THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 157221 --- People of the Philippines, Appellee, versus Cesar
Galvez, Appellant.

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DISSENTING OPINION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing

circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually
committed in secret and under condition where concealment is highly
probable. If direct evidence is insisted under all circumstances, the
prosecution of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or
secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.[1]

In acquitting appellant Cesar Galvez (Galvez) based on reasonable doubt,

the ponencia reasoned that: (1) conspiracy was not alleged in the information, hence,
Galvez could only be held accountable for his individual acts; (2) the prosecution
witnesses never saw Galvez shoot the victim; and (3) the paraffin and ballistic tests
yielded negative results.

After a review of the evidence on record, I submit that there is sufficient

evidence to hold Galvez liable for attempted murder.

The ponencia relied on the testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses,

Wilfredo Rellios (Rellios) and Danilo Perez (Perez), that they did not actually see
Galvez shoot Enojarda. The ponencia thus required no less than direct evidence to
charge Galvez for the murder of Enojarda, and totally disregarded the circumstantial
evidence.
 It must be stressed, however, that direct evidence of the commission of the
offense is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt.[2] Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence
provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[3] While no general rule
can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in
a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.[4] The circumstances proved should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person.[5]

The case of Baleros, Jr. v. People[6] is instructive with respect to the positive
identification of the culprit through circumstantial evidence, to wit:

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and

not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of
the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may
identify a suspect or accused as the offender as an eyewitness to the very
act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct
evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness
may not have actually witnessed the very act of commission of a crime,
he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person
or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and
right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of
positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial
evidence. In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort
to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are
usually committed in secret and under condition where concealment is
highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted under all circumstances, the
prosecution of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or
secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to
prove.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
 In the instant case, Rellios and Perez testified that on July 27, 1991, at
around 11 p.m., they along with Enojarda and two other companions were seated in
a circle formation while eating merienda outside a copra kiln located in Lantawan,
Basilan. They had not brought a lamp in order not to draw attention to their group
given the peace and order situation in the area. Nonetheless, they were able to see
the food they were eating because the moon was bright. When Enojarda stood up to
drink water from a container located near the copra kiln, they heard a burst of gunfire
at which time Enojarda shouted that he was hit by a bullet and thereafter fell on the
ground. They did not know where the gunshots were coming from but they were
certain that the firing was directed at them. Upon hearing the burst of gunfire,
Rellios, Perez and their two companions ducked to seek cover. Rellios crawled
inside the copra kiln while Perez crawled towards the nearby bushes to hide. Their
other companions scampered away but they could no longer tell in what
direction. About five minutes after the first burst of gunfire, Rellios peeped from
where he was hiding in the copra kiln and saw Galvez armed with an armalite
rifle shooting at him and his companions and in the direction of the copra kiln:

Q: While you were taking your merienda a little bit outside from the copra
kiln, what happened next?
A: When Rosalio Enojarda stood up to drink water we heard shots.

Q: x x x [W]hat happened to Rosalio Enojarda?

A: He was hit, sir.

Q: How do you know that he was hit?

A: Because he shouted Dan ya tupa comigo, meaning Dan [referring to
the other prosecution witness Danilo Perez] I was hit.

Q: As a result of the shots that you heard and according to you your
companion Rosalio Enojarda was hit, what did you do?
A: We dropped to the ground.

Q: x x x [W]hat did you do next?

A: I crawled, sir. x x x

Q: When you were in a crawling position what happened?

A: When I was on that position I saw Cesar Galvez holding his gun
firing at us.
COURT: (To the witness) How far was he when you saw him shooting at
you?
A: Around five (5) meters Your Honor.

Q: In other words he was pointing his gun at you?

A: Yes, to all of us.

Q: Were you together with your companions when crawling?

A: No, your Honor, we were separated.

Q: How do you know they were being fired upon?

A: Because I saw him shooting at us.

FISCAL GENERALAO: (Continuing) x x x How were you able to

recognize him holding an armalite?
A: The moon was bright, sir. x x x

Q: Aside from the accused, Cesar Galvez, can you tell the Court whether
he was alone that time?
A: He had companions, sir.

Q: Were you able to recognize the companions?

A: No sir.

COURT (To the witness): Did you see what kind of firearms they were bringing?
A: No Your Honor because they were far.

Q: How far?
A: (Witness pointed to the door of the courtroom which has a distance of
approximately nine (9) meters)

Q: In other words you were able to identify Cesar Galvez bringing an armalite rifle?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

FISCAL GENERALAO: (Continuing) You stated there were several

shots that you heard, is that correct?
A: Yes sir.

Q: How do you know there were several shots?

A: I heard many shots, sir.
 Q: Aside from the shot that hit Rosalio Enojarda where else were (sic)
hit, if you know?
A: On the wall and the roof of the coconut kiln.

Q: After you recognize Cesar Galvez about five meters away from you,
what else did Cesar Galvez do, if any?
A: They left the place.[8] x x x

COURT: (To the witness) You said earlier when you heard the shot you
immediately dived and crawled?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: And you saw the accused after you already crawled inside the copra
kiln?
A: Yes.

Q: For how long have you seen the accused after the burst of
[gun]fire?
A: More or less five minutes.[9] (Emphasis supplied)

Rellios positively saw Galvez but he could not identify the other three armed
malefactors because they were farther away. About 20 to 25 minutes from the time
he heard the first burst of gunfire and after the gunfire had already stopped,
Perez also saw Galvez, armed with an M16 armalite rifle and wearing a fatigue
uniform, along with three armed companions, pass by the bushes where he was
hiding.[10]

The testimonies of Rellios and Perez sufficiently established the presence of

Galvez at the scene of the crime. Both also categorically declared that Galvez was
one of the four armed malefactors who attacked them and their companions that
fateful night in the copra kiln resulting in the death of Enojarda. Indeed, Rellios and
Perez did not see the persons who fired upon their group during the first burst of
gunfire which fatally hit Enojarda; however, considering all the attendant
circumstances, I find no other rational conclusion except that it was Galvez and his
three armed companions who shot them.
 There is no doubt that Galvez was present at the scene of the crime. Five
minutes after the first burst of gunfire, he was seen armed with an armalite rifle and
shooting in the direction of the copra kiln. He not only failed to explain and justify
his presence at the crime scene and his act of shooting in the direction of the copra
kiln, but raised the defense of alibi which was inherently weak and remained
uncorroborated.[11] He also refused to give his statement despite being summoned
three times by the police.[12] It is also worth noting that Perez, one of the prosecution
witnesses who positively identified Galvez, was a cousin of the latter. The Court of
Appeals found no ill-motive on the part of Perez, hence his positive identification of
Galvez is all the more convincing and credible.[13]

The combination of the aforementioned circumstances leads to no other

conclusion than that Galvez was among the four armed malefactors who fired upon
Enojarda and company at the copra kiln resulting in the death of
Enojarda. Lamentably, the prosecution charged Galvez in the information as the lone
principal for the murder of Enojarda.[14]As noted by the ponencia, the failure to
allege conspiracy in the information renders the indictment insufficient to hold one
accused liable for the individual acts of his co-accused and that each of them would
be held accountable only for their respective participation in the commission of the
offense in consonance with our rulings in People v. Tampis[15]and People v.
Quitlong.[16] More so in the instant case where the three John Does were not
indicted. Consequently, even if the evidence tends to show that Galvez acted in
conspiracy with the three John Does during the shooting incident, he cannot be made
liable for the acts of the three John Does.

I submit, however, that the prosecutions failure to allege conspiracy would

not completely absolve Galvez from any liability. For sure, Galvez cannot be held
liable for the acts committed by the three John Does, but he may definitely be made
to answer for the consequences of his own act. On this point, the case of People v.
Narciso[17] is instructive.

In Narciso, Rufino Pea along with Francisco Celso, Elias Gloria and Ramon
Narciso were charged with murder for the death of Roberto Monreal. However, the
prosecution failed to allege conspiracy in the information charging the four
accused. During the course of the trial, the case was dismissed as against Celso while
Gloria escaped prison and Narciso died. Thus, the case proceeded as against Pea
only. The trial court convicted Pea for murder and sentenced him to death. On
automatic review, this Court ruled

All the foregoing considered, there is no room for doubt that

accused Rufino Pea participated in the clubbing of Roberto Monreal inside
Cell 2-A of the city Jail of Manila on the night of July 10, 1961. The
writer is of the opinion, however, that said accused should not be
convicted of consummated murder, as charged in the information. x
x x The only evidence of his direct participation in the commission of the
crime was his own extra-judicial confession, a scrutiny of which, on the
other hand, would readily cast doubt as to whether the blow with the piece
of wood he delivered upon the victim as revealed in the said confession
could have been fatal. x x x

