CIV PRO (WEDNESDAY)

RULE 38

Mesina vs. Meer GR 146845 (GREG) if hindi na malinis, mesina. Jk. happy
studying.

FACTS
· Meer is a registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pandacan, Manila, evidenced
by TCT No. 158886.
o He applied for a loan to construct thereon, However, he discovered that his
TCT has been cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 166074, was issued in the
name of the sps. Bunquin.
o The latter acquired said property by virtue of a deed of sale purportedly
executed by Meer in their favor.
· Meer sought the cancellation of the TCT in the name of the sps. Bunquin and on the
same day, a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the back of TCT No. 166074.
o While the case was pending, TCT No. 166074 was cancelled and replaced by
another TCT No. 216518 issued in the name of petitioner sps. Mesina.
o It appears that the property has been conveyed to petitioners on September
28, 1993, which is prior to the annotation of lis pendens and absolute deed of
sale was also notarized on the same day, including the payment of taxes.
o However, the transfer of title from sps. Bunquin to petitioners was effected only
on June 15, 1994 because of some requirements imposed by NHA.
· RTC ruled that the alleged sale between Meer and Bunquin was fraudulent.
o However, petitioners were adjudged buyers in good faith and thus entitled to
possession of the property.
o It also ordered the spouses Bunquin to pay respondent Meer the value of the
property and damages.
o “It bears notice that defendant-spouses Mesina not only relied on what
appeared in Lerma Bunquin’s title but beyond the latter’s title and even made
verification with the NHA and sought legal advice prior to the subject
property’s purchase. Their actuations incline the court to hold and consider
that defendant-spouses Mesina acted in good faith when they acquired
subject property.”
· Meer’s MR – denied; appeal granted.
o RTC reversed and ruled that petitioners were not purchasers in good faith,
reasoning that it is the registration of the Deed of Sale, and not the date of its
consummation that will confer title to the property.
o Since the Deed of Sale was registered subsequent to the annotation of the lis
pendens, petitioners were bound by the outcome of the case.
o Petitioners appealed to the CA, CA affirmed the RTC.
 · On July 17, 2000 and after reglementary period for appeal has lapsed, petitioners filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment and prayed that CA set aside its Resolution for the
following reasons: (a) extrinsic fraud was committed which prevented petitioners from
presenting his case to the court and/or was used to procure the judgment without fair
submission of the controversy; (b) mistake and excusable negligence has prevented the
petitioner from taking an appeal within the prescribed period; and (c) petitioner has good
and substantial defense in his action.
o With respect to the first ground, petitioners argued that there has been
collusion between respondent and the Bunquins during trial of the case at the
MeTC. Had the Bunquins testified in court as to the validity of the Deed of
Sale as well as the authenticity of the respondent’s signature, petitioners
argued that the result would have been in their favor.
o Anent the second ground, petitioners averred that their failure to file the
requisite appeal on time was largely due to the delay of counsel of record to
produce the requested documents of the case.
o The CA denied the petition.
· As aptly pointed out by the respondent, the first ground raised by the petitioner spouses
should have been filed before the court of origin, the Metropolitan Court of Manila, pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as amended.
o As to the second ground, the petitioner spouses who were the prevailing party
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, did not mention the alleged
extrinsic fraud when the case was on appeal before the Regional Trial Court.
o Petitioners cannot now challenge the decision of this Court for the fraud
allegedly perpetrated in the court of origin.
o Besides, it is extremely doubtful that the remedy of a petition for relief under
Rule 38 may be availed of from a judgment of the Court of Appeals in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
· Their MR was denied also.

ISSUE Whether the petition for relief under Rule 38 a proper remedy against the judgment of
the CA promulgated in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction?

HELD

NO. Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional
circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present. Where
the defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or appeal
from the adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.

Rules of Court provide that the petition for relief must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside and must be
accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court which
rendered the decision.

As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief.
Under the old rule, petition for relief from the judgment or final order of municipal trial courts
should be filed with the regional trial court.
Petitioner argues that the present rule extends the remedy of relief to include judgments or
orders of the CA since the rule uses the phrase “any court.” Court ruled that the procedural
change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for municipal and
regional trial courts and designation of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts of record.
While Rule 38 uses the phrase “any court”, it refers only to municipal/metropolitan and regional
trial courts.

As correctly pointed out by the CA, the petitioners’ allegation of extrinsic fraud should have been
brought at issue in the MTC. If they truly believe that the default of the spouses Mesina
prejudiced their rights, they should have questioned this from the beginning but they chose to
participate in the proceedings and the MTC actually ruled in their favor.

Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from
the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence,
or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving
the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due
to mistaken mode of procedure by counsel.

Cayetano vs Ceguerra 13 SCRA 73 (JAZ)

No. L-18831, 30 Jan 1965
Paredes, J.

Direct Appeal from CFI’s Order

FACTS:
● On 15 Nov 1960, plaintiff Catalina Cayetano filed a case for foreclosure of REM
against spouses Osmundo Ceguerra and Felisa Serrano;
● Summons and copy of complaint were served to the spouses on 2 Dec 1960 and
they filed their Answer in a form of letter on 15 Dec 1960;
● In spite of the letter-answer, the spouses were declared in default upon motion of
the plaintiff thus, the latter were able to present their evidence ex parte on 7 Jan
1961;
● On 11 Jan 1961, the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff ordering the spouses to
pay P4,000 with interest and if within 90 days they failed to do so, properties in
question will be sold in public auction;
● However, such order never reached the spouses and the same was returned to
the Court, unclaimed;
● On 21 Apr 1961, a copy of Writ of Execution was served to the spouses:
○ The writ was dated 10 Feb 1961 and addressed to the Sheriff of QC
commanding him to seize goods and chattels of the spouses;
● The writ was referred to the counsel of the spouses and on 17 Jun 1961, they
presented a Petition for Relief based on the following grounds:
(1) That the answer-letter was substantial compliance with the rules, for it
contained facts upon which defendants relied upon as defenses, and if
said letter-answer did not conform with the rules, the non-conformity could
be considered “an excusable mistake” taking into account that defendants
are mere ordinary lay-men not cognozant with the intricacies of the Rules
of Court;
(2) That defendants have substantial and valid defense;
(3) That defendants have been deprived of their day in court.
● In their petition for relief, the spouses prayed that the Court, in interest of justice
to set aside the order declaring them in default and that the case be set for
hearing;
● Petition was opposed by the plaintiff claiming that: (1) declaration of default was
proper since defendants failed to present a responsive pleading and/or furnish
copy of answer-letter letter to the plaintiff; (2) that their belief that the letter-
answer was sufficient cannot be an excusable mistake; and (3) that the defenses
in the letter-answer are not only false but also not substantial or meritorious;
● On 24 Jun 1961, the Court ruled that the Petition for Relief was filed beyond the
reglementary period;
○ It appears that the first registry notice for the decision was received by
defendants on 13 Jan 1961 (5 days after the receipt of first notice, they
presumed to have received the same);
○ From 13 Jan 1961 to 17 Jun 1961 (date of filing of the Petition), more than
60 days elapsed.
● A MR was filed by the spouses arguing that they have only known about the
adverse decision of the Court on 21 Apr 1961 (57 days from 17 Jun 1961)
invoking Sec. 3, Rule 38 stating that petitions should be filed within 60 days after
petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceedings to be set aside but
the motion was denied;
● Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Petition for Relief was presented within the period provided by the
Rules.

RULING: Yes, it was filed on time.

In PHHC v Tiongco & Escasa, the Court ruled that Petition for Relief may likewise be
taken from the order of execution, inasmuch as Sec.2, Rule 38 does not only refer to
judgements, but also to orders, or any other proceedings.

In this case, from the time the spouses had actual knowledge of the order of execution
(21 Apr 1961) until the filing of the petition for relief (17 Jun 1961), only 57 days had
elapsed. It is conceded that defendants received a first registry notice on 13 Jan 1961,
but they did not claim the letter, which gave rise to the presumption that 5 days after
receipt of first notice, defendants were deemed to have received the letter. The Court
however, cannot justly attribute upon defendants actual knowledge of the decision,
because there is no showing that registry notice itself contained any indication that the
registered letter was a copy of the decision, or that the registry notice referred to the
case being ventilated.

Thus, the order denying the petition for relief and denying the MR of defendants were
set aside and the case was remanded for hearing on merits.

*The letter-answer presented to the court by ordinary layman containing recital of facts, relied
upon as defenses, was a sufficient and substantial compliance with the requirements of the
rules; after all, a liberal interpretation has always been advocated. Having filed such, the
defendants should have been entitled for hearing and cannot be declared in default. The
absence of such hearing deprived them of their day in court mounting to lack of due process
which will render all the proceedings undertaken a nullity. And if answer was not responsive, it is
the duty of the Court to apprise the defendants given that they were not lawyers.

Dirige vs. Biranye - 17 SCRA 840

No. L-22033. July 30, 1966.

MARIA FLOR V. DIRIGE, plaintiff and appellee, vs. VICTORIANO BIRANYA, defendant and
appellant,
Doctrines:

Section 7, Rule 40 of the old Rules of Court provides that once the case is docketed on appeal
to the Court of First Instance, it shall be the duty of the clerk of court to notify the parties of that
fact by registered mail, and the period for making an answer shall begin with the date of the
receipt of such notice by the defendant. This provision on notice to the parties being express
and specific, cannot be interpreted to mean that the notice can. be given to the lawyer alone.
(Ortiz vs. Mania, 93 Phil. 317). Accordingly, notice to the parties personally·not exclusively to
their attorneys·is required.

Judgments; Time to file petition for relief.· Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court, a petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the
judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after
such judgment or order was entered, or such proceeding was taken. The law does not say six
months after the date of the default order.

Entry of judgment.·The recording of the judgment or order in the book of entries

Same; Bases of relief from judgment.· Relief from judgment or order is premised on equity. It is
granted only in exceptional cases. The sine qua non conditions for proper allowance thereof
include, amongst others, excusable negligence and good and substantial defense.

Facts:

· A forcible entry case dismissed, after trial and here Plaintiff appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur.


· The registered mail containing the notice of the appealed case was was received by
Ciriaco Biranya for his father, defendant Victoriano Biranya. Defendant did not answer the
complaint.

Do note of the following dates

July 8, 1960·Date of order of default.


July 21, 1960·Judgment by default rendered.


July 21, 1960· Judgment entered.


July 25, 1960·Receipt of judgment by plaintiff.

February 22, 1961·Defendant learns of order and judgment.


February 24, 1961·Verified petition for relief from default order and judgment filed.


July 21, 1960, entry of final judgment was made by the Clerk.

On February 24, 1961, defendant petitioned for relief to set aside the default order and the
default judgment, and for a new trial.

On July 29. 1961. The trial court overturned the petition for relief. Ground therefor: from July 8,
1960 the date of the default order to February 24, 1961 when defendant moved for relief, the
six-month reglementary period had elapsed.

Defendant’s position is that the six-month period should begin to toll from the alleged date of
finality of default judgment, i.e., from August 24, 1960· 30 days after July 25, 1960, the date
when plaintiff received notice of the judgment dated July 21, 1960.

Plaintiff contends, upon the other hand, that the said six-month period should start from July 8,
1960, the date of the default order, or, at latest, from July 21, 1960, the date of the rendition of
the judgment. Because a default judgment is immediately final and executory.

Issue: Whether the petition for relief was filed within the six-month limit set forth in Section 3 of
Rule 38 of the old Rules of Court, which in part reads:

EC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.·A

petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule

must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner

learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set aside,

and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was

entered, or such proceeding was taken; x x x."


Held: The six-month period has elapsed. Defendant’s remedy is lost.

It says that petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the
judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after
such judgment or order was entered, or such proceeding was taken. The law does not say six
months after the date of the default order. No mention there is made of the date of rendition of
the judgment or order. Neither does it speak of the date of the finality of the judgment or order. It
does say, in plain terms six months after the judgment or order was entered.

If no appeal or motion for new trial is filed within the time provided in these rules, the judgment
or order shall be entered by the clerk. The recording of the judgment or order in the book of
entries of judgments shall constitute its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the
judgment or order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or order
has become final and executory"


Here, the final judgment was entered on July 21, 1960. Defendant’s petition for relief was filed
on February 24, 1961. Therefore, the six-month period has elapsed. Defendant’s remedy is lost.

Other doctrine à basically cannot invoke the son’s stomach ache/lost of the letter…. Petition for
relief from judgment is is premised on equity. It is granted only in exceptional cases. It is an act
of grace, It is not regarded with favor. The sine qua non conditions for proper allowance include,
amongst others, excusable negligence and good and substantial defense. Mere forgetfulness of
a party to an action is not sufficient ground for vacating or setting aside a judgment by default.

Tantoco vs. CA - 77 SCRA 225

FACTS:
• The record shows that in Civil Case No. 63494 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled “General Milk Co. (Phil), Inc., plaintiff, versus Arturo Tantoco, doing
business under the name of ‘Maria Belen Store’, defendant”, plaintiff therein—
hereinafter referred to as private respondent—filed on December 3, 1965 a complaint
against petitioner to recover the sum of P80,933.00, representing the value of milk
products obtained on credit by the latter from the former on various dates, plus 25% of
the said amount, which is equivalent to P20,238.25, as attorney’s fees.
• As petitioner failed to file his answer within the period prescribed by the Rules of
Court, on March 10, 1966, the trial court, at private respondent’s behest, declared the
petitioner in default and directed the private respondent to present its evidence ex parte
on March 15, 1966.
• On April 18, 1966, on private respondent’s evidence, the trial court rendered
judgment for the said respondent “ordering the defendant Arturo Tantoco, doing
business under the name of ‘Maria Belen Store’, to pay the respondent the amount of
P80,933.00, with interest at 12% per annum from October 14, 1965, the date of the
letter of demand, until fully paid, plus P1,500.00 for attorney’s fees and the costs.”
• On February 3, 1967, petitioner filed a petition to vacate the order of default, the
ex-parte judgment and the order of execution.
• On April 25, 1967, petitioner filed his answer to the complaint.
• On May 19, 1967, the trial court ordered the parties to submit evidence on the
question of whether the summons and the judgment which were issued and rendered in
the case were properly served upon the petitioner. For this purpose, the trial court
appointed a commissioner to receive the evidence of the parties.
• On February 27, 1968, the trial court denied the petition for relief, and also
rejected answer filed on April 25, 1967.
• petitioner claims that he filed his petition for relief from the default judgment
dated April 18, 1966, within the period set forth in Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner filed his petition for relief from the default judgment dated
April 18, 1966, within the period set forth in Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

RULING: No, it was filed beyond the reglementary period.

“SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.—A petition provided for in
either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days
after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or other proceedings to be set aside,
and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.”
The record shows that petitioner filed his petition for relief on February 3, 1967. He
admitted having learned of the default judgment on September 19, 1966, when the
same was being executed by respondent sheriff. Under the aforequoted rule, petitioner
had sixty (60) days after September 19, 1966 within which to file his petition for relief.
But he filed his petition for relief only on February 3, 1967, 136 days, or 4 months and
16 days after he knew on September 19, 1966 of said default judgment.
Then again, there is evidence in the record that the default judgment from which the
petitioner seeks to be relieved was entered on June 2, 1966 (pp. 46, 49, Brief for
Respondents, p. 432, rec.). Six (6) months, or 180 days, from June 2, 1966, would be
November 29, 1966. Petitioner filed his petition for relief on February 3, 1967, or after
the lapse of 245 days, or 8 months and 5 days from June 2, 1966.

Hence, petitioner’s remedy is totally lost.

WE reiterate what WE said in the case of Dirige vs. Biranya (L-22033, July 30, 1966, 17
SCRA 840, 850):

“We therefore rule that a petition for relief must, amongst others, be filed within six
months from the date judgment is entered. Rulings inconsistent herewith are hereby
expressly overruled ”

Petitioner invokes the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of People’s Homesite
& Housing Corporation vs. Tiongco (12 SCRA 471, 475, where, despite the fact that the
petition for relief was presented outside of the reglementary period of sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, nevertheless, due to peculiar circumstances obtaining in
the case, WE considered the rule to have been substantially complied with and the
petition for relief from judgment was seasonably filed. In that case, the delay in the filing
of the petition for relief consisted only of two (2) days from receipt of the judgment by
defendant’s former counsel.

In the present case, as pointed out above, the delay consisted of seventy-seven (77)
days, or two (2) months and seventeen (17) days after petitioner learned of the
judgment, and sixty-six (66) days, or two (2) months and six (6) days, or two (2) months
and six (6) days, after entry of judgment. Furthermore, relief from judgment or order,
being an act of grace, is premised on equity. It should, therefore, be granted only in
exceptional cases (Dirige vs. Biranya, supra). On top of this, petitioner must prove
excusable negligence and the existence of good and substantial defense.

Petitioner claims that he became sick after he consulted then Assistant Fiscal Magat
(now City Court Judge Magat) of Manila. Nothing in the record suggests how long his
sickness disabled him or prevented him from filing a timely petition for relief. Not even a
medical certificate did he produce to prove his claim. In sum, he failed to make a clear
case of excusable negligence. He has not discharged his burden to clear himself of the
imputation of want of due diligence. His case must therefore fall.

Even the merits of his alleged good and substantial defense will not carry the day for
him. He claims “the goods mentioned in plaintiff’s ten causes of action and received in
concept of consignment credit were all burned in the fire of July 31, 1966”, through no
fault of his but by force majeure (Joint Affidavit of Merit, p. 32, rec.). In effect, he wants
this Court to believe that since July 6, 1964, when he began receiving milk products
from private respondent tip to and including September 4, 1965, when he received the
last shipment of 200 cans of Liberty Milk, worth P5,230.00, he never made any sale,
until ALL were burned in said fire of July 31, 1966.
Again, while it is true that petitioner stated in his affidavit of merit that a certificate was
issued by the chief of police of Malolos, Bulacan, the record does not bear any such
certificate. WE therefore have no means of knowing just what that certificate was all
about. Neither does the record show that the goods lost in said fire were precisely those
consigned to him during the period from July 6, 1964 to September 4, 1965 (Complaint,
pp. 63-66, ibid.), nor does it show any evidence of the extent of his actual loss, as
reflected in his income tax return for the year 1966.

Funtila vs. A 93 SCRA 251 (NICH)

Lamberto Funtila, vs. CA and Lolita Martin (No. L-49829. 25 Sep 1979)
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of CA
Melencio-Herrera, J.:

Facts:
· On 14 Aug 1973, petitioner filed with the CFI of Rizal for the recovery of damages for the injuries
sustained by his minor daughter who was allegedly thrown out of a public utility bus owned by private
respondent. Private respondent, however, denied ownership of the bus.
· On 4 June 1976, the trial Court issued an Order dismissing the Complaint for failure of petitioner
and his counsel to attend the hearing set on said date.
· On 8 July 1976, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that his counsel’s failure to
attend the hearing on 4 June 1976 was due to the fact that he became indisposed the day before (3 June
1976) because of high blood pressure and was advised by his physician to rest; and that his counsel sent
a telegram on the same day requesting for a resetting of the hearing of the case but that said telegram
was received by the Court only on 7 June 1976.
· In an Order dated 27 Sep 1976 (and 14 Dec 1976), the trial Court issued an Order denying 2
Motions for Reconsideration for the reasons that the same was not under oath and that it did not contain
any affidavit of merit
· After denying 2 prior motions for reconsideration (27 Sep 1976 and 14 Dec 1976), of the petitioner
it was on 23 Dec 1977, that the trial Court, finding that petitioner had already presented 3 witnesses
and substantial and voluminous exhibits, and in compliance with the mandate that the Rules of
Court shall be liberally construed granted the Petition for Relief and directed petitioner to continue
with the presentation of his evidence on 27 Jan 1978.
· Private respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
with the CA contending that the trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in granting the Petition for Relief for the reason that the same was filed beyond
the period provided for in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
· On 20 Nov 1978, the CA set aside the Order of the trial Court, granting the Petition for Relief, as well
as the Order dated 30 March 1978 denying private respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, in view of
petitioner’s admission that the Petition for Relief was filed 101 days after his receipt of the Order
dismissing the Complaint and, therefore, beyond the period of sixty days provided for in Section 3, Rule
38 of the Rules of Court.
· Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 12 Jan
1979.
 · Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.


Issue: Whether the 101-day filing period of petition for relief may be considered as having substantially
complied with the Rules and therefore seasonably filed. YES

Ruling:
A petition for relief though filed out of time may be acted upon favorably where petitioner, complainant
below for damages due to reckless imprudence, had already presented the substance of his evidence when
the judge ordered the case dismissed for failure of petitioner and his counsel to attend a scheduled hearing.
In this case, the petitioner had already presented the substance of his evidence in support of his claim for
damages against private respondent and was, in fact, about to present his last witness at the hearing on 4
June 1976 when the dismissal order was issued. In fact, due to the non-appearance by plaintiff and his
counsel on said date, private respondent merely moved that trial be considered terminated and the case
deemed submitted. However, since there was, as yet, no offer of evidence by petitioner, the trial Court opted
to dismiss the Complaint. Indeed, this case could have seen a speedier disposition on the merits if the trial
Court had reconsidered its Order of dismissal, particularly, since petitioner twice sought to have the Order
dismissing his Complaint reconsidered. While it is the duty of judges to terminate cases with promptness and
dispatch, a reminder is not amiss that inconsiderate dismissals are not a solution to congestion of Court
dockets.
From a strictly legal perspective, there can be no gainsaying that the Petition for Relief was presented out
of time, particularly in the light of doctrinal jurisprudence which mandates that the two reglementary periods
provided for in Section 3, Rule 38, of sixty-days after a petitioner learns of the Order complained of, and six-
months after the order or proceeding has taken place, must both be taken into consideration. However, in the
absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the
merits, and final disposition of cases before the court.”
Due to the very peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, the Petition for Relief
may be considered as having substantially complied with the Rules and, therefore, seasonably filed.
Petitioner’s minor daughter had suffered injuries. He was almost through with the presentation of his
evidence except for one witness.
Therefore, as a matter of conscience, in keeping with the demands of equity and to attain substantial
justice, we except this case from the strict operation of the Rules. Procedural technicality should not be made
a bar to the vindication of a legitimate grievance. When such technicality “deserts from being an aid to
justice,” the Courts are justified in excepting from its operation a particular case.

The questioned Decision and Resolution of the CA are hereby set aside and another entered remanding the
case to the Court of origin for further proceedings, and thereafter to render judgment accordingly.