PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES [RULE 110]

People v. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647 –

Acts and Omissions constituting the offense must be clearly alleged.
"That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the
commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not
perform all the acts of execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason
of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the
complainant's mother."
In this case, the phrase "attempt to rape" does not suffice. eg. Through force and
intimidation, took off her clothes and is about to have carnal knowledge.

Sasot v. People, 462 SCRA 138

A Filipino company charged of infringing foreign product, contends that the offended
party is a foreign entity thereby removing the legal standing from local complainants.
However, since the crime committed is a public crime, it may be instituted by the law
enforcement agency of the law violated.
"In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts for
unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are
moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and France
are parties. We are simply interpreting and enforcing a solemn international
commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which we are a party
and which we entered into because it is in our national interest to do so"

Lasoy v. Zenarosa, 455 SCRA 360

This case was about a wrongful detail in the information, upon conviction of which, can
no longer be raise for double jeopardy has already set in.
"The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In this case, it bears
repeating that the accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they were already
in the stage where they were applying for probation. It is too late in the day for the
prosecution to ask for the amendment of the information and seek to try again accused
for the same offense without violating their rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an information by motion of the
prosecution and at the time when the accused had already been convicted is contrary to
procedural rules and violative of the rights of the accused."
This case is about a 45Kg marijuana mistakenly alleged in the information as merely
42.410 grams, thereby entitling herein accused to probation. When the prosecution
raised the issue, it was denied for it was already filed far too late.

People v. Batin, G.R. No. 177223, November 28, 2007

Treachery was not alleged in the information to qualify homicide to murder.
"That on or about the 21st day of October, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each
other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and with evident premeditation, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one EUGENIO REFUGIO y
ZOSA, by then and there shooting him with a handgun, hitting him on the right side of
his stomach, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said Eugenio Refugio y Zosa, in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code"

The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common

understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment
properly. The rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
Information in order not to violate the accused constitutional right to be properly
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is to allow
the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.
Significantly, the appellant never claimed that he was deprived of his right to be fully
apprised of the nature of the charges against him because of the style or form adopted
in the Information.

People v. Cachapero, G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004

The law requires only approximate time, not exact time (Except when time is an
essential element of the crime). In this case, time is not an essential element of rape.

Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 184537, April 23, 2010

This case is about an alleged violation of RA3019 (anti graft and corrupt practices). The
remedial aspect of the case is that, the information when quashed for alleged
insuffciency in substace( unable to prove the actual damages in this case) when refiled
under a different manner of comission under the same offense, constitutes a substantial
ammendment thereby entitling the accused to plea anew and preliminary investigation.
No. the law provides for different modes of committing the offense under 3019, 1.
causing injury to the government 2. give unwarranted advantages to a private individual.
The charge is proper under either.

Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. NO. 157472, September 28, 2007

Judge ordered to change the caption of the crime from homicide to murder(only on the
preamble) . Defense claimed that the charge for homicide was dismissed without their
express consent thereby invoking double jeopardy.
Held: allowed for it is merely formal amendment. It neither changes the nature of the
offense, furthermore it does not prejudice the rights of the accused.

Bonifacio v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010

Venue is an element in the crime of libel, it is important to allege where the article was
first published, or where the offended party resides. It is fatally defective fail in such
allegations as it will not confer jurisdiction upon the court.

Cabo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 169509, June 16, 2006

Jocelyn Cabo and Mayor Bonifacio C. Balahay was charged of violation of Section 3(b)
of RA 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. She filed a motion to travel abroad.
This was granted by SB in Exchange for her “conditional arraignment” which she
pleaded not guilty. One of the conditions on her arraignment is that she automatically
waived her right to object to amendment and right against double jeopardy. Balahay,
her co-accused file a filed a quashal of information on the ground of that the facts did
not constitute the crime charged. This was denied by SB but ordered amendment of the
information.
Cabo filed a motion to cancel her second arraignment contending that the amenment
was done after her plea and that double jeopardy had already attached.
Held: No, He arraignment was only conditional. And double jeopardy did not attach
because the original information was not sufficient in substance and in form, the trial
was not dismissed, and the complaint was merely amended. The amendment in the
second information was only as to form and not substance, therefore it is allowed by
law.

Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 172476-99, September 15, 2010

Does the motion for reconsideration in OMB bars arraignment of the accused?
Ans: No. The filing of motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall not bar the filing
of the information. (Rule of procedure of the Office of the OMB, Section 7, Rule 11)
Consequently, neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in normal course
of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of information.

Panaguiton v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008

Once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for PI, the prescription of the
offense is halted.
Rationale: To rule otherwise would deprive the offended party the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. Eg. Accused delaying
tactics; inefficiency of investigating agencies.

People v. Romuladez, G.R. No. 166510, April 29, 2009

The charge of RA 3019 or Anti-Graft… had prescribed. The filing of the subject case is
clearly beyond the 15-year prescriptive period provided under Sec 11 of RA No. 3019.
Note: Although as a GR, the commencement of PI tolls prescriptive period, such was
not the case here because the PI conducted (that supposedly tolled the prescriptive
period) was void ab initio. So it is as if there was no PI in the first place.

Pinote v. Ayco, 477 SCRA 409

Judge Roberto Ayco allowed the defense to present evidence consisting of the
testimony of two witnesses even in the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar Pinote.
Issue: WON the judge’s conduct was in violation of Rule 110 Sec 5 of Revised Rules of
Crim Pro.
Held: Yes. As a GR, all criminal actions shall be presented under the control and
direction of the prosecutor. The presence of the prosecutor is necessary to protect the
vital State interest. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.

Bureau of Customs v. Whelan, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011

The judge may dismiss the case on the withdrawal of the prosecutor but with the
opposition of the private individual. Prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive
department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed. In line with this, the public prosecutor has control and
supervision over the case. A private complainant’s participation is limited to that of a
witness both in the criminal and civil aspect of the case.

Flores v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188197, August 03, 2010

Once a complaint is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion
(a motion to withdraw information) to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter
if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.

PROSECUTION OF CIVIL CASES [RULE 111]

Yakult vs CA
WON private respondent can file independently a civil case from criminal action without
expressly reserving the same.
Ans: Yes. In this case the offended party neither waived the civil action nor reserved the
right to institute it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action
prior to the criminal action. (Criminal was filed Jan. 6, 1983 and civil on Oct. 19, 1984)
However, the civil action was filed in the court before the prosecution had presented
their evidence of which the presiding judge on the criminal case was duly informed so
that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.
Ching, Nicdao vs CA, April 27, 2007-
acquitted because she did not commit it, no other source of obligation, civil liability is
likewise extinguished.
Cheng vs Sps. Sy, July 9, 2009
Source of obligation contract of loan , not found beyond reasonable doubt for B22. Civil
liability was not extinguished.
Bun Tiong v. Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, January 28, 2008
a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in cases of violations of B.P. No.
22 is allowed when the civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case.
Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011
There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance
of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP
22). (Rule 111 of the Rules of Court effective December 1, 2000.)
Asilo v. People, G.R. Nos. 159017-18, March 09, 2011
3 accused, 2 deceased.
Paulino Asilo (alive) – guilty; criminally and civilly liable
Mayor Demetrio Comendador (deceased) – guilty; his death did not extinguish his civil
liability because it is based on another source of obligation – law (Art. 31 and 32 (6) in
relation to Art. 1157 of Civil Code)
Alberto S. Angeles (deceased) – acquitted; both the criminal and civil cases against him
was not appealed. His civil liability was not questioned and lapsed into finality.
People v. Bayot, G.R. No. 200030, April 18, 2012
No other source of obligation. Death on appeal extinguished civil and criminal liability.
People v. Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000
Acquittal is appealable if there is grave abuse of discretion or violation of due
process(procedural)
Omictin vs CA, Jan. 22, 2007
Estafa case- absent any proof of misappropriation, it only involves a civil case - involves
a Prejudicial question
Dreamwork Construction v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009
Rescission of contract, not a prejudicial question to BP22
Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010
Nullity of document not pq Same with bobis v bobis- nullity of marriage is not a pq

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION [RULE 112]

Cudia vs CA 284 SCRA 173 (1998)

Information filed by the wrong fiscal, (jurisdiction because it happened in mabalacat, it
was filed by angeles fiscal) the proceedings is null and void.
Tilendo vs Ombudsman Sept. 13, 2007
Requisites of unreasonable delay to invoke speedy disposition
Castro vs Deloria, June 27, 2009
Petitioner contend that since her case is cognizable by RTC, it should be the
prosecutors and not ombudsman who should investigate. Held: No, the ombudsman
has the power to prosecute not only in SB, but also in RTC.
Schroeder vs Saldevar April 27, 2007
Finding of probable cause does not lie with the judiciary , but the prosecutors.
AAA vs Carbonell, June 8, 2007
The judge must base probable cause to issue warrant based on his evaluation of the
records, and not to personally examine the witness in the witness stand. This case, the
judge dismissed because no probable cause existed since the witness failed to take the
witness stand. (DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE WA)
Tatad vs Sandiganbayan 159 SCRA 70, March 21, 1988
Unreasonable delay in the resolution of the fiscal(3yrs) could be dismissed by right to
speedy disposition(TATAD DOCTRINE)
Santiago vs Garchitorena, Dec. 2, 1993
Because of the complexity of the issues involved, and the failure to timely invoke the
right to a speedy disposition, spelled defeat on her claim(speedy disposition).
Pp vs SPO4 Emiliano Anonas, Jan. 31, 2007
Petitioner was detained for 5 years because the fiscal handling his case was promoted
to judge, and did not inform the fiscal in lieu of the latter of the case regarding herein
petitioner. Invoked speedy disposition, Granted.
Quisay case (Sec. 4, par.3)
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the
filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the
named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts.
Otherwise, the same is defective and therefore subject to quashal.
Tolentino vs Paqueo, June 7, 2007
A State Prosecutor cannot commence a prosecution without approval of the City
Prosecutor (situs of the crime)—even if his alleged authority was designated by the
Regional State Prosecutor.
Crespo vs Mogul, June 30, 1987
Fiscals may not be enjoined (prevented from prosecuting by prohibition, or compelled
by injunction)
(The case, once jurisdiction is assumed by the courts, is purely under such courts'
disposition. Even if a fiscal, or even the secretary of justice, files a motion to dismiss
because no probable cause was found during re-investigation, grant or dismissal of the
same is within the court's sound discretion. The fiscal must continue to appear and
adduce evidence for the PP)
Lim vs Felix, 194 SCRA 292, 1991
The records in the information and supporting documents must be personally evaluated
by the judge based on his own independent consideration of the facts and law. In this
case, the judge relied solely on the fiscal's conclusion.
Amarga vs Abbas, 98 Phil 739
Issuance of WA is a prerogative of the judge
Ong vs Genio, Dec. 23, 2009
An appeal to the CA must have conformity with OSG
De Castro vs Fernandez, Feb. 14, 2007
Under Section 7 of Rule 112, if an information is filed in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused may, within five days from the time he learns its filing ask for
a PI. The accused’s failure to request for a PI within specified period is deemed a
waiver of his right to a PI.
Brocka vs Enrile 192 SCRA 83
(provides for exceptions which fiscals may be enjoined)

ARREST [RULE 113]

Pangandaman vs Casar 276 SCRA 55, July 24, 1997
Respondent judge issued WA against 50 john does, W/N this is allowed:
Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) “John Does” not one of whom the
witnesses to the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general
warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once
anathematized as “totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.” Clearly violative of
the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe
the person or persons to be seized,[31] the warrant must, as regards its unidentified
subjects, be voided
Pp vs Zaspa Sept. 21, 2000- Marijuana leaves/ confidential tip
consti - An arrest based on a confidential information is sufficient to make an arrest, and
convict upon the evidence procured as an incident to a lawful arrest.
crim pro - Defects to the regularity of the arrest is deemed cured by failure to raise the
same prior to arraignment.
Malaloan vs CA 234 SCRA 249

Whether or not the issuance of search warrants and/or warrants of arrest is subject to
jurisdictional restrictions. No.

