Continental Flight 3407 Accident by Jim Warnick: 1 Running Head: Course Case Study Assignment
Continental Flight 3407 Accident by Jim Warnick: 1 Running Head: Course Case Study Assignment
Continental Flight 3407 Accident by Jim Warnick: 1 Running Head: Course Case Study Assignment
by Jim Warnick
October 2017
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Introduction
The aviation community has committed themselves to ensuring that safety is a top
priority. They want to reduce and or eliminate any future accidents and ensure that they do not
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) organization mainly focuses on what the
cause was of an accident. They also make recommendations to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and aircraft manufacturers as to what changes they need to implement to
their programs and procedures in order to reduce the reoccurrence of future accidents. It is very
unfortunate that airline accidents usually have a large amount of live lost. The cost that is
acquired to better understand and develop newer and better programs, policies and procedures
for the aircrews and maintainers is invaluable. The more that they can learn and utilized to
On the night of February 12, 2009, Continental flight 3407 took off from Liberty
International Airport, Newark, New Jersey. It was due to land at its final destination at Buffalo-
Niagara International Airport, Buffalo, New York. As the aircraft began its final approach just
five nautical miles from the airport it crashed killing all 45 passengers, two pilots, two flight
attendants and one person on the ground according to the (National Transportation Safety
Board, 2009). The aircraft accident is a prime example of how human factors and human error or
so closely related and have caused such a great concern within the aviation community
As reported by the FAA (2009) Aircraft Accident Report, “The NTSB determined that
the probable cause of the accident was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of
the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover” (pg.
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155). The human factors that were observed and discovered during the investigation should that
the procedures that the aircrew failed to follow and recognize were the reasons that lead the
aircrew to make their poor decisions. Their improper procedure that they went through when
they were reacting to an emergency situation during icing conditions, caused the flight crew to
react in a manner causing the aircraft to stall as they were making preparations for final approach
Some of the investigators findings showed that the captain was forced to decrease the
aircraft’s air speed quickly in order for him to make the correct approach, although he had lost
his positional awareness during a critical phase of the flight. The report also showed that the
captain and the first officer had been distracted as they had been talking about things that were
unrelated to their flight duties during most of the flight. It is believed that due to this distraction
it caused them to react to the final approach checklist to late into the approach preparation
sequence.
Fatigue was just one of the major human factors that was discovered in the flight crew’s
poor decision making. Fatigue is a characteristic that is somewhat normal for most humans.
Most of the time an individual can easily recover from the state of fatigue by simply taking a nap
and getting some rest. They can also make the right decision to stop what they are doing and rest
until they are capable of making correct and cohesive decisions once again. Even though it is
thought that fatigue is very common and normal it has also been determined that it is extremely
difficult to determine how it effects every person individually. Humans react to fatigue in many
ways as it can be caused by repetitive efforts, boredom and different levels of physical exertion.
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No matter what level of fatigue a human in the aviation community is functioning, if it is not
The FAA (2009) report mentions that playback of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) the
first officer had made comments that he had been feeling tired even before the aircraft took off
from New Jersey. The CVR also had recorded both the captain and the first officer making
sounds which sounded like yawning during the flight. The report by the FAA (2009) also states
that “The captain had experienced chronic sleep loss, and both he and the first officer
experienced interrupted and poor-quality sleep during the 24 hours before the accident” (pg.
106). The investigation also revealed that the captain was talking about how he was having
difficulty due to his long commutes from his home in Florida to work. He was speaking of not
having a place to rest and get sleep that was closer to work when he was there. It was also
determined that the first officer had earlier flown aboard a on a cargo airplane from Memphis
Tennessee to Newark, New Jersey. The investigation reported that she had caught the flight
around 4:00 am and that she was seen sleeping during the two hour flight to New Jersey. It was
also mentioned that she was sleeping in the crew room at home base prior to the flight to
Buffalo.
It is very common for the investigation to show that there are normally other important
factors that have taken place prior to the actual factor that causes the aircraft to crash.
The Continental Flight 3407 Accident was no different as it revealed the several levels of safety
prevention had failed as identified by the safety models such as the Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). The aircraft accident report showed that
the Regional Chief Pilot did not have any type of record that showed Newark Liberty
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International Airport (EWR) exactly how many of their pilots had been commuting over long
distance each day. The reasons that were discover for why the aircrews had been making the
long commutes was due to the company’s low wages and the high cost of living in the Newark
area. It was for this reasoning why most of the pilots commuted from different states around the
country to work at Newark, New Jersey. Another reason was the company’s inability to properly
manage its fatigue policy and believed to be a contributing factor according to the (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2009). The policy that was in place allowed the company’s pilots
to self-report when they were feeling fatigued. There were also identified the procedures in place
in order for the proper notifications to be provided to the chief pilot or duty officer.
The reporting investigators also determined that there were discrepancies based from the
interview conducted with the EWR regional chief pilot regarding the company’s policy relating
to pilot and aircrew fatigue. The FAA (2009) document showed the regional pilot stated:
“If a pilot had repeatedly called in for being fatigued, that he would speak with the pilot
to determine what was the reasoning behind the calls. A crew check airman mentioned
that he had called in fatigued a few times and that there was never any follow up
It was determined that the lack of effort and oversight from senior managers on existing policies,
had provided the pilots away to be able to deviate from the responsibility of self-reporting when
they felt they could not properly conduct their duties and responsibilities.
Another very important finding that contributed to the factors was that there was a
deficiency in the levels of experience on how to properly identify and utilize the aircraft’s de-
icing system. The deicing system as it was designed to provide an aircraft stall warning prior to
normal airspeed for a de-icing condition. All the factors determined by the investigation relating
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to the situation directly contributed to the incorrect decision to pulling back on the control which
slowed the aircraft instead of pushing forward to increase the aircraft’s air speed in order to
recommended to the FAA, that their operators must review follow the standard operating
procedures to ensure they were consistent with monitoring techniques. The NTSB proposed to
make a change to the airspeed indicator display that provided warning lights so that the pilots
could quickly see when a critical condition existed. This also included a low airspeed alert
system which provided flight crews with visual and audible warnings of a hazardous low speed
condition. It was also reported by the NTSB (2009) a requirement for all operators under the 14
Code of Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K to have to take a leadership course of training. This
training provided specific requirement for operators to brief commuting pilots of the dangers of
fatigue associated with commuting. In addition to ensuring the establishment of policies and
guidance to mitigate risks associated with fatigue for those pilots and aircrew who commuted to
have established place for rest near the home base for flight departures. The NTSB also made it
a requirement for all operators to conduct simulator training requirements to enable the pilots to
The effort of the NTSB’s recommendations was to do its part in identifying the causes
and setting procedures in place to prevent similar accidents from recurring. They also wanted to
ensure that it was more than just the pilots and aircrew complying with its minimum
requirements and recommendation. A prime example of this was just a few months after the
Continental 3407 accident, when Air France Flight 447 crashed in the Atlantic Ocean in July
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2009. The cause of the crash was determined to have been once again pilot error, it was
discovered that when the aircrafts autopilot disengaged along with the combination of its flight
by wire system failure the aircraft became uncontrollable. The co-pilot reaction to mistakenly
pull back on the stick and causing the aircraft to take a rapid nose up direction was cause for him
to encounter a stall warning and placing the aircraft in an aerodynamic stall, which the aircrew
was not able to recover from and causing the aircraft to crash.
Aircraft system engineers and the manufacturers are consistently try to take full
advantage and implementation of newly designed technologies to make aircraft and flight safer.
The installation of, and reliance on newly automated systems has drawn cause for concern as
pilots have become more accustom to allowing the aircraft to fly itself. It is for these reasons
that it has been determined that pilots and aircrews have been less attentive on the duties and
responsibilities associated with actually flying the aircraft. This has provide aircrews with a
seemingly higher level of complacency and lacking the basic training and knowledge resulting in
poor judgement reactions when they are dealing with aircraft inflight emergencies.
Conclusion
It is understandable that aviation safety programs, procedures and policies have been
established to prevent and reduce aircraft accidents. They have also been established so that
when an accident does occur they can determine and provide training and guidance to prevent
another similar accident from happening. The use of safety strategies and models aids the
investigators in how to identify the causes behind the accidents. It is very unfortunate though that
even with all the safety locks in place there will always be aircraft accidents and new and betters
ways of discovering what the causes were will need to be implemented. But even with all this
there will always be the issue relating to human factors and what part they play in identifying the
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human conditions that directly affect the flight crews’ decision making efforts. It will still remain
difficult in identifying how the human performance traits are significantly degraded when placed
in emergency situations.
The Continental Flight 3407 accident was a direct example of the consequences of an
aircraft flight crew deviating from established policies related to human factors. As it had been
determined by the investigators final report that the fatal crash could have possibly been avoided
if the flight crew had followed the proper procedures of self-reporting the levels of fatigue they
were experiencing prior taking charge of the flight. It has also been determined that if fatigue
was not a factor in this accident, the flight crew could have reacted properly during the
emergency. However the compilation of factors such as; fatigue, lack of situational awareness,
and poor system knowledge made this a prime candidate for an accident to happen.
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References
National Transportation Safety Board. (2009). Loss of Control on Approach Colgan Air, Inc.
10/01 PB2010-910401) (p. 299). Clarence Center, New York. Retrieved from
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1001.pdf
Wiegmann, D., & Shappell, S. (2003). A Human Error Approach to Aviation Accident Analysis: