Berris Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Abyadang

2/13/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 633
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr.,*** Leonardo-De Castro,**** Brion***** and

Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Note.—Persons guilty of any improper conduct pending,

directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice may be punished for indirect
contempt. (Racines vs. Morallos, 547 SCRA 295 [2008])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 183404. October 13, 2010.*
BERRIS AGRICULTURAL CO., INC., petitioner, vs.

NORVY ABYADANG, respondent.
Mercantile Law; Law on Trademarks; Words and Phrases;

Definition of a “Mark”; “Collective Mark” and “Trademark”.—R.A.
No. 8293 defines a “mark” as any visible sign capable of
distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of
an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of
goods. It also defines a “collective mark” as any visible sign
designated as such in the application for registration and capable
of distinguishing the origin or any other common characteristic,
including the quality of
_______________
*** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per

Special Order No. 897 dated September 28, 2010.
**** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad per

Special Order No. 905 dated October 5, 2010.
***** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta per

Special Order No. 904 dated October 5, 2010.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000168eaee1afa2b512638003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/18
* SECOND DIVISION.
197
VOL. 633, OCTOBER 13, 2010 197
Berris Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Abyadang
goods or services of different enterprises which use the sign under

the control of the registered owner of the collective mark. On the
other hand, R.A. No. 166 defines a “trademark” as any distinctive
word, name, symbol, emblem, sign, or device, or any combination
thereof, adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant on his
goods to identify and distinguish them from those manufactured,
sold, or dealt by another. A trademark, being a special property, is
afforded protection by law. But for one to enjoy this legal
protection, legal protection ownership of the trademark should
rightly be established.
Same; Same; The ownership of a trademark is acquired by its
registration and its actual use by the manufacturer or distributor
of the goods made available to the purchasing public.—The
ownership of a trademark is acquired by its registration and its
actual use by the manufacturer or distributor of the goods made
available to the purchasing public. Section 122 of R.A. No. 8293
provides that the rights in a mark shall be acquired by means of
its valid registration with the IPO. A certificate of registration of
a mark, once issued, constitutes prima facie evidence of the
validity of the registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the
mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the same in
connection with the goods or services and those that are related
thereto specified in the certificate. R.A. No. 8293, however,
requires the applicant for registration or the registrant to file a
declaration of actual use (DAU) of the mark, with evidence to that
effect, within three (3) years from the filing of the application for
registration; otherwise, the application shall be refused or the
mark shall be removed from the register.
Same; Same; Two tests in determining similarity and
likelihood of confusion—the Dominancy Test and the Holistic or
Totality Test.—In determining similarity and likelihood of
confusion, jurisprudence has developed tests—the Dominancy
Test and the Holistic or Totality Test. The Dominancy Test
focuses on the similarity of the prevalent or dominant features of
the competing trademarks that might cause confusion, mistake,
and deception in the mind of the purchasing public. Duplication or
imitation is not necessary; neither is it required that the mark
sought to be registered suggests an effort to imitate. Given more
consideration are the aural and visual impressions created by the

marks on the buyers of goods, giving little weight to factors like
prices, quality, sales outlets, and market
198
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
segments. In contrast, the Holistic or Totality Test necessitates a

consideration of the entirety of the marks as applied to the
products, including the labels and packaging, in determining
confusing similarity. The discerning eye of the observer must
focus not only on the predominant words but also on the other
features appearing on both labels so that the observer may draw
conclusion on whether one is confusingly similar to the other.
Remedial Law; Administrative Agencies; Administrative
agencies, such as the Intellectual Property Office (IPO), by reason
of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under
their jurisdiction are in a better position to pass judgment thereon;
Their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great
respect, if not finality by the courts, as long as they are supported
by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.—The protection of
trademarks as intellectual property is intended not only to
preserve the goodwill and reputation of the business established
on the goods bearing the mark through actual use over a period of
time, but also to safeguard the public as consumers against
confusion on these goods. On this matter of particular concern,
administrative agencies, such as the IPO, by reason of their
special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their
jurisdiction, are in a better position to pass judgment thereon.
Thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded
great respect, if not finality by the courts, as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might
not be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of
the appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted
before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment
for that of the administrative agency in respect to sufficiency of
evidence.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Saludo, Fernandez, Aquino & Taleon Law Offices for
petitioner.
Frances C.M. Aguindadao for respondent.
199
VOL. 633, OCTOBER 13, 2010 199

