1987 Constitution Provisions

Jurisprudence in Atty Lara’s PPT

Additional Jurisprudence during lecture
Questions of Atty Lara

Section 14.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
The due process clause in paragraph (1), Section 14, is understood to be criminal due process.
Because we also have a due process clause in Section 1. So what is the difference between the two because
both speaks of due process, we have due process in Section 1 no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law then we find Section 14, also talking about due process that is Section
14, paragraph (1).

Rights of a person under investigation are covered by Section 12. After investigation, and assuming the case
prospered, the gov’t is now ready to file a case, and when the case is filed, Section 14 sets in. (Kung saan
iniwan ng Sec. 12, sasaluhin ng sec 14)

Criminal due process in Section 14 as against due process in Section 1.

The difference between Section 14 P1 and Section 12 of BOR is Section 14 P1 is understood to be criminal
due process as against due process in Section 1 which is due process clause in general.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and ....

...and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

P2 contains the rights of an accused in a criminal prosecution. More on P1 of Section 14, the criminal due
process clause of the BOR presupposes that the penal law being applied for these rights is the substantive
requirement of due process. Section 14 is more specific treatment of due process in judicial proceedings as
applied in criminal cases. The rights of the accused guaranteed that the Section 14, Paragraph (2) are rights
in all criminal prosecutions.

When do these rights become available to the accused? From arraignment to rendition of judgment.
Arraignment is the time where the criminal complaint is read to the accused in an open court.
These rights in paragraph 2, Section 14 is available up to rendition of judgement. Meaning to say that every
step in the trial or in the criminal prosecution from the arraignment to the rendition of judgement.

SPECIFIC RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

Right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.

It is merely required of the State to establish a prima facie case after which the burden of proof shifts to the
accused. To establish a prima facie case means to prove the act/acts that constitute the crime or the so-
called elements of the crime. It is then will be the duty of accused to prove that the act/acts are innocent or
are not committed with criminal intent. In criminal law (RPC), these elements must be proved to convict the
accused. In the first place, it must be alleged in the information, otherwise, there can be no trial. The case is
dismissible if the elements of the crime as seen in RPC are not alleged in the information. Even if alleged if it is
not proven in the trial, then there is no conviction.

Elements of the crime. These elements must be proven in court to convict the accused. In the first place, it
must be alleged in the information otherwise, there can be no trial. The case is dismissible if the elements of
the crime as seen in the revised penal code is not alleged in the information even if it is alleged if it is not
proven in the trial, then there is no conviction. Establishing the prima facie case, the facts constituting the
elements of the crime.

Malana v. People, GR No. 173612, March 26, 2008. The "equipoise rule"
The "equipoise rule" provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly balanced,
the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused.
 Facts:
That on or about the 28th day of May 2000, in the municipality of San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan,
Philippines (Dominador Malana (Dominador) and Rodel Tiaga (Rodel), together with their acquitted co-accused
Elenito Malana (Elenito), armed with explosives and with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and throw explosives inside the house of Vicente Roxas Jr. which
exploded thereby causing serious physical injuries on Betty Capsa-Roxas which directly caused her death and
also causing serious physical injuries to Suzette Roxas and Jenny Rose de la Cruz which required the amputation
of the left leg of said Suzette Roxas and medical attendance for more than 30 days with respect to Jenny Rose de
la Cruz, which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Suzette Roxas and Jenny Rose de la Cruz, thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Suzette Roxas and Jenny Rose de la Cruz which prevented their deaths.
Issue:
Are the accused liable for the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder and attempted murder?
Ruling:
Yes. There is no merit in appellants’ assiduous assertion that they should be acquitted under the equipoise rule in
view of what to them are doubts as to their guilt. This rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a
criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused. There is, therefore, no equipoise if the evidence is not evenly balanced. Said rule is not applicable in the
case before us because the evidence here presented is not equally weighty. The equipoise rule cannot be invoked
where the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00138 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellants are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole.

Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 96131, September 6, 1991.

Preventive suspension pendente lite or the pendency of the proceedings, does not violate the right to be
presumed innocent because preventive suspension is not a penalty. So why does a preventive suspension
even if an employee, a government employee, for example is suspended and not provided with salaries and
everything. Why is this constitutional? Because preventive suspension is not a penalty. It does not violate the
right to be presumed innocent.

Facts:
A complaint was filed before the Ombudsman by the Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of Malabon, based
on the audit report of the Commission on Audit, wherein petitioner-Corazon Gonzaga, as an accountable officer is
alleged to have incurred a shortage of P15,188.37; that an information2 dated 2 March 1990 was thereafter filed
against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for the crime of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code;3 that before she could be arraigned, accused-petitioner filed with respondent court a motion
for re- investigation, which motion was denied by said court in its resolution dated 2 July 1990;4 that on 17 August
1990, accused-petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged; and that on the same date, the prosecution filed
a motion seeking to suspend, pendente lite, the accused as school principal of the above-named school,5 on the
basis of Section 13, Republic Act 3019 ("Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"), as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195. The Sandigan Bayan granted the prosecutions motion to suspend the accused, pendente lite.

Issues:
(1) Is Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, as amended, unconstitutional as the suspension provided thereunder partake
of a penalty even before a judgment of conviction is reached, and is thus violative of her constitutional right to be
presumed innocent?
(2) Is the indefinite period of suspension, pendente lite, from her (Gonzaga) mentioned office, on the basis of
Section 13, Rep. Act 3019, valid?

Ruling:
(1) No. Because, firstly, under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a public officer upon the filing of a valid
information is mandatory.9 What the Constitution rejects is a preventive suspension of indefinite duration as it
raises, at the very least, questions of denial of due process and equal protection of the laws; in other words,
preventive suspension is justifiable for as long as its continuance is for a reasonable length of time;10 secondly,
preventive suspension is not a penalty; a person under preventive suspension, especially in a criminal action,
remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence as his culpability must still be established
established; thirdly, the rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of validity, and that to declare a law
unconstitutional, the basis for such a declaration must be clearly established.
 (2) No. The Constitution abhors an indefinite preventive suspension as it violates the due process and equal
protection clauses,19 and the right of public officers and employees to security of tenure. Preventive suspension
under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days, from
issuance thereof, and this applies to all public officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly
charged under said Act. . Petitioner may re-assume the position of school principal of the Malabon Municipal High
School, Malabon Metro Manila without prejudice to the continuation of trial on the merits of the pending case
against her in the Sandiganbayan, unless there are other supervening legal grounds which would prevent such re-
assumption of office.

Preventive suspension pendente lite

Preventive suspension pendente lite or the pendency of the proceedings, does not violate the right to be
presumed innocent because preventive suspension isn’t a penalty. So why does a preventive suspension
even if an employee, a government employee, for example is suspended and not provided with salaries
and everything. Why is this constitutional? because preventive suspension is not a penalty. It does not
violate the right to be presumed innocent.

