Humanitarian Succession Against

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䉷 EJIL 2003
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Revisiting State Succession to

Humanitarian Treaties: Is There
a Case for Automaticity?
Akbar Rasulov*
When the law is able to distinguish clearly between the different categories of treaties in
terms of purpose and function, it will have taken an important step forward . . . When that
stage is reached, those treaties which are immediately available to a new State will, it is safe
to predict, be so because of their purpose and function and not because of a ‘succession’ from
the parent State; it is precisely because law at present makes provision only for succession
that the decision to become party or not is primarily a political one. Seen in this context, then,
there is much more to be said for the ‘pick and choose’ attitude than has been commonly
assumed.
Robert Jennings1
Without automatic succession to such a Convention, we would have a situation where the
worldwide system of human rights protections continually generates gaps in the most vital
part of its framework, which open up and close, depending on the break up of the old political
authorities and the emergence of the new.
Judge Christopher Gregory Weeramantry2
Abstract
A belief formed over the last decade, both within and outside the academic community, that
humanitarian treaties are subject to a special regime in the law of state succession, known as
‘automatic succession’. This article seeks to critically re-examine the accuracy of this belief.
* LLM (Essex); LLM Candidate, Harvard Law School; PhD Candidate, University of Hull. This article
developed from the author’s LLM dissertation done at the University of Essex, in 2000. Although the
author alone bears responsibility for all opinions, errors, and omissions contained in the text, he
acknowledges his great debt to Professor Sir Nigel Rodley, under whose supervision the dissertation was
written, and Professor Geoff Gilbert, also of Essex, whose insightful comments on earlier drafts were of
invaluable help. The author also thanks Dr Eric Sievers for his inspirational guidance and mentorship as
well as for attracting the author’s attention to this subject area.
1
R. Y. Jennings, General Course on Principles of International Law, RCADI, vol. 121 (1967-II) 323, at 445.
2
Separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Judgment on Preliminary Objections (hereinafter
Application of the Genocide Convention), ICJ Reports (1996) 595, at 654–655.
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EJIL (2003), Vol. 14 No. 1, 141–170
142 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
By analysing the state practice generated during the recent wave of state succession, this
article comprehensively elucidates the current customary regime of succession applicable to
humanitarian treaties. With minor exceptions, the final verdict appears pessimistic: not only
have the successor states not behaved as though succession to humanitarian treaties were
automatic, but on the general level there also has not been any de facto continuity in
succession patterns. The opinio juris currently held by the successor states strongly
disfavours any automaticity of succession. Even the human rights bodies seem to vacillate in
their opinion. Nevertheless, the idea of automatic succession to humanitarian treaties,
strengthened by the doctrine of ‘acquired rights’, possesses enough legitimacy to be
incorporated into positive international law. The major requirement at this stage, therefore,
is to boost the spirit of accountability. Depositaries and treaty-monitoring bodies must
become more active in discharging their watchdog functions.
1 Introduction
That humanitarian treaties occupy a special position in contemporary international
law has been asserted as often as it has been claimed that the goals enshrined in such
treaties have a direct bearing on the fate of the world and its order.3 The observance of
human rights standards has long been recognized to have a direct bearing on the
maintenance of international peace and security,4 the potential implications of
non-observance varying from mass influxes of refugees to the expansionist policies of
totalitarianism. Human rights are one of the foundations of international peace and
security;5 they are part of the goals defining the world public order. Guidance as to
how to achieve these goals comes from international human rights law (IHRL) and
international humanitarian law (IHL).
According to common perceptions, IHRL is that part of international law which
stipulates that obligations are owed by states directly to their own citizens.6 It is rooted
in the international bill of human rights, comprising the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights7 and the two UN Covenants.8 IHL, in its turn, is commonly defined as
the branch of international law that owes its inspiration to a feeling for humanity and
3
Reservations to the Genocide Convention, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1951) 15; Ireland v. United
Kingdom, ECHR (1978) Series A, No. 25, 90, at §239; UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/80; Human Rights
Committee (HRC), General Comment No. 24, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6. See also M. Shaw, International
Law (4th ed., 1997), at 695; Kamminga, ‘State Succession in Respect of Human Rights Treaties’, 7 EJIL
(1996) 469.
4
See, for instance, O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (1991), at 331; Van der Stoel,
‘Human Dimension Commitments Are Matters of Direct and Legitimate Concern to All Participating
States’, in W. Zellner and F. Lange (eds), Peace and Stability through Human and Minority Rights: Speeches by
the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (1999) 49.
5
See, for instance, SC Res. 253 (1968), for an illustration of how gross human rights violations have been
viewed as a threat to international peace and security.
6
See R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994), at 95; P. Sieghart, The
International Law of Human Rights (1983), at xix.
7
GA Res. 217A (III), 10 December 1948.
8
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, 993 UNTS 3.
Revisiting State Succession to Humanitarian Treaties: Is There a Case for Automaticity? 143
is centred on the protection of the individual in times of armed conflict.9 It represents

the body of law known as the ‘Geneva law’, combining the four Geneva Conventions
and the two additional Protocols thereto and, together with the law of warfare,
comprises jus in bello.
