Philippine Telegraph v. NLRC
Philippine Telegraph v. NLRC
Philippine Telegraph v. NLRC
Facts:
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
"Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April
20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever
Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be
immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. After August 8, 1991, and
pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join
petitioner company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150
days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose,
she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the
two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8,
1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in
Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January
15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was
reminded about the company's policy of not accepting married women for employment.
In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she
was not aware of PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along
she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.5 Petitioner nonetheless remained
unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company
effective January 29, 1992.
Issue: Whether or not De guzman was illegally dismissed for her having contracted
marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company
policies.
Law:
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in
Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night
work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with facilities and
standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety.
For purposes of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail
lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be considered as an
employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a woman's right
against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account
simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly
prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee.
Case History:
·0 Upon dismissal, De Guzman filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a
claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.
·1 On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a
decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of
a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner.
·2 On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public
respondent upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it
ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and
unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT & T.
·3 The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by
respondent NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994,
·4 Petitioner sought relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Ruling:
Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more
frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as
Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment as a signatory to
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW).
Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 12 which explicitly prohibits
discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
promotion, and training opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955 13 which bans the "mail-
order-bride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot
guarantee protection to the rights of women workers; Republic Act No. 7192 14 also
known as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Act," which affords women
equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment,
admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police; Republic Act No.
7322 15 increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the private sector;
Republic Act No. 7877 16 which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the
workplace and in the education and training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042, 17
or the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," which prescribes as a
matter of policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women,
only in countries where their rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point
out that in the Family Code, 18 women's rights in the field of civil law have been greatly
enhanced and expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in
Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night
work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with facilities and
standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety.
For purposes of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail
lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be considered as an
employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a woman's right
against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account
simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly
prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee.
Opinion:
The policy of petitioner is unjustifiable since it derogates, at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the
foundation of the nation. That it must be effectively interdicted in all its indirect, disguised
or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not
only in order but imperatively required.