cf. Manual of Naval Prize Law (1909), p. 101.
(1888), § 303. {d) Of. Japanese Eegulations gov-
(a) Of. The Acteon, 2 Dods. 48. erning Caroturee at Sea (1904),
Art. 91; Takahashi, p. 788.
800 EIGHTS OF WAE AS TO NEUTKALS.
accordance with her regulations (e), sank several neutral merchant-

men bringing them in for adjudication e.g., the
instead of
—
Knight Commander, the Hipsang, the Ikhona, the 8t. Kilda (all
British); the Thea (German); the Princess Maria (Danish) (/).
Declaration
of London In 1907 the question was discussed at the second Hague Con-
(1909) on ference, but owing to the conflicting views entertained by the
dettruction
of neutral delegates no conclusion was arrived at.
The London Naval Con-
prizes.
ference, however, arrived at an agreement in 1909, whereby Great
Britain modified her opposition to the practice of destruction when
carried out in circumstances of exceptional urgency. The follow-
ing are the rules laid down:

—
"
A neutral vesisel that has been captured may not be destroyed
by the captor, but must be taken into such port as is proper in order
to determine there all questions concerning the validity of the
capture" (g).
"
As an exception, a neutral vessel which has been captured by a
belligerent warship, and which would be liable to condemnation,
may be destroyed if the observance of Article 48 would involve
danger to the safety of the warship or to the success of the opera-
"
tions inwhich she is engaged at the time (h).
The Eeport emphasizes, in reference to this Article, that it is
the circumstances existing at the moment of destruction that must
be considered, in order to decide whether the conditions specified
are or are not fulfilled (^) .
"
Before the vessel is destroyed all persons on board must be
placed in safety, and all the ship's papers and other documents
which the parties interested consider relevant for the purpose o£
deciding on the validity of the capture must be taken on board
"
the warship (k).
"
A
captor who has destroyed a neutral vessel must, prior to any
decision respecting the validity of the prize, establish that he
only acted in the face of an exceptional necessity of the nature

contemplated in Article 49. If he fails to do this, he must com-
pensate the parties interested without examination as to whether
"
the capture was valid or not (?).
"
If the capture of a neutral vessel is subsequently held to be
invalid, though the act of destruction has been held to have been
justifiable, the captor must pay compensation to the parties
(e) Russian Regulations (1895), Art. 48.

§ 21; Instructions (1900), § 40. (A) Art. 49.
(/) Cf. Lawrence, War and Neu- (*) Pari. Papers, Misoell. No. 4
trality in the Far East, 2nd ed. (1904), (1909).
pp. 250—289. (k) Art. 50.
(ff) Declar. of London (1909), (0 Art. 51.
interested instead of the restitution to which thej would have been

' '
entitled (m)
"
If goods not liable to condemnation have been The
neutral cargo,
destroyed with the vessel, the owner of such goods is entitled to

"
compensation (?2) .
That is, the owner of the innocent neutral cargo is entitled to an
indemnity, regardless of the justifiable or unjustifiable destruc-

tion of the vessel.
"
The captor has the right to demand the surrender or to proceed
himself to the destruction of any goods liable to condemnation
found on board a vessel not herself liable to condemnation, pro-
vided that the circumstances- are such as would, under Article 49,
justify the destruction of a vessel herself liable to condemnation.
The captor must enter the goods surrendered or destroyed in the
log-book of the vessel stopped, and must obtain duly certified
copies of all relevant papers. When the goods have been surren-
dered or destroyed, and the formalities duly carried out, the master
must be allowed to continue his voyage. The provisions of
Articles 51 and 52 respecting the obligations of a captor who has
destroyed a neutral vessel are applicable" (o).
The provisions laid down in this Article constitute a novel
contribution to international maritime practice. The Report com-
ments thereon as follows: *'A cruiser encounters a neutral
merchant vessel carrying contraband in a proportion less than that
specified in Article 40 (p) The captain of the cruiser may put
.
a prize crew on board the vessel and take her into port for adjudica-
tion. He may, in conformity with the provisions of Article 44 (g),
accept the contraband if it is offered to him by the vessel stopped.

But what is to happen if neither of these solutions is reached? The
vessel stopped does not offer to deliver the contraband, and the
cruiser is not in a position to take the vessel into a national port.
go with the contra-

Is the cruiser obliged to let the neutral vessel
band on board? This has seemed excessive, at least in certain
exceptional circumstances. These circumstances are in fact the
same as would have justified the destruction of the vessel, if she
had been liable to condemnation. In such a case the cruiser may
require the delivery or proceed to the destruction of the goods
liable to condemnation. The reasons which warrant the destruc-
tion of the vessel would justify the destruction of the contraband
(m) Art. 52. either by value, or by weight, by

(/i)Art. 53. volume, or by freight, see supra.
(o) Art. 54. (q) See supra, p. 754.
(p) I.e., less than, half, reckoned 4
w. 51
goods, the more so as the considerations of humanity which may

be invoked against the destruction of a vessel do not in this case
apply. Against an arbitrary demand by the cruiser there are the
same guarantees as those which made it possible to recognise the
right to destroy the vessel. The captor must, as a condition pre-
cedent, prove that he was really faced by the exceptional circum-
stances specified; failing this, he is condemned to pay the value of
the goods delivered or destroyed, without investigation as to
whether they were or were not contraband .
The Article prescribes certain formalities which are necessary

to establish the facts of the case and to enable the Prize Court to
adjudicate" (r).
<'
Compensa- j| ^^^ capture of a vessel or of goods is not upheld by the Prize
Court, or if the prize is released without any judgment being
given, the parties interested have the right to compensation, unless
there were good reasons for capturing the vessel or goods" (s).
(r) Pari. Papers, Misoell. No. 4 (s) Declar. of London, Art. 64.
(1909), pp. 52, 97.
TEEATY OF PEACE. 803
CHAPTER V.
TREATY OF PEACE.
The power of concluding peace, like that of declaring war, Power of
depends upon the municipal constitution of the State. These au- dependent on
thorities are generally associated. In unlimited monarchies, both the municipal
constitution.
.,
reside m the sovereign
. , .
;
and even m Tlimited or constitutional/ mon-
. . , . .
archies, each maJ, be vested in the Crown. Such is the British

Constitution, at least in form; but it is well known, that in its
practical administration, the real power of making war actually
resides in the Parliament, without whose approbation it cannot be
carried on, and which body has consequently the power of com-
pelling the Crown to make peace, by withholding the supplies
necessary to prosecute hostilities. The American Constitution
vests the power of declaring war in the two houses of Congress,
with the assent of the President. By the forms of the Constitu-
tion, the President has the exclusive power of making treaties
of peace, which, when ratified with the advice and consent of the
Senate, become the supreme law of the land, and have the effect
of repealing the declaration of war and all other laws of Congress,
and of the several States which stand in the way of their stipula-
tions. But the Congress may at any time compel the President
to make peace, by refusing the means of carrying on war. In
France, the President has nominally power to declare war, to
make treaties of peace, of alliance, and of commerce; though it is
the Cabinet (as in Great Britain) that actually exercises it. But
the real power of making both peace and war resides ultimately
in the two Chambers, which have the authority of granting or
refusing the means of prosecuting hostilities (a) .
The power of making treaties of peace, like that of making Power of
other treaties with foreign States is, or may be, limited in its J^gatief of
extent by the national constitution . We have already seen that a peace
general authority to make treaties of peace necessarily implies a itêxtent.
power to stipulate the conditions of peace; and among these may

properly be involved the cession of the public territory and other
property, as well as of private property included in the eminent
(«) Of. the Constitutional Law of 1875.
51(2)
804 TREATY OF PEACE.
domain. If, then, there be no limitation, expressed in the funda-

mental laws of the State, or necessarily implied from the distribu-
tion of its constitutional authorities, on the treaty-making power
in this respect, necessarily extends to the alienation of public
it
and private property, when deemed necessary for the national

safety or policy (6).
Indemnity to The duty of making compensation to individuals, whose private
thus
is sacrificed to the general welfare, is inculcated by
fofws b property
public conces- public jurists, as correlative to the sovereign right of alienating
sions.
those things which are included in the eminent domain; but this
duty must have No Government can be supposed to

its limits.
be able, consistently with the welfare of the whole community, to

assume the burden of losses produced by conquest, or the violent
dismemberment of the Where, then, the cession of terri-
State.
tory is the result of coercion and conquest, forming a case of
imperious necessity, beyond the power of the State to control, it

does not impose any obligation upon the Government to indemnify
those who may suffer a loss of property by the cession (c) .
Dismember- The fundamental laws of most free Governments limit the

the dismemberment of the
W trea^ty*^*^^ treaty-making power, in respect to
State, either by an express prohibition, or by necessary implica^
tion from the nature of the constitution. Thus, even under the
constitution of the old French monarchy, the States-General of
the kingdom declared that Francis I. had no power to dismember
the kingdom, as was attempted by the Treaty of Madrid, con-
cluded by that monarch; and that not merely upon the ground
that he was a prisoner, but that the assent of the nation, repre-
sented in the States-General, was essential to the validity of the
treaty. The Burgundy was therefore
cession of the province of
annulled, as contrary to the fundamental laws of the kingdom;

and the provincial States of that duchy, according to Mezeray,
declared, that "never having been other than subjects of the
crown of France, they would die in that allegiance; and if aban-
doned by the king, they would take up arms, and maintain by
force their independence, ratlier than pass under a foreign
dominion." But when the ancient feudal constitution of France
was gradually abolished by the disuse of the States-General, and
the absolute monarchy became firmly established under Eichelieu
and Louis XIV., the authority of ceding portions of the public
territory, as the price of peace, passed into the hands of the
(6) Vide ante, Pt. iii. ch. 2, p. 365. des Gens, liv. i. ch. 20, § 244; liv. iv.
(c) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. ch. 2, § 12. Kent, Comment, on
lib. iii. cap. 20, § 7. Vatftel, Droit American Law, vol. i. p. 178 (5th ed.).
*
TREATY OF PEACE. 805
king', in whom all the other powers of government were concen-

trated. The different constitutions established in France, subse-
quently to the Eevolution of 1789, limited this authority in the

hands of the Executive in various degrees. The provision in the
Constitution of 1795, by which the recently-conquered countries
on the left bank of the Ehine were annexed to the French terri-
tory, became an insuperable obstacle to the conclusion of peace

in the conferences at Lisle. By the Constitutional Charter of
1830, the king was invested with the power of making peace,
'
without any limitation of this authority, other than that which

is implied in the general distribution of the constitutional powers
of the Government. Still it was believed that, according to the
general understanding of French public jurists, the assent of the

Chambers, clothed with the forms of a legislative act, was con-
sidered essential to the ultimate validity of a treaty ceding any]
portion of the national territory. The extent and limits of the

territory being defined by the municipal laws, the treaty-making
power not considered sufficient to repeal those laws.
is
In Great Britain, the treaty-making power, as a branch of the Treaty -

royal prerogative, has in theory no limits; but it is practically oTareat^^^^*^
limited by the general controlling authority of Parliament, whose Britain,
approbation is necessary to carry into effect a treaty, by which

the existing territorial arrangements of the empire are altered.
In confederated Governments, the extent of the treaty-making Treaty-
power, in this respect, must depend upon the nature of the con- ^f^^con?^^^'
federation. If the union consists of a system of confederated federation.
States, each retaining its own sovereignty complete and unim-

paired, evident
it is that the federal head, even if invested with
the general power of making treaties of peace for the confederacy,
cannot lawfully alienate the whole or any portion of the territory
of any member of the union, without the express assent of that
member. Such was the theory of the Germanic Confederation;
the dismemberment of its territory was contrary to the funda-
mental laws and maxims of the empire. But this theory of the
public law of has often been compelled to yield in
Germany
practice to imperious necessity; such as that which forced the
cession to France of the territories belonging to the States of the
empire, on the left bank of the Rhine, by the treaty of Lune-

ville, in 1800. Even in the case of a supreme Federal Govern-
ment, or composite State, like that of the United States of
America, it may, perhaps, be doubted how far the mere general
treaty-making power, vested in the federal head, necessarily,
carries with it that of alienating the territory of any member of
the union without its consent.
806 TEEATY OF PEACE.
Effects of a The effect of a treaty of put an end to the war, and

peace is to
°^
to abolish the subject of it. an agreement to waive all dis-
It is
peTce^
cussion concerning the respective rights and claims of the parties,
and to hury in oblivion the original causes of the war It forbids .
the revival of the same war, by resuming hostilities for the
original cause which first kindled it, or for whatever may have
occurred in the course of it. But the reciprocal stipulation of
perpetual peace and amity between the parties does not imply
that they are never again to make war against each other for
any cause whatever. The peace relates to the war which it ter-
minates; and is perpetual, in the sense that the war cannot be
revived for the same cause. This will not, however, preclude the
right to claim and resist, if the grievances which originally

—
kindled the war be repeated for that would furnish a new injury
and a new cause of war, equally just with the former. If an
abstract right be in question between the parties, on which the
treaty of peace is silent, it follows, that all previous complaints

and injury, arising under such claim, are thrown into oblivion,
by the amnesty necessarily implied, if not expressed; but the
claim itself is not thereby settled either one way or the other. In
the absence of express renunciation or recognition, it remains
open for future discussion. And even a specific arrangement of

a matter in dispute, if it be special and limited, has reference only
to that particular mode of asserting the claim, and does not
preclude the party from any subsequent pretensions to the same

thing on other grounds. Hence the utility in practice of requiring
a igeneral renunciation of all pretensions to the thing in con-
troversy, which has the effect of precluding for ever the assertion
of the claim in any mode (d) .
The treaty of peace does not extinguish claims founded upon

debts contracted or injuries inflicted
previously to the war, and
unconnected with its causes, unless there be an express stipulation
to that effect. Nor does it affect private rights acquired ante-
cedently to the war, or private injuries unconnected with the
causes which produced the war. Hence debts previously con-
tracted between the
respective subjects, though the remedy for
their recovery is
suspended during the war, are revived on the
restoration of peace. There are even cases where debts
contracted,
or injuries committed, between the
respective subjects of the
belligerent nations during the war, may become the ground of a
valid claim, as in the case of
ransom-bills, and of contracts made
by prisoners of war for subsistence, or in the course of trade
(d) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iv. ch. 2, U 19—21.

carried on under a licence. In all these cases, the remedy may be

asserted subsequently to the peace (e).
The treaty of peace leaves everything in the state in which jjtipossidetu
it found it —accordine- to the principle of uti possidetis — unless the basis of
. , .
, mi • • every treaty of
there be some express stipulation to the contrary. The existing peace, unless
state of possession is maintained, except so far as altered by the
beêxpreS
terms of the treaty. If nothing be said about the conquered
country or places, they remain with the conqueror, and his title
cannot afterwards be called in question. During the continu-
ance of the war, the conqueror in possession has only a usufruc-
tuary right, and the latent title of the former sovereign continues,
until the treaty of peace, by its silent operation, or express
provisions, extinguishes his title for ever(/).

The restoration of the conquered
-
territory to its original Effect of

of
sovereign-, by the treaty of peace, carries with it the restoration of
Restoration
all persons and things which have been temporarily under the treaty of
P®^^^-
enemy's dominion, to their original state. This general rule is
applied, without exception, to real property or immovables. The
title acquired in war to this species of property, until confirmed
by a treaty of peace, confers a mere temporary right of posses-
sion. The proprietary right cannot be transferred by the con-
queror to a third party, so as to entitle him to claim against the
former owner, on the restoration of the territory to the original
sovereign. If, on the other hand, the conquered territory is ceded
by the treaty of peace to the conqueror, such an intermediate
transfer thereby confirmed, and the title of the purchaser
is
becomes valid and, complete. In respect to personal property or

movables, a different rule is applied. The title of the enemy
to things of this description is considered complete against the
original owner after twenty-four hours' possession, in respect to

booty on land. The same rule was formerly considered appli-
cable to captures at sea; but the more modern usage of maritime
nations requires a formal sentence of condemnation as prize of
war, in order to preclude the right of the original owner to
restitution on payment of salvage. But since the jus postliwdnii
does not, strictly speaking, operate after the peace, if the treaty
of peace contains no express stipulation respecting captured
property, it remains in the condition in which the treaty finds it,
and is thus tacitly ceded to the actual possessor. The jus post^
(0) Of. Kent, Comment, vol. i. Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens,
p. 168 (5th ed.). Uv. iii. ch. 4, § 282. Kluber, Droit
(/) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. des Gens Moderne de I'Europe, §§ 254
cap. 6, §§ 4, 5. Vattel, Droit
lib. iii. —259.
dee Gens, liv. iii. ch. 13, §§ 197, 198.
liminii is a right which belongs exclusively to a state of war;

and therefore a transfer to a neutral, before the peace, even
without a judicial sentence of condemnation, is valid, if there
has been no recovery or recapture before the peace. The inter-
vention of peace covers all defects of title, and vests a law.ful
possession in the neutral, in the same manner
as it quiets the title
of the hostile captor himself {g) .
From what A treaty of peace binds the contracting parties from the time
time the
of its signature. Hostilities are to cease between them from that
treaty of
peace com- time, unless some other period be provided in the treaty itself {h) .
mences its
operation. But the treaty binds the subjects of the belligerent nations only
from the time it is notified to them. Any intermediate acts of
hostilitycommitted by them before it was known, cannot ]be
punished as criminal acts, though it is the duty of the State to
make restitution of the property seized subsequently to the con-
clusion of the treaty (^); and in order to avoid disputes respecting
the consequences of such acts, it is usual to provide, in the treaty,
itself, the periods at which hostilities are to cease in different
places. Grotius intimates an opinion that individuals are not

responsible, even civiliter, for hostilities thus continued after the
conclusion of peace, so long as they are ignorant of the fact,
although it is the duty of the State to make restitution, wherever

the property has not been actually lost or destroyed. But the
better opinion seems to be, that wherever a capture takes place
at sea, after the signature of the treaty of peace, mere ignorance
of the fact will not protect the captor from civil responsibility in
damages; and that, if he acted in good faith, his own Government

must protect him and save him harmless. When a place or country
is exempted from
hostility by Articles of peace, it is the duty of
the State to give its subjects
timelj notice of the fact. In such
a case it is the actual wrong-doer who is made responsible to the
injured party, and not the superior commanding officer of the

unless he be on the spot, and
fleet, actually participating in the
transaction. Nor will damages be decreed by the Prize Court,
against the actual wrong-doer, after a lapse of a great length
of time (/c).
Cessation of When the treaty of peace contains an
express stipulation that
hostilities
after treaty. hostilities are to cease in a at a certain time, and a
given place
capture is made previous to the expiration of the
period limited.
{g) Vatt«l, liv. iii. ch. 14, §§ 209, et Duverdy, 148.

212, 216. The Purissima Conoepcion (0 Bain v. Speedwell (1784), 2
(1805), 6 O. Rob. 45; The Sophia Dall. 4rO.
(1805), 6 O. Rob. 138. (^)The Mentor, 1 O. Rob. 121;
(A) Cf. The Thetis (1801), 1 Pistoye cf. The John (1818), 2 Dodson, 336.
but with a knowledge of the peace on the part of the captor, the
capture is still for since constructive knowledge of the
invalid;
peace, after the periods limited in the different parts of the world,
renders the capture void, much more ought actual knowledge of
the peace to produce that effect It may, however, be questionable
.
whether anything short of an official notification from his own

Government wôuld be sufficient, in such a case, to affect the captor
wdth the legal consequences of actual knowledge {I) And where a .
capture of a British vessel was made by an American cruiser,

before the period fixed for the cessation of hostilities by the Treaty
of Ghent, in 1814, and in ignorance of the fact, but the prize —
had not been carried infra prcesidia and condemned, and while at
seawas recaptured by a British ship of war, after the period fixed
for the cessation of hostilities, but without knowledge of the
peace,
— was judicially determined, that the possession of the
it
vessel by an American cruiser was a lawful possession, and that the

British recaptor could not, after the peace, lawfully use force to
divest this lawful possession (m) The restoration of peace put an
.
end, from the time limited, to all force; and then the general
principle applied, that things acquired in war remain, as to title
and possession, precisely as they stood when the peace took place.
The uti possidetis is the basis of every treaty of peace, unless the
contrar}^ bo expressly stipulated. Peace gives a final and perfect
title to captures without condemnation, and as it forbids all force,
it destroys all hope of recovery, as much as if the captured vessel

was carried infra prcesidia and judicially condemned (n).
Things stipulated to be restored by the treaty, are to be restored in what con-
in the condition in which they were first taken, unless there be an taken
areô^
be restored,
express provision to the contrary but this does not refer to altera-
;
tions which have been the natural effect of time, or of the
operations of war. A
fortress or town is to be restored as it was
when taken, so far as it still remains in that condition when the
peace is concluded. There is no obligation to repair, as well as
(Z) Cf . The Sivlnehet'd (1801) a ;

Dutch was captured by an
vessel
British ship having been captured in Italian warship during the war
the Indian Ocean by a French priva- between Italy and Abyssinia. The
teer, after the latter had received news Italian Prize Court found her guilty
from English and Portuguese sources of eontraband trading, but did not
of the conclusion of peace, but had decree condemnation, as peace had in
received no notification from the the meantime been declared. Of.
French authorities, was condemned by Archives Diplomatiques, Jan. 1897,
the French Prize Cburt: Merlin, p. 81.
Repertoire, tit. Prise, xiii. 183; Snow, (^n^ Of. Valin, ^
Traite des Prises,
p. 388. ch. 4, §§ 4, 5. Emerigon, Traite des
(m) Of. The Sophia (1805), 6 C. Assurances, ch. § 12, 19.
Merlin,
Rob. 138. In the case of The Doel- Repertoire de Jurisprudence, tom. ix.
wyk (189'6) (see Ruys v. R. Ex. tit. Prise Maritime, § 5. Kent, Com-
Assur. Corp., (1897) 2 Q. B. 135), a ment. vol. i. p. 172 (5th ed.).
restore, adismantled fortress or a ravaged territory. The peace

in war, or arising from the
extinguishes all claim for damages done
operations of war. Things are
to be restored in the condition in
which the peace found them; and to dismantle a fortification or
waste a country after the conclusion of peace, and previously to the-
surrender, would be an act of perfidy. If the conqueror has re-
paired the fortifications, and re-established the place in the stato

it was in before the siege, he is bound to restore it in the samo
condition. But if he has constructed new works, he may

demolish them; and, in general, in order to avoid disputes, it is
advisable to stipulate in the treaty precisely in what condition the
places occupied by the enemy are to be restored (o) .
Breach of the The any one Article of the treaty is a violation of

violation of
treaty.
the whole treaty; for all the Articles are dependent on each other,,
and one is to be deemed a condition of the other. violation A
of any single Article abrogates the whole treaty, if the injured
party so elects to consider it. This may, however, be preven.ted
by an express stipulation, that if one Article be broken, the others
shall nevertheless continue in full force. If the treaty is violated
bj one of the contracting parties, either by proceedings incom-

patible with its general spirit, or by a specific breach of any one of
its Articles, it becomes not absolutely void, but voidable at the
election of the injured party. If he prefers not to come to a
rupture, the treaty remains valid and obligatory. He may waive

or remit the infraction committed, or he may just demand a
satisfaction (p).
Disputes Treaties of peace are to be interpreted by the same rules as are
respecting its
breach, how applied to other treaties. Disputes respecting their meaning or
adjusted.
alleged infraction may be adjusted by amicable negotiation
between the contracting parties, by the mediation of friendly
Powers, or by reference to the arbitration of some one Power
selected by the parties. This latter office has effectively been
assumed, in several instances, by the great Powers of Europe,
with the view of preventing the disturbance of the general peace,
by a partial infraction of the territorial arrangements stipulated
by the treaties of Vienna, in consequence of the internal revolutions
which have taken place in some of the States constituted by those
treaties. Such are the protocols of the conference of London
(1830),by which a suspension of hostilities between Holland and
Belgium was enforced, and terms of separation between the two
(o) Vatfeel, Droit dee Gens, liv. iv. lib. ii.

cap. 15, § 15; lib. iii. cap. 19,
eh. 3, § 81.
§ 14. Vattel, liv. iv. ch. 4, §§ 47, 48,
(j>) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. 54.
countries proposed, which, when accepted bj both, became the

basis of a permanent peace. The objections to this species of
interference, and the difficulty of reconciling* it with the inde-
pendence of the smaller Powers, are obvious; but it is clearly
distinguishable from that general right of superintendence over
the internal affairs of other States, asserted by the Powers who
were the original parties to the Holy Alliance, for the purpose of
preventing changes in the municipal constitutions not proceeding
from the voluntary concession of the reigning sovereign, or sup-
posed in their consequences, immediate or remote, to threaten the
social order of Europe. The proceedings of the conference ^
treated the revolution, by which the union between Holland and
Belgium, established by the Congress of Vienna, had been

dissolved, as an irrevocable event; and confirmed the independence,
neutrality, and state of territorial possession of Belgium, upon the
conditions contained in the Treaty of the 15th November, 1831,
between thefive Powers and that kingdom, subject to such modifi-
cations asmight ultimately be the result of direct negotiations

between Holland and Belgium (g) In the same way the great
.
Powers, signatories of the Berlin Treaty, intervened to regulate

the state of affairs caused by the revolutionary union of Eastern
Eoumelia with Bulgaria in 1885 (r) ; and compelled Greece to
preserve the peace the year following (s) .
Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, (s) Ante, p. 119. See further ante,
{q)
—
pp. 538 655. Part II. ch. 1; Lawrence, Essays on
(r) Ante, p. llo. some disputed questions in modem
International Law (1885), Essay V.
APPENDIX A.
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN FOREIGN ENLISTMENT

ACTS.
I.— ENGLISH ACT.—33 & 34 Vict. Chap. 90.
An Act to regulate the conduct of Her Majesty's Subjects durmg

the existence of hostilities between foreign States with which
Her Majesty is at peace. [9th August, 1870.]
Whereas it is make provision for the regulation of

expedient to
the oonduct of Her Majesty's subjects during the existence of ho.s-
tilities between foreign States with which Her Majesty is at peace:
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with
the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority
of the same, as follows:
Preliminary.
"
1. This Act may be cited for all purposes as The Foreign Enlist- Short title
ment Act, 1870." of Act.
2. This Act shall extend to all the dominions of Her Majesty,
Application
including the adjacent territorial waters. of Act.
3. This Act shall come into operation in the United Kingdom im- Commence -
mediately on the passing thereof, and shall be proclaimed in every ment of Act.
British possession by the governor thereof as soon as may be after he
receives notice of this Act, and shall come into operation in that
British possession on the day of such proclamation, and the time at
which this Act comes into operation in any place is, as respects such
place, in this Act referred to as the commencement of this Act.
Illegal Enlistment.
4. If any person, \vithout the license of Her Majesty, being a Penalty on
British subject, within or without Her Majesty's dominions, accepts enlistment in
or agrees to accept any commission or engagement in the military or service of
^ ®*
naval service of any foreign State at war with any foreign State at ^^^^^^
peace with Her Majesty, and in this Act referred to as a friendly
State, or whether a British subject or not within Her Majesty's
dominions, induces any other person to accept or agree to accept any
commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any
such foreign State as aforesaid, —
He shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be
punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punish-
ments, at the discretion of the Court before which the offender is
convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or
without hard labour.
814 APPENDIX.
Penalty on 5. If any person, without the license of Her Majesty, being a

leaving Her British subject, quits or goes on board any ship with a view of
with intent to accept any com-
quitting Her Majesty's dominions,
Majesty's
dominions
mission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign
with intent to
serve a foreign State at war with a friendly State, or,
whether a British subject or
State. not, within Her Majesty's dominions, induces any other person to
quit or to go on board any ship
with a View of quitting Her Majesty's
dominions with the like intent, —
Penalty on 6. If any person induces any other person to quit Her Majesty's
embarking dominions or to embark on any ship within Her Majesty's dominions
persons under under a
false repre- misrepresentation or false representation of the service in
sentations as which such person is to be engaged, with the intent or in order that
to service. such person may accept or agree to accept any commission or engage-
ment in the military or naval service of any foreign State at waj^
with a friendly State, —
ments, at the discretion of the Court before which the offender is,
Penalty on 7. If the master or owner of any ship, without the license of Her
taking
illegally
Majesty, knowingly either takes on board, or engages to take on
enlisted board, or has on board such ship within Her Majesty's dominions
persons on any of the following persons, in this Act referred to as illegally
board ship. enlisted persons; that is to say,
(1.) Any person who, being a British subject within or without
the dominions of Her Majesty, has, without the license of
Her Majesty, accepted or agreed to accept any commission
or engagement in the military or naval service of any
foreign State at war with any friendly State:
(2.) Any person, being a British subject, who, without the license
of Her Majesty, is about to quit Her Majesty's dominions
with intent to accept any commission or engagement in the
military or naval service of any foreign State at war with
a friendly State:
(3.) Any person who has been induced to embark under a mis-
representation or false representation of the service in which
such person is to be engaged, with the intent or in order that
such person may accept or agree to accept any commission
or engagement in the military or naval service of any
foreign State at war with a friendly State:
such master or owner shall be guilty of an offence against this Act,
and the following consequences shall ensue; that is to say,
(1.) The offender shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment,
or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the
Court before which the offender is convicted ;
and im-
prisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard
labour: and
(2.) Such ship shall be detained until the trial and conviction or
acquittal of the master or owner, and until all penalties
inflicted on the master or owner have been
paid, or- the
FOEEIGN ENLISTMENT. 815
master or owner has given security for the payment of such

penalties to the satisfaction of two justices of the peace, or
other magistrate or magistrates having the authority of two
justices of the peace: and
(3.) All illegally enlisted persons shall immediately on the dis-
covery of the offence be taken on shore, and shall not be
allowed to return to the ship.
Illegal Shipbuilding and Illegal Expeditions.

8. If any person within Her Majesty's dominions, without the Penalty on
license of Her Majesty, does any of the followii^ acts; that is to say, ^^^V-
^^.^^}
(1.) Builds or agrees to build, or causes to be built any ship with illegal
^pedi-
intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe tions.
that the same shall or will be employed in the military or
naval service of any foreign State at war with any friendly
State: or
(2.) Issues or delivers any commission for any ship with intent
or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that
the same shall or will be employed in the military or
naval service of any foreign State at war with any friendly
State: or
(3.) Equips any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reason-
able cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed
in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war
with any friendly State: or
(4.) Despatches, or causes or allows to be despatched, any ship
with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to
believe that the same shall or will be employed in the mili-
tary or naval service of any foreign State at war with any
friendly State:
such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence against
this Act, and the following consequences shall ensue:
(1.) The offender shaU be punishable by fine and imprisonment,

or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the
Court before which the offender is convicted and im-;
prisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard

labour:
(2.) The ship in respect of which any such offence is committed,
and her equipment, shall be forfeited to Her Majesty:
Provided that a person building, causing to be built, or equipping a
ship in any of the cases aforesaid, in pursuance of a contract made'
before the commencement of such war as aforesaid, shall not be liable
to any of the penalties imposed by this section in respect of sudh'
building or equipping if he satisfies the conditions following; that is
to say,
(1.) If forthwith upon a proclamation of neutrality being issued

by Her Majesty he gives notice to the Secretary of State
that he is so building, causing to be built, or equipping such
ship, and furnishes such particulars of the contract and of

any matters relating to, or done, or to be done under the
contract as may be required by the Secretary of State:
(2.) If he gives such security, and takes and permits to be taken
such other measures, if any, as the Secretary of State may
prescribe for ensuring that such ship shall not be despatched,
816 APPENDIX.
delivered, or removed without the license of Her Majesty

until the termination of such war as aforesaid.
Presumption 9. Where any ship is built by order of or on behalf of any foreign
as to evidence State when at war with a friendly State, or is delivered to or to the
in case of
order of such foreign State, or any person who to the knowledge of
illegal ship.
the person building is an agent of such foreign State, or is paid for
by such foreign State or such agent, and is employed in the military
or naval service of such foreign State, such ship shall, until the
contrary is proved, be deemed to have been built with a view to
being so employed, and the burden shall lie on the builder of suoh
ship of proving that he did not know that the ship was intended to
be so employed in the military or naval service of such foreign State.
Penalty on 10. If any person within the dominions of Her Majesty, and witli-
aiding the out the license of Her Majesty, —
w^like
equipment of
By adding to the number of the guns, or by changing those on
board for other guns, or by the addition of any equipment for war,
foreign ships.
increiases or augments, or procures to be increased or augmented, or is
knowing'ly concerned in increasing or augmenting the warlike force
of any ship which at the time of her being within the dominions of
Her Majesty was a ship in the military or naval service of any
foreign State at war with any friendly State,
—
Such person shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall
be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punish-
Penalty on 11. If any person within the limits of Her Majesty's dominions,
fitting out
naval or
and without the license of Her Majesty, —
military Prepares or fits out any naval or military expedition to proceed
expeditions against the dominions of any friendly State, the following conse-
without quences shall ensue:
license.
(1.) Every person engaged in such preparation or fitting out, or
assisting therein, or employed in any capacity in such expe-
dition, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and
shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of
such punishments, at the discretion of the Court before
which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if
awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.
(2.) All ships, and their equipments, and all arms and munitions
of war, used in or forming part of such expedition, shall
be forfeited to Her Majesty.
Punishment 12. Any person who aids, abets, counsels, or procures the commis-
of accessories. of this Act, shall be liable to bo tried and
sion^ any offence against
punished as a principal offender.
Limitation of 13. The term of imprisonment to be awarded in
respect of any
term of offence against this Act shall not exceed two
years.
imprisonment.
Illegal Prize.
Illegal prize
14. If, during the continuance of any war in which Her Majesty
brought into may be neutral, any ship, goods, or merchandize captured as prize of
British ports war within the territorial jurisdiction of Her
restored. Majesty, in violation of
the neutrality of this realm, or
captured by any ship which may
have been built, equipped, commissioned, or
despatched, or the force
of which may have been to the of
augmented, contrary provisions
this Act, are brought within the limits of Her Majesty's dominions
FOREIGN ENLISTMENT. 817
by the captor, or any agent of the captor, or by any person having-

come into possession thereof with knowledge that the same wa^
prize of war so captured as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the
original owner of such prize, or his agent, or for any person autho-
rized in that behalf by the Government of the foreign State to which
such owner belongs, to make application to the Court of Admiralty
for seizure and detention of such prize, and the Court shall, on due
proof of the facts, order such prize to be restored.
Every such order shall be executed and carried into effect in the
same manner, and subject to the same right of appeal, as in case of
any order made in the exercise of the ordinary jurisdiction of such
Court; and in the meantime and until a final order has been made
on such application the Court shall have power to make all such
provisional and other orders as to the care or custody of such caj)-
tured ship, goods, or merchandize, and (if the same be of perishable
nature, or incurring risk of deterioration) for the sale thereof, and
with respect to the deposit or investment of the proceeds of any such
sale, as may be made by such Court in the exercise of its ordinary
jurisdiction.
General Provision.
15. For the purposes of this Act, a license by Her Majesty shall be License by
under the sign manual of Her Majesty, or be signified by Order in Her Majesty,
how granted.
Council or by proclamation of Her Majesty.
Legal Procedure.
16. Any Act shall, for all purposes of and
offence against this Jurisdiction
in respect of
incidental to the trial and punishment of any person guilty of any
such offence, be deemed to have been committed either in the place ^
pers^M^
in which the offence was wholly or partly committed, or in any place
against Act.
within Her Majesty's dominions in which the person who committed
such offence may be.
17. Any offence against this Act may be described in any indict- Venue in
ment or other document relating to such offence, in cases where the respect of
mode of trial requires such a description, as having been committed oênces by
at the place where it was wholly or partly committed, or it may be

S^^tô^-'v-
^ ^^ f '
averred generally to have been committed within Her Majesty's ^ 97

dominions, and the venue or local description in the margin may
be that of the county, city, or place in which the trial is held.
18. The following authorities, that is to say, in the United Powerto
Kingdom any judge of a Superior Court, in any other place within remove
the jurisdiction of any British court of justice, such Court, or, if offenders for
*^^^
there are more Courts than one, the Court having the highest criminal
'
jurisdiction in that place, may, by warrant or instrument

"
in the nature
of a warrant in this section included in the term warrant," direct
that any offender charged with an offence against this Act shall be
removed to some other place in Her Majesty's dominions for trial
in cases where it appears to the authority granting the warrant that
the removal of such offender would be conducive to the interests of
justice, and any prisoner so removed shall be triable at the place
to which he is removed, in the same manner as if his offence had been
committed at such place.
Any warrant for the purposes of this section may be addressed to
the master of any ship or to any other person or persons, and the
person or persons to whom such warrant is addressed shall have
power to convey the prisoner therein named to any place or places
w. 52
818 APPENDIX.
named in such warrant, and to deliver him, when arrived at such

of any authority designated by such
place or places, into the custody
time of his removal under any

Every prisoner shall, during the
such warrant as aforesaid, be deemed to be in the legal custody of
the person or persons empowered to remove him.
Jurisdiction 19. All proceedings for the condemnation and forfeiture of a ship,
in respect of or ship and equipment, or arms and munitions of war, in pursuance
forfeiture of of this Act shall require the sanction of the Secretary of State or such
ships for chief executive authority as is in this Act mentioned, and shall be
offences
against Act.
had in the Court of Admiralty, and not in any other Court; and the
Court of Admiralty shall, in addition to any power given to the
Court by this Act, have in respect of any ship or other matter brought
before it in pursuance of this Act all powers which it has in the
case of a ship or matter brought before it in the exercise of its
ordinary jurisdiction.
Regulations 20. Where any offence against this Act has been committed by any
as to proceed-
person by reason whereof a ship, or ship and equipment, or arms and
ings against munitions of war, has or have become liable to forfeiture, proceedings
the offender
may be instituted contemporaneously or not, as may be thought fit,
and against
the ship. against the offender in any Court having jurisdiction of the offence,,
and against the ship, or ship and equipment, or arms and munitions
of war, for the forfeiture in the Court of Admiralty; but it shall not
be necessary to take proceedings against the offender because x>ro-
ceedings are instituted for the forfeiture, or to take proceedings
for the forfeiture because proceedings are taken against the offender.
Officers 21. The following officers, that is to say,
authorized to
(1.) Any officer of Customs in the United Kingdom, subject never-
seize offend-
theless to any special or general instructions from the
ing ships.
Commissioners of Customs or any officer of the Board of
Trade, subject nevertheless to any special or general instruc-
tions from the Board of Trade:
(2.) Any officer of Customs or public officer in any British posses-
sion, subject nevertheless to any special or general instruc-
tions from the governor of such possession:
(3.) Any commissioned officer on full pay in the military service of
the Crown, subject nevertheless to any special or general
instructions from his commanding officer:
(4.) Any commissioned officer on full pay in the naval service of
the Crown, subject nevertheless to any special or general
instructions from the Admiralty or his superior officer,
may seize or detain any ship liable to be seized or detained in pursu-
ance o'f this Act, and such officers are in this Act referred to as the
"local authority"; but nothing in this Act contained shall derogate
from the power of the Court of Admiralty to direct any ship to be
seized or detained by any officer by whom such Court may have
power under its ordinary jurisdiction to direct a ship to be seized or
detained.
Powers of 22. Any officer authorized to seize or detain
officers
any ship in respect of
authorized to
any offence against this Act may, for the purpose of enforcing such
seizure or detention, call to his aid
seize ships. any constable or officers of police,
or any officers of Her
Majesty's army or navy or marines, or any,
excise officers or officers of Customs, or
any harbour-master or dock-
master, or any officers having authority by law to make seizures of
ships, and may put on board any ship so seized or detained any one
or more of such officers to take
charge of the same, and to enforce
the provisions of this Act, and any officer seizing or detaining any
ship under this Act may use force, if necessary, for the purpose of
enforcing seizure or detention, and if any person is killed or maimed
by reason of his resisting such officer in the execution of his duties,
or any person acting under his orders, such officer so seizing or
detaining the ship, or other person, shall be freely and fully in-
demnified as well against the Queen's Majesty, her heirs and suc-
cessors, as against all persons so killed, maimed, or hurt.
23. If the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority is Special
satisfied that there is a reasonable and probable cause for believing power of
that a ship within Her Majesty's dominions has been or is being
state or^ hi f
built, conmaissioned, or equipped contrary to this Act, and is about executive
to be taken beyond the limits of such dominions, or that a ship is authority to
about to be despatched contrary to this Act, such Secretary of State detain ship,
or chief executive authority shall have power to issue a warrant
stating that there is reasonable and probable cause for believing ^
aforesaid, and upon such warrant the local authority shall have power
to seize and search such ship, and to detain the same until it has
been either condemned or released by process of law, or in manner
hereinafter mentioned.
The owner of the ship so detained, or his agent, may apply to the
Court of Admiralty for its release, and the Court shall as soon as
possible put the matter of such seizure and detention in course of
trial between the applicant and the Crown.
If the applicant establish to the satisfaction of the Court that the
ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, or equipped, or
intended to be despatched contrary to this Act, the ship shall be
released and restored.
If the applicant fail to establish to the satisfaction of the Court
that the ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, or
equipped, or intended to be despatched contrary to this Act, then
the ship shall be detained until released by order of the Secretary
of State or chief executive authority.
The Court may in cases where no proceedings are pending for its
condemnation, release any ship detained under this section on the
owner giving security to the satisfaction of the Court that the ship
shall not be employed contrary to this Act, notwithstanding that the
applicanfc may have failed to establish to the satisfaction of the Court
that the ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, or
intended to be despatched contrary to this Act. The Secretary of
State or the chief executive authority may likewise release any ship
detained under this section on the owner giving security to the
satisfaction of such Secretary of State or chief executive authority
that the ship shall not be employed contrary to this Act, or may
release the ship without such security if the Secretary of State or
chief executive authority think fit so to release the same.
If the Court be of opinion that there was not reasonable and pro-
bable cause for the detention, and if no such cause appear in the
course of the proceedings, the Court shall have power to declare that
the owner is to be indemnified by the payment of costs and damages
in respect of the detention, the amount thereof to be assessed by the
Court, and any amount so assessed shall be payable by the Commis-
sioners of the Treasury out of any moneys legally applicable for that
purpose. The Court of Admiralty shall also have power to make a
like order for the indemnity of the owner, on the application of such
owner to the Court, in a summary way, in cases where the ship is
52(2)
820 APPENDIX.
released by the order of the Secretary of State or the chief executive

authority, before any application is
made by the owner or his agent
to the Court for such release.
Nothing in this section contained shall affect any proceedings insti-
tuted or to be instituted for the condemnation of any ship detained
under this section where such ship is liable to forfeiture, subject to
this provision, that if such ship is restored in pursuance of this
section, all proceedings for such condemnation shall be stayed; and
where the Court declares that the owner is to be indemnified by the
payment of costs and damages for the detainer, all costs, charges
and expenses incurred by such owner in or about any proceedings
for the condemnation of such ship shall be added to the costs and
damages payable to him in respect of the detention of the ship.
Nothing in this section contained shall apply to any foreign non-
commissioned ship despatched from any part of Her Majesty's domi-
nions after having come within them under stress of weather or in
the course of a peaceful voyage, and upon which ship no fitting out
or equipping of a warlike character has taken place in this country.
24. Where it is represented to any local authority, as defined by
Special power
of local this Act, and such local authority believes the representation, that
authority to there is a reasonable and probable cause for believing that a ship,
detain ship.
within Her Majesty's dominions has been or is being built, commis-
sioned, or equipped contrary to this Act, and is about to be taken
beyond the limits of such dominions, or that a ship is about to be
despatched contrary to this Act, it shall be the duty of such local
authority to detain such ship, and forthwith to communicate the
fact of such detention to the Secretary of State or chief executive
authority.
Upon the receipt of such communication, the Secretary of State or
chief executive authority may order the ship to be released if he
thinks there is no cause for detaining her, but if satisfied that there
is reasonable and probable cause for believing that such ship wa^
built, commissioned, or equipped, or intended to be despatched in

oontravention of this Act, he shall issue his warrant, stating that
there is reasonable and probable cause for believing as aforesaid, and
upon such warrant being issued further proceedings shall be had as
in cases where the seizure or detention has taken place on a warrant
issued by the Secretary of State without any communication from the
local authority.
Where the Secretary of State or chief executive authority orders
the ship to be released on the receipt of a communication from the
local authority without issuing his warrant, the owner of the ship
shall be indemnified by the payment of costs and damages in respect
of the detention upon application to the Court of Admiralty in a
summary way in like manner as he is entitled to be indemnified
where the Secretary of State having issued his warrant under this
Act releases the ship before any application is made by the owner
or his agent to the Court for such release.
Power of 25. The Secretary of State or the chief executive
authority may,,
Secretary of by warrant, empower any person to enter any dockyard or other
State or
executive place within Her Majesty's dominions, and inquire as to the desti-
nation of any ship which may appear to him to be intended to be
authority to
grant search employed in the naval or military service of any foreign State at
warrant. war with a friendly State, and to search such ship.
Exercise of 26. Any powers or jurisdiction
by this Act given to the Secretary
powers of of State may be exercised by him
throughout the dominions of Her
Secretary of
Majesty, and such powers and jurisdiction may also be exercised by State or chief
executive
any of the following officers, in this Act referred to as the chief
executive authority, within their respective jurisdictions; that is to ^-uthonty.
say,
(1.) In Ireland by the Lord Lieutenant or other the chief governor
or governors of Ireland for the time being, or the chief
secretary to the Lord Lieutenant:
(2.) In Jersey by the Lieutenant Governor:
(3.) In Guernsey, Alderney, and Sark, and the dependent islands
by the Lieutenant Governor:
(4.) In the Isle of Man by the Lieutenant Governor:
(5.) In any British possession by the Governor.
Acopy of any warrant issued by a Secretary of State or by any
officer authorized in pursuance of this Act to issue such warrant in
Ireland, the Channel Islands, or the Isle of Man shall be laid before
Parliament.
27. An appeal may be had from any decision of a Court of Admi- Appeal from
Court of
ralty under this Act to the same tribunal and in the same manner to
and in which an appeal may be had in cases within the ordinary juris- -^"^^î^îty
diction of the Court as a Court of Admiralty.
28. Subject to the provisions of this Act providing for the award Indemnity to
of damages in certain cases in respect of the seizure or detention of a officers,
ship by the Court of Admiralty no damages shall be payable, and no
officer or local authority shall be responsible, either civilly or crimi-
nally, in respect of the seizure or detention of any ship in pursuance

of this Act.
29. The Secretary of State shall not, nor shall the chief executive Indemnity to
authority, be responsible in any action or other legal proceedings Secretary of
whatsoever for any warrant issued by him in pursuance of this Act, ®*^*® ^.^ ^hief
or be examinable as a witness, except at his own request, in any
authority
Court of justice in respect of the circumstances which led to the issue
of the warrant.
Interpretation Clause.
30. In this Act, not inconsistent with the context, the following
if Interpreta-
terms have the meanings hereinafter respectively assigned to them; tion of terms.
that is to say,
"Foreign State" includes any foreign prince, colony, province, or ''Foreign

"
State
part of any province or people, or any person or persons exer- :
cising or assuming to exercise the powers of government in or

over any foreign country, colony, province, or part of any
"
province or people:
"
Military service shall include military telegraphy and any other
<»
Military-
"
employment whatever, in or in connection with any miHtary service:
operation:
"Naval service" shall, as respects a person, include service as a "Naval
marine, employment as a pilot in piloting or directing the service:"
course of a ship of war or other ship when such ship of war or
other ship is being used in any military or naval operation,
and any employment whatever on board a ship of war, trans-
port, store ship, privateer or ship under letters of marque; and
as respects a ship, include any user of a ship as a transport,
store ship, privateer or ship under letters of marque:
"United Kingdom" includes the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, ** United "
'
and other ad j acent islands : Kingdom :

822 APPENDIX.
«*
British 'British possession" means any territory, colony, or place being"
possession :
''
part of Her Majesty's dominions,

and not part of the United
Kingdom, as defined by this Act:
''The 'The Secretary of State" shall mean any one of Her Majesty's
Secretary of Principal Secretaries of State:
State:
"
*'
'The Governor" shaU as respects India mean the Governor-
Governor:
General or the governor of any presidency, and where a British
possession consists of several constituent colonies,
mean the
Governor-General of the whole possession, or the governor of
any of the constituent colonies, and as respects any other
British possession it shall mean the officer for the time being
administering the government of such possession; also any
person acting for or in the capacity of a governor, shall be
" "
included under the term Governor :
"
Court of Admiralty shall mean the High Court of Admiralty
''
"Court of
" of England or Ireland, the Court of Session of Scotland, or
Aiioiiralty :
any Vice -Admiralty Court within Her Majesty's dominions:

"
" "
Ship :
Ship any description of boat, vessel, floating bat-
shall include
tery, or floating craft;also any description of boat, vessel, or
other craft or battery, made to move either on the surface of
or under water, or sometimes on the surface of and sometimes
under water:
"
Building in relation to a ship shall include the doing any act
Building :
towards or incidental to the construction of a ship, and all

words having relation to building shall be construed accord-
ingly: "
" Equipping in relation to a ship shall include the furnishing a
Equip-
ping:" ship with any tackle, apparel, furniture, provisions, arms,
munitions, or stores, or any other thing which is used in or
about a sihip for the purpose of fltting or adapting her for the
sea or for naval service, and all words relating to equipping
shall be construed accordingly :
"Ship and Ship and equipment" shall include a ship and everything in or
equipment :
belonging to a ship:
"
"Master." Master shall include any person having the charge or command
of a ship.
Repeal of Acts and Saving Clauses.

Repeal of 31. From and after the commencement of this Act, an Act passed
Foreign in the fifty-ninth year of the reign of His late Majesty King George
Enlistment the Third, chapter sixty-nine, intituled "An Act to prevent the
Act.
enlisting or engagement of His Majesty's subjects to serve in foreign
69 Geo. III.
c. 69.
service, and the fitting out or equipping, in His Majesty's dominions,
vessels for warlike purposes, without His
Majesty's license," shall be
repealed: Provided that such repeal shall not affect any penalty, for-
feiture, or other punishment incurred or to be incurred in respect of
any offence committed before this Act comes into operation, nor the
^
institution of any investigation or

legal proceeding, or any other
remedy for enforcing any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as
aforesaid. i
|
Saving as to 32. Nothing in this Act contained shall

subject to forfeiture any
commissioned commissioned
ship of any foreign State, or give to any British Court
foreign ships. or in respect of any ship entitled to
oyer recognition as a commis-
sioned ship of any foreign State any
jurisdiction which it would
not have had if this Act had not passed.
33. Nothing in this Act contained shall extend or be construed to Penalties not
*o extend to
extend to subj ect to any penalty any person who enters into the
military service of any prince, State, or potentate in Asia, with such gnterini? into
leave or license as is for the time being required by law in the caê military
of subjects of Her Majesty entering into the military service of service in
-^s^^-
princes, States, or potentates in Asia.
59 Geo. III.
c. 69, 8. 12.
II.— PROCLAMATION UNDER THE FOREIGN ENLISTMENT

ACT (a).
By the King.
A Proclamation.
Edward, R. and I.
Whereas we are happily at peace with all sovereigns, powers, and
States: And whereas a state of war unhappily exists between His
Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and His Majesty the
Emperor of Japan, and between their respective subjects, and others
inhabiting within their countries, territories, or dominions And :
whereas we are on terms of friendship and amicable intercourse

with each of these powers, and with their several subjects, and others
inhabiting within their countries, territories, or dominions And :
whereas great numbers of our loyal subjects reside and carry on

commerce, and possess property and establishments, and enjoy
various rights and privileges, within the dominions of each of the
aforesaid powers, protected by the faith of treaties between us and
each of the aforesaid powers: And whereas we, being desirous of
preserving to our subjects the blessings of peace, which they now
happily enjoy, are firmly purposed and determined to maintain a
strict and impartial neutrality in the said state of war unhappily
existing between the aforesaid powers: we, therefore, have thought

fit, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to issue this our
royal proclamation: And we do hereby strictly charge arid command

all our loving subjects to govern themselves accordingly, and to
observe a strict neutrality in and during the aforesaid war, and to
abstain from violating or contravening either the laws and statutes
of the realm in this behalf, or the law of nations in relation thereto,
as they will answer to the contrary at their peril: And whereas in
and by a certain statute made and passed in a session of Parliament
holden in the 33rd and 34th year of the reign of Her late Majesty
Queen Victoria, intituled An Act to Regulate the conduct of Her
*'
Majesty's Subjects during the existence of Hostilities between

Foreign States with which Her Majesty is at Peace," it is, among
other things, declared and enacted as follows: —
—
The proclamation then recites sects. 2 and 4 10 of the Act as
above set out, and continues: —
And whereas by the said Act it is further provided that ships built,
commissioned, equipped, or despatched in contravention of the said
Act, may be condemned and forfeited by judgment of the Court of
Admiralty; and that if the Secretary of State or chief executive
authority is satisfied that there is a reasonable and probable cause for
believing that a ship within our dominions has been or is being built,
commissioned, or equipped, contrary to the said Act, and is about to
be taken beyond the limits of such dominions, or that a ship is about
(a) London Gazette Extraordinary, Feb. 12th, 1904.

824 APPENDIX.
to be despatched contrary to the Act, such Secretary of State or chief

executive authority shall have power to issue a warrant authorizing
the seizure and search of such ship and her detention until she has
been either condemned or released by process of law.
And whereas certain powers of seizure and detention are conferred
by the said Act on certain local authorities;
Now, in order that none of our subjects may unwarily render them-
selves liable to the penalties imposed by the said statute, we do hereby
strictly command that no person or persons whatsoever do commit any
act, matter, or thing whatsoever contrary to the provisions of the said
statute, upon pain of the several penalties by the said statute imposed
and of our high displeasure.
And we do hereby further warn and admonish all our loving sub-
jects, and all persons whatsoever entitled to our protection, to observe
towai-ds each of the aforesaid powers, their subjects, and territories,
and towards all belligerents whatsoever with whom we are at peace,
the duties of neutrality; and to respect, in all and each of them, the
exercise of belligerent rights.
And we hereby further warn all our loving subjects, and all persons
whatsoever entitled to our protection, that if any of them shall pre-
sume, in contempt of this our royal proclamation, and of our high dis-
pleasure, to do any acts in derogation of their duty as subjects of a
neutral power in a war between other powers, or in violation or con-
travention of the law of nations in that behalf, as more especially
by breaking, or endeavouring to break, any blockade lawfully and
actually established by or on behalf of either of the said powers, or
by carrying officers, soldiers, despatches, arms, ammunition, military
stores or materials, or any article or articles considered and deemed to
be contraband of war according to the law or modern usages of
nations, for the use or service of either of the said powers, that all
persons so offending, together with their ships and goods, will right-
fully incur and be justly liable to hostile capture, and to the penalties
denounced by the law of nations in that behalf.
And we do hereby give notice that all our subjects and persons
entitled to our protection who may misconduct themselves in the pre-
mises will do so at their peril and of their own wrong and that they
;
will in no wise obtain any protection from us against such capture or

such penalties as aforesaid, but will, on the contrary, incur our high
displeasure by such misconduct.
Given at our Court at Buckingham Palace, this eleventh day of
February, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred,
and four, and in the fourth year of our reign.
God save the King.
Rules for Observation of Neutrality issued under the above Procla-

mation by the Foreign Secretary to the Lords of the Admiralty
and all the Heads of Government Departments.
Foreign Office, February 10, 1904.

My Lords,— His Majesty being fully determined to observe the
duties of neutrality during the
existing state of war between Russia
and Japan; being, moreover, resolved to prevent, as far as possible,
the use of His Majesty's harbours, ports, and coasts, and the waters
within His Majesty's territorial jurisdiction, in aid of the warlike
purposes of either belligerent, has commanded me to communicate to
FOREIGN ENLISTMENT. ^
825
your lordships, for your guidance, the following rules, which are to
be treated and enforced as His Majesty's orders and directions: —
Kule 1. During the continuance of the present state of war, all
ships of war of either belligerent are prohibited from making use of
any port or roadstead in the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man, or
the Channel Islands, or in any of His Majesty's colonies or foreign
possessions or dependencies, or of any waters subject to the territorial
jurisdiction of the British Crown, as a station or place of resort for
any warlike purpose, or for the purpose of obtaining any facilities for
warlike equipment; and no ship of war of either belligerent shall
fiereafter be permitted to leave any such port, roadstead, or waters
from which any vessel of the other belligerent (whether the same
shall be a ship of war or a merchant ship) shall have previously
departed until after the expiration of at least twenty-four hours from
the departure of such last-mentioned vessel beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of His Majesty.
Eule 2. If there is now in any such ^jort, roadstead, or waters
subject to the territorial jurisidiction of the British Crown any ship of
war of either belligerent, such ship of war shall leave such port, road-
stead, or waters within such time not less than twenty-four hours as
shall be reasonable, having regard to all the circumstances and the
condition of such ship as to repairs, provisions, or things necessary for
the subsistence of her crew; and if after the date hereof any ship of
war of either belligerent shall enter any such port, roadstead, or
waters subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the British Crown, such
ship shall depart and put to sea within twenty-four hours after her
entrance into any such port, roadstead, or waters, except in case of
stress of weather, or of her requiring provisions or things necessary
for the subsistence of her crew, or repairs; in either of which cases
the authorities of the port, or of the nearest port (as the case may be),
shall require her to put to sea as soon as possible after the expiration
of such period of twenty-four hours, without permitting her to take in
supplies beyond what may be necessary for her immediate use; and
no such vessel which may have been allowed to remain within British
waters for the purpose of repair shall continue in any such port^
roadstead, or waters, for a longer period than twenty-four hours after
her necessary repairs shall have been completed. Provided, never-
theless, that in all cases in which there shall be any vessels (whether
ships of war or merchant ships) of both the said belligerent parties in
the same port, roadstead, or waters within the territorial jurisdiction
of His Majesty, there shall be an interval of not less than twenty-four
hours between the departure therefrom of any such vessel (whether a
ship of wai' or merchant ship) of the one belligerent, and the subse-
quent departure therefrom of any ship of war of the other belligerent;
and the time hereby limited for the departure of such ships of war
respectively shall always, in case of necessity, be extended so far
as may be requisite for giving effect to this proviso, but no further or
otherwise.
Rule 3. No ship of war of either belligerent shall hereafter be
permitted, while in any such port, roadstead, or waters subject to the
territorial jurisdiction of His Majesty, to take in any supplies, except
provisions and such other things as may be requisite for the sub-
sistence of her crew, and except so much coal only as may be sufficient
to carry such vessel to the nearest port of her own country, or to some
nearer named neutral destination, and no coal shall again be supplied
to any such ship of war in the same or any other port, roadstead, or
826 APPENDIX.
waters subject to the territorial jurisdiction of His Majesty, without

the expiration of three months from
special permission, until after
tho time when such coal may have been last supplied to her within
British waters as aforesaid.
Rule 4. Armed ships of either belligerent are interdicted from
carrying prizes made by them into the ports, harbours, ro.adsteads, or
waters of the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands,
or any of His Majesty's colonies or possessions abroad.
The governor or other chief authority of each of His Majesty's
territories or possessions beyond the seas shall forthwith notify and
publish the above rules.
I have, &c. Lansdowne.
II. —American Act.
An Act in dddition to the ''Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes

against the United States,'' and to repeal the Acts therein men-
tioned (1818) (b).
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America, in Congi-ess assembled. That if any citizen
of the United States shall, within the territory or jurisdiction thereof,
accept and exercise a commission to serve a foreign prince. State,
colony, district, or people, in war, by land or by sea, against any
prince, State, colony, district, or people, with whom the United States
are at peace, the person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high
misdemeanour, and shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars,
and shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years.
Sect. 2. And be it further enacted. That if any person shall, within
the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlist or enter him-
self, or hire or retain another person to enlist or enter himself, or to
go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent
to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, State,
colony, district, or people, as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman, on
board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, every
person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanour,
and shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars, and be im-
prisoned not exceeding three years: Provided that this Act shall not
be construed to extend to any subject or citizen of any foreign prince.
State, colony, district, or people, who shall transiently be within the
United States, and shall on board of any vessel of war, letter of
marque, or privateer, which at the time of its arrival within the
United States, was fitted and equipped as such, enter and enlist
himself, or hire or retain another subject or citizen of the saine
foreign prince, State, colony, district, or people, who is transiently
^
within the United States, to enlist or enter himself to serve such

foreign prince. State, colony, district, or people, on board such vessel
of war, letter of marque, or privateer, if the United States shall then
be at peace with such foreign prince. State, colony, district, or people.
Sect. 3. And be it further enacted. That if
any person shall, within
(b) This Act is given as it was to in the text. It will be found in

originally passed in order to retain the U. S. Revised Statutes under the
the numbering of the sections referred title of Neutrality.
FOREIGN ENLISTMENT. .
827
the limits of the United States, fit out and arm, or attempt to fit out
and arm, or procure to be fitted out and armed, or shall knowingly be
concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming, of any ship or
vessel with intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the
service of any foreign prince or State, or of any colony, district, or
people, to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens,
or property of any foreign prince or State, or of any colony, district,
or people with whom the United States are at peace, or shall issue or
deliver a commission within the territory or jurisdiction of the United
States, for any ship or vessel, to the intent that she may be employed
as aforesaid, every person so offending shall be guilty of a high
misdemeanour, and shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars,
and imprisoned not more than three years; and every such ship or
vessel, with her tackle, apparel, and furniture, together with all
material, arms, ammunition, and stores, which may have 'been pro-
cured for the building and equipment thereof, shall be forfeited;
one-half to the use of the informer, and the other half to the use of
the United States.
Sect. 4. And be it further enacted. That if any citizen or citizens of
the United States shall, without the limits thereof, fit out and arm, or
attempt to fit out and arm, or procure to be fitted out and armed, or
shall knowingly aid or be concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or
arming, any private ship or vessel of war, or privateer, with intent
that such ship or vessel shall be employed to cruise, or commit hos-
tilities, upon the citizens of the United States, or their property, or
shall take the command of, or enter on board of any such ship or
vessel, for the intent aforesaid, or shall purchase any interest in
any such ship or vessel, with a view to share in the profits thereof,
such persons so offending shaU. be deemed guilty of a high misde-
meanour, and fined not more, than ten thousand dollars, and im-
prisoned not more than ten years; and the trial for such offence, if
committed within the limits of the United States, shall be in the
district in which the offender shall be apprehended or first brought.
Sect. 5. And be it further enacted, That if any persons shall,
within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, increase or
augment, or procure to be increased or augmented, or shall knowingly
be concerned in increasing or augmenting the force of any ship of
war, cruiser, or other armed vessel, which, at the time of her arrival
within the United States, was a ship of war, or cruiser, or armed
vessel, in the service of any foreign prince or State, or of any colony,
district, or people, or belonging to the subjects or citizens of any
such prince or State, colony, district, or people, the same being at war
with any foreign prince or State, or of any colony, district, or people
with whom the United States are at peace, by adding to the number
of the guns of such vessel, or by changing those on board of her for
guns of a larger calibre, or by the addition thereto of any equipment
solely applicable to war, every person so offending shall be deemed
guilty of a high misdemeanour, shall be fined not more than one
thousand and be imprisoned not more than one year.
dollars,
Sect. 6. And be
it further enacted. That if
any person shall, within
the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, begin or set on foot,
or provide or prepare the means for any military expedition or enter-
prise, to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominions
of any foreign prince or State, or of any colony, district, or people,,
with whom the United States are at peace, every person so offending
shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanour, and shall be fined
'
828 APPENDIX.
not exceeding three thousand dollars, and be imprisoned not more

than one year.
Sect. 7.. And be it further enacted, That the District Courts shall
take cognizance of complaints, by whomsoever instituted, in cases of
of the United States, or within a
captures made within the waters
marine league of the coasts or shores thereof.
Sect. 8. And be it further enacted, That in every case in which a
vessel shall be fitted out and armed, or attempted to be fitted out and
armed, or in which the force of any vessel of war, cruiser, or other
armed vessel, shall be increased or augmented, or in which any mili-
tary expedition or enterprise shall
be begun or set on foot, contrary
to the provisions and prohibitions of this Act; and in every case of
the capture of a ship or vessel within the jurisdiction or protection
of the United States as before defined, and in every case in which any
process issuing out of any Court of the United States shall be dis-
obeyed or resisted by any person or persons having the custody of
any vessel of war, cruiser, or other armed vessel of any foreign prince
or State, or of any colony, district, or people, or of any subjects or
citizens of any foreign prince or State, or of any colony, district, or
people, in every case it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States, or such other person as he shall have empowered for
that purpose, to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the
United States, or of the militia thereof, for the purpose of taking
possession of and detaining any such ship or vessel, with her prize or
prizes, if any, in order to the execution of the prohibitions and
penalties of this Act, and to the restoring the prize or prizes in the
cases in which restoration shall have been adjudged, and also for
the purpose of preventing the carrying on any such expedition or
enterprise from the territories or jurisdiction of the United States
against the territories or dominions of any foreign prince or State,
or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States
are at peace.
Sect. 9. And be it further enacted, That it shall be lawful for the
President of the United States, or such person as he shall empower for
.
that purpose, to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the
United States, or of the militia thereof, as shall be necessary to compel
any foreign ship or vessel to depart the United States in all cases in
which by the law of nations or the Treaties of the United States,
they ought not to remain within the United States.
Sect. 10. And be it further enacted. That the owners or consignees
of every armed ship or vessel sailing out of the ports of the United
States, belonging wholly or in part to citizens thereof, shall enter into
bond to the United States, with sufficient sureties, prior to clearing
out the same, in double the amount of the value of the vessel and
cargo on board, including her armament, that the said ship or vessel
shall not be employed
by such owners to cruise or commit hostilities
against the subjects, citizens, or property, of any foreign prince or
State, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United,
States are at peace.
Sect. 11. And be it further enacted, That the collectors of the
Customs be, and they are, hereby respectively authorized and required
to detain any vessel manifestly built for warlike
purposes, and about
to depart the United States, of which the
cargo shall principally con-
sist of arms and munitions of
war, when the number of men shipped
on or other circumstances, shall render it
boaxd,^ probable that such
vessel is intended to be
employed by the owner or owners to cruise
or commit hostilities upon the subjects, citizens, or property of any

foreign State, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the
United States are at peace, until the decision of the President be had
thereon, or until the owner or owners shall give such bond and
security as is required of the owners of armed ships by the preceding
section of this Act.
Sect. 12. And be it further enacted. That the Act passed on the
fifth day of June One thousand seven hundred and ninety-four, en-
titled, "An Act in addition to the Act for the punishment of certain
crimes against the United States," continued in force, for a limited
time, by the Act of the second of March One thousand seven hundred
and ninety-seven, and perpetuated by the Act passed on the twenty-
fourth of April One thousand eight hundred, and the Act passed on
the fourteenth day of June One thousand seven hundred and ninety-
seven, entitled, "An Act to prevent citizens of the United States from
privateering against nations in amity with, or against the citizens
of, the United States," and the Act passed the third day of March
One thousiand eight hundred and seventeen, entitled, "An Act more
effectually to preserve the neutral relations of the United States,"
be, and the same are hereby severally repealed: Provided nevertheless,
that persons having heretofore offended against any of the Acts afore-
said may be prosecuted, convicted, and punished as if the same were
not repeale<l; and no forfeiture heretofore incurred by a violation of
any of the Acts aforesaid shall be affected by such repeal.
Sect. 13. And be it further enacted. That nothing in the foregoing
Act shall be construed to prevent the prosecution or punishment of
treason, or any piracy defined by the laws of the United States.
830 APPENDIX.
APPENDIX B.
ENGLISH NAVAL PEIZE ACT.

27 & 28 Vict. Chap. 25.
An Act for regulating Naval Prize of War. [23rd June, 1864.]

Whereas it is
expedient permanently, with amendments,
to enact
such provisions concerning Naval Prize, and matters connected there-
with, as have heretofore been usually parsed at the beginning- of a
war:
Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal
and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the
authority of the same, as follows:
Preliminary.
Short title.
1. This Act may be cited as The Naval Prize Act, 1864.
Interpreta-
2. In this Act—
tion of terms.
The term "the Lords of the Admiralty" means the Lord High
Admiral of the United Kingdom, or the Commissioners for exe-
cuting the office of Lord High Admiral:
"
The term " the High Court of Admiralty means the High Court
of Admiralty of England:
The term "any of Her Majesty's ships of war" includes any of
Her Majesty's vessels of war, and any hired armed ship or vessel
in Her Majesty's service:
The term " officers and crew " includes flag officers, commanders,
and other officers, engineers, seamen, marines, soldiers, and others
on board any of Her Majesty's ships of war:
The term "ship" includes vessel and boat, with the tackle, furni-
ture, and apparel of the ship, vessel, or boat:
The term "ship papers" includes all books, parses, sea briefs,
charter parties, bills of lading, cockets, letters, and other docu-
ments and writings delivered up or found on board a captured
ship :
" "
The term goods includes all such things as are by the course of
admiralty and law of nations the subject of adjudication as prize
(other than ships).
I. Prize Courts.
High Court of 3. The High Court of Admiralty, and every Court of Admiralty or
Admiralty of Vice -Admiralty, or other Court
and other exercising admiralty jurisdiction in
Her Majesty's dominions, for the time being authorized to take cogni-
courts to be
zance of and judicially proceed in matters of
Prize Courts prize, shall be a Prize
for purposes Court within the meaning of this Act.
of Act. Every such Court, other than the High Court of Admiralty, is com-
NAVAL PEIZE. 831
"
prised in the term Vice-Admiralty Prize Court," when hereafter used
in this Act.
High Court of Admiralty.

4. The High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction throughout Jurisdiction
Her Majesty's dominions as a Prize Court. of High Court
The High Court of Admiralty as a Prize Court shall have power to ^f Admiralty,
enforce any order or decree of a Vice -Admiralty Prize Court, and any
order or decree o£ the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in a
prize appeal.
Appeal; Judicial Committee.

5. An appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council from any order or Appeal to
decree of a Prize Court, as of right in case of a final decree, and in Queen in
other cases with the leave of the Court making the order or decree. Council, m
Every appeal shall be made in such manner and form and subject
to such regulations (including regulations as to fees, costs, charges,
and expenses), as may for the time being be directed by Order in
Council, and in the absence of any such order, or so far as any such
order does not extend, then in such manner and form and subject
to such regulations as are for the time being prescribed or in force
respecting maritime causes of appeal.
6. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council shall have jurisdic- Jurisdiction
tion to hear and report on any such appeal, and may therein exercise of Judicial
all such powers as for the time being appertain to them in respect of Committee m
^^^^® appea s.
appeals from any Court of Admiralty jurisdiction, and all such powers
as are under this Act vested in the High Court of Admiralty, and all
such powers a^ were wont to be exercised by the Commissioners of
Appeal in Prize Causes.
7. All processes and documents required for the purposes of any
Custody of
such appeal shall be transmitted to and shall remain in custody of the processes,
Eegistrar of Her Majesty in Prize Appeals (c). papers, &c.
8 In every such appeal the usual inhibition shall be extracted from
.
Limit of time
the Kegistry of Her Majesty in Prize Appeals within three months for appeal,
after the date of the order or decree appealed from if the appeal be
from the High Court of Admiralty, and within six months after that
date if it be from a Vioe-Admiralty Prize Court.
The Judicial Committee may, nevertheless, on sufficient cause shown,
allow the inhibition to be extracted and the appeal to be prosecuted
after the expiration of the respective periods aforesaid (c).
Vice- Admiralty Prize Courts.

9. Every Vice- Admiralty Prize Court shall enforce within its juris- Enforcement
diction all orders and decrees of the Judicial Committee in Prize of orders of
Appeals, and of the High Court of Admiralty in Prize Causes. ^^^^
Court,
10. Her Majesty in Council may grant to the Judge of any Vice- a' -
{ f
Admiralty Prize Court a salary not exceeding five hundred pounds a ,-^^^^8 of
year, payable out of money provided by Parliament, subject to such Vice-Admi-
regulations as seem meet. ralty Prize
A Judge to whom a salary is so granted shall not be entitled to Courts.
any further emolument, arising from fees or otherwise, in respect of

prize business transacted in his Court.
An account of all such fees shall be kept by the Registrar of the
(c) Repealed by the Prize Courts (Procedure) Act, 1914; see infra, p. 842.
832 APPENDIX.
to and form part of

Court, and the amount thereof shall be carried
the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.
Retiring 11. In accordance, as far as circumstances admit, with the prin-
laid down in the Superannuation Act, 1859,
pensions of ciples and regulations
judges, as in Her Majesty in Council may grant to the Judge of any Vice-Admiralty
22 & 23 Vict,
Prize Court an annual or other allowance, to take effect on the termi-
c. 26.
nation of his service, and to be payable out of money provided by
Parliament.
Returns from 12. The Kegistrar of every Vice- Admiralty Prize Court shall, on
Vice -Admi- the First day of January and First day of July in every year, make
ralty Prize out a return (in such form a^ the Lords of the Admiralty from time to
Courts.
time direct) of all cases adjudged in the Court since the last half-
yearly return, and shall with all convenient speed send the same to
the Eegistrar of the High Court of Admiralty, who shall keep the
same in the Eegistry of that Court, and who shall, as soon a,s con-
veniently may be, send a copy of the returns of each half-year to
the Lords of the Admiralty, who shall lay the same before both
Houses of Parliament.
General.
General 13. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, with the Judge
orders for of the High Court of Admiralty, may from time to time frame General
Prize Courts. Orders for regulating (subject to the provisions of this Act) the pro-
cedure and practice of Prize Courts, and the duties and conduct of the
officers thereof and of the practitioners therein, and for regulating
the fees to be taken by the officers of the Courts, and the costs,
charges, and expenses to be allowed to the practitioners therein.
Any such General Orders shall have full effect, if and when
approved by Her Majesty in Council, but not sooner or otherwise.
Every Order in Council made under this section shall be laid
before both Houses of Parliament.
Every such Order in Council shall be kept exhibited in a con-
spicuous place in each Court to which it relates (^d) .
Prohibition of 14. It shall not be lawful for any registrar, marshal, or other officer
officer of of any Prize Court, or for the Registrar of Her Majesty in Prize
Prize Court
Appeals, directly or indirectly to act or be in any manner concerned
acting as as ladvocate, proctor, solicitor, or agent, or otherwise, in
proctor, &c. any Prize
Cause or Appeal, on pain of dismissal or suspension from office, by
order of the Court or of the Judicial Committee (as the case may
require).
Prohibition of 15. It shall not be lawful for any proctor or solicitor, or person
proctors being practising as a proctor or solicitor, being employed by a party in a
concerned for
Prize Cause or Appeal, to be employed or concerned, by himself or
adverse
his partner, or by any other person,
parties in a directly or indirectly, by or on
cause. behalf of any adverse party in that Cause or Appeal, on pain of
exclusion or suspension from practice in prize matters, by order of
the Court or of the Judicial Committee (as the case may
require).
II. — Procedure in Prize Causes.
Proceedings by Captors.
16. Every ship takenas prize, and brought into port within the
Custody of
prize ship. jurisdiction of a Prize Court, shall forthwith, and without bulk
broken, be delivered up to the marshal of the Court.
(d) This section is repealed by section three of the Prize Courts Act, 1894;
see infra, p. 841.
NAVAL PEIZE. 833
If there is no such marshal, then the ship shall be in like manner

delivered up to the principal officer of customs at the port.
The ship shall remain in the custody of the marshal, or of such
officer, subject to the orders of the Court.
17. The captors shall, with all practicable speed after the ship is
Bringing in
brought into port, bring the ship papers into the registry of the of ship papers.
Court.
The command, or one of the chief officers of the capturing
officer in
ship, or some other person who was present at the capture, and saw
the ship papers delivered up or found on board, shall make oath that
they are brought in as they were taken, without fraud, addition,
subduction, or alteration, or else shall account on oath to the satis-
faction of the Court for the absence or altered condition of the ship
papers or any of them.
Where no ship papers are delivered up or found on board the
captured ship, the officer in command, or one of the chief officers of
the capturing ship, or some other person who was present at the
capture, shall make oath to that effect.
18. As soon as the affidavit as to ship papers is filed, a monition issue of
shall issue, returnable within twenty days from the service thereof, monition,
citing all persons in general to show cause why the captured ship
should not be condemned (e).
19. The captors with
all practicable speed after the captured Examinations
shall,
ship brought into port, bring three or four of the principal persons on standing
is
belonging to the captured ship before the Judge of the Court or some "iterroga-
*°"^^'
person authorized in this behalf, by whom they shall be examined on
oath on the standing interrogatories.
The preparatory examinations on the standing interrogatories shall,
if possible, be concluded within five days from the commencement
thereof.
20. After the return of the monition, the Court shall, on production
Adjudication
of the preparatory examinations and ship papers, proceed with all by Court,
convenient speed either to condemn or to release the captured ship.
21. Where, on production of the preparatory examinations and ship Further
papers, it appears to the Court doubtful whether the captured ship is proof,
good prize or not, the Court may direct further proof to be adduced
either by affidavit or by examination of witnesses, with or without
pleadings, or by production of further documents; and on such further
proof being adduced the Court shall with all convenient speed proceed
to adjudication.
22. The foregoing provisions, as far as they relate, to the custody of Custody, &c.,
the ship, land to examination on the standing interrogatories, shall not of ships of
^^^"
apply to ships of war taken as prize.
Claim.
•
23. At any time
before final decree made in the cause, any person Entry of
claiming an interest in the ship may enter in the registry of the claim;
^°''
Court a claim, verified on oath.
JosS^*^
Within five days after entering the claim, the claimant shall give
security for costs in the sum of sixty pounds; but the Court shall have
power to enlarge the time for giving security, or to direct security to
be given in a larger sum, if the circumstances appear to require it.
(e) Sections 18 to 29, 32, 33 and 36 are repealed by the Prize Courts (Pro-
cedure) Act, 1914; see infra, p. 842.
w. 53
834 APPENDIX.
Appraisement.
Power to 24. The Court may, if it thinks fit, at any time direct that the
Court to
captured ship be appraised.
Every .appraisement shall be made by competent persons
direct ap- sworn to
praisement.
maJke the same according to the best of their skill and knowledge.
Delivery on Bail.
Power to Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that
25. After appraisement, the
Court to the captured ship be delivered up to the claimant, on his giving
direct delivery
security to the satisfaction of the Court
to pay to the captors the
on baiT^"^* appraised value thereof in case of condemnation.
Sale.
Power to 26. The Court may at any time,if it thinks fit, on account of the
Court to condition of the captured ship, or on the application of a claimant,
order sale. order that the captured ship be appraised as aforesaid (if not already
appraised), and be sold.
Sale on con- 27. On or after condemnation the Court may, if it thinks fit, order
demnation.
that the ship be appraised as aforesaid (if not already appraised), and
be sold.
How sales to 28. Every sale shallbe made by or under the superintendence of
be made. the Marshal of the Court or of the officer having the custody of the
captured ship.
Payment of 29. The proceeds of any sale, made either before or after condemna-
proceeds to tion, and after condemnation the appraised value of the captured
Paymaster-
General or ship, in case she has been delivered up to a claimant on bail, shall be
official paid under an order of the Court either into the Bank of England to
accountant. the credit of Her Majesty's Paymaster-General, or into the hands of
an ofl&cial accountant (belonging to the commissariat or some other
department) appointed for this purpose by the commissioners of Her
Majesty's Treasury or by the Lords of the Admiralty, subject in either
case to such regulations as may from time to time be made, by Order
in Council, as to the custody and disposal of money so paid.
Small-Armed Ships.
One adjudica- 30. The
captors may include in one adjudication any number, not
tion as to
several small exceeding six, of armed ships not exceeding one hundred tons each,
taken within three months next before institution of proceedings.
ships.
Godds.
Application 31. The foregoing provisions relating
to ships shall extend and
of foregoing
apply, mutatis mutandis, to goods taken as prize on board ship; and
provisions to the Court may direct such goods to be unladen, inventoried and
prize goods.
warehoused.
Monition to Captors to Proceed.

Power to 32. If the captors fail to institute or to with effect pro-
Court to call prosecute
on captors to ceedings for adjudication, a monition shall, on the application of a
proceed to
claimant, issue against the captors, returnable within six days from
the service thereof, citing them to
adjudication. appear and proceed to adjudica-
tion; and on the return thereof the Court shall either forthwith
proceed to adjudication or direct further proof to be adduced a^s
aforesaid, and then proceed to adjudication.
NAVAL PEIZE. 835
Claim on Appeal.
33. Where any person, not an original party in the cause, inter- Person inter-
venes on appeal, he shall enter a claim, verified on oath, and shall vening on
give security for costs. enteTcMm.
III. —Special Cases of Capture.

Lafid Expeditions.
34. Where, in an expedition of any of Her Majesty's naval or Jurisdiction
naval and military forces against a fortress or possession on land, pf Prize Court
goods belonging to the State of the enemy or to a public trading capture in
company of the enemy exercising powers of government are taken land expedi-
in the fortress or possession, or a ship is taken in waters defended tion.
by or belonging to the fortress or possession, a Prize Court shall have
jurisdiction as to the goods or ship so taken, and any goods taJsen
on board the ship, as in case of prize.
Conjunct Capture with Ally.

Where any ship or goods is or are taken by any of Her
35. Jurisdiction
-^^^^ Court
Majesty's naval or naval and military forces while acting in con- ?^ •ITl PfiRP Ox
junction with any forces of any of Her Majesty's allies, a Prize expedition
Court shall have jurisdiction as to the same as in case of prize,; with ally,
and shall have power, after condemnation, to apportion the due share
of the proceeds of Her Majesty's ally, the proportionate amount and
the disposition of which share shall be such as may from time to time
be agreed between Her Majesty and Her Majesty's ally.
Joint Capture.
36. Before condemnation, a petition on behalf of asserted joint Restriction
petitions
captors shall not (except by special leave of the Court) be admitted, ^
unless and until they give security to the satisfaction of the Court
j(^nt captors,
to contribute to the actual captors a just proportion of any costs,
charges, or expenses or damages that may be incurred by or awarded
against the actual captors on account of the capture and detention of
the prize.
After condemnation, such a petition shall not (except by special
leave of the Court) be admitted unless and until the asserted joint
captors pay to the actual captors a just proportion of the costs,,
chaises, and expenses incurred by the actual captors in the case, and
give such security as aforesaid, and show sufficient cause to the Court
why their petition was not presented before condemnation.
Provided, that nothing in the present section shall extend to the
asserted interest of a flag officer claiming to share by virtue of hi^
flag.
Offences against Law of Prize.

37. APrize Court, on proof of any offence against the law of in case of
nations, or against this Act, or any Act relating to naval discipline, offence by
or against any Order in Council or Royal Proclamation, or of any captors, prize
breach of Her Majesty's instructions relating to prize, or of any act
for Cro^
of disobedience to the orders of the Lords of the Admiralty, or to
the command of a superior officer, committed by the captors in rela-
tion to any ship or goods taken as prize, or in relation to any person
on board: any such ship, may, on condemnation, reserve the prize to
53 (2)
836 APPENDIX.
Her Majesty's disposal, notwithstanding any grant that may have

been made by Her Majesty in favour of captors.
*
Pre-emption.
38. Where a ship of a foreign nation passing
the seas laden with
Purchase by
to a port of any
Admiralty for naval or victualling stores intended to be carried
public service of Her is taken and brought into a port of the United
of stores on
gêmy Majesty
board foreign j^jng^^m^
and the purchase for the service of Her Majesty of the
stores on board the to the Lords of the Admiralty expe-
ship appears
dient without the condemnation thereof in a Prize Court, in that case
the Lords of the Admiralty may purchase, on the account or for the
service of Her Majesty, all or any of the stores on board the ship;
and the Commissioners of Customs may permit the stores purchased
to be entered and landed within any port.
Capture by Ship other than a Ship of War.

Prizes taken 39. Any ship or goods taken as prize by any of the officers and
by ships other crew of a ship other than a ship of war of Her Majesty shall, on
than ships of
condemnation, belong to Her Majesty in her Office of Admiralty.
war to be
droits of
Admiralty. IV. —Prize Salvage.
40. Where any ship or goods belonging to any of Her Majesty's
Salvage to
recaptors of subjects, after being taken as prize by
the enemy, is or are retaken
British ship from the enemy by any of Her Majesty's ships of war, the same shall
or goods from
be restored by decree of a Prize Court to the owner, on his paying as
enemy. to be decreed
prize salvage one-eighth part of the value of the prize
and ascertained by the Court, or such sum not exceeding one-eighth
part of the estimated value of the prize as may be agreed on between
the owner and the re-captors, and approved by order of the Court;
provided,that where the re-capture is made under circumstances of
special difficulty or danger, the Prize Court may, if it thinks fit, award
to the re-captors as prize salvage a larger part than one-eighth part,
but not exceeding in any case one-fourth part, of the value of the
prize.
Provided also, that where a ship after being so taken is set forth
or used by any of Her Majesty's enemies as a ship of war, this
provision for restitution shall not apply, and the ship shall be adjudi-
cated on as in other cases of prize.
Permission to 41. Where a ship belonging to any of Her Majesty's subjects, after
re -captured
being taken as prize by the enemy, is retaken from the enemy by any
ship to pro-
ceed on of Her Majesty's ships of war, she may, with the consent of the
voyage. re-captors, prosecute her voyage, and it shall not be necessary for the
re-captors to proceed to adjudication till her return to a port of the
United Kingdom.
The master or owner, or his agent, may, with the consent of the
re-captors, unload and dispose of the goods on board the ship before
adjudication.
In case the ship does not, within six months, return to a port of the
United Kingdom, the re-captors may nevertheless institute proceed-
ings against the ship or goods in the High Court of Admiralty, and
the Court may thereupon award prize salvage as aforesaid to the
re-captors, and may enforce payment thereof, [either by warrant of
arrest against the ship or goods, or by monition and attachment
against the owner] (/).
(/) The words bracketed are repealed by the Prize Courts (Procjedure)
Act, 1914; see infra, p. 842.
'
NAVAL PEIZE. 837
V. —Prize Bounty.
42. If, in relation to any war, Her Majesty is pleased to declare, by Prize
bounty
proclamation or Order in Council, her intention to grant prize bounty to officers and
to the officers and crews of her ships of war, then such of the officers present
^-^^^
and crew of any ofHer Majesty's ships of war as are actually present men^^w^h'an
at the taking or destroying of any armed ship of any of Her Majesty's
enemy,
enemies shall be entitled to have distributed among them as prize
bounty a sum calculated at the rate of five pounds for each person on
board the enemy's ship at the beginning of the engagement (^r).
43. The number of the persons so on board the enemy's ship shall Ascertain-
be proved in a Prize Court, either by the examinations on oath of the ment of
survivors of them, or of any three or more of the survivors, or if there amount of
is no survivor by the papers of the
enemy's ship, or by the examina- b^^êcreeôf
tion on oath of three or more of the officers and crew of Her Majesty's prize Court,
ship, or by such other evidence as may seem to the Court sufficient in
the circumstances.
The Court shall make a decree declaring the title of the officers and
crew of Her Majesty's ship to the prize bounty, and stating the
amount thereof.
The decree shall be subjectto appeal as other decrees of the Court.
44. On production of an official copy of the decree the commis- Payment of
sioners of Her Majesty's Treasury shall, out of money provided by prize bounty
awarded.
Parliament, pay the amount 'of prize bounty decreed, in such manner
as any Order in Council may from time to time direct.
VI. —Miscellaneous Provisions.

Ransom.
45. Her Majesty in Council may from time to time, in relation to Power for
any war, make such orders as may seem expedient, according to regulating
ransom by
circumstances, for prohibiting or allowing, wholly or in certain cases,
or subject to any conditions or regulations or otherwise, as may from councir
time to time seem meet, the ransoming or the entering into any
contract or agreement for the ransoming of any ship or goods be-
longing to any of Her Majesty's subjects, and taken as prize by
any of Her Majesty's enemies.
Any contract or agreement entered into, and any bill, bond, or other
security given for ransom of any ship or goods, shall be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty as a Prize
Court (subject to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council), and if entered into or given in contravention of any such
Order in Council shall be deemed to have been entered into or given
for an illegal consideration.
If any person ransoms or enters into any contract or agreement for
ransoming any ship or goods, in contravention of any such Order in
Council, he shall for every such offence be liable to be proceeded
against in the High Court of Admiralty at the suit of Her Majesty in
her Office of Admiralty, and on conviction to be fined, in the discretion
of the Court, any sum not exceeding five hundred pounds.
CofDvoy.
46. If the master or other person having the command of any ship Punishment
of any of Her Majesty's subjects, under the convoy of any of Her of masters of
(g) It has already been pointed out prize bounty was substituted for the
that during the Great War (1914) ordinary grant of prize proceeds.
838 APPENDIX.
lawful signal, instruc-

vesselsunder Majesty's ships of war, wilfully disobeys any
of the convoy, or without leave
convoy dis- tion, or command of the commander
in the
obeying deserts the convoy, he shall be liable to be proceeded against
orders or at the suit of Her Majesty in her Office of
deserting
High Court of Admiralty
to be fined, in the discretion of the
convoy. Admiralty, and upon conviction
Court, any sum not exceeding five hundred pounds,
and to suffer
one year, as the Court
imprisonment for such time, not exceeding
may adjudge.
Customs Duties and Regulations.

Prize ships 47. All ships and goods taken as prize and brought into a port of
and goods the United Kingdom shall be liable to and be charged with the same
liable to
rates and charges and duties of customs as under any Act relating to
duties and
forfeiture.
the customs may be chargeable on other ships and goods of the like
description; and
All goods brought in as prize which would on the voluntaiy impor-
tation thereof be liable to forfeiture or subject to any restriction
under the laws relating to the Customs, shall be deemed to be so
liable and subject, unless the Commissioners of Customs see fit to
authorize the sale or delivery thereof for home use or exportation,
unconditionally or subject to such conditions and regulations as they
may direct.
Regulations 48. Where any ship or goods taken as prize is or are brought into
of customs to a port of the United Kingdom, the master or other person in charge
be observed as
or command of the ship which has been taken or in which the goods
to prize ships
and goods. are brought shall, on arrival at such port, bring to at the proper
place of discharge, and shall, when required by any officer of Customs,
deliver an account in writing under his hand concerning such ship
and goods, giving such particulars relating thereto as may be in his
power, and shall truly answer all questions concerning such ship or
goods asked by any such officer, and in default shall forfeit a sum
not exceeding one hundred pounds, such forfeiture to be enforced as
forfeitures for offences against the laws relating to the Customs are
enforced, and every mich ship shall be liable to such searches as
other ships are liable to, and the officers of the Customs may freely
go on board such ship and bring to the Queen's wareliouse any goods
on board the same, subject nevertheless to such regulations in respect
of ships of war belonging to Her Majesty as shall from time to time
be issued by the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.
Power for 49 Goods taken as prize may be sold either for home consumption
.
treasury to re- or for exportation; and if in the former case the proceeds thereof,
mit Customs
after payment of duties of Customs, are insufficient to satisfy the
duties in
certain cases. just and reasonable claims thereon, the Commissioners of Her
Majesty's Treasury may remit the whole or such part of the said
duties as they see fit.
Ferjury.
Punishment 50. If :any person wilfully and corruptly swears, declares, or affirms
of persons
falsely in any prize cause or appeal, or in any proceeding under this
guilty of
Act, or in respect of any matter required by this Act to be verified on
perjury.
oath, or suborns any other person to do so, he shall be deemed guilty
of perjury, or of subornation of perjury (as the case may be), and
shall be liable to be punished accordingly.
NAVAL PRIZE. 839
Limitation of Actions, dc.

51. Any action or proceeding shall not lie in any part of Her Actions
Majesty's dominions against any person acting under the authority against
or in the execution or intended execution or in pursuance of this Act persons
^*^*
for any alleged irregularity or trespass, or other act or thing done or
^q^T^*^^^
omitted by him under this Act, unless notice in writing (specifying
brought with-
the cause of the action or proceeding) is given by the intending plain- out notice, &c.
tiff or prosecutor to the intended defendant one month at least before
the commencement of the action or proceeding, nor unless the action
or proceeding is commenced within six months next after the act or
thing complained of is done or omitted, or, in case of a continuation
of damage, within six months next after the doing of such damage
has ceased.
In any such action the defendant may plead generally that the act
or thing complained of was done or omitted by him when acting
under the authority or in the execution or intended execution or in
pursuance of this Act, and may give all special matter in evidence;
and the plaintiff shall not succeed if tender of sufficient amends is
made by the defendant before the commencement of the action;
and in case no tender has been made, the defendant may, by leave
of the Court in which the action is brought, at any time pay into
Court such sum of money as he thinks fit, whereupon such proceeding
and order shall be had and made in and by the Court as may be had
and made on the payment of money into Court in an ordinary action;
and if thg plaintiff does not succeed in the action, the defendant
shall receive such full and reasonable indemnity as to all costs,
charges, and expenses incurred in and about the action as may be
taxed and allowed by the proper officer, subject to review; and though
a verdict is given for the plaintiff in the action he shall not have costs
against the defendant, unless the judge before whom the trial is had
certifies his approval of the action.
Any such action or proceeding against any person in Her Majesty's

naval service, or in the employment of the Lords of the Admiralty,
shall not be brought or instituted elsewhere than in the United
Kingdom.
Petitions of Right.
52. Apetition of right, under the Petitions of Right Act, 1860, Jurisdiction of
may, if the suppliant thinks fit, be intituled in the High Court of High Court of
Admiralty, in case the subject-matter of the petition or any material eti^rns of^"
part thereof arises out of the exercise of any belligerent right on fio-ht in
behalf of the Crown, or would be cognizable in a Prize Court within certain cases,
Her Majesty's dominions if the same were a matter in dispute between as in 23 & 24
^^^*' ^- ^*'
private persons.
Any petition of right under the last-mentioned Act, whether in-
tituled in the High Court of Admiralty or not, may be prosecuted
in that Court, if the Lord Chancellor thinks fit so to direct.
The provisions of this Act relative to appeal, and to the framing
and approval of general orders for regulating the procedure and
practice of the High Court of Admiralty, shall extend to the case of
any such petition of right intituled or directed to be prosecuted in
that Court; and, subject thereto, all the provisions of the Petitions
of Right Act, 1860, shall apply, mutatis mutandis, in the case of any
such petition of right; and for the purposes of the present section,
the terms "Court" and "Judge" in that Act shall respectively be
understood to include and to mean the High Court of Admiralty and
840 APPENDIX.
the judge thereof, and other terms shall have the respective meanings
given to them in that Act.
Orders in Council.
Power to 53. Her Majesty may from time to time make such
in Council
make orders Orders in Council as seem meet for the better execution of this Act.
54. Every Order in Council under this Act shall be published in
in council.
the London Gazette, and shall be laid before both Houses of Parlia-
Order in
council to be
ment within thirty days after the making thereof, if Parliament is
gazetted, &c.
then sitting, and, if not, then within thirty days after the ne'xt
meeting of Parliament.
Not to aflPect 55. Nothing in this Act shall

—
rights of (1.) give to the officers
and crew of any of Her Majesty's ships
Crown ; effect of war any right or claim in or to any ship or goods taken
of treaties, &c.
as or the proceeds thereof, it being the intent of this
prize
officers and crews shall continue to take only
Act that such
such interest (if any) in the proceeds of prizes as may be
from time to time granted to them by the Crown; or
(2.) affect the operation of any existing treaty or convention with
any foreign power; or
(3.) take away or abridge the power
of the Crown to enter into any
treaty or convention with any foreign power containing any
stipulation that may seem meet concerning any matter to
which this Act relates; or
(4.) take away, abridge, or control, further or otherwise than as
-
expressly provided by this Act, any right, power, or pre-
rogative of Her Majesty the Queen in right of her Crown,
or in right of her Office of Admiralty, or any right or power
of the Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom, or of
the commissioners for executing the office of Lord High
Admiral; or
(5.) take away, abridge, or control, further or otherwise than as
expressly provided by^this Act, the jurisdiction or authority
of a Prize Court to take cognizance of and judicially pro-
ceed upon any capture, seizure, prize, or reprisal of any
ship or goods, and to hear and determine the same, and,
according to the course of Admiralty and the law of nations,
» to adjudge and condemn any ship or goods, or any other
jurisdiction or authority of or exerciseable by a Prize Court.
Commencement.
Commence- Act shall commence on the commencement of the Naval
56. This
ment of Act.
Agency and Distribution Act, 1864 (/i).
(A) By the operation of the Supreme currence of the Lord Chancellor, or,
Court of Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & in his absence, of the Lord Chief Jus-
37 Vict. c. 66), the jurisdiction of the tice, be heard by anotheir judge of the
High Court of Admiralty is assigned, High Court. By sect. 18 of the same
subject to any rule under the Act Act, the appellate jurisdiction of the
which may transfer it to some other Judicial Committee on appeal from
division, to the Probate, Divorce, and the High Court of Admiralty is trans-
Admiralty Division of the High Court ferred to the Court of Appeal; from
of Justice. But any cause or matter which Court a further appeal lies to
assigned to that division may, at the the House of Lords (Appellate Juris-
request of the president, with the con- diction Act, 1876, s. 3). The appeal
NAVAL PETZE. 841
PEIZE COURTS ACT, 1894.
57 & 58 Vict. Chap. 39.
An Act to make further provisions for the establishment of Prize

Courts, and for other purposes connected therewith.
[17th August, 1894.]
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with

the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the autho-
rity of the same, as follows:
—
1. This Act cited as the Prize Courts Act, 1894.
may be
2. —
(1.) Any commission, warrant, or instructions from Her
Majesty the Queen or the Admiralty for the purpose of commis-
sioning or regulating the procedure of a Prize Court at any place in
a British possession may, notwithstanding the existence of peace, be
issued at any time, with a direction that the Court shall act only upon
such proclamation as hereinafter mentioned being made in the pos-
session.
(2.) Where any such commission, warrant, or instructions have
been issued, then, subject to instructions from Her Majesty, the
Vice-Admiral of such possession may, when satisfied by information
from a Secretary of State or otherwise, that war has broken out be-
tween Her Majesty and any foreign State, proclaim that war has so
broken out, and thereupon the said commission, warrant, and in-
structions shall take effect as if the same had been issued after the
breaking out of such war and such foreign State were named therein.
(3.) The said commission and warrant may authorize either a
Vice -Admiralty Court or a colonial Court of Admiralty, within the
meaning of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, to act as a
Prize Court, and may establish a Vice-Admiralty Court for that
purpose.
(4.) Any such commission, warrant, or instructions may be re-
voked or altered from time to time.
(5.) A
Court duly authorized to act as a Prize Court during any
war shall after the conclusion of the war continue so to act in relation
to, and finally dispose of, all matters and things which arose during
the war, including all penalties and forfeitures incurred during the
war.
3. —
(1.) Her Majesty the Queen in Council may make rules of
Court for regulating, subject to the provisions of the Naval Prize
Act, 1864, and this Act, the procedure and practice of Prize Courts
within the meaning of that Act, and the duties and conduct of the
officers thereof, and of the practitioners therein, and for regulating
the fees to be taken by the officers of the Courts, and the costs,
charges, and expenses to be allowed to the practitioners therein.
(2.) Every rule so made shall, whenever made, take effect at the
time therein mentioned, and shall be laid before both Houses of
from Vice- Admiralty Courts, and other 1863 (26 Vict. c. 24), s. 22; and supra,
prize courts, etill lies to the Privy p. 831.)
Council. (Vice- Admiralty Courts Act,
842 APPENDIX.
in a conspicuous place in
Parliament, and shall be kept exhibited
each Court to which it relates.
(3.) This section

shall be substituted for section thirteen of the
Naval Prize Act, 1864, which section is hereby repealed.
(4.) If any colonial
Court of Admiralty within the meaning of the
Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, is authorized under this Act
or otherwise to act as a Prize Court, aU fees arising in respect of
in the Court shall be fixed, collected, and
prize business transacted
in like manner as the fees arising in respect of the Admi-
appHed
ralty business of the Court
under the said Act.
4. Her Majesty the Queen in Council may make rules of Court
for regulating the procedure and practice, including fees and costs,
in a Vice- Admiralty Court, whether under this Act or otherwise.
5. Section twenty-five of the Government of India Act, 1800, is
hereby repealed.
PEIZE COUETS (PEOCEDUEE) ACT, 1914.
4&5 Geo. 5, Chap. 13.
An Act to amend the Law relating to Procedure in Prize Courts.

[5th August, 1914.]
Be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with

ihe .advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the autho-
rity of the same, as follows:
—
1. — (1.) As from the date when
rules under an Order in Council
made Act in pursuance of section three of
after the passing of this
the Prize Courts Act, 1894, regulating the procedure and practice in
Prize Courts, come into operation, such of the provisions of the
Naval Prize Act, 1864, as are specified in the Schedule to this Act
(being enactments relating to the practice and procedure in Prize
Courts) shall be repealed:
Provided that nothing in such repeal shall have the effect of ex-
tending section sixteen of that Act to ships of war taken as prize,,
and accordingly that section shall have effect as if the following
—
words were inserted therein: "Nothing in this section shall apply
to ships of wiar taken as prize."
(2.) Any cause or proceeding commenced in any Prize Court before
such rules as aforesaid come into operation as respects that Court
may, as the Court directs, be either —
(a) recommenoed and proceeded with in accordance with the said
rules; or
(b) continued in accordance with the said rules subject to sucli
adaptations as the Court may deem necessary to make them
applicable to the case; or
(c) continued to the determination thereof in accordance with the
procedure applicable to the case at the commencement of
the cause or proceeding.
2. This Act may be cited as the Prize Courts
(Procedure) Act,
1914, and shall be construed as one with the Naval Prize Act, 1864 ;
NAVAL PEIZE. 843
and that Act and the Prize Courts Act, 1894, and this Act may he
cited together as the Naval Prize Acts, 1864 to 1914.
Schedule.
Provisions of Naval Prize Act, 1864, repealed.
Sections 7 and 8, 18 to 29, 32, 33, and 36, and in section 41, the
words "either by warrant of arrest against the ship or goods, or
by monition and attachment against the owner" (i).
(i) As to procedure and practice, were issued during tlie Great War.
there is a considerable number of (Cf. Manual of Emergency Legisla-
Orders, rules and regulations; many tion, ed. by A. Pulling, passim.)
844 APPENDIX.
APPENDIX C.
THE TEEATY OF WASHINGTON, 1871.
Concluded May 8, 1871 ; Ratifications Exchanged June 17, 1871 ;
Proclaimed July 4, 1871.
The United States of America and Her Britannic Majesty, being

desirous to provide for an amicable settlement of all causes of differ-
ence between the two countries, have for that purpose appointed their
respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: the President of the
United States has appointed, on the part of the United States, as
Commissioners in a Joint High Commission and Plenipotentiaries,
Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State; Robert Cumming Schenck, Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain; Samuel
Nelson, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States; Ebenezer Rockwood Hoaa?, of Massachusetts; and George
Henry Williams, of Oregon; and Her Britannic Majesty, on her part,
has appointed as Her High Commissioners and Plenipotentiaries, the
Right Honourable George Frederick Samuel, Earl de Grey and Earl
of Ripon, Viscount Goderich, Biaron Grantham, a Baronet,' a Peer of
the United Kingdom, Lord President of Her Majesty's Most Honour-
able Privy Council, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter,
&c., &c.; the Right Honourable Sir Stafford Henry Northcote,
Baronet, one. of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, a
Member of Parliament, a Companion of the Most Honourable Order
of the Bath, &c., &c.; Sir Edward Thornton, Knight Commander of
the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Her Majesty's
Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of
America; Sir John Alexander Macdonald, Knight Commander of
the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, a member of Her Majesty's
Privy Council for Canada, and Minister of Justice and Attorney-
General of Her Majesty's Dominion of Canada; and Mountague
Bernard, Esquire, Chichele Professor of International Law in the
University of Oxford.
And the said Plenipotentiaries, after having their full
exchanged
powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed
to and concluded the
following Articles:
Article I.
Alabama Whereas differences have arisen between the government of the

claims to be United States and the government of Her Britannic and still
Majesty;
referred to
arbitration.
exist, growing out of the committed by the several vessels which
acts
have given rise to the claims generically known as the ''Alabama
"
Claims :
And whereas Her Britannic Majesty has authorized Her High Com-
missioners and Plenipotentiaries to
express, in a friendly spirit, the
regret felt by Her Majesty's government for the escape, under what-
TREATY OF WASHINGTON, 1871. 845
ever circumstances, of The Alabama and. other vessels from British

ports, and for the depredations committed by those vessels:
Now, in order to remove and adjust all complaints and claims on Arbitrators,
the part of the United States, and to provide for the speedy settle- ^^^ ^^
^^^^^^
ment of such claims, which are not admitted- by Her Britannic
'
Majesty's Government, the High Contracting Parties agree that all

the said claims, growing out of acts committed by the aforesaid vessels
and generically known as the ''Alabama Claims,'' shall be referred to
a Tribunal of Arbitration to be composed of five Arbitrators, to be
appointed in the following manner, that is to say: One shall be named
by the President of the United States; one shall be named by Her
Britannic Majesty; His Majesty the King of Italy shall be requested
to name one; the President of the Swiss Confederation shall be re-
quested to name one; and His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil shall
be requested to name one.
In case of the death, absence, or incapacity to serve of any or either Vacancies,
of the said Arbitrators, or, in the event of either of the said Arbitra- how filled,
tors omitting or declining or ceasing to act as such, the President of
the United States, or Her Britannic Majesty, or His Majesty the King
of Italy, or the President of the Swiss Confederation, or' His Majesty
the Emperor of Brazil, as the case may be, may forthwith name
another person to act as Arbitrator in the place and stead of the
Arbitrator originally named by such head of a State.
And in the event of the refusal or omission for two months after
receipt of the request from either of the High Contracting Parties of
His Majesty the King of Italy, or the President of the Swiss Con-
federation, or His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, to name an Arbi-
trator either to fill the original appointment or in the place of one w-ho
may have died, be absent, or incapacitated, or who may omit, decline,
or from any cause cease to act as such Arbitrator, His Majesty the.
King of Sweden and Norway shall be requested to name one or more
persons, as the case may be, to act as such Arbitrator or Arbitrators.
Article II.
The Arbitrators shall meet at Geneva, in Switzerland, at the earliest Arbitrators to

convenient day after they shall have been named, and shall proceed meet, when,
and where;
impartially and carefully to examine and decide all questions that
t-heir
shall be laid before them on the part of the governments of the powers ;
United States and Her Britannic Majesty respectively. All ques- majority to
^ ®°^ ®*
tions considered by the tribunal, including the final award, shall be
decided by a majority of all the Arbitrators.
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall also name one person to Agents of
attend the tribunal as its agent to represent it generally in all matters each party,
connected with the arbitration.
Article III.
The written or printed case of each of the two parties, accompanied Case of each
by the documents, the official correspondence, and other evidence on party, &c.,
which each relies, shall be delivered in duplicate to each of the Arbi- ^.^^^
^
^^
trators and to the agent of the other party as soon as may be after the fJbitrators.
organization of the tribunal, but within a period not exceeding six
months from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this
treaty.
846 APPENDIX.
Article IV.
Counter-case, Within four months after the delivery on both sides of the written
&e. or printed, case, either party may, in like manner, deliver in duplicate
to each of the said Arbitrators, and to the agent of the other party, !a
counter-case, and additional documents, correspondence, and evidence,
in reply to the case, documents, correspondence, and evidence so pre-
sented by the other party.
Time may be The Arbitrators may, however, extend the time for delivering such
counter-case, documents, correspondence, and evidence, when, in their
extended.
judgment, it becomes necessary, in consequence of the distance of the

place from which the evidence to be presented is to be procured.
Documents If in the case submitted to the Arbitrators either party shall have
and papers to specified or alluded to any report or document in its own exclusive
be produced.
possession without annexing a copy, such party shall be bound, if the
other party thinks proper to apply for it, to furnish that party with a
copy thereof; and either party may call upon the other, through the
Arbitrators, to produce the originals or certified copies of any papers
adduced as evidence, giving in each instance such reasonable notice
as the Arbitrators may require.
Article V.
Arguments It shall be the duty of the aênt of each party, within two months
and briefs. after the expiration of the time limited for the delivery of the counter-
case on both sides, to deliver in duplicate to each of the said Arbi-
trators and to the agent of the other party a written or printed
argument showing the points and referring to the evidence upon
which his government relies: and the Arbitrators may, if they desire
further elucidation with regard to any point, require a written or
printed statement or argument, or oral argument by counsel upon it;
but in such case the other party shall be entitled to reply either
orally or in writing, as the case may be.
Article VI.
Rules to In deciding the matters submitted to the Arbitrators, they shall be
govern the
arbitrators in
governed by the following three rules, which are agreed upon by the
their decision. High Contracting Parties as rules to be taken as applicable to the
case, and by such principles of international law not inconsistent
therewith as the Arbitrators shall determine to have been applicable
to the case.
RULES.
Obligation of A neutral government is bound —
neutral First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting- out, arming, or
government
as to fitting equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reason-
able ground to believe is intended to cruise or to
out vessels in carry on war against
its waters a Power with which it is at peace; and also to use like
:
diJigeince to
prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to
cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel
having been specially
adapted, in whole or in part within such jurisdiction, to warlike use.
as to the use Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of
of its ports its ports or waters as the base of naval
operations against the other,,
;
or for the purpose of the renewal or

augmentation of military supplies
or arms, or the recruitment of men.
Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and, to prevent
as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of violation of its
the foregoing obligations and duties. obligations.
Her Britannic Majesty has commanded her High Commissioners These rules
and Plenipotentiaries to declare that Her Majesty's Government not admitted
cannot assent to the foregoing rules as a statement of principles of *o been
^^^^
international law Avhich were in force at the time when the claims
the claknl
mentioned in Article I. arose; but that Her Majesty's Government, arose.
in order to evince its desire of strengthening the friendly relations
between the two countries and of making satisfactory provision for
the future, agrees that, in deciding the questions between the two
countries larising out of those claims, the Arbitrators should assume
that Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to act upon the
principles set forth in these rules.
And the High Contracting Parties agree to observe these rules as Rules to
between themselves in future, and to bring them to the knowledge of govern future
cases.
other maritime powers, and to invite them to accede to them.
Article VII.
The decision of the tribunal shall, if possible, be made within three Decision to be
months from the close of the argument on both sides. made, when,
It shall be made in writing, and dated, and shall be signed by the "^^^^
|^*^ ^^
^°^'
Arbitrators who may assent to it.
The said tribunal shall first determine as to each vessel separately If Great
whether Great Britain has, by any act or omission, failed to fulfil any Britain is
of the duties set forth in the foregoing three rules, or recognized by tound in fault,
the principles of international law not inconsistent with such rules,

may^be^^'^
and shall certify such fact as to each of the said vessels. In case the awarded,
tribunal find that Great Britain has failed to fulfil any duty or duties
as aforesaid, it may, if it think proper, proceed to award a sum in
gross to be paid by Great Britain to the United States for all the
claims referred to it; and in such case the gross sum so awarded shall
be paid in coin by the Government of Great Britain to the Govern-
ment of the United States, at Washington, within twelve months
after the date of the award.
The award shall be in duplicate, one copy whereof shall be delivered Award to be
to the agent of the United States for his Government, and the other in duplicate,
copy shall be delivered to the agent of Great Britain for his Govern-
ment.
Article VIII.
Each Government shall pay its own agent, and provide for the Expenses of
proper remuneration of the counsel employed by it and of the Arbi- the arbitra-
trator appointed by it, and for the expense of preparing and sub-
® ® ^^^
J^^^'
^^^®
^^ '
mitting its case to the tribunal. All other expenses connected with
the arbitration shall be defrayed by the two Governments in equal
moieties.
Article IX.
The Arbitrators shall keep an accurate record of their proceedings. Arbitrators to
and may appoint and employ the necessary oflScers to assist them. ^êp a record.
Article X.
In case the tribunal finds that Great Britain has failed to fulfil any If Great
duty or duties as aforesaid, and does not award a sum in gross, the Britain is
found in fault.
848 APPENDIX.
aud a gross High Contracting Parties agree that a Board of Assessors shall be
appointed to ascertain and determine what
sum is not claims are valid, and what
awarded, amount or amounts shall be paid by Great Britain to the United
board of
States on account of the liability arising from such failure, as to each
asseasors to
be appointed vessel according to the extent of such liability as decided by the
to determine Arbitrators.
claims. The Board of Assessors shall be constituted as follows: One member
thereof shall be named by the President of the United States, one
memiber thereof shall be named by Her Britannic Majesty, and one
member thereof shall be named by the representative at Washington
of His Majesty the King of Italy and in case of a vacancy happening
;
from any cause, it shall be filled in the same manner in which the
original appointment was made.
Board, when As soon as possible after such nominations the Board of Assessors
to meet. shall be organized in Washington, with power to hold their sittings
Members to
there, or in New York, or in Boston. The members thereof shall
subscribe a
declaration. severally subscribe a solemn declaration that they will impartially and
carefully examine and decide, to the best of their judgment, and
according to justice and equity, all matters submitted to them, and
shall forthwith proceed, under such rules and regulations as they
may prescribe, to the investigation of the claims which shall be
presented to them by the Government of the United States, and shall
examine and decide upon them in such order and manner as they may
think proper, but upon such evidence or information only as shall
be furnished by or on behalf of the Governments of the United States
and of Great Britain respectively. They shall be bound to hear on
each separate claim, if required, one person on behalf of each Govern-
ment, ,as counsel or agent. A
majority of the Assessors in each case
shall be sufiicient for a decision.
Decision, The decision of the Assessors shall be given upon each claim in
when and and shall be signed by them respectively and dated.
how given. writing,
Every claim shall be presented to the Assessors within six months
Claims, when from the
to be pre- day of their first meeting; but they may, for good cause
sented. shown, extend the time for the presentation of any claim to a further
period not exceeding three months.
Report of The Assessors shall report to each Government at or before the
expiration of one year from the date of their first meeting the amount
of claims decided by them up to the date of such report; if further
claims then remain undecided, they shall make a further report at or
before the expiration of two years from the date of such first meeting;
and in case any claims remain undetermined at that time, they shall
make a final report within a further period of six months.
how to be The report or reports shall be made in duplicate, and one copy
made and to thereof shall be delivered to the
whom de- Secretary of State of the United
livered. States, and one copy thereof to the representative of Her Britannic
Majesty at Washington.
Awards, when All sums of money which may be awarded under this Article shall
and where to be at Washington, in coin, within twelve months after the
be paid. payable
delivery of each report.
Clerks. The Board of Assessors may employ such clerks as they shall think
necessary.
Expenses. The expenses of the Board of Assessors shall be borne
equally by
the two Governments, and
paid from time to time, as may be found
expedient on the production of accounts certified by the Board. The
remuneration of the Assessors shall also be
paid by the two Govern-
ments in equal moieties in a similar manner.
Article XI.
The High Contracting Parties engage to consider the result of the Decisions of
the arbitra-
proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration and of the Board of
^^^^ ^
Assessors, should such Board be appointed, as a full, perfect, and ,
final settlement of all the claims hereinbefore referred to and further ^^ final.
;
engage that every such claim, whether the same may or may not claims not
have been presented to the notice of, made, preferred, or laid before presented to
the Tribunal or Board, shall, from and after the conclusion of the be deemed
settled,
proceedings of the Tribunal or Board, be considered and treated as finally
finally settled, barred, and thenceforth inadmissible.
Article XII.
The High Contracting Parties agree that all claims on the part of Certain claims
corporations, companies, or private individuals, citizens of the United (other than
States, upon the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, arising out of ciaimst^
acts committed against the persons or property of citizens of the
against either
United States during the period between the 13th of April, 1861, and government
the 9th of April, 1865, inclusive, not being claims growing out of the to be referred
*o <ôm-
acts of the vessels referred to in Article I. of this treaty, and all *"/^^
claims, with the like exception, on the part of corporations, 'com-
panies or private individuals, subjects of Her Britannic Majesty,
upon the Government of the United States, arising out of acts com-
mitted against the persons or property of subjects of Her Britannic
Majesty during the same period, which may have been presented to
either Government for its interposition with the other, and which
yet remain unsettled, as well as any other such claims which may be
presented within the time specified in Article XIV. of this treaty,
shall be referred to three Commissioners, to be appointed in the
following manner, that is to say: One Commissioner shall be named
by the President of the United States, one by Her Britannic Majesty,
and a third by the President of the United States and Her Britannic
Majesty conjointly; and in case the third Commissioner shall not
have been so named within a period of three months from the date of
the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, then the third Com-*
missioner shall be named by the representative at Washington of
His Majesty the King of Spain. In case of the death, absence, or
incapacity of any Commissioner, or in the event of any Commissioner
omitting or ceasing to act, the vacancy shall be filled in the manner
hereinbefore provided for making the original appointment; the
period of three months in case of such substitution being calculated
•
from the date of the happening of the vacancy.

The Commissioners so named shall meet at Washington at the Their powers
earliest convenient period after they have been respectively named and duties,
;
and shall, before proceeding to any business, make and subscribe

a solemn declaration that they will impartially and carefully examine
and. decide, to the best of their judgment, and according to justice
and equity, all such claims as shall be laid before them on the part
of the Governments of the United States and of Her Britannic
Majesty, respectively; and such declaration shall be entered on the
record of their proceedings.
Article XIII.
The Commissioners shall then forthwith proceed to the investiga- claims to be
tion of the claims which shall be presented to them. They shall investigated.
w. 54
850 APPENDIX.
claims in such order and sucli manner

investigate and decide such
as they may think proper, but upon such evidence or information
or on behalf of the respective govern-
only as shall be furnished by
They shall be bound to receive and consider
ments. all written
documents or statements which may be presented to them by or on

behalf of the in support of, or in answer to,
respective governments
one person on each side on
any claim, and to hear, if required,
behalf of each government, as counsel or agent for such government,
A majority on each and every separate claim. A majority of the Commissioners
to decide.
shall be sufficient for an award in each case. The award shall be
upon each claim in writing, and shall be signed by the Com-
given
missioners assenting to it. It shall be competent for each govern-
ment to name one person to attend the Commissioners as its agent,
to present and support claims on its behalf, and to answer claima
made upon it, and to represent it generally in all matters connected
with the investigation and decision thereof.
Decisions to The High Contracting Parties hereby engage to consider the deci-
be final. sion of the Commissioners as absolutely final and conclusive upon
each claim decided upon by them, and to give full effect to such-
decisions without any objection, evasion or delay whatsoever.
Article XIV.
Claims, when Every claim shall be presented to the Commissioners within six
to be pre-
months from the day of their first meeting, unless in any case where
sented to the
commis- reasons for delay shall be established to the satisfaction of the Com-
sioners. missioners, and then, and in any such case, the period for presenting
the claim may be extended by them to any time not exceeding three
months longer.
When to be The Commissioners shall be bound to examine and decide upon
decided.
every claim within two years from the day of their first meeting.
It shall be competent for the Commissioners to decide in each case
whether any claim has or has not been duly made, preferred, and
laid before them, either wholly or tp any and what extent, according
to the true intent and meaning of this
treaty.
Article "XV.
Awards, when All sums of money which may be awarded by the Commissioners on
to be paid. account of any claim shall be paid by the one government to the other,
as the case may be, within twelve months after the date of the final
award, without interest, and without any deduction save as specified
in Article XVI. of this treaty.
Article XVI.
Records. The Commissioners shall keep an accurate record and correct
minutes or notes of all their
proceedings, with the dates thereof, and
Secretary. may appoint and employ a secretary, and any other necessary officer
or officers, to assist them in the transaction of the business which
may come before them.
Expenses. Each government shall pay its own Commissioner and
agent or
counsel. All other expenses shall be
defrayed by the two govern-
ments in equal moieties.
Chargeable The whole expenses of the Commission,
on awards. including contingent
expenses, shall be defrayed by a rateable deduction on the amount of
the sums awarded by the Commissioners,
provided always that such
TEEATY OF WASHINGTON, 1871. 851
deduction shall not exceed the rate of five per cent, on the sums so
awarded.
Article XVII.
The High Contracting Parties engage to consider the result of the Decision of
commis-
proceedings of this Commission as a full, perfect, and final settle-
ment of ,all such claims as are mentioned in Article XII. of this ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^
treaty upon either government; and further engage that every such elaims^hat*
claim, whether or not the same may have been presented to the ndghthave
notice of,made, preferred, or laid before the said Commission, shall, beenpre-
from and after the conclusion of the proceedings of the said Commis- rented,
sion, be considered and treated as finally settled, barred, and thence-
forth inadmissible.
Article XVIII.
It is agreed by the High Contracting Parties, that in addition to Rights of the
the liberty secured to the United States fishermen by the Convention inhabitants of
the United
between the United States and Great Britain, signed at London on
the 20th day of October, 1818, of taking, curing, and drying fish on certain sea
certain coasts of the British North American Colonies therein defined, fisheries in
the inhabitants of the United States shall have, in common with the common with
British
subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, the liberty, for the term of years
*^^^3ects.
mentioned in Article XXXIII. of this treaty, to take fish of every
kind, except shell-fish, on the sea-coasts and shores, and in the bays,
harbours, and creeks, of the Provinces of Quebec, Nova Scotia, and
New Brunswick, and the Colony of Prince Edward's Island, and of
the several islands thereunto adjacent, without being restricted to
any distance from the shore, with permission to land upon the said
coasts and shores and islands, and also upon the Magdalen Islands,
for the purpose of drying their nets and curing their fish: provided
that, in so doing they do not interfere with the rights of private
property, or with British fishermen in the peaceable use of any part
of the said coasts in their occupancy for the same purpose.
It is understood that the above-mentioned liberty applies solely to Salmon and
the sea fishery, and that the salmon and shad fisheries, and all other shad fisheries
fisheries in rivers and the mouths of rivers, are hereby reserved
-^ ^^.^^^^î v
, . , » -r, ... 1 « , British fisher-
'exclusively tor British fishermen. ^^^^
Article XIX.
It is agreed by the High Contracting Parties that British subjects Rights of
shall have, in common with the citizens of the United States, the British
liberty, for the term of years mentioned in Article XXXIII. of this '^^^X^^nited
treaty, to take fish of every kind, except shell-fish, on the eastern grates sea
sea-coasts arid shores of the United States north of the thirty-ninth fisheries,
parallel of north latitude, and on the shores of the several islands^
thereunto adjacent, and in the bays, harbours, and creeks of the said
sea-coasts and shores of the United States and of the said islands,
without being restricted to any distance from the shore, with permis-
sion to land upon the said coasts of the United States and of the
islands aforesaid, for the purpose of drying their nets and curing
their fish: provided that, in so doing, they do not interfere with the
rights of private property, or with the fishermen of the United States
in the peaceable use of any part of the said coasts in their occupancy
'for the same purpose.
54 (2)
852 'APPENDIX.
Salmon and It is understood that the above-mentioned liberty applies solely to

shad fisheries the sea fishery, and that salmon and shad fisheries, and all other
reserved. fisheries in rivers and mouths of rivers, are hereby reserved exclu-
sively for fishermen of the
United States.
Article XX.
the Commissioners
Certain places It is agreod that the places designated by
reserved from
appointed under the First Article of the treaty
between the United
the common
gtates and Great Britain, concluded at Wa^shington on the 5th of
fishinff J^^6» 18^4, upon the coasts of Her Britannic Majesty's dominions
and the United States, as places reserved from the common right of
as in like manner re-
fishing under that treaty, shall be regarded
served from the common right of fishing under the preceding Articles.
In case any question should arise between the governments of the
United States and of Her Britannic Majesty as to the common right
of fishing in places not thus designated as reserved, it is agreed that
a Commission shall be appointed to designate such places, and shall
be constituted in the same manner, and have the same powers, duties,
and authority as the Commission appointed under the said First
Article of the treaty of the 5th of June, 1854.
Article XXI.
Certain fish- It is lag-reed that, for the term of years mentioned in Article XXXIII.
wl and fish to of this treaty, fish-oil and fish of all kinds (except fish of the inland
be free of
lakes, and of the rivers falling into them, and except fish preserved in
oil),being the produce of the fisheries of the United States or of the
Dominion of Canada, or of Prince Edward's Island, shall be admitted
into each country, respectively, free of duty (/c).
Article XXII.
Commis- Inasmuch as it is asserted by the. government of Her Britannio
sioners to
Majesty that the privileges accorded to the citizens of the United
determine the States under Article XVIII. of this treaty are of greater value than
compensation,
those accorded by Articles XIX. and XXI. of this treaty to the sub-
ifany, to be
paid by jects of Her Britannic Majesty, and this assertion is not admitted by
United States the government of the United States, it is further agreed that Com-
for privileges
missioners shall be appointed to determine, having regard to the
granted by
Art. XVIII. privileges accorded by the United States to the subjects of her
Britannic Majesty, as stated in Articles XIX. and XXI. of this treaty,
the amount of any compensation which, in their opinion, ought to
be paid by the government of the United States to the government
of Her Britannic Majesty in return for the
privileges accorded to the
citizens of the United States under Article XVIII. of this
treaty; and
that any sum of money which the said Commissioners
may so award
shall^
be paid by the United States government, in a gross sum,
within twelve months after such award shall have been
given.
Article XXIII.
Commis- The Commissioners referred to in the preceding Article shall be
sionershowto appointed in the
be appointed.
following manner, that is to say: One Commissioner
^Yidll be named by the President of the United
States, one by Her
(7c) Arts. XVIII. to XXI. were subsequently abrogated by the United
States, see ante, p. 289.
TEEATY OF WASHINGTON, 1871. 853
Britannic Majesty, and a third by the President of the United States

and Her Britannic Majesty conjointly; and in case the third Commis-
sioner shall not have been so named within a period of three months
from the date when this Article shall take effect, then the third Com-
missioner shall be named by the representative at London of His
Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. In case of
the death, absence, or incapacity of any Commissioner, or in the event
of any Commissioner omitting or ceasing to act, the vacancy shall be
filled in the manner hereinbefoi^ provided for making the
original
appointment, the period of three months in case of such substitution
being calculated from the date of the happening of the vacancy.
The Commissioners so named shall meet in the City of Halifax, in When and
the Province of Nova Scotia, at the earliest convenient period after whereto
^^^^'^ ^^îr
they have been respectively named, and shall, before proceeding to ^°
any business, make and subscribe a solemn declaration that they will dutier
impartially and carefully examine and decide the matters referred to
them to the best of their judgment, and according to justice and
equity; and such declaration shall be entered on the record of their
proceedings.
Ea<)h of the High Contracting Parties shall also name one person to Agent for
attend the Commission as its agent, to represent it generally in all each govern-
matters connected with the Commission. ment.
Article XXIV.
The proceedings shall be conducted in such order as the Commis- Proceedings
sioners appointed under Articles XXII. and XXIII. of this treaty before these
shall determine. They shall be bound to receive such oral or written commis-
testimony as either government may present. If either party shall toTrcon-^^

offer oral testimony, the other party shall have the right of cross-, ducted,
examination, under such rules as the Commissioners shall prescribe.
If in the case submitted to the Commissioners either party shall Documents
have specified or alluded to any report or document in its own exclu- and papers,
sive possession, without annexing a copy, such party shall be bound,
if the other party thinks proper to apply for it, to furnish that party
with a copy thereof; and either party may call upon the other,
through the Commissioners, to produce the originals or certified copies
of lany papers adduced as evidence, giving in each instance such
reasonable notice as the Commissioners may require.
The case on either side shall be closed within a period of six months Cases to be
from the date of the organisation of the Commission, and the Com- closed in six
missioners shall be requested to give their award a^ soon as possible "ôîtlis.
thereafter. The aforesaid period of six months may be extended Awards,
for three months in case of a vacancy occurring among the Commis-
sioners under the circumstances contemplated in Article XXIII. of
this treaty.
Article XXV.
The Commissioners shall keep an accurate record and correct Eecords,
minutes or notes of all their proceedings, with the dates thereof,
and may appoint and employ a secretary, and any other necessary
officer or officers, to assist them in the transaction of the business
which may come before them.
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall pay its own Commis- Expenses,
sioner and agent or counsel; all other expenses shall be defrayed
by the two governments in equal moieties.
854 APPENDIX.
Article XXVI.
Navigatiou of The navigation of the Eiver St. Lawrence, ascending and de-
the St. Law- of north latitude, where it
scending, from the forty-fifth parallel
rence to be
ceases to form the boundary between the two countries, from, to, and
free.
into the sea, shall for ever remain free and open for the purposes of
oommerce to the citizens of the United States, subject to any laws and
regulations of Great Britain, or of the Dominion of Canada, not
inconsistent with such privilege of free navigation.
Other rivers. The navigation of the Elvers Yukon, Porcupine, and Stikine,
ascending and descending, from, to, and into
the sea, shall for ever
remain free and open for the purposes of commerce to the subjects
of Her Britannic Majesty and to the citizens of the United States,.
either country within its own
subject to any laws and regulations of
territory not inconsistent with such privilege of free navigation.
Article XXVII.
Use in com- The government of Her Britannic Majesty engages to urge upon
men of certain the government of the Dominion of Canada to secure to the citizens
canals to be
^f ^j^^ United States the use of the Welland, St. Lawrence, and other
urged. canals in the Dominion on terms of equality with the inhabitants
of the Dominion, and the government of the United States engages
that the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty shall enjoy the use of the
St. Clair Flats' Canal on terms of equality with the inhabitants of
the United States, and further engages to urge upon the State govern-
ments to secure to the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty the use of
the several State canals connected with the navigation of the lakes
or rivers traversed by or contiguous to the boundary-line between the
possessions of the High Contracting Parties on "terms of equality
with the inhabitants of the United States.
Article XXVIII.
Navigation The navigation of Lake Michigan shall also, for the term of years
of Lake mentioned in Article XXXIII. of this treaty, be free and open for
Michigan. ^^le purposes of oommerce to the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty,
subject to any laws and regulations of the United States or of the

States bordering thereon not inconsistent with such privilege of free
navigation.
Article XXIX.
It is agreed that, for the term of years mentioned in Article XXXIII.
Through
transit of of this treaty, goods, wares or merchandise arriving at the ports of
goods landed ]S[ew York, Boston, and Portland, and
any other ports in the United
States which have been or may, from time to time, be specially de-
andêatined^
for the other, signated by the President of the United States, and destined for Her
Britannic Majesty's possessions in North America, may be entered at
the proper custom-house and conveyed in transit, without the payment
of duties, through the territory of the United States, under such rules,
regulations and conditions for the protection of the revenue as the
government of the United States may from time to time prescribe;
and, under like rules, regulations, and conditions, goods, wares, or
merchandise may be conveyed in transit, without the payment of
duties, from such possessions through the territory of the United
States for export from the said ports of the United States.
It is further agreed that, for the like
period, goods, wares, or mer-
chandise, arriving at any of the ports of Her Britannic Majesty's pos-
sessions in North America, and destined, for the United States, may be
entered at the proper custom-house and conveyed in transit, without
the payment of duties, through the said possessions, under such rules
and regulations and conditions for the protection of the revenue as
the governments of the said possessions may from time to time pre-
scribe; and, under like rules, regulations, and conditions, goods,,
wares, or merchandise may be conveyed in transit, without payment
of duties, from the United States through the said possessions to
other places in the United States, or for export from ports in the said
possessions.
Article XXX.
agreed that, for the term of years mentioned in Article XXXIII.
It is Carriage of
of this treaty, subjects of Her Britannic Majesty may carry in British goods free of
duty from one
vessels, witliout payment of duty, goods, wares, or merchandise from
place to
one port or place within the territory of the United States upon the another in
St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, and the rivers connecting the same, to the same
another port or place within the territory of the United States as country.
aforesaid: provided, that a portion of such transportation is made
through the Dominion of Canada by land carriage and in bond,
under such rules and regulations as may be agreed upon between the
government of Her Britannic Majesty and the government of the
United States.
Citizens of the United States may, for the like period, carry in
United States vessels, witliout payment of duty, goods, wares, or
merchandise from one port or place within the possessions of Her
Britannic Majesty in North America to another port or place within
the said possessions: provided, that a portion of such transportation
is made through the territory of the United States by land carriage;
and in bond, under such rules and regulations as may be agreed upon
between the government of the United States and the government of
Her Britannic Majesty.
The government of the United States further engages not to impose Export duties.
any export duties on goods, wares, or merchandise carried under this
Article through the territory of the United States; and Her Majesty's
government engages to urge the parliament of the Dominion of
Canada and the legislatures of the other Colonies not to impose any
export duties on goods, wares, or merchandise carried under this
Article; and the government of the United States may, in case such
export duties are imposed by the Dominion of Canada, suspend,
during the period that such duties are imposed, the right of carrying-
granted under this Article in favour of the subjects of Her Britannic
Majesty.
The government of the United States may suspend the right of Suspension of
these privi-
carrying granted in favour of the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty
under this Article, in case the Dominion of Canada should at any leges by the
United States.
time deprive the citizens of the United States of the use of the canals
in the said Dominion on terms of equality with the inhabitants of
the Dominion, las provided in Article XXVII.
Article XXXI.
The government of Her Britannic Majesty further engages to urge Duty on
upon the parliament of the Dominion of Canada and the legislature luniber cut in
of New
Brunswick that no export duty, or other duty, shall be levied ¥^^"®j^^^.i
on lumber or timber of any kind cut on that portion of the American \j^j^^ States^
856 APPENDIX.
territory in tlie State of Maine watered by the Eiver St. John and its
tributaries, and floated down that river to the sea, when the same is
shipped to theUnited States from the Province of New Brunswick.
And in case any such export or other duty continues to be levied after
of the ratifi-
the expiration of one year from the date of the exchange
it is that the government of the United
cations of this treaty, agreed
under
States may suspend the right of carrying hereinbefore granted
or other
Article XXX. of this treaty for such period as such export
duty may be levied.
Article XXXII.
It is further agreed that the provisions and stipulations
of Articles
Provisions of
Arts. XVIII. XVIII. to XXV. of this treaty, inclusive, shall extend to the Colony
and XXV. k>
of Newfoundland so far as they are applicable. But if the Imperial
extend to
of Newfoundland, or the congress of the
parhament, the legislature
Newfound-
land. United shall not embrace the Colony of Newfoundland
States,
their m
laws enacted for carrying the foregoing Articles into effect, then this
Article shall be of no effect; but the omission to make provision by
law to give it effect, by either of the legislative bodies aforesaid,
shall not in any way impair any other Articles of this treaty.
Article XXXIII.
Arts. XVIII. The foregoing Articles XVIII. to XXV., inclusive, and Article XXX.
to XXV. and of this treaty, shall take effect as soon as the laws required to oa.rry
Art. XXX.
when to take
them into operation shall have been passed by the Imperial parlia-
effect.
ment of Great Britain, by the parliament of Canada, and by the
legislature of Prince Edward's
Island on the one hand, and by the
congress of the United States on the other.
Such assent having been
the said Articles shall remain in force for the period of ten
given,
into operation; and
years from the date at which they may come
further until the expiration of two years after either of the High
its wish
Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other of
to terminate the same each of the High Contracting Parties being at
;
liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of

the said period
of ten years or at any time afterward (l).
Article XXXIV.
Decision as to Whereas it was stipulated by Article I. of the treaty concluded at
North -West
Washington on the 15th of June, 1846, between the United States
boundary to and Her Britannic Majesty, that the line of boundary between the
be left to
territories of the United States and those of Her Britannic Majesty,
Emperor of
Germany as from the point on the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude up to
arbitrator. which it had already been ascertained, should be continued westward
"
along the said parallel of north latitude to the middle of the channel
which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island, and thence
southerly, through the middle of the said channel and of Fuca Straits,
"
to the Pacific Ocean and whereas the Commissioners appointed by
;
the two High Contracting Powers to determine that portion of the

boundary which runs southerly through the middle of the channel
aforesaid were unable to agree upon the same; and whereas the
government of Her Britannic Majesty claims that- such boundary
line should, under the terms of the
treaty above recited, be run
through the Eosario Straits, and the government of the United States
claims that it should run through the Canal de Haro, it is agreed
(0 See 36 & 36 Vict. c. 45.

that the respective claims of the Government of the United States

and of the government of Her Britannic Majesty shall be submitted
to the arbitration and award of His Majesty the Emperor of Ger-
many, who, having regard to the above-mentioned Article of the
said treaty, shall decide thereupon, finally and without appeal, which
of those claims is most in accordance wdth the true interpretation of
the treaty of June 15, 1846.
Article XXXV.
The award of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany shall be con- Award to be
sidered as absolutely final and conclusive; and full effect shall be conclusive,
^°^"^ ^"^
given to such award without any objection, evasion, or delay what- ^^
soever. Such decision shall be given in writing and dated; it shall be
in whatsoever form His Majesty may choose to adopt; it shall be de-
livered to the representatives or other public agents of the United
States and of Great Britain respectively, who may be actually at
Berlin, and shall be considered as operative from the day of the date
of the delivery thereof.
Article XXXVI.
The written or printed case of each of the two parties, accompanied Cases of the
hy the evidence offered in support of the same, shall be laid before two parties to
His Majesty the Emperor of Germany Avithin six months from the
^^^?,-^^^+^^
J'l^
date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, and a copy of
such case and evidence shall be communicated by each party to the
other through their respective representatives at Berlin.
The High Contracting Parties may include in the evidence to be
considered by the Arbitrator such documents, official correspondence,
and other official or public statements bearing on the subject of the
reference .as they may consider necessary to the support of their
respective cases.
After the written or printed case shall have been communicated by Counter-
each party to the other, each party shall have the power of drawing* cases.
up and laying before the Arbitrator a second and definitive state-
ment, if it think fit to do so, in reply to the case of the other party
so communicated, which definitive statement shall be so laid before
the Arbitrator, and also be mutually communicated in the same
manner as aforesaid, by each party to the other, within six months
from the date of laying the first statement of the case before the
Arbitrator.
Article XXXVII.
If, inthe case submitted to the Arbitrator, either party shall specify
Papers and
or allude to any report or document in its own exclusive possesision documents,
without annexing a copy, such party shall be bound, if the other party
thinks proper to apply for it, to furnish that party with a copy thereof,
and either party may call upon the other, through the Arbitrator, to
produce the originals or certified copies of any papers adduced as evi-
dence, giving in each instance such reasonable notice as the Arbi-
trator may require. And if the Arbitrator should desire further
-elucidation or evidence with regard to any point contained in the
statements laid before him, he shall be at liberty to require it from
either party, and he shall be at liberty to hear one counsel or
ajgsent
for each party, in relation to any matter, and at such time, and; in
such manner, as he may think fit.
868 APPENDIX.
Article XXXVIII.
The of the United States and
Agents of representatives or other public agents
each govern- of Great Britain at Berlin, respectively, shall be considered as the
ment. to conduct their cases before
agents of their respective governments
the Arbitrator, who shall be requested to address all his communica-
tions, and give all his notices, to such representatives or other public
agents, who shall represent
their respective governments generally in
all ^natters connected with the arbitration.
Article XXXIX.
Proceedings It shall be competent to the Arbitrator to proceed in the said arbi-
tration, and all matters relating thereto, as and when he shall see fit^
of the arbi-
trator.
either in person, or by a person or persons named by him for that
purpose, either in the presence or absence of either or both agents, and
either orally or by written discussion or otherwise.
Article XL.
Secretary or The Arbitrator may, if he think fit, appoint a secretary or clerk for
clerk.
the purposes of the proposed arbitration, at such rate of remuneration
as he shall think proper. This and all other expenses of and con-
nected with the said arbitration, shall be provided for as hereinafter
stipulated.
Article XLI.
Expenses, The Arbitrator shall be requested to deliver, together with hi&
how to be
award, an account of all the costs and expenses which he may have
paid.
been put to in relation to this matter, which shall forthwith be repaid
by the two governments in equal moieties.
Article XLII.
Form of The Arbitrator shall be requested to give his award in writing as
award.
early as convenient after the whole case on each side shall have been
laid before him, and to deliver one copy thereof to each! of the Baid
Article XLIII.
Ratifications. The present treaty shall be duly ratified
by the President of the*
United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate thereof, and by Her Britannic Majesty; and the ratifications
shall bo exchanged either at
Washington or at London within six
months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.
In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed
this treaty, and have hereunto affixed our seals.
Done in Duplicate at Washington the 8th day of May, in the year
of ourXiord 1871.
[L.S.] Hamilton Fish.
[L.S.] ROBT. C. SCHENCK.
[L.S.] Samuel Nelson.
[L.S.] Ebenezer Rockv\ôod Hoar.
[L.S.] Geo. H. Williams.
[L.S.] De Grey and Ripon.
[L.S.] Stafford H. Northcote.
[L.S.] Edv^^d. Thornton.
[L.S.] John A. Macdonald.
[L.S.] Mountague Bernard.
THE ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT, 1904. 85^
APPENDIX D
THE ANGLO-FEENCH AGREEMENT, 1904.
Convention signed at London, April 8, 1904.
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Irelan<:land of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of
India, and the President of the French Eepublic, having resolved to
put an end, by a friendly Arrangement, to the difficulties which have
arisen in Newfoundland, have decided to conclude a Convention to
that effect, and have named as their respective Plenipotentiaries:
Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of
India, the Most Honourable Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice,
Marquess of Lansdowne, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs; and
The President of the French Republic, his Excellency Monsieur
Paul Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at the Court of
Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of
India;
Who, after having communicated to each other their full powers,
found in good and due form, have agreed as follows, subject to the
approval of their respective Parliaments:
—
Article I.
France renounces the privileges established to her advantage by

Article XIII. of the Treaty of Utrecht, and confirmed or modified by
subsequent provisions.
Article IL
France retains for her on a footing of equality with British
citizens,
subjects, the right of fishing in the territorial waters on that portion
of the coast of Newfoundland comprised between Cape St. John and
Cape Ray, passing by the north; this right shall be exercised during
the usual fishing season closing for all persons on the 20th October
of each year.
The French may therefore fish there for every kind of fish, includ-
ing bait and also shell fish. They may enter any port or harbour
on the said coast and may there obtain supplies or bait and shelter
on the same conditions as the inhabitants of Newfoundland, but they
will remain subject to the local Regulations in force; they may also
fish at the mouths of the rivers, but without going beyond a straight
line drawn between the two extremities of the banks, where the river
enters the sea.
They shall not make use of stake-nets or fixed engines without
permission of the local authorities.
860 APPENDIX.
On the above-mentioned portion of the coast, British subjects

and
French citizens shall be subject alike to the laws and Eegulations
now in force, or which may hereafter be passed for the establishment
of a close time in regard to any particular kind of fish, or for the
im-
of the fisheries. Notice of any fresh laws or Regulations
provement
shall be given to the Government of the French Republic three
months before they come into operation.
The policing of the fishing on the above-mentioned portion of the
illicit liquor trafiic and smuggling of
coast, and for prevention of
spirits, shall form
the subject of Regulations drawn up in agreement
by the two Governments.
Article III.
A pecuniary indemnity shall be awarded by

His Britannic Majesty's
Government to the French citizens engaged in fishing or the prepara-
"
tion of fish on the Treaty Shore," who are obliged, either to abandon
the establishments they possess there, or to give up their occupation,
in consequence of the modification introduced by the present Conven-
tion into the existing state of affairs.
This indemnity cannot be claimed by the parties interested unless
the closing of the
they have been engaged in their business prior to
fishing season of 1903.
Claims for indemnity shall be submitted to an Arbitral Tribunal,
composed of an officer of each nation, and, in the event of disagree-
ment, of an Umpire appointed in accordance with the procedure laid
down by Article XXXII. of The Hague Convention. The details
regulating the constitution of the Tribunal and the conditions of
the
to be instituted for the purpose of substantiating the claims,
inquiries
shall form the subject of a special Agreement betwêen the two
Governments.
Article IV.
His Britannic Majesty's Government, recognizing that, in addition
to the indemnity referred to in the preceding Article, some territorial
compensation is due to France in return for the surrender of her
privilege in that part of the Island of Newfoundland referred to in
Article II., agree with the Government of the French Rejûblic to
the provisions embodied in the following Articles: —
Article V.
The present frontier between Senegambia and the English Colony
of the Gambia shall be modified so as to give to France Yarbutenda
and the lands and landing places belonging to that locality.
In the event of the river not being open to maritime navigation up
to that point, access shall be assured to the French Government at a
point lower down on the River Gambia, which shall be recognized by
mutual agreement as being accessible to merchant ships engaged in
maritime navigation.
The conditions which shall govern transit on the River Gambia and
its tributaries, as well as the method of access to the
point that may
be reserved to France in accordance with the preceding paragraph,
shall form the subject of future agreement between the two Govern-
ments.
In any case, it is understood that these conditions shall be at least
as favourable as those of the system instituted
by application of the
THE ANGLO-FEENOH AGREEMENT, 1904. 861
General Act of the African Conference of the 26th February, 1885,

and of the Anglo-French Convention of the 14th June, 1898, to the
English portion of the basin of the Niger.
Article VI.
The group known as the lies de Los, and situated opposite Konakry,
is ceded by His Britannic Majesty to France.
Article VII.
Persons born in the territories ceded to France by Articles V. and
VI. of the present Convention may retain British nationality by
means of an individual declaration to that effect, to be made before
the proper authorities by themselves, or, in the case of children under
aê, by their parents or guardians.
The period within which the declaration of option referred to in the
preceding paragraph must be made, shall be one year, dating from
the day on which French authority shall be established over the
territory in which the persons in question have been born.
Native laws and customs now existing will, as far as possible,
remain undisturbed.
In the lies de Los, for a period of thirty yea*rs from the date of
exchange of the ratifications of the present Convention, British fisher-
men shall enjoy the same rights as French fishermen with regard to
anchorage in all weathers, to taking in provisions and water, to
making repairs, to transhipment of goods, to the sale of fish, and to
the landing and drying of nets, provided always that they observe
the conditions laid down in the French Laws and Eegulations which
may be in force there.
Article VIII.
To
the east of the Niger the following line shall be substituted for
the boundary fixed between the French and British possessions by the
Convention of the 14th June, 1898, subject to the modifications which
may result from the stipulations introduced in the final paragraph of
the present Article.
Starting from the point on the left bank of the Niger laid down in
Article III. of the Convention of the 14th June, 1898, that is to say,
the median line of the Dallul Mauri, the frontier shall be drawn along
this median line until it meets the circumference of a circle drawn
from the town of Sokoto as a centre, with a radius of 160,932 metres
(100 miles). Thence it shall follow the northern arc of this circle to
a point situated 5 kilometres south of the point of intersection of
the above-mentioned arc of the circle with the route from Dosso to
Matankari via Maourede.
Thence it shall be drawn in a direct line to a point 20 kilometres
north of Konni (Birni-N'Kouni), and then in a direct line to a point
15 kilometres south of Maradi, and thence shall be continued in a
direct line to the point of intersection of the parallel of 13° 20/ north
latitude with a meridian passing 70 miles to the east of the seoond
intersection of the 14th degree of north latitude and the northern arc
of the above-mentioned circle.
Thence the frontier shall follow in an easterly direction the parallel
of 13° 20/ north latitude until it strikes the left bank of the River
Komadugu Waube (Komadougou Ouobe), the thalweg of which it
862 APPENDIX.
will then follow to Lake Chad. But, if before meeting this river the
frontier attains a distance of 5 kilometres from the caravan route from
Zinder to Yo, through Sua Kololua (Soua Kololoua), Adeber, and
Kabi, the boundary shall then be traced at a distance of
5 kilometres
to the south of this route until it strikes the left bank of the River
Komadugu Waube (Komadougou Ouobe), it being nevertheless
understood that, if the boundary thus drawn should happen to pass
shall be assigned to the
through a village, this village, with its lands,
Government to which would fall the larger portion of the village and
its lands. The boundary will then, as before, follow the thalweg of
the said river to Lake Chad.
Thence it will follow the degree of latitude passing through the
thalweg of the mouth of the said river up to its intersection with the
meridian running 35/ east of the centre of the town of Kouka, and
will then follow this meridian southwards until it intersects the
southern shore of Lake Chad.
It is agreed, however, that, when the Commissioners of the two
Governments at present engaged in delimiting the line laid down in
Article IV. of the Convention of the 14th June, 1898, return home
and can be consulted, the two Governments will be prepared to
consider any modifications of the above frontier line which may seem
desirable for the purpose of determining the line of demarcation with
greater accuracy. In order to avoid the inconvenience to either party
which might result from the adoption of a line deviating from recog-
nized and well-established frontiers, it is agreed that in those portions
of the projected line where the frontier is not deterniined by the trade
routes, regard shall be had to the present political divisions of the
territories so that the tribes belonging to the territories of Tessaoua-
Maradi and Zinder shall, as far as possible, be left to Prance, and
those belonging to the territories of the British zone shall, as far as
possible, be left to Great Britain.
It is further agreed that, on Lake Chad, the frontier line shall, if
necessary, be modified so as to assure to France a communication
through open water at all seasons between her possessions on the
north-west and those on the south-east of the Lake, and a portion of
the surface of the open waters of the Lake at least proportionate to
that assigned to her by the map forming Annex 2 of the Convention
of the 14th June, 1898.
In that portion of the River Komadugu which is common to both
parties, the populations on the banks shall have equal rights of ,
fishing.
Article IX.
The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall
be exchanged, at London, within eight months, or earlier if
possible.
In witness whereof his Excellency the Ambassador of the French
Republic at the Court of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions
bey(md the
Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs,
duly authorized for that purpose, have
signed the present Convention and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th
day of April, 1904.
(L.S.) LANSDOWNE. (L.S.) PAUL CAMBON.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT, 1904. 863
Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco.
Article I.
His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no

intention of altering the political status of Egypt.
The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that
they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by
asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in
any other manner, and that they give their assent to the draft Khe-
divial Decree annexed to the present Arrangement, containing the
guarantees considered necessary for the protection of the interests of
the Egyptian bondholders, on the condition that, after its promulga-
tion, it cannot be modified in any way without the consent of the
Powers Signatory of the Convention of London of 1885.
It is agreed that the post of Director-General of Antiquities in
Egypt shall continue, as in the past, to be entrusted to a French
savant.
The French schools in Egypt shall continue to enjoy the saine
liberty as in the past.
Article II.
The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no

intention of altering the political status of Morocco.
His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognize that
it appertains to France, more particularly as a power whose domi-
nions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to
preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the
purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military re-
forms which it may require.
They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France
for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the
rights which Great Britain, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and
usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade
between the ports of Motocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901.
Article III.
His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, will respect the
rights which France, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage
enjoys in Egypt, including the right of coasting trade between
Egyptian ports accorded to French vessels.
Article IV.
The two Governments, being equally attached to the principle of
commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will
not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the
imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport
charges.
The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy
the same treatment in transit through the French and British posses-
sions in Africa. An Agreement between the two Governments shall
settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of
entry.
This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty
years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year
in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.
Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to
864 APPENDIX.
themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government

reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions
for roads, railways, ports, &c., are only granted on such conditions as
will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great
undertakings of public interest.
Article V.
His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they will use their
influence in order that the French officials now in the Egyptian service
may not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those
in the same service.
applying to the British officials
The Government of the French Kepublic, for their part, would make
no objection to the application of analogous conditions to British
officials now in the Moorish service.
Article VI.
^ In order passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic
to insure the free
of
Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations
the Treaty of the 29th October, 1888, and that they agree to their
being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus
1 as
guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of paragraph
well as of paragraph 2 of Article VIII. of that Treaty will remain
in abeyance.
Article VII.
In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the
two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifica-
tions or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco
comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which
command the right bank of the River Sebou.
This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in
the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.
Article VIII.
The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friend-
ship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which
that country derives from her geographical position and from her
territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.
In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an
understanding with the Spanish Government.
The agreement which may be come to on the subject between
France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's
Government.
Article IX.
The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplo^
matic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the
present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.
In witness whereof his Excellency the Ambassador of the French
Republic -at the Court of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions
beyond the
Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs,
duly authorized for that purpose, have
signed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.
(L.S.) LANSDOWNE. (L.S.) PAUL CAMBON.

THE ANGLO-FRENGH AGREEMENT, 1904. ^^^
Declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides.
I. —Siam.
The Government of His Britannic Majesty and the Government of
the French Republic confirm Articles 1 and 2 of the Declaration
signed in London on the 15th January, 1896, by the Marquess of
Salisbury, then Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, and Baron de Courcel, then Ambassador of the
French Republic at the Court of Her Britannic Majesty.
In order, however, to complete these arrangements, they declare by
mutual agreement that the influence of Great Britain shall be recog-
nized by France in the territories situated to the west of the basin of
the River Menam, and that the influence of France shall be recognized
by Great' Britain in the territories situated to the east of the same
region, all the Siamese possessions on the east and south-east of the
zone alDove described and the adjacent islands coming thus henceforth
under French influence, and, on the other hand, all Siamese posses-
sions on the west of this zone and of the Gulf of Siam, including the
Malay Peninsula and the adjacent islands, coming under English
influence.
The two Contracting Parties, disclaiming all idea of annexing any
Siamese territory, and determined to abstain from any act which
might contravene the provisions of existing Treaties, agree that, with
this reservation, and so far as either of them is concerned, the two
Governments shall each have respectively liberty of action in their
spheres of influence as above defined.
II. — Madagascar.
In view of the Agreement now in negotiation on the questions of
jurisdictionand the postal service in Zanzibar, and on the adjacent
coast. His Britannic Majesty's Government withdraw the protest
which they had raised against the introduction of the Customs Tariff
established at Madagascar after the annexation of that island to
France. The Government of the French Republic take note of this
Declaration.
III. —New Hebrides.

The two Governments agree to draw up in concert an Arrangement
which, without involving any modification of the political status quo,
shall put an end to the difficulties arising from the absence of juris-
diction over the natives of the New Hebrides.
They agree to appoint a Commission to settle the disputes of their

respective nationals in the said islands with regard to landed pro-
perty. The competency of thLs Commission and its rules of procedure
shall form the subject of a preliminary Agreement between the two
Governments.
In witness whereof His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs and his Excellency the Ambassador of the
French Republic at the Court of His Majesty the King of the United
w. 55
866 APPENDIX.
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions

beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, duly authorized for that purpose,
have signed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their
als.
Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.
(L.S.) LANSDOWNE.
(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON.
( 867 )
INDEX.
Note. —See also the Index of Cases for references specific cases
to
and incidents —relative persons, places, and vessels—that have
to
arisen in Prize Courts and other Courts of law, in diplomacy and
negotiation, in arbitration, and in war.
ACTIONS-AT-LAW of the enemy, 497, 503.
'ACTS OF GOD,' 692.

ACTS OF INDEMNITY, 523.
ADAIE, SIR E., on binding power of treaties, 361.
ADMIRALTY COURTS, their position, 27.
ADRIANOPLE, treaty of (1829), 54, 105, 305.

AFRICAN occupation, 268 seq., 281.
rivers, 320.
AID SOCIETIES. (See Relief Societies.)

AIRCRAFT PROJECTILES, 496, 499, 508, 622.
AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, treaty of (1748), 88, 382, 705, 719.

(1818), 94,332.
ALABAMA claims, 24. (See Index of Gases.)
ALAND ISLANDS, not to be fortified, 89.
ALASKA, 300.
boundary question, 272 seq.
ALBANIA, 122.
ALGIERS, 65.
'
ALIEN ENEMY,' meaning of, 463 seq.
ALIENS and real property abroad, 136 seq. (See also Enemy.)
resident, local jurisdiction over, 228 seq.
contracts of, 230.
bankruptcy of, 231.
ALLEGIANCE, 241, 254 seq.

distinguished from domicile, 449.
and military occupation, 522, 530.
55 (2)
868 INDEX.
ALLIANCE and neutrality, 637.

treaties of,380 seq. (See Treaties.)
of five great Powers, 94.
Quadruple Alliance (1834), 127.
(For other alliances, see Treaties.)
ALLIES trading with common enemy, 440 seq.
'ALTERNAT,' use of, 264.
ALVERSTONE, LORD, on relation of international law to muni-^

eipal law, 27.
ANDORRA, 55.
ANDRASSY NOTE, 111.
ANGARY, right of, 409, 658.
AMBASSADORS, within territory of another State, 152, 154.

use of permanent diplomatic missions, 329.
right to send and obligation to receive, 329.
what States may send, 330.
effect of civilwar, 330.
conditional reception of, 331.
classification of public ministers, 332.
diplomatic precedence, 332.
letters of credence, 335.
full power, 336.
instructions, 336.
passport, 336.
duties, 337.
privileges, 338 seq.
inviolabilityand exterritoriality, 338.
exemption from local jurisdiction, 339.
suits by and against, 340 seq.
instances of expulsion, 343 seq.
position of family, suite, etc., 346.
house and property, 347.
duties and taxes, 348.
messengers and couriers, 348.
passing through territory of third States, 349 seq.
freedom of religious worship, 352.
termination of mission, 354.
letter of recall, 355.
AMBULANCES. (See Sick and Wounded.)

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR,
473, 475, 476, 482, 499, 503, 507, 526,.
533, 547, 581, 586, 613, 623, 655, 665, 675, 687, 691, 693,.
731, 743, 745, 770, 774, 783.
proposed mediation in, 126.
AMERICAN NOTE to British Government, 580.
AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. (See Spanish- American War.)
AMIENS, treaty of (1802), 706.

INDEX. 869
ANGLO-AMEEICAN WAR (1812), 505, 586, 657, 755.

ANGLO-BOER WAR. (See South African War.)
ANGLO-DUTCH WAR, 757.
ANGLO-FRENCH WARS. (See Napoleonic Wars.)
ARBITRATION, international, 391 seq.
early cases, 391.
treaties of, 392, 401.
instances of, prior to Hague Conference, 393.
and Hague Conferences, 395 seq.
permanent Court, 397.
procedure, 398.
instances of, since Hague Conference, 399 seq.
scope of, 401.
compulsory, 402.
proposed judicial Court, 403.
ARMED NEUTRALITIES (1780, 1800), 24, 297, 705, 706, 792.
ARMISTICE, 512 seq., 517.
ARMS causing superfluous injury, 496.

export of, 642.
ARMY FOLLOWERS, their position, 482.
ART, works of, acquired in war, 540.

ARTISTIC BUILDINGS, in war, 509, 540.
ASPHYXIATING GASES, 496, 499.
ASSAULT, 508.
ASYLUM, right of, in neutral ports, 686.
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY, constitution of, 71
AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR (1866), 571.
BALANCE OF POWER, 92.
BALKAN WAR. (See Turkey, Greece, Eastern Question, and

names of Balkan States.)
BALLOONISTS, 510.
BALLOONS, projectiles from, 496.

BALTIC SEA, 297.
BANKRUPT discharge, effect of, in another country, 145.
proceedings, foreign, transfer of property, 227.
BARBARIAN TROOPS, in warfare, 476.
BARBARY STATES and Turkey, 64 seq.
BEHRING SEA dispute, 300 seq.
870 INDEX.
BELGIUM, intervention in (1830), 122, 123.

123.
treaty with Holland (1839),
neutrality of, 633.
BELLIGERENCY, recognition of, 41.

insurgents carrying on war at sea,
206 seq.
rebels without a commission, 207 seq.
BELLIGERENTS, who are lawful, 473 seq., 546 seq.
BELTS, THE, and Danish sovereignty, 295.
BERLIN Conference (1885), 215, 320.

treaty of (1878), 55, 108, 114, 294, 305, 811.
BLACK SEA, 110, 292 seq., 303.

Turkish blockade of, 775.
BLOCKADE, pacific, 408.

the law of, 767 seq.
definition, 767.
views of earlier writers, 767.
legal aspect of blockade -running, 768.
distinction between siege and blockade, 770.
extent of, 770.
interior canal navigation, 771.
impartiality, 771.
entry on account of distress, 772.
essential elements, 772 seq.
effectiveness, 772.
temporary interruption, 773.
knowledge and notification, 776.
extent of notice, 776.
notice under Declaration of London, 777.
presumed knowledge, 778.
special notification in case of lack of knowledge,
780.
treaty stipulations, 781.
act of ingress or egress, 784.
cessation, 782.
blockading force driven off, 782.
blockaded place occupied by blockading forces, 783.
intent to violate, 785.
violation by egress, 786.
purchase of goods in a blockaded port, 786.
duration of the offence, 787.
range of capture under Declaration of London, 787.
penalty for breach, 789.
'continuous voyage' inapplicable, 788.
BOMBARDMENT. (See Sieges and Bombardments.)
BOOTY, 532, 533.

and prize, 581.
joint capture of, 585.
BOSNIA, 122.
BOSPHORUS, 292 seq., 303, 304.

INDEX. 871
BOUNDARY disputes, 272 seq., 395.
BEAZIL-PARAGUAY WAR, 688.

BRITISH-AMERICAN WAR (1812), 505, 586, 657, 755.
BRUSSELS, Anti-Slavery Conference (1890), 224.

Conference (1874), 471, 508, 519.
Declaration (1874), 477.
BUCHAREST, treaty of (1886), 116.
BUILDINGS, protected, in war, 509, 540.
BULGARIA, 55, 115, 117.

war with Serbia, 120.
BULGARIAN ATROCITIES, HI.

BULLER, GENERAL, attitude towards non-combatants, 473.
BULLETS, explosive, 496, 498.

expanding, 496, 498.
causing superfluous injury, 496.
'BUNDESSTAAT,' 74.
BUREAU of information as to prisoners of war, 483.

BYNKERSHOEK, on origin of law of nations, 6.
pirates, 65.
jurisdiction over foreign Sovereigns, 158.
ships of war, 159.
inviolability of ambassadors, 349, 350.
binding power of treaties, 359.
enemy property within the territory, 417.
rights against enemy, 468.
good faith towards enemies, 512.
capture and infra prcesidia, 594.
unjust sentence of Prize Court, 607.
the term 'neutrals,' 628.
duty of neutrals, 629.
captures in neutral waters, 658.
neutral goods on enemy vessel, 701.
contraband, 715, 727.
blockade, 767.
CAMPO FORMIO, treaty of, 543.
CANALS, international, 320 seq.

Suez Canal, 321.
Panama Canal, 324,
CANNING, on foreign enlistment, 546.

on intervention, 101.
CAPITULATIONS, 183, 703. (See Consular Jurisdiction.)

for surrender, 514 seq.
CAPTURE of prizes. (See Prizes.)

872 INDEX.
CARTEL SHIPS, 566.
CARTELS, 358, 477.
CASTLEREAGH, LORD, on works of art acquired by France in

war, 541.
CASUS F(EDERIS, 381.
CATHEDRALS, in war, 509, 540.
CAUDINE FORKS, Convention of the, 515.
CESSION, 521.
CHARGES D'AFFAIRES, 332, 337.
CHATEAUBRIAND, on intervention, 91.
CHILE-PERU WAR (1883), 538, 607, 671.
CHINA, under international law, 19.

relations of, and certain Asiatic States, 68.
CHINESE-JAPANESE WAR (1895), 473, 500, 563, 763.
CHRISTIANOPLE, treaty of (1645), 295.
CHURCHES, in war, 509, 540.
CICERO, on universal law of nations, 15.

meaning of a State, 32.
regular enemy, 65.
regular combatants, 474.
enemy property, 531.
CIVIC GUARD, Belgian, in the Great War, 475.
CIVILIANS and belUgerents, 473.
CIVIL WAR, and foreign nations, 38, 411.

relationships of contending parties, 38.
international position of colony or province asserting its in-
dependence, 39.
in America. (See American Civil War.)
CLOSTER-SEVEN, convention of, 515.
COAST FISHERIES, 564.
'COASTS,' meaning of, 284.
COCKBURN, CHIEF JUSTICE, on authority of text- writers, 23.

on exemption of public ships, 166.
when municipal law exceeds international law, 684.
coal as contraband, 736.
COLLECTIVE PENALTIES, 543.
COMITY OF NATIONS, 134.

COMMERCIA BELLI, 512.
INDEX. 873
C0MPR0MI8, 398.
COMPULSOKY SERVICES of enemy subjects, 503.
CONFEDERATED STATES, 73 seq.

CONFISCATION of property in war. (See Property, Enemy.)
CONFLICT OF LAWS. (See Private International Law.)
CONQUEST, title by, 269.

and occupation, 520.
and property, 532.
CONSOLATO DEL MARE, 594, 703.
CONSULAR JURISDICTION, 180 seq.

Courts, American, in China, 181.
authority of, 183.
British, in non-Christian countries, 181 seq.
in Turkey, 181.
in Egypt, 183.
in Japan, 184.
CONSTANTINOPLE, treaty of (1885), 59.

(1887), 60.
(1888), 323, 326.
conference at (1877), 112.
CONSULS, 335.
how differ from ambassadors, 352.
privileges, 353.
CONTINUOUS VOYAGE, doctrine of, 742.

earlier application to the 'rule of 1756,' 743.
as applied to contraband, 743.
difference between carriage by land and carriage by sea, 744.
under the Declaration of London (1909), 745.
destination of absolute contraband, 745.
destination of conditional contraband, 748.
place of capture, 750.
time of capture, 750.
inapplicable to blockade, 788.
CONTRABAND OF WAR, 714 seq.

meaning of, 714.
classification by earlier jurists, 715.
naval stores, 716.
Sto well's judgment, 717.
various treaties, 719.
when contraband apart from treaty, 721.
articles of promiscuous use, 722.
provisions, 722, 723, 724.
various articles by treaty, 724.
general principles, 727.
recent practice as to what goods are contraband, 730.
contraband trade no breach of neutrality, 735, 769.
persons and despatches, 179.
874 INDEX.
CONTKABAND OF WAR—continued.
ships, 735.
coals and machinery, 736.
food, 736.
in Russo-Japanese war, 737.
at the Hague Conference, 738.
absolute contraband, 739.
conditional contraband, 740.
free list, 741.
continuous voyag-e and destination, 742 seq. (See Continuous
Voyage.)
penalty for carrying, 751.
effect of ignorance, 753 .
handing over contraband to belligerent warship, 754.

CONTRACTS, validity abroad, 146 seq.
obligation of, 233.
form, 233.
-
CONTRIBUTIONS OF WAR, 534.
CONVERSION of merchantmen, 551 seq.
CONVOY, 792 seq.
COPENHAGEN, treaty of (1701), 296.
CORFU, 635.
CORPORATIONS, as objects of international law, 34.
COURTS-MARTIAL, 523.
CRACOW, a former independent State, 52.

neutrality of, 634.
CRETE, 120. .
CRIMEAN WAR, 478, 503, 547, 642, 770, 771, 774, 793.
CRIMES committed on vessels in foreign waters, 163 seq.
CUBA, Spanish expeditions against, 67.3.

position of, 63.
CUBAN INSURRECTION, 89.
CUMBERLAND, on utility as basis of international law, 4.
CUSTOMS LEGISLATION, 286.
D'AGUESSEAU, use of term 'droit des gens,' 17,
DANUBE, the, 308.

Commission, 309.
DARDANELLES, 292 seq., 303, 304.
DEAD, treatment of the, 486.

INDEX. 875
DEBTS, public, effect of change of Sovereign, 46.

effect of war on, 417 seq., 424 seq.
DECLARATION of Brussels (1874), 477.
London (1909), 25, 571, 572, 573, 578, 616, 639,
738, 745, 752, 761, 770, 771,
772, 773, 777, 780, 787, 793,
798, 800.
(1885), 322.
Paris (1856), 25, 547, 568, 569, 570, 713, 731,
773, 793.
St. Petersburg (1868), 25, 470, 473, 495, 496,
498, 503.
of war, 412 seq. (See War.)
'DEFENDED' places and bombardment, 508.
DEFENSIVELY armed merchantmen, 553.
DESPATCHES, enemy military, transport by neutrals of, 758.
diplomatic, 760.
of neutral correspondents, 763.
DEVASTATION and destruction, 504 seq.

when ravaging territory is lawful, 506.
DILIGENCE, due, of neutrals, 686.

DIPLOMACY, language used in, 265.
DIPLOMATIC precedence, 333.
DISCOVERY, by, 269.
title
DIVORCES, foreign, 236 seq.

validity in England, 237.
DOMICILE, and personal property, 139 seq.

matrimonial, 144.
and residence, 241.
definitions of, 242.
of origin and of choice, 243.
change of, 244, 450.
residence in exterritorial community, 245.
acquisition of, 246.
in enemy country, 442 seq.
trade or war, 443 seq.
distinguished from allegiance, 449.
'DROIT d'auhaine; 136.
de retraite,* 137.
de detraction,' 137.
DROITS OF ADMIRALTY, 420.

DUM-DUM BULLETS, 496, 498.
EASTERN QUESTION, THE, 107 seq. (See also Turkey.)

EASTERN ROUMELIA, 115 seq.
876 INDEX.
'
EGYPT, 57.
. . .
status of, before British occupation, 57.

after British occupation, 58.
a British protectorate, 62.
EL ARISH, convention of, 515.
ELBE, THE, 308.
EMBARGO, 404, 406.

EMINENT DOMAIN, 268.
ENEMY, regular, meaning of, 65.

combatants on neutral merchantmen, 180.
persons on neutral merchantmen, 178 seq.
property within the territory, 417 seq.
merchantmen found in the ports, 422 seq.
debts due to, 424 seq.
trading with, 427 seq., 434 seq., 444 seq.
debts contracted with, 439.
contracts with, 441.
domicile or residence, effect of, 442 seq.
territory, produce of, 456 seq.
alien, meaning of, 463 seq.
locus standi of, 465 seq.
uniform, abuse of, 496.
property, during hostilities, 496, 504 seq.
legal rights and actions of, 497, 503.
compelling them to perform services in war, 497, 503.
under military occupation, 519 seq. (See Occupation, Military.)
treatment of property, 531 seq. (See Property, Enemy.)
property, under a neutral flag, 569.
character, 571.
merchantmen, 586. (See also Prizes.)
crews of, 567.
'
enemy ships enemy goods,' 702.

military persons, transport by neutrals of, 757, 764.
despatches, 759.
ENLISTMENT in foreign armies, 644 seq.
ENVOYS. (See Ambassadors.)
EQUALITY OF STATES, 51. (See also State.)

rights of equality, 261 seq.
as modified by compact and usage, 261.
royal honours, 262.
precedence, 262 seq.
ESPIONAGE, not prohibited, 510.

definition of, 510.
balloonists, 510.
penalty, 511.
EXCEPTIO REI JUDICATA, 204, 234.
EXCHANGE of prisoners of war, 477.
EXPANDING BULLETS, 496, 498.
INDEX. 877
EXPATRIATION, 247 seq.

in various countries, 250 seq.
EXPLOSIVE BULLETS, 496, 498.
EXTERRITORIALITY, doctrine of, 165 seq.

operation of a criminal sentence, 203.
of ambassadors, etc., 338.
of Sovereigns, 151, 153.
EXTRADITION OF CRIMINALS, 187 seq.

by the United States constitution, 189.
English practice, 189.
United States practice, 191.
French practice, 192.
what criminals are liable, 193 seq.
political refugees, 193.
political offences, 194.
treaties, 189, 200 seq.
surrender by a State of its own subjects, 202.
FAMILY HONOUR, rights, etc., to be respected by belligerents,

531.
FEDERAL UNIONS, 73. (See also Alliances; United States;

German Confederation; Swiss Confederation.)
FISHERY, right of, 287, 300.

convention between Great Britain and France, 287.
Great Britain and United States, 287^
369 seq.
further disputes between Great Britain and United States,
290.
Great Britain and France, 291.
FISHING BOATS, 563.
FLAG, false, use of, 579.

of truce, rules as to, 517.
abuse of, 496, 500, 501.
enemy, use of, 501.
and nationality, 572.
F(EDERA, 377.
FORCED GUIDES, 530.

FOREIGN ENLISTMENT ACT, 645, 674, 681.
FOREIGNERS. (See Aliens.)
•FORMOSA, blockade of, 736, 775.
'
FORTIFIED '
places and bombardment, 508.
FRANCO-CHINESE WAR, 688.

^78 INDEX.
FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 473, 475, 482, 499, 508, 509, 510, 529,
530, 537, 544, 548, 568, 570, 571, 623, 635, 642, 648, 649, 650,
652, 653, 665, 685, 688, 696, 731, 752, 771, 775.
'
FREE SHIPS FREE GOODS,' 702 seq.
FRENCH REVOLUTION WARS, 93. (See Napoleonic Wars.)
FUGITIVES. (See Political Refugees.)
on foreign vessels, 165.
and pirates, 196.
FULL POWER, 336.
FUNDS, private, 537.
OASES, asphyxiating, 496, 499.

GENEVA Conventions (1864, 1906), 25, 485 seq., 509, 554 seq.
cross. (See Red Cross.)
GENTILIS, on dominion of the sea, 298.
GERMAN EMPIRE since 1871. ..79.
GERMANIC CONFEDERATION, 57, 74.

GERMANIC EMPIRE, the former, 57.
GHENT, treaty of (1814), 312, 370, 393, 809.
GLADSTONE, Mr., on loan to Spanish Pretender, 642.
GOOD FAITH in war, 477, 501, 512, 514, 518.

GOOD OFFICES, 396.
GOVERNMENTS, de facto and de jure, 36.
GRANT, SIR WILLIAM, on municipal ordinances, 26.
-GRAY, Mr. JUSTICE, on authority of jurists, 23.

GREAT WAR OF 1914... 62, 90, 388, 416, 424, 441, 462, 475, 476,
480, 482, 484, 498, 499, 500, 502 n., 507, 509, 525, 527, 529,
534, 536 n., 537, 544, 545, 548, 553, 554, 555, 558, 560, 564, 565,
571, 573, 575, 576, 579, 580, 587, 622, 623, 627, 641, 643, 653,
665, 698, 735 n.
GREECE, intervention by great Powers, 102 seq., 114, 119.

Greek war (1897), 120 seq.
GREEK war of independence, 642.
'GROTIUS, on origin of international law, 2.

distinguishes law of nations from natural law, 3.
how differs from Wolf, 9.
and modern manuals of war law, 30.
sovereignty over a portion of the sea, 172, 298.
inviolability of ambassadors, 349.
casus foederis, 381.
INDEX. 879
GB.OTIVS—continued.
good faith towards enemies, 512.
Convention of the Caudine Forks, 515.
conduct of invaders, 519.
capture and infra prmsidia, 593.
the term 'neutrals,' 628.
neutral goods on enemy vessel, 701.
classification of contraband, 715, 725, 726.
blockade, 767.
GUARANTEE, treaty of, 70, 378 seq.
GUERILLA WARFARE, 476.

GUIDES, forced, 530.
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE (1899), 395, 471. (And passim.)

(1907), 395, 471. (And passim.)
HALE, SIR MATTHEW, 524.
HANOVER, 70.
HARCOURT, SIR W., on intervention, 91.
HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY (1901), 326, 690, 691, 696.
HAYTI, blockade of, 775.
HEFFTER, work of, 12, 519.

on branches of jus gentium, 12.
HERZEGOVINA, 111, 122.
HIGH SEA. (See Sea.)
HISTORIC MONUMENTS, in war, 509, 540.
HOBBES, on law of nature and law of nations, 5.
HOLLAND, Belgic revolution, 121, 380.
HOLLAND, PROF., whether prisoners of war may be employed in

building fortifications, 480.
HOOKER, on meaning of law, 16.
HOSPITAL SHIPS, 554 seq., 742.
HOSPITALS, in war, '509. (See Sick and Wounded.)
HOSTAGES, and execution of treaties, 389.

taken by military occupant, 544.
HOSTILE AID. (See Unneutral Service.)
HOVERING ACTS, 286.

880 INDKX.
IMPRESSMENT of seamen, 173.
INCITING enemy soldiers to desert, etc., 503.
INDEPENDENCE, recognition of, 39 seq., 43.

examples of, 43.
as to internal government, 125.
as to choice of rulers, 126.
as to legislation, 131 seq,
as to procedure, 151.
as to judicial power, 184 seq.
INDIA, native States in, 69.
INDIANS, North American, 66 seq.
INDIVIDUALS, objects of international law, 34.
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 520, 730.
INSURGENTS, carrying on war at sea, 206.

and belligerency, 212.
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 391 seq. (See Arbitration.)
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS, 393, 394, 396.
INTERNATIONAL LAW, origin of, 1.

from what authority derived, 1.
absence of positive sanction, 1, 404.
distinguished from natural law, 3.
distinguished from international morality, 4, 16.
utility the basis of, 4.
as derived from reason and usage, 6.
voluntary, conventional, and customary law, 11.
use of the term, 13.
distinction between public and private, 13, 131.
there is no universal, 14.
as true law, 15.
definition of, 22.
sources and evidences of, 22 seq.
authority of text- writers, 22.
and municipal law, 27 seq.
objects of, 34.
violations of, how punished, 478.
INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT, proposed, 616 seq.

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTORATES. (See Protectorates.}
INTERNMENT of prisoners of war, 479.
of belligerents, 647.
of belligerent vessels, 697.
INTERVENTION, right of, 90 seq.

legal aspect of, 91.
examples of, 92 seq., 127, 810.
INVASION. (See Occupation, Military.)
IONIAN ISLANDS, 52.
INDEX. 881
JAPAN, and the society of States, 20.
JAY TREATY (1794), 368, 375, 393.
JEFFERSON, on contraband trading, 735.
JENKINS, SIR LEOLINE, opinions on Prize causes, 30.

'King's Chambers,' 659.
contraband, 718.
JUDGMENTS in rem, foreign, conclusiveness of, 226 seq.
in personal actions, conclusiveness of, 234 seq.
JURISDICTION, of consuls. (See Consular Jurisdiction.)

over criminal offences committed abroad, 184 seq.
over property within the territory, 224 seq.
over vessels on the high seas, 172 seq.
territorial, and foreign Sovereign, 151, 153.
ambassador, 152, 154. (See also .4m-
bassadors.)
army or fleet, 152, 155.
private vessels, 163, 168 seq.
offences on, 163 seq.
public vessels, 170.
and crime, 185. (See also Extradition.)
and property, 224 seq.
and foreigners, 228 seq.
and torts committed abroad, 232.
maritime jurisdiction, 282 seq., 302 seq.
JUS, use of the term, 15.

and lex, 15.
JUS DETRACTUS, 137.
JUS FECIALE, 18.

JUS GENTIUM, meaning of, 3, 12, 13.
JUS INTER GENTES, 17.
JUS POSTLIMINII, 48, 446, 539, 593, 596, 807.
KARLSTAD, treaty of (1905), 70.

'KING'S CHAMBERS,' 285, 659.
KLUBER, on binding power of treaties, 361.
KOREA, 68.
treaty with Japan, 68.
'
KRIEGSBRAUCH IM LANDKRIEGE,' the German war manual,

31, 475, 481, 482, 497, 506, 508, 649, 652.
'
KRIEGSMANIER,' 498.
'
KRIEGSRAISON,' 498.
'
KRIEGSVERRATH' (war treason), 528.

W. 56
882 INDEX.
LAW, Austinian sense, 16.

Hooker on meaning of, 16.
LEE, GENERAL, attitude towards civilians, 473.
LEGAL RIGHTS and actions of the enemy, 497, 503.
LEGATION, rights of, 329 seq. (See Ambassadors.)
LEGISLATION, State's exclusive right of, 131 seq.
LEIBNITZ, utility as basis of international law, 4.
LETTERS OF CREDENCE, 335.
LEVY en masse, 474.

LEX DOMICILII, 139, 143, 145, 148, 225, 230.
effect on universal successions, 141.
and divorce, 238 seq.
LEX FORI, 151, 225, 230.
LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS, 146, 233.

LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS, 144, 146, 147, 148, 151, 230, 233.
effect on personal property, 144.
LEX LOCI REI SITM, 134, 135, 136, 143, 145, 147, 224, 227.
LEX SITUS, 135.

LIBRARIES, in war, 509.
LICENSE to trade in time of Avar, 435 seq., 518.

authority to grant, 436.
vitiation of, 437.
LION AND SUN, THE, 492.
LIS FIN IT A, 236.
LOANS to belligerents by neutrals, 642.
LOCCENIUS, rule of tAventy-four hours' possession, 594.
LOCUS STANDI of enemy aliens, 465 seq.
LONDON, Declaration of. (See Declaration.)

treaty of (1827), 103.
(1832), 105 n.
(1841), 293, 305.
(1871), 109, 112, 294, 309.
(1883), 309.
LOU VAIN, 509.
LUNJEVILLE, treaty of (1800), 805.
LUXEMBURG, neutrality of, 635.

INDEX. 883
MACKINTOSH, SIE J., on intervention and defeiioo. 105.

devastation in war, 505.
martial law, 524.
foreign enlistment, 645.
McLELLAN, GENERAL, attitude towards civilians, 473.
MADISON, on force of treaties, 24.

MADRID, treaty of, 804.
MAGELLAN, STRAITS OF, 292.
MAIL BOATS, 561. =
MAINE, SIR HENRY, on war manuals, 30.
MALINES, 509.
MANILA, capitulation of, 516.

MANUALS OF THE USAGES OF WAR, 30, 471, 481.
the German manual, 31, 475, 481, 482, 497, 506, 508, 528,
649, 652.
MARINE league, 282, 303. (See also Territorial Waters.)

ordinance of Louis XIV., 700, 791.
ordinances, 26, 701, 791.
MARITIME capture and enemy character, 568 seq.
restrictions on, 561 seq.
liens, 575.
sovereignty. (See Sea.)
territorial jurisdiction, 282 seq., 660.
ceremonials, 266.
MARRIAGES, foreign, 147 seq.

capacity to marry, 148.
polygamous, 150.
of British subjects abroad, 150.
MARSCHALL VON BIEBERSTEIN, 626.
MARSHALL, CHIEF JUSTICE, on relation of international to

municipal laAv, 28.
MARTENS, on binding poAver of treaties, 362.

MARTIAL LAW, 522 seq.
MATRIMONIAL DOMICILE, 144.
MAYENCE, treaty of, 311.
MEDIATION, 125 seq., 390, 391, 396.
MERLIN, on inviolability of ambassadors, 351.
MEXICO, intervention in (1861), 123.
MILITARY law, 522.

necessity, 497, 502, 524, 532.
and authority of occupying army, 522.
occupation. (See Occupation, Military.)
operations, meaning of, 503.
56 (2)
884 INDEX.
MINES, submarine, 623 seq.
MISSISSIPPI, THE, 312 seq.
MIXED COMMISSION, 393, 394, 396, 612, 613.
MOLDAVIA, 54.
MONACO, 55.
MONEOE DOCTRINE, 97 seq.
MONTESQUIEU, on existence of law of nations, 14.
MUNICIPAL LAW, and international law, 25, 27 seq.
MUSEUMS, in war, 509.
NAPOLEONIC WARS, 540, 547, 553, 563, 606, 630, 759, 773, 793.
NAPOLEON'S Berlin and Milan decrees. 614.
NATIONALITY, effect of birth in various countries, 138.
NATIONAL CHARACTER, distinguished from domicile and alle-
giance, 241 seq.

acquisition of, 246.
incidents of, 246.
expatriation, 247 seq.
who are natural-born British subjects, 247.
who are citizens of the United States, 249.
American certificates of naturalization, 252 seq.
and Continental military service, 256 seq., 259.
of ships, 459.
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN STATES, 32 seq.
NATURAL LAW, definition of, 2.

applied to intercourse of States, 3.
distinguished from positive or voluntary law of nations, 4.
distinguished from international law, 3.

and use of force, 468.
NATURALIZATION, 143.
in America, 252 seq.
treaty between Great Britain and United States, 254.
in Germany, 258.
in France, 258.
NAVAL PRIZE ACT, 753.
NEGOTIATION, rights of, 357 seq. (See Treaties.)
NECESSITY, MILITARY. (See Military Necessity.)

-
INDEX. 885
NEUTRAL maritime jurisdiction, extent of, 660.

claims on captured vessels, 575.
flag, use of, by belligerents, 580.
port, prizes in, and belligerent Prize Courts, 604.
NEUTRALITY, conception of, 628.

different species of, 628, 639.
perfect, 629, 639.
imperfect, 629, 639.
of Belgium, 633.
Switzerland, 632.
Cracow, 634.
Luxemburg, 635.
conventional or guaranteed, 635.
and limited alliance with a belligerent, 637.
and previous treaty stipulations to a belligerent, 638.
fundamental principles of, 639, 643.
in land warfare, 639 seq.
passage through neutral territory, 640.
wireless telegraphy stations in neutral territory, 641.
export of arms, etc., 642.
loans to belligerents, 642.
levying troops, 643.
arming and equipping vessels, 644.
internment of belligerents, 647 seq.
neutral persons, 650.
neutral property, 653.
in maritime warfare, 653 seq.
respect of neutral waters, 654.
captures in neutral waters, 654.
Prize Courts in neutral territory, 662.
neutral port as base of operations, 663.
supply of warships, etc., 664.
fitting out vessels in neutral ports, 666 seq.
American neutrality laws, 666 seq.
English neutrality laws, 674 seq.
belligerent vessels in neutral ports, 686 seq.
rules of various countries, 687 seq.
neutral impartiality, 689.
twenty-four hours' stay, 690.
number allowed, 691.
twenty-four hours' interval, 691.
repairs in neutral ports, 692.
increase of armaments, 693.
supply of provisions and fuel, 693.
prizes in neutral ports, 695.
prizes fitted out as ships of war, 696.
internment of belligerent vessels, 697.
neutral commerce and belligerent rights, 698 seq.
neutral vessels on the high seas, 698.
distinction between public and private vessels, 699.
enemy goods on neutral vessels, 700, 711.
neutral goods on enemy vessels, 700.
'
free ships free goods,' 702 seq.

contraband of war, 714 seq. (See Contraband.)
unneutral service, 754 seq. (See Unneutral Service.)
886 INDEX.
JîEJJTRALlTY— continued.
trade of neutrals closed to them in time of peace, 765.
the 'rule of the war of 1756 '...765.
blockade, 767 seq. (See Blockade.)
—
right of visit and search convoy, 789 seq. (See Visit and
Search.)
destruction of neutral prizes, 799 seq.
NEUTRALIZATION, of Luxemburg, 380.

of Belgium, 380.
of Switzerland, 629.
NEWFOUNDLAND, fishery rights, 369, 374. (See Fishery.)

NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS with belligerents, 482, 511.
NIMIGUEN, treaty of (1678), 704.
NON-HOSTILE INTERCOURSE between enemies, 512 seq.
NOOTKA SOUND, dispute between Great Britain and Spain as to,

271 seq.
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, 66 seq.

NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION, 78.
NORTH SEA INCIDENT, 29.

NORTH-WEST COAST OF AMERICA, dispute between United
States and Russia, 272 seq.
OCCUPATION, 268 seq.

of the African coast, 281.
OCCUPATION, MILITARY, 519 seq.

when territory is considered occupied, 520.
and conquest, 520.
and sovereignty, 520, 537.
authority of military occupant, 522 seq.
military law and martial law, 522 seq.
' '
war crimes and war treason,' 528 seq.

'
occupation and the local law, 529.

forcing population to give information, 530.
to take oath of allegiance, 530.
family honour, 531.
private property, 531.
pillage, 533.
contributions and requisitions, 534.
treatment of property, 536 seq.
penalties imposed by occupant, 543.
hostages, 544.
ORDINANCES OF STATES, and international law, 25
OREGON TERRITORY, claim to, 276.
OUCHY, treaty of (1912), 65.
INDEX. 887
PACIFIC BLOCKADE, 408.
PANAMA CANAL, 324 seq., 690, 691, 771.
PAPACY, THE, 5Q.

the former Papal States, 124.
PARIS, declaration of. (See Declaration.)

treaty of (1763), 88, 317, 705, 719.
(1783), 312.
(1814), 311, 541.
(1815), 632.
(1856), 19, 25, 109, 111, 112, 293, 294, 305, 308, 390.
PAROLE, release of prisoners of war on, 481.

breach of, 481.
PASSPORTS, 518.
PAXO, 635.
PEACE, treaty of, 803 seq.

power to make, 803.
of Great Britain, 805.
of a confederation, 805.
effects of treaty of, 806.
principle of uti possidetis, 807.

effect of restoration of territory, 807.
date of operation, 808.
continuance of hostilities after treaty, 808.
breach of the treaty, 810.
how resulting- disputes adjusted, 810.
PERFIDY. (See Good Faith; Treacherous Conduct.)
PERSONA STANDI IN JUDICIO, 429.

PHILANTHROPIC MISSION, ships charged with, 565.
PILLAGE, 533.
PIRACY, under the law of nations, 204 seq.

ingredients of, 204.
and commissioned cruisers, 205.
triable everywhere, 205.
distinguished from piracy under municipal law, 206.
insurgents carrying on war at sea, 206.
rebels without a commission, 207.
PIRATES, and organized societies, 65.
PO, THE, 308.
POISON, 496.
POISONED WEAPONS, 496, 499.

POLAND, 72, 73.
POLITICAL REFUGEES, 193. (See Extradition.)
POLIZZA, 55.
888 INDEX.
POPE, THE. (See Papacy.)
PORTSMOUTH, treaty of (1905), 484.

PORTUGAL, British intervention in, 101.
POSITIVE LAW OF NATIONS, 4.
POSTAL CORRESPONDENCE, 561.
POSTLIMINIUM, 539.
POTHIER, neutral goods on enemy vessels, 701.
PRECEDENCE among princes and States, 262 seq,
PRE-EMPTION, practice of, 753.
PRESCRIPTION, 268, 521.
PRISONERS OF WAR, 476 seq.

former treatment, 476.
Hague rules, 477.
treatment of, 478.
internment, 479.
labour, 479.
maintenance of, 480.
discipline, 480.
escape, 480.
release on parole, 481.
exchange, 482.
who may be made, 482.
bureau of information, 483.
relief societies, 483.
privileges, 483.
on neutral territory, 649.
PRIVATEERS, 547, 596.

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, distinguished from public,
^
13, 131.
fundamental principles, 131 seq.
no obligation as to foreign laws, 132.
comity of nations, 133.
(See also under various heads, e.g., Domicile; National
Character; Extradition, etc.)
PRIVATE PROPERTY. (See Property.)
PRIZES, in foreign waters, 171.
capture of, 579 seq., 654.
booty and prize, 581.
how capture is effected, 583.
joint capture, 584.

duties of captors, 585.
destruction of, 586.
recapture and salvage, 589 seq.
in neutral ports, 695.
prizes fitted out as ships of war, 696.
destruction of neutral, 799.
INDEX. 889
PRIZE COURTS, 604 seq.

jurisdiction of, 605.
effect of unjust sentence of, 606.
locality of, 606.

and municipal tribunals, 607 seq.
procedure, 615.
proposed international Prize Court, 616 seq.
in neutral territory, 662.
PROCEDURE, judicial, right to regulate, 151.
PROPERTY situated in a State, regulation of, 143, 224 seq. (See

also Enemy Property ; Prizes, etc.)
personal property, 143.
succession to, 225.
of foreign Sovereigns, and local jurisdiction, 161. (See also
Ships.)
a State's rights of, 268 seq.
eminent domain, 268.
prescription, 268.
conquest and discovery, 269.
disputes as to boundaries, etc., 272 seq.
maritime territory, 282 seq.
indemnity for private loss, 804.
enemy, under military occupation, 531 seq.
contributions and requisitions, 534.
confiscation of private property, 531 seq.
pillage, 533.
general treatment of, 536 seq.
State movable property, military material, etc.,
536 seq.
submarine cables, 538.
immovable State property, 539 seq.
private, on sea and on land, 568.
title to, captured in war, 580.
captured, ransom of, 587.
recapture and salvage, 589.
neutral, 653.
on enemy vessels, 700.
destruction of neutral prizes, 800.
enemy, on neutral vessels, 700.
PROTECTORATES, international, examples of, 51.

Egypt a British protectorate, 62.
PROVISIONS AND FUEL, supply of, to beUigerent ships in neutral

ports, 693.
PUFENDORF, on law of nature and law of nations, 5.

dominion of the sea, 299.
PYRENEES, treaty of (1659), 704.
QUARTER IN WAR, 496, 502.

890 INDtlX.
RANSOM bills, 806.

contracts, 519.
of captured property, 587.
REALIZABLE SECURITIES, 536.
REAY, LORD, proposed classification of public vessels, 546.

RECAPTURES AND SALVAGE, 589.
RED CRESCENT, THE, 492.
RED CROSS, 492.

flag-, 492, 493, 496, 501, 502, 556.
REFUGEES, political, 193. (See Extradition.)

BELIEF SOCIETIES, for prisoners of war, 483.
for sick and wounded, 489.
RELIGIOUS MISSION, ships charged with, 565.
REIMS, 509.
REPAIRS of belligerent
shi^s in neutral ports, 692.
REPRISALS, 405.
effect,406.
in war, 470.
and unjust sentence of Prize Court, 606.
REQUISITIONS in war, 535, 621.
RES ADJUDICATA, 234.
'RES ANCIPITIS VSUS; 715, 755.
RES SACRM, 531.
RESIDENCE and domicile, 241.

in a foreign State, 245, 246.
in enemy territory, 442 seq.
RETORSION, 404.
RHINE, THE, 310.
RIGHTS OF STATES. (See State; Self-preservation; Indepen-

dence; Legislation, etc.)
RIVERS, 305 seq.

territorial, 305.
international, 306 seq.
rights as to, 306.
African, 320.
ROBERTS, LORD, attitude towards non-combatants, 473.
ROESKILD, treaty of (1658), 295.
ROME, French garrison in, 124.
ROUMANIA, 54.
INDEX. 891
ROUMELIA. (See Eastern Roumelia.)
EOUSSEAU, war a relation between States, 473.
ROYAL HONOURS enjoyed by States, 262.

'RULE OF 1756 '...765.
RUSES OF WAR, 497, 500.
RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, LORD, on meaning of international
law, 17, 22.
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904), 473, 475, 476, 480, 483 n., 484,
487, 488, 492, 500, 503, 511, 528, 529, 550, 557, 562, 564, 623,
642, 656, 665, 688, 689, 690, 692, 694, 737, 738, 758, 763, 764,
769 n., 770, 799.
RUSSO-SWEDISH WAR (1788), 637, 664.
RUSSO-TURKISH WAR (1877), 176, 587, 623, 775.
RUTHERFORTH, on sovereignty over the high sea, 172.

jurisdiction of Prize Courts, 609 seq.
RYSWICK, treaty of (1697), 704.
SAFE-CONDUCT, 518.
SALE of belligerent ships to neutrals, 576 seq.
SALVAGE AND RECAPTURE, 589 seq.

SAN LORENZO EL REAL, treaty of, 312.
SAN MARINO, 55.
SAN STEFANO, treaty of (1878), 113, 115 n.
SANCTION in international law, 1, 404.
SARPI, on dominion of the sea, 299.
SAVAGE TROOPS, use of, 476.
SAVIGNY, on significance of international law, 18.
SCHELDT, THE, 307.

redemption of tolls, 307.
SCIENCE BUILDINGS, in war, 509, 540.
SCIENTIFIC MISSION, ships charged with, 565.
SEA, HIGH, jurisdiction over, 172 seq.

claims to portions of, 291 seq. (See also Fishery.)
straits, 292.
Black Sea, Bosphorus, and Dardanelles, 292.
controversy as to dominion of, 298 seq.
SELDEN, on dominion of the sea, 298.

892 INDEX.
and extraterritorial acts, 89.
87.
^''SELF-PKESERVATION, right of,
SEMI-SOVEKEIGN STATES, 51.
SERBIA, 54, 111, 115, 120.
SERBO-BULGARIAN WAR, 120.
SEVEN YEARS' WAR, 515.
SHERMAN, view as to lawful belligerents, 475.
SHIPS, distinction between public and private, 157, 165, 699.

kinds of public ships, 546.
private ships and local jurisdiction, 163.
merchant vessels in foreign ports, 168 seq.
public vessels and local jurisdiction, 170 seq.
on the high sea, jurisdiction, 172.
national character, 459.
o^vnership of British, 461.
protected in war, 561 seq.
enemy merchantmen, crews of, 567.
belligerent, sale of, to neutrals, 567 seq.
belligerent, in neutral ports, 686. (See also Neutrality.)
SHIPS OF WAR in foreign ports, jurisdiction, 156 seq.
'SHORE,' meaning of, 284.
SICK AND WOUNDED, 484 seq.

Geneva Conventions, 485, 494, 495.
treatment, 485.
protection of medical units, 488.
personnel, 489.
aid societies, 489.
material, 491.
convoys of evacuation, 491.
in maritime war, 554 seq.
in neutral territory, 649.
SIEGE AND BLOCKADE, distinction between, 770.
SIEGES AND BOMBARDMENTS, 507 seq.

undefended places, 507, 620.
previous warning, 508.
protected buildings, 509, 622.
naval bombardment, 619 seq.
aerial bombardment, 622.
SILESIAN LOAN. (See in Index to Cases.)
SLAVE TRADE, and law of nations, 213 seq.

treaties for suppression, 213.
•
SLAVES, FUGITIVE, 222 seq.
on foreign ships, 167, 223.
INDEX. 893
SOVEREIGN princes as objects of international law, 34.

within territory of another State, 151, 153.
property of, 161.
suits by, 162.
States. (Se& State.)
SOVEREIGNS, titles of, 265.
SOVEREIGNTY, defined, 34.

how acquired, 35.
recognition of, 37.
and occupation, 520, 537.
over the sea. (See Sea.)
SOUND, THE, and Danish sovereignty, 295.

abolition of dues, 296.
SOUTH AFRICAN WAR, 473, 475, 478, 482, 487, 490, 498, 500,
507, 528, 531, 544, 570, 640, 651, 734, 745, 749.
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL, intervention in, 127.
SPANISH- AMERICAN WAR(1898), 476, 482. 498, 538, 548, 550,

562, 569, 623, 651, 688, 732, 774, 777, 778.
SPANISH-CHILE WAR, 671, 688.
SPANISH-MEXICAN WÂR (1825), 665.
SPIES. (Sec Espionage.)
SPONSIONS, 358, 515.
ST. PETERSBURG, Declaration of (1868), 25, 470, 473, 495, 496,

498, 503.
treaty of, between United States and Russia (1824), 274.
treaty of (1801), 707.
ST. LAWRENCE, THE, 315 seq.

'
STAATENBUND,' 73.
STATE, difference between State and individual, 10.

difference between State and nation, 33.
definition of a, 32.
and sovereignty, 34 seq.
identity of, 37.
and revolution, 37.
effects of change of sovereign, 45 seq.
on treaties, 45.
public debts, 46 seq.
public domain and private rights of property, 48 seq.
wrongs and injuries, 50.
dismemberment of, by treaty, 804.
sovereign States defined, 50.
equality of, 51.
semi-sovereign States, 51 seq.
894 INDEX.
STATE—continued.
tributary and vassal States, 64 seq.
single or united, 69.
real and personal unions, 70.
incorporate unions, 72.
federal unions, 73 seq.
absolute international rights, 87 seq.
(See also Independence ;
Equality; Property, etc.)
property in war, 536 seq. (See Property, Enemy.)
'STATE OF SIEGE,' 525. {Sqq Martial Law .)

STATUS, personal, 142 seq.
STOWELL, LOED, on law of nations and usage, 5.
STRAITS, claims to jurisdiction over, 292.

territorial straits and sounds, 303.
STEASSBURG LIBRARY, 509.
SUBMARINE cables, 538.

mines, 623 seq.
SUEZ CANAL, 321 seq.
"Convention, 323, 690, 691, 696, 771.
SUITS by foreign Sovereigns, 162.
SUZERAINTY, States under, 51.
SWISS CONFEDERATION, 84.

neutrality of, 629.
TAXES, collection of, by military occupant, 534.

TERMONDE, 509.
TERRITORIAL WATERS, 282 seq., 302 seq.
Jurisdiction Act, 283.
extension of three-mile belt, 283.
meaning of 'coasts' and 'shore,' 284.
ports, mouths of rivers, etc., 302.
marine league, 303.
straits and sounds, 303.
'THALWEG,' 305.
THIRTY YEARS' WAR, 473.
TILSIT, treaty of (1807), 707.
TORTS committed in a foreign country, jurisdiction, 232.
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY, 427 seq. (See also License to

Trade.)
TRANSFERS in transitu, 614:. (See also Sale.)

INDEX. 895
TEEACHEROUS CONDUCT towards enemies, 496, 500, 512.
TREATIES AND NEGOTIATION, 357 seq.

power of making, 357.
form, 357.
cartels, truces, and capitulations, 358.
sponsions, 358.
binding power, 358 seq.
when sovereign may refuse to ratify, 363.
when treaties begin to bind, 364, 366.
treaty-making and municipal law, 365. *
freedom of consent and validity, 367.
kinds, 368 seq., ^11.
effect ofwar on, 371.
dissolution of, 377 seq.
revival of, 378.
conventions of guarantee, 378 seq.
alliances, 380 seq.
interpretation of, 389, 390.
TREATIES, as source of international law, 24.

effect of change of sovereign, 45.
personal and real, 45.
as to arbitration, 392, 401.
as to extradition, 189, 200 seq.
as to naturalization, 254.
of mediation, 125.
of peace. (See Peace.)
of guarantee, 70, 125, 635.
TREATY of Adrianople (1829), 54, 105, 305.

Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), 88, 382, 705, 719.
(1818), 94, 332.
Amiens (1802), 706.
Berlin (1878), 55, 108, 114, 294, 305, 811.
Bucharest (1886), 116.
Christianople (1645), 295.
Constantinople (1885), 59.
(1887), 60.
(1888), 323, 326.
Copenhagen (1701), 296.
France-Austria (1756), 379.
France-China (1885), 68.
France-Morocco (1912), 63.
Germany- Austria (1879), 388.
Germany-Austria-Italy (1882), 389.
Ghent (1814), 312, 370, 393, 809.
Great Britain-China (1886), 68.
Great Britain-Denmark (1841), 296.
Great Britain-Denmark, etc. (1857), 296.
Great Britain-France (1839), 287.
(1903), 401.
(1904), 62, 324.
Great Britain- Japan (1902, etc.), 388.
896 INDEX.
TREATIES— continued.
Great Britain- Portugal (1642, 1654, 1661, 1703, 1810), 385
seq., 704, 712.
(1891), 640.
Great Britain- Russia (1801), 719, 773.
(1812), 707.
Great Britain- Sweden (1661), 720.
Great Britain-United States (1783), 368, 370 seq.
(1794), 368, 375, 393, 612, 708,
724, 728, 781.
^ (1818), 279, 377.
(1827), 280.
(1846), 2&0.
(1850), 325.
(1854), 319.
(1862), 214.
(1870), 254.
(1873), 287.
(1901), 326, 690, 691, 696.
(1909), 320.
Japan-Korea (1904), 68.
Karlstad (1905), 70.
London (1827), 103.
(1832), 105 n.
(1841), 293, 305.
(1871), 109, 112, 294, 309.
(1883), 309.
Luneville (1800), 805.
Madrid, 804.
Mayence (1831\ 311.
Nimiguen (1678), 704.
Ouchy (1912), 65.
Paris (1763), 88, 317, 705, 719.
(1783), 312.
(1814), 311, 541.
(1815), 632.
390.
(1856), 19, 25, 109, 111, 112, 293, 294, 305, 308,
Portsmouth (1905), 484.
Pyrenees (1659), 704.
Roeskild (1658), 295.
Ryswick (1697), 704.
San Stefano (1878), 113, 115 n.
St. Petersburg (1801), 707.
Tilsit (1807), 707.
United States-Denmark (1830), 613.
United States-France (1778), 708.
United States-Panama (1903), 327.
United States-Prussia (1785), 709.
(1828), 137, 710.
United States-Russia (1824), 274.
United States-Spain (1795), 702.
(1819), 711.
Utrecht (1713), 88, 382, 634, 704, 719.
Versailles (1783), 706, 719.
Vienna (1815), 52, 72, 308, 316, 332. 630, 810.
WangHiya (1844), 181.
INDEX. 897
TREATIES— continued.
Washington (1842), 174, 195.
(1843), 200.
(1871), 24, 281, 289, 319, 666, 693, 698, 783.
(1892), 301.
(1897), 269.
(1903), 275.
Westminster (1678), 381.
Westphalia (1648), 93, 125, 307, 329, 629.
Zurich (1815), 632.
TEIBUTARY STATES, 64.
TRIPOLI, 65.
TRUCE, 358, 512 seq.

rules as to, 517.
flag- of,
abuse of, 496, 500, 501.
TUNIS, 65.
TURCO-ITALIAN WAR (1912), 621, 764.

TURKEY and Egypt, 58 seq. (See also Eastern Question.)
and Greece, 102 seq., 120 seq.
intervention in, 105 seq.
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS' interval, 691.

stay, 690.
possession, 806.
ULTIMATUM, 414, 415.

recent instances of, 416, 417.
UNIFORM OF ENEMY, abuse of, 496, 501.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as a Confederation, 80 seq.
Monroe doctrine, 97 seq.
hegemony on American continent, 100.
neutrality laws, 666 seq.
UNIVERSAL successions to property, 141.
UNNEUTRAL SERVICE, 754 seq.

'hostile aid,' 755.
transport of military persons, 757.
despatches, 758, 759, 760.
enemy civil officials, 758.
lesser offences, 761.
more serious offences, 762.
enemy combatants on neutral vessels, 764.
'USELESS MOUTHS' in sieges, 508.
UTI POSSIDETIS, principle of, 807.
UTILITY, as basis of international law, 4.
UTRECHT, treaty of (1713), 88, 382, 634, 704, 719.

w. 57
898 INDEX.
'"VALEURS EXIGIBLES: 6S7.
VALIN, 605.
neutral goods on enemy vessels, 701.
VATTEL, system of, 9.

relation to Wolf, 9.
domain of a nation, 172.
dominion of the sea, 299.
inviolability of ambassadors, 349,
surety and guarantee, 379.
reprisals, 406.
devastation, 504.
interpretation of truce, 513.
Convention of the Caudine Forks, 515.
rights of occupation, 519.
contraband, 715, 725.
visit and search, 791.
VENEZUELA boundary dispute, 395.

preferential claims against, 399.
ports, blockade of, 777.
VERSAILLES, treaty of (1783), 706, 719.
VESSELS. (See Ships.)
VIENNA, treaty of (1815), 52, 72, 308, 316, 332, 630, 810.
VISIT AND SEARCH, right of, 789 seq.

customary law, 790 seq.
convoy, -793.
neutral goods in an armed enemy vessel, 794.
neutral vessels under enemy's convoy, 795 seq.
Declaration of London on convoy, 798.
VISTULA, THE, 308.
VOLUNTARY law of nations, 4, 6, 8.

and conventional law, 8.
VOLUNTEER NAVY, 548.
WALLACHIA, 54.
WANG HIYA, treaty of (1844), 181.
WAR, forcible measures short

of, 404 seq. (See also under different
headings that follow.)
embargo, 404, 406.
forcible possession, 404.
INDEX. 899
WAR— continued.
forcible measures short of —continued.
retorsion, 404.
reprisals, 405 seq., 407.
pacific blockade, 408.
right to make, 410.
pubKc or solemn, 410.
perfect or imperfect, 411.
civil, 411.
declaration of, 412 seq.
cases without declaration, 413.
in civil war, 414.
recent examples, 414.
Hague rules (1907), 415.
immediate effects of, 417 seq.
enemy property found within the territory, 417 seq.
enemy merchantmen found in the ports, 422 seq.
debts due to the enemy, 424 seq.
trading with the enemy, 427 seq., 434 seq., 462 seq.
by allied subjects, 440 seq.
quitting hostile territory at outbreak of war, 432, 447.
debts contracted between enemies, 439.
contracts with neutrals to be performed in enemy terri-
tory, 439.
contracts with enemy, 441.
persons domiciled in enemy territory, 442 seq.
trade or war domicile, 443 seq.
meaning of 'alien enemy,' 463 seq., 465 seq.
produce of the enemy's territory, 456 seq.
rights of war as between enemies, 468 seq.
fundamental principles, 468 seq., 495.
when reprisals justifiable, 470.
Hague regulations, 471 seq.
persons exempt from acts of hostility, 472.
who are lawful belligerents, 47Sêq.
prisoners of war, 476 seq.
sick and wounded, 484 seq.
means of injuring the enemy on land, 495 seq.
devastation, 504 seq.
sieges and bombardments, 507 seq.
espionage and 'war crime,' 510 seq.
non-hostile intercourse, 512 seq.
truce and armistice, 512.
capitulations for surrender, 514.
military occupation, 519 seq.
military and martial law, 522 seq.
' ' '
war crimes and war treason,' 528 seq.
occupation and the local law, 529.
exacting unlawful information and oath of alle-
giance, 530.
family honour, rights, etc., 531.
private property, 531.
pillage, 533.
collection of taxes, 534.
contributions, 534.
requisitions, 535.
900 .
INDEX.
WAR —continued. —
rights of war as between enemies continued.
—
militaiy occupation continued.
treatment of property generally, 536 seq. (See
Property, Enemy.)
penalties imposed by occupant, 543 seq.
hostages, 544.
maritime warfare, 546 seq.
lawful belligerents, 546 seq.
sick, wounded, etc., 554 seq.
restrictions on maritime capture, 561 seq.
maritime capture and enemy character, 568 seq.
Prize Courts, 604 seq.
naval bombardment, 619 seq.
aerial bombardment, 622 seq.
and neutrals, 628 seq. (See Neutrality.)
WARS. (See under different names, e.g., Franco -German War;

South African War; Russo-Japanese War; Great War (1914),
etc.)
WASHINGTON, rules of the treaty of, 676.

treaty of (1842), 174, 195.
(1843), 200.
(1871), 24, 281, 289, 319, 666, 676, 693, 698, 783.
^1892), 301.
(1897), 269.
(1903), 275.
WATER SUPPLY, cutting off enemy's, 500.
WEAPONS, poisoned, 496, 499.
WEBSTER, DANIEL, on necessity of self-defence, 89, 641.
WELLINGTON, treatment of civilians, 473.

conduct of troops, 519.
martial law, 527.
WEST AFRICAN CONFERENCE, 281.
WESTBURY, LORD, on national character and domicile, 241.
WESTLAKE, PROF., whether prisoners of war may be employed

to build fortifications, 480.
WESTMINSTER, treaty of (1678), 381.
WESTPHALIA, treaty of (1648), 93, 125, 307, 329, 629.
WICQUEFORT, on inviolability of ambassadors, 349.

on binding power of treaties, 360.
WILLS, and domicile, 140 seq.

of British subjects made abroad, 141.
made in England, 142.
how carried into effect abroad, 225.
of prisoners of war, 484.
INDEX. 901
WIRELESS telegraphy stations on neutral territory, 641.

messages of neutral correspondents, 763.
WOLF, system of, 8.

how differsfrom Grotius, 9.
relation to Vattel, 9.
WOUNDED. (See Sick and Wounded.)
YPRES, 509.
ZOLLVEREIN, the, 80.
ZOUCH, on jus" inter gentes, 17.
ZURICH, treaty of (1815), 632.
LONDON: PRINTED BY G. F. ROWORTH, 88, FETTER LANE. E.G.
w. 58
GENERAL LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—BERKELEY
RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED
This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the
date to which renewed.
Renewed books are subject to immediate recall.
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International Law by Wheaton's Elements

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E"^

FIFTH ENGLISH EDITION,

published in 1836, in two editions, one appearing in

sixth) was edited by W. B. Lawrence, and published in

Boston ; a second edition by the same editor appeared in

1863, also in Boston. The next issue, in 1864, teas a

one, edited by R. H. Dana, 1866, Boston. The first

prepared the second and the third edition, the latter in

REVISED THROUGHOUT, CONSIDERABLY ENLARGED

COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, M.A., LL.D., Litt.D.,

Author of " " " The Law

STEVENS AND SONS, LIMITED,

New York: BAKER, VOOEHIS & CO.

The present edition contains extensive additions, as well

position of a good deal of the matter has been rearranged

subjects that have now lost their importance; whilst

previous editionWheaton's case (involving a discussion

edition it lias been reduced to half a page. Thirteen

cerning the renewal of their treaty of 1785 now half a ;

page is devoted to it. On the contrary, in the previous

pages. The previous edition contained little or nothing

to an appendix, as was done before in the case of the

The preceding Wheaton's text throughout

and a uniform type, intermediate in size between that of

seemed, however, impossible to keep on preserving it in

necessarily adapted to the exigencies of time and place.

The have not only been retained

throughout, they have also been expanded here and

regard the work of earlier writers (such as Grotius,

justice to the earlier writers, especially so when their

predecessors, and frequently are not so well expressed ?

Examples of conduct in modern wars, as furnishing

during the present war have been referred to they ;

cannot, however, yet be considered as part of inter-

The number of cases has been increased by nearly

The table of contents and the index have been

work in one volume, owing to the adoption of a more

Another new feature of this edition is the Introduction

by Sir Frederick Pollock, to whom the editor owes a

debt of gratitude. The forcible observations of a writer

Definition and Sources of International Law.

Origin of International law 1

tary law of nations 9

Nations and Sovereign States.

Subjects of international law 32

Use of the terms Sovereign and State 34

Rights of Self-Preservation and Independence.

Rights of sovereign States with respect to one another ..". 87

Rights of Civil and Criminal Legislation.

Exclusive j)ower of legislation 131

Ca&e of The Trent 178

Independence of the State as to its* j udicial power 184

National Character and Domicile.

National character, domicile, and allegiance 241

allegiance of their subjects 254

Usage of the alternat 264

National proprietary rights ba.sis — 268

Papal Bull of 1493 270

Meaning of term coasts or shore 284

The former Hovering Acts 286