Half a decade ago, an article appeared in this Journal, in which the author,
reflecting on the issues of state succession, asserted that the
state practice during the 1990s strongly supports the view that obligations arising from a
human rights treaty are not affected by a succession of States. This applies to all obligations
undertaken by the predecessor State, including any reservations, declarations and derogations
made by it. The continuity of these obligations occurs ipso jure. The successor State is under no
obligation to issue confirmations to anyone.10
This statement, although not the first of its kind, has become the illustration par
excellence of a trend that was then developing in international legal doctrine, centred
around a belief that a particular legal regime11 of state succession has come to apply to
humanitarian treaties: the regime of automatic succession. The belief was taken up by
many in the academic community, as various scholars advanced in various
formulations what can be termed, after the above-quoted author, the Kamminga
model.12 It was also endorsed in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) by Judge Weeramantry13 and, to a lesser extent, by Judge Shahabuddeen,14 and
was also welcomed by a number of other international bodies.15
This article aims to provide what has long been overdue — a comprehensive
analysis of the special position of humanitarian treaties in the law of state succession.
Ten years after the demise of the Soviet bloc, the timing for this scrutiny could not be
more appropriate. With secessionism still popular in different parts of the world, given
the substance of humanitarian treaties, the examination of Kamminga’s claim has
become an increasingly important task.
If humanitarian treaties are indeed subject to automatic succession, then we may
claim that another victory has been secured for the human rights cause in the last
decade. If, however, they are not, then the quest is further from being complete than
some academics would have us believe. Repeated scholarly pronouncements may
then be misleading and harmful, creating a false sense of security about the reliability
of certain important international legal regimes.
Before proceeding to a re-evaluation of Kamminga’s argument, it is necessary to
clarify the term ‘humanitarian treaties’ employed here. For present purposes, this
9
See I. Detter, The Law of War (2nd ed., 2000), at 160, quoting Jean Pictet.
10
Kamminga, supra note 3, at 482.
11
For present purposes, a regime is defined as a system of norms governing a certain sphere of international
and other social relations. A treaty’s regime emanates from its substance, which is the totality of those
provisions of the treaty that immediately deal with the treaty’s subject matter(s).
12
Müllerson, ‘New Developments in the Former USSR and Yugoslavia’, 33 VJIL (1993) 299, at 319–320;
B. Stern, La Succession d’Etats, RCADI, vol. 262 (1996) 297; Shaw, State Succession Revisited, 5 FYIL
(1994) 34, at 84.
13
See supra note 2.
14
Application of the Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at 634.
15
See e.g. HRC General Comment No. 26, UN Doc. A/53/40, §4.
144 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
category of treaties is understood to include those multilateral treaties that uphold

and promote humanitarian principles and the human dignity of the individual,
treaties that are normally to be found under the rubrics of IHRL and IHL. Although the
relationship between the two branches — IHRL and IHL — is not uncontroversial,16
they may be seen at least as overlapping17 and at most as requiring conceptually to be
merged into one body.18 As a final answer to this question remains far outside the
scope of this study, suffice it to say that for the purposes of developing generic rules
applicable to treaties fusing IHL and IHRL conventions into a single category is
absolutely legitimate.19
The second section of this paper provides a brief historical background to the
analysis. The third section clarifies some of the general legal concepts involved.
Section four analyses the claim of humanitarian treaties to the automaticity of
succession from a theoretical perspective. Section five presents an analysis of relevant
state practice. Finally, before passing to the concluding remarks, the article considers,
in Section six, some peculiar sub-regional developments in Eastern Europe.
2 Historical Backdrop: The Recent Wave of State Succession

The recent wave of state succession occurred against the backdrop of the demise of the
Soviet bloc that started in 1989 and included the disintegration of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR), Czechoslovakia, and the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY). It also included the unification of Germany and that of Yemen.
Only the three cases involving dismemberment, however, have challenged the
existing dogmas and have led to a significant revival in academic debates.
Twenty-four successor states have emerged in the wake of this wave of state
succession. Of them only 16 properly qualify for the status of ‘successor state’:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, the former Yugos-
lav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the united
Yemen. This latter state, which arose from the merging of the Yemen Arab Republic
and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, declared itself a party to all treaties
that had been applicable to at least one of its predecessors,20 which eliminated all of the
potential problems, simultaneously making the case uninteresting for the purposes of
the current analysis.
Both the unified Germany and the Russian Federation claimed to be the
continuations of their predecessor states, which was unanimously accepted by the
16
Partsch, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, Inst. 8 (1985) 292.
17
N. S. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (2nd ed., 1999), at 57.
18
A. H. Robertson and J. G. Merrills, Human Rights in the World (4th ed., 1996), at 310–314; Partsch, supra
note 16, at 293; Detter, supra note 9, at 161.
19
See Article 60(5) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (hereinafter
Convention on the Law of Treaties), which mentions ‘treaties of humanitarian character’. According to
the commonly accepted interpretation, this category includes both IHL and IHRL conventions.
