amount given to her as 'an allotment for the 3-month period (of April, May and office had

office had already closed for the day. Thus, the appeal
June 1984), he was entitled to recover the additional US$ 1,500.00 "as mandated was filed the following day.
under the Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the decision of the
Dubai Civil Court. As evidence of this foreign award, private respondent
3

submitted what purports to be an "original copy (sic) of the decision" of the Dubai To Support the above explanation, in addition to an affidavit executed by Mr.
court written in Arabic script and language, With a copy of an English translation Ruben de la Cruz, petitioner submitted a certification dated 2 May 1986 executed
by an unidentified translator and a copy of a transmittal letter dated 23 by Evelyn G. Sauza, receive . receiving clerk of respondent NLRC stating that
September 1984 signed by one Mohd Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for she had read to receive the Memorandum on Appeal on or about 4:15 P.M., 28
Philippines." The full texts of the purported English translation of the Dubai award April 1986, because the Memorandum was supposed to be filed with the POEA
and of the transmittal letter are set out in the margin.
4 office in Ortigas and not with the NLRC in Intramuros.

In its answer filed on 11 December 1985, petitioner Pascor made four principal The brevity of the delay in filing an appeal is not, of course, by itself a sufficient
arguments: that the copy of the Dubai decision relied upon by private respondent basis for giving due course to the appeal. In the present case, however, the
could not be considered as evidence, not having been properly authenticated; factual circumstances combine with the legal merits of the case urged by the
that Pascor was not a party to the Dubai court proceedings; that the POEA had petitioner to move us to the conviction that respondent NLRC should have
no jurisdiction over cases for the enforcement of foreign judgments; and that the recognized and heeded the requirements of orderly procedure and substantial
claim had already been resolved in POEA Case No: M-84-09-848, having been justice which are at stake in the present case by allowing the appeal. In Siguenza
there dismissed as a counterclaim. v. Court of appeals, the Court stressed that the right to appeal should not be
5

lightly disregarded by a stringent application of rules of procedure especially

where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interests of substantial justice
In a decision dated 14 April 1986, the POEA held petitioner Pascor liable to pay would be served by permitting the appeal:
private respondent Rances the amount of US$ 1,500.00 "at the prevailing rate of
exchange at the time of payment." This decision was served on petitioner's
counsel on 18 April 1986, which counsel filed a 'Memorandum on Appeal and/or In the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (132 SCRA
Motion for Reconsideration" on 29 April 1986. 782), we stressed the importance and real purpose of the
remedy of appeal and ruled:

Private respondent moved the next day for dismissal of the appeal and for
issuance of a writ of execution, upon the ground that petitioner's appeal had been An appeal is an essential part of
filed one (1) day beyond the reglementary period and that, consequently, the our judicial system. We have
POEA decision had become final and executory. advised the courts to proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a
party of the right to
Petitioner opposed dismissal of its appeal and issuance of a writ of execution, appeal (National Waterworks and
arguing that the one (1) day delay in filing its Memorandum on Appeal had been Sewerage Authority v. Municipality
occasioned by an excusable mistake. of Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138) and
instructed that every party-litigant
should be afforded the amplest
On 20 May 1986, the POEA issued an order denying petitioner's appeal for opportunity for the proper and just
having been filed out of time. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, paid the disposition of his cause, freed
docket fee and posted the required supercedes bond in connection with its from the constraints of
appeal. technicalities (A. One Feeds, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA
590).
On 29 May 1986, the POEA denied private respondent's Motion for a Writ of
<äre||anº•1àw>

Execution and elevated the case to the NLRC.

The rules of procedure are not to
be applied in a very rigid and
On 14 August 1986, public respondent NLRC denied petitioner's appeal as flied
technical sense. The rules of
out of time. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied.
procedure are used only to help
secure not override substantial
In the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for Preliminary justice. (Gregorio v. Court of
Injunction and Temporary Restraint ' 9 Order, Pascor urges that public Appeals [72 SCRA 1201).
respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its Therefore, we ruled in Republic v.
jurisdiction in denying its appeal and motion for reconsideration. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453)
that a six-day delay in the
perfection of the appeal does not
We think petitioner's contention has merit. The record shows, not an intent to warrant its dismissal. And again
delay the proceedings but rather a genuine and substantial effort on the part of in Ramos v. Bagasao, 96 SCRA
petitioner Pascor to file, in a timely manner, its Memorandum on Appeal which, in 396, this Court held that the delay
the circumstances of this case, should not have been disregarded by respondent in four (4) days in filing a notice of
NLRC. The circumstances surrounding the one (1) day delay in the filing of appeal and a notion for extension
petitioner's Memorandum on Appeal are summed up by petitioner in the following of time to file a record on appeal
terms: can be excused on the basis of
equity.
30.1. Mr. Ruben de la Cruz, who was newly hired as
messenger in the law firm representing the petitioner was We should emphasize, however, that we have allowed the
tasked with the delivery of the memorandum on appeal in of an appeal in some cases where a sent application of
the afternoon of April 28, 1986 (the last day for filing the the rules would have denied it only when to do so would
same). serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of our equity junction.
30.2. When Mr. de la Cruz read the caption of the
memorandum, he noted that the same is addressed to the In the case at bar, the petitioner's delay in their record on
respondent NLRC and he erroneously concluded that it appeal should not be strictly construed as to deprive them
should be filed with the offices of the NLRC in Intramuros, of the right to appeal especially since on its face the
Manila. appeal appears to be impressed appeal especially with
merit.6

30.3. Wen Mr. de la Cruz presented petitioner's Appeal at

the docket section of respondent NLRC, he was advised We turn to the merits of the Petition. An examination of the complaint and of the
that the same should be filed with the offices of the POEA Manifestation and Motion filed by respondent Rances in POEA Case No: M-85-
in Ortigas, San Juan, Metro Manila. 08-14, shows that the cause of action pleaded by respondent Rances was
enforcement of the decision rendered by c. Dubai Court which purported to
award him, among other things, an additional amount of US$ 1,500.00 under
30.4. Mr. de la Cruz upon being apprised of his error certain circumstances. In the complaint dated 23 October 1985, respondent
immediately proceeded to the offices of the POEA in order Rances stated:
to have petitioner's (PASCOR's) appeal received but
unfortunately, by the time he arrived thereat, the POEA
 Details of cause of action (Why are you complaining?) (To We think petitioner's contention has merit. The record shows, not an intent to
include place and date of occurrence of case of action delay the proceedings but rather a genuine and substantial effort on the part of
and amount of claim, if any) P 2,295 US$ salary for three petitioner Pascor to file, in a timely manner, its Memorandum on Appeal which, in
(3) months stated in the compromise of 1,500 TJS$ total the circumstances of this case, should not have been disregarded by respondent
of 2,795.50 US$ [as] per decision from Civil Court of NLRC. The circumstances surrounding the one (1) day delay in the filing of
Dubai U.A.E. 7
petitioner's Memorandum on Appeal are summed up by petitioner in the following
terms:

The Motion/Manifestation dated 3 December 1985 filed by respondent Rances

may be quoted in extension 30.1. Mr. Ruben de la Cruz, who was newly hired as
messenger in the law firm representing the petitioner was
tasked with the delivery of the memorandum on appeal in
1. Originally, complainant's claim was US$ 9,364.89 the afternoon of April 28, 1986 (the last day for filing the
which he filed with the Dubai Court for adjudication. same).

xxx xxx xxx 30.2. When Mr. de la Cruz read the caption of the
memorandum, he noted that the same is addressed to the
respondent NLRC and he erroneously concluded that it
2. The US$ 9,364.89 claim was compromised by the court
should be filed with the offices of the NLRC in Intramuros,
in a decision dated September 12, 1984. Xerox copy of
Manila.
the decision is hereto attached as Annex "B" and the
authentication as Annex "B-l' and made an integral part
thereof. 30.3. Wen Mr. de la Cruz presented petitioner's Appeal at
the docket section of respondent NLRC, he was advised
that the same should be filed with the offices of the POEA
3. Pertinent portion of the decision referred to above
in Ortigas, San Juan, Metro Manila.
reads as follows:

30.4. Mr. de la Cruz upon being apprised of his error

Both parties came to a decision
immediately proceeded to the offices of the POEA in order
that t
to have petitioner's (PASCOR's) appeal received but
unfortunately, by the time he arrived thereat, the POEA
amount given to her as 'an allotment for the 3-month period (of April, May and office had already closed for the day. Thus, the appeal
June 1984), he was entitled to recover the additional US$ 1,500.00 "as mandated was filed the following day.
under the Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the decision of the
Dubai Civil Court. As evidence of this foreign award, private respondent
3

To Support the above explanation, in addition to an affidavit executed by Mr.

submitted what purports to be an "original copy (sic) of the decision" of the Dubai
Ruben de la Cruz, petitioner submitted a certification dated 2 May 1986 executed
court written in Arabic script and language, With a copy of an English translation
by Evelyn G. Sauza, receive . receiving clerk of respondent NLRC stating that
by an unidentified translator and a copy of a transmittal letter dated 23
she had read to receive the Memorandum on Appeal on or about 4:15 P.M., 28
September 1984 signed by one Mohd Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for
April 1986, because the Memorandum was supposed to be filed with the POEA
Philippines." The full texts of the purported English translation of the Dubai award
office in Ortigas and not with the NLRC in Intramuros.
and of the transmittal letter are set out in the margin.
4

The brevity of the delay in filing an appeal is not, of course, by itself a sufficient
In its answer filed on 11 December 1985, petitioner Pascor made four principal
basis for giving due course to the appeal. In the present case, however, the
arguments: that the copy of the Dubai decision relied upon by private respondent
factual circumstances combine with the legal merits of the case urged by the
could not be considered as evidence, not having been properly authenticated;
petitioner to move us to the conviction that respondent NLRC should have
that Pascor was not a party to the Dubai court proceedings; that the POEA had
recognized and heeded the requirements of orderly procedure and substantial
no jurisdiction over cases for the enforcement of foreign judgments; and that the
justice which are at stake in the present case by allowing the appeal. In Siguenza
claim had already been resolved in POEA Case No: M-84-09-848, having been
v. Court of appeals, the Court stressed that the right to appeal should not be
5

there dismissed as a counterclaim.

lightly disregarded by a stringent application of rules of procedure especially
where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interests of substantial justice
In a decision dated 14 April 1986, the POEA held petitioner Pascor liable to pay would be served by permitting the appeal:
private respondent Rances the amount of US$ 1,500.00 "at the prevailing rate of
exchange at the time of payment." This decision was served on petitioner's
In the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (132 SCRA
counsel on 18 April 1986, which counsel filed a 'Memorandum on Appeal and/or
782), we stressed the importance and real purpose of the
Motion for Reconsideration" on 29 April 1986.
remedy of appeal and ruled:

Private respondent moved the next day for dismissal of the appeal and for
An appeal is an essential part of
issuance of a writ of execution, upon the ground that petitioner's appeal had been
our judicial system. We have
filed one (1) day beyond the reglementary period and that, consequently, the
advised the courts to proceed with
POEA decision had become final and executory.
caution so as not to deprive a
party of the right to
Petitioner opposed dismissal of its appeal and issuance of a writ of execution, appeal (National Waterworks and
arguing that the one (1) day delay in filing its Memorandum on Appeal had been Sewerage Authority v. Municipality
occasioned by an excusable mistake. of Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138) and
instructed that every party-litigant
should be afforded the amplest
On 20 May 1986, the POEA issued an order denying petitioner's appeal for opportunity for the proper and just
having been filed out of time. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, paid the disposition of his cause, freed
docket fee and posted the required supercedes bond in connection with its from the constraints of
appeal. technicalities (A. One Feeds, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA
590).<äre||anº•1àw>

On 29 May 1986, the POEA denied private respondent's Motion for a Writ of
Execution and elevated the case to the NLRC.
The rules of procedure are not to
be applied in a very rigid and
On 14 August 1986, public respondent NLRC denied petitioner's appeal as flied technical sense. The rules of
out of time. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied. procedure are used only to help
secure not override substantial
justice. (Gregorio v. Court of
In the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for Preliminary
Appeals [72 SCRA 1201).
Injunction and Temporary Restraint ' 9 Order, Pascor urges that public
Therefore, we ruled in Republic v.
respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its
Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453)
jurisdiction in denying its appeal and motion for reconsideration.
that a six-day delay in the
perfection of the appeal does not
 warrant its dismissal. And again
in Ramos v. Bagasao, 96 SCRA
396, this Court held that the delay
in four (4) days in filing a notice of
appeal and a notion for extension
of time to file a record on appeal
can be excused on the basis of
equity.

We should emphasize, however, that we have allowed the

of an appeal in some cases where a sent application of
the rules would have denied it only when to do so would
serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of our equity junction.

In the case at bar, the petitioner's delay in their record on

appeal should not be strictly construed as to deprive them
of the right to appeal especially since on its face the
appeal appears to be impressed appeal especially with
merit. 6

We turn to the merits of the Petition. An examination of the complaint and of the
Manifestation and Motion filed by respondent Rances in POEA Case No: M-85-
08-14, shows that the cause of action pleaded by respondent Rances was
enforcement of the decision rendered by c. Dubai Court which purported to
award him, among other things, an additional amount of US$ 1,500.00 under
certain circumstances. In the complaint dated 23 October 1985, respondent
Rances stated:

Details of cause of action (Why are you complaining?) (To

include place and date of occurrence of case of action
and amount of claim, if any) P 2,295 US$ salary for three
(3) months stated in the compromise of 1,500 TJS$ total
of 2,795.50 US$ [as] per decision from Civil Court of
Dubai U.A.E. 7

The Motion/Manifestation dated 3 December 1985 filed by respondent Rances

may be quoted in extension

1. Originally, complainant's claim was US$ 9,364.89

which he filed with the Dubai Court for adjudication.

xxx xxx xxx

2. The US$ 9,364.89 claim was compromised by the court

in a decision dated September 12, 1984. Xerox copy of
the decision is hereto attached as Annex "B" and the
authentication as Annex "B-l' and made an integral part
thereof.

3. Pertinent portion of the decision referred to above

reads as follows:

Both parties came to a decision

that t