NACHURA,** J.:
This petition for review1 on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the Decision dated
April 14, 20082 and the Resolution dated June 18, 20083 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99928.
The antecedents—
On January 16, 2004, respondent Norvy A. Abyadang
(Abyadang), proprietor of NS Northern Organic Fertilizer,
with address at No. 43 Lower QM, Baguio City, filed with
the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) a trademark
application for the mark “NS D-10 PLUS” for use in
connection with Fungicide (Class 5) with active ingredient
80% Mancozeb. The application, under Application Serial
No. 4-2004-00450, was given due course and was published
in the IPO e-Gazette for opposition on July 28, 2005.
On August 17, 2005, petitioner Berris Agricultural Co.,
Inc. (Berris), with business address in Barangay Masiit,
Calauan, Laguna, filed with the IPO Bureau of Legal
Affairs (IPO-BLA) a Verified Notice of Opposition4 against
the mark under application allegedly because “NS D-10
PLUS” is similar and/or confusingly similar to its
registered trademark “D-10 80 WP,” also used for
Fungicide (Class 5) with active ingredient 80% Mancozeb.
The opposition was docketed as IPC No. 14-2005-00099.
After an exchange of pleadings, on April 28, 2006,
Director Estrellita Beltran-Abelardo (Director Abelardo) of
the IPO-
_______________
** In lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Special Order No.

898 dated September 28, 2010.
1 Rollo, pp. 9-36.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate
Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo, concurring; id.,
at pp. 63-75.
3 Id., at pp. 101-102.
4 Id., at pp. 104-117.
200
BLA issued Decision No. 2006-245 (BLA decision), the

dispositive portion of which reads—
“WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of all the foregoing, this

Bureau finds and so holds that Respondent-Applicant’s mark “NS
D-10 PLUS” is confusingly similar to the Opposer’s mark and as
such, the opposition is hereby SUSTAINED. Consequently,
trademark application bearing Serial No. 4-2004-00450 for the
mark “NS D-10 PLUS” filed on January 16, 2004 by Norvy A.
Ab[yada]ng covering the goods fungicide under Class 5 of the
International Classification of goods is, as it is hereby,
REJECTED.
Let the filewrapper of the trademark “NS D-10 PLUS” subject
matter under consideration be forwarded to the Administrative,
Financial and Human Resources Development Services Bureau
(AFHRDSB) for appropriate action in accordance with this Order
with a copy to be furnished the Bureau of Trademark (BOT) for
information and to update its records.
SO ORDERED.”6
Abyadang filed a motion for reconsideration, and Berris,

in turn, filed its opposition to the motion.
On August 2, 2006, Director Abelardo issued Resolution
No. 2006-09(D)7 (BLA resolution), denying the motion for
reconsideration and disposing as follows—
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for

Reconsideration filed by the Respondent-Applicant is hereby
DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT. Consequently, Decision No.
2006-24 dated April 28, 2006 STANDS.
Let the filewrapper of the trademark “NS D-10 PLUS” subject
matter under consideration be forwarded to the Bureau of
Trademarks for appropriate action in accordance with this
Resolution.
SO ORDERED.”8
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 118-124.

6 Id., at p. 124.
7 Id., at pp. 125-126.
8 Id., at p. 126.
201
VOL. 633, OCTOBER 13, 2010 201

Aggrieved, Abyadang filed an appeal on August 22, 2006

with the Office of the Director General, Intellectual
Property Philippines (IPPDG), docketed as Appeal No. 14-
06-13.
With the filing of the parties’ respective memoranda,
Director General Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr. of the IPPDG
rendered a decision dated July 20, 2007,9 ruling as follows
—
“Wherefore, premises considered[,] the appeal is hereby

DENIED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the Director is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Let a copy of this Decision as well as the trademark application
and records be furnished and returned to the Director of Bureau
of Legal Affairs for appropriate action. Further, let also the
Directors of the Bureau of Trademarks, the Administrative,
Financial and Human Resources Development Services Bureau,
and the library of the Documentation, Information and
Technology Transfer Bureau be furnished a copy of this Decision
for information, guidance, and records purposes.
SO ORDERED.”10
Undeterred, Abyadang filed a petition for review11

before the CA.
In its Decision dated April 14, 2008, the CA reversed the
IPPDG decision. It held—
“In sum, the petition should be granted due to the following

reasons: 1) petitioner’s mark “NS D-10 PLUS” is not confusingly
similar with respondent’s trademark “D-10 80 WP”; 2) respondent
failed to establish its ownership of the mark “D-10 80 WP” and 3)
respondent’s trademark registration for “D-10 80 WP” may be
cancelled in the present case to avoid multiplicity of suits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated
July 20, 2007 of the IPO Director General in Appeal No. 14-06-13
(IPC No. 14-2005-00099) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 127-135.

10 Id., at pp. 134-135.
11 Id., at pp. 37-61.
202

new one is entered giving due course to petitioner’s application for

registration of the mark “NS D-10 PLUS,” and canceling
respondent’s trademark registration for “D-10 80 WP.”
SO ORDERED.”12
Berris filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but in its June

18, 2008 Resolution, the CA denied the motion for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition anchored on the following
arguments—
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals’ finding that there exists no

confusing similarity between Petitioner’s and respondent’s marks
is based on misapprehension of facts, surmise and conjecture and
not in accord with the Intellectual Property Code and applicable
Decisions of this Honorable Court [Supreme Court].
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals’ Decision reversing and setting
aside the technical findings of the Intellectual Property Office
even without a finding or, at the very least, an allegation of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of said agency is not in accord with
law and earlier pronouncements of this Honorable Court [Supreme
Court].
III. The Honorable Court of Appeals’ Decision ordering the
cancellation of herein Petitioner’s duly registered and validly
existing trademark in the absence of a properly filed Petition for
Cancellation before the Intellectual Property Office is not in
accord with the Intellectual Property Code and applicable
Decisions of this Honorable Court [Supreme Court].13
The basic law on trademark, infringement, and unfair

competition is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 829314 (Intellectual
_______________
12 Id., at p. 74.
13 Id., at p. 15.
14 An Act Prescribing the Intellectual Property Code and Establishing
the Intellectual Property Office, Providing for Its Powers and Functions,
and for Other Purposes.
203
VOL. 633, OCTOBER 13, 2010 203

Property Code of the Philippines), specifically Sections 121

to 170 thereof. It took effect on January 1, 1998. Prior to its
effectivity, the applicable law was R.A. No. 166,15 as
amended.
Interestingly, R.A. No. 8293 did not expressly repeal in

its entirety R.A. No. 166, but merely provided in Section
239.116 that Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent with it
were repealed. In other words, only in the instances where
a substantial and irreconcilable conflict is found between
the provisions of R.A. No. 8293 and of R.A. No. 166 would
the provisions of the latter be deemed repealed.
R.A. No. 8293 defines a “mark” as any visible sign
capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services
(service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped
or marked container of goods.17 It also defines a “collective
mark” as any visible sign designated as such in the
application for registration and capable of distinguishing
the origin or any other common characteristic, including
the quality of goods or services of different enterprises
which use the sign under the control of the registered
owner of the collective mark.18
On the other hand, R.A. No. 166 defines a “trademark”
as any distinctive word, name, symbol, emblem, sign, or
device, or any combination thereof, adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant on his goods to identify and
distinguish
_______________
15 An Act to Provide for the Registration and Protection of

Trademarks, Trade Names and Service Marks, Defining Unfair
Competition and False Marking and Providing Remedies Against the
Same, and for Other Purposes.
16 Sec. 239. Repeals.—
239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more
particularly Republic Act No. 165, as Amended; Republic Act No. 166, as
amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code;
Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as
amended, are hereby repealed.
17 Sec. 121.1.
18 Sec. 12.2.
204

them from those manufactured, sold, or dealt by another.19

A trademark, being a special property, is afforded
protection by law. But for one to enjoy this legal protection,
legal protection ownership of the trademark should rightly
be established.
The ownership of a trademark is acquired by its

registration and its actual use by the manufacturer or
distributor of the goods made available to the purchasing
public. Section 12220 of R.A. No. 8293 provides that the
rights in a mark shall be acquired by means of its valid
registration with the IPO. A certificate of registration of a
mark, once issued, constitutes prima facie evidence of the
validity of the registration, of the registrant’s ownership of
the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the
same in connection with the goods or services and those
that are related thereto specified in the certificate.21 R.A.
No. 8293, however, requires the applicant for registration
or the registrant to file a declaration of actual use (DAU) of
the mark, with evidence to that effect, within three (3)
years from the filing of the application for registration;
otherwise, the application shall be refused or the mark
shall be removed from the register.22 In other words, the
prima facie presumption brought about by the registration
of a mark may be challenged and overcome, in an
appropriate action, by proof of the nullity of the
registration or of non-use of the mark, except when
excused.23 Moreover, the presumption may likewise be
defeated by evidence of prior use by another person, i.e., it
will controvert a claim of legal appro-
_______________
19 Sec. 38.
20 Sec. 122. How Marks are Acquired.—The rights in a mark shall be
acquired through registration made validly in accordance with the
provisions of this law.
21 R.A. No. 8293, Sec. 138.
22 R.A. No. 8293, Sec. 124.2.
23 Sec. 152. Non-use of a Mark When Excused.—
152.1. Non-use of a mark may be excused if caused by circumstances
arising independently of the will of the trademark owner. Lack of funds
shall not excuse non-use of a mark.
205
VOL. 633, OCTOBER 13, 2010 205

priation or of ownership based on registration by a

subsequent user. This is because a trademark is a creation
of use and belongs to one who first used it in trade or
commerce.24
The determination of priority of use of a mark is a

question of fact. Adoption of the mark alone does not
suffice. One may make advertisements, issue circulars,
distribute price lists on certain goods, but these alone will
not inure to the claim of ownership of the mark until the
goods bearing the mark are sold to the public in the
market. Accordingly, receipts, sales invoices, and
testimonies of witnesses as customers, or orders of buyers,
best prove the actual use of a mark in trade and commerce
during a certain period of time.25
In the instant case, both parties have submitted proof to
support their claim of ownership of their respective
trademarks.
Culled from the records, Berris, as oppositor to
Abyadang’s application for registration of his trademark,
presented the following evidence: (1) its trademark
application dated November 29, 200226 with Application
No. 4-2002-0010272; (2) its IPO certificate of registration
dated October 25, 2004,27 with Registration No. 4-2002-
010272 and July 8, 2004 as the date of registration; (3) a
photocopy of its packaging28 bearing the mark “D-10 80
WP”; (4) photocopies of its sales invoices and official
receipts;29 and (5) its notarized DAU dated April
_______________
24 Agpalo, R.E. The Law on Trademark, Infringement and Unfair

Competition, 1st Ed. (2000), pp. 8-11, citing Sterling Products
International, Inc. v. Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 27 SCRA
1214 (1969) and Chung Te v. Ng Kian Giab, 18 SCRA 747 (1966).
25 Agpalo, R.E. The Law on Trademark, Infringement and Unfair
Competition, 1st Ed. (2000), pp. 11-12.
26 CA Rollo, pp. 149-150.
27 Id., at p. 69.
28 Id., at p. 68.
29 Id., at pp. 72-73.
206

23, 2003,30 stating that the mark was first used on June 20,
2002, and indicating that, as proof of actual use, copies of
official receipts or sales invoices of goods using the mark
were attached as Annex “B”.
On the other hand, Abyadang’s proofs consisted of the
following: (1) a photocopy of the packaging31 for his
marketed fungicide bearing mark “NS D-10 PLUS”; (2)

Abyadang’s Affidavit dated February 14, 2006,32 stating
among others that the mark “NS D-10 PLUS” was his own
creation derived from: N — for Norvy, his name; S — for
Soledad, his wife’s name; D — the first letter for December,
his birth month; 10 — for October, the 10th month of the
year, the month of his business name registration; and
PLUS — to connote superior quality; that when he applied
for registration, there was nobody applying for a mark
similar to “NS D-10 PLUS”; that he did not know of the
existence of Berris or any of its products; that “D-10” could
not have been associated with Berris because the latter
never engaged in any commercial activity to sell “D-10 80
WP” fungicide in the local market; and that he could not
have copied Berris’ mark because he registered his
packaging with the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority
(FPA) ahead of Berris; (3) Certification dated December 19,
200533 issued by the FPA, stating that “NS D-10 PLUS” is
owned and distributed by NS Northern Organic Fertilizer,
registered with the FPA since May 26, 2003, and had been
in the market since July 30, 2003; (4) Certification dated
October 11, 200534 issued by the FPA, stating that, per
monitoring among dealers in Region I and in the Cordillera
Administrative Region registered with its office, the
Regional Officer neither encountered the fungicide with
mark “D-10 80 WP” nor did the FPA provincial officers
from the same area receive any report as to
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 193-194.