Right to be heard by himself or counsel: 3 specific rights –

1. right to present evidence and to be present at the trial;
2. right to be assisted by counsel;
3. right to compulsory process

To compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence on his behalf.

Right to present evidence includes: The right to testify in one’s favor; The right to be given time to call witnesses;

The right to be present at the trial. The accused has an absolute right to be personally present during the
entire proceedings from the arraignment to the to sentence if he so desire.

Why did we add if he so desire? Because under the new provision of the rules of court or even the constitution
where trial in absentia can be hard. The accused option not to attend a trial of his case except during
arraignment when the criminal complaint is read to him and at the time of judgement or the time the decision
is read to him in open court.

Guarantee of the right to counsel serves to minimize the imbalance in the adversary system. Meaning: The
accused is alone. Ang kalaban niya people of the Philippines. Buong structure of the government is against
the accused. The police, fiscal, the investigation, the NBI, forensic experts. The accused only have his defense
counsel and his rights under the constitution. It is adversarial that is why a counsel is needed.

Under the right to counsel in Section 14 (2), counsel need not be one who is the choice of the
accused.
Remember that in Section 12, paragraph (1), we said that one of the rights of a person under investigation is
his right to counsel, a competent counsel preferably his own choice. The difference in paragraph (2), Section
14, is that the counsel is not given in the same terms as that found in Section 12. So that the counsel that is
given to the accused will be given by the court. It need not be the counsel of his own choice. The preference
in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly and specifically the person under investigation under Section 12,
paragraph (1) rather the one who is accused in a criminal proceeding.

Amion v. Judge Chiongson, AM RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999.

In this case, the accused cannot contend that the appointment by the trial court judge of a counsel de
officio deprive him of his constitutional rights to be defended by a counsel of his own choice. The preference,
in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one
who is the accused in the criminal prosecution.

Facts:
A verified complaint dated August 29, 19961 was filed by Baltazar D. Amion with this Court on October 7, 1996
charging Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Bacolod City with Ignorance of
the law and Oppression relative to Criminal Case No. 94-159772 pending in said trial court and in which
complainant is the accused. The allegations against respondent judge are premised on his appointment of a
counsel de oficio for accused-complainant despite the latters objection thereto on the ground that he had his own
retained counsel in the person of Atty. Reynaldo C. Depasucat.
 Accused-complainant explains that respondent judge appointed another lawyer in the person of Atty. Manuel Lao
Ong of the Free Legal Aid to act as counsel de oficio for the scheduled hearing of the aforecited criminal case on
March 28, and 29 1996. He further avers that his retained counsel was ready for hearing on said dates but on
March 27, 1996, the day before the scheduled hearing, he was informed that Atty. Depasucat was ill.
Complainant-accused asserts that the aforesaid incidents constitute a clear violation of his right to due process
and a deprivation of his constitutional and statutory right to be defended by counsel of his own choice.

Issue:
Did the appointment by the judge of a Counsel de oficio violates the right of the accused to due process and a
deprivation of his constitutional and statutory right to be defended by counsel of his own choice?

Ruling:
No. An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the
preference in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation 11 rather
than one who is the accused in criminal prosecution.
Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of preference in the choice of counsel to an accused in a
criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would
make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.
The facts and circumstances of this case point to the pervasive and prevaricated procrastination of the proceedings
undertaken by the accused-complainant and his counsel.
The accused discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is not so much as to grant
him a plenary prerogative which would preclude other equally competent and independent counsels from
representing him. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the
detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as
he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he
forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings.
Accused-complainant had more than sufficient time and every available opportunity to present his side which would
have led to the expeditious termination of the case. A party cannot feign denial of due process when he had the
opportunity to present his side.
(Sa case kasi nato ilang ulit na nagfile ng postponement si accused dahil may sakit si counsel, may out of the
country travel si counsel. Ganun. E nadedelay kaya nag appoint ng counsel de officio. Sabi kasi delaying tactic na
lang yung mga rason rason. Accused-complainant is a police officer charged in Criminal Case No. 94-15772 for
having allegedly killed a fellow policeman on January 24, 1994. Iyan kwento if di nyo mabasa yung full case. Hehe.)

May the right to counsel be waived?

Yes, according to Bernas.
No, according to Atty Lara.

Why is this so? The cases cited by Bernas to support his contention, our cases decided in 1912, 1915, and 1955.
It must be pointed out that in the language of the provision right to counsel like the other rights guaranteed
there on accused to be mandatory. If the right to counsel may be waived, may the right to be heard, the
right to be informed, the right to present evidence can also be waived. Moreover, in a way where in practical
considering adversarial nature of the criminal proceedings.

At what point in the criminal proceeding is the accused entitled to counsel: from arraignment to
rendition of judgment.
The rights enumerated in Section 14 are rights in all criminal prosecution which cover the period from
arraignment to rendition of judgement. The right of counsel exists only during that period. Under the
circumstances of Section 12 however, the right to counsel exists before arraignment.

Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him:
This is the arraignment where the accused is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The purpose is to inform the accused of the charge against him as it will enable him to make his defense. To
obeying himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against the order prosecution for the same cause.
To inform the court of the facts alleged so that we may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support
the conviction if one should be had. The accused must be informed of the facts that are included to rim. The
information must describe the act with sufficient particularity.
The right to assail the sufficiency of the information may be waived by the accused, by his favor of the
objective during the trial and the deficiency is cured by competent evidence presented.
Alright, let’s just say that nakalusot, there are elements in the information like elements of the crime where not
alleged in the information (di nakita ng counsel, di rin nakita ng husgado, di nakita ng court). Now, if the
accused does not assail the sufficiency of the information, then it is deemed waived. Di niya nakita, di nakita
ng counsel so it is deemed waived. The deficiency in the information. Now, if he fails to object the writ during
the trial when the prosecution now presents evidence to prove that the particular element of the crime which
was not alleged in the information. then, the deficiency is cured by competent evidence. That is why defense
counsel must always be on their toes in so far as the presentation of evidence is concerned.

The accused must raise the issue of defective information in a motion to quash or in a motion for a bill of
particulars.

Right to speedy, impartial and public trial: remedy for violation is dismissal; it is equivalent to
acquittal.
The right to speedy in trial prohibits unreasonable delays. The right may be waived when the postponement
of a trial has been sought and obtained by the accused himself or by his counsel. The accused does not have
any reason to question the delay of the proceedings himself. The remedy of the accused for violation of his
rights to speedy trial is dismissal of the case. Dismissal for the violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent
to acquittal and is barred to subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (R.A. 8493)

If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit provided by the Act, upon motion of the
accused, the information shall be dismissed (Sec. 13).
It provides that the arraignment of the accused shall be held within 30 days from the filing of the information
and after arraignment; trials shall commence 30 days from the arraignment. Under the new guidelines issued
by the Supreme Court, a case must be raffled off to a trial court 3 days from the filing of the criminal
information. The arraignment must take place within 10 days from the date of the raffle. The trial must take
place within 30 days after the pre-trial conference. Regular trials must be completed in under 80 days. Trials
on judicial affidavits must resolve after 60 days. Eto panaginip, panaginip ng judicial system, it's more of the
exception rather than the general rule. It is not happening in our judicial system unfortunately.
The speedy trial act is a very good law only if it will be followed. Napakatapang nung Speedy Trial Act.
Imagine any delay, any violation, of the schedules that are provided in the law for the court to follow, may
cause the dismissal of the case and the dismissal is failure to prosecute. The failure to prosecute is a dismissal
with prejudice, it cannot be re-filed.
If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit provided by the act upon motion of the accused,
the information shall be dismissed, that is provided under Section 13 of the law.