x x x The last wound was never described as fatal by the medico-legal

officer, both in his necropsy report and in his testimony during the trial.
And this wound, the way We look at it, could have been the one caused
by the accused Rufino Pea when he delivered the first blow upon the
victim, considering the evidence that at the time the victim was lying on
his back (tihaya) and the face was then covered with the blanket. The fatal
wounds at the back of the head may reasonably be attributed to the
succeeding blows delivered by any of the other accused who, as seen by
the eyewitness, struck at the victim while the man was laying on his belly
(nakadapa) with the head already exposed. x x x [I]f this were so, then it
would be safe to conclude that the superficial wound was the one that may
alone be attributed to accused Rufino Pea, considering the circumstances
that there was no allegation of conspiracy in the information, and the
defense had seasonably made objections to the introduction of evidence
tending to prove conspiracy, and which objections were all sustained by
the trial court. Neither did the court below make any finding of conspiracy
in the decision under review; for on the contrary it declared:

. . . It should be noted that in default of an allegation of

conspiracy, the herein accused is not found responsible for
the acts of his co-accused as his conspirators, but for his
individual participation for the death of the victim.

Rufino Pea should, therefore, be held liable only for the consequences of
his own act that of inflicting upon the person of the victim the superficial
wound above-mentioned.
 Intent to kill is apparent on the face of Rufino Peas own confession,
but he failed to hit the victim mortally, either because of his poor aim or
because he failed to apply the degree of force necessary. Whatever the
real cause is, there is no doubt that the injury he inflicted upon the victim
could not have produced the intended killing as a consequence; hence,
the stage of execution insofar as accused Pea is concerned, was merely
attempted.[18] (Emphasis supplied)

Preliminarily, it might be noted that in the Narciso case, all of the four accused were
charged in a single information while in the instant case Galvez is charged as the
lone principal in the information. This difference is, however, immaterial
considering that the Court in Narciso ruled that the failure to allege conspiracy in
the information would only make each accused liable for his individual participation
in the commission of the offense. Stated differently, the Court treated the four
accused in Narciso as if they were individually charged in separate informations
which is analogous to the instant case where Galvez is charged as the lone principal
in the information.

Due to the failure of the prosecution to allege conspiracy and indict the three
John Does in the information, the critical point of inquiry is Galvez individual
participation in the killing of Enojarda, i.e., whether the evidence prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Galvez was the one who shot and fatally wounded Enojarda.

I submit that there is reasonable doubt as to whether Galvez inflicted the fatal
gunshot wound.

The presence of Galvez three armed companions creates reasonable doubt as

to who among them fired the bullet which killed Enojarda. Any one of them could
have inflicted the fatal gunshot wound during the first burst of gunfire. As a result,
Galvez cannot be convicted of murder.

However, even if the circumstantial evidence does not prove beyond

reasonable doubt that Galvez was the one who inflicted the fatal gunshot wound
on Enojarda, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to hold that he was one
of the four armed malefactors who fired upon Enojarda during the first burst
of gunfire.Thus, insofar as Galvez is concerned, he may be held liable for attempted
murder similar to the penalty imposed on Pea in the Narciso case.

None of the prosecution witnesses actually saw Galvez shoot at

Enojarda. However, more or less five minutes after the first burst of gunfire, Galvez
was positively identified by Rellios as one of the assailants. He was armed with an
armalite rifle and was firing in the direction of the copra kiln. This provides a
sufficient link in the chain of events with respect to time and place necessary to
implicate Galvez in the shooting of Enojarda.

The manner by which Galvez and his three armed companions carried out the
attack shows their intent to harm not just Enojarda but all of the latters companions
as well.To ensure the success of their murderous assault, all members of Galvez
group would have to simultaneously fire upon the occupants of the copra kiln during
the first burst of gunfire.

Galvez was identified by Rellios barely five minutes after the first burst of
gunfire as the person nearest to the copra kiln. Because of his proximity,[19] Galvez
was in the best position to see, fire upon and hit Enojarda.

The gunfire started when Enojarda stood up to drink water thereby exposing
him to the attack. Given Galvezs proximity to the copra kiln vis--vis his companions,
it would be illogical, unnatural and unreasonable for us to conclude that Galvez
watched and stood idly by for the first five minutes while his three armed
companions, who were farther away, shot at Enojarda. A more reasonable and
logical interpretation of the circumstances in the instant case would lead us to the
fair conclusion that Galvez actively participated throughout the shooting
incident, i.e., (1) shooting, along with his three armed companions, at Enojarda
during the first burst of gunfire when the latter was fatally hit; (2) shooting five
minutes into the incident when he was identified in the act of shooting in the
direction of the copra kiln; and, (3) shooting up until the gunfire died down.

Aside from the direct evidence which established that Galvez was shooting in
the direction of the copra kiln about five minutes after the first burst of gunfire when
Enojarda was fatally hit, the evidence also showed that Enojarda died of hemorrhage
due to one gunshot wound;[20] that he was hit by a bullet at his left abdomen;[21] and
that the bullet came from an M16 armalite rifle. [22] Thus, it may be reasonably
inferred that at the time Galvez was seen shooting in the direction of the copra kiln,
Enojarda was on the copra kilns floor bleeding to his eventual death. This act of
shooting when viewed as a continuation of Galvez initial participation during the
first round of gunfire would, likewise, support a conviction for the attempted murder
insofar as Galvez is concerned because it was still possible for Galvez to hit Enojarda
in the head, heart or lungs while the latter lay bleeding on the copra kilns floor.

Of course, it is always possible to hypothesize that Galvez did not fire upon
Enojarda because all that the direct evidence show is that he was shooting in the
direction of the copra kiln about five minutes after the first burst of gunfire in the
company of three armed individuals. Yet, it must not be forgotten that in a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence, absolute certainty is not required and that, in
making reasonable inferences, we are always guided by logic, reason and the
common experience of humankind.

Under American jurisprudence, various tests have been adopted to determine

the amount of circumstantial evidence necessary to justify a conviction in a criminal
case:

Although there are a variety of tests by which courts assess the

sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, there appear to be factors in
common among the tests, such as the trier of fact's ability to decide
among reasonable interpretations of the evidence and the fact that the
evidence need not be absolutely conclusive of guilt or demonstrate the
impossibility of innocence. One such test for the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the people, and giving it the benefit of every reasonable
inference, the facts from which the inference of defendant's guilt are
drawn are inconsistent with innocence and exclude, to a moral certainty,
every other reasonable hypothesis. Another test, frequently stated in
conjunction with the first, is whether the evidence is strong enough to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Stated differently,
circumstantial evidence can provide the basis to support a conviction, but
it must be consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any
other reasonable conclusion, or so strong and convincing as to exclude
everyreasonable hypothesis except the defendant's guilt and must exclude
 any reasonable hypothesis of defendant's innocence.[23] (Emphasis
supplied)

In other words, a possible hypothesis of innocence cannot be the basis for acquittal
but only some reasonable hypothesis thereof. This is but a logical consequence of
the basic precept that in all criminal prosecutions, the prosecution must prove all the
elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt. As a corollary, acquittal will not
lie based on a mere possible or imaginary doubt. Rather, any doubt as to the guilt of
an accused must always satisfy the reasonable doubt standard.

Thus, I find that the circumstantial evidence in the instant case proves beyond
reasonable doubt that Galvez was one of the four armed malefactors who fired upon
Enojarda during first burst of gunfire. Further, his intent to kill may be deduced from
the kind of weapon he used as well as the manner of shooting he
employed. Treachery is, likewise, present due to the suddenness of the attack and
the use of the cover of darkness in mounting the attack. Thus, there is sufficient
evidence to hold him liable for attempted murder only because, as previously
discussed, there is reasonable doubt as to whether he inflicted the fatal gunshot
wound on Enojarda.

Before discussing the proper penalty to be imposed, I wish to address certain

evidence interpreted by the ponencia as tending to establish the innocence of
Galvez, to wit: (1) the negative finding of the paraffin test, (2) the negative finding
of the ballistic test, and (3) the seeming lack of motive on the part of Galvez in killing
Enojarda.

The ponencia gave weight to the negative results of the paraffin test to establish that
Galvez was not involved in the shooting incident. It stated that the principle
espoused by this Court in People v. Pagal[24] and People v. Teehankee, Jr.[25] to the
effect that a negative finding on a paraffin test is not conclusive proof that one has
not fired a gun is not applicable to the instant case because Galvez was not
positively identified as the perpetrator of the crime. The ponencia seems to imply
that the aforesaid principle is only applicable to cases where the accused was
positively identified as the perpetrator of the crime, and considering that Galvez was
not positively identified, the negative result of the paraffin test bolsters his claim that
he did not shoot Enojarda.
Preliminarily, it must be pointed out that Galvez was positively identified through
circumstantial evidence as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Be that as it may, the
Courts rulings in the Pagal and Teehankee, Jr. cases on the inconclusiveness of the
paraffin test are not contingent on the positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime. What this Court has long recognized is that the paraffin
test, by itself, is inconclusive to establish whether a person did in fact fire a
gun. Thus, it was in held in Teehankee, Jr. that

[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has x x
x proved extremely unreliable in use, and that the only thing it can
definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the
hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the
nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. x x x In numerous
rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about
the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when
the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time
of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman
at the time of firing.[26]

In short, the negative finding of the paraffin test cannot be used to prove either
the guilt or innocence of an accused because of the unreliability of the test
itself. Thus, it would be erroneous to use the results of this test to establish
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Galvez, as the ponencia did.