20
P. Malanczuk (ed.), Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th ed., 1997), at 168.
international community. While the German case was largely viewed as the
absorption of the GDR by the FRG,21 the academic assessment of Russia’s continuation
of the former USSR’s identity turned out to be controversial.22
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania claimed a clean slate position and succeeded in
having this recognized,23 basing their argument on the illegality of their annexation
by the Soviet Union and asserting a return to their pre-World War II legal identity.24
Belarus and the Ukraine, both being founding members of the United Nations, already
had a significant degree of international personality of their own at the moment of
independence, being parties in their own right to many treaties that otherwise would
become objects for their succession. Although not absolutely insignificant, their
practice of succession is, thus, not extensive (as it practically did not have a chance to
occur due to the overlaps between the lists of treaties to which they and the Soviet
Union adhered separately) and, hence, not as conclusive as the practice of the other
former Soviet republics. Finally, the practice of succession of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) has been so perplexing that very few useful generalizations may be
made from it.
Initially, in 1992, the FRY claimed continuator status. This claim, however, was
comprehensively rejected. In September 1992, the Security Council and the General
Assembly came to the conclusion that the post-April 1992 entity could not
automatically continue the membership of the former SFRY in the UN and it had to
apply for membership anew.25 The decision was then replicated throughout the UN
structure. As no one state could be admitted twice to one organization, in reality it
meant that in the General Assembly’s eyes the SFRY ceased to exist and the FRY was a
new state. Interestingly, however, the Legal Counsel took the view that the former
Yugoslavia’s membership in the UN was neither terminated nor suspended. It further
directed the Secretary-General that the latter was not in a position to pronounce on
the FRY’s claim as to its continuation of the SFRY’s personality.26 The country’s legal
position as a party to treaties deposited with the UN Secretary-General thus remained
unclear until October 2000.27
21
See Beemelmans, ‘State Succession in International Law: Remarks on Recent Theory and Statepraxis’,
15 Boston University International Law Journal (1997) 71, at 77, 98.
22
For a supportive view, see Müllerson, supra note 12, at 302 et seq. For criticism, see Blum, ‘Russia Takes
over the Soviet Union’s Seat at the United Nations’, 3 EJIL (1992) 354. See also Lukashuk’s remark in
ASIL Proceedings (1992) at 23, stating that Russia’s recognition as the continuator state was a pragmatic,
not a legal, decision.
23
Müllerson, supra note 12, at 308 et seq.
24
Ibid., at 309–310.
25
See GA Res. 47/1, 22 September 1992; SC Res. 777 (1992).
26
See UN Doc. A/47/485.
27
See Craven, ‘The Genocide Case, the Law of Treaties and State Succession’, 68 BYIL (1997) 127, at
131–134. O’Lloyd made an interesting submission to the extent that the reason why Russia’s claim to be
the continuing state of the USSR was accepted while the FRY’s identical claim as regards the SFRY was
not lies in the fact that Russia willingly chose to abide by the principles of the UN Charter, respecting the
established borders, partaking in international cooperation, and respecting human rights, while the FRY
failed to do so. See O’Lloyd, ‘Succession, Secession, and State Membership in the United Nations’, 26 New
York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1993–4) 761, at 783.
146 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
Despite the non-recognition of the FRY’s claim by the international community,

depositaries’ records consistently kept listing ‘Yugoslavia’ as a party to the respective
multilateral treaties, with the dates in the respective entries corresponding to those of
the SFRY, thus de facto treating the FRY as a continuing state. We will return later to
the evidentiary significance of depositaries’ records. For now, suffice it to say that the
Legal Counsel’s findings and the position taken by the Secretary-General caused much
confusion. As the Secretary-General’s summary of depositary practice then explained,
for Secretary-General’s depositary purposes ‘the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) . . . remains as the predecessor State upon separation of parts
of the territory of the former Yugoslavia.’28 This came despite the virtually universally
accepted findings of the Badinter Commission29 and, which is more intriguing, the
new official position of the Yugoslav state itself, which following the democratic end of
the Milosevic regime, was admitted to the United Nations as a new state on 1
November 2000.30 On the same day, incidentally, the FRY renounced its claim to the
international legal personality of the SFRY, creating further confusion in the
depositaries’ records. Even now depositaries continue to list the SFRY as a party to the
treaties in their custody.31
Whether or not the FRY is a successor state is no longer a contested issue. The value
of its practice, however, remains seriously undermined, especially because the main
source of evidence available — the depositaries’ records — is devastated by
incoherence.
To illustrate this uncertainty in relation to the Yugoslav case, the current records
for the Vienna Convention on the Diplomatic Relations32 list Yugoslavia as a party by
succession (the date of the communication of succession is 12 March 2001).
Previously, the records indicated 1 April 1963, the date when the Convention came
into force for the SFRY.
With respect to the Genocide Convention,33 the new records list Yugoslavia as a
party by accession from 12 March 2001, whereas the previous records showed an
unbroken continuum since 1950, when the Convention entered into force for the
SFRY.
It is not absolutely clear whether the two other fairly recent cases of transfer of
territory — Hong Kong and Macau — are, strictly speaking, cases of state succession.
The United Kingdom and Portugal leased the territories from China, without
exercising stricto sensu any de jure sovereignty over them; as a result, it appears there
28
Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, ST/LEG/7/Rev. 1
(hereinafter Summary of Practice) at 88, §297.
29
Arbitration Commission of the European Communities (later Arbitration Commission of the Inter-
national Conference on the former Yugoslavia). See Opinions 8–10, reprinted in 31 ILM (1992) 1521;
Opinion 11, reprinted in 32 ILM (1993) 1587.
30
See GA Res. 55/12, 1 November 2000.
31
See, e.g., the depositary records for the UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage at http://www.unesco.org/whc/debut.
32
500 UNTS 95; http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIII/treaty26.
asp.
33
78 UNTS 277.
was no change of sovereignty involved when the respective transfers were

accomplished.34 Nevertheless, according to the litmus test of state succession, the
United Kingdom and Portugal were responsible for the international relations of the
two territories, which could bring the two transfers into the state succession field. Still,
China has consistently taken the position that neither case involved a change in
sovereignty. Thus, paragraph 1 of the Macau Joint Declaration stated that Macau
‘form[s] part of Chinese territory’ and that from 20 December 1999 China ‘will resume
the exercise of sovereignty’ over it.35 In any event, neither transfer raised any
problematic issues of succession, both being fairly unique occurrences, carried out
according to special agreements36 negotiated long before the actual transfers took
place.37
Accordingly, as only the cases of dismemberment of the three socialist federations
raised challenges to the existing vision and have caused a stir in the corpus juris, the
transfers of Hong Kong and Macau, as well as the unifications of Yemen and
Germany, will not be examined in the present paper.
3 General Remarks on the Law of State Succession

‘State succession’ in international law is a process during which a certain competence
— usually defined as the ‘responsibility for international relations of territory’38 — is
transferred between two or more states. In other words, as a result of state succession,
one state (the ‘successor state’) replaces another (the ‘predecessor state’) as the
representative of a certain territory and its population in the international arena.39
The legal doctrine behind the law of state succession represents one of the most
controversial aspects of international law.40 For a long time, this branch of
international law remained a ‘grey zone’, arguably ‘altogether unsuited to the
processes of codification, let alone of progressive development’.41
Its most developed area is succession in respect of treaties, whose theoretical gist is
formed by the interplay of two driving objectives: the need to ensure the continuity of
obligations beyond the changes of sovereignty and the need to observe the principle of
34
A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000), at 323.
35
Infra note 36 (emphasis added).
36
See the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, 1984, 1399 UNTS 33, and the Joint Declaration
on the Question of Macau, 1987, 1498 UNTS 229.
37
Neither of the two agreements mentions the term ‘state succession’.
38
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 1978, UN Doc. A/CONF.80/31,
reprinted in 17 ILM 1488 (1978) (hereinafter Vienna Convention), Art. 2(b).
39
D. P. O’Connell, The Law of State Succession (1956), at 3.
40
See A. Verdross and B. Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht: Theorie und Praxis (3rd ed., 1984), at §973.
41
O’Connell, ‘Reflections on the State Succession Convention’, 39 ZaöRV (1979) 725, at 726.
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consent. Accordingly, two conceptual mechanisms42 of state succession can be

distinguished: ‘continuity’ and the ‘clean slate’ (tabula rasa).43
The rationale behind the principle of consent dictates that a state can be bound by
an international obligation only if it so agrees.44 Unless the successor state consented
in its pre-independence era to the treaties in question, acting qua itself, or qua an entity
with largely the same, even if not international, personality, it emerges on the
international arena with a clean slate, free of any of the treaty obligations of its
predecessor.
The international system, however, cannot afford an abrupt abortion of its internal
links on whose balanced connection its stability rests. A cessation of the legal
existence of an international subject by itself is a major disruption in the fabric of the
international system. The discontinuity of its obligations has an even greater
destabilizing effect. As observed by Crawford: ‘the international community cannot
allow the negation of the extensive body of legal relations built up over time. It cannot
allow communities simply to opt out of obligations and responsibilities, even by so
fundamental and difficult a process as dissolution of or secession from a State.’45
Therein lies the justification for the ‘continuity’ mechanism, according to which the
successor state inherits all the treaties of its predecessor which had been applicable to
its territory before the succession, unless such inheritance is impossible or objectively
unjustified. States incur considerable opportunity costs in arriving at and committing
themselves to treaties; as a result, they should be entitled to rely on the observance of
commitments residing therein,46 presumably beyond all but the most extraordinary
political upheavals.
Although historically the support of scholars was divided between the two
mechanisms,47 in recent years scholarly preference has tended towards ‘continuity’,
as being more responsive to the needs of the international community.
Practically, however, neither mechanism has been applied in its pure form, and it
would be erroneous to expect otherwise. Since the law of state succession always
42
‘Mechanism’ for present purposes is defined as a set of dynamically connected legal norms (in which the
application of a preceding norm triggers the application of the subsequent norm) whose overall
applicability is subject to the occurrence of certain legally relevant conditions. A mechanism is thus a
transcription of a certain route of behaviour into legal norms, where each norm reflects a stage or an
aspect of the route.
43
The concept of ‘continuity’ as used in the context of succession to treaties should be distinguished from
the concept of ‘continuity’ as used in the context of describing the change in the legal identity of a state.
The state that continues the personality of its predecessor is a continuator state, whereas the state that
only continues its predecessor’s treaties is a successor state.
44
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 2 and Art. 34. On the principle of consent, see generally L.
Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (1995), at 26 et seq.; G. Schwarzenberger and E. D. Brown, A
Manual of International Law (6th ed., 1976), at 119 et seq.
45
Crawford’s remarks in ASIL Proceedings (1992) at 21.
46
Vagts, ‘State Succession: the Codifiers’ View’, 33 VJIL (1993) 275, at 288.
47
See Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961), at 601. Compare Lauterpacht, ‘Succession of States with
Respect to Private Law Obligations’, in E. Lauterpacht (ed.), International Law being the Collected Papers of
Hersch Lauterpacht, vol. 3 (1977) 121, at 126, who argues that the very purpose of law generally
applicable to succession is ‘to maintain the continuity of law, independent of the physical or legal death of
the natural or juridical person concerned’.
occurs in highly politicized contexts,48 case-by-case arrangements and negotiations

invariably take place.49
The norms on state succession in contemporary international law, as in its classical
predecessor, come from international customs. Although as a result of an arduous
codification process, two international treaties50 were produced to govern the issues of
state succession, neither gained much support. The Vienna Convention on state
succession in respect of treaties only came into force in 1996.51 From the outset, it was
perceived not as a codification of the existing law, but as a progressive development,
and one which was not welcome at that.52 The state practice that followed its adoption
largely deviated from its provisions.53 Although the Convention failed to achieve
customary status as a whole, some of its provisions are commonly believed to reflect
norms of a customary nature.54
Custom, as a source of international law, is state practice that is perceived as being
legally obligatory.55 It represents ‘a particular pattern of behaviour . . . engaged in
with sufficient uniformity and consistency and . . . explained in terms appropriate to
consider [this pattern] as one dictated by or in accordance with a rule of law.’56
Customary international law results from an accretion of practices and convictions
(opinio juris).57 This last element is elusive in terms of its empirical ascertainment and
frequently has to be inferred, partly on the basis of existing practice and partly on the
basis of the absence of objections.58
Automatic succession, as the term is used in international law, is succession that
occurs regardless of the volition of the successor state and without any steps being
48
Crawford, supra note 45, at 18.
49
Ibid., at 21. Cf. Schwarzenberger and Brown, supra note 44, at 71, and O’Connell, supra note 41, at 729.
50
Supra note 38. There also exists a Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts, 1983, reprinted in 24 ILM (1983) 306.
51
As of October 2001, the following states were parties to the Convention: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Morocco, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, the Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia,
the Ukraine and Yugoslavia.
52
See Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), at §208, Reporters’ Note 4.
See also I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed., 1998), at 663–664; Müllerson, supra
note 12, at 299; Malanczuk, supra note 20, at 161.
53
See I. Shearer, Starke’s International Law (11th ed., 1994), at 294; Crawford, supra note 45, at 17.
54
When it comes to such cases as the unification of states, boundary treaties, and membership in
international organizations, scholars agree that the Vienna Convention is a sufficiently close reflection of
customary law. See P. M. Dupuy, Droit International Public (2nd ed., 1993), at 40; Tichy, ‘Two Recent
Cases of State Succession — An Austrian Perspective’, 44 Austrian Journal of Public and International Law
(1992) 117, at 122; Shaw, supra note 3, at 683.
55
North Sea Continental Shelf cases (FRG v. Denmark/Netherlands), ICJ Reports (1969) 3, at 43–46, paras
73–81.
56
Rodley, ‘Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Populations: the Legal
Framework’, in N. S. Rodley (ed.), To Loose the Bands of Wickedness (1992) 14, at 16.
57
Henkin, supra note 44, at 34.
58
See M. Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties (2nd ed.,1997), at 53; K. Wolfke, Custom in
Present International Law (2nd ed., 1993), at 128–131.
150 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
taken by that state. It is a succession that is both implied and obligatory.59 Its effect
consists of the transfer of treaty rights and obligations not as a result of the will of the
successor state, but on the basis of the operation of international law.60 It is a
succession ipso jure, and no formalities, such as the sending of diplomatic notes, need
to be fulfilled in order to confirm it.61
In international law, the term ‘automatic succession’ is used in two contexts,
depending on the taxonomy of succession. In one context, automatic succession is
also known as ‘universal succession’.62 This refers to a succession that occurs along
the lines of the mechanism envisaged in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention:
1. When a part or parts of the territory of a State separate to form one or more States, whether
or not the predecessor State continues to exist:
(a) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of
the predecessor State continues in force in respect of each successor State so formed;
(b) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect only of that part of the
territory of the predecessor State which has become a successor State continues in force in
respect of that successor State alone. [. . .]63
Alternatively, the automaticity of succession is tied not to the nature of the successor
state, but to that of the treaty. In this context, automatic succession occurs in respect
of certain categories of treaties. It is in this sense that ‘automatic succession’ is
employed in the Kamminga model.
With respect to ‘universal succession’, it must be noted that no successor state ever
behaved as if state succession to all treaties were ipso jure. In those cases where
succession occurred and the general positions of successor states were communicated
to the international community, successor states always found it appropriate to
announce their succession expressly. The CIS states, for example, chose to state in the
Alma-Ata Declaration that they undertook to guarantee ‘the discharge of the
international obligations deriving from treaties and agreements concluded by the
former [USSR]’.64 Had they believed in automatic succession along the lines of Article
34, such a paragraph would not have been included.
59
Stern, supra note 12, at 269–270; see also Rosenne, ‘Automatic Treaty Succession’, in J. Klabbers and R.
Lefeber (eds), Essays on the Law of Treaties: a Collection of Essays in Honour of Bert Vierdag (1998) 97.
60
See the dissenting opinion of Judge Kreca in the Application of the Genocide Convention case, supra note 2, at
784, para. 115.
61
‘[L]a succession automatique signifie qu’aucun acte formel n’est prévu pour que les effets de la succession
se réalisent.’ Stern, supra note 12, at 269. The author later went on to clarify that automaticity
presupposes ‘inutilite d’une notification de succession’.
62
O’Connell, supra note 39, at 6–7.
63
Citing Article 34 of the Vienna Convention, Slovakia claimed that ‘the principle of automatic succession
[is a]. . . rule applicable in the case of dissolution of a State where the predecessor State has ceased to exist’.
(Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ, Judgment of 25 September 1997, www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ihs/ihsjudgement/ihs ijudgment 970925 frame.htm, at para. 121).
64
See 31 ILM 148 (1992) at 149.
4 Can Humanitarian Treaties Qualify for Automatic

Succession?
Given that respect for sovereignty lies at the heart of the international legal system
today, automatic succession appears as an alien element in the international legal
order. Should it be proved to exist, the systemic principles of international law would
require that its scope of applicability be construed as narrowly as possible, for it is a
clear restriction on the liberty of states.
Considering this link between automatic succession and the systemic requirements
of international law, we can conclude that in order to qualify for automatic
succession, the treaty or treaties at issue must be, by virtue of their purpose and
functions, directly related to international values of the greatest importance, sufficient
to override the principles of sovereignty and consent. Moreover, the treaty or treaties
must be removed as far as possible from the personality of the states parties, for, as
Koskenniemi correctly observed, the more ‘intimate’ the link between the treaty and
the ‘self ’ of the predecessor state, the weaker the case for automatic succession to that
treaty.65
Another point worth considering is the notion of the ‘working capital of legal
relationships’, with which every new state entering the international arena needs to
be equipped.66 Traditionally, international law held that this ‘working capital’ was all
contained in customary law. However, Robert Jennings, lecturing at the Hague
Academy in 1967, posited that ‘multilateral conventions of humanitarian character’
also belonged to ‘the necessary working capital of international jural relationships
that a new State needs at the outset.’67 Having said that, however, he immediately
made a reservation: ‘Whether the distinction between these and other kinds of treaty
can yet be expressed in terms of legal criteria is more than doubtful.’68
Today, the general opinion appears to be that this hurdle has been cleared. Even the
most modest claims made about humanitarian treaties seem to suggest that they
enjoy a special status as a category of treaties under international law:
● humanitarian treaties have been classified as treaties under which obligations

are owed primarily and directly to individuals, not other states;
● contracting states in humanitarian treaties, it is believed, do not have any
interests of their own, but only a common interest, which is the accomplishment
of the standards enshrined in these treaties;69
65
Koskenniemi, ‘The Present State of Research’, in State Succession: Codification Tested against the Facts
(1997) 89, at 156.
66
Jennings, supra note 1, at 442–443.
67
Ibid., at 444–445.
68
Ibid.
69
‘In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests of their own; they merely have,
one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison
d’être of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual
advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between
rights and duties.’ Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at 23.
152 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
● humanitarian treaties often provide for direct access of individuals to inter-

national redress mechanisms;
● compliance with humanitarian treaties, it is claimed, is immune to the principle
of reciprocity;70
● humanitarian treaties create public orders between groups of states rather than
webs of bilateral obligations;71
● humanitarian treaties cannot be terminated on grounds of material breach by
another party;72
● humanitarian treaties do not contain termination clauses;
● increasing the number of its parties inheres in the object and purpose of every
humanitarian treaty, as the universality of cooperation in the humanitarian
sphere requires universality of participation;73
● special rules apply to reservations made to humanitarian treaties.74
Humanitarian treaties have differed so frequently in their regime from other types of
treaties that to expect a special status for them in the law of state succession would
only seem natural.
