EDUZ 9802 Briefing Note 2 (2001)

ACCOUNTABILITY - Public Control of

Executive Bodies
A briefing note

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

1. WHAT INFORMATION SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC?

2. MAKING INFORMATION ACCESSIBLE

3. MAKING COMPLAINTS and GETTING SATISFACTION

4. HOW DO WE ENSURE THAT THE SERVICES ARE WORKING

EFFECTIVELY?

5. LOOKING AT SYSTEMS FAILURE

6. WHO IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING and MEASURING

GOOD PERFORMANCE?

Ronald G Young Tashkent – 6 February 2001

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INTRODUCTION
Democracy requires that the decisions of both politicians and officials are -
• transparent
• legal
• subject to critical scrutiny.

This involves the establishment and effective operation of several systems -

1. the effective operation of an effective system of scrutiny of the Executive by
the elected representatives of the Council or parliament (eg specialist
committees and question time).
2. systems of reporting by public organisations about their activities and
performance
3. legal systems to allow appeal about the legality of decisions (courts)
4. audit systems to check the financial probity of public organisations - and, more
recently, to analyse whether their policies give “value-for-money”
5. inspectorates to ensure that the activities of the services managed by them are
consistent with (any) agreed national standards.
6. Complaint and Redress systems - such as the Ombudsman and Citizen Charters
7. Media coverage of these issues

There are three different levels which should be the subject of scrutiny - policy,
management and practice.
Executive; Courts
Elected Ministers
Representatives
(Parliament) Policy

Management Audit
Practice Inspectorates
Professional
Tribunals
Bodies

Complaints to
Ombudsman
Annual
Reports
Public
Some important questions which arise in the development of such systems are -
• How does one define information which is not "in the public interest" to publish - eg
security issues and personal information? Who decides on such issues?
• How can complex matters be made comprehensible to the public at large?
• how should policies and practice best be monitored?
• How do the public voice their complaints and get results?
• How can the independence which such systems require best be established and
protected?

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This briefing note gives a broad indication of the sort of institutions and mechanisms
Britain has set up to deal with such questions.

1. WHAT INFORMATION SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC?

There are two general arguments for governments to be open about both their policy
deliberations – and how effective public spending on specific items is. There are also two
arguments in favour of restricting the right of the public to specific bits of “information”

1.1 Consultation
Governments have not generally favoured letting the public know that there are several
ways (options) of dealing with an issue. They have preferred to create the impression
that there is only one effective policy. Increasingly, however, they publish
"consultative" documents, defining any given problem; indicating different ways of
dealing with it; justifying their preferred option and inviting comment. That way they
give themselves the possibility of improving policies - and of getting wider acceptance of
the chosen one.

1.2 Performance
Public organisations seem to have an aversion to publicity about their performance.
The initial instinct is to publish nothing. When they eventually realise the benefit of good
public relations, they continue to control information by printing only the good news. It
is only at the third stage that they start to treat the public as adults - and they generally
have to be forced to do so. It required legislation, for example, before British local
Councils sent out clear statements to the taxpayers on where their money went - and
before they started to publish clear annual reports of their activities (see 2.2 below).
More recently still, successive British governments have published comparative statistics
on the performance of schools. This, in conjunction with the parental rights to change
schools and greater autonomy in school management, has put powerful pressure on
schools and teachers to improve performance. And an independent analysis has just
been published in Britain which, for the first time, gives a “league Table” of the
performance of hospitals1
A balance has to be struck always between the public's "right to know" and "protection of
state interests". Advance information, for example, about tax changes is generally
discouraged. In the last decade policy guidance has often been enshrined in -

1.3 Freedom of Information Laws

These set out the areas of state activity which remain confidential - and beyond the scope
of publicity (eg defence issues). And the police are understandably reluctant to release
information about "operational management" even to elected representatives. The
problem is giving practical definition to such a concept! The British government has
been trying for the past couple of years to agree such a statement2. It has not so far
succeeded. This should not, however, discourage particularly transition governments
from demonstrating their real commitment to openness. The media need hard
information - not press handouts - if they are to play their democratic role.

1
see the “Good Hospital Guide” produced by the Dr Foster foundation (on www.drfoster.co.uk)
2
For a very comprehensive discussion of the issues involved see Freedom of Information - the Continuing
Debate (House of Commons research Paper 99/61) and The Freedom of Information Bill (H of C research
Paper 99/98)

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1.4 Libel Laws
In some transition countries, the media have celebrated their new-found freedom by
personalised attacks on politicians. This can breed cynicism in the public about the
democratic process. On the other hand there are too many examples (eg Turkey) where
legitimate and necessary policy criticism is muzzled and opposition figures are thrown in
prison for carrying out their basic function of challenging those in power.

2. MAKING INFORMATION ACCESSIBLE

2.1 Making it understandable - and relevant to the citizen

Organisations tend to have their own jargon; even if they want to communicate with the
public they are not therefore very good at it.
The "Plain English" campaign has been very effective in helping to remove
mystifying technical language from documents of the private and public sector. The
organisation (an NGO) publishes guidelines; trains - and gives annual awards - both for
good practice and bad practice ("wooden spoons")

2.2 Making it objective

Organisations will naturally present good aspects and want to conceal the failures. This
is possible when the organisation has vague and general objectives. It becomes more
difficult when targets are set - or negotiated - for which they can be held accountable.
See UK Ministry and Agency Annual Reports for examples of key output measures.

2.3 Making it available

There is not much point in developing coherent statistics and attractive publications if
they are then difficult to obtain. There need to be clear codes governing the distribution
of key material - eg leaflets for the public in post offices; key documents to be placed in
all libraries etc

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3. MAKING COMPLAINTS and GETTING SATISFACTION
As the public have become more educated (not least through the media), they have
become less inclined to accept the treatment given to them by public servants - whether
administrators or professionals. Governments themselves have encouraged this eg

3.1 Ombudsman
The role of such bodies is generally to investigate complaints by individual citizens that
they have been the subject of inefficient or unfair treatment. Britain has several specialist
Ombudsmen (eg Health; Local Government). The Offices do not have powers to rectify
any mistake - but rather to recommend changes in procedure. The Uzbek Ombudsman
seems to have much wider functions than is normal elsewhere - their interest, for
example, in the rights of the handicapped are generally pursued in Britain by local Social
Services departments and by NGOs.

3.2 The British "Citizen Charters" which set out what the public can reasonably expect
from each public service (eg waiting time) - and a redress procedure which, for rail travel
for example, offers financial compensation for late trains. Other systems are -

3.3 "Peer" Review

The first stage of a complaint against a public professional (such as a doctor or social
worker) is often the procedure set up by the profession itself to ensure good standards of
practice. As examples of poor practice have multiplied, the British Medical Authority
(BMA) has put in place a stringent new system of attestation and review.

4. HOW DO WE ENSURE THAT THE SERVICES ARE WORKING

EFFECTIVELY?
Soviet countries had a highly developed system of administrative control - of both
policies and personnel. The culture was a centralised one - assuming, that is, that
wisdom and competence was at the centre and that lower levels could not really be
trusted – and that ex-ante control was needed .
OECD systems have moved away from this bureaucratic model; increasingly recognising
that lower levels of organisations and society have skills and insights which can, if given
encouragement, improve performance. And that major mistakes were more often made
at higher levels. Several types of "control" mechanism can be identified – all of which are
ex-post

4.1 Political
One of the functions of parliamentary (or local) assemblies is to challenge and control
the political executive. This requires information - and its analysis. Usual practice is to
set up specialist committees of parliament which focuses on the coherence of policies
and programmes of specific Ministries.
Such committees have their own secretariat and are chaired by an opposition member eg
in Britain
• Parliamentary Select Committees (eg on Education; Health; Defence). These
were set up experimentally in the 1970s3.

3
see Richard Chapman

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• Public Accounts Committee (which analyses programmes of public spending)
These committees have the powers to conduct public hearings; require the attendance of
civil servants and Ministers; and issue reports to which Government gives a formal
response.
Effective chairmanship of such Committees is one way of advancing one's political
career. And effectiveness means the development of bipartisan agreement.

4.2 Managerial
In Britain one of the most important development has been the work of the National
Audit Office4. This reports to the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament – not to
Government. It now employs 700 staff and not only audits the work of all public
agencies; it also carries out 50 special studies each year on “Value for money” in the
public sector. Its reports exert increasing influence.

In the past 2 decades independent public organisations have developed with the
responsibility for examining the cost-effectiveness of policies, programmes and practices
of public organisations and issuing guidance on best practice eg The Audit
Commission for Local Government and Health Service in England and
Wales

These bodies explore the operations of services from many perspectives.

The attached diagram indicates some of the questions which might be asked about
activities in the health service - and therefore identify the sort of data which needs to be
collected for effective monitoring.

4
for a description of how all this process works see the chapter by Lashmar in SIGMA paper 4 on
Management Control in Government – obtainable from website www.oecd.puma.sigma/org

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4.3 Professional Inspectorates
The focus of this work is the practice of schools and hospitals. This looks at the
performance of individuals units (eg a school), comments on performance and issues
recommendations. The inspectorate also issue guidelines on good practice. This used to
be done within the relevant Ministry but is now done more independently (see para 5
below for further discussion)
• eg Office For Standards for Teachers (OFSTED)

4.4 The Public

Curiously it is only in the past decade that it has been appreciated that the individual
citizen is effectively the most important check on the workings of the state system. Now
polls and complaint systems are used. But the information referred to in para one – and
comparative league tables on the performance of schools and hospitals gives the citizen
the power to vote with his/her feet5

5
what Hirschmann has referred to as the “exit” option – rather than that of “voice” only (see his famous
Exit, Voice and Loyalty (

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5. LOOKING AT SYSTEMS FAILURE
In particularly serious cases – where an individual failure seems to go beyond the
particular case and suggest a failure of policy or management system - the Government
will set up an independent Tribunal to examine the facts surrounding a case - and to
assess the implications for practice and management.

There have been many such reviews in Britain involving the decisions and behaviour of
care-staff in Child Care6.

Two recent examples of medical practice in Britain have horrified the nation and led
to a critical reappraisal of review systems7.
• A family doctor (Dr Shipley) was found to have systematically murdered about 20 of
his older patients over a long period8.
• A recent Tribunal report was very critical of the management systems which had
allowed an incompetent surgeon to maim many women over a period of more than a
decade. The status of surgeons discouraged people form complaining - and the
culture of professional self-defence meant that his colleagues did not articulate their
own anxieties. Strong recommendations have now been made for an independent
Institute for Clinical Standards9.

But the most serious issue which has shocked countries throughout Europe and forced
reassessments of government systems has been the BSE outbreak which has killed about
one hundred people – and affected another 100,000 in Britain.

An Independent Inquiry into the BSE (or Mad Cow) crisis was set up by the British
Government in December 1997. It was chaired by a High Court Judge and produced on
October 26 2000 a report of 16 volumes and 4,000 pages – at a cost of $20 million (the
cost to the economy of the BSE outbreak has been put at almost 9 billion dollars!10)

The report looked at the history of scientific advice and ministerial responses over a ten
year period and identified a range of professional, bureaucratic and political errors
Amongst the features identified as contributing to the failure to take appropriate action
in time were –
• Culture of secrecy in the senior civil service – the failure to share information
• The ability of the system to deliver well-drafted reports but inability to recognise
a crisis and the need to take urgent action (that is the continued lack of emphasis
in the senior civil service given to implementation11)
• Political concern to avoid panic
• The inclination to set up advisory committees (which delayed action and
confused responsibility)
• Overlap of departmental responsibilities (Agriculture and Health)
• Poor communications between departments

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7
see "Doctors' errors cost NHS £2billion a year" in Guardian 14 June 2000 - and "Blair gets tough with
doctors - "consultant is king " culture must end" in Guardian 5 June 2000
8
investigations in late 2000 have put the figure at more than 200
9
10
almost half of this from the ban on use of cattle over a 3 year period; 3 billion in lost exports
11
see the project

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Governments have become more interested in results in recent years - and have
recognised that independent evaluations have more credibility than "in-house"
assessments. Universities and Policy institutes are often commissioned by both
Government and Parliament to do such evaluations.

6. WHO IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING and MEASURING

GOOD PERFORMANCE?
This last case illustrates, in particularly stark detail, two fundamental questions about
control systems -
• Who has the ultimate responsibility for them? Ministers and Ministries - who have
executive powers? Parliament- with its responsibility to represent the public interest?
The Professions - who generally have an important role in giving practitioners their
right to practice?
• Who is best placed to carry out the detailed monitoring of performance and
standards - those in the Ministries? Independent Institutes? The professions
themselves?

The answer, at the moment, is that all have a responsibility. And that detailed
monitoring needs to be independent of the main source of power. Where that is located
will vary. In Britain the social services (Health and Education) were run from 1945 to the
mid 1980s by a triumvirate - central government; local government and the professions
themselves12. And the professions were the strongest group in the Health system.

In ex-Soviet systems the power structure has been different - and the answer to these
questions will accordingly now be different.

What matters is that oversight of performance and standards is credible.

That generally requires independence and multiple checks.

12
see Simon Jenkins Accountable to None (H Hamilton 1995)