‘The  Subaltern  Can  Speak’:  Reflections  On  Voice  Through  The  Lens  
Of  The  Politics  Of  Jacques  Rancière  
 
by    
 
Yvonne  Jooste  
 
 
Submitted  in  fulfilment  of  the  requirements  for  the  degree  
 
 
LLD  
(Doctor  Legum)  
 
 
In  the  Faculty  of  Law,  
University  of  Pretoria  
 
 
 
August  2015  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUPERVISOR:                                                                                                                        PROFESSOR  KARIN  VAN  MARLE  
 
 
 
 
 
  
SUMMARY  
 
The  aim  of  the  research  is  to  reflect  on  the  notion  of  political  voice  through  the  lens  of  
the  politics  of  Jacques  Rancière.  This  reflection  takes  place  against  the  background  of  the  
difficulty  and  complexity  of  issues  surrounding  the  political  voice  of  many  South  African  
women.   The   motivation   behind   the   reflection   on   political   voice   arose   out   of   concerns  
regarding   the   contradiction   between   the   exemplary   formal   position   of   South   African  
women   and   their   lived   realities   as   it   pertains   to   the   contexts   of   poverty   and   sexual  
violence  that  many  women  face  and  live  in.  
 
Since   South   Africa’s   transition   to   democracy,   many   activists   and   scholars   have   engaged  
with   notions   of   gender   equality   along   the   lines   of   constitutional   discourse,   substantive  
equality   and   transformative   constitutionalism.   This   research   seeks   an   alternative  
understanding.   I   turn   to   the   work   of   theorist,   Jacques   Rancière   in   order   to   consider  
possible   alternatives   and   ways   of   thinking   about   the   notion   of   voice.   I   explore   his   unique  
formulation   of   politics   as   well   as   other   theoretical   engagements   in   order   to   open   up  
questions   around   the   frameworks   that   determine   the   possibilities   of   political   voicing  
and/or  silencing.    
 
The   reflection   also   entails   an   exploration   of   Gayatri   Chakravorty   Spivak’s   famous   essay  
“Can   the   Subaltern   Speak”.   I   analyse   Spivak’s   essay   along   the   lines   of   Jacques   Rancière’s  
formulation   of   politics   in   order   to   further   make   sense   of   what   it   means   to   have   a   political  
voice.  I  also  read  instances  of  political  statements  and  historical  and  literary  figures  from  
the   perspective   of   Rancière’s   politics.   The   aim   is   to   contest   and   question   current  
meanings   of   voice   and   to   suggest   that   Jacques   Rancière’s   postulations   can   provide  
valuable  insight  on  issues  of  political  voicing,  silence,  politics  and  equality.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This  thesis  is  dedicated  to  my  mother  and  father,  
Estelle  Audrey  Jooste  and  Willem  Gerhard  Jooste    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  
 
SUMMARY                                                                                                                                              
 
CHAPTER  ONE  
Introduction  
1.1  Introduction                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          1  
1.2  Background  and  context                                                                                                                                                                                          2  
1.3  Research  questions                                                                                                                                                                                                          16  
1.4  Methodology  and  chapter  overview                                                                                                                                          18  
 
CHAPTER  TWO  
The  Politics  of  Jacques  Rancière  
2.1  Introduction                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    28  
2.2  Rancière’s  background                                                                                                                                                                                          30    
             2.2.1  Introduction                                                                                                                                                                                                              30  
             2.2.2  Rancière  and  Althusser                                                                                                                                                                      33  
2.3  The  mature  politics                                                                                                                                                                                                        55  
             2.3.1  The  police                                                                                                                                                                                                                        55  
             2.3.2  Politics/Equality                                                                                                                                                                                                  61  
             2.3.3  The  political  subject                                                                                                                                                                                  72  
             2.3.4  The  miscount  and  the  wrong                                                                                                                                              80  
             2.3.5  The  distribution  of  the  sensible                                                                                                                                      90  
2.4  Conclusion                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    106  
 
CHAPTER  THREE  
Radical  Intellectual  Equality  and  the  Reconfiguration  of  Work’s  Space  and  
Time  
3.1  Introduction                                                                                                                                                                                                                                116  
3.2  Joseph  Jacocot                                                                                                                                                                                                                    118  
3.3  Gabriel  Gauny  in  The  Nights  of  Labor  and  Plato  in  The  Philosopher  and  His  
Poor                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          132  
             3.3.1  Plato                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        133  
             3.3.2  Gauny                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  139  
3.4  Conclusion                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    148  
 
CHAPTER  FOUR  
Gayatri  Chakravorty  Spivak:  “The  Subaltern  Cannot  Speak”  
4.1  Introduction                                                                                                                                                                                                                                153  
4.2  The  sexed  subaltern                                                                                                                                                                                                  159  
4.3  The  sexed  subaltern:  Concluding  remarks                                                                                                                179  

 
 
 4.4  Subaltern  equality                                                                                                                                                                                                        181  
4.5  Conclusion                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    192  
 
CHAPTER  FIVE  
Practicing  a  “Method  of  Equality”:  Reacting  Against  Sensible  Intelligibility    
5.1  Introduction                                                                                                                                                                                                                                196  
5.2  Olympe  de  Gouges                                                                                                                                                                                                      202  
5.3  Lucy                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            209  
5.4  Abahlali  baseMjondolo                                                                                                                                                                                        215  
5.5  Bhubaneswari  Bhaduri                                                                                                                                                                                        223  
5.6  Conclusion                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    225  
 
CHAPTER  SIX  
Conclusion:  Retracing  the  Way  Towards  the  Possibility  of  Voice                                    228  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                                                                                                                                                                234  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER  ONE  
Introduction  
 
The  one  who  belongs  to  the  demos,  who  speaks  when  he  is  not  to  speak,  is  the  one  
who  partakes  in  what  he  has  no  part  in.1  
 
But  the  question  is,  who  has  the  power  of  speech  and  who  has  only  voice?2  
 
In  order  to  enter  into  political  exchange,  it  becomes  necessary  to  invent  the  scene  
upon  which  spoken  words  may  be  audible,  in  which  objects  become  visible,  and  
individuals  themselves  may  be  recognised.  It  is  in  this  respect  that  we  may  speak  of  a  
poetics  of  politics.3    
 
1.1  Research  problem  
What   does   it   mean   to   speak   politically   and   what   does   it   mean   to   be   heard?  
Conceptions   of   politics   have   always   revolved   around   questions   of   speaking   and  
being  heard.  Domination  and  oppression  are  usually  theorised  along  the  lines  of  
political   subjectivity,   political   agency   and   having   a   voice.   Political   participation   is  
usually   conditioned   upon   the   possibility   of   intelligibility   and   being   qualified   to  
speak  and  participate  in  a  specific  framework  or  context.  Within  the  framework  of  
political   participation,   people   can   be   described   as   struggling   for   a   greater   say,   for  
inclusion   and   for   greater   representation.   These   processes   represent   continuous  
negotiation,   contestation   and   confrontation.   Depending   on   the   framework,   the  
speech   of   certain   people   is   rendered   intelligible,   whilst   others   are   denied  
authoritative   voice   and   are   for   the   most   part   politically   invisible   or   silenced   in  
certain   circumstances.   The   idea   of   having   a   voice   and   how   it   is   politically  
expressed   is   a   complex   question   and   is   one   that   is   extraordinarily   diverse.   People  
express   their   views   differently,   on   different   levels   and   platforms   of   society   and  
from   within   the   context   of   multiple   influences   and   discourses.   This   project  
revolves  around  making  sense  of  what  it  means  to  have  a  voice  and  it  is  around  
the   notion   of   voice   that   the   work   of   French   theorist   Jacques   Rancière   becomes  

                                                                                                           
1
Rancière J Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (2010) 32.
2
Rancière J Malaise Dans L’esthètique (2004) 37.
3
Rancière J in Panagia D “Dissenting words: A conversation With Jacques Rancière”
Diacritics (2001) 115.

1  
 
important.  Rancière’s  work  on  politics  can  be  summarised  by  the  phrase  “ce  que  
parler  veut  dire”-­‐  what  it  means  to  speak,  or  what  speaking  means.4  The  thesis  is  a  
reflection   on   the   notion   of   voice   through   the   lens   of   the   politics   of   Jacques  
Rancière.   This   contemplation   takes   place   against   the   background   of   what   I  
perceive  to  be  specific  difficulties  of  voice  pertaining  to  many  women  within  the  
post-­‐apartheid   South   African   context.   I   contend   that   in   this   regard   Jacques  
Rancière’s  work  on  politics  can  provide  a  valuable  theoretical  lens  through  which  
to  approach  and  imagine  the  notion  of  political  voice.  Rancière’s  descriptions  of  
politics   are   a   continuous   effort   to   make   sense   of   and   dismantle   the   various  
obstacles   that   confront   exercises   of   thought,   speech   and   political   voicing   and   I  
argue   that   his   formulations   informed   by   his   intellectual   background,   can   shed  
significant  light  on  issues  of  speaking  politically.    
 
1.2  Background  and  Context  
The   motivation   for   this   research   arose   out   of   real   concerns   regarding   the  
difficulty,   precariousness   and   complexity   of   issues   of   political   voice   regarding  
many   women   within   post-­‐apartheid   South   Africa.   South   Africa   has   one   of   the  
most  progressive  constitutions  in  the  world  and  post-­‐apartheid  policy  is  dedicated  
towards   enabling   a   socio-­‐political   environment   that   is   governed   by   principles   of  
equality   and   social   justice   for   all.5   Women   have   enjoyed   equal   rights   since   the  
transition  from  apartheid’s  authoritarian  rule  to  South  African  democracy.  Specific  
policy  and  legislative  directives  aimed  at  gender  equality  have  been  the  focus  of  

                                                                                                           
4
See Pelletier C “Rancière and the poetics of the social sciences” International Journal of
Research and Method in Education (2009) 253-248. Published online 10 November 2009
available at Taylor and Francis Online www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17437270903
259741?journal Code=cwse20 (accessed 07/12/2014).
5
The new democratic South Africa was established in 1994 after extended negotiations
between the African National Congress and the National Party. The final constitution was
promulgated in 1996. The South African constitution has the familiar features of a liberal
democracy, but also envisions a more substantive vision of democratic inclusion, participation
and accountability. It further strives to transform our society from one deeply divided by the
legacy of a racist and unequal past to one based on democracy, social justice, freedom and
equality.

2  
 
governmental  projects  and  initiatives.6  Yet,  there  are  two  pressing  and  persisting  
issues  that  face  South  African  women.  As  will  be  explained  below,  the  country  is  
known  as  one  of  the  most  unequal  in  terms  of  race,  class  and  gender  in  the  world  
and   as   one   of   the   most   violent   for   women   and   girls.   South   African   women   live  
with   continuous   sexual   violence   perpetrated   against   them   and   the   socio-­‐
economic   deprivation   of   the   majority   of   the   country   results   in   black   women  
remaining  the  poorest  of  the  poor.    
 
The   problem   can   be   sketched   in   the   following   way:   Firstly,   as   mentioned,   South  
African   democracy   has   established   the   basis   for   progressive   policy   frameworks  
aimed   at   eradicating   gender   inequality.7   These   efforts   have   included   legislation  
that   facilitates   the   inclusion   of   women   in   different   public,   economic   and  
governmental   sectors.   As   Lynn   Snodgrass   highlights,   on   paper   South   African  
women   enjoy   the   highest   status   globally.8   When   judged   against   global  
benchmarks,   women   in   South   Africa   have   surpassed   expectations   in   terms   of  
                                                                                                           
6
See for example The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of
2000, The South African Constitution, 1996 which specifically prohibits unfair discrimination
on the grounds of sex and gender, The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 that introduced
affirmative action for “designated groups” which includes black women, women of all races
and people with disabilities and the Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Bill [B50B-
2013] presented in 2014 which makes provision for at least 50% of decision-making posts to
be filled by women. It also aims to improve women’s access to education, training and skills
development and it seeks to protect women’s reproductive health as well as to eliminate
discrimination and gender-based violence.
7
When the apartheid regime ended, the hope was that the deep conservatism with regards
to women’s rights would also end. The new South African government committed to non-
racism and non-sexism took the place of authoritarian rule. Walsh explains that the new
government brought 111 diverse women into parliament. See Walsh D Women’s Rights in
Democratizing States: Just Debate and Gender Justice in the Public Sphere (2011) 185-186. A
core group of talented MP’s working with an array of women’s organisations in civil society
helped pass a series of laws that included the gender equality clause in the final constitution,
the right to abortion, domestic violence legislation, affirmative action programs that targeted
black women, a new maintenance act, and customary marriage reform. As Walsh further
explains, the state support for gender justice on the scale that occurred in South Africa since
the establishment of democracy is rare. See Walsh D (2011) 185. For a detailed and more
comprehensive discussion of the initiatives and processes surrounding South Africa’s
transformation on gender issues see Walsh D (2011) 185-216.
8
See Snodgrass L “South Africa: A dangerous place to be poor, black and a woman” The
Conversation. Published online 11 September 2015 and available at http://theconversation
.com/south-africa-a-dangerous-place-to-be-poor-black-and-a-woman-47287 (accessed on 13/
01/2016).

3  
 
solid   representation   in   state-­‐decision-­‐making   structures,   extensive   legal   and  
constitutional   mechanisms   protecting   the   rights   of   women   and   girls   and  
groundbreaking  laws  safeguarding  the  interests  of  women.9  Many,  from  within  a  
variety  of  different  contexts,  celebrated  the  South  African  achievements  around  
women   and   the   related   notions   of   gender   equality.10   South   Africa   celebrates  
women’s  day  and  an  entire  month  once  a  year  is  dedicated  to  programs  that  aim  
to  transform  gender  relations.  Anti-­‐discrimination  campaigns  and  notions  of  social  
justice   for   all   have   almost   become   cliché.11   Therefore,   in   general   the   goal   on  
different   levels   of   society   has   been   the   transformation   of   highly   patriarchal  
cultures  and  traditions  that  render  women  politically  marginalised.  When  it  comes  
to   the   continuous   sexual   violence   perpetrated   against   women,   civil   society,  
activists  and  government  have  participated  and  are  continuously  participating  in  
drawing   attention   to   the   high   levels   of   rape   in   the   country.   However,   as  
Snodgrass   further   mentions,   formal   recognition   has   not   translated   into  
fundamental   freedoms   of   dignity,   safety   and   security   in   practice.12   Many   South  
African  women  live  in  contexts  comprising  of  extreme  violence  and  as  Snodgrass  
rightly   states,   “the   impressive   national   machinery   belies   the   realities   of   most  
women,  especially  black  women”.13  Although  South  Africa  does  not  have  accurate  
statistics   on   gender-­‐base   violence   because   of   the   fact   that   there   are   no   reliable  
governmental  databases,  Du  Toit  notes  that  there  is  wide  consensus  with  regards  
to   the   fact   that   the   country   has   one   of   the   highest   rates   of   rape   in   the   world.14  
Sexual   violence   also   remains   under-­‐reported.15   The   Medical   Research   Council  

                                                                                                           
9
As above.
10
See for example Ruiters G (ed.) Gender Activism: Perspectives on the South African
Transition, Institutional Culture and Everyday Life (2008).
11
As above.
12
Snodgrass L The Conversation (2015).
13
As above. Snodgrass also mentions that black women bear the brunt of humiliation,
deprivation and discrimination because of the way in which racism and sexism intersects. She
refers to the deep disconnect between the political elites, such as women who have risen to
power in government, and ordinary South African women. Despite the African National
Congress Women’s League’s impeccable struggle credentials, it has not been able to tackle
controversial gender issues. See Snodgrass L The Conversation (2015).
14
Du Toit L A Philosophical Investigation of Rape: The Making and the Unmaking of the
Feminine Self (2009) 2.
15
Snodgrass L The Conversation (2015).

4  
 
estimates   that   only   one   in   nine   rapes   are   reported   to   the   police.16   It   is   further  
estimated   that   one   in   four   men   admitted   to   raping   a   woman   and   that   three  
women   per   day   are   killed   by   an   intimate   partner.17   Violence   against   women   is  
partly   the   result   of   factors   such   as   poverty,   patriarchy,   inequality,   high   rates   of  
unemployment   and   low   levels   of   education.18   Although   these   factors   exist   in  
many   post-­‐colonial   African   countries,   Snodgrass   states   that   they   cannot   fully  
account   for   the   “extraordinary   savagery”   of   South   African   rapes   and   femicide.19  
The  violence  against  women  and  girls  is  often  sexual,  whilst  involving  debasement  
and   humiliation   and   in   some   cases   even   torture   and   dehumanising   deaths.20   For  
Snodgrass   this   cannot   easily   be   explained   by   patriarchal   dominance   or   socio-­‐
economic   conditions   (such   as   poverty,   unemployment   and   substance   abuse).  
Rather   she   refers   to   “rape   as   a   weapon   of   war   […]   the   war   against   South   African  
women”.21  
 
Secondly,   and   related   to   the   discussion   above,   when   it   comes   to   the   socio-­‐
economic   conditions   of   women,   many   South   African   lives   are   constructed   as  
disposable.   The   majority   of   the   nation   is   left   to   occupy   zones   of   impoverished  
invisibility.22    
                                                                                                           
16
As above.  
17
As above.
18
As above.
19
As above. It should be mentioned here that Snodgrass further notes that deep humiliation
is part of South Africa’s history. It has been fuelled by the symbiotic ideologies of apartheid
and patriarchy characterised by institutionalised violence, which rendered whole groups of
people inferior. The effect of deep-rooted historical, social and psychological factors
therefore also plays a role in the on-going sexual violence that characterises the South African
landscape.
20
As above. One of the most notable cases in this regard is the 2013 rape and murder of
Bredasdorp resident, Anene Booysen. The teenager was out with friends at a local pub. In the
early hours of the morning she was seen walking home with a man whom she knew. This
person was subsequently convicted of her murder. She was raped and mutilated and left for
dead at a housing construction site. Booysen had been brutally raped and disemboweled by
having her abdomen slit open and she sustained other numerous injuries all over her body.
The crime was described as a senseless and savage act and it mobilised citizens and
government to prioritise the war against rape.
21
As above.
22
See Selmeczi A “Dis/placing political illiteracy: The politics of intellectual equality in a South
African shack-dweller’s movement” Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements
(2014) 230-265.  

5  
 
This   construction   partly   rests   on   the   inherited   geography   of   apartheid  
displacements   that   see   many   people   still   occupying   spaces   on   the   margins   of  
national   cities   with   poverty   taking   on   a   racialised   and   gendered   logic.   Although  
election  campaigns  are  conceptualised  along  the  lines  of  alleviating  poverty  and  
transforming   the   conditions   of   the   poor,   the   economic   power   dynamics   have  
largely  stayed  the  same  over  the  last  twenty-­‐one  years  of  democracy.23    
 
What   is   more   is   that   the   prevailing   political   discourse   at   times   labels   the   struggles  
and  protests  of  poor  people  as  less  than  political.  This  discourse  sometimes  views  
most  protests  and  demonstrations  by  the  poor  through  the  lens  of  notions  such  
as   the   idea   that   all   protest   is   related   to   the   pace   of   service   delivery,   that  
protestors  are  violent  and  that  their  protests  are  illegitimate  because  of  the  fact  
that   proper   local   governmental   procedures   with   regard   to   claims   were   not  
followed.24  In  some  instances  demonstrators  and  protestors  are  described  as  not  
being  able  to  understand  the  complicated  mechanisms  of  government,  the  time  
that  developmental  projects  take  and  the  difficult  issues  facing  the  state.  In  worse  
cases  the  state  is  perceived  as  justified  in  exercising  illegal  evictions  and  violently  

                                                                                                           
23
The South African Constitution envisions the redistribution of the country’s resources and
benefits, socio-economic reparation as well as the reconstruction of the society along
egalitarian lines. After 20 years of democracy however, there still remains an unacceptable
socio-economic gulf between black and white South Africans. As Madlingozi explains, the
gravest legacy that apartheid bequeathed to South Africa is one of systematic poverty,
structural unemployment and socio-economic inequality and the politics of redistribution still
remains a problematic topic within the country. See for example Madlingozi T “Good victim,
bad victim: Apartheid’s beneficiaries, victims and the struggle for social justice” in Le Roux W
& Van Marle K (eds.) Memory and the Legacy of Apartheid: Ten Years After AZAPO v
President of South Africa 107.
24
See Selmeczi A “Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 230.

6  
 
crushing  protest  and  dissent.25  Therefore,  when  the  poor  attempt  to  make  their  
voices  heard  or  protest  against  their  circumstances,  certain  discourses  frame  their  
protests   as   illegal   or   illogical,   rather   than   political.   Further,   the   majority   of   the  
black  population  who  live  under  the  poverty  line  is  female.26  The  lived  realities  of  
black  women  therefore  not  only  comprises  of  extreme  violence,  but  also  grinding  
poverty.   The   socio-­‐economic   conditions   of   many   women   also   make   them  
particularly   vulnerable   to   sexual   violence   as   they   have   fewer   resources   to   seek  
justice  or  escape  contexts  of  domestic  violence.27  
 
It  would  appear  that  although  there  are  frameworks  of  consensual  activism  and  
awareness,   specialised   policy   and   legislation   and   notions   of   the   socio-­‐economic  
transformation   of   the   country,   it   still   remains   difficult   for   women,   as   a   group  
and/or  individually,  to  meaningfully  appear  as  political  subjects.  In  South  Africa,  on  
different   levels   of   society,   we   are   aware   and   continuously   made   aware   of   the  
epidemic   numbers   of   rapes   and   of   the   fact   that   the   majority   of   the   nation   lives  
impoverished  lives  (with  black  women  being  the  most  impoverished).  Therefore,  
the   consensually   perceived   “plight   of   women”   has   had   a   converse   effect:  
localised   forms   of   action   and   individual   or   specific   instances   of   voice   do   not  
appear  to  be  politically  understood,  relevant  and  to  a  certain  extent  some  issues  
cannot  even  be  politically  formulated.  When  thought  of  along  the  lines  of  political  
speech,   a   paradox   emerges.   It   seems   as   if   women’s   issues   and   broader   gender  
challenges   are   within   the   public   realm,   but   that   they   themselves   as   bodies   and  

                                                                                                           
25
The most notable example of the violent crushing of protest was the events at Marikana
near Rustenburg in 2012. A strike occurred at a mine owned by Lonmin Mining Company. The
event was marked by a series of violent incidents between the South African Police Service,
Lonmin Security, the leadership of the National Union of Mine Workers and the strikers
themselves. The strike resulted in the death of 44 strikers whilst 78 were injured. The majority
of the strikers were killed on the 16th of August. The strike resulted in the single most lethal
use of force by the South African Police Service against civilians since the 1960’s and the late
1980’s, the era at the end of Apartheid. The incident caused much controversy, especially
when it was discovered that majority of the victims were shot far from police lines and some
were even shot in the back. The controversy resulted in President Jacob Zuma commissioning
an inquiry into the shooting. See for example D’Abdon R (ed.) Marikana: A Moment in Time
(2012).
26
Snodgrass L The Conversation (2015).
27
As above.  

7  
 
beings   are   somehow   beyond   the   realm   of   care-­‐   living   in   constant   fear   of   sexual  
violence  and  living  in  abject  poverty.  The  issues  of  socio-­‐economic  marginalisation  
and   sexual   violence   perpetrated   against   women   are   therefore   in   the   realm   of  
public  visibility,  but  these  issues  do  not  politically  appear  or  they  are  not  politically  
formulated  in  such  a  way  that  would  result  in  the  transformation  of  the  material  
and   concrete   contexts   of   many   women.28   These   pressing   problems   take   on  
complicated  forms  and  cannot  be  easily  answered.  The  aim  of  the  study  is  by  no  
means  to  solve  these  problems  or  to  suggest  concrete  ways  in  which  to  address  
them.  Rather,  my  aim  is  to  theoretically  reflect  on  what  it  means  to  have  a  voice  in  
order  to  understand  questions  surrounding  political  speech  better.  It  is  therefore  
an   attempt   to   contemplate   voice   against   the   background   of   these   complicated  
occurrences  of  not  being  heard  or  becoming  politically  relevant  to  the  extent  of  
significant   transformation   occurring.   Along   these   lines   the   study,   rather   than  
focusing   on   concepts   such   as   political   agency,   subjectivity   and   programs   of  
participation,   focuses   on   the   larger   frameworks   that   define   and   delineate  
possibilities   of   political   agency,   subjectivity   and   participation.   The   research  
therefore  consists  of  a  broader  theoretical  contemplation  than  merely  the  ability  
to  express  ones  views  and  interests  in  an  effort  to  influence  policy  and  decision-­‐
making  directives.  As  mentioned,  the  position  of  and  issues  surrounding  women  
were  and  are  put  central  in  the  conceptualisation  of  formal  policy  and  legislative  
directives.  As  such,  the  study  has  a  different  aim.  In  an  attempt  to  make  sense  of  
the  notion  of  voice,  the  research  takes  place  along  the  more  general  lines  of  sight  
and   forms   of   speech   that   demarcate   who   and   what   can   be   seen   and   heard   in  
what   places,   times   and   circumstances.   It   is   my   contention   that   considering   the  
disconnect  between  the  efforts  of  government,  the  campaigns  of  civil  society  as  

                                                                                                           
28
In this regard it should be mentioned that the transformation of the material contexts of
women in South Africa is a complex and difficult struggle. As Snodgrass accurately notes,
“[g]ender equality is up against a powerful enemy in societies with strong patriarchal
traditions (such as South Africa), where women, of all races and cultures have been
oppressed, exploited and kept in positions of subservience for generations. Patriarchy,
premised on women’s humiliation and subjugation, is resilient and adapts to changing social
and political contexts, aided and abetted by complicity and silence”. See Snodgrass L The
Conversation (2015).
 
8  
 
well  as  the  general  awareness  of  the  most  important  issues  that  women  face;  and  
the   problematic   everyday   material   contexts   of   many   South   African   women   as   it  
pertains   to   ongoing   poverty   and   sexual   violence,   it   becomes   necessary   to   engage  
with  the  larger  frameworks  that  determine  who  has  voice  and  who  has  not.  
 
To   be   clear,   the   background   sketched   above   and   the   specific   relationship  
between   sexual   violence,   poverty,   women   within   the   South   African   context   and  
conceptions   of   voice   and   political   speech,   can   be   addressed   and   analysed   in   a  
number   of   different   ways.   For   the   purposes   of   my   analysis   here,   I   locate   the   need  
to   theoretically   reflect   on   the   notion   of   voice   because   of   the   disconnect   between  
governmental   and   societal   mechanisms   and   frameworks   that   attempt   to  
empower  women  and  to  alleviate  poverty  and  sexual  violence  AND  the  concrete  
contexts   of   many   South   African   women.   A   contradiction   comes   into   play   when  
considering   the   public-­‐political   efforts   of   the   South   African   government   and  
society   and   the   ongoing   number   of   rapes,   violence   against   women   in   general   and  
contexts   of   poverty.   My   motivation   therefore   arose   from   this   specific  
background.  In  essence,  my  reading  of  the  background  sketched  above  highlights  
the   difficulty,   precariousness,   fragility   and   complexity   of   questions   surrounding  
voice   and   speaking   politically   and   being   heard.   The   issue   of   voice   is   therefore   laid  
bare   when   considering   the   disconnect   or   contradiction   between   the   exemplary  
formal   position   and   recognition   of   women   and   their   everyday   lives.   It   is   therefore  
the   detection   of   this   disconnect   and   the   complexities   of   where   and   if   political  
voice   can   be   located   or   formulated   within   these   frameworks   that   leads   me   to  
explore   the   concept   of   voice.   As   mentioned,   the   issues   of   socio-­‐economic  
marginalisation  and  sexual  violence  perpetrated  against  women  are  in  the  realm  
of   public   visibility,   but   these   issues   do   not   politically   appear   or   they   are   not  
politically   formulated   or   voiced   in   such   a   way   that   would   result   in   the  
transformation  of  the  material  and  concrete  contexts  of  many  women.  It  is  within  
and   from   the   perspective   of   this   problematic   that   I   discern   the   need   to  
theoretically   explore   and   think   through   the   question   of   having   a   political   voice.  
The   study   is   an   exercise   in   thinking   about   voice   and   its   specific   definition   in  
Jacques  Rancière’s  work  on  politics.  The  aim  is  to  show  that  Rancière’s  work  on  

9  
 
politics  can  provide  alternative  languages  and  frameworks  of  understanding  from  
within  which  to  think  about  political  voicing.    
 
Apart  from  outlining  my  specific  reading  of  the  position  of  women  in  South  Africa,  
it   also   becomes   necessary   to   outline   two   distinct   lines   of   thinking   or   discourses  
surrounding   issues   regarding   women   and   political   speaking.   These   lines   of  
thinking   or   discourses   are   in   no   way   the   only   theorising   or   thinking   surrounding  
women   and   political   voicing   in   the   South   African   context.   There   are   many   and  
diverse   theoretical   engagements   in   this   regard.29   However,   these   represent   two  
important  lines  of  thought  when  it  comes  to  women  and  voice  within  the  South  
African  context.  I  outline  them  below  in  order  to  further  contextualise  the  study.  
 
The   first   line   of   thinking   is   closely   related   to   the   background   sketched   above.  
Since   South   Africa’s   transition   to   democracy,   many   activists   and   scholars   have  
engaged   with   notions   of   gender   equality   along   the   lines   of   constitutional  
discourse,   substantive   equality   and   transformative   constitutionalism.30   These  

                                                                                                           
29
There are a variety of different discourses and strands of engagement within the context of
post-apartheid jurisprudential thought. These include engagements from postmodern, post-
structuralist and postcolonial perspectives. See for example Van Marle K “Lives of action,
thinking and revolt: A feminist call for politics and becoming in post-apartheid South Africa”
South African Public Law (2004) 605, Bohler-Muller N “Other possibilities? Postmodern
feminist legal theory in South Africa” South African Journal on Human Rights (2002) 614, Du
Toit L “Feminism and the Ethics of Reconciliation” in Veitch S (ed.) Law and the Politics of
Reconciliation (2007) 185-214.
30
The South African constitution has a general commitment to achieving substantive equality.
The type of equality that it envisions involves large-scale egalitarian, redistributive and social
transformation. It does not only have aspirations of equality, redistribution and social security,
but it also strives to realise multiculturalism, pays close attention to gender and sexual
identity, has an emphasis on participation and governmental transparency, recognises the
importance of environmentalism and extends democratic ideals into the private sphere.
Along these lines the concept of “transformative constitutionalism” refers to a long-term
project of constitutional enactment, interpretation and enforcement committed to
transforming the country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a
democratic, participatory and egalitarian way. US critical legal scholar, Karl Klare first
introduced this notion in 1998. Ever since the first mention of the concept scholars have
interpreted and applied it in an effort to explain the role of law and the new constitution in a
transformative society. Klare’s article became the most frequently referred to article in the
field of constitutional law and references to the term are legion. The term is usually
understood as a social-democratic concept that strives for the attainment of social justice,
substantive equality and the cultivation of a culture of justification in public interactions as

10  
 
efforts   have   mainly   consisted   of   seeking   to   transform   gender   relations   through  
the   law   and   human   rights.   Socio-­‐economic   reparation,   violence   against   women  
and  transformation  have  been  viewed  and  widely  analysed  along  the  lines  of  our  
progressive   constitution   and   democracy.   Many   of   these   efforts   have   done   the  
important   work   of   legally   analysing   gender   issues   within   historical,   economic,  
political   and   social   contexts   with   added   focus   on   how   race,   gender,   sexual  
orientation  and  socio-­‐economic  status  intersect.31  However,  some  commentators  
have   pointed   to   the   fact   that   the   law   and   human   rights   alone   cannot   effect  
significant   change.32   When   considering   the   ongoing   socio-­‐economic   divide   and  
the   prevalence   of   sexual   violence   described   above,   the   impotency   of   rights   and  
legislation  relating  to  specific  rights  of  gender  equality  in  changing  the  concrete  
contexts   of   everyday   South   Africans,   becomes   noticeable.   It   can   therefore   be  
argued   that   efforts   and   theoretical   interventions   through   the   lens   of  
constitutionalism,   jurisprudential   approaches   to   rights,   although   important   and  
necessary,   cannot   solely   address   the   continuing   marginalisation   and   oppression  
of   women.33   Many   scholars   seem   to   suggest   that   the   contemporary   crisis   that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
well as the infusion of the private sphere with human rights standards. See Klare K
“Transformative constitutionalism and legal culture” South African Journal on Human Rights
(1998) 146-188, Pieterse M “What do we mean when we talk about transformative
constitutionalism?” South African Public Law (2005) 155-166.
31
But a few examples include Botha H “Equality, plurality and structural power” South African
Journal on Human Rights (2009) 1-37, Liebenberg S “Towards a transformative adjudication of
socio-economic rights” Speculum Juris (2007) 41-59, Froneman J “Legal reasoning and legal
culture: Our ‘vision’ of law” Stellenbosch Law Review (2005) 1-20, Sibanda S “Not purpose-
made! Transformative constitutionalism, post-independence constitutionalism, and the
struggle to eradicate poverty” in Liebenberg S & Quinot G (eds.) Law and Poverty:
Perspectives from South Africa and Beyond (2012) 40, Moseneke D “The Bram Fischer
Memorial Lecture: Transformative adjudication” South African Journal of Human Rights (2002)
314, Langa P “Transformative Constitutionalism” Stellenbosch Law Review (2006) 351, Roux T
“Transformative Constitutionalism and the best interpretation of the South African
constitution: Distinction without a difference?” Stellenbosch Law Review (2009) 258, Van der
Walt A “Transformative Constitutionalism and the development of South African Property
Law (Part 2)” Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (2006) 1, Van Marle K “Transformative
Constitutionalism as/and critique” Stellenbosch Law Review (2009) 286.
32
See for example Van Marle K “The spectacle of post-apartheid constitutionalism” Griffith
Law Review (2007) 411-429, “Laughter, refusal and friendship: Thoughts on a ‘jurisprudence of
generosity’” Stellenbosch Law Review (2007) 198-206.
33
South Africa did not escape the language and rhetoric of human rights that swept across
the contemporary world of politics in the 1970’s. This discourse picked up after the end of the
Cold War and quickened again in the latter half of the 1990’s. After South Africa’s transition

11  
 
South  Africa  is  grappling  with  when  it  comes  to  women  requires  a  total  revolution  
if   it   is   to   be   adequately   addressed.34   It   is   at   this   junction   that   other   theoretical  
engagements  and  interventions  become  important  and  it  is  also  from  within  this  
problematic  or  context  that  I  attempt  to  make  sense  of  voice  and  political  speech  
so   as   to   consider   other   possibilities   and   alternatives.   Therefore,   rather   than  
exploring   the   inadequacy   or   inability   of   law,   constitutionalism   and   human   rights  
or   searching   for   alternative   approaches   to   law;   I   turn   to   a   different   exploration.  
My   contention   here   is   that   the   important   and   necessary   work   of   illustrating   the  
workings,   failures   and   successes   of   legal   and   constitutional   mechanisms   have  
been  and  are  being  done.  These  efforts  are  myriad  and  continuous.  My  goal  with  
this   research   is   simultaneously   broader   and   narrower.   It   is   an   effort   to   consider  
alternatives   and   to   explore   the   wider   frameworks   that   determine   the   possibility  
of   voice.   My   contention   is   by   no   means   that   such   an   exploration   would   better  
address   the   complicated   background   sketched   above.   Rather,   my   contention   is  
that   considering   the   contradictions   between   the   formal   position   of   women   and  
the   complexity   of   issues   of   being   politically   heard   and   becoming   politically  
relevant,   theoretical   engagement   from   a   variety   of   different   angles   and  
approaches   becomes   necessary   in   making   sense   of   these   issues.   My   analysis   of  
the  larger  frameworks  that  determine  the  possibility  of  voice  is  also  a  result  of  a  
more  complex  and  multidimensional  view  of  the  law  and  its  inherent  relationship  
to  society,  power,  politics  and  community.  In  this  regard  my  research  is  influenced  
by   critical   legal   theory.35   Although   I   do   not   directly   engage   with   specific  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
to a constitutional democracy the country fully embraced the rather optimistic potential for
human rights law and advocacy, adopting neo-liberal lines of thinking, whilst establishing all
the necessary democratic institutions. See Hafner-Burton E & Ron J “Human rights
institutions: Rhetoric and efficacy” Journal of Peace Research (2007) 379-383.
34
See the contributions in Ruiters G (ed.) Gender Activism: Perspectives on the South African
Transition, Institutional Culture and Everyday Life (2008).
35
In this regard two critical approaches that influence my work can be mentioned. Both of
these approaches have been adopted in the South African legal context to a certain extent.
The first is tenets that can be associated with the US Critical Legal Studies Movement and the
second approach are engagements with Euro-Brit Critical Legal Studies. With regards to the
first see, in the South African context, Klare K “Transformative constitutionalism and legal
culture“ South African Journal on Human Rights (1998) 146-188 and also see with regards to
the second approach Motha S & Van Marle K (eds.) Genres of Critique: Law, Aesthetics and
Liminality (2013). Although Euro-Brit CLS is associated with theorising along the lines of

12  
 
arguments   within   critical   legal   theory,   my   direction   of   inquiry   in   this   research   is  
animated   by   the   belief   that   the   law   should   be   framed   and   analysed   alongside   and  
within   broader   social,   political   and   discursive   contexts.   Thus   rather   than   placing  
the  law  and  related  mechanisms  of  rights,  policy  and  constitutionalism  central  to  
my   analysis,   I   look   at   broader   frameworks   of   politics   and   political   voice   that  
ultimately   influences,   creates   and   functions   alongside   the   law   and   its   related  
instruments.  Although  I  reflect  on  the  notion  of  voice  against  the  background  of  
the  legislative  and  constitutional  efforts  and  the  policy  and  public-­‐political  norms  
instituted  in  an  effort  to  better  the  position  of  women  since  the  beginning  of  the  
post-­‐apartheid   era,   my   goal   is   to   reflect   on   these   mechanisms   and   instruments  
from   a   different   angle.   More   specifically,   I   reflect   on   these   issues   from   the  
perspective   of   thinking   about   voice   within   the   framework   of   Jacques   Rancière’s  
work  on  and  imaginative  definition  of  politics.  
 
Further,  the  aim  of  my  analysis  of  Rancière’s  work  on  politics  is  to  illustrate  that  
some   of   the   formal   mechanisms   along   the   lines   of   rights   and   constitutionalism  
and   theoretical   and   public   interventions   form   part   of   what   may   be   called   the  
current  “distribution  of  the  sensible”.36  I  elaborate  fully  on  this  notion  in  chapter  2  
of   the   thesis.   At   this   stage   it   can   be   mentioned   that   the   “distribution   of   the  
sensible”   refers   to   the   general   laws   of   a   society   that   distribute   and   determine  
lines  of  sight,  forms  of  speech  and  implicit  estimations  of  the  capacities  of  people  
in   specific   contexts.37   The   notion   of   voice,   rather   than   involving   the   current  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
ethics, language and ontology (see for example Douzinas C & Gearey A Critical
Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Law (2005)) and US CLS points to the
indeterminacy, contradictions and politics of the law, (see for example Unger K The Critical
Legal Studies Movement (1986), Kennedy D “Form and substance in private law adjudication”
Harvard Law Review (1976) 1685-1778) both schools or approaches emphasise the violence,
power relationships and identity politics of the law. There is a specific emphasis on
interrogating and analysing the law within the social, economic and political contexts in which
it functions and these approaches suggest that the law cannot be separated from issues of
power, morality, community and politics. The law is not viewed as a coherent body of rules
that function objectively and neutrally. Rather, many of these scholars point to the violence
and injustices prevalent in law as well as the law’s ability to, behind the guise of neutrality,
objectivity and fairness, perpetuate inequality and hierarchies.
36
See Rancière J Disagreement (1999) 27-28. See section 2.3.5 below.
37
If viewed from the perspective of the distribution of the sensible, the law, legal

13  
 
distribution   of   the   sensible   or   the   current   accepted   forms   and   frameworks   of  
possibility  of  voice,  involves  a  redistribution  of  the  sensible  or  a  recasting  of  these  
frameworks.   It   is   therefore   also   from   the   perspective   of   this   line   of   thinking   in  
Rancière’s  politics  that  I  turn  to  other  possibilities  or  alternative  ways  of  doing.    
 
The  second  important  line  of  thinking  that  should  be  mentioned  involves  Gayatri  
Chakravorty   Spivak’s   essay   “Can   the   Subaltern   Speak?”38   This   contribution  
originally   published   in   1988   has   been   described   as   having   altered   the   fields   of  
postcolonial   and   gender   studies.39   Considered   to   be   highly   influential,   the   essay  
poses  the  question  of  whether  the  most  oppressed  and  invisible  constituencies  in  
society  (subalterns)  can  speak  in  the  sense  of  their  voices  being  politically  heard.  
Spivak   specifically   focus   on   women   in   postcolonial   India.   Her   more   general  
analysis  involves  emphasising  how  women  living  in  the  southern  hemisphere  bear  
the  brunt  of  global  economic  exploitation.  In  general  they  are  not  represented  in  
the   global   theatre   of   international   politics   and   when   there   are   attempts   to  
represent   the   political   interests   of   women   in   the   “Third   World”,   it   does   not  
involve   changing   or   transforming   the   infrastructural   conditions   which   maintain  
the   economic   impoverishment   of   rural-­‐based   women   of   colour.40   After   her  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
establishments and mechanisms as well as the institutional language of our constitutional
democracy can be regarded as part of the current distribution of the sensible that seeks to
enforce a society’s consensual order of things. A call for a redistribution of the sensible can
therefore also be viewed as a call for the interrogation of law’s complicity in determining
acceptable forms of speech and the consensual frameworks of voice or authority of voice. See
Jooste Y “Thinking two worlds into one: The ‘distribution of the sensible’ and women’s
renegotiation” Stellenbosch Law Review (2013) 528-537.
38
Spivak GC “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Nelson C & Grossberg L (eds.) Marxism and the
Interpretation of Culture (1988) 271-313. First reprinted in Williams P & Chrisman L (eds.)
Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader (1994) 66-111.
39
See Morris R “Introduction” in Morris R (ed.) Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the
History of an Idea (2010) 1-2.
40
Morton S Routledge Critical Thinkers: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2003) 138-139. Spivak
has consistently vocalised her criticism of global development policies which focus on women
in the “Third World”. In a response to the United Nations conference on Women in Beijing in
1995 for example, Spivak emphasised how the rhetoric on women’s rights in the United
Nations paradoxically overlooks the poorest women of the South, the very women whom the
United Nations are claiming to represent. More recently Spivak has warned against the
rhetoric of United Nations declarations on women’s rights that seem to confuse access to
global telecommunications and the right to bear credit with “Third World” women’s political
empowerment as such.

14  
 
theoretical   analysis   in   the   essay,   Spivak   concludes   that   women,   especially   the  
most   economically   marginalised,   cannot   speak.   It   can   be   argued   that   when  
engaging   with   women   and   voice   in   the   post-­‐apartheid   and   postcolonial   South  
African   context,   it   becomes   necessary   to   address   the   concerns   that   Spivak   puts  
forth  in  her  highly  recognised  essay.41  Spivak’s  contribution  directly  engages  with  
the  possibility  of  political  speech  as  well  as  with  the  conditions  that  efface  voice  in  
the   context   of   the   global   South.   As   such   her   contribution   becomes   part   of   my  
analysis.  I  explain  and  reflect  on  her  essay  in  the  study.  My  aim  is  to  open  up  the  
question   that   she   poses   in   the   title   (and   answers   in   the   negative)   to   discussion  
and  contestation.42  As  Jacques  Rancière’s  work  on  politics  is  my  main  theoretical  

                                                                                                           
41
For a discussion on South Africa as “postcolonial” see Chrisman L Postcolonial
Contraventions: Cultural Readings of Race, Imperialism and Transnationalism (2003) 145-155.
It should be mentioned here that a number of different other theorists could have been
discussed. Two other important theorists for example that could have been discussed within
the context of women and voice, are, firstly, Adriana Cavarero’s work on the embodied voice
of women. (Cavarero A For More Than One Voice: Toward A Philosophy of Vocal Expression
(2005) trans. Kottman P). In this work, Cavarero begins her analysis of voice by starting from
the given uniqueness of every voice. She rereads the history of philosophy by illustrating how
it takes this embodied uniqueness of voice for granted and how it privileges mind over body.
Through the analysis of figures of women, she provides a counter-history where the
embodied voice or the “who” triumphs over the immaterial semantic or the “what” of
speaking. What therefore matters is the “who” that is speaking rather than the
communicative content of a given discourse. She innovatively proposes a politics of voice
that reveals a more feminine or female logic. Cavarero’s work with regard to voice is therefore
relevant to women and speaking. However, I do not engage with her work in this study. My
decision to engage with Spivak in this regard revolves around the relevance of her essay as it
applies to the South African context that can be described as postcolonial and that forms part
of the global south where women make up the poorest of the world. I therefore view Spivak’s
contribution as more fitting within and relevant to the context of the research problem that I
state below. Spivak’s engagement also analyses, in its most basic sense, the possibility of
political speech being voiced and heard and as such, I limit my analysis to her specific essay
on subaltern speaking. Further, after careful consideration, I believe that a thorough
engagement with Cavarero’s work here would have resulted in the project going beyond the
scope of the problems that I am trying to address. However, Cavarero’s work on voice reveals
an important avenue for further or future research on this topic. The second theorist that can
be mentioned here is Hannah Arendt and her arguments around action and speech in The
Human Condition (1958) 75-180. Rancière critically engages with Arendt in his article “Who is
The Subject of the Rights of Man?” South Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 103. I discuss his article in
chapter 5 and explore some of the arguments he postulates. I also explain his engagement
with the work of Arendt. Although I do not go into this engagement in depth, the discussions
there should suffice in addressing some of Arendt’s important claims on politics, speech and
action.
42
Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 313.

15  
 
focus,   I   discuss   and   problematise   her   essay   from   the   perspective   of   Rancière’s  
arguments  as  part  of  my  reflection  on  what  it  means  to  have  a  voice.    
 
1.3  Research  questions  
Before   setting   out   the   research   questions   of   the   study   it   becomes   necessary   to  
clarify  the  following  assumptions  and  reasoning  behind  the  formulation  of  these  
questions:  Firstly,  the  discussion  of  the  background  illustrate  my  concerns  when  it  
comes   to   many   South   African   women   and   their  specific   contexts   as   it   relates   to  
grinding   poverty   and   ongoing   instances   of   sexual   violence.   Secondly,   given   the  
exemplary  governmental  and  public  mechanisms  and  legislative,  democratic  and  
other  interventions,  I  detect  a  disconnect  or  a  contradiction  between  the  formal  
recognition   of   gender   equality   as   well   as   of   the   issues   that   many   South   African  
women   face   AND   the   everyday   contexts   of   many   women.   It   seems,   in   my   reading  
of   the   background   sketched   above,   that   democratic   representation,   formal  
constitutional   inclusion   and   equality   as   well   as   the   public-­‐political   recognition   of  
the   importance   of   overturning   patriarchal   systems   does   not   translate   into   the  
embodied  political  visibility  of  many  South  Africa  women,  especially  those  women  
that   live   in   contexts   of   poverty   and   that   continuously   face   sexual   violence.   This  
leads   me   to   ask   questions   regarding   the   notion   of   political   speech   or   political  
voice.   The   issues   of   voice   and   political   speech   or   visibility   surrounding   South  
African   women   are   complicated   and   this   study   represents   but   one   theoretical  
effort  to  make  sense  of  the  notion  of  voice.  Thirdly,  I  assume  with  other  scholars  
and   activists   that   legal   and   policy   directives,   constitutionalism   and   efforts   to  
transform   and   engage   with   gender   relations   through   and   along   the   lines   of  
transformative   constitutionalism,   the   law   and   rights   are   important   in   addressing  
sexual   violence   and   the   socio-­‐economic   deprivation   of   women.   However,   I  
contend   that   other   theoretical   engagements   outside   or   beyond   these   lines   of  
thinking  and  from  different  perspectives  are  also  important  and  as  such  I  attempt  
to  explore  a  different  line  of  inquiry  in  this  study.  I  argue  that  the  work  of  theorist  
Jacques  Rancière  can  provide  a  different  and  valuable  avenue  of  thinking  in  this  
regard  and  I  aim  to  explain  his  work  on  politics  in  an  effort  to  reflect  on  the  notion  

16  
 
of   political   voice.   I   further   propose   that   it   becomes   necessary   to   engage   with  
Spivak’s   important   contribution   on   speaking   in   my   analysis   and   I   contend   that  
Rancière  can  provide  other  possibilities  and  shed  a  different  light  on  the  idea  of  
subaltern  silencing.  The  idea  is  that  an  analysis  of  the  essay  from  the  perspective  
of  the  work  of  Rancière,  can  further  disclose  meaningful  and  reflective  prospects  
for  voice.  Ultimately  I  suggest  that  Rancière’s  work  can  frame  questions  in  a  new  
way  and  contribute  valuable  insights  when  it  comes  to  the  notion  of  voice  in  the  
South  African  context.  
 
The  primary  aim  of  the  research  is  an  effort  to  analyse  the  notion  of  voice  through  
exploring   the   work   of   Jacques   Rancière.   This   analysis   takes   place   against   the  
background  sketched  above  and  within  the  context  of  what  I  perceive  to  be  the  
necessity  of  searching  for  other  or  more  theoretical  possibilities.  In  order  to  make  
sense  of  voice,  the  research  problem  unfolds  by  way  of  the  following  questions:  
1. In   reflecting   on   voice   and   political   speaking   what   directions   of  
consideration   and   useful   lines   of   thinking   are   opened   up   by   an   exploration  
and  analysis  of  the  intellectual  background  and  theoretical  work  on  politics  
of  Jacques  Rancière?  
2. In  what  way  does  problematising  Gayatri  Chakravorty  Spivak’s  essay  “Can  
the  Subaltern  Speak?”  from  the  perspective  of  Rancière’s  politics  identify  
moments  within  which  the  subaltern  can  speak?  Or  put  differently,  can  an  
analysis   of   her   essay   through   the   lens   of   Rancière’s   work   on   politics  
answer  the  question  differently  or  propose  different  questions?  
3. When   reading   instances   of   political   speaking   and   literary   examples   and  
figures   from   the   perspective   of   Rancière’s   politics   of   speaking,   what  
further  or  other  possibilities  of  or  for  voice  are  revealed?    
I   explore   these   questions   in   an   effort   to   understand   political   voice   against   the  
background   of   the   specific   disconnect   or   difficulties   of   voice   when   it   comes   to  
many  South  African  women  in  the  post-­‐apartheid  context.  My  aim  is  to  show  that  
the   work   of   Jacques   Rancière   can   meaningfully   contribute   to   conversations  
around  voice  and  political  speaking.  I  plan  on  illustrating  this  by  firstly  discussing  
and   explaining   his   background   as   theorist,   his   work   on   politics   and   his   theoretical  

17  
 
engagements   with   certain   historical   figures.   Secondly,   I   aim   to   explain   and  
explore  Gayatri  Chakravorty  Spivak’s  essay  on  subaltern  silencing  and  to  consider  
it   from   the   perspective   of   Rancière’s   work.   Lastly,   I   plan   to   reflect   on   certain  
literary   examples,   political   statements   and   historical   figures   through   the   lens   of  
the   politics   of   Rancière.   I   elaborate   more   on   this   in   the   methodology   and   chapter  
overview  below  
 
1.4  Methodology  and  Chapter  Overview  
The  chapters  of  the  thesis  unfolds  in  the  following  way:  
 
In  the  first  chapter  after  this  introductory  chapter,  chapter  2,  I  start  with  the  main  
theoretical  focus  of  the  thesis,  namely  Jacques  Rancière’s  work  on  politics.  I  begin  
by   explaining   Rancière’s   current   influence   as   well   as   his   background   and  
intellectual   beginnings.   In   this   section   I   also   outline   the   main   arguments   of  
Marxist   philosopher   Louis   Althusser   who   as   a   former   teacher   of   Rancière   had   a  
significant   influence   on   his   work.   I   shed   light   on   Rancière’s   relationship   with  
Althusser   as   well   as   on   the   main   tenets   of   Althusserianism.   In   many   ways  
Rancière’s   later   work   on   politics   may   be   regarded   as   a   reaction   against   the   key  
tenets   of   Althusserianism.   His   experiences   with   his   former   teacher   shaped   the  
rest  of  his  intellectual  life  in  numerous  ways  and  it  therefore  becomes  important  
to   shed   light   on   this   period   of   his   intellectual   development.   After   this   period,  
Rancière’s  work  can  be  described  as  representing  three  stages.  Starting  from  the  
early   1970’s,   the   first   stage   was   a   critique   of   the   main   tenets   of   Althusserian  
theory   informed   by   his   experiences   and   training   under   Louis   Althusser.43   He  
subsequently,   within   the   second   stage,   engaged   with   questions   involving  
education  and  pedagogy  as  well  as  history,  historiography  and  historical  agency.44  
It  was  after  and  from  the  experiences  of  these  engagements  that  he  formulated  

                                                                                                           
43
The main work coming forth from this period was La Leçon d’ Althusser (Althusser’s Lesson)
(1973).
44
The main works that can be mentioned here are The Names of History: On the Poetics of
Knowledge trans. Melehy H (1994), The Nights of Labor: The Worker’s Dream in Nineteenth-
Century France trans. Drury J (1989), The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual
Emancipation trans. Ross K (1991) and The Philosopher and His Poor trans. Drury J (2003).

18  
 
what   may   be   called   his   mature   philosophy   that   concerns   notions   of   politics   and  
social   and   political   agency   and   organisation.45   Over   the   past   ten   to   fifteen   years  
his  thought  has  also  become  increasingly  concerned  with  art  and  aesthetics  and  
its  relation  to  politics  and  to  possibilities  of  political  participation,  transformation  
and  emancipation.46  
 
After   explaining   his   intellectual   background   and   his   critique   of   Althusserian  
theory,   or   what   can   be   called   the   first   stage   of   his   theoretical   efforts,   I   explain  
Rancière’s   mature   philosophy   by   exploring   five   aspects   or   moments   within  
Rancière’s  formulation  of  politics,  namely  “the  police  order”,  “politics/  equality”,  
“the  political  subject”,  “the  miscount  and  the  wrong”  and  “the  distribution  of  the  
sensible”.  These  five  features  involve  the  third  stage  of  Rancière’s  work  and  they  
should  be  read  together  in  order  to  get  a  thorough  understanding  of  his  notion  of  
politics.  After  discussing  the  various  elements  of  his  politics,  I  reflect  on  Rancière’s  
work  against  the  background  and  within  the  context  discussed  above.  The  aim  is  
to   reflect   on   the   lines   of   thinking   that   such   a   reading   can   reveal   when   thinking  
about  the  notion  of  political  voice.  
 
In   chapter   3   I   explore   two   historical   figures   that   Rancière   explored.   This  
discussion   serves   to   illuminate   some   of   his   arguments   and   also   allows   for   an   even  
deeper   understanding   of   his   theory.   As   with   his   intellectual   background,   his  
engagement  with  certain  historical  figures  and  philosophers  becomes  important  
when  attempting  to  understand  his  postulations  with  regards  to  politics.    In  many  
ways  the  engagement  with  these  figures  crystallised  Rancière’s  so-­‐called  mature  
politics.  I  discuss  the  figure  of  Joseph  Jacocot  discussed  in  his  book  on  pedagogy  
The   Ignorant   Schoolmaster   in   order   to   explain   Rancière’s   conception   of   equality  

                                                                                                           
45
See Disagreement (1999) trans. Rose J, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics trans.
Cocoran S (2009), On the Shores of Politics trans. Heron L (1995), The Hatred of Democracy
trans. Cocoran S (2006).
46
See Aesthetics and its Discontents trans. Cocoran S (2009), The Emancipated Spectator
trans. Elliot G (2009), The Flesh of Words: The Politics of Writing trans. Mandell C (2004), The
Future of The Image trans. Elliot G (2007), The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the
Sensible trans. Rockhill G (2004), The Politics of Literature trans. Rose J (2011).

19  
 
that  is  central  to  his  notion  of  politics.47  I  also  discuss  the  figure  of  Gabriel  Gauny  
discussed   in   his   book   The   Nights   of   Labor.48   The   discussion   of   Gauny   occurs  
alongside   a   discussion   of   certain   aspects   of   Plato   that   Rancière   engages   with   and  
criticises   in   his   book   The   Philosopher   and   His   Poor.49   Chapter   3   can   be   said   to  
encompass   the   second   stage   of   Rancière’s   work.   Apart   from   shedding   further  
light   on   Rancière’s   work   on   politics,   the   discussion   of   these   figures   in   chapter   3  
also   serves   to   further   reflect   on   the   notion   of   political   voice   within   a   Rancièrian  
understanding   of   politics.   These   figures   point   to   certain   ways   in   which   to  
approach   and   engage   with   the   notion   of   political   voice   and   I   therefore  
contemplate   Rancière’s   engagements   with   these   historical   figures   against   the  
background   of   the   disconnect   or   contradictions   that   emerges   when   it   comes   to  
many  South  African  women  and  political  voice  sketched  out  in  section  1.3  above.  
 
Since  the  1970’s  Rancière  has  elaborated  on  his  intellectual  project  in  the  form  of  
many  articles,  books,  lectures  and  interviews  that  spans  numerous  disciplines.  It  
has  been  argued  that  Jacques  Rancière’s  philosophy  of  equality  represents  one  of  
the  most  important  and  original  contributions  to  the  political  thought  of  the  late  
twentieth   and   early   twenty-­‐first   centuries.50     I   therefore   hope   that   engaging   all  
three   stages   of   his   work,   will   serve   to   provide   a   clear   picture   of   his   politics.   As  
mentioned,   Rancière   is   the   main   theoretical   focus.   The   thesis   can   therefore   also  
be  regarded  as  a  way  of  introducing  the  reader  that  has  not  yet  come  across  his  
work   to   his   notion   of   politics.   I   examine   the   notion   of   voice   by   using   Rancière’s  
work  on  politics.  The  aim  is  to  investigate  what  lines  of  thinking  or  contribution  an  
exploration   of   his   theory   can   yield   when   approaching   the   issue   of   voice   and  
speaking  politically.    
 
It   is   from   the   perspective   of   Rancière’s   work   that   the   rest   of   the   research   takes  
place.   Chapter   4   starts   with   outlining   and   explaining   the   main   arguments   of  

                                                                                                           
47
Rancière J (1991).
48
Rancière J (1989).
49
Rancière J (2003).
50
James I The New French Philosophy (2012) 110.

20  
 
Gayatri  Chakravorty  Spivak’s  essay  “Can  the  Subaltern  Speak?”  As  mentioned,  the  
impact  of  Spivak’s  essay  has  been  tremendous.  I  explain  her  main  arguments  with  
the   purpose   of   addressing   her   concerns   on   the   impossibility   of   the   subaltern  
speaking.   The   discussion   is   not   an   in-­‐depth   analysis   of   the   essay,   its  
interpretations  and  impact.  Spivak’s  essay  and  the  work  that  resulted  from  it  has  
been   cited,   invoked,   imitated,   summarised,   critiqued,   revered,   reviled,   misread,  
misunderstood  and  misappropriated  in  English  and  in  translation.51  The  academic  
contributions   that   engage   with   it   are   legion   and   its   significance   cannot   be  
understated.  Further,  Spivak  has  revisited  the  essay  in  a  chapter  titled  “History”  
which   spans   just   over   a   hundred   pages   in   her   book   A   Critique   of   Postcolonial  
Reason:   Towards   a   History   of   the   Vanishing   Present.52   An   in-­‐depth   and   detailed  
analysis   is   therefore   beyond   the   scope   of   this   study.   I   outline   her   main   arguments  
and   problematise   and   reflect   on   her   analysis   in   an   effort   to   better   understand  
what   it   means   to   have   a   voice.   The   question   that   arises   for   me   is   whether  
problematising   the   essay   through   the   lens   of   Rancière’s   theory   can   result   in  
answering   her   question   differently,   or,   if   it   identifies   moments   within   which   the  
subaltern   can   speak.   In   her   essay   Spivak   declares   for   various   reasons   that  
subalterns,  as  the  most  oppressed  and  invisible  constituencies  in  society,  cannot  
be   heard   in   dominant   political   frameworks.   This   argument   partly   rests   on   her  
definition   and   construction   of   subalternity.   The   displacement   of   her   arguments  
from   the   perspective   of   Rancière’s   politics   serves   to   highlight   important   points  
regarding   the   notion   of   voice   and   the   possibility   of   actually   speaking   politically  
and  being  heard.  It  therefore  becomes  important  to  address  her  concerns  and  it  is  
my   contention   that   the   displacement   of   her   arguments   from   the   perspective   of  
Rancière’s   work   can   serve   to   highlight   important   and   valuable   points   regarding  
the  notion  of  voice.  It  should  be  emphasised  here  that  Rancière’s  work  on  politics  
is   my   main   theoretical   focus.   As   such,   I   engage   with   Spivak’s   essay   from   a   specific  
angle   or   perspective,   namely   from   the   perspective   of   some   of   Rancière’s   main  
postulations  with  regard  to  politics  and  political  voicing.  A  larger  investigation  or  
comparison   of   the   work   of   Spivak   in   relation   to   Rancière’s   work   may   have  
                                                                                                           
51
See Morris R (ed.) (201) 2.
52
Spivak GC (1999) 198-310.

21  
 
resulted   in   some   interesting   theoretical   points   for   consideration.53   As   will   be  
explained   in   more   detail,   Spivak   focuses   on   the   specific   obstacles   that   confront  
political   voicing   and   as   such   I   explain   some   of   her   most   important   points   on  
speaking  politically.54  However,  the  aim  of  the  research  is  not  to  compare  the  two  
theorists,   but   rather   to   make   sense   of   political   voicing   through   an   analysis   of  
different  notions  put  forth  by  Rancière.  My  aim  is  to  follow  Rancière’s  thought  in  
order   to   consider   what   possibilities   of   thinking   can   emerge   when   writing   about  
voice   and   as   such   I   limit   my   engagement   with   Spivak’s   work   to   the   extent   of  
serving  and  answering  the  specific  research  questions  formulated  above.  
 
In   chapter   5   I   discuss   some   literary   and   historical   figures   and   their   relevant  
political   statements   through   the   lens   of   the   politics   of   Rancière.   I   start   with   the  
figure   of   Olympe   De   Gouges,   a   French   revolutionary   woman   that   blurs   traditional  
political  boundaries  that  Rancière  himself  discusses  and  analyses.55  I  also  explore  
the  character  of  Lucy  in  J.M  Coetzee’s  novel  Disgrace  as  a  character  that  overturns  
the   normative   framework   that   she   finds   herself   in.56   I   further   discuss   the   South  
African   Shack-­‐dweller’s   movement   (Abahlali   baseMjondolo)   and   the   numerous  
political   statements   that   they   have   made   declaring   their   equality   against  
frameworks   that   describe   their   statements   as   less   than   political.57   I   also   discuss  
the   figure   of   Bhubaneswari   Bhaduri   that   Spivak   discusses   in   her   essay   “Can   the  
Subaltern   Speak?”   as   a   woman   who   recasts   gender   positions   and   limitations  
against   silencing.   The   discussion   of   these   examples   is   a   reaction   against   the  
problems  and  difficulty  of  voicing  described  within  the  background  of  the  thesis.    
It  is  also  a  way  of  practicing  a  “method  of  equality”  that  is  used  and  suggested  by  

                                                                                                           
53
In this regard I would like to thank one of the anonymous examiners of the thesis that drew
my attention to the possibility of such a theoretical exploration. Such an exploration would
have allowed for an interesting and possibly meaningful critical engagement with Rancière’s
work. However, my reflections here are more focused in that I follow Rancière’s work and the
possibilities around political voicing that it can open up or point to. The aim here is to lay the
theoretical foundation from where future or further critical and other engagement with
Rancière in relation to the South African context can take place.
54
See chapter 4 below.
55
See Rancière J South Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 103.
56
Coetzee JM Disgrace (1999).
57
Abahlali baseMondjolo (See Abahlali.org. (accessed 28/12/2014).

22  
 
Rancière.   I   therefore   employ   his   concepts   so   as   to   attempt   to   make   sense   of  
voice.  I  suggest  that  in  all  these  instances  a  type  of  political  speaking  occurs  and  
my   aim   is   to   contemplate   their   meaning   and   significance   along   the   lines   of  
Rancière’s  postulations  as  a  way  of  considering  possibilities  of  voice  and  speaking.    
 
It  is  further  important  to  mention  that  the  research  can  be  described  as  a  desktop  
study   by   way   of   the   review   and   analysis   of   various   literary   sources.   The   aim,   as  
mentioned,   is   to   understand   Jacques   Rancière’s   work   and   specifically   his  
description   and   definition   of   politics.   In   this   regard   I   engage   with   some   of  
Rancière’s  main  works  on  politics,  but  also  refer  to  a  number  of  authors  that  can  
be  described  as  Rancière’s  principal  English  commentators.58  As  Oliver  Davis,  one  
of   Rancière’s   most   prominent   analysts,   notes,   it   is   only   relatively   recently   that  
Rancière’s   impact   has   begun   to   be   felt   in   the   English-­‐speaking   world.59   The  
moment   of   reception   of   any   thinker’s   work   and   the   years   following   it   becomes  
integral  in  explaining  and  engaging  a  thinker’s  work  as  correctly  and  accurately  as  
possible.   The   sources   and   authors   that   I   have   chosen   are   sources   and   authors  
more   frequently   referred   to   in   other   academic   engagements.60   These   authors  

                                                                                                           
58
The main Rancièrian works that I engage with are   Disagreement (1999) trans. Rose J,
Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics trans. Cocoran S (2009), On the Shores of Politics trans.
Heron L (1995), The Names of History: On the Poetics of Knowledge trans. Melehy H (1994),
The Nights of Labor: The Worker’s Dream in Nineteenth-Century France trans. Drury J (1989),
The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation trans. Ross K (1991) and
The Philosopher and His Poor trans. Drury J (2003).  
59
Davis O Jacques Rancière (2010) vii.  
60
One of the most notable sources in this regard is Davis O Jacques Rancière (2010) referred
to above. This book by Davis is the first book-length publication by a single author devoted
entirely to Rancière’s thought. Davis has also recently edited a volume of critical essays on
Rancière’s work. See Davis (ed.) Rancière Now: Current Perspectives on Jacques Rancière
(2013). Another important introductory work that I frequently refer to is Tanke J Jacques
Rancière: An Introduction: Philosophy, Politics, Aesthetics (2011). Tanke situates a distinctive
approach against the background of Continental philosophy and postulates critical questions
on how we might proceed after encountering Rancière. An important volume of essays that I
refer to is Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) Jacques Rancière: History, Politics, Aesthetics (2009).
This book includes essays by Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy, Peter Hallward, Étienne Balibar,
Yves Citton, Todd May and Kristin Ross. Ross translated Rancière’s important work on
pedagogy The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation (1991).
Gabriel Rockhill, the editor of the volume, translated Rancière’s important work The Politics of
Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (2004). I also frequently refer to Todd May. May
has published numerous articles and chapters in books on Rancière. See for example

23  
 
include   principle   translators   of   Rancière’s   work   and   authors   that   played   an  
integral  role  in  introducing  his  work  to  the  English-­‐speaking  world.61  What  makes  
and   explanation   of   Rancière’s   work   difficult   is   the   fact   that   his   body   of   work   is  
especially   resistant   to   explanatory   exposition.62   Firstly,   Rancière’s   work   embodies  
a   suspicion   of   the   very   act   of   explaining   or   explanation.   In   this   regard   he   employs  
a   method   of   equality   that   I   will   elaborate   on   in   chapter   5   of   the   thesis.   His  
philosophical  style,  as  Davis  further  explains,  is  declarative  or  “assertoric”  rather  
than   explanatory.63   He   proposes   theses   and   seeks   to   constructively   elaborate  
new  conceptual  frameworks  of  understanding.  His  thinking  and  writing  strives  to  
be  egalitarian.64  Parataxis  or  juxtaposition  is  his  principle  conceptual  mode  and  he  
tends  to  eschew  hierarchal  constructions.65  His  approach  can  be  described  as  one  
that   intervenes,   often   in   discussions   that   are   already   very   complex.   As   such,  
explaining   Rancière’s   work   gives   rise   to   a   particular   set   of   difficulties.   In   this  
regard   other   or   secondary   sources   become   important   when   attempting   to  
understand   his   notion   of   politics.   My   aim   is   to   present   as   thorough   an  
understanding  of  his  work  on  politics  as  possible  within  the  scope  of  this  project.  
Most   of   the   sources   that   I   use   read   Rancière   in   light   of   his   intellectual   history   and  
background.   As   such,   I   also,   as   mentioned,   explain   his   background   and   the  
trajectory   of   his   thought   in   the   first   section   of   chapter   2.   In   his   work,   Rancière  
further   offers   a   particular   version   of   interdisciplinarity.66   Rather   than   affirming  
disciplines  or  working  within  specific  disciplinary  frameworks,  Rancière  combines  
disciplines   and   attempts   to   recast   their   boundaries.   In   an   attempt   to   explain   his  
work   as   well   as   attempting   to   capture   something   of   the   spirit   of   Rancière’s   work,  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
“Rancière and Anarchism” in Deranty J & Ross A (eds.) Jacques Rancière and the
Contemporary Scene: The Philosophy of Radical Equality (2012) 117, “Rancière in South-
Carolina” in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 105, “There are no Queers: Jacques Rancière
and post-identity politics” Borderlands (2009) 3, May T “Jacques Rancière and the Ethics of
Equality” SubStance (2007) 24. May also published a full-length book on Rancière politics
titled The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière (2008).  
61
See footnote 3 above.
62
Davis O (2010) viii –xi.
63
As above.
64
As above.
65
As above.
66
See Ross K “Historicising Untimeliness” in  in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 24-25.  

24  
 
I  use  the  following  approaches  in  my  writing:  Firstly,  in  explaining  Rancière’s  work  
on   politics   (in   chapters   2   and   3)   my   writing,   more   often   than   not,   assumes   a  
declarative  tone.  As  mentioned,  Rancière’s  writing  is  declarative.  In  this  regard,  he  
proposes   theses   and   leaves   the   reader   free   to   take   it   or   leave   it.67   I   therefore  
declare   and   assert   some   of   his   standpoints   and   definitions   on   politics,   rather   than  
adopting  an  explanatory  tone.  Secondly,  I  identified  a  specific  problem  that  I  want  
to  address-­‐   understanding  the  notion  of  political  voice-­‐   and  rather  than  trying  to  
address   this   problem   within   specific   conceptual   frameworks   or   disciplines,   I  
follow   Rancière   and   adopt   a   more   interdisciplinary   approach.   I   especially   adopt  
this   approach   in   chapter   5   where   I   discuss   some   literary   and   historical   figures   and  
political   statements.   Lastly,   Rancière’s   work   embodies   “dissensus”,   a   term   he  
uses   to   explain   his   politics.68   Always   looking   to   subvert,   through   an   egalitarian  
understanding   and   approach,   Rancière   challenges   forms   of   systematisation.   He  
continuously  rubs  against  the  grain  of  established  lines  of  thinking  and  regimes  of  
thought.  In  this  regard,  I  also  take  my  cue  from  Rancière  in  my  approach  to  and  
description  of  the  problems  that  I  attempt  to  address.  Rather  than,  for  example,  
proposing   legal   reform   or   asserting   approaches   to   rights   and   constitutionalism   or  
for  that  matter  affirming  Gayatri  Chakravorty  Spivak’s  assertion  that  the  subaltern  
cannot  speak  mentioned  earlier,  I  aim  to  question  certain  established  frameworks  
against  the  specific  South  African  background  explained  above.    
 
It  should  be  mentioned  here  again  that  when  it  comes  to  the  political  subjectivity,  
agency   and   the   speech   of   women   in   the   South   African   context,   there   are   a  
number   of   ways   in   which   to   analyse,   approach   or   explain   the   notion   of   political  
voice.  This  project  represents  but  one  way  in  which  to  contemplate  these  issues.  
The   problem   can   be   framed   in   many   different   ways.   My   exploration   of   Jacques  
Rancière’s   work   in   this   thesis   is   but   one   perspective   from   where   to   explore   and  
imagine   the   notion   of   political   voice.   It   is   also   important   to   note   that   in   the  
heterogeneous   South   African   society,   there   are   vast   cultural,   ethnic,   religious   and  
socio-­‐economic   differences   between   women.   The   experiences   of   South   African  
                                                                                                           
67
Davis O (2010) viii –xi.  
68
See section 2.3.1 below.

25  
 
women  are  diverse  and  even  more  so  diverse  given  the  historical  marginalisation  
of   black   women   and   other   women   of   colour   through   the   systems   of  
colonialisation   and   apartheid,   which   positioned   white   women   to   a   higher   political  
status.   It   therefore   becomes   impossible   to   reduce   women   in   this   context   to   a  
social   category   or   describe   them   as   having   a   shared   identity.69   As   will   be  
explained   later,   such   as   a   reduction   or   description   runs   counter   to   Rancière’s  
analysis   of   politics   and   his   work   rather   points   to   fleeting   and   temporary   identities  
and  categories.70  As  it  pertains  to  the  background  sketched  above,  my  aim  is  not  
to   offer   a   universal   account   of   the   experiences   of   women,   or   to   make  
assumptions   with   regards   to   their   positions,   locales,   capabilities   or  
understandings.   Rather,   my   interest   lies   in   the   way   in   which   the   consensual  
frameworks  of  government  and  society  describe  and  practice  the  empowerment  
of  women  in  South  Africa  and  the  related  efforts  to  create  a  more  equal  society  
and  the  contexts  of  many  women  as  it  pertains  specifically  to  the  well-­‐known  and  
extremely   high   rates   of   sexual   violence   and   dire   socio-­‐economic   circumstances   of  
the   majority   of   women.   It   is   within   this   configuration   of   the   public-­‐political  
description   of   and   thinking   about   the   category   of   women   and   the   perceived  
solutions   to   certain   problems   that   I   locate   the   need   to   reflect   on   voice   so   as   to  
                                                                                                           
69
Such a description can be referred to as “essentialism” or the notion that “a unitary,
‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class,
sexual orientation, and other realities of experience”. See Harris “Race and essentialism in
feminist legal theory” Stanford Law Review (1990) 585. My goal here and with the description
of the background is by no means to describe a universal suffering or experience that can be
located in the lives of all South African women. As mentioned, my interests rather lies in the
precariousness of the specific relationship between the way in which government and society
in general attempt to empower women in South Africa, the efforts to address rape and
poverty, the fact that sexual violence and poverty still persists and where and when the notion
of political voice can be located or detected within this relationship. My suggestion ultimately
is exactly that Rancière’s politics can point is into new directions of making sense of these
issues or relationships.
70
See sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 below. Rancière refers to a process of subjectivation in his
politics. This process is never about asserting identity categories, but always about refusing
the identities imposed by others or systems of power. Rancière proposes discord, polemics
and the disruption and disordering of set and existing identity categories. He is highly critical
of the way in which existing categories of race, gender and socio-economic position function
to silence people’s voices, rather than resulting in political speech. Ultimately this is a
valuable insight that I attempt to demonstrate and I suggest that Rancière’s politics might
point to new ways in which we are to think about categories, such as the category of women,
especially as formulated within consensual frameworks.  

26  
 
open   up   possible   different   understandings   and   ways   of   reading,   thinking   and  
speaking.  My  aim  is  exactly  to  demonstrate,  through  reflecting  on  the  notion  of  
voice,   that   Jacques   Rancière’s   politics,   informed   by   his   intellectual   background  
and  animated  by  his  engagement  with  certain  historical  figures,  can  provide  new  
insights   and   frameworks   when   it   comes   to   our   understanding   of   the   notion   of  
political  voice.  Rancière’s  work  indeed  points  to  different  inventions  and  ways  of  
thinking   about   categories   or   descriptions   of   situations   of   inequality,   politics   and  
political   voicing   and   his   work   further   suggests   localised,   individual   and   contextual  
thinking  in  this  regard.  The  aim  is  to  suggest,  against  dominant  configurations  of  
the   relationship   between   political   voice,   women   in   the   South   African   context   and  
questions   surrounding   politics   that   Rancière’s   work   can   contribute   in   mapping  
different   relationships,   different   approaches   and   different   ways   of   imagining  
these   relationships.   The   aim   is   not   to   produce   final   answers   or   solutions   in   any  
way.   Rather,   it   is   to   reflect   and   contemplate   possibilities   and   to   postulate  
Rancièrian  notions,  readings  and  ideas  so  as  to  open  up  questions  around  voice.  
“Reflection”   in   this   regard   does   not   indicate   solving   problems   or   offering  
solutions  to  the  contexts  of  sexual  violence  and  poverty  that  many  South  African  
women   live   in.   It   also   does   not   indicate   formulating   concrete   steps   in   an   effort   to  
go   forward.   It   rather   indicates   a   way   of   opening   up   or   framing   questions   in   an  
effort  to  point  to  lines  of  thinking  from  where  further  engagement  can  take  place.  
It   therefore   involves   a   journey   that   can   hopefully   point   me   to   new   insights   and  
possibilities  from  where  to  think  about  and  engage  with  the  notion  voice.    
 