Right to public trial: A trial is public when anyone interested in observing how a judge conducts the
proceedings in his courtroom may do so.
There is no ban on such attendance. Being a stranger to the litigant is of no moment; no relationship to the
parties need not be shown.
During the early days or years of practice, there were salas in the City of Manila and even in Quezon City
where it is just like the anteroom or the inner room of a judge. The courtroom consists of a table where the
judge sits and then a chair for the prosecutor and a chair for the defense counsel. So, it’s only a 4x5 or 4x4
room. Now if that is the case, such that not too many people who want to attend the trial can be
accommodated, is that a public trial? Is that not a violation of the constitution? No, it is not. It is still a public
trial. As long as it is open to the public, notwithstanding the fact that the public cannot come in. Provided
that anybody who wish to come in, provided they are accommodated, are not barred from coming in.

Right of confrontation: Means the right to meet the witnesses face to face.

The right has a two fold purpose:

1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross examination;
2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness.
How he acts, his body language, is he telling the truth, does his body language tells he’s telling the truth.
Does his body language tells that he is telling the truth?
 Testimony not subjected to cross examination must be excluded.
Let’s just say a witness testified in court but through postponements and lots of postponements, he was never
crossed-examined. It is that testimony must be expunged from the records and can never be used if there
was no cross-examination.

Dying declarations is an exemption.

What is a Dying declaration? It is a declaration of a dying person. Let’s just say a person who was dying or
who believes he was dying said that it was this who shot him. It was dying declaration. Provided the person
believes that he was dying. It doesn’t matter if he lives after that, it is still a dying declaration. The meat of that
circumstance is that he believes he was dying. Even if not subjected to cross-examination that is admissible.

Estrada vs. Bersamin, et.al., GR Nos 212140-41, Jan. 21, 2015.

Facts:
Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints
for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-
affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made
“[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not
have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’
(Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.

Issue:
WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law

Held:
NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents.

The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as
Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for ready reference.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his
constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a
compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent
with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen.
Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to
furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the
order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant
and his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of
the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any
respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the
affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the
supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman
for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of
probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand
the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural
law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence
now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the
fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only
as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie
evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence
presented and the facts obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct
of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we
find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative proceedings as
laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish
the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial
evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than
evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable
cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men,
not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because
such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However,
in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial
evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as
substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include
hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will
change the quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability
of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.

Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-affidavits of some of other co-
respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions
for reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint
Order to formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully complied with the
existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules required.
Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to
preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish
preliminary investigations without running afoul of the constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply and were
never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with
finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a decision against the
respondent in the administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required.
To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence
required to establish probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as
 amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary
investigations, the respondent has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial
and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In preliminary investigations, the
same public officer may be the investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and
hearing officer may be under the control and supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or
Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary
investigations. To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and
essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary investigations
invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases
now pending in all courts throughout the country. No preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law
designates a public officer, outside of the prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those
serving sentences by final judgment would have to be released from prison because their conviction violated
constitutional due process.

Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum shopping.

(Moreover, a person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada is in the present case when he filed his
Request, is not yet an accused person, and hence cannot demand the full exercise of the rights of an accused
person)- eto ang parang gist nya guys. di pa sya accused talaga.)

It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross
examine the witnesses which the complainant may present
The right of confrontation is not available during preliminary investigation; this can be gleaned from Section
12, paragraph (1) which does not mention the right of confrontation as one of the guaranteed rights during
investigation. However, the statutory rights to confrontation are recognized during the preliminary
investigation process proper but not during preliminary examination.

Compulsory process: to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf.
The right of the accused should be issuance by the court of compulsory processes. To secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf that is the compulsory process that is right of the
accused under Section 14 (2).

The 1935 Constitution, speaks of the right to compulsory process for the attendance of the witness for his
behalf. The 1973 and the 87 versions added the right to have a compulsory process to secure also the
production of evidence on behalf of the accused.

Trial in absentia: A situation where the trial of the accused may proceed even when he is absent.

May occur in two instances; must have been arraigned; must be present during promulgation.
1. The accused despite noticed and justifiably thinks to appear
2. The accused voluntarily waived his rights to be present
In the second instance, the accused must undertake appear in court when required by the prosecution for
purposes of identification or that he unqualified and admits in an open court that he is the person named as
defendant in the case on trial.

In most cases, the accused was not already been arraigned. In either case, the accused is also required to
be present during a propagation.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, we have taken up this one also in Article 7 Section 18.

Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
1987 Constitution, Article 7, Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may,
for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
 or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing
to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Writ of habeas corpus is an order.

The habeas corpus means to produce the body.

It is an order direct to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner
at the designated time and place. With the day and cause of his caption, and detention to do submit to and
receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ should consider in that behalf. Hence, the essential
requisite of availability of the writ is actual deprivation of liberty.

The privilege of the writ is the privilege to be brought to court for the immediate determination of legality of
the deprivation of physical liberty.

So, what is the writ of habeas corpus and what is the privilege of habeas corpus? What is suspended is it the
privilege of the habeas corpus or is it the privilege of the writ of the habeas corpus?

What is suspended is the privilege of the writ; not the issuance of the writ.
Because the court shall issue the writ as a matter of cause and the officer to whom it was directed is bound
to honor. If however, there is reasonable belief that the person subject of the writ participated in the crime
covered by suspension of the privilege, the officer shall state such fact and in his answer in return and shall
ask the court to proceed the court of order. What happens after such return and answer, the Supreme Court
suggested in Lansang vs. Garcia 1971 case that the next step is for the court appointed commissioner to
receive evidence or such stated belief. The suggestion of the Supreme Court in Lansang is impractical
because it defeats the very purpose of the suspension of the privilege which is to keep the person under
custody without a judicial inquiry. Furthermore, the situation might never happen because of restrictive
provision of the 1987 constitution. On the suspension of the writ and the declaration of the martial law, Article
7 Section 18.

The function of the writ of habeas corpus...

To achieve immediate determination of the legality of the detention.

The effect of the suspension of the privilege of the writ...

To prevent courts temporarily from inquiring to the legality of the detention.
 The suspension of the privilege of the writ is subject to judicial review.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ is subject to judicial review under the express provision of the Section
18, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution. That is why, the cases cited by Bernas is no longer applicable. Barcelon
vs. Baker 1905, Montenegro vs. Castaneda 1952, Lansang vs. Garcia 1971, Padilla vs. Garcia, all of these are
no longer applicable because of the restrictive provision of the 1977 Constitution.

...under the express provision of the Section 18, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution.

Under the express provisions of Section 13, Article III, in relation to Section 18, Article VII, a person
accused (detained) for an offense covered by the suspension of the writ is entitled to be released
on bail.
It is this thus the cases cited by Bernas are no longer applicable. Naga vs. Gaitmaitan, Padilla vs. Morales. The
heart of the suspension of the privilege is to freeze temporarily inquiry into the justification of the detention.
Notwithstanding that under Section 13 Article 3 the right to bail shall not be failed even when the privilege of
the writ is suspended. There is still a necessity for the filing of the charges in court first conformably with Section
18 Article 7 before the bail can be granted. Once formal charges are filed, bail becomes available under
Section 13. Filing of charges entails executive waiver of the effects of the suspension of the privilege.

However, there is still a necessity for the filing of the charges in court first.

The law on the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has undergone radical
changes in the 1987 constitution: the doctrine on the power to suspend the privilege of the writ, on
the grounds for suspension, on the termination of the suspension, on judicial review, and on the
scope and effects of the suspension.
The president may suspend the privilege of the writ not exceeding 60 days. The ground of suspension is now
only confined in the case of rebellion or invasion for the public safety requires it and Congress is given the
power to revoke the suspension and the President may not set aside such revocation but congress upon the
initiative that the President may extend the suspension. Provision of Section 18 Article 7, the Supreme Court
upon initiative of the citizen may review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege
and must promulgate this decision thereon within 30 days from its filing.

The scope of the suspension is severely limited by Article 7, Section 18, second to the last paragraph. The
suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to person judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent or directly collected with invasion.

We had the occasion already to the study of the implication of this in Constitutional law I, but it will be best
for you to review it and again, examine if the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is still
applicable as a tool of the state to protect itself. As I have said in the Constitutional Law 1 when we are
studying Section 18, when you are studying Section 18, you must study it with a mindset that these are
provisions for the protection of the state. Maybe immediately, you imagine abuses of Martial law on the three
commander-in chiefship of the President and you imagine immediately abuses, don’t do that as of yet
because these abuses are addressed in the Bill of Rights Article 3 of the constitution. So that the Article 7
Section 18 must be understood as a provision for the protection of the state.

In section 14, it provides for the rights of the accused in the criminal case the speedy trial. That is only trial
aspect of the case because there are many aspects: preparation, etc. preliminary investigation, and
others and it also has administrative.

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

In section 14, it provides for the rights of the accused in the criminal case to speedy trial. That is only trial
aspect of the case because there are many aspects: preparation, etc. preliminary investigation, and others
and it also have administrative.

Section 16 speaks of the disposition of cases not a trial of a case. The overall dispositions from the time of there
is arraignment or the time probably that it was investigated when the person accused is still only investigated
from the commission of the crime, kasama nayon ng Section 16, speedy disposition of the case. And up to
the time of judgement speedy disposition of case that do not cover only judicial, quasi-judicial but also
administrative bodies.

The provision guarantees the right to a speedy disposition of cases. It covers the periods before,
during and after trial.
It gives broader protection than Section 14 paragraph 2 which guarantees the right to a speedy trial. It is also
broader than the protection given in Article 8 Section 15 which covers the period after the submission of the
case. The right may be obtained by a petition for mandamus.

Speedy trial in Sec 14 covers only trial phase.

of the criminal case. Whereas Section 16 covers all phases of all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
proceedings. There is a new doctrine in ordinate delay. It has been a pain, a problem with the ombudsman
for because of the delay of a case or disposition of the case when it reaches the Sandiganbayan, some cases
were dismissed, on the ground of inordinate delay because of the delay in filing of the case. Disposition of
the case in the ombudsman in the filing of the case before the Sandiganbayan. So that, the Supreme Court
has come up with a new doctrine in so far, as an inordinate delay is concerned. This is a 2018 case which
cannot be found in any book. Yet, every accused has the right to due process and to speedy disposition of
cases. Inordinate delay, the resolution of the termination of the preliminary investigation will result in the
dismissal of the case of the accused. Mrs. Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. 206438 July 21, 2018. The
concept of inordinate delay was introduced in Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan where the Supreme Court was
constrained to apply the radical relief of dismissing the criminal complaint against an accused due to the
delay of the determination of the preliminary investigation. In people vs Sandiganbayan fifth division, the
ruling that fact finding investigations are included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is
abandoned. The period for the resolution of the graft cases starts with the preliminary investigation phase in
the office of the Ombudsman. The justices upheld the position of the Ombudsman that the reckoning period
on the right to speedy trial, does not start with the fact-finding investigation.

The court interpreted the reckoning period of the right to the speedy disposition of cases under the Article 3
Section 16 to start from the preliminary investigation of cases and not before the preliminary investigation and
not from the fact-finding stage.

Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. 206438 July 21, 2018

Facts:
Cagang was the Provincial Treasurer of Sarangani.
Both Petitions question the Sandiganbayan’s denial to quash the Informations and Order of Arrest against
Cagang despite the Office of the Ombudsman’s alleged inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation.

In February 10, 2003, Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint alleging the graft and
corruption at the Vice Governor’s Office, Sarangani Province by diverting public funds given as grants or aid
using barangay officials and cooperatives as “dummies.” The complaint was referred to the Commission on Audit
for audit investigation.

On November 17, 2011, the OMB filed Informations for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents against Cagang, Camanay, Zoleta,
Macagcalat, and Mangalen.

Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest.

Cagang argued that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the Informations.
Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan and Roque v. Ombudsman, he argued that the delay violated his constitutional
rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. The OMB, on the other hand, filed a
Comment/Opposition arguing that there was no showing that delay in the filing was intentional, capricious,
whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons.

The Sandiganbayan denied the Motions to Quash/Dismiss.

It also found that there was no inordinate delay in the issuance of the information, considering that 40 different
individuals were involved with direct participation in more or less 81 different transactions.

Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed his Motion to
Quash/Dismiss since the Informations filed against him violated his constitutional rights to due process and to
speedy disposition of cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not inordinate delay exists in this case.

RULING:
What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding is not determined by “mere mathematical
reckoning.” It requires consideration of a number of factors, including the time required to investigate the
complaint, to file the information, to conduct an arraignment, the application for bail, pre-trial, trial proper, and the
submission of the case for decision. Unforeseen circumstances, such as unavoidable postponements or force
majeure, must also be taken into account.

Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a query on when a case is deemed to have commenced.

In Dansal v. Fernandez, this Court recognized that the right to speedy disposition of cases does not only include
the period from which a case is submitted for resolution.

Rather, it covers the entire period of investigation even before trial. Thus, the right may be invoked as early as
the preliminary investigation or inquest.

To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation violates the
accused’s right to due process and the speedy disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case
against the accused. The burden of proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods
provided by law or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during the given periods, the burden
is on the respondent or the accused to prove that the delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to have
occurred beyond the given periods, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the delay was reasonable
under the circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a competent and
independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case. If there has been delay, the
prosecution must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice was suffered
by the accused as a result. The timely invocation of the accused’s constitutional rights must also be examined on
a case-to-case basis.

Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. Inordinate delay in the
resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will result in the dismissal of the case against the
accused. Delay, however, is not determined through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination
of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case.

Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so
could be considered by the courts as a waiver of right.

Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has not shown that he asserted his rights during this period,
choosing instead to wait until the information was filed against him with the Sandiganbayan.

The ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division that factfinding investigations are included in the period for
determination of inordinate delay is ABANDONED.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED.

 Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Right against self-incrimination.

The guarantee of the right against self-incrimination is justified on the ground of public policy and
humanity.
Public policy - because if the party is required to testify, it would place him under the greatest temptation to
commit perjury; Humanity - because it would prevent the extorting of confessions under duress.

The accused may not be compelled to take the witness stand. He may refuse to be a witness altogether. A
mere witness who is not an accused in order to avail himself of the right must wait for the incriminating
questions. The right is extended to respondents in administrative investigation partaking of the nature of the
criminal proceedings or analogous to a criminal proceeding. A proceeding for the forfeiture of property under
the Anti-graft Law is deemed criminal and the respondent is accorded the right to refuse to take the witness
stand.

To violate the right, it is not necessary that a categorical admission of a specific offense be sought.
The right includes refusal to testify to a fact which would be necessarily in a chain of evidence to prove the
commission of the crime.

It does not necessarily mean that the witness is asked a direct question, “Did you kill Juan?” That would be
incriminating, through and through, but it also covers questions which would later on tend to go to that
question. “Were you in the house?”, “Were you in the same room with the victim?”, “Do you own a gun?”,
etc. Those are facts that would necessarily link in the chain of evidence that would prove the commission of
the crime. So, you may not have been asked a direct question of “Did you kill Juan?”, but instead asked
several questions which would link to that and that would still be incriminating and the witness may refuse to
answer.

What is prohibited is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness not an
inclusion of his varying evidence whether it may be material.

Beltran v.Samson, 53 Phil 570 (1929)

Since witnesses in a preliminary investigation are protected by the prohibition, they may not be compelled
to take a dictation in order to compare their handwriting with that found in a supposedly falsified
document. In support of this ruling, the Court said: [w]riting is something more than moving the body, or the
hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of the
intelligence and attention ... We say that, for the purpose of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen
of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. And we say
that the present case is more serious .. . because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by
means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist. Constitution by Bernas

When the accused voluntarily answers an incriminating question he is deemed to have waived his right. So
again, defense counsel must be on their toes. They must be attentive to the question of the adversary, the
prosecution for example because once the accused has answered, it cannot be taken back. You can no
longer object to a question that has already been answered. All the prosecution has to say is, it has already
been answered.

The privilege is a personal one, applying only to individuals- to natural persons.

Beltran v.Samson, 53 Phil 570 (1929)

Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge
ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.

The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting
and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
 Issue:
Whether or not the order violates the petitioner's right against self-incrimination.

HELD:
Yes.

The constitutional inhibition is directed not merely in giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the
furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which
the accused has a right to hold secret.

Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar
writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier.

For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to
produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both
cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. The present case is more serious than
that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write
and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as
the falsifier.

It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the
petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to
obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen
or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a
personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed
in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of
the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

Note: Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege. Nor is the removal or replacement
of his garments or shoes.

When the accused voluntarily answers an incriminating question, he is deemed to have waived his right.

Section 18.
(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted.

Paragraph 1:
does not add anything substantive to the due process clause, nor to the guarantee of freedom of
speech, press and expression.

Paragraph 2:
that involuntary servitude may exist only when it is a punishment for a crime for which the party is
convicted.

Return to work order: may it be challenged as being violative of the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude.
In a strike, there is usually a negotiation for their return to work of the striking employees, then after
negotiations, then depending on the exigency of the business of the entity when there is a strike, the return
to work order may be issued. The question is may the return to work order be challenged as being violative
of the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude?

Because there is a government order for them to return to work. Is that involuntary servitude?

Take note of Sec 3, Art. XIII, where voluntary modes of settling disputes is preferred.
Although compulsory arbitration shall still be had. Thus, a return to work order is not involuntary servitude
because the workers may voluntarily submit themselves to arbitration.
 Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131 (1975).
That a former court stenographer may be compelled under pain of contempt to transcribe stenographic
notes he had failed to attend to while still in service. The Court said that such compulsion is not the
"condition of enforced, compulsory service" referred to by the Constitution. And the former stenographer
did reluctantly agree to do the transcription during his spare time. But as Justice Fernando noted in his
concurrence, the matter could become tricky should a stenographer stubbornly refuse to obey and the
court insist on keeping him in jail. The detention could then become punitive and could give rise to the issue
of involuntary servitude. Constitution by Bernas

Facts:
On May 29 and July 29, 1974 Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan and Justice Jose N. Leuterio, Chairmen of the Third
and Seventh Divisions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, ordered the Chief of Police of Makati, Rizal, to arrest
Aclaracion, a resident of that municipality, and to confine him in jail until he submits a complete transcript of his
notes in the said cases. Aclaracion was arrested on June 21, 1974 and incarcerated in the municipal jail. In a
petition dated July 12, 1974 he asked the Court of Appeals that he be not required to transcribe his notes
in all the cases tried in the Gapan court. He suggested that the testimonies in the said cases be
retaken.

The Third Division of the Court of Appeals in its resolution of August 7, 1974 ordered the release of Aclaracion.
Later, he transcribed his notes in the Muncal case. However, the warden did not release him because of the order
of arrest issued by the Seventh Division.

On August 9, 1974 Aclaracion filed a petition for habeas corpus. He advanced the novel contention that to compel
him to transcribe his stenographic notes, after he ceased to be a stenographer, would be a transgression of the
rule that "no involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted"

(Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill of Rights, 1972 Constitution). He was averse to being subjected "to involuntary servitude sans
compensation". He desired to be released from the obligation of transcribing his notes.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a involuntary servitude.

Held:
NO. there was no involuntary servitude in the case because It was already moot because, as already noted, the
Third Division of the Court of Appeals had ordered his release on August 7th. Another hearing was held on
September 3, 1974 in connection with the detention of Aclaracion at the instance of Justice Leuterio. At that
hearing, this Court resolved to order Aclaracion's provisional release on condition that within twenty days thereafter
he would complete the transcription of his notes in the Paderes case in his office at the Insurance
Commission, Manila.

Section 19.
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
congress hereinafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or
detainee, or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall
be dealt with by law.

Cruel, unusual, degrading, inhuman as prohibited punishment under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitutions.
1935 Constitution, Article 3, Section 19. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted.

1973 Constitution, Article 4, Section 21. Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel or unusual
punishment inflicted.
 1987 Constitution, Article 3, Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment inflicted ….

1935 constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment".

To be prohibited by the provision the punishment must not only be unusual but must also be at the same
time cruel because of the conjunctive “and”.

1973 constitution, the phrase became "cruel or unusual punishment".

So, if it is cruel, it is violative of the constitution, if it is unusual, it is still violative of the Constitution. So, either of
the two. The interpretation is that the provision prohibits the unusual punishment even if it’s not cruel.

1987 constitution, the text is "cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment“

A punishment is prohibited if it is either cruel, degrading, or inhuman.

The abolition of the death penalty in the 1971 convention made clear that there was no intention to pass
judgment on capital punishment as cruel or unusual. Instead, the matter must be left to legislative discretion.

The 1986 Constitutional Commission went ahead to abolish death penalty but left discretion for Congress to
rewrite it for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

The congress rewrites the capital punishment in 1993 through Republic Act 7659, the Death Penalty Law.

However, in 2006 under RA 9346 they prohibited the death penalty because it was proven to be a deterrent
to crime as held in People vs. Bon, October 30, 2006.

Heinous crimes: … atrocity … decency and morality.

Heinous crimes – “as grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.”- from the book of Bernas

Paragraph (2) concerns itself with the manner of treating prisoners in detention.

When confinement amounts to cruel and unusual punishment where it is characterized by conditions
and practices so bad as to be shocking to the conscience.

When I was at the capitol, the then chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, who hailed from Aparri
came to visit me and after an official call to the government ,and the he told me that he would like to go
and visit the Provincial jail because it is one of the specific powers of the CHR. So, I told her immediately,
please don’t go there anymore, Ma’am. Mea Culpa. I have to agree with you that the condition in the
Provincial Jail is very bad. It will shock your conscience. (Kwento na ng provincial jail.)

Facilities must be to a level of constitutional tolerability.

People v. Mercado, GR No. 116239, November 29, 2001. Lethal injection is not a cruel and unusual
punishment.
Thus, when lethal injection was challenged as a cruel and unusual punishment disallowed by the
Constitution, the Court easily dismissed the contention appealing to well-settled jurisprudence that the
death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. Punishment is so if it involves torture
or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in
the constitution. Unconstitutional punishment implies something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life. Constitution by Bernas

That is why they discontinued the death by electrocution because they found out that the one being
electrocuted does not die immediately. He has to suffer before he dies. (I think medyo kulang yata yung
kuryente na pumapasok.) Atty Lara
Bernas Primer: Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to life. Nevertheless, Article 6(2) of the
Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject
to the limitation that it be imposed for the158 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sec. 13 A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER 'most serious crimes.' Pursuant to Article 28 of the Covenant, a Human Rights Committee was
established and under Article 40 of the Covenant, States Parties to the Covenant are required to submit an
initial report to the Committee on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized
within the Covenant and on the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights within one year of its entry
into force for the State Party concerned and thereafter, after five years. On July 27,1982, the Human Rights
Committee issued General Comment No. 6 interpreting Article 6 of the Covenant stating that '(while) it follows
from Article 6(2) to (6) that State parties are not obliged to abolish the death penalty totally, they are obliged
to limit its use and, in particular, to abolish it for other than the 'most serious crimes.' The Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the Abolition of the Death
Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15,1989. The Philippines neither signed nor
ratified said document. Evidently, petitioner's assertion of our obligation under the Second Optional Protocol
is misplaced." People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 116239, November 29,2000.

Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of poll tax.

Simply means that no person may be imprisoned for debt in virtue of an order in a civil proceeding.
Either as a substitute for satisfaction of debt or as a means of compelling satisfaction.

But a person may be imprisoned as penalty for a crime from a contractual debt imposed in a
criminal proceeding.
Thus, the conversion of a criminal fine into a prison term does not violate the provision because in such a
case, imprisonment is imposed for a monetary obligation arising not ex contractu but ex delicto.

What is a poll tax? It is a cedula tax or tax paid for a residence certificate. The provision was a reaction to
the Administrative Code which authorizes imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax.

Poll tax (cedula): community tax certificate.

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.

Meaning of jeopardy - being placed in danger of punishment or annoyance and vexation of a

criminal prosecution.
One who is prosecuted for a criminal offense is put in danger of being punished for the same.

The provision consists of two parts: The first sentence deals with prosecution for the same offense. The
second deals with prosecution for the same act.

Requisites to raise the defense of double jeopardy:

(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
To understand that, we are talking of first jeopardy then second jeopardy-there are 2 jeopardies, when we
say jeopardy is to put in danger of being punished, there are two cases actually so the requisites to raise the
defense of double joupardy. Nauna na yung first jeopardy case
(2) the first jeopardy must have terminated;
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

First requisite: Jeopardy attaches:

(1) upon a good indictment;
(2) before a competent court;
(3) after arraignment;
(4) after plea.

Good indictment means that there must be a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction.
So under a defective information, the accused can never be convicted and hence cannot be said to be in
jeopardy of punishment because there cannot be a second jeopardy.
 Competent court means a court that has jurisdiction over the offense charged or that it has
territorial jurisdiction over the crime committed.
There are 2 jurisdictions:
a. Over the offense charged - may be either a jurisdiction of RTC and against the jurisdiction of an MTC. If it
is case that should be within the jurisdiction of a RTC and it was filed in an MTC, then that MTC lacks
jurisdiction. There can never be a double jeopardy.

b. Territorial jurisdiction - if the offense happened in Aparri, you cannot file the case in Tugue. That is
because Tugue has no territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged w/c happened in Aparri.

Arraignment and plea are the final steps in the commencement of jeopardy.

Second requisite: the first jeopardy must have been terminated –

Bulaong v. People, GR No. L- 19344, July 17, 1966.

Two informations were filed on the same day against the same accused, one in the CFI of Laguna for
rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and the other in the CFI of Manila for subversion under
the Anti-Subversion Act. On appeal of the Laguna case to the Supreme Court, the accused raised the
defense of double jeopardy on the ground that rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code was
but a lesser cognate offense to that defined in the Anti-Subversion Act under which he had a case pending
in the CFI of Manila. The Court rejected this defense because neither of the two cases had as yet been
terminated. In a footnote, the Court added: "Appellant should direct his plea to the CFI of Manila, for his
final conviction in the case at bar would preclude his further prosecution there, assuming that the charge
therein is indeed for a lesser cognate offense to that alleged in the pending case therein." Constitution by Bernas
G.R. No. L-19344
July 27, 1966
AGATON BULAONG, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Marcial F. Desiero for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General A. A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General P. P. de Castro and Solicitor J. R. Coquia
for respondent.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

On May 31, 1956 Agaton Bulaong and others were charged before the Court of First Instance of Laguna with the
crime of rebellion. Trial did not proceed with respect to Agaton Bulaong until 1958 for he was then at large.

Meanwhile Congress enacted the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act 1700) which took effect on June 20, 1957.

On September 12, 1958, Agaton Bulaong was arrested.

On October 1, 1958 the information for rebellion filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna was amended to
read as follows:

The accused above named, ... did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously join the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CCP) and the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" (HMB), otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps
(HUKS), the latter being the military arms of the former, whose aims and purposes are to remove people and
territory of the Republic of the Philippines and to overthrow it eventually by the use of force and arms, as in fact
said accused together with other officers and members of said organization have risen publicly and taken up arms,
making armed raids, ambuscades and attacks upon the Philippine Constabulary, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Police Forces and other military detachments of the government, said accused AGATON BULAONG alias Ka Era
being then an organizer and leader.
On the same date another information was filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila charging Agaton
Bulaong of the crime of subversion defined in Section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act. We quote the information
hereunder:

That in or about the month of July, 1957, and for the time subsequent thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and the place which he had chosen as the nerve center of all his activities in the different parts of the Philippines,
the said accused, knowingly and by overt acts, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully become an officer and/or
a ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) and its Military Arm, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya
ng Bayan (HMB) formerly known as Hukbalahaps, which organizations have aimed to overthrow the Government
 of the Republic of the Philippines by means of force and which organizations have been outlawed and declared
illegal and continued and remained an officer and/or a ranking leader of said organizations until his arrest in or
about September, 1958, without having renounced his membership therein, as in fact that the said accused
together with other officers, members and affiliates of said outlawed and illegal organizations have taken arms
against the Government of the Philippine Republic, by making and conducting raids, ambuscades and armed
attacks against and upon the Philippine Constabulary, Armed Forces of the Philippines and local police
forces.1äwphï1.ñët

The case for subversion is still pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila; while the case for rebellion has
already been decided by the Court of First Instance of Laguna adversely against the accused.1 Accused Bulaong
appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. At
bar is his appeal from said judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The issue is whether or not accused Bulaong can interpose the defense of double jeopardy in this case in view of
the filing against him of the information for subversion in the Court of First Instance of Manila which allegedly
involves the same facts obtaining in this case.

Accused contends that rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is a lesser cognate offense
to that defined in Section 4 of Republic Act 1700. And he further contends that since the facts alleged in the
informations for rebellion and subversion are the same he can not be legally prosecuted for both offenses without
being placed twice in jeopardy of being punished for the same acts.

Accused's contention has no merit.2 Under Section 9, Rule 1133 of the Rules of Court, the defense of double
jeopardy is available to the accused only where he was either convicted or acquitted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent.4 Such is not the situation in this case. For accused has not
been convicted or acquitted in the case filed in the Court of First Instance against him for subversion. Neither was
the said case dismissed or terminated without his consent, for as stated, it is still pending in said court. Needless
to say, it is the conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or termination of the case that bars further
prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

Termination of jeopardy may be by conviction or acquittal. Termination may also be by "dismissal".

There is acquittal when the case is terminated upon the merits of the issue as when there is a
pronouncement that the evidence does not show the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

There is dismissal if the case is terminated on any ground that does not decide the merits of the issue as to
whether or not the accused is or not guilty of the offense charged.

Without the consent of the accused: Dismissal, even if not on the merits, if done without the consent
of the accused is a bar to subsequent prosecution.
Termination if based on the merits, even with or without the consent of the accused is a bar to further
prosecution because such termination is in fact an acquittal.

People v. Velasco, GR 140633, February 4, 2002.

Facts:
The Information filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against Geronimo Velasco,
then Minister of Energy, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 ("The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices
Act"), as amended, reads: "That on or about and during the period from 1977 to 1986, in Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the Minister of Energy and
Chairman of the Board and President of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), a government owned and
controlled corporation, did then and there deliberately and unlawfully, in evident bad faith and shameless abuse of
his administrative official function and power as such Minister of Energy and PNOC President and Chairman of the
Board, spend funds and utilize equipment and personnel of PNOC and its subsidiaries at a total cost to PNOC of
P3,032,993.00 in the construction and maintenance of his own Telin Beach Resort located at Bagac, Bataan,
Philippines, managed by Telin Development Corporation and owned by Gervel, Inc., a corporation wholly owned
by said accused, thereby giving himself unwarranted benefits and causing undue injury to PNOC, to the damage
and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount of P3,032,993.00, Philippine Currency. Contrary to law."
 Upon arraignment, Velasco pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed, with leave
of court, a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, it was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Velasco filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution dated 11 October 1999. Consequently, the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Hence,
the petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion
bars a plea of double jeopardy.

Held:
Under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss
the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or
without leave of court. Thus, in resolving the accused's demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the
matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the
demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal; and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a
criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy.
On the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of
acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent
against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not
guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this
right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose
innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. Such is the magnitude
of the accused's right against double jeopardy that even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of
evidence by the trial court will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process,
i.e., that the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case. However, while certiorari may be resorted
to cure an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial
court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. Here,
Velasco filed his demurrer to evidence after the prosecution adduced its evidence and rested its case. Obviously,
the People was not deprived of its right to due process. Thus, Velasco's plea of double jeopardy must be upheld.

With the consent of the accused: Even if the dismissal is definite, if made with the consent of the
accused, it would not be a bar to subsequent prosecution. The consent of the accused to the
dismissal of his case works as a waiver.
Labeling a dismissal with the word definite or provisional is a supracedes. What determines the effect of the
dismissal is its nature and not its label. So if there is an order the court saying that this case is a definitely
dismissed but the accused consent to the dismissal, then that is not a final dismissal because it was with the
consent of the accused.

Based on speedy trial: If the dismissal is predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the
dismissal is on the merits.
Then the suggested procedure. When the defense wants to exercise the right to speedy trial, it is not to ask
for a dismissal outright but to insist for immediate trial. Kunwari handa ka sa trial, then you insist if nafifeel mo
na the prosecution is not ready. You insist on the trial. If the court grants immediate trial and the prosecution
is not prepared then the court must dismiss the case. Such dismissal amounts to acquittal.

Third requisite: the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.

Same evidence test: whether the evidence needed in one case will support a conviction in the
other.
Same evidence test:
The test to determine whether the second is the same offense as the first.
It is necessary that one offense is completely included in the other. Thus, when physical injury is not identical
with attempted homicide for purpose of double jeopardy, physical injury is the same as attempted
homicide, because physical injury is necessarily included in attempted homicide.

Same act (actually mean the same physical act) that is punished by an Ordinance and statute.

People v. Jovelo, 101 Phil. 1213 (1957).

The accused was prosecuted in the Justice of the Peace Court for violation of an ordinance prohibiting the
carrying of deadly weapons. The case was dismissed over the objections of the accused. Subsequently, he
was prosecuted for the same act under Section 26 of Act No. 1780 for having carried in his possession a
deadly weapon while attending a meeting of the board of canvassers. The Supreme Court upheld the
lower court ruling that the second prosecution would place the accused in double jeopardy. Constitution by
Bernas

Yap v. Lutero, GR 12669, April 30, 1959.

Under an analogous set of facts, the Supreme Court made a similar ruling in Yap v. Lutero2051 and Justice
Concepcion, writing for the majority, said that under the second clause of the jeopardy provision, there is
double jeopardy "even if the offenses charged are not the same. ... If the two charges are based on one
and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution
under the other." Constitution by Bernas

Rule when one act violates two different statutes or two different provisions of a statute: If the one
act results in two distinct offenses, prosecution under one is a bar to prosecution under the other.
The controlling rule is that it comes from the same act, then there is one criminal intent, and there is only
crime.

If the single criminal act is impelled by a single criminal intent, the resultant harm cannot be split into
different offenses.

Rule on new supervening fact: Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950).

When after the first prosecution, new facts intervene for which the defendant is responsible, the accused
here was first accused of serious physical injuries. When the case was filed and there was arraignment
already etc., the victim died. So, the prosecution sought to amend the complaint. Then it was allowed
because it was a supervening fact. It changes the character of the offense and together with the facts
existing at the time constitute a new and distinct offense. The accused cannot be said to be in jeopardy if
indicted again.

Appeals: The protection against second jeopardy not only means that an accused cannot be
prosecuted a second time for the same offense but also that the prosecution cannot appeal a
judgment of acquittal.
A judgement of acquittal rendered within a court jurisdiction, even if erroneous, ends the case finally.
Provided that the judge considered the evidence even the appreciation of the evidence leading to an
acquittal is erroneous, an appeal under a motion for reconsideration under the constitution cannot allowed
When a judgment of acquittal or dismissal on the merit is void for lack of jurisdiction, the judgment cannot
be a base for a plea of double jeopardy.
Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950).
Facts:
Petitioner was charged in the CFI with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon victim with a kitchen
knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for
a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of
time. On December 29, 1949, at eight o’clock in the morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged,
and at 10:15 in the evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of death was available
to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950, and on the following day, January 4, 1950, an amended information
was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. The accused filed a motion to quash the amended
information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied by the respondent court; hence, the instant petition
for prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further entertaining the amended information.

Issue:
Whether the amendment of the information charged against the accused constitute Double Jeopardy.
 Held:
No, It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same
offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that “if an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.” The
phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second offense
charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be
sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This so called “same-evidence test” which was found to be vague
and deficient, was restated by the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules there is
identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessary includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information
constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when all the
ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter. In other words, on who has been
charged with an offense cannot be again charged with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or
greater than the former. “As the Government cannot be with the highest, and then go down step to step, bringing
the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither can it begin with the lowest and ascend to the
highest with precisely the same result.”

Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986).

There was a first trial conducted in 1986 on the Aquino-Galman case. The accused, some of the accused
were convicted, some of the accused were acquitted. When Corazon Aquino became president, there was
a move to reopen the case. The Jurisprudence then was a case that has become final and executory can
no longer be reopened. But they found a way.

They said that the reopening of the case is premised on the proceedings in the Sandigan Bayan which was
characterized by grave abuse of discretion. I believe that this is again a case decided by the SC to favour
Cory Aquino, whose husband is the victim in this case.
Facts:
An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the assassination of Ninoy
Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed that they are unconvinced on the participation of
Galman as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the military
reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military respondents as indictable for the premeditated killing of
Aquino and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give due consideration.

The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26 military accused as principal
to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention of President Marcos who insist on the innocence
of the accused. Marcos however recommended the filing of murder charge and to implement the acquittal as
planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.
The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross violation of
constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to present vital
documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a
re-trial before an impartial tribunal.

Issue:
Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove their case which grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no double jeopardy since legal
jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid
plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent
of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not
competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect
the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial
before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused
to a second jeopardy.
 The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President ordered the
Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due pressure to
the judiciary. The court’s decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in observing due
process during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
More so the trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the account of collusion between the lower court
and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.

The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set aside and rendered the
decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was granted.

Appeal by the accused:

When an accused appeal on his conviction, he waives his right to double jeopardy. The appellate court
could impose a penalty higher than that of the original conviction. In double jeopardy, the prosecution
cannot appeal an acquittal of the accused. But the accused can appeal his case of conviction. If he does
that, he waives his right to double jeopardy and in waiving his right to double jeopardy, the appellate court
could impose a penalty higher. So, if he was convicted for 12 years, the appeal said that there is no law that
prohibits the higher court from imposing a 20 year penalty.

Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

An ex post facto law is one:

(1) Which makes an action done before the passing of the law, which was innocent when done,
criminal, and punishes such action;
(2) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed;
(3) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed;
(4) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant
(5) Which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of right;
and,
(6) Which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former acquittal or conviction or amnesty proclamation.

Ex post facto laws embrace only criminal or penal statutes. STUDY IT

Bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. STUDY AGAIN

Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals, or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without trial are
bills of attainder prohibited by the constitution.

People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972). At issue is the Anti-subversion Act (RA 1700). The lower court
declared the law as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers the CPP" and thereby congress
usurped the powers of the judge and assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the
CPP without any of the forms or safeguards of a judicial trial.

Limitations on the Power/Authority of the State to Punish Crimes

Facts:
Hon. Simeon N. Ferrer in his capacity as Judge of the CFI of Tarlac, Branch I dismissed two (2) cases involving
criminal complaints for violation of Anti-Subversion Act on the grounds that the said act is a bill of attainder and
that it is vague and overbroad.

The two cases include that of Feliciano Co who was criminally charged for violation of Section 4 of Anti-Subversion
Act and Nilo Tayag et. al., who were charged with subversion. In both cases aggravating circumstances are
present. Counsel on both cases moved to quash the complaint on the ground that the basis of the complaint, the
Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
 Issue:
The Government appealed the decision of the CFI of Tarlac, Branch 1. The Supreme Court resolved to treat its
appeal as a special civil action for certiorari. Is the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder?

Decision:
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act with reservation. On the grounds that the act
provides that the guilt of the accused has to be judicially established. Specifically, the statute requires that
membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is
what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party
must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty
knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization’s unlawful activities, while the latter
requires proof of mere adherence to the organization’s illegal objectives.

RATIO:
THAT the Government has a right to protect itself against subversion is a proposition too plain to require
elaboration. Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and transcends every other value, "for
if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed internal attack, no subordinate value can be protected".

Recitation on April 29, 2021