Neither can the negative ballistic tests prove that Galvez did not participate in
the shooting incident. The conduct of the aforesaid test
was unreliable and irregular. Defense witness Lemuel Caser, who conducted the
ballistic examination, could not establish whether the four empty shells compared
with the test bullets fired from the M16 armalite rifle issued to Galvez by the
Philippine National Police (PNP) were recovered from crime scene or the cadaver
of the victim. As to who collected the aforesaid empty shells as well as when and
where they were collected, he could not say.[27] Consequently, the ballistic test
cannot be given any probative weight.

Be that as it may, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the

negative results of the ballistic tests would not exculpate Galvez considering that he
may have used a different firearm in the shooting incident. On this point,
the ponencia argues that it is the prosecution which has the burden of proving that
Galvez used a different firearm. I beg to disagree. The ponencia might have
overlooked the fact that the prosecution, to begin with, never claimed that Galvez
used his PNP-issued armalite rifle during the shooting incident. Thus, even
assuming arguendo that the ballistic test is reliable, the same cannot exculpate
Galvez because it does not absolutely foreclose the possibility that he used another
M16 armalite rifle during the shooting incident.

Finally, anent the seeming lack of motive on the part of Galvez to kill
Enojarda, the record shows that Perez testified that he had no misunderstanding with
Galvez and that he does not know any motive why Enojarda was killed. However, it
must be pointed out that during the trial, the defense on the cross-examination of
Perez tried to establish that the location of the copra kiln in Lantawan, Basilan was
a place of abductors.[28] Further, Perez admitted on cross-examination that he and his
companions did not bring a lamp while they worked and ate that fateful night in the
copra kiln in order not to attract attention to their group given the unstable peace and
order situation in that area.[29]Considering that Galvez was then an active member of
the police force and, in fact, he had just arrived from a military operation a day prior
to the shooting incident,[30] and that he was seen clad in a fatigue uniform during the
shooting incident, it is not far fetched to surmise that the shooting may have been
precipitated by the erroneous assumption by Galvez and his three armed companions
that Enojarda and company were rebels or terrorists because the latter were spotted
in the copra kiln at so late at night and without a lamp. This is not to say, of course,
that if the latter were indeed rebels or terrorists, Galvez and his companions would
be justified in their attempt to massacre them. Instead, it is merely to recognize the
sad reality that protracted armed conflicts bring out the worst in human beings and,
more often than not, innocent civilians are the casualties thereof.

The more important point to be made is that motive is not as important in the
instant case vis--vis other criminal cases decided by this Court based on
circumstantial evidence because Galvez was seen firing in the direction of the copra
kiln merely minutes after the first burst of gunfire when Enojarda was fatally hit and
fell to ground. Galvez motive in firing at Enojarda and company is not as vital
because his intent to kill, as reasonably deduced from the circumstantial evidence,
is readily apparent. Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of the
offense on which his conviction rests.

Going now to the proper penalty, attempted murder is punished by a penalty

lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony which,
in this case, is prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
considering that no aggravating circumstances were alleged and proved,[31] nor can
any mitigating circumstances be appreciated in favor of Galvez, the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty should be anywhere within the range of prision correccional,
while the maximum should be prision mayor medium. Galvez should further be
required to pay the heirs of Enojarda P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[32] In addition, he
should be made to pay P25,000.00 as exemplary damage because the aggravating
circumstance of armed band, although not alleged in the information was proved
during the trial, and the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure on December 1, 2000 in line with our ruling in People
v. Catubig.[33]

In closing, it is worth noting that the conclusions reached here are consistent
with the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent as well as the
concomitant burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt both of which are rooted on the fundamental principle of due
process in the Constitution.However, like the accused, so too is the State and the
offended party entitled to due process such that when the guilt of the accused is
proved beyond reasonable doubt, his conviction must follow as a matter of
course. Indeed, the great goal of our criminal law and procedure is not to send people
to jail but to render justice. This justice is, however, always only for the deserving.

ACCORDINGLY, appellant Cesar Galvez is found guilty of Attempted

Murder and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which is two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional minimum and the maximum of
which is ten (10) years of prision mayor medium. He should, likewise, be ordered
to pay the heirs of EnojardaP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.