31 Id., at pp. 151-152.
32 Rollo, pp. 304-306.
33 Id., at p. 307.
34 Id., at p. 303.
207
VOL. 633, OCTOBER 13, 2010 207

the presence or sale of Berris’ product; (5) Certification

dated March 14, 200635 issued by the FPA, certifying that
all pesticides must be registered with the said office
pursuant to Section 936 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
114437 and Section 1, Article II of FPA Rules and
Regulations No. 1, Series of 1977; (6) Certification dated
March 16, 200638 issued by the FPA, certifying that the
pesticide “D-10 80 WP” was registered by Berris on

November 12, 2004; and (7) receipts from Sunrise Farm
Supply39 in La Trinidad, Benguet of the sale of Abyadang’s
goods referred to as “D-10” and “D-10+.”
Based on their proffered pieces of evidence, both Berris
and Abyadang claim to be the prior user of their respective
marks.
We rule in favor of Berris.
Berris was able to establish that it was using its mark
“D-10 80 WP” since June 20, 2002, even before it filed for
its registration with the IPO on November 29, 2002, as
shown by its DAU which was under oath and notarized,
bearing the stamp of the Bureau of Trademarks of the IPO
on April 25, 2003,40 and which stated that it had an
attachment as Annex “B” sales invoices and official receipts
of goods bearing the
_______________
35 CA Rollo, p. 205.

36 Sec. 9. Registration and Licensing.—No pesticides, fertilizer, or
other agricultural chemical shall be exported, imported, manufactured,
formulated, stored, distributed, sold or offered for sale, transported,
delivered for transportation or used unless it has been duly registered
with the FPA or covered by a numbered provisional permit issued by FPA
for use in accordance with the conditions as stipulated in the permit.
Separate registrations shall be required for each active ingredient and its
possible formulations in the case of pesticides or for each fertilizer grade
in the case of fertilizer.
37 Creating the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority and Abolishing The
Fertilizer Industry Authority.
38 CA Rollo, p. 204.
39 Id., at pp. 70-71.
40 Id., at p. 14.
208

mark. Indeed, the DAU, being a notarized document,

especially when received in due course by the IPO, is
evidence of the facts it stated and has the presumption of
regularity, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Thus, the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of
authenticity and due execution lies on the party contesting
it, and the rebutting evidence should be clear, strong, and
convincing as to preclude all controversy as to the falsity of
the certificate.41 What is more, the DAU is buttressed by

the Certification dated April 21, 200642 issued by the
Bureau of Trademarks that Berris’ mark is still valid and
existing.
Hence, we cannot subscribe to the contention of
Abyadang that Berris’ DAU is fraudulent based only on his
assumption that Berris could not have legally used the
mark in the sale of its goods way back in June 2002
because it registered the product with the FPA only on
November 12, 2004. As correctly held by the IPPDG in its
decision on Abyadang’s appeal, the question of whether or
not Berris violated P.D. No. 1144, because it sold its
product without prior registration with the FPA, is a
distinct and separate matter from the jurisdiction and
concern of the IPO. Thus, even a determination of violation
by Berris of P.D. No. 1144 would not controvert the fact
that it did submit evidence that it had used the mark “D-10
80 WP” earlier than its FPA registration in 2004.
Furthermore, even the FPA Certification dated October
11, 2005, stating that the office had neither encountered
nor received reports about the sale of the fungicide “D-10
80 WP” within Region I and the Cordillera Administrative
Region, could not negate the fact that Berris was selling its
product using that mark in 2002, especially considering
that it first
_______________
41 Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza, G.R. No. 185477, December 4, 2009,

607 SCRA 807, 816-817; Calma v. Santos, G.R. No. 161027, June 22, 2009,
590 SCRA 359, 371.
42 CA Rollo, pp. 64, 66.
209
VOL. 633, OCTOBER 13, 2010 209

traded its goods in Calauan, Laguna, where its business

office is located, as stated in the DAU.
Therefore, Berris, as prior user and prior registrant, is
the owner of the mark “D-10 80 WP.” As such, Berris has in
its favor the rights conferred by Section 147 of R.A. No.
8293, which provides—
“Sec. 147. Rights Conferred.—

147.1. The owner of a registered mark shall have the
exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s
consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs

or containers for goods or services which are identical or similar
to those in respect of which the trademark is registered where
such use would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the
use of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a likelihood
of confusion shall be presumed.
147.2. The exclusive right of the owner of a well-known mark
defined in Subsection 123.1(e) which is registered in the
Philippines, shall extend to goods and services which are not
similar to those in respect of which the mark is registered:
Provided, That use of that mark in relation to those goods or
services would indicate a connection between those goods or
services and the owner of the registered mark: Provided, further,
That the interests of the owner of the registered mark are likely
to be damaged by such use.”
Now, we confront the question, “Is Abyadang’s mark ‘NS

D-10 PLUS’ confusingly similar to that of Berris’ ‘D-10 80
WP’ such that the latter can rightfully prevent the IPO
registration of the former?”
We answer in the affirmative.
According to Section 123.1(d) of R.A. No. 8293, a mark
cannot be registered if it is identical with a registered mark
belonging to a different proprietor with an earlier filing or
priority date, with respect to: (1) the same goods or
services; (2) closely related goods or services; or (3) near
resemblance of such mark as to likely deceive or cause
confusion.
210


In determining similarity and likelihood of confusion,
jurisprudence has developed tests—the Dominancy Test
and the Holistic or Totality Test. The Dominancy Test
focuses on the similarity of the prevalent or dominant
features of the competing trademarks that might cause
confusion, mistake, and deception in the mind of the
purchasing public. Duplication or imitation is not
necessary; neither is it required that the mark sought to be
registered suggests an effort to imitate. Given more
consideration are the aural and visual impressions created
by the marks on the buyers of goods, giving little weight to
factors like prices, quality, sales outlets, and market
segments.43
In contrast, the Holistic or Totality Test necessitates a

consideration of the entirety of the marks as applied to the
products, including the labels and packaging, in
determining confusing similarity. The discerning eye of the
observer must focus not only on the predominant words but
also on the other features appearing on both labels so that
the observer may draw conclusion on whether one is
confusingly similar to the other.44
Comparing Berris’ mark “D-10 80 WP” with Abyadang’s
mark “NS D-10 PLUS,” as appearing on their respective
packages, one cannot but notice that both have a common
component which is “D-10.” On Berris’ package, the “D-10”
is written with a bigger font than the “80 WP.” Admittedly,
the “D-10” is the dominant feature of the mark. The “D-10,”
being at the beginning of the mark, is what is most
remembered of it. Although, it appears in Berris’ certificate
of registration in
_______________
43 Prosource International, Inc. v. Horphag Research Management SA,

G.R. No. 180073, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 523, 531; McDonald’s
Corporation v. MacJoy Fastfood Corporation, G.R. No. 166115, February
2, 2007, 514 SCRA 95, 106; McDonald’s Corporation v. L.C. Big Mak
Burger, Inc., 480 Phil. 402, 434; 437 SCRA 10, 32 (2004).
44 Id.; Philip Morris, Inc. v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, G.R. No.
158589, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 333, 357.
211
VOL. 633, OCTOBER 13, 2010 211

the same font size as the “80 WP,” its dominancy in the “D-
10 80 WP” mark stands since the difference in the form
does not alter its distinctive character.45
Applying the Dominancy Test, it cannot be gainsaid that
Abyadang’s “NS D-10 PLUS” is similar to Berris’ “D-10 80
WP,” that confusion or mistake is more likely to occur.
Undeniably, both marks pertain to the same type of goods
—fungicide with 80% Mancozeb as an active ingredient and
used for the same group of fruits, crops, vegetables, and
ornamental plants, using the same dosage and manner of
application. They also belong to the same classification of
goods under R.A. No. 8293. Both depictions of “D-10,” as
found in both marks, are similar in size, such that this
portion is what catches the eye of the purchaser.
Undeniably, the likelihood of confusion is present.
This likelihood of confusion and mistake is made more

manifest when the Holistic Test is applied, taking into
consideration the packaging, for both use the same type of
material (foil type) and have identical color schemes (red,
green, and white); and the marks are both predominantly
red in color, with the same phrase “BROAD SPECTRUM
FUNGICIDE” written underneath.
Considering these striking similarities, predominantly
the “D-10,” the buyers of both products, mainly farmers,
may be misled into thinking that “NS D-10 PLUS” could be
an upgraded formulation of the “D-10 80 WP.”
Moreover, notwithstanding the finding of the IPPDG
that the “D-10” is a fanciful component of the trademark,
created for the sole purpose of functioning as a trademark,
and does not give the name, quality, or description of the
product for
_______________
45 R.A. No. 8293, Sec. 152.2.