I   start   in   the   next   chapter   to   discuss   and   explain   Jacques   Rancière’s   innovative  
work  on  politics.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

27  
 
 CHAPTER  2  
The  Politics  of  Jacques  Rancière  
 
2.1  Introduction  
In   this   chapter   I   discuss   Jacques   Rancière’s   work   on   politics   as   the   main  
theoretical   focus   of   the   thesis.   As   mentioned,   I   explain   Rancière’s   formulations   of  
politics  so  as  to  understand  and  reflect  on  the  notion  of  political  voice.  The  aim  of  
this   chapter   is   to   thoroughly   examine   Rancière’s   work   and   to   reflect   on   the  
meaning   of   voice   within   the   context   of   his   description   and   definition   of   politics.  
The   chapter   unfolds   in   the   following   way:   In   the   first   section   I   attempt   to  
theoretically  situate  Rancière’s  work  by  explaining  his  background  and  intellectual  
beginnings.   As   mentioned   in   the   introduction,   the   discussion   of   Rancière’s  
background   involves   discussing   his   relationship   with   his   former   teacher,   Louis  
Althusser.   Althusser   influenced   Rancière’s   work   in   a   significant   way.   Although  
Rancière  later  became  one  of  Althusser’s  most  trenchant  critics,  his  work  was  and  
remains   shaped   by   the   experiences   he   had   under   the   tutelage   of   the   Marxist  
philosopher.   Indeed,   it   has   been   noted   that   it   was   perhaps   the   circumstances  
surrounding   Rancière’s   break   with   Althusser   that   most   decisively   shaped   the  
development   of   his   philosophy   as   a   whole   and   the   radical   egalitarianism   that  
characterises   it.71   It   is   the   way   in   which   he   distanced   himself   from   Althusserian  
theory   that   determined   the   specificity   of   his   subsequent   concerns.   Therefore,   in  
order   to   thoroughly   understand   Rancière’s   notion   of   politics,   it   becomes  
necessary  to  shed  light  on  his  early  contextual  setting,  especially  his  relationship  
with   Althusser.   Moreover,   Rancière’s   work   is   not   easily   identifiable   within  
dominant   theoretical   movements.   I   explore   this   point   in   more   detail   below.   For  
now   it   can   be   mentioned   that   his   work   is   expansive;   it   stretches   across   disciplines  
and  resists  easy  categorisation.  The  broader  difficulty  of  situating  his  thinking  in  
any   clear   disciplinary   framework   has   been   noted   many   times.72   It   is   therefore   also  
in   an   effort   to   properly   theoretically   locate   his   work   that   the   discussion   of   his  
intellectual   beginnings   becomes   important.   I   therefore   discuss   Rancière’s  
                                                                                                           
71
James I (2012) 111.
72
See James I (2012) 111.  

28  
 
background  to  the  extent  that  it  informs  his  work  on  politics.  By  way  of  discussing  
his   background,   I   begin   by   shortly   describing   Rancière’s   current   scholarly  
influence  as  well  as  the  nature  of  his  engagements.  I  also  later  outline  the  political  
events  that  transpired  during  the  month  of  May  in  1968  in  France.  These  events  
had   an   immense   impact   on   Rancière.   The   upheavals   by   students   and   workers  
during   that   time   crystallised   his   objections   to   Althusser’s   thought.   Much   of  
Rancière’s   work   thereafter   can   partly   be   understood   as   an   attempt   to   give  
discursive   form   to   the   idea   of   radical   equality   that   he   saw   as   implicit   in   the   events  
of   May   1968.73   I   further   outline   some   of   the   main   characteristics   of   Althusser’s  
project  on  Karl  Marx  in  order  to  allow  for  a  thorough  understanding  of  Rancière’s  
reaction   against   Althusser.   The   first   section   is   therefore   an   attempt   to  
theoretically   position   Rancière’s   work   by   exploring   and   explaining   his   current  
impact,   his   intellectual   beginnings   under   Louis   Althusser   and   his   experiences  
around  May  1968.  
 
In   the   second   section,   I   discuss   and   explain   Rancière’s   notion   of   politics.   This  
discussion   is   categorised   with   reference   to   five   elements   or   moments   within   his  
definition   of   politics,   namely,   “the   police   order”,   “politics   (equality)”,   “the  
political   subject”,   “the   miscount   and   the   wrong”   and   “the   distribution   of   the  
sensible”.   These   elements   or   moments   in   Rancière’s   thinking   are   closely   related  
and   interrelated.   Structuring   his   theorising   in   this   way   should   help   to   offer   a   clear  
explanation   of   his   politics.74   I   work   from   the   premise   that   the   discussion   of   the  
five  elements  of  his  politics,  considered  in  light  of  his  background,  will  provide  a  
comprehensive   explanation   of   his   imaginative   formulation   of   politics.   The  
description  of  his  engagement  with  certain  historical  figures  in  the  next  chapter  
provides   a   detailed   picture   and   understanding   of   his   thought.   In   the   third   and  
concluding  section  of  this  chapter,  I  reflect  on  the  meaning  of  voice  in  the  context  
of   the   discussion   of   Rancière’s  politics.   I   contemplate   the   notion   of   voice   within  
the  framework  of  his  accounts  and  consider  them  against  the  background  of  the  

                                                                                                           
73
Davis O Jacques Rancière (2010) 1.
74
See for example Davis O (2010) as well as Tanke J (2011) who also broadly structure their
discussions of Rancière’s politics along the lines of these elements or aspects.

29  
 
disconnect   between   the   formal   position   of   women   and   the   lived   realities   of   many  
South  African  women  set  out  in  the  introductory  chapter.    
 
2.2  Rancière’s  Background  
2.2.1  Introduction  
As   mentioned   in   the   introductory   chapter,   it   has   been   argued   that   Jacques  
Rancière’s   philosophy   of   equality   represents   one   of   the   most   important   and  
original   contributions   to   the   political   thought   of   the   late   twentieth   and   early  
twenty-­‐first   centuries.75   Rancière   is   now   in   his   eighth   decade   and   interest   in   his  
work   has   never   been   greater.   Davis   notes   that   since   the   1970’s   Rancière   has  
progressively   elaborated   his   intellectual   project   in   numerous   articles,   books,  
lectures   and   interviews   ranging   over   a   daunting   number   of   disciplines.76   During  
the   last   decade   several   high   profile   international   conferences   and   keynote  
addresses   have   been   devoted   to   his   work.77   The   English   translation   of   his   book  
Disagreement,   considered   to   be   his   most   important   work   on   politics,   resulted   in    
numerous  articles  that  turned  into  a  steady  stream  of  special  issues,  symposia  and  
edited  volumes.78  It  is  said  that  the  potential  of  Rancière’s  work  can  be  found  in  
his  ability  and  willingness  to  treat  politics  anew  and  to  approach  the  question  of  
politics   from   unexplored   angles.79   His   work   has   influenced,   echoed   and  
demanded   critical   reaction   from   leading   intellectuals   such   as   Slavoj   Žižek80   and  
Alain   Badiou.81   Rancière’s   corpus   extends   well   beyond   the   boundaries   of  
traditional   philosophy   and   includes   engagements   with   the   fields   of   philosophy,  
history,   politics,   sociology,   literary   theory,   literary   history,   pedagogy,   aesthetics,  
art,  psychoanalysis  and  film  theory.  Although  Rancière  has  an  explicit  aversion  to  
systematic   or   organised   philosophies   that   will   be   elaborated   on   later,   he   has  
developed   a   robust   project   that   is   redefining   contemporary   thought   about   the  

                                                                                                           
75
In this regard, see James I (2012) 110.
76
Davis O (2010) vii.
77
Davis O (2010) vii.
78
Rancière J Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (1999) trans Rose J.
79
James I (2012) 110.
80
See Žižek S The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (1999).
81
See Badiou A Metapolitics (2005) trans. Barker J.

30  
 
complex   relationship   between   politics   and   aesthetics.82   Rockhill   and   Watts   note  
that  if  his  reception  in  the  English-­‐speaking  world  has  not  kept  pace  with  his  rise  
to   prominence   in   France,   it   is   in   part   because   of   the   fact   that   his   idiosyncratic  
work   does   not   fit   comfortably   within   dominant   models   and   models   of   intellectual  
importation.83   He   is   still   at   times   mistakenly   classified   as   a   structuralist   theorist  
because  of  his  early  contribution  to  Louis  Althusser’s  Lire  le  Capital.84  However,  as  
mentioned,  he  became  one  of  Althusser’s  most  rigorous  critics.  His  first  book  La  
Leçon   d’   Althusser   or   Althusser’s   Lesson   was   a   powerful   collection   of   essays  
criticising  his  former  teacher.  Rockhill  and  Watts  further  explains  that  he  has  also  
repeatedly   criticised   the   “discourse   of   mastery   and   the   logic   of   hidden   truths”  
which   he   identifies   with   the   structuralist   project   reaching   back   to   Marx.85   He  

                                                                                                           
82
See for example Rancière J Aesthetics and Its Discontents (2009) trans. Cocoran S and The
Emancipated Spectator (2009) trans. Elliot G.
83
Rockhill G & Watts P “Introduction: Rancière: Thinker of Dissensus” in Rockhill G & Watts P
(eds.) Jacques Rancière: History, Politics, Aesthetics (2009) 1.
84
Althusser L (ed.) Lire Capital (1996) originally published in 1965.
85
Rockhill G & Watts P in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 1. See Rancière J La Leçon d’
Althusser (1973). Structuralism was one of the most influential theoretical movements in
twentieth century thought, especially French thought. It reached its height in the mid-1960’s
with the appearance of major collective studies of “narratology” (See Communications 1966),
the writings of Jacques Lacan, particularly Écrits (1966), Michel’s Foucault’s The Order of
Things (1966), Louis Atlhusser’s For Marx (1966) and Reading Capital by Althusser and Etienne
Balibar (1965). In general, as Macey explains, structuralism can be defined as an attempt to
unify the human sciences by applying a single model of methodology based on Saussurean
linguistics. Macey D Dictionary of Critical Theory (2000) 364-364. This general linguistic model
derives from Saussure’s insight that language is not a list of names of things, but a system of
signs consisting of a signifier (an acoustic image) and a signified (a concept). Macey D (2000)
364-365. Signs do not designate an external reality and are meaningful only because of the
similarities and differences between them. As Macey explains, the so-called Prague School
made a further significant contribution to the development of structuralism by introducing
the idea of functionalism, which is the idea that the meaning of linguistic units is the function
they perform within the system of language. Macey D (2000) 364-365. What becomes
pertinent in structuralism is that language is no longer seen as a means of expression at the
disposal of a speaking subject, but rather language, or the symbolic in Lacanian terms, is the
precondition for both thought and social existence. See further Culler J Structuralist Poetics:
Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature (1975). The proceedings of the John
Hopkins’ Conference on The Languages of Criticism and the Science of Man in October 1966,
marked the American “moment of structuralism”, though, it also became clear in retrospect
that the conference and especially Jacques Derrida’s contribution (“Structure Sign and Play in
the Discourse of Human Sciences”) inaugurated a critique of structuralism. Macey D (2000)
364-365. Derrida described deconstruction as a criticism of structuralism. Although it is
difficult to identify it with any specific school of thought, poststructuralism is usually
associated with the work of Deleuze, Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, Baudrillard and Rorty. These

31  
 
therefore   cannot   be   described   as   a   structuralist,   nor,   can   he   be   described   as   a  
poststructuralist,   the   other   dominant   theoretical   movement   of   his   time   and  
context.  86  It  even  becomes  difficult  to  decide  whether  Rancière  is  a  philosopher,  
a   historian,   an   anti-­‐philosopher,   or   an   archivist   of   popular   struggles.87   As  
mentioned  in  chapter  one,  Rancière’s  work  introduces  irreversible  disturbances  in  
the   fixed   demarcation   of   disciplines.88   The   boundaries   of   disciplines   are   blurred.  
The  boundaries  between  the  sayable  and  unsayable,  the  proper  and  improper,  the  
legitimate   and   illegitimate   are   all   dismantled.   Rancière   plays   with   the   intervals  
between   various   discourses.   His   aim   is   always   to   derail   the   regimes   of   thought  
“that  would  assign  certain  ways  of  doing,  speaking  and  seeing  to  a  stable  set  of  
competences,   qualities,   or   properties.”89   It   might   be   precisely   the   fact   that   his  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
theorists can all be described as poststructuralists. Poststructuralism is often equated with
deconstruction and also with postmodernism in general, but, as Macey further explains, it can
also be seen as a strand within everything from “New Historicism” to postcolonial theory.
Macey D (2000) 364-365. The common core of these tendencies can be described as “a
reluctance to ground discourse in any theory of metaphysical origins, an insistence on the
inevitable plurality and instability of meaning, a distrust of systematic scientificity and the
abandoning of the Enlightenment project.” See Macey D (2000) 364-365.
86
See Rockhill G & Watts P in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 2. As Rockhill and Watts
explains, Rancière cannot be described as either a structuralist or post-structuralist theorist,
the dominant theoretical movements of his time and context. Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.)
(2009) 2. Firstly, Rancière rejects the characteristic structuralist distinction between science
and ideology suggested by his former teacher Althusser (and which will be discussed in detail
below) and he also forcefully declared his distance from post-structuralists such as Gilles
Deleuze and Jean-Francois Lyotard. Rockhill and Watts further elucidates that Rancière has
been interested from the very beginning in developing a research agenda that broke with the
dominant intellectual paradigms of his student years, specifically structuralism. Rockhill G &
Watts P (eds.) (2009) 2. As mentioned, he also did not follow the lead of his poststructuralist
compatriots or “the philosophers of difference” as he describes them. See Tanke J (2011) 9.
There are a variety of different markers that distinguishes his work from that of post-
structuralists. These markers as Rockhill and Watts articulately summarises include: “his
aversion to compulsive textualism (visible in the general lack of quotations and his allergy to
etymology), his angst-free relationship with Hegel, his general indifference toward
phenomenology, his lack of deference to ethico-religious forms of alterity, his criticisms of the
ethical turn in politics, his disregard for the supposed spectres of metaphysics and the project
of deconstruction, and his intense commitment to history that has led him beyond the
canonical writers of the philosophic tradition”. See Rockhill G & Watts P in Rockhill G & Watts
P (eds.) (2009) 2.
87
See Bosteels B “Rancière’s Leftism, Or, Politics and Its Discontents” in Rockhill G & Watts P
(eds.) (2009) 160.
88
As above.
89
As above.

32  
 
work   does   not   fit   comfortably   within   identifiable   intellectual   movements   that  
makes  it  of  such  interest  today.  
 
Rancière  has  developed  a  distinct  project  with  his  own  conceptual  framework  and  
reading   and   writing   strategies.   His   work   maintains   a   sharp   polemical   edge   as   he  
regularly   critically   engages   with   prevailing   assumptions   and   their   underlying  
framework.   It   has   been   argued   that   he   is   a   thinker   of   dissensus   who   constantly  
undermines  what  is  taken  to  be  the  solid  footing  of  previous  philosophic  work.90  
Hallward  explains  that  some  of  the  most  consistent  aspects  of  his  thinking  are  the  
affirmation  of  a  fundamental  inconsistency  and  instability  of  experience  as  well  as  
a   refusal   of   any   gesture   of   authority   or   theoretical   mastery   that   seeks   to  
categorise   and   maintain   experience   by   limiting   it   to   conventional   categories   or  
disciplines.91   This   can   be   directly   related   to   the   difficulty   of   theoretically  
positioning  Rancière’s  thought:    
Rather   than   abandoning   philosophy   in   favour   of   another   discipline,   the  
practice   of   writing   that   Rancière   develops   questions   the   protocols,  
conventions   and   limits   which   would   allow   history,   philosophy,   political  
philosophy  or  aesthetics  to  maintain  themselves  as  stable  categories.92    
 
Rancière  states:  
My   problem   has   always   been   to   escape   the   division   between   disciplines,  
because   what   interests   me   is   the   question   of   distribution   of   territories,  
which  is  always  a  way  of  deciding  who  is  qualified  to  speak  about  what.93  
 
Below  I  elaborate  on  Rancière’s  relationship  with  Louis  Althusser.  
 
2.2.2  Rancière  and  Althusser    
Rancière   began   his   career   as   a   participant   in   Althusser’s   reading   group   on   Karl  
Marx’s  Capital  that  was  held  between  January  and  April  1965  at  the  École  Normale  
Supérieure  (ENS),  Rue  d’Ulm  in  Paris.  Tanke  notes  that  the  broader  environment  
in   which   Rancière   began   his   career   was   marked   by   the   social   and   political  
radicalism   which   grew   up   during   and   after   the   Algerian   war   and   which   resulted   in  
                                                                                                           
90
See Tanke J (2011) 9.
91
See Hallward P “Jacques Rancière and the Subversion of Mastery” Paragraph: A Journal of
Modern Critical Theory (2005) 26.
92
James I (2012) 111.
93
Tanke J (2011) 9.

33  
 
the  revolutionary  events  of  May  1968,  which  will  be  discussed  below.94  Rancière’s  
intellectual   beginnings   can   be   situated   within   the   milieu   of   theoretical   and  
structuralist   Marxism   of   which   Althusser   was   the   most   prominent   and   leading  
proponent   at   the   time.95   The   influence   of   Althusser   on   the   French   philosophical  
scene   of   the   1960’s   cannot   be   overestimated.   In   1948,   upon   passing   his  
aggregation  in  philosophy,  Tanke  notes  that  Althusser  was  awarded  a  position  as  
agrégé  répétiteur  at  ENS.96  As  one  of  Althusser’s  subsequent  roles  was  to  prepare  
students   for   their   own   aggregation   in   philosophy,   he   participated   in   the  
intellectual   formation   of   many   who   would   become   France’s   most   distinguished  
intellectuals   in   the   twentieth   century.97   Althusser   also   played   a   crucial   role   in  
opening   the   ENS   up   to   new   theoretical   perspectives,   such   as   linguistics,   Levi-­‐
Strauss’  structural  anthropology  and  the  readings  of  Sigmund  Freud  pioneered  by  
psychoanalyst,   Jacques   Lacan.98   Etienne   Balibar   has   stated   that   Althusser   made  
the   ENS   “a   centre   for   philosophy   that   was   living   and   not   academic”   and  
compared   the   atmosphere   to   “a   proper   philosophical   life”   in   the   sense   that   the  
ancients  would  have  understood  it.99  Tanke  further  explains  that  Rancière  himself  
fondly  recalled  the  “intellectual  dynamism”  centred  on  Althusser  and  credits  the  
differences   he   articulated   with   phenomenology   as   offering   “a   kind   of   liberation  
from  university  culture.”100  
 
Althusser   made   the,   by   now,   famous   assertion   that   he   was   rereading   Karl   Marx  
“as   a   philosopher”.101   He   contended   that   Marx’s   early   and   mature   works   were  
separated  by  an  “epistemological  break”.102  Davis  explains  that  at  the  beginning  
of  the  1960’s  Althusser  advanced,  by  way  of  a  series  of  journal  articles,  an  original,  

                                                                                                           
94
As above.
95
As above.
96
Tanke J (2011) 10.
97
As above.
98
Tanke J (2011) 10.
99
As above.
100
As above.
101
Davis O (2010) 2.
102
As above.

34  
 
albeit  idiosyncratic,  reading  of  Marx.103  His  reading  was  based  on  the  radical  break  
between  Marx’s  early  ideological  writings  and  his  more  mature  scientific  project  
of  Capital.104  This  break  is  also  known  as  the  science/ideology  distinction.105    Very  
simply   put,   ideology   embodied   for   Althusser   all   those   forms   of   ideas,  
understandings,   beliefs   and   values   which   allow   individuals   to   collectively   function  
in  a  given  socio-­‐economic  world  and  which  work  to  sustain  the  relations  of  power  
and   domination   which   underpin   that   socio   economic   order.106   In   this   context,  
personal   beliefs   or   attitudes   (religious   values   or   shared   social   discourse   for  
example)  are  seen  to  be  a  function  of  ideology  and  part  of  the  process  in  which  
individuals  are  “interpellated”  as  the  subjects  of  ideology.107  Importantly,  much  of  
what   can   be   regarded   as   philosophy   or   political   theory   is   also   a   product   of  
ideology,   which   is   an   imaginary   construct   or   relation   that   conceals   actually  
existing   constructs   and   relations.108   James   notes   that   as   opposed   to   ideology,  
Althusser   proposed   his   specific   understanding   of   Marxist   science.109   Althusser  
contended   that   Marx’s   early   writings   were   tainted   by   their   reliance   on   the  
vocabulary   of   German   Idealism   that   prevented   the   development   of   a   scientific  
understanding  of  social,  political  and  economic  reality.110  Therefore,  according  to  

                                                                                                           
103
As above.
104
As above.  
105
Tanke J (2011) 11. See Althusser L & Balibar E Lire Le Capital (1968).
106
James I (2010) 114.
107
As above. “Interpellation” refers to the mechanism that produces subjects in such a way
that they recognise their own existence in terms of the dominant ideology of the society that
they live in. See Macey D (2000) 203. In French it is commonly used to mean, “being taken in
by the police for questioning” or it can also refer to questioning a minister of parliament. See
Macey D (2000) 203. Macey mentions that Althusser’s basic illustration of the mechanism
exploits the sense of “questioning” or “haling”. See Macey D (2000) 203. An individual
walking down the street is hailed by a police officer- “Hey, you there!” and turns round to
recognise the fact that he is being addressed. In doing so, that individual is constituted as
subject. According to Althusser the idea of interpellation demonstrates that subjects are
always already products of ideology and thus subverts the idealist thesis that subjectivity is
primarily self-founding. See Macey D (2000) 203. See also Althusser L Lenin and Philosophy
and Other Essays (1971) trans. Brewster B.
108
As above.
109
James I (2012) 114. For Althusser, as James explains, scientific knowledge is not ideology,
attitude or opinion. It is a theoretical practice that identifies the actually existing structures
which, behind the veil of ideological appearance, underpin social, economic and historical
forms. James I (2012) 114.
110
Davis O (2010) 2.

35  
 
Althusser,   as   Tanke   elucidates,   the   later   works   belonged   to   a   fundamentally  
different  “problematic”,  the  term  he  used  for  the  general  conceptual  framework  
in   which   concepts   gain   their   meaning   and   applicability.111   He   argued   that   all  
sciences  begin  with  a  phase  in  which  the  world  is  understood  from  a  perspective  
positioned   around   human   nature   and   concrete   particular   facts;   and   it   is   only   after  
an  epistemological  break  with  this  early  phase  that  abstract  and  so-­‐called  proper  
scientific   conceptual   knowledge   of   the   world   become   possible.112   Althusser  
contended   that   Marx’s   work   after   1845,   specifically   Capital,   was   not   continuous  
with   his   work   of   the   early   period,   but   rather   constituted,   as   Davis   explains,   a  
radical   break   with   it.113   He   suggested   that   Capital   was   a   theoretical   revolution   and  
that   it   made   possible   knowledge   of   the   world   as   it   really   is.   This   he   termed  
“Marxist   science”.   Marx’s   early   work,   by   contrast,   represented   an   inferior,   pre-­‐
scientific  form  of  understanding  that  he  accordingly  termed  “ideology”.    Ideology  
attempted   to   explain   the   world   in   terms   of   human   nature   and   could   therefore  
also   be   characterised   as   “humanist”   and   “anthropological”.114   Belief   in   “the  
break”   is   a   hallmark   of   Althusserianism.   Davis   explains   that   non-­‐Althusserian  
Marxists   tend   not   to   think   that   there   is   such   a   pronounced   rupture   or   break,  
although   many   would   acknowledge   that   there   is   a   discernable   movement   away  
from   explanation   in   human   terms   toward   more   abstract,   theoretical  
formulations.115   Tanke   notes   that   in   For   Marx,   Althusser   suggested   that   Marx’s  
thought   could   be   categorised   according   to   the   following   schema:   1840-­‐44:   early  
works,  1845:  the  works  of  the  break,  1845-­‐57:  transitional  works,  1857-­‐83:  mature  
works.116   The   science/ideology   distinction   is   central   to   nearly   all   Althusser’s  
thought   and   much   of   his   work   consisted   in   properly   separating   the   scientific  
notions   from   the   remnants   of   idealism   that   he   thought   hampered   or   limited  
Marx’s   thought.117   An   example   of   the   more   humanist   writings   can   be   seen   in  

                                                                                                           
111
Tanke J (2011) 11.
112
Davis O (2010) 2.
113
As above.
114
Davis O (2010) 2. See Althusser L & Balibar E (1970) 17.
115
As above.
116
Tanke J (2011) 12. See Althusser L (1971) 40.
117
As above. As Tanke explains, according to Althusser, the rupture must be continually
produced if Marx’s thought was no to lapse into the speculative thought that preceded it.

36  
 
Marx’s   early   account   of   the   way   in   which   factory   workers   are   alienated   by   their  
work.   These   writings,   as   Tanke   explains,   centred   on   the   human   worker   and   the  
way  in  which  his  work  gave  rise  to  feelings  of  being  divided  from  himself  and  from  
his   fellow   workers   as   well   as   from   the   object   that   he   is   producing.118   “Alienation”,  
in   this   early   sense,   is   a   form   of   unhappiness,   a   psychological   feeling   of   being  
divided  from  oneself.119  As  Davis  illuminates,  the  first  nine  chapters  of  Capital  on  
the  other  hand,  begins  with  a  very  abstract  exposition  of  economic  concepts  such  
as   “commodity”,   “value”   and   “labour”.120   The   logic   of   Marx’s   approach   here  
suggests   that   these   concepts   are   necessary   if   the   underlying   mechanisms   that  
account   for   the   real   basis   of   feelings   of   alienation   are   to   be   understood.121  
Therefore,  as  Davis  elucidates,  in  Capital,  the  alienating  effects  of  work  can  only  
be   understood   properly   in   terms   of   the   structure   of   the   economic   relations   in   the  
society   in   question.122   These   relations   are   not   immediately   accessible   however.  
They   cannot   be   perceived   or   discerned   by   the   factory   worker,   as   he   or   she  
requires   a   developed   theoretical   understanding   of   the   underlying   economic  
processes  and  structures.123    
 
Marx   was,   according   to   Althusser,   a   voracious   and   remarkably   perceptive  
reader.124   Althusser   suggested   that   Marx,   in   Capital,   could   be   seen   as   undertaking  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
See Tanke J (2011) 12. Activating this break therefore involved scratching Marx’s corpus of
concepts such as “labour”, “alienation”, “consciousness”, “species-being”, and the vague
anthropology they refer to. Tanke J (2011) 12. Althusser can be read as attempting to
distance Marxism from the humanist platform espoused by the French Communist Party and
he also worked to undermine its attempt to find common ground with socialists, social
democrats and the Catholic left. Tanke J (2011) 12. His strategy involved distancing Marx from
his predecessors. He, for example, as Tanke explains, opposed the interpretation applied by
Marx and Engels themselves, according to which historical materialism would be Hegelianism
in inverted form. Tanke J (2011) 12-13. Althusser contended that readers should take seriously
the famous thesis of Marx (XIth on Feuerbach) in which philosophy was condemned for only
having merely interpreted the world.
118
Tanke J (2011) 13.
119
Davis O (2010) 3.
120
As above.
121
As above.
122
As above.
123
As above.  
124
As above.

37  
 
two  distinctive  types  of  reading.125  The  second  type  of  reading  is  the  reading  that  
interested   Althusser.   Davis   explains   this   type   of   reading   in   the   following   way:  
Althusser   suggested   that   when   Marx   reads   the   work   of   the   economist   Adam  
Smith   for   example,   Marx   discerned   that   Smith’s   theory   had   hit   upon   a   correct  
answer  to  a  question  which  Smith  himself  had  not  known  how  to  formulate,  but  
which   Marx   was   able   to   pose   openly   and   explicitly.126   Marx   started   by   handling   as  
questions   what   bourgeois   political   economists   saw   as   solutions.   As   Davis   notes,  
his  method  consisted  of  working  through  the  blind  spots  in  their  writings  in  order  
to   supply   concepts   for   the   economic   phenomena   that   they   left   unexplained.127  
Marx,  for  example,  applies  the  name  “surplus-­‐value”  to  what  Smith  could  think  of  
only   as   profit,   rent   and   interest.128   While   Marx   was   not   the   first   to   isolate   this  
concept,  Althusser  contends  that  he  was  the  first  to  handle  it  properly,  using  it  to  
reconstruct   “the   causal   nexus   to   which   it   belongs”.129   Tanke   explains   that   after  
identifying   “surplus-­‐value”   as   the   key   explanation   of   capital,   Marx   used   it   to  
elaborate   the   entirety   of   the   capitalist   mode   of   production,   which   is   itself   viewed  
as   a   historically   variable   system   of   effects.130   Importantly,   for   Althusser,   this  
understanding   of   the   mode   of   production   is   what   allowed   Marx   to   describe  
capitalism’s   distinct   form   of   structural   causality,   or   the   manner   in   which   the  
capitalist   system   is   determined   by   “the   reciprocal   functioning   of   economic,  
political,   ideological   and   scientific   components”.131   The   scientificity   of   Marx’s  
analysis   thus   results   from   the   “identification   of   a   concept-­‐problem   and   the  
rigorous   analysis   of   the   causal   system   to   which   it   belongs”.132   Althusser   termed  

                                                                                                           
125
See Althusser L & Balibar E (1970) 19-21.
126
Davis O (2010) 3.
127
As above.
128
Tanke J (2011) 13.
129
As above.
130
As above.
131
As above.
132
As above. It should be mentioned here that Rancière’s marked difference from
structuralism and post-structuralism can also be seen in his approach to writing and reading.
Rancière describes his break from Althusser in terms of a shift away from a hermeneutic
reading of texts towards a more affirmative view of language. He moved away from a critique
based on the “Saussurian distinction between la langue and la parole”, the distinction
between underlying, unconscious structures and the cultural, social, political and other texts
that are determined by those structures. See Arsenjuk L “On Jacques Rancière” Fronesis

38  
 
this  type  of  reading  “symptomatic”  and  in  doing  so  he  aligned  Marx  with  a  kind  of  
psychoanalyst  whose  therapy  comprised  of  helping  the  analyst  to  formulate  the  
problem  that  lies  beneath  the  surface  manifestation  that  is  his  or  her  symptom.133  
In   other   words,   to   read   Marx   “as   a   philosopher”   meant   reading   his   text   as   a  
psychoanalyst,   taking   what   it   says   on   the   surface   to   be   a   mere   symptom   of   its  
underlying   meaning.134   Althusser’s   intention   was   to   explicitly   theoretically  
formulate  this  underlying  meaning  of  the  philosophy  of  Marx,  which  he  thought  
was  implemented  but  not  stated  explicitly  in  Capital.    He  thereby  applied  Marx’s  
form   of   reading   to   his   own   work.135   Davis   explains   that   Marx’s   philosophy,  
according   to   Althusser,   was   a   theory   of   history   as   ultimately   determined   by  
relationships   of   material   production.136   This   theory   is   also   sometimes   called  
“dialectical  materialism”.137    
 
Althusser   described,   as   Tanke   explains,   the   symptomatic   method   of   reading   as  
“restoring   to   the   text   its   unconscious”.138   Symptomatic   reading   conceives   of   a  
theoretical  text  as  “the  necessary  combination  of  sightings,  lacks  and  oversights  
whose   relationships   it   attempts   to   make   explicit”.139   It   begins   with   “present  
terms,  identifies  the  absent  concepts  upon  which  the  text  nevertheless  relies,  and  
attempts   to   reconstruct   the   mechanism   their   interactions   bespeak”.140   With  
respect   to   Capital   this   involves   attending   to   those   analyses   that   exploit,   but   do  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
(2005) 1. This comes down to a distancing from any kind of reading based on suspicion of the
meaning of texts towards embracing an approach that is more affirmative of the surface of
text itself. Arsenjuk L Fronesis (2005) 1-2. It will hopefully become clear later that for Rancière
the surface of texts does not hide what is underlying, but becomes a scene on which the
creativity and effectiveness of language games and speech acts are demonstrated. In
Rancière’s approach speech acts are not understood as ideological artefacts, but precisely as
acts or political gestures that are in themselves capable of reconfiguring the situation in which
they are enunciated. See Arsenjuk L “On Jacques Rancière” Fronesis (2005) 1. Published in
English on 2007/03/05 available online at Eurozine Journals www.eurozine.com/ articles/2007-
01-01-arsenjuk-en.html (accessed 28-12-2014).
133
Davis O (2010) 3.
134
As above
135
As above.
136
As above.
137
As above.
138
Tanke J (2011) 14.
139
As above.
140
As above

39  
 
not   explicitly   articulate   philosophical   concepts.   The   symptomatic   reading   of  
Capital  therefore  “attempts  to  reconstruct  the  theoretical  problematic  to  which  it  
belongs,   while   distinguishing   it   from   the   ideological   problematic   from   which   it  
departs”.141   The   project   of   dividing   a   line   between   science   and   ideology   is   the  
obligation  that  Althusser  assigns  to  philosophical  practice:    
Philosophy  represents  people’s  class  struggle  in  theory.  In  return  it  helps  the  
people   to   distinguish   in   theory   and   in   all   ideas   (political,   ethical,   aesthetic  
etc.)  between  true  and  false  ideas.142    
 
It   is   important   to   note   that   Althusser   could   not   imagine   a   society   without  
ideology.   As   Tanke   further   explains,   even   a   classless   society   will   rely   on   it   for  
achieving  social  integration.143  It  is  therefore  necessary  for  philosophy  to  separate  
the   truth   of   economic,   political   and   scientific   practices   from   their   so-­‐called  
mystifications.144   As   Tanke   elucidates,   philosophy   is   class   struggle   in   theory   to   the  
extent   that   it   prevents   knowledge   from   being   exploited   by   bourgeois  
tendencies.145   Philosophy   has   for   Althusser   an   indispensable   part   to   play   in  
politics:  the  education  of  those  immersed  in  the  economic  sector.146  
 
Althusser,  as  mentioned,  applied  Marx’s  symptomatic  mode  of  reading  to  his  own  
major  text  in  Reading  Capital  and  in  doing  so  Althusser  claimed  to  be  formulating  
Marx’s  philosophy  in  theoretical  terms.147  Davis  states:    
The  understanding  of  Marx’s  philosophy  thus  obtained  from  Capital  was  to  
be   supplemented   by   an   analysis   of   revolutionary   struggle:   like   Marx’s  
masterwork,   revolutionary   movements   were   thought   to   be   practical  
enactments   of   Marxists   philosophy   in   which   it   was   Althusser’s   self-­‐
appointed   task   to   read   the   theory.   For   Althusser,   books   and   revolutionary  
movements   alike   were   deemed   susceptible   to   his   eclectic   mix   of   self-­‐
assertingly  philosophical  and  notionally  psychoanalytic  analysis.148  
 
Davis  further  notes  that  the  attraction  of  Althusser’s  enterprise  for  Rancière  and  a  
whole  generation  of  activists  on  the  Left  can  partly  be  explained  by  the  political  
                                                                                                           
141
As above.
142
See Althusser L (1971) 21.
143
Tanke J (2011) 14.
144
As above.
145
As above.
146
Davis O (2010) 4.
147
As above.
148
Davis O (2010) 4.

40  
 
climate  of  the  time.149  During  the  1960’s  it  became  clear  to  most  that  the  Soviet  
Union   under   Stalin   had   become   a   brutally   oppressive   police   state.   Althusser’s  
objective   was   to   find   in   Marx’s   thinking   the   principle   of   a   theoretical  
understanding   of   Marxism’s   aberrations.     It   was   suggested   that   only   a   correct  
understanding  of  the  true  meaning  of  Marx’s  philosophy  could  serve  as  a  reliable  
guide   to   political   action   and   as   a   safeguard   against   those   aberrations.150  
Revolutionary   political   practice   without   the   correct   theory   was   felt   to   be  
“doomed   to   the   short-­‐sighted   pursuit   of   ill-­‐understood   goals”.151   Althusser’s  
theory   further   held   a   particular   appeal   to   activists   on   the   Left   who   were   also  
intellectuals   as   it   seemed   to   transcend   the   distinction   between   theory   and  
practice  by  redefining  the  kind  of  intellectual  work  undertaken  in  lecture  halls  as  a  
form   of   political   action,   or   “theoretical   practice”.152   Rancière:   “We   found   in  
Althusser’s  work  the  idea  that  intellectuals  could  have  a  different  role,  one  other  
than   cultural   consumption   or   ideological   reflection:   real   involvement   as  
intellectuals   in   transforming   the   world”.153   The   fact   that   this   was   a   false   hope   and  
that   theoretical   practice   was   “something   of   a   sleight   of   hand”,   as   Davis   describes  
it,   only   became   clear   to   Rancière   after   the   events   of   May   1968,   which   shall   be  
discussed  below.154Althusser’s  approach  therefore  promised  Marxist  intellectuals  
a   significant   role   in   the   revolution   as   intellectuals.   Importantly,   as   Davis   further  
explains,  it  also  set  the  interpretation  of  Marx’s  work  free  from  the  authority  of  
the  French  Communist  Party  (FCP)  whose  support  of  Stalin  in  the  fifties  lead  to  a  
forceful   de-­‐Stalinisation   in   the   sixties.155   With   this,   the   party’s   commitment   to  
violent   revolutionary   struggle   had   transformed   into   support   for   the   pursuit   of  
social   change   through   democratic   means.156   The   most   damaging   to   the   party   was  
their   support,   during   the   Algerian   War   of   Independence,   for   the   Socialist   Prime  
minister   Guy   Mollet’s   1956-­‐Bill   that   granted   special   powers   to   the   governor   of  

                                                                                                           
149
Davis O (2010) 5.
150
As above.
151
See Davis O (2010) 5.
152
Davis O (2010) 6.
153
Rancière J (1974) (passage translated by Davis O (2010) 6).
154
Davis O (2010) 6.
155
As above.
156
As above.

41  
 
Algeria   thereby   effectively   establishing   a   police   state   and   by   doing   so,   seriously  
compromising   revolution   and   liberation.157   As   Davis   notes,   it   was   therefore   no  
surprise   that   the   idea   that   Althusser’s   theory   could   free   the   interpretation   of  
Marx  from  the  interpretive  authority  of  the  party  was  attractive  to  leftist  activists,  
activists   who   positioned   themselves   to   the   left   of   the   FCP.158   As   noted   by  
Rancière,  “Marx’s  theory  belonged  to  nobody  but  his  readers  and  their  only  duty  
was   to   it   […]   Everyone   could   read   Marx   and   see   what   followed.   All   that   was  
required  was  for  them  to  approach  the  text  through  the  discipline  of  science”.  159    
 
However,  as  Davis  further  mentions,  the  practice  proved  to  be  less  emancipatory  
than   many   students   had   hoped   for.   Behind   the   discipline   of   science   lay   another  
form  of  authority,  that  of  pedagogical  authority.160  And  as  shall  be  seen  later,  with  
the  discussion  of  Joseph  Jacocot  in  Rancière’s  book,  The  Ignorant  School  Master,  
this  is  highly  problematic  for  Rancière  and  key  elements  of  his  theory,  especially  
his   conception   of   equality,   can   be   seen   as   a   reaction   to   the   idea   of   pedagogical  
authority  experienced  by  him  during  these  years.161  
 
This   pedagogical   authority   was   related   to   the   fact   that   the   art   of   symptomatic  
reading   was   not   open   to   all.   Apart   from   investment   of   effort   and   attention   it  
required  instruction.  As  stated  by  Althusser  “[w]e  need  something  quite  different  
from  an  acute  attentive  gaze;  we  need  an  educated  gaze”.162  Davis  explains  that  
Marxist   science   had   been   set   free   from   the   authority   of   the   party,   to   become  
dependent   on   the   authority   of   the   pedagogue.163   This   is   why   Rancière’s  
repudiation  of  Althusser  is  entitled  “Althusser’s  Lesson”  and  why,  as  Davis  further  
notes,   at   key   junctures,   it   frames   Rancière’s   argument   against   Althusser   as   an  
argument  against  pedagogy.164  For  Rancière,  Althusserianism  is  “fundamentally  a  

                                                                                                           
157
Davis O (2010) 6.
158
As above.
159
As above. See Rancière J (1974) 20 (passage translated by Davis O (2010) 6).
160
Davis O (2010) 7.
161
Rancière J (1991).
162
Althusser L (1970) 27.
163
Davis O (2010) 7.
164
As above.

42  
 
theory   of   education”   and   “every   theory   of   education   strives   to   maintain   the  
source  of  the  power  it  seeks  to  shed  light  on”.165  Althusser  suggested  that  only  by  
a  correct  understanding  of  theory  would  a  political  practice  that  avoided  the  so-­‐
called   aberrations   of   Stalinism   and   the   compromises   of   democratic   socialism   be  
possible.166  For  Rancière,  Althusser’s  investment  in  the  privileged  position  of  the  
pedagogue   meant   that   it   would   never   be   time   for   his   students   to   fulfil   the  
promise   of   political   action:   “It   followed   from   the   logic   of   Althusserian   discourse  
that   the   moment   would   never   come:   the   antagonistic   struggle   of   empirical  
politics  would  never  allow  philosophy  the  opportunity  to  conclude”.167  Although  
Althusserianism   seemed   to   be   at   the   forefront   of   progressive   Left   discourse,   as  
Davis  highlights,  Rancière  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  functioned  in  accordance  
with   a   “pedagogical   temporality   of   delay”.168   The   time   to   act   would   therefore  
never   come;   the   inequalities   that   were   to   be   eliminated   would   always   remain   in  
place.   Rancière   viewed   Althusserianism   as   an   “endlessly   procrastinating   process  
of   instruction”.169   It   served   only   to   emphasise   the   inequality   between   the  
instructed  and  those  unschooled  in  Marxist  science  and  therefore  the  importance  
and  authority  of  the  teacher.  
 
It   should   also   be   mentioned   that   Althusserianism   asserted   itself   at   a   time   when  
higher   education   in   France   was   subject   to   an   intense   debate   that   ultimately  
culminated   in   the   liberation   of   curricula,   the   creation   of   several   new   universities  
and   an   influx   of   students   from   backgrounds   traditionally   under-­‐represented   in  
French  Universities.170  As  Tanke  explains,  the  changes  eventually  put  in  place  were  
largely  the  result  of  the  demands  made  by  students  throughout  the  1960’s  and  it  
was  in  this  sense  that  Althusserianism  functioned  as  a  call  to  order  addressed  to  
students.171   During   this   time,   students   were   questioning   the   university’s   position  

                                                                                                           
165
Rancière J (1974) 104.
166
Davis O (2010) 7.
167
Rancière J (1974) 104.
168
Davis O (2010) 7.
169
As above.
170
Tanke J (2011) 17-18.
171
As above.

43  
 
within  the  capitalist  system.172  They  were  politicising  forms  of  instruction  as  well  
as   the   power   relations   inherent   in   traditional   pedagogy.173   Althusserianism  
attempted   to   “defuse   these   institutional   critiques   by   shifting   the   investigation  
from   the   forms   of   power   at   issue   in   the   student-­‐teacher   relationship   to   a  
discussion   about   the   content   of   courses   themselves”.174   The   science/ideology  
distinction   transformed   debates   about   social   functions   and   procedures   into  
assessment  of  whether  or  not  the  knowledge  was  properly  materialist.  However,    
Althusserianism   masked   the   novelty   of   student   demands,   displacing  
critique   of   practices   into   the   realm   of   ideas.   Not   only   did   this   gesture  
forestall  a  serious  reckoning  with  institutionalised  forms  of  domination,  it  
quietly   laid   the   groundwork   for   a   pedagogical   space   in   which   philosophy  
could  be  awarded  pride  of  place.175  
 
In   Rancière’s   view   the   idea   that   Althusserianism   allowed   its   supporters   to   claim  
that   theory   itself   was   class   struggle,   amounts   to   a   shell   game   in   which   the  
revolution   continually   “recedes   behind   the   endless   development   of   science”.176  
Rancière   has   explained   that   the   book-­‐length   publication   of   Althusser’s   Lesson   in  
1974   was   made   pressing   by   a   renaissance   of   Althusserianism,   attempting   to  
recapture   the   events   of   May   ‘68.177   The   book   describes   how   Althusser’s  
“theoreticist”   assumptions,   predicated   upon   a   sharp   divide   between   those   who  
think   and   those   who   act   forecloses   possibilities   of   human   emancipation.178  
Throughout  the  book,  Rancière  rejects  any  conception  of  philosophy  premised  on  
the   idea   that   some   are   capable   of   thought   while   others   are   not.179   As   will   be  
demonstrated  later,  this  notion  or  idea  becomes  central  to  Rancière’s  politics.  
 
For   Althusser,   revolutionary   education   “must   have   a   rigorously   defined   object,  
unfold   with   a   carefully   defined   methodology,   and   be   officiated   over   by   those  

                                                                                                           
172
As above.
173
As above.
174
As above.
175
As above.
176
As above.
177
Tanke J (2011) 18.
178
As above.
179
As above.

44  
 
possessing   specialised   training”.180   Tanke   mentions   that   Althusserian   students  
were   famous   for   their   insistence   that   the   “theoretical   formation”   was   a  
precondition  for  political  militancy.181  The  science/ideology  distinction  institutes  a  
division   into   the   sphere   of   practices,   separating   the   learned   from   those   absorbed  
by   ideology.   This   secures   the   necessity   of   scholars   in   general   and   university  
theoreticians   in   particular.   For   Rancière,   as   mentioned,   this   attitude   reserves   a  
place   for   philosophy   at   the   top   of   the   division   of   labour.   Rancière:   “The   challenge  
is   clear:   it   is   a   question   of   saving   philosophy,   and   ‘Marxist   philosophy’   in  
particular,  as  the  business  of  university  specialists”.182    And  as  Tanke  explains    
[l]ike  its  Platonic  forbearer,  Althusserianism  presents  itself  as  indispensable  
for   discerning   between   true   and   false   ideas,   that   is,   the   directives   of   science  
and   the   petit-­‐bourgeois   tendencies   threatening   to   take   hold   of   the   worker’s  
movement.   It   is   here   that   philosophy   finds   its   justification,   for   as   long   as  
men   and   women   misjudge   the   shadows   in   the   cave   wall,   they   will   require  
philosophers  to  guide  their  politics.183  
 
Philosophy   therefore   struggles   on   behalf   of   the   non-­‐ideological   concepts  
produced   by   science,   using   them   to   clarify   political   thought   and   action.   Tanke  
further  explains  that  theory’s  “clear-­‐sightedness”  is  predicated  upon  its  conscious  
removal   from   the   spheres   of   economic   and   political   practice.   It   provides   those  
engaged   with   the   reality   of   what   they   cannot   see   because   of   their   position   within  
the  division  of  labour.184  
 
What  was  therefore  alarming  for  Rancière  was  that  Althusserianism  requires  the  
masses  to  wallow  in  ideology.185  Althusser  opposed  any  practices  of  what  can  be  
called   “auto-­‐emancipation”.186   He   assumed   that   popular   movements   are   limited  
by  degrees  of  incapacity,  therefore  requiring  the  formation  of  a  theoretical  avant-­‐
garde.187   For   him,   the   class   struggle   unfolds   transparently   and   therefore   relies  

                                                                                                           
180
Tanke J (2011) 19.
181
As above.
182
Rancière J (1974) 35.
183
Tanke J (2011) 20.
184
As above.
185
As above.
186
As above.
187
As above.

45  
 
upon   science   to   clarify   its   stakes.188   Tanke   explains   that   Rancière,   in   contrast,  
assumes   that   practices   are   relatively   evident   to   those   engaged   in   them.189   He  
even   suggests   that   economic   exploitation   and   political   domination   require   little  
explanation   to   those   who   are   subjected   to   it.   He,   as   will   be   elucidated   in   the  
discussion   of   his   mature   politics   below,   turns   his   critical   efforts   against   those  
discourses   that   benefit   from   postulating   truths   in   an   effort   to   redistribute   the  
field  of  capacities.190  
 
Davis  explains  that  for  Althusser,  the  Marxist  truth  of  things  does  not  lie  on  the  
surface   waiting   to   be   discovered   by   the   attentive   reader.191   It   is   rather,   as   Davis  
further  explains,  the  educated  reader,  schooled  in  the  art  of  symptomatic  reading  
that   delves   beneath   the   surface   in   order   to   find   and   formulate   the   latent  

                                                                                                           
188
As above.
189
As above.
190
As above. It should be mentioned that although it has rightly been remarked that
Rancière’s reaction against Althusserianism borders on the extreme, as Davis notes, it is also
multifaceted. Davis O (2010) 12-13. Davis identifies four aspects of Althusserianism, which he
argues are preserved in Rancière’s project. Davis O (2010) 12-13. For the purposes of my
discussion I refer to the aspect with regards to Rancière’s style. Davis explains two marks that
can broadly be termed Althusser’s philosophical style that are reflected in Rancière’s work.
Davis O (2010) 12-13. According to Davis, Althusser, by reading Marx “as a philosopher” and
thereby, as he put it, “redressing one hundred and twenty years of censorship by silence
within the university”, provided a model for displacing philosophy which is echoed by
Rancière in the 1970’s when Rancière, as lecturer in philosophy at Vincennes, used the
academic freedom accorded to him to immerse himself and his student Alain Faure in the
archives of the nineteenth century French worker’s movement and read them “as
philosophers”. See Davis O (2010) 12-13. For all Althusser’s rhetoric of disciplinary rigour and
systematicity, he also offered an early lesson in ”indiscipline” or “anti-disciplinarity”. For
Davis, the intellectual and political potential of this approach is demonstrated in an
unparalleled fashion in Rancière’s work. Davis O (2010) 12-13. Davis further explains that the
second vestige of Althusser’s philosophical style exhibited in Rancière’s work is what has
been called Althusser’s “declarative” conception of philosophy, which Rancière adopted to
some extent. Davis O (2010) 12-13. The philosopher’s task is to “present his theses”. Some of
Rancière’s more schematic work, for example his assertion of the separation between politics
and the police order that will be explained later in this chapter, or the periodisation of the
history of literature and art, exhibits, according to Davis, a decidedly Althusserian inclination
for declaring the existence of lines of demarcation and seeing what follows. Davis O (2010)
12-13. Davis argues that these observations are in no way an argument of Rancière’s work as
derivative of Althusser’s in any reductive sense. Davis O (2010) 12-13. Rather, he demonstrates
that the relationship between the two thinkers is more involved than cursory readings would
suggest. See Davis O (2010) 12-14.
191
Davis O (2010) 13.

46  
 
theoretical   question.192   The   specialists   in   symptomatic   reading,   namely,   the  
Althusserian  intellectuals  engaged  in  this  work  of  theoretical  practice,  would  then  
instruct  the  proletariat,  the  ordinary  men  and  women,  in  correct  political  action.193  
The   intellectual   thus   stands   in   a   “one-­‐way   pedagogical   relationship”   to   the  
proletariat.194   The   public   is   condemned   to   spontaneous   practice,   rather   than  
being  engaged  in  real  revolutionary  action.  Rancière  states:    
The   “masses”   make   history,   no   doubt   about   it,   but   not   just   any   masses:  
those   which   we   educate   and   organise.   They   only   make   history   if   they   first  
understand   that   they   are   separated   from   it   by   a   thick   layer   of   “dominant  
ideology”   by   all   of   those   stories   the   bourgeoisie   tell   them   and   which,   stupid  
as  they  are,  they  would  always  swallow  hook,  line  and  sinker  if  we  weren’t  
there  to  teach  them  how  to  tell  good  ideas  from  bad  ones.195  
 
Thus,  Althusserianism  is  for  Rancière  a  condescending  philosophy,  which  protects  
the  social  privilege  of  those  institutionally  associated  with  it.  As  Davis  notes,  the  
tone   in   the   passage   above   is   almost   visceral.   Rancière’s   response   to  
Althusserianism   is   less   of   a   critique   and   rather   almost   a   “violent   allergic  
reaction”.196  Rancière’s  approach,  as  will  be  discussed  later,  is  founded  upon  the  
assumption   of   radically   equal   capacities.   Central   to   his   thesis   is   that   one   cannot  
start   with   inequality   and   work   progressively   towards   its   elimination.   Equality   in  
Rancière’s  approach  is  a  “presupposition,  an  axiom,  or  it  is  nothing”.197  Rancière  
contends   that   politics   is   not   hampered   by   a   lack   of   knowledge,   the   mal-­‐
information  of  the  marginalised  classes  or  the  inopportunity  of  the  moment,  but  
rather  by  the  failure  to  embody,  in  advance,  the  equality  we  want  to  bring  into  a  
context.198  For  him,  nothing  is  more  troubling  than  the  contention  that  the  world  
is  divisible  on  the  basis  of  intellectual  capacities,  the  fact  that  some  can  draw  lines  
and   erect   hierarchies,   whether   between   theory   or   practice,   or   between   science  
and  ideology,  intellectuals  and  workers.199  
 
                                                                                                           
192
As above.
193
As above.
194
As above.
195
Rancière J (1974) 34 (passage translated by Davis O (2010) 13).
196
Davis O (2010) 13.
197
Rancière J The Philosopher and His Poor (2004) 223.
198
Davis O (2010) 14.
199
As above.

47  
 
Rancière,  as  a  student  of  Althusser,  initially  contributed  to  Reading  Capital.200  The  
contribution   entitled   “The   Concept   of   Critique   and   the   Critique   of   Political  
Economy   from   the   1844   Manuscripts   of   Capital”   followed   immediately   after  
Althusser’s  prefatory  essay.  Rancière’s  contribution  was  a  compliant  rehearsal  of  
Althusserian  doctrine.  As  Davis  mentions,  Rancière’s  contribution  is  extreme  in  its  
Althusserian   orthodoxy   because   it   emphasises   the   opacity   of   the   world   to  
ordinary   perception   and   because   it   holds   that   only   symptomatic   reading   can  
result  in  a  reliable  understanding  of  the  world.201  It  is  important  to  mention  that  
Rancière’s  transition  from  compliant  student  to  outspoken  critic  of  Althusser  did  
not   happen   in   a   vacuum.   Mao’s   Cultural   Revolution   that   was   at   its   height   in   the  
period  between  1965  and  1968,  and  the  near  revolution  in  France  in  May  ’68,  both  
applied   pressure   on   young   Althusserians.202   The   Cultural   Revolution   questioned  
the   social   and   institutional   privilege   accorded   to   scholars,   teachers   and  
bureaucrats  by  virtue  of  their  knowledge  and  education,  whilst  May  ’68  began  as  
a  student  revolt  and  it  questioned  the  power  and  processes  of  pedagogy.  May  ’68  
saw   students   and   factory   workers   engage   in   revolutionary   action   without  
guidance   from   the   FCP.203   On   the   contrary,   the   FCP   was   instrumental   in   ending   it.  
In   this   context   Althusserian   science   and   the   FCP   became   redundant.   Rancière:  
“Althusserianism  met  its  death  on  the  barricades  of  May  along  with  many  other  
ideas   of   the   past”.204   Althusser,   however,   did   not   seem   to   realise   this.   As   Davis  
notes,   even   before   publishing   his   excoriating   repudiation,   Althusser’s   Lesson,  
Rancière  had  already  written  a  sceptical  book  and  an  article  in  which  he  described  

                                                                                                           
200
See Davis O (2010) 4. Davis notes that Rancière’s essay followed at least within the first
edition of 1965. Davis O (2010) 4. The textual history of Rancière’s piece reflects his
relationship with Althusser. The second French edition at the end of 1968 contained only
Atlhusser’s and Balibar’s contributions. Davis O (2010) 4. In his preface to that edition,
Althusser rather insultingly remarks that the new edition is “improved” (p xii) and that the
omissions in no way damage the integrity of the interpretation of Marx’s works being put
forward. Davis O (2010) 4. In 1973, Althusser and his publisher wanted to reprint the first
edition in its entirety. Rancière requested that his contribution be preceded by a prefatory
autocritique, but Althusser refused. Davis explains that the autocritique was published
separately. Davis O (2010) 4.
201
As above.
202
Davis O (2010) 20.
203
As above.
204
As above.

48  
 
Althusser’s   work   as   “reactionary”   and   labelled   his   own   contribution   to   Reading  
Capital   as   “rustic”   because   of   the   crudeness   with   which   it   reproduced  
Althusserian   dogma   about   the   epistemological   break.205   Rancière   presented  
Althusser’s   Lesson   as   an   exasperated   reaction   to   his   former   teacher’s   failure   to  
take   in   the   broad   lessons   of   May   ’68.206   Rancière   complained   that   Althusser’s  
“Response   to   John   Lewis”   written   in   1973,   a   counterattack   against   the   British  
communist,   simply   restated   in   more   accessible   language   the   same   ideas   he   had  
advanced  eight  years  before,  as  though  May  ‘68  had  changed  nothing.207  
 
Rancière’s   break   with   Althusser   was   therefore   in   part   because   of   their   different  
views  on  the  significance  of  the  events  of  May  1968.  Rancière  has  explained  that  
his  Althusserian  perspective  began  to  fall  apart  when  9  million  people  struggled  
and   went   on   strike   across   France,   without   the   support   of   parties   or   trade  
unions.208   For   Rancière   “a   whole   system   of   certainties   was   shaken”.209   Tanke  
explains  that  the  events  indicated  that  it  was  time  to  revisit  the  tenets  of  Marxism  
as   articulated   by   Althusser.   May’68   had   arguably   demonstrated   the   capacity   of  
workers  and  students  to  instigate  and  organise  protests  without  the  guidance  of  
Marxist   intellectuals.   It   had   in   fact   happened   and   popular   revolt   was   eminently  
possible   without   correct   theoretical   understanding.210   For   Rancière,  
Althusserianism’s   overemphasis   on   acquiring   scientific   rigorous   understanding,  
“risked   suppressing   [struggle]   in   the   endless   meantime,   the   social   and  
institutional  hierarchies  through  which  pedagogical  power  is  exercised”.211  
 
Althusserian   analysis   was   out   of   feeling   with   the   new   forms   of   politics   brought  
forth   by   May   ‘68.   In   order   to   demonstrate   the   eclipse   of   Althusserian   Marxism,  
Rancière  juxtaposed  it  to  the  experiences  of  workers  at  the  LIP  watch  factory  in  
France.   Tanke   explains   that   these   workers,   upon   learning   of   plans   for   the  
                                                                                                           
205
As above.
206
As above.
207
See Althusser L Résponse à John Lewis (1973) as referenced in Davis O (2010) xx.
208
Davis O (2010)
209
Tanke J (2011) 20.
210
Davis O (2010) 15.
211
As above.

49  
 
termination   of   a   number   of   their   colleagues,   forcibly   occupied   their   plant.212  
Rather  than  simply  striking,  these  workers  continued  the  production  and  sale  of  
watches  under  the  slogan  “[i]t  is  possible:  we  make,  we  sell,  we  pay  ourselves!”213  
Tanke   notes   that   what   followed   were   experiments   in   self-­‐management   that  
gripped   the   imagination   of   the   French   public.214   In   simple   economic   terms,  
workers’  control  produced  greater  profits  than  those  of  management.  Because  of  
the   refusal   of   traditional   channels   such   as   labour   unions,   the   event   is   often  
claimed   as   part   of   the   political   legacy   of   May   ’68.215   This   was   at   the   time   when  
Althusser  wrote  his  famous  “Reply  to  John  Lewis”,  affirming  most  of  his  original  
theses.   These   workers   articulated   their   struggle   in   the   following   terms:   “The  
economy  is  in  service  of  man,  man  is  not  in  the  service  of  the  economy”.216  “Man”  
according   to   Rancière   did   not   function   as   a   lure   to   lead   workers   back   into   the  
darkness   of   ideology,   but   rather   as   a   means   of   resisting   hierarchy.217   “Man”   is   the  
political  name  by  which  workers  opposed  the  powers  exercised  over  them,  with  
its  extension  refuting  the  division  on  which  their  bosses  rely.218  The  question  is  not  
for   Rancière   whether   the   name   is   of   bourgeois   derivation,   “but   whether   it   can   be  
made   to   serve   the   self-­‐emancipation   of   the   people”.219   For   Rancière,   the  
Althusserian  equation  of  “Man”  and  his  rights  with  bourgeois  humanism  is  rash,  
as   a   brief   history   of   the   workers’   movement   demonstrates.220   The   events   at   the  
watch   factory   closely   resemble   demonstrations   of   equality   that   will   become  
central   to   Rancière’s   politics,   demonstrations   that   use   a   name   of   sufficient  
generality,   “man”,   which   facilitates   in   the   creation   of   a   polemical   scene.221   The  
workers   asserted   themselves   against   a   distribution   in   which   they   had   little   part  
and  the  name  allowed  for  the  elaboration  of  a  site  of  struggle  where  the  goal  was  

                                                                                                           
212
Tanke J (2011) 20.
213
Tanke J (2011) 21.
214
As above.
215
As above.
216
As above. See Rancière (1974) 157.
217
As above.
218
As above.
219
As above.
220
Tanke J (2011) 21-22.
221
As above.

50  
 
to  determine  who  was  and  who  was  not  covered  by  it.222  The  use  of  such  names  
provides  an  opportunity  to  engage  in  politics,  altering  current  relations.  The  LIP-­‐
workers’  experiment  asserts,  as  Tanke  highlights,  that  a  world  free  of  hierarchal  
divisions   is   possible.223   For   Rancière,   they   demonstrated   that   the   time   in   which  
intellectuals  instructed  people  about  what  they  can  and  cannot  do  had  passed.  
 
Rancière’s   exploration   in   the   mid-­‐1970’s   of   the   archives   of   the   French   workers’  
movement   that   will   be   discussed   later,   was   driven   by   a   desire   to   refute   the  
Althusserianism   claim   that   “the   workers   need   our   scientific   knowledge”   by  
showing  that  workers  had  time  and  again  not  only  organised  meaningful  political  
revolt,   but   also   understood   their   circumstances   and   their   position   in   the   world.224    
According   to   Davis,   this   understanding   was   in   no   sense   inferior   to   Marxist  
science.225   His   work   in   the   archives   affirmed   his   belief   that   the   Althusserian  
understanding   of   the   relationship   between   Marxist   intellectual   work   and  
revolutionary   struggle   was   incorrect.   In   his   book   The   Philosopher   and   His   Poor  
Rancière   explores   the   relationship   between   intellectual   work   and   revolutionary  
struggle  in  the  work  of  Marx,  tracking  its  reappearance  in  the  work  of  Jean-­‐Paul  
Sartre   and   Pierre   Bourdieu   as   well   as   its   prehistory   in   Plato’s   model   of   the   ideal  
state.226   In   this   book,   Davis   explains   that   Rancière   insinuates   by   suggestive  
juxtaposition   that   the   scientific   strand   identified   within   the   Marxist   tradition,   in  
Marx,  Sartre,  Bourdieu  and  Althusser,  is  rooted  in  a  specific  relationship  between  
power   and   knowledge   first   elaborated   in   Plato’s   ideal   state   in   Republic.227  
Importantly,   in   Rancière’s   subsequent   work,   Plato,   as   Davis   discerns,   is   enemy  
number  one  against  whom  his  politics  of  radical  equality  and  true  democracy  will  
be  defined.228  I  will  elaborate  more  on  this  point  in  the  following  chapter.    
 

                                                                                                           
222
As above.
223
As above.
224
As above. See chapter 3.
225
Davis O (2010) 15.
226
Rancière J (2004).
227
Davis O (2010) 15-16.
228
See chapter 3.

51  
 
At   this   stage   it   is   important   to   further   mention   that   in   The   Philosopher   and   His  
Poor,   Rancière   reaches   the   conclusion   that   Marx   “alternately   disparaged   and  
idealised   the   workers   of   his   day”.229   Rancière   was   struck   by   the   way   Marx   and  
Engels   often   distanced   themselves   from   the   working-­‐class   activists   of   their   day,  
even   going   as   far   as   to   contemptuously   refer   to   some   of   them   in   private   as  
“jackasses   hungry   for   new   ideas   but   unable   to   engage   with   them   other   than   by  
feeding  them  like  animals”.230  As  Davis  clarifies,  Marx,  in  Rancière’s  view,  is  guilty  
of   a   condescending   view   of   even   the   most   overtly   politicised   members   of   the  
working  class  as  intellectually  incapable.231  Rancière  juxtaposes  Marx’s  contempt  
towards  the  workers  of  his  day  with  his  commitment  to  a  theoretical  position  that  
states   that   the   future   lies   with   the   proletariat   -­‐   “a   new   class   which   is   strictly   not   a  
class   but   which   would   emerge   with   the   growth   of   industrialisation   from   the  
dissolution   of   existing   classes,   including   the   working   class   as   it   was   then”.232   As  
Davis   explains,   Rancière’s   point   was   not   that   Marx’s   private   remarks   to   Engels  
about   certain   workers   contradict   the   theoretical   claims   of   his   work.233   Rather,  
Marx’s   private   contempt   seems   disconcertingly   consistent   with   certain   kinds   of  
public   theorising   and   also   helps   to   illuminate   it.   Workers,   as   they   actually   are   in  
the  here  and  now,  “are  the  brut  embodiment  of  a  future  that  they  are  incapable  
of  understanding”.234  
All  the  nobility  of  humanity  may  shine  on  the  brows  of  Parisian  workers  who  
meet   for   study,   but   the   commodity   itself   presents   a   more   obtuse   face.   It  
does  not  have  written  on  it  that  it  is  the  sign  of  the  division  of  labour  that  
marks  it  as  the  property  of  capital,  except  in  the  form  of  hieroglyphics  that  
cannot   be   read   by   workers   who   wear   on   their   brows   the   sign   of   a   people  
both  chosen  and  condemned.235  
 
As   Davis   further   notes,   the   identified   “germs”   of   Althusserian   scientism   were  
actually   already   present   in   Marx’s   conflicted   view   of   workers   who   embody   a  

                                                                                                           
229
Davis O (2010) 17-18.
230
As above.
231
As above.
232
As above.
233
As above.
234
Davis O (2010) 16.
235
Rancière J (2004) 75.

52  
 
future   that   they   cannot   know.236   Rancière   also   draws   attention   to   the   way   in  
which  Marx  may  be  said  to  “police”  the  proletariat,  particularly  in  The  Eighteenth  
Brumaire.237   He   is   concerned   with   distinguishing   the   true   proletariat   from   their  
degenerate   close   cousins,   the   common   criminals,   colonial   fortune-­‐seekers   and  
Bohemians,   referred   to   as   the   “lumpenproletariat”   in   the   Marxist   tradition.238  
Rancière’s   question   is   as   follows:   “what   exactly   are   we   to   make   of   an   abstract  
theory   of   the   revolutionary   proletarian   future   if,   from   the   outset,   it   is  
accompanied   by   a   view   of   large   numbers   of   workers   in   the   present   as,   at   best,  
constitutionally  unable  to  grasp  the  political  reality  of  their  own  situation  and  at  
worst,  asinine  and  degenerate?”239  Davis  further  notes  that  Rancière,  although  he  
by   no   means   offers   a   systematic   and   complete   genealogy   of   Marxist   “scientism”,  
does   succeed   in   pointing   to   an   uneasy   combination   within   the   tradition   of   a  
theory   of   proletarian   future   with   condescendingly   reductive   views   of   concrete  
workers   in   the   present   and   their   limited   capacity   to   understand   themselves   and  
their  world.240  Marx  therefore  assumes  that  were  it  not  for  the  intervention  and  
contribution  of  intellectuals  and  their  “generously  extended  pedagogical  helping  
hand”,  the  proletariat  would  be  incapable  of  an  understanding  necessary  for  the  
accomplishment  of  their  historical  role,  namely,  revolution.241  Rancière’s  target  is  
scientism   as   manifested   in   the   idea   that   the   proletariat   are   incapable   of  
understanding   their   political   function   without   the   pedagogical   assistance   of  
bourgeoisie   intellectuals.   For   Rancière,   May   ’68,   amongst   other   happenings,  
prove  this  was  a  convenient  fiction.  Further,  
[s]cientism   is   associated,   for   Rancière,   not   just   with   a   privileging   of   the  
social   position   of   intellectuals   but   also   with   an   indefinite   deferral   of   the  
realisation  of  equality:  for  Marx,  just  as  for  Althusser,  with  his  pedagogy  of  
delay,   the   time   to   enact   the   egalitarian   future   would   always   be   after   the  
knowledge-­‐deficit   of   the   student-­‐proletariat   had   been   corrected   […]   in  
other  words,  never  now.242  
 

                                                                                                           
236
Davis O (2010) 16.
237
Davis O (2010) 17.
238
As above.
239
As above.
240
As above.
241
Davis O (2010) 18.
242
As above.

53  
 
And  it  is  this  scientism  that  privileges  some  and  decides  who  can  think  and  who  
cannot  think,  who  can  act  and  under  what  circumstances,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  
equality   is   infinitely   deferred   by   it,   that   Rancière   reacts   against   for   most   of   the  
rest  of  his  intellectual  life.  After  he  distanced  himself  from  Althusser  and  criticised  
the   tenets   of   Althusserianism,   he   engaged   with   questions   around   history,  
historical  agency,  education  and  pedagogy.243  I  elaborate  on  these  engagements  
in   the   next   chapter.   It   is   these   engagements   that   gave   rise   to   his   “mature  
politics”.244     In   the   next   section   I   discuss   the   five   elements   or   moments   of  
Rancière’s  mature  politics.    

                                                                                                           
243
  The main works that can be mentioned here is The Names of History: On the Poetics of
Knowledge trans. Melehy H (1994), The Nights of Labor: The Worker’s Dream in Nineteenth-
Century France trans. Drury J (1989), The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual
Emancipation trans. Ross K (1991) and The Philosopher and His Poor trans. Drury J (2003).  
244
  Davis mentions that Rancière’s political work, or mature politics, responded to two
countervailing pressures. See Davis O (2010) 99. In global terms, the collapse of the
communist regimes in or shortly after 1989 inspired some philosophical and political
commentators to declare “the end of history” and “the end of politics”. (The “end of history”
refers to a book written in 1992 by Francis Fukuyama (The End of History and The Last Man) in
which he declares that the advent of Western liberal democracy may signal the endpoint of
humanity’s sociocultural evolution and the final form of human government. Western liberal
democracy therefore signals the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution as this form of
government becomes universal. In general it refers to political and philosophical concepts
that suppose that a particular political and economic or social system may develop that
would constitute a final form of human government. In different forms Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, Vladimir Solovyov and Fukuyama have posited this idea.) Davis
explains that during the same time in France, there was a resurgence of interest in political
philosophy, particularly by, neo-Aristotelians and followers of Hannah Arendt and it went
hand in hand with the idea that “ideological” or emancipatory questions could be put aside
and the political could be rethought in ethical terms of how to best “live together”. Davis O
(2010) 99. See also in general Beasley JP A Prehistory of Rhetoric and Composition: New
Rhetoric and Neo-Aristotelianism at the University of Chicago 1947-1959 (2007). Rancière’s
determination, in Disagreement, as will be discussed later, to refute Aristotle’s assumption
that the political could be deduced from the properties of human beings, language and the
power to reason, was motivated, in no small measure, according to Davis, by the popularity of
neo-Aristotelian conceptions of politics at that time. Davis O (2010) 99. Rancière, in his mature
politics, goes much further than attacking a single philosopher’s conception of politics and he
sets his sights instead on political philosophy as a whole, which he argues is flawed and
conservative because of the fact that it is unable to accept and think through the
consequences of the basic fact that any social order is contingent. See Davis O (2010) 99.
Davis explains that Rancière suggests that political philosophy cannot help but to always look
for the most rational social arrangement and what it fails to see is that any and “every social
arrangement is inherently irrational and ultimately provisional”. Davis O (2010) 99. Rancière
goes as far as suggesting that the ambition of the longstanding tradition of political
philosophy is to dispense with politics all together. Davis explains that the intellectual mood

54  
 
2.3  The  Mature  Politics  
2.3.1  The  Police  
In  order  to  explain  Rancière’s  alternative  vision  of  politics,  it  is  necessary  to  start  
with   an   explanation   of   his   conception   of   “the   police”,   “policing”   or   “the   police  
order”.  Rancière  states  in  Disagreement:  
 Politics   is   generally   seen   as   a   set   of   procedures   whereby   aggregation   and  
consent   of   collectivities   is   achieved,   the   organisation   of   powers,   the  
distribution   of   places   and   roles   and   the   systems   for   legitimising   this  
distribution.  I  propose  to  give  this  system  of  distribution  and  legitimisation  
another  name.  I  propose  to  call  it  the  police.245    
 
Rancière,  in  the  quote  above,  is  describing  mainstream  politics,  or  politics  as  we  
have   come   to   know   it,   namely,   the   hierarchal   administration   of   society   that  
governs  its  citizens  in  the  name  of  welfare.246  Rancière,  however,  defines  this  as  
“the   police”.   On   this   description,   as   Chambers   elucidates,   the   actions   of  
parliaments   and   assemblies,   the   decisions   of   courts,   the   work   of   politicians   and  
bureaucratic   efforts   are   all   classified   under   the   non-­‐political   heading   of   “the  
police”,  “policing”  or  “the  police  order”.247  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  police  
order  does  not  only  refer  to  state  institutions,  but  also,  as  Davis  explains,  include  
private   institutions   and   an   array   of   social   and   cultural   practices   and  
arrangements.248   Therefore,   it   does   not   only   refer   to   the   institutions   and  
processes   of   governing,   organisation   and   the   representation   of   communities,   but  
it  also  includes  the  exercise  of  power  on  different  levels  of  society  as  well  as  the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
of the 1990’s with talk of “the end of politics” and the return to political philosophy was a
fitting trend to accompany what Rancière had already discerned operating in French politics
since the early 1980’s. Davis O (2010) 99. That is, the development and advancement of the
idea that the aim of politics is consensus. Importantly, as Davis elucidates, Rancière, in a
characteristic emphatic reversal, claims that consensus is not the aim of politics, but the
negation of politics: “consensus politics”, as will become clearer later, is effectively the
transformation of politics into management, a transformation which Rancière also associates
with the increasing power of elites and experts trained to undertake this managerial task.
Davis O (2010) 99-100.
245
Rancière J (1999) 28.
246
May T “There are no queers: Jacques Rancière and post-identity politics” Borderlands
(2009) 3.
247
Chambers S “Jacques Rancière and the problem of pure politics” European Journal of
Political Theory (2011) 306.
248
Davis O (2010) 76.

55  
 
way  in  which  social  roles  are  distributed  and  legitimated.249  Rancière,  in  order  to  
explain  the  broad  nature  of  the  term,  states  the  following:    
[I]t  is  an  order  of  bodies  that  defines  the  allocation  of  ways  of  doing,  ways  
of   being,   and   ways   of   saying,   and   sees   that   those   bodies   are   assigned   by  
name   to   a   particular   place   and   task.   It   is   an   order   of   the   visible   and  
sayable.250    
 
Rancière’s  reference  to  “an  order  of  the  visible  and  sayable”  connects  with  what  
he  calls  the  “distribution  or  the  partition  of  the  sensible”  (la  partage  du  sensible).  
The  distribution  of  the  sensible  glosses  over  a  central  point  of  Rancière’s,  namely,  
the  aesthetic  dimension  of  politics.251  The  notion  of  the  distribution  of  the  sensible  
will   form   an   integral   part   of   this   chapter   and   I   believe   that   it   is   one   of   the   most  
interesting   and   valuable   facets   of   Rancière’s   political   formulations.   I   therefore  
explain   and   analyse   the   notion   fully   at   a   later   stage.     At   this   stage   it   should   be  
mentioned   that   the   distribution   of   the   sensible   and   the   police   are   two   closely  
related   and   interrelated   terms.   The   police,   as   Tanke   explains,   is   the   means   by  
which  a  society  enforces  its  distribution  of  the  sensible  and  the  distribution  of  the  
sensible   is   the   general   laws   distributing   lines   of   sight,   forms   of   speech   and  
estimations’   of   people’s   or   bodies’   capacities.252   Put   simply,   for   the   purposes   of  
this   section,   the   distribution   of   the   sensible   indicates   a   specific   picture   of   the  
world   and   the   police   order   is   that   which   (through   different   mechanisms   and  
procedures   of   domination   and   prescription)   enforces   that   picture   of   the   world.  
                                                                                                           
249
As above.
250
Rancière J (1999) 29. Rancière demonstrates the link between his use of the term and the
work of Michel Foucault in the quote above. Foucault argues that “the police includes
everything” to the extent that any police order determines hierarchal relationships between
human beings as well as to the extent that it sets up relationships between “men and things”.
It thus also constitutes a material order. See Foucault M “Omnes et Singulatum” The Tanner
Lectures on Human Values (1979). Davis has mentioned that Rancière draws on an older and
wider sense of the term “police” than the familiar one of a repressive state organ. Davis O
(2010) 76-77. He rather draws on one closer to that identified by Foucault in the seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century writings as synonymous with the social order in its entirety. Davis O
(2010) 76-77. Despite his reference to Foucault, Davis claims that the opposition between
“the police” and “politics” that Rancière describes and the renaming of what is normally
thought of as politics as “policing” is a twisting of the ordinary usage of both of the terms
which blurs their proper meanings and dramatises the conflict between them. According to
Davis, Rancière works with a more open, creative and less disciplined view of the normal
usage of these terms. See Davis O (2010) 76-77.
251
As above.
252
Tanke J (2011) 45.

56  
 
The   quote   mentioned   above   indicates   that   the   police   or   policing   should   be  
understood   broadly.   The   police   enforce   the   framework   of   how   things   are.   It  
hierarchises,   it   orders   and   regulates.   It   allocates   roles,   occupations,   norms   of  
communication   and   display.   It   determines   modes   of   being,   seeing   and   saying,   it  
affixes   ranks   and   values   and   continually   reinstates   the   legitimacy   of   social  
hierarchy  as  well  as  its  own  domination.253  Its  role,  as  Tanke  notes,  is  to  maintain  
the  status  quo  and  to  delimit,  in  advance,  the  sphere  of  politics.254  It  indicates  who  
is   capable   of   speaking   and   what   they   are   able   to   say   and   also   what   can   become   a  
matter   of   political   dispute.255   The   police   order   assigns   individuals   to   particular  
positions   in   society   and   assumes   that   their   way   of   thinking   and   behaving   will  
follow  from  those  positions.  In  other  words,  the  police  order  assumes  that  people  
have   different   capacities   and   are   accordingly   destined   to   occupy   different  
positions  in  society.256  
 
Todd  May  describes  the  police  order  as  any  order  of  hierarchy.257  May  notes  that  
within   a   specific   police   order   or   order   of   hierarchy   there   are   those   who   benefit  
and   those   who   do   not,   or   those   who   benefit   more   than   others.258   Rancière   has  
called  it  “those  who  are  counted  and  those  who  are  not”.259  The  way  in  which  we  
understand  the  counted  and  uncounted  is  crucial  to  understanding  police  orders.  
The  counted  and  uncounted  should  not  be  understood  as  or  reduced  to  a  single  
class  division.  As  May  elucidates,  societies  function  with  a  number  of  hierarchies,  
such   as   racial   hierarchies,   economic   hierarchies,   sexual   hierarchies,   gender  
hierarchies,   religious   hierarchies   and   so   forth.260   Who   is   therefore   among   the  
counted   and   who   is   among   the   uncounted   depends   on   the   hierarchy   one   is  
looking  at.  The  concept  of  the  police  can  therefore  be  utilised  in  a  fluid  way.  Not  
                                                                                                           
253
Stoneman E “Appropriate indecorum: Rhetoric and aesthetics in the political theory of
Jacques Rancière” Philosophy and Rhetoric (2011) 143.
254
Tanke J (2011) 45.  
255
As above.
256
Davis O (2010) 78.
257
May T Borderlands (2009) 4.
258
As above.
259
Rancière J (1999) 6. In the section that explains the notions of the “miscount and the
wrong" below, I elaborate fully on the idea of the counted and uncounted.
260
May T Borderlands (2009) 4.

57  
 
all  oppression  occurs  along  a  single  register.  May  highlights  that  the  police  does  
not   refer   to   a   single   or   particular   hierarchy,   but   to   the   various   and   different  
hierarchies  that  govern  societies.  Therefore,  “[i]t  is  entirely  possible  for  one  to  be  
a   member   of   the   uncounted   in   one   part   of   the   police   order   and   among   the  
counted   in   another   part”.261   Further,   not   all   orders   of   hierarchy   are   equally  
oppressive   or   dominant.   Thus,   as   Rancière   states   as   a   further   indication   of   the  
term’s  fluidity,  “[t]here  is  a  worse  and  a  better  police”.262  
 
Tanke   explains   that   the   police   monopolises   interpretations   in   an   attempt   to  
create   a   single   direction   for   the   movement   of   society.263   It   therefore   refers   to   a  
series   of   assumptions   that   structure   life   in   common.264   It   is   a   specific  
interpretation   that   attempts   to   strip   the   given   order   of   things   from   its   litigious  
character.265  It  primarily  has  to  do  with  the  logic  of  inequality  that  creates  forms  
of   inclusion   and   exclusion.   It   distributes   bodies   and   voices,   define   what   is   seen  
and   unseen   and   draws   boundaries   such   as   those   that   exists   between   the   public  
and  the  private.266  Policing  attempts  to  co-­‐opt,  manage,  contain,  and  undermine  
any   dispute   about   the   excluded   within   the   community.   Tanke   explains   further  
that  police  operations  include  the  selective  framing  of  issues  by  mainstream  news  
organisations,   the   management   of   economic,   cultural   and   existential   insecurity  
and   the   transformation   of   political   names   or   subjects   like   “the   people”   or   “the  
workers”  into  socio-­‐economic  identities.267  The  police  order  can  also  be  described  
as  that  which  enforces  the  perceptual  configuration  of  society.268  What  is  sayable,  
visible,   understood,   who   counts   and   who   doesn’t?   It   maintains   the   more   or   less  
“automatic   perception   of   status,   identity,   position   and   entitlement”.269   With   its  
close   relation   to   the   distribution   of   the   sensible,   Tanke   explains   that   the   police  

                                                                                                           
261
As above.
262
Rancière J (1999) 30-31.
263
Tanke J (2011) 46.
264
As above.
265
As above.
266
As above.
267
Tanke J (2011) 45.
268
As above.
269
As above.

58  
 
order   ultimately   concerns   the   material   ground   of   communicability,   intelligibility  
and   sensibility.270   It   maintains   the   operations   that   set   the   limit   of   what   is  
conceivable  and  possible  in  a  specific  time  and  place.    
 
It   should   be   mentioned   further   that   Rancière’s   formulation   of   the   notion   of   the  
police  helps  to  explain  some  of  his  opinions  or  arguments  when  it  comes  to  our  
current   perception   of   politics.   He   encourages   us   to   question   that   the   notion   of  
governance   is   about   the   management   of   a   shared   and   unequal,   prosperity   and,  
more   radically,   he   opposes   the   equation   of   politics   with   the   state.   Rancière  
attributes   the   weakness   of   contemporary   politics   to   the   politics   of   what   he   terms  
“consensus”.   I   elaborate   shortly   on   the   meaning   of   consensus   in   order   to  
introduce  the  notion.  Thereafter,  I  turn  to  Rancière’s  definition  of  politics.  
 
Consensus  is  the  means  by  which  the  police  attempt  to  prevent  the  emergence  of  
political  subjects  or  what  Rancière  calls  “the  demos”.271  Consensus  aims  to  avoid  
the  demos’  politicisation  by  distributing  the  various  parts  of  a  community  without  
remainder.  
 As  the  absence  of  politics,  it  attempts  to  render  invisible  and  inaudible  those  
discourses,   issues,   individuals,   and   groups   that   would   tear   open   the   self-­‐
evidence  of  the  police  by  giving  voice  to  their  exclusion.272  
 
Consensus,   through   the   mechanisms   of   the   police,   holds   forth   that   everyone   in  
the   community   has   been   fairly   counted   or   taken   into   regard.   Consensus,   as   will  
become   clearer   later,   is   not   the   goal   of   politics   for   Rancière;   it   is   rather   the  
sensible  distribution  that  politics  must  overcome.273  Rancière  has  in  the  same  vein  
referred   to   our   time   as   a   “consensual   time”   to   indicate   that   the   logic   of  
depoliticisation  is  becoming  more  sophisticated  and  politics  itself  more  difficult.274  
Rancière   has   set   his   conception   of   politics   in   opposition   to   a   specific   consensus  
prevalent   today:   “The   discourses   ascendant   since   the   fall   of   the   Berlin   Wall   that  

                                                                                                           
270
As above.
271
Rancière J (1999) 9.
272
Tanke J (2011) 45.
273
As above.
274
Rancière J Chroniques Des Temps Consensuels (2005) 7-10 as quoted in Tanke J (2011) 46.

59  
 
attempt   to   legitimate   the   unrestricted   reign   of   the   market”.275   This   form   of  
consensus  employs,  as  Tanke  explains,  a  particular  series  of  operations  to  convert  
democratic  struggles  into  a  series  of  managed  conflicts.276    Tanke  further  explains  
that  consensus  exploits  the  cover  of  political  realism  as  a  doctrine  that  “justifies  
war,   social   hierarchies   and   economic   inequalities   by   invoking   necessity”.277   For  
Rancière  “[r]ealism  is  the  absorption  of  all  reality  and  all  truth  in  the  category  of  
the   only   possible   thing”.278   According   to   Rancière,   the   type   of   political   realism  
present  today  is  the  ideology  that  claims  that  it  is  beyond  ideology.  An  ideology  
that  would  have  us  believe  that  it  is  possible  to  base  government  on  a  pragmatic  
estimation  of  human  nature,  the  laws  of  the  market  and  the  global  situation:  
We  witness  a  version  of  realism  whenever  leaders  exploit  the  imperatives  of  
modernisation,  economic  necessity,  or  notions  such  as  the  “post-­‐9/11  world”  
to  justify  unpalatable  decisions.  Realism  gains  traction  by  promoting  itself  as  
the  efficient  alternative  to  the  chimeras  of  democracy.  [...]  They  encourage  
citizens   to   become   reasonable   in   their   demands   and   to   acknowledge   the  
contingencies  of  the  globalised  world,  asking  us  to  be  content  with  what  we  
have,  and,  in  lean  times,  to  give  back  some  of  our  “privileges”.279  
 
Realism  is  therefore  one  form  of  police  operations  that  attempt  to  put  an  end  to  
politics.  It  is  one  of  the  discourses  that  attempt  to  convince  us  that  the  existing  
world  is  the  only  one  possible.  It  also  presents  itself  as  the  only  rational  choice  in  
the   management   of   common   life.   Tanke   argues   that   in   instances   where   realist  
discourse   is   employed,   for   example,   to   undermine   pension   funds,   lower   wages,  
deny  people  healthcare,  or  limit  democracy,  it  typically  promises  a  future  in  which  
prosperity   and   security   will   offset   these   short-­‐term   inconveniences.280   Rancière  
asks;   “what   is   more   utopian   than   a   schema   whose   goal   continually   recedes   into  
the   future?”281   The   meaning   of   consensus   will   hopefully   become   even   clearer   as  
the  different  aspects  of  Rancière’s  politics  are  explained.  At  this  stage,  I  can  add  
that   consensus   has   to   do   with   the   agreement   of   political   parties   and   social  
partners   within   a   given   community   about   the   common   interests   of   that  
                                                                                                           
275
Tanke J (2011) 46.
276
As above.
277
As above.
278
Rancière J (1999) 132. See also Tanke J (2011) 46.
279
Tanke J (2011) 47.  
280
As above.
281
Rancière J Aux bords du Politique (1998) 56-59.

60  
 
community.   Moreover,   it   has   to   do   with   agreement   about   what   is   given   or   self-­‐
evident   in   a   specific   context.   These   “givens”   are   objectified   to   the   extent   that  
they  can  no  longer  lend  themselves  to  a  dispute;  they  are  not  open  to  litigation  or  
contestation.   It   is   against   this   type   of   contemporary   consensus   or   realism   that  
Rancière   conceptualises   his   definition   of   politics.   Consensus   results   from   and  
relies  upon  the  police  operations  that  enforce  roles,  places  and  positions  as  well  
as   ways   of   doing,   seeing   and   saying   that   delimit   the   boundaries   of   the  
perceptible,  thinkable  and  possible  and  see  that  those  boundaries  persist.282  For  
Rancière,   it   is   politics   functioning   upon   equality   that   can   protect   the   possible   as  
possible.  With  the  police  in  mind,  I  now  turn  to  Rancière’s  definition  of  politics.    
 
2.3.2  Politics/Equality  
I  propose  to  reserve  the  term  politics  for  an  extremely  determined  activity  
antagonistic   to   policing:   whatever   breaks   with   the   tangible   configuration  
whereby  parties  and  parts  or  lack  of  them  are  defined  by  a  presupposition  
that,   by   definition,   has   no   place   in   that  configuration-­‐   that   of   the   part   that  
has   no   part   [...]   political   activity   is   always   a   mode   of   expression   that   undoes  
the   perceptible   divisions   of   the   police   order   by   implementing   a   basically  
heterogeneous   assumption   [...]   an   assumption   that   at   the   end   of   the   day,  
itself  demonstrates  the  sheer  contingency  of  the  order,  the  equality  of  any  
speaking  being  with  any  other  speaking  being.283  
 
Politics   is   the   undoing   of   the   police   order   through   a   presupposition   of   equality.284  
Rancière  conceptualises  politics  around  the  concepts  of  equality,  contingency  and  
antagonism.285  It  is  always  dissensual  and  polemical.  Importantly,  “[p]olitics  is  the  
activity   which   turns   on   equality   as   its   principle”.286   In   order   to   make   sense   of  
Rancière’s   politics,   I   firstly   address   two   aspects   described   by   Rancière   in   the  
opening   quote   above,   namely,   the   equality   of   speaking   beings   and   the  
heterogeneous  assumption  that  needs  to  be  implemented.  
 
The  presupposition  of  equality  is  the  presupposition  of  the  equality  of  all  speaking  
beings:  
                                                                                                           
282
Tanke J (2011) 47.
283
Rancière J (1999) 29-30.
284
May J “Jacques Rancière and the ethics of equality” SubStance (2007) 24.
285
As above.
286
Rancière J (1999) XI.

61  
 
 There   is   an   order   in   society   because   some   people   command   and   others  
obey,   but   in   order   to   obey   an   order   at   least   two   things   are   required:   you  
must   understand   the   order   and   you   must   understand   that   you   must   obey   it.  
And  to  do  that,  you  must  already  be  the  equal  of  the  person  who  is  ordering  
you.287  
 
According  to  this  conceptualisation,  equality  must  be  presupposed  on  the  basis  of  
the   equality   of   anyone   capable   of   hearing   and   understanding   an   order.   It   is   the  
presupposition  of  those  who  have  no  part  in  the  police  order.  May  explains  that  
this  presupposition  belongs  to  anyone  who  acts  in  terms  of  it,  when  a  person  or  
persons   decide   to   assert   himself/herself/themselves   in   the   name   of   his/her/their  
own  equality.288  By  presupposing  equality,  subjects  undo  the  classifications  of  the  
police  order.289  Equality  therefore  undoes  the  classifications  by  which  some  give  
orders.   May   notes   that   the   equality   of   every   speaking   being   lies   at   the   heart   of  
democratic  politics  for  Rancière.290  This  equality  is  found  within  the  fact  that  the  
person  who  understands  the  order  is  equal  to  the  one  who  issues  it.  People  can  
communicate   with   one   another   and   conduct   their   lives   on   the   basis   of   these  
communications,  but  “one  may  be  in  a  position  that  permits  one  to  give  orders,  
but   that   position   is   never   justified   by   any   inequality   between   those   who   give  
orders  and  those  who  receive  it”.291  The  heterogeneous  assumption  that  Rancière  
refers   to   in   the   quote   mentioned   above   is   exactly   the   equality   of   all   speaking  
beings.  This  is  the  heterogeneous  assumption  that  politics  postulates  against  the  
police.  Police  orders  work  on  the  assumptions  that  some  are  to  give  orders  and  
some   are   to   receive   them.   May   further   notes   that   racial,   gender   and   class  
distinctions   for   example   are   grounded   in   the   police   assumption   that   there   is  
inequality  between  those  who  can  order  the  lives  of  others  and  those  who  have  

                                                                                                           
287
Rancière J (1999) 16.
288
May T SubStance (2007) 24.
289
May T SubStance (2007) 25.
290
As above.
291
May T Borderlands (2007) 5. Equality in this sense is an irreducible fact of social existence
that can never entirely be effaced. Rancière does not argue that humans are essentially equal.
He doesn’t have to. He instead argues that all attempts to justify inequality are incoherent.
See Tanke J (2011) 56. Rancière states that “in order for authority to be more than arbitrary
force, it must inevitably give reasons. This process of supplying reasons undermines the claims
on behalf of inequality for when it attempts to explain the hierarchies it would erect, inequality
presupposes equality”. See Rancière J (1991) 46-49.

62  
 
no   part.292   In   other   words,   the   simple   act   of   understanding   a   command   can  
become   an   occasion   for   staging   a   counterdemonstration   of   equality.   For  
Rancière,  in  principle,  every  social  arrangement  is  therefore  open  to  disruption  by  
egalitarian  politics.293  
 
It   should   be   mentioned   here   that   May   explains   that   when   one   presupposes  
equality   a   contradiction   comes   into   play.294   Political   action   brings   out   into   the  
open  the  fact  that  elites,  especially  those  in  democratic  societies,  on  the  one  hand  
believes  in  equality,  whether  this  belief  is  ontological  (in  the  sense  that  for  politics  
it  is   important   for   people   to   be   considered   equal)   or   normative   (in   the   sense   that  
all   human   beings   should   be   treated   equally)   and   on   the   other   hand   believes   in  
inequality.295   This,   as   May   further   elucidates,   does   not   necessarily   refer   to   a   belief  
in  inequality  per  se,  but  rather  to  a  commitment  to  hierarchies  and  dominations  of  
the   police   order,   which   implies   inequality.296   This   is   the   belief   that   it   is   permissible  
to   distribute   certain   roles   to   certain   people,   i.e.   by   approving   of   the   hierarchal  
police   order   they   hold   the   principle   of   inequality.   Politics   introduces   the  
assumption   that   every   speaking   being   is   equal   to   every   other.   Heterogeneity  
functions  on  two  levels  within  this  assumption.  Firstly,  equality  is  posited  against  
inequality.   It   challenges   the   right   of   those   positioned   to   give   orders.   As   May  
notes:  
Those   who   fail   to   have   a   part   do   not   do   so   because   of   some   lack   they  
possess.   They   find   themselves   where   they   are,   not   because   it   is   right   that  
they   be   there,   but   because   the   police   order   just   happened   to   place   them  
there.   It   could   well   have   been   that   they   were   placed   elsewhere,   better  
positioned   in   the   police   order,   and   the   order   would   be   no   worse   off   for  
that.297  
 
The   second   level   on   which   heterogeneity   functions   in   Rancière’s   formulation   is  
the  contingency  of  the  order  itself.  If  every  speaking  being  is  equal  to  every  other  
speaking  being,  then  the  fact  that  some  have  a  part  and  others  do  not  is  purely  

                                                                                                           
292
As above.
293
As above.
294
May T SubStance (2007) 28-29.
295
As above.  
296
As above.
297
May T Borderlands (2009) 5.

63  
 
contingent.   Having   a   part   is   therefore   not   naturally   justified.298   This   does   not  
mean   that   people   are   never   to   delegate   authority,   but   delegation   itself  
presupposes   participation   of   the   delegators   and   presupposes   their   equality.299  
Police   orders   that   divide   along   various   registers   refuse   to   recognise   the  
contingency   of   their   distributions.300   Such   distributions   or   divisions   are   taken   as  
justified  and  even  natural.  Politics  positing  the  equality  of  speaking  beings,  as  May  
elucidates,   gnaws   away   at   the   supposedly   natural   order.301   Politics   concerns  
equality  and  equality  arises  when  the  traditional  mechanisms  of  what  are  usually  
called  politics  are  put  into  question.302  Rancière  states:  
Politics   only   occurs   when   these   mechanisms   are   stopped   in   their   tracks   by  
the   effect   of   a   presupposition   that   is   totally   foreign   to   them   yet   without  
which   none   of   them   could   ultimately   function:   the   presupposition   of  
equality  of  anyone  with  everyone.303  
 
It   should   be   mentioned   here   that   Rancière   derives   his   conception   and  
understanding   of   equality   from   the   notion   of   the   equal   intelligence   of   people  
postulated   in   his   work   on   pedagogy.   His   specific   understanding   of   equality   is  
developed   in   his   book   The   Ignorant   Schoolmaster   in   which   he   engages   with   the  
ideas  of  the  historical  figure  of  Joseph  Jacocot.304  This  engagement  is  central  to  

                                                                                                           
298
As above.
299
As above.
300
As above.
301
As above.
302
May T in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 108.
303
Rancière J (1999) 17. To illustrate the above-mentioned point, Rancière has frequently
referred to the account of the plebeian revolt around Menenius Agrippa, who served as the
patrician ambassador to the plebs occupying Aventine Hill. See Rancière J (1973) 9. He
explains how, in an attempt to restore order to the city, Menenius resorted to the familiar
fable of the body politic with hierarchal divisions of labour. Menenius explained that everyone
has a place, and without patrician command the plebeian body will starve. Rancière highlights
that the problem with his explanation is that it had to be spoken. He was addressing a group
of addressees capable of understanding. Rancière: “The principle of superiority is ruined if it
has to be explained to inferiors why they are inferior”. See Rancière J (1973) 9. A command,
Tanke notes, presupposes that it can be understood, cutting across the relationship of
dissimilarity from which it is articulated. Tanke J (2011) 57. Rancière: “There is no service that
is carried out, no knowledge that is imparted, no authority that is established without the
master having, however little, to speak ‘equal to equal’ with the one he commands or
instructs”. Rancière J (1973) 9. This can also be seen as Rancière’s response to Aristotle’s
partitioning of the logos, namely that there is no meaningful distinction between perceiving
and possessing reason. See Rancière J (1973) 9. See also Tanke J (2011) 57.
304
Rancière J (1991).

64  
 
Rancière’s   understanding   of   politics   and   equality.   Because   of   its   centrality   and  
importance,   as   mentioned   in   the   introductory   chapter,   I   dedicate   a   section   to   it   in  
the  next  chapter.  That  discussion  should  enable  an  even  deeper  understanding  of  
his  formulation   of  equality.  In   this   section,  I   ensue   with   a   general  discussion  of  his  
politics  and  the  role  of  equality  therein.  What  should  be  made  clear  at  this  stage  is  
that  not  every  disruption  of  the  police  order  is  worthy  of  the  name  of  politics.305  
Tanke   explains   that   Rancière   reserves   this   term   for   actions,   speech   situations,  
manifestations,   practices,   arguments,   and   even   works   of   art   and   literature   that  
inscribes   equality   into   police   divisions   of   inequality.306   He   states   that   “[n]othing   is  
political   in   itself   […]   for   the   political   only   happens   by   means   of   a   principle   that  
does   not   belong   to   it:   equality”.307     Therefore,   only   the   supposition   of   equality  
allows   for   speech,   action   and   organisation   to   break   from   the   police.   Without  
equality   such   operations   are   categorised   under   the   heading   of   non-­‐political  
competition  between  parts.308  Rancière:  
What   makes   an   action   political   is   not   its   object   or   the   place   where   it   is  
carried   out,   but   solely   its   form,   the   form   in   which   the   confirmation   of  
equality  is  inscribed  in  the  setting  up  of  a  dispute,  of  a  community  existing  
solely  through  being  divided.309  
 
Thus,  politics  entails  the  enactment  of  equality  (the  equality  of  speaking  beings),  
through  the  staging  of  a  scene  of  dissensus  or  conflict,  within  a  police  situation  of  
inequality.   Put   differently,   politics   is   that   which   ruptures   orders   of   domination,  
legitimacy   and   distribution   through   people   enacting   their   equality   within   an  
unequal  police  order.310  
 

                                                                                                           
305
Tanke J (2011) 51.
306
As above.
307
Rancière J (1999) 33.
308
Tanke J (2011) 51.
309
Rancière J (1999) 32.
310
Davis explains that Rancière’s opposition between the police and politics and the
renaming of what is normally thought of as politics as policing is a twisting of the ordinary
usage of both terms and which blurs and dramatises their proper meanings. See Davis O
(2010) 76. This twisting and dramatising is, as will become clearer later, characteristic of
Rancière’s politics. See Davis O (2010) 76.

65  
 
Stoneman  highlights  that  politics  in  Rancière’s  sense  does  not  derive  from  a  priori  
truths   about   knowledge,   human   nature   or   social   interaction.311   It   is   not   a   function  
or   form   of   government   and   it   neither   ensures   nor   establishes   socio-­‐economic  
order.312   Politics   is   a   dissensual   activity   that   consists   only   in   demonstrating  
equality   in   order   to   break   with   the   “tangible   configuration”   of   the   police   order   as  
Rancière   puts   it   in   the   quote   mentioned   in   the   beginning   of   this   section.   The   type  
of  equality  that  Rancière  holds  forth  is,  as  Stoneman  mentions,  not  something  to  
be   attained,   preserved   or   balanced   against   competing   factors.313   Equality,  
understood   in   this   way,   names   an   assumption   that   political   subjects   must  
presuppose  on  their  own  account  and  demonstrate  through  their  own  actions.314  
Equality  is  therefore  not  given  by  a  social  order,  nor  is  it  claimed,  it  is  practiced,  
verified.315   In   this   regard,   May   has   usefully   described   Rancière’s   conception   of  
equality  as  an  “active  equality”,  a  form  of  equality  that  the  oppressed  presume,  
declare  and  verify  for  themselves  and  which  is  to  be  distinguished  from  equality  
as   conventionally   understood   as   “passive   equality”   which   is   given   by   those   in  
power.316   Equality   cannot   be   given.   The   police   order   or   given   hierarchal   social  
arrangement   is   symbolically   disrupted   by   an   equality   that   is   presupposed   and  
antagonistic.317   Politics   is   the   subversion   of   hierarchy   by   way   of   introducing   a  
scene   of   dissensus   into   the   inegalitarian   partitions   or   orderings   of   the   police.   It  
ruptures   the   logic   that   presupposes   inferiority   and   superiority.318   As   Stoneman  
further   highlights,   it   disorders   the   coherence   of   any   distribution   of   places,   roles  
and  parts  given  by  the  police.319  
 

                                                                                                           
311
Stoneman E Philosophy and Rhetoric (2011) 129.
312
As above.
313
As above.
314
As above.
315
Rancière J (1991) 88.
316
See May T The Political Though of Jacques Rancière (2008).
317
Stoneman E Philosophy and Rhetoric (2011) 129.
318
Stoneman E Philosophy and Rhetoric (2011) 135.
319
Stoneman E Philosophy and Rhetoric (2011) 136.

66  
 
Further,   it   can   be   stated   that   politics   is   also   not   the   assertion   of   personal  
autonomy.  One  does  not  emancipate  oneself  politically  by  oneself.320  The  practice  
of   democracy   is   a   matter   of   community   and   of   “membership   in   a   single   world  
which   can   only   be   expressed   in   adversarial   terms,   a   coming   together   which   can  
only  occur  in  conflict”.321    
It  is  an  assumption  made  together.  May  notes:  
To   engage   in   a   democratic   politics,   in   the   politics   of   equality   is   not   simply   to  
say,   or   act   as   though   one   were   saying   “we   are   all   equal   now”.   It   is   to  
structure  the  past  in  light  of  equality.  To  act  democratically  is  to  always  have  
been  equal.  The  democratic  political  subject  creates  itself  in  the  moment  of  
its  struggle,  but  the  presupposition  of  its  struggle  is  ascribed  to  a  past  that  
justifies  it  retrospectively.322  
 
Within   the   presupposition   of   equality,   political   subjects   are   not   asking   to   be  
merely  “included”.  The  presupposition  of  equality  is  demonstrating  the  fact  that  
political  subjects  have  always  been  equal.323  It  is  important  to  mention  that  since  
the   practice   of   politics   occurs   in   a   situation   of   the   inegalitarian   classifications   of  
the   police   order,   by   breaking   with   that   order,   politics   can,   in   Rancière’s  
conception,   be   more   or   less   effective   in   creating   change.324   But,   as   warned   by  
Ross,  we  ought  not  to  confuse  social  effects  with  the  existence  of  politics.325  It  is  
not   in   the   consequences   but   in   the   acting   out   of   the   presupposition   of   equality  
that  politics  occurs.  Ross  notes:  
Unconcerned   with   the   duration   or,   for   the   most   part,   with   measuring   any  
social   effects   or   usefulness   such   events   might   have-­‐   and   supremely  
unconcerned   with   institutions-­‐   Rancière’s   thought   has   produced  
disappointment   for   readers   looking   for   a   prescription   or   a   program   for  
action  or,  for  that  matter,  a  celebration  of  time  spent  “in  the  trenches”,  so  
to  speak,  the  temporality  of  militant  organising.326  
 
Politics   begins   and   ends   in   a   scene   of   dissensus   or   police   conflict.327   Ross  
eloquently  explains  further:  

                                                                                                           
320
Rancière J On the Shores of Politics (1995) 49 trans. by Heron L.
321
As above.
322
May T (2008) 71.
323
As above.  
324
As above.
325
Ross K “Historicizing Untimeliness” in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 29.  
326
As above.
327
May T (2008) 71.

67  
 
 Politics  is  an  event  that  cannot  be  predicated  any  more  than  its  end  can  be  
apocalyptically   announced.   It   is   always   circumstantial,   local   and   entirely  
contained  in  its  singular  manifestations.328    
 
It   therefore   does   not   carry   on   indefinitely,   but   only   exists   through   enacting  
equality   by   means   of   a   scene   of   dissensus   within   a   particular   police   order   and   it   is  
only   within   the   moment   of   dissensus   and   undoing   of   the   classifications   of   the  
police  order  that  it  exists.  Politics  in  Rancière’s  definition  of  it  is  rare,  it  is  temporal  
and  it  is  localised.  It  is  an  activity  of  the  moment  and  always  provisional.329  
 
Enactments  of  equality  also  re-­‐enacts  what  Rancière  calls  “the  distribution  of  the  
sensible”   which   I   mentioned   in   the   previous   section   and   explain   below.330   The  
division   or   distribution   of   the   sensible   is   both   an   order   of   intelligibility   and   an  
order   of   distribution.   The   order   of   distribution   constitutes   division.   Some   can  
speak,  others  cannot,  some  have  their  voice  heard  or  have  greater  say  and  others  
do  not.  Politics  is  a  partition  in  this  division  of  the  sensible  that  only  ever  institutes  
yet   another   order   that   is   itself   open   to   egalitarian   challenge.331   Politics,   therefore,  
as   Dillon   eloquently   explains,   is   itself   this   never-­‐ending   polemical   intrusion   of  
equality   into   specific   historical   orders   (distributions   of   the   sensible).332   In   other  
words,   politics   takes   place   within   the   police   order.   The   encounter   between  
politics  and  the  police  is  never  final  or  definitive  and  never  “produces  a  new  stage  
of   history”.333   It   is   always   a   renegotiation   of   the   police   order   that   we   must   live  
in.334   Democratic   politics,   enacted   by   the   presupposition   of   the   equality   of  
speaking   beings,   can   only   renegotiate   or   reconfigure   the   police   order.   The  
practice  of  equality  occurs  in  the  context  of  a  particular  hierarchy  in  a  particular  
police  order.  As  mentioned,  nothing  guarantees  that  politics  will  create  change.335  
According  to  Rancière,  equality’s  “verification  becomes  ‘social’,  causes  it  to  have  
                                                                                                           
328
Ross K in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 29.
329
Davis O (2010) 79.
330
Dillon M “A Passion for the (im)possible: Jacques Rancière, equality, pedagogy and the
messianic” European Journal of Political Theory (2005) 431.
331
As above.
332
As above.
333
Chambers S European Journal of Political Theory (2011) 307.
334
As above.
335
May T in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 116.

68  
 
real   social   effect,   only   when   it   mobilises   an   obligation   to   hear”.336   Politics   is   a  
process   and   “[i]t   is   the   emergence   of   a   collective   subject   acting   under   the  
presupposition   of   its   equality,   an   acting   that   disrupts   a   particular   police   order”.337  
It   should   be   emphasised   further   that   the   police   and   politics   are   closely   related.  
Rancière  elucidates:  
If   the   distinction   between   politics   and   the   police   can   be   useful,   it   is   not   to  
allow  us  to  say:  politics  is  on  this  side,  police  is  on  the  opposite  side.  It  is  to  
allow  us  to  understand  the  form  of  their  intertwinement.  We  rarely,  if  ever,  
face   a   situation   where   we   can   say:   this   is   politics   in   its   purity.   But   we  
ceaselessly   face   situations   where   we   have   to   discern   how   politics  
encroaches  on  matters  of  the  police  and  the  police  on  matters  of  politics.338  
 
Further,  the  idea  that  we  should  not  confuse  change  with  politics  does  not  mean  
that  for  Rancière  political  change  is  merely  unimportant.  As  may  reiterates,  it  is  of  
the  highest  importance  for  Rancière.339  But,  we  must  distinguish  the  existence  of  
politics  from  its  effectiveness.340  If  we  do  not  “we  risk  missing  it  in  the  moment  of  
its  happening,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  ascribing  it  where  it  does  not  exits”.341    
 
Politics  and  equality  as  described  by  Rancière  upsets,  it  ruptures  and  breaks  apart.  
Hallward  emphasises  that  equality  does  not  refer  to  a  place,  but  to  the  placeless  
or  the  out  of  place,  not  to  a  class,  but  to  the  unclassifiable  or  the  out  of  class.342    
The  essence  of  equality  is  not  so  much  to  unify,  but  as  to  declassify,  to  undo  
the   supposed   naturalness   of   orders   and   replace   it   with   controversial   figures  
of  division.  Equality  is  the  power  of  the  inconsistent,  disintegrative  and  ever-­‐
played  division.343    
 
Rancière’s   politics   postulate   the   presumptions   of   a   disruptive   equality   against   the  
advocates  of  an  orderly,  hierarchical  inequality.  Rancière’s  most  general  effort  has  
always  been  “to  explore  the  various  resources  of  displacement,  indistinction,  de-­‐

                                                                                                           
336
Rancière J (1995) 86.
337
May T in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 116.
338
Rancière J “The Method of Equality: An Answer to Some Questions” in Rockhill G & Watts
P (eds.) (2009) 287.  
339
 May T in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 116.  
340
As above.
341
As above.
342
Hallward P in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 141.
343
Rancière J (1995) 32-33.

69  
 
differentiation  or  de-­‐qualification  that  are  available  in  any  given  field”.344  And  the  
tool  for  this  displacement  or  indistinction  is  equality.  
 
In   his   formulation   of   equality   Rancière   attempts   to   defend   the   idea   that   the  
notion   of   politics   should   be   reserved   for   democratic   forms   of   organisation,  
communication,   practice,   and   action.   Democracy   in   the   Rancièrian   framework   is  
necessarily   a   destabilising   and   disruptive   force.   Politics   is   distinguishable   from  
other   ways   of   ordering   the   community   by   its   most   basic   element,   equality.  
Without   equality   therefore,   distributions,   operations,   and   discourses   partake   of  
the   opposite   of   politics,   namely   the   police.   The   police   employ   a   fundamentally  
different   logic   than   politics   and   the   opposition   is   sometimes   explained   by  
Rancière   in   terms   of   “worlds”   in   order   to   highlight   the   fact   that   the   police   and  
politics   are   essentially,   although   closely   related,   different   orientations   toward   the  
community.345   “Doing”   politics   is   placing   the   two   worlds   or   logics   in   conflict   by  
creating   spaces   where   the   two   can   be   opposed   and   the   police   hierarchies,  
however  provisionally,  overturned.    
The   political,   according   to   Rancière,   is   the   third   space   of   contestation,   an  
indeterminate   and   always   shifting   meeting   point   between   politics   and   the  
police.346    
 
It   is   further   important   to   mention   that   equality   relies   upon   its   demonstration.  
Tanke   explains   that   Politics   is   about   generating   obligations   to   recognise   the  
existence   of   a   shared   world   through   the   creation   of   polemical   sites   where  
equality   can   be   verified.347   Equality   follows   from   demonstration,   both   in   the  
logical   and   performative   sense.348   It   resides   in   demonstrating   that   the  
demonstrators   are   political   subjects   and   that   their   arguments   count   as   political  
arguments.  This  notion  of  demonstration  is  closely  related  to  Rancière’s  argument  
that   politics   is   about   redistributing   the   distribution   of   the   sensible.   As   mentioned,  
                                                                                                           
344
Hallward P in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 141.
345
Tanke J (2011) 51. See for example “Who is the subject of the Rights of Man?” South
Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 297-310 at 304 where Rancière describes politics as “putting two
worlds in one and the same world”.
346
As above.
347
Tanke J (2011) 59.
348
As above.

70  
 
I   will   discuss   this   notion   fully   at   a   later   stage.   At   this   stage   it   should   suffice   to  
mention  that  the  demonstration  of  equality  is  necessary  to  create  the  conditions  
in   which   others   recognise   the   import   of   equality.349   These   demonstrations   or  
actions   create   a   shared   world   where   one   was   previously   denied   and   they   are  
significant   for,   as   Tanke   notes,   they   overturn   the   exclusionary   partitions   of   the  
police.350   Therefore,   demonstrations   create   possibilities   to   begin   to   take   part   or  
participate.   Equality   requires   a   polemical   demonstration,   a   case   or   verification.  
Equality   as   demonstration   is   closely   related   to   Rancière’s   idea   of   politics   as  
dissensus.   Dissensus   has   to   do   with   “disputing   subjects   and   litigious   objects”.351  
Politics   opposes   consensus   by   means   of   dissensus.   Tanke   notes   further   that  
dissensus  is  the  means  by  which  the  given  situation  is  deprived  of  its  self-­‐evidence  
and   subjected   to   dispute.   He   states   that   “[d]issensus   is   the   process   of   politics  
itself  in  that  it  is  the  activity  of  countering  the  police  distributions  of  the  sensible  
with   the   egalitarian   supplement”.352   Dissensus   breaks   open   an   interpretation   of  
sense   thought   to   be   undisputable,   whether   it   be   through   polemics,  
demonstrations,   strikes,   speech,   poetic   activities,   or   the   definition   of   new  
capacities.353   If   consensus   promotes   the   obviousness   of   the  status   quo,   politics   as  
dissensus  opposes  it  by  postulating  another  world:  
Dissensus   operates   on   space   and   time   in   order   to   create   a   new   terrain   for  
confrontation.  It  is  the  action  of  creating  a  stage  upon  which  one  can  appear  
equal.   It   sketches   the   outline   of   a   different   world   and   forces   us   to  
reconsider  it  alongside  our  own.  Politics  is  the  activity  of  holding  in  conflict  
the   world   of   the   police   and   the   one   defined   under   the   assumption   of  
equality.   Dissensus   consists   in   making   apparent   fundamentally  
heterogeneous  ways  of  parcelling  out  capacities  and  parts.354    
                                                                                                           
349
As above.  
350
Tanke J (2011) 60.
351
Tanke J (2011) 61.
352
Tanke J (2011) 62.
353
As above.
354
Tanke J (2011) 62- 63. According to Tanke it is for this reason that Rancière speaks of
politics as “made up of the relationships between worlds” and not simply conflicts over
power. Tanke J (2011) 62- 63. As he explains, for Rancière the concept of power has outlived
its usefulness. Tanke J (2011) 62- 63. It was formerly an instrument for problematising aspects
of existence erroneously believed to be apolitical. It provided resources for critiquing
phenomena as diverse as education, urbanism, the framing of life in the media and the ability
of class, race, gender and heteronormative privileges to perpetuate themselves. For
Rancière, it sustains the thesis that “everything is political” and therefore ends politics. See
Rancière (1999) 31-32 & 118.

71  
 
  
Politics  as  dissensus  means  that  police  distributions  are  never  secure  and  can  be  
continually  contested  by  those  who  as  subjects  question  its  objects,  parameters  
and   partitions.   Before   explaining   Rancière’s   notion   of   the   political   subject,   I  
reiterate  the  most  important  points  discussed  above.  
 
Politics  is  an  antagonistic  activity,  which  inscribes  equality  into  police  situations  of  
inequality.   Its   aim   is   to,   on   the   basis   of   a   universal   equality   (the   equality   of  
speaking  beings),  disrupt  particular  hierarchal  arrangements  so  as  to  reconfigure  
the  police  order  that  we  must  live  in.  Equality  is  central  in  Rancière’s  conception  
of  politics.  Political  subjects  presuppose  it  on  their  own  and  it  is  an  equality  that  is  
demonstrated   and   manifested   in   order   to   generate   obligations   within   a   specific  
police   order.   Politics   occur   in   a   scene   of   dissensus,   which   is   the   setting   up   of   a  
scene   or   a   stage   where   equality   can   play   itself   out.   It   lays   bare   the   contingency   of  
police   meanings,   rejecting   police   definitions.   The   police   order   is   concerned   with  
titles  and  roles,  classification  and  identification.  Politics  is  concerned  with  not  only  
breaking   with   the   established   framework   of   the   police,   but   importantly;   with  
opening   up   the   possibility   of   reconfiguring   the   police   order   itself.     If   the   police  
order  is  concerned  with  prescribing  what  is  thinkable  and  perceptible,  the  political  
subject   is   concerned   with   instituting   breaches   so   that   other   meanings   and  
directions   are   possible.   In   the   section   below   I   explain   Rancière’s   notion   of   the  
political  subject.  
 
2.3.3  The  Political  Subject  
Politics,  as  mentioned,  involves  dissensus.  It  is  the  disruption  and  reconfiguration  
by   a   political   subject   of   the   given   order   of   domination   and   the   political   subject,   in  
Rancière’s  terms,  only  emerges  and  comes  to  exist  through  the  act  of  politics.355  
To  engage  in  politics  is  not  to  discover  a  subject  of  politics,  it  is  rather  to  create  
one.356    Before  the  scene  of  dissensus,  before  the  enactment  of  equality  there  is  
no   political   subject.   Political   subjectivity   happens   alongside   and   through   the  
                                                                                                           
355
Rancière J (2010) 31.
356
May T (2008) 71.

72  
 
enactment   of   equality.   To   become   a   subject   is   therefore,   as   May   explains,   one  
side  of  the  coin.357  The  other  side  is  the  creation  of  dissensus.  Rancière  states  that  
“[i]t  consists  of  creating  a  stage  around  a  specific  conflict  on  which  the  equality  or  
inequality  as  speaking  beings  of  the  partners  in  conflict  can  be  played  out”.358  One  
becomes   a   subject   by   “rejecting   the   classification   of   the   police   order   and   one  
does   that   by   acting   and   speaking   in   a   way   that   demonstrates   equality   that   runs  
counter   to   the   inequality   of   the   classifications   of   the   police   order”.359   Equality  
cannot  be  received,  but  only,  as  mentioned,  practiced  or  verified  by  the  political  
subject.   As   May   further   notes,   Rancière   might   argue   that   equality   cannot   be  
received,   because   to   receive   it,   is   already   to   be   less   than   equal   to   those   who  
bestow  it.  Democratic  politics  is  politics  of  the  formation  of  subjects.360  Rancière  
states:  
Politics  is  not  the  exercise  of  power.  Politics  ought  to  be  defined  in  its  own  
specific  mode  of  action  that  is  enacted  by  a  specific  subject  and  that  has  its  
own  proper  rationality.  It  is  the  political  relationship  that  makes  it  possible  
to  conceive  of  the  subject  of  politics,  not  the  other  way  around.361    
 
Therefore,  there  is  no  sphere  of  pre-­‐constituted  subjects.  There  are  no  pre-­‐given  
interests,   classes   or   struggles.362   Interests,   classes   and   struggles   arise   because   a  
group  of  people  decide  to  make  itself  a  subject  by  demonstrating  their  equality.  
Rancière  explains  it  in  the  following  way:  
Politics   does   not   happen   just   because   the   poor   oppose   the   rich.   It   is   the  
other  way  around:  politics  causes  the  poor  to  exist  as  entity.363  
 
Rancière   does   not   mean   here   that   nobody   is   poor   before   the   emergence   of  
politics.   What   come   into   existence   are   not   poor   people,   but   the   poor,   a   collective  
subject   taking   action   by   challenging   the   police   order’s   presupposition   of   the  
inequality  of  poor  people.364  In  order  to  describe  the  political  subject  as  Rancière  

                                                                                                           
357
As above.
358
Rancière J (1999) 51.
359
May T (2008) 71.
360
As above.
361
Rancière J (2010) 27.
362
As above.
363
Rancière J (1999) 11.
364
May T Borderlands (2009) 7.

73  
 
envisions   it,   it   is   important   to   introduce   the   concept   of   “subjectivisation”,  
“subjectivation”  or  “subjectification”:  
By  way  of  subjectification  I  mean  the  production  through  a  series  of  actions  of  
a   body   and   a   capacity   for   enunciation   not   previously   identifiable   within   a  
given   field   of   experience,   whose   identification   is   thus   part   of   the  
reconfiguration  of  the  field  of  experience.365  
 
Subjectivation   is   a   production   that   arises   through   collective   action.   It   does   not  
give   rise   to   collective   action   and   does   not   pre-­‐exist   it.   It   also,   as   May   notes,  
doesn’t  arise  from  collective  action  as  a  consequence.  Subjectivation  rather  arises  
through  collective  action,  within  it  and  alongside  it.366  What  therefore  arises  is  a  
we.367  Where  there  were  once  individuals,  within  the  moment  of  politics,  a  subject  
of  collective  action  comes  to  exist  when  the  members,  recognising  one  another  in  
solidarity,   confront   the   police   order   on   the   basis   of   equality.368   But   what   then  
distinguishes   politics   from   any   group   taking   action   in   its   own   name?   Let’s   say   in  
the   name   of   women,   homosexuals   or   black   people?   Importantly,   subjectivation  
should   not   be   understood   as   a   process   of   identifying,   but   rather   as   one   of  
declassifying.  May  states:    
A   democratic   politics   rejects   the   hierarchy   of   the   police   order   not   in   the  
name   of   particular   identities,   but   in   the   name   of   equality,   the   equality   of  
speaking  beings.369    
 
The   process   of   subjectivation   is   not   a   process   of   adding   a   new   police   category,  
but  a  process  of  undercutting  police  categories.  It  does  not  merely  give  us  a  new  
name   that   can   be   added   to   the   existing   names   in   the   police   order.370   Rancière  
argues   that     “[t]he   essence   of   equality   is   in   fact   not   so   much   to   unify   as   to  
declassify,   to   undo   the   supposed   naturalness   of   orders   and   to   replace   it   with  

                                                                                                           
365
Rancière J (1999) 35. It seems that these terms are used interchangeably in the English
translations of Rancière’s books as well as in the various works of authors who write about the
process of subjectivation. See for example the index of words in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.)
(2009) 352.
366
May T Borderlands (2009) 7.
367
As above.
368
As above.
369
As above.
370
As above.

74  
 
controversial   figures   of   division”.371     Identification   imposes   qualities,   usually  
qualities   already   associated   with   the   police   order.372   Subjectivation   is   not  
blackness   or   the   feminine,   for   example,   or   any   other   particular   content   for   that  
matter.  The  underlying  meaning  is  equality  and  only  equality.373    
 
The   following   important   question   has   been   formulated   in   this   regard:   Is   the  
concept   of   equality   shorn   from   any   type   of   identity   capable   of   supporting   politics  
directed   at   specific   hierarchal   conditions?374   Or   put   differently,   don’t   we   need   the  
specific   content   of   identity   in   order   to   struggle   against   the   identity   imposed   by  
the  police  order.  May  answers  this  question  in  the  following  way  and  I  quote  him  
at  length:  
Rancière’s  politics  does  not  deny  that  people  in  struggle  see  themselves  as  
having  particular  identities.  What  is  at  issue  is  how  the  politics  defines  itself  
or   at   least   how   its   unfolding   reveals   it   to   be.   We   might   put   the   point   this  
way:  an  identity  may  be  motivating  for  political  actors,  and  it  may  structure  
the   way   they   act,   but   what   is   politically   relevant   for   a   democratic   politics  
does   not   have   to   do   with   any   of   that.   It   only   has   to   do   with   whether   the  
presupposition   of   equality   is   in   play:   that   is,   whether   the   action   taken   is  
reasonably   seen   as   an   expression   of   that   presupposition.   [...]   What   is   at  
stake  is  not  the  preservation  of  identity  but  the  equality  of  those  who  seek  
to  live  as  they  see  fit.  [...]  It  is  the  politics  of  those  who,  regardless  of  [let’s  
say   for   example]   their   sexual   orientation,   see   one   another   as   fellow  
members  of  a  police  order  that  can  incorporate  and  co-­‐opt  almost  anything  
into  its  operation:  anything,  of  course,  except  equality.375    
 
Gabriel  Rockhill  has  defined  Rancière’s  political  subject  as:  
neither   a   political   lobby   nor   an   individual   who   seeks   adequate  
representation  for  his  or  her  interests  and  ideas.  It  is  an  empty  operator  that  
produces   cases   of   political   dispute   by   challenging   the   established  
framework  of  identification  and  classification.376  
 
The   established   framework   of   identification   and   classification   is   of   course   the  
police  order.  “Identity”  is  therefore  not  a  term  usually  associated  with  Rancière’s  
work.   In   fact,   he   is   highly   critical   of   identity,   specifically   the   way   in   which   it  

                                                                                                           
371
Rancière J (1995) 37.
372
May T Borderlands (2009) 7.
373
As above.
374
May T Borderlands (2009) 12.
375
May T Borderlands (2009) 14-15.
376
Rockhill G “Glossary of Technical Terms” in Rancière J (ed.) The Politics of Aesthetics
(2004) 90.

75  
 
operates   within   and   becomes   identical   to   the   distribution   and   classifications   of  
the  police  order.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  it  might  be  apt  to  describe,  as  Rockhill  
does,   Rancière’s   political   subject   as   an   “empty   operator”.377   In   this   regard,  
Rancière  states  the  following:  
For   me   politics   is   never   a   question   of   identity;   it   always   stages   a   gap   [un  
ècart].  When  one  says  “we  are  the  people”,  I  would  say  precisely  that  “we”  
and   “the   people”   is   not   the   same   thing;   politics   takes   place   in   the   gap  
between   the   two.   […]   For   me   politics   is   the   constitution   of   a   theatrical   and  
artificial  sphere  […]  A  political  subject  is  a  type  of  theatrical  being,  temporary  
and  localised.378  
 
It   should   be   mentioned   that   the   notion   of   verifying   equality,   or   presupposing   it,  
encompasses   the   idea   that   one   is   acting   “as   if”   one   is   an   equal   and   the   idea   of  
creating   a   scene   of   dissensus   relates   to   the   idea   of   building   a   stage   from   where   to  
demonstrate  one’s  equality.  This  notion  of  acting  “as  if”  shall  be  discussed  in  more  
detail   later,   when   discussing   the   distribution   of   the   sensible.   Rancière   uses   a  
number  of  theatrical  metaphors  in  order  to  explain  his  politics  and  it  is  from  within  
this  formulation  that  he  conceptualises  the  political  subject,  not  according  to  any  
type  of  identity,  but  according  to  the  enactment  of  equality,  through  the  process  
of  subjectivation.  The  people  “does  not  constitute  a  type  of  group;  it  is  not  a  mass;  
it  is  purely  the  name  of  an  act  of  subjectivisation”.379  
 
In   order   to   understand   Rancière’s   political   subject,   we   need   to   make   a   distinction  
between   the   identities   forced   upon   people   in   the   police   order   and   the   political  
subjects   that   break   from   these   allocations.380   It   is   only   through   the   elaboration   of  
bodies   and   voices   not   identified   within   the   police   order   that   politics   take   place.  
This  is  what  Rancière  means  when  he  states  in  the  above-­‐mentioned  quote  that  
politics  involves  “actions  of  a  body  and  a  capacity  for  enunciation  not  previously  
identifiable  within  a  given  field  of  experience,  whose  identification  is  thus  part  of  

                                                                                                           
377
As above.
378
Citton Y “Political Agency and the Ambivalence of the Sensible” in Rockhill G & Watts P
(2009) 129-130.
379
As above.
380
Tanke J (2011) 67.

76  
 
the  reconfiguration  of  the  field  of  experience”.381    The  political  subject  is  a  class  
that   belongs   to   no   one   in   particular   and   thus   potentially   to   everyone.382   The  
process   of   subjectivation   contains   two   closely   related   moments;   firstly,   the  
moment   of   disidentification   where   the   subject   tears   away   from   the   identities   and  
interests   as   defined   by   the   police.383   In   other   words,   the   moment   when   an  
individual   actively   challenges   their   position   within   the   dominant   order.   And   the  
second   moment   entails   a   creation   of   new   subjectivities   in   excess   to   the   parts  
already  identifiable  within  the  police  order.384  These  subjectivities  revolve  around  
“impossible  identifications”  or  names  that  do  not  belong  to  anyone  in  particular.  
Tanke  elucidates:  
Strictly   speaking,   these   subjectivities   cannot   be   inhabited   by   the   person   or  
group   making   the   identification;   however,   they   provide   the   means   for  
escaping  the  policed  identities  that  limit  individuals.385    
 
The  impossible  identification  allows  a  subject  to  extend  beyond  itself,  redefining  
capacities  and  insisting  upon  commonality  with  others.386  
 
In   “Politics,   Identification   and   Subjectivization”   Rancière   refers   to   an   impossible  
identification   as   “an   identification   that   cannot   be   embodied   by   he   or   she   who  
utters  it”.387  Rather  than  erasing  the  difference  between  one  subject  and  another,  
impossible   identifications   take   “the   difference   between   voice   and   body”   to  
generate  otherwise  unimaginable  political  effects.388  Rancière  states:  
“We   are   the   wretched   of   the   earth”   is   the   kind   of   sentence   that   no  
wretched  of  the  earth  could  ever  utter.  Or,  to  take  a  personal  example,  for  
my   generation   politics   in   France   relied   on   an   impossible   identification-­‐   and  
identification  with  the  bodies  of  Algerians  beaten  to  death  and  thrown  into  
the  Seine  by  the  French  police,  in  the  name  of  the  French  people,  in  October  
1961.  We  could  not  identify  with  those  Algerians,  but  we  could  question  our  
identification   with   the   “French   people”   in   whose   name   they   were  
murdered.  That  is  to  say,  we  could  act  as  political  subjects  in  the  interval  or  
                                                                                                           
381
Rancière J (1999) 35.
382
Tanke J (2011) 67.
383
Tanke J (2011) 67.
384
As above.
385
As above.
386
As above.
387
Rancière J October (1992) 67.
388
Parker A “Impossible Speech-Acts: Jacques Rancière’s Erich Auerbach” in Rockhill G &
Watts P (eds.) (2009) 256.

77  
 
 gap   between   two   identities,   neither   of   which   we   could   assume.   That  
process   of   subjectivisation   had   no   proper   name,   but   it   found   its   name,   its  
cross  name,  in  the  1968  assumption  “We  are  all  German  Jews”-­‐   a  “wrong”  
identification,   an   identification   in   terms   of   the   denial   of   an   absolute  
wrong.389  
 
Therefore,  to  identify  with  the  Algerian  people  is  impossible.  It  was  impossible  to  
identify  with  their  lives  and  suffering  under  the  existing  regime,  yet  neither  was  it  
possible  to  identify  with  the  French  in  whose  name  they  had  been  killed.  But,  as  
Rancière  states,  “we  could  act  in  the  interval  between  two  identities”,  hence  the  
slogan   “We   are   all   German-­‐Jews”   whilst   most   of   the   demonstrators   were   not  
themselves   German   Jews.   Therefore,   what   is   staged   by   the   political   subject   is   not  
an   identity,   but   the   gap   between   two   identities.   The   idea   of   subjectivation   will  
become   clearer   later   with   the   discussion   of   the   distribution   of   the   sensible   and  
with   illustration   of   some   of   the   examples   that   Rancière   uses.   At   this   junction   it  
should   be   made   clear   that   political   subjectivity   is   about   reconfiguring   the   police  
order   by   creating   new   identities,   capacities   or   bodies.   It   is   therefore   a   claim   to  
equality   that   rejects   the   allocations   of   the   police   order   and   appeals   to  
identifications   that   are   new   to   the   police   order   and   that   holds   the   potential   to  
reconfigure   the   order.   Subjectivation   is   the   process   of   straying   from   one’s  
“natural”   position   given   by   the   police   order,   under   the   heading   of   equality,   in  
order   to   create   new   capacities   or   bodies.   The   example   that   Rancière   uses   and  
mentioned   above   is   complex   and   contains   multiple   nuances.   But,   ultimately,   for  
the   purposes   of   this   section,   Rancière   stipulates   that   subjectivation   is   never  
simply   about   the   assertion   of   identity   but   always   also   about   the   refusal   of   an  
identity   imposed   by   others,   by   the   police   order,   and   it   therefore   involves   an  
impossible   identification,   which   places   the   subject   between   identities.390   The  
subject   strays   from   the   police   order   identity   and   then   has   to   identify   with  
something   else,   an   identification   that   undercuts   the   police   order   and   therefore  
doesn’t   exist   within   the   given   police   order.   Because   of   the   fact   that   it   doesn’t  
exist   within   the   police   order,   it   is   an   impossible   identification,   so   to   speak.   The  
discussion  of  the  figure  of  Gabriel  Gauny  in  the  next  chapter  will  illustrate  in  more  

                                                                                                           
389
Parker A in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 257.
390
Davis O (2010) 42.

78  
 
detail   in   what   way   impossible   identifications   can   be   made.   Impossible  
identifications,   at   this   juncture,   can   be   said   to   involve   names   belonging   to   no   one  
in  particular  because  they  are  not  simply  the  reiteration  of  police  identities.391  The  
particular  name  is  not  the  important  thing  in  question.  Rather,  it  is  how  that  name  
manifests,   the   content   it   is   given   and   the   way   in   which   it   used   to   disrupt   police  
order  identities.  Because  it  is  not  merely  a  confirmation  of  the  categories  of  the  
police   order,   the   subject   is   between   identities,   between   a   police   identity   and   an  
impossible  identity.  At  this  stage,  it  should  therefore  suffice  to  say  that  dissensual  
politics   prefers   polemics,   discord   and   confusion   to   the   identities,   places   and  
capacities  of  the  police  order.  
 
This  definition  is  intimately  related  to  Rancière’s  view  of  politics  as  disruptive,  as  
that  which  attempts  to  break  apart  the  police  order’s  logic  and  to  reconfigure  the  
order.   Politics   and   political   subjectivity   is   about   mixing   identities,   spaces   and  
places   of   the   police   order.   It   is   about   challenging   the   police   order’s   account   of  
things  by  demonstrating  something  different  to  the  police  order  and,  not  merely  
disrupting  it,  but  opening  up  the  possibility  of  reconfiguring  the  order  itself;  and  
equality  is  the  vehicle  of  this  demonstration.  
 
It   is   further   important   to   mention   that   subjectivation   has   a   complex   relation   to  
time   and   it   relates   to   the   time   of   politics.   Subjectivation   is   “self-­‐creation”   and   a  
people   in   struggle   become   subjects   when   they   act   out   of   a   collective   sense   of  
their   equality.392   However,   although   the   sense   of   one’s   equality   is   bound   to   the  
struggle  itself,  it  is  projected  backwards  in  time.  May  explains:  
Thus   equality   is   not   simply   that   presupposition   which   ascribes   social  
congregation   in   the   last   instance   to   the   community   of   speaking   beings   as   to  
a  principle  necessarily  forgotten;  for  it  is  manifested  in  the  recurring  rupture  
which,  by  projecting  the  egalitarian  presupposition  back  to  a  point  anterior  
to  itself,  endows  it  with  social  significance.393    
 

                                                                                                           
391
Tanke J (2011) 67.
392
May T (2008) 71.
393
May T (2008) 72.

79  
 
The   political   subject   is   therefore   the   subject   that   acts   “as   if”   it   has   always   been  
equal  within  a  particular  dissensus  or  instance.  Or  more  to  the  point,  the  political  
subjects   act   as   if   it   has   always   been   a   political   subject   within   a   particular  
dissensus.    
 
Before   explaining   the   notions   of   “the   wrong   and   the   miscount”,   it   should   be  
reiterated  that  one  becomes  a  political  subject  within  a  specific  scene  of  dissensus  
by  rejecting  police  classifications  and  identities  as  well  as  the  allocations  of  ways  
of   doing,   seeing,   saying   and   being   that   the   police   order   states   should   follow   from  
these   classifications   or   identities.   It   is   about   rejecting   the   “natural”   position   given  
by   the   police   order   as   well   as   the   implicit   police   order   assumptions   about   that  
position.   There   are   no   pre-­‐constituted   political   subjects   that   are   regarded   as  
qualified   to   participate   in   politics.   It   is   through   the   construction   of   a   “we”   that  
speaks   in   and   through   equality   that   a   political   subject   is   constituted.   As   shall  
become  clear  later,  for  Rancière,  unimaginable  political  effects  can  be  generated  
by  the  process  of  subjectivation,  by  the  process  of  speaking  to  the  gap  between  
identities  and  by  identifying  with  the  impossible.  
 
The  wrong  and  the  miscount  further  elucidates  Rancière’s  political  subject.  I  turn  
to  these  notions  below.  
 
2.3.4  The  wrong  and  the  miscount  
It   was   mentioned   in   the   previous   section   that   subjectivation   is   as   much   a   struggle  
for  recognition  of  the  political  existence  of  subjects  as  it  is  for  the  identification  
with   a   new   category.   The   notions   of   the   miscount   and   the   wrong   serve   to   further  
elucidate   this   idea.   Rancière,   in   order   to   explain   his   formulation   of   the   “structural  
miscount”,  looks  back  at  democracy  in  ancient  Athens.  Democracy  emerged  after  
Solon’s   reforms   of   594   BCE   abolished   enslavement   for   indebtedness.394   Davis  
explains   that   this   led   to   the   emergence   of   a   class   of   citizen   called   the   demos   or  

                                                                                                           
394
Davis O (2010) 80. See also Rancière J (1999) 9.

80  
 
the  people.395  The  demos  lacked  all  of  the  traditional  attributes  thought  necessary  
for   active   involvement   in   the   political   process   or   public   sphere,   such   as   noble  
birth,   wealth   or   moral   excellence.   Yet,   they   nevertheless   claimed   not   only   to  
participate   in   the   political   process,   but   also   to   be   on   equal   footing   with   those  
thought  to  have  the  right  to  participate  in  politics.396  Their  claim  is  a  response  to  
what   Rancière   calls   the   “wrong”   (le   tort).   This   refers   to   the   fact   that   they   are  
denied   a   legitimate   part   in   society,   or   the   right   to   legitimate   political  
participation.397  Aristotle  describes  the  members  of  the  demos  as  those  who  had  
“no   part   in   anything”.398   Their   political   existence   was   essentially   denied.   For  
Rancière  the  demos  is  a  prime  example  of  a  political  subject.  Rancière  states  that  
the  demos  is:  
An   excessive   part-­‐   the   whole   of   those   who   are   nothing,   who   do   not   have  
specific   properties   allowing   them   to   exercise   power   [...]   Democracy   is,  
properly   speaking,   the   symbolic   institution   of   the   political   in   the   form   of   the  
power   of   those   who   are   not   entitled   to   exercise   power-­‐   a   rupture   in   the  
order  of  legitimacy  and  domination.  Democracy  is  the  paradoxical  power  of  
those  who  do  not  count:  the  count  of  the  unaccounted  for.399  
 
“The   part   of   those   who   have   no   part”   (la   part   des   sans-­‐part)   occurs   alongside  
“the   count   of   the   uncounted”   (le   compte   des   incomptes).400   The   demos   becomes  
the  very  subject  of  politics  and  Rancière  uses  Aristotle’s  formulation  in  order  to  
explain   the   notions   of   the   wrong   and   the   miscount.   The   demos   is   the   political  
subject   inasmuch   as   it   is   capable   of   exceeding   and   thereby   undermining   the  
police’s   accounting.401   The   demos   therefore   have   no   recognised   existence   within  
the   social   hierarchy   of   the   police   order.   They   do   not   count   and   they   have   not  
been  counted.  Policing  therefore  also  denotes  a  specific  way  of  counting.402  An  
aspect   of   the   police   order   has   counted   all   the   parts   of   the   community.   Policing   is  
not  just  a  way  of  counting  the  actual  groups  that  make  up  the  social  whole,  it  is  
also   a   way   of   counting   that   excludes   the   possibility   of   any   remainder   to   that  
                                                                                                           
395
Davis O (2010) 80.
396
As above.
397
As above.
398
As above.  
399
Davis O (2010) 81. Rancière J in Panagia D Diacritics (2000) 124.
400
Tanke J (2011) 43.
401
As above.
402
Chambers S European Journal of Political Theory (2011) 307.

81  
 
order.403   As   Davis   explains,   the   police   must   count   it   all.   The   demos   is   therefore  
the   part   “that   has   no   part”,   “the   unaccounted   for”.   Politics   occurs   when   the  
demos   appears   through   the   enactment   of   equality,   by   the   construction   of   a  
scene   of   dissensus.404   Whereas   the   police   define   the   community   as   unified   and  
whole,   politics   consists   of   contesting   the   very   definition   of   community.405   It  
demonstrates   that   there   has   been   a   fundamental   “miscount”   and   insist,   through  
the  enactment  of  the  equality  of  speaking  beings,  that  there  is  another  ac/count  
of  the  city.406  For  Rancière,  the  hierarchy  of  a  specific  social  order  is  based  on  the  
basic   injustice   of   the   wrong   or   this   miscount.   The   demos’   claim   to   equality   is  
therefore  also  an  assertion  of  their  existence  outside  of  the  police’s  accounting.  
Their   egalitarian   claim   seeks   to   highlight   the   contingency   of   the   police   order’s  
hierarchy,   which   is   a   hierarchy   based   on   a   basic   injustice,   the   fundamental  
miscount  or  wrong  of  their  non-­‐existence.407  Therefore,  politics  cannot  be  other  
than   antagonistic   or   disputatious,   because   it   is   the   expression   of   a   basic  
disagreement   with   a   police   order   that   recognises   neither   the   claim,   nor   the  
existence  of  the  part  that  has  no  part.408  The  police  order  assumes  that  there  is  
no  part  of  those  who  have  no  part.  And  the  struggle  for  equality  is  the  struggle  
for  the  very  existence  of  the  part  of  those  who  have  no  part  as  subject.    
 
Equality   exists   through   the   inability   of   any   political   order   to   count   the   shares   of  
the  community  or  the  communal  parts  and  distribute  the  common  between  them  
on   the   basis   of   some   “harmonious   geometrical   governance”   or   what   Rancière  
refers  to  as  an  arkhe  (a  principle  of  justice  or  the  good  for  example).409  Because  
                                                                                                           
403
As above.
404
As above.
405
As above.  
406
Tanke J (2011) 43.
407
Davis O (2010) 81.
408
As above.
409
Arsenjuk L “On Jacques Rancière” Fronesis (2005) 1-2. (Published on 2007/03/05 and
available online at Eurozine Journals www.eurozine.com/ articles/2007-01-01-arsenjuk-en.html
(accessed 28-12-2014). Rancière states: “An arkhe is two things: it is a theoretical principle
entailing a clear distribution of positions and capacities, grounding the distribution of power
between rulers and ruled; and it is a temporal beginning entailing that the fact of ruling is
anticipated in the disposition to the rule and, conversely, that the evidence of this disposition
is given by the fact of its empirical operation”. Rancière J (2010) 51. For Rancière the

82  
 
there  is  no  arkhe  or  perfect  principle  or  transcendental  truth  according  to  which  
the  parts  of  the  community  can  be  regarded,  there  is  a  fundamental  wrong  done  
during   any   type   of   counting.410   The   equality   of   speaking   beings   is   irreducible   to  
any  political  order  and  thus  never  instituted  as  such.  Arsenjuk  notes:  
It  is  an  equality  which  presents  itself  only  through  a  declaration  of  a  wrong  
committed  by  the  count  of  the  community  parts-­‐  it  is  thus,  an  equality  which  
exists  through  what  it  denies.411  
 
Equality   needs   to   be   axiomatically   assumed   through   the   declaration   of   the  
wrong.412   This   equality   is   of   course   simply   the   equality   of   anyone   with   everyone  
else,  or  the  equality  of  speaking  beings.  It  demonstrates  the  absence  of  the  arkhe,  
of  a  proper  principle  or  the  sheer  contingency  of  the  social  order.413  The  political  
subject   demonstrates   not   merely   the   lack   of   proper   principle,   “but   the   principle  
that  there  is  lack  of  a  proper  principle”.414    
Politics   is   the   process   that   authorises   the   exercise   of   power   by   those   with  
no  sanctioned  authorisation  or  authority.  Politics  is  the  process  that  founds  
the   power   to   govern   other   people   on   nothing   other   than   “the   absence   of  
foundation”,  on  nothing  other  than  the  absence  of  the  arkhe.415    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
existence of a wrong pre-sets philosophy with the effect of another kind of equality, “one that
suspends simple arithmetic without setting up any kind of geometry. This equality is simply
the equality of anyone with anyone else: in other words, in the final analysis, the absence of
arkhe, the sheer contingency of any social order”. Rancière J (1999) 15. According to
Rancière, it is this contingency that the existence of politics makes manifest and that political
philosophy has sought to domesticate and placate by suturing politics to a certain extra-
political principle. Rancière J (1999) 15. Arsenjuk explains that this takes on three forms:
Firstly, “archi-politics”; this refers to Plato and the attempt to tie politics to a communitarian
rule, to subsume politics under the logic of a strict and closed distribution of parts and the
establishment of a social space which is homogenously structured and thus leaves no space
for politics to emerge. Arsenjuk L Fronesis (2005) 3-4. Secondly, “para-politics”; this refers to
Aristotle and the attempt to reduce political antagonism to mere competition, negotiation
and exercise of an agonic procedure, or, to draw the political subject into the police order as
just one more of its many parts. Arsenjuk L Fronesis (2005) 3-4. Lastly, “meta-politics”; this
refers to Marx and the understanding of political antagonism as a displaced manifestation of
“true” antagonism, which is socio-economic, or, politics that can only happen with the
promise of its self-abolishment or the destruction of the political theatre that is necessary for
the direct administration of the socio-economic sphere. Arsenjuk L Fronesis (2005) 3-4. See
Rancière J (1999) 61-93.
410
As above.
411
As above.
412
As above.
413
As above.
414
As above.
415
Hallward P in Rockhill G & Watts P (2009) 146.

83  
 
For   Rancière   democracy   is   a   radical   paradox   and   it   is   indeed   the   paradox   of  
politics   itself.   It   is   a   paradox   “[b]ecause   the   institution   of   politics   seems   to  
provide  an  answer  to  the  key  question  as  to  what  it  is  that  grounds  the  power  of  
rule   in   a   community”.416   And   democracy   provides   an   answer,   but   it   is   an  
astonishing  one:  namely,  that  the  very  ground  for  the  power  of  ruling  is  that  there  
is   no   ground   at   all”.417   Rancière   thinks   of   politics   in   the   form   of   encounter.418  
Politics   opposes   the   logic   of   “the   supplementary”   (that   there   is   another   part)  
with  the  logic  of  the  police  logic  of  saturation  (all  is  counted).  The  police  take  for  
granted  that  there  are  only  the  existing  parts  of  society  and  that  each  of  them  has  
been  given  its  due,  its  common  share.  Politics  claims  the  opposite,  that  there  is  a  
wrong  done  in  the  existing  count  of  the  community,  that  there  is  the  part  of  those  
who   have   no   part   and   it   is   through   constructing   a   scene   of   dissensus   in   which   the  
existence   of   the   wrong   is   verified.   It   is   also   then   through   the   axiomatic  
assumption   or   presupposition   of   equality   that   the   political   subject   is   born.419  
Further,  the  part  of  those  who  have  no  part  has  to  be  staged  because  it  is  not  a  
part   identifiable   or   recognisable   within   the   police   order,   as   such   an   “impossible  
identification”   is   necessary.420   The   demos,   the   people,   appear   as   the   exception  
that   stands   in   for   the   whole   and   has   the   effect   of   disrupting   existing  
identifications  by  separating  the  community  parts  from  its  places.    
 
For   Rancière   there   are   no   privileged   political   actors,   no   inherently   political   object;  
there  is  no  proper  political  content.  Because  of  the  fact  that  politics  occurs  within  
the  police  order  and  it  shares  its  objects  and  its  content  and  happens  against  its  
background,  politics  is  a  matter  of  form:    
Anything   can   become   political   (the   strike,   the   demonstration,   the  
workplace)-­‐   if   it   breaks   with   the   logic   of   negotiation   between   the   existing  
parts   of   social   entities,   stop   being   the   site   of   determination   of   the   proper,  
an  becomes  a  scene  of  an  encounter  between  the  logic  of  the  police  and  the  

                                                                                                           
416
As above.
417
Rancière J (2010) 50.
418
Arsenjuk L Fronesis (2005) 15.
419
Arsenjuk L Fronesis (2005) 4.
420
As above.

84  
 
 axiomatic   assumption   of   equality,   a   subjectivisation   of   a   wrong   and   the  
disidentification  of  the  communal  parts  from  themselves.421  
 
It   has   been   noted   that   the   idea   of   the   wrong   or   le   tort,   derived   from   the   word  
“torde”,  a  verb  that  Rancière  frequently  uses,  means  to  wring  or  to  twist.422  This  
indicates   that   the   wrong   is   torsion   or   twisting   of   the   equality   underpinning   all  
human  relationships.  Social  inequality  is  therefore  a  wronging  or  wringing  of  the  
primordial   equality   on   which   inequality   relies.423   Politics   name   these   twists.     It  
disrupts  the  supposed  naturalness  of  the  initial  count  with  the  emergence  of  the  
demos,   whose   emergence   also   manifests   the   wrong.424   The   emergence   of   the  
demos   impacts   on   the   entire   community   for   the   reason   that   it   cannot   begin   to  
take   part   without   altering   the   ordering,   count   and   distribution   of   parts  
constituted  at  its  expense.425  The  logic  of  the  arkhe,  mentioned  above,  attempts  
to   turn   the   arbitrariness   of   the   social   into   something   natural   and   it   is   the  
emergence   of   the   demos   that   makes   its   arbitrariness   manifest.   The   essentially  
groundless   nature   of   human   community,   along   with   any   natural   equality   that  
might   exist   is   covered   over   by   a   “geometric   equality”   that   attempts   to   supress  
the  emergence  of  the  demos,  by  claiming  it  doesn’t  exist.426  The  emergence  of  the  
demos  therefore  turns  the  consensual  community  into  a  litigious  one;  where  the  
community  was  the  sum  of  its  parts,  the  emergence  of  the  demos  separates  the  
community  from  itself.427  
 
                                                                                                           
421
As above.
422
Tanke J (2011) 52.
423
As above.
424
As above.
425
As above.
426
Tanke J (2011) 54.
427
Rancière states: “Politics exist whenever the counts of parts and parties of society is
disturbed by the inscription of a part of those who have no part. It begins when the equality
of anyone and everyone is inscribed in the liberty of the people. This liberty of the people is
an empty property, an improper property through which those who are nothing can purport
that their group is identical to the whole of the community. Politics exists as long as singular
forms of subjectification repeat the forms of the original inscription of the identity between
the whole of the community and the nothing that separates it from itself- in other words, the
sole count of its parts. Politics ceases wherever this gap no longer has any place, wherever
the whole of the community is reduced to the sum of its parts with nothing left over”.
Rancière J (1999) 306.

85  
 
It   should   further   be   noted   that   the   wrong   does   not   simply   precede   and   therefore  
determine  political  subjects.428  This  would  mean  finding  the  equivalent  of  an  arkhe  
of   politics.   The   situation   is   a   bit   more   complicated.   Arsenjuk   explains   that   the  
declaration  of  the  wrong  that  marks  the  beginning  of  politics  happens  within  the  
police   order.429   The   police   order   is   by   its   definition   the   order   of   the   non-­‐existence  
of   the   wrong.   The   wrong   can’t   therefore   simply   precede   its   declaration.   The  
wrong  does  not  simply  precede  the  appearance  of  the  subject.430  Not  only  does  
the  political  subject  appear  within  the  police  order,  but  also  the  wrong  itself:  
The   declaration   of   a   wrong   is   therefore   never   simply   a   statement   of   an  
already  existing  fact.  Politics  is  not  the  countering  of  facts  with  other  facts.  
The  existence  of  a  wrong  is  not  a  fact.  The  declaration  of  the  wrong  consists  
rather  in  the  break  with  the  logic  of  the  factual.431  
 
In   a   strict   sense   then   the   declaration   of   a   wrong   is   impossible   due   to   the   fact   that  
the   wrong   does   not   precede   such   a   declaration.   Nevertheless,   the   declaration  
occurs.   It   happens   through   an   “enunciation   that   retroactively   changes   the  
conditions   of   its   own   possibility”.432   As   Arsenjuk   aptly   notes,   the   birth   of   the  
political  subject  through  the  declaration  of  the  wrong  thus  involves  “a  kind  of  free  
gesture  or  an  anarchic  that  authorises  itself  through  a  retroactive  presupposition  
of  its  own  existence”.433  
 
Rancière’s  analysis  of  the  Greek  experience  allows  him  to  describe  the  encounter  
between  politics  and  the  police  as  a  specialised  form  of  class  struggle.434  As  Tanke  
notes,  this  is  not  to  say  that  politics  is  in  any  way  about  the  contest  over  goods  
within   a   society.435   In   the   Greek   experience,   the   rich   attempt   to   put   an   end   to  
politics  by  insisting  upon  the  fundamentally  just  nature  of  the  distribution  of  the  
police   order.   The   poor   on   the   other   hand,   who   embody,   according   to   Rancière,  
“nothing  other  than  politics  itself”  attempt  to  reconfigure  the  police  distribution  
                                                                                                           
428
Arsenjuk L Fronesis (2005) 4.
429
As above.
430
As above.
431
As above.
432
As above.
433
As above.
434
Tanke J (2011) 52.
435
As above.

86  
 
so  that  they  can  take  part.436  Politics  is  the  means  by  which  the  part  that  has  no  
part,   through   the   declaration   of   a   wrong,   “contest   the   categories,   divisions,  
identifications   and   means   of   social   integration   that   attempt   to   consign   them   to  
non-­‐existence”.437  Rancière  makes  it  clear  that  political  conflict  does  not  involve  
an  opposition  between  groups  with  different  interests  that  has  an  equal  share  or  
equal   right   to   participate   in   politics.438   The   count   of   the   unaccounted   is   relegated  
by   the   police   order   to   that   which   is   not.   Politics   forms   an   opposition   between  
logics  that  count  the  parties  and  parts  of  the  community  in  different  ways.439  
 
In   conclusion   and   to   clarify,   the   whole   of   the   community   is,   according   to   the  
police,   a   perfect   “fittingness   of   functions,   places   and   ways   of   being”.440   Everyone  
has  his  or  her  place  and  function.  This  can  even  include  the  poor,  or  those  that  are  
excluded.   The   point   is   that   the   police   have   named   them   or   counted   them.   And  
with   this   naming   all   the   assumptions   about   what   the   poor   or   the   excluded   can   be  
or  do  is  established.  The  police  count  the  community  as  the  sum  or  totality  of  this  
“fittingness”   of   empirical   parts,   each   part   bearing   particular   qualifications   for  
membership.   These   parts   or   groups   are   defined   by   differences   in   birth,   by  
different   functions,   locations   and   interests   and   by   their   “dedication   to   specific  
modes  of  action,  in  places  where  these  occupations  are  exercised”.441  The  police  
say  what  there  is  and  what  there  is  not  and  politics,  through  the  declaration  of  the  
miscount,   disturbs   this   entire   arrangement.   The   demos   therefore   brings   politics  
into   existence   through   the   manifestation   of   the   wrong   and   is   therefore   the  
subject   of   politics   in   two   senses,   namely:   “It   is   the   agent   whose   emergence   turns  
the   consensual   community   into   a   litigious   one,   and   its   existence   as   a   potential  
part-­‐taker  is  the  very  object  of  confrontation”.442  
 

                                                                                                           
436
As above.
437
As above.
438
Rancière J (2010) 35.
439
As above.
440
As above.
441
As above.
442
Tanke J (2011) 52.

87  
 
The   miscount   and   the   wrong   can   mean   different   things   in   different   contexts.  
Simply  put,  it  refers  to  the  attempt  to  make  manifest  the  fact  that  there  is  nothing  
natural,  or  that  there  is  no  principle  that  can  justify  the  existing  structure  of  the  
community’s   hierarchies,   parts,   groups   and   positions.   On   the   contrary,   this  
structure’s  existence  is  based  on  a  fundamental  miscount,  or  wrong.  The  central  
point   that   Rancière   attempts   to   make   with   regards   to   these   specific   notions   of  
the  wrong,  the  miscount  and  the  demos  can  be  further  explained  by  his  use  of  the  
term   “disagreement”.   Rancière   has   stated   that   politics   “has   the   rationality   of  
disagreement   as   its   very   own   rationality”.443   Disagreement   here   does   not   refer   to  
simple  differences  of  political  outlook.  Disagreement  “has  clearly  not  to  do  with  
words   alone.   It   generally   bears   on   the   very   situation   in   which   speaking   subjects  
find   themselves”.444   As   James   explains,   Rancière’s   concern   is   the   concrete   and  
material   situation   or   conditions   from   which   people   are   able   to   speak   and   from  
which  their  voices  can  be  heard  and  understood.445  It  refers  to  content  as  well  as  
position.   As   will   become   clear   later,   disagreement   is   a   function   of   the   distribution  
of  the  sensible  which  divides  up  space  and  place,  sites  and  the  perspectives  of  a  
shared   world.   As   such,   disagreement   cannot   simply   be   a   matter   of   discursive  
differences,   but   it   rather   concerns   the   ground   of   intelligibility   and  
communicability   upon   which   such   differences   may   be   articulated   in   the   first  
place.446    Rancière  states  that  disagreement    
is  less  concerned  with  arguing  than  with  what  can  be  argued,  the  presence  
or   the   absence   of   a   common   object   between   X   and   Y.   It   concerns   the  
sensible   presentation   of   this   common   object,   the   very   capacity   of   the  
interlocutors  to  present  it.447    
 
Disagreement  is  therefore  not  just  a  difference  in  opinion  or  misrecognition,  nor  is  
it   misunderstanding.448   It   therefore   concerns,   as   James   further   notes,  
fundamentally   divergent   ways   of   understanding   and   encountering   any   object   of  
disagreement   as   well   as   the   relative   possibilities   of   expression   and  
                                                                                                           
443
James I (2010) 120.
444
Rancière J (1999) XI.
445
James I (2012) 121.
446
As above.
447
Rancière J (1999) XII.
448
As above.

88  
 
communication   that   are   available   to   those   who   may   be   party   to   the  
disagreement.449  The  essence  of  an  unequal  order  lies  in  the  unequal  distribution  
of   material   conditions,   situations   and   positions   which   determine   possibilities   of  
active  participation.  James  states:  
This   means   that   the   things   which   may   be   disputed   in   Rancière’s  
understanding   of   disagreement   are   not   disputed   by   parties   who   have   an  
equal   say   in   the   dispute,   nor   an   equal   position   from   which   to   shape   its  
terms.450    
 
Politics,   with   disagreement   as   its   rationality,   therefore,   does   not   just   relate   to   the  
contestation  of  a  disputed  object  but  also  to  the  status  and  position  from  which  
parties  can  speak  and  make  themselves  heard.   451  This  is  why  the  political  subject  
is  formulated  as  “the  part  that  has  no  part”.  They  have  no  part  in  the  sense  that  
they   are   not   afforded   an   equal   position   to   participate   and   speak   from.   Politics,  
through   the   miscount   and   the   wrong,   demonstrates   or   makes   manifest   the  
unequal  distribution  of  speaking-­‐positions  and  the  contingency  thereof.  
 
Before  turning  to  the  concept  of  the  distribution  of  the  sensible,  it  is  necessary  to  
state   that   politics   is   therefore   about   the   part   that   has   no   part;   the   demos   that  
must  make  manifest  their  existence  as  political  subject  within  a  particular  scene  of  
dissensus   or   context.   Rancière   uses   the   Greek   experience   and   the   definition   of  
the   demos   in   order   to   show   that   questions   of   politics   and   political   participation  
rely   on   prior   decisions   about   what   will   be   a   political   argument   and   who   will   be  
able   to   qualify   for   participation   in   what   circumstances.   The   demos,   therefore  
                                                                                                           
449
James I (2012) 121.
450
As above.
451
As above. As James elucidates, for Rancière the activity of politics of disagreement
concerns the inequality of material conditions which determine the possession or otherwise
of a voice or logos. James I (2012) 122. In this context, politics cannot simply be party politics
because political parties already participate, have a voice and are assigned a place within the
social order. James I (2012) 122. Nor, as James further explains, can politics be the more or
less competent management of economic forces and resources since this too is a matter for
those who are already accounted for and have been given a privileged role within the order
of society. James I (2012) 122. Not, for the same reason, can politics be the management of
competing interests within a shared political, legal and juridical framework. Rancière wants to
underline that politics properly speaking is not an activity, which is pursued on the basis of
any consensus, constitutional or institutional or on the basis of shared norms or protocols.
See James I (2012) 122.

89  
 
represents  the  groundlessness  of  any  political  title,  the  fact  that  these  decisions  
are   contingent   and   that   there   is   a   different   way   of   counting.   The   part   that   has   no  
part  also  serves  to  illustrate  the  notion  that  politics  is  at  once  the  entering  into  a  
realm   of   perceptibility   and   visibility.   Other   than   being   the   presupposition   of  
equality  through  the  process  of  subjectivation,  by  declaring  a  wrong  against  the  
classifications  of  the  police  order,  politics  is  also  about  redistributing  the  sensible.  
 
2.3.5  The  Distribution  of  the  Sensible    
Politics  is,  before  all  else,  an  intervention  in  the  visible  and  sayable.452  
 
Rancière  has  stated  that  “[t]here  never  has  been  any  aestheticization  of  politics  in  
the   modern   age   because   politics   is   aesthetic   in   principle”.453   And   “[p]olitics   is  
aesthetic   in   that   it   makes   visible   what   had   been   excluded   from   a   perceptual   field,  
and  in  that  it  makes  audible  what  use  to  be  inaudible”.454  Politics  is  for  Rancière  
fundamentally   a   matter   of   expression   and   therefore   of   aesthetics.   Police   orders  
are   also   “regimes   of   expression   and   they   determine   what   is   expressible   on   the  
basis  of  a  “partition  (or  sharing  out)  of  the  perceptible”.455  Rancière  argues  that  
the   struggle   of   politics   is   always   an   aesthetic   struggle   for   a   new   partition   of   what  
can  be  called  the  distribution  of  the  sensible.456  As  Ross  affirms,  aesthetics,  in  this  
formulation,  should  be  understood  in  its  widest  sense,  not  only  as  perceptibility,  
but   also   sensibility.457   Politics   is   demonstrated   and   expressed   and   within   and  
through   it   that   the   political   subject   appears.   Politics   is   a   political   aesthetic  
countering   of   the   presentations   and   representations   of   the   police   order.458   As  
mentioned,  the  distribution  of  the  sensible  comprises  of  a  certain  picture  of  the  
world   and   the   police   order   comprises   of   the   mechanisms,   procedures   and  
functions   that   enforces   this   picture.   The   police   order   is   therefore   the   means   by  

                                                                                                           
452
Rancière J (2010) 37.
453
Rancière J (1999) 58.
454
Rancière J (2004) 226.
455
Ross D “Politics and Aesthetics, or, Transformations of Aristotle and Bernard Stiegler”
(2009) Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture available at
www.transformationsjournal.or/journal/issue_19/artivle_032.shtml(accessed2014/12/0).
456
As above.
457
As above.
458
As above.

90  
 
which   a   society   enforces   its   distribution   of   the   sensible.   The   police   maintain   the  
operations   that   set   the   limit   of   what   is   thinkable,   possible   and   conceivable   and  
the   distribution   of   the   sensible   describes   or   defines   the   thinkable,   possible   and  
conceivable  within  a  specific  context.  Policing  further  denotes  an  ordering  of  the  
parts   of   society,   which   is   an   ordering   “that   invents   a   range   of   communicative   and  
behavioural   norms   that   is   then   distributed   on   the   basis   of   a   body’s   nature,  
function   and   occupation”.459   The   distribution   of   the   sensible   therefore,   as  
mentioned,   comes   down   to   the   perceptual   configuration   of   society.460   What   is  
sayable,   what   is   visible,   what   is   understood,   who   counts   and   who   doesn’t?   It   is,  
more   or   less,   as   mentioned,   our   “automatic   perception   of   status   identity   and  
entitlement”.461   In   this   regard,   the   French   formulation   of   the   distribution   of   the  
sensible  becomes  helpful.  Tanke  explains  that  the  word  partage  has  two  elements  
or   senses   that   is   easily   lost   in   the   English   translation.462   Partage   has   a   double  
meaning,  namely,  separation  and  community,  dividing  and  sharing.463  In  the  first  
sense,   “it   describes   how   partitions   and   divisions   of   the   sensible   is   seen   and  
unseen,  audible  and  inaudible,  how  certain  objects  and  phenomena  can  be  related  
or  not,  and  also,  who,  at  the  level  of  subjectivity,  can  appear  in  certain  times  and  
places”.464  It  denotes,  as  Tanke  further  explains,  a  general  distribution  of  bodies  
as  well  as  an  implicit  estimation  of  what  they  are  capable  of  in  what  times  and  in  
what  places.465  It  therefore  divides  up  and  separates  spheres,  people,  places  and  
times.   The   second   sense   of   partage   indicates   that   these   distributions   are  
shared.466  It  indicates  a  sharing  of  the  sensible  that  refers  itself  to  the  principles  
and   forms   of   relation   that   are   part   of   the   community   or   common   world.   It  
therefore   denotes   the   parcelling   out   of   spaces   and   times   to   create   a   shared  

                                                                                                           
459
Stoneman E Philosophy and Rhetoric (2011) 43.
460
Tanke J (2011) 2.  
461
As above.
462
As above.
463
Bosteels B “Rancière’s Leftism, Or, Politics and Its Discontents” in Rockhill G & Watts P
(eds) (2009) 170.
464
Tanke J (2011) 2.
465
As above.
466
As above.

91  
 
world.467   As   Tanke   further   highlights,   the   distribution   of   the   sensible   is   of   great  
significance   to   Rancière.468   Its   distinctions   and   divisions   anticipate   what   is  
thinkable  and  possible.469  Tanke  eloquently  explains  that  it  provides  a  picture  of  
the   world   of   what   can   be   conceived,   discussed   and   disputed   and   what   can   be  
conceived,   discussed   and   disputed   in   turn   structures   what   presents   itself   as  
thought  and  as  possibility  for  further  thought.470  The  sensible  provides  courses  of  
action,  forms  of  relation  and  what  may  be  regarded  as  new  thought  for  sensible  
configuration.471  The  distribution  of  the  sensible  thus  ultimately  defines  the  field  
of   possibility   and   impossibility   within   a   specific   context   or   community.472   In  
French,  the  word  sense  means  at  once,  sense,  meaning  and  direction.473  Politics  is  
a   redistribution   of   the   sensible   and   to   redistribute   the   sensible   means   to   bring  
into   question   both   the   obviousness   of   what   can   be   perceived,   thought   and   done,  
as   well   as   the   distribution   of   those   thought   capable   of   perceiving,   thinking   and  
doing.474   With   his   formulation   of   the   distribution   of   the   sensible,   Rancière   is  
interested,   as   Tanke   further   explains,   in   the   sense   that   is   made   of   sense.475   The  
distribution   of   the   sensible   connotes   to   the   meanings   that   are   made   of   what  
appears   to   our   senses.476   The   task   of   politics   is   that   of   introducing   breaches   so  
that  other  meanings  and  directions  are  created.477  The  police  order,  enforcing  the  
distribution   of   the   sensible,   ultimately   concerns   the   material   ground   of  
communicability,   intelligibility   and   sensibility   and   politics   concerns   the  
contestation  of  this  material  ground.478  
 

                                                                                                           
467
As above.
468
Tanke J (2011) 2-3.
469
As above.
470
Tanke J (2011)
471
Tanke J (2011) 2-3.
472
As above.
473
As above.
474
Sellberg K “Sublime gender transposition: The reformed platonism of Jacques Rancière’s
aesthetics as queer performance” Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture 2011
www.transformationsjournal.or/journal/issue_19/artivle_032.shtml (accessed 2014/12/06).
475
Tanke J (2011) 2.
476
Tanke J (2011) 22.
477
Tanke J (2011) 2.
478
Tanke J (2011) 49-50.

92  
 
Citton   mentions   that   the   partition   or   distribution   of   the   sensible   has   become  
something   of   a   household   name   in   France.479   With   this   phrase   or   formulation  
Rancière   refers   to   the   most   basic   system   of   categorisation   through   which   we  
perceive  and  intuitively  classify  the  data  provided  to  our  senses.480  Citton  explains  
the   usefulness   of   the   formulation   by   highlighting   that   it   has   been   adopted   by  
literary  critics,  philosophers,  theorists  of  aesthetics  as  well  as  sociologists,  who  all  
seem  to  find  in  the  formulation  a  way  of  expressing  what  they  always  wanted  to  
express.481   Indeed,   many   scholars   have   been   seduced   by   the   phrase   as   its   role  
hinges  between  politics  and  aesthetics  and  it  proves  to  be  extremely  helpful  as  it  
allows  one  to  dig  tunnels  under  disciplinary  frontiers.482  For  Citton,  it  sets  up  an  
interface   through   which   various   approaches   can   interact   and   shed   light   on   each  
other  and  it  offers  a  foundational  common  ground  on  the  basis  of  which  one  can  
root   and   articulate   various   reflections.483   It   unites   discussions   on   philosophy,  

                                                                                                           
479
Citton Y in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 120.
480
As above.
481
As above.
482
As above.
483
As above. Rockhill explains that Rancière has formulated an alternative conception of the
relationship between art and politics. Rockhill G “The Politics of Aesthetics: Political History
and the Hermeneutics of Art” in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 200-201. Instead of searching for
a definitive solution of the long-standing problem of the connection between art and politics,
he attacks the guiding assumption on which the problem is based: “that art and politics are
separate domains in need of being linked together”. See Rockhill G in Rockhill G & Watts P
(eds.) 200-201. Rather, with the notion of the distribution of the sensible, Rancière sums up his
position, namely, that art and politics are consubstantial insofar as they both organise a
common world of self-evident facts of sensory perception: “In fact, the very delimitation and
definition of what are called art and politics are themselves dependent upon a distribution of
the sensible regime of thought and perception that identifies them as such”. See Rockhill G
in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 200-201. Rancière states: “[A]rt and politics are not two separate
realities about which it might be asked if they must be put in relationship to one another.
They are two forms of distribution of the sensible tied to a specific regime of identification”.
See Rancière J Le Destin Des Images (2003) 19. It is argued that since the late 1990’s,
Rancière has put forth one of the most powerful accounts of aesthetics. See Rockhill G in
Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 200-201. Instead of taking art to be historical and attempting to
unveil its fundamental essence he maintains, as Rockhill and Watts elucidates, that there is no
“art in general” but only historically constituted “regimes” that establish a given distribution
of the sensible and determine the framework of possibility for artistic production and
theoretical reflection on art. Rockhill G & Watts P Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 9.

93  
 
politics,  art,  aesthetics,  and  cinema,  all  of  which  are  conceived  of  as  practices  of  
creating,  distributing,  contesting  and  redistributing  the  sensible  world.484  
 
When   the   distribution   of   the   sensible   is   viewed   through   the   lens   of   human  
capacity   or   action,   some   data   is   perceived   and   selected   as   relevant   by   people,  
while   other   data   is   rejected   as   irrelevant   or   ignored.485   As   Citton   further  
elucidates,  each  time  this  happens,  agents  inherit  a  specific  social  configuration  of  
the  distribution  of  the  sensible,  which  they  can  transmit  as  it  has  been  transmitted  
to   them,   or   which,   following   the   encounter   with   this   data,   can   lead   them   to  
modify  it  at  a  minute  or  sometimes  more  dramatic  level.486  The  reconfiguration  of  
the   distribution   of   the   sensible   appears,   within   Rancière’s   formulation,   as   the  
founding  moment  of  political  subjectivation:    
Whether   I   stand   in   front   of   a   work   of   art   or   am   involved   in   a   social  
movement,  the  possibility  of  politics  rests  on  such  a  moment  when  I  am  led  
to   reconfigure   the   partage   du   sensible   I   have   inherited   from   the   majoritarian  
norms   (along   with   its   blind   spots,   its   denial   of   rights,   and   its   hierarchy   of  
privileges).487    
 
When   it   comes   to   the   concept   of   the   distribution   of   the   sensible,   aesthetics  
should   be   understood,   as   mentioned,   in   an   expanded   sense.   It   should   include  

                                                                                                           
484
Tanke J (2011) 1-2.
485
Citton Y in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 123 & 313.  
486
As above. Citton further theorises the distribution of the sensible as active in the sense that
theatrical politics draws on our capacity to repartition, alter lines and blur borders. Citton Y in
Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 131-137. Citton reminds that we should not forget that we can only
do so from within a certain given or inherited configuration of the partage du sensible or “a
state of things that pre-exists and largely predetermines our possible work of
reconfiguration”. Citton Y in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 131-137. Before taking place toward
other people, the re-presentation takes place within us. This is what is active in Rancière’s
formulation according to Citton. Citton Y in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 131-137. He refers to
the process of thought within which certain data perceived by our sensory apparatus get to
be considered as relevant, and make it to the point where they become a deciding factor in
the determination of our future behaviours, while other comparable data gets lost along the
way. Citton Y in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 131-137. And it is in this process that we become
agents, political or otherwise. The selective re-presentation appears as a way to mange a
situation of excess. There are too many data in our sensory input for us to give an exhaustive
account of all features. Not everything can count and any given state of things carries excess.
See Citton Y in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 131-137.
487
As above.

94  
 
factors  such  as  time  and  space  that  structure  the  way  in  which  things  appear.488  
The   way   in   which   the   given   world   or   the   sensible   is   defined   through   the  
partitioning   of   space   and   time   is   political   because   it   sketches   the   boundaries   of  
what   is   sensible,   intelligible   and   possible.   The   redistribution   of   the   sensible   is  
about   invalidating   the   current   distribution   of   space   and   time.489   It   is   about  
undermining   the   space   and   time   prescribed   by   the   police   order.   As   mentioned,  
the  noun  le  partage  from  the  verb  partager,  means  both  to  share  out  and  divide  
up.490   It   therefore   simultaneously   suggests   the   sharing-­‐out   and   the   dividing-­‐up   of  
the   sensory   or   the   sensible   world.491   The   sharing-­‐out   and   dividing-­‐up   can   be  
understood  in  terms  of  a  system  of  
[a]  priori  forms  determining  what  presents  itself  to  sense  experience.  It  is  a  
delimitation  of  spaces  and  times,  of  the  visible  and  invisible,  of  speech  and  
noise,   that   simultaneously   determines   the   place   and   the   stakes   of   politics   as  
a   form   of   experience.   Politics   revolves   around   what   is   seen   and   what   can   be  
said   about   it,   around   who   has   the   ability   to   see   and   the   talent   […]   to   speak,  
around  the  properties  of  spaces  and  the  possibilities  of  time.492  
 
Further,   the   nature   of   the   distribution   of   the   sensible   makes   it   seem   as   self-­‐
evident.  The  redistribution  of  the  sensible  is  about  disputing  that  which  is  given,  
it  is  a  division  put  in  the  common  sense.493  Rancière  states:  
[Politics]   is   a   subversion   of   a   given   distribution   of   the   sensible.   […]   The  
subversion  implies  the  reframing  of  a  common  sense.  A  common  sense  does  
not   mean   a   consensus   but,   on   the   contrary,   a   polemical   place,   a  
confrontation  between  common  senses  or  opposite  ways  of  framing  what  is  
common.  […]  Politics  is  a  polemical  form  of  reframing  of  common  sense.494  
 
And   it   is   up   to   political   subjects,   presupposing   their   equality,   to   reframe   the   given  
distribution  of  the  sensible.495  To  become  the  subject  of  politics  is  to  make  oneself  

                                                                                                           
488
Tanke J (2011) 5.
489
Tanke J (2011) 25.
490
Davis O (2010) 91.
491
As above.
492
Rancière J (2004) 13. As Kristin Ross notes, Rancière prefers to think about time in terms of
the way it gives form to relations of power and inequality and how its denaturalisation
shatters those relations. See Ross K in in Rockhill G & Watts P (2009) (eds.) 18.
493
Rancière J South Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 304.
494
Rancière J “The method of Equality: An Answer to Some Questions” in Rockhill G & Watts
P (2009) (eds.) 277.
495
It should be mentioned, as Rockhill explains, that some of Rancière ’s more recent work
offers a slightly more nuanced position that remained somewhat peripheral in his earlier work

95  
 
appear   where   there   had   previously   been   only   categories   and   indeed   categories  
that   rendered   one   or   one’s   experience   invisible.496   Politics   is   an   aesthetic  
phenomenon;   it   makes   something   appear   that   had   not   been   there   before,  
namely,   the   part   of   those   who   has   no   part.497   Politics   therefore   disorders   the  
coherence   of   any   distribution   of   roles   and   places   and   parts.   As   May   notes,   it  
disidentifies  bodies  from  their  police  order  nature  and  their  ends.498  It  interrupts,  
through   the   part   that   has   no   part,   the   symbolic   partitions   that   mark   some   as  
unseen,   unheard   and   of   no   account.499   Politics   has   to   do   with   aesthetic  
performances   that   create   spaces   for   disagreement.   As   mentioned   in   the   previous  
section,   Rancière   often   refers   to   politics   and   the   police   in   terms   of   worlds.   He  
states  in  Disagreement  that  politics  is  bringing  two  worlds  together,  the  world  in  
which  all  speaking  beings  are  regarded  as  equal  and  the  world  in  which  they  are  
not.500   Politics   may   therefore   be   regarded   as   an   “aesthetic   operation   of   world-­‐

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
when it comes to politics and the distribution of the sensible. See Rockhill G in Rockhill G &
Watts P (2009) (eds.) 201-202. Instead of simply juxtaposing a consensual distribution of the
sensible and dissensual acts of political subjectivisation, Rancière increasingly uses the term
politics to refer to both distributions and redistributions of the sensible order. See Rockhill G
in Rockhill G & Watts P (2009) (eds.) 201-202. Because of the more detailed account of the
conjunction of politics, Rancière has been led to break down “a strict opposition between an
established order and intermittent moments of destabilisation”. See Rockhill G in Rockhill G
& Watts P (2009) (eds.) 201-202. The distribution of the sensible, more recently, refers to both
of these elements: “This distribution and redistribution of places and identities, this
delimitation and re-delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and invisible, of noise and
speech constitutes what I call the distribution of the sensible”. Rancière J Malaise Dans
L’esthètique (2004) 38 (passage translated by Rockhill G). A similar change is visible in his
definition of politics: “[Politics is] the configuration of a specific space, the delimitation of a
particular sphere of experience, of objects established in common and coming from a
common decision, of subjects recognised as capable of designating these objects and
arguing about them”. See Rancière J Malaise Dans L’esthètique (2004) 37 (passage translated
by Rockhill G). Rockhill further explains that Rancière is emphasising the police process in
politics and the dissensual elements in the distribution of the sensible. See Rockhill G in
Rockhill G & Watts P (2009) (eds.) 201-202. He therefore breaks down the rigid opposition
between stable structures and intermittent acts of reconfiguration. Politics is a distribution of
the sensible insofar as every distribution presupposes at least the potential for redistribution.
See Rockhill G in Rockhill G & Watts P (2009) (eds.) 201-202.
496
Tanke J (2011) 3-4.
497
May T (2008) 71.
498
As above.
499
As above.
500
Rancière J (1999) 30.

96  
 
disclosure”.501   It   transforms   perceptual   limitations   to   reveal   an   equality   of   bodies,  
capacities  and  voices.  
 
Tanke  has  mentioned  that  they  key  question  for  any  distribution  of  the  sensible  is  
to  know  whether  it  is  founded  upon  equality  or  inequality.502  A  division  is  always  a  
division  into  parts  and  it  is  essential,  in  Rancièrian  terms,  to  determine  the  metric  
according   to   which   this   division   takes   place:   “Whether   it   is   the   distribution   of  
parts,   objects,   the   arts,   or   the   relationship   between   speech   and   visibility,   these  
operations   define   worlds   that   are   either   compatible   or   incompatible   with  
equality”.503  Therefore,  the  primary  goal  of  any  analysis  of  the  distribution  of  the  
sensible  is  thus  to  determine  whether  equality  is  present  or  not.  It  is  interesting  to  
note  that  Tanke  reads  Rancière  ’s  writings  as  initiating  a  twofold  movement  with  
respect   to   the   distribution   of   the   sensible.504   In   the   first   instance,   it   offers   what  
Tanke  calls  a  “topographical  analysis”  of  the  sensible.  This  form  of  analysis  should  
be   seen   as   sidestepping   the   so-­‐called   “hermeneutics   of   depth”.505   This   refers   to  
interpretations   that   are   premised   upon   meanings   thought   to   reside   below   the  
surface   of   texts,   political   arrangements   and   artistic   forms.506   If   one   is   to   explain   it  
in  Rancièrian  terms,  beside  from  such  interpretations’  theological  residue,  depth  
hermeneutics   establishes   the   pedagogical   space   of   the   master,   the   one   who  
knows  the  true  meaning  of  things  and  is  gracious  enough  to  impart  it  to  others.507  
As  we  will  see,  with  reference  to  Joseph  Jacocot  that  will  be  discussed  below,  the  
hermeneutics   of   depth   is   problematic   for   Rancière   as   it,   along   the   lines   of  
scienticism,  divides  the  world  into  two:  minds  capable  of  detecting  in  words  and  
forms  their  correct  meaning  and  those  who  are  dependent  upon  others  for  such  
discoveries.   In   Tanke’s   reading,   the   topographical   analysis   sticks   to   the   surface   of  
things.508   It   offers   a   description   of   the   relationship   between   elements   and   the  

                                                                                                           
501
Stoneman E Philosophy and Rhetoric (2011) 146.
502
Tanke J (2011) 2.
503
As above.
504
Tanke J (2011) 3.
505
As above.
506
As above.
507
Tanke J (2011) 3.
508
As above.

97  
 
common  world.509  This  form  of  analysis  does  not  claim  to  strike  upon  the  ultimate  
or   correct   meaning   of   these   forms.   The   point   is   rather   to   try   and   indicate   “how  
they   appear,   the   logic   of   their   relations,   the   conditions   of   their   historical  
possibility,   the   meanings   they   have   been   given   and   the   overall   picture   they   give  
rise  to”.510  The  sensible  world  is  itself  shared  and  these  elements  are  detectable  
on   the   surfaces   of   texts,   images   and   political   arrangements.511   Because   of   this,  
topographical   analysis   employs   a   supposition   opposed   to   the   hermeneutics   of  
depth,   namely;   “it   credits   its   addressees   or   readers   with   being   already   in  
possession  of  capacities  for  making  sense  of  sense”.512  The  analysis  is  thus  framed  
inter-­‐subjectively   according   to   Tanke.513   The   second   instance,   or   moment   that  
Tanke   detects,   is   evaluating   these   arrangements   in   terms   of   the   version   of   the  
possible   that   they   define.514   Rancière   attempts   to   analyse   how   the   constitution   of  
a  sensible  given  (whether  in  philosophical  discourses,  political  arrangements  and  
artistic   practices)   defines   forms   of   openness   or   closure.   Rancière’s   work   can   be  
viewed   as   a   series   of   interferences   designed   to   break   apart   and   undermine   the  
sense  of  inevitability  attached  to  many  forms  of  intellectual,  political  and  artistic  
labour.515   The   second   movement   is   therefore   an   intervention   into   the   sensible  
configuration   of   our   common   world   designed   to   create   space   for   the  
implementation  of  equality.516  Further,  it  becomes  important  to  explain  Rancière’s  

                                                                                                           
509
As above.
510
As above.
511
As above.
512
As above.
513
Tanke J (2011) 3-4.
514
As above.
515
As above.
516
As above. Ross argues that beginnings, or points of departure is more important for
Rancière than for most thinkers and he likes to begin by throwing things into reverse. Ross K
in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 20-21. For example, if one looks at Rancière along the lines of
culture; he doesn’t begin with culture (conceived of as one’s proper allotment in symbolic
capital or culture conceived of as a set of consoling rituals). Ross K in Rockhill G & Watts P
(eds.) 20-21. He, as Ross explains, rather begins with emancipation. Ross K in Rockhill G &
Watts P (eds.) 20-21. The concept of culture “whether one applies it to knowledge of the
classics or to the manufacture of shoes, has the sole effect of effacing this movement of
subjectivisation that operates in the interval between several nominations and its constitutive
fragility”. See Rancière J The Names of History: On the Poetics of Knowledge (1994) 98. The
concept of culture thus presupposes an identity tied to a way of speaking, being and doing
that is itself tied to a situation, a name, body, assigned to a place, a life station. Ross K in

98  
 
use   of   theatre   within   his   notion   of   politics,   the   power   of   language   and   speech  
within  the  context  of  the  distribution  of  the  sensible  and  the  argumentative  and  
logical  character  of  equality  that  seeks  to  redistribute  the  sensible.  I  address  these  
points  below  before  concluding.    
 
Rancière’s   conception   of   equality   is   illuminated   by   his   use,   metaphorically   and  
literally,   of   theatre.517   Here   aesthetics   again   come   into   play   and,   as   Hallward  
explains,   rather   than   a   principle   of   order   or   distribution,   Rancière   presents  
equality  as  a  “pure  supposition  that  must  be  verified  continuously  -­‐   a  verification  
or   an   enactment   that   open   specific   stages   of   equality,   stages   that   are   built   by  
crossing   boundaries   and   interconnecting   forms   and   levels   of   discourse   and  
spheres  of  experience”.518  Hallward  explains  that  every  subject  plays  or  acts  in  the  
theatrical   sense.519   Every   political   subject   is   first   and   foremost   “a   sort   of   local   and  
provisional  theatrical  configuration”.520  The  thematic  of  the  stage  is  all  pervading  
in   Rancière’s   work.   In   the   mid-­‐1970’s   Rancière   already   adopted   the   view   that  
rather  than  a  matter  of  “popular  savagery”  or  “historical  necessity”,  revolt  is  “a  
staging  of  reasons  and  ways  of  speaking”.521  Rancière  went  on  in  Disagreement  to  
define  politics  as  a  matter  of    

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 20-21. Culture, as Ross further notes, is “inherently functionalist
and non-contingent” in Rancière’s terms. Ross K in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 20-21. With
reference to Arlette Farge and her discussion of the anti-ethnological dimension of Rancière’s
work on history, the following might be discerned, according to Ross: “If a space (territory or
terroir) is the point of departure for an analysis, whether it be the space of the region, ghetto,
island or factory, the people’s voices, their subjectivities, can be nothing more than the
naturalised, homogenised expressions of those spaces”. Ross K in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.)
20-21. Rancière’s project could be said to be a different kind of cultural studies, an anti-
identitarian one: “A cultural study where the concept of culture has been banished form the
outset and identitarian matters twisted into a fluid and unscheduled non-system of significant
misrecognitions”. See Ross K in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 20-21.
517
Hallward P in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 141.
518
As above. See Rancière J “The Thinking of Dissensus: Politics as Aesthetics” paper
presented at the conference “Post-structuralism and Radical Politics” Goldsmiths College,
London (16-17 September 2003) available at http://homepages.gold.ac.uk/psrpsg/confe-
rence/fidelity/html(accessed2014/12/16).
519
As above.
520
Hallward P in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 141.
521
Rancière J Les Scenes Du Peuple (2003) 10 as referenced in Hallward P in Rockhill G &
Watts P (eds.) 142.

99  
 
 performing   or   playing,   in   the   theatrical   sense   of   the   word,   the   gap   between  
a   place   where   the   demos   exists   and   a   place   where   it   does   not   […]   Politics  
consist  in  playing  or  acting  out  this  relationship,  which  means  first  setting  it  
up   as   theatre,   inventing   the   argument,   in   the   double   logic   and   dramatic  
scene  of  the  term,  connecting  the  unconnected.522    
 
In   this   regard,   Rancière   has   also   referred   to   the   example   of   an   ordinary   act   of  
policing,   namely,   the   instruction   to   “move   along   now,   there   is   nothing   to   see  
here”.523  If  the  police  order  denies  that  there  is  anything  to  see,  politics  creates  a  
spectacle   or   something   to   see.   Politics   entails   transforming   this   space   of   “moving-­‐
along”   into   a   space   of   the   appearance   of   the   subjects.524   Politics   is   in   this   sense  
creative   and   dramatic.525   Moreover,   it   is   axiomatically   theatrical   since   the  
emergence   of   a   subject   is,   for   Rancière,   always   also   the   emergence   into   the   realm  
of   perception,   visibility   and   audibility.   As   Davis   states,   “it   is   a   manifestation”.526  
Political   subjectivation   resembles   acting   because   it   involves   pretending   that   you  
are   something   you   are   not   in   order   to   become   it;   pretending   to   be   an   equal  
participant   within   the   political   process   from   which   you   are   in   fact   excluded.   And  
within   the   act   of   demonstration,   the   political   subject   or   the   demos,   previously  
unaccounted   for,   appears   within   the   realm   of   perception   or   the   current  
distribution  of  the  sensible.    
 
Importantly,   the   notion   of   speech   is   intimately   linked   to   Rancière’s   politics   and  
the  distribution  of  the  sensible.  Rancière  states:    
                                                                                                           
522
Rancière J (1999) 88. Hallward terms Rancière’s politics as theocracy and discusses seven
reasons why Rancière’s politics is theatrical, namely, “it is spectacular”, “it is artificial”, “it
privileges multiplicity over unity”, “it is disruptive”, “its performance is contingent”, “it tends
toward improvisation” and “it operates within a liminal configuration”. See Hallward P in
Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 146-157.
523
Davis O (2010) 86.
524
As above.
525
As above. Hallward, as mentioned, has described Rancière’s politics as “theatocracy”. See
Hallward P in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 140-157. The term derives originally from Plato
who famously excluded theatre from his ideal city in Republic. This was not because of the
immoral content of plays, but rather because the theatre was a dangerous place of
semblance where actors are doing two things and being two people at the same time.
Theatre therefore challenges the metaphysical organising principle of Plato’s autocratic and
hierarchal state, namely, the principle of specialisation according to which people can only do
or become one thing. Rancière’s deep-level connection and engagement with Plato will be
discussed within chapter 3 below.
526
Davis O (2010) 86.

100  
 
 [P]olitics,   in   fact,   is   not   the   exercise   of   power   and   the   struggle   for   power.   It  
is   the   configuration   of   a   specific   space,   the   parcelling   out   of   a   particular  
sphere   of   experience,   of   objects   we   take   to   be   shared   and   stemming   from   a  
common   decision,   of   recognised   subjects   able   to   designate   these   objects  
and   to   discuss   them.   Man,   Aristotle   says,   is   political   because   he   can   speak  
and  thereby  share  notions  of  just  and  unjust,  whereas  animals  have  only  the  
ability   to   voice   pain   and   pleasure.   But   the   question   is,   who   has   the   power   of  
speech   and   who   has   only   a   voice?   Politics   happens   [subjects]   demonstrate  
that  their  mouths  can  articulate  speech  that  states  shared  realities  and  not  
just   a   voice   that   signifies   pain.   This   arrangement   and   rearrangement   of  
places   and   identities,   the   parcelling   and   reparcelling   out   of   spaces   and  
times,   of   the   visible   and   the   invisible,   of   noise   and   speech,   constitute   what   I  
call  the  sharing  of  the  sensible.527  
 
When  Rancière  asks  in  the  above  quote  “who  has  the  power  of  speech  and  who  
has   only   voice?”   he   points   to   the   fact   that   when   people   sometimes   try   to   voice  
their   grievances   or   claims,   there   is   a   tendency   for   their   speech   not   to   be   heard   as  
rational   argument.528   Part   of   the   wrong   or   the   miscount   is   that   there   is   a  
presumption  that  no  account  will  be  taken  of  the  complaints  of  the  part  of  those  
who  have  no  part.  As  Davis  notes,  this  does  not  mean  that  these  complaints  are  
understood   and   then   disregarded.529   Rather,   in   a   more   fundamental   sense,   they  
are   not   heard   as   meaning-­‐bearing   language   or   speech   that   is   politically  
relevant.530   Rancière   is   not   referring   to   inaudibility   and   invisibility   in   a  
straightforward   way.   The   question   revolves   around   whether   or   not   a   group   in  
question  is  thought  to  be  capable  of  participation  in  the  life  of  the  community  as  a  
whole,  a  question  of  that  group’s  share  in  “the  definition  of  the  common  of  the  
community”.531   Rancière   uses   the   aesthetics   of   politics   to   express   the   idea   that  
questions   of   partaking   rely   on   prior   decisions   about   what   will   be   interpreted   as  
logically  formed  human  speech  and  what  will  be  construed  as  animal  noise.532  He  
illustrates   the   aesthetic   dimension   of   politics   by   making   recourse   to   the   double  
sense  of  logos,  which  in  Greek  means  both  speech  and  account:  

                                                                                                           
527
Rancière J Malaise Dans L’esthètique (2004) 37-38 passage translated by Méchaoulan E.
See Méchaoulan E “Sophisticated Continuities and Historical Discontinuities, Or, Why Not
Protagoras?” in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) 55.
528
Davis O (2101) 90-91.
529
As above.
530
As above.
531
Rancière J (199) 36.
532
Tanke J (2011) 49.

101  
 
 Politics   exists   because   the   logos   is   never   simply   speech,   because   it   is   always  
indissolubly   the   account   made   of   this   speech:   the   account   by   which   a  
sonorous   emission   is   understood   as   speech   capable   of   enunciating   what   is  
just,   whereas   some   other   emission   is   merely   perceived   as   noise   signalling  
pleasure  or  pain,  consent  or  revolt.533  
 
Rancière   is   therefore   highlighting   here   that   logos   is   at   once   speech   and   a  
distribution   of   speech   positions.534   Domination   and   oppression   follows   from   the  
refusal   to   acknowledge   someone’s   full   possession   of   speech,   which   is   the   basic  
requirement  for  political  participation.  As  Tanke  explains,  the  aesthetics  of  politics  
indicates   that   before   being   about   the   negotiation   of   interests,   the   community  
relies   upon   judgments   about   what   constitutes   speech,   who   is   capable   of  
possessing  it,  what  the  appropriated  places  for  it  are  and  what  can  be  addressed  
as   a   political   issue.535   Politics   revolves   around   the   use   that   is   made   of   the  
distinction   between   speech   and   noise.   Politics   contests   the   general   aesthetic  
framework  in  which  distinctions,  such  as  the  distinction  between  full  and  partial  
possession  of  speech,  operate:    
It   consists   of   forcing   an   opposing   side   to   acknowledge   not   only   the  
demands  for  inclusion  but  also  the  speech  of  those  making  the  demands.536    
 
In  order  to  explain  this  line  of  thinking,  Rancière  refers  to  a  number  of  Aristotle’s  
and  especially  Plato’s  formulations.  These  are  important  references  and  I  discuss  
them   in   full   when   discussing   the   figure   of   Gabriel   Gauny   in   the   next   chapter.  
Rancière   has   a   specific   view   of   language   that   can   be   described   as   a   poetical  
account   of   language.   It   is   based   on   a   rereading   of   Plato’s   critique   of   writing   in  
Phaedro.537  Plato  views  the  written  word  or  what  he  calls  the  “orphan”  word  as  
always   supplementary   to   the   communal   order.538   As   Arsenjuk   highlight,   the  
written   word   can   liberate   itself   from   a   situation   in   which   the   roles   of   both   the  
addresser  and  the  addressee  are  established.539  The  limits  of  what  is  sayable  are  
strictly   determined   within   specific   orders   of   power.   Anyone   can   appropriate   the  
                                                                                                           
533
Rancière J (1999) 22-23.
534
Tanke J (2011) 50-51.
535
As above.
536
As above.
537
Arsenjuk L Fronesis (2005) 1-3.
538
As above.
539
As above.

102  
 
written  word.  It  is  not  the  same  for  the  spoken  word  however.  The  spoken  word  
is  tied,  for  Plato,  as  Rancière  states,  to  the  “logic  of  the  proper”.540  The   written  
word  on  the  other  hand  presents  excess.541  It  is  unexpected  and  inexhaustible  in  
its   relation   to   a   world   of   distributed   tasks   and   roles   and   speech   that   belong   to  
individuals   and   groups   in   the   communal   order.542   Excessive   words   or   words   of  
excess   over   the   existing   distribution   of   the   sensible   represents   the   egalitarian  
power   of   language,   which   Rancière   calls   “literarity”.543   These   words   can   disturb  
the   existing   circuits   of   meanings   and   places   of   enunciation.544   Humans   are  
political   animals   for   Rancière   for   two   reasons,   firstly,   because   they   have   the  
power   to   put   more   words   into   circulation   (useless   words,   supplementary,  
unnecessary  words  that  go  beyond  rigid  designation)  and,  secondly,  because  that  
ability   is   unceasingly   “contested   by   those   who   claim   to   speak   properly   or  
correctly”.545   The   words   used   within   the   moment   of   politics   become   significant.  
Words  or  phrases  can  intervene  within  a  specific  distribution  of  the  sensible  and  
can   as   such   create   or   mobilise   the   moment   of   politics.   Rancière   argues   that  
politics   connects   individuals   with   the   entire   community   by   announcing,   for  
example,   “we,   the   workers   of   the   world”.546   Tanke   aptly   and   very   importantly  
highlights   that   for   Rancière,   political   speech   relies   upon   poetic   world-­‐opening  
devices,  such  as  “we  are  the  workers  of  the  world”.  These  enunciations  fashion  
collective   subjects,   a   “we”,   a   people   or   the   demos.547   The   logic   of   equality   uses  
expansive  political  names:  

                                                                                                           
540
As above.
541
As above.
542
As above.  
543
As above.
544
As above.
545
As above. See also Rancière J (1999) 59. If one for example looks at the name “the
proletariat”, the classical name for the part of those who have no part in a capitalist society,
Rancière claims that this word, when it appeared in the struggles of the nineteenth century,
did not really express a working-class culture. Rancière J (1999) 59. It is not that it functioned
as a representation of a social class or that it identified a part of the existing population. It
rather functioned as a “useless” word, unrecognisable as a valid category from the
standpoint of the police order. It is an artifice, which enabled a declaration of a wrong, the
naming of the part that has no part. See Arsenjuk L Fronesis (2005) 1-3.
546
As above.
547
Tanke J (2011) 65.

103  
 
 The   poetic   moments   of   politics   are   the   creative   linguistic   actions   that  
challenge  the  divisions  between  capacity  and  incapacity,  between  rulers  and  
ruled,  between  those  with  and  those  without  a  part.548      
 
The   poetics   of   politics   is   about   the   invention   of   names   for   a   collective.   These  
names   are   usually   names   with   sufficiently   generality,   recognisable   within   the  
current   distribution   of   the   sensible.   But,   the   invention   occurs   in   making   new  
connections   or   configurations   with   regards   to   these   names,   giving   them   new  
content   as   well   as   using   them   to   make   impossible   identifications.   For   Rancière,  
concepts  can  be  used  as  tools  “to  displace  existing  topographies  and  undermine  
consensual   regimes   by   thinking   through   the   far   side   of   the   police”.549   The   poetics  
of   politics   invents   new   names   and   identities   and   the   point   is   also   to   invent  
arguments.  Davis  explains  that  one  of  the  aspects  of  subjectivation  is  that  it  has  
an   argumentative   dimension   to   it.550   The   argumentative   characteristic   of  
subjectivation  highlights  Rancière’s  insistence  on  struggles  that  involve  language  
and  rational  argument,  especially  in  his  historical  work.  In  his  book  On  the  Shores  
of  Politics  he  places  a  strong  emphasis  on  the  logical  and  argumentative  character  
of   revolt   by   referring   to   what   he   terms   the   “syllogism   of   emancipation”.551   The  
example   he   discusses   of   such   a   syllogism   of   emancipation   is   a   strike   by   Paris  
tailors   in   1833,   protesting   against   their   employer’s   refusal   to   entertain   their  
demands  for  better  pay,  shorter  working  hours  and  improved  working  conditions.  
Davis  explains  that  they  invented  their  argument  by  using  a  clause,  or  syllogism,  
from  the  preamble  of  the  Charter  of  1830  that  resulted  from  the  July  Revolution,  
namely   “all   the   French   are   equal   before   the   law”.552   Three   premises   seemed   to  
contradict   this   clause   according   to   Rancière.553   Firstly,   the   refusal   to   entertain   the  
workers’   demands   meant   that   they   were   not   treated   as   equal,   secondly,  
confederations  of  workers  and  employers  alike  were  illegal  and  yet  only  workers  
were  pursued  by  authorities  and  thirdly,  no  less  a  representative  of  the  law  than  
the   public   prosecutors   gave   a   speech   in   which   he   asserted   that   workers   were   not  
                                                                                                           
548
As above.
549
Rockhill G & Watts P in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 12.
550
Davis O (2010) 84.
551
As above.
552
As above.
553
Davis O (2012) 85.

104  
 
equal  members  of  society.554  As  Davis  further  highlights,  it  could  be  argued  that  
the   Charter   had   always   been   understood   as   an   aspiration.555   But,   this   was   not   the  
approach   adopted   by   the   tailors.556   They   demanded   that   the   three   premises   be  
reconciled  with  the  clause  or  that  the  clause  be  changed  to  something  like  “not  all  
the   French   are   equal   before   the   law”.557     The   charter   therefore   employed   in   an  
effort  to  create  logical  argument.  For  Rancière,  the  charter  served  as  a  basis  for  
the   practical   verification   of   equality   as   part   of   a   logical   and   argumentative  
demonstration  of  equality.  However,  it  should  be  mentioned  with  regards  to  the  
logical   and   argumentative   aspect   that   Rancière   does   not   conceive   of   politics   as  
simply   a   debate   between   subjects   who   disagree   and   negotiate   over   specific  
issues.   For   him,   as   mentioned,   the   subjects   are   wronged   in   such   a   fundamental  
way   as   to   place   in   doubt   their   very   existence   as   subjects,   their   capacity   to  
participate  in  the  debate  and  whether  their  arguments  are  understood  as  rational  
arguments  by  other  parties.558  Further,  in  his  analysis  of  the  strikes  of  the  1830’s  
Rancière  elucidates  the  workings  of  equality.  Rancière  refers  to  the  charter  as  “a  
most  peculiar  platform  of  argument”.559  The  tailors  acted  as  if  they  have  always  
been  equal  and  they  demanded  that  the  charter  should  be  rectified  to  reflect  their  
situation   or   that   the   conditions   of   their   situation   must   be   changed.   In   this   regard,  
political  subjects  are  those  who  make  visible  the  fact  that  they  belong  to  a  shared  
world  that  others  do  not  see  and  importantly:  

                                                                                                           
554
As above.
555
As above.
556
As above
557
As above. As Davis highlights, the declaration of equality in the Charter and similar legal
and political declarations or instruments are, for Rancière, a powerful resource. Davis O (2010)
85. But they are only powerful resources “if they are taken up confidently with a view of
verifying them, rather than regarded as optimistic aspirations or illusory descriptions of
reality”. Davis O (2010) 85. According to Davis, Rancière is far from being a disillusioned
skeptic about formal declarations of equality in legal and constitutional documents, unlike
Marx, for instance that saw rights as mere expressions of the interests of the bourgeois
property-owning class. Davis O (2010) 85. Rancière is not naïve enough to think that such
documents can somehow magically produce the equality that they declare, but he does insist
then that they can serve as a basis for a practical verification of equality as part of a logical
argumentative demonstration. See Davis O (2010) 85.
558
As above.
559
Davis O (2010) 86.

105  
 
 The   worker   who   puts   forward   the   public   nature   of   a   “domestic”   wage  
dispute   must   demonstrate   the   world   in   which   his   argument   counts   as  
argument  and  must  demonstrate  it  as  such  for  those  who  do  not  have  the  
frame  of  reference  enabling  them  to  see  it  as  one.  Political  argumentation  is  
at   one   and   the   same   time   the   demonstration   of   a   possible   world   in   which  
the   argument   could   count   as   argument   […]   It   is   the   construction   of   a  
paradoxical  world  that  puts  together  two  separate  worlds.560  
 
The  workers  must  stage  equality  and  they  must  pretend  it  already  exists  in  order  
to   create   it.   They   must   not   only   demonstrate   their   argument,   but   also  
demonstrate  a  common  world  of  argument.  Davis  elucidates:  
The   worker   subject   that   gets   included   on   it   as   speaker   has   to   behave   as  
though   such   a   stage   existed,   as   though   there   were   a   common   world   of  
argument-­‐   which   is   eminently   reasonable   and   eminently   unreasonable,  
eminently   wise   and   resolutely   subversive,   since   such   a   world   does   not  
exist.561    
 
Rancière   detects   through   his   analysis   that   creative   linguistic   actions,   poetic  
devices   and   expansive   political   names   or   syllogisms   can   disclose   possibilities   for  
the   demonstration   of   arguments   and   the   worlds   in   which   they   count   and  
therefore  also  disclose  possibilities  for  reconfiguring  sensible  distribution.  
 
2.4  Conclusion  
Rancière’s   experiences   under   Althusser   resulted   in   him   distancing   himself   from  
any  notion  of  politics  that  function  to  maintain  social  and  institutional  hierarchies  
through   the   exercise   of   pedagogical   power.   The   idea   that   some   can   not   only  
instruct   others   on   how   to   politically   revolt,   but   can   also   help   them   in   fully  
understanding   their   own   conditions   and   position   within   the   world   became  
untenable  for  Rancière.  The  concept  of  the  truth  of  Marxist  science  against  all  the  
falsehoods   of   ideology   served   only   to   classify   people   into   those   who   need  
scientific   knowledge   and   those   who   can   impart   it.   Scientism   infinitely   defers  
political   struggle   and   equality   whilst   maintaining   the   status   quo.   For   Rancière,   the  
events   of   May   ’68   made   the   ideas   that   he   came   to   adopt   under   Althusser  
questionable.   He   gleaned   from   it   the   possibility   of   an   equality   embodied   in  
advance   and   the   events   only   affirmed   the   problematic   relationship   between  

                                                                                                           
560
Rancière J (2010) 38-39.
561
Davis O (2010) 87.

106  
 
knowledge   and   power   that   he   later   reacted   against.   For   him   this   relationship  
represented  nothing  more  than  a  form  of  legitimisation  of  current  roles,  what  he  
would  later  refer  to  as  the  police  order.    
 
Rancière   highlights   in   his   mature   politics   that   what   we   normally   perceive   as  
politics   comes   down   to   policing,   or   the   suppression   of   politics.   Governance,  
organisation   and   the   representation   of   communities   as   well   as   the   exercise   of  
power  on  different  levels  of  society,  rather  than  facilitating  struggle,  legitimates  
current  ways  of  doing,  being  and  saying.  Rancière’s  conception  of  the  police  is  a  
fluid   concept   indicating   the   mechanisms   and   procedures   that   enforce   the   broad  
systems   of   domination   in   a   specific   context.   The   police   order   help   to   maintain  
hierarchies,  it  allocates  and  regulates.  It  indicates  who  is  capable  of  speaking  and  
what   they   are   able   to   say   in   what   time   and   in   what   place.   The   police   order  
embodies  consensus,  holding  forth  a  form  of  realism  that  tells  us  that  the  police’s  
way  is  the  only  possible  way.  It  objectifies  matters  to  such  an  extent  that  they  can  
no  longer  be  contested.  They  become  self-­‐evident  and  not  open  to  dispute.    
 
Against  the  police  Rancière  postulates  politics.  A  specific  form  of  demonstration  
that   runs   counter   to   policing.   It   implements   the   assumption   of   the   equality   of  
speaking   beings   in   order   to   undo   the   workings   of   the   police   order.   Equality  
presupposed,   from   the   outset,   confronts   the   police   with   its   own   contingency.  
Equality   is   central.   What   makes   something   political   is   not   its   object   or   the   place  
within   which   it   is   carried   out,   it   exists   solely   in   the   form   of   an   equality   that   is  
declared,   demonstrated   and   presupposed.   Equality   cannot   be   given   by  
governments   and   it   cannot   be   preserved,   attained   or   balanced   against   other  
principles.   It   is   practiced   and   verified.   Politics   therefore   exits   solely   in   the  
enactment   of   equality   by   means   of   a   scene   of   dissensus.   It   does   not   carry   on  
indefinitely.   It   exists   in   and   through   the   demonstration   of   dissensus.   It   is   rare,  
temporal  and  localised.  It  does  not  necessarily  effect  change.  It  institutes  a  breach  
within   a   specific   police   order   that   divides   a   specific   distribution   of   the   sensible  
that   is   itself   open   to   egalitarian   challenge.   Politics   and   the   police   order   are  
therefore   not   perfectly   identifiable   or   pure   enactments   or   systems.   They   are  

107  
 
interrelated,   intertwined   and   fluid   and   the   point   is   to   discern   where   politics  
actually   happen,   where   and   when   it   encroaches   on   the   police   and   where   and  
when  police  matters  encroach  on  politics.  The  meeting  point  between  politics  and  
the  police  is  always  shifting.    
 
Politics,   through   the   declaration   of   equality   disorders,   upsets,   breaks   apart   and  
ruptures.   Its   power   is   division   and   inconsistency.   The   police   order   is   by   its   very  
nature  an  order  of  unequal  ordering  and  the  equality  of  speaking  beings  therefore  
becomes   a   tool   for   displacement   and   declassification.   It   breaks   open,   through  
dissensus,  interpretations  thought  to  be  incontestable.    
 
In  Rancière’s  formulation  of  the  political  subject,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  subject  
of   politics   only   exists   through   and   within   the   process   of   subjectivation.   A   political  
subject  exists  and  ends  within  the  moment  of  politics.  It  is  politics  that  declares  
equality  that  makes  it  possible  to  conceive  of  the  subject  of  politics  and  not  the  
other  way  around.  The  political  subject  too,  is  localised  and  temporal.  The  process  
of  subjectivation  is  the  process  whereby  a  subject  rejects  the  classification  of  the  
police  order.  It  undercuts  police  categories.  It  is  not  simply  the  process  of  adding  
a  new  police  category  to  the  existing  police  categories.  Rancière,  as  mentioned,  is  
highly  critical  of  identity,  especially  the  way  in  which  it  becomes  identical  to  the  
classifications   of   the   police   and   all   the   assumptions   implicit   in   police   categories.  
Politics  is  never  a  question  of  identity;  it  is  a  question  of  working  within  the  gaps  
between   identities,   of   dividing   a   police   identity   from   itself,   of   complicating   and  
overturning   it.   The   first   moment   of   subjectivation   is   the   disidentification   with  
police  categories  and  the  second  is  the  creation  of  new  identities  or  of  giving  new  
content   to   identities-­‐   confusing   and   disrupting   the   identities   within   the   police  
order.   In   the   next   chapter   the   figure   of   Gabriel   Gauny   will   demonstrate   how  
impossible  identifications  tear  people  away  from  police  order  designated  places.  
The  process  of  subjectivation  whereby  subjects  identify  with  new  categories  also  
encompasses   the   struggle   for   the   existence   of   political   subjectivity   as   such.  
Rancière  demonstrates  this  by  his  equation  of  the  political  subject  with  the  demos  
in  Athenian  democracy.  The  demos  as  collective  were  regarded  as  not  having  the  

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necessary   attributes   for   involvement   in   politics.   Policing   also   denotes   a   specific  
way  of  counting  the  community.  The  police  order’s  way  of  counting  excludes  the  
possibility   of   remainder.   However,   the   police’s   way   of   counting   is   based   on   a  
structural   miscount.   The   demos   lays   bare   this   miscount   or   wrong   of   their   non-­‐
existence   as   political   subject.   Politics   therefore   has   to   be   disputatious   or  
antagonistic   as   it   expresses   a   basic   disagreement   with   the   recognitions   of   the  
police  order.  When  the  equality  of  speaking  beings  is  postulated,  it  discloses  that  
the  ground  for  the  power  of  ruling  is  that  there  is  no  ground  at  all.  The  miscount  
and   the   wrong   are   employed   by   Rancière   to   demonstrate   that   politics   is   about  
disagreement.  Disagreement  involves  the  concrete  and  material  conditions  from  
within   which   people   are   able   to   speak.   It   illustrates   that   politics   is   not   the  
participation   of   parties   that   have   an   equal   say   from   within   the   context   of   equal  
positions.  At  the  heart  of  a  political  dispute  there  is  conflict  over  what  constitutes  
reason,  what  is  a  legitimate  object  of  political  discussion,  and  what  it  means  to  be  
a  political  subject.  This  is  why  Rancière’s  states  that  politics  is  first  and  foremost  
about  the  existence  of  politics.562  
 
Politics   is   not   about   the   management   of   competing   interests   within   shared  
political,  legal  or  juridical  frameworks.  That  is  the  police  order.  Politics  is  therefore  
not   an   activity   pursued   on   the   basis   of   any   consensus,   constitutional,   institutional  
or  on  the  basis  of  shared  norms.  Politics  consists  of  a  radically  more  fundamental  
manifestation.   Politics   is   about   the   part   that   has   no   part   in   anything,   the   demos  
that  is  according  to  the  police  not  within  the  realm  of  visibility  and  perceptibility.  
The   demos   as   political   subject,   struggles   in   order   to   enter   into   this   realm,   to  
essentially,   appear.   Rancière   therefore   demonstrates   that   the   police   order  
determines   speaking   positions   and   politics   is   not   about   struggling   within   the  
already   existing   realm   of   determined   positions.   Rather,   it   is   about   a   radical  
egalitarian   call   that   disputes   and   opens   up   the   foundational   and   structural   beliefs  
that  holds  claim  to  the  correct  way  of  counting.  Because  of  the  fact  that  politics  
radically   disputes   the   framework   of   speaking   positions   it   is   also   always   an  

                                                                                                           
562
Rancière J Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (2010) 35.

109  
 
intervention  into  the  visible  and  sayable.  It  is  an  intervention  into  the  distribution  
of  the  sensible.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  politics  is  aesthetics.  The  distribution  of  the  
sensible  as  the  perceptual  configuration  of  society  shapes  what  is  visible,  audible  
and   what   object   and   phenomena   can   be   related   in   what   times   and   spaces.   As   the  
regime   of   possibility   and   impossibility,   it   determines   sense,   meaning   and  
direction.   The   distribution   of   the   sensible   has   become   a   popular   concept.   It   can  
not   only   be   described   as   an   idea.   It   is   also   a   way   of   describing,   a   way   of   mapping,  
of   viewing   and   of   bringing   together   and   taking   apart   everything   that   we  
experience   through   our   sense.   Rancière   postulates   a   type   of   topographical  
analysis   that   attempts   to   trace   the   distribution   of   the   sensible,   its   logic   and  
relations;   the   conditions   and   the   possibilities   it   gives   rise   to.   The   sensible   is   a  
certain   picture,   a   way   of   framing   things   and   politics   intervenes   in   this   picture,   and  
it  subverts  its  message,  its  narrative  and  form.  If  the  police  order  enforces  the  fact  
that   the   distribution   of   the   sensible   has   specific   perceptual   limitations,   politics  
confronts  it  with  expansion.    
 
The   thematic   of   the   stage   permeates   Rancière’s   work.   Indeed,   politics   is   about  
staging   a   scene   of   dissensus,   presupposing   equality,   creating   it   where   it   isn’t,  
inventing   arguments   and   worlds   in   which   these   arguments   count.   Political  
subjects  are  local,  provisional  and  theatrical  configurations  that  act  as  if  they  are  
equal  in  unequal  police  distributions.  They  create  syllogisms  or  use  words  in  order  
to  build  a  stage  on  which  their  equality  can  be  played  out.    
 
In  reflecting  on  voice  within  the  framework  of  Rancière’s  formulation  of  politics,  it  
becomes   clear   that   politics   is   the   very   struggle   for   voice.   The   police   order  
enforces   a   specific   regime   of   sensible   distribution   that   determine   who   has   the  
power   of   voice   and   who   has   not.   Politics   is   the   process   by   which   those   whose  
speech   is   seen   as   noise   declare   themselves   as   equal   participants   with   equal   voice.  
The   police   order   determines   the   forms   that   a   speech-­‐act   can   take,   its   place   and  
time.  As  the  basic  system  through  which  we  perceive  and  intuitively  classify  and  
process  information,  the  distribution  of  the  sensible  creates  the  framework  that  
determines   the   possession   or   otherwise   of   political   voice.   In   Rancièrian   terms  

110  
 
political  voice  or  the  notion  of  having  political  voice,  can  be  aligned  with  speech  
as  opposed  to  noise,  which  cannot  appear  within  the  sensible  distribution  of  the  
police   order.   Rancière   makes   it   clear   that   politics   concerns   realms   of   visibility,  
intelligibility   and   perceptibility.   The   possession   of   political   voice   is   conditioned  
upon  the  possibility  of  appearance  within  these  realms.  This  is  why  politics  can  be  
described   as   a   conflict   over   voice,   over   who   has   it   in   what   times   and   spaces.   As  
such,   political   voicing   occurs   upon   entering   or   appearing   within   a   specific  
framework   of   thinking   and   interpretation.   However,   this   is   not   appearing   or  
entering   into   a   framework   of   perception   in   any   straightforward   way.   Political  
voicing  opens  up  the  possibility  of  the  reconfiguration  of  the  sensible  realm  itself.  
In   a   Rancièrian   sense,   political   voicing   radically   disputes   the   current   configuration  
by  confronting  it  with  an  alternative  configuration.  Political  voicing  occurs  within  
the   context   of   a   political   subject   that   challenges   the   sensible   distribution   of   the  
police.  Matters  of  politics  and  political  voicing  are  in  this  way  aesthetic.  Voicing  is  
the   moment   wherein   the   properties   of   space,   the   possibilities   of   time,   the  
formation   of   identities   and   locales   are   thought   of   in   another   way.   When  
considered   from   the   perspective   of   Rancière’s   politics,   political   voice   is   not   about  
claims   for   inclusion,   or   for   that   matter   identity.   It   is   about   the   employment   of  
universal   equality   in   order   to   displace,   divide   and   redistribute.   As   mentioned,  
politics  discloses  (through  staging  a  dissensus,  acting  equal,  inventing  arguments  
and   syllogisms   and   supplementary   words)   a   different   world.   Political   voice   is  
therefore   that   which   must   reveal,   through   demonstration,   a   different   way   of  
thinking,   doing,   seeing,   saying   and   interpreting.   In   the   context   of   Rancière’s  
politics,   political   voice   involves   creation.   Politics   consists   of   creating   spaces   and  
times  in  which  the  demonstration  of  equality  can  take  place.  At  this  juncture  it  can  
already  be  gleaned  from  his  formulations  that  it  is  the  invention  of  worlds,  words,  
arguments   and   linguistic   configurations   that   blur   the   well-­‐ordered   partitions   of  
voice  and  silence.    
 
The   discussion   of   Rancière’s   engagements   with   certain   historical   figures   in   the  
next   chapter   as   well   as   the   engagement   with   Spivak   after   that,   will   serve   to  
further  shed  light  on  the  notion  of  political  voice.  My  aim  is  for  a  more  complete  

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picture  of  voice  to  emerge  during  these  explorations.  At  this  stage,  what  further  
emerges,   when   considering   voice   against   the   background   of   the   problems,  
difficulties   or   the   lack   of   political   voicing   or   political   visibility   of   many   South  
African   women,   is   that   the   distribution   of   the   sensible   becomes   a   valuable  
formulation.  The  distribution  of  the  sensible,  as  mentioned,  has  become  a  popular  
concept  and  tool  for  analysis  across  a  variety  of  disciplines.  It  is  not  only  a  concept  
that  describes  a  specific  regime  of  thinking  and  interpretation,  but  it’s  also  a  way  
of   tracing   and   mapping   the   various   sensible   distributions   that   determine   the  
possibilities   and   perceptual   limitations   of   voice.   This   way   of   describing   a   given  
framework  allows  for  the  identification  of  mechanisms,  procedures  and  ways  of  
thinking  that  supress  or  reveal  the  content,  form  and  times  and  spaces  of  speech,  
voicing   or   enunciation.   Political   arrangement,   power   relations   and   social  
hierarchies   within   society   are   conceived   of   as   practices   of   creating,   distributing  
and   contesting   the   sensible   world.   The   distribution   of   the   sensible   names   these  
practices  and  as  such  provides  a  basis  from  where  to  intervene  in  the  structures  
that   render   some   issues,   individuals   and   discourses   inaudible   and   invisible.   It  
therefore   provides   a   useful   foundation   from   where   various   reflections   can   take  
place.  
 
It   should   further   be   mentioned   that   Rancière’s   formulation   of   the   police   order  
and   of   the   notion   of   consensus,   highlights   the   fact   the   legal   and   institutional  
mechanisms   of   government   and   even   more   broadly;   the   shared   norms   and  
protocols   within   a   community   cannot   give   rise   to   political   activity,   properly  
speaking.  Rather,  these  mechanisms  and  shared  norms  give  rise  to  a  specific  logic  
or   orientation   towards   the   sensible   world.   As   mentioned   in   the   introductory  
chapter,   from   one   perspective   the   specific   issues   facing   many   South   African  
women,   especially   the   levels   of   sexual   violence   and   contexts   of   poverty,   are  
addressed   through   various   legal   and   political   mechanisms   and   tools.   It   was  
mentioned   that   in   this   regard   a   paradox   emerges:   Women’s   issues   and   broader  
gender  challenges  are  within  the  public  realm,  but  they  themselves,  as  bodies  and  
beings,  are  somehow  beyond  the  realm  of  care,  with  many  living  in  abject  poverty  
and  in  constant  fear  of  sexual  violence.  When  it  comes  to  gender,  South  Africa  has  

112  
 
one   of   the   most   progressive   legislative   and   policy   frameworks   in   the   world.  
However,  it  would  seem  that  either  the  voices  of  many  women  cannot  be  heard  
to   the   extent   that   their   material   and   concrete   contexts   are   meaningfully  
transformed,   or   these   issues   can   to   a   certain   extent   not   even   be   formulated.  
When   viewed   through   the   lens   of   Rancière’s   formulation   of   politics,   it   becomes  
clear  that  specialised  policy  and  law  as  well  as  consensual  activism  and  awareness  
becomes   part   of   the   mechanisms   of   the   police   order.   The   sexual   violence  
perpetrated   against   many   women   as   well   as   their   socio-­‐economic   marginalisation  
has   been   taken   into   account   by   the   police   order.   “Women”   have   been   counted  
and   their   issues   named.   There   can   be   no   doubt   about   the   fact   that   the   strides  
made   by   government   through   policy   and   legal   frameworks   in   order   to   promote  
gender  equality  were  and  remain  important,  on  a  practical  as  well  as  a  symbolic  
level.   However,   Rancière’s   formulation   of   the   police   order   allows   us   to   ask   to  
what   extent   these   mechanisms   contribute   in   maintaining   the   status   quo.   These  
frameworks,  mechanisms,  procedures  and  discourses  that  surround  the  particular  
problems   that   many   women   face,   also   serve   to   confirm   the   notion   that  
government  is  aware  of  these  pressing  issues,  that  it  has  done  a  lot  and  that  it  is  
doing   what   it   can,   affirming   that   they   are   being   addressed.   This   results   in   the  
closing   off   of   alternative   conversations   surrounding   these   issues,   establishing   a  
discourse  of  pragmatic  management.  Moreover,  the  ineffectiveness  of  measures  
and   laws   with   regard   to   these   problems   might   be   explained   by   the   fact   that   it  
would   seem   that   government   is   less   concerned   about   actually   reducing   the  
number   of   rapes   and   improving   the   living   conditions   of   the   majority   of   women,  
than  showing  that  they  are  tirelessly  engaged  in  the  effort.    Further,  because  of  
the   progressive   frameworks   that   are   established,   the   issues   of   the   socio-­‐
economic   deprivation   of   many   women   as   well   as   the   continuing   sexual   violence  
perpetrated   against   them   are   selectively   framed   and   interpreted.   They   are  
therefore  only  viewed  through  and  along  the  lines  of  these  frameworks,  limiting  
other   possible   perceptions   and   possibilities   of   voice.   Progressive   policy  
frameworks   as   well   as   activism   within   the   public   and   private   realms   of   society  
serve   to   limit   democracy   to   a   certain   extent.   The   widespread   awareness   and  
consensual   activism,   together   with   specialised   policy   and   legislation   effectively  

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neutralises   these   issues.   When   we   have   societal   consensus   (coupled   with   the  
managerial   efforts   of   government)   over   the   fact   that   the   highly   patriarchal  
cultures   in   the   country   needs   to   be   transformed   and   the   suffering   of   many  
women   need   to   be   alleviated,   these   problems   become   part   of   the   most   interior  
logic   and   workings   of   the   police   order   and   they   therefore   essentially   lose   their  
capacity   for   litigation,   for   dispute,   for   contestation,   for   discussion   and  
controversy.   As   mentioned,   the   specific   legislative   and   policy   directives   of   the  
South   African   government   as   well   as   societal   activism   in   general   are   exemplary.  
These  efforts  cannot  be  lamented.  However,  Rancière’s  description  of  politics  and  
the  police  order  allows  us  to  ask  what  different  frameworks  and  understandings  
are   available.   His   formulations   points   the   question   of   how   certain   issues   can  
become  intelligible,  visible  and  perceptible  to  the  extent  that  it  declares  a  wrong  
or   manifests   in   a   struggle   for   equality.   These   postulations   therefore   point   to   a  
different   visibility   than   the   visibility   involved   in   consensual   frameworks.   They  
point  to  the  possibility  of  a  different  voicing  that  can  frame  certain  issues  in  such  a  
way  so  as  to  politicise  them  or  open  them  up  to  dispute  or  contestation  again.  
 
Rancière’s   politics   reminds   of   the   fact   that   the   police   order   through   consensus  
refers  to  a  topography  of  the  visible,  of  what  is  possible  and  what  can  be  thought.  
Political  voice  does  not  form  part  of  this  topography.  It  forms  part  of  dissensus.  
Dissensus   has   two   primary   operations;   firstly,   it   questions   who   counts   as   subjects  
worthy  of  taking  part  in  politics  and  secondly,  what  constitutes  an  object,  or  the  
possible   topic   of   politics.   Dissensus   therefore   multiplies   “litigious   objects   and  
disputing   subjects”   as   Rancière   puts   it.563   It   questions   a   society’s   definitions   of  
competence,  forms  of  relation,  and  divisions  of  labour.  The  potency  of  dissensus  
is  that  it  politicises  issues,  objects  or  subjects  thought  not  to  be  political,  ever  or  
anymore.  When  it  comes  to  the  precariousness,  complexity  and  difficulty  of  issues  
surrounding  voicing  as  it  relates  to  many  South  African  women,  Rancière’s  politics  
points   to   the   creation   of   a   new   terrain   for   confrontation.     It   becomes   clear   that  
the   most   urgent   issues   that   many   South   African   women   face   are   within   the  

                                                                                                           
563
Rancière J (1999) 118.

114  
 
current  distribution  of  the  sensible,  but,  they  appear  (they  are  only  audible,  visible  
and   intelligible)   in   a   specific   way.   As   such   these   problems   also   essentially,  
disappear.  In  the  face  of  disappearance,  Rancière’s  formulation  of  politics  points  
to  the  fact  that  a  dissensual,  radically  egalitarian  political  voicing  can  re-­‐open  the  
space  in  which  they  can  again  be  thought.  
 
In  the  next  chapter  I  discuss  the  figures  of  Gabriel  Gauny  and  Joseph  Jacocot  as  
figures  that  overturned  sensible  distributions.  These  discussions  further  serve  to  
explain  Rancière’s  work  around  politics  and  they  also  further  serve  to  make  sense  
of   voice.   They   allow   for   a   deeper   understanding   of   Rancière’s   formulation   on  
politics   and   therefore   political   voice.   Jacocot   illustrates   the   power   of   equality   and  
Gauny   demonstrates   the   power   of   identifications   that   redistribute   the   times,  
spaces  and  places  of  the  distribution  of  the  sensible.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

115  
 
 CHAPTER  3  
Radical  Intellectual  Equality  and  the  Reconfiguration  of  Work’s  Space  
and  Time  
 
 
3.1  Introduction  
In  the  previous  chapter  I  explained  Rancière’s  formulation  of  politics  and  reflected  
on  the  notion  of  political  voice  through  the  lens  of  his  formulations.  Against  the  
background  of  the  complexities  and  difficulties  of  political  voice  or  visibility  as  it  
pertains   to   many   women   within   the   South   African   context   ,   I   discussed   in   what  
way  the  mechanisms  of  government  and  consensual  activism  can  be  thought  of  
when   viewed   in   the   frame   of   Rancière’s   conception   of   politics.   I   suggested   that  
the   operations   of   government   and   activism,   rather   than   opening   issues   of  
silencing   to   litigation,   dispute   and   contestation,   to   a   certain   extent   contributes   to  
the  disappearance  of  some  of  the  most  pressing  issues  that  many  South  African  
women  face.  These  operations,  rather  than  giving  rise  to  political  voicing,  create  a  
discourse   of   pragmatic   management.   It   was   mentioned   in   the   introductory  
chapter  that  the  discussions  of  Joseph  Jacocot  and  Gabriel  Gauny  in  this  chapter  
will  allow  for  an  even  deeper  or  better  understanding  of  Rancière’s  formulation  of  
politics.  In  this  regard  it  should  be  mentioned  again  that  Rancière’s  work  can  be  
said  to  represent  three  stages.    
 
The  first  stage  was  his  critique  of  the  main  tenets  of  Althusserian  theory  starting  
from   the   early   1970’s.   The   second   stage   involved   questions   of   education,  
pedagogy,  history,  historiography  and  historical  agency.  From  these  engagements  
he   formulated   his   mature   politics   that   represents   the   third   stage   of   his   work.   The  
previous   chapter   therefore   involved   the   first   and   third   stages.   The   discussion   of  
Joseph   Jacocot   and   Gabriel   Gauny   in   this   chapter   involves   the   second   stage   of   his  
work.   As   mentioned,   the   discussions   around   these   historical   figures   that   Rancière  
engages   with   serve   to   illuminate   some   of   his   most   important   arguments.   In   many  
ways,   Rancière’s   research   into   these   figures   not   only   crystallised   his   objections   to  
Althusserianism,  but  also  allowed  him  to  properly  formulate  his  work  on  politics.  

116  
 
The  way  in  which  Rancière  engages  with  these  figures  as  well  as  the  arguments  
that  he  formulates  on  the  basis  of  them,  demonstrates  two  important  elements  
of   his   work   namely;   the   political   potency   of   equality   and   the   reconfiguration   of  
the  space  and  time  of  the  distribution  of  the  sensible.  I  therefore  find  it  necessary  
to  shed  light  on  Rancière’s  work  in  this  regard.  It  provides  significant  insight  into  
his  thinking.    
 
A   further   aim   of   this   chapter   can   be   described   as   involving   ways   in   which   to  
approach   the   notion   of   voice   or   moments   of   voicing   in   the   context   of   the  
difficulties  surrounding  the  voice  of  many  South  African  women  set  out  in  the  first  
chapter.   What   becomes   important   here   is   the   way   in   which   Rancière   mobilises  
these   historical   figures   in   order   to   refute   certain   dominant   lines   of   thinking   in  
specific   contexts.   The   way   in   which   these   historical   figures   are   staged   has   itself  
the   political   effect   of   expanding   perception   and   reframing   what   is   thinkable.564  
Therefore,   apart   from   providing   further   insight   into   Rancière’s   thinking   on  
politics,   the   figures   and   discussions   in   this   chapter   also   represent   a   way   of  
engaging  with  and  writing  about  moments  of  political  voicing.  These  discussions  
therefore  serve  to  suggest  different  angles  or  places  from  where  to  think  through  
and   how   to   write   about   the   notion   of   political   voice   within   the   context   of   a  
Rancièrian   understanding   of   politics.   The   question   that   arises   is,   when   making  
sense   of   voice,   how   are   we   to   engage   with   and   approach   the   notion   political  
voice?   In   this   regard,   I   suggest   that   Rancière’s   engagement   with   the   figures   of  
Joseph   Jacocot   and   Gabriel   Gauny   is   suggestive   of   some   important  
considerations,  which  I  explain  below.  
 
I   firstly   discuss   the   figure   of   Joseph   Jacocot   explored   in   his   book   on   pedagogy,  
The   Ignorant   Schoolmaster   in   order   to   explain   Rancière’s   conception   of   equality  
that   is   so   central   to   his   notion   of   politics.565   I   also   discuss   the   figure   of   Gabriel  
Gauny  discussed  in  his  book  The  Nights  of  Labor.566  The  discussion  of  Gauny  occurs  

                                                                                                           
564
Ross K “Historicizing Untimeliness” in Rockhill G & Watts p (eds.) (2009) 24-25.
565
Rancière J (1991).
566
Rancière J (1989).

117  
 
alongside   a   discussion   of   certain   aspects   of   Plato   that   Rancière   engages   with   and  
criticises   in   The   Philosopher   and   His   Poor.567   I   individually   introduce   these  
discussions  in  the  sections  below.  
 
3.2  Joseph  Jacocot  
Rancière’s  reflections  on  equality  and  pedagogy  were  formulated  in  his  book  The  
Ignorant   Schoolmaster.568   As   mentioned,   an   analysis   of   Rancière’s   reflections   on  
the  figure  of  Joseph  Jacocot  will  allow  for  a  deeper  understanding  of  the  type  of  
equality   that   he   postulates.   Davis   notes   that   Badiou   and   May   have   both   rightly  
insisted   that   the   radical   conception   of   equality   that   Rancière   formulates   in   his  
book  on  Jacocot  is  one  of  the  most  important  defining  and  original  features  of  his  
work  and  has  implications  far  beyond  the  field  of  pedagogy.569  It  becomes  clear  in  
his  discussions  of  Jacocot  that  his  reflections  on  equality  and  politics  are  rooted  in  
his   explorations   of   what   it   means   to   learn   and   teach.   Rancière’s   account   of  
pedagogy  and  equality  also  echoes  his  earlier  concerns  with  Althusserianism.  The  
Ignorant   Schoolmaster   is   profoundly   sceptical   of   the   professed   interests   of  
educational   institutions   in   equality.570   As   stated,   Althusserianism,   for   all   its  
promises  of  correct  revolutionary  practice,  seemed  to  Rancière  to  come  down  to  
“a   pedagogy   of   delay”.571   The   moment   of   the   revolution   is   infinitely   postponed  
and   in   the   meantime   the   social   and   institutional   privileges   of   pedagogues   are  
strengthened.572  It  was  in  the  figure  of  Jacocot  that  Rancière  found  a  way  to  react  
to  some  of  his  concerns  around  Althusserianism.  He  also  found  in  Jacocot  a  way  in  
which  to  conceptualise  his  highly  original  description  of  equality.  
 
Whilst   much   of   Jacocot’s   anti-­‐method   of   teaching   remains   vague   in   Rancière’s  
account,  it  is  important  to  note,  as  Davis  highlights,  that  Rancière  does  not  devise  

                                                                                                           
567
Rancière J (2003).
568
Rancière J The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation (1991)
trans. Ross K.
569
Davis O (2010) 27.
570
Davis O (2010) 29.
571
As above.
572
See section 2.2 above.

118  
 
a   “new   curriculum   or   a   pedagogical   programme”.573   Jacocot’s   pedagogical  
experiment   rather   provides   a   new   understanding   of   the   nature   of   equality.574  
According   to   Davis,   the   book   offers   “an   emancipatory   reconfiguration   of   the   idea  
of   the   lesson”.575   For   May,   Rancière   puts   into   question   the   distance   between  
teacher   and   taught   subjects,   knowledge   and   non-­‐knowledge   and   the   knowing  
master   and   the   ignorant   masses.576   Before   explaining   Rancière’s   exploration   of  
Jacocot,   it   should   be   mentioned   that   in   his   telling   of   Jacocot,   Rancière’s   voice  
mingles   thoroughly   with   that   of   Jacocot’s.   May   explains   that   the   book   works  
assiduously   to   avoid   any   type   of   commentary   and   it   also   shies   away   from   any  
devices  that  would  separate  the  author  and  subjects  or  readers.577  In  this  regard,  
May  explains  that  Rancière  employs  the  present  tense  throughout  the  book  and  
avoids   phrases   such   as   “Jacocot   says”.578   Rancière   also   fully   adopts   Jacocot’s  
vocabulary.  Swenson,  for  example  notes  that  the  key  terms  such  as  émancipation,  
explication   and   abrutissement   are   all   Jacocot’s   usages   and   Rancière   gives   the  
responses  Jacocot  gave  to  the  objections  he  encountered.  579  As  Swenson  further  
explains,   the   small   number   of   authors   referred   to   are   all   contemporaries   whom  
Jacocot   liked   to   read   and   the   primary   citations   are   largely   drawn   from   Jacocot  
himself,   his   detractors,   and   his   defenders.580   As   Swenson   notes,   “there   is   no  
moment  at  which  Rancière  leaves  Jacocot’s  circle”.581  Davis  notes  that  the  book  is  
a  philosophical  tale  that  offers  material  resistance  to  easy  conceptual  analysis.582  
He  argues  that  
[g]iven  Jacocot’s  suspicion  of  explanation,  it  is  appropriate  that  -­‐  because  of  
its  complex  conceptual-­‐material  texture  -­‐   this  is  an  especially  difficult  book  
                                                                                                           
573
Davis O (2010) 29.
574
As above. Fénelon F Les Aventures de Télémaque published anonymously in 1699 and
reissued by Fénelon’s family in 1717. Davis explains that the story fills out a gap in Homer’s
Odyssey, recounting the educational travels of Telemachus, son of Ulysses, accompanied by
his tutor, Mentor, who is revealed at the end of the story to be Minerva, the goddess of
wisdom. Davis O (2010) 29.
575
As above.
576
May T “Rancière in South Carolina” in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 111.
577
As above.
578
As above.
579
Swenson J “Style indirect libre” in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 266.
580
As above.
581
As above.
582
Davis O (2010) 29.

119  
 
 to   explain.   [It]   is   a   skillfully   crafted   material   object,   a   textured   work   of   art  
and  artifice,  as  well  as  a  book  of  ideas.583  
 
Thus,  it  becomes  difficult  to  fully  capture  Rancière’s  engagement  with  Jacocot.  I  
therefore   do   not   propose   to   fully   explain   Rancière’s   exploration   and   the  
implications   thereof,   but   rather   to   shed   some   light   on   the   most   important  
arguments  that  Rancière  puts  forth  through  his  analysis  of  Jacocot.  
 
Joseph   Jacocot   (1770-­‐1840)   was   an   artilleryman   in   the   Republican   Armies   and   a  
partisan   from   the   French   Revolution.   The   Bourbon   Restoration   forced   him   into  
exile  and  it  was  while  he  was  in  exile  that  he  obtained  a  teaching  position  at  the  
University   of   Louvain   in   Flanders.   He   had   to   teach   French   to   a   group   of   Flemish  
students.  The  only  problem  was  that  Jacocot  did  not  speak  a  word  of  Flemish  and  
his   students   did   not   speak   a   word   of   French.   This   would   normally   present   a  
problem   when   it   comes   effective   teaching.   However,   as   Davis   explains,   Jacocot  
devised   a   plan   so   as   to   not   be   exposed   as   a   fraud.584   He   came   upon   a   bilingual  
copy   of   Télémaque,   Fenelon’s   praised   portrayal   of   the   wanderings   of   Telemachus.  
He  asked  his  students  to  learn  the  French  by  comparing  it  to  the  Flemish  and  his  
desperate  attempt  at  teaching  “yielded  unexpected  results”.585  After  some  time,  
the   students   were   not   only   able   to   read   the   French   text,   but   they   could   compose  
essays  on  its  meaning.  Rancière  states:  
                                                                                                           
583
As above. In Rancière’s account of him, Jacocot may be seen as emphasising the
“materiality of the subjects” he is teaching and conversely the ideality, or intellectuality, of so-
called “manual” labour. See Davis O (2010) 28-29. One of the principles of Jacocot’s method
for Rancière, is to establish a relation of equivalence between knowledge and the materials
worked upon by the labourer: “Each citizen is also a man who makes a work, with the pen,
with the drill, or with any other tool” (Rancière J The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991) 108). The
intention, as Davis mentions, is to also persuade the manual worker who thinks learning is
something he is unable to do that he is already exercising the same human intellect in his
work. See Davis O (2010) 28-29. To understand Telemachus takes no special gift, or no gift
more special than the intellect, which he is already using in his work. As will be explained,
with regards to Rancière’s discussion in The Nights of Labour, this undermines the
assumption underlying the Platonic social hierarchy, which placed pedagogues in superior
positions and posits occupations. For Rancière, no one person is especially suited or destined
for writing books any more than any other is for making shoes. This notion carries over into
the style in which The Ignorant Schoolmaster is written, in the sense that it “weaves a
complex conceptual-material web”. See Davis O (2010) 28-29.
584
Davis O (2010) 29.  
585
As above.

120  
 
 He   had   given   no   explanation   to   his   students   on   the   first   elements   of  
language.  He  had  not  explained  spelling  or  conjugations  to  them.  They  had  
looked   for   the   French   words   that   correspond   to   words   they   knew   and   the  
reasons  for  their  grammatical  endings  themselves.586    
 
Students   were   therefore   learning   without   Jacocot’s   instruction   and   he   soon  
employed  this  method  of  so-­‐called  “non-­‐teaching”  to  other  subjects  in  which  he  
was   not   proficient,   such   as   law,   piano   and   painting.587   As   Tanke   explains,   non-­‐
teaching  somehow  allowed  Jacocot  to  see  what  is  often  concealed  in  traditional  
pedagogical   practices   namely,   that   one   does   not   learn   by   internalising   the  
knowledge  of  another,  but  through  the  exercise  of  one’s  own  faculties.588  What  
he  learned  was  ways  of  removing  obstacles  to  student’s  abilities  so  that  they  can  
eventually,   with   time,   make   their   own   discoveries.589   From   his   experiences  
Jacocot   draws   the   conclusion   that   people   are   equally   intelligent   or   they   have  
equal   mental   capacities.   For   Jacocot,   the   problem   of   education   is   not   that   people  
have   different   levels   of   intellectual   abilities,   but   as   Swenson   notes,   that   some  
attend  closely  to  what  they  are  doing  and  others  do  not.590  There  are  therefore  no  
natural  divisions  that  prevent  people  from  achieving  academic  success.  One  only  
has  to  engage  with  the  material.591  Jacocot’s  experiences  led  him  to  conceptualise  
a  pedagogical  theory  of  radical  intellectual  equality,  affirming  that  all  people  are  
in  possession  of  equal  mental  capacity.  Rancière  states:    
The   duty   of   Joseph   Jacocot’s   disciples   is   thus   simple.   They   must   announce  
to  everyone  in  all  places  and  all  circumstances,  the  news,  the  practice:  one  
can  teach  what  one  doesn’t  know.592  
 
Jacocot’s  experiences  also  led  him  to  general  scepticism  about  the  function  and  
effectiveness  of  explanation.  Rancière  states  the  following:  
Explanation  is  not  necessary  to  remedy  an  incapacity  to  understand.  On  the  
contrary,   that   very   incapacity   provides   the   structuring   fiction   of   the  
explicative   conception   of   the   world.   It   is   the   explicator   who   needs   the  
incapable   and   not   the   other   way   around;   it   is   he   who   constitutes   the  

                                                                                                           
586
Rancière J (1991) 4-5.
587
As above.  
588
Tanke J (2011) 35.
589
As above.
590
Swenson J in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 111.
591
As above.
592
Rancière J On the Shores of Politics (1995) 101.

121  
 
 incapable   as   such.   To   explain   something   to   someone   is   first   of   all   to   show  
him   he   cannot   understand   it   by   himself.   Before   being   the   act   of   the  
pedagogue,   explication   is   the   myth   of   pedagogy,   the   parable   of   a   word  
divided   into   knowing   minds   and   ignorant   ones,   ripe   minds   and   immature  
ones,  the  capable  and  the  incapable,  the  intelligent  and  the  stupid.593  
 
For  Jacocot,  “all  people  are  virtually  capable  of  understanding  what  others  have  
done  and  understood”.594  Everyone  has  the  same  intelligence  and  differences  in  
knowledge  are  simply  matters  of  either  opportunity  and/or  motivation.  Hallward  
explains   that   on   the   basis   of   this   assumption,   superior   or   having   more  knowledge  
than   another   ceases   to   be   a   necessary   qualification   of   the   teacher,   just   as   the  
process   of   explanation   ceases   to   be   an   important   part   of   teaching.595   The   usual  
supposition   of   education   systems   is   that   it   should   function   in   such   a   way   that   it  
eventually   furthers   social   justice   and   equality   between   people.596   Jacocot  
however,   as   Tanke   explains,   begins   with   the   assumption   of   intellectual   equality  
and   seeks   to   establish   a   different   type   of   pedagogy   on   the   strength   of   this  
assumption.597   Over   time   Jacocot   defended   his   method   and   came   to   oppose  
traditional  pedagogy  on  its  grounds.    
 
Tanke   further   clarifies   that   in   order   to   maintain   the   position   that   people   are  
equally   intelligent   what   is   required   is   the   refusal   to   accept   that   intellectual  
inequality   is   the   explanation   for   why   some   do   better   than   others   or   why   some  
achieve   greater   academic   success   than   others.598   Intelligence   needs   to   be  
separated   from   its   material   effects.   He   explains   that   it   is   obvious   that   some   do  
better  than  others,  that  some  are  more  successful  than  others  and  more  quickly  
successful   when   it   comes   to   the   tests   and   trails   put   forth   by   educational  
institutions.599  But  this  cannot  necessarily  and  should  not  be  described  in  terms  of  
intelligence.   For   Tanke,   the   question   that   Rancière   puts   forth   with   regards   to  
Jacocot  is  the  following:  “How  are  we  to  move  seamlessly  from  material  facts  to  
                                                                                                           
593
Rancière J (1991) 6-7.
594
Hallward P in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 144.
595
As above.
596
As above.
597
May T in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 111.
598
Tanke J (2011) 36-37.
599
As above.

122  
 
the   immaterial   of   the   mind?”600   For   Jacocot,   the   juncture   between   thought   and  
expression  must  be  affirmed  in  order  to  do  so.601  As  Tanke  elucidates,  thought  is  
prior   to   language   and   all   communication   is   first   and   foremost   the   will   to  
communicate  sentiments  by  means  of  arbitrary  signs.602  It  is  therefore  possible  to  
contend  that  intellectual  activity  is  equal  because  of  the  fact  that  communication  
is  sometimes  difficult  and  it  is  within  the  process  of  communication,  articulation  
and  expression  that  problems  may  arise.  What  is  therefore  preferred  is  a  different  
explanation  for  why  some  students  learn  faster  than  others.  Tanke  explains  that  
dissimilar  results  should  rather  be  attributed  to  different  intensities  of  will.603  As  
Tanke   further   elucidates;   the   claim   is   not   that   all   academic   works   are   equal   in  
quality,   but   rather   that   they   do   not   originate   from   two   different   natures.604  
Rancière  states:    
There  aren’t  two  sorts  of  minds.  There  is  inequality  in  the  manifestations  of  
intelligence,   according   to   the   greater   or   lesser   energy   communicated   to   the  
intelligence   by   the   will   for   discovering   and   combining   new   relations;   but  
there   is   no   hierarchy   of   intellectual   capacity,   emancipation   is   becoming  
conscious  of  this  equality  of  nature.605    
 
And    
I   will   not   say   that   one’s   faculties   are   inferior   to   other’s.   I   will   only   suppose  
that  the  two  faculties  haven’t  been  equally  exercised.606    
 
Jacocot   named   his   method   “universal   teaching”   and   it   basically   involves   the  
natural   method   by   which   one   learns   through   comparing   of   two   facts.607   Tanke  
explains  that  a  student  must  identify  a  fact,  relate  it  to  something  else  and  then  
relate   or   recount   the   connection   between   the   two.608   In   order   to   do   this,   no  
explanation  is  needed:  

                                                                                                           
600
As above.
601
As above.
602
As above.
603
As above.
604
As above.
605
Rancière J (1991) 27.
606
Rancière J (1991) 50.
607
Tanke J (2011) 37.
608
As above.

123  
 
 All   that   is   required   is   the   confidence   to   venture   forward   into   a   world   of  
unconnected   facts,   the   will   to   focus   the   intelligence   and   the   courage   to   find  
the  language  to  communicate  one’s  adventure.609    
 
In   his   pedagogical   experiment,   Jacocot’s   role   as   teacher   was   reduced   to   the  
relentless   and   continuous   questioning   of   students   to   ensure   that   they   apply  
themselves   to   the   task   at   hand.610   When   there   were   performances   of   uneven  
achievement,   the   teacher’s   role   is   not   to   use   these   performances   to   rank   the  
students  by  intelligence  or  capacity,  but  rather  to  see  weakness  as  evidence  of  a  
lack   of   application   to   the   task.   Davis   notes   that   when   students   protested   that  
they   cannot   do   better,   or   cannot   perform   the   task   at   all,   the   teacher   was   to  
become   “an   intractable   master”,   as   stubborn   as   possible.611   Jacocot   therefore,  
according  to  Davis,  took  the  protests  of  students  as  false  modesty.612  A  typically  
response  from  Jacocot  was:  
You  must  begin  to  speak.  Don’t  say  that  you  can’t.  You  know  how  to  say  “I  
can’t”.  Say  in  its  place  “Calypso  could  not”,  and  you’re  off.  You’re  off  on  a  
route   that   you   already   knew,   and   that   you   should   follow   always   without  
giving   up.   Don’t   say:   “I   can’t”.   Or   then   learn   to   say   it   in   the   manner   of  
Calypso,  in  the  manner  of  Telemachus,  of  Narbal,  of  Idomeneus  […]  you  will  
never   run   out   of   ways   to   say   “I   can’t”,   and   soon   you   will   be   able   to   say  
everything.613  
 
The  ignorant  teacher  is  therefore  someone  who  validates  the  efforts  of  students  
and  provides  them  with  continuous  encouragement,  always  keeping  students  on  
track  to  their  intellectual  emancipation.614  Tanke  states:  
The   master   compels   the   student   to   make   greater   effort,   to   draw   more  
connections,  to  recognise  deeper  patterns,  and  to  communicate  the  results  
more   elegantly.   He   does   not   for   all   that   tell   the   student   what   to   think   about  
what  he  finds.  He  simply  provides  the  occasion  for  the  student  to  discover  
his  own  capacity.615    
 

                                                                                                           
609
As above.
610
Davis O (2010) 27.
611
As above
612
As above.
613
Rancière J (1991) 24 as quoted in Davis O (2010) 27.
614
Tanke J (2011) 37.
615
Tanke J (2011) 38.

124  
 
Tanke   further   explains   that   universal   teaching   refuses   to   employ   “explication”,  
which  is  the  process  whereby  a  teacher  clarifies  and  explains  text.616  Explication  
supplements   a   text   with   commentary   that   is   designed   to   make   the   meaning   of  
the  text  clearer  or  apparent.617  During  the  process  of  explication,  as  Tanke  notes,  
the  assumption  exists  that  the  text  will  not  be  properly  understood  without  the  
teachers’   intervention.618   The   process   therefore   continuously   reveals   what   a  
student  would  not  have  gathered  without  assistance.619  For  Rancière,  explication  
institutes  a  relationship  between  intelligence  and  intelligence,  thereby,  as  Tanke  
notes,  convincing  a  student  of  the  inferiority  of  her  own.620  What  is  learned  in  this  
process  is  that  one’s  intelligence  relies  upon  another’s  and  in  Rancière’s  view  the  
intelligence   of   the   student   is   subordinated   and   the   relationship   is   termed  
“stultification”.621   As   Tanke   further   explains,   the   process   whereby   the   mind  
realises   its   own   powers   without   the   reliance   on   another’s,   is   known   as  
“emancipation”   and   emancipation   is   opposed   to   stultification.622   Stultification  
therefore   convinces   the   student   that   he   is   dependent   on   the   intelligence   of  
others   whilst   emancipation   enables   him   to   discover   what   he   is   capable   of.623  
Rancière   through   his   exploration   of   Jacocot   is   contesting   the   belief   that   nature  
has  distributed  the  gifts  of  the  mind  unequally:    
What   sustains   the   positions   of   educators,   to   say   nothing   of   the   social   order,  
if  not  the  notion  that  some  are  not  capable  of  thinking  as  well  as  others?624    
 
Universal   teaching   postulates   the   presupposition   of   intellectual   equality   and   as  
Tanke  further  explains,  the  presupposition  of  intellectual  equality  is  a  hypothesis  
in   search   of   proof.625   The   point   is   shifting   the   terms   of   the   debate   and   Tanke  
notes  that  whilst  it  might  be  difficult  to  establish  the  presupposition  definitively,  it  

                                                                                                           
616
As above.  
617
Tanke J (2011) 37.
618
As above.
619
As above.
620
As above
621
As above.
622
Tanke J (2011) 38.
623
As above.
624
Tanke J (2011) 36.
625
As above.

125  
 
is   a   belief   that   is   legitimate   to   hold.626   Rancière   explains,   “our   problem   isn’t  
proving   that   all   intelligence   is   equal.   It   is   seeing   what   can   be   done   under   that  
presupposition”.627    
 
Davis   argues   that   at   times   Jacocot’s   method   might   be   viewed   as   an   elaborate  
form  of  “autodidactism”,  the  process  whereby  a  learner  struggles  alone  with  the  
content  of  a  text,  while  the  teacher  at  most  seeks  to  keep  the  student  focussed  
with  relentless  questioning.628  Jacocot’s  method  is  further  viewed  by  Rancière  as  
a   radical   critique   of   the   Enlightenment   model   of   progressive   pedagogy.   For  
Rancière,  Jacocot    
derives  the  “mad”  notion  that  all  intelligence  is  equal  and  that  this  equality  
is  a  presupposition  that  requires  demonstration  and  not  a  goal  that  needs  to  
be   attained   […]   he   derives   the   notion   that   the   ideals   of   progress   and   the  
progressive  moment  are,  in  and  of  themselves,  principles  of  inequality  as  a  
social   end   and   entrusting   certain   education   “experts”   with   the   task   of  
reducing   the   effects   of   the   clash   between   an   “equality   to   come”   with  
existing  inequality  means,  in  short  to  institute  inequality  as  principle  whose  
reproduction  is  infinite.629  
 
According   to   Davis,   Rancière’s   thoughts   around   Jacocot   can   therefore   be   seen   as  
an  early  challenge  to  the  progressivism  which  took  hold  of  the  nineteenth  century  
and   which   still   dominates   thinking   about   education   and   social   inequality   today.630  
According  to  Rancière:    
An   enormous   machine   was   revving   up   to   promote   equality   through  
instruction.   This   was   equality   represented,   socialised,   made   unequal,   good  
for   being   perfected-­‐   that   is   to   say,   deferred   from   commission   to  
commission,  from  report  to  report,  from  reform  to  reform  until  the  end  of  
time.   Jacocot   was   alone   in   recognising   the   effacement   of   equality   under  
progress,  of  emancipation  under  instruction.631  
 
It   should   further   be   noted   that   Rancière’s   assumption   of   equal   intelligence  
amounts  too  much  more  than  merely  the  idea  to  have  the  utmost  of  faith  in  the  

                                                                                                           
626
As above.
627
Rancière J (1991) 46.
628
Davis O “The radical pedagogies of François Bon and Jacques Rancière” French Studies
(2010) 183.
629
Panagia D “Dissenting words: A conversation with Jacques Rancière” Diacritics (2000) 122.
630
Davis O (2010) 30.
631
Rancière J (1991) 134.

126  
 
abilities   of   students.632   Davis   argues   that   it   implies   a   profoundly   different  
understanding  of  the  relationship  between  student  and  teacher.633  The  teacher’s  
role   is   to   place   the   student   in   a   position   or   situation   from   which   they   can   only  
escape  by  using  their  intellect.634  Universal  teaching  therefore  involves  somewhat  
of  a  paradox:  “[I]f  emancipation  is  something  which  can  never  be  given,  but  only  
taken,   to   teach   is   to   construct   a   serious   of   puzzles   from   which   the   student   can  
only  escape  by  seizing  knowledge”.635  Universal  also  teaching  involves  relentless  
questioning   in   an   attempt   “to   expose   non-­‐sequiturs   and   obscurities”.636   For  
Davis,  Jacocot’s  aversion  to  explanation  is  sometimes  exaggerated  to  the  limits  of  
plausibility.637   He   radically   marks   his   stance   from   any   type   of   common-­‐sense  
thinking  about  education.638  However,  as  further  explained  by  Davis,  his  suspicion  
of   explanation   is   not   incoherent.   It   should   rather   be   understood   in   institutional  
and  political  terms.639  In  his  view,  when  students  are  taught  in  a  “normal”  way  by  
being   led   from   imperfect   or   incorrect   explanations   to   less   imperfect   or   correct  
ones,   this   promotes   intellectual   dependency   and   endorses   the   sense   of  
intellectual   inequality   which   is   crucial   to   the   survival   of   the   institution   and   the  
maintenance   of   the   status   quo.640   Therefore,   Davis   explains,   the   intellectual  
inequality  that  is  produced  by  institutions  is  thought  of  by  Rancière  in  relation  to  
other   forms   of   social   inequality.641   According   to   Rancière   it   rationalises   the  
division   of   society   into   those   who   are   born   to   think   and   govern   and   their  
intellectual   inferiors   in   intelligence   that   are   fit   only   to   follow   instruction.642  
Educational   institutions   therefore   seem   to   instil   a   sense   of   intellectual   and  
political  inequality  through  processes  such  as  marking  and  examinations  as  well  as  

                                                                                                           
632
Davis O French Studies (2010) 184.
633
As above.
634
As above.
635
As above.
636
As above.
637
As above.
638
As above.
639
As above.
640
As above
641
As above.
642
As above.

127  
 
through   the   subtext   of   the   everyday   interactions   between   student   and   teacher,  
rather  than  instilling  a  sense  of  capability.643  
 
Jacocot   also   argues   that   even   though   the   aim   of   ordinary   pedagogy   is   to   bring  
about   greater   equality   between   student   and   teacher   by   way   of   a   series   of  
incrementally  more  sophisticated  explanations,  it  is  unacceptably  slow.644    It  is  a  
hierarchal  approach,  which  misunderstands  the  process  of  learning  and  the  reality  
of  human  intellect.645  For  Jacocot,  one  can  obtain  better  results  by  assuming  from  
the   outset   that   students   are   the   intellectual   equals   of   their   teacher.646   Davis  
explains   that   when   a   teacher   presumes   that   a   student   is   equal   in   intelligence   it  
enables   the   student   to   retranslate   his   expression   of   incapacity   into   the   very  
knowledge  of  which  he  thought  himself  incapable.647  This  is  the  key  point  about  
Jacocot’s  method.648  Alain  Badiou  has  formulated  the  following  two  theses  with  
regard  to  this  point:  
1. Under   the   condition   of   a   declared   equality,   ignorance   is   the   point   at   which  
new  knowledge  can  emerge.  
2. Under   authority   of   an   ignorant   master,   knowledge   can   be   a   space   for  
equality.649  
 
As   Davis   notes,   the   radical   conception   of   equality   that   Rancière   derives   from  
Jacocot   is   that   equality   must   be   presupposed,   from   the   outset,   within   the  
pedagogical  encounter;  it  is  an  equality  that  must  be  declared  and  verified  within  
that   encounter.650   This   line   of   thinking   of   course   permeates   Rancière’s   politics.  
Equality  is  active  and  must  be  assumed  and  put  to  the  test.    
 
It   is   further   important   to   mention   that   the   method   of   universal   teaching   is  
essentially   anti-­‐institutional.   Jacocot   was   deeply   sceptical   of   all   attempts   to  
translate   universal   teaching   into   any   type   of   hierarchical   social   arrangement.   He  
                                                                                                           
643
Davis O French Studies (2010) 188.
644
As above.
645
As above.
646
Davis O (2010) 25.
647
As above.
648
Davis O (2010) 27.
649
Badiou A in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 42.
650
Davis O (2010) 27.

128  
 
therefore   rejected   the   possibility   of   the   incorporation   of   universal   teaching   into  
organised   frameworks.   As   Tanke   eloquently   puts   it,   “for   Jacocot,   its  
institutionalisation  will  be  its  betrayal”.651  As  Tanke  explains,  Jacocot  insists  on  the  
pedagogical  being  a  site  for  the  realisation  of  equality  and  institutions  inevitably  
function  by  establishing  hierarchies  and  inequality.652  However,  this  is  not  a  call  to  
anarchism.653   Rancière   emphasises   that   Jacocot’s   students   were   more   than   ready  
and   willing   to   engage   in   political   argument,   but   they   realised   that   its   rhetoric   is  
often  competition  for  supremacy  and  that  moments  of  reason  are  far  and  few  in  
between.654   For   Rancière   it   is   rather   about   the   fact   that   “every   institution   is   an  
explication  in  social  act,  a  dramatisation  of  inequality”.655  
 
Further,  Télémaque  was  necessary  within  Jacocot’s  experiment.  The  text  allowed  
Jacocot   to   distance   himself   from   his   intelligence   and   knowing,   thereby   allowing  
students  to  discover  their  own  intellectual  capabilities.  According  to  the  approach  
of   radical   intellectual   equality   the   teacher   no   longer   distributes   knowledge   to   the  
student,   but   he   rather   encourages   the   student   to   acquire   knowledge   for   him   or  
herself  through  an  encounter  with  a  written  text  or  some  other  demonstration  or  
example   from   that   field   of   knowledge.656   Télémaque   formed   the   bond   between  
Jacocot   and   his   students   and   Jacocot’s   role   amounted   to   nothing   more   than  
continuously   pointing   students   back   to   the   text.   Davis   notes   that   “the  
schoolmaster   can   be   ignorant   because   the   text   it   savant”.657   Therefore,   when  
Jacocot   radicalised   his   experiment   by   teaching   more   subjects   that   he   didn’t   know  
anything   about,   the   text   or   other   example   from   that   field   is   what,   according   to  
Davis,   saves   the   ignorant   schoolmaster   from   absurdity.658   Télémaque,   or   its  

                                                                                                           
651
Tanke J (2011) 40.
652
As above.
653
Davis O (2010) 29.
654
Davis O (2010) 28-29.
655
Rancière J (1991) 105.
656
Davis 28-29.
657
Davis O French Studies (2010) 183.
658
As above.

129  
 
equivalent,   allows   pedagogy   to   be   simultaneously   egalitarian   and   meaningful   as  
“the  teacher  and  the  student  are  equal  before  the  book”.659  
 
Tanke  explains  that  universal  teaching  works  on  the  assumption  that  knowledge  
is  simply  there  for  the  taking,  based  on  the  model  of  primary  language  learning.660  
It   is   always   a   matter   of   learning   a   language,   or   using   a   familiar   tool.661   Anything  
can  serve  as  a  starting  point.  The  idea  that  thought  is  before  language  allows  us  
to  transform  knowledge  into  creative  activity:    
[W]e   speak   as   poets   when   we   recount   the   mind’s   adventure   with   imperfect  
signs.662    
 
According   to   Rancière/Jacocot,   the   most   important   virtue   of   intelligence   is  
poetry,   understood   in   a   broad   sense.663   Tanke   explains   that   for   Jacocot   and  
Rancière,   knowledge   consists   in   drawing   connections   and   inventing   language   in  
which  we  can  communicate  these  findings.664  Rancière  states  that  
[i]n   the   act   of   speaking,   man   doesn’t   transmit   his   knowledge,   he   makes  
poetry;  he  translates  and  invites  others  to  do  the  same.  He  communicates  as  
artisan:  as  a  person  who  handles  words  like  tools.665    
 
Communication   is   therefore   a   double   creation   and   it   consists   of   translating   to  
signs  one’s  own  experience  of  navigation.666  Jacocot  and  Rancière  contend  that  
the   artist   can   probably   more   readily   discover   the   language   of   equality   than  
university   professors,   because   “[t]hey   renounce   the   tyranny   of   the   fixed  
message,  creating  instead  spaces  for  play,  reciprocal  engagement  and  negotiated  
meaning”.667  
 

                                                                                                           
659
As above.
660
Tanke J (2011) 39.
661
Rancière J (1991) 65 & 5-6.
662
Tanke J (2011) 39.
663
As above.
664
As above.
665
Rancière J (1991) 65.
666
Tanke J (2011) 39.
667
Tanke J (2011) 39.

130  
 
Ultimately,  Rancière’s  work  and  exploration  of  Jacocot  seeks  to  demonstrate  the  
power   of   declarations   of   equality,   intellectually   and   politically.   Ross   eloquently  
reiterates  the  role  of  equality  in  the  context  of  Jacocot  and  I  quote  her  at  length.  
At   the   heart   of   the   pedagogical   relation   is   the   representation   of   inequality  
as  evolutionary  epistemology:  the  people  who  can  never  catch  up  with  the  
enlightened  elite,  or  who  can  never  be  completely  modern.  People  who  are  
trapped,   without   knowing   it,   at   one   stage   along   the   trajectory   of  
progressive  time,  and  who  are  destined  to  remain  there,  imprisoned  in  this  
other   time,   that   of   the   child,   or   that   of   the   primitive.   But,   inequality   can’t   be  
gradually  whittled  away,  just  as  equality  is  not  a  goal  to  be  one  day  attained,  
nor   arrived   at   by   dint   of   a   series   of   concessions   made   by   the   state.   Short-­‐
circuiting  the  temporality  of  pedagogy  makes  equality  a  point  of  departure,  
the  point  of  departure,  an  axiom  anterior  to  the  constitution  of  a  particular  
staging   of   politics   and   which   makes   such   a   staging   possible.   Rather   than  
being  the  criteria  that  determines  how  long  it  will  take  for  society  as  it  is  to  
become   society   as   it   might   or   should   be,   equality   as   an   axiom   enables,  
thought,  experiment,  invention.668  
 
For   Rancière,   the   idea   that   students   learn   on   their   own   means   that   the   hierarchal  
ordering  and  policing  of  society  is  constantly  undermined  by  the  absolute  equality  
that  characterises  the  human  intellectual  and  always  insures  a  potential  for  true  
political   intervention.   What   does   it   mean   to   presuppose   people   are   equally  
intelligent?   In   short,   it   has   to   do   with   the   ability   of   people   to   shape   their   own  
lives.669  In  this  regard  May  states  that  
[s]urely   there   are   things   that   others   can   teach   us.   But   we   are   capable   of  
cobbling   those   teachings   together   into   a   meaningful   whole,   and   far   more  
capable   of   teaching   ourselves   many   of   those   things   than   the   hierarchal  
order  in  which  we  live  would  lead  us  to  believe.670  
 
The   employment   of   equality   allows   for   previously   supressed   capacities   to   emerge  
and  the  presupposition  of  equality  is  a  destabilising  force.  Equality  can  disrupt  any  
notion   of   the   distribution   of   the   sensible.   It   is   not   given,   or   claimed,   but   practiced  
and   verified.   Assuming   radical   intellectual   equality   bolsters   capacities   previously  
denied  or  not  recognised  and  allows  those  deprived  or  silenced  voices  the  ability  
to   reconfigure   the   sensible   configuration.671   In   the   conclusion   I   elaborate   on  

                                                                                                           
668
Ross K in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 26.
669
May T in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 111.
670
As above.
671
Tanke J (2011) 36-37.

131  
 
Jacocot’s   equality   as   it   pertains   to   voice.   Below,   I   turn   to   the   figure   of   Gabriel  
Gauny.  
 
3.3   Gabriel   Gauny   in   The   Nights   of   Labor   and   Plato   in   The   Philosopher  
and  His  Poor  
 
There  is  no  point  waiting  for  some  moment  in  the  future  when  everyone  has  the  leisure  to  
be  by  turns  a  shepherd,  a  fisherman  and  a  critic  at  nightfall  […]  the  time  is  now  for  us  to  
break  the  chains  of  the  working  day  in  which  and  against  we  struggle,  the  time  to  win  for  
ourselves  the  body  and  soul  of  philosophical  leisure.672  
 
Tanke   mentions   that   one   of   the   major   political   legacies   of   May   ‘68   was   to   disrupt  
the   boundaries   thought   to   exist   between   manual   and   intellectual   labour.673   The  
boundaries   between   manual   and   intellectual   labour   became   of   great   interest   to  
Rancière.   His   work   of   the   1970’s   around   Althusserianism   can   be   viewed   as   an  
attempt   to   displace   the   representational   mechanisms   through   which   intellectuals  
attempted  to  guide  political  movements.674  And  the  disruption  of  the  boundaries  
between   manual   and   intellectual   labour   became   central   to   this   displacement.     His  
concern   in   this   regard   sent   him   into   the   archives   of   the   French   workers’  
movement.  He  would  remain  there  for  ten  years.  This  experience  was  essential  to  
the   formation   of   many   of   Rancière’s   central   notions,   especially   those   pertaining  
to   politics   as   the   redefining   of   partitions   of   the   sensible   world.   The   insights   he  
gathered  in  the  archives  continue  to  define  his  thought  and,  as  Tanke  mentions,  
its  spirit  shapes  his  general  approach  to  political  and  philosophical  questions.675  
 
Rancière’s   archival   work   resulted   in   the   publication   of   The   Nights   of   Labor:   The  
Worker’s   Dream   in   Nineteenth-­‐Century   France   in   1981   and   The   Philosopher   and   his  
Poor  in  1983.676  The  Philosopher  and  His  Poor  can  be  viewed  as  a  companion  to  The  
Nights  of  Labor.  The  latter  charts  the  history  of  workers  who  refused  to  live  their  
lives   according   to   the   prescriptions   of   work   and   therefore   their   strict   identities   as  
                                                                                                           
672
Rancière J Louis-Gabriel Gauny: Le Philosophe Plébéien (1983) 17 as quoted in and
translated by Davis O (2010) 160.
673
Tanke J (2011) 22.
674
As above.
675
As above.
676
Rancière J (1989) & (2004).

132  
 
workers.   The   former,   as   Davis   notes,   investigates   the   means   by   which   philosophy  
has   locked   up   workers   through   discourses   about   their   nature.677   For   Rancière,  
philosophy  has  historically  defined  itself  against  those  people  engaged  in  manual  
labour,   arguing   for   its   superiority   and   powers   of   discernment   against   those  
supposedly   lacking   the   time   for   thought.   Both   of   the   books   therefore   interrogate  
the  idea  that  thinking  is  a  luxury  of  a  few.    
 
In   this   section,   I   discuss   the   historical   figure   of   Gabriel   Gauny   that   Rancière  
explores   in   his   book,   The   Nights   of   Labor.   Before   focussing   on   Gauny   and  
Rancière’s   engagement   with   him,   I   outline   Rancière’s   engagement   with   Plato   in  
The  Philosopher  and  His  Poor.  When  it  comes  to  the  relationship  between  power  
and  knowledge  and  intellectual  and  manual  labour,  Plato  becomes  an  important  
critical  focus  for  Rancière.  An  outlining  of  Rancière’s  main  concerns  with  regards  
to   Plato   becomes   important   as   it   allows   for   a   proper   appreciation   of   the   figure   of  
Gabriel   Gauny.   Rancière,   at   times,   directly   link   Gauny’s   actions   and   words   with  
Plato’s   assumptions   in   order   to   show   that   the   latter   is   unfounded.   The   analysis   of  
Plato   is   further   central   to   Rancière’s   thinking   as   it   directly   relates   to   the   notion  
that  some  are  capable  of  thinking  and  others  are  not  or  that  some  are  destined  
for  contemplation  and  others  for  work.  It  therefore  becomes  important  to  shortly  
outline  some  arguments  made  by  Plato.    
 
3.3.1  Plato  
Davis   explains   that   for   Rancière   Plato’s   idea   of   the   city   in   Republic   is   a   political  
model   of   “philosophical-­‐pedagogical   tyranny”.678   The   Republic   is   a   treatise   on  

                                                                                                           
677
Tanke J (2011) 22.
678
Davis O (2010) 18. Davis outlines the way in which Rancière’s positive account of
intellectual equality originated from his radicalisation of the critique of pedagogy in
Althusser’s Lesson to encapsulate Marx as well as Sartre and Bourdieu as thinkers in the
French Marxist tradition. Rancière’s work in the archives bolstered his belief that an
Althusserian understanding of the relationship between Marxist intellectual and revolutionary
struggle was wrongheaded. See Davis O (2010) 18-25. Davis explains that in The Philosopher
and his Poor, he returns to explore the contours of this motif in Marx’s work and its
reappearance in that of Jean-Paul Sartre and Pierre Bourdieu and its prehistory that he finds
in Plato’s ideal state (Davis O (2010) 18-25). In this book, Rancière argues by suggestive
juxtaposition that the scientific strand identified within the Marxist tradition (in Marx, Sartre

133  
 
government  as  well  as  a  treatise  on  education  in  which  the  educated  rule  and  in  
turn  educate  their  successors.  Plato  allows  for  three  social  classes  in  his  ideal  city  
namely;  workers,  who  fulfil  the  material  needs  of  a  society  as  a  whole,  a  military  
class   of   soldier-­‐guardians   and   a   governing   class   of   philosopher-­‐kings.679   Rulers  
must   be   trained   in   order   to   ensure   that   they   have   acquired   the   necessary  
knowledge  to  rule.  As  Davis  explains,  in  this  society,  government  is  a  product  of  a  
selective  education  system  and  the  preserve  of  experts.680  It  is  a  self-­‐perpetuating  
system  because  of  the  fact  that  philosopher-­‐kings  must  educate  their  successors  
and  those  whom  education  is  offered  to  are  preselected  from  among  the  children  
of  parents  in  the  military  and  the  ruling  classes.681  The  children  of  workers  are  not  
normally   educated   for   government.   According   to   Plato,   the   hierarchy   of   classes  
corresponds   to   a   hierarchy   of   human   character   types.   Davis   explains   that   the  
assumption   is   that   in   members   of   the   working   class,   appetitive   desires   such   as  
hunger  and  sexual  satisfaction  will  predominate,  whilst  in  the  classes  of  warrior-­‐
guardians   and   philosopher-­‐kings,   reason   and   honour   will   prevail   over   appetitive  
desire.682   It   is   not   difficult   to   see,   considering   Rancière’s   intense   aversion   to  
destined   positions   within   the   police   order,   why   Plato,   at   times,   becomes  
Rancière’s  enemy  number  one.    
 
As   Davis   elucidates   further,   Plato   is   quite   aware   that   the   assumption   of   the  
hierarchy  of  human  character  types  is  exactly  that,  an  assumption.683  However,  he  
suggests   that   it   should   be   taught   as   fact   and   in   order   to   argue   this,   he   takes  
recourse  in  the  myth  of  three  metals.684  According  to  this  myth,  there  are  three  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
and Bourdieu, as well as Althusser), is rooted in a certain conception of the relationship
between power and knowledge first elaborated in Plato’s autocratic model of the ideal city in
Republic. It should be mentioned that I do not discuss Rancière’s engagement with Jean-Paul
Sartre and Pierre Bourdieu as an outline of the engagement with Plato will suffice in order to
contextualise Gabriel Gauny properly and in order to demonstrate Rancière’s contentions in
this regard. For general discussions on these theorists and Rancière’s engagement with them
see Davis O (2010) 18-25 and Tanke J (2011) 28-35.
679
As above.
680
As above.
681
As above.
682
As above.
683
As above.  
684
As above.

134  
 
races   of   people   in   the   hierarchal   relationships   of   society,   namely,   bronze,   silver  
and  gold  races  that  correspond  to  the  three  social  classes.  The  myth  suggests  that  
children   will   be   born   with   roughly   the   same   mix   of   metals   in   their   soul   as   their  
parents.  The  main  function  of  the  selective  educational  system  outlined  by  Plato  is  
to   deselect   or   to   disqualify   those   offspring,   so   that   the   racial   purity   of   the   classes  
is  preserved.685    
 
The   greatest   threat   to   this   system   is   the   social   climber,   “the   parvenu”   or   the  
worker  with  ideas  above  what  his  station  requires.686  Davis  notes  that  there  is  of  
course   nothing   especially   outlandish   about   Rancière’s   commentary   on   Plato.687  
However,   what   makes   Rancière’s   criticisms   significant   is   where   he   repeatedly  
places   the   emphasis,   namely,   on   the   fact   that   there   is   absolutely   no   rational   basis  
for  Plato’s  elaborate,  autocratic  hierarchy.688  The  section  on  Plato  is  titled  “Plato’s  
Lie”,   indicating   that   the   entire   system   rests   on   a   lie,   myth   or   founding   fiction.  
Plato  was  disturbed  by  the  so-­‐called  “amateurishness”  of  Athenian  democracy.689  
He   rather   opted   for   aspects   of   the   Spartan   model   of   war-­‐state   ruling   over   a  
largely   submissive   population   that   provided   for   the   material   needs   of   the   state   as  
a  whole.690  In  Plato’s  ideal  model  there  is  a  hierarchy  of  specialists  in  which  each  
class   would   do   only   one   thing.   The   shoemaker   will   only   make   shoes   and   the  
farmer   only   grow   crops   and   shoes   and   crops   will   be   exchanged   for   the   good   of  
all.691   Plato   claims   that   only   by   devoting   all   our   time   to   one   activity,   an   activity   for  
which   our   birth   equips   us,   can   the   best   results   be   achieved.   And   so   it   follows   that  
workers  do  not  have  time  to  do  anything  but  work.    
 
Rancière  doesn’t  find  the  claim  about  innate  character  traits,  nor  the  claim  about  
the  time  required  for  perfecting  a  skill  persuasive.692  Rancière  acknowledges  that  

                                                                                                           
685
Davis O (2010) 19.
686
As above.
687
As above.
688
As above.
689
As above.
690
As above.
691
As above.
692
As above.

135  
 
Plato   is   merely   making   an   assumption   that   specialisation   is   the   only   way   to  
achieve  the  best  results.  Workers,  it  is  assumed,  are  not  able  to  do  more  than  one  
thing   at   a   time.   For   Rancière,   this   assumption   about   the   worker   translates   into   an  
arbitrary  prohibition:  “the  simple  prohibition  against  doing  anything  else”.693  For  
Plato,   the   climber   who   “trespasses”   on   the   role   or   the   position   of   others   lies   at  
the  root  of  injustice  and  for  him,  justice  means  staying  put.694    
 
Rancière  finds  it  significant  that  Plato,  through  introducing  the  myth  of  the  three  
metals,   admits   to   the   arbitrariness   of   the   distinction   between   those   who   rule,  
those  who  are  capable  of  philosophy  and  the  rest  of  the  multitude  or  the  workers  
that  is  not  suited  for  for  thinking.695  For  Davis,  the  originality  in  Rancière’s  reading  
lies  not  in  what  he  says  about  Plato  in  isolation,  but  rather  in  his  argument  by  way  
of  “parataxis”  between  Plato  and  the  reputedly  progressive  work  of  philosophers  
such   as   Marx,   Jean-­‐Paul   Sartre   and   Pierre   Bourdieu.696   These   thinkers   are  
therefore  tainted  by  association  according  to  Davis.697  For  Rancière,  all  four  have  
in   common   the   construction   of   a   group   he   calls   “the   poor”   which   is   also   the  
proletariat,  the  workers  or  the  dominated  class  who  are  constitutively  incapable  
of   thought.698   Rancière   suggests   that   similar   reasons   are   advanced   in   each   case  
                                                                                                           
693
As above.
694
As above.
695
See Rancière J in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 276.
696
As above.
697
As above. Davis notes that with regard to Sartre, Rancière concentrates on his later work
that involves the question of the relation between workers and the Communist Party (Davis O
(2010) 22-25). According to Sartre, workers are unable to think for themselves and need the
Party because they do not have time and are too tired. Rancière thus aligns Sartre with the
Platonic argument for “specialisation”. See Davis O (2010) 22-25. In suggesting that workers
are too tired to think, Sartre unwittingly recreates the Platonic ban on doing more than one
thing. He also, according to Rancière, articulates Marx’s assumption that people make
history, but they do not know they do so. See Davis O (2010) 22-25. It should be mentioned
that Rancière’s point is not that Sartre’s concern for workers is disingenuous, but rather that
his emphasis on the worker’s inevitable tiredness deprives the worker of the power of
thought. As Davis explains, for Rancière, what Sartre is ultimately doing is denying his tired
poor the same capacity for “self-directing intellectual freedom”, which he as philosopher
exercises. For a more detailed discussion, see Davis O (2010) 20-22. Davis notes that
Rancière’s dispute with Bourdieu’s work on pedagogy and aesthetics is more involved than
his engagement with either Marx or Sartre. Davis accurately summarises Rancière’s
engagement with Bourdieu. See Davis O (2010) 22-25.
698
As above.

136  
 
and   that   these   reasons   are   all   similarly   unfounded.699   More   importantly,   in   each  
case   “the   philosopher”   is   dependent   on   “his   poor”   who   cannot   think   for  
themselves.700   Marx’s   proletariat,   for   example,   are   held   up   as   the   embodiment   of  
a   common   future.   However,   Davis   explains,   the   proletariat   are   constitutively  
unable  to  understand  that  future  and  their  role  in  it.701  Such  knowledge  must  be  
introduced   by   intellectuals,   who   stand   in   a   relationship   of   mutual   independence  
to  their  specific  “poor”.702  In  The  Philosopher  and  His  Poor,  Rancière  calls  for  the  
recognition  of  the  equal  capacity  of  all  for  what  Davis  terms  “sophisticated  self-­‐
understanding   and   self-­‐performance”;   an   understanding   that   goes   far   beyond  
conservative  thinking  such  as  that  captured  by  the  idea  that  the  worker  must  do  
one  thing  at  a  time.703  Rancière’s  biggest  concern  in  The  Philosopher  and  His  Poor  
is   the   underestimation   of   understanding   and   imagination   of   those   people   or  
“poor”   on   whose   behalf   certain   philosophers   speak.   As   we   have   seen   with   his  
discussion   on   Jacocot,   Rancière’s   conception   of   radical   intellectual   equality   is   a  
reaction  against  pedagogical  power.    It  is  after  The  Philosopher  and  His  Poor  that  
he   radicalises   his   critique   of   the   assumption   that   some   think   and   others   do   not  
into  a  pedagogy  of  equal  intellectual  capacities.    
 
Rancière   seeks   to   refute   the   idea   that   workers   should   perform   only   those  
functions   that   supposedly   correspond   with   their   natures.704   Some   people   are  
thought  to  be  naturally  capable  of  thought  and  others  are  destined  only  for  work.  
Some  have  gold  in  their  souls,  others  silver  and  bronze.  Tanke  mentions  that  the  
style  and  terrain  of  The  Philosopher  and  his  Poor  is  very  different  than  The  Nights  
of  Labor.705  The  Philosopher  and  His  Poor  is  a  critique  of  philosophy  that  attempts  
to   show   that   philosophical   thought,   in   order   to   demonstrate   its   difference   from  
and   superiority   of   other   practices,   denies   the   poor   capacities   for   thought.706   In  

                                                                                                           
699
As above.
700
As above.
701
As above.
702
As above.
703
Davis O (2010) 19.
704
Tanke J (2011) 28.
705
Tanke J (2011) 27-28.
706
As above

137  
 
this   book,   Rancière   argues   that   philosophy   locks   up   the   poor   because   it   is  
interested   in   preserving   its   own   purity.707   Tanke   explains   that   the   book   traces   the  
form   that   philosophy   assumes   when   partitions   the   world   on   the   basis   of  
supposedly  distinct  natures.  For  Rancière,  philosophy  harbours  a  general  disdain  
for  the  working  classes.708  
 
Plato’s   belief   that   each   should   perform   the   social   function   that   best   suit   his  
nature,   justifies   a   certain   separation   between   theory   and   practice.709   Tanke  
explains  that  in  Republic,  philosophy  regulates  production,  determines  moments  
for  reproduction,  decides  which  spectacles  are  appropriate  and  generally  assures  
that  the  division  of  labour  remains  intact.710  The  philosopher  therefore  promotes  
or   demotes   individuals   based   on   judgements   about   their   aptitudes.711   Rancière  
describes   philosophy   as   a   form   of   thinking   that   forcefully   denies   its   birth   and  
obsessively   guards   its   lineage.712   For   Rancière,   philosophy   is   characterised   by   a  
fundamental   and   ultimately   unsustainable   desire   for   purity   and   this   desire  
compels   it   to   structure   itself   in   such   a   way   that   it   is   separate   from   other  
practices.713   As   Tanke   explains,   whilst   there   are   considerable   differences   between  
the   thinkers   that   Rancière   discusses,   they   all   rely   on   a   “conceptualisation   of   the  
poor   as   an   inert   mass   whose   passivity   is   the   sine   qua   non   of   its   would-­‐be  
representatives”.714   For   Rancière,   this   conceptualisation   is   merely   a   variation   of  
the  Platonic  distribution.  The  actions  of  certain  philosophers  restrict  the  business  
of   thinking.715   Workers   require   specialists   that   are   dedicated   to   their   cause   and  
the  traditional  division  of  labour  is  affirmed.716  For  Rancière,  certain  thinkers  fail  to  
think   of   a   radical   alternative;   the   joining   together   of   the   realms   of   practice,  

                                                                                                           
707
As above
708
As above.
709
As above
710
Tanke J (2011) 29.
711
As above.  
712
Tanke J (2011) 30.
713
As above.
714
Tanke J (2011) 31.
715
As above
716
As above

138  
 
thought   and   equality.717   Rancière   finds   in   the   figure   of   Gabriel   Gauny   a   joining  
together   of   these   realms.   Gauny   forceful   asserts   the   rights   of   the   imagination   -­‐   as  
a  right  that  is  not  only  available  to  philosophers,  but  rather  to  anybody  who  wants  
to  practice  such  a  right.  
 
3.3.2  Gabriel  Gauny  
Rancière  began  his  archival  work  during  a  period  in  which  many  intellectuals  left  
their   normal   milieus   in   order   to   meet   and   engage   with   workers.718   Certain  
intellectuals   had   hoped   to   find   what   can   be   described   as   an   authentic   working  
class   culture   uncorrupted   and   uncontaminated   by   Marxist   theses.719   As   Tanke  
explains,  The  Nights  of  Labor  began  for  Rancière  under  the  assumption  that  it  was  
possible  to  trace  a  coherent  body  of  discourses  from  the  history  of  the  workers’  
movement   into   the   present.720   Tanke   further   mentions   that   Rancière   has  
explained  that  he  intended  to  “counterpose”  the  workers’  voice  to  the  voice  of  
its   would-­‐be   representatives.721   However,   he   was   forced   to   abandon   the   initial  
lines  of  his  project  for  the  reason  that  he  quickly  came  to  the  conclusion  that  no  
such   culture   or   coherent   workers’   voice   existed.   Instead,   he   encountered   a  
strange   hybrid   culture   in   which   workers   refused   to   behave   as   workers.722   This  
resulted  in  a  study  that  followed  the  lives  of  a  few  remarkable  voices  that  wrote  
poetry   and   essays   in   defiance   of   the   partitioning   of   their   lives   as   workers.  
Rancière  states:  
I   set   out   to   find   primitive   revolutionary   manifestoes,   but   what   I   found   was  
texts  which  demanded  in  refined  language  that  workers  be  considered  as  
equals  and  their  arguments  responded  to  with  proper  arguments.723    
 
Tanke  elucidates:    

                                                                                                           
717
As above.
718
Tanke J (2011) 22-23.
719
As above.
720
As above.
721
As above.
722
As above.
723
Rancière J “Preface to the Hindi translation of Nights of Labor” as referenced in Tanke J
(2011) 23 & 166.

139  
 
 Workers  did  not  simply  struggle,  as  a  certain  line  of  thought  would  expect,  
nor   did   they   valorise   the   trades   they   were   compelled   to   adopt   out   of  
economic  necessity;  they  founded  journals,  composed  poetry,  and  imitated  
“bourgeois”  forms  of  aesthetic  contemplation.724  
 
For   Rancière,   this   discovery   demanded   that   he   abandon   the   epistemology   of  
Marxist  historiography:  
In  many  cases,  we  have  a  tendency  to  interpret  as  collective  practice  or  class  
“ethos”   political   statements   which   are   in   fact   highly   individualised.   We  
attach  too  much  importance  to  the  collectivity  of  workers  and  not  enough  
to   its   divisions;   we   look   too   much   at   worker   culture   and   not   enough   at   its  
encounters  with  other  cultures.725  
 
The   Nights   of   Labor   relays   the   tale   of   workers   in   the   aftermath   of   the   July  
Revolution   of   1830   and   follows   their   traces   of   revolt   up   to   1848.   Their   story   is  
weaved   with   poems,   stories   and   essays   published   in   various   journals.726   The   book  
describes   the   personal   significance   and   meaning   that   these   associations   and  
publications  had  for  many  workers.  As  Tanke  explains,  on  Rancière’s  telling,  it  was  
precisely  the  speculative  dimension  of  these  publications  that  was  of  the  greatest  
appeal  and  Rancière  makes  a  long  argument  against  the  discursive-­‐practical  form  
the  workers’  movement  assumed  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.727  
Rancière’s   narrative,   at   that   time,   challenged   many   leftist   notions   about   the  
supposed   dignity   of   labour.   He   demonstrated   that   workers,   rather   than   finding  
manual   work   a   source   of   pride,   described   it   as   torment.728   However,   they   used  
their  nights    
[n]ot  to  simply  replenish  the  machines  that  would  report  to  work  the  next  
morning;  they  engaged  in  creative  and  scholarly  pursuits.729    
 
Rancière   insists   that   these   types   of   activities   can   hardly   be   seen   as   laying   the  
foundations  for  the  European  workers’  movement.730  Far  from  affirming  anything  
                                                                                                           
724
Tanke J (2011) 23.
725
Rancière J “The myth of the artisan: Critical reflections on a category of social history”
International Labor and Working-Class History (1983) 10.
726
Such the Christian Socialist journal L’Atelier and the various publications founded by
Fourierites, Saint Simonians and Icarians, most notably La Ruche populaire. See Tanke J
(2011) 24.
727
Tanke J (2011) 25.
728
As above.
729
As above.

140  
 
like   a   proletarian   identity,   Tanke   explains   that   these   writings   and   the   very   activity  
of  writing  itself,  was  a  means  of  refuting  what  is  taken  to  be  natural,  namely,  that  
workers  have  little  time  for  anything  else.731  Their  activities  were,  in  the  Rancièrian  
sense,  a  means  of  “disidentification”  from  police  order  identities.  These  activities  
allowed  them  to  reject  their  assigned  positions  in  the  division  of  labour  through  
the  assumption  of  capacities  they  were  not  thought  to  possess.  Further,  as  Tanke  
explains,   Rancière,   instead   of   contending   to   know   in   advance   the   nature   of   the  
object   of   his   study,   refuses   in   The   Nights   of   Labor   to   categorise   the   texts  
composed   by   these   workers.732   He   therefore   deliberately   avoids   representing  
their   voices,   allowing   the   workers’   texts   to   circulate   on   their   own,   without  
correcting,   classifying   or   explaining   them.733   What   is   demonstrated   is   that   the  
workers   engaged   in   political   discussions   and   speculations   about   alternative   social  
conditions.734   They   challenged   their   economic   subordination   and   exclusion   from  
political   life.   Tanke   explains   that   the   workers   also   immersed   themselves   in  
complicated   aesthetic   forms.735   They   organised   readings,   composed   poems,  
commented   upon   the   works   of   others   and   adopted   a   generalised   outlook.736  
These   interests   demonstrate   the   myth   of   restricting   aesthetic   pursuits   to   the  
leisure  classes:    
These  activities  were,  in  a  very  real  sense,  a  struggle  over  the  delimitation  of  
the  economy  of  pleasures.737    
 
Rancière  states:    
I   assumed   that   those   narratives   were   much   more   than   descriptions   of  
everyday  experience.  They  reinvented  the  everyday.738  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
730
As above.
731
As above.
732
As above.
733
As above.
734
The Nights of Labor takes us through “poems composed by metal workers, letters written
by builders who dream of being artists, interior decorators which aspire to a bourgeois
aesthetics and newspapers written by carpenters in which they represent their work to
themselves and respond to the images of work by others”. See Pelletier C “Rancière and the
poetics of the social sciences” International Journal of Research and Method in Education
(2009) 242-243.
735
Tanke J (2011) 25.
736
As above.
737
As above.
738
Rancière J in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 274.

141  
 
  
Rancière  took  particular  interest  in  a  man  named  Gabriel  Gauny.  
 
Gabriel  Gauny  was  a  joiner  who  left  the  archives  of  his  intellectual  life.739  From  the  
1830’s   to   the   1880’s   he   wrote   an   impressive   number   of   texts,   most   of   which  
remains   unpublished.740   Rancière   focuses   on   a   specific   essay.   It   relates   to   Gauny’s  
workday   as   a   floor   layer.   It   was   one   of   the   essays   published   in   one   of   the  
numerous   newspapers   that   blossomed   during   the   French   revolution   of   1848.   It  
came  out  as  a  contribution  to  a  collective  political  affirmation.  However,  Rancière,  
instead   of   taking   on   the   “collective   meaning   in   a   revolutionary   context”,  
emphasises   passages   that   focuses   on   “the   joiner’s   individual   experience   and   his  
personal  appropriation  of  the  power  of  writing”.741  For  Rancière,  Gauny  embodied  
a   distinct   form   of   aesthetic   political   action.742   He   laid   floors   in   bourgeois   interiors.    
However,  he  was  also  “composing  a  system  of  principles  designed  to  convert  his  
modest  resources  into  the  maximum  quotient  of  freedom”.743  Tanke  explains  that  
Gauny  had  a  special  knack  for  disassociating  his  mind  from  the  torments  the  body  
endured  on  the  job.744  Through  his  imagination  he  would  transport  himself  into  a  
realm   of   contentment.745   Gauny   describes   the   labourer’s   aesthetic   attitude   in   a  
specific  way,  thereby  redistributing  the  particular  distribution  of  the  sensible.  He  
shifted  his  gaze  outside  of  the  space  and  time  of  work.746  Rancière  highlights  the  
following  passage  by  Gauny:  
Believing  himself  at  home,  he  loves  the  arrangement  of  a  room,  so  long  as  
he   has   not   finished   laying   the   floor.   If   the   window   opens   out   on   a   garden   or  
commands  a  view  of  a  picturesque  horizon,  he  stops  his  arms  and  glides  in  
imagination   toward   the   spacious   view   to   enjoy   it   better   than   the   possessors  
of  the  neighbouring  residences.747        
                                                                                                           
739
Rancière J in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 273.
740
As above.
741
As above.
742
Tanke J (2011) 26.
743
As above.
744
As above.
745
As above.
746
As above.
747
As above. See Gabriel Gauny Le Philosophe plebeian 45-46. This passage is frequently
employed by Rancière in order to demonstrate the nature of aesthetics and its ability to free
bodies from specific distributions of the sensible.

142  
 
  
Rancière  reads  in  this  passage  an  exceptional  aesthetic-­‐political  performance.  He  
states  the  following  and  I  quote  him  at  length:  
The  tiny  shift  that  I  perceived  in  the  little  narrative  of  the  joiner,  and  that  I  
decided   to   develop   as   a   large   theoretical   and   political   shift,   consists   in  
stripping   the   argument,   in   order   to   set   forth   its   core.   The   schema   of  
knowledge   and   ignorance,   reality   and   illusion,   actually   covers   up   a   mere  
tautology:   people   are   where   they   are   because   they   are   where   they   are,  
because   they   are   incapable   of   being   elsewhere.   This   matter   of   incapacity  
must  be  stripped  of  its  “scientific”  disguise.  People  are  not  unable  because  
they   ignore   the   reason   for   being   there.   They   are   unable   because   unable  
means  the  same  thing  as  being  there.  The  point  is  that  those  who  have  the  
occupation  of  workers  are  supposed  to  be  equipped  for  that  occupation  and  
for  the  activities  that  are  related  to  it.  They  are  supposed  to  be  equipped  for  
working,   not   for   peripheral   activities   such   as   looking   around   and  
investigating   how   society   at   large   works.   This   is   what   a   distribution   of   the  
sensible   means:   a   relation   between   occupation   and   equipment,   between  
being  in  a  space  and  time,  performing  specific  activities,  and  being  endowed  
with   capacities   of   seeing,   saying,   and   doing   that   “fit”   those   activities.   A  
distribution   of   the   sensible   is   a   matrix   that   defines   a   set   of   relations  
between   sense   and   sense:   that   is,   between   a   form   of   sensory   experience  
and   an   interpretation   which   makes   sense   of   it.   It   ties   and   occupation   to   a  
presupposition.748  
   
In  the  section  from  which  the  above  quote  is  taken,  Rancière  refers  to  Plato  and  
to  the  so-­‐called  reasons  why  workers  must  stay  in  their  place.749  The  first  reason  is  
that   workers   have   no   time   to   go   elsewhere,   because   of   the   empirical   fact   that  
work  does  not  wait.  And  Rancière  indeed  regards  this  as  an  empirical  fact.750  The  
second  is  that  God  mixed  iron  in  the  makeup  of  workers  and  he  mixed  gold  in  the  
makeup   of   those   who   are   destined   to   deal   with   the   common   good.   The   second  
reason,  of  course,  is  not  an  empirical  fact.  The  second  reason  provides  the  logos  
that   “sustain   the   empirical   state   of   things   by   identifying   the   place   where   work  
does   not   wait   with   the   place   where   universal   thinking   is   expected   to   stay,   the  
place  of  the  particular”.751  The  inequality  of  the  social  ordering  has  to  rest  on  an  
inequality  in  terms  of  nature.  This  is  what  Ranciere  says  the  logos  provide.752  But  
importantly;   it   provides   it   in   the   guise   of   a   myth,   of   a   lie   about   what   “fitting”  
                                                                                                           
748
Rancière J in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 275.
749
Rancière J in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 275-276.
750
As above.
751
As above.
752
As above.

143  
 
means-­‐  the  story  of  the  deity  who  mixes  gold,  silver  or  iron  in  souls.753  The  logos  is  
therefore   a   mythos.   The   argument   is   a   story   and   the   story   an   argument:   “The  
social  distribution  rests  on  the  circle  of  the  empirical  and  the  prescriptive”.754    
 
The   reason   for   inequality   has   to   be   given   in   the   guise   of   a   story,   but   a   story   is   the  
most   egalitarian   form   of   discourse.   Rancière   states   that   “it   makes   of   the  
philosopher  the  brother  of  the  children  who  enjoy  stories  and  of  the  old  women  
or   the   old   slaves   who   tell   them   stories”.755   Here,   Rancière   is   highlighting   the  
contradiction   that   opens   up   the   possibility   of   the   affirmation   of   equality.   The  
inequality  of  the  workers  has  to  be  explained  to  them  through  a  story,  which  they  
understand   just   as   well   as   those   who   are   telling   the   story.   The   very   means,   by  
which   their   inequality   is   established,   requires   the   equal   intellectual   capacity   to  
understand   the   story.   Or   put   in   Rancière’s   political   terms,   in   order   to   obey   an  
order,  you  must  understand  it,  making  you  equal  to  the  one  that  is  ordering  you.  
Rancière  tells  us  that  
[t]he   logos   must   be   represented   as   a   story.   And   the   story,   Plato   says,   has   to  
be   believed.   In   order   to   understand   what   is   at   stake   in   the   “belief”   of   our  
joiner,  we  have  to  define  what  it  means  to  believe.  Obviously,  Plato  does  not  
demand   that   workers   have   the   inner   conviction   that   a   deity   truly   mixed   iron  
in  their  soul  and  gold  in  the  soul  of  the  rulers.  It  is  enough  that  they  sense  it:  
that   is,   that   they   use   their   arms,   their   eyes,   and   their   minds   as   if   it   were  
true”.756  
 
For   Rancière,   the   ordering   of   social   occupations   and   orderings   functions   within  
this  “as  if”,  which  ties  it  to  a  belief.757  Inequality  in  this  setting  works  out  to  the  
extent   that   one   believes   it-­‐   “[b]ut   that   belief   can   be   conveyed   only   in   the  
egalitarian  mode  of  the  story”.758    
 
For  Rancière,  in  the  construction  and  the  writing  of  his  sensory  experience,  Gauny  
implements   a   different   “as   if”;   and   this   “as   if”   overturns   the   whole   logic   which  

                                                                                                           
753
Rancière J in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 276.
754
As above.
755
As above.
756
As above
757
As above.
758
Rancière J in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 277.

144  
 
allotted   him   his   place.   However,   this   overturning   is   not   the   idea   of   the   freeing  
power  of  awareness  of  his  domination.  The  jobber  frees  himself  by  becoming  less  
aware   of   his   exploitation,   pushing   aside   its   sensory   grip.   He   therefore   frees  
himself  by  nurturing  the  power  of  self-­‐delusion.  As  Rancière  acknowledges,  Gauny  
still   works,   he   still   works   for   the   benefit   of   others   against   his   own   employment  
and  his  health:    
But  this  counter  effect,  which  results  from  his  way  of  reframing  the  space  and  
time   of   exercise   of   his   force   of   labour,   is   the   source   of   a   new   pleasure,   the  
pleasure  of  a  new  freedom.759  
 
Rancière  explains  it  in  the  following  way  and  I  quote  him  at  length:  
The  objection  has  it  that,  whatever  our  joiner  may  believe  as  he  looks  through  
the   window;   the   room   remain   the   possession   of   its   owner   and   his   force   of  
labour  the  possession  of  his  boss.  The  equal  and  disinterested  pleasure  of  the  
gaze  is  just  as  delusive  as  the  promises  of  equality  written  in  the  Declaration  
of  Rights.  Both  are  expressions  of  false  equality  that  delude  him  and  block  the  
way   that   leads   to   true   equality.   I   answer   that   the   claim   of   “true”   equality  
dismisses   the   reality   of   the   operations   of   the   verification   of   equality.   It  
dismisses  it  at  the  same  time  that  it  grasps  the  struggle  over  the  as  if  in  the  
pincers   of   appearance   and   reality.   Appearance   and   reality   are   not   opposed.   A  
reality  always  goes  along  with  an  appearance.  For  sure,  the  joiner  remains  in  
the   world   of   domination   and   exploitation.   But   he   is   able   to   split   up   the  
tautology   of   the   being-­‐there.   He   is   able   to   locate   his   ownership   in   the  
ownership  of  the  master  and  the  owner.  He  actually  builds  up  a  new  sensible  
world  in  the  given  one.  A  verification  of  equality  is  an  operation  which  grabs  
hold  of  the  knot  that  ties  equality  to  inequality.  It  handles  the  knot  so  as  to  tip  
the   balance,   to   enforce   the   presupposition   of   equality   tied   up   with   the  
presupposition   of   inequality   and   increase   its   power.   For   instance,   the  
perspective   gaze,   that   has   been   long   associated   with   mastery   and   majesty,  
can   be   assumed   and   verified   as   a   power   of   equality.   That   verification  
contributes,  thus,  to  the  framing  of  a  new  fabric  of  common  experience  or  a  
new  common  sense,  upon  which  new  forms  of  political  subjectivation  can  be  
implemented.760  
 
For   Rancière,   Gauny’s   demonstration   of   equality   is   what   is   meant   by   the   word,  
emancipation.   It   is   a   subversion   of   a   given   distribution   of   the   sensible.   What   is  

                                                                                                           
759
As above.
760
Rancière J in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 280. It is important to note here that Gauny
does not engage in politics proper as described in Rancière’s mature politics. He is not
involved in a collective affirmation of equality in the way in which Rancière describes politics.
That is why Rancière uses the words “upon which new forms of political subjectivation can be
implemented”; meaning that Gauny’s example is a redistributing of sensible time and place
from where politics can be established.

145  
 
overturned   is   the   relationship   between   what   is   done   by   one’s   arms,   what   is  
looked  at  by  one’s  eyes,  what  is  felt  as  sensory  pleasure  and  what  is  thought  of  as  
intellectual  concern:    
It   is   the   relationship   between   an   occupation,   the   space-­‐time   where   it   is  
fulfilled,  and  the  sensory  equipment  for  doing  it.  The  subversion  implies  the  
reframing  of  a  common  sense.  A  common  sense  does  not  mean  consensus  
but,   on   the   contrary,   a   polemical   place,   a   confrontation   between   opposite  
common  senses  or  opposite  ways  of  framing  what  is  common.761  
 
This  is  what  the  relationship  between  aesthetics  and  politics  means:  “Politics  is  a  
polemical   form   of   reframing   of   common   sense”.762   And   in   that   sense,   it   is   an  
aesthetic  affair.  In  this  context  Tanke  mentions  that  one  virtue  of  the  aesthetic  is  
that   it   conducts   one   into   an   indeterminate   zone   where   the   destiny   of   class   is  
thrown   off.763   It   neutralises   the   properties   thought   to   inhere   in   a   body;  
transporting  it  into  a  world  where  the  distributions  of  places,  times  and  capacities  
are  not  permanently  fixed.764  It  allows  sense  to  be  separated  from  the  distribution  
of   the   sensible.   The   platonic   assertion   that   “work   does   not   wait”   amounts   to  
locking  up  workers  in  the  space  of  their  absence  of  time.765  And  the  experience  of  
emancipation   consists   in   “locating   another   time   in   that   time,   another   space   in  
that  space”.  766  
 
Kristin  Ross  mentions  that  The  Nights  of  Labor  drew  attention  to  a  very  powerful  
act   of   stealing   time.   She   explains   that   Rancière’s   study   relocated   workers   into  
another   kind   of   time,   outside   the   temporal   regime   established   by   Marx.767  
Rancière   demonstrated   that   Marx’s   workdays   were   actually   exceeded   by   nights  
and  all  its  possibilities.768  Ross  notes  that  what  becomes  clear  is  that  Marx’s  own  
perspective   (as   Rancière   also   puts   forth   in   The   Philosopher   and   His   Poor)   was  
closely   aligned,   not   to   that   of   the   worker,   but   rather   to   that   of   capital-­‐   the  
                                                                                                           
761
As above.
762
As above.
763
Tanke J (2011) 34.
764
As above.  
765
Rancière J in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 282.
766
As above.
767
Ross K in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 23.
768
As above.

146  
 
perspective   of   “the   production   of   surplus   value”.769   Gauny   does   not   fit  
comfortably  in  the  framework  of  the  worker,  neither  Plato  nor  Marx’s.  He  rather  
asserts  his  rights  to  the  imagination  against  temperance  and  beyond  the  context  
of  proletarian  recruiters.770    
 
Gauny   and   the   other   workers   used   their   Nights   to   engage   in   a   different   kind   of  
labour,  the  labour  of  writing.  Tanke  eloquently  states:  
Writing  for  them,  was  part  of  a  politics  of  world  opening.  It  was  not  simply  a  
vehicle   for   giving   voice   to   their   grievances;   the   activity   itself   was   a   means   of  
removing   themselves   from   a   sensible   order   in   which   they   had   little   part.   It  
enabled   them   to   create   capacities,   and   there   with   the   new   space-­‐time  
configuration  in  which  to  attest  their  equality.771  
 
According   to   Tanke,   the   act   of   writing   is   a   symbolic   and   practical   rupture   that  
effaces  the  barriers  thought  to  exist  between  those  granted  the  luxury  of  thought  
and   those   thought   to   be   held   captive   by   the   space-­‐time   of   their   employment.772  
Their  pleasure  of  writing  was  not  a  retreat  from  politics:  
Theses   hard-­‐won   bonuses   of   time   and   liberty   were   not   marginal  
phenomena,   they   were   not   diversions   from   the   building   of   the   worker  
movement  and  its  great  ideals.  They  were  a  revolution,  discreet  but  radical  
nonetheless.773  
 
The   aesthetic   attitudes   that   these   workers   assumed,   whether   in   writing   or  
contemplating   a   view,   allows   them   to   move   away   from   their   habitual   identities-­‐  
the   identities   prescribed   by   police   order   categories   and   associations.774   Rancière  
explains   how   the   identity   of   “worker”   became   something   very   different   in   the  
construction  of  the  worker  poets:  
For  a  long  time,  I  looked  for  a  “proper”  worker  […]  in  the  corporatisation  of  
crafts/cultures/forms   of   originary   identities.   This   did   not   work.   It   was  
impossible   to   see   working   class   speech   constructing   itself   from   a   proper  
body   emerging   from   its   proper   location.   What   instead   manifested   itself   was  
a   speech   sought   to   drag   itself   away   from   these   incarnations,   no   longer   to  

                                                                                                           
769
As above.
770
As above.
771
Tanke J (2011) 64-65.  
772
As above.
773
Tanke J (2011) 64-65.
774
Tanke J (2011) 67.

147  
 
 speak  like  a  worker  but  to  subjectivise  itself  under  the  name  of  the  worker  in  
the  space  of  common  speech.775  
 
The   worker   poets   rejected   the   identities   that   were   stamped   on   their   bodies,   the  
assumptions   made   about   their   capacities   and   the   “spatio-­‐temporal   locales”   which  
they  are  forced  to  occupy.776  Gauny,  in  a  very  real  sense,  was  not  waiting  for  some  
point  in  the  future  to  take  for  himself  the  leisure  of  philosophical  contemplation.  
He   did   not   wait   for   some   or   other   revolution   or   change.   Rather,   he   embodies   in  
the  here  and  now  the  possibility  of  a  radical  reconfiguration  of  speech.  
 
3.4  Conclusion  
It   becomes   clear   that   the   figure   of   Joseph   Jacocot   allowed   Rancière   to   glean   a  
specific   type   of   formulation   of   equality   that   he   would   later   articulate   within   his  
mature  politics.    His  engagements  with  the  figure  of  Jacocot  opened  up  a  way  of  
thinking   about   equality   as   a   destabilising   force.   The   lessons   of   education   and  
universal   teaching   served   as   a   means   from   where   to   conceptualise   the   political  
potency   of   equality   declared   and   axiomatically   assumed.   The   notion   of   radical  
intellectual   equality   leaves   us   speculating   about   what   can   be   done   under   the  
presupposition  of  equality.  In  a  very  real  way,  Jacocot’s  arguments  also  invokes  a  
political  opportunity:  
Essentially   what   an   emancipated   person   can   do   is   to   be   an   emancipator:   to  
give,  not  the  key  to  knowledge,  but  the  consciousness  of  what  an  intelligence  
can   do   when   it   considers   itself   equal   to   any   other   and   considers   any   other  
equal  to  itself.777  
 
Against   institutional   and   political   power,   equality   postulates   the   freedoms   of  
invention,   poetry   and   thought.   We   see   the   same   type   of   invention   within  
Rancière’s   politics-­‐   the   invention   of   names   for   a   “we”,   the   construction   of   the  
language  within  which  arguments  can  be  understood,  the  creation  of  worlds  and  
scenes   of   dissensus.   Politics   is   about   new   words,   new   meanings   and   new  
formulations   made   by   new   figures,   or   figures   previously   denied   the   capacity   for  

                                                                                                           
775
Rancière J (2005) referenced in Pelletier C International Journal of Research and Method in
Education (2009) 242-243.
776
Tanke J (2011) 67.  
777
Rancière J (1991) 39.

148  
 
voice.   For   Rancière,   declarations   of   equality   hold   open   the   possibility   for   true  
political   intervention   and   for   radical   redistribution   of   the   sensible.   Equality’s  
function  is  to  reopen  the  space  for  politics,  for  contestation  and  redistribution.  In  
Rancière’s   engagements   with   Jacocot   and   Gauny,   he   constantly   undermines   the  
notion  that  some  can  think  and  think  better  than  others.  He  insists  on  displacing  
distinctions  that  determine  who  can  think  and  speak,  who  can  impart  knowledge  
and  who  has  time  for  philosophical  leisure.  When  these  distinctions  are  displaced,  
possibilities  for  voice  are  created.  He  affirms,  over  and  over  again,  his  aversion  to  
predestined   spaces,   places,   times   and   identities.   For   Rancière,   Gauny   becomes   a  
figure  that  redistributes  the  sensible.  His  redistribution  involves  a  politics  of  new  
forms  of  innovation  that  tears  bodies  and  voices  from  their  police  order  assigned  
places,   thereby   freeing   up   time,   speech   and   expression;   acting   as   if   and  
demonstrating  the  lessons  of  equality.  For  Rancière:  
Such   lessons   can   be   found   everywhere.   It   is   possible   to   find   everywhere  
new   examples   of   the   disjunctive   junction   between   being-­‐there   and   the  
reason  for  being-­‐there.  It  is  possible  to  disentangle  in  every  case  the  “as  if”  
which   is   involved   in   the   “that’s   the   way   it   is”.   From   this   point   on,   it   is  
possible   to   imagine   a   method   of   equality   specifically   aimed   at   detecting   and  
highlighting  the  operations  of  equality  that  may  occur  everywhere  at  every  
time.778  
 
Therefore,   for   Rancière,   equality   is   in   gestation   around   us   all   the   time   and   equality  
makes   it   possible   to   redistribute   spatio-­‐temporal   locales   and   identities;   equality  
can  introduce  new  voices  into  the  sensible  mix.  
 
It   was   mentioned   in   the   introduction   of   this   chapter   that   a   further   aim   of   the  
chapter  is  to  suggest  ways  in  which  to  engage  with  and  write  about  the  notion  of  
political   voice.   As   mentioned,   the   question   that   arises   for   me   is,   when   making  
sense   of   the   notion   of   political   voice,   how   are   we   to   approach   and   think   about  
voice?  When  reflecting  on  ways  in  which  to  think  through  voice  within  the  context  
of   a   Rancièrian   politics   and   against   the   background   of   the   disconnect   or  
difficulties  of  voice  of  many  South  African  women,  two  important  points  should  
be   mentioned:   Firstly,   I   would   like   to   highlight   Rancière’s   choice   of   historical  

                                                                                                           
778
Rancière J in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 280-281.

149  
 
figures   as   a   way   of   expanding   the   distribution   of   the   sensible.   As   Ross   explains,  
Rancière   chooses   marginal   characters   often   drawn   from   the   most   obscure  
historical  archives.779  The  particular  actions  and  points  of  view  of  these  marginal  
individuals,   when   reframed   and   restaged,   are   mobilised   by   Rancière   against   the  
dominant  categories  and  lines  of  thought.780  These  readings  can,  along  the  lines  
of   the   redistribution   of   the   sensible,   renegotiate   and   expand   perception   and  
reconfigure   what   is   thinkable.   It   is   important   to   mention   that   from   a   Rancièrian  
point   of   view,   these   individuals   are   not   used   as   spokespersons   or   sociological  
representatives,   but   are   nevertheless   mobilised   to   serve   as   a   “diagnostic   of   the  
contemporary   situation”.781   Each   person   retains   his   or   her   individual   singularity  
and   historical   contingency.   Ross   further   mentions   that   Rancière   writes   against  
generalisations,  systems  and  at  times  even  against  concepts.782  His  concern  is  first  
and   foremost   with   what   specific   historical   actors   have   said   and   written   in  
contingent   and   contextual   situations.783   Ross   further   highlights   the   fact   that   his  
historical   figures   are   framed   like   literary   characters   in   order   to   refute   various  
myths   and   ideologies.784   The   important   point   in   this   regard   is   that   writing   itself  
becomes   a   way   of   politically   expanding   perception.   Rancière   has   termed   this  
“literarity”,   which   refers   to   writing’s   ability   to   disrupt   the   organisation   of  
society.785  Rancière  states:    
The   democracy   of   writing   is   the   regimes   of   the   letter   which   is   free   for  
anyone   to   take   up   for   themselves,   whether   to   make   their   own   the   life   of  

                                                                                                           
779
Ross K “Historicizing Untimeliness” in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 24-25.
780
As above. Further, the discussion of these characters also becomes important in order to
demonstrate Rancière’s method of engagement in a more general sense. As mentioned,
what is significant is the way in which he mobilises these historical figures so as to create
spaces for the implementation of equality within his writing. To an extent I employ the same
method of engagement in chapter 5. It is a method of equality that works between
disciplines, which I will elaborate on in the introduction of chapter 5.
781
As above.
782
As above.
783
As above. As mentioned, Ross explains that Rancière also offers a “peculiar and powerful
version of transdisciplinarity” (Ross K in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 24-25). His response
to fixed knowledges is not to combine different knowledges, but rather to use one to
undermine or contest another. In an effort to redistribute the sensible distribution of
discipline, he uses history against philosophy or literature against political theory for example.
See Ross K in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 24-25.
784
Ross K in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 24-25.
785
See Davis O (2010) 107-115.

150  
 
 heroes  or  heroines  of  a  novel,  or  to  become  a  writer,  or  as  a  way  of  joining  in  
the   discussion   about   affairs   of   common   concern.   This   is   not   a   matter   of  
irresistible  social  influence,  but  rather  of  a  new  division  of  the  sensory,  of  a  
new   relationship   between   the   speech   act,   the   world   it   configures   and   the  
capacities  of  those  who  inhabit  that  world.786  
 
Therefore,   when   it   comes   to   making   sense   of   the   notion   of   voice,   the   way   in  
which   we   approach   political   voice   and   write   about   political   voice   becomes  
important  considerations  as  these  engagements  itself  form  part  of  a  topography  
of   the   visible   and   sayable.   These   engagements   can   form   new   relations   between  
the   visible   and   invisible,   audible   and   inaudible   and   voice   and   silence.   The  
distribution   of   the   sensible   is   itself   a   regime   of   presentation   tied   to   a   specific  
interpretation  and  as  such  the  interpretation  of  events  and  their  meaning  either  
confirms   the   consensual   distribution   or   form   new   dissenting   interpretations   of  
meaning.  
 
Secondly,  the  engagements  above  highlight  what  can  be  described  as  the  fragility  
and   difficulty   involved   when   it   comes   to   thinking   about   politics   and   political  
voicing.   Rancière’s   project   around   Gabriel   Gauny   demonstrated   this.   He   started  
with   the   assumption   that   it   was   possible   to   trace   a   coherent   political   worker’s  
voice.  As  mentioned,  he  soon  abandoned  this  assumption,  as  what  he  found  was  
voices   that   could   not   easily   fit   into   any   identifiable   category   of   worker.   Making  
sense   of   voice   through   Rancière’s   framework   against   the   background   of   the  
difficulties   and   complexities   surrounding   voicing   as   it   pertains   to   many   South  
African   women   therefore   points   to   a   way   of   thinking   about   political   voice   that  
doesn’t   seek   to   coherently   partition   highly   individualised   political   statements   or  
moments   of   voicing.   Rancière   highlights   the   fact   that   political   voice   cannot  
emerge  from  a  proper  body  in  its  proper  location,  tied  to  specific  forms  of  speech.  
It  therefore  doesn’t  point  to  any  type  of  analysis  or  way  of  thinking  about  voice  
that  seeks  to  trace  it  along  the  lines  of  established  categories.  The  suggestion  is  
rather  a  rethinking  and  displacing  of  established  distinctions.  Joseph  Jacocot  and  
Gabriel   Gauny   as   well   as   the   other   worker   poets   embody   for   Rancière   the  

                                                                                                           
786
Rancière J Politique de la littérature (2007) 21-22 trans. Davis O (2010) 112.

151  
 
transgression  of  boundaries  and  the  recasting  of  habitual  identities.  They  point  to  
dissensus   and   to   vigilance   when   it   comes   to   the   openings   of   equality.   What  
becomes  central  in  Rancière’s  engagement  with  Jacocot  is  that  equality  as  a  point  
of   departure   creates   a   place   from   where   to   think   about   voice.   What   therefore  
becomes  valuable  in  the  discussion  with  regards  to  Jacocot  is  the  question  that  he  
opens   up   and   invites   us   to   contemplate,   namely,   what   can   be   done   under   the  
presupposition   of   equality,   radically   declared?   Equality,   rather   than   affirming  
occupations,  identities  and  coherent  orderings,  provides  a  space  from  where  new  
forms  of  political  subjectivation  can  be  established.787    
 
Thus,  when  making  sense  of  the  notion  of  voice,  Rancière’s  formulations  points  to  
the   fact   that   the   way   in   which   we   approach   and   write   about   political   voicing,   is  
itself  political  practice:    
Democracy   is   first   of   all   the   invention   of   words,   words   with   which   those  
who   do   not   count   make   themselves   count   and,   in   so   doing,   confuse   the  
ordered  division  between  speech  in  silence  […]788    

The   distribution   of   the   sensible   is   reconfigured   depending   on   the   method,  

approaches   and   means   of   our   engagement.   Further,   these   methods   and   means  
put   equality   central   and   don’t   aim   to   trace   and   map   moments   of   voicing   in   such   a  
way   that   coherently   locates   established   identities   and   categories.   Making   sense  
of   voice   within   the   framework   of   Rancière’s   politics   rather   invents   new   sensible  
forms  and  material  structures  from  where  to  engage.    

In   the   next   chapter   I   explain   Gayatri   Chakravorty   Spivak’s   analysis   of   speaking   in  

her   essay   “Can   the   Subaltern   Speak?”   For   Spivak,   the   question   is   not   whether  
voices  can  be  proclaimed  or  even  recasted,  but  rather  if  voicing  itself  can  actually  
occur  in  certain  contexts.  Below  I  discuss  Spivak’s  essay  and  reflect  on  it  through  
the  lens  of  Rancière  politics.  
 
   

                                                                                                           
787
See Rancière J in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 280.
788
Rancière J Politique de la littérature (2007) 53 trans. Davis O (2010) 114.  

152  
 
 CHAPTER  4  
Gayatri  Chakravorty  Spivak:  “The  Subaltern  Cannot  Speak”  
 
 
4.1  Introduction  
As   mentioned   in   the   introductory   chapter,   the   main   aim   of   the   research   is   an  
effort   to   understand   the   notion   of   political   voice.   In   the   previous   chapters,   I  
explained   and   shed   light   on   Rancière’s   notion   of   politics   and   reflected   on   what  
lines   of   thinking   for   political   voice   and   ways   of   approaching   political   voice   are  
opened  up  by  his  work.  In  this  chapter  I  discuss  Gayatri  Chakravorty  Spivak’s  essay  
“Can  the  Subaltern  Speak?”789  In  this  highly  influential  essay,  Spivak  engages  with  
the  notion  of  political  speech.  As  will  be  explained,  her  focus  in  the  essay  is  mainly  
on  the  possibility  of  the  political  voice  of  women  within  post-­‐colonial  settings.  As  
my  reflections  on  voice  take  place  against  the  background  of  the  precariousness  
and   complexity   of   the   political   voice   of   many   South   African   women,   it   can   be  
argued  that  engagement  with  Spivak’s  essay  becomes  necessary;  firstly,  because  
of  the  fact  that  Spivak  rejects  the  possibility  of  the  political  voice  of  women  within  
certain   conditions   and   secondly,   because   of   the   fact   that   the   essay   revolves  
around  the  conditions  that  efface  the  voices  of  women  within  the  global  South.  
As  will  become  clearer  in  the  discussion  below,  Spivak  answers  the  question  that  
she  poses  in  the  title  of  her  essay  in  the  negative  and  she  attempts  to  trace  the  
causes   of   the   economic   impoverishment   of   rural-­‐based   women   of   colour   within  
this   setting.   As   such,   her   analysis   becomes   relevant   to   the   plight   of   women,  
especially   the   plight   of   economically   marginalised   black   women   within   the   post-­‐
apartheid   South   African   context.790   Below,   I   introduce   Spivak   and   in   the   second  
section   I   explain   the   main   arguments   formulated   in   her   well-­‐known   essay.   From  
there,   I   critically   reflect   on   her   essay   through   the   lens   of   the   politics   of   Jacques  

                                                                                                           
789
Spivak S in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 271-313.
790
The consequences of Apartheid (as a system that strategically impoverished and politically
disempowered the black majority of the country) and highly traditional and patriarchal
cultures result in black women being the poorest of the poor. This is especially true for rural-
based women that have limited political agency and access to education and healthcare. See
for example Ruiters G (ed.) (2008).  

153  
 
Rancière.   The   aim   is   therefore   to   highlight   her   main   concerns   and   to   read   them  
along  the  lines  of  Rancière’s  work  so  as  to  further  make  sense  of  and  contemplate  
the   notion   of   political   voice.   The   aim   is   to   see   whether   Rancière’s   work   can  
provide   different   possibilities   or   lines   of   thinking   when   it   comes   to   the   idea   of  
subaltern   silencing.   To   what   extent   can   his   work   frame   Spivak’s   question   in   a  
different   way,   or,   does   his   work   identify   moments   within   which   the   subaltern   can  
speak?  
 
Before   explaining   Spivak’s   main   essay,   I   shortly   introduce   her   in   order   to  
contextualise  her  essay.  
 
Spivak   has   been   described   as   an   unsettling   voice   in   literary   theory   and,   especially,  
in   post-­‐colonial   studies.791   Her   work   is   influenced   by   Marxism,   feminism   and  
deconstruction  and  she  is  known  for  her  passionate  analyses  of  the  harm  done  to  
women,   non-­‐Europeans   and   the   poor   by   the   privileged   West.792   Spivak   also  
persistently   questions   the   very   grounds   on   which   radical   critique   is   formulated.793  
Morton  explains  that  Spivak’s  work  is  characterised  by  an  ongoing  attempt  to  find  
a   critical   vocabulary   that   is   appropriate   to   describe   the   experiences,   voices   and  
histories   of   individuals   historically   dispossessed   and   exploited   by   European  
colonialism.794   As   Morton   further   highlights,   Spivak’s   consistent   focus   on   women,  
the   working   class,   new   immigrants   and   post-­‐colonial   subjects   has   led   her   to  

                                                                                                           
791
Leitch VB, Cain WE et al (eds.) The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism (2010) 2193.
792
As above.
793
As above. As will be discussed below, Spivak criticises Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault
in her essay. In the context of feminism, Spivak has criticised western feminist thought for not
taking the lives and histories of “third world” women seriously in its account women’s
struggles against oppression. Spivak also challenged the universal claims of feminism to
speak for all women during the 1980’s, emphasising the importance of differences in race,
class, religion, citizenship and culture between women. See Morton S Routledge Critical
Thinkers: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2003) 75.
794
Morton S (2003) 45. Spivak often specifically focuses her attention on India in this regard.
Morton explains that Spivak’s literary criticism has greatly informed and influenced the
practice of reading literary texts in relation to the history of colonialism. See Morton S (2003)
45. She repeatedly emphasises that the production and reception of nineteenth-century
English literature in postcolonial nations as bound up with imperialism. See for example
Spivak GC A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Towards a History of the Vanishing Present
(1999).

154  
 
challenge   some   of   the   dominant   ideas   of   our   contemporary   era,   specifically   the  
notion   that   the   western   world   is   somehow   more   civilised,   democratic   and  
developed   than   the   non-­‐western   world;   and   that   the   post-­‐colonial   era   is   more  
modern   and   progressive   than   the   earlier   historical   period   of   European  
colonialism.795   For   Spivak,   the   damaging   effects   of   and   harms   done   through  
European  colonialism  still  remains  and  did  not  simply  subside  or  stop  when  many  
former   European   colonies   achieved   independence   in   the   second   half   of   the  
twentieth   century.796   She   suggests   that   the   political   and   economic   structures   and  
mechanisms  that  were  established  during  colonialism  continue  to  determine  and  
shape   cultural,   political   and   economic   life   in   post-­‐colonial   nations.797   Further,  
Spivak   also   emphasises   how   anti-­‐colonial   nationalism,   specifically   in   India,  
assumed  a  bourgeois  character  and  therefore  in  many  ways  only  reproduced  the  
social  and  political  inequalities  that  dominated  under  colonial  rule.798  
 
Landry  and  Maclean  describes  Spivak’s  work  as  “following  a  complex  intellectual  
trajectory   through   a   deeply   feminist   perspective   on   deconstruction,   the   Marxist  
critique   of   capitalism   and   the   international   division   of   labour,   the   critique   of  
imperialism   and   colonial   discourse,   the   critique   of   race   in   relation   to   nationality,  
ethnicity   and   the   status   of   the   migrant   and   the   question   of   what   it   means   to  
identify   with   a   nation   or   a   cultural   form   as   a   postcolonial   subject   in   a   neo-­‐colonial  
                                                                                                           
795
Morton S (2003) 1.
796
As above.
797
Morton S (2003) 1-2. These nations range from Ireland to Algeria, from India to Pakistan to
Jamaica and Mexico. Morton explains how the British Empire’s policies on education in India
encouraged educated, middle-class Indian subjects to internalise the cultural values of the
British (Morton S (2003) 1-2). The teaching of British cultural values to the upper middle class
in India was intended to instruct and enlighten the Indian middle class in the morally and
politically superior culture of the British Empire. By using these practices, the British tried to
persuade the Indian middle-class that colonial rule was in their best interest. Morton S (2003)
1-2. The teaching of English literature in colonial India therefore provided an effective,
though insidious way of executing the so-called civilizing mission of western imperialism.
Morton S (2003) 1-2. Spivak’s literary criticism, as mentioned, has specifically worked to
undermine the ideological function of English literature in the colonial context. She has
contended, for example, that “it should not be possible to read nineteenth-century English
literature without remembering that imperialism, understood as England’s social mission, was
a crucial part of the cultural representation of England to the English”. See Spivak GC “Three
Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism” Critical Inquiry (1985) 243.
798
Morton S (2003) 2.

155  
 
world”.799  Her  trajectory  has  gained  her  a  relatively  heterogeneous  international  
audience   and   in   the   context   of   feminism,   Spivak   is   recognised,   as   among   the  
foremost   feminist   critics   that   has   achieved   international   prominence.800  
According   to   Landry   and   Maclean   she   is   one   of   a   few   who   can   claim   to   have  
influenced  intellectual  production  on  a  truly  global  scale.801  
 
Spivak’s   earliest   important   work   was   her   introduction   to   and   translation   of  
Jacques   Derrida’s   Of   Grammatology,   the   first   of   Derrida’s   major   books   to   be  
rendered   in   full   into   English.802   She   therefore   played   a   significant   role   in  

                                                                                                           
799
Landry D & Maclean G (eds.) (1996) 3.
800
As above.
801
As above. Morton explains that in the context of feminism, Spivak has, for example,
questioned the idea of a global sisterhood between women, rather pointing to the complicity
of western feminism and imperialism in the oppression of women of colour. Morton S (2003)
2-4. She therefore expanded and complicated the critical terms and political objectives of
feminism in a way that is more sensitive to differences between women. Morton explains that
her continual interrogation of assumptions can make her difficult to read. Morton S (2003) 2-4.
She represents her work in complex language and style in order to interrogate to common-
sense assumption that clear, transparent language is the best way to represent silenced and
oppressed groups and individuals. Morton S (2003) 2-4. Rather, she suggests that the
opposite is true. The transparent systems of representation through which things are known
and understood are also systems that dominate and control people. Morton further explains
that her thought therefore emphasises the limitations of linguistic and philosophical
representation and their potential to mask real political and social inequalities. Rather than
simply presenting her arguments in inaccessible prose, Spivak’s writing carefully links
“disparate histories, places and methodologies in ways that refuse to adhere to the
systematic conventions”. See Morton S (2003) 2-4. Morton further argues that such a refusal is
not merely a symptom of academic fashion, but a conscious strategy employed to engage
the reader in critical interrogation of how we make sense of and understand literary, social
and economic texts after colonialism. Further, Spivak believes that theoretical writings should
be complex and flexible enough to reveal the complex and contradictory nature of social
relations. Morton S (2003) 2-4.
802
See Derrida J Of Grammatology (1976) trans. Spivak GC. Along with Spivak’s professor
Paul de Man, Derrida was one of the most prominent advocates of deconstruction. Jacques
Derrida can be described as the principal theorist of deconstruction. In 1967, three of his
works that lay the foundations of deconstruction was published and these works (Of
Grammatology, Writing and Difference and Speech and Phenomena) pushed Derrida to the
forefront of the philosophical stage. Derrida’s deconstruction is a strategy of critical analysis
in dialogue with the history of western philosophy. See Morton S (2003) 27-28. Commentators
struggle to define deconstruction because of the fact that it cannot be reduced to a method,
or defined as a theory with a clear set of objectives. See Morton S (2003) 27-28. Nevertheless,
some key points can be identified. Norris defines it as “the vigilant seeking out of those
“aporias, blindspots or moments of self-contradiction where a text involuntarily betrays the
tension between rhetoric and logic, between what it manifestly means to say and what it is

156  
 
introducing  French  theory  into  North  American  and  British  literature  departments  
between   1975   and   1982.803   Besides   introducing   the   influential   French   thinker   to  
English-­‐speaking   audiences,   it   has   been   argued   that   Spivak’s   “Translator’s  
Preface”   set   a   new   standard   for   self-­‐reflexivity   in   prefaces   and   introductions.804  
Landry   and   Maclean   explains   that   it   addressed,   from   every   considerable   angle,  
“the   question   of   the   preface”   and   what   it   meant   to   translate   and   explicate   the  
work   of   Derrida.805   After   introducing   Derrida   the   scholar,   she   explored   the  
question   of   preface   as   a   form   of   writing   and   an   occasion   or   event   in   writing,   with  
particular   protocols   to   be   observed,   which   is   one   of   the   characteristic   gestures   of  
deconstruction.806  
 
Indeed,   Spivak   was   and   remains   heavily   influenced   by   deconstruction.   Morton  
notes   that   Derrida’s   deconstructive   strategies   have   been   particularly   useful   to  
postcolonial   intellectuals   such   as   Spivak   because   these   strategies   provide   a  
theoretical   vocabulary   and   a   critical   conceptual   framework   from   where   the   very  
philosophical   tradition   that   has   also   explained   and   in   many   ways   justified   the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
nonetheless constrained to mean”. See Norris C Derrida (1978) 19. Derrida argues for
example that the process of making meaning, or signification, is structured in terms of how
signs differ from other signs; a thing is defined in relation to what it is not. This notion is
derived from Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. Derrida takes this notion a step further
and emphasises how meaning is also perpetually deferred across a spatial and temporal axis,
so that a final point of stable meaning and knowledge is never reached in any signifying
system. He uses the word “différance” to demonstrate that signs are never fully identical to
the things they refer to- signs are structurally incomplete from the beginning and they require
additional or supplementary terms to complete them. See Morton S (2003) 27-28. Morton
explains that meaning is therefore radically unstable and “the need for supplementation to
compensate for the lack of original self-identity reveals how all signs are by definition
incomplete and lacking in identity or self-presence”. See Morton S (2003) 27-28. In this way,
Derrida’s thought radically undermines the authority and centrality of the western humanist
subject. See Morton S (2003) 27-28. Derrida also emphasises that the repression, exclusion
and erasure of “impossible” concepts such as différance are the very conditions of possibility
which ground and constitute philosophical meaning and truth. See Morton S (2003) 27-28.
803
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2193.
804
Landry and Maclean argues that Spivak’s preface set a new standard to the extent that the
preface and her translation of it are by now considered required reading for any serious
Derridean scholar. See Landry D & Maclean G (eds.) (1996) 1.
805
As above.
806
As above.

157  
 
subjection   of   non-­‐western   societies   can   be   interrogated.807   Spivak,   specifically,  
has   followed   the   Jacques   Derrida’s   thought   carefully   and   has   in   this   way  
continually   emphasised   the   potential   usefulness   of   Derrida’s   work   for   making  
critical  interventions.808  In  this  regard,  she  has  highlighted  how  deconstruction’s  
interest  in  the  violence  of  traditional  hierarchal  binary  oppositions  (between  male  
and  female,  the  west  and  third  world  for  example)  has  afforded  a  passage  from  
literary  theory  to  radical  politics.809  Leitch  et  al  explains  that  Spivak  has  enjoined  
feminism’s   involvement   in   the   silencing   of   women   to   a   Marxist   global   concern  
with  the  political,  economic  and  cultural  oppression  of  non-­‐white  people.810  This  
resulted  in  a  serious  of  highly  significant  and  acclaimed  essays  that  contributed  to  
setting   the   agenda   for   feminism   and   post-­‐colonial   theory   in   the   1980’s   and  
1990’s.811  “Can  the  Subaltern  Speak?”  was  arguably  her  best-­‐known  essay  and,  as  
Leitch   et   al   argues,   certainly   her   most   controversial   that   originated   from   that  
decade.812  In  this  essay,  Spivak  answers  the  question  that  she  poses  in  the  title  in  
the   negative.   She   suggests   that   the   most   oppressed   and   politically   invisible  
individuals   and   groups   in   society   cannot   speak,   meaning   that   they   cannot   be  
heard   by   dominant   political   frameworks   and   within   dominant   discourses   of  
political   representation.   In   the   section   below   I   examine   “Can   the   Subaltern  
Speak?”813  
 
                                                                                                           
807
Morton S (2003) 27.
808
As above.
809
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2193. It should be mentioned here that in the context of
deconstruction, writing does not only refer to printed matter on a page, but to any text-
visual, vocal, cinematic, historical, social or political. See Morton S (2003) 27-28. Text is made
meaningful by a system of signs or code. Spivak, by emphasising how intellectuals are part of
the larger social text that they describe, reiterates the political consequences of all reading
practices. The radical challenge of the truth claims of western philosophy moves from textual
analysis of literature or philosophy to include economic and political texts, “thereby
questioning the opposition between philosophical or literary texts and the so-called real
world.” See Morton S (2003) 27-28.
810
As above.
811
As above.
812
Her suggestion that the subaltern cannot speak created much controversy, as it was
initially misinterpreted to mean that certain groups do not have any political agency or voice.
As will be demonstrated, this was not Spivak’s argument in her essay and is indeed a
misinterpretation. See Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2193.
813
Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 271-313.

158  
 
4.2  The  Sexed  Subaltern  
In  order  to  explain  Spivak’s  main  concerns  in  her  essay,  it  is  important  to  define  
and   trace   the   term   “subaltern”.   According   to   the   dictionary,   as   Leitch   et   al  
explains,   the   term   refers   to   a   person   holding   a   subordinate   position.814  
Conventionally,   the   term   refers   to   a   junior   ranking   officer   in   the   British   army.815  
The   Italian   Marxist   theorist   Antonio   Gramsci   was   the   first   to   theoretically   apply  
the   term.   He   used   the   term   in   order   to   describe   the   unorganised   masses   that  
must   be   politicised   for   the   workers   revolution   to   succeed.816   Gramsci   used   the  
term   interchangeably   with   “subordinate”   to   denote   “non-­‐hegemonic   groups   or  
classes”.817  His  focus  was  specifically  on  organised  groups  of  rural  peasants  that  
were  based  in  Southern  Italy.  For  Gramsci,  as  Morton  explains,  these  groups  had  
no  social  or  political  consciousness  as  a  group  and  were  therefore  vulnerable  to  
the   ruling   ideas,   culture   and   leadership   of   the   state.818   The   term   was   later   applied  
in  the  1980’s  by  a  group  of  Indian  historians  that  called  themselves  “The  Subaltern  

                                                                                                           
814
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2194.
815
As above.
816
Morton S (2003) 48.
817
As above. See also Gramsci A Selections from Prison Notebooks (1978) trans. Hoare Q &
Nowell Smith G. Antonio Gramsci was an Italian Marxist thinker and one of the principal
representatives of western Marxism. He was active in the Italian Socialist Party and then the
Italian Communist Party. Gramsci was arrested by Mussolini’s police in 1928 and spent the
rest of his life in prison. Macey notes that he produced thirty-three notebooks in prison, with a
selection published. Gramsci was the most important influence on the development of Italian
communism in the postwar period. See Macey D (2000) 165-166. One of his most important
theoretical developments was the concept of “hegemony”. Morton mentions that after the
failure of a worker’s revolution in Italy, Gramsci questioned the classic Marxist view that a
proletarian revolution was the natural consequence of the economic division of labour
between the worker and the capitalist and that ideology would somehow disappear once
capitalism was overthrown. Morton S (2003) 65. Gramsci rather emphasised that dominant
ideological institutions, such as political parties, the church, education, the media and
bureaucracy also play and important role in maintaining the relations of ruling and power.
Against the classis Marxist notion of ideology as false consciousness Gramsci proposed the
term “hegemony” which signified a more complex and flexible term to emphasise how
people’s everyday lives and identities are defined in an through dominant social structures
that are relatively autonomous of economic relations. Morton S (2003) 65. Morton further
explains that the crucial difference between classic Marxist accounts of ideology and
Gramsci’s definition of hegemony is that classic Marxist accounts of ideology as “false
consciousness” suggest and element of manipulation, deception and even coercion; whereas
hegemony depends on the consent and agreement of the individual. See Morton S (2003) 65.
818
As above.

159  
 
Studies   Collective”.819   They   developed   the   term   in   order   to   define   the   “general  
attribute  of  subordination  in  South  Asian  society,  whether  expressed  in  terms  of  
class,  caste,  age,  gender  and  office  or  in  any  other  way”.820  Leitch  et  al  explains  
that   the   term   held   particularly   rich   connotations   for   the   Indian   subcontinent   as  
imperialism  was  often  considered  from  the  ambivalent  and  contradictory  position  
of   the   subaltern,   “or   of   the   socially   subordinate   person   that   is   situated   within   a  
complex   system   of   colonial   hierarchies”.821   For   the   Studies   Collective,   Gramsci’s  
discussion  of  the  rural  peasantry  in  Southern  Italy  aptly  and  usefully  described  the  
continued   domination   of   the   rural   peasantry   and   the   working   class   in   post-­‐
independence  Indian  society.822  The  concern  of  the  group  was  that  India  achieved  
political   independence   from   the   British   Empire   without   a   corresponding  
revolution   in   the   class   system.823   The   Studies   Collective   attempted   to   retrieve  
what  can  be  referred  to  as  a  history  of  subaltern  agency  and  resistance  from  the  
perspective   of   the   people   rather   than   the   state.   They   thereby   appropriated   the  
term   to   focus   their   attention   on   the   disenfranchised   and   economically  
dispossessed   peoples   of   India.824   As   Morton   explains,   for   the   Studies   Collective,  
elite   and   dominant   social   groups   traditionally   recorded   the   histories   of   the   rural  

                                                                                                           
819
As above.
820
Morton S (2003) 49. Members of the collective include Shahid Amin, David Arnold, Partha
Chatterjee, David Hardiman, Ranajit Guha and Gyanendra Pandey.
821
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2193.
822
As above. It is argued that Gramsci’s account provides a key theoretical resource for
understanding the conditions of the poor, the lower class and peasantry in India because of
the fact that he drew parallels between the division of labour in Mussolini’s Italy and the
colonial division of labour in India. Morton S (2003) 49. Gramsci also emphasised that the
oppression of the rural peasantry in Southern Italy could be subverted through an alliance
with the urban working class, or through the development of class-consciousness among the
peasants. Morton S (2003) 49. Gramsci’s account of the subaltern resembles Marx’s earlier
proclamation in the nineteenth century that the industrial working class in Europe carried the
future potential for collective social and political change. However, as Morton explains, unlike
Marx’s model of change, Gramsci stressed that the social and political practices of the rural
peasantry were not systemic or coherent in their position to the state. See Morton S (2003) 49-
50. And it is this lack of coherence that distinguished Gramsci’s notion of the subaltern from
the traditional Marxist perception of the industrial working class as unified and coherent.
Furthermore, it is argued that this lack of coherence when it comes to political identity in
Gramsci’s description of the subaltern is crucial to Spivak’s argument of the subaltern in the
post-colonial world that will be discussed below. Morton S (2003) 49
823
Morton S (2003) 48.
824
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2194.

160  
 
peasantry  and  the  urban  working  class.825  Subaltern  histories  were  documented  in  
the   archives   of   British   colonial   administrators   under   colonial   rule   and   were   later  
rewritten  in  the  historical  reports  of  the  educated,  Indian  middle-­‐class  elite  during  
and  after  the  struggle  for  national  independence.826  Morton  elucidates:  
The  historiography  of  Indian  nationalism  has  for  a  long  time  been  dominated  
by   elitism   and   bourgeois   nationalist   elitism.   Both   originated   as   the  
ideological  product  of  British  rule  in  India,  but  have  survived  the  transfer  of  
power   and   have   been   assimilated   to   neo-­‐colonialist   and   neo-­‐nationalist  
forms  of  discourse  in  Britain  and  India  respectively.827    
 
Therefore,   the   historical   representation   of   various   lower-­‐class   subaltern   groups  
was   and   is   framed   in   the   terms   and   interests   of   the   ruling   power   and   dominant  
social   classes.828   Morton   explains   further   that   the   British   historical   archives  
rendered   the   lives   and   political   agencies   of   the   rural   peasantry   in   India  
subordinate  to  the  larger  project  of  imperial  governance.829  Therefore,  in  the  elite  
narratives   of   bourgeois   national   independence,   “the   localised   resistances   of   the  
peasants   were   subordinated   to   the   larger   nationalist   project   of  
decolonialisation”.830   The   Studies   Collective   thus   attempted   to   recover   the  
histories  and  voices  of  subaltern  groups  before,  during  and  after  British  colonial  
rule   in   India   by   critiquing   the   colonial   and   elite   representation   of   subalterns.831  
Whilst   the   Studies   Collective   appropriated   the   term   to   denote   the   economically  
disenfranchised   and   politically   disempowered   peoples   in   India,   Spivak   draws   on  
the   nuances   of   the   term   in   her   essay,   insisting   that   the   subaltern   subject   is  
“irretrievably  heterogeneous”.832    
 

                                                                                                           
825
Morton S (2003) 49.
826
As above.
827
Morton S (2003) 50.
828
As above.
829
As above.
830
Morton S (2003) 50-51.
831
As above.
832
T Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2194. Leitch et al further explains that the term always
stands in an ambiguous relation to power in the sense that subalterns are subordinate to it,
but never fully consents to its rule. Subalterns therefore never adopt the dominant point of
view or vocabulary as expressive as its own identity. T Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2194.

161  
 
In  “Can  the  Subaltern  Speak?”  Spivak  critically  engages  with  the  Subaltern  Studies  
Collective.  Although  Spivak  highlights  the  important  points  and  achievements  of  
the   Collective   in   their   work   of   recovering   the   histories   of   subaltern   groups,   she  
criticises   them   on   two   points.   Firstly,   Spivak   argues   that   the   Collective’s   classic  
Marxist   methodology   does   not   allow   them   to   read   the   history   of   women’s  
resistance  in  India.833  Therefore,  as  Morton  explains,  although  Spivak  agrees  with  
their  arguments  in  general,  she  argues  that  the  use  of  a  classic  Marxist  approach  
to  social  and  historical  change  overlooks  the  lives  and  struggles  of  women  before,  
during   and   after   India’s   independence.834   Further,   she   argues   that   anti-­‐colonial  
nationalist   leaders   originally   invoked   the   Marxist   model   of   historical   change   in  
order   to   try   to   mobilise   the   subaltern,   but   it   clearly   failed   in   changing   the  
economic,  political  and  social  circumstances  of  subalterns.835  
 
Rather   than   a   classic   Marxist   definition   of   the   term,   Spivak   proposes   a   more  
nuanced,   flexible,   post-­‐Marxist   definition   of   the   subaltern;   “one   informed   by  
deconstruction  and  that  takes  the  lives  and  histories  of  women  into  account”.836  
Indeed,   gender   becomes   central   to   her   argument   on   the   subaltern.   For   Spivak,  
“women’s   interception   [in   subalternity]   can   be   staked   out   across   strict   lines   of  
definition   by   virtue   of   their   muting   by   heterogeneous   circumstances”.837  
Therefore,  for  Spivak,  the  question  of  subalternity,  of  the  most  oppressed  groups  
and  individuals,  cannot  be  conceived  of  only  in  terms  of  imperialistic  oppression  
and   bourgeois   nationalism,   but   must   also   be   conceived   of   in   terms   of   gender  
because  of  the  historical  and  persistent  patriarchal  oppression  of  women  through  
various  mechanisms:  
Within   the   effaced   itinerary   of   the   subaltern   subject,   the   track   of   sexual  
difference   is   doubly   effaced.   The   question   is   not   of   female   participation   in  
                                                                                                           
833
Morton S (2003) 47.
834
As above.
835
As above.
836
As above.
837
Morton S (2003) 50. The expansion of the term “subaltern” complicates the lower-class
associations of the term because it includes women from the upper middle class, as well as
peasantry and the sub-proletariat. Spivak’s crucial argument is however that the active
involvement of women in the history of the anti-British-colonial insurgency in India has been
excluded form the official history of national independence. Morton S (2003) 50.

162  
 
 insurgency,  or  the  ground  rules  of  the  sexual  division  of  labour,  for  both  of  
which   there   is   “evidence”.   It   is,   rather,   that,   both   as   object   of   colonialist  
historiography   and   as   subject   of   insurgency,   the   ideological   construct   of  
gender   keeps   the   male   dominant.   If,   in   the   context   of   colonial   production,  
the   subaltern   has   no   history   and   cannot   speak,   the   subaltern   as   female   is  
even  more  deeply  in  the  shadow.838  
 
Therefore,   the   dominant   point   of   view   holds   the   male   position   and   women  
experience  marginalisation  in  India  by  virtue  of  patriarchal  discourses  of  religion,  
family   and   the   state,   which   results   in   economic   disadvantage   and   gender  
subordination.   The   sexed   subaltern   is   therefore   doubly   marginalised   and   in   the  
shadow,   not   only   in   terms   of   race   and   economic   position,   but   also   in   terms   of  
gender.   Spivak   therefore   expands   and   complicates   the   term.   For   Spivak,   the   term  
should  be  flexible  enough  to  include  an  array  of  social  positions  and  to  denote  the  
most   oppressed   and   invisible   constituencies   in   society.839   Her   insistence   on   a  
nuanced  and  flexible  definition,  one  that  does  not  fall  prey  to  the  reductive  terms  
of  strict-­‐class  analysis,  relates  to  the  second  point  of  critique  with  regards  to  the  
Studies  Collective.    
 
Spivak’s   second   point   of   criticism   involves   her   concern   over   the   Collective’s  
attempts   to   retrieve   a   subaltern   voice   or   consciousness,   or   put   differently,   to  
recover   “the   will   of   the   subaltern”.840   For   Spivak,   such   an   approach   results   in  
establishing   a   false   coherence   on   what   can   be   regarded   as   much   more   complex  
and  differentiated  struggles  of  subaltern  groups.841  As  Morton  explains,  for  Spivak  
there   is   a   risk   that   general   claims   or   theoretical   statements   made   on   behalf   of  
disempowered   subaltern   groups   by   educated,   metropolitan   based   intellectuals  
will  overlook  or  marginalise  the  crucial  differences  between  subaltern  groups  and  
individuals.842    For  Spivak,  any  model  of  political  consciousness  will  paradoxically  

                                                                                                           
838
Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 287.
839
Morton S (2003) 47. Although Spivak, in the different versions of the essay and in numerous
interviews refer to different definitions of the term, she, as will be demonstrated later,
appropriates subalternity to encompass a range of different social positions that are not
predetermined by dominant political discourses
840
Morton S (2003) 53.
841
As above.
842
Morton S (2003) 46.

163  
 
work  to  objectify  the  subaltern,  or,  “control  her  through  knowledge”.843  Indeed,  
the  idea  of  speaking  for  disempowered  people  is  a  central  concern  for  Spivak.  In  
her   engagement   with   the   Studies   Collective,   she   identifies   risks   attached   to   this  
idea   and   she   expands   her   critique   to   post-­‐colonial   intellectuals   and   in   the  
beginning  of  her  essay,  engages  in  a  rigorous  critique  of  the  western  academy  in  
general.844  
 
Spivak   attempts   to   argue   that   post-­‐colonial   critics   that   attempt   to   give   silenced  
people   a   voice,   might   repeat   the   very   silencing   that   they   are   writing   against.845  
Spivak   highlights,   for   example,   that   even   colonialists   thought   of   themselves   as  
well  intentioned  and  in  this  regard  she  refers  to  the  British  outlawing  of  sati  under  

                                                                                                           
843
See Morton S (2003) 56. In this regard Spivak uses the term “epistemic violence” in order
to demonstrate how western knowledge or epistemology has been used to justify “the
violent exercise of political and military force over non-western cultures”. Morton S (2003) 18-
19. The relationship between western knowledge and the violence of colonial dispossession
can best be illustrated by the following passage from Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness:
“The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking away from those who have a
different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you
look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only”. Conrad J Heart Of Darkness (1973)
10 as quoted in Morton S (2003) 19. Morton explains that Conrad’s correlation of the violent
exercise of colonial dispossession and the redemptive idea of imperialism as a civilising
mission illustrates the damaging effects that western knowledge continues to have on non-
western cultures. Morton S (2003) 19. For, in emphasising the moral and intellectual
superiority of western cultures, Europeans were able to justify the violent project of
imperialist expansion as a civilising mission. Morton S (2003) 19. Spivak also uses the term
“worlding” to refer to the way in which writing in general has provided a rhetorical structure
to justify imperial expansion. See Morton S (2003) 18. Spivak does not claim to avoid such
violence herself; rather she “self-consciously explores the structures of violence without
assuming a final settled position”. See Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2193. The notion of
terra nullius can also be mentioned here in the context of the damage of colonialism. As
Morton explains, there are frequent historical references to colonial territories being
uninscribed or empty territories and references to indigenous people without culture, writing
or political sovereignty. Morton S (2003) 19. These descriptions of colonial territory as empty
and indigenous people as people without writings are persuasive metaphors employed to
justify colonial expansion. As Morton further notes these metaphors illustrate how people and
territory have been controlled, subjected, dispossessed and exploited through dominant
systems of western writing, textuality and knowledge. See Morton S (2003) 19.
844
Spivak specifically focuses on the writings of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze and their
attempts of radical criticism involving the notion of a “sovereign subject”. See Spivak GC in
Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 271-272.
845
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2193.

164  
 
colonial   rule.846   Sati   is   the   Hindu   practice   of   widows   killing   themselves   on   their  
husband’s   funeral   pyres,   in   other   words,   self-­‐immolation.   While   the   British’s  
intervention  can  be  said  to  have   saved   lives   and   may   have   given   some   free   choice  
to  women  when  it  came  to  the  practice,  it  also  served  to  secure  British  power  in  
India   and   to   underscore   the   difference   between   Indian   “barbarism”   and   British  
“civilisation”.847   The   British   effectively   drove   Hindu   culture   underground.   It   was  
denied   legitimacy   and   written   out   of   law.   Morton   notes   that   for   many   British  
colonial   administrators,   the   practice   of   sati   epitomised   the   repulsive   and  
inhumane  characteristics  of  Hindu  society.848  Therefore,  by  representing  sati  as  a  
barbaric   practice,   the   British   were   able   to   justify   imperialism   as   a   civilising   mission  
in   which   white   British   colonial   administrators   believed   that   they   were   rescuing  
Indian  women  from  the  reprehensible  practices  of  a  traditional  Hindu  patriarchal  
society,  or  in  Spivak’s  terminology,  the  British  were  “saving  brown  women  from  
brown  men”.849  For  Spivak,  rather  than  defending  the  choice  and  agency  of  Hindu  
women,  the  British  used  “the  body  of  the  widow  as  an  ideological  battleground  
for  colonial  power”.850  Spivak’s  question  is  whether  intellectuals,  and  specifically  
post-­‐colonial  critics,  can  avoid  a  similar  condescension  when  they  try  to  represent  
post-­‐colonial   subjects,   or   oppressed   peoples   in   general?851   As   will   become   clear  
later,   she   seems   doubtful.   By   using   the   example   of   sati,   Spivak   also   makes   an  
important   point   with   regards   to   the   agency   of   women   or   the   possibility   of   the  
subaltern  woman  “speaking”.  
 
Spivak  considers  how  the  voice  of  Hindu  women  was  represented  in  descriptions  
of  sati.  Morton  explains  that  in  terms  of  ancient  Hindu  texts,  the  practice  of  self-­‐
immolation  is  coded  as  an  exceptionally  sacred  practice  or  pilgrimage,  rather  than  
an  act  of  suicide.852  Suicide  was  strictly  forbidden,  but  was  permissible  as  stated  in  

                                                                                                           
846
As above. Also See Spivak GC (1988) 298- 302.
847
As above.
848
Morton S (2003) 63.
849
Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 296.
850
Morton S (2003) 63.
851
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2193.
852
Morton S (2003) 62.

165  
 
the   Dharmasastra   if   it   was   part   of   a   sacred,   religious   pilgrimage.853   This   pilgrimage  
or   privilege   was   only   reserved   for   men.   However,   as   Morton   further   explains,  
exception  was  made  for  the  practice  of  widow  sacrifice  or  sati  -­‐the  practice  of  a  
woman   physically   repeating   her   husband’s   death   in   a   sacred   place.854   Women  
were   therefore,   within   this   context,   given   some   agency   by   patriarchal   Hindu  
religious   practices.   They   could   perform   the   sacred   ritual   if   they   wished   to   do   so,   a  
privilege   usually   only   reserved   for   men.   Spivak   argues   that   Sati   can   therefore  
symbolise  an  exemplary  moment  of  woman’s  free  will  and  moral  conduct  as  the  
practice  of  widow  self-­‐immolation  is  not  prescribed  or  enforced  by  Hindu  religious  
codes.855   It   can   therefore,   rather   than   being   interpreted   as   a   signifier   of   the  
woman’s   moral   conduct   as   a   good   wife,   be   seen  a   signifier   of   her   own   desire.   It   is  
this   sense   of   sati   that   was   lost   to   British   colonial   legislation.   The   colonial  
representation   of   sati   therefore   overlooked   the   voice   and   agency   that   may   be  
found   within   the   practice,   within   the   “choosing”   of   a   woman   to   enact   the  
practice.   But,   interestingly,   the   agency   allowed   by   Hindu   religious   law,   is   the  
agency  to  kill  oneself.  It  is  therefore,  as  Morris  explains,  a  self-­‐negating  agency.856  
In   other   words,   it   is   an   agency   that   recognises   women’s   non-­‐identity.857   The  
exception   made   for   women   thus   engenders   a   patriarchal   structure   of   domination  
within   Hindu   religious   codes.858   It   can   also   be   argued   that   from   a   patriarchal  
perspective,   women   did   not   necessarily   have   a   “free”   choice.   Hindu   women   were  
expected  to  be  good  wives.  In  circumstances  where  she  inherited  her  husband’s  
property,  it  might  have  been  expected  of  her  to  perform  sati  and  act  morally,  so  
that   other   male   heirs   might   inherit   her   husband’s   property.   Here   her   voice   or  
agency   is   ignored   by   Hindu   religious   expectations.   For   Spivak   then,   within   the  
context   of   this   problematic,   it   is   hard   to   see   how   the   subaltern   as   woman   can  

                                                                                                           
853
As above.
854
Morton S (2003) 62-63.
855
As above.
856
Morris R (ed.) Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of an Idea (2010) 6.
Morris states that: “The entire ideological formation seems designed to foreclose the
possibility of woman acceding to the position from which she could actually speak- as
political subject”. See Morris R (ed.) (2010) 6.
857
As above.
858
Morton S (2003) 63.

166  
 
speak.859   She   demonstrates   that   in   both   Hindu   and   British   discussions   of   widow  
sacrifice,   the   voice   and   political   agency   of   women   is   effectively   repressed   from  
official   historical   discourses   and   political   representation.860   Women’s   agency   or  
voice   is   not   discussed   within   those   texts.   As   Morton   argues,   the   Hindu   religious  
codes   as   well   as   the   British   constitution   of   the   widow   as   “passive   victim   of  
patriarchal   violence”,   both   ignore   the   political   agency   of   the   subaltern   woman.861  
It   is   within   this   context   that   Spivak   therefore   argues   that   the   sexed   subaltern  
cannot   speak   because   of   the   fact   that   the   voices   of   subaltern   women   were   so  
embedded   in   Hindu   patriarchal   codes   of   moral   conduct   and   the   British   colonial  
representation   of   women   as   victims   of   a   barbaric   culture.862   This   results   in  
subaltern   women’s   voices   being   impossible   to   recover.   There   is   nothing   that  
remains  or  nothing  to  be  detected  in  terms  of  the  voices  of  the  women  within  this  
context.   Their   voices   therefore   effectively   disappear   under   the   practices   of  
patriarchy   and   imperialism.   Spivak’s   discussion   of   sati   also   operates   as   an  
important   counterpoint   to   western   theories   of   representation   and   serves   to  
argue  her  point  on  the  Studies  Collective’s  attempt  to  give  voice  to  the  subaltern.  
 
Spivak   relates   the   desire   of   British   colonisers   to   “save   brown   women   from   brown  
men”  to  the  desire  of  western  intellectuals  to  give  a  voice  to  the  oppressed.  As  
Morton   explains,   she   claims   that   radical   intellectuals   can   paradoxically   silence   the  
subaltern   when   claiming   to   represent   and   speak   for   their   experience,   in   the   same  
way   the   colonialist   silenced   the   voice   of   the   widow   “choosing”   to   die.863   In   this  
regard,   Spivak   engages   within   her   essay   in   a   severe   interrogation   of   those  
western   writers   who,   at   the   time   of   Spivak’s   first   writing   of   the   essay,   were  
attempting   to   produce   a   radical   critique   of   the   western   subject,   namely   Gilles  
Deleuze   and   Michel   Foucault.864   Spivak   criticises   them   for   the   incapacity   to  
recognise   the   non-­‐universality   of   the   western   position   from   within   which   their  

                                                                                                           
859
Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 299.
860
Morton S (2003) 64.
861
As above.
862
As above.
863
Morton S (2003) 56.
864
Morris R (ed.) (2010) 4.

167  
 
writing   takes   place   as   well   as   not   recognising   the   “constitutive   place   of   gender  
within  the  formation  of  the  subject”.865    
 
First,   it   should   be   explained   that   in   the   context   of   post-­‐colonial   studies   and   the  
political   struggle   for   national   independence,   Spivak   has   criticised   the   use   of   so-­‐
called  “master  words”,  such  as  “the  colonised”,  “the  worker”,  and  “women”.866  
Morton   explains   that   although   these   master   words   may   seem   to   provide   a  
coherent  political  identity  for  disempowered  groups  in  order  to  struggle  against  
an  oppressor,  they  do  not  do  justice  to  the  lives  and  histories  of  those  people  who  
are   and   were   frequently   marginalised   and   oppressed   by   anti-­‐colonial   national  
independence   movements.867   Instead   of   using   these   master   words,   Spivak  
suggests  the  word  “subaltern”  as  it  can  encompasses  a  range  of  different  subject  
positions   that   are   not   predetermined   by   dominant   political   discourses.868  
However,   as   mentioned   within   her   critique   of   the   Studies   Collective,   the   term  
must  remain  flexible  enough  to  accommodate  different  social  identities,  without  
falling  under  the  reductive  terms  of  strict-­‐class  analysis.  
 
Further,   according   to   Spivak,   theorists   and   advocates   of   political   transformation  
have   looked   to   oppressed   peoples   as   a   potential   source   of   change   or  
transformation.869  Marxists  speak  of  and  for  the  proletariat,  feminists  of  and  for  
women   and   anti-­‐colonialists   of   and   for   third   world   peoples   for   example.870   Spivak  
reacts  against  what  she  sees  as  the  tendency  of  radical  politically  movements  to  
romanticise   the   so-­‐called   other   (for   instance,   as   Leitch   et   al   explains,   the   notion  
that   third   world   people   should   lead   the   fight   against   multinational   global  

                                                                                                           
865
As above. Morris refers here to “the subject of language, not only in the grammatical
sense, but also in the sense of having a voice that can access power”. See Morris S (ed.)
(2010) 4.
866
Morton S (2003) 45.
867
As above.
868
As above.
869
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2194.
870
As above.

168  
 
capitalism).871   As   Leitch   et   al   further   elucidates,   to   assign   disempowered   people  
certain   roles,   is   to   repeat   colonialism’s   violence,   which   views   non-­‐European  
people   as   important   or   relevant   only   to   the   extent   that   they   follow   western  
scripts.872   Intellectuals,   who   romanticise   the   oppressed,   can   therefore   ironically  
repeat   the   colonialist   discourse   that   they   want   to   critique.     In   the   context   of  
Spivak’s   discussion   of   Deleuze   and   Foucault,   she   argues   that   the   use   of   master  
words   is   essentialist.   It   assumes   cultural   solidarity   or   coherence   of   a   group   of  
people   that   are   heterogeneous   in   nature   and   the   use   of   such   terms   by  
intellectuals  puts  the  intellectual  in  the  role  of  a  transparent  medium  that  merely  
represents  the  oppressed.873    
 
In  order  to  elucidate  Spivak’s  critique  on  this  point,  it  should  be  mentioned  that  
when  it  comes  to  specific  disempowered  groups  such  as  subalterns,  it  should  be  
recognised  that  there  is  no  “pure”  subaltern,  or  for  that  matter  other.  The  other  
always   exists   in   relation   to   the   discourse   that   would   name   it   as   other.874   Leitch   et  

                                                                                                           
871
As above. The notion of the “other” in its most general sense refers to one pole of the
relationship between a subject and a person or thing defined or constituted as a non-self that
is different or other. See Macey D (2000) 229. In the context of postcolonial theory the term
refers to the discursive production of (an) other, which is a process that is characterised by the
way in which Europe produces an Orient-as other through the discourse of orientalism as
analysed by postcolonial theorist Edward Said. See Macey D (2000) 229. This has also been
described as “othering”. Europe functions as subject that asserts its control over the means
of communication and interpretation, and at the same time constitutes its colonial peoples
and nations as other. See Macey D (2000) 229. According to postcolonial theorist Homi
Bhabha the dominant discourse constructs otherness in an ambivalent way. Whilst it attempts
to construct the other as radically different from itself, it must also ascribe to the other an
element of its identity in order to valorise or justify the control it exerts. See in general Macey
D Dictionary of Critical Theory (2000) 285-286. See also Bhabha H The Location of Culture
(1994) and Said E Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (1977). The notion of
“alterity” also refers to otherness. Originally formulated by Emmanuel Lévinas, in a
postcolonial context it refers to the process of becoming altern or different from the
dominant view. See also Macey D (2000) 229.
872
As above.
873
Morton S (2003) 45. Spivak refers to Deleuze and Foucault using terms such as “Maoist”
and “the workers struggle” to refer to collectives. Spivak in GC Nelson C & Grossberg L
(1988) 272.
874
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2193. French philosopher Michel Foucault originally
developed the study of “discourse”. In his view discourse is not simply a body of words and
sentences, but “the very structure in which the social world is constructed and controlled as
an object of knowledge”. Morton S (2003) 85. What is more, Foucault argues that “it is in

169  
 
al   explains   that   Spivak   is   emphasising   the   fact   that   research   or   any   knowledge  
acquirement   are   always   defining   the   “over   there”,   making   it   an   object   of   study,  
something   that   knowledge   can   be   subtracted   from   and   “brought   back   here”.875  
The   researcher   preserves   him-­‐   or   herself   as   subject   and   any   discourse   is,   for  
Spivak,   eventually   about   the   discoursing   agents   or   intellectuals   themselves.876  
Leitch  et  al  explains  further  that  postcolonial  studies  are  a  feature  of  the  West’s  
intellectual  tradition  and  therefore  relates  to  the  other  or  the  subaltern  with  what  
can  be  called  a  hegemonic  vocabulary.877  If  viewed  in  this  way,  representing  the  
subaltern  becomes  highly  problematic.  As  Lazarus  notes,  the  danger  is  thought  to  
reside   in   the   fact   that   in   speaking   for   others   we   might   unintentionally   and  
unwittingly   objectify   those   people   we   are   speaking   for   and   superimpose   our   own  
elite   and   western   cognitive   maps   on   them   whilst   we   do   so   (it   is   of   course,   as  
Lazarus   further   notes,   our   relative   privilege,   such   as   our   schooling   for   example,  
that  has  put  us  in  a  position  to  do  so,  or  to  even  think  of  doing  so).878    

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
discourse that power and knowledge are joined together”. See Foucault M The History of
Sexuality: An Introduction (1978) 100. The study of discourse can therefore not be separated
from the study of institutional power, discipline and domination of western societies. Morton
S (2003) 85. In Orientalism (1977) Edward Said expanded Foucault’s analysis of regimes of
discourse, power and knowledge in western societies by applying this model to what he calls
orientalism, or “colonial discourse”. Said, along the lines of Foucault, emphasised how the
will to know and understand the non-western world in colonial discourse is inseparable from
the will to power over that world. Morton S (2003) 85. Said argues that western colonial power
over the non-western “oriental” world is maintained in and through the discourses of the arts,
humanities and social sciences as well as through the more direct forms of domination such
as political rule and military repression. Colonial discourse analysis dissolves the simple
distinction between cultural texts and institutional or political discourses, rather pointing to
the fact that all texts that represent the colonial world are implicated in a structure of colonial
power and knowledge. Postcolonial theorist Robert Young explains: “Said’s deployment of
the concept of ‘discourse’ for his analysis of Orientalism enabled him to demonstrate a
consistent discursive register for particular perceptions, vocabularies and modes of
representation common to a wide variety of texts extending across the humanities and social
sciences- from travel accounts to history, from literature to racial theory, from economics to
autobiography, from philosophy to linguistics. All these texts could be analysed as sharing a
consistent colonial ideology in their language as well as their subject matter, a form of
knowledge that was developed simultaneously with its deployment and utilization in a
structure of power, namely colonial domination”. See Young R Postcolonialism: An Historical
Introduction (2001) 388. Also see Morton S (2003) 85.
875
As above.
876
As above.
877
As above.
878
Lazarus N The Postcolonial Unconscious (2011) 43.

170  
 
  
What   is   more,   writing   about   the   subjectivity   or   the   will   of   the   subaltern   takes  
place  within  dominant  discourses.  There  are  no  universal  frameworks  or  concepts  
available  to  us  to  investigate  different  cultures.  These  investigations  always  take  
place  within  structures  of  power  and  domination.  In  the  context  of  postcolonial  
studies,   the   will   of   the   subaltern   is,   for   Spivak,   constructed   by   the   dominant  
discourse   as   an   effect   of   elite   nationalism.879   This   discourse   effectively   contains  
the   subaltern   within   the   grand   narrative   of   bourgeois   national   liberation   and  
ignores  the  different  local  struggles  of  particular  subaltern  groups.880  And  within  
the   broader   global   context,   Spivak’s   historical   and   political   analysis   describes  
western   capitalism   and   colonialism   as   immensely   powerful   dominant  
discourses.881   Leitch   et   al   argues   that   for   Spivak   the   whole   world   is   organised  
economically,   politically   and   culturally   along   the   lines   of   western   discourses.882   Of  
course,   no   discourse   can   completely   suppress   all   alternative   discourses.  
Intellectuals   have   frequently   tried   to   create   counter-­‐discourses   that   contest  
dominant   discourses   in   order   to   connect   with   oppressed   people’s   struggles.883  
However,   the   point   that   Spivak   attempts   to   make   is   that   although   dominant  
western  discourses  aren’t  perfectly  aligned,  their  “multiplicity  generally  reinforces  
rather   than   undercuts   the   marginalisation   of   non-­‐white   people   and   the   dual  
marginalisation  of  non-­‐white  women”.884  Therefore,  it  is  not  possible  for  critics  or  
intellectuals  to  write  about  colonial  subjects  without  sustaining  colonialism.  Post-­‐
colonial   critics   therefore   write   from   within   the   same   power   structures   and  
discourses  that  help  maintain  colonialism.  Research  is  always  in  a  way  colonial  and  

                                                                                                           
879
Morton S (2003) 54.
880
As above. Spivak contends that local and particular struggles such as the role of Muslim
weavers in Northern India during the 1857 mutiny, the industrial action of Jute workers in
early twentieth century Calcutta, or the Adwah peasant rebellion of 1920 are ignored. See
Morton S (2003) 54.
881
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2195.
882
As above
883
For Spivak, postcolonial studies is another attempt to “liberate the other and to enable the
other to experience and articulate those parts of itself that falls outside what the dominant
discourse has constituted as its subjecthood”. See Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2194.
884
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2195.

171  
 
the  political  and  economic  interests  of  the  west,  always  already  taint  knowledge  
about  the  so-­‐called  third  world.885  
 
Spivak   refers   to   Sigmund   Freud   in   order   to   argue   some   of   her   points   on  
colonialism.   Freud   helps   us   to   see   how   the   very   identity   of   whiteness   itself   is  
created   in   part   through   the   self-­‐proclaimed   benevolence   of   colonial   action.886  
Freud   implicitly   cautions   against   the   idea   of   scapegoating,   or   creating   saviours.  
Spivak’s  phrase  “white  men  are  saving  brown  women  from  brown  men”  serves  as  
a  justification  of  colonial  interventions  if  white  men  are  taken  to  be  the  saviours  
and   brown   men   are   scapegoated   as   the   oppressors   (of   brown   women).887  
Postcolonialist   discourse   could   just   as   easily   scapegoat   white   men,   with   the  
inevitable  consequence  of  presenting  either  brown  men  or  brown  women  as  the  
saviours.888  Spivak  argues  that  Freud  can  aid  in  reminding  to  explore  the  dynamics  
of   human   relationships   without   foreclosing   narratives   by   assigning   determinate  
and   fixed   roles.889   It   is   along   these   lines   that   Spivak   remains   cautious   of   any  
attempt  to  fix  and  celebrate  the  subaltern’s  distinctive  voice  “by  claims  that  the  
subaltern  occupies  the  position  of  victim,  abjected  other,  scapegoat,  saviour  and  
so  on”.890  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  Spivak  insists  in  defining  the  subaltern  
flexibly;  to  such  an  extent  that  she  points  to  the  subaltern  as  that  which  inevitably  
gets   excluded   by   and   from   all   systems,   defining   the   subaltern   as   “the   sheer  
heterogeneity  of  decolonised  space”.891  I  will  return  to  this  point  below.  
 
Spivak  is  postulating  the  argument  that  although  it  might  seem  as  an  obvious  goal  
for   subaltern   groups   to   escape   their   exploitation   and   oppression,   the   historical  
and   structural   conditions   of   political   representation   do   not   guarantee   that   the  
interests   of   particular   groups   will   be   recognised   or   that   their   voices   will   be  

                                                                                                           
885
As above.
886
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2196.
887
As above.
888
As above.
889
As above.
890
As above.
891
See Spivak GC A Critique of Postcolonial Reason (1999) 310.

172  
 
heard.892  In  her  critique  of  Deleuze  and  Foucault,  she  starts  from  the  premise  that  
the   structure   underpinning   aesthetic   representation   (in   artistic,   literary   or  
cinematic  texts  for  example)  also  underpins  political  representation.  The  general  
difference   between   aesthetic   and   political   representation   is   that   aesthetic  
representation   tend   to   foreground   its   status   as   re-­‐presentation.893   It   therefore  
self-­‐consciously  declares  itself  as  representation.  Morton  explains  that  for  Spivak  
then,   the   problem   with   Deleuze   and   Foucault   is   that   they   efface   their   role   as  
intellectuals   in   re-­‐presenting   the   disempowered   groups   they   describe.   Spivak  
compares  this  effacement  to  a  masquerade  in  which  the  intellectual  as  an  “absent  
non-­‐representer   […]   lets   the   oppressed   speak   for   themselves”.894   Therefore,  
despite  all  the  energy  that  Foucault  and  Deleuze  invest  in  showing  how  subjects  is  
constructed   through   discourse   and   representation,   when   it   comes   to   real,  
historical   examples   of   social   and   political   struggle,   they   fall   back   on   a   transparent  
model   of   representation,   in   which   “oppressed   subjects   speak,   act   and   know   their  
own  conditions”.895  Spivak  attempts  to  clarify  this  criticism  through  a  discussion  
of   political   representation   in   Karl   Marx’s   Eighteenth   Brumaire   of   Louis   Bonaparte.  
In   this   text,   Marx’s   offers   a   description   of   peasant   proprietors   in   nineteenth-­‐
century   French   agrarian   society.896   He   argues   that   these   proprietors   did   not  
collectively  represent  a  coherent  class  as  their  conditions  of  economic  and  social  
life   prevented   them   from   having   class-­‐consciousness.897   For   this   reason,   Spivak  
argues  that  the  “absent  collective  consciousness  of  the  small  peasant  proprietor”  
is   symbolically   depicted   by   a   political   representative   or   proxy   from   the   middle-­‐
class,  who  speaks  on  their  behalf.898  For  Marx,  the  representation  of  the  peasant  
proprietor   has   double   meaning,   which   in   German   is   distinguished   by   the   terms  
darstellen  (representation  as  aesthetic  portrait)  and  vertreten  (representation  by  

                                                                                                           
892
Morton S (2003) 57.
893
As above.
894
As above.
895
As above.
896
Morton S (2003) 57. See Marx K Surveys from Exile (1974) 239 trans. Fernbach D as
referenced in Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 275.
897
As above.
898
As above.

173  
 
political   proxy).899   Spivak   argues   in   the   Deleuze-­‐Foucault   conversation   that   the  
two   meanings   of   representation   are   conflated   because   of   the   fact   that   in   the  
constitution  of  disempowered  groups  as  coherent  political  subjects,  the  process  
of  aesthetic  representation  is  subordinated  to  the  voice  of  the  political  proxy  who  
speaks   on   their   behalf.   As   a   consequence   of   this   conflation,   the   aesthetic   portrait  
–  symbolically  representing  disempowered  people  as  coherent  political  subjects-­‐  
is  often  taken  as  a  transparent  expression  of  their  political  desire  and  interests.900  
 
What   is   important   is   that   Spivak   argues   that   the   act   of   rhetorical   conflation   can  
have   potentially   damaging   effects   on   and   consequences   for   the   oppressed  
groups   that   certain   intellectuals   claim   to   speak   for.901   In   Foucault   and   Deleuze’s  
case,  these  groups  include  factory  workers  and  people  who  were  incarcerated  in  
prisons   or   psychiatric   institutions   in   the   west.   For   Spivak,   when   this   model   of  
political   representation   is   mapped   onto   the   third   world,   the   gap   between  
aesthetic   and   political   representation   is   even   more   pronounced.902   Spivak   is  
attempting   to   highlight   the   limitations   of   applying   European   theories   of  
representation   to   the   lives   and   histories   of   disempowered   groups   in   the   third  
world.   Unless   western   intellectuals   take   the   aesthetic   dimension   of   political  
representation   into   account,   Spivak   argues   that   these   intellectuals   will   continue  
to  silence  the  voice  of  subaltern  women.903  
 
Spivak  calls  for  intellectuals  to  involve  themselves  in  a  project  of  “unlearning  our  
privilege  as  our  loss”  in  order  to  strive  towards  having  an  ethical  relationship  with  
the  subaltern.904  Unlearning  one’s  privilege  or  loss  involves  a  double  recognition;  
firstly,   as   Landry   and   Maclean   explains,   it   requires   that   we   recognise   that   our  
                                                                                                           
899
Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 275-276.
900
See Morton S (2003) 57.
901
Morton S (2003) 58.
902
As above.
903
Intellectuals such as Benita Parry have accused Spivak of repeating the very silencing she
criticises. For Parry, Spivak effectively writes out “the evidence of native agency recorded in
India’s 200 year struggle against British conquest and the Raj” with the phrase “the subaltern
cannot speak”. Parry B “Problems in current theories of colonial discourse” Oxford Literary
Review (1987) 35.
904
Spivak GC The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues (1990) 9.

174  
 
privileges,  whatever  they  may  be  in  terms  of  class,  race,  nationality,  gender  and  
the   like,   prevents   us   from   gaining   a   certain   kind   of   Other   knowledge.   This  
knowledge  is  not  simply  information  that  we  have  not  yet  received,  but  is  rather  
knowledge   that   we   are   not   equipped   to   understand   by   reason   of   our   social  
positions.905  To  unlearn  one’s  privilege  means  to,  on  the  one  hand,  work  hard  at  
gaining   knowledge   of   others   who   occupy   spaces   that   are   most   closed   to   the  
privileged   view   and,   on   the   other   hand,   it   means   attempting   to   speak   to   those  
others  in  such  a  way  that  they  might  be  able  to  answer  back.  906  Spivak:  
It   seems   to   me   that   finding   the   subaltern   is   not   so   hard,   but   actually  
entering   into   a   responsibility   structure   with   the   subaltern,   with   responses  
flowing   both   ways:   learning   without   this   quick-­‐fix   frenzy   of   doing   good   with  
an   implicit   assumption   of   cultural   supremacy   which   is   legitimised   by  
unexamined  romanticisation,  that’s  the  hard  part.907  
 
In  the  last  part  of  the  essay,  Spivak  invokes  the  story  of  Bhubaneswari  Bhudari,  a  
young  middle-­‐class  Indian  woman  who  took  her  own  life  in  her  father’s  apartment  
in  Calcutta  in  1926.908  It  was  later  discovered  that  she  was  a  member  of  one  of  the  
many  groups  involved  in  the  armed  struggle  for  Indian  independence.909  She  had  
been   entrusted   with   a   political   assassination,   which   she   was   unable   to   do.   She  
subsequently  committed  suicide  in  order  to  avoid  capture  by  the  British  colonial  
authorities  and  to,  speculatively,  safeguard  the  members  of  her  group.910  Spivak  
reads   Bhubaneswari’s   suicide   as   an   attempt   to   cover   up   her   involvement   in   the  
anti-­‐colonial  insurgency  movement  by  disguising  her  suicide  as  a  modern  example  
of  sati.  Yet,  in  doing  so,  her  voice  and  agency  as  a  real  historical  woman  freedom  
fighter   disappeared   form   the   official,   male-­‐centred   historical   records.911  
Technically,  her  suicide  did  not  conform  to  the  codes  of  sati  because  she  was  not  
a   widow   and   the   suicide   did   not   take   place   in   the   sacred   site   of   the   husband’s  

                                                                                                           
905
Landry D & Maclean G (eds.) (1996) 4.
906
As above.
907
“Sublatern Talk” Spivak GC in interview with Landry D & Maclean G in Landry D & Maclean
G (eds.) (1996) 288.
908
Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 306-308.  
909
Morton S (2003) 65.
910
As above.
911
As above.

175  
 
funeral   pyre.912   However,   as   Morris   elucidates,   on   Spivak’s   account   Bhubaneswari  
at   least   foreclosed   any   possible   that   her   suicide   might   be   interpreted   as   an  
illegitimate  pregnancy  as  she  was  menstruating  at  the  time  of  her  suicide.913    For  
Spivak,   there   is   no   question   that   Bhubaneswari   was   a   politically   committed   and  
courageous  member  of  the  national  independence  struggle.  But,  she  argues  that  
Bhubaneswari’s   attempt   to   rewrite   the   text   of   sati-­‐suicide   is   a   “tragic   failure”  
because   the   “subaltern   as   female   cannot   be   heard   or   read”   in   the   male-­‐centred  
terms   of   the   national   independence   struggle.914   Spivak   explains   that  
supplementary   narratives   and   retellings   erased   Bhubaneswari’s   story.915   Her  
exceptional   act   of   women’s   resistance   was   later   re-­‐coded   as   a   case   of   an   illicit  
love   affair   and   a   source   of   shame   for   the   subsequent   generations   of   her   family.916  
Everyone,   including   her   own   family,   misunderstood   Bhubaneswari’s   suicide   and  
no  one  in  India  seemed  interested  in  Spivak’s  return  to  and  reinterpretation  of  the  
event   at   the   time   of   writing   the   essay.917   “Unnerved   by   this   failure   of  
communication”,   Spivak   wrote   her   passionate   lament:   “the   subaltern   cannot  
speak!”918   For   Spivak,   Bhubaneswari’s   suicide   is   not   an   example   of   an   Indian  
women’s   inability   to   speak   within   western   discourse,   but   she   rather   shows   how  
Indian   discourse   has   been   so   battered   by   colonial   history   that   it   too   offers   no  
resources  for  successful  communication.919  
 
Fifteen   years   later   Spivak   mentioned   that   her   remark   “the   subaltern   cannot  
speak”   was   inadvisable   because   she   reminded   herself   that   “speaking”   always  
occurs   within   the   nexus   of   actions   that   include   listening,   responding,   interpreting  

                                                                                                           
912
It should be mentioned here that there is of course no way in which Bhubaneswari’s
intentions can really be proved, nevertheless, Spivak reads Bhubaneswari’s story as an
attempt to rewrite “the social text of sati-suicide in an interventionist way”. Spivak GC (1988)
307.
913
Morris R (ed.) (2010) 6.
914
Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 307-308. See also Morton S (2003) 65-66.
915
Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 307.  
916
Morton S (2003) 66.
917
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2195.
918
Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 307.
919
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2195.

176  
 
and  qualifying.920  One’s  words  can  be  taken  up  in  a  number  of  possible  ways:  “The  
ongoing  effects  of  an  utterance,  not  its  singular  expression  or  any  one  response,  
produces  its  character  as  a  speech-­‐act”.921  Spivak,  however,  remains  weary  of  all  
representations  and  she  insists  on  the  inevitable  silences  in  all  discourses.922  She  
still  seems  doubtful  that  political  speech  can  occur  within  certain  frameworks  and  
she   also   still   reserves   the   term   “subaltern”   for   that   which   gets   excluded   by  
systems   of   representation   or,   as   she   puts   it,   “the   sheer   heterogeneity   of  
decolonised   space”.923   Before   concluding   this   point   should   be   discussed.   In   her  
original   essay,   Spivak   appropriated   the   term   sublatern,   against   the   Subaltern  
Studies   Collective,   to   refer   to   the   gendered   position   of   the   most   oppressed  
individuals   within   Indian   society.   She   insisted   that   the   subaltern   should   be  
understood  as  a  flexible  term  in  order  to  avoid  the  trappings  of  master  words  and  
dominant  political  descriptions.  After  her  essay  and  in  the  different  and  abridged  
versions   of   her   essay,   she   developed   and   expanded   the   term   in   order   to   affirm  
and   explain   some   of   her   arguments   (presumably   because   of   the   impact   of   the  
essay  as  well  as  the  praise  and  criticisms  that  the  essay  provoked).  She  has  given  
several   definitions   of   the   term   in   subsequent   interviews   and   has   described   the  
term  in  different  ways  in  her  writings  after  her  original  essay.924  
 

                                                                                                           
920
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2196.
921
Leitch et al explains that Spivak recognises that much of the point of revisionist history or
of returning to instances of oppression, is to reactivate attempts at speaking that other forces
tried to obliterate and keep from having effects. See Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2196.
To deny this retelling as a form of speaking will hold on to a criterion of “authenticity” that
runs counter to Spivak’s whole argument about identity. For her the historian can sketch “the
itinerary of trace” that the silenced subaltern left. They should also mark the sites where the
subaltern was effaced and should delineate these discourses that did the effacing. See Leitch
V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2196.
922
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2196.
923
Spivak GC A Critique of Postcolonial Reason (1999) 310.
924
For example, “you have the foreign elite and the indigenous elite. Below that you will have
the vectors of upward, downward, sideward and backward mobility. But then there is a space
that is for all practical reasons outside those lines”. See Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L
(1988) 284. Another definition refers to the subaltern as “the part that remains most excluded
from the circuits and benefits of social capital”. See “Subaltern Talk” Spivak GC interview
with Landry D & Maclean G in Landry D & Maclean G (eds.) (1996) 288. See also “Interview
with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: New Nation Writers Conference in South Africa” with De
Kock L in A Review of International English Literature (1992) 29-47.

177  
 
Ultimately,   in   postcolonial   terms,   Spivak   uses   the   term   to   refer   to   everything   that  
has   no   or   limited   access   to   cultural   imperialism.   The   term   has   developed   in   such   a  
way  as  to  denote  something  of  a  non-­‐speakingness.925  As  Morris  elucidates:    
Subalternity  is  less  an  identity  than  what  we  might  call  a  predicament,  but  this  
is   true   in   a   very   odd   sense.   For,   in   Spivak’s   definition,   it   is   the   structured   place  
from  which  the  capacity  to  predicate  is  radically  obscured.926    
 
This   results   in   the   idea   that   if   anyone   escapes   the   muting   of   subalternity,   she  
ceases   to   be   subaltern   (something   that,   as   Morris   explains,   is   absolutely   to   be  
desired  according  to  Spivak).927  Thus,  the  term  developed  to  denote  those  people  
that  are  constitutively  beyond  or  outside  of  representation,  so  much  so  that  what  
is   subaltern   has   “always-­‐already   been   made   over,   not   only   translated   but  
traduced,  not  only  appropriated,  but  expropriated”.928  This  has  resulted  in  some  
criticism.929    Although  Spivak  has  attempted  to  refine  her  original  argument,  the  
expansion  of  the  term  results  in  a  circuitry:  that  which  is  subaltern  cannot  speak  
and   that   which   cannot   speak   is   subaltern.   In   Spivak’s   ultimate   formulation,  
subalternity   as   a   singular   state   or   “a   position   without   identity   […]   where   the  
social   lines   of   mobility,   being   elsewhere,   do   not   permit   the   formation   of   a  
recognisable   basis   for   action”   has   become   that   which   is   unrepresentable.930   Colin  
Graham  has  described  it  as  “a  theoretical  site  of  disempowered  purity”.931  In  this  
way,   subalternity   becomes   an   end   in   itself.   For   the   purposes   of   my   discussion,   I  
read   the   term   “subaltern”   within   the   context   of   her   original   essay.   In   other  
words,   I   read   the   term   to   refer   to   economically   oppressed   and   politically  
marginalised  individuals,  irreducible  to  singular  analysis  and  as  including  an  array  
of  social  positions  and  identities.  Spivak’s  most  important  and  significant  points  in  

                                                                                                           
925
Landry D & Maclean G (eds.) (1996) 289.
926
Morris R (ed.) (2010) 8.
927
As above.
928
Lazarus N (2011) 144.
929
See for example in this regard Lazarus N (2011) 144-145.
930
Spivak GC “Scattered Speculations on the subaltern and the popular” Postcolonial Studies
(2005) 476.
931
See Graham C Deconstructing Ireland (2001) 106. See also Lehner S “’Dangerous Liaisons’:
Gender Politics in the Contemporary Scottish and Irish Imagination” in Gardiner M,
Macdonald G & O’Gallagher N (eds.) Scottish Literature and Postcolonial Literature:
Comparative Texts and Critical Perspectives (2011) 229.

178  
 
her  original  essay  was  firstly,  her  warnings  against  describing  subalterns  along  the  
lines   of   coherent   groups   in   ways   that   would   objectify   them   and   secondly,   reading  
the  term  through  the  lens  of  gender  and  highlighting  the  silencing  of  women  by  
way   of   heterogeneous   circumstances.   Spivak   suggests   that   we   should   engage  
with  the  histories  and  social  texts  of  subalterns  through  careful  reading  strategies  
and   deconstruction.932   Such   an   engagement   will   acknowledge   the   complicity   of  
theory  with  its  object  of  critique  and  thereby  ensure  a  more  nuanced  and  ethical  
engagement   that   does   not   objectify   or   romanticise   groups,   but   rather   seeks   to  
trace  the  silences  and  exclusions  present  in  all  discourses.    
 
4.3  The  Sexed  Subaltern:  Concluding  Remarks  
In   her   discussion   of   sati   and   the   suicide   of   Bhubaneswari   Badhuri   as   well   as   the  
surrounding   contexts   of   those   events,   Spivak   brilliantly   demonstrates   how   the  
ideological   formations   of   those   events   seemed   designed   to   foreclose   the  
possibility  of  woman  acceding  to  a  position  from  which  she  could  actually  speak-­‐  
or   have   a   voice   as   political   subject.933   Spivak   further   passionately   warns   against  
the   dangers   in   any   attempt   to   speak   for   the   politically   invisible   and  
disempowered.  With  regards  to  subalternity,  Spivak  insists  on  the  role  of  gender  
within  its  formation  and  she  demonstrates  how  the  notion  of  subaltern  resistance  
is   always   already   filtered   through   the   dominant   discourse   within   which   writing,  
speaking   and   the   occurrence   of   voice   takes   place.   When   Spivak   states   that   the  
subaltern   cannot   speak,   she   means   that   the   subaltern   cannot   be   heard   by   the  
dominant  political  discourses  or  by  the  privileged  in  the  third  and  first  world.  Her  
speech   or   voice   falls   short   of   fully   authorised   political   speech,   specifically   as  
constrained   by   imperialist,   masculinist   colonial   and   postcolonial   structures   of  
apprehension.  The  dominant  political  discourses  that  Spivak  discusses  in  her  essay  
are   the   discourses   of   western   imperialism,   elite   representations   of   national  
independence  in  India  as  well  as  masculinist  and  patriarchal  ideological  forms.934  

                                                                                                           
932
See Morton S (2003) 40-42. See also Spivak GC 1(978) 201.
933
Morris R (ed.) (2010) 6.
934
The discourses of masculine hegemony and patriarchy becomes important within the
context of South Africa as South African women have traditionally and historically been

179  
 
The  meaning  of  Spivak’s  contention  should  not  be  taken  out  of  context  to  mean  
that  disenfranchised  peoples  have  no  agency.  Such  a  reading  will  be  contrary  to  
the   situated   framework   that   she   establishes   in   her   essay.935   Morton,   for   example,  
states   that   Spivak   would   certainly   not   want   to   deny   the   social   agency   and   lived  
realities  of  disempowered  women.  What  Spivak  objects  to  in  the  early  research  of  
the   Subaltern   Studies   Collective   is   the   idea   that   the   subaltern   “is   a   sovereign  
political   subject   in   control   of   her   own   destiny”.936   The   crucial   point   for   Spivak   is  
that  “speaking”  belongs  to  an  already  existing  structure  of  domination.  Further,  
for   Spivak,   even   when   the   subaltern   “speaks”,   it   should   be   recognised   that   she  
has   received   her   political   and   discursive   identity   within   historically   determinate  
systems  of  political  and  economic  representation.937  Therefore,  such  a  speaking  is  
also   already   an   effect   of   dominant   discourses   of   apprehension.   Ultimately,  
Spivak’s   arguments   should   be   seen   as   valuable   in   enabling   an   investigation   of  
what   conditions   obtrude   to   mute   the   speech   of   subaltern   women   and   render  
their   speech-­‐acts   or   voices   as   unimportant   to   those   who   occupy   dominant  
patriarchal  spaces.938      
 
It   can   therefore   be   said   that   Spivak   highlights   reasons   why   certain   phenomena   of  
political   invisibility,   voicelessness,   or   difficulties   with   regards   to   political   voice  
might   occur.   She   reminds   of   the   fact   that   “voice”   and   “speaking   politically”   are  
filtered   through   dominant   discourses   that   might   serve   to   render   such   voices   as  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
subjected to highly patriarchal cultures. The prevalence of sexual violence and rape further
denotes the existence of hegemonic masculine orders and ways of life. Spivak’s analysis of
the way in which women are muted by different circumstances still remains relevant in the
context of gender oppression. Further, importantly, Morris notes that since the writing of
Spivak’s essay, much has changed. Morris highlights that the international division of labour
currently is organised to permit the effective exploitation of women and girl children in the
urban and rural peripheries (in sweatshops, factories, and brothels). The imperial project
today is mainly interested in liberating women for labour, which refers to “surplus value
extraction”. Human rights have often provided the alibi for this process. For Morris, we can
therefore be as cautious now of the promise for women’s salvation being proffered through
war and imperial domination as when Britain made the abolition of sati the mask and means
of its own imperialism. Morris (ed.) (2010) 7.
935
Morton S (2003) 60.
936
Morton S (2003) 53.
937
As above.
938
Morris R (ed.) (2010) 3.

180  
 
politically   irrelevant   or   illegible.   There   is   no   guarantee   that   such   speech-­‐acts   or  
utterances   will   be   heard   within   dominant   discourses.   What   is   more,   even   when  
the   subaltern   “speaks”,   her   discursive   identity,   as   mentioned,   renders   such   an  
utterance   as   an   effect   of   the   dominant   political   and   economic   discourses.939  
“She”   is   therefore   not   left   untouched   by   the   hegemonic   discursive   formations  
that   surround   her.   Spivak   further   highlights   how   attempts   of   speaking   for   certain  
people  might  serve  to  silence  their  voices  and  she  also  points  to  the  dangers  of  
attaching  coherent  political  identities  to  heterogeneous  groups.    
 
In   the   section   below,   I   reflect   on   Spivak’s   essay   through   the   lens   of   the   politics   of  
Jacques  Rancière.    
 
4.4  Subaltern  Equality  
As   mentioned   in   the   introduction,   in   this   section   I   reflect   on   Spivak’s   essay  
through  the  lens  of  Rancière’s  politics.  The  goal  here  is  not  to  embark  on  a  step-­‐
by-­‐step   comparison,   but   rather   to   critically   contemplate   some   of   Spivak’s   main  
arguments.   As   Spivak’s   arguments   in   her   original   essay   result   in   her   concluding  
that  subalterns  cannot  speak,  it  becomes  important  to  reflect  on  her  essay  so  as  
to  understand  the  notion  of  political  voice  against  the  background  sketched  in  the  
first  chapter.  Rancière  sees  people  voicing  political  claims  through  staging  a  scene  
of  dissensus  on  which  their  equality  can  be  declared.  And  he  indeed  argues  that  
people  in  various  circumstances  can  speak  politically  against  the  police  order  and  
its   distributions   of   the   sensible.   I   therefore   aim   to   open   Spivak’s   claim   up   to  
contestation  in  order  to  further  investigate  what  political  voicing  means.  
 
The   first   point   that   can   be   mentioned   in   this   regard   relates   to   Spivak’s   criticism   of  
the  use  of  master  words.  It  was  mentioned  above  that  Spivak  disparages  the  use  
of   master   words   such   as   “women”   or   “the   worker”   for   example.   Her   criticism  
with  regards  to  this  point  is  related  to  her  critical  engagements  with  the  Subaltern  
Studies   Collective   and   her   warnings   against   objectifying   and   silencing   voices   by  

                                                                                                           
939
Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 204.  

181  
 
attaching   coherent   political   identities   to   individuals.   Such   objectification,   it   was  
argued,  ignores  the  real  differences  between  people.  Rancière  is,  as  mentioned,  
highly   critical   of   identity   and   specifically   identity   categories   associated   and  
appropriated  by  the  police  order.  Therefore,  Rancière  and  Spivak  both  highlight  in  
their   own   way   the   dangers   of   notions   of   identity   or   identity   categories.   However,  
important  differences  need  to  be  highlighted.    
 
Rancière  demonstrates  that  word  “worker”  for  example,  can  serve  as  the  name  
under   which   people   can   subjectivise   themselves.   “Worker”   can   become   the  
heading   under   which   subjects   can   tear   their   bodies   away   from   the   positions  
assigned   by   the   police   and   its   representations   and   discourses.   Rancière   highlights  
the   fact   that   people   in   struggle   sometimes   use   universal   syllogisms,   names   and  
constructions   in   the   forming   of   a   “we”.   He   does   not   care   whether   “man”   for  
example,   is   from   bourgeois   derivation   (in   colonialist,   imperialist,   or   patriarchal  
terms  for  that  matter).  The  only  thing  that  matters  is  whether  it  can  serve  the  self-­‐
emancipation   of   people.   The   point   is   how   and   if   subjectivation   occurs   through  
equality   and   whether   it   redistributes   the   sensible   police   interpretations   of   the  
name   that   the   “we”   goes   by.   Further,   such   theorisation   is   not   an   attempt   to  
objectify   a   group   of   people.   Politics   and   the   political   subject   in   struggle   is  
provincial,   localised   and   temporary.   The   struggle   of   the   demos   under   the   name   of  
the  “we”  does  not  deny  the  real  differences  between  people,  but  rather  seeks  a  
temporary   “coming   together”.   The   use   of   certain   master   words   in   a   process   of  
subjectivation   and   in   the   redistribution   of   the   sensible   can   therefore   become   a  
heading  under  which  equality  is  assumed,  practised  and  verified.    
 
It   should   be   mentioned   that   although   Spivak   heavily   criticises   the   use   of   master  
words,   she   did   however   concede   to   the   idea   of   “strategic   essentialism”.  
“Essentialism”   refers   to   the   belief   that   certain   people   or   entities   share   some  
essential   nature   that   secures   their   membership   within   a   category.   In   the   1980’s  
essentialism   was   the   target   of   feminist   criticism   because   activists   recognised   that  

182  
 
generalisations   about   women   inevitably   excluded   some   women.940   Spivak  
suggested   that   it   was   important   to,   in   some   instances,   strategically   make  
essentialist   claims,   whilst   being   aware   that   these   claims   were   at   best   crude  
generalisations.941   An   example   is   the   publicising   of   the   feminisation   of   poverty.  
This  refers  to  the  way  in  which  employment  practices,  wages  and  social  policies  
ensure  that  in  many  societies  women  make  up  the  majority  of  poor  adults.942  Of  
course   not   all   women   are   poor,   but   in   order   to   battle   the   poverty   of   some  
women,   strategic   essentialism   can   highlight   the   gendered   nature   of   economic  
inequality.943   Although   Spivak   later   disassociated   herself   from   the   notion   of  
strategic   essentialism   because   she   felt   that   it   had   “been   taken   as   an   excuse   for  
just   essentialism   which   is   an   excuse   for   just   identitarianism”,   she   still   argues,   in  
the   same   text,   that   strategic   essentialism   can   work   as   a   context-­‐specific   strategy,  
but   it   cannot   provide   long-­‐term   political   solutions   to   end   oppression   and  
exploitation.944  
 
In  the  context  of  Rancière’s  politics  some  claims,  rather  than  being  “essentialist”  
claims,  would  be  “universal”  claims  and  rather  being  long-­‐term  solutions,  would  
overturn   the   sensible   logic,   which   can   have   a   number   of   effects   on   the   police  
order.   Although   I   agree   with   the   notion   that   essentialist   claims   can   serve   to  
silence   or   exclude,   it   might   be   interesting   to   ask   in   what   way   theorising   in   this  
regard  serve  to  close  off  opportunities  or  occasions  for  a  politics  of  equality.  The  
theoretical   point   might   be   that   the   claim   of   equality   that   occurs   under   a   universal  
heading   or   under   a   master   word   is,   as   mentioned,   localised   and   temporary.   It   is  
within   a   particular   scene   of   dissensus.   Although   this   scene   might   occur   under   a  
universal  heading,  the  point  of  politics  is  not  to  make  claims  about  the  universal,  
but  rather  to  break  it  apart.  It  involves  problematising,  from  different  angles,  the  
dominant   police   interpretations   of   such   master   words   or   headings.   The   point   is  
exactly   to   reject   the   implicit   assumptions   made   about   this   category   or   identity,   to  
                                                                                                           
940
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2194.
941
As above.
942
As above.
943
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2195.
944
Chakravorty P et al Conversations with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2006) 64.

183  
 
disidentify   and   to   reconfigure   the   identity   category   in   a   different   way.   An  
impossible   identification   is   an   identification   that   cannot   be   embodied   by   the  
person/peoples   who   is   identifying   and   as   such   cannot   signify   a   coherent  
collectivity.   Master   words   or   headings   are   names   with   sufficient   generality,  
already  recognisable  within  a  dominant  discourse  and  as  such  they  can  be  given  
new   content   through   politics.   What   matters   are   the   poetical   linguistic  
configurations   that   occur   alongside   names   or   headings;   demonstrating   logical  
argument,   demonstrating   another   world.     The   fact   that   these   master   words   are  
already  part  of  the  distribution  of  the  sensible  means  they  can  actually  help  with  
the   demonstration   of   an   argument   and   the   world   in   which   that   argument   counts.  
Its   recognisability   is   what   can   help   to   make   it   legible.     However,   this   heading   or  
name   under   politics   is   exactly   what   doesn’t   become   a   coherent   collectivity.  
Although  it  might  be  recognisable  within  the  current  police  order  or  distribution  
of  the  sensible,  its  police-­‐meanings  become  contested.  Through  Rancière’s  lens,  in  
the   moment   of   politics,   this   name   is   made   up   of   impossible,   confusing  
identifications   that   become   incoherent   and   they   therefore   involve   the  
“indetermination   of   identities,   the   delegitimation   of   speaking   positions,   the  
deregulation  of  divisions  of  space  and  time.”945  Further,    
Political-­‐being-­‐together   is   a   being-­‐between:   between   identities,   between  
worlds  […]  between  several  names  […].946    
 
The   relevant   question   is:   can   the   name   or   the   master   word   facilitate   in   the  
creation  of  a  polemical  scene?  
 
Another  very  important  point  that  Spivak  refers  to  in  her  analysis  of  subalternity  is  
the   idea   that   speaking   politically   becomes   problematic   when   considering   the  
dominant  political  discourses  within  which  such  a  speech-­‐act  occurs.  Spivak  refers  
to   the   imperialistic,   patriarchal   and   elite   nationalist   discourses   in   India   in   her  
discussion   of   sati   as   well   as   the   death   of   Bhubaneswari   Bhaduri   that   served   to  
silence  women.  These  discourses  therefore  served  to  foreclose  any  possibility  of  

                                                                                                           
945
Rancière J Partage du Sensible (2000) 15 as quoted in Hallward P in Rockhill G & Watts P
(eds.) (2009) 144.
946
Rancière J (1999) 137-138.

184  
 
women  within  that  context  actually  speaking  or  making  their  voices  heard.  After  
considering  Rancière’s  thought,  what  can  be  mentioned  and  reflected  upon  is  the  
idea   that   there   are   always   useless,   supplementary   words   at   our   disposal.   As  
mentioned  no  discourse  can  ever  obliterate  all  alternative  discourses.  For  Spivak  
however,   the   discourses   of   western   imperialism   and   masculinity,   although   not  
perfectly   aligned,   mutually   reinforce   the   oppression   of   non-­‐white   peoples   and  
especially   non-­‐white   women.   Along   the   lines   of   Rancière’s   theorising,   this   may   be  
viewed  in  the  light  of  Rancière’s  point  that  politics  is  always  a  renegotiation  of  the  
police   order   we   must   live   in.   All   we   can   do   is   to   attempt   to   renegotiate   the  
sensible   distribution.   However,   and   this   is   an   important   point,   such   a  
renegotiation   is   possible.   It   does   not   mean   that   people   cannot   politically   speak.  
The   point   is   exactly   that   there   are   more   words   at   our   disposal   and   Rancière’s  
examples   show   that   a   contradiction   within   the   dominant   discourse   can   mobilise  
an  obligation  to  hear.  My  discussion  of  Olympe  de  Gouges  within  the  next  chapter  
takes   this   argument   further   to   illustrate   this   point.   The   dominant   language,  
manipulated,  handled  and  redistributed  can  open  up  the  space  for  equality  to  be  
declared  and  for  the  redistribution  of  the  given.  People  or  political  speech  acts  in  
Rancière’s   view   of   them   aren’t   just   simply   within   a   dominant   discourse.   The   point  
is  that  they  can  be  between  dominant  identities,  spaces  and  places  and  it  is  within  
the  “in-­‐between”  that  equality,  verified,  might  occur.  Further,  it  is  exactly  maybe  
instances   of   the   naming   of   all-­‐encompassing   discourses   and   the   idea   that  
everything   is   an   after-­‐effect   of   such   discourses   that   can   result   in   local   and  
particular   struggles   declaring   equality   and   unique   in   complexity,   not   being  
detected.  It  theoretically  positions  people  within  discursive  formations  that  they  
cannot  escape  from.    
 
Further,   Spivak   is   indeed   correct   in   stating   that   there   is   no   guarantee   that   the  
claims   of   certain   groups   of   people   will   be   heard.   The   struggles   and   voices   of  
oppressed   and   invisible   constituencies   more   often   than   not   fall   short   of   fully  
authorised   political   speech.     This   is   exactly   Rancière’s   point   with   regards   to  
politics,  that  is,  that  there  have  been  prior  decisions  of  who  will  be  heard  within  
what  times  and  what  spaces  and  that  politics  is  at  once  the  entering  into  a  realm  

185  
 
of  visibility,  audibility  and  perceptibility.  Politics  for  Rancière  doesn’t  occur  often,  
but  the  possibility  of  a  universal  equality  is  in  gestation  around  us  all  the  time.  The  
possibility  of  laying  the  contingency  of  the  prior  decisions  bare  is  always  there  and  
this   might   be   exactly   Rancière’s   invitation;   not   to   romanticise   everywhere   what  
we  see  as  the  subaltern  “speaking”,  but  rather  to  continuously  contest  the  lines  
of  sensible  intelligibility.    
 
Spivak   further   warns   against   the   dangers   of   representation   and   she   highlights  
that  even  the  most  benevolent  efforts  at  representation  can  result  in  silencing  the  
people   that   is   (or   would   be)   represented.   She   illustrates   this   point   masterfully  
with  the  colonial  impulse  to  “save  brown  women  from  brown  men”  and  equates  
this  desire  to  the  desire  of  post-­‐colonial  intellectuals  to  speak  for  certain  groups  
of   people.   Representation   is   also   highly   problematic   for   Rancière.   For   him   it  
enforces  the  inferiority  of  the  people  that  must  be  represented  by  others  who  can  
think   “better”   or   do   things   better.   Within   these   efforts   lies   a   presumed   inferiority  
and   dependency   on   those   with   the   expertise   to   represent   and   to   engage   in  
politics.   Combating   inequality   on   behalf   of   others   assumed   to   be   incapable   of  
emancipating   themselves   simply   reproduces   the   logic   of   subordination   or  
inferiority.947  Further,  Rancière  highlights  the  fact  that  certain  intellectuals  rely  on  
a   conceptualisation   of   the   poor   as   an   inert   mass   whose   passivity   is   the   sine   quo  
non   of   its   would-­‐be   representatives   whilst   Spivak   reminds   of   the   limited   and  
potential   harmful   effects   of   representation   or   of   intellectuals   speaking   for  
disempowered   groups.948   The   point   is   that   for   Rancière,   representation  
dramatises   the   world   in   a   certain   way,   locating   voices   and   bodies   in   certain  
locales,   times   and   places,   thereby   implicitly   making   assumptions   about   their  
capacities.   It   is   important   to   mention   that   for   Rancière   people   can   meaningfully  
organise   political   revolt   and   understand   their   circumstances   and   their   world  
without   the   instruction   of   intellectuals,   or   anyone   for   that   matter.   On   this   point  
Spivak   and   Rancière   seems   to   have   certain   similarities   in   their   theorising.  
However,  the  point  that  Spivak  makes  with  reference  to  Deleuze  and  Foucault  is  
                                                                                                           
947
See Tanke J (2011) 36.
948
Tanke J (2011) 31. See also Rancière J (2004) 48.

186  
 
that  even  when  people  “speak  for  themselves”,  something  that  Rancière  would  
insist   upon,   they   have,   along   the   lines   of   post-­‐structuralist   thought   (that   Spivak  
remains   heavily   influenced   by),   received   their   discursive   identities   within  
dominant   structures   of   domination.   In   the   context   of   her   essay,   the   voices   or  
speech   acts   of   women   are   so   embedded   in   Hindu   patriarchal   codes   of   moral  
conduct   and   British   colonial   representation   that   this   speaking   is   impossible   to  
recover.   Rancière,   on   the   contrary,   does   not   view   speech   acts   as   ideological  
artefacts   or   as   after   effects   of   dominant   discourses,   rather   he   takes   these   acts   on  
the   surface   of   things,   as   an   act   that   can   reconfigure   the   situation   in   which   it   is  
enunciated.  This  position  has  to  do  with  Rancière’s  rejection  of  post-­‐structuralism  
in   general.   Rancière   refuses   to   theorise   “the   subject”,   rather   focussing   on   the  
process   of   subjectivation   as   the   process   of   making   other   or   impossible  
identifications   in   the   precarious   temporality   of   politics.949   His   position   rather  
points   to   temporary   and   unstable   subject   positions.   Rancière   rejects   notions   of  
theorising  subjects  as  well  as  the  notion  that  speech  acts  are  effects  of  discourse  
as   for   him   such   notions   contain   implicit   assumptions   about   the   capacities   of  
people  and  who  and  what  can  appear  in  what  times  and  places;  and  what’s  more,  
these   notions   can   produce   imposing   counter-­‐discourses   of   subject   formation.950  

                                                                                                           
949
The term “subject” is usually used in work deriving from continental philosophy, the
psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan and the Marxism of Louis Althusser. See Macey D (2000) 203
& 368-369. It points towards all those descriptions of decentering that displace the source of
meaning away from “the individual” and towards structures, impersonal or unconscious
processes and ideology. See Macey D (2000) 203 & 368-369. For most of these theories the
individual is a product rather than a source of meaning. Rancière’s refusal to theorise the
subject is also closely related to his criticism of Althusserianism. Althusser uses “ the subject”
in a broadly similar way to Lacan (“the subject” is the subject of the unconscious and it is
therefore the subject that enters into the dimension of the symbolic which produces a
splitting or decentering of the subject by subordinating it to the laws of language). See
Macey D (2000) 203 & 368-369. For Althusser “the subject” does not exist prior to its
interpellation, but is summoned into its being by it. The process of interpellation refers to the
mechanisms that produces subjects in such a way that they recognise their own existence in
terms of the dominant ideology of the society in which they live. The idea of interpellation
demonstrates that subjects are always already the products of ideology. See Macey D (2000)
203 & 368-369.
950
See for example Dasgupta S “Words, bodies, time: Queer theory before and after itself”
Borderlands (2009) 1-20. In this article the author demonstrates in what way the critiques of
identity in the context of queer theory have served to created counter-discourses of subject-
formation.

187  
 
Further,   as   Rancière   illustrates   with   his   discussions   of   Gauny   and   the   worker-­‐
poets,  speech-­‐acts  are  never  simply  straightforward  (whether  seen  as  a  discursive  
product  or  not).  The  redistribution  of  the  sensible  is  not  just  about  an  utterance  
that   is   heard   or   not   heard   as   political   speech.   It   is   rather   about   words,   bodies   and  
actions  in  places  that  all  combine  polemically.  Gauny  best  illustrates  this  example  
where  time  and  place  becomes  as  important  than  specific  utterances  or  speech-­‐
acts.   The   worker   poets,   it   is   interesting   to   note,   borrowed   words,   images   and  
speeches   from   the   elite   bourgeois   intellectual   discourse   of   their   time.   However,  
the   manifestation   of   their   will   to   transgress   the   limits   of   the   discourse   that   would  
see   them   as   workers   (with   only   time   to   work   and   their   bodies   incarnating   the  
worker’s   revolution)   violates   the   very   “order   of   discourse”.951   Rancière   states   the  
following  with  regards  to  their  writing:  
By  stealing  away  to  wander  aimlessly  without  knowing  who  to  speak  to  or  
what   to   speak   to,   writing   destroys   every   legitimate   foundation   for   the  
circulation   of   words,   for   the   relationship   between   the   effects   of   language  
and  the  positions  of  bodies  in  shared  space.952  
 
The   worker-­‐poets   with   their   borrowed   intellectual   words,   images   and   notions,   by  
not  staying  put  and  simply  working  and  taking  pride  in  that  work,  but  by  writing;  
acts  in  the  complete  opposite  to  the  discourse  that  would  name  them  as  workers.  
The  idea  that  voices  are  so  embedded  in  the  discourse  that  would  oppress  them  
and   produce   identities   (which   these   people   cannot   know,   but   cannot   help   to  
manifest  with  their  words  and  actions)  comes  down  to  a  counter-­‐discourse  that  
would  lock  them  up  in  a  specific  distribution  of  the  sensible,  a  specific  “the  way  
things   are”.   This   is   Rancière’s   objection.   The   worker   poets   borrow   words   and  
images   and   speeches   and   notions   from   the   dominant   bourgeois   intellectual  
discourse   or   paradigm,   effectively   taking   aspects   of   it   on,   but,   the   relationship  
between   those   words   and   their   bodies   in   specific   (or   other)   times   and   places  
reconfigures   and   destabilises   the   dominant   discourse   on   workers   completely.  
Therefore,  for  Rancière  the  situation  is  more  complex  and  it  is  not  about  speech-­‐
acts  or  voices  as  products  of  discursive  identities,  but  rather  about  the  “counter-­‐

                                                                                                           
951
See Rancière J La Parole Ouvrière: 1830-1851 (1976) as reference in Dasgupta S
Borderlands (2008) 8.
952
Rancière J (2004) 13.

188  
 
intuitive   relation   between   bodies   and   worlds”   or   the   “disembodiment   of   ‘the  
people’  from  the  discourse  that  produces  it”.953  
 
It  should  be  mentioned  that  the  discussion  above  is  not  to  suggest  that  we  should  
not  attempt  analyse  the  discourses  that  efface  the  possibility  of  speaking.  Indeed,  
Rancière  states  that  the  distinction  between  the  police  order  and  politics  can  help  
us   discern   how   politics   encroaches   on   matters   of   the   police   and   the   police   on  
matters   of   politics.   We   can   understand   the   form   of   their   intertwinement.954  
However,   such   theorising   should   not   create   counter-­‐discourses   that   prescribe  
who  can  do  what  in  what  times  and  places,  nor  should  it  diminish  the  complexity  
of   matters   of   the   spatio-­‐temporal   actions   of   bodies   that   disrupt   and   overturn   the  
order  of  the  discourses  that  surround  them.  
 
Another   point   that   can   be   discussed   with   regards   to   representation   is   Spivak’s  
insistence   on   the   idea   that   representation   as   aesthetic   portrait   and  
representation  by  political  proxy  should  not  be  conflated.  The  representation  of  
people   as   coherent   subjects   should   not   be   taken   as   transparent   expressions   of  
their   political   desires   and   interests.   With   regards   to   Rancière’s   politics,   Citton  
makes   an   interesting   point.   He   argues   that   in   Rancière’s   formulation   of   politics,  
representation   does   occur,   but   it   is   the   political   subjects   themselves   who   is  
involved  in  these  representations.955  Citton  elucidates:  
Rancière   thus   answers   Gayatri   Spivak’s   question:   yes,   within   certain  
historical   junctures,   the   subaltern   can   speak.   These   moments   are   relatively  
rare   […]   but   it   has   occurred   in   the   past   […].   Subalterns   however,   in  
Rancière’s   theatrical   politics,   never   speak   directly   for   themselves:   it   is   they  
who  speak,  but  they  do  so  from  under  a  mask  that  they  have  painted  upon  
their   face,   from   under   a   costume   they   have   collectively   designed   for  
themselves,   on   a   carnivalesque   stage   they   are   building   with   each   of   their  
interventions.956    
                                                                                                           
Dasgupta S Borderlands (2009) 8.
953

Rancière J “Afterword: The method of equality: An answer to some questions” in Rockhill

954

G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 288.

955
See Citton Y “Political Agency and the Ambivalence of the Sensible” in Rockhill G & Watts
P (eds.) (2009) 132-133. For Citton one always speaks from within certain position within
complex structures of social dominance and oppression and as a result one always has to
pose as this or that persona.
956
As above.  

189  
 
  
Citton   therefore   refers   to   the   inner   distance   and   separation   between   the  
representative   and   the   represented,   even   when   both   are   located   within   the   same  
body.957   He   refers   to   the   persona,   or   the   acting   “as   if”   that   Rancièrian   political  
subjects   stage   during   politics,   which   is   brought   on   by   the   making   of   impossible  
and   paradoxical   identifications.   The   point   is   that   people   can   pose   as   things   they  
are  not;  they  can  act  as  if  they  have  the  equality  they  have  not  and  according  to  
Rancière,  as  mentioned,  what  is  staged  is  not  an  identity,  but  a  gap  between  the  
“we”  and  “the  people”  in  whose  name  the  “we”  purports  to  speak.  
 
From  one  point  of  view,  it  can  appear  that  Spivak’s  claim  that  the  subaltern  is  a  
discursive  effect  removes  the  very  ground  for  effective  political  struggle.  Indeed,  
Neil   Lazarus   argues   that   Spivak   is   not   really   concerned   with   “native   agency   […]  
but  [rather  with]  a  theory  of  the  way  in  which  the  social  and  symbolic  practice  of  
the   disenfranchised   elements   of   native   population   are   represented   (or   rather   not  
represented)   in   colonialist   elitist   discourse”.958   It   is   therefore   argued   that   what  
Spivak  focuses  on  is  not  so  much  examples  of  the  struggles  of  people  or  groups,  
but   rather   the   way   in   which   intellectuals   construct   groups   and   speaking   positions  
and   it   is   within   this   context   that   the   subaltern   cannot   speak.   In   her   essay,   she  
insightfully   demonstrates   how   subaltern   women   have   no   discursive   space   from  
which   to   speak   in   the   context   of   sati   and   the   suicide   Bhubaneswari   Bhaduri.  
However,  she  goes  on  to  emphasise  that  not  only  is  there  no  discursive  space  that  
can   emerge   from   which   the   subaltern   could   formulate   an   “utterance”,   but   also  
that  “no  scene  of  speaking”  can  arise  for  the  subaltern  women  (the  example  that  
she   usually   uses   are   economically   marginalised   third   world   women).959   It   is   within  
this  regard  that  Spivak  has  been  criticised  for  contributing  in  the  silencing  of  third  
world  women.960  From  a  Rancièrian  point  of  view  the  question  that  can  be  asked  
is  to  what  extent  does  such  a  description  close  off  opportunities  for  the  detection  
of  instances  of  the  verification  of  equality  and  to  what  extent  it  involves  making  
                                                                                                           
957
As above.
958
See Lazarus N Nationalism and Cultural Practice in a Postcolonial World (1999) 112.
959
Shetty S & Bellamy E “Postcolonialism’s archive fever” Diacritics (2000) 25-48.
960
See for example Parry B Oxford Literary Review (1992) 27-58.

190  
 
assumptions   about   the   bodies   of   people,   in   this   case   the   bodies   of   subaltern  
women?  For  Rancière,  descriptions  that  lock  people  up  in  certain  discourses  and  
that  sees  them  theoretically  positioned  within  a  specific  time,  place,  discourse  and  
capacity,   is   as   damaging   as   the   objectification   or   romanticising   of   people   or  
others.  
 
Further,  as  mentioned  above,  Spivak’s  suggests  that  intellectuals  should  engage  
with   the   social   texts   and   histories   of   subalterns   through   deconstructive   and  
careful  reading  strategies  so  as  to  ensure  an  ethical  engagement.  Such  readings  
can   help   us   to   refrain   from   the   objectification   or   romanticisation   of   subalterns.  
From  a  Rancièrian  point  of  view,  this  will  only  serve  a  “discourse  of  mastery  and  
the  logic  of  hidden  truths.”961  Spivak  will  become  here  “the  master  who  knows”  
how   to   theorise   the   conditions   that   oppress   subalterns   and   how   to   put   forth   a  
more   situated   articulation   of   particular   subaltern   histories.   And   it   is   these  
particular   deconstructive   readings   that   will   do   justice   (as   much   justice   as   can   be  
done)   to   the   lives   and   struggles   of   specific   subalterns,   especially   third   world  
women.   What   becomes   apparent   here   is   again   a   notion   of   the   “the   way   things  
are”.  It  can  also  be  asked  to  what  extent  this  theorising  serves  to  divide  the  world  
up   into   people   that   can   do   deconstructive   readings   and   communicate   to   others  
the   conditions   of   their   own   oppression   and   domination   and   those   that   must   be  
told   about   their   own   conditions   of   oppression,   or,   those   who   know   how   to  
ethically   engage   with   material   and   subaltern   peoples   and   those   who   do   not?  
Although   Spivak’s   call   for   an   ethical   engagement   with   certain   materials   and  
subaltern   struggles   is   well   intentioned   and   important,   Rancière’s   thought   might  
be   able   to   add   an   extra   element   or   question   when   it   comes   to   the   engagement  
with  social  texts  and  histories:  To  what  extent  it  is  thought  under  the  condition  of  
an  egalitarian  maxim,  in  a  relationship  with  ignorance  so  as  to  open  up  and  create  
new  space  for  equality.962  
 

                                                                                                           
961
Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2000) 2.
962
See Badiou A “The Lessons of Jacques Rancière” in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2000) 48.

191  
 
If   we   had   to   answer   the   question   that   Spivak   poses   in   the   title   of   her   essay  
through   the   lens   of   Rancière   politics,   it   has   to   be   yes:   The   subaltern   can   speak;  
temporarily,   rare   and   localised,   she   can   within   certain   circumstances   tear   words  
from   her   body   in   other   spaces   and   times,   giving   incoherent,   confusing   and  
paradoxical   content   to   names   of   sufficient   generality,   disembodied   from   the  
discourses  that  produce  her.  For  Spivak,  the  subaltern  discursively  formed  and  as  
effect   of   dominant   political   and   economic   discourse   cannot   be   “a   sovereign  
political   subject   in   control   of   her   own   destiny”.963   For   Rancière,   the   subaltern   can  
meaningfully  know  her  own  circumstances  and  conditions  and  have  “voice”  and  it  
is  only  under  the  assumption  that  she  is  in  control  of  her  own  destiny  that  we  can  
“take  seriously  the  equality  that,  at  various  points  in  history,  has  been  declared,  
and  […]  act  relentlessly  from  within  the  sensible  mode  of  being  that  challenges  
the  distribution  of  the  sensible”.964  
 
4.5  Conclusion  
In  reflecting  on  the  notion  of  voice  against  the  background  sketched  in  the  first  
chapter,   what   becomes   significant   in   Spivak’s   analysis   is   her   highlighting   of   the  
discourses   of   masculinity   and   patriarchy.   She   emphasises   that   when   it   comes   to  
the  voice  of  women,  especially  those  in  the  global  South  that  are  impoverished,  
these  discourses  will  have  an  impact  on  whether  women  can  be  heard  politically.  
Women   in   South   African   society   suffer   under   highly   traditional   and   patriarchal  
cultures.   This   becomes   evident   when   considering   the   number   of   rapes  
perpetrated   against   women   and   their   persistent   economic   inequality.   The  
sensible   distributions   of   masculinity   and   patriarchy   point   to   South   African   women  
truly   being   doubly   in   the   shadow.   What   therefore   becomes   valuable   in   Spivak’s  
postulations  in  her  famous  essay  is  the  fact  that  she  highlights  that  when  it  comes  
to   voice,   non-­‐white   women   in   the   post-­‐colonial   settings   experience   a   particular  
set   of   difficulties.   More   recently,   Spivak   has   vocalised   her   criticism   of   global  

                                                                                                           
963
Morton S (2003) 53.
964
De Boever A “Feminism after Rancière: Women in J.M. Coetzee and Jeff Wall”
Transformations (2011) “The Politics of Photography”.  

192  
 
developmental   policies   that   focus   on   women   in   the   so-­‐called   third   world.965  
Spivak   has   warned   against   the   rhetoric   of   United   Nations   declarations   on  
women’s   rights   that   seem   to   confuse   access   to   global   telecommunications   and  
the   right   to   bear   credit   with   women’s   political   empowerment   as   such.   For   Spivak,  
the  rhetoric  on  women’s  rights  paradoxically  overlooks  the  poorest  women  of  the  
South,   the   very   women   the   United   Nations   are   claiming   to   represent.966   It   is  
argued  that  the  imperial  project  today  is  mainly  interested  in  liberating  women  for  
labour,   which   refers   to   “surplus   value   extraction”.967   Human   rights   have   often  
provided   the   alibi   for   this   process.968   Against   the   background   of   South   African  
policy  directives  on  gender  equality  and  women’s  rights  these  arguments  become  
significant.   Spivak’s   analysis,   just   as   Rancière’s   formulation   of   the   police   order,  
helps   to   ask   to   what   extent   the   mechanisms   of   human   rights   and   gender   equality  
contributes   to   the   maintenance   of   the   status   quo,   rather   than   contributing   to   the  
creation   of   spaces   where   voices   can   be   revealed.   Ultimately   Spivak’s   essay   points  
to  the  notion  of  a  gendered  muting  of  political  voice,  denoting  how  the  voices  of  
women  within  certain  conditions  are  effaced  by  the  surrounding  discourses  of  the  
police   order.   She   therefore   also   draws   our   attention   to   the   way   in   which   voice  
hinges  on  the  practices  of  listening,  responding,  interpreting  and  qualifying.  She  
also   underlines   the   dangers   and   problems   with   identity   categories   and   political  
representation   and   the   fact   that   “speaking”   or   voice   already   belongs   to   an  
existing   structure   of   domination   and   it   is   from   within   this   formulation   that   she  
argues  that  the  subaltern  cannot  speak.    
 
As  mentioned  above,  if  one  has  to  answer  the  question  of  whether  the  subaltern  
can   speak   through   the   lens   of   Rancière’s   politics,   the   answer   would   be   yes.   A  
reading  of  Spivak’s  essay  from  Rancière’s  perspective  opens  up  the  question  and  
her   proposed   answer   to   contestation   and   dispute.   My   reading   of   Spivak’s   essay  
through   the   lens   of   Rancière’s   politics   points   to   the   fact   that   the   subaltern   can  

                                                                                                           
965
Morton S (2003) 138-139.
966
As above.
967
Morris R (ed.) (2010) 7.
968
As above.  

193  
 
speak  through  radical  forms  of  equality.  One  of  Spivak’s  important  points  in  her  
essay   is   her   warning   of   the   use   of   master   words   or   identity   categories   that   can  
serve   to   exclude   and   silence   others,   or   erase   the   differences   between   people  
when  a  coherent  political  identity  is  attached  to  groups  of  individuals.  Rancière’s  
formulations  demonstrate  how  certain  so-­‐called  universal  names  for  a  “we”  can  
become  a  heading  under  which  equality  is  declared.  It  can  become  a  name  under  
which  people  can  tear  away  their  bodies  from  police  order  assigned  positions.  The  
relevant   point   is   how   equality   manifests   under   these   headings   or   even   master  
words.   Politics   is   rare,   temporary,   provincial   and   localised   and   rather   than   being  
about   identity   or   the   name   under   which   equality   is   declared,   it   is   about  
disidentification,   the   indetermination   of   identities   and   the   delegitimation   of  
speaking   positions.   For   Spivak   the   presence   of   certain   conditions,   specifically  
imperialist,   masculinist   and   patriarchal   discourses   means   that   these   discourses  
mutually   reinforce   oppression   and   therefore   efface   the   possibility   of   women  
speaking.  From  a  Rancièrian  point  of  view  one  might  react  by  stating  that  when  it  
comes   to   voice,   we   can   only   renegotiate   the   police   order   and   its   distribution   of  
the   sensible   that   we   must   live   in.   However,   the   possibility   of   the   declaration   of  
equality   is   in   gestation   around   us   all   the   time   and   these   declarations   can   have   a  
number  of  effects  on  the  police  order  and  in  certain  cases  mobilise  an  obligation  
to   hear.   The   point   is   not   that   we   can   somehow   be   beyond   or   outside   of   the   limits  
of  dominant  language  or  discourse,  but  rather  that  the  order  of  discourse  can  be  
overturned.  The  dominant  discourse,  handled  correctly  and  manipulated  can  give  
rise   to   paradoxical,   confusing   identities   in   the   in-­‐between   of   names   and   worlds.  
When  it  comes  to  the  possibility  of  voice,  the  question  is  not  simply  about  the  way  
in   which   discourses   work   to   efface   voice,   but   rather   also   about   the  
disembodiment   of   the   subaltern   from   the   discourses   that   produce   her.   Speech  
acts   are   never   merely   ideological   artefacts   or   after   effects   of   the   dominant  
discourse,  they  are  also  acts  that  can  renegotiate  the  situation  in  which  they  are  
enunciated  -­‐   the  way  in  which  words,  bodies,  actions,  places  and  times  combine  
polemically  in  the  precarious  temporality  of  politics  can  renegotiate  the  sensible  
of   a   situation.   From   a   Rancièrian   point   of   view,   the   assertion   that   subaltern  
women   within   certain   conditions   and   junctures   cannot   speak,   is   to   lock   the  

194  
 
subaltern   up   in   a   counter   discourse,   in   a   position   where   she   is   defined   by   the  
discourses   that   surround   her.     The   question   that   becomes   relevant   is   to   what  
extent   such   a   theorising   closes   off   opportunities   for   a   politics   of   equality.   With  
regards  to  the  reading  above,  it  should  be  mentioned  that  Rancière  should  not  be  
read   as   to   suggest   that   if   we   just   look   hard   enough,   politics   and   declarations   of  
equality   could   be   found   everywhere.   This   is   contrary   to   Rancière’s   project.   As  
mentioned,   moments   of   politics   are   rare   for   Rancière.   The   moments   within   which  
the   sensible   is   distributed   do   not   happen   every   day.   However,   it   is   possible.  
Equality  has  been  declared  at  various  points  in  history  and  importantly:  
Political   statements   […]   produce   effects   in   reality.   They   define   models   of  
speech  or  action  but  also  regimes  of  sensible  intensity.  They  draft  maps  of  
the   visible,   trajectories   between   the   visible   and   sayable,   relationships  
between   modes   of   being,   modes   of   saying,   and   modes   of   doing   and   making  
[…]   They   thereby   take   hold   of   unspecified   groups   of   people,   they   widen  
gaps,  open  up  space  for  deviations,  modify  speeds,  the  trajectories  and  the  
ways   in   which   groups   of   people   adhere   to   a   condition,   react   to   situations,  
recognise  their  images.969  
 
Ultimately,  reading  Spivak’s  essay  through  the  lens  of  Rancière’s  politics  results  in  
a  shift  in  the  question  that  she  poses  in  the  title  of  her  essay.  Rather  than  “Can  the  
subaltern   speak?”   Rancière’s   politics   points   to   “If   the   subaltern   could   speak,   what  
would  she  say?”  This  shift  does  not  represent  a  way  of  speaking  for  the  subaltern  
or   coming   to   a   definitive   conclusion   about   what   she   would   say.   But,   rather   than  
closing   off   possibilities   of   voice,   this   question   points   to   the   basic   spirit   of  
Rancière’s  politics  namely,  the  assertion  of  the  rights  to  the  imagination  -­‐   against  
theoretical  limits.  
 
In   the   next   chapter,   I   attempt   to   map   and   trace   some   redistributions   of   the  
sensible.   The   figures   that   I   explore   blur   political   boundaries   and   overturn   their  
distinctive   frameworks.   My   aim   is   to   contemplate   their   significance   and   meaning  
as  a  way  of  thinking  through  political  voice.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                           
969
Rancière J (2004) 30.

195  
 
 CHAPTER  5  
Practicing  a  “Method  of  Equality”:  Reacting  Against  Sensible  
Intelligibility    
 
 
5.1  Introduction  
In  this  chapter  I  discuss  some  examples  of  political  statements  and  historical  and  
literary  figures.  The  discussion  of  these  examples  is  not  only  a  reaction  against  the  
difficulties   surrounding   voice   outlined   in   chapter   one,   but   it   is   also   a   way   of  
considering   further   possibilities   of   voice.   These   examples   can   be   regarded   as  
declarations  of  equality  and  as  reconfigurations  of  the  distribution  of  the  sensible.  
The   examples   that   I   explore   are:   the   figure   of   Olympe   De   Gouges   that   Rancière  
uses  to  illustrate  some  of  his  arguments  on  politics;  the  character  of  Lucy  in  J.M  
Coetzee’s   novel   Disgrace;   the   figure   of   Bhaduri   Bhubaneswari   invoked   in   Gayatri  
Chakravorty   Spivak’s   essay   “Can   the   Subaltern   Speak?”;   and   comments   and  
political   statements   made   by   the   South   African   Shack-­‐dweller’s   Movement.970   I  
read  these  historical  and  literary  figures  and  statements  from  the  perspective  of  
Rancière’s   politics   in   order   to   contemplate   their   meaning   and   significance   as   it  
relates   to   the   idea   of   political   voice.   This   chapter   represents   a   way   of   thinking  
through   the   theory   discussed   in   the   previous   chapters   and   I   also   discuss   these  
figures   so   as   to   expand   certain   lines   of   thinking   or   to   form   new   relations   of   the  
visible  and  sayable.  Writing  itself,  as  mentioned,  is  a  way  of  expanding  perception  
and   these   discussions   therefore   become   a   way   of   disrupting   certain   forms   of  
organisation   or   they   can   also   be   considered   as   a   way   of   making   use   of   a  
democratic  writing  practice  as  explained  in  the  chapter  three.971  I  also  employ  or  
practice   a   “method   of   equality”   along   the   lines   of   Rancière’s   description   of  
politics.  Before  ensuing  with  the  exploration  of  the  literary  characters  and  figures,  
I  shed  some  light  on  what  a  “method  of  equality”  entails.  
 
                                                                                                           
970
Rancière J “Who is The Subject of the Rights of Man?” South Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 103,
JM Coetzee Disgrace (1999), Abahlali baseMondjolo (South African Shack-dweller’s
Movement) (See Abahlali.org. (accessed 28/12/2014)), Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L
(1988) 313.
971
See section 3.4 above.

196  
 
In  her  discussion  of  Rancière’s  argument  for  a  democratic  research  practice  in  the  
context  of  methodological  debates  in  the  social  sciences,  Caroline  Pelletier  gives  
some  direction  of  what  a  method  of  equality  might  look  like.972  She  indicates  how  
Rancière’s   writings   frame   research   as   a   particular   kind   of   enterprise   namely,   to  
make   visible   what   has   been   denied   and   to   argue   with   widely   used   systems   of  
categorisation   in   order   to   enact   equality.973   In   his   writings   Rancière   aims   to  
defend  the  possibility  of  politics  on  the  basis  of  the  equality  of  speaking  beings.974  
Pelletier   explains   that   Rancière   has   critiqued   the   social   sciences   by   referring   to  
what   he   calls   the   “aesthetics   of   knowledge”.975   He   discusses   the   ways   in   which  
discourses   of   knowledge   or   discourses   that   claim   to   know   the   world   (including  
research   accounts),   constitute   themselves   as   coherent,   valid   and   credible  

                                                                                                           
972
Pelletier C International Journal of Research and Method in Education (2009) 253-248.
Published online 10 November 2009 available at Taylor and Francis Online-
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17437270903259741?journalCode=cwse20. The pages
referenced are the pages as cited within the online publication. Pelletier reviews the
significance of Rancière’s work for methodological debates in the social sciences. She
explores the implications of framing methodology as an aesthetic endeavor, rather than as
the applied technique of research. For Pelletier, what is at stake in this distinction is the
means by which research intervenes in a social order and how it assumes political
significance. Pelletier situates Rancière’s argument for a democratic research practice
organised around a “method of equality” in relation to openly ideological feminist
ethnography.
973
Pelletier C (2009) 4.
974
Pelletier C (2009) 3. Rancière’s position here, as Pelletier notes, is not relativistic in the
sense of all claims to knowledge being equally valid. It is rather a defense of the possibility of
politics on the basis of the equality of speaking beings. Making this equality visible means
interrogating the basis on which discourses legitimate themselves as epistemologically
superior to one another. Pelletier explains further that this is the basis of Rancière’s
accusation against the paradigm of social science, which defines its object of study in terms
of its social attributes (gender, ethnicity, occupation and so on) or position in the social order
(Pelletier C (2009) 3). This order is unequal precisely because it is an ordering. Therefore,
Pelletier explains, by defining its object in terms of its social attributes, social science restricts
its object of study to its social location and effectively denies the possibility of collectivity on
the basis of a lack of social attributes or on the basis of equality as Rancière defines it. See
Pelletier C (2009) 3. So-called “reflexive” social science discourses that address the problems
of “critical theory” by being aware of and announcing and recognising their own location in
the social order, simply reconfirms (from the perspective of Rancière) its hegemony, or its lack
of difference from itself. The solution is not to reflect on the sociological location of one’s
own position or scientific discourse, but rather by challenging the “equivalence established
between discourse and social location in both the object and the subject of study”. See
Pelletier C (2009) 3.
975
See Rancière J “Thinking between disciplines: An aesthetics of knowledge” Parrhesia
(2006) 1-12.

197  
 
accounts   in   opposition   to   “ignorance   or   forms   of   ignorance”.976   As   Pelletier  
explains,   Rancière   puts   forth   the   following   question:   When   knowledge   is  
proffered,  what  form  of  ignorance  is  thereby  produced?977  Pelletier  asks  further:  
When  social  science  research  accounts  claim  to  generate  scientific  knowledge  of  
social   groups,   how   do   they   generate   a   category   of   research   accounts   that   are  
non-­‐scientific?978  What  role  is  therefore  ascribed  to  ignorance  or  non-­‐science  and  
under   what   condition   is   ignorance/non-­‐science   transformed   into   knowledge?979  
Pelletier  elucidates:  
“[I]gnorance”   here   is   not   clearly   defined   in   terms   of   the   bad   thing   which  
science  fights  to  eradicate,  but  is  instead  treated  as  a  necessary  corollary  of  
knowledge   production   insofar   as   knowledge   implies   a   certain   relation   to  
ignorance.980  
 
In   this   regard,   Rancière   refers   to   two   traditions   that   created   the   occasion   for   him  
to   develop   his   own   working   method   against   traditional   knowledge   production  
and  research.  A  central  question  to  both  of  these  traditions,  as  Pelletier  explains,  
is   how   can   someone   at   a   particular   time   and   place   perceive   their   world?981   One  
way  of  answering  this  question  is  in  relation  to  ideology  as  described  in  Marxism,  
which   refers   to   a   set   of   false   beliefs.   This   is   the   first   tradition.   I   elaborated   on  
Rancière’s  objections  in  this  regard  in  the  second  chapter  of  this  research.  In  this  
section,  I  focus  on  the  second  tradition,  or  second  way  of  answering  the  question.  
The   second   tradition   refers   to   as   a   set   of   practices,   which,   post-­‐Althusser,   bring  
“about   false   judgments,   perceptions,   sensibilities   and   actions”.982   Pelletier  
explains   that   in   the   latter   tradition   “false”   does   not   mean   untrue,   but   rather  
refers  to  that  which  sustains  domination  or  dispossession.983  This  distribution  of  
domination,   which   Rancière   traces   from   German   ideology   to   Pierre   Bourdieu’s  
entire   corpus,   sees   that   people   are   characterised   as   having   only   certain  

                                                                                                           
976
Pelletier C (2009) 5.
977
As above.
978
As above.
979
As above.
980
As above.
981
As above.
982
As above.
983
As above.

198  
 
perceptions.984   These   perceptions   are   determined   by   their   place   in   society   and   by  
their   incapacity   to   “see”   or   to   name/signify/know   their   place   within   the   social  
order.  In  other  words,  “the  perceptions  are  determined  by  their  ignorance  of  the  
means  and  fact  of  their  domination”.985  Pelletier  explains  that  within  this  critical  
tradition   what   is   produced   is   precisely   the   ignorance   of   domination   and   its  
corresponding   reasons.986   Pelletier   notes   that   what   the   social   order   therefore  
produces  is  ignorance  of  how  the  social  order  really,  in  essence,  works.  To  make  
this  claim  means  that  one  must  remove  oneself  from  that  social  order  or  extricate  
oneself   from   the   source   of   ignorance.   This   is   how   Rancière   reads   Bourdieu’s  
concept   of   reflexivity   for   example;   it   partitions   knowledge   from   ignorance   by  
placing   knowledge   as   that   which   is   in   difference   to   the   social   order   and   then  
claims   ignorance   as   the   object   of   knowledge.987   Pelletier   explains   that   Rancière  
treats  Bourdieu’s  discourse  as  “performative”  rather  than  descriptive  in  the  sense  
that  “ignorance  or  the  logic  of  practice  which  Bourdieu’s  discourse  posits,  exists  
in  the  first  instance  as  a  product  of  that  discourse”.988  This  type  of  figuration  of  

                                                                                                           
984
Pelletier explains that the second tradition that Rancière seeks to counter focuses not so
much on the incorporation of domination as on the finding of “a true and authentic popular
culture defined in terms of its autonomy from dominant values”. See Pelletier C (2009) 6. The
target of his readings in this tradition is social histories produced in the 1970’s and 1980’s,
which conceptualised a “working class culture in terms of resistance or agency”. See Pelletier
C (2009) 6. Celebrations of popular authenticity, he suggests, function as injunctions that
“popular people” should remain authentic to their own culture and by implication avoid
becoming tainted by middle-class “intellectualism”- or what he calls “exclusion by homage”.
See Rancière J (2004) xxiv. Pelletier explains that Rancière’s argument here suggests that
when “intellectual” readings by “popular people” are classified as “popular ventriloquism”
what is effectively claimed is the incapacity of “popular people” to think “authentically” (See
Pelletier C (2009) 6). Popular people are therefore granted their “own” domain of knowledge
and this is all for the better to preserve the domain of “intellectual knowledge” from
intrusions by non-scientists. See Pelletier C (2009) 6. Popular knowledge is therefore defined
in opposition to science. In other words, “it is constituted by ignorance of science”. See
Pelletier C (2009) 6. See also Rancière J (2004) xxiv and Bourdieu P (1991). As Davis explains,
Rancière’s dispute with Bourdieu’s work on pedagogy and aesthetics is extremely involved.
See Davis O (2010) 22-25. Rancière reacts against the sociologist’s self-interest and he is at
times unforgiving in his commentary in this regard. I do not explain his engagement with
Bourdieu here as it goes beyond the scope of explaining a method of equality. For a general
discussion on Rancière’s engagement with Bourdieu, see Davis O (2010) 22-25.  
985
Pelletier C (2009) 5.
986
As above.
987
As above.
988
As above.

199  
 
domination   creates   a   domain   of   knowledge   from   which   the   ignorant   are,   by  
definition,  excluded.  Pelletier  explains  that:  
Rancière   reads   the   modelling   of   ineluctable   social   reproduction   in  
Bourdieu’s   discourse   not   as   a   description   of   the   state   of   affairs,   but   as   a  
performative   securitisation   of   a   domain   of   knowledge.   Sociological  
discourse   can   safely   critique   domination   whilst   “knowing”   it   can   never  
change,  since  this  knowing  is  precisely  of  other  people’s  ignorance.989  
 
Rancière’s   concern   is   that   this   tradition   claims   knowledge   of   “the   poor”   on   the  
basis   of   “the   poor’s”   ignorance.   Or   as   phrased   by   Ross,   Rancière   points   to   the  
fact   that   the   scientist   gives   himself   the   task   “of   speaking   for   those   who’s  
presumed   ignorance   grants   [him   his]   domain”.990   This   notion   is   of   course  
captured   by   the   title   of   Rancière’s   book   The   Philosopher   and   His   Poor.   For  
Rancière,   such   theorisation   is   effected   in   the   alignment   between   sensibilities  
(judgments,  perceptions,  ways  of  doing,  being,  seeing,  saying)  and  social  location.  
Therefore,  as  Pelletier  explains  further,  what  is  claimed  is  that  people  in  a  social  
location  can  only  “be”  in  a  way  that  is  determined  by  their  social  location.991  This  
ordering  establishes  “stable  relations  between  states  of  the  body  and  the  modes  
of   perception   and   signification   which   correspond   to   them.”992   Pelletier   explains  
further   that   this   ordering   sets   the   scene   for   a   dramatisation   that   ensures   that   a  
certain   location   coincides   with   a   certain   type   of   thought.993   As   we   have   seen   in  
the   previous   chapters,   Rancière   rejects   notions   of   determined   locales,   positions  
and  times  that  correspond  with  specific  bodies  and  voices.  
 
The   “aesthetics   of   knowledge”   refers   to   the   way   in   which   discourse  
performatively  divides  the  world  into    
people   who   speak   and   people   who   merely   ventriloquize,   people   who   can  
think   the   social   order   and   people   who   can   only   obey   its   logic,   people   who  
can   contribute   to   discussions   about   how   society   should   be   organised   and  
people  who  are  too  caught  up  in  their  own  economic  occupation/culture  to  
apply  themselves  authentically  to  the  affairs  of  society.994    

                                                                                                           
989
As above.
990
Ross K “Introduction” in Rancière J (1991) xviii.
991
Pelletier C (2009) 5.
992
Rancière J Parrhesia (2006) 9.
993
Pelletier C (2009) 6.
994
Pelletier C (2009) 7.

200  
 
  
Pelletier  explains  that  “knowing”  a  situation  of  domination  can  therefore  become  
a  way  of  participating  in  it.995  What  is  submitted  in  this  distribution  of  knowledge  
and   ignorance   is   the   idea   that   the   objects   of   science   (the   poor)   can   do   nothing  
else   than   that   which   has   already   been   ordered   by   science   -­‐   a   science   which,   as  
Pelletier   explains,   is   precisely   a   knowledge   of   domination.996   Knowledge   is  
therefore   aesthetic   in   that   a   research-­‐based   account   dramatises   the   world   in   a  
particular   way.997   It   constitutes   an   act,   a   way   of   configuring   and   dividing   the  
domain  of  the  sensible.  Knowledge/scientific  statements  produce  effects  that    
draft   maps   of   the   visible,   trajectories   between   the   visible   and   the   sayable,  
relationships  between  modes  of  being,  modes  of  saying  and  modes  of  doing  
and  making.998  
 
The  question  that  arises  is  how  one  is  suppose  to  practice  equality  in  one’s  own  
writing   without   establishing   this   type   of   relationship   between   ignorance   and  
knowledge.  Firstly,  as  Pelletier  explains,  the  verification  of  equality  has  little  to  do  
with   “respecting”   the   words   of   others   or   trusting   their   rationality   or   even  
celebrating  their  existence.999  It  is  therefore  not  a  matter  of  being  faithful  to  the  
content.  It  is  about  declassifying  words  and  re-­‐ordering  the  way  in  which  words  
take   on   meaning   through   a   category   or   body   to   which   they   are   assigned   in   the  
social  order.1000  This  includes  the  time  and  place  of  utterances  and  the  activity  to  
which  these  utterances  are  related.  Pelletier  elucidates:  
It   is   about   reading/producing   words   against   the   guarantees,   or   modes   of  
legitimation,   offered   by   the   social   location   of   the   speaker.   One   can   for  
instance  treat  scientific  statements  as  literary  prose,  opinion  as  philosophy,  
and   historical   words   as   speaking   in   the   present,   in   the   texture   of   the  
historian’s  narration.1001    
 
                                                                                                           
995
As above.
996
As above. It should be noted that Rancière’s disagreement with social history and
sociology is not with the quality of their research. Pelletier notes that he doesn’t highlight
shortcomings or contradictions in how some researches go by collecting data. It is rather the
way in which a discipline positions its own discourse in relation to other discourses and the
object of study. Pelletier C (2009) 9.
997
Pelletier C (2009) 9.
998
See Rancière J (2004) 39.
999
Pelletier C (2009) 8.
1000
As above
1001
As above.

201  
 
Verifying   equality   therefore   involves   equality   as   action,   rather   than   as   the  
consequence  of  that  action.1002  The  question  that  Rancière  puts  forth  according  to  
Pelletier   is   what   makes   one’s   research   practice   political,   or   what   can   we   do   in   the  
context  of  research  practices  in  order  to  open  up  the  possibilities  of  equality?  As  
noted   by   Pelletier,   in   some   ways,   not   very   much.1003   One   can   enact   equality   in  
one’s  own  writing.1004  This  would  involve  reconfiguring  the  field  of  knowledge  to  
undo   the   partitions   that   divide   people   into   territories   of   competence   and  
territories   by   which   people   are   assigned   certain   social   attributes.1005   Equality,  
therefore,   has   to   be   figured   differently.   Rather   than   a   state   to   be   worked  
towards,  Pelletier  elucidates  that  it  becomes  in  Rancière’s  politics  a  disruption  of  
inequality.1006   Verifying   equality   can   also   be   concerned   with   “valorising”   certain  
actions   namely,   those   actions   that   are   characterised   by   the   way   in   which   they  
transgress   the   boundaries   of   categories.1007   Pelletier   notes   that   it   is   about   making  
prominent   in   one’s   own   analytical   strategy   those   discursive   practices   which   lays  
the  contingency  of  inequality  bare  and  which  demonstrate  and  reconfigure  ways  
of   doing,   being   and   saying.1008   In   the   section   below   I   discus   Olympe   de   Gouges  
that   Rancière   may   be   said   to   “valorise”.   From   there   I   attempt   to   valorise   or  
describe  certain  characters  that  transgress  boundaries  and  disrupt  inequality  with  
equality  in  the  South  African  context.  
 
5.2  Olympe  de  Gouges  
In  the  context  of  his  article  “Who  is  the  Subject  of  the  Rights  of  Man?”  Rancière  
discusses   the   figure   of   Olympe   de   Gouges.1009   De   Gouges   was   a   woman   who  

                                                                                                           
1002
Pelletier C (2009) 9.
1003
As above.
1004
As above.
1005
As above.
1006
As above.
1007
As above.
1008
As above.
1009
See Rancière J South Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 297. In this article, Rancière discusses De
Gouges in relation to a critique of Hannah Arendt. In her influential discussion of the plight of
stateless people in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) Arendt invokes “the right to have
rights” as the one true human right. Arendt observes that “the rights of man” or human rights
proved to be a mere illusion in the inter-war period where European states was forced to deal

202  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
with refugees who had been deprived of citizenship and who were for all intense and
purposes stateless. They did not belong to the community that they fled from and neither to
the community that they fled too. The idea of human rights therefore came apart at the very
moment when they were most needed, for it is only by virtue of citizenship that one could say
to have a claim to rights. For Arendt, these people were “people that lost all other qualities
and specific relationships except that they were still human”. See Arendt (1951) 297-198. The
plight of stateless people revealed that the modern conception of human dignity was a mere
abstraction. For Arendt, to live outside of a political community amounted to a deprived form
of existence in which individuals were thrown back on the giveness of their natural situation.
Andrew Schaap explains that in the exceptional inter-war period in which stateless people
had nothing left to appeal to except their rights as human beings, they were barely
recognisable as human. See Schaap A “Enacting the right to have rights: Jacques Rancière’s
critique of Hannah Arendt” European Journal of Political Theory (2011) 23-45 at 23. Schaap
explains that as a consequence of this experience, we became aware of a primordial human
right, a right more important than the rights to justice and freedom, namely, the right to
belong to a political community, which amounts to the right to politics. Schaap A European
Journal of Political Theory (2011) 23. Therefore, for Arendt, what was at stake were not
particular rights, but rather membership to a political community. Arendt’s analysis of the
perplexities of the rights of man or human rights provoked widespread debate in
contemporary political theory. In “Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?” Rancière
criticises the problematic that Arendt established. For Arendt, the deprivation of citizenship
to a particular community means that a person has no means of redress; there is no basis on
which to claim “the right to have rights”. One is outside of legal structures, outside of politics
and outside of humanity because of the fact that for Arendt it is only by virtue of historical
institutions that we can be said to be human. Rancière argues that Arendt depoliticises
human rights as Arendt identifies the human with mere life and the citizen with the good life.
Rancière J South Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 297-299. For Rancière, Arendt establishes an aporia
when it comes to rights, as there is no basis, according to her, on which one can claim the
right to have rights. Rancière J South Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 298. This aporia is for Rancière
a product of the ontological presuppositions on which her analysis relies rather than being a
defining aspect of the actual experience of statelessness. See Rancière J South Atlantic
Quarterly (2004) 297. Rancière insist against Arendt (and her appropriation of Aristotle) that it
is a political mistake to deduce a conception of what it means to lead a fully human life from
an understanding of the human as a speaking animal. See Schaap A European Journal of
Political Theory (2011) 23-24. For Rancière, as discussed earlier, what counts as human speech
and as animal noise is a political question from the outset. Rancière rejects Arendt’s
conception of the political as a “world-disclosing public action through which individuals
reveal their humanness in the presence of equals”. See Schaap A European Journal of
Political Theory (2011) 23. Instead Rancière conceives of the political as the staging of a scene
of dissensus in which those who lack speech make themselves heard as political subjects. For
Rancière, the human in human rights does not correspond to a form of life. The human is a
litigious name, another heading under which equality can be confirmed. See Rancière J South
Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 299-304. Schaap explains that Arendt understands ordinary rights as
a precondition for politics since they institutionalise an artificial equality that is constitutive of
a public sphere, which is the sphere that politics takes place in. See Schaap A European
Journal of Political Theory (2011) 23-24. This is why the right to have rights amounts to the
right to politics. For Rancière, politics is contesting the political, it is about contesting what is
perceived as political and what is not, who has speech and who doesn’t, in what place and
time: “[…] Arendt views ‘the human’ in human rights ontologically as a life deprived of
politics, Rancière views ‘the human’ polemically as the dismissal of any difference between

203  
 
during  the  French  Revolution  famously  stated  that  if  women  were  entitled  to  go  
to   the   scaffold,   they   were   entitled   to   go   to   the   assembly.1010     Women   could   be  
(and  were)  sentenced  to  death  as  enemies  of  the  Revolution  and  De  Gouges  used  
this   point   to   demonstrate   that   there   was   at   least   one   instance   where   women’s  
private   life   was   political.   Rancière   explains   that   “equal-­‐born   women   were   not  
equal   born   citizens”   because   they   could   not   fit   what   was   deemed   the   purity   of  
political  life  of  the  time.1011  Women  belonged  to  the  domesticated  and  the  public  
life   and   common   good   had   to   be   kept   apart   from   the   activities,   feelings   and  
interests   of   the   private   life.1012   De   Gouges’   point   was   that   if   women   could   lose  
their   lives,   sentenced   to   death   as   enemies   of   the   state   out   of   public   judgment  
based   on   political   reasons,   then   their   private   life   (their   life   doomed   to   death)   was  
political.  De  Gouges  was  the  author  of  the  text  The  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  
Women  and  the  Female  Citizen.  Rancière  states:    
If,  under  the  guillotine,  they  were  as  equal,  so  to  speak,  “as  men”,  they  had  
the   right   to   the   whole   of   equality,   including   equal   participation   to   political  
life.1013    
 
He   further   explains   that   the   lawmakers   of   the   time   could   not   even   hear   this.  
Nevertheless,  it  could  be  enacted  in  the  construction  of  a  scene  of  dissensus  and  
he  states  that:    
A   dissensus   is   not   a   conflict   of   interests,   opinions,   or   values;   it   is   a   division  
put   in   the   “common   sense”:   a   dispute   about   what   is   given,   about   the   frame  
in   which   we   see   something   as   given   [...]   This   is   what   I   call   dissensus:   putting  
two  worlds  in  one  and  the  same  world.1014    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
those who are qualified to participate in politics and those who are not”. See Schaap A
European Journal of Political Theory (2011) 23. Therefore, as Schaap further notes, for Arendt,
the sphere of implementation of rights is the public sphere or the sphere of citizenship. For
Rancière, politics is a process, the process of the enactment of equality and the sphere where
it takes place or when it takes place can be the very question of politics- the time and space
of politics is a political question. See Schaap A European Journal of Political Theory (2011) 23.
Politics is about the line that is drawn between the spheres of politics and so-called other
spheres. Politics is about the activity that brings into question where politics can take place
and by who it can be practiced. For a thorough and insightful discussion of Rancière’s
engagement with Arendt, see Schaap A European Journal of Political Theory (2011) 32-45.
1010
Rancière J The South Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 303.
1011
As above.
1012
As above.
1013
Rancière J The South Atlantic Quarterly 304.
1014
As above. I have quoted this passage before, but quote it again so as to properly explain
Rancière’s point with regards to De Gouges.

204  
 
  
A   political   subject   for   Rancière   is,   as   mentioned,   a   subject   with   the   capacity   to  
stage   a   scene   of   dissensus.1015   As   a   woman   De   Gouges   had   no   qualification   to  
make  the  claims  that  she  did.  She  was  not  a  party  with  equal  membership  to  the  
political  table.  Yet,  she  made  the  claims.  She  therefore  presupposed  her  equality  
in  making  political  claims.  De  Gouges  becomes  here  the  demos,  representing  the  
part   that   has   no   part   according   to   the   police   order   or   according   to   the   sensible  
distribution   of   women   as   private   beings.   By   constructing   a   scene   of   dissensus  
(making   political   statements   which   she   is   not   qualified   to   do   and   authoring   the  
declaration)   she   challenges   the   overall   distribution   of   the   sensible,   the  
distribution   of   roles,   places   and   tasks.   De   Gouges   puts   together   what   Rancière  
calls   “a   relation   of   inclusion   and   exclusion”.1016   She   is   excluded   from   political  
participation,   yet   included   as   she   can   lose   her   life   on   political   grounds.   De   Gouges  
therefore   demonstrates   and   highlights   a   contradiction   within   the   dominant  
political   discourse   or   framework   of   the   given.   For   Rancière,   De   Gouges   was   not  
merely  making  a  claim  for  inclusion.  Her  claim  rather  embodied  the  contradictions  
of   the   police   order   arrangements   that   exclude   her.   She   mobilises   this  
contradiction  within  the  dominant  discourse  of  the  time  and  handles  the  knot  of  
this  contradiction,  disrupting  the  police  order  and  illuminating  its  contingency.    
 
It   should   be   mentioned   here   that   although   De   Gouges   makes   her   claim   under   the  
heading  of  “women”  and  she  does  this  as  a  woman  and  to  the  ends  of  women,  
this   “identity”   operates   on   two   different   levels:   woman   is   both   associated   with  
the  police  order  that  she  is  challenging  and  also  with  the  position  that  marks  this  
challenge.1017   It   is   associated   with   both   the   distribution   of   the   sensible   and   also  
with   its   redistribution.   It   is   associated   with   the   world   where   women   are   not  
qualified  to  participate  in  politics  and  where  there  are  roles  and  tasks  and  places  

                                                                                                           
1015
As above.
1016
As above.
1017
See Jooste Y “Thinking two worlds into one: The ‘distribution of the sensible’ and
women’s renegotiation” Stellenbosch Law Review (2013) 528-537.

205  
 
designated  to  them  and  the  world  where  they  are  equal.1018  De  Gouges  can  here  
be   located   as   being   in-­‐between   identities   and   identifying   with   the   impossible  
namely,   a   category   of   woman   that   does   not   yet   exist.   It   can   be   said   that   she  
disidentifies  herself  from  the  category  of  woman  as  understood  and  seen  within  
the  police  order  namely,  a  privatised,  non-­‐political  designation  and  demonstrates  
through  the  process  of  subjectification  (through  declaring  a  wrong  and  staging  a  
contradiction)   another   category   of   woman,   identifying   with   the   impossible  
somewhere  in-­‐between:  
It   is   the   measure   of   a   relationship   between   a   particular   social   group  
identifiable  within  the  order  of  the  police  (woman  as  a  social  category  with  
the   expected   set   of   tasks   to   perform   and   roles   to   assume)   and   the   ability   of  
its  name  to  be  appropriated  by  anyone,  the  ability  of  its  name  becoming  the  
inscription   of   a   wrong   (women   as   the   subject   of   a   political   struggle   as   the  
name  with  which  the  declaration  of  a  wrong  takes  place).1019  
 
As  Arsenjuk  notes,  for  Rancière,  politics  lives  off  the  difference  between  the  name  
as   a   rigid   designation   of   a   social   entity   and   everything   that   goes   along   with   it   and  
a  name  as  an  anonym  that  can  stand  for  the  equality  of  everyone.1020    
 
Rancière   uses   De   Gouge   in   order   to   show   how   the   relationship   between   the  
universal  and  particular  can  be  divided  anew.1021  Women  were  denied  the  rights  of  
citizens   on   account   of   the   principle   that   states   that   citizenship   is   part   of   the  
sphere   of   universality   while   woman’s   activities   belonged   to   the   sphere   of   the  
particular   of   domestic   life.   Women   occupy   the   sphere   of   the   particular   and   as   a  
result   they   could   not   be   included   in   political   life,   the   sphere   of   the   universal.  
Against   this   statement   De   Gouges   made   her   argument   about   the   scaffold.   Her  
argumentation,   for   Rancière,   blurred   the   boundaries   separating   two   realms   by  
setting   up   a   universality   entailed   in   the   life   of   the   particular.   On   the   scaffold  

                                                                                                           
1018
As above.  
1019
Arsenjuk L “On Jacques Rancière” Fronesis (2005) 19-20. Published online 2007/03/05 and
available at Eurozine Journals www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-01-01-arsenjuk-en.html
(accessed 28-12-2014).
1020
As above.
1021
Rancière J (2010) 56-57.

206  
 
everyone   was   equal:   women   were   “as   men”.1022   Men   and   woman   could   be  
sentenced  to  death  for  treason  out  of  public  reasons:  
This  is  what  a  democratic  process  entails:  creating  forms  of  subjectivation  in  
the   interval   between   two   identities;   creating   cases   of   universality   by   playing  
on  the  double  relation  between  the  universal  and  the  particular.1023    
 
De   Gouges’   declaration   about   the   scaffold   can   be   seen   as   a   poetic   linguistic  
device.   The   poetry   or   invention   is   within   the   making   of   new   connections   and  
relations.   She   connects   the   life   of   the   body   that   can   die   on   grounds   of   political  
reasons  with  the  right  to  participate  in  politics.  In  this  instance  she  connects  the  
private  with  the  public  and  the  public  with  the  private,  dividing  these  two  notions  
anew   and   blurring   and   confusing   the   boundaries   between   them.   Her  
configuration  of  the  scaffold  and  the  private  life  further  indicates  a  demonstration  
of   an   argument   as   well   as   the   world   in   which   that   argument   can   count-­‐   she  
invents   a   way   in   which   to   present   a   logical   argument   by   demonstrating   in   what  
way  women  might  be  included  in  the  public  life.  In  the  text  “Who  is  the  Subject  of  
the   Rights   of   Man?”,   Rancière   makes   an   interesting   point   with   regards   to   the  
notion   of   rights   that   is   worth   discussing.1024   He   demonstrates   how   they   can   be  
used   to   stage   a   scene   of   dissensus.   He   makes   the   following   point   with   regards   to  
the  so-­‐called  “subject  of  rights”:    
The   subject   of   rights   is   the   subject,   or   more   accurately   the   process   of  
subjectivization,   that   bridges   the   interval   between   two   forms   of   existence  
of  those  rights.1025    
 
The  two  forms  of  existence  that  he  refers  to  are  the  following:  Firstly,  rights  are  
written   rights   or   inscriptions   of   a   community   as   free   and   equal.1026   They   are  
incorporated   within   constitutions   and   international   treaties   and   standards.   As  
such,   Ranciere   states,   these   rights   are   not   just   abstract   ideals   far   from   a   given  
situation.1027   They   are   part   of   the   distribution   of   the   sensible.   What   is   therefore  
given  to  us  is  not  only  a  situation  of  inequality,  rights  are  also  an  inscription  or  a  

                                                                                                           
1022
As above.
1023
As above.
1024
Rancière J South Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 302-303.
1025
Rancière J South Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 302.
1026
As above.
1027
As above.

207  
 
“form  of  visibility  of  equality”.1028  Secondly,  the  rights  of  “Man”  are  the  rights  of  
those  who  make  something  of  them-­‐  of  this  or  that  inscription.  They  are  the  rights  
of  those  who  use  their  rights  to  build  cases  for  verification  of  the  power  of  that  
inscription.1029  For  Rancière,  it  is  not  only  a  matter  of  checking  whether  a  situation  
confirms  or  denies  those  rights:  “The  point  is  about  what  confirmation  or  denial  
means”.1030   “Man”   and   “citizen”   and   “human”   are   not   designated   collection   of  
individuals.   They   are   political   names   or   surplus   names   that   set   out   a   question   or   a  
dispute   about   who   is   included   in   their   count   and   accordingly,   freedom   and  
equality   are   not   predicates   belonging   to   definite   subjects,   they   are   political  
predicates   or   predicates   that   can   open   up   a   dispute   about   what   they   exactly  
entail   and   whom   they   concern   in   which   cases.1031   Rancière   is   not   referring   here   to  
a   court   process   or   going   through   the   necessary   legal   procedures   in   order   to   get   a  
specific  outcome.  The  point  is  that  rights  can  be  politicised  or  made  political.  They  
are   part   of   the   current   distribution   of   the   sensible   and   as   such   they   can   be  
mobilised   in   a   process   of   subjectivisation.   They   can   open   up   a   dispute   or   a  
dissensus  about  what  they  mean  and  who  should  be  included  in  their  count.  It  is  a  
standard   inscribed   within   the   community,   not   as   an   ideal   or   as   something   to  
measure  our  progress  against;  in  Rancière’s  terms  it  is  rather  an  example  that  can  
be   utilised   in   the   verification   of   equality.   The   tailor’s   strike   of   1833,   discussed   in  
chapter   two,   is   such   an   example.1032   The   strikers   claimed   that   either   their   working  
conditions   should   change   or   the   French   Charter   of   Rights   should   be   changed   to  
something   like   “not   all   the   French   people   are   equal   before   the   law”.   Rights   can  
therefore   be   employed   to   make   new   connections   or   to   fashion   linguistic  
formulations.   De   Gouges   made   such   new   connections   -­‐   she   connected   the  
particular   with   the   universal,   the   public   with   the   private   and   the   scaffold   with   the  
assembly,   thereby   blurring   the   lines,   mobilising   contradictions   and   putting   two  
worlds   into   one.   The   next   figure   that   I   discuss   is   the   figure   of   Lucy   in   J.M  

                                                                                                           
1028
Rancière J South Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 303.
1029
As above.
1030
As above.
1031
As above.
1032
See section 2.3.5 above.  

208  
 
Coetzee’s   novel   Disgrace.   Lucy   may   be   said   to   live   out   the   idea   of   putting   two  
worlds  into  one.  
 
5.3  Lucy  
In  J.M.  Coetzee’s  novel  Disgrace,  Lucy  is  a  white  lesbian  woman  who  lives  in  the  
Eastern  Cape  province  of  South  Africa.1033  Lucy  makes  a  living  by  selling  flowers  at  
the   local   market   and   by   taking   care   of   other   people’s   pets.   In   the   novel,   David  
Lurie,  Lucy’s  father  comes  to  stay  with  her  after  he  has  resigned  from  his  teaching  
job  in  Cape  Town  because  of  a  charges  involving  sexual  harassment.  One  morning  
Lucy  and  David  take  the  dogs  that  are  in  Lucy’s  care  out  for  a  walk.  They  walk  pass  
two   black   men   and   a   boy   and   when   they   get   back   to   the   farmhouse,   the   same  
two   men   and   boy   are   waiting   for   them.   The   men   claim   that   they   come   from  
Erasmuskraal,  where  there  is  no  electricity  or  water  and  they  ask  if  they  may  make  
a  phone-­‐call  as  the  sister  of  one  of  them  is  having  a  baby.  Lucy  allows  one  of  the  
men  into  the  house,  but  when  the  other  immediately  follows  without  invitation,  
David   knows   that   something   is   wrong.   David   makes   his   way   into   the   house  
through   the   kitchen   as   the   front   door   is   locked   and   there   he   receives   a   hard   blow  
to   the   head.   The   men   lock   him   in   the   bathroom   and   while   he   is   locked   up,   they  
rape   Lucy.   They   are   robbed   and   all   except   one   of   Lucy’s   dogs   are   killed.   Before  
taking   off,   the   men   douse   David   with   methylated   spirits   and   set   him   on   fire.   He  
manages  to  extinguish  the  flames  with  water  from  the  toilet  bowl.  
 
In   the   aftermath   of   the   horrific   attack,   a   disagreement   develops   between   David  
and   Lucy.   David   wants   to   call   the   police   and   tell   them   what   happened.   Lucy  
agrees,  but  she  does  so  on  the  condition  that  David  tells  his  side  of  the  story  and  
                                                                                                           
1033
JM Coetzee Disgrace (1999). As Arne De Boever notes, much has been written on
Disgrace, especially within the branch of literary criticism called “ethical criticism”. Some of
this work has revolved around the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and the challenge
to Levinas’ ethics that Disgrace puts forth. As De Boever notes, it can be argued that in the
novel, and arguably within Coetzee’s work in general, women occupy a problematic position.
De Boever attempts to read Lucy through Rancière’s politics so as to cast another light on the
aesthetic politics of Disgrace. See De Boever A “Feminism after Rancière: women in JM
Coetzee and Jeff Wall” Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture (2011) “Lucy’s Politics”
available at www.transformationsjournal .org/journalissue_19/article_032.shtml. See also
Jooste Y Stellenbosch Law Review (2013) 528-537.

209  
 
only  his.  She  will  tell  the  police  what  happened  to  her.  The  police  take  Lucy  and  
David’s   testimonies   and   during   hers,   Lucy   does   not   mention   anything   about   the  
rape.  This  confuses  and  infuriates  David:    
Lucy,  my  dearest,  why  don’t  you  want  to  tell?  It  was  a  crime  […]  You  did  not  
choose  to  be  the  object.  You  are  an  innocent  party  […]  Can  I  guess?  Are  you  
trying   to   remind   me   of   something?   […]   Of   what   women   undergo   at   the  
hands  of  men?1034    
 
The  implicit  reference  to  his  trail  with  regards  to  the  sexual  harassment  scandal  in  
Cape  Town  invokes  a  harsh  answer  from  Lucy:  
This   has   nothing   to   do   with   you,   David.   You   want   to   know   why   I   have   not  
laid  charge  with  the  police.  I  will  tell  you,  as  long  as  you  agree  not  to  raise  
the   subject   again.   The   reason   is   that,   as   far   as   I   am   concerned,   what  
happened  to  me  is  a  purely  private  matter.  In  another  time,  in  another  place,  
it  might  be  held  to  be  a  public  matter.  But  in  this  place,  at  this  time,  it  is  not.  
It  is  my  business,  mine  alone.1035  
 
David  asks:  “This  place  being  what?”  and  Lucy  answers:  “This  place  being  South  
Africa”.1036  De  Boever  notes  how  the  statement  made  by  Lucy  that  her  rape  is  a  
private  matter  might  seem  profoundly  conservative  because  of  the  fact  that  she  is  
affirming   women’s   association   with   the   private   life.1037   However,   Lucy’s   refusal   to  
report  the  rape  happens  within  a  very  specific  context.  Many  commentators  have  
read   her   statement   against   the   background   of   the   processes   of   the   South   African  
Truth   and   Reconciliation   Commission   that   was   established   in   order   to   deal   with  
transition,  reconciliation  and  forgiveness.1038  Victims  as  well  as  perpetrators  under  
the   apartheid   regime   could   come   and   testify   and   tell   their   story.1039   The   TRC  

                                                                                                           
1034
Coetzee JM (1999) 111
1035
As above.
1036
Coetzee JM (1999) 112.
1037
De Boever A Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture (2011) “Lucy’s Politics”. See
also Jooste Y Stellenbosch Law Review (2013) 533-534.
1038
See for example Boehmer E “Not saying sorry, not speaking pain: Gender implications in
Disgrace” Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies (2002) 342-351. See also
the Promotion of the National Unity and Reconciliation act 34 of 1995. The TRC was given the
task of dealing with issues of transition, reconciliation and forgiveness. The commission’s
assignment included addressing the trauma of the past, repairing trust and restoring
humanity, building a moral basis and new values for the South African society and legitimising
the new dispensation. The Truth and Reconciliation hearings were established as part of the
mandate of the TRC to get as complete picture as possible of the causes, extent and nature
of politically motivated gross violations of human rights.
1039
As above.

210  
 
established  a  “culture  of  confession”  or  a  politics  of  confession.1040  In  response  to  
this   politics   of   confession,   Lucy   does   not   tell   and   she   insists   on   women’s  
association  with  the  private.1041  At  a  later  point,  Lucy  tells  David  after  he  brings  up  
the  rape  again:    
This  is  my  life.  I  am  the  one  who  has  to  live  here.  What  happened  to  me  is  
my  business,  mine  alone,  not  yours,  and  if  there  is  one  right  I  have  it  is  the  
right   not   to   be   put   on   trial   like   this,   not   to   have   to   justify   myself-­‐   not   to   you,  
not  to  anyone  else.1042  
 
De   Boever   explains   that   Lucy   therefore   disclaims   the   right   that   she   has.   In   a  
culture   of   sensible   distribution   of   confession,   she   chooses   “non-­‐confession”.1043  
Commentators  have  called  Lucy’s  association  with  the  private  life  a  revolutionary  
position   when   considering   women’s   historical   exclusion   from   the   political   life   in  
South  Africa.1044  Her  words  “not  to  be  put  on  trial  like  this”  also  arguably  refers  to  
a   refusal   to   have   to   represent   what   occurred,   a   refusal   to,   as   De   Boever   notes,  
stand  before  the  violence  that  consists  of  asking  for  accounts  and  justifications  to  
the  police  and  courts  of  law.1045  De  Boever  describes  Lucy  as  challenging  several  
distributions  of  the  sensible  that  are  at  work  in  Coetzee’s  novel.1046  She  challenges  
the  historical  context  in  which  the  novel  is  situated  specifically,  the  aftermath  of  
apartheid  and  the  problematic  and  complicated  relationships  between  black  and  
white  people.  Lucy  announces  that  she  will  continue  to  live  on  the  farm  where  the  
attack   took   place.   Her   decision   becomes   extremely   difficult   for   her   David   to  
understand,  especially  after,  as  De  Boever  explains,  Lucy’s  black  assistant  Petrus  
becomes   the   co-­‐proprietor   of   Lucy’s   farm   through   a   land   transfer   that   aims   to  
restore   land   to   the   native   South   African   black   population.1047   Lucy   stays   on,  
deciding   to   become   a   “bywoner”   (a   poor   tenant   labourer   who   works   for   the  

                                                                                                           
1040
De Boever A Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture (2011) “Lucy’s Politics”. See
also Jooste Y Stellenbosch Law Review (2013) 533-534.  
1041
As above.
1042
Coetzee JM (1999) 133.
1043
De Boever A Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture (2011) “Lucy’s politics”.
1044
As above.
1045
As above.
1046
As above.
1047
As above.

211  
 
landowner,   but   is   also   allowed   to   make   some   profit   for   him   or   herself).1048   In  
order   to   give   Lucy   some   protection   Petrus   asks   via   David   to   marry   her.   To   her  
father’s  surprise  she  accepts  the  proposal.  She  explains  that  he  is  not  offering  her  
“a  church  wedding  followed  by  a  honeymoon  on  the  Wildcoast”,  but  rather  “an  
alliance,  a  deal”-­‐   “I  contribute  from  the  land  in  return  for  which  I  am  allowed  to  
creep   under   his   wing.   Otherwise,   he   wants   to   remind   me,   I   am   without  
protection,  I  am  fair  game”.1049  De  Boever  notes  the  following  and  I  quote  him  at  
length:  
What   Lucy   thus   realises   is   the   “impossible”   community   of   a   white   lesbian  
woman   living   under   a   black   man’s   wing/   of   a   black   man   taking   a   white,  
lesbian  woman  under  his  wing.  It  is  neither  the  future  for  South  Africa  that  
her   father   imagined,   nor   the   one   that   Petrus   imagined.   Her   position   marks  
instead   the   country’s   radically   “democratic”   future:   a   future   that   would   lie  
beyond   the   established   framework   of   identification   and   classification-­‐   race  
(black/white),   gender   (male/female),   class   (owner/tenant),   and   sexuality  
(straight/gay)-­‐   in   which   South   Africa,   from   Lucy’s   perspective   ,   is   caught  
up.1050    
 
Lucy’s   position   here   indeed   marks   a   radically   democratic   future   as   De   Boever  
notes.  She  mixes  the  categories  and  blurs  the  sensible  boundaries  at  work  in  this  
context.   Disgrace   also   realises   this   particular   politics   at   the   level   of   the   novel’s  
aesthetic.1051  De  Boever  explains  that  Spivak  has  noted  that  the  novel  is  focalised  
“relentlessly”   through   David   Lurie.   Spivak   draws   an   important   conclusion   about  
the  aesthetic:  
The   reader   is   provoked   for   he   or   she   does   not   want   to   share   in   Lurie-­‐the-­‐
chief-­‐focaliser’s   inability   to   “read”   Lucy   as   patient   and   agent.   No   reader   is  
content   with   acting   out   the   failure   of   reading   [...]   This   provocation   is   the  
“political”  in  political  fiction,  the  transformation  of  a  tendency  into  crisis.1052  
 
It   is   precisely   then   Lucy’s   internally   excluded   position   of   the   part   of   those   who  
have   no   part   that   becomes   Disgrace’s   aesthetic.1053   The   novel   focuses   through  
Lurie,  thereby  provoking  the  reader  to  counter-­‐focalise  and  take  up  Lucy’s  cause.  

                                                                                                           
1048
As above.
1049
Coetzee JM (1999) 203.
1050
De Boever A Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture (2011) “Lucy’s Politics”.
1051
As above.
1052
See Spivak GC “Ethics and politics in Tagore, Coetzee and certain scenes of teaching”
Diacritics (2002) 32.
1053
De Boever A Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture (2011) “Lucy’s Politics”.

212  
 
While  Lucy  is  thus,  according  to  De  Boever,  “an  empty  operator”,  her  emptiness  
“resists”,   “making   its   own   disappearance   impossible”.1054   De   Boever   further  
interestingly  notes  that  the  closing  paragraph  in  Judith  Butler’s  book,  Antigone’s  
Claim:  Kinship  Between  Life  and  Death,  almost  reads  like  a  summary  of  Rancière’s  
political  subject.  I  think  it  is  worth  quoting:  
Who  then  is  Antigone  within  such  a  scene,  and  what  are  we  to  make  of  her  
words,  words  that  become  dramatic  events,  performative  acts?  She  is  not  of  
the   human,   but   speaks   in   its   language.   Prohibited   from   action,   she  
nevertheless   acts,   and   her   act   is   hardly   a   simple   assimilation   to   an   existing  
norm.   And   in   acting,   as   one   who   has   no   right   to   act,   she   upsets   the  
vocabulary  of  kinship  that  is  a  precondition  for  the  human,  implicitly  raising  
the  question  for  us  of  what  those  preconditions  really  must  be.  She  speaks  
within  the  language  of  entitlement  from  which  she  is  excluded,  particularly  
in  the  language  of  the  claim  with  which  no  final  identification  is  possible.  If  
she   is   human,   then   the   human   has   entered   into   catachresis:   we   no   longer  
know   its   proper   usage.   And   to   the   extent   that   she   occupies   the   language  
that  can  never  belong  to  her  she  functions  as  chiasm  within  the  vocabulary  
of  political  norms.  If  kinship  is  the  precondition  of  the  human,  then  Antigone  
is   the   occasion   for   a   new   field   of   human,   achieved   through   political  
catachresis,   the   one   that   happens   when   the   less   than   human   speak   as  
human,  when  gender  is  displaced  and  kinship  founders  on  its  own  founding  
laws.  She  acts,  she  speaks,  she  becomes  one  for  whom  the  speech  act  is  a  
fatal   crime,   but   this   fatality   exceeds   her   life   and   enters   the   discourse   of  
intelligibility   as   its   own   promising   fatality,   the   social   form   of   its   aberrant,  
unprecedented  future.1055  
 
It  is  Lucy’s  insistence  on  distributing  otherwise  in  this  specific  material  and  spatio-­‐
temporal  locale  that  allows  for  alternative  capacities  and  ways  of  being.  The  place  
within  which  Lucy  positions  herself  is  exactly  where  she  shouldn’t  be  according  to  
the   specific   context   and   it   is   exactly   this   place   that   holds   the   possibility   of   an  
unprecedented   future.   Within   the   established   Apartheid-­‐aftermath   framework,  
she  locates  another  time,  an  impossible  time  that  points  to  different  relationships  
and   she   also   lives   impossibly   within   this   time.   In   a   sense,   she   identifies   with   an  
impossible   South   African   democratic   future   -­‐   imagining   that   things   can   be  
different   or   otherwise.   But,   Lucy   does   not   only   imagine   that   things   can   be  
otherwise,  she  also  embodies  this.  She  stays  and  works  on  the  farm  as  labourer-­‐
tenant,   married   to   the   black   Petrus.   Lucy   is   a   white   lesbian   woman   that   marries  

                                                                                                           
1054
As above.
1055
Butler J Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death (2000) 82.

213  
 
the  black  Petrus  for  “protection”.  If  she  is  married  to  a  local  man,  she  is  safe  from  
rape   by   other   men.   It   is   therefore   not   only   the   refusal   to   report   the   rape   that  
might  be  controversial,  but  also  the  undercurrent  of  this  arrangement  namely,  a  
woman  that  is  now  married  to  a  man  and  therefore  becomes  his  property  and  as  
such  cannot  be  sexually  used  anymore.  Lucy  thereby  enters  into  marriage  within  
highly   patriarchal   terms.   She   tears   her   body   from   various   sensible   distributions.  
Lucy  insists  on  another  account  and  she  thereby  defines  differently  and  acts  in  a  
way  that  paradoxically  embodies  a  transformation  thought  to  have  not  yet  been  
attained.  
 
It   should   be   mentioned   here   that   some   readings   of   Disgrace   within   the   context   of  
post-­‐apartheid   thought,   rather   than   viewing   Lucy’s   actions   as   actions   that  
represent   the   embrace   of   a   radical   reconfiguration   of   the   South   African  
democratic   future,   reads   her   actions   as   highly   problematic   within   patriarchal  
South   African   culture.1056   When   it   comes   to   Lucy’s   silence   and   passivity   in   her  
refusal   to   report   the   rape   and   her   retreat   into   working   the   land   as   a   bywoner,  
Lucy   can   be   seen   as   assuming   the   generic   and   stereotypical   position   of   woman  
suffering   in   silence.1057   Lucy   serves   the   needs   of   others   and   Boehmer   asks:   “Is  
reconciliation   with   a   history   of   violence   possible   if   woman   […]   is   as   ever   biting  
her  lip?”1058  When  it  comes  to  having  a  political  voice,  Lucy  can  indeed  be  read  in  
some   instances   as   lacking   voice   and   although   refusal   to   speak   or   silence   can  
establish  political  speaking  or  claims,  when  read  within  the  context  of  patriarchy  

                                                                                                           
1056
See Boehmer E Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies (2002) 342-351.
See also Sanders M “Disgrace” Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies
(2002) 363-373.
1057
Van Marle et al explains that within the highly patriarchal traditional South African
landscape oppression through silence was one of the characteristic ways in which to keep
women in constrained political spheres. See Van Marle, De Villiers I, Beukes E M “Memory,
space and gender: Re-imagining the law” South African Public Law (2012) 570. As Van Marle
et al further explains, during the apartheid era women did not speak of the atrocities that
were done to them and when they did, they were silenced by the state and marked as liars
unsupported by family as their confessions brought shame to the family name (Van Marle, De
Villiers I, Beukes E M South African Public Law (2012) 570). The silence of women and
daughters also influenced the voices of all those around them. See Van Marle, De Villers I,
Beukes E M South African Public Law (2012) 570.
1058
Boehmer E Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies (2002) 351.

214  
 
and  masculinity,  Lucy’s  silence  –  rather  than  pointing  to  political  voice  -­‐   points  to  
an   affirmation   of   the   distribution   of   the   sensible   and   its   cycles   of   female  
domination.1059    
 
As   illustrated   by   the   discussion   above,   I   read   Lucy   as   redistributing   a   certain  
sensible  distribution  and  as,  to  a  certain  extent,  having  a  voice.  When  Lucy  in  no  
uncertain   terms   declares:   “It   is   my   business   and   mine   alone”   she   is   not   silent,   she  
is  not  biting  her  lip.1060  The  point  may  be  that  Lucy  resists  any  easy  readings.  She  is  
silent  in  one  sense  and  she  speaks  in  another.  She  is  therefore  problematic  and  it  
is   in   within   this   logic   that   she   redistributes   the   sensible   as   a   contradictory,  
alternative   character   that   inhabits   an   in-­‐between   space.   Rather   than   reading   Lucy  
as  speaking  or  not  speaking,  as  having  a  voice  or  not  having  a  voice,  I  read  her  as  a  
figure  of  division.    Therefore,  the  possibility  of  political  voice  is  not  opened  up  by  
the  fact  that  she  can  be  seen  as  having  a  voice  or  not  having  a  voice.  Rather,  it  is  
opened  up  by  the  fact  that  she  can  be  read  as  both  and  neither.  
 
5.4  Abahlali  baseMjondolo  
Abahlali   baseMjondolo   is   a   social   movement   that   consists   of   South   African   shack-­‐
dwellers.   The   movement   began   in   Durban   in   early   2005   and   it   is   the   largest  
organisation  of  the  militant  poor  in  post-­‐apartheid  South  Africa.1061  As  mentioned  
in   the   introduction,   the   majority   of   South   Africans   live   impoverished   lives.   As  
Selmeczi   notes,   the   inherited   apartheid   topography   results   in   the   spatial   and  

                                                                                                           
1059
Refusal to speak can be read as a powerful instance of political subjectivity. Rather than
being seen as embodying passivity, refusal can be read as a counter-hegemonic action,
imbued with challenge and the beckoning of alternatives. See for example Van Marle K (ed.)
Refusal, Transition and Post-Apartheid Law (2009).
1060
Coetzee JM (1999) 111.
1061
See Abahlali’s official website: http//abahlali.org/a-short-history-of-abahlali-
basemjondolo-the-durban-shack-dwellers-movement/ (accessed on 20/12/2014). Instead of
explication and lengthy discussion, my aim here is to rather let these statements be read as is
so as to avoid speaking for or any implicit assumptions about the capacities of the
movement.

215  
 
infrastructural   segregation   of   the   black   poor.1062   It   effectively   renders   them  
spatially   and   materially   marginalised,   living   on   the   peripheries   of   the   national  
cities.  Abahlali  has  practiced  numerous  forms  of  dissent  in  an  effort  to  transform  
the  socio-­‐economic  fate  of  the  poor  and  to  oblige  government  to  attend  to  their  
plight.1063   The   majority   of   their   forms   of   dissent   and   efforts   have   been   defined   by  
governmental   political   discourse   as   criminal   action.   1064
  Members   of   the  
movement   as   well   as   academics,   activists   and   journalists   have   produced   a   large  
amount   of   research,   publications   and   various   other   forms   of   writing   on   the  
movement   and   their   activities.1065   I   therefore   do   no   recount   their   whole   story  
here.  It  is  also  important  to  mention  that  I  do  not  intend  to  speak  for  Abahlali  in  
any  way.  The  movement  insists  on  a  protocol  that  interested  researchers  should  
visit  them  and  talk  to  them-­‐   “talk  to  us,  not  about  us”.1066  I  therefore  only  make  

                                                                                                           
1062
  See Selmeczi A “Dis/placing political illiteracy: The politics of intellectual equality in a
South African shack-dweller’s movement” Interface: A Journal for and about Social
Movements (2014) 230.  
1063
As above. The movement began when a road blockage was organised in the Kennedy
Road settlement in protest to the sale of a piece of land to a local industrialist. The local
municipal counselor promised the shack-dwellers the land for housing. The movement grew
quickly and now has tens of thousands of supporters from more than 30 settlements around
the country. Within the last couple of years, more than 300 hundred of the members have
been arrested and subjected to police assaults, death threats and intimidation from local
ruling parties. The movement has tried to develop a sustained voice for shack-dwellers and
have marched to the offices of local councilors, police stations, municipal offices, newspapers
and the City Hall in Durban against governmental actions that have resulted in thousands of
people living on the street. The movement organised a successful boycott of the March 2006
local governmental elections under the slogan “No Land, No House, No Vote”. Abahlali have
also stopped evictions in a number of settlements, won access to schools and stopped the
industrial development of the land promised in Kennedy Road and forced numerous
government officials, offices and projects to visit Abahlali in the shanty towns. The movement
has struggled for land, housing, for an end to forced removals, access to education and the
provision of water, electricity, sanitation and health care. The movement has also set up
projects such as crèches, gardens, sewing collectives as well as support structures for people
living with HIV and AIDS.
1064
See Selmeczi A “Dis/placing political illiteracy: The politics of intellectual equality in a
South African shack-dweller’s movement” Interface: A Journal for and about Social
Movements (2014) 230-265.
1065
These engagements have included undergraduate essays, post-graduate theses, research
reports and work published in peer reviewed academic journals. See the list of publications
on Abahlali’s official website: http//abahlali.org/node/3204 (accessed on 20/12/2014).
1066
See http//abahlali.org/node/3204 (accessed on 20/12/2014).

216  
 
use  of  literature  that  is  accepted  by  Abahlali.1067  I  also  explicate  as  little  as  possible  
in  an  effort  to  let  the  movement’s  words  circulate  on  their  own.  The  point  is  not  
to  represent  Abahlali  or  tell  their  story  for  them,  but  rather  to  attempt  to  practice  
a   method   of   equality   that   valorise   words   and   instances   of   the   verification   of  
equality.  
 
It   has   been   argued   that   the   prevailing   political   discourse   sees   the   poor   black  
majority  as  unable  to  practice  and  conceptualise  their  own  politics.1068  People  that  
demonstrate  or  strike  are  often  seen  as  politically  illiterate.1069  As  mentioned,   the  
spatial  order  of  apartheid  still  remains  and  most  people  are  left  to  live  in  spaces  of  
infrastructural   decay.1070   In   their   discussion   of   the   municipal   practice   of   illegal  
evictions,  Mark  Butler  and  Richard  Pithouse  have  stated  the  following:  
[T]he  local  state  acts  in  a  systematically  criminal  manner  towards  its  poorest  
residents   on   the   assumption   that   this   behaviour   is   within   the   norms   of   a  
shared   social   consensus   amongst   the   social   forces   and   institutions   that  
count.   That   elite   consensus   is   that   rights   formally   guaranteed   in   abstract  
principle  should  not,  in  concrete  practice,  apply  to  the  poor.1071  
 
Abahlali   has   struggled   in   various   forms   against   the   living   conditions   of   the   poor  
and   the   manner   in   which   the   poor   are   dealt   with   by   the   state.   Most   of   their  
efforts,  whether  in  the  form  of  marches,  strikes,  protests  or  demonstrations  have  
been   received   by   government   as   criminal   and   violent   claims   to   service   delivery.  

                                                                                                           
1067
I focus especially on the work of Anna Selmeczi who has written extensively on the
movement. See Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 230-
265. See also Selmeczi A “We are the people who do no count” Thinking the distribution of
the biopolitics of abandonment” PhD thesis at Central European University, March 2012.
1068
Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 230.
1069
Selmeczi explores this point with regards to the protests of Abahlali baseMjondolo. She
argues that the contemporary spatio-political order of the South African “world class” city is
conditional upon constructing many South African lives as superfluous and disposable. See
Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 230.The production
and abandonment of surplus people also depends on rendering them as improper political
subjects and dominant discursive conceptions further imply and reinforce conceptions of the
poor black majority as unable to think and practice their own politics as an illiterate group of
people. See Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 230.
1070
As above.
1071
Butler M & Pithouse R Lessons from eThekwini: Pariahs Hold Their Ground Against a
State that is Both Criminal and Democratic (2007) http://abahlali.org/node/984 (accessed on
28/12/2014).

217  
 
Abahlali  contends  that  the  black  poor  majority  are  seen  as  less  than  equal  political  
and   economic   subjects.1072   The   movement   has   in   many   ways   attempted   to  
overturn  the  implicit  assumptions  of  their  demonstrations  as  criminal  acts:  
They  say  we  committed  public  violence  but  against  which  public?  If  we  are  
not  the  public  then  who  is  the  public  and  who  are  we?1073  
 
By   asking   who   is   included   in   the   count   of   the   public,   this   statement   strikingly  
disputes   the   criminality   often   associated   with   the   movement’s   actions.   On   this  
logic,  the  movement  and  its  members  must  certainly  be  perceived  in  excess  to  the  
public:  
The   fact   that   our   minor   and   non-­‐criminal   offences   are   treated   as   criminality-­‐  
as   public   violence-­‐   shows   that   in   reality   we   are   not   included   in   the   definition  
of  the  public  […]  Therefore  we  have  to  rebel  just  to  count  as  public.1074  
 
Here   the   movement   overturns   the   logic   that   sees   them   as   uncounted.   These  
demonstrations  can  be  read  as  political  statements  that  “exist  because  those  who  
have   no   right   to   be   counted   as   speaking   beings,   make   themselves   of   some  
account.”1075   Tanke   has   argued   that   demonstrations   are   necessary   in   Rancière’s  
conception   of   politics,   “demonstration   create   possibilities   for   the   part   of   those  
who  have  no  part  to  begin  to  take  part”.1076  Demonstrations  can  therefore  impose  
a  sensible  obligation  upon  others  to  recognise  the  rationality  of  the  arguments  of  
the   demonstrators.1077   Whether   through   polemics,   strikes,   speech   scenes,   poetic  
                                                                                                           
1072
Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 235-236.
1073
Zikode S “The Third Force” in Yonk’ Indawo Umzabalazo Uyasimuvela: New York From
Durban: Durban Centre for Civil Society Research Reports (2013) as referenced in Selmeczi A
Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 235.
1074
Poni M “Public Violence” (2009) available at http://abahlali.org/node/5769 (accessed on
23/12/2014). As Selmeczi explains Abahlali has claimed on numerous occasions that
blockading roads is not violence: “violence is harm to human beings.” See Selmeczi A
Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 237. The members of the
movement often make the point that protests usually only turn violent after the police
intervenes: “Usually harm is only experienced when the police come. Before police come, no
harm happens, whether we sing and burn tires as part of our expression […] So, when we
burn tires, we sing our songs, the only thing we’re causing is traffic, which traffic always
happens by the way. And then, when police come, that’s where harm take place, and usually
we are the only victims”. See Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements
(2014) 237.
1075
Bosteels B “Rancière’s Leftism, or, Politics and its Discontents” in Rockhill G & Watts P
(eds.) (2009) 165.
1076
Tanke J (2011) 60.
1077
As above.

218  
 
activities   or   the   definition   of   new   capacities,   equality   must   be   made   visible   or   it  
must   manifest   in   the   declaration   of   a   wrong   so   as   to   break   open   an   interpretation  
of  sense  thought  to  be  incontestable.1078  
 
Dominant  discourse  has  also  often  seen  the  demonstrations  of  the  movement  as  
“reactionary”,   “opportunistic”,   “anarchist”   and   “populist”.1079   They   have   been  
condemned   for   vandalising   “already   existing   infrastructure   in   our   community”.1080  
This   type   of   logic   with   regard   to   dissent-­‐   that   includes   road   blockades,   trespassing  
and   civil   disobedience-­‐   is   becoming   more   and   more   prominent   within   the   new  
South   African   constitutional   order.   It   is   indicative   of   a   reasoning   that   puts   forth  
that   post-­‐apartheid   freedom   and   equality   should   be   achieved   through   patient  
organisation,   education   and   sustained   struggle.   The   implicit   consensus   is   that   in  
our   constitutional   dispensation,   such   acts   are   criminal   and   there   is   a   refusal   to  
acknowledge  certain  types  of  dissent  as  political  struggle.  The  movement’s  speech  
is  in  some  cases  not  recognised  as  fully  authorised  speech:  
We   have   discovered   that   our   municipality   does   not   listen   to   us   when   we  
speak   to   them   in   Zulu.   We   tried   English.   Now,   we   realise   that   they   won’t  
understand  Xhosa  or  Sotho  either.  The  only  language  that  they  understand  
is  when  we  put  thousands  of  people  on  the  street.1081  
 
Rancière:    
[I]f  there  is  someone  you  do  not  wish  to  recognise  as  a  political  being,  you  
begin   by   not   seeing   them   as   the   bearers   of   politicalness,   by   not  
understanding  what  they  say,  by  not  hearing  that  it  is  an  utterance  coming  
out  of  their  mouths.1082    
 
Abahlali   has   also   been   made   out   to   be   “thoughtless”   in   their   actions.1083   They  
maintain   however   that   although   they   have   chosen   a   different   form   of   struggle  
(than  what  may  be  considered  as  acceptable  legal  and  political  routes),  it  doesn’t  

                                                                                                           
1078
Tanke J (2011) 61.
1079
Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 238.
1080
As above.
1081
Zikode S “Third Force” (2005) as referenced in Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal For and
About Social Movements (2014) 239.
1082
Rancière J (2001) 32.
1083
Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 239.

219  
 
mean  that  “we  did  not  come  to  this  campaign  after  careful  thinking”.1084  Further,  
the   movement   has   not   only   sought   to   overturn   the   sensible   distribution   of   their  
dissent   as   thoughtless,   but   has   also   resisted   dominant   allocations   of   the   poor   as  
ignorant  and  in  need  of  education:  
We   hear   that   the   political   analysts   are   saying   that   the   poor   must   be  
educated  about  xenophobia.  Always  the  solution  is  to  “educate  the  poor”.  
When   we   get   cholera   we   must   be   educated   about   washing   our   hands   when  
in  fact  we  need  clear  water.  When  we  get  burnt  we  must  be  educated  about  
fire  when  in  fact  we  need  electricity.  This  is  just  a  way  of  blaming  the  poor  
for  our  suffering.  We  want  land  and  housing  in  the  cities,  we  want  to  go  to  
university,  we  want  water  and  electricity-­‐   we  don’t  want  to  be  educated  to  
be  good  at  surviving  poverty  on  our  own.1085  
 
After  a  fire  broke  out  in  a  settlement,  the  same  type  of  imposed  education  was  
postulated  by  the  state:  
After  the  fire,  people  were  basically  telling  us  to  teach  people  how  to  use  a  
paraffin   stove   properly-­‐   how   to   use   a   paraffin   stove   is   not   something   I   need  
to   teach   to   the   people   who   have   used   them   all   their   lives!   Why   is   this   the  
thing   they   think   must   be   taught   when   we   have   said   clearly   the   problem   is  
that  we  are  excluded  from  getting  electricity.1086  
 
Many   protests   and   forms   of   dissent   have   been   viewed   by   the   dominant   political  
discourse  through  the  lens  of  the  pace  of  government’s  service  delivery.  Dissent  is  
viewed   within   the   framework   of   the   immediacy   experienced   by   the   poor   that  
cannot   grasp   the   complexities   of   government   processes   and   that   lack  
understanding   of   the   patience   and   work   involved   in   long-­‐lasting   and   proper  
development:  
Many   journalists   have   been   phoning   us   and   asking   if   our   “service   delivery  
protest”   will   be   going   ahead   tomorrow.   We   appreciate   the   interest   of   the  
media   but   we   really   want   to   stress   that   this   will   not   be   a   “service   delivery  
protest”.   We   have   never   organised   “a   service   delivery   protest”.   […]   The  
language   in   which   people’s   struggles   are   turned   into   “service   delivery  
protest”   is   a   language   that   has   been   imposed   on   our   struggles   from   the  
outside-­‐   it   is   not   our   language.   Of   course   we   are   struggling   for   land   and  
housing,   water   and   electricity.   But   we   do   not   accept   the   limited   way   in  
which   these   “services”   are   “delivered”.   Often   an   important   part   of   our  
struggles   is   to   reject   the   way   that   services   are   delivered   […]   We   are  
struggling   for   the   full   recognition   and   realisation   of   our   humanity   in   a  
                                                                                                           
1084
As above.
1085
Abahlali baseMjondolo “Statement of the Xenophobic Attacks in Johannesburg” (2008)
available at http://abahlali.org/node/3582 (accessed on 13/11/2014).
1086
Abahlali baseMjondolo and Rural Network Living Learning (2009) as referenced in
Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 252.

220  
 
 society   that   denies   our   humanity   at   every   turn   […]   To   call   our   struggles  
“service  delivery  protests”  is  a  way  of  making  them  safe  for  our  oppressors  
[....]1087    
 
And  
We  are  concerned  that  your  chief  of  staff  has  said  that  the  meeting  would  
only  deal  with  “service  delivery  issues”  and  would  not  deal  with  “unrelated  
issues”.  Since  when  was  democracy  about  service  delivery?  Since  when  was  
human   dignity   about   service   delivery?   We   have   a   democratic   right   to   take  
this  view  and  to  argue  for  it  when  we  engage  the  state.  In  fact  we  reject  the  
whole   paradigm   of   “service   delivery”   […]   Your   chief   of   staff   wants   to  
confine   us   to   discussions   of   peripheral   importance   just   as   we   are   already  
confined  on  peripheral  land  on  the  outskirts  of  the  city.1088  
 
Abahlali   refuses   the   description   of   their   struggles   within   frameworks   that   can  
neutralise   their   claims   or   contain   their   politics.   The   movement   lays   the  
contingency  of  the  current  South  African  spatio-­‐temporal  order  bare:  “We  know  
that  we  are  not  supposed  to  be  living  the  way  we  do”1089  and  attempt  to  disrupt  
any  form  of  intellectual  authority:  “We  always  say  that  the  fact  that  we  are  poor  
in   life   does   not   make   us   poor   in   mind.”1090   Although   the   movement   has  
continually   stated   that   they   are   “ordinary   men   and   women   [that]   insist   on   their  
right  to  speak  and  be  heard  on  matters  that  concern  their  daily  lives”,  the  ruling  
party   has   insisted   that   the   movement   is   ruled   by   a   “third   force”   of   leftist  
intellectuals.1091   As   Selmeczi   confirms,   this   logic   postulates   a   fundamental   doubt  
of  the  shack-­‐dwellers’  capacity  to  theorise  and  conduct  their  own  struggle.1092    
 
The   movement   has   established   the   “University   of   Abahlali   baseMjondolo”   by  
declaring  that  the  shantytowns  are  places  of  “living  learning”.1093  The  movement  
has   also   refused   knowledge   imparted   by   the   “politician-­‐expert”   and   “charity-­‐

                                                                                                           
1087
Abahlali baseMjondolo “Sutcliff’s Dirty Tricks Won’t Keep Us From Marching In Our City
Tomorrow” (2010) available at http://abahlali.org/node/6403 (accessed on 27/12/2014).
1088
Poni M quoted in Dear Mandela A film by Dara Kell and Christopher Nizza (2011) as
referenced by Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 248.
1089
Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 248.
1090
Hlongwa M “The No Land, No House, No Vote Campaign Still On For 2009” (2007)
available at httpp://abahlali.org/node/510 (accessed on 12/12/2014).
1091
Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 249.
1092
As above.
1093
Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 255.

221  
 
expert”   that   aim   to   “enlighten   the   dark   pockets   of   the   ignorant”.1094   Abahlali  
notes:  
We   are   supposed   to   suffer   silently   so   that   some   rich   people   can   get   rich  
from   our   work   and   others   can   get   rich   having   conferences   about   having  
more   conferences   about   suffering   […]   We   must   even   be   invisible   when  
people   are   getting   paid   to   talk   about   us   in   government   or   in   NGO’s.  
Everything  is  done  under  our  name.1095  
 
Here   Abahlali   can   be   said   to   indicate   something   of   Rancière’s   contention   that  
some  knowledge  emerge  as  the  surplus  value  of  the  poor’s  labour:  “It  is  produced  
by  them,  but  claimed  by  the  owners  of  the  means  of  production”.1096  
 
Although  at  times  government  has  intentionally  sought  to  subvert  the  workings  
and   actions   of   the   movement   by   way   of   arbitrary   evictions   and   arrests   (with  
charges   usually   dropped   before   cases   reach   court)   and   intimidation   by   ruling  
party   members,   the   movement   has   managed   to   sustain   protests   and   broader  
public  engagement.  Their  membership  has  grown  to  tens  of  thousands  and  they  
have  attracted  the  intention  of  activists  across  different  levels  of  civil  society.  The  
movement   has   also   helped   numerous   members   of   their   community   and   has  
demanded   response   from   various   governmental   institutions.   Against   prevailing  
discourses  and  dominant  configurations  of  society  that  ensures  that  only  certain  
classes  of  people  are  authorised  to  think  and  speak,  Abahlali  have  declared  that  
they   do   think   and   speak.   To   say   that   “[e]veryone   speaks,   everyone   thinks”   is  
more   subversive   than   it   sounds.1097   As   Hallward   elucidates,   thinking   “evades  
regulation   and   contests   classification”.1098   To   think   is   therefore,   according   to  
Hallward,  itself  to  subvert  any  rigid  distribution  of  places  and  roles.1099  
 

                                                                                                           
1094
Selmeczi A Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements (2014) 252.
1095
Hlongwa M “The No Land, No House, No Vote Campaign Still On For 2009” (2007)
available at httpp://abahlali.org/node/510 (accessed on 12/12/2014).
1096
Pelletier C (2009) 6.
1097
As above. Hallward P “Jacques Rancière and the Subversion of Mastery” Paragraph: A
Journal of Modern Critical Theory (2005) 26.
1098
As above.
1099
As above.

222  
 
Before   concluding,   I   return   to   the   figure   of   Bhubaneswari   Bhaduri   that   Spivak  
invokes   in   her   essay   “Can   the   Subaltern   Speak?”   In   the   section   below   I   offer   a  
short  and  different  reading  of  Bhubaneswari.  
 
5.5  Bhubaneswari  Bhaduri  
It   has   been   mentioned   that   the   tragic   figure   of   Bhubaneswari   Bhaduri   haunts  
Spivak’s   famous   essay   “Can   the   Subaltern   Speak?”1100   Morris   explains   that  
Bhubaneswari,   as   a   continually   misread   woman   with   an   impossible   story,   has   in  
many   ways   accompanied   and   also   possessed   Spivak   in   her   own   effort   to   be  
accountable   to   and   for   the   history   of   the   subaltern.1101   In   chapter   four   it   was  
explained   that   Bhubaneswari   Bhudari   was   a   young   middle-­‐class   Indian   woman  
who  took  her  own  life  in  her  father’s  apartment  in  Calcutta  in  1926.1102  After  her  
suicide   it   was   discovered   that   she   was   a   member   of   one   of   the   many   groups  
involved  in  the  armed  struggle  for  Indian  independence.  She  had  been  entrusted  
with   a   political   assassination,   which   she   was   unable   to   do.   She   subsequently  
committed  suicide  in  order  to  avoid  capture  by  the  British  colonial  authorities  and  
to,   speculatively,   safeguard   the   members   of   her   group.   Spivak   reads  
Bhubaneswari’s   suicide   as   an   attempt   to   cover   up   her   involvement   in   the   anti-­‐
colonial  insurgency  movement  by  disguising  her  suicide  as  a  modern  example  of  
sati.1103   However,   Spivak   contends   that   her   voice   and   agency   as   a   real   historical  
woman   freedom   fighter   disappeared   from   the   official,   male-­‐centred   historical  
records.   Technically,   her   suicide   did   not   conform   to   the   codes   of   sati   because   she  
was   not   a   widow   and   the   suicide   did   not   take   place   in   the   sacred   site   of   the  
husband’s   funeral   pyre.1104   However,   on   Spivak’s   account,   as   Morris   explains,  
Bhubaneswari   at   least   foreclosed   any   possibility   that   her   suicide   might   be  

                                                                                                           
1100
Morris R (ed.) (2010) 16.
1101
It should be mentioned here that Spivak later wrote that Bhubaneswari wrote a letter to
her grandmother. Spivak’s mother told her the story of Bhubaneswari and that is how she
came to research her as historical figure. See Morris R (ed.) (2010) 228.
1102
See section 4.2.
1103
As above.
1104
It should be mentioned here that there is of course no way in which Bhubaneswari’s
intentions can really be proved. Spivak offers a reading of Bhubaneswari’s story as an attempt
to rewrite “the social text of sati-suicide in an interventionist way”. See Spivak GC (1988) 307.

223  
 
interpreted   as   an   illegitimate   pregnancy   as   she   was   menstruating   at   the   time   of  
her   suicide.1105     For   Spivak,   there   is   no   question   that   Bhubaneswari   was   a  
politically   committed   member   of   the   national   independence   struggle.   However,  
Bhubaneswari’s   attempt   to   rewrite   the   text   of   sati-­‐suicide   is   a   “tragic   failure”  
because   the   “subaltern   as   female   cannot   be   heard   or   read”   in   the   male-­‐centred  
terms   of   the   national   independence   struggle.1106   Her   voice   was   “effaced   by   the  
ideological   structures   of   imperial   masculinity   and   the   state”.1107   Spivak   explains  
that   supplementary   narratives   and   retellings   erased   Bhubaneswari’s   story.1108  
According   to   Spivak,   her   exceptional   act   of   women’s   resistance   was   later   re-­‐
coded  as  a  case  of  an  illicit  love  affair  and  a  source  of  shame  for  the  subsequent  
generations   of   her   family.1109   Spivak   was   disturbed   by   the   fact   that   everyone,  
including   Bhubaneswari’s   own   family,   misunderstood   her   suicide   and   no   one  
seemed   interested   in   Spivak’s   return   to   and   reinterpretation   of   the   event.1110  
“Unnerved   by   this   failure   of   communication”,   Spivak   concluded   that   “the  
subaltern  cannot  speak!”1111  
 
Bhubaneswari’s   narrative   is   discussed   at   the   end   of   the   essay   and   Spivak   offers  
Bhubaneswari  as  a  text  to  be  read.1112  As  mentioned,  since  her  initial  essay  Spivak  
has  reminded  herself  that  speaking  always  occurs  within  the  nexus  of  actions  that  
include   listening,   responding,   interpreting,   qualifying   and   so   on.   To   happen,  
events   must   be   perceived   and   acknowledged   as   such.   Although   on   Spivak’s  
reading   Bhubaneswari’s   suicide   was   a   tragic   failure,   she   certainly   redistributes  
some   of   the   sensible   distributions   at   work   in   her   context.   She   was   a   female  
member   of   an   anti-­‐colonialist   struggle.   She   took   her   own   life   against   religious  
codes.   And   she   committed   suicide   while   menstruating   so   as   to   rule   out  
subsequent   narratives   of   illicit   pregnancy.   With   these   actions,   Bhubaneswari  

                                                                                                           
1105
Morris R (ed.) (2010) 6.
1106
Morton S (2003) 65-66.
1107
Morris R (2010) (ed.) 7.
1108
See section 4.2 above.
1109
Morton S (2003) 66.
1110
Leitch V, Cain W et al (eds.) (2010) 2195.
1111
Spivak GC in Nelson C & Grossberg L (1988) 307.
1112
See footnote 992 above.

224  
 
refuses  to  be  interpreted  in  a  certain  way.  Her  body  carried  the  signs  that  would  
make   certain   masculinist   and   imperialist   interpretations   impossible.  
Commentators  have  noted  how  Spivak’s  retelling  of  the  story  of  Bhubaneswari  on  
numerous  occasions  has  transformed  the  private  family  secret  of  her  suicide  that  
nobody   in   her   family   wants   to   talk   about   into   the   “public   political   archive   of   post-­‐
colonial   studies”.1113   This   is   especially   accurate   if   one   considers   the   impact   of  
Spivak’s  essay.  When  considered  along  the  lines  of  Rancière’s  politics,  a  different  
lesson   can   be   gleaned   from   Bhubaneswari.   When   it   comes   to   the   retelling   of  
Bhubaneswari,   Spivak   records   in   the   discourse   of   her   essay,   a   voice   that   is  
phenomenally   impossible   as   a   historical   speech-­‐act.1114   According   to   Spivak,  
Bhubaneswari   has   no   place   from   which   to   speak.   And   it   is   from   within   this  
juncture   that   a   different   political   future   might   be   opened   up:   The   alternative  
telling   lies,   not   in   making   Bhubaneswari   speak,   but   rather   within   the   very  
impossibility   of   her   having   a   voice.   For   in   recording   Bhubaneswari,   Spivak   does  
“more   than   give   [her]   a   historical   identity”,   she   also   demonstrates   along   the   lines  
of   a   Rancièrian   framework,   “how   a   politics   can   be   predicated   on   an   impossible  
phenomenality  of  voice”.1115  Spivak  records  a  speech  event  that  is  impossible  and  
it  is  from  within  this  recording  that  the  politics  of  voice  is  revealed.    
 
5.6  Conclusion  

                                                                                                           
1113
See Shetty S & Bellamy E “Postcolonialim’s archive fever” Diacritics (2000) 25-48.
1114
See Parker A in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 249. Parker discusses Rancière’s
discussion of Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature.
See Rancière J The Names of History: On the Poetics of Knowledge (1994) 29-30. Auerbach
discusses the New Testament and a specific instance where Tacitus records a speech of
Percennius in his writing. Percennius cannot speak for he is of the poor, he is a soldier. He
therefore has no place from which to speak, but Tacitus “lends him his tongue”. For Rancière,
it is exactly the fact that Tacitus records in his discourse the speech event that is impossible
that can point to a political future or politics: “By invalidating the voice of Percennius,
substituting his own speech for the soldier’s, Tacitus does more than give him a historical
identity. He also creates a model of subversive eloquence for the orators and simple soldiers
of the future” See Rancière J (1994) 29-30. I therefore use this line of thinking in Rancière’s
discussion of Auerbach and Parker’s eloquent relaying of Edward Said’s and Rancière’s
engagements with Auerbach in my contemplation on Spivak’s essay with regards to this last
point. Parker A in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 249-257.
1115
Parker A in Rockhill G & Watts P (eds.) (2009) 257.  

225  
 
The  figures  and  statements  discussed  above  represent  a  way  of  reacting  against  
the   background   sketched   in   the   first   chapter,   specifically   the   complexities   and  
difficulties   of   voicing   as   it   pertains   to   many   South   African   women.   Along   the   lines  
of  employing  a  method  of  equality,  I  attempted  to  contemplate  moments  of  the  
reconfiguration  of  the  sensible.  These  figures  and  related  statements  encompass  
a  different  way  of  mapping  the  trajectories  of  the  visible  and  sayable.  A  method  
of  equality  entails  reading  and  producing  words  against  guarantees  and  modes  of  
legitimation.   It   entails   highlighting   verifications   of   equality   and   valorising  
redistributions   of   the   sensible   order   so   as   to   give   rise   to   voicing   and   ways   of  
voicing  thought  not  to  exist.  
 
De   Gouges   mobilises   the   contradictions   of   the   contingent   police   order   that  
surrounds   her   by   connecting   the   unconnected.   She   therefore   invents   an  
argument   by   relating   facts   previously   unrelated.   She   handles   the   (im)possible  
double   meanings   of   the   public   and   private,   the   universal   and   particular   and  
inclusion   and   exclusion   in   a   way   that   mixes   descriptions   and   definitions   and   she  
presupposes  equality  on  these  grounds.    
 
Lucy   divides   the   distribution   of   places   and   roles   and   tasks   anew   by   refusing   to  
follow   or   act   in   a   way   that   affirm   police   order   designations.   Her   redistributions  
not   only   allow   her   to   tread   her   own   path,   but   also   open   up   the   possibility   of  
another   time   and   place   within   the   located   time   and   place.   She   lives   an   impossible  
transformation   by   contesting   the   lines   of   post-­‐apartheid   sensibility   and   as   an  
alternative  figure  of  division,  she  holds  open  the  possibility  of  voice.    
 
The  statements  of  Abahlali  baseMjondolo  represent  a  refusal  to  simply  accept  the  
distributions   of   the   dominant   political   discourse   that   sees   the   movement   as  
ignorant  and  unable  to  understand  the  complex  mechanisms  of  governance.  They  
rather   insist   that   their   voices   count   and   that   their   struggle   is   political   –   refusing  
intellectual   and   consensual   authority   that   defines   what   people   should   and   should  
not   do   and   who   should   think   and   not   think.   Within   their   demonstration   and  

226  
 
sustained   struggle   they   incite   and   represent   to   others   that   there   is   nothing  
natural  about  their  position  within  the  societal  order.    
 
Bhubaneswari  overturns  certain  readings  that  would  see  her  through  the  lens  of  
masculinst  assumptions.  A  retelling  of  her  story  demonstrates  how  a  politics  can  
be   thought   through   instances   of   impossible   voicing.   The   recording   of   non-­‐speech  
acts  invalidates  those  frameworks  that  would  see  them  as  noise  and  not  political  
voice.   These   figures   and   statements   all   in   some   way   traced   and   mapped  
redistributions   that   can   possibly   disclose   and   reveal   the   way   in   which   voice   is  
freed   when   it   refuses   to   be   reduced   to   the   space-­‐times   and   locales   of   sensible  
configuration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

227  
 
  
CHAPTER  6  
Conclusion:  Retracing  the  way  Towards  the  Possibility  of  Voice  
 
It   is   mentioned   in   the   first   chapter   that   this   thesis   involves   making   sense   of   the  
notion  of  political  voice.  More  specifically,  it  involves  a  reflection  on  voice  through  
the   lens   of   the   politics   of   Jacques   Rancière,   against   the   background   of   the  
difficulties  surrounding  voicing  as  it  pertains  to  many  South  African  women.  It  is  
also  mentioned  that  the  thesis  does  not  involve  formulating  concrete  steps  in  an  
effort   to   go   forward.   Rather,   my   exploration   of   Rancière’s   work   on   politics,  
against  the  specific  background  sketched  in  chapter  one,  comprises  of  a  journey  
that  ultimately  points  me  to  new  insights  and  ways  of  understanding  the  notion  
of   political   voice   as   well   as   the   way   in   which   political   voice   relates   to   my  
discussion   of   women   and   the   specific   disconnect   that   comes   into   play   when  
considering   some   of   the   most   pressing   issues   that   many   South   Africa   women  
face.    
 
As  explained  in  the  second  chapter,  Rancière  does  not  conceive  of  politics  along  
social  conditions  or  identity  categories.  Rather,  what  matters  is  equality.  As  Clarke  
confirms  with  regards  to  the  social  category  of  “women”  and  Rancière’s  thinking:  
“[W]hile  […]  disagreements  may  invoke  the  name  of  a  particular  social  category  
(‘women’),  it  is  an  error  in  Rancière’s  view  to  understand  this  name  as  a  reference  
to   a   prior   community   or   social   body”.1116   Indeed,   Rancière’s   thinking   on   politics  
points   to   localised,   contextual   and   individual   thinking   and   theorising   and   my  
exploration  here  opens  up  the  question  of  how  we  are  to  trace  new  topographies  
of  the  visible  and  sayable  and  of  how  we  are  to  think  about  contexts  of  inequality  
as   it   relates   to   many   women.   Such   thinking   does   not   require   an   expression   of   a  
social   category   or   a   unified   self.   Rather,   it   requires   expressions   in   relation   to  
equality,   in   relation   to   new   categories   and   identifications   and   in   relation   to   the  
questioning   and   interrogating   of   gaps   between   universal   categories   and   lived  
realities.   Rancière’s   politics   therefore   points   to   the   possibility   of   new  

                                                                                                           
1116
Clarke C “Ranciere, Politics and the Social Question” in Davis O (ed.) (2013) 15.

228  
 
configurations   of   voice   and   of   voicing   as   a   politicising   gesture.   In   order   to  
conclude   in   the   section   below,   I   highlight   some   of   the   most   significant   lines   of  
thinking  opened  up  by  my  reflection  on  voice.  
 
In   exploring   Rancière’s   politics   by   way   of   the   concepts   of   “the   police   order”,  
“politics/equality”,   “the   political   subject”,   “the   miscount   and   the   wrong”   and  
“the   distribution   of   the   sensible”,   it   becomes   clear   that   within   a   Rancièrian  
framework,   politics   is   the   very   struggle   over   or   for   voice.   Politics   is   the   process  
that  breaks  apart  the  various  obstacles  that  confront  exercises  of  political  voicing.  
Moments   of   political   voicing   runs   counter   to   the   police   order   and   the   various  
categories  and  configurations  of  the  distribution  of  the  sensible  by  confronting  it  
with   a   different   configuration.   Politics   radically   disputes   the   frameworks   that  
determine  who  and  what  can  be  heard  and  seen  in  what  contexts.  The  possession  
of   political   voice   is   conditioned   upon   the   possibility   of   appearance   in   realms   of  
intelligibility,   perceptibility   and   visibility.   Voicing   becomes   the   moment   wherein  
the   properties   of   space,   the   possibilities   of   time   and   the   formation   of   identities  
and   locales   are   overturned.   Political   voicing   consists   of   inventing   worlds,  
arguments   and   supplementary   names   and   identities.   When   analysing   Rancière’s  
formulation   of   politics   against   the   background   of   the   disconnect   and   difficulties  
of  voice  as  it  pertains  to  the  contexts  of  many  South  African  women,  the  notion  
of   consensus   highlights   the   fact   that   legal   and   institutional   mechanisms   of  
government   and   the   broader   protocols   of   the   community   cannot   give   rise   to  
political   voicing   properly.   These   mechanisms,   rather   than   giving   rise   to   politics,  
establish   a   discourse   of   pragmatic   management.   Further,   the   policy   and   legal  
mechanisms  of  government  as  well  as  the  shared  norms  of  activism  give  rise  to  a  
specific  logic  or  orientation  towards  the  sensible  world.  As  mentioned,  women’s  
broader   issues   and   gender   challenges   are   within   the   public   realm,   but   they  
themselves,  as  individuals,  bodies  and  beings,  are  somehow  beyond  the  realm  of  
relevance,   living   in   abject   poverty   and   in   constant   fear   of   sexual   violence.   Many  
women   cannot   therefore   politically   appear   or   be   visible   to   the   extent   of   their  
concrete   contexts   being   transformed.   The   challenges   facing   South   African  
women,   when   viewed   through   the   lens   of   the   police   order   becomes   issues   that  

229  
 
has   been   counted,   taken   into   account   and   named.   As   such,   they   are   neutralised  
and   naturalised-­‐   not   open   to   dispute   and   contestation,   litigation   and   controversy.  
The  first  research  question  stated  in  chapter  one  of  the  thesis  is:  What  directions  
for   thought   and   useful   lines   of   thinking   are   opened   up   by   an   exploration   of   the  
work   of   Rancière?   I   argue   in   chapter   two   that   the   distribution   of   the   sensible  
becomes  valuable  as  mechanism  and  concept,  as  idea  and  tool.  The  topography  
of   the   visible   and   sayable   provides   a   ground   from   where   to   think   through   and  
intervene   in   the   structures   that   set   up   the   well-­‐ordered   partitions   of   voice   and  
silence.   More   importantly,   Rancière’s   work   on   politics   allows   us   to   ask   to   what  
extent   certain   mechanisms   and   societal   consensus   becomes   part   of   the   inner  
logic  of  the  police  order  and  as  such  contributes  to  silencing.  Policy  and  juridical  
frameworks  as  well  as  the  shared  norms  of  society  create  forms  of  inclusion  and  
exclusion.  These  frameworks  produce  spaces  of  silence.  It  selectively  frames  and  
interprets,   lending   an   air   of   inevitability   and   postulating   the   given   or   “the   way  
things  are”.  
 
In  chapter  three,  I  explain  the  fact  that  Rancière’s  formulations  on  politics  were  
built   on   his   encounters   with   the   figures   of   Joseph   Jacocot   and   Gabriel   Gauny.  
Radical   intellectual   equality   resulted   in   the   political   presupposition   of   equality.  
Equality,  declared  from  the  outset,  is  a  destabilising  force  that  discloses  political  
opportunities  of  emancipation  against  institutional  power  and  postulates  poetry,  
invention,  thought  and  creation.  Equality  is  used  to  make  space  for  politics.  Gauny  
and   the   other   worker-­‐poets   displaced   distinctions   and   thereby   created  
possibilities  for  voicing.  These  figures  displaced  predestined  spaces,  places,  times,  
identities   and   in   this   regard   voicing   consists   of   a   radical   redistribution   of   spatio-­‐
temporal   locales.   The   rejection   of   identities   stamped   on   bodies   by   dominant  
discourses   reveals   a   space   where   voice   can   be   radically   reconfigured.   The  
discussions  in  chapter  three  give  rise  to  the  question  of  how  we  are  to  approach  
the   notion   of   political   voice   against   the   background   of   the   difficulties,  
complexities  and  precariousness  of  voicing  when  it  comes  to  many  South  African  
women.   Within   a   Rancièrian   understanding,   characters,   concepts   and   ways   of  
writing  are  framed  in  such  a  way  so  as  to  refute  various  lines  of  thinking.  Writing  

230  
 
becomes   an   aesthetic-­‐political   expanding   of   perception   that   can   divide   the  
capacities  of  voice  and  silence  anew.  Within  Rancière’s  conception  of  politics  our  
thinking   on   voice   and   our   writing   about   voice   highlights   the   fragility   of   voice.   It  
was   mentioned   that   voice   cannot   emerge   from   a   proper   body,   in   its   proper  
location   tied   to   specific   forms   of   speech.   It   cannot   be   traced   along   the   lines   of  
established   categories.   Our   approaches   are   in   themselves   political   practices   and  
therefore   require   dissensual   methods   that   invent   new   forms   of   sensible  
structures  from  where  to  engage.  
 
In   chapter   four   I   discuss   Gayatri   Chakravorty   Spivak’s   essay   “Can   the   Subaltern  
Speak?”  An  analysis  of  Spivak’s  essay  highlights  the  fact  that  women  in  the  global  
South  are  confronted  by  a  particular  set  of  difficulties  when  it  comes  to  political  
voicing.   The   discourses   of   masculinity,   patriarchy   and   imperialism   serves   to,   in  
Spivak’s   analysis,   silence   the   voices   of   women.   Against   the   background   of   the  
voices   of   South   African   women   Spivak   also   highlights   in   what   way   mechanisms   of  
human   rights   and   gender   equality   serve   to   maintain   the   status   quo   rather   than  
contributing  to  the  creation  of  spaces  where  voices  can  be  revealed.  Spivak  warns  
against   the   dangers   of   representation   and   underlines   that   “speaking”   always  
already   belongs   to   an   existing   structure   of   domination.   When   reading   Spivak’s  
assertions   through   the   lens   of   Rancière’s   politics,   it   would   seem   as   if,   from   this  
perspective,  the  subaltern  can  speak  through  radical  forms  of  equality.  Rancière’s  
politics  emphasises  how  voicing  is  about  disidentification  and  the  delegitimation  
of  speaking  positions.  Although  voicing  functions  within  the  police  order  that  we  
must   live   in,   we   can   upset   the   order   of   the   police’s   discourse   and   mobilise  
obligations  to  hear.  Equality  can  give  rise  to  paradoxical  confusing  identities  that  
work  in-­‐between  dominant  political  spheres,  names  and  spaces.  The  subaltern  is  
confronted  by  dominant  established  frameworks  and  discourses  that  function  in  
certain   circumstances   to   efface   voice,   but   voicing   can   occur   by   way   of   the  
disembodiment  of  the  subaltern  from  the  discourses  that  produce  her.  Rancière’s  
politics   points   to   the   question   of   how   we   close   off   opportunities   for   equality   in  
our   theorising   and   shifts   the   point   of   focus   to   the   possibility   of   voices   declaring  
equality.    

231  
 
  
In   chapter   five   I   attempt   to   trace   redistributions   of   the   sensible   as   a   way   of  
further   reflecting   on   the   notion   of   voice.   Reacting   against   the   difficulties  
surrounding   the   political   voicing   and   visibility   of   many   South   African   women  
sketched   out   in   the   first   chapter,   I   explore   certain   figures   that   map   different  
trajectories   of   the   visible   and   sayable.     Highlighting   verifications   of   equality   and  
valorising  redistributions  of  the  sensible,  these  figures  give  rise  to  voicing  thought  
not   to   exist.   De   Gouges   demonstrates   the   invention   that   is   characteristic   to  
Rancière’s   political   subject.   Working   in-­‐between   and   handling   double   meanings,  
she   presented   a   political   case   for   women   to   be   counted   as   having   the   right   to  
participate   in   politics.   Inventing   an   argument   and   the   ground   from   which   this  
argument   counts,   De   Gouges   divides   the   parameters   of   inclusion   and   exclusion  
anew.   Lucy   similarly   divides   anew   by   acting   and   speaking   in   a   way   that   point   to  
another  time  and  place  and  another  way  of  living.  Lucy’s  voice  cannot  simply  be  
located.   She   resists   easy   readings   and   as   such   becomes   an   alternative   figure   of  
division.   The   political   statements   of   Abahlali   baseMjondolo   represent   a  
declaration   of   equality   that   lays   the   contingency   of   inequality   bare.   Against  
dominant   configurations   that   would   see   them   unable   to   understand   the  
mechanism   of   government   and   governance,   Abahlali   sustains   struggle   and  
engagement,  stating  that  they  also  think  and  that  they  cannot  easily  be  confined  
to   the   peripheries   of   the   city.   The   discussion   of   Bhubaneswari   revealed   the  
politics   of   voice.   A   different   reading   doesn’t   attempt   to   make   Bhubaneswari  
speak,  but  rather  demonstrates  that  politics  work  between  the  lines  of  what  can  
be  seen  and  interpreted  as  voice  and  what  cannot.  An  alternative  telling  therefore  
reveals   an   impossible   voicing   that   maps   a   different   relation   between   voice   and  
silence.  
 
Continuously   working   against   the   grain   of   established   frameworks   of   visibility,  
intelligibly  and  perceptibility,  Rancière’s  thinking  opens  up  a  different  framework  
from   where   to   consider   what   it   means   to   speak.   He   invites   us   to   contemplate,  
under  the  presupposition  of  equality,  new  ways  of  acting,  speaking  and  doing  in  
order   to   displace   current   norms   of   voice.   Mapping   times,   places,   spaces,  

232  
 
capacities   and   sensible   distributions,   his   politics   implicitly   raises   the   question   of  
how  we  are  to  continue  to  resist  the  established  formations  of  voice.  
 
It  was  mentioned  in  chapter  one  that  Rancière’s  work  on  politics  is  but  one  way  in  
which   to   imagine   the   notion   of   political   voice.   After   exploring   Rancière’s  
formulations,   this   description   becomes   even   more   accurate.   In   the   context   of  
Rancière’s   conception   of   politics,   implicit   in   the   notion   voice,   is   imagination.  
Rancière   points   us   to   a   radical,   dissensual,   egalitarian   call   to   contest   the   very  
definitions   of   what   it   means   to   have   a   voice.     Politics   is   the   process   of   inventing   a  
voice.   We   always   have   invention   at   our   disposal;   invention   against   the   way   it   is,  
against   inevitability   and   naturalisation,   against   the   mechanisms   of   silence   and  
against  the  domain  of  the  impossible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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Rancière   J   Disagreement:   Politics   and   Philosophy   trans.   Rose   J   Minneapolis:  
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Rancière   J   Dissensus:   On   Politics   and   Aesthetics   Cocoran   S   (ed.)   London:  
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Rancière  J  The  Emancipated  Spectator  trans.  Elliot  G  London:  Verso  2009.  
 
Rancière   J   The   Flesh   of   Words:   The   Politics   of   Writing   trans.   Mandell   C   Stanford:  
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Rancière  J  The  Future  of  the  Image  trans.  Elliot  G  London:  Verso  2007.  
 
Rancière  J  Hatred  of  Democracy  trans.  Cocoran  S  London:  Verso  2006.  
 
Rancière   J   The   Ignorant   Schoolmaster:   Five   Lessons   in   Intellectual   Emancipation  
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Rancière   J   The   Names   of   History:   On   the   Poetics   of   Knowledge   trans.   Melehy   H  
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Rancière  J  The  Nights  of  Labor:  The  Worker’s  Dream  in  Nineteenth-­‐Century   France  
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Rancière  J  On  the  Shores  of  Politics  trans.  Heron  L  London:  Verso  1995.  
 
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Rancière  J  The  Politics  of  Literature  trans.  Rose  J  Cambridge:  Polity  2011.  
 
Rancière   J   Short   Voyages   to   the   Land   of   the   People   trans.   Swenson   J   Stanford:  
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Rancière  J  Althusser’s  Lesson  trans.  Battista  E  London:  Continuum  2011.  
 
Rancière   J   The   Aesthetic   Unconscious   trans.   Keates   D,   Swenson   J   Cambridge:  
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Rancière   J   Chronicles   of   Consensual   Times   trans.   Cocoran   S   London:   Continuum  
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Rancière  J  Malaise  Dans  L’esthètique  Paris:  Galilée  1995.  
 
Rancière  J  “The  Method  of  Equality:  An  Answer  to  some  Questions”  in  Rockhill  G  
&   Watts   P   (eds.)   Jacques   Rancière:   History,   Politics,   Aesthetics   Durham,   NC:   Duke  
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Swenson   J   “Style   Indirect   Libre”   in   Rockhill   G   &   Watts   P   (eds.)   Jacques   Rancière:  
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Unger  R  The  Critical  Legal  Studies  Movement  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press  
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Van   Marle   K   (ed.)   Refusal,   Transition   and   Post-­‐Apartheid   Law   Stellenbosch:   Sun  
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Walsh  D  Women’s  Rights  in  Democratizing  States:  Just  Debate  and  Gender  Justice  in  
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Bohler-­‐Muller   N   “Other   possibilities?   Postmodern   feminist   legal   theory   in   South  
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Botha  H  “Equality,  plurality  and  structural  power”  South  African  Journal  on  Human  
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Studies  (2010)  LXIV  178-­‐191.  
 
Dasgupta   S   “Words,   bodies,   time:   Queer   theory   before   and   after   itself”  
Borderlands  (2009)  8  1-­‐20.  
 
Dillon   M   “A   passion   for   the   (im)possible:   Jacques   Rancière,   equality,   pedagogy  
and  the  messianic”  European  Journal  of  Political  Theory  (2005)  4  429-­‐452.  
 
Froneman   J   “Legal   reasoning   and   legal   culture:   Our   ‘vision’   of   law”   Stellenbosch  
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Hallward   P   “Jacques   Rancière   and   the   subversion   of   mastery”   Paragraph:   A  
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Harris   A   “Race   and   essentialism   in   feminist   legal   theory”   Stanford   Law   Review  
(1990)  42  581-­‐616.  
 
Jooste   Y   “Thinking   two   worlds   into   one:   The   ‘distribution   of   the   sensible’   and  
women’s  renegotiation”  Stellenbosch  Law  Review  (2013)  24  528-­‐537.  
 
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Langa   P   “Transformative   constitutionalism”   Stellenbosch   Law   Review   (2006)   17  
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Liebenberg   S   “Towards   a   transformative   adjudication   of   socio-­‐economic   rights”  
(2007)  Speculum  Juris  21  41-­‐59.  
 
May  T  “Jacques  Rancière  and  the  ethics  of  equality”  SubStance  (2007)  113  20-­‐36.  
 
May   T   “There   are   no   Queers:   Jacques   Rancière   and   post-­‐identity   politics”  
Borderlands  (2009)  8  1-­‐17.  
 
Moseneke   D   “The   Bram   Fischer   Memorial   Lecture:   Transformative   adjudication”  
South  African  Journal  of  Human  Rights  (2002)  14  314.  

240  
 
  
Parry   B   “Problems   in   current   theories   of   colonial   discourse”   Oxford   Literary  
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Pelletier  C  “Rancière  and  the  poetics  of  the  social  sciences”  International  Journal  
of  Research  and  Method  in  Education  (2009)  32  267-­‐284.  
 
Pieterse   M   “What   do   we   mean   when   we   talk   about   transformative  
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Rancière  J  “Politics,  identification  and  subjectivization”  October  (1992)  61  58-­‐64.  
 
Rancière   J   “Who   is   The   Subject   of   the   Rights   of   Man?”   South   Atlantic   Quarterly  
(2004)  103  297-­‐310.  
 
Rancière   J   “Literature,   politics,   aesthetics:   Approaches   to   democratic  
disagreement”  SubStance  (2000)  29  3-­‐24.    
 
Rancière  J  “Thinking  between  disciplines:  An  aesthetics  of  knowledge”  Parrhesia  
(2006)  1  1-­‐12.  
 
Rancière   J   “The   myth   of   the   artisan:   Critical   reflections   on   a   category   of   social  
history”  International  Labor  and  Working-­‐Class  History  (1983)  24  1-­‐16.  
 
Roux   T   “Transformative   constitutionalism   and   the   best   interpretation   of   the  
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Sanders   M   “Disgrace”   Interventions:   International   Journal   of   Postcolonial   Studies  
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Schaap  A  “Enacting  the  right  to  have  rights:  Jacques  Rancière’s  critique  of  Hannah  
Arendt”  European  Journal  of  Political  Theory  (2011)  10  23-­‐45.  
 
Selmeczi  A  “Dis/placing  political  illiteracy:  The  politics  of  intellectual  equality  in  a  
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Movements  (2014)  6  230-­‐265.  
 
Shetty  S  &  Bellamy  E  “Postcolonialism’s  archive  fever”  Diacritics  (2000)  30  25-­‐48.  
 
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241  
 
Spivak  GC  “Ethics  and  politics  in  Tagore,  Coetzee  and  certain  scenes  of  teaching”  
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law”  South  African  Public  Law  (2012)  27  560-­‐572.  
 
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Landry   D   &   Maclean   G   “Subaltern   Talk”   interview   with   Spivak   GC   in   Landry   D   &  
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Official  website  of  Abahlali  baseMjondolo:  Abahlali.org  
 
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Arsenjuk  L  “On  Jacques  Rancière”  Fronesis  (2005)  19/20  available  online  at:    
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242  
 
Butler   M   &   Pithouse   R   “Lessons   from   eThekwini:   Pariahs   Hold   Their   Ground  
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De   Boever   A   “Feminism   after   Rancière:   Women   in   J.M   Coetzee   and   Jeff   Wall”  
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Hlongwa   M   “The   No   Land,   No   House,   No   Vote   Campaign   Still   On   For   2009”  
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Poni  M  “Public  Violence”  2009  available  online  at:  
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Rancière  J  “The  Thinking  of  Dissensus:  Politics  as  Aesthetics”  paper  presented  at  
the  conference  Post-­‐structuralism  and  Radical  Politics  Goldsmiths  College,  London  
(16-­‐17  September  2003)  available  at:  
http://homepages.gold.ac.uk/psrpsg/conference  /fidelity/html.  
 
Ross   D   “Politics   and   aesthetics,   or,   transformations   of   Aristotle   in   Bernard  
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Sellberg   K   “Sublime   gender   transposition:   The   reformed   Platonism   of   Jacques  
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and  Culture  (2011)  19  available  online  at:  
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Snodgrass   L   “South   Africa:   A   dangerous   place   to   be   poor,   black   and   a   woman”  
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africa-­‐a-­‐dangerous-­‐place-­‐to-­‐be-­‐poor-­‐black-­‐and-­‐a-­‐woman-­‐47287.  
 
Zikode  S  “We  are  the  third  force”  October,  2006  available  online  at:  
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Dissertations:  
 
Selmeczi  A  “We  Are  The  People  Who  Do  Not  Count:  Thinking  the  Distribution  of  
the  Biopolitics  of  Abandonment”  PhD  thesis,  Central  European  University,  March  
2012.  
 
 
 
 

243