Enforceability of WA is indefinite until executed, recalled, quashed. It is still enforceable

even if returned unserved.

Umil vs Ramos GR 81567

Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

Pp vs Evaristo 261 S 431

As for the existence of personal knowledge, the gunfire, the bulge in Carillo’s waist, and
the peace officer’s professional instinct are more than sufficient to grant him personal
knowledge of the facts of the crime that has just been committed. Consequently, the
firearm taken from Carillo can be said to have been seized incidental to a lawful and
valid arrest.

Pp vs Alunday June 1, 2007

Herein, Alunday (D) went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter,
he actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his
arrest only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived
such alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-
assisted plea during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not
raising the objection before his arraignment.

Pp vs Racho 640 P 669 (2010)

A “reliable information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless search – the

accused must perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed is
actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. Arrest must precede the
search.

Pp vs Cogaed 740 P 212 (2014)

A basic criterion of a “stop and frisk” would be that the police officer with his or her
personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. (In
this case, there was nothing suspicious about riding a jeep and the assessment of
suspicion was not made by the police officer himself but by the jeepney driver. It was
the driver who signaled to the police that Cogaed was suspiciously carrying marijuana.)

Pp vs dela Cruz Nov. 20, 2008

Same with the doctrine laid in Alunday. (Deemed to have waived such alleged defect of
the arrest by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court)
The illegal drug was not under his control and possession and cannot be used as an
evidence against him.

Pp vs Gerente GR 95847-48
There is a 3-hour lapse of time from the commission of the crime to the arrest. SC
sustained that such was still a valid warrant of arrest because the policemen had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that Gerente and others had killed Blace.
Policemen saw Blace in the hospital and Edwina Reyes (witness) pinpointed Gerente as
one of the killers. Consequently, the seized marijuana leaves in Gerente’s person is
admissible as such was a search incident to lawful arrest.

Pp vs Doria GR 125299
The marijuana inside the box was not in plain view. Hence, inadmissible.

Pestilos, et al vs Generoso, Pp GR 182601

The arrest took place less than an hour from the commission of the crime. SC held the
validity of such warrantless arrest. There was also personal knowledge.

Pp vs Briones 202 S 708

A robbery with homicide happened which was witnessed by Pantaleon Francisco at
night 11pm. The next morning he went to the house of the victims and found the dead
bodies. He reported the crime and the perpetrators of the crime to the police at 9am.
Thereafter the police arrested Briones and Javier.
Held: SC held there was no valid warrantless arrest. The officers effected the arrest had
no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
the crime. It is Francisco who had such knowledge.

Pp vs Madriaga 211 S 698

Facts: Madriaga was arrested in an entrapment for selling marijuana. He pointed
Pangilinan – a man standing some 7 to 10 meters away from where Madriaga was
apprehended, as the source of such marijuana.

Held: There is a valid warrantless arrest to the both of them. Madriaga was caught in
flagrante delicto. Pangilinan’s arrest was based on personal knowledge of the arresting
police officers.
Sanchez vs Demetriou 227 S 1993 (1993)
A forty six days from the commission of the crime to the date of the arrest cannot be
said that the offense had “in fact just been committed”. Nevertheless, the invalid
detention was cured by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued thereafter.

Pp vs Mahinay Feb. 1, 1999

SC discussed the Miranda Rights in this case.

BAIL [RULE 114]

Mabutas v. Perello, A.M.-RTJ No. 03-1817, June 8, 2005.
A Hearing must be conducted for the determination whether or not the evidence of guilt
is strong. The determination is discretionary based on the personal evaluation of the
evidence by the judge, and not by the mere perusal of the prosecutor's conclusions.

Note: Procedural Due Process here is violated. The judge must determine upon his
personal evaluation of the facts and applicable law the proper judgment and not based
solely on a subordinate or another's appreciation of the same.

Paderanga vs CA 247 S 741

Confinement in a hospital is constructive custody of law, therefore bail must be granted.

Hilario vs Ocampo A.M. MTJ-00-1305 Dec. 3, 2001

No Warrant of Arrest, yet posted bail.
Accused posted bail bond in advance, not allowed because he is not yet under custody
of law. (The judge lying about WA is immaterial, it was the accused who voluntarily
posted advance bail.)

Chua vs CA April 12, 2007

Respondent has no right to be freed on bail pending his appeal from the trial court’s
judgment. His conviction carries a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years (to be
exact, 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum) which justifies the cancellation of his bail pursuant to the third paragraph of
Section 5 (b), (d) and (e) of Rule 114, quoted above. Moreover, he failed to appear
despite notice during the promulgation of judgment on January 26, 1999. His
inexcusable non-appearance not only violated the condition of his bail that he "shall
appear" before the court "whenever required" by the latter or the Rules, but also showed
the probability that he might flee or commit another crime while released on bail.

OCA vs Lorenzo A.M. No. RTJ-05-1911 December 23, 2008

Judge dismissed hearing to establish strong evidence for purposes of bail because the
prosecution failed to present the witnesses
Held: The judge erred, respondent judge's decision "would have been correct, if only
[he] paid enough attention to the factors why the prosecution had not yet established
that the evidence of guilt is strong," referring to the non-appearance during the April 4,
5, and 11, 2002 bail hearings of two key prosecution witnesses

Leviste vs CA March 17, 2010

Leviste was convicted of Homicide in the RTC, Posted bail on appeal but denied.
Held: Bail is discretionary upon conviction in the RTC with an offense punishable by 6-
20 years imprisonment. Furthermore, it should be denied if any of the circumstances
mentioned in Sec 5 paragraph 3 of Rule 114.

Narciso vs Sta. Romana-Cruz March 17, 2000

Judge granted bail without objection from the prosecution(parricide) , held: invalid for no
summary hearing for the determination of the strength of evidence of guilt was
conducted. Absence of objection from prosecutor is never a basis of determination of
quantum of evidence.

Locus standi of the sister of the complainant. (w/n sister of the offended party has locus
standi to assail the order granting bail to herein accused in the CA), furthermore, she
has been assisted by private counsel(NOT SOLGEN) in this action. (Stupid contention
of the accused is that the sister is not the offended party in parricide for obvious
reasons)

It is settled that while actions in the CA must be brought by SolGen, in this peculiar
case, the sister has locus standi for she is likewise an offended party. For the ends of
justice to be met, she must not be denied due legal recourse.

Basco vs Rapatalo March 5, 1997

Summary hearing is a condition sine qua non for the determination of the strength of
evidence. In this case, no hearing was conducted, but judge granted bail.

Bravo, Jr. vs Borjay GR L-65228 Feb. 18, 1985

Accused committed murder(punishable by death since it happened 1985) and the

evidence of guilt is very strong thus denied bail by respondent judge. However, accused
was only 16 when he committed it, and even if proven, the imposable penalty is one
degree lower.

Held: Bail should be granted

"The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one who is accused of a capital
offense where the evidence of guilt is strong. The obvious reason is that one who faces
a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee. This reason
does not hold where the accused has been established without objection to be a minor
who by law cannot be sentenced to death. " (so according to the court, since he will not
be put to death, his chance of fleeing upon bail is nigh)

Espiritu vs Jovellanos A.M. MTJ-97-1139 Oct. 16, 1997

Dumlao(accused) posted bail while released under custody of the Assistant State
Prosector(recognizance). Allowed !! (PADERANGA VS CA). In this case, accused
subsequently brought himself under custody of the courts which cured the defect if any
ever existed.

NOTE: this is the case that cited when recognizance may be allowed.

Simbulan vs Bartolome A.M. MTJ-05-1588 June 5, 2009

Simbulan is a judge in whose sala the accused case was pending. Accused
surrendered before the sala of Judge Bartolome whom granted the bail and accepted
the surety bond by an insurance company.

Bartolome is found guilty of gross neglect of duty.

"In approving the surety bond of the accused, respondent Judge violated Section 17,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. In the instant case, the accused Rosalina Mercado was
not arrested. That being the case, she should have filed her bail bond with the court
where her case was pending, i.e., the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, San
Fernando City, Pampanga. In the absence of the judge thereof, it could be done at
another branch of the same court within the province of Pampanga or City of San
Fernando. Instead, accused Mercado filed her bond in the Municipal Trial Court of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, where respondent Judge presides, who approved the same and
ordered her release from custody"

Lim vs Dumlao A.M. MTJ-04-1556 March 31, 2005

Judge Dumlao granted bail to detained persons outside of his jurisdiction. Held: Not
allowed.

NOTE: Memorize Section 17, Rule 114

Savellana vs Ines A.M. MTJ-0701673 April 19, 2007

Respondent Judge granted bail to an accused with a pending case in another court.
Held: Guilty of gross ignorance.
Assuming arguendo that the bail was proper, her failure to transmit the order of release
and other supporting papers to the court where the case is pending
constitutes violation of sec 19 of rule 114.

Mendoza vs Alarma GR 151970

For failure to appear when called on trial, the property bond is forfeited in view of :

SEC. 21. — Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is required by the
court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on
a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall
be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce
their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for
the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:

(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and

(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen,
jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise
mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is
acquitted.

NOTE!!! : The execution of the property was void because no judgement was ever
rendered against the bondsman and the latter was denied procedural due process.
Thus property was reconveyed.

Bongcac vs Sandiganbayan GR 156687-88

Cancellation of bail is automatic upon execution of the judgment of conviction. The
Sandiganbayan did not err in cancelling petitioners cash bailbond after the judgment of
conviction became final and executory and its execution became ministerial.

SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of the bondsmen, with

due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of
the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the
accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of
conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability

on the bail. (emphasis supplied).

Pp vs Cawaling GR 157147

Can a bondsperson (Cruz) withdraw property bond and post cash bond in lieu thereof?

No, Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is explicit:

SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail.— Upon application of the bondsmen with due
notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the
accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused,
dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the
bail.

With the conviction of Cawaling for murder, and the Court’s consequent failure to
execute the judgment of conviction because of Cawaling’s flight, the posted property
bond cannot be cancelled, much less withdrawn and replaced with a cash bond by
movant Cruz, unless Cawaling is surrendered to the Court, or adequate proof of his
death is presented.

Under Section 1 of Rule 114, Cruz, as a bondsman, guarantees the appearance of the
accused before any court as required under specified conditions.