Sec. 152.2. The use of the mark in a form different from the form in
which it is registered, which does not alter its distinctive character, shall
not be a ground for cancellation or removal of the mark and shall not
diminish the protection granted to the mark.
212

which it is used, nor does it describe the place of origin,

such that the degree of exclusiveness given to the mark is
closely restricted,46 and considering its challenge by
Abyadang with respect to the meaning he has given to it,
what remains is the fact that Berris is the owner of the
mark “D-10 80 WP,” inclusive of its dominant feature “D-
10,” as established by its prior use, and prior registration
with the IPO. Therefore, Berris properly opposed and the
IPO correctly rejected Abyadang’s application for
registration of the mark “NS D-10 PLUS.”
Verily, the protection of trademarks as intellectual
property is intended not only to preserve the goodwill and
reputation of the business established on the goods bearing
the mark through actual use over a period of time, but also
to safeguard the public as consumers against confusion on
these goods.47 On this matter of particular concern,
administrative agencies, such as the IPO, by reason of their
special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under
their jurisdiction, are in a better position to pass judgment

thereon. Thus, their findings of fact in that regard are
generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the
courts, as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming
or even preponderant. It is not the task of the appellate
court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the
administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for
that of the administrative agency in respect to sufficiency
of evidence.48
_______________
46 Agpalo, supra note 25, citing Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Ng
Sam, 115 SCRA 472, 476 (1982); Romero v. Maiden Form Brassiere, 10
SCRA 556, 561 (1964); and Masso Hermanos, S.A. v. Director of Patents,
94 Phil. 136, 138-139 (1953).
47 McDonald’s Corporation v. MacJoy Fastfood Corporation, supra note
43, at p. 114, citing Faberge Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 215
SCRA 316, 320 (1992); and Chuanchow Soy & Canning Co. v. Dir. of
Patents and Villapania, 108 Phil. 833, 836 (1960).
48 Amigo Manufacturing, Inc. v. Cluett Peabody Co., Inc., 406 Phil. 905,
916; 354 SCRA 434, 445 (2001).
213
VOL. 633, OCTOBER 13, 2010 213

Inasmuch as the ownership of the mark “D-10 80 WP”

fittingly belongs to Berris, and because the same should
not have been cancelled by the CA, we consider it proper
not to belabor anymore the issue of whether cancellation of
a registered mark may be done absent a petition for
cancellation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated April 14, 2008 and Resolution dated June
18, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99928
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Decision No. 2006-24 dated April 28, 2006 and the
Resolution No. 2006-09(D) dated August 2, 2006 in IPC No.
14-2005-00099, and the Decision dated July 20, 2007 in
Appeal No. 14-06-13 are REINSTATED. Costs against
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr.,*** Leonardo-De Castro,**** Brion***** and

Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.
Note.—Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that all

actions involving trademarks, including charges of unfair
competition are under the exclusive jurisdiction of civil
courts. (In-N-Out Burger, Inc. vs. Sehwani, Incorporated,
575 SCRA 535 [2008])
——o0o——
_______________
*** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio

per Special Order No. 897 dated September 28, 2010.
**** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad
per Special Order No. 905 dated October 5, 2010.
***** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta per Special Order No. 904 dated October 5, 2010.
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2/13/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 633

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

Velasco, Jr.,*** Leonardo-De Castro,**** Brion***** and

Note.—Persons guilty of any improper conduct pending,

G.R. No. 183404. October 13, 2010.*

BERRIS AGRICULTURAL CO., INC., petitioner, vs.

Mercantile Law; Law on Trademarks; Words and Phrases;

*** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per

**** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad per

***** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta per

VOL. 633, OCTOBER 13, 2010 197