PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL LINES (PTE) LTD.

Date: 22 January 2015

Re: Safety Bulletin no.01 of 2015

To: All ships

Attn: Masters & Chief Engineers
Fm: Capt. Edward D. Abban
Designated Person Ashore
Quality, Safety & Security Dept. /Fleet Division

Subject: Accident Investigation Report - Collision between M.V. XXXX and fishing vessel on 01 Jul 2014

This report resulted from investigation carried out from 08-July-2014 to 11-July -2014 on board
M.V. XXX at Tianjin anchorage and analysis of Documented Records and VDR/CCTV.
The fundamental purpose of investigating any marine accident is to determine its circumstances
and the causes with the aim of improving safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the
future. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve the
fundamental purpose, to apportion blame.
The targeted aim of the investigation is to enhance a mechanism of improving compliance with the
Safety Management Systems and preventing any reoccurrences of such lapses in the future. It is
aimed on identifying the causes – direct, indirect and root in order to develop a mechanism of
preventive reoccurrences.

This report is based on information from the following sources:

1. Official statements from members of Crew involved (Bridge team)
2. Facts gathered through interviews with the Master, Chief Officer , third officer and other ship’s
staff during the course of investigation.
3. VDR records
4. CCTV records
5. ECDIS records
6. Extracts from various log books and charts, position logs, rest hour log, alcohol test log etc.

1. Summary & Pre Events of the incident:

The Multi-Purpose Vessel M.V.XXX had sailed from Durban port bound for Tianjin on 4th June 2014 with
25648.8MTs manganese ore in bulk loaded in Durban, she called Singapore(anchored at AEW) for Bunkers and
stores on 24th June 2014. Vessel sailed from Singapore on 25th June 2014.

At the time of incident the vessel was in East China sea and following were the vessel’s and weather particulars:

Draft F/10.530m A/10.466m.

GoM 2.787m (Min. GoM required was 0.57m per GoM Curve with damage stability)
Course: 356°
Speed: 12.8kts
Engine status Economy speed
Position: 28° 08.60N 123° 10.28E east of TaiZhou East China Sea water.
Visibility: 6 (2-6 nm)
Wind: SSW/force-3
Sea: Slight
Current: E-0.5kts

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 Time Zone: GMT + 0800

Vessel departed Singapore on 25 June 2014 at 1012hrs LT. On 1 July 2014, at 0745hrs LT (30 June 2345 UTC)
@position 25° 12.45N 122° 59.28E vessel altered course to 003°T ,

The vessel was en-route . The 3rd officer reported to bridge a few minutes before 2000hrs. At this time, the Master,
Ch. Officer, 4th Officer and OS were on the bridge. No communication was noted for Handover of watch between Ch.
Off and 3rd Officer. It was also noted that the 4th Officer reported course being steered and the state of visibility to the
3rd Off. Prior to 3rd officer taking over the watch, the range of visibility as reported by the Chief Officer to the Master,
was less than 3nm.

Master left the bridge at about 2007hrs after writing the Night Orders and advising the 3rd officer to keep clear from
fishing vessels.

Status of navigation Equipment

X- Band radar: Off center, range scale 12 nm, Head Up & relative motion, VRM: 2.74nm
S- Band Radar : Off center, range scale 6 nm, North Up & relative motion, VRM 1.95nm
Both Radar Limit set: CPA- 0.1nm, TCPA: 1 min
Vector: 15 Min

 At about 2009hrs, the 4th officer handed over the navigation information such as Course and visibility to 3rd
Officer.

 Steering mode was changed from auto mode to hand steering at 2017hrs. The helmsman at this time was OS.
Charted course was 003º as per passage plan and the course being steered was 006º.

 At about 2048hrs the AIS target of F/V was acquired on the X-band radar. The acquisition information that
was displayed was that for the fishing vessel’s AIS transmitted information and not ARPA. At this time, the
echo of the fishing vessel was not yet seen on the PPI. The COG of the target was 150ᵒ & CPA was 0.49nm.

 At 20:56:45s, the 3rd officer ordered the helmsman to adjust the course from 000º to 005º.At 20:57:40s, the
course was brought to 359.1º giving appropriate helm orders by helms man.

 At about the same time bridge phone rang and 3rd officer picked up the phone.

 For reasons unknown the wheel was kept on port 6º for about 35 seconds, when, 3rd officer realized that the
vessel was swing fast to port, that he ordered the helms man to maintain present course (i.e. 352º). The time
was about 20h 51m 25s.

 At 20:58:45s, when the 3rd officer realized that the helms man was unable to bring the vessel to a steady course,
he gave helms order to Starboard 10º.

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  At 20:59:10s when the course was 330º, 3rd officer ordered the helmsman to steer 350º and went to the chart
room. As the vessel was still turning to port, the helmsman gave a counter helm of 5º starboard.21:00:30s, the
Helms man reported that he could not steady the vessel on course. At 21:00:41s 3rd officer came out of the chart
room, took over the steering and put the wheel to starboard 10.

 By 21:04:20s the course was made steady to steer 000º.

 Between 21:05:00s & 21:10:35s, the Engine Cadet entered the bridge. Conversation regarding the mobile
phone signal strength was made between the 3rd officer and the Engine Cadet. During this conversation, the 3rd
officer commented on the helmsman inability to steer properly. At 21:07:45s steering mode was change from
hand steering to auto mode by the 3rd officer. No report was made to the Master on this helmsman’s steering
ability.

3. Events leading to the incident

TIME EVENT

F/V steering a course between 151º and 141º with constant speed of 10kts and
2048hrs to 2116hrs
adjusting course at frequent interval.

F/V right ahead crossing the bow & steering course of 146º, Speed 10kts at a
distance of 1.95 nm & CPA of 0.48nm

21:16:36hrs

When 1.5nm off and right ahead, F/V a/c to stbd by 20º and steer 167ºand
reducing the CPA to 0.18nm

21:17:20 to
21:17:40s hrs

21:17:40s hrs 3rd Officer adjusted the course by 4º to port on Auto mode to steer 357º

21:19:03s onwards
F/V at a distance of 0.97nm starts turning to her stbd at steady rate.

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 Look out reported about the crossing F/V. At this time the F/V had a/c more
to Starboard.

21:19:48s hrs

At a distance of 0.60nm from F/V, course adjustment of 7º to port was made

21:20:07s hrs by the 3rd Officer with the steering in autopilot mode. At same time the FV
altered her course to her starboard to steer 195º.
21:20:31s hrs
Steering mode was changed over from Auto mode to Manual Mode by 3rd
officer and steering by himself, put the rudder at port 20ᵒ.

F/V came in contact with MV XXX.

21:21:25s hrs

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 Damages sustained to MV XXX:

Stbd bow railing bent- forecastle deck Stbside main deck railings damaged

Starboard Shipside Railing Starboard Ballast Tk. air-pipe head

Stbd bunker davit broken and adjacent railing bent Stbd bunker manifold.

Stbd gangway serious damaged

Scratches on the shipside –stbd, slight indent on the 1st sheer strake plating between Fr.25-Fr.26 (STBD)

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 3. Immediate / Direct causes:
a. The direct cause of the accident was the failure of the watchkeeping team to take action as per COLREGS.

Rule (b). Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational, including long-range scanning
to obtain early warning of risk of collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observation of detected
objects Although 2 radars were in operation one with the X-Band radar on a 12nm range and the other (S-band) on
6nm range., the monitoring was mostly done on the X-Band radar

Rule 8 (a). Any action to avoid collision shall be taken in accordance with the Rules of this Part and shall, if
the circumstances of the case admit, be positive, made in ample time and with due regard to the observance
of good seamanship. - At 21:17hrs, with the FV at a distance of 1.5nm it was observed that she had altered her
course substantially to her own starboard and the CPA reduced from .48nm to .18nm. The first noticeable action
taken by vessel was when the F/V was 0.60nm off.

Rule 8) - (b). Any alteration of course and/or speed to avoid collision shall, if the circumstances of the case
admit, be large enough to be readily apparent to another vessel observing visually or by radar; a succession
of small alterations of course and/or speed should be avoided. A succession of small alteration of course was
carried out by OOW towards port side with the steering system on autopilot.

b. Loss of Situational awareness/control- The F/V was approaching from starboard side and as per bridge layout
the X band radar which is on the starboard side of the wheel was on 12 NM range scale. The 3rd Officer
adjusted the ship’s course while the steering was in auto pilot mode and then later changed it to hand steering
to make further course changes by himself. Having engaged himself in the steering of the vessel, with the X-
Band radar on 12nm range and the close proximity of the F/V, he lost control of the situation.
4.Root Cause Analysis
a. Master did not ensure that the bridge team was adequately manned with respect to prevailing condition of
visibility. Company’s procedure as per SMM Ch. 3, section 3.10.1 pertaining to Critical Shipboard
Operation, SMPM Ch. 1, section 1.3 and Safety management Circular 11 of 2013 (Bridge Team
management) were not complied. At the time of incident, only OOW and O.S were manning the bridge
which was contrary to the Watch Condition chart (what was the watch condition; 2?) which requires at least
2 Certified Officers along with helms man and dedicated look out.

b. Key shipboard operation procedures (Basic Principles Of navigation watch) as per SMPM Ch. 15 were not
complied with.

1. 15.2 (A)- Watch arrangement was not adequate and appropriate to prevailing condition of visibility

2. 15.3 (A) - The officer of watch may visit the chart room for short period for necessary performance
of his navigational duties, but he should satisfy himself that it is safe to do so…” As per VDR
information it is noted that 3rd officer after giving order for correction of course went to the chart
room between 20:59:10s and 21:00:41s during which time the O.S was not able to steady the course
to which he had been instructed to do. As verbalized by the 3rd officer, he lost his confidence in
O.S ability in steering

3. 15.3 (B) - “The relieving officer of the watch shall ensure that members of his watch were fully
capable of performing their duties…” In this case, although O.S was assigned on bridge duties, he
was put on hand steering for practicing purpose.

c. 3rd Officer did not notify Master when he was in doubt about the O.S steering ability. Although the O.S was
certified for navigational watch keeping functions, but when his steering capabilities were in doubt neither
did be he call for a more experienced watch personnel to help take control of the situation nor did he inform
master.
Approved By

Capt. Edward Abban

Designated Person Ashore
Quality, Safety & Security
Fleet Division, Pacific International Lines (Pte) Ltd.

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