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    14 de Guzman v. CA

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    Rem Serrano
    1) The respondent transported goods as a side business to his scrap metal business, charging lower freight rates to deliver goods from Manila to various establishments in Pangasinan. 2) When 600 cartons of milk were hijacked while being transported by the respondent, the petitioner sued for the value of the lost goods, arguing the respondent was a common carrier. 3) The Supreme Court ruled the respondent was a common carrier as defined by law, even though transportation was occasional, but found the respondent not liable because the loss was due to an unforeseeable criminal act beyond his control.

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    14 de Guzman v. CA

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    Rem Serrano
    59 views3 pages
    1) The respondent transported goods as a side business to his scrap metal business, charging lower freight rates to deliver goods from Manila to various establishments in Pangasinan. 2) When 600 cartons of milk were hijacked while being transported by the respondent, the petitioner sued for the value of the lost goods, arguing the respondent was a common carrier. 3) The Supreme Court ruled the respondent was a common carrier as defined by law, even though transportation was occasional, but found the respondent not liable because the loss was due to an unforeseeable criminal act beyond his control.

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    1) The respondent transported goods as a side business to his scrap metal business, charging lower freight rates to deliver goods from Manila to various establishments in Pangasinan. 2) When 600 cartons of milk were hijacked while being transported by the respondent, the petitioner sued for the value of the lost goods, arguing the respondent was a common carrier. 3) The Supreme Court ruled the respondent was a common carrier as defined by law, even though transportation was occasional, but found the respondent not liable because the loss was due to an unforeseeable criminal act beyond his control.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    59 views3 pages

    14 de Guzman v. CA

    Uploaded by

    Rem Serrano
    1) The respondent transported goods as a side business to his scrap metal business, charging lower freight rates to deliver goods from Manila to various establishments in Pangasinan. 2) When 600 cartons of milk were hijacked while being transported by the respondent, the petitioner sued for the value of the lost goods, arguing the respondent was a common carrier. 3) The Supreme Court ruled the respondent was a common carrier as defined by law, even though transportation was occasional, but found the respondent not liable because the loss was due to an unforeseeable criminal act beyond his control.

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    De Guzman v.

    CA
    No. L-47822, 22 December 1988

    Facts:

     Respondent Ernesto Cendaña, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying up scrap


    metal and bottles in Pangasinan. Upon gathering sufficient quantities, respondent
    would bring them to Manila for resale utilizing two (2) six-wheeler truckers.
     On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles with cargo
    which various merchants wanted delivered to differing establishments in
    Pangasinan. For that service, respondent charged freight rates which were
    commonly lower than regular commercial rates.
     Petitioner De Guzman contracted with respondent for hauling of 750 cartons of
    milk from their warehouse to petitioner’s establishment in Urdaneta. 150 cartons
    was loaded in the first truck, while the remaining 600 were placed in the other truck.
     Only 150 boxes of milk were delivered to petitioner. The other 600 boxes never
    arrived since the truck which carried these boxes was hijacked by armed men, who
    took with them the truck, the driver, his helper and the cargo.
     Eventually, De Guzman commenced an action against private respondent
    demanding payment the value of the lost merchandise (P 22,150.00) plus
    damages.
    o Petitioner argued that private respondent, being a common carrier, and
    having failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of him by the
    law, should be held liable for the value of the undelivered goods.
     Private respondent denied that he was a common carrier and argued that he could
    not be held responsible for the loss having been due to force majeure.
     Trial court ruled in favor of petitioner ordering private respondent to pay the value
    of the goods + damages. Trial court declared the respondent as a common carrier
    as he habitually offered trucking services to the public.
     CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held that respondent had been
    engaged in transporting return loads of freight as a casual occupation “a sideline
    to his scrap iron business” and not as a common carrier.

    Issue + Ratio:

    Whether the respondent may be properly characterized as a common carrier. YES (But
    not liable because of the fortuitous event of hijacking)

     The Civil Code defines common carriers in the following terms: “Article 1732.
    Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
    business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water,
    or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.”
     The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business
    activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
    only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a sideline).
     Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or
    enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one
    offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
     Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the
    “general public” and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
    segment of the general population.
     It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly characterized as a
    common carrier even though he merely “back-hauled” goods for other merchants
    from Manila to Pangasinan, although such backhauling was done on a periodic or
    occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though private
    respondent’s principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others. There
    is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a fee for hauling their
    goods, regardless if it is less than the commercial freight rates.

     [Additional info for recit purposes] Furthermore, the Court of Appeals referred to
    the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public convenience, and
    concluded he was not a common carrier. This is palpable error.
    o A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of
    liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers. That
    liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier,
    without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the
    requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing
    regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or
    other franchise.
    o To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier
    because he has not secured the necessary certificate of public
    convenience, would be offensive to sound public policy; that would be to
    reward private respondent precisely for failing to comply with applicable
    statutory requirements. The business of a common carrier impinges directly
    and intimately upon the safety and well-being and property of those
    members of the general community who happen to deal with such carrier.
    The law imposes duties and liabilities upon common carriers for the safety
    and protection of those who utilize their services and the law cannot allow
    a common carrier to render such duties and liabilities merely facultative by
    simply failing to obtain the necessary permits and authorizations.

     In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must


    reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier
    and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that
    even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of
    travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events
    which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have
    complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence. We,
    therefore, agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals that private
    respondent Cendaña is not liable for the value of the undelivered
    merchandise which was lost because of an event entirely beyond private
    respondent’s control.

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