4 Allandale Sportsline Inc. v. The Good Development
4 Allandale Sportsline Inc. v. The Good Development
4 Allandale Sportsline Inc. v. The Good Development
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ , J : p
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the May 15, 2003 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 59475 which dismissed the petition of Allandale Sportsline, Inc. and Melbarose
R. Sasot from the January 13, 1998 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 158 in Civil Case No. 61053; and the June 12, 2004 CA Resolution 3 which
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. HECaTD
Meanwhile, ASI and Melbarose led their Answer with Counterclaim. 1 9 They
claimed that their loan obligation to GDC was only for P200,000.00, and after deducting
P18,000.00, which amount was retained by GDC as advanced interest payment, and
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P29,000.00, which represents payments made from June 4, 1991 to July 8 , 1991, their
unpaid obligation was only P171,000.00; 2 0 that they repeatedly tendered payment of
this amount, but GDC rejected their efforts for no valid reason; that the unreasonable
refusal of GDC to accept their tender of payment relieved them of their loan obligation;
2 1 that its Complaint being obviously without merit, GDC should be held liable to them
for damages. 2 2
Manipon led a separate Answer in which she did not deny the authenticity of her
signature on the Promissory Note, but argued that she did not knowingly or voluntarily
sign the instrument as a co-maker, for at that time she was under the impression that
the instrument she was signing was her own loan application with GDC. 2 3
In its Pre-Trial Order dated May 22, 1992, the RTC identi ed only these issues: (a)
whether GDC was entitled to collect P175,000.00, as well as the interests, attorney's
fees and other expenses and costs; (b) whether ASI and Melbarose made a valid tender
of payment; (c) whether Manipon was a real party-in-interest; and (d) whether the
prevailing party was entitled to damages. 2 4
However, it is signi cant that at the trial that ensued, GDC disclosed that after it
obtained possession of the properties subject of the writs of replevin, it caused the
auction sale of some of them and realized proceeds amounting to P78,750.00.
While there is no certi cate of sale in the records of the case, respondent's
witness Leonila Buenviaje testified thus:
ATTY. MAMARIL:
Q- In this case, Miss witness, you were able to seize by way of a writ of
replevin some properties of the defendants. What did you do with these
properties?
Q- Could you tell this Honorable Court if the auction sale pushed through? ADEaHT
A- Yes, sir.
Q- How much were you able to realize from the auction sale?
xxx xxx xxx
A- We had pulled amounting to P55,050.00. The Karaoke — P3,200.00; the t.v.
— P500.00; and athletic uniforms amounting to P20,000.00.
Q- So, all in all how much could that be?
On cross-examination, the same witness further described the auction sale: aHTCIc
ATTY. QUINONES:
Q- And the car Toyota Corona was also seized and sold?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- And in turn you were able to sell it to a third party?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- And that car was sold already in the amount of P56,000.00, is that correct?
A- P55,000.00. 2 6
Moreover, GDC presented to the RTC a Statement of Account dated August 24,
1992, which indicated that the total outstanding balance of the loan obligation of ASI
and Melbarose was reduced to P191,111.82 after the proceeds of the auction sale
conducted on June 19, 1992 in the amount of P78,750.00 was deducted from the
earlier balance of P266,126.17. 2 7
The RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered in favor of
the plaintiff Good Development Corporation against defendants Melbarose
Sasot, Allandale Sportsline Inc., and Ma. Theresa Manipon ordering them to pay
the plaintiff jointly and severally the amount of P269,611.82 plus legal
interest thereon effective to date until the full amount is fully paid,
and 25% of the total amount due as liquidated damages . DTESIA
SO ORDERED. 2 9
II. Whether or not the "parol evidence rule" applies on the promissory note in
question when the co-makers thereon are total strangers to one another;
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III. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the return of their properties
pursuant to Section 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.
IV. Whether or not there is legal basis in the award of liquidated damages. 3 1
The second issue deserves scant consideration for lack of basis. Manipon did
not join in the petition. Hence, the nding of the RTC, as a rmed by the CA, that she
was a co-maker of Promissory Note and a real party-in-interest is already nal and
conclusive. Petitioners cannot now question this nding by raising the defense that
Manipon signed the promissory note without knowledge of the nature of her liability
under the instrument. Such defense is personal to Manipon and cannot be invoked by
petitioners, unless it is shown that their interests are so interwoven with and dependent
on Manipon's as to be inseparable. 3 2 However, in their pleadings, petitioners do not
deny the authenticity and due execution of the Promissory Note, whereas Manipon has
maintained that said instrument was not duly executed; hence, their defenses are
clearly separate and distinct. ISTHED
Petitioners did not allege or prove that after their tender of payment was refused
by respondents, they attempted or pursued consignation of the payment with the
proper court. Their tender of payment not having been followed by a valid consignation,
it produced no effect whatsoever, least of all the extinguishment of the loan obligation.
Therefore, the rst issue of the validity or invalidity of their tender of payment is
completely moot and academic, for either way the discussion will go, it will lead to no
other conclusion but that, without an accompanying valid consignation, the tender of
payment did not result in the payment and extinguishment of the loan obligation. The
Court cannot take cognizance of such a purely hypothetical issue. 4 3
The third and fourth issues are interrelated because their resolution depends on
the nature of the remedy which respondent actually adopted.
As emphasized at the outset, the reliefs respondent prayed for in its Complaint
and Amended Complaint are in the alternative: delivery of the mortgaged properties
preparatory to foreclosure or payment of the unpaid loan. 4 4
Moreover, after respondent acquired possession of the mortgaged properties
through the writs of replevin, it caused the auction sale of assorted sports out ts, one
unit Sansio Karaoke, one unit Sony T.V. Set and one unit Toyota Corona, and earned
proceeds amounting to P78,750.00. 4 5 While it appears that respondent failed to
obtain the other personal properties covered by the Deed of Mortgage and the writs of
replevin, there is no doubt that it had effectively elected the remedy of extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage security over the remedy of collection of the unpaid loan.
The RTC was aware that respondent had elected one remedy. In its Decision, it
cited the fact that some of the mortgaged properties which were delivered to
respondent by means of the Writs of Replevin had been sold on auction, and
acknowledged that the proceeds from said auction sale should be deducted from the
loan account of petitioners. The RTC noted:
The seized pieces of personal properties by virtue of the writ of replevin
and alias writ of replevin were sold in an auction sale where [respondent]
realized P78,750.00 from the sale. 4 6
xxx xxx xxx
[Respondent] realized P78,500.00[sic] from the auction sale of the seized
personal property by virtue of the writ of replevin. The amount realized from the
auction sale is clearly insu cient to cover the unpaid balance, interest,
attorney's fees, costs of the suit and other expenses incidental to litigation.
This amount was deducted from the [petitioners'] total obligation in
the amount of P269,111.82 [sic] resulting in the net total obligation of
P191,111.82 as of August 24, 1992. 4 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Yet, it is curious that in the dispositive portion of its Decision, the RTC granted
respondent the remedy of collection of sum of money. The dispositive portion of the
RTC Decision is reproduced below for emphasis:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered in favor of
the [respondent] Good Development Corporation against [petitioners] Melbarose
Sasot, Allandale Sportsline Inc., and Ma. Theresa Manipon ordering them to pay
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the [respondent] jointly and severally the amount of P269,611.82 [sic] plus
legal interest thereon effective to date until the full amount is fully
paid, and 25% of the total amount due as liquidated damages. aEHIDT
SO ORDERED.
Not only is there no more reference to the conduct of the auction sale of the
mortgaged properties, there is also no longer any acknowledgment that the proceeds
earned from the auction sale should be deducted from the total unpaid loan.
This is a glaring error.
In Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarangal, 4 8 the Court held that the remedies
available to any mortgage creditor are alternative, not cumulative or successive, 4 9 viz.:
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single
cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the
recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor
in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the
foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the
non-payment of the debt, and for that reason, they constitute a single cause of
action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the
latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation.
Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that
obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rules above stated, cannot
split up his single cause of action by ling a complaint for payment
of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the
mortgage. If he does so, the ling of the rst complaint will bar the
subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to le two separate
complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and
another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural
redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so
much vexation and oppression to the debtor. (Emphasis supplied)
By causing the auction sale of the mortgaged properties, respondent effectively
adopted and pursued the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure, 5 0 using the writ of
replevin as a tool to get hold of the mortgaged properties. 5 1 As emphasized in
Bachrach, one effect of respondent's election of the remedy of extra-judicial
foreclosure is its waiver of the remedy of collection of the unpaid loan.
Therefore, there was no more legal basis for the RTC to grant respondent the
relief of collecting from petitioners "the amount of Php269,611.82 [sic] plus legal
interest thereon effective to date until the full amount is fully paid", nor for the CA to
affirm it.
However, another effect of its election of the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure
is that whatever de ciency remains after applying the proceeds of the auction sale to
the total loan obligation may still be recovered by respondent. 5 2 EHDCAI
But to recover any de ciency after foreclosure, the rule is that a mortgage
creditor must institute an independent civil action. 5 3 However, in PCI Leasing &
Finance, Inc. v. Dai 5 4 the Court held that the claim should at least be included in the pre-
trial brief. In said case, the mortgage-creditor had foreclosed on the mortgaged
properties and sold the same at public auction during the trial on the action for
damages with replevin. After judgment on the replevin case was rendered, the
mortgage-creditor led another case, this time for the de ciency amount. The Court
dismissed the second case on the ground of res judicata, noting that:
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Petitioner ignores the fact that it prayed in the replevin case that in the
event manual delivery of the vessel could not be effected, the court "render
judgment in its favor by ordering [herein respondents] to pay . . . the sum of
P3,502,095.00 plus interest and penalty thereon from October 12, 1994 until
fully paid as provided in the Promissory Note."
Since petitioner had extrajudicially foreclosed the chattel
mortgage over the vessel even before the pre-trial of the case, it
should have therein raised as issue during the pre-trial the award of a
deficiency judgment. After all, the basis of its above-stated alternative prayer
was the same as that of its prayer for replevin — the default of respondents in
the payment of the monthly installments of their loan. But it did not. (Emphasis
supplied)
The question in the present case therefore is whether respondent instituted the
proper action for the deficiency amount or raised its claim at the pre-trial.
An examination of the Complaint and Amended Complaint reveals that
respondent did not allege any de ciency account. Nor did it raise the matter in its Pre-
Trial Brief. 5 5 This is only to be expected because the auction sale of the properties was
apparently conducted on June 19, 1992, long after it led its Complaint/Amended
Complaint and Pre-trial Brief.
However, the Court notes that evidence on the de ciency amount was duly
presented by respondent and examined by petitioners. Respondent's employee Leonila
Buenviaje testi ed that the proceeds respondent earned from the auction sale of the
mortgaged properties amounted to only P78,750.00. 5 6 Another employee, Grace
Borja, testi ed that after applying the proceeds of P78,750 to the unpaid account of
petitioners, there remained a de ciency of P91,111.82. 5 7 Documentary evidence of the
de ciency amount was also presented in the form of the August 24, 1992 Statement of
Account marked Exhibits "F-1" and "F-2". 5 8 Thus, an independent action to recover the
de ciency will merely entail the presentation of the same evidence of the same claim, in
the process taxing the time and resources of the parties and the courts. 5 9 Therefore, in
the higher interest of justice and equity, the Court takes it upon itself to grant the claim
of respondent to the de ciency amount of P191,111.82, as stated in its August 24,
1992 Statement of Account. cEASTa
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion and concurred in by Associate
Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of the Supreme Court) and Lucas P. Bersamin;
rollo, p. 29. HaEcAC
2. Records, p. 578.
3. Rollo, p. 37.
4. Exhibit "D", Folder of Plaintiff's Exhibits.
5. Exhibit "B", id. EcHIDT
11. Defendants Endrino and John Doe were not served summons hence, they were dropped
from the Complaint.
32. Ouano Arrastre Services, Inc. v. Peary Aleonar, G.R. No. 97664, October 10, 1991, 202
SCRA 618; Citytrust Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82009, April 10,
1989, 171 SCRA 758.
33. Exhibit "17", records, p. 559.
34. Id.
35. Exhibits "20" and "21", id. at 562-563.
36. Exhibit "28", id. at 570.
37. Exhibit "21", id. at 567. TEHDIA
41. Benos v. Lawilao, G.R. No. 172259, December 5, 2006, 509 SCRA 549.
42. Pabugais v. Sahijwani, G.R. No. 156846, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 596.
43. Ticzon v. Video Post Manila, Inc., G.R. No. 136342, June 15, 2000, 333 SCRA 472.
44. Supra notes 12 and 15.
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45. Supra notes 25 to 27.
46. RTC Decision, rollo, p. 116, citing TSN, July 16, 1992, p. 12.
47. RTC Decision, id. at 118, citing TSN, October 15, 1992, p. 7.
48. 68 Phil. 287 (1939).
49. Chieng v. Santos, G.R. No. 169647, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 730; Suico Rattan & Buri
Interiors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138145, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 560.
50. Magna Financial Services Group, Inc. v. Colarina, G.R. No. 158635, December 9, 2005,
477 SCRA 245, citing Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Fernandez, 99 Phil. 782 (1956).
51. See PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. v. Dai, G.R. No. 148980, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA
611. IaAEHD
52. Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. v. ICC Leasing & Financing Corporation, G.R.
No. 150673, February 28, 2003, 398 SCRA 508; Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 121739, June 14, 1999, 308 SCRA 229; PAMECA Wood Treatment
Plant, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106435, July 14, 1999, 310 SCRA 281; The Bank
of the Philippine Islands v. Olutanga Lumber Company, 47 Phil. 20 (1924).
53. Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. v. ICC Leasing & Financing Corporation, supra
at note 52; Bicol Savings & Loan Association v. Guinhawa, No. L-62415, August 20,
1990, 188 SCRA 642.
54. PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. v. Dai, supra note 51.
55. Records, p. 121. ADcHES