It is beyond cavil that, with the property bond posted by Cruz, Cawaling was allowed
temporary liberty, which made it possible, quite easily, to flee and evade punishment.
As it stands now, Cawaling, a convicted felon, is beyond reach of the law, and the
property bond cannot be released.
Manotoc vs CA GR L-62100
An accused out on bail may not leave the counrty.
Principle: The court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of bail bond. If
allowed otherwise, then he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

Silverio vs CA GR 94284
Out on bail, Silverio sought to leave the country but is prevented by the court. Silverio
invoked the constitutional guarantee of freedom to travel.
Held: Such constitutional provision did not limit the inherent power of the courts.

Santiago vs Garchitorena GR L-109266

Santiago has a pending case. In a TV interview, she announced that she is leaving the
country for academic purposes. The court then, motu propio issued a hold departure
issue against her.
W/N the court may motu propio issue a hold departure order without the filing or motion
of the prosecution?
Held: Yes, the court can perform acts motu propio to protect its jurisdiction.

Gov’t of HK vs Olalia, Jr, Munoz GR 153675

Govt of Hongkong Filed an Extradition against Olalia. During the pendency of the same,
Olalia filed a petition for bail which the court Granted.
Held:Bail applies in cases of extradition. While extradition is an administrative
proceedings, it bears all earmarks of criminal process. The extraditee may be subjected
to arrest to a prolonged restraint of liberty.

Borlongan vs Pena GR 143591

Accused posted bail immediately after a warrant of arrest is issued. At arraignment , the
accused refused to enter a plea questioning the validity of the arrest. The court replied
that since he posted bail, he waived any action against the validity of his arrest.

Held: Bail is not a waiver of the irregularities of the arrest

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED [RULE 115]

Pp vs Sequerra GR L-58574
Reason for the presumption of innocence "Confronted by the full panoply of state
authority, the accused is accorded the presumption of innocence to lighten and even
reverse the heavy odds against him.

Pp vs Calayca GR 121212

Convicted of qualified rape, charged only with simple rape.

Held: Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is
violated.

Pp vs Bermas GR 120420

Accused had no counsel. Held: Right to counsel is a constitutional right. " Even the most
intelligent or uneducated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the
rules of procedure and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his innocence."
There can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel.

Carredo vs People GR 77542

Non appearance of the accused during trial(Trial in absentia) is tantamount to waiver of

his right to meet the witness face to face. Note: This right may be waived by non
appearance, although his bail will still be forfeited. Thus, his appearance cannot be
compelled.

Additional: Can he be arrested when his presence is required? yes for purposes of
identification.

Gimenez vs People GR L-37933

5 accused, 1 escaped; 4 of them were dismissed, conviction of the escaped one was
held in abeyance for his absence in the trial.

Accused escaped after arraignment, now the question w/n the court lost its jurisdiction
and thus hold in abeyance the trial with respect to the one who escaped?

No, the court do not lose jurisdiction over an escaped person after arraignment. The trial
must proceed in absentia. The judge must render a judgement, along with his other co-
accused already acquitted, notwithstanding his absence and waiver to produce
evidence in his behalf.

Pp vs Agbulos GR 73875

Same: Trial in absentia

"Under the old doctrine, trial in absentia of the escapee could not be held because he
could not be duly notified thereof. Under the present rule, the fugitive is deemed to have
waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that
makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal
justification.

In the past, his escape "rewarded" him by postponing all further proceedings against
him and in effect ultimately absolving him of the charge he was facing. Under the
present rule, his escape will, legally speaking, operate to his disadvantage as he will be
unable to attend his trial, which will continue even in his absence and most likely result
in his conviction."

Pp vs Delmendo GR 123300

Accused refused to take the witness stand, Held: Silence cannot be taken against him,
but it should advance his defense, failure to do so would give rise to a presumption that
he did not want to testify because he did not want to betray himself.

Very good excerpt:

"While his failure to testify cannot be considered against him, it may however help in
determining his guilt. The unexplained failure of the accused to testify, under a
circumstance where the crime imputed to him is so serious that places in the balance
his very life and that his testimony might at least help in advancing his defense, gives
rise to an inference that he did not want to testify because he did not want to betray
himself.
An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of
crime, as a matter of self-preservation, and as a precaution against prejudicing
himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent, may justify an
inference that he is not innocent. Thus, we have the general principle that when an
accused is silent when he should speak, in circumstances where an innocent person so
situated would have spoken, on being accused of a crime, his silence and omission are
admissible in evidence against him. Accordingly, it has been aptly said that silence may
be assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime
is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-confession."

Pp vs Crispin GR 128360

RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and raised the irregularity of such
conviction that Cesar Delima, a witness, filed a witness affidavit, but was not presented
for cross examination although subpoenaed.

An affidavit is hearsay and weak probative value, by failure to be present at the witness
stand, herein accused was deprived of his right to cross examine the witness face to
face.

Pp vs Gallarde GR 133025

W/N Taking picture of the accused violates his right against self incrimination. No, it is
purely mechanical. (can be taken even when he is asleep)

Alviza vs Sandiganbayan GR 101689

Accused raised right to speedy trial because it took 11 years to file his case in court.
(preliminary investigation 11yrs)

" the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether or not that right has been
violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are the length of delay, the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay."

In this particular case, " frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential

decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the
creation of new ones by executive fiat, 20 resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary
jurisdiction, functions and powers of prosecuting agencies." Delay was thus justified.

Roque vs Ombudsman GR 129978

Right to speedy disposition " Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of
law and to speedy trial, the Constitution commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act
promptly on complaints filed against public officials.Thus, the failure of said office to
resolve a complaint that has been pending for six years is clearly violative of this
mandate and the public officials rights. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to
the dismissal of the complaint."
Case was dismissed due to the unreasonable/unjustified delay.
NOTE: REMEMBER TATAD DOCTRINE
ARRAIGNMENT & PLEA [RULE 116]

Pp vs De Asis GR 105581 Dec. 7, 1993

Convicted of robbery, now assails the validity of their conviction for lack of preliminary
investigation.
Held: They are in estoppel for making a plea of not guilty during arraignment without
raising the issue thereby effectively waiving it.

Pp vs Pangilinan GR 171020

Accused was arraigned after the presentation of evidence.

Held: Allowed because such defect was cured when counsel for the defense failed to
raise it, thereby waiving it.

"His counsel’s active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully
aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and
informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was
subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the
trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences,
that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to
raise this procedural defect"

Ampatan vs Aujerio AM RTJ-93-956

Committed homicide, plea bargained to attempted homicide

Held: Denied for obvious reasons

" The fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally
liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of
guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide."

Pp vs Villarama GR 99287 210 S 226

IMPORTANT CASE
As a general rule, Plea bargain takes place at the time of arraignment or after
arraignment but before trial( Rule 116 Sec 2)

In this case, plea bargaining was filed by the counsel AFTER THE PROSECUTION
HAS RESTED ITS CASE.
Since the purpose of the plea bargaining is for the speedy disposition of the case. Plea
Bargaining is not a matter of right, but upon the sound discretion of the court. In this
case, the court GRANTED it without the consent of the prosecutor.

Held: Allowed, but double jeopardy cannot attach because " Sec. 7. Former conviction or
acquittal; double jeopardy. —

xxx xxx xxx

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or
information under any of the following instances:

(a) . . . ;

(b) . . . ;

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of
the offended party;"

In sum: plea bargaining may be allowed after the prosecution has rested its case at the
sound discretion of the court, even without the consent of the prosecutor. But without
the consent of the prosecutor, there is prejudice of refiling, thus the first jeopardy does
not attach.

Pp vs Albert 251 S 136

MOST CASES ARE FOR IMPROVIDENT PLEA (FOCUS)

Improvident plea : Plead guilty to a capital offense, assisted by counsel. The court was
convinced of the accused guilt.

Pp vs Cruz GR 127789

Improvident plea : Convicted for his plea of guilt for a capital offense. Held: " Time and
again, we have stated that a plea of guilty is improvidently accepted where no effort was
even made to explain to the accused that a plea of guilty to an information for a capital
offense, attended by an aggravating circumstance, may result in the imposition of the
death penalty. We have scrupulously gone over the record of the proceedings at the
trial court level and nowhere is it shown that the court a quo administered a searching
inquiry as to the voluntariness of appellants plea and his full knowledge of the
consequences and meaning of the same. Not having been properly made, we cannot
now admit appellants plea of guilty as a basis for his conviction"

NOTE: improvident plea(PLEA OF GUILT UPON A CAPITAL OFFENSE) cannot be the

basis of conviction if there is no inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea. The court shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt.
(RULE 116 SEC 3)

Pp vs Besonia GR 151284-85

Charged for 2 counts murder, Plead guilty and immediately thereafter ensued an inquiry
to the voluntariness and full knowledge of the consequences of his plea. The
prosecution presented evidence, and he(accused) did not adduce evidence in his favor.
Thus, conviction followed.

The SC cited the requisites for compliance under rule 116 sec 3 as follows:

"We have already outlined, as early as in the case of People v. Camay, how
compliance with the said rule could be attained by the trial court, thus:

1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and precise degree of his culpability; and

3. The court must ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence in his behalf,
and allow him to do so if he so desires." (SO DEEMED COMPLIED WITH)

accused contention: Besonia claims that 1.his arraignment was

notoriously flawed in that despite his endeavor to plead guilty to the lesser crime of
homicide, the trial court paid no attention to it, thus depriving him of the opportunity to
make such plea ( no merit because plea bargaining is discretionary)

2. His plea was a violation of his right against self

incrimination, ANS of the SC to this issue " It does not apply where, as in these cases,
the testimony was freely and voluntarily given by the accused himself without any
compulsion from the agents of the State. There is nothing in the records that would
indicate that Besonia was forced, intimidated, or compelled by the trial court or by
anybody into admitting the crimes. (No merit because it was voluntary and made in
open court)

At any rate, his plea of guilty and confession or admissions during the searching
inquiry cannot be the sole basis for his conviction." (CANNOT BE THE SOLE BASIS,
meaning it is only supporting evidence or secondary evidence, thus conviction
was also based on the evidence produced by the prosecution) emphasis supplied.

However, another issue was raised, his right to counsel was violated
because during the trial, " we observe that Besonias defense counsel Atty. Perez
merely performed a lackadaisical and perfunctory representation of the appellant before
and during the trial. First, he failed to question before the arraignment the legality
of Besonias arrest, which failure is deemed as a waiver of the right to raise that
question once an accused enters a plea. Second, he failed to object to the
admissibility of the firearm seized after Besonias arrest. Third, there is no showing
that he advised Besonia of the consequences of his plea of guilty to the crimes of
murder. Fourth, he remained silent throughout the searching inquiry. Fifth, he did
not cross-examine the police officers, and his cross-examination of the two
doctors was limited to only two questions each. Lastly, he did not present any
evidence on behalf of Besonia. These are all indicative of his failure to effectively
provide Besonia with qualified and competent representation. His behavior
irrefutably falls short of the demanding mandate required of a lawyer to defend an
accused no matter how guilty the latter may seem to be. In short, his deportment
evinces an apparent disregard of his fidelity to his oath as a lawyer and responsibility as
an officer of the court to aid in the administration and dispensation of justice." THE
CASES (2 counts murder) WAS SET ASIDE AND REMANDED.

Pp vs Mendoza GR 80845

Accused(magalop) for robbery plead guilty, but then acquitted.

Prosecution(petitioner) seeks the reversal of the acquittal and contends that the
accused be convicted upon his plea of guilt. (note that in the CA, the republic must be
represented by OSG, in this case, this lapse was overlooked by the SC to gave
credence to the novelty of this case)

" There is no rule which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to the
charge that his conviction automatically follows. Additional evidence independent of the
plea may be considered to convince the judge that it was intelligently made."
In this case, the stolen articles were found in possession of Babie Tan, but the
prosecution did not even call to take the witness stand said Babie Tan.

Respondent judge found that the plea was not made intelligently. (NOTE: What the
judge could have done, since the plea was not made intelligently, is to consider the
plea of guilt withdrawn and enter a plea of not guilty, instead of acquitting herein
accused upon a plea of guilt. PP v Padernal).

Hence, acquittal is sustained.

Webb vs de Leon GR 121234

Record is voluminous, thus the case related to the topic is the only issue tackled.

When is the proper time for a bill of particulars and production or inspection of material
evidence in possession of prosecution?
What is the remedy to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration of material evidence
in possession of the prosecution, police, or investigating agencies?

Answered by Reading rule 116 sec 9 and 10.

Dino vs Olivarez GR 170447

An appeal for the resolution of the prosecutor may suspend arraignment, only for a
period not exceeding 60 days.(Rule 116 sec 11)

Read further Rule 116 Sec 11 for other circumstances that suspension of arraignment
may be suspended.
a. unsound mind
b. prejudicial question
c. appeal to review resolution of prosecutor (should not exceed 60
days).

MOTION TO QUASH [RULE 117]

Pp vs Nitafan Feb. 1, 1999

Imelda marcos was charged with 3 informations for violations of Central Bank Circular.
The judge, without participation by herein accused, dismissed the first case for being
"ex post facto law" being enacted later than the date the crime was allegedly committed,
and the 2 other charges dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy.(hence, the judge
acted independently without participation of accused)

Not allowed because: "Section 2. The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the
accused or his counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor and
the Court shall consider no grounds other than those stated therein, except lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of
the following grounds:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of
the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe
a single punishment for various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or
acquitted of the offense charged.
Section 8. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads"

No motion to quash was ever filed by accused, nor the grounds for quashal exist. On
the ground that it is ex post facto law, a constitutionality of a law cannot be attacked
collaterally, and on the ground of double jeopardy, the first jeopardy has not yet
attached. Important Principle: The action to QUASH is EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE
ACCUSED.

Note: The judge here acted like the counsel for the defense.

Lopez vs Sandiganbayan Oct. 13, 1995

Mayor Lopez of Mati(CITY) was a donee of an ambulance, but he allowed the
DavOr(Province) to utilize or appropriate as their own. Now charged for RA3019 for anti
graft and corrupt practices. Accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the acts
complained of in the information do not constitute an offense because he was but an
SB member when the alleged crime took place, and that Mati had no use for such
ambulance for there was no hospital at that time in said place.

W/N: Courts should take judicial notice of facts alleged(THAT HE WAS NOT YET
THE MAYOR AT THAT TIME/ Which was not alleged) in the motion to quash.
(WHETHER FACTS NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION COULD BE THE BASIS
OF QUASHAL)

Held: Motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of facts, matters of defense

cannot be raised in such action.

However, in this case: " Since the prosecution has admitted the fact that petitioner was not yet the Municipal
Mayor on or about December 10, 1987 and that Petitioner Mayor Lopez became the Municipal Mayor only after the date of the
commission of the offense charged, such an admission constitutes as a judicial admission which is binding upon the prosecution"

Note: Although not alleged in the information, the prosecutor's admission of such
fact had the effect of judicial admission that the court took cognizance of.

State Pros vs Paquero June 7, 2007

Prosecutor Tolentino charges Ticklo for violations of SSS LAW(Failure to remit). In the
information, Tolentino, the investigating prosecutor, stated that he was authorized by
the REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR. Herein accused moved to quash the
information on the ground that among the grounds for quashal Rule 117 Sec 3: (c) that
the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so,in relation to Rule
112. Sec 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.
"No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy"

Note: No regional state prosecutor is mentioned, expressio unius et exclusio alterius.

Held: Motion to quash should be granted based on the abovementioned ground.

Quisay vs Pp GR 216920

Quisay was charged for RA7610, signed by the investigating prosecutor stating that he
was authorized by the City Prosecutor.

Accused moved to quash on the ground that

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

Held: Granted because there is no showing that said investigating prosecutor had prior
authority by the City Prosecutor. There is but a certification that states" and that the
filing of the Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City Prosecutor"
without the actual signature of said City Prosecutor.

Gonzales vs Salvador, Glen Dale Dec. 5, 2006

A Case for libel against petitioner was filed which he moved to quash on the ground that
the information was defective for not alleging where the material was first published nor
the residence of the complainant which are essential elements of libel.

Petitioner(prosecutor) now contents that he should be given time to amend rather than
quash it outright in view of " SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. If the
motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can
be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made." However
"It is gathered that petitioner never asserted the propriety of amending the Information,
he having maintained that the allegations in the Information provided sufficient
and adequate bases to confer jurisdiction. When the trial court granted the motion to
quash, petitioner did not assail the same within the reglementary period. The order
quashing the Information thus became final and executory"

For Sec 4 to apply, it needs to be raised within the reglementary period.

Otherwise the irregularity is cured.

Pp vs Relova GR L-45129 148 S 292

Accused(Opulencia ice plant/ Manuel Opulencia) was charged of (1) theft for
installing illegal electrical connections, and (2) for violation of an Ordinance in
Batangas(regarding the same act). Respondent judge granted the motion to quash for
the violation of the ordinance on the ground of double jeopardy.

Held: The quashal is proper because the same act was punished by a statute
and an ordinance. (Double Jeopardy)

Pp vs Pineda 219 S 1
Accused was charged with 2 counts estafa before different courts. She sought
quashal of the second invoking double jeopardy in which the judge granted.
Held: The act was premature, the first double jeopardy has not yet attached.
(Review the requisites of double jeopardy "validly terminated") In this case, accused
invoked the second jeopardy even before the proper disposition of the first case.
Remember, termination must either be for acquittal, conviction, or dismissal without the
express consent of the accused.
Pp vs Vergara 221 S 960
A case for two counts of frustrated murder was filed against the accused
(Arraigned). The accused sought re-investigation and the prosecution resolved the case
stating that the real aggressors were the offended party, thus moved to dismiss the first
case and re-filed a new information. The accused pleaded not guilty to the new charge
and invoked double jeopardy which the court granted.
Was the court correct in granting the dismissal on the ground of double
jeopardy? Yes because the first charged was dismissed without the EXPRESS
CONSENT of the accused, thereby validly terminating said case. Although
they(accused) were the ones who requested a re-investigation, such act cannot be
equated to EXPRESS CONSENT.
NOTE: Dismissal without the express consent is a ground to invoke double
jeopardy.

Pp vs Mogol 131 S 296

Accused is facing charges for Serious Physical Injury, the Prosecutor moved to
amend the information because the facts can prove that the crime committed is actually
Frustrated Murder. The Judge dismissed the case in order to give way to the filing of the
new Charge.

Whether or not the first jeopardy has attached : No, the judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion thus the proceeding was null and void, and has not been validly
terminated thereby.
Note: The duty of the judge was to render judgement based on the charge and
evidence presented.
Further note: First jeopardy does not attach if the proceedings is rendered null
and void, mostly for grave abuse of discretion or violation of procedural due
process.

Benares vs Lim Dec. 14, 2006

Estafa was filed against accused, the court then dismissed the case because of
the prosecution's failure to prosecute " in this case, No Formal Offer of Exhibits"
(discussed further in rule 119).
Held: The first jeopardy did not attach because republic was deprived of
procedural due process. Although republic did not make any formal offer of exhibits, the
same may still prove the guilt of the accused through testimonial evidence.
Note: Prosecution was denied of substantial due process, thus fist jeopardy
did not attach.

Cerezo vs Pp June 1, 2011

Respondents were facing charges for libel, in which they filed a motion for re-
investigation before the DOJ. The valid information was filed in court of competent
jurisdiction and the accused entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment. The motion for
re-investigation for the finding of probable cause was reversed by the DOJ, thus the
prosecutor filed a motion to dismiss the case. Upon the recommendation of the
prosecutor, the court dismissed the case and found no more cause to continue. The
petitioner appeal by certiorari citing that the court erred in dismissing the case, whereas
respondent raised the defense of double jeopardy because the case was dismissed
without their express consent.
 Held: The first jeopardy did not attach because the court gravely abused its
discretion when it submitted to the recommendation of dismissal by the prosecutor. The
judge must consider the evidence presented and determine the merits thereof on its
own independent appreciation of the facts and law involved, and not the mere
recommendation of the prosecutor.

Suero vs Pp Jan. 31, 2005

Accused was charged with violation of RA3019 anti Graft and corrupt practices
for undue injury against the government in which the same was acquitted. Ombudsman
filed a new information against the accused for the same transaction, with a new charge
for falsification of public documents. Accused contends that ombudsman is now barred
by double jeopardy.

Held: No double jeopardy because the elements of the offense under RA3019
and falsification of public document are distinct from each other. Thus, the refiling is not
barred.

Nierras vs Dacuycuy 181 S 1

The petitioner is charged for violation of bp22 and filed a petition for review on
certiorari due to the respondent judge's denial of his motion to quash on the ground of
double jeopardy to the case of estafa.
Held: There is no double jeopardy because of the variance of elements.
" there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another
law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double
jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated
prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the
same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give
rise to double jeopardy "

Mallari vs Pp 168 S 422

Accused was charged for estafa through falsification of public document. Held:
Since the crime is complex under article 48, double jeopardy sets in upon the conviction
of which, can no longer be prosecuted for the same offense.

Santiago vs Garchitorena 228 S 214

Santiago was charged with 32 informations for RA3019 giving unwarranted
benefit and undue injury to the state, but consolidated in one information upon finding
that it is a continuing offense.
However, the issue in this case is the motion to quash by Santiago, on the
ground that the offense charge does not constitute an offense.
Principle: A motion to quash on such ground(it does not constitute an offense) is
a hypothetical admission. Thus Santiago hypothetically admitted all charges in the
information to wit:

"Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:

(1) She was a public officer;

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984;

(3) Those aliens were disqualified;

(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and

 (5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official
functions."

The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019."

Los Banos vs Pedro April 22, 2009

Accused was charged for violating the election gun ban. He then filed a motion to
quash on the ground that the preliminary investigation did not materialize. The
prosecution sought to re-open the case, but accused contends that the provisional
dismissal's period of 1 year has elapsed thereby bars the prosecution from reopening
said case.
Held: " the provision used applies where both the prosecution and the accused
mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the
offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where
the information was quashed upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the
prosecution"
Principle: The grant of a motion to quash does not have the effect of provisional
dismissal.

PRE-TRIAL [RULE 118]

Chua-Burce vs CA April 27, 2007

Chua-Burce was charged of criminal case and civil case for estafa. During the pre-trial
conference of the criminal case, the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in
the civil case as their respective evidence in the criminal case.
Held: It was during pre-trial conference when the parties agreed to adopt their
respective evidence in the civil case to the criminal case. This is allowed under Section
2 (e) of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court which provides that during pre-trial conference,
the parties shall consider "such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious
trial." The parties, in compliance with Section 4 of Rule 118, reduced to writing such
agreement. Petitioner, her counsel, and the public prosecutor signed the agreement.
Petitioner is bound by the pre-trial agreement, and she cannot now belatedly disavow its
contents.
Pp vs Ancheta Jan. 14, 2004

Rule 118, Sec. 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "all
agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be
reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be
used against the accused." This requirement is mandatory. Thus, the omission of the
signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules,
renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.

Pp vs Guzman Jan. 26, 2007

The pre-trial order of the RTC shows that the defense named only four witnesses. Only
one witness was presented. The defense counsel moved to substitute them but the
RTC denied the motion.
Held: RTC is correct in denying the motion. Matters agreed upon in the pre-trial
conference and as stated in the pre-trial order shall bind the parties as mandated
under Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Note: Such provision is not absolute. It can be relaxed in the greater interest of justice.
TRIAL [RULE 119]

Mari vs Gonzales GR 187728

Indicted for rape, the accused was detained. However, the prosecution did not appear
for trial by reason of the pendency of petition for change of venue. The RTC then
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.
Held: The RTC did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the case on the ground of
speedy trial.
" Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already been deprived of his liberty on two occasions. First,
during the preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when he was incarcerated from November 18, 2004 to March 16,
2005, or a period of almost four months; then again, when an Information had already been issued and since rape is a non-
bailable offense, he was imprisoned beginning June 27, 2008 until the case was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or a period
of over 6 months. Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any duration of time is quite
oppressive. Because of private respondent's continued incarceration, any delay in trying the case would cause him great
prejudice. Thus, it was absolutely vexatious and oppressive to delay the trial in the subject criminal case to await the
outcome of petitioners' petition for transfer of venue, especially in this case where there is no temporary restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction issued by a higher court against herein public respondent from further proceeding in the
case."

Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court “The following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including
but not limited to the following:”

A careful reading of the above rule would show that the only delays that may be excluded from the
time limit within which trial must commence are those resulting from proceedings concerning
the accused. The time involved in the proceedings in a petition for transfer of venue can only be
excluded from said time limit if it was the accused who instituted the same. Hence, in this case, the
time during which the petition for transfer of venue filed by the private complainant is pending,
cannot be excluded from the time limit of thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order imposed
in Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

Olbes vs Buembo GR 173319

Accused(PETITIONER) was facing charges for Grave Coercion before MTC Manila. He
was arraigned Feb 12 2003, and pre-trial was set on May 2008(105 Days time gap)
and another gap of 148 days from the latter date up to the second pre-trial setting on
October 23, 2003 or for a total of 253 days - a clear contravention, according to
petitioner, of the 80-day time limit from arraignment to trial.

Held: No merit
" In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy
trial, four factors must be considered:
a) length of delay;
(b) the reason for the delay;(must not be vexatious, capricious, and oppressive)
(c) the defendants assertion of his right; and
(d) prejudice to the defendant" (not prejudiced when out on bail)

The reason for the delay is justified (Declaration of holiday, issuance of warrant upon a
mistake that petitioner was notified of the hearing, typhoon chedeng,.. etc). Inspite the
prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of
"speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

Pp vs SPO1 Marcial GR 152864-65

Respondents in this case was charged of homicide and frustrated homicide. Petitioner
made an oral motion to reverse the order of the trial upon the ground that respondents
admitted committing the acts for which they were charged in the two informations but
interposed lawful justifying circumstances. RTC denied such motion. Hence the petition.

Held: RTC’s decision was sustained. Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 3(e):

xxx

(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.10

Accordingly, the RTC correctly exercised its discretion in denying petitioner's request for
a reverse order of trial.

In any event, a denial of a motion to reverse the Order of Trial is interlocutory in nature
and, hence, not appealable. As it turned out, petitioner's appeal has in fact caused
more, a lot more, delay than would have been caused by proceeding with the trial
forthwith as directed by the trial court. No further delay should be countenanced in these
cases.

Vda. De Manguerra vs Risos Aug. 28, 2008

The conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his
deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the
case is pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. If the
deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is
under detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge would be
able to observe the witness’ deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility.

Pp vs Ocimar Aug. 17, 1992

Who is the least guilty in a crime perpetrated in conspiracy?

The discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual
and individual participation in the commission of the crime, which may or may not have
been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused. What the law prohibits is that
the “most guilty” will be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty will be sent to
jail. And by "most guilty" we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of
participation in the commission of the offense, and not necessarily the severity of the
penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason
of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take into account his
degree of participation in the perpetration of the offense.

The matter of discharging a co-accused to become state witness is left largely to the
discretion of the trial fiscal, subject only to the approval of the court. The reason is
obvious. The fiscal should know better than the court, and the defense for that matter,
as to who of the accused would best qualify to be discharged to become state witness.

Pp vs CA, Pring 223 S 475

Facts: Pring was charged with kidnapping for ransom along with other accused, Arile.
The prosecution filed a Motion to Discharge Arile to be a state witness. Such motion
was challenged by private respondent Pring in his Opposition to Discharge Nonilo Arile
and in his Petition for Bail. The respondent is questioning the validity of discharge
without conducting a hearing.
Held: The present rule (Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rule on Criminal Procedure)
thus amends the old rule (Prior to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
Section 9, Rule 119) by categorically requiring a hearing where the prosecution shall
present the sworn statement of the proposed witness and its other evidence for the
purpose of proving to the satisfaction of the court that the conditions for discharge as
enumerated exist. (Note: This Rule is now in Sec. 17, or Rule 119, Discharge of accused to
be state witness. —… after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement
of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge…)

However, it cannot be denied that the defense was able to oppose the motion to
discharge Nonilo Arile. Private respondent Jose Pring has filed his opposition to the
motion to discharge Nonilo Arile and even discussed the material points of the latter's
testimony in his petition for bail. His assertion then that there was a denial of due
process for failure to conduct a hearing in support of the discharge is unfounded and not
substantiated after a perusal of the records of the case.

In requiring therefore, a "hearing in support of the discharge," the essential objective of

the law is for the court to receive or possess evidence for or against the discharge
which will serve as tangible and concrete basis, independent of the fiscal's or
prosecution's persuasions, in granting or denying the motion for discharge.

Bogo-Medellin Co. vs Pedro Son 209 S 329 (Erroneous Discharge)

Facts: The presiding judge here reinstated the State witness as co-accused for the
crime of qualified theft. The prosecution argue that reinstating would place the
discharged accused in double jeopardy. However, the Judge countered that Section 10
(now Section 18) of Rule 119, would mean that, where the discharged accused
(Hermosa) has not yet testified, the principle of double jeopardy does not yet apply.

Held: SC held nope. We consider Section 10 (Sec. 18) to mean that once the discharge
of an accused from the information is effected, the legal consequence of acquittal
follows and persists unless the accused so discharged fails or refuses to testify against
his co-defendant, in which case the defense of double jeopardy is withdrawn from him
and becomes unavailable to him. Hence, absence any showing that the accused has in
fact failed or refused to testify against his co-defendant reinstating would place the
discharged accused in double jeopardy. (Mere failure to attend two (2) scheduled
hearings does not necessarily show that he had violated his undertaking to testify
against his co-accused)

Webb vs De Leon, supra

Petitioner here challenged the validity of R.A. No. 6981, vesting in the Department of
Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who
shall be granted immunity from prosecution.

Held: Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the
decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and
beyond executive and legislative interference. The argument is based on Section 9,
Rule 119 which gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused
to be a state witness. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion — the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which
depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. SC
thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No.
6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a
witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9
of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a
state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court, is given
the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction
over the crime and the accused.

Mah main take away: The power to choose a state witness is different to the power to
discharge a state witness???

Pp vs dela Cruz June 25, 2008

The provision does not require that a state witness should appear to be the "least guilty"
among the accused. Rather, it provides that he "does not appear to be the most guilty."

Salvanera vs Pp, Parane GR 143093

The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very
same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. If it is shown that
the statements of the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have
convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some
particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects."

Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is

essential because only they have knowledge of the crime.
Pp vs Turingan 282 S 424

The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the
right to present evidence for the accused.

The rationale for the rule is that when the accused moves for dismissal on the ground of
insufficiency of the prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said evidence is
insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to present any evidence is
negated. The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing
motions for dismissal as a demurrer to the evidence of the prosecution and, after denial
thereof, the defense would then claim the right to present its evidence.

Pp vs Cachola Jan. 21, 2004

It is clear that the filing by the appellants of a demurrer to evidence in the absence of
prior leave of court was a clear waiver of their right to present their own evidence. To
sustain their claim that they had been denied due process because the evidence they
belatedly sought to offer would have exculpated them would be to allow them to "wager
on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever
dictated by convenience.”

Pp vs Cristobal GR 159450

Facts: Upon the State resting its case against the accused, her counsel filed a Demurrer
to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence, praying for the dismissal of the
charge on the ground that the evidence of the State did not suffice to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It was denied for lack merit by the RTC and she was
convicted of qualified theft.
Appellant now contends that such demurrer is not a waiver of his right to present
evidence because her demurrer was, at the same time, also a motion to defer defense
evidence.

Held: A motion to defer evidence does not constitute a request for leave to file a
demurrer to evidence. In fact, such motion indicates that appellant wanted the Trial
Court to consider the demurrer before proceeding to hear her evidence. Furthermore,
there is nothing in appellant’s Demurrer from which it can be inferred that appellant was
asking the Trial Court permission to move for the dismissal of the case.

Cabador vs Pp GR 186001

Facts: The prosecution made its formal offer on August 1, 2006, the day Cabador
(petitioner) filed his motion to dismiss. The RTC issued an Order treating petitioner
Cabador’s August 1, 2006 motion to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence. And, since he
filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his right to
present evidence in his defense.

Held: To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to

dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the
stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party
filing it.

It can be seen from the motion to dismiss, petitioner Cabador took pains to point out in
paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, "10 (sic)," 13, 14, and 15 (in his motion) how trial
in the case had painfully dragged on for years. The gaps between proceedings were
long, with hearings often postponed because of the prosecutor’s absence. In criminal
cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused’s right to
speedy trial.

It was only in few observations made in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12 (of the motion)
regarding the inadequacy of the evidence against him that the RTC and the CA simply
chose to treat Cabador’s motion as a demurrer to evidence

Since Cabador filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s
formal offer, before the trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution
could rest its case, it could not be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to
serve as a demurrer to evidence.

Cabarles vs Maceda Feb, 20, 2007

Facts: Cabarles insists that Judge Maceda gravely abused his discretion when he
ordered the reopening of the case before promulgation of judgment although both
parties had already rested their case. Cabarles argues that a case may only be
reopened after a judgment of conviction has been made but before its finality, as
provided in Section 24, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

For Judge Maceda’s cause, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that
Section 24 is a new provision (took effect on December 1, 2000.) which merely
formalized the long-accepted practice of judges of reopening a case to avoid a
miscarriage of justice. This being the case, jurisprudence providing that a judge has the
discretion to reopen a case even before promulgation of judgment still holds.
Held: A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both
parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is
rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment.

Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for
reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of
conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3)
the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to
prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further
evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.

However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is
rendered, Section 24 requires that a hearing must first be conducted. Judge Maceda
issued the April 1, 2003 Order without notice and hearing and without giving the
prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the matter.

Alegre vs Reyes 161 S 226

Facts: Before rendition or judgment Alegre (petitioner) filed a Motion to Reopen Trial.
RTC denied such motion. Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s decision.
Held: The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. A motion to reopen the trial is
quite distinct from a motion for new trial.

For one thing, a motion to reopen may properly be presented only after either or both
parties have formally offered, and closed their evidence, but before judgment. On the
other hand, a motion for new trial is proper only after rendition or promulgation of
judgment.

For another, a motion for reopening, unlike a motion for new trial, is not specifically
mentioned and prescribed as a remedy by the Rules of Court. There is no specific
provision in the Rules of Court governing motions to reopen. It is albeit a recognized
procedural recourse or device, deriving validity and acceptance from long, established
usage.

Hence, the trial court acted unreasonably in spurning Alegre's plea for reopening the
trial since his motion was before judgment. (And considering that it took the prosecution
no less than two and a half years to adduce its proofs while the accused presented
evidence within than a span of five (5) days and only on two (2) hearing dates.)

Note: Alegre is a 1988 case while Cabarles is a 2007 case. Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000.

JUDGMENT (RULE 120)

Pp vs Bugarin GR 110817-22

Lengthy case. Point is, the trial court fell short of what was required in the form and
contents of a judgment. First, it does not contain an evaluation of the evidence of the
parties and a discussion of the legal questions involved. It does not explain why
accused-appellant's licking of complainant's genital constituted attempted rape and not
another crime. Second, six informations were filed against the accused, but the decision
found the accused-appellant guilty of only four counts of rape (which the trial court
erroneously said three counts) and one count of attempted rape, without explaining
whether accused-appellant was being acquitted of one charge of rape. Third, the
decision is so carelessly prepared that it finds the accused-appellant guilty
of three counts of consummated rape but sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua "for each of the four counts of . . . rape."

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of four counts of rape and of acts of lasciviousness.

Pp vs Nadera GR 131384-87

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the
sole basis of judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to
convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not
merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the
offense charged.

Abay Sr., vs Garcia GR L-66132

Facts: The case were verbally dismissed by the judge during the trial. On the same day,
the prosecution moved to have the order of dismissal set aside. The Judge granted the
motion for reconsideration and set aside the verbal order of dismissal, reinstating the
case.
WON double jeopardy had set in.
Held: No. An order of dismissal must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him. There is no showing that this verbal
order of dismissal was ever reduced to writing and duly signed by him. Thus, it did not
yet attain the effect of a judgment of acquittal, so that it was still within the powers of the
judge to set it aside and enter another order, now in writing and duly signed by him,
reinstating the case.
D’Aigle vs Pp GR 174181

Requisites of a valid judgment of conviction, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 120 of the

Rules of Court.

1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission;
2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or accessory;
3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and
4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if
there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

SC find that all of these are sufficiently stated in the trial court’s Decision. All elements of estafa have
been sufficiently established by the prosecution.

Pp vs Flores GR 128823-24

In this case, a criminal complaint stated that the daughter was “sexually abused” by his
father. Can the father be convicted for a lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness by
virtue of variance doctrine?

No. The case is not one of variance between allegation and proof. The recital of facts in
the criminal complaints simply does not properly charge rape, "sexual abuse" not being
an essential element or ingredient thereof.
Consulta vs Pp GR 178462

Facts: Nelia R. Silvetre was riding a tricycle when Pedro Consulta, the herein accused,
and his brother Edwin Consulta (Edwin) blocked and kicked the tricycle. Accused
shouted "Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala, sinabihan na kita na
kahit saan kita matiempuhan, papatayin kita." Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelia’s 18K
gold necklace with a crucifix pendant which was worth ₱3,500. He was charged of
robbery.

Held: Should be convicted of grave coercion. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 is applicable
in this case. Grave coercion, like robbery, has violence for one of its elements. The
taking of Nelia’s necklace does not indicate presence of intent to gain. Intent to gain is
difficult to appreciate given his undenied claim that his relationship with Nelia is rife with
ill-feelings. Intimidation and violence consisting of, inter alia, uttering of invectives,
driving away of the tricycle driver, and kicking of the tricycle, Nelia was prevented from
proceeding to her destination.

Navarette vs Pp GR 147913

Although an accused is charged in the information with the crime of statutory rape (i.e.,
carnal knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age), the offender can be convicted
of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness, which is included in rape.

Parungao vs Sandiganbayan GR 96025

Facts: Oscar Parungao,a Municipal Treasurer of Porac, Pampanga was charged of

malversation of public funds. He was nevertheless convicted in the same criminal case,
for illegal use of public funds.

Issue: WON SB’s judgment was proper.

Held: No. Section 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not
apply in the instant case. A comparison of the two articles reveals that their elements
are entirely distinct and different from the other. In malversation of public funds, the
offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal use or allows any other
person to take such public funds for the latter's personal use. In technical malversation,
the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or another's
personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by
law or ordinance. Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it
necessarily include the crime of malversation of public funds charged in the information.

Daan vs Sandiganbayan GR 163972-77

Facts: Accused Joselito Daan was charged of malversation and falsification of public
document by a public officer or employee involving a sum of P18,860.00. The accused
with the recommendation of the prosecution, plea bargain for a lesser of offense. SB
denied the motion.

Issue: WON the decision of SB was proper.

Held: No. SC however, acknowledged the SB’s discretion in denying the motion.
Second sentence of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, use the word may,
denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused
to make such plea.
However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that
petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The Court sees no reason why the standards
applied by the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not be applied to the present case.
Estrada involves a ₱25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case
tremendously pales in comparison.

Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to

Render Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of
Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with
which petitioner was originally charged.

Pp vs Sumingwa GR 183619

Following the "variance doctrine" embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule

120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an accused charged of rape can be found guilty
of the lesser crime of Acts of Lasciviousness.

If there was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert the accused penis into the
complainant’s vagina, the accused can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness.

PP vs CFI Quezon City Br. 10 GR 48817

Is the judgment of acquittal penned by a trial judge detailed to a vacant branch of the
court but promulgated after a permanent judge has been duly appointed to the vacancy
is valid?

Held: Yes. Because a trial judge whose temporary detail to a vacant branch which has
expired remains to be the incumbent judge of the branch of the court where he is
permanently assigned. Thus, he may still decide cases submitted to him for decision
during his temporary detail in the vacant branch even after the vacancy has been filled.

What is required is that the judge who pens the decision is still an incumbent judge. In
this case, even after the expiration of Judge Montecillo’s temporary designation at
Branch X, he continued to be an incumbent of Branch III. (Juan B. Montecillo, Presiding
Judge of Branch III, was designated pro tempore to take over Branch X.)

Cruz vs Judge Pascual GR AM MTJ-93-782

In a verdict of acquittal, the presence of the accused is not indispensable since no

appeal is necessary and the judgment becomes final and executory immediately after
promulgation. The reading of the sentence in open court to counsel for the accused or
giving a copy of the decision to the accused or his counsel is sufficient promulgation.

Pp vs Prades GR 127569

In the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the judgment is promulgated by merely
filing the signed copy thereof with the Clerk of Court who causes true copies of the
same to be served upon the parties, hence the appearance of the accused is not even
required there as his presence is necessary only in the promulgation of the judgments
of trial courts. Thereafter, when the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory,
the records of the case together with a certified copy of the appellate court judgment are
returned to the court a quo for execution of the judgment. (Note: This is a 1998 case.
Last paragraph Section 6 of Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure was
cited.)

Bernardo vs Pp GR 166980
Icdang vs Sandiganbayan GR 18596 Jan. 25, 2012

There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be
served on both accused and his counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of
judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of
the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the
sentence was pronounced.

Palu-ay vs CA July 30, 1998

Tamayo vs Pp July 28, 2008

Accused-appellant Tamayo contends that the decision of the trial court and CA should
be set aside because the private complainant and her had entered into a compromise
agreement.

Held: No. As can be gleaned from Sec. 7 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, a judgment of
conviction may be modified or set aside only if the judgment is not yet final. A judgment
becomes final when no appeal is seasonably perfected. In this case, it is clear that the
petitioner did not appeal the Decision the Court of Appeals despite her, or her former
counsel’s, receipt of the same, therefore, petitioner’s conviction for estafa has already
attained finality.

De Vera vs De Vera April 7, 2009

Facts: RTC convicted the accused for bigamy but appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Geren (accused) was able to apply for probation
by reason of such mitigating circumstance. Rosario (complainant) appealed before CA
questioning the validity of the appreciation of RTC to the mitigating circumstance.

Held: Geren timely invoke his right against double jeopardy. Moreover, the same should
have been likewise denied pursuant Section 7, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
Judgments of conviction, errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the
accused consents thereto; or he, himself, moves for reconsideration of, or
appeals from, the decision.

NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION [RULE 121]

Mapagay vs Pp Aug. 19, 2009

Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of the
judgment of conviction may be filed within 15 days from the promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. Failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period renders the subject decision final and
executory.
Dinglasan vs CA Sept. 19, 2006

Facts: While petitioner Dinglasan agrees that the instant petition (Petition for New Trial
or in the alternative, Reopening of the Case) should be filed before the finality of the
judgment for conviction, he, however argues that judgment attains finality only upon the
receipt of the order or resolution denying his second motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not a new trial or reopening of the case based on newly discovered
evidence should be allowed.

Held: No. An accused may move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence only before judgment becomes final. Rule 52 Section 2 provides:

Section 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. – No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or a final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained.

To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or
order denying the second motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd situation
whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders or resolutions denying what is a
prohibited motion in the first place, in order that the period for the finality of judgments
shall run, thereby, prolonging the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would
allow a party to forestall the running of the period of finality of judgments by virtue of
filing a prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only illogical but also unjust to the
winning party.

Pp vs Garcia 288 S 382

An affidavit of recantation is not sufficient to warrant a new trial. More likely, it was
prepared by a legal mind and presented to the complainant already typed and
signature-ready. It is not the withdrawal or recantation or exculpation that the law
considers sufficient to overturn the overwhelming evidence earlier given during the trial.

Pp vs Clamor July 1, 1991

Facts: Gregorio Clamor was charged of Murder for shooting and killing Ricardo Rivera.
After the trial court had rendered its decision sentencing appellant for the crime of
murder, two (2) of the prosecution witnesses apparently executed affidavits in which
they retract testimony given by them: Gregorio Rivera, father of the victim; and
Inocencio Arellano, uncle of the victim.

Issue: Whether or not a new trial on the basis of a retraction by a witness should be
granted.

Held: No. the Court has ruled against the grant of a new trial on the basis of a retraction
by a witness. The rationale for the rule is obvious:

Affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant

witnesses usually for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is
exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it may later be
repudiated. So courts are wary or reluctant to allow a new trial based on
retracted testimony.

However, when aside from the testimonies of the retracting witness or witnesses there
is no other evidence to support a judgment of conviction, a new trial may be granted.

Custodio vs Sandiganbayan 453 S 24 (2005)

Facts: Petitioners are charged of double murder of Benigno Aquino Jr. and Rolando
Galman. Petitioners were found guilty. The petitioners, assisted by the Public Attorney’s
Office, now want to present the findings of the forensic group to this Court and ask the
Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to determine
the circumstances surrounding the case.
Issue: Whether or not re-opening of the case for a third trial should be granted.

Held: No. The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly discovered
evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence." The question of
whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was
the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been
discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance.

It appears from their report that the forensic group used the same physical and
testimonial evidence proferred during the trial, but made their own analysis and
interpretation of said evidence.

These materials were available to the parties during the trial. Petitioners, in their present
motion, failed to present any new forensic evidence that could not have been obtained
by the defense at the time of the trial even with the exercise of due diligence.

APPEAL (RULE 122)

Pp vs Abon GR 169245 Feb. 8, 2008

People vs. Mateo, 2004, modified these rules by providing an intermediate review of the
cases by the CA where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or
death. Pursuant to Mateo’s ruling, the Court issued A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC 2004-10-12,
amending the pertinent rules governing review of death penalty cases.

Moreover, provisions of the Rules of Court on appeals, death penalty are no longer
operational due to the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines, which took effect on June 29,
2006.

Pp vs Madali Jan. 16, 2001

It has been held that the word "party" in the provision (Sec 1, Rule 122) includes not
only the government and the accused but other persons as well, such as the
complainant who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal
proceedings. The complainant has an interest in the civil liability arising from the crime,
unless of course he has reserved to bring a separate civil action to recover the civil
liability.

Pp vs Sandiganbayan GR 164577

Section 1 of Rule 122 allows "any party" to appeal from a judgment or final order, unless
the right of the accused against double jeopardy will be violated. As a consequence, an
appeal by the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal necessarily places the accused
in double jeopardy.

The rule barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is, however, not absolute. The
following are the recognized exceptions thereto: (i) when the prosecution is denied due
process of law; and (ii) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting the
accused’ demurrer to evidence.

Pp vs Balisacan Aug. 31, 1966

The People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in
double jeopardy. However, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without
giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the
testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And
for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The
acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and
thus cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy

Pp vs Panganiban GR L-48879-82 125 S595

Facts: The judge sentenced the accused Moises Panganiban to reclusion perpetua in
Criminal Case No. L-437 for the murder of one Generoso Panganiban while in Nos. L-
438 and L-439, two death penalties were imposed for the murders of Victoria and
Anatalia Panganiban. L-438 and L-439 came before this (Supreme) Court on automatic
review. Criminal Case L-437, however, was not appealed by the accused.

Held: Criminal Case No. L-437 where accused-appellant was sentenced to life
imprisonment (reclusion perpetual) by the trial court, should be deemed also included in
this automatic review of the death penalty imposed on him in the other two cases, L-438
and L-439, although accused-appellant did not expressly appeal his conviction in L-437.
It would be absurd to require accused-appellant, under the peculiar circumstances, to
file a separate appeal in L-437 because the three criminal cases of which he was
convicted by the trial court in a single decision are so intertwined with each other, the
three cases having arisen on the same occasion.

Manuel vs Alfeche, Jr. GR 115683 259 S 475

While petitioner may be correct in asserting that a direct petition may, under appropriate
circumstances, be taken to this Court from the final judgment of the Regional Trial Court
on pure questions of law in the form and manner provided for in the Revised Rules of
Court, nevertheless, in view of the factual environment of this case, particularly that
private respondents herein had already taken an appeal to the Court of Appeals to
question the trial court's judgment of conviction, the proper remedy for petitioner is
simply ordinary appeal to the said tribunal.

Pp vs Rocha GR 173797 Aug. 31, 2007

Issue: WON the Motions to Withdraw Appeal of accused-appellants should be granted.

(In this case, it is the plaintiff-appellee’s contention that in cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, appeal in criminal cases to this Honorable Court is a
matter of right. A review of the trial court’s judgment of conviction is automatic and does
not depend on the whims of the convicted felon. It is mandatory and leaves the
reviewing court without any option.)

Held: The confusion in the case at bar seems to stem from the effects of the Decision of
this Court in People v. Mateo. We had not intended to pronounce in Mateo that cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are subject to the
mandatory review of this Court.

Since the case of accused-appellants is not subject to the mandatory review of this
Court, the rule that neither the accused nor the courts can waive a mandatory review is
not applicable. Consequently, accused-appellants’ separate motions to withdraw appeal
may be validly granted.

Cesar vs SB 134 S 105 GR L-54719-50

Supreme Court carefully examines petitions for review of Sandiganbayan decisions.

Because of the absence of an intermediate appeal from Sandiganbayan decisions,
where questions of fact could be fully threshed out, this Court has been most consistent
in carefully examining all petitions seeking the review of the special court's decisions to
ascertain that the fundamental right to be presumed innocent is not disregarded. This
task has added a heavy burden to the workload of this Court but it is a task we
steadfastly discharge.

Obugan vs Pp GR 116506 May 22, 1995

The period within which to perfect an appeal is fifteen days from receipt of the new
judgment. (If the motion for new trial is granted and new judgment is rendered.)

Neypes vs CA GR 141524

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

Carmelo vs Pp GR 166980

Facts: Petitioner argues that the 15-day extension granted to him by the appellate court
should be reckoned from his date of receipt of its Resolution granting him such
extension.

Held: A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC issued on February 29, 2000 is clear. It provides that "[a]ny
extension of time to file the required pleading should . . . be counted from the expiration
of the period . . ." The extension should thus be tacked to the original period, to
commence immediately after the expiration of such period. The court has no discretion
to reckon the commencement of the extension from a date later than the expiration of
such original period, not even if the expiry date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal
holiday.

Yu vs Tatad GR 170979

The fresh period rule in Neypes (a civil case) should equally apply to period for appeal
in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Pp vs Rugay July 2, 1998 291 S 692

Facts: Ricolito Rugay and Arvil Villalon alleged to have conspired to kill and actually
killed one Ariel Mendoza. RTC convicted them of the crime of murder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Both accused appealed to
Supreme Court. However, accused Arvil Villalon later filed a motion to withdraw his
appeal, which was granted by the Court in its Resolution of December 13, 1995, thus
leaving accused Ricolito Rugay as the lone appellant in this case.

After a careful study of the evidence on record, SC find that the prosecution failed to
establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: Finally, the Court notes that the conviction of appellant's co-accused, Arvil
Villalon, rests on the same evidence used to convict appellant. The Court finds that
such evidence does not prove beyond reasonable doubt either of the accused's guilt.
The acquittal of Ricolito Rugay should also benefit Arvil Villalon, the withdrawal of the
latter's appeal notwithstanding.

Lubrica vs Pp GR 156147-54 Feb. 6, 2007

The benefit of stay of execution afforded to a co-accused who timely files an appeal
cannot be extended to those who failed to file the same. Thus, the period to appeal
continued to run against petitioner notwithstanding the petitions for review filed by his
co-accused.
Petitioner cannot invoke the exception contained in the second clause of Section 11(a)
Rule 122 because it speaks of a judgment rendered by the appellate court which is
favorable to accused-appellant. It is too strained to construe the exception as including
procedural consequences of a pending appeal although it may be beneficial to the
accused.

Pp vs Tuniacao Jan. 19, 2010

The court cannot increase the civil liability of the accused who did not appeal. The
appeal by one or more of several accused cannot affect those who did not appeal,
except if the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to them.

Teodoro vs CA 258 S 643

The withdrawal of appeal may be allowed before judgment of the case on appeal.

(Compare with Rule 122, Sec. 12??)

PROCEDURE IN THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS (RULE 123)

Balayon, Jr. vs Ocampo 218 S 13 A.M. MTJ-91-619

In Rules on Summary Procedure, a witness who has not submitted any affidavit cannot
testify (Affidavit in Rules on Summary Procedure serve as direct testimony--- cross
examination na lang). However, in this case, a doctor who has not priorly submitted
his/her affidavit, may be called to testify with a specific factual matter relevant to the
issue.

Note: The doctor’s issued medical certificate is among the evidence on record.

Rio vs Cawaling June 7, 2004 A.M. MTJ-02-1391

Facts: Rino was charged of grave threat. The judge ordered his arrest.
Issue: WON this case is governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Held: Yes. Grave threat is penalized with imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day to 6
months (arresto mayor) and a fine not exceeding P500.00 if the threat is not subject to a
condition. Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides that “upon
the filing of a civil or criminal action, the court shall issue an order declaring whether or
not the case shall be governed by the Rule.

Tan vs Tabin Jan. 20, 2009 A.M. MTJ-09-1729

Judge Tabin issued a warrant of arrest to Tan because he failed to appear before the
court on his arraignment. It was found out that Tan was not notified of his arraignment.

Held: Judge Tabin failed to uphold the rules for which she should be held
administratively liable. Nothing in the Rules on Summary Procedure that states that a
warrant of arrest shall immediately issue even without actual notice to the accused.

Enriquez vs Vallarta Feb. 27, 2002 A.M. MTJ-02-1398

Judge Vallarta erred in requiring parties to submit memoranda. Sec. 19 on Rules on

Summary Procedure enumerates prohibited pleadings and motions, which includes
memoranda. A memorandum is one which other trial courts may require at the
conclusion of a trial. The purpose of the prohibition is to carry out the objective of the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure to promote the “expeditious and inexpensive
determination of small or simple cases.”

PROCEUDRE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS (RULE 124)

Foralan vs Pp Feb. 7, 1995

The failure to file appellant’s brief on time may cause the dismissal of the appeal except
when the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.

Pp vs Esparas GR 120034

In death penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. Section 8 of Rules 124 of the
Rules of court which authorizes the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant jumps
bail has no application to cases where the death penalty has been imposed. This is the
text and tone of Section 10, Rule 122.

Pp vs Zarate Feb. 28, 2005 GR 162767

The rationale for Sec 8 Rule 124 is that once an accused escapes from imprisonment or
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country he loses his standing in court.

Lagua vs CA GR 173390

Despite several extensions, the accused failed to file his brief. Hence, his appeal was
declared to be abandoned by the CA. He comes to Supreme Court alleging GAD on the
part of the lower court in declaring his appeal abandoned.
Held: CA correctly dismissed his appeal. The independent action for certiorari will lie
only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proven to exist. Yet, far from committing
the grievous error petitioner presents it to be, the CA merely exercised the authority
expressly granted to it under Rule 124, Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or
failure to prosecute. – The appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or on its
own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file
his brief within the time prescribed by this rule, except in case the appellant is
represented by a counsel de oficio.

Petitioner was represented by private counsel (and not counsel de oficio) to whom the
CA had granted multiple extensions.

PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME COURT (RULE 125)

Cuenca vs CA 250 S 485

Although in "Goduco v. CA", this Court ruled that it is not authorized to entertain a
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly discovered
evidence the rationale of which being: SC is not a trier of facts.

The rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like
"Helmuth, Jr. v. People" and "People v. Amparado".

In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition
of the Solicitor General, granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the
basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court considered as
newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of
conviction.

SEARCH & SEIZURE (RULE 126)

Malaloan vs CA 232 S 249 GR 104879

Uy vs BIR Oct. 20, 2000

Facts: A search warrant indicates “Hernan Cortes St. Cebu City” while the body of the
same warrant states the address as “Herman Cortes St., Mandaue City.”

WON the warrant is invalid.

Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement. In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named
Herman Cortes could be found in Cebu City. Nor the officers had any difficulty in
locating the premises. Therefore, such is not a defect that would spell the warrant’s
invalidation in this case.

Pp vs Encinada Oct. 2, 1997

Columbia Pictures vs CA Aug. 26, 1996

Stonehill vs Diokno 20 S 383

A search warrant was issued against a businessman who had a violation of Central
Bank Laws, tariff and customs laws, Tax Code and Revised Penal Code.

Such was general warrant and was invalidated by the Court because no specific offense
had been alleged in said application.

Note: A 1967 case.

Burgos vs Chief of Staff Dec. 26, 1984

Burgos challenged the validity of the warrant because the paraphernalia and
machineries allegedly used for subversive purposes were not his and those were not
personal properties.

Held: There is no provision to that effect. Under Section 3 (Rule 126), stolen or
embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense can be seized. And such were
personal properties because the machines were attached by somebody who is not the
owner of the building. (Article 415, [5])

However, the search warrant was declared a general warrant despite the fact that only
one law was violated.

Pp vs Dichoso 223 S 174

Appellant suggests that the search warrant is for more than one specific offense and
thus invalid. There should have been 3 separate warrants for illegal possession of
marijuana, illegal possession of shabu and illegal possession of paraphernalia.

Held: Dangerous drugs act is a special law that deal specifically with dangerous drugs
which are subsumed into “prohibited and “regulated” drugs and defines and penalizes
categories of offense which are closely related or which belong to the same species.
Therefore, one search warrant may be validly issue for said violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

Pp vs CA 216 S 101

Quintero vs NBI 162 S 467

NBI agents conducted search simultaneously. No members of the household were in

the position to watch them.

Held: Such a procedure were highly irregular. It is violative both the spirit and letter of
the law, which provides that “no search of a house, room, or any other premises shall
be made, except in the presence of at least one competent witness, resident of the
neighborhood.”

Sony Computer vs Bright Future Feb. 15, 2007

Mustang Lumber vs CA 257 S 430 (1996)

A truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber was seized which were not
accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. On the following day
or on April 3, 1990, a warrant was issued. Thereafter, a search was conducted on their
warehouse on April 3, 1990 which was continued on April 4, 1990.

WON the search and seizures were valid.

Held: Valid seizure. The search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search
could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.

And the search conducted on April 4, 1990 by virtue of April 3, 1990 search warrant is
also valid. Such were a continuation of the search. A search may be continued under
the same warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period.

Washington Distillers vs CA 260 S 821 (1996)

La Tondena applied for a search warrant to raid the premises of Washington Distillers to
recover their bottles which was allegedly cleaned and used by WD.There was a raid
and the bottles were turned over to LT.

Held: A search warrant proceeding is a special criminal process the order of which
cannot and does not adjudicate the permanent status or character of the seized
property. SW cannot be resorted as a means of acquiring property or of settling a
dispute over the same.

It was also held that the search warrant is also void because there was no certification
on non-forum shopping.

Uy Khey Teng vs Villareal 42 P 886

A search warrant was issued for the seizure of opiums but the officers found firearms
instead. WON the seizure of firearms were valid.

As a general rule, a SW can only issue on one offense thus it cannot be used for the
seizure of firearms. However, they discovered another crime of illegal possession of
firearms and therefore there was a valid warrantless arrest. And because there was a
valid WA such seizure becomes incidental to the arrest of the accused.

Pp vs Cendana Oct. 17, 1990

Upon arresting the accused, they found a gun allegedly used for the killing the victim. Is
the gun admissible as evidence?

Held: There was no valid warrantless arrest. The accused was arrested one day after
the killing and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources.
Evidence obtained during an unlawful search is inadmissible in evidence.

Pp vs Catan 205 S 235

Appellant was arrested for selling marijuana. A search was thereafter made on his
immediate vicinity (his house) where the arrest was made. The police officers found
more marijuana which became the basis of his conviction for possession of prohibited
drugs. Was the search valid.

Held: Yes. Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. The subsequent search in his
house which yield another incriminating evidence was a search contemporaneously
made and as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest in the immediate vicinity where the
arrest was made.

Incidental search not only means the body but also within the immediate premises.

Pp vs Li Way Chung 214 S 431 (1992)

The search without a valid warrant of appellant’s dwelling (a 9 square meter room) was
a valid incident of a lawful warrantless arrest. The search was conducted in a confined
area whithin his control where he might gain possession of a weapon.

Pp vs Gerente 219 S 756

There was a mauling incident. The police investigator went to the hospital and found out
that the victim had died. Upon proceeding to the scene of the mauling a witness told
them that there were three men who killed the victim. The police went to the house of
Gerente and arrested him. He was frisked and found in his body a marijuana leaves. Is
marijuana admissible as an evidence for illegal possession of drugs.

Held: Yes. The search was made as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. An
individual may be frisked for concealed weapons he may use against the arresting
officer.

Compare with Cendana Case.

Pp vs Quizon 256 S 325 (1996)

The law requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the search
may likewise be considered legal.

Posadas vs CA 180 S 283

At about 10 o’clock in the morning, when the police officers were conducting a
surveillance, they spotted Posadas carrying a buri bag. When the police approached
and introduced themselves Posadas attempted to flee. He was arrested and the buri
bag was searched. It contained grenades, a gun and live ammunitions.

Held: Valid seizure. The search is reasonable considering that Posadas acted
suspiciously. He attempted to flee, there was probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal.

Pp vs Mengote 210 S 174

Rogelio Mengote were acting suspiciously, looking side to side and holding his
abdomen. When searched, he was found with a gun and live ammunitions. He was
convicted of illegal possession of firearms.
Held: Almost the same case with Posadas. However, there was an invalid search and
seizure in this case. He never attempted to flee. He was not committing an offense.
Looking side to side and holding his abdomen are not sinister acts.

Pp vs Evaristo Dec. 11, 1992

A burst of gunfire was heard. The police officers came upon Barequiel Rosillo who was
firing a gun into the air. Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant
Evaristo prompting the lawmen to pursue him. Upon approaching the immediate
perimeter of the house, the patrol chanced upon the slightly inebriated appellants,
Evaristo and Carillo. Inquiring as to the whereabouts of Rosillo. Sgt. Vallarta
immediately observed a noticeable bulge around the waist of Carillo who, upon being
frisked, admitted the same to be a .38 revolver.

Held: This visual observation along with the earlier report of gunfire, as well as the
peace officer's professional instincts, are more than sufficient to pass the test of the
Rules. Consequently, under the facts, the firearm taken from Carillo can be said to have
been seized incidental to a lawful and valid arrest.

Pp vs Lacerna 278 S 561

Nonetheless, we hold that appellant and his baggage were validly searched, not
because he was caught in flagrante delicto, but because he freely consented to the
search. True, appellant and his companion were stopped by PO3 Valenzuela on mere
suspicion — not probable cause — that they were engaged in a felonious enterprise.
But Valenzuela expressly sought appellant's permission for the search. Only after
appellant agreed to have his person and baggage checked did the actual search
commence. It was his consent which validated the search, waiver being a generally
recognized exception to the rule against warrantless search.

Pp vs Encinada GR 116720

This case was compared to Lacerna case. In Lacerna case, the appellant testified in
open court that he allowed such search because he had nothing to hide. In the present
case, there was no checkpoint established. The policemen stopped the motorela and
forthwith subjected the passengers to a search of their persons and baggage. In
contrast to the accused in Lacerna, herein appellant testified that he openly objected to
the search by asking for a warrant. The prohibited drugs found in his possession —
cannot be therefore used against him in this case.

Pp vs Malmsteadt 198 S 401

An information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that a Caucasian

coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.

Held: There was a valid search. The receipt of information by NARCOM that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the
suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole,
led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable
cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of
the accused.
To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to
search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

Pp vs Bagista 214 S 53

The same with Malmstedt case. There was a tip. And the description fits the woman
allegedly carrying a marijuana. Valid search. Evidence is admissible. There was a
probable cause.

Pp vs Aminudin 163 S 402

PC officers had received a tip that Idel Aminnudin was carrying a marijuana. Aminnudin
was arrested shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon. The PC officers inspected
his bag and finding what looked like marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation.

Held: Vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the
PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9.

Caballes vs CA Jan. 15, 2002

Two police officers spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers
flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant Rudy Caballes. When
asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
The police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation
(NPC).

Held: No valid search. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the
police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if
made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Still and
all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search, which must still be present in such a case.

Obra vs CA 317 S 594

.
Pp vs Musa 217 S 597 (1995)

Pp vs Doria GR 125299

Pp vs Figueroa 248 S 679

Pp vs Salanguit 356 S 683

Pp vs Valdez 341 S 24

Veroy vs Layague 210 S 97

Pp vs Cuizon 265 S 325

Pp vs De Gracia 233 S 716

Pp vs Montilla GR 123872

Pp vs Sucro GR 93239

Pat. Roy Fulgencio was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. to monitor the activities
of appellant Edison Sucro. Fulgencio observed Sucro from a distance. Sucro would go
to the chapel, take marijuana and sell it to his customers. Upon his third customer,
Fulgencio apprehended Sucro. Sucro now contends that the marijuana was
inadmissible because the officer had sufficient time to apply for a search and arrest
warrants.

Held: An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof. Under the circumstances (monitoring of
transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest appellant
who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband. There is nothing unlawful
about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a warrantless
arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.

Pp vs Maspil GR 85177

The appellants were caught transporting marijuana on their jeep. WON the marijuana
are inadmissible evidence. Accused-appellants cited the Aminudin case where the
Court ruled that since the marijuana was seized illegally, it is inadmissible in evidence.

Held: There are certain facts of Aminudin case which are not present in this case. In
the Aminnudin case, the records showed that there was sufficient time and adequate
information for the PC officers to have obtained a warrant. The officers knew the name
of the accused, that the accused was on board M/V Wilcon 9, bound to Iloilo and the
exact date of the arrival of the said vessel.

On the other hand, in this case there was no information as to the exact description of
the vehicle and no definite time of the arrival. A jeepney cannot be equated with a
passenger ship on the high seas. The ruling in the Aminnudin case, is not
applicable to the case at bar.

Pp vs Bongcawaran GR 143944

The vessel security personnel found shabu on the suitcase of Basher Bongcarawan.
WON there was an unlawful seizure.

Held: The baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security
personnel. It was only after they found "shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the
contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence,
the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
Pp vs Marti 193 S 57

Facts: Reyes (a shipping proprietor) opened the box containing marijuana leaves, he
took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of
business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and
entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents.

Held: Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one,
contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant. The mere presence of the NBI agents
did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and
seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in
plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search
that is prohibited by the constitution. It was held that the search and seizure clauses
are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals.

Pp vs Malaloan, supra

Pp vs Bans GR 104147

But if the criminal case which was subsequently filed by virtue of the search warrant is
raffled off to a different branch, all incidents relating to the validity of the warrant issued
should be consolidated with that branch trying the criminal case. The rationale is to
avoid confusion as regards the issue of jurisdiction over the case and to promote an
orderly administration of justice.

For this reason, the court trying the criminal case should be allowed to rule on the
validity of the search warrant in order to arrive at a judicious administration of justice.

Solid Triangle vs RTC Sheriff Nov. 13, 2001

It is therefore puerile to argue that the court that issued the warrant cannot entertain
motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is ongoing. Such
erroneous interpretation would place a person whose property has been seized by
virtue of an invalid warrant without a remedy while the goods procured by virtue thereof
are subject of a preliminary investigation

I. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES (RULE 127)