In fact, in his separate opinion in the Application of the Genocide Convention case,
Judge Shahabuddeen tried to make precisely this point. According to him, the
humanitarian nature of a treaty, together with its humanitarian objects and
purposes, can create a juridical mechanism that will support a certain legal
construction in which successor states are made parties to a humanitarian treaty by
virtue of the adherence expressed by the predecessor state.75 He also observed that the
break in protection that would arise in the absence of automaticity would appear to be
a priori incompatible with the object and purpose of humanitarian treaties which, in
the first place, exist to safeguard the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual
and endorse the most elementary principles of morality.76
Apart from considerations of human dignity, there are also a number of political
factors that support automaticity in the case of humanitarian treaties. One of them is
linked to the recognition that during periods of political instability, which tend to
accompany state succession, human rights violations and flagrant atrocities occur.77
70
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial
Chamber Judgment, available at http://www.un.org/icty/kupreskic/trialc2/judgement/index.htm, at
paras 511, 517–519; HRC General Comment No.24, supra note 3, at para. 17; see, however, Provost,
‘Reciprocity in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, 65 BYIL (1994) 383. See also D. Gomien et al.,
Law and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter (1996), at
432–433, observing that the European Social Charter tends to favour reciprocity.
71
Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 3; Shaw, supra note 3, at 696.
72
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 60(5).
73
See e.g. GA Res. 368 (IV), 1949, affirming that the Genocide Convention is intended for universal
participation (thereby inviting as many states as possible to join it). See also the separate opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen, supra note 14, at 635, and Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at 24.
74
HRC General Comment No.24, supra note 3, at paras 17 and 19. See also Belilos v. Switzerland, ECHR
(1988) Series A, No. 132.
75
Judge Shahabuddeen, supra note 14, at 637.
76
Ibid., at 635.
77
Such violations are concomitant with mass refugee inflows, which can constitute a
threat to international peace and security. As a systemic principle of international
law, the preservation of international peace and security is sufficiently weighty to
override the principles of sovereignty and consent which oppose the introduction of
the mechanism of automatic succession.
However, as Judge Weeramantry showed in his separate opinion in the Application
of the Genocide Convention case it is not imperative to limit sovereignty to create room
for automatic succession. The principle of sovereignty can be bypassed, rather than
curtailed. As Judge Weeramantry explained, humanitarian treaties by their very
nature transcend the concept of state sovereignty, since their subject matter is of
universal concern.78 Where a case of state succession occurs, a bona fide successor
state should not, therefore, cite the intrusion of its sovereignty as a ground for
discarding its predecessor’s humanitarian treaties. Unfortunately, Judge Weeraman-
try’s argument does not provide a route for bypassing the principle of consent in the
same manner. Or, rather, what he identifies as a route is in fact a dead end. His
argument that under humanitarian treaties individuals are made into beneficiaries,
not third parties, and therefore the res inter alios acta principle should not prevent these
treaties from automatic succession,79 is flawed. Equally flawed is a parallel three-step
argument, which Judge Weeramantry did not make, but which would be a logical
outgrowth of his position, viz.: (1) because the principle of consent is a systemic
requirement of international law, not just a customary rule, it should not operate
where there is no systemic need for negotiating sovereign interests, and (2) since
humanitarian treaties relate to human dignity and not to the political stances of
states, the interests of predecessor states do not differ from those of their successors,80
that is, no systemic need is apparent for a separate consent on their part, which means
that (3) humanitarian treaties ought to be made subject to automatic succession. The
flaw of both of these arguments lies in substituting the vector of treaty obligations with
that of the substantive rules which these treaties encompass. Humanitarian treaties
are dual in nature: they act both as contractual instruments and as sources of
substantive normative orders. Individuals are not third parties to humanitarian
treaties in any manner whatsoever. They are simply beneficaries of these treaties’
regimes. The res inter alios acta argument in their respect, therefore, is not simply
invalid, as Judge Weeramantry argues, but is simply out of place. Furthermore, to
argue that there is no systemic need for a separate consent on the part of successor
states would mean to overlook the contractual nature of treaties altoghether. There is
always a systemic need for consent in the case of treaties, if only because treaties
represent more than just sums of their substantive provisions.
78
Judge Weeramantry, supra note 2, at 646.
79
Ibid., at 651.
80
Ibid., at 646–647.
154 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
5 Examination of the Relevant State Practice: the Position

of the Kamminga Model in Customary Law
A Evidence of State Practice in the Field of State Succession
State succession is a difficult field in which to search for state practice. To begin with,
there are almost no authoritative decisions on the subject.81 In addition, the acts that
make up the relevant state practice consist for the most part of succession notes and
various declarations, i.e. verbal statements, which in some teachings on custom are
regarded as ‘bad evidence’, since they reflect only the subjective beliefs of the entities
that issue them, not the picture of legal reality.82 However, those acts which these
teachings would treat as ‘good evidence’ are an extremely rare occurrence in the field
of state succession. Humanitarian treaties are rarely executed in such a way so as to
produce ‘physical deeds’, since states for the most part do not carry any positive
obligations that would be relevant for these purposes. How is it possible, for example,
to determine whether Slovakia acceded or succeeded to the Apartheid Convention,
without considering the notes it sent to the depositary?83 How would one find the
cases of actual execution of such a Convention’s provisions that indicate with a
sufficient degree of finality the presence of a certain pattern of state practice? The truth
is that in most cases the actual fulfilment84 of humanitarian treaties does not take
place at all, or does not take place in such a manner85 which would provide an
unequivocal answer to the question whether a given sate succeeded or acceded to a
particular humanitarian treaty.
