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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this study do not represent the views of the European
Commission. Its content does not bind the European Commission. The European
Commission accepts no liability whatsoever with regard to the information contained in this
document.
January 2005
Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Glossary
Context
China’s export performance in the products liberalised under the third stage of the Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) has been characterized by a surge in exports accompanied by
a considerable drop in average unit price. The main factors driving this impressive
performance include, on the one hand, the liberalisation of the production and export regime
and on the other, considerable increases in production capacity.
This research suggests that the sharp decrease in average unit price was partly caused by the
elimination of quota price premiums (the share of quota costs as a percentage of the final cost
constituted up to 25% of the final price, or even more if quotas were traded on the black
market) and the development of cut-throat price competition in the clothing sector, which has
created downward price pressure. The export competitiveness of the Chinese clothing sector
is underpinned by qualitative and quantitative gains in China’s fibre-processing industries,
which underwent major restructuring from 1997-2000 under the framework of the Ninth
Five-Year Plan (1996-2000).
The restructuring of the textile industry has had an encouraging effect on the performance of
the clothing industry. A vibrant fibre processing industry has further integrated the various
links in the supply chain, which is one of China’s key competitive advantages. Nevertheless,
even as China’s textile and clothing (T&C) industry makes significant absolute gains in terms
of fibre-processing and garment production capacity, the sector’s relative overall export
performance as a percentage of total exports has been steadily decreasing.
Increased Capacity
On the upstream side of the sector, Chinese textile companies have been adding new capacity
over the last three or four years and have made significant headway in enhancing efficiency
and quality of production. There is now a wider variety of fabrics available for the garment
manufacturing industry. In the clothing sector, manufacturing companies have been planning
to increase production capacity in anticipation of the phase-out of the quota system.
Factories have been adding production capacity chiefly by hiring more workers and many
have also been purchasing or upgrading equipment in order to improve efficiency and
productivity.
On balance, recent investments in China’s T&C sector have a double objective: to upgrade
the T&C sector’s industrial infrastructure and to expand production capacity. The bulk of
fixed asset investment has focused on the purchase of capital equipment for the domestic
textile industry. In 2003, total sales of textile machinery reached US$ 8.6 billion, of which
imports of textile machinery accounted for US$ 4.37 billion and sales of domestic machinery
accounted for US$ 4.23 billion. China has now become the world’s leading buyer of textile
machinery, according to the International Textile Manufacturers’ Federation. Installed
capacity in spinning, weaving and knitting equipment has increased substantially since 2000.
industry, particularly in terms of phasing out obsolete equipment and upgrading machinery.
This restructuring process was subsidised by the central government and may have facilitated
China’s export surge of T&C products. During 2003 the industry again saw increased
investment in the sector, but this was due to excessive liquidity in the banking system rather
than any direct subsidy from central government.
Since 2003 China’s rates of investment in fixed assets have become so high that some
economists caution the inevitable restraints on such investment might yet cause the Chinese
economy to suffer a ‘hard-landing’. This cycle of investment is due in part to the absence of
sound risk assessment practices in the state-owned banking system. The government has now
introduced a series of administrative and macro-economic measures in an attempt to cool
investment in the sector.
Given the fact that the government’s direct or indirect subsidies to the T&C sector long pre-
date the implementation of the third stage of ATC liberalisation, the sudden drop in unit
prices cannot principally be attributed to industry subsidies. Although some government
support at the local level is a continuing phenomenon, central government subsidies have
been gradually phased out. The real problem is rooted in China’s financial system, which is
beset by structural lending and risk management issues, underlining the difficulties that
continue to hamper China’s efforts to become a fully-fledged market economy.
Besides domestic investment, foreign direct investment (FDI) has also contributed to the
development of China’s T&C sector. Hong Kong remains a major investor in China’s
clothing industry and many Hong Kong-based garment suppliers have their own production
facilities on the mainland. Recently, Korean and Taiwanese textile producers have also been
migrating manufacturing capacity into China in order to address more effectively Chinese
buyers’ requirements for higher value-added fabrics.
Growth Projections
Textile enterprises will not benefit directly from the phase-out of the quota system in a
significant way. But they will stand in a better position to reap the benefits of greater
internationalisation thanks to the government’s efforts to rationalise the sector. The Chinese
clothing sector will be the biggest market-share winner in the restructuring of the global
textile trade system, as buyers strengthen their purchasing activities in China.
Recent economic projections suggest that the share of China’s exports of clothing products in
key markets will vastly outstrip its share of textile exports. A recently published WTO
report, for instance, projects that China’s share of the combined US/Canada garment market
will balloon from 16% to 50%, whereas its share of these countries’ textile market will rise
marginally from 11% to 18%1. In the EU, China’s share of the garment market is projected
to reach 29%, up from 18%2. The projected increase in China’s share of the EU textile
imports however is negligible.
Although these projections have been criticised for failing to take into account contingency
factors such as the imposition of safeguard measures on Chinese exports, China’s self-
imposed export control measures and other key drivers of trade in clothing products such as
1
Figures are based on 1997 and 2005 values estimated by the WTO
2
Ibid
preferential tariff arrangements and time to market, Chinese exports of clothing products will
continue to increase substantially following the total elimination of quotas on 1 January 2005,
thanks to increases in China’s installed textile manufacturing capacity and to garment
manufacturers’ stated intention to increase production capacity further. Estimates vary, but
on average they point to potential increases in garment production capacity from 20% to 50%
for key products including men’s trousers, shorts, T-shirts and women’s blouses.
Price competition following the liberalization of the garment export market will probably
create further downward price pressure on garment exports, although recent surges in raw
material and labour costs may mitigate this pressure. The purchasing pull of large
international buyers however may also contribute to downward price competition and the
larger the volume of the orders, the more prices are likely to drop. Liberalisation of the
sector means that garment manufacturers’ profits will be further squeezed unless they decide
to compete on something other than price, for instance on quality and service. As labour
prices and raw material costs increase, manufacturers face the choice of passing the burden of
rising costs to buyers or absorbing the shortfall themselves.
As yet, there are few sources of comprehensive quantifiable analysis on just how poor
standards are in the textile and garment industries, though significant anecdotal evidence has
been widely documented and the Chinese government has released some indicative statistics.
There is general consensus among sources that poor enforcement of existing regulations,
which are generally viewed as comprehensive, and the exclusion of migrant workers from the
Chinese legal system are the most serious barriers to improved work conditions. These
obstacles are closely related to the competition between jurisdictions to facilitate investment
and economic growth: the attitude of provincial and local officials is that lax law enforcement
that promotes growth is not an abrogation of duties.
Foreign observers have noted recent improvements in enforcement and in the attitude of
lower-level officials, especially related to migrant workers’ rights, health and safety.
Enforcement is still highly variable and poorly planned. Interviewees have also seen
increased interest in standards and corporate social responsibility by factories, but this has
primarily been driven by a desire to understand the international market and some managers
have openly expressed their disbelief that better labour conditions would benefit their
business and their resentment at what they view as multinational hypocrisy.
INTRODUCTION
Background
China’s textiles and clothing industry has achieved remarkable growth and plays an important
role in the domestic economy both as a foreign exchange revenue-earner, as well as a key
source of employment. The global share of China’s textile and clothing exports has increased
from 2.6% in 1970 to approximately 17% today. Accession to the WTO has strengthened
China’s textile and clothing sector as key importers of textiles and clothing, including the
United States, the European Union and Canada, have begun to phase out quotas on Chinese
imports as outlined in the ATC. Indeed, the sector has demonstrated a burgeoning export
performance since the implementation of the third stage of ATC came into effect in 2002.
In the EU, China’s textile and clothing products removed from quota restrictions surged by
46% in value and 188% in volume in 2002, while average prices decreased by 50%,
according to EU estimates. Indeed, China has become the largest exporter of textile and
clothing products to the EU, ahead of the combined top three Mediterranean exporters to the
EU (Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco), in spite of the duty- and quota-free import benefits
enjoyed by the latter. Furthermore, experts predict that continued export growth in the sector
coupled with the coming into effect of the final round of ATC liberalisation will significantly
increase imports of Chinese textile and clothing products by the EU.
Report Overview
This report sheds light on the conditions under which China has achieved this extraordinary
export performance. It is designed to help the EU Commission gain a clear understanding of
the characteristics of the textiles and clothing sector in China and the prevailing regulatory
framework. The report covers the following areas:
Methodology
This report does not seek to provide a definitive and exhaustive overview of the sector.
Rather, it provides qualitative conclusions drawn from available statistics and findings from
direct engagement with policy-makers, industry representatives and NGOs. In undertaking
this study, initially a research framework was developed and tools were designed to gather
quantitative data. The raw data was then analysed systematically to reach conclusions about
trends and developments in the sector. This research methodology consisted of:
Desk Research
In the first instance the research team reviewed and analysed a substantial volume of existing
information, including statistical information, investment data, growth patterns and export
trends. Desk research was based upon materials and secondary sources such as:
• Customs’ data
• National Bureau of Statistics data
• Industry statistics from the China National Textiles Industry Council (CNTIC) and the
CCCT
• UN, IMF and World Bank reports
• NGO social accountability audit reports (on labour, health and safety standards)
• Selected media sources
Primary Research
Given the shortcomings of information available from public sources in China, consultations
were conducted with the relevant government agencies and industry contacts. Interviews
were conducted face-to-face, by telephone and by e-mail.
In order to guide the consultations with stakeholders, a set of preliminary questionnaires was
developed. A “sample batch” of interviews was conducted to identify the general issues
affecting the industry. The feedback and findings that emerged from these consultations
provided the basis for developing another set of targeted questionnaires, designed to gather
more in-depth information about specific industry issues.
Desk
Research
Textile Sector
The textile segments of the T&C sector in China differ from the downstream segments in the
degree of state-ownership of key enterprises. This is partly due to the more capital-intensive
nature of the industry and the involvement of government agencies in the micro-economic
management of the industry. The textile industry in China has experienced a period of
gradual consolidation and concentration, thanks to some painful but necessary reorganisation.
The government has actively encouraged the industry to implement upgrading strategies,
particularly investment in capital equipment such as textile machinery. This research,
however, suggests that a significant number of textile manufacturers, particularly textile
mills, have been sold off in the last couple of years. If this trend continues, state involvement
in the textile sector is likely to be significantly reduced.
Clothing Sector
Garment manufacturing, which is more labour-intensive, has been almost entirely deregulated
and is one of the most liberalised sectors in China. Barriers to entry in the sector are low and
the state plays only a minor role in directing the industry. However a recent wave of
overinvestment and unfettered competition has created serious downward price pressure as
international buyers now have a much greater choice of suppliers. This has contributed to
further price reductions. Major textile companies have recently voiced their concerns that the
cut-throat competition unleashed by the elimination of quotas will harm the industry’s profits
as manufacturers slash prices in a bid to stay afloat.
Knit garments
62%
Source: CNTIC
Regulatory Framework
Raw materials
(cotton, Yarns Fabrics Garments Textile Dyestuff
silk, wool) Machinery
Standards-Setting
The State Administration for Quality, Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) is
the government agency responsible for setting technical, safety and environmental
protection standards for textile products in China. In the textile sector, AQSIQ functions
as a standards-setting coordinator. When setting standards, it seeks technical support
from the Textile Industry Standardisation Institute and consults with the CNTIC. AQSIQ is
also the agency in charge of enforcing standards and providing certification of products
and enterprises. AQSIQ is also involved in drafting laws and regulations governing
industrial standardisation in the textile sector.
Nevertheless, the state continues to exercise control on some segments in the sectoral value
chain, and controls the supply of key raw materials. In most other areas, however, central
planning mechanisms have been shed, and the sector is now one of the most deregulated
industries in China.
Until the late 1990s China’s textile sector was inefficient and loss-making, due mainly to
overcapacity, reliance on outdated technology and high overhead costs. In 1997, the
Communist Party’s Central Economic Working Committee put together a draft policy to
restructure the sector, under the leadership of former State Council Premier Zhu Rongji. The
sector has benefited, from a structural readjustment of its production infrastructure, under the
framework of the Ninth and Tenth Five Year Plans. The macro-economic agency in charge
of “basic construction projects”, the State Planning Commission (now referred to as the
NDRC), and the authority in charge of “technical renovation projects”, the State Economic
and Trade Commission (SETC), together committed billions of dollars worth of loans to
establish new textile mills and upgrade existing ones with high-tech equipment. Reform has
focused on revamping the unprofitable textile sector by increasing efficiency in the
production of manmade fibres and transforming cotton spinning and weaving facilities.
This extensive restructuring programme formed part of the larger process of reform of
China’s state sector. The guiding principles of State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) reform,
reflected in the official slogan “grasp the large; let go off the small” (zhuanda, fangxiao),
applied to the T&C industry. Since 1997, the government has closed down hundreds of
smaller, inefficient SOEs in the T&C sector, allowing them to declare bankruptcy and write
off debt. To allow for this, significant provisions for bad loans were made. At the same time,
the government established a US$ 1.5 billion fund to implement the restructuring of the
sector; for example, to provide for the loss of 1.5 million jobs and the scrapping of 10 million
obsolete spindles, or a quarter of the national total. By 2000, the textile sector had become
profitable. This fund has been added to since 1998 (see Section 3 below).
Top 10 Listed Mainland Textile and Clothing Manufacturers, 2003 (RMB million)
Company Revenues Profit
Weiqiao Textile 6,560 541.7
Shanghai Shenda 4,961 134.3
Shanghai Dragon 3,287 17.1
Inner Mongolia Erdos Cashmere Products 2,917 175.2
China Union Holdings 2,722 34.1
Youngor Group 2,703 400.2
Shanghai Worldbest Industry Development 2,677 58.2
Shanghai Matsuoka 2,417 110.3
Wujiang Silk 2,200 81.7
Shanghai Kaikai Industrial 2,180 30.8
Source: Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong stock exchanges, CEQ
3
The Ministry was degraded as a Bureau and was merged into the SETC
4
The State Planning Commission became the State ‘Development’ and Planning Commission
5
The National Textile Industry Bureau was eliminated in 2001 and its policy functions were transferred into the
SETC. The industry coordination function was transferred to the CNTIC
The now defunct State Economic and Trade Commission set industrial policy goals for
the T&C sector. The guidelines set for strategic adjustment of the textile industry under
the Plan were as follows:
1. The textile industry should centre on the structural adjustment of technology and
products, reform traditional industry with new technologies, continue to implement the
policy of eliminating backward productivity and of personnel reshuffling, pay great
attention to improving the quality, varieties and economic benefits of products and
expedite technical reform to realise industrial upgrading.
3. The textile industry should give full play to the regional comparative advantages;
encourage trans-regional, inter-trade and trans-ownership combinations between the
eastern and western parts of the country to realise the complementarities of different
advantages for a common development.
4. The textile industry should further push forward its strategic reorganisation and
strengthen the economic-pattern adjustment of state-owned enterprises. Large- and
medium-scale state-owned enterprises should speed up the adjustment of capital
structure by means of being listed on the stock market, setting up joint ventures, and
absorb capital as enterprise shares. For the enterprises whose equity-debt ratios are
high but have advanced equipment, potential market and good management, they
should lower equity-debt ratios through asset reorganisation to strengthen their
vigour. However, for those that have serious losses with debts surpassing assets,
bankruptcy is the major way for them to quit the market.
However, the quota for sensitive textile products is given to the CCCT, which uses a
tendering mechanism to allocate it. Only ‘qualified’ companies can bid for the quota. In
order to qualify for the tendering process companies need to fulfil the following criteria:
6
State Economic and Trade Commission, The Tenth Five-Year Plan for the Textile Industry (June 25, 2001)
But there will also be negative effects, especially for companies that used to benefit from the
quota system. When quotas are gone, these companies stand to lose. Some enterprises
(especially trading companies) are proposing that the government use a voluntary quota
system to control China’s textile exports. MOFCOM, however, does not want to use such a
system, but has asked the CCCT to promote “self-discipline” among its members. The
problem, however, is that only a fraction of T&C manufacturers, particularly in the garment
manufacturing industry, are CCCT members, thus there is a limit to how much the CCCT can
hope to achieve in urging self-regulation.
Meanwhile, officials in Beijing are anxious about the twin threats of protectionist sentiment
abroad and an overheating economy at home. Chinese textile organisations have already
expressed fears that export prices might drop too far too fast and, according to state-
controlled media reports, are urging state intervention to prevent “predatory price
competition”. They are concerned that tumbling prices will hurt profits and invite
protectionist measures in Europe and America.
A CNTIC official interviewed showed concern that breakneck expansion will also increase
costs for materials and labour, thus blunting China’s competitiveness and encouraging buyers
to seek cheaper sources of labour and raw materials elsewhere in the region. As will be
discussed in more detail in Section 3 below, some clothing factories in coastal areas are
finding it difficult to attract workers. Despite having a huge rural population seeking higher-
paying work, rural incomes are rising so the incentive to travel to industrial areas for work is
declining. And it will continue to decline unless manufacturing wages also begin to rise.
In this context, officials are considering taking steps to limit the industry’s expansion.
Sources close to MOFCOM report that Beijing is looking into putting restraints on export
growth. However this is easier said than done. China’s T&C sector is no longer subject to
central planning controls. In the old days of the planned economy the State Planning
Commission or SETC (China’s former microeconomic planning agency) would simply push
levers to control the level of investment in the industry. But these days, Beijing can no
longer issue orders and expect that they will be followed; instead, according to Wang
Yiming, vice-president of the NDRC’s Academy of Macroeconomic Research, it must be
content with “trying to convince local governments that the centre’s policies are in their own
best interests.” 7
7
Cited from ‘The Emperor is not Always Obeyed’, The Economist, November 13th 2004
The post-quota environment throws open opportunities for small and medium enterprises to
sell directly to buyers. In this environment, entrepreneurs are busy jockeying for position
with international customers who cannot fail to notice and take advantage of the price
competition that is currently taking place.
Yet the ferocious competition that quota liberalisation has unleashed is embedded in China’s
micro-economic conditions, and particularly in corporate pricing policies. Until market
mechanisms fully set-in and consolidation creates incentives for companies to compete on
service and quality – as opposed to competing solely on price – further downward price
pressure is inevitable.
This situation arises from the lack of coherent regulatory framework. The regulations
governing mergers and acquisitions (M&A) remain underdeveloped. More importantly,
China lacks adequate bankruptcy laws. Additionally, microeconomic issues such as the lack
of management capacity also adversely affect the situation as many Chinese enterprises do
not have a long-term business development or growth strategy.
However trends in other manufacturing sectors suggest that in spite of the lack of adequate
self-correcting mechanisms, a sectoral shakeout is likely to take place sooner or later. The
sector has already witnessed the beginnings of consolidation, as former state-trading
companies, having lost their competitive edge, are now busy acquiring their own
manufacturing capacities. Moreover, fluctuating commodity prices and labour wages are
already punishing the smaller firms, which rely on informal credit associations for their
funding.
As smaller enterprises fall out of business, the onus will be on raising overall business
performance to avoid margin-destroying price competition. In the aftermath of this painful
process of industrial reorganisation there will be a few winners, and many losers.
The logical evolution of the industry points towards more consolidation. Consolidation is
driven partly by buyers, in what can be called a “pull” effect. The size of orders is growing
steadily and will grow further, especially for export markets. Buyers are increasingly looking
for large suppliers, with larger capacity and efficient operations. Small manufacturers cannot
offer these facilities, nor can they offer value-added services, because they do not enjoy the
necessary economies of scale. According to Françoise Vappereau from Research-Works,
Hong Kong, the consolidation of the industry will ultimately depend on the general health of
the industry: “crisis and hard times generally accelerate consolidation as they eliminate the
weaker companies.”8 It will depend also on local vested interests; some cities or provinces
might not let textile factories close down for social reasons. Overall, consolidation is not
expected to take place quickly. Consolidation is expected to be driven by company closures
rather than M&A. Local vested interests will prevent company closures from spreading
rapidly. The process is likely to take place gradually, and local government officials are
likely to manage the pace of company closures to prevent a domino-effect.
In the textiles sector, the government has taken a more active role in formulating industrial
policy goals and directing the restructuring of the state sector. In capital-intensive sub-
sectors such as chemical fibre production, cotton spinning and textile machinery
manufacturing, the top 50 players account for the bulk of domestic sales. Industrial
concentration is particularly noticeable in the polyester production industry. According to
CNTIC the top 10 industry players account for 40% of total domestic production.
With the liberalisation of the trading regime, small companies are also allowed to export.
MOFCOM issued a new rule prior to the promulgation of the new foreign trade law and
further lifted the government’s control on import and export qualifications. Currently,
trading companies with registered capital of no less than US$ 121,065 (or US$ 60,532 in
central and western areas) are qualified to apply for import and export rights. Under the
current regulatory framework, applications are approved automatically unless there is a
specific reason to turn them down. For manufacturing enterprises, the minimum registered
capital requirement is RMB 500,000 (US$ 60,532). A “registration” certificate is enough for
companies to obtain import and export rights. This liberalisation is part of the new Foreign
Trade Law, in line with China’s WTO commitment to liberalise trading rights and eliminate
the traditional examination and approval procedures for import and export rights. The new
regulations will simplify procedures and reduce administrative costs in the textile industry.
8
Interview, November 2004
Production
Value 10,000 - 4,000 - 1,000 - 500 -
(Million $) 0 - 500
40,000 10,000 4,000 1,000
Source: CNTIC
In the case of the clothing sector, exports account for more than half of China’s garment
production. These statistics in fact cover “statistically significant enterprises”. In other
words, all state-owned and non-state owned textile enterprises (private, foreign enterprise or
JV) with annual sales value over RMB 5 million (US$ 604,000). In fact, China boasts a large
number of small-scale clothing manufacturing enterprises, particularly in Jiangsu, Zhejiang
and Fujian provinces (which have traditionally supplied state trading enterprises). If the
entire clothing industry were captured in official statistics it is likely that the industrial output
to export ratio would be even higher.
Jiangxi 115.3
Beijing 130.0
Hubei 158.2
Liaoning 207.6
Tianjin 222.1
Hebei 271.8
Fujian 441.1
Shanghai 491.2
Shandong 1038.6
Jiangsu 1607.7
Zhejiang 2144.7
Guangdong 2624.0
60
51.9
50
41.2
US$ billions
40 36.0 36.5
30.0 30.0 28.6
30
21.8
17.0 17.8
20 13.7
12.8
10
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Japan and other Asian Pacific markets are currently China’s T&C industry’s top export
destinations, closely followed by the EU and the US. Asian countries accounted for 56.5% of
all Chinese clothing exports during the first half of 2004.
Japan, 24%
EU, 22%
Guangdong’s rapid industrialisation has however created a new set of challenges, including
increased costs associated with labour, land, utility tariffs and taxes, which have gradually
weakened Guangdong’s competitiveness in traditional manufacturing sectors. As costs
increased, foreign investors began to move first from Shenzhen and Guangzhou’s Economic
and Technological Development Zone to other cities along the PRD and subsequently to
other coastal provinces such as Fujian and Jiangsu, which offer cheaper costs of production.
Inevitably, this trend is slowly eroding Guangdong’s privileged position as the country’s
leading exporter in the T&C sector.
Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces have therefore become attractive alternative investment
destinations in recent years. Spearheaded by Shanghai, the Yangtze River Delta’s (YRD)
economy is now increasingly integrated, thanks to rapidly growing networks of suppliers that
provide a wide range of products for export markets. The introduction of policies to
encourage foreign investment in the YRD means that the preferential access policies offered
by Guangdong’s SEZs have partly lost their significance.
Fujian Shandong
10% 8%
Shanghai
Other
13%
13%
Jiangsu Guangdong
15% 21%
Zhejiang
Source: China Customs' Statistics 20%
Small and medium enterprises, key building blocks of the industrial fabric in the two
provinces, have avoided state-owned banks which tend to shun small private businesses or
individuals in need of funds. Instead they have sought funding from informal credit
associations, known as biaohui. Biaohui are part of a larger phenomenon of small and
medium industry clusters prevalent in certain parts of eastern China and can offer quick credit
solutions when capital is required. They provide the lifeblood for the increasingly
competitive small, informal industrial networks found across Zhejiang and Fujian.
This is particularly relevant in the context of Zhejiang’s rise as China’s largest T&C
exporting province.
The Ninth and Tenth Five Year Plans for the textile industry formulated by the SETC focused
on the restructuring of the state-owned sector. The main objectives of the strategic
restructuring plan involved the increase of production efficiency through the reduction of
redundant and obsolete spindles and the reduction of redundant costs. This is captured by the
slogan “reduce capacity, reduce personnel and cut losses”. Inevitably, this has involved the
elimination of over 1.5 million jobs and the sale of state-owned assets. Even so, redundant
capacity still besets the industry.
In the clothing manufacturing segment, there are three different kinds of enterprises:
14
12.2
12 10.7
10 8.8
8 6.9
5.6
6
3.5
4
1.4
2 0.5
0
2001 2002 2003
SOE Private Company Foreign Invested Company
Source: China Customs
15.1
15.0 14.0
10.0
4.6
5.0 2.8 3.5
0.0
2001 2002 2003
Management and local government officials often buy out smaller firms owned by local
governments. Local managers, often the same managers that used to manage the plants under
government ownership, typically run privatised companies in the T&C sector. These
enterprises do not carry heavy overhead expenses and are typically managed relatively
efficiently.
In the textile sector there are still many SOEs although privatisation schemes have taken
place at the local level. As a result there are a number of semi-private companies where the
local government owns a certain percentage. Many of them are quite large, with 3000-5000
employees, and they are thus achieving the necessary economies of scale.
during 2003, however, hit profit margins in the textile industry harder than in the clothing
industry.
According to CNTIC statistics, the profit margin of private and collective enterprises in the
T&C sector increased by 0.05% in 2003.
9
CNTIC, 2003/2004 Report on China’s Textile Industry Development
In contrast, imports of textiles and clothing have grown at a much slower pace, from US$
12.8 billion in 1994 to US$ 15.6 billion in 2003. This represents a meagre year-on-year
increase of 2.2%. The share of textiles and clothing in China's total imports of goods has
dropped from 11% to 3.8%. The trade surplus generated by the textiles and clothing industry
during the last decade has almost doubled, climbing up from US$ 21.3 billion to US$ 63.2
billion.
The clothing sector represents about two-thirds of the industry’s exports. Principal markets
are Japan (38% of exports), the EU (17%) and the US (17%). Textile exports make up the
remaining one-third of exports. ASEAN countries are the major recipients of China’s textile
exports.
90
80
70
60
percent
50
40
30
20
10
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Foreign currency earnings derived from the T&C sector make a significant contribution to
China’s foreign currency reserves and the balance of payments.
In 2003 the total import and export value of textile and clothing products increased 24% year-
on-year, reaching US$ 94.5 billion with US$ 78.8 billion in exports and US$ 15.6 billion in
imports. This represented increases of 27.7% and 8.5% respectively, resulting in a surplus of
US$ 63.2 billion, up 33.4%.
90 30
28.3 78.9
80
25
24.1
70 23.1 23.7 61.8
Export Value (US$ bn)
22.0
The following section analyses the competitiveness of China’s T&C sector throughout the
value chain. It examines the competitive advantages that have helped the Chinese T&C
industry obtain an extraordinary performance in the third stage of ATC and draws attention to
competitiveness factors that in some instance are construed as “unfair practices”.
As highlighted in the Executive Summary, given the fact that the Chinese government’s
support for the T&C industry long pre-dates the implementation of the third stage of ATC,
the sudden and recent drop in unit price cannot be attributed directly to government subsidies.
Indeed, in recent years China’s T&C sector has been moving steadily away from state control
and the support mechanisms of the planned economy. Instead, this research suggests that the
sharp decrease in average unit price was caused principally by the elimination of quota
constraints and the development of vigorous competition, with concomitant downward
pressure on prices.
Nevertheless, it is true to say that China’s T&C sector today has been the beneficiary of
government initiated restructuring and investment over the course of the Ninth and Tenth
Five Year Plans. Part of this restructuring process involved the provision of funds for the
overhaul of China’s textile industry infrastructure, particularly in terms of phasing out
obsolete equipment and debt-laden plants (and dealing with the associated social costs), and
upgrading to more modern machinery.
The estimated average export tax equivalents of the quotas for T&C for four major suppliers
to the USA and the EU are presented in the summary table below. These estimates, prepared
by the Centre for Management and Economic Research, are based on the latest available data
with adjustments made for particular features of the quota allocation system in the different
countries compared. Note the high export tax equivalents on China’s exports to the US for
textiles and clothing and on exports of clothing to the European Union, compared to its rivals.
When quotas are binding, as it is the case with many of the T&C products under quota
restrictions, quota licenses naturally command a premium.
Quota utilisation rates in three of the four group limits imposed by the US on Chinese imports
of textiles and clothing were filled by more than 90%, which suggest that China’s exports on
products under quota restrictions are severely restricted. The difference between the export
tax rates for China and other suppliers, such as Bangladesh whose quotas (to the US) are also
binding, seems to be explicable largely in terms of the much lower growth rates allowed for
China’s quotas relative to its production capacity. The EU for its part had 42 quotas on
imports of Chinese T&C products, mostly on clothing products, of which 25 were filled by
over 90%.
The elimination of export quotas which used to account for a significant proportion of the
costs partly explains the export price fall. A US Trade Development (USTD) report shows
that “in 2002 the estimated export tax equivalent on the quota for Chinese knit cotton shirts
was about 27% ad valorem and for cotton trousers it was 64% ad valorem.10 Lower prices in
a post-quota environment therefore reflect the absence of quota fees. This also explains how
some manufacturers still enjoy higher profit margins even though they are selling their
products at lower prices. So, firms that are competitive in producing high-quality products
are expected to still be able to make profits by selling cheaper products after the end of
quotas.
10
‘Textiles and Apparel: Assessment of the Competitiveness of Certain Foreign Suppliers to the U.S. Market’,
United States Trade Commission, January 2004
The supply of raw materials to the industry is still partly controlled by the state through
MOFCOM and the NDRC, which continues to play a major role in textile raw material
importation. The NDRC controls textile raw material imports through tariff rate quotas.
Historic data in recent years shows that the quota is generally lower than demand, and there
have been additional quotas allocated each year in order to meet demand.
Made-up
Clothing goods
6% 12%
Fibers
21% Yarns
20%
Fabrics
41%
Source: China Chamber of Commerce for Import & Export of Textiles
Import Quotas
Except for cotton and wool, which are subject to an import tariff rate quota regime, other
textile products can be freely imported into China. Quotas are obtained via the NDRC
system. Sources consulted noted the opacity of the quota allocation system and the market
distortions that it tends to create. These distortions affect both foreign exporters who do not
have a clear understanding of the regulatory process for the import quota regime, as well as
domestic businesses, which bear the burden of higher raw material costs generated by
inefficiencies in the supply and distribution system for key raw materials. Some
commentators have alleged that the tariff rate quota (TRQ) system is being manipulated at the
expense of international textile exporters, with imports of raw materials being condoned for
re-export purposes only, and then the TRQ used to block market access for other imports.
Cotton
The supply of cotton remains crucial for the textile industry. Although the government has
restructured the cotton market through widening the distribution channels and relaxing price
controls, supply is still subject to government controls. In the absence of market
mechanisms, the following government bodies are involved in setting prices:
2500
2122
2000
Price (US$/per ton)
1500 1498
1000 942
827
500
0
2000 2001 2002 2003
Experts from the cotton sector at the Agriculture Ministry’s Economic Research Centre,
estimate that in 2004-2005 China’s domestic cotton output will be around 6.1 million tons
(more than 25% of the world’s total), while total demand reaches 7.33 million tons. In other
words, about a quarter of China’s cotton supply is now imported.
The abolition of price supports for cotton production took place in 1999. Thereafter, China’s
cotton prices actually dropped to US$ 1,145 per ton at the end of 1999 from US$ 2,350 in
1997.
In 2003 China’s domestic cotton prices increased significantly once again – in spite of the
fact that world supplies of cotton exceeded demand – as suppliers could not meet growing
domestic demand due partly to a poor harvest. The gap between supply and demand was
closed through imports. However, cotton vendors took advantage of the lack of market
mechanisms to regulate the supply and distribution of imported cotton to speculate on prices.
At the end of 2003, the price of cotton reached US$ 2,179/t, more than US$ 205.8 higher than
average international prices.
Currently, China’s Cotton Textiles Association estimates that raw materials take 70% of
overall production costs for manufacturing cotton fabrics.
Another surge in production volume in the post-quota context will create a huge demand for
cotton, driving up the costs of cotton imports. It is expected that this will diminish China’s
advantage as a producer of cheap textiles.
Silkworm Cocoon
This product is strictly regulated by the government in the areas of production, purchasing,
distribution and pricing. MOFCOM and NDRC control the supply.
120,000
111,000
100,000 98,700
87,000
80,000
75,000
tons
70,100
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Source: China National Textile Industrial Council
It is worth noting that although the government does not officially set dual pricing of fibres
and raw materials, especially cotton and silk, when they are in short supply, private
distributors offer higher prices than state-owned enterprises. It is likely that the government
will use its strategic reserves to reverse any significant price hikes, for instance by supplying
subsidised raw materials to producers for government procurement. Other than in this
scenario, there is no dual pricing for raw materials.
Wool
China is a major importer of wool, which is subject to import quotas regulated by the NDRC.
Currently, wool represents less than 5% of the total textile output from China, and is
therefore less significant than the manmade fibre and cotton industries.
Recent investments in the Chinese wool-processing sector are focused mainly on weaving,
dyeing and finishing machinery, e.g. later-stage processing equipment. Until recently,
domestic industry purchased a large amount of second-hand equipment from international
textile machinery manufacturers. Recent imports of foreign wool processing machinery have
been underpinned by strong growth in wool textile processing in the last year or so.
There are large numbers of small foreign direct investments in Chinese wool processing
mills. However, larger foreign companies such as Suedwolle, Chargeurs and Shnalder have
become WFOEs. Technology levels have been upgraded throughout. In the last five years,
most of the SOEs in this segment have been privatised and today there are few SOEs left in
the wool textile industry.
The wool industry is concentrated along the eastern coastline: namely Shandong, Jiangsu,
Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces. This research suggests that there is no more government
support to the wool processing industry in terms of investment from the central government
level. However, for political reasons, China does subsidise wool procurement from South
America (this is common knowledge but the government will not acknowledge it officially)
to gain support from South American countries for political purposes (e.g. to gain diplomatic
leverage vis-à-vis Taiwan, which traditionally has had close political links with South
American countries). In addition, the government is providing support for the China Wool
Textile Association (CWTA) to join the International Wool Textile Organisation (IWTO) –
with the government paying the membership fee.
Manmade Fibres
China has become the world’s largest producer of manmade fibres. Production capacity has
increased at an average annual rate of 18.3% in the past five years according to China’s
Chemical Fibre Association. In 2003, the output of chemical fibres reached 11.8 million
tons, accounting for one third of the world total and 65% of the total output of domestically-
produced fibres, according to the CNTIC. Exports of T&C products made of chemical fibres
reached 35.4% of total T&C exports in the same year.
A combination of state-led efforts to restructure the industry with the opening up of the fibre-
processing sector to domestic private and foreign investment has led to a significant
technology upgrade in manmade fibre production. China is rapidly becoming a competitive
fabric supplier, and will catch-up with Taiwan and Korea shortly. Consultations with firms in
the sector suggest that a number of Taiwanese and Korean fabric manufacturers have shifted
production to wholly-owned subsidiaries in mainland China, thereby benefiting from lower
labour costs and proximity to buyers and suppliers. China’s manmade fibre production sector
also benefited from the surge in domestic cotton prices in 2003, which caused a diversion of
supplies from cotton to manmade fibres.
12
9.5
10
8.3
8 6.8
6
0
2000 2001 2002 2003
Source: National Statistical Bureau
Industry sources, however, complain that the supply of key chemical fibre inputs are subject
to volatile market changes and often need to be imported. Prices of synthetic and chemical
fibres are, to a certain extent, linked to oil prices and naphtha prices and therefore fluctuate
accordingly.
This research indicates, however, that the quality and efficiency of China’s manmade fibre
production is inconsistent, and operates using obsolete equipment. As a result, productivity
and efficiency levels are lower than in South Korea and Taiwan. The use of old equipment
also poses a serious environmental issue. As the sectoral restructuring programme laid out in
the Tenth Five Year Plan unfolds, however, China is rapidly upgrading its manmade fibre
production capacity through investments in new equipment. Production of manmade fibres is
still concentrated in top SOEs. According to the China Chemical Fibre Association, the
proportion of loss-making SOEs is being reduced but still accounts for 23% of the whole
industry.11
Intermediary Inputs
China’s domestic production of processed fibres is increasing rapidly. Domestic production
of cotton yarn grew at an annual average of 8.8% to 8.5 million tons between 1990 and 2002.
Production of cotton and manmade fabrics grew at a slower pace, averaging 4.6% to 32.2
billion metres during the same period.
11
‘Chemical Fibre Manufacturing Industry - Industry Overview’, 2003/2004 Report on China’s Textile Industry
Development, CNTIC
Spinning Activities
China has invested heavily in spinning and weaving equipment in the last five years. Its
installed short-staple spindle capacity, for instance, has almost doubled since 1999.
10 9.83
8.5
8 7.61
6.57
6 5.67
4
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
China’s knitting sub-sector is dominated by SOEs. Smaller companies supply the lower-end
of the market, typically consisting of domestic-oriented manufacturing companies, whereas
larger knitting firms with more advanced machinery and management systems supply the
export-processing sector. Until recently the industry suffered from low-levels of technical
advancement and weak managerial skills, although since 2000, the sector has invested
heavily in new machinery, which has helped improve production quality and efficiency.
According to International Textile Manufacturers Federation (ITMF) statistics, during 2000-
2002, China accounted for 27% of world purchases of circular knitting equipment.
The dyeing and printing industry is almost entirely in private hands and is concentrated in
coastal provinces, particularly Zhejiang, which accounted for 50% of production of dyed and
printed cloth in 2003. According to China’s Dyeing and Printing Association, 18.3% of
enterprises in the sector are making losses, a 12% increase from the previous year. It is
estimated that 41.3% of the remaining SOEs in the sector are incurring losses.
To be sure, China enjoys some of the world’s lowest cost structures in the textile and clothing
sector, reflecting not only “raw labour” costs but also high rates of efficiency and
productivity. In fact wage rates in China’s garment manufacturing sector are actually higher
than in countries such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, where average wages per hour are
less than US$ 0.50.
Other associated costs, such as social security and insurance liabilities are also low in China,
although this is gradually changing with more stringent requirements placed on factories to
comply with compulsory worker insurance schemes.
China’s wage advantage in the textile sector, however, is pronounced when compared with
other competitors. Hourly rates in China average US$ 0.69 compared to US$ 5.73 in South
Korea and US$ 7.15 in Taiwan, China’s main suppliers of fabric.
This research suggests that patterns in China’s labour market have evolved significantly over
the last 3-4 years. Three key factors (which are closely linked with the competitiveness in the
T&C sector) characterise China’s market for unskilled and semi-skilled workers: 1) shifting
urban-rural terms of trade; 2) changing demographic patterns; and 3) fragmented labour
supply routes.
First, China suffered during the 1990s from China's Itinerant Labour Force
erratic government policies that provided Number in 2003 (million) 98.0
artificial incentives to farmers to produce Share of rural workforce 20.1%
grain, encouraged by the government’s Average age 33.4
Average annual income (RMB/worker) 5597.0
promises to subsidise grain production. This
Total income of group (RMB/worker) 527.8
policy gradually led to overproduction of Total remittences (RMB million) 327.4
staple crops and consequently plummeting Regional distribution (%)
prices, which coupled with the government’s Guangdong, Fujian 38.3%
failure to pay subsidies in cash, actually Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang 16.9%
caused farmers’ incomes to stagnate, Beijing, Tianjin 10.2%
particularly in relation to rapidly raising Source: Financial Times
incomes in urban areas. Since 1998, however, this policy has been abandoned and farmers
have diversified production into higher value-added crops which yield higher economic
returns. As a result, the urban-rural terms of trade have improved considerably over the last
three years, with a marked jumped in 2003 owing to rising food prices. In other words, farm
prices have been rising while prices for manufactured goods have been falling steadily, which
means that some farmers are now better off than urban workers were three years ago.
contributed to a male to female ratio of 118 to 100, one of the world’s highest gender
inequalities.
Third, migrant labour flows are multi-tiered and highly fragmented. The majority of the
estimated 100 million migrant workers travel within inland areas, typically from rural
counties to nearby cities. This is partly a product of the government’s drive to urbanise
China’s interior. Migration flows from the rural hinterland to industry clusters along coastal
regions, where the bulk of China’s textiles and clothing manufacturing factories are located,
are less pronounced. These manufacturing regions moreover, rely on specific networks of
migrants from particular inland regions. Factories in Guangdong for instance rely heavily on
migrant labour from particular counties in Sichuan and Hunan provinces.
These trends affect the supply of labour in two ways. On the one hand, raising relative
agricultural prices increases the purchasing power of farmers and reduces the incentive for
migrant work. On the other, the continued fall in manufacturing prices, driven by chronic
overcapacity and rising raw material prices puts a squeeze on manufacturers, many of whom
are consequently unwilling to raise wages. The point is that these trends will eventually force
garment manufacturers either to raise wages, and therefore lose part of their competitive
advantage, or relocate production to alternative locations with greater availability of cheap
labour. Whether manufacturers relocate to China’s interior provinces or they move
production to less developed countries such as Vietnam remains to be seen.
Cost however is not the only source of competitiveness of China’s labour force. And indeed
China’s cost advantages are already lower than competitors such as India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Vietnam, where unit labour costs are cheaper. Research carried out by the
Institut Francais de la Mode identify overall labour skills and know-how throughout the T&C
value chain as a key source of competitive advantage.12 The Institut rates China’s labour
competitiveness above that of other key T&C manufacturing countries such as India,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, Romania and Morocco.
China’s manufacturers are also perceived to be quick and responsive to buyers’ needs and
have more flexibility to meet tight deadlines than counterparts in countries such as India and
Pakistan. In the case of the US, this is in part due to shorter lead times from Chinese ports,
but it is also a reflection of leaner, less bureaucratic management structures.
Clothing Manufacturing
China’s clothing manufacturing sector comprises about 15,000 export suppliers generating
annual sales of US$ 50 billion. 13 Official statistics show that a Chinese clothing
manufacturing firm on average employs 300 workers, although these statistics exclude
smaller manufacturing firms, which have a significant manufacturing presence in T&C
clusters around Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian provinces. According to some industry
forecasts, in a non-quota environment China’s annual exports of clothing products could
reach US$ 128 billion by 2008.14
12
‘Study on the Implications of the 2005 Trade Liberalisation in the Textile and Clothing Sector’, IFM and
partners, February 2004
13
Global Sources Market Intelligence: Summer Garments, China Supplier Survey: Summer 2005 Buying
Season
14
Ibid
Industry analysts agree that the end of the quota system will divert trade in clothing products
away from other Asian markets to more profitable markets in the EU and North America (e.g.
the US and Canada). China’s exports of T-shirts, casual and dress shirts, suits, dresses,
cotton trousers and shorts are extremely competitive. These products are supplied in a range
of materials including cotton, polyester, lace, ramie, organza, silk and denim. Key
production hubs include Zhejiang with 23% of exports of clothing products and Guangdong,
with 22% of exports.
Commercial Factors
Many European textile buyers prefer China to its competitors because of the dependability of
its supply chain, from ordering to shipping. Buyers generally consider China to be business
friendly and firms are increasingly working directly with producers in the mainland rather
than working through Hong Kong or mainland state-owned agents. This reduces the costs of
Business Environment
This section examines China’s business environment as a competitive factor. The focus of
this section centres on conditions that arise from government intervention in the industry.
Other non-conventional sources of competitive advantage such as lack of
compliance/enforcement with international sustainable development standards are addressed
in more detail in the following section.
Price Wars
As stated in Section 2 above, China still lacks the mechanisms to provide the necessary
incentives and disincentives to enterprises seeking to compete in the marketplace. These
basic market inefficiencies have triggered cut-throat price wars which in turn have created
downward price pressure, leading to a steady fall in the prices of manufactured goods. For
reasons that are peculiar to China’s transitional economy, Chinese companies often continue
to boost production in an effort to expand market share long after their profit margins have
been squeezed. In some cases, even when domestic demand is fully satisfied and inventories
are filling up with unsold goods, production lines run are kept running.
This phenomenon, in evidence at several factories in the PRD and other parts of China, has
important implications for the country’s emergence as a manufacturing power. First, it means
that without reforms to eradicate the causes of oversupply, the price wars and anaemic
corporate profits that have characterised industrial development in the past five years could
continue. And deflationary risks, which China stands accused of exporting to the world,
remain a concern. As shall be seen in the section below, the reason why Chinese producers
lack the capacity to refrain from producing more at lower costs when they face excessive
competition and price depression is rooted in structural inefficiencies connected with a
partially reformed banking system and a system of political and economic incentives biased
towards boosting growth at all costs.
Although deflation diminishes the profits of companies that compete within China, it raises
the competitiveness of those that export to the world. Hence the strong motivation for China-
based companies to export, contributing to trade surpluses in some key trading
relationships.15
The overall impact of price wars is considerable. Profit margins take a beating, affecting the
ability to spend on research and development and to repay bank debt. In this scenario most
companies are forced to seek alternative markets. Diversification of domestic sales into
higher margin segments and exporting to less saturated markets remain the main choices.
And for the majority of enterprises in the T&C sector, the abolition of the quota system
provides an incentive to expand their exports.
15
‘China's big exports: appliances, deflation’, Financial Times, 12 February 2003
At the heart of the problem lies an ‘iron triangle’ of companies, bank managers and local
government officials who are driven to push production and investment to excessive levels by
a mixture of administrative and political incentives.
“The answer revolves around the prevalent culture in China’s half-reformed state banks.
Chinese banks rarely conduct research on market conditions, nor do they perform techniques
such as cash-flow analysis. Instead, they lend mainly on the basis of collateral: If a company
is big [...] it is considered creditworthy. This attitude reinforces a desire among Chinese
companies to expand market share at all costs.”16
Such inefficiencies in resource allocation are rooted in lending decisions made at the local
level. The performance of local branch managers at state-owned banks has until now been
based on asset growth: “Lending lots and attracting deposits quickly have been all that
counted: risk return and capital adequacy have meant nothing.” 17 In some cases local
managers are egged on by local government officials eager to seek funding for local
investment projects.
Indeed, for local officials GDP growth is a political-performance target by which they are
measured, and this creates incentives to attract investments that can boost local economic
growth and create jobs. Investments therefore are often made where there is no sound
economic rationale. Yet in a highly fragmented and localised market, a “band-wagon” effect
of unsound investments often follows. “The outcome tends to be waves of overcapacity, as
investments are made up to – and sometimes way beyond – the point where it is patently
obvious that the economics cannot justify them.”18 In spite of the administrative measures
taken by the Hu/Wen leadership to cool down the economy, boom-and-bust cycles remain an
enduring feature of the Chinese economy.
According to some estimates, local governments in China have illegally underwritten US$
100 billion in loans to bankroll favoured investment projects.19
These problems underlie the gap China needs to close to become a fully-fledged market
economy. In a market economy, market forces eventually correct capital misallocation and
oversupply, punishing those firms that placed too many eggs in the same basket. Ultimately
bankruptcy is the price companies have to pay for making unsound investments in sectors
suffering from overcapacity.
However, the proportion of companies that go bankrupt in China relative to gross domestic
product, for example, is less than a tenth that of the US. Beijing is aware of the economic
16
‘China's big exports: appliances, deflation’, Financial Times, February 12th 2003
17
‘China’s Banks, Root and Branch’, The Economist, November 6th 2004
18
Jonathan R. Woetzel, ‘China: The best of all possible models’, The McKinsey Quarterly, 2004 Special
Edition: China today
19
‘China’s Banks, Root and Branch’, The Economist, November 6th 2004
rationale for accelerating reform of the bankruptcy regime. Yet the lack of progress in this
area is not so much technical in nature as political. The Chinese government and the
Communist Party in which it is embedded need to maintain social stability and avoid
industrial unrest as a precondition for sustaining their rule. As a result, China does not have
an effective bankruptcy law, making creditor banks wary of seeking liquidation for fear they
will lose most of their assets. A draft bankruptcy law has apparently been drafted, yet
legislators in China’s National People’s Congress have dragged their feet on this issue for
almost 10 years.
Without recourse to liquidation, local banks are often predisposed to extending credit, not
least because corporations often keep several sets of accounts, which they use to persuade
banks to lend to them. In addition, banks seldom take any action if one of their debtor
companies starts expanding production into an oversupplied market. It is no wonder that the
price of industrial products as they leave the factory gates has fallen by up to 5% year on year
from 1998 to 2003, apart from in 2000 when higher oil prices inflated the average. For
banks, the price to pay for this excess is a swelling portfolio of non-performing loans that run
at around 40% of total assets according to independent analysts’ estimates.
Lending malpractice, however, may ease in the following years as Beijing unfolds an
ambitious plan to modernise the banking system. The reform, led by the China Banking
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) is intended to make local bank managers responsible for
risk assessment and maintaining capital-adequacy ratios of 8%.
VAT in China is levied at each link of the production chain, at a rate of 17%, before the final
product is manufactured. However, part of the taxation on the producer at each link is
deducted because that portion has been paid and is included in the supply the producer buys
from the previous link. Because the deduction is made at each link, the final taxpayer
appears to pay a much lower rate of tax (i.e. the so-called ‘tax burden’ which is different from
the actual ‘tax rate’). So the final producer has paid a full VAT of 17% covering the process.
In other words, the end user picks up the total tax liabilities. It would appear that this tax
rebate policy does not violate Article III, Part II of the GATT, which outlines national
treatment on internal taxation and regulation, since it is applied to all exporting enterprises
irrespective of their legal status (i.e. whether they are domestic or foreign-invested).
The rebate cut is expected to put pressure on clothing companies, many of which relied on
this export rebate to make up for losses. The cut will therefore raise costs significantly for
garment enterprises, it is estimated that every percentage point drop will push up production
costs by RMB 5 million annually. It is expected that the export rebate cut will have a
negative effect on growth momentum, although in view of the fierce competition in the
garment manufacturing sector in particular, it is likely companies will be prepared to bear
losses to continue to export.
The rebate adjustment will place new pressure on the overall cost structure. Many companies
will depend on timely payment of the full cost of the rebate to keep their balance sheets in the
black. If the rebate is made in time, the pressure brought about by the rebate cut will be
offset to some extent by reducing the enterprises’ interest burden.20
Note also that prior to the policy adjustment, VAT refund was entirely funded by the central
government. Under the new system the rebate will be shared by both central and local
government.
In order to reduce costs, enterprises may engage in more processing trade, in particular with
supplied materials, which may slow down the growth rate of normal trade. This research
suggests that the larger companies, particularly in the Shanghai area, plan to adjust the
product structure to produce higher-value garments.
Claims from some quarters about the application of different exchange rates, higher for
imports and lower for exports, would appear in fact to refer to the dual exchange rate, which
was abolished in 1994. Since 1994, one single exchange rate has been applied uniformly.
Given the pressure that the US in particular has applied on China to revalue the Yuan, it is
sometimes assumed that the currency valuation issue is the root of all problems in the
bilateral trade relationship. However, this research does not support the view that currency
valuation is the decisive factor in explaining China’s surge in T&C exports or the drop in unit
price of those exports. Although the Yuan is pegged to the US dollar, Chinese T&C exports
to the US have also surged and at a lower unit price. In summary, while the currency
valuation issue cannot be discounted, it would appear that other factors, such as the
competitive environment, flexibility of the labour market and the elimination of costs
associated with export quotas are more directly responsible for recent trends in Chinese T&C
exports.
It is impossible to calculate accurately the share of round tripping from China’s total FDI
inflows, as Hong Kong and other free markets keep no official statistics on free capital flows
entering and leaving their territory. A 2002 report by Guy Pfeffermann, Chief Economist of
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), estimates that round-tripping stands at 30-50%
of total FDI, based on 1999 and 2000 figures.21 It is expected that the system of incentives to
foreign investors will be harmonised in 2006 as China implements its tax reform programme.
This will reduce the incentives for round-tripping. Yet, the problem will not be completely
eliminated, as preferential measures to attract foreign investment are likely to remain a key
20
China Garment Association, quoted in CNTIC, Report on China’s Textile Industry Development
21
Quoted in Ryan, P, Marubeni Research Institute, 2002
tactic among local governments eager to attract FDI inflows to stimulate growth and
employment in their own regions.
The sectoral options for foreign investment in China are governed by the Catalogue for the
Guidance of Foreign Investment. The latest version of this Catalogue, issued in 2004,
superseded previous versions, promulgated in 1995 and 1997. In addition to the Catalogue,
the Chinese government has issued a range of accompanying laws defining tax concessions,
special investment incentives, foreign exchange controls, etc.
The Catalogue and associated regulations provide guidance to government at central and
local levels and to potential investors regarding:
Note that in China there are often significant discrepancies between legislation and the
manner of its implementation. Many local governments, either with central government in
ignorance or turning a blind eye, cut special deals with foreign investors. The same is, of
course, often true in the case of domestic enterprises, many of which are kept afloat by a
combination of tax rebates and bank loans, granted more on social/political grounds than on
any rational assessment of credit risk.
Investment categories:
The Catalogue divides sectors into four categories according to their degree of openness to
foreign investment: ‘encouraged’, ‘permitted’, ‘restricted’ and ‘prohibited’. Generally
speaking, the main difference between these categories is the level of access afforded to
investors:
1. Encouraged:
- Projects for new agro-technology and comprehensive development as well as
for construction in energy, transportation and key raw materials;
- Projects using high-tech conducive to performance improvements and
energy savings;
- Projects enhancing product quality to satisfy domestic market demand, and
to increase exports;
- Projects adopting new technologies and equipment for comprehensive
utilisation of resources;
- Projects in the mid-west region for the full use of human and natural
resources and in line with the industrial policy.
2. Permitted: any projects that do not fall into any of the other three categories.
3. Restricted:
- Projects using outdated technology;
- Projects non-conducive to the environment and resources saving;
- Projects for the mining of specified minerals;
4. Prohibited:
- Projects endangering the state security or damaging the public interests;
- Projects causing pollution and impairment of human health;
- Projects taking a large amount of farm land;
- Projects threatening military installations and facilities;
- Projects utilising Chinese traditional craftsmanship or technology, which are
unique in China.
Only projects in the encouraged category are eligible for exemption of customs duty for
imported capital goods. VAT rebates are also available for the purchase of domestically
made equipment. Enterprises in the permitted category that export 100% of their finished
products are also considered ‘encouraged’ and therefore are eligible for the above tax
concessions. It is arguable, that tax concessions for ‘encouraged’ sectors is contrary to the
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures that restrict export subsidies.
At the national level, corporate tax concessions are granted to foreign investors in
manufacturing and production sectors, which enjoy a two year tax exemption, commencing
on the first profit-making year, as well as a 50% reduction on corporate income tax during the
next three years if the operating term is more than ten years.
However, only two categories of textiles and clothing projects are encouraged by central
government policy:
• Complete waiver of the land use fee for a specified period or preferential rate;
• Extension of the tax holiday;
The tax incentive system, however, is complex and haphazard in its implementation. It is not
uncommon for different government levels to apply tax regulations inconsistently. However,
tax collection is being increasingly centralised and the responsibility for assessment and filing
of returns was transferred to enterprises in 1999.
Power Costs
Preferential conditions to foreign investors – and indeed domestic investors – looking to
invest in the textiles and clothing sectors are no longer offered in key provinces such as
Guangdong, which in fact has some of the highest power costs in the region. Subsidies for
utility payments however are still found at the county and township level where local
authorities are eager to attract investment.
This research suggests that local authorities in key T&C manufacturing regions such as
Guangdong are no longer offering special deals to T&C enterprises. In manufacturing
industry clusters in Guangdong province, such as Dongguan, land has become more
expensive and harder to come by. Beijing is also cracking down on illegal land deals being
made by local officials, in an effort to cool down the economy. Harry Lee, Managing
Director at TAL apparel (one of Hong Kong’s largest apparel manufacturers, with annual
revenues of US$ 600 million), advised that his company had to cancel plans to build a second
plant in Guangdong after local government officials blocked a deal it had to buy land for the
factory.22
Export-Oriented Industries
Export-oriented industries enjoy concessionary tax rates under the following conditions:
• Enterprises in the permitted category that export 100% of the finished products are
also considered encouraged projects and therefore are eligible to the above tax
concessions;
• Following expiry of the ordinary tax holiday, FIEs exporting at least 70% of their
output in a given year are eligible for a 40% reduction in enterprise income tax in that
year (subject to a minimum reduced rate of 10%).
22
No Rush into China, Far Eastern Economic Review, November 4th, 2004
Additional tax and other incentives are available to foreign investors in designated SEZs,
coastal cities (in particular their Economic and Technology Development Zones) and other
special investment zones (including Pudong New Area, New and High-Technology
Development Zones, Bonded Zones and Export Processing Areas).
Incentives include:
• Corporate tax reductions;
• VAT exemptions;
• Tariff exemptions;
• Others (reduced land use fees, utility charges, etc.).
The incentives available vary from zone to zone, but the following gives a flavour of the
incentives that may be offered:
Part of the attraction of investing in certain Chinese regions is the deals that can be secured
from special status zones. For example, Tianjin Economic Development Area cut Motorola’s
VAT rate from 17% to 6% and exempted the firm from paying enterprise income tax for five
years, with the rate cut by half for a further five years. Imports of parts and raw materials are
exempted from Customs duties, and profits generated can be converted into US dollars.
As explained above, China does not offer any preferential treatment to foreign investors in
the T&C sector as a matter of policy, with the exception of two specific technical categories
of products in the textiles segment.
The situation is in fact similar in key manufacturing regions such as the PRD area (in
Guangdong province), where local governments actively encourage foreign investment in
high-tech industries.
However, China is in the process of amending its corporate tax law, which will unify the
separate tax codes that govern foreign and domestic enterprises. The State Tax
Administration and the MOF have completed a draft that is now circulating within the
National People’s Congress. The government has not indicated whether it will grandfather
the preferential tax treatments already approved, and this is likely to emerge as a point of
contention.
Some government officials have unofficially indicated that the government will gradually
phase out preferential treatment applied to foreign investors. Currently this proposal remains
unclear, although unofficial sources close to MOFCOM claim that incentives offered to
foreign investors in priority investment areas will remain in place at least throughout 2005.
This research suggests that no local content requirements are mandated for foreign investors
in the T&C sector in Guangdong province.
FIEs established in bonded zones can be exempted from import tariffs and VAT upon
imported equipment, materials and goods to be used for manufacturing, construction, and
administration within the bonded zones. Additionally, manufacturing companies that export
100% of their products may enjoy a duty exemption on imported capital equipment, which is
typically refunded on a yearly basis over a five year period.
Domestic export processing companies can apply for import duty rebates on imported raw
materials provided they export 100% of their products. To qualify as a processing company,
domestic firms have to obtain an import/export licence.
Protectionism
Protectionism does occur at the local level – in Beijing this is usually referred to as “regional
protectionism”. The principal driver of regional protectionism is the desire of local officials
to keep jobs and maintain social stability. Shutting down factories is a thankless task and the
fear of creating social disruptions is real. In many instances local governments prefer to keep
loss-making enterprises afloat through a combination of subsidies and soft loans. This is,
however, illegal and Beijing is currently putting administrative measures in place to curb
illegal lending and subsidies to loss-making industries, particularly, but not restricted to, the
state sector.
It is arguable that allowing a loss-making company to continue to operate and sell products is
a hidden form of subsidy. Loss-making companies that are protected by the government
receive an unfair advantage in comparison to others which have to be profitable to survive or
to provide a legitimate return to their shareholders.
From the Chinese perspective, this can be seen as an analogue with Chapter Eleven type
bankruptcy arrangements in the US, or indeed as comparable to efforts to prop up loss-
making ‘national champions’ in other jurisdictions.
It would be misleading to assess the preparations of China’s textile and clothing industries
prior to the elimination of the quota system as if the two industries were a coherent whole. In
fact, the bulk of the investment poured into China’s T&C industry has gone to the textile
sector, whether through subsidies or through domestic private and foreign investment, and
was initially conducted within the framework a wider state sector reform programme. The
revamping of the textile industry in this sense was not conducted only in direct anticipation of
the removal of quotas; it was done as part of a 3-year SOE “shock-therapy” plan designed to
allow inefficient, loss-making enterprises to go bankrupt and to bring the more promising
enterprises back to the black through a strategic upgrading process.
Since the completion of the restructuring programme in 2000, however, the textile industry
has once again started to add manufacturing capacity and investment, driven partly by the
surge in demand for textile products from clothing manufacturers.
China’s textile industry will no doubt benefit from a quota-free environment in terms of
market access. But the largest single beneficiary from the phase-out of the quota system will
be the Chinese clothing industry. To be sure, the strengthening of the textile industry will
have an encouraging effect on the performance of the clothing industry. A vibrant fibre
processing industry will strengthen the integration of the supply chain, which is one of
China’s key competitive advantages.
Yet recent economic projections suggest that the share of China’s exports of clothing
products in key markets will vastly outstrip its share of textile exports. A recently published
WTO report, for instance, projects that China’s share of the combined US/Canada garment
market will balloon to from 16% to 50%, whereas its share of these countries’ textile market
will rise marginally to from 11% to 18%. In the EU, China’s share of the garment market is
projected to reach 29% in 2005, up from 20% in 200223. The projected increase of China’s
share of the EU’s textile imports is negligible, as shown in the table above.
These projections, however, have been criticised for failing to take into account contingency
factors such as the imposition of safeguard measures on Chinese exports, or China’s self-
imposed export control measures. Nor do they consider other key drivers of trade in clothing
products such as preferential tariff arrangements and time to market. Nevertheless, in light of
recent increases in China’s textile manufacturing capacity, thanks in part to investment in
textile machinery, and of garment manufacturers’ intentions to increase production capacity
(see page 57 below), it would be logical to conclude that Chinese exports of clothing products
will increase substantially over the next few years. Estimates very, but on average they
point to potential increases in garment production capacity of about 40% for key products
including men’s trousers, shorts, T-shirts and blouses.
In the clothing sector, garment manufacturing companies have been planning to increase
production capacity in anticipation of the phase-out of the quota system. As shall be seen
below, expanding production capacity in the clothing sector is achieved chiefly by hiring
more factory staff. Purchasing or upgrading equipment can also lead to efficiency and
production increases among garment manufacturers.
Recent investments in China’s T&C sector have a double objective: to upgrade the T&C
industrial infrastructure and to expand production capacity. In the first instance, upgrading is
driven by purchases of high-tech textiles machinery equipment. In 2003, total sales of textile
machinery reached US$ 8.6 billion, of which imports of textile machinery accounted for US$
4.37 billion and sales of domestic machinery accounted for US$ 4.23 billion.
23
The Global Textile and Clothing Industry Post the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Hildegunn Kyvik
Nordas, WTO 2004
10
8 6.7
6 5.2
4
2
0
2001 2002 2003
* for State-owned Textile Enterprises and Private Enterprises with Annual Sales
Source: CNTIC Revenues above RMB5 Million (US$604,000)
In 1999, the SETC began to coordinate the issuing of bonds to provide soft loans for
technological renovation projects in certain targeted sectors. Loans were mainly used to
support 520 key companies and 120 test companies in seven key industries: metal smelting
and processing, ferrous metals, petrochemicals, textile machinery, electronics and
information and paper products. By 2001, 880 projects had been approved, 141 of them in
the textile industry. These bonds were intended to stimulate investments by supplying a form
of seed capital to be augmented through other channels.
The CNTIC (former State Textile Bureau) stated that China committed US$ 2.4 billion in
grants to the industry’s top 200 textile enterprises and US$ 1.7 billion in soft loans to fund the
upgrading of the industry – mainly through the replacement of obsolete equipment. The
funds were made available by the Ministry of Finance. According to this research,
enterprises were eligible for grants worth US$ 363,196 and soft loans worth US$ 242,130 for
every ten thousand spindles scrapped.
These subsidies were categorised as a spindle-scrapping plan and were mainly to be used for
the reemployment of those workers who were laid-off as a result of the modernisation of the
industry. Fixed investment growth statistics in the sector during that period would suggest
that some funds were also used to replace and upgrade equipment. More recently, the
CNTIC has launched a programme to encourage the consolidation of the top 600 textile mills
in China in an effort to enhance quality, efficiency and develop economies of scale. However,
few subsidies have been available to the textile industry since 2002.
In v e s t m e n t in R e n o v a tio n ( U n it : R M B 1 0 0 m illio n Y u a n )
Y ear T e x t ile C lo t h in g , F o o t w a r e , a n d C a p s
1998 6 1 .9 7 1 2 .2 7
1999 6 4 .4 1 1 0 .5 5
2000 1 0 7 .8 6 1 7 .2 8
2001 1 4 0 .6 9 1 7 .1 6
2002 1 9 2 .9 8 3 3 .6 6
2003 2 8 6 .8 9 4 7 .4 8
In the textile sector, companies have been upgrading machinery under the framework of the
Tenth Five Year Plan, which makes provisions for grants and soft loans to the industry. This
is not fundamentally linked to the end of the quota regime, but rather is a programme
designed to restructure the sector strategically by enhancing, for instance, China’s capacity to
supply high quality, locally-produced fabrics. This research suggests that rather than
increasing capacity, Chinese textile enterprises have been mostly involved in upgrading their
machinery, with emphasis on improving efficiency through technology upgrades.
However there has been a slowdown in growth recently, following the government’s
measures to restrain investments in ‘overheated’ sectors. Following these measures Chinese
banks are beginning to hold back on loans to private domestic enterprises, although specific
figures on the effects of recent restraints on investment are not yet available. One
consequence of tighter lending policies has been a cutback on the amount of sales to China by
foreign textile machinery manufacturers.
24
ITMF, International Machinery Shipment Statistics, 2002
According to the ITMF, in 2003, shipments of short-staple cotton spindles reached 8.2
million, a 133% year-on-year increase. The surge in orders from China was the main factor
driving the massive growth of cotton-spindle shipments worldwide. Asia received 88% of all
spindles shipped in 2003. China was the main market with 4,951,000 spindles. Shipments to
India (933,000), Pakistan (632,000) and Turkey (595,000) also contributed to the growth in
cotton-spindle shipments.
According to the ITMF, “240,000 long-staple (wool) spindles were delivered in 2003, a
decline of 32% compared with 2002, as Chinese and Turkish investment in the sector
weakened. The most important investors in wool spinning were China (82,000 spindles),
Turkey (63,000) and Iran (25,000). Shipments of open-end rotors also declined by 5% from
2002 levels. Open-end rotors shipped in 2003 totalled 346,000 worldwide. Rotor shipments
were concentrated in China (248,000 rotors) and Turkey (32,000), which together accounted
for 81% of global shipments in 2003 (up from 78% in 2002).”25
Nevertheless, even as imports of foreign textile machinery have increased over the last couple
of years, domestic production of machinery has also improved significantly.
Textile machinery manufacturers are investing in China to produce for the domestic market
and to export to less developed markets. Foreign enterprises typically establish WFOE or
joint ventures although the trends suggest that WFOE have become the preferred vehicle for
entering the Chinese market. Intellectual property rights (IPR) violations within the industry
are an issue, and European companies claim that many Chinese machinery makers are
copying foreign technology.
25
ITMF, International Textile Machinery Shipment Statistics, Volume 26 / 2003
Despite this concern, this research suggests that currently the technology being transferred to
China includes state-of-the-art equipment because of rapidly rising textile standards
requirements. Foreign manufacturers are protecting their investments mainly by establishing
WFOE, thereby reducing the risk of possible leaks of proprietary technology to domestic
competitors.
The competitiveness of China’s domestic textile machinery industry varies. For example, in
the case of rapier weaving machines, China is only importing 10% and manufacturing the rest
locally. But for advanced air-jet weaving, Chinese companies are importing 92% and only
manufacturing 8% locally.
This research suggests that Japan is a major provider of weaving and spinning equipment,
whereas Italy focuses mostly on sales of spinning and weaving machinery. German and
Swiss companies have shown strong sales in China for their spinning machinery.
In 2003 the export value of textile machinery from Italy to China reached over US$ 494
million, taking a market share of 12.5%. The export of Italian weaving machinery decreased
compared to 2002, however exports of knitting machines and spinning machines increased.
Of Italy’s total machinery exports to China, yarn preparation and spinning machinery
accounts for 32% of exports, weaving machinery for 34%, knitting machines for 23% and
finishing machines for 11%. Germany and Belgium are also major exporters of textile
machinery to China.
Yes
91%
Source: Global Sources Market Intelligence
More than
50%
Source: Global Sources Market Intelligence 16%
More than half of China’s suppliers of manufactured clothing products intend to boost
capacity by 20-50%. However, only 16% of suppliers intend to increase capacity by more
than 50%.27 Garment manufacturing companies plan to increase capacity mainly by adding
to their headcount. The problem facing clothing manufacturing enterprises as is discussed in
Section 3 is that although factory managers prefer to hire young female workers in their late
teens or early twenties, this particular pool of labour is shrinking. Labour costs are therefore
expected to rise, as are raw materials and overhead costs, including land and utility charges.
26
Global Sources Market Intelligence: Summer Garments, China Supplier Survey, Buying Season 2005
27
Ibid
% of total respondents
Source: Global Sources Market Intelligence
Aside from manufacturers, trading companies are increasing capacity in an effort to reinvent
their business. In a non-quota environment, trading companies will no longer be the bridge
between suppliers and buyers. These companies may continue to provide value-added
services as middlemen, but only if they can compete effectively against manufacturers, which
are developing their own international marketing capabilities. Trading companies are
therefore setting up their own manufacturing capabilities. This will also enable them to
manage the production process more efficiently, improving design innovation, production
efficiency and quality control.
Foreign Investment
This research suggests that large garment makers and sourcing companies are still reluctant to
expand production significantly in China due to the possibility that safeguard quotas may be
placed on China-made garments. Interestingly, it would seem that the uncertainty
surrounding the transition to a quota-free environment may in itself place certain restraints,
albeit as an indirect effect, on the growth of orders for Chinese T&C products.
Most international garment makers and traders active in China in fact continue to source from
factories in other countries within the region. The other reason why companies are not
significantly expanding capacity in China is because new entrants in the garment sector are,
by and large, rushing into the lower-end of the market. This may cause a surge in exports of
bulk garments. Yet international buyers are not yet willing to sacrifice quality by switching
to lower-cost upstarts.
CNTIC data on FDI in the T&C sector indicates that as of 2003 there were over 22,727 FIEs
in the sector, of which 11,777 were garment companies and 10,950 were textile companies,
including manmade fibre manufacturing companies. In 2003, FIEs accounted for US$ 43.19
billion in gross output, US$ 41.49 billion in sales and US$ 1.64 billion in profit. Hong Kong
accounts for the bulk of FDI in the sector with 70% of total investment. Taiwan trails in
second position with about 10% of total FDI according to 2000 statistics.
Interestingly, quotas imposed on mainland China’s exports of T&C products have halted the
wholesale migration of Hong Kong’s T&C manufacturing sector across the border. Indeed
the combined T&C manufacturing sector continues to account for 25% of manufacturing
employment in the territory and a similar proportion of gross output.28 Yet in spite of the
migration of manufacturing to the mainland, T&C products still constitute Hong Kong’s
second-largest industry. T&C exports totalled US$ 23.1 billion in 2003.
28
‘Leaping Dragon, Trailing Tigers? Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Challenge of Mainland China’, Economist
Intelligence Unit, May 2003
8,000
5,966
6,000
1980
4,000 2001
1,546 1,796
2,000
0
Clothing Textiles
Source: Census and Staistics Dept., Hong Kong SAR, EIU
Shift to Services
The migration of manufacturing capacity to the mainland, however, has not decreased the
importance of the T&C sector for the Hong Kong economy. The deindustrialisation process
has been accompanied by a rapid development of a dedicated service industry catering to the
commercial needs of T&C manufacturers. According to the Hong Kong Trade Development
Council (TDC), by 2002 more than 15,000 companies in Hong Kong were involved in
garment import-export trade and employing over 90,000 workers.29 Indeed, most Hong Kong
T&C companies are engaged in supply chain management, from product design and factory
sourcing to transport and logistics services.
29
Ibid
30
Goldman Sachs 2005 Quota Elimination Impact Survey
Source 15%
to 25% more
Source in
46.4%
excess of
25% more
Source: Global Sources Buyer Poll
10.1%
Production Structures
Big players, such as Wal-Mart, are continually raising the bar, forcing both retailers and
suppliers to “chase a moving target”.31 In 2003 Wal-Mart, the US retailing giant, sourced
US$ 15 billion worth of goods in China and mainland products made up about 80% of
imports sold by Wal-Mart at its more than 3,200 outlets in the US. The company, which is
the single largest importer of manufactured goods from China into the US, works with its
suppliers to lower prices (Wal-Mart’s global purchasing headquarters is located in Shenzhen
in Southern China). As a result, companies like Wal-Mart are driving prices down, thanks
partly to consolidation of supply chains in China, thereby achieving the economies of scale
needed to provide Wal-Mart with its low-price mandate.32 However, as large corporations
like Wal-Mart create competition by selling at lower prices, retailers will also cut prices but
will not necessarily sell more.33 One result may be deflation in the clothing industry.
31
Deloitte Research, Global Consumer Business, Strategies for a Challenging World
32
Deloitte & Touche USA LLP, The Wal-Mart Effect
33
‘Textiles and Clothing Summary’, Center for International Development at Harvard University,
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/textiles.html
Yet the necessity of maintaining low costs is also an imperative driven by consumers in
developed markets in the EU, the US and Japan. The balance of power in global supply
chains has already tipped towards the consumers in developed economies. Already, decisions
in the global supply chain are taken in the higher value-added segments of the T&C value-
added chain, such as in design, fashion, brand and retailing. These decisions, including
pricing policies, are ultimately driven by consumer behaviour.
In the current economic environment, consumers face serious constraints on spending. This
means that retailers in developed markets seeking to retain their market share will be
unwilling to pass on cost increases to consumers. Rising commodity prices, exchange rate
volatility, shortages created by sudden surges in demand or the application of trade defence
measures could generate such cost increases.
Downward price pressure and reduced profit margins are the most obvious examples of the
“pull” effect as power shifts to stakeholders who call the shots in the global supply chain: the
retailers, and ultimately, the consumers. The consequences are felt throughout the value
chain. In developing countries like China, where suppliers face a market of fewer, larger
buyers, their bargaining power is significantly reduced. In the end they have to compete on
price, as well as on service and quality differentiation.
European retailers and suppliers interviewed for this study corroborate the “pull” effect of
consumer-driven price pressure in their pricing policies. Most of Europe’s leading retailers
have a significant sourcing presence in China because it offers low-cost products of
reasonably good quality. Although few of them source exclusively from China, and indeed
most plan to continue sourcing from other countries after 2005, they expressed serious
concern about the possibility of measures being put in place in the EU. Interestingly, this
research also revealed that a number of apparel manufacturers from leading EU T&C
manufacturing regions deliberately keep a low profile in their China operations to avoid
criticism from labour unions and other interest groups in Europe. Many of these traditional
European enterprises have developed a strong buying presence in China, and in some cases
have invested directly into domestic manufacturing plants to offset high production costs in
Europe.
Market Dependency
China’s market share of Australia and Japan’s combined imports of textile and clothing
products (69% in 2002 and 77% in 2001) demonstrate its ability to compete effectively in a
non-quota environment. These figures may appear to corroborate the results of a recent
WTO report which projects that China’s share of garment exports to the US will rise to 50%
after 2005, up from 16% after the third stage of ATC liberalisation in 200234.
Cambodia 18.2%
Pakistan 27.3%
Bangladesh 36.4%
India 63.6%
No
Yes
However a number of obstacles may attenuate the expansion of Chinese exports of T&C
goods to the EU and the US, including the potential imposition of safeguard measures.
Consultations with wholesalers and manufacturers suggest that buyers, including leading
sourcing giants such as Wal Mart, do not want to rely too heavily on China due to uncertainty
about the use of safeguard quotas by the US and the EU.
Given that the buying cycle for T&C products is often longer than the length of time required
to process petitions for the application of safeguard measures, buyers do not want to be
34
The Global Textile and Clothing Industry Post the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Hildegunn Kyvik
Nordas, WTO 2004
caught having ordered products that will be barred from entering into US or EU ports.
Buyers and retailers, in other words, are afraid of placing their supply chains at risk by
“putting all their eggs in the same basket”. They want to avoid excess market dependency on
China in case the US and the EU take trade defence action against imports of Chinese goods.
Therefore many of them are diversifying their production to other key supplying countries
such as India, Vietnam, Bangladesh and Pakistan.
A recent McKinsey report suggests that the value of the global trade in T& C goods is likely
to reach US$ 248 billion by 2008, with China and South Asian countries gaining the lion’s
share. The report forecasts that India may increase its share from the current 4% to 6.5%
valued at US$ 16 billion by 2008 and notes that by 2013, exports from India could grow 15%
to 18% annually amounting to over US$ 30 billion.35
Other obstacles including concerns about working and environmental conditions in factories
are explored in more detail below.
Thus far, some details are available concerning the proposed duties on exports of T&C
products37. Duties levied will be based upon the quantity of garments exported instead of
their value. The Chinese authorities hope that this measure will encourage Chinese
enterprises to export products with a higher added value, as the duty will be comparatively
lower. Duties will be imposed at the symbolic levels of between 0.2 and 0.3 Yuan
(US$0.025 and 0.04) per item and of 0.5 Yuan (US$ 0.06) per kg.
In practice export duties are unlikely to become an effective deterrent unless exporters share a
clear understanding of what constitutes a ‘risk zone’, which may not become apparent unless
real safeguard measures are put in place. Otherwise the duties will restrain surge in exports
in so far as they pose an administrative burden. This research however indicates that large-
scale Chinese exporters do not actually perceive the export duties to be a real burden
(although industry analysts suggest that they may have a negative impact on small exporters).
As the measure has only recently come into force, however, it will take some time to see the
effect on the different types of exporting enterprises.
On balance, the absence of a strong reaction from Chinese exporters would seem to
corroborate the view that the measures are largely symbolic and are unlikely to lead to a fall
in garment exports, particularly in light of the expected reduction in average unit prices
which is likely to accompany the end of quota-bound product categories under the final stage
of ATC liberalization.
35
DHL-McKinsey Apparel and Textile Trade Report
36
This analysis is shared by the CCCT.
37
In December 2004, the General Administration of Customs announced that from January 1 this year export
duties will be levied on some garment products and this should apply to products exported under general trade,
process trade and border small trade. This measure covers a total of 148 garment products according to customs
classification.
The measures concerning the restraint on investment in particular may only affect production
and exports in the medium term. In any event they are likely to have a limited impact, as
there are many indications that a large amount of investment projects have already been
carried out so the capacity is already there. Questions also arise regarding the implementation
of investment restraint measures at the local level.
Potentially the most significant measure is the call for self-discipline in the industry,
including the publication of data on exports (which would in a way mirror the EU monitoring
system), but of course the feasibility of this approach depends on how it is implemented.
There have been press notices that some groups of exporters are introducing price controls for
certain products, but they cover only a relatively small part of exporters (in the case of the
CCCT, less than 20 %) and only for some products.
If on the whole the measures appear toothless, they nevertheless reveal that the Chinese
authorities are interested in avoiding potential safeguard measures, and that they want to be
perceived as ‘good citizens’ committed to ensuring a smooth transition to a quota-free trade
regime.
38
The promised lowering of import duties (when, how much, for which products), duty-free treatment of
imports of “parts of products” imported from 25 African countries (which products, when), intensification of
IPR protection, encouragement to Chinese companies to invest overseas, “dialogue and cooperation” in textiles.
By most accounts, including those of Chinese central government officials, compliance with
labour and workplace HSE standards is far from satisfactory. Large, state-owned enterprises
and Western-invested operations are generally believed to have higher levels of compliance
than private or other foreign invested enterprises. As yet, there are few sources of
comprehensive quantifiable analysis on just how poor standards are in the textile and garment
industries, though significant anecdotal evidence has been widely documented and some
indicative statistics have been released by the Chinese government.39
There is general consensus among sources that poor enforcement of existing regulations,
which are generally viewed as comprehensive, and the exclusion of migrant workers from the
Chinese legal system are the most serious barriers to improved work conditions. These
obstacles are closely related to the competition between jurisdictions to facilitate investment
and economic growth: the attitude of provincial and local officials is that lax law enforcement
that promotes growth is not an abrogation of duties.
Foreign observers have noted recent improvements in enforcement and in the attitudes of
lower-level officials, especially related to migrant workers’ rights, health and safety
(including HIV/AIDS). Enforcement is still highly variable and poorly planned.
Interviewees have also seen increased interest in standards and corporate social responsibility
by factories, but this has primarily been driven by a desire to understand the international
market and some managers have openly expressed their disbelief that better labour conditions
would benefit their business, and their resentment at what they view as multinational
hypocrisy.
This section begins by focusing on labour, health and safety issues, providing an overview of
the political environment, relevant government and semi-government actors, key pieces of
legislation, actual labour conditions, wages and remuneration, and worker empowerment.
Environmental issues are treated separately, though many of the systemic enforcement
problems and reasons for non-compliance are similar.
39
This section and the section on environmental compliance draws from 18 interviews with foreign government
officials, compliance and communication officers from foreign textile buyers, NGO and multilateral
organisation representatives, Chinese factory owners, and representatives of Chinese government-organised
NGOs, as well as reports published by the Chinese government, international NGOs, the international media,
and the domestic media.
Despite the government’s reticence concerning “labour rights,” the State Council, MOLSS,
the ACFTU, CEC, and the progressive State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) openly
acknowledge health and safety problems and the lack of protection for migrant workers and
have initiated efforts aimed at providing access to legal protection and representation, as well
as limited social services for migrant workers. The state media is also increasingly covering
these issues. However, not only are these initiatives too recent to have produced widespread
improvements, but the central government is compelled to rely on often uncooperative lower-
level branches to lead enforcement efforts.
Government resources are limited at each level, and incentives for enforcement are usually
weak. The central government lacks the capacity to oversee effectively the efforts of
provincial and local governments, and lower-level governments are motivated to overlook
employer transgressions as they compete to attract investment and orders. Furthermore,
health and safety problems in the textile and garment industries are dwarfed by the number of
deaths and injuries in the mining and transportation industries, prompting SAWS to focus
more resources on those sectors.
Nonetheless, foreign interviewees from NGOs and multinationals have noted a marked
improvement in the attitudes of some local government officials towards health and safety
issues and migrant workers, and in some cases labour conditions. One interviewee reported
that local labour bureau and union officials were very willing to participate in projects related
to both migrants and health issues (including the previously taboo HIV/AIDS), but continued
to resist efforts to improve working conditions or introduce anything related to freedom of
association.
State Council
The State Council is the highest executive body in the Chinese government, led by Premier
Wen Jiabao. The State Council spearheaded the ongoing campaign against delayed wage
payment for migrant workers (discussed below) and issued the “Notice on Properly Carrying
Out the Work of Management and Services for Rural Migrant Workers in Urban Areas,”
40
“China Rejects Criticism Over Cancelled Labour Conference,” Associated Press Newswires, 9 December
2004.
dealing with payment in arrears, schooling for the children of migrant workers and working
conditions. The involvement of the State Council in migrant workers and health issues, such
as HIV/AIDS, is a signal to the rest of the government to take those issues seriously.
Over the past few years, MOLSS has become increasingly forthright about problems with
labour conditions; a report released in September this year partially blames inadequate wages
and sweatshop conditions for the recent labour shortage. 43 In 2003, MOLSS launched a
campaign to assist migrant workers by distributing the Manual of Protection of Labourers’
Rights and establishing hotlines for complaints. On December 1, 2004, they announced a
two-month inspection drive to combat wage defaults.44
The active participation of local labour bureaux in central MOLSS initiatives is doubted by
many. However, according to an expert from the Guangdong Textile Association, the stricter
requirements for production required by international buyers are having an effect on the
behaviour of some local labour officials. He described the previous method of inspection as
“one eye open and one eye shut” as officials would give advance notice to factory
management. He claims that Guangdong officials have now begun “cross-district”
inspections, in which officials inspect factories in districts other than their own without prior
notification.45 Such improved practices are still rare.
The statements of SAWS officials in the media and their interaction with NGOs do indicate
that SAWS is comparatively open about the problems it faces. At a conference on work
safety for migrant workers co-hosted by SAWS, Beijing-based NGOs, and Hong Kong
Oxfam, Mr. Zhao Tiechui, a deputy director at SAWS, said that mainland China had more
42
An example of the relationships between government branches is a ‘pact’ that was signed between the Beijing
municipal Bureau of Labour and Social Security, Construction Commission, Judicial Department, Trade Union,
and Women’s Federation and their counterparts from Heilongjiang Province in October 2004. The agreement
created a framework for protecting “the legal rights of migrant workers from the province in order to tackle the
capital’s labour shortage.” This example illustrates increasing efforts at protecting migrant workers; the
independence of departments at administrative levels (the pact was signed by individual departments); the lack
of a nationwide framework for protecting migrants and the inability of the central MOLSS to institute one.
“Beijing, Heilongjiang sign labour pact,” China Daily, 14 October 2004.
43
Ministry of Labour and Social Security, “Report on the Shortage of Migrant Workers,” 15 Sept. 2004.
44
“Nation Witnesses Progress in Human Rights,” China Daily, 31 March 2004 and Gu Zi, “Protecting Migrant
Workers’ Rights,” China Daily, 4 December 2004.
incidences of workplace-induced illness than any other country. More specifically, he stated
that 50,000 cases of workplace poisonings are recorded annually and migrant workers are
particularly prone to accidents due to long working hours and lack of education on work
safety: “the awareness is not low—there is no awareness at all.” He also conceded that law
enforcement was weak and that the “intertwined” relationships between local governments
and enterprises complicate the problem.46
The young agency, created in 2001, is tasked with improving occupational safety and
reducing workplace accidents, which their statistics estimate resulted in 98,809 deaths during
the first nine months of 2004.47 Despite SAWS’ apparent activism, it is limited by its status
in the government hierarchy: its lead administrator was recently promoted to full ministerial
rank, but its authority is still weaker than other ministries. Although workplace safety in the
textile and garment industries falls under their purview, SAWS is much more focused on coal
mining and traffic accidents, as they respectively accounted for well over three-quarters of
those deaths. Consequently, one Chinese interviewee felt that they have very little relevance
for the textile industry.
When set against the scale of the labour issues across China, it is unlikely that their projects
have made significant impacts on workplace conditions; however, as their experience grows
and projects expand, this may change. More importantly at this time, their status as quasi-
governmental institutions reflects both a greater political openness and commitment towards
labour issues and represents a source of pressure on other government agencies to act that is
recognised as legitimate by the central government.
46
Josephine Ma, “Despite a decline in job-related deaths, many labourers face grave dangers,” South China
Morning Post, 19 June 2004.
47
“Workplace carnage claims 15 lives an hour: More than 70 percent of incidents blamed on dangerous
practices,” South China Morning Post, 22 October 2004.
48
Some actors have asserted that standards are unrealistic for many enterprises to attain at current levels of
development and are therefore not taken seriously.
Law, which deals with work safety issues. There are also a number of other national laws,
regulations and rules, as well as provincial and local regulations.
• Flaws in the hukou system of residential permits effectively force migrant workers to
remain outside of the legal system at the mercy of their employers (see below), and
therefore unprotected under this law. Although this situation is now improving in
some areas, migrant workers are still frequently unaware of their entitlements under
the law and lack the capacity to seek enforcement. Most do not seek labour contracts
with employers and are left without recourse to hold employers accountable.
• Article 39 of the Labour Law states that if an enterprise “cannot follow [the hour
restrictions stipulated] in Article 36 and Article 38 of this Law due to its special
production nature, it may adopt other rules on working hours and rest with the
approval of the labour administrative department.” Local government approval is
apparently not difficult to obtain.
• Factory managers are often inexperienced and poorly educated; many lack awareness
of their obligations under the law.
• The Labour Law allows for “probation” periods of up to six months, after which
workers can be dismissed without having a fixed term contract.
• Minimum wages can vary across large municipalities and within provinces.
According to Articles 48 and 49, they are determined by provincial or municipal
governments taking into account “The lowest living expenses of labourers themselves
and the average family members they support; the average wage level of the society
as a whole; labour productivity; the situation of employment; and the different levels
of economic development between regions.”
provide education and training courses and all units should have occupational injury and
social insurance for employees.
According to Article 19, production units not dealing with dangerous materials that have over
300 employees must set up a work safety control organ or assign full-time work safety
controllers. If a production unit has fewer than 300 employees it should hire full- or part-
time work safety controllers or hire appropriate technologists. Article 7 stipulates that trade
unions should “organise employees to participate in production and operation units’
democratic management and supervision over work safety, and maintain employees’ lawful
rights and interests in work safety.” According to a study by Impactt, a social consultancy,
some factories have had difficulty with implementation due to lack of experience. It is also
likely that many are simply not bothering to implement it or are half-heartedly appointing
committees or personnel that are then not held accountable for performance.49
The major labour conditions described below tend to apply most to foreign invested factories
(especially Taiwanese, Korean, and Japanese) and private Chinese SMEs. According to a
Shanghai-based Chinese textile factory manager, roughly 80 percent of the companies in the
textile and clothing industry near Shanghai are SMEs, and most of these are privately owned
or county-level collectives. The industry is therefore difficult to monitor, with competition
pushing down margins along with labour conditions.
Officials from local labour bureaux are frequently more concerned with attracting investors
or buyers and often offer exemptions from social insurance requirements and other
regulations as explicit incentives to potential investors. Lax enforcement also follows as
factory managers actively cultivate friendly relationships with labour officials.
49
Impact and the Global Alliance for Workers and Communities, “China Mapping Exercise,” October 2003, pg.
18.
50
In addition to interviews, media reports, and other reports, the Impactt study cited above and “Labour
Standards in China, the Business and Investment Challenge,” published by the Association for Sustainable &
Responsible Investment in Asia, December 2002, were particularly helpful.
Labour Conditions
The following key labour issues are widely acknowledged as being the most serious.
According to one NGO interviewee, the issues workers care most about are, in order of
importance, excessive overtime, payment in arrears, and dormitory/canteen quality. One
interviewee from a multinational felt that workers care most about compensation, as their
suppliers experienced much higher turnover when hours were reduced to limit overtime.
• Excessively Long Hours: Factories often illegally force migrant workers to work
additional unpaid hours either directly or indirectly through production quotas and
“per-piece” payment. In other instances, excessive hours may be sanctioned by local
governments through Article 39 in the National Labour Law as described above. The
state media and SAWS have admitted that this is a serious problem. According to
SAWS: 46 percent of workers in the PRD work 14 hours per day, while only 30
percent work eight hours per day.51
In many cases, migrant workers are paid legal and fair wages “on the books” that are
then in effect diluted by unpaid overtime and convoluted fine systems that dock pay
for minor errors or “offences” such as leaving production to use the toilet. Migrant
workers often do not understand the complicated company formulas for determining
their wages and typically do not receive other forms of compensation or entitlements,
such as holiday, sick leave, or health insurance.
51
It is unclear how SAWS produced this figure and it is likely that it is not accurate. However, the fact that the
government is openly admitting to such a high proportion of overtime workers is significant. Josephine Ma,
“Despite a decline in job-related deaths, many labourers face grave dangers,” South China Morning Post, 19
June 2004.
52
People’s Daily, 19 September 2004.
53
“Zeng: Pay all owed wages to migrants,” China Daily¸24 August 2004.
• Dormitory and Canteen Issues: Major complaints among workers relate to poor food
and cramped living conditions. Employers frequently charge workers for room and
board at rates above fair market prices, provide low quality fare, and subtract fees
directly from their pay.
• Poor Health and Safety: As discussed in the section describing SAWS above, poor
standards for health and safety are widely acknowledged. The financial savings for
employers resulting from lax enforcement is unclear. They are cutting costs by not
purchasing or maintaining adequate safety equipment, neglecting training for workers
or managers, and saving in management hours. One representative from a major
Western buyer noted that their inspectors have observed that even when factories have
invested in appropriate equipment it is often simply not used. This points to low
levels of training and awareness that may or may not be translating to a cost
advantage.
The hukou system requires all residents of China to hold a hukou, or residential permit, and
people are only legally permitted to work or entitled to social services in areas for the
location of their hukou. This is a barrier to migration from rural to urban areas and an added
hardship for workers seeking employment. Upon arrival in some cities, migrants were forced
to pay exorbitant fees for temporary hukous—often this money is paid by the factories and
then withheld from the workers’ salaries. Alternatively, some workers are unable to obtain
permits and, living in fear that they will be arrested and/or abused by the authorities, cannot
54
The majority of garment workers are young, female migrant workers.
seek legal protection against their employers. The extent to which this is still the case is
unclear.
Since at least 2001, the central government has been issuing directives to lower-level
governments to take measures to protect the rights of migrant workers and integrate them into
the official employment system.55 Central government messages were intensified after the
transfer of power to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in 2002 and following the much publicised
beating to death of a student mistaken for a migrant worker in Guangzhou in 2003. The
central government, including the State Council and the Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong
branches of MOLSS, ACFTU, and ACWF have been attempting to protect migrants and
provide them with healthcare and education for their children; however, the situation outside
of major municipalities remain uncertain. 56 Although these efforts are either newly
implemented or in development, growing numbers of complaints by migrant workers to
authorities concerning abuse may indicate that the atmosphere is changing for the better in
some areas: in the first half of 2004, the Shenzhen government received over 41,000
petitions concerning poor labour conditions, an increase of 13.6 percent from the same period
in 2003.57
Factory Management
Often underestimated in the media, the lack of management capacity negatively impacts
working conditions and HSE. Local management are often poorly educated and have not had
training on appropriate working conditions, HSE issues, and management skills that would
improve their capacity to manage a workforce without labour violations. Representatives of
multinationals working with suppliers or contractors often complain that local management
simply do not understand the need for HSE standards. Management training projects such as
the China Training Initiative by Business for Social Responsibility, a US-based NGO, have
been operating in garment factories, but impact so far has been inconclusive. One challenge
that they have noted is the relatively high-rate of turnover among factory managers
themselves.
Factory management also faces intense pressure from buyers to produce on tight deadlines at
the lowest possible cost. Foreign efforts to force them to improve labour standards are often
viewed as trade barriers, creating resistance to compliance. Many also do not believe the
“business case” for improved conditions and social responsibility, and accuse advocates of
hypocrisy. Competition makes compliance exceptionally painful for the countless small
companies, so many of them feel justified in not complying.
55
In October 2001, the Ministry of Finance and the State Development and Planning Commission (predecessor
to the National Development and Reform Commission) reportedly ordered all local governments to stop
charging a variety of “unreasonable” fees on migrant workers. According to Yang Chen, the Shenzhen
government resisted the directive until mid-2002. From “Shenzhen Government Disregards Migrant Worker’s
Rights,” China Labour Watch, www.chinalaborwatch.org.
56
Examples: Occupational insurance scheme for enterprises registered or operating in Beijing: Mu Zi, “Migrant
Workers to get medical insurance,” China Daily, 23 August 2004; Bill Salvadove, “Shanghai unveils plans to
make low-cost health insurance available to all,” South China Morning Post; “Illegal schools for migrant
workers’ kids await government approval,” Xinhua, 19 February 2004.
57
Chow Chung-yan, “Shenzhen struggles to deal with rising labour disputes: Migrant workers continue to suffer
long hours and non-payment by employers,” South China Morning Post¸14 August 2004.
Worker Empowerment
Collective actions by workers, including protests, strikes, and petitions to the government, are
growing in number. Although the official media rarely covers worker protests, state media
coverage of labour abuses is increasing, undoubtedly raising awareness among the general
public and migrant workers themselves. The ACFTU and the ACWF claim to be making
efforts to educate workers about their rights and support their entry into the official
employment system. However, protesting workers still risk retribution from their employers
and/or the local government and officials repeatedly demonstrate their lack of tolerance for
collective action.58
There have been some attempts to set up “Health & Safety” committees in lieu of
independent unions, but according to the Work Safety Law, worker representation related to
work safety is still under the purview of the ACFTU. Some committees have reportedly been
successful, but in others the union has asserted its control.
Union representatives are usually appointed and foreign buyers report that factory managers
often hire relatives or retired employees to run the union branch, though in some areas they
are more closely affiliated with the Communist Party than with management. For these
reasons, unions are often corrupt, inept, or not taken seriously. Opinions concerning their
intentions and utility among Western multinational and NGO representatives are generally
not high.
Despite much corruption within its system, there are ACFTU officials who are genuinely
trying to protect the rights of workers, so local trade union chapters could theoretically play
an important role despite their lack of independence. At this time, however, these cadres
often take care to speak about labour issues as individuals and not as representatives of the
trade union. As an institution, the ACFTU has begun to place greater emphasis on protecting
the rights of workers through corporate social responsibility and SA8000, despite public
comments that corporate social responsibility is partially driven by trader barriers. They have
generally increased their rhetoric about workers rights and have even taken the lead—
58
“China labour protesters convicted,” BBC, 29 October 2004.
59
Article 27 of the Trade Union Law of the People’s Republic of China (amended in 2001) reads, “In case of a
work stoppage or a go-slow in an enterprise, the trade union shall represent staff and workers in consultation
with the enterprise, institution or relevant party, and shall reflect the opinions and demands of staff and workers
as well as raise solutions. The enterprise or institution shall strive for a settlement with the reasonable demands
made by the staff and workers. The trade union shall strive hard in its task to assist the enterprise or institution
to restore the normal order of production as soon as possible.”
In a purported effort to protect the rights of abused workers, the ACFTU launched a “Million
Branch Campaign” a few years ago to increase its reach into private and foreign-invested
enterprises, which are required by law to have a workers committee if the workers desire
one. 61 Although trade union membership increased, the ACFTU was unable to establish
branches in a large number of factories, so in late 2004, its leadership announced that it
would blacklist foreign-invested enterprises that refuse to set up unions.62 If local-level union
branches take the initiative to protect workers rights, the ACFTU could make a significant
difference; however, most interviewees were sceptical.
There are three main areas where the government has permitted international and local NGOs
to be particularly active in support of migrant workers: health, legal rights, and general
support. Marie Stopes International (MSI) and Family Health International (FHI) have been
working with suppliers of Nike and Adidas to provide workers with training on health issues
such as HIV/AIDS. A number of NGOs, government-organised NGOs and individuals have
begun to provide legal assistance to migrant workers, including the Hubei Provincial Legal
Aid Centre for Migrant Workers, the Beijing-based Law Maintenance Group for Migrant
Women, the Guangdong Women’s Federation Legal Aid Group and Gao Zhisheng.64 NGOs
60
In November 2004, the ACFTU was the lead organiser to launch a Red Ribbon workplace campaign to
combat HIV/AIDS and will be using its network to educate workers about the disease.
61
Under the Trade Union Law of the People’s Republic of China (1950), all trade unions must belong to the
ACFTU and “a basic-level trade union committee shall be set up in an enterprise, and institution or a
government department with a membership of twenty-five or more.”
62
“Wal-Mart Says It Would Support Unionisation Efforts in Chinese Stores,” BSR News Monitor, 24 November
2004.
63
Edward Cody, “In China, Workers Turn Tough,” Washington Post Foreign Service, 27 November 2004.
64
Gao Zhisheng, a lawyer from Beijing, is currently representing five migrant workers appealing a conviction
for labour-related riots in the Stella International Shoe Factory in Guangdong.
registered under the Women’s Federation and run by female cadres who gained experience
and status through the ACWF have set up support programmes for female migrant workers,
most notably the Cultural Development Centre for Rural Women in Beijing.
Other organisations, such as Business for Social Responsibility, Hong Kong-based NGOs and
the Ethical Trading Initiative, are working on labour rights issues. Such work is often done
without the express approval of the government, through multinational sponsors, and/or in
conjunction with more “desirable” programmes from the local government point-of-view.
Environmental Performance
The environmental performance of manufacturers includes many of the same issues as labour
standards, although there are some differences:
• The implementing body, the State Environmental Protection Administration and its
lower level Environmental Protection Bureaux, is admittedly weak and lacks capacity.
The central government has come out more forcefully on environmental issues, but
was embarrassed when it was revealed that billions of dollars spent to combat
pollution in major rivers was wasted through poor local enforcement.
• Environmental laws are generally acknowledged to be comparable to international
best practice—in some industries they are believed to be too stringent to be realistic.
The Chinese lack quality enforcement, not quality legislation.
• Labour and environmental issues balance economic development with social concerns
and state security. With labour issues, the government aims to manage unrest through
suppression, rhetoric and improvement to avoid rebellion. With environmental issues,
especially related to water scarcity, the government must also balance development
and potential social unrest. The desire for economic development encourages lax
enforcement to attract investment at the same time as it necessitates the careful
maintenance of natural resources. Both severe pollution and the actions that could
curtail it—increased prices for resources and the closing of offending facilities—
could spark social unrest.
• Production is dispersed among too many small factories. According to the China
Chemical Reporter, the lack of consolidation in the dyeing and printing sector, in
which most textile-related pollution is concentrated, has resulted in poor
environmental performance and outdated production processes.65
• The state media is increasingly exposing environmental malpractice, though there are
still limits to what the press can disclose.66
• Domestic and international non-governmental organisations are extremely active in
Chinese environmental issues, but they rarely adopt confrontational tactics. With few
exceptions, they have not begun to tackle industrial pollution.
coordinate with and support other members of the bureaucracy that may have different
objectives.67
An outspoken vice director, Pan Yue, openly describes his agency’s major weakness: local
environmental officials often report to the local authorities instead of the central level SEPA
and therefore prioritise economic growth over the environment. 68 In some cases, local
environmental protection bureaux (EPBs) are funded by local governments and must adhere
to their policies. Fines collected from polluters are sometimes refunded by the local
government through tax breaks.69 In other cases, EPBs depend on the income from fines paid
by polluters, creating a perverse incentive for EPBs to keep polluting factories open. Such
fines are frequently less than the cost of investing in appropriate solutions, so there is no
incentive for factories to improve.70
Some EPBs are genuinely interested in enforcing regulations; however, one interviewee who
works closely with an EPB overseeing the Tianjin Economic Development Area described
them as “forward thinking but clueless.” They had some positive initiatives in place, such as
incentives to recycle water and an environmental fund in which offenders were given a
percentage of their fines back to invest in a solution. She found that they lacked systemised
data and analysis necessary for proper environmental management. Data is generally
collected only annually to fulfil central level reporting requirements and is unconnected with
risk management. Inspections were ad hoc and limited by extreme staff shortages.
SEPA is also leading a new initiative known as “Green GDP”: officials are reportedly
developing a method of calculating economic growth that would account for environmental
costs. Pilot programmes are slated to begin in 2005.72 There is also some speculation that
environmental measures could soon be included in performance indicators for government
officials. The results of Green GDP are far from certain, but it could be an indication that
SEPA will be leading more progressive policymaking in the future.
67
The Shanghai EPB has only 300 staff to monitor 20,000 factories. “A Great Wall of Waste,” The Economist,
19 August 2004.
68
Jim Yardley, “Bad Air and Water, and a Bully Pulpit in China,” New York Times, 25 September 2004.
69
“A Great Wall of Waste,” The Economist, 19 August 2004.
70
An official from the Shanghai EPB stated that it is only permitted to fine a polluting company a maximum of
RMB 100,000. “A Great Wall of Waste,” The Economist, 19 August 2004.
71
Tim Johnson, San Jose Mercury News, 23 May 2004.
72
Jim Yardley, “Bad Air and Water, and a Bully Pulpit in China,” New York Times, 25 September 2004.
Environmental Legislation
There is a significant amount of legislation covering environmental issues, including national
laws, administrative rules and standards, and provincial/local regulations. Because the most
significant and controversial aspect of these laws is the lack of enforcement, this analysis
does not discuss the laws and regulations in detail. The following is a list of the most
relevant pieces of national legislation and applicable rules:
• Discharge Standard of Water Pollutants for Dyeing and Finishing in the Textile
Industry (1992) – These standards were set by the National Environmental Protection
Bureau (predecessor to SEPA) to “prevent and solve water pollution and promote
technical advancement of manufacturing techniques and pollution abatement.”
• Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Water
Pollution (1984, amended in 1996);
• Notice of Issuance of Technology Measures of Prevention of Waste Water Pollution
for Dyeing Industry (2001) – These measures were issued to apply the Law on Water
Pollution Prevention and Control to the dyeing industry;
• Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (1989);
• Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention of Environmental Pollution
Caused by Solid Waste (1995);
• Rules on Environmental Administrative Penalty (1999);
• Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric
Pollution (1995, amended in 2000);
• The Water Law of the People’s Republic of China (2002);
• Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion of Cleaner Production
(2002).
73
This is based on interviews with four people in the energy industry and the website of the State Energy
Regulatory Commission: www.serc.gov.cn.
They are not, however, bearing the full social Water Prices in December 2003
or environmental cost of coal use. In an CITY Industry (元/m3) Municipal (元/m3)
article penned for China Coal Outlook 2004, Beijing 2.90 2.00
Shanghai 1.30 1.03
the Director of the Board of the Shandong Jiangsu
Xinwen Coal Field Group Corporation, Lang Nanjing 1.80 1.45
Qingtian, indicated that coal was undervalued Wuxi 1.70 1.40
and pollution and mining accidents could be Jiangyin 1.45 1.05
Yangzhou 1.68 1.40
reduced if the costs of compensation, safety Zhejiang
equipment, and pollution were factored into Hangzhou 1.75 1.55
the overall price and the additional funds Ningbo 1.15 1.20
Shandong
invested in safety precautions.74
Jinan 2.10 1.75
Qingdao 1.35 1.30
Frequent power shortages beginning in the Zibo 0.60 0.60
summer of 2002 have impacted production, as Guangdong
Guangzhou 1.37 0.90
well as labour standards. In some cases, Shenzhen 1.90 1.50
power shortages may have hurt labour Shantou 0.89 1.25
conditions, as workers are forced to work 24 Foshan 0.96 0.79
Source: Aqua BioTronic.
hours/day to make up for lost production time.
In other cases, some observers have suggested
that power shortages may have improved conditions by forcing factories to shut down for part
of the week.
Despite the water scarcity, the prices of water do not generally reflect the real cost of
pumping or the depletion of non-renewable sources. Although prices and amounts of
available water vary regionally, prices tend to be 80-90 percent lower than countries with
four times more water per capita.77 The actual market value of water is difficult to determine
and would vary in areas like Guangdong, rich in water but heavily polluted, and Beijing or
Shandong, which have less than half of the level of water availability that the United Nations
Environment Programme classifies as “danger level.”78
With little economic incentive to develop waste-water treatment industries or conserve water,
most smaller cities do not charge for water treatment services and a majority of cities charge
below cost. 79 Although unlikely due entirely to pricing, the Chinese Ministry of Water
74
“Expert: Reflecting actual value of coal in pricing system can improve mining safety,” Interfax China
Business News, 28 October 2004. This article summarised in English Lang’s statements in China Coal Outlook
2004, published by the China National Coal Association.
75
Interview with John McAlister, CEO of Aqua Biotronic, 6 December 2004.
76
“China Industry: Thirst for Water Sector Reform”, Economist Intelligence Unit, 6 July 2004.
77
Interview with John McAlister.
78
“China Water vision,” and John McAlister
79
“China Industry: Thirst for Water Sector Reform”, Economist Intelligence Unit, 6 July 2004.
Resources estimates that industrial enterprises in China consume five to ten times more water
to produce an equal unit of goods as developed countries consume.80
Having recognised the threat posed to economic development by water scarcity, the central
government has begun instructing local water bureaux nationwide to gradually raise prices.
The current challenge is to raise the price enough to encourage conservation and foreign
investment in facilities, but to keep it low enough to avoid fuelling inflation and a public
outcry. 81 The government did not charge for water at all until 1985, and some observers
have suggested that many Chinese still strongly believe that water should be publicly
subsidised. 82 Criticisms of the Beijing government for increasing prices in 2004 do indicated
that some academics feel that the cost of water should not be born by consumers. 83 It is
likely that subsidies will continue for some time, despite being unsustainable.
80
“Beijing’s Acute Water Situation Forcing Price Increases,” Interfax China Business News, 17 June, 2004.
81
Peter Wonacott, “To Conserve Water, China Lifts Its Price,” The Wall Street Journal, 15 June 2004.
82
Yu Bian, “The Shadow of Water Shortage,” Beijing Review, December 2004.
83
“Payments for water spout higher,” Business Daily Update, 10 June 2004.
Industrial Policy
Adjustment to Post-Quota Environment
The government officials interviewed expressed serious concerns on trade developments after
2005. It seems clear that MOFCOM is eager to end unfair competition practices within the
industry in order to avoid trade friction with key trade partners. To this end it has sought to
work through the sectoral chambers of commerce to urge the industry to self-regulate.
However, the chambers have not been successful in negotiating an agreement on export
practices. Partly this is a result of the degree of sectoral liberalisation.
But it is also a reflection of the extent to which the chambers can co-opt only the major
industry players in this fragmented market.
The government is considering taking active measures to change the situation, but thus far
has not made any concrete progress. MOFCOM is planning to introduce a “Foreign Trade
Agent System”, as a way to reduce the increasingly hostile competition amongst Chinese
exporters (not only for textiles).
Overall the domestic T&C sector accounts for about two thirds of total production. Chinese
industry expects this share to increase, even in a quota free environment.
Upgrading Strategies
Although the government is trying to encourage the adoption of industry upgrading
strategies, attempts to move to the high-end of the sector will not be easy. Some garment
manufacturers are already attempting to upgrade by developing brands. But brand-building is
a difficult and time-consuming process. Thus far, Chinese T&C enterprises have proven
themselves effective at producing cheap textiles in bulk, but the fashion segment of the trade
is a different ball game. And it is simply not enough for the government to order companies
to move up the value chain, particularly in the more competitive market segments such as
garments and home textiles.
In innovation and design Chinese T&C enterprises are weak. Therefore, in the short term, the
focus of the textile sector in China will continue to be on low-price, high-volume
manufacturing.
3.00
2.62
2.50
2.08
million tons
2.00 1.74
1.56
1.50 1.32
1.00
0.50
0.00
1997 1998 2000 2002 2003
Textiles for the home is another segment that will see a surge in domestic sales, due to the
increasing levels of home ownership in urban areas, and increased spending on furniture and
fittings.