It must also be borne in mind that even when the substantive part of the treaty is
fulfilled it does not necessarily mean that the successor state has succeeded to the
treaty in question. It may well have fulfilled the substantive provisions following a
conviction that they are part of customary law. Consequently, only the fulfilment of
81
In the two recent cases pertaining to the matter — Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note 63, and Application of
the Genocide Convention — the ICJ avoided making a meaningful pronouncement on controversial points
of the law of state succession, dismissing them on the ground that there was no need to discuss them. See
also Castaneda’s remarks in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1970 (1) 156 (the field of state
succession is in a state of anarchy, there is a great wealth of precedent and legal opinion on the subject,
but both are far from uniform).
82
See Wolfke, supra note 58, at 41–44. Cf. A. D’Amato, International Law: Process and Prospect (1995), at
122–124, 132–133, 141.
83
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1973, 1015
UNTS 243.
84
In the instant case, the actual fulfilment would not be the adoption of relevant domestic legislation — it
already had been in place in the former Czechoslovakia and, presumably, passed on since then to the new
state — but the prosecution of an alleged perpetrator, e.g. on the charges of ‘exploitation of the labour of
the members of a racial group’. A prosecution for this offence would clearly indicate factual succession to
the Apartheid Convention, since it could not occur on any other ground, as the offence in question is not
per se a crime under customary international law.
85
The only act of fulfilment that can indicate whether a succession, rather than an accession, has occurred
is one which occurs within a period of time during which the succeeded regime would be in force (by
virtue of its retroactive effect), but the acceded regime would not.
clearly non-customary provisions of a treaty — such as, for instance, the submission
of reports to a treaty-monitoring body — would comprise a ‘physical deed’ clearly
indicating a case of succession.
Apart from a handful of cases, the ascertainment of customary law on state
succession to humanitarian treaties therefore demands the examination of verbal
acts, notes and declarations submitted by the successor states.86 Hence, the central
evidentiary role in the field of state succession is played by the depositary records in
which such notes and declarations are registered.
Having said that, it must be clarified that in practice depositaries never rely on any
theory of automatic succession as such, but always require successor states to make
formal statements confirming their succession.87 The UN Secretary General, whose
depositary practice because of its sheer volume and influence on other depositaries
makes him the most important depository in international law, rejects in his practice
all general succession notes and accepts only treaty-specific notes.88 It is hardly
surprising, against the background of such formalism, that an environment
conducive to the birth of automatic succession never formed. Formalistic though
depositaries may be, their records still present the most valuable source of evidence in
the law of state succession.
Ignoring the depositary records could lead to rather absurd consequences, such as a
situation where Ruritania’s case for automatic succession remains under consider-
ation despite Ruritania’s sending an accession note. Automatic succession by
definition is supposed to occur without any formal confirmation.89 The only way to
ascertain that no such confirmation has occurred is to look at the depositaries’
records. Brigitte Stern, however, seems to offer another answer. She asserts that
although the succession in question may not be implicit, it is still obligatory.90 Even if
we leave aside all other objections to such a finding,91 it nonetheless remains unclear
86
‘Depositary practice must provide valuable guidance for identification of rules relating to [state]
succession.’ Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1970 (1) 133.
87
Rosenne, supra note 59, at 102. See also Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1970 (2) 34. Cf.
Summary of Practice, supra note 28, at 89, para. 304: ‘it has always been the position of the
Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary, to record a succeeding State as a party to a given treaty
solely on the basis of a formal document similar to instruments of ratification, accession, etc . . .’
88
UNESCO adopted a different approach in this respect; it decided to recognize general declarations of
succession, such as the Alma-Ata Declaration, supra note 64. See, for instance, http://ramsar.org/key
cp e.htm.
According to Article 2(g) of the 1978 Vienna Convention, the form of notification is not of essential
importance, as long as the consent of the notifying state to be bound by the treaty clearly transpires from
it.
89
‘“Automatic succession” and “notification of succession” are mutually exclusive.’ Judge Kreca,
dissenting opinion, supra note 60, at 784, para. 115. See also supra note 61.
90
‘Ne pas accepter une succession implicite ne signifie pas nier le caractère obligatoire de la succession.’
Stern, supra note 12, at 270.
91
Subscribing to Stern’s argument basically means suggesting that the difference between notes of
succession and notes of accession is meaningless. This could only hold true if both types of notes were
declaratory and had no legal effect. That, however, would contradict the established principles of the law
of treaties, which views notes of accession as important constitutive acts that epitomize the principle of
consent, since through them states signify their consent to adhere to a given treaty.
156 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
exactly how Stern intends to use this argument in favour of automaticity, as she
herself expressly describes the latter as requiring both obligatoriness and implicitness.
Turning to depositary records for answers about the state practice, however, must
not be misapprehended. Such records do not bind the parties to any treaty, nor do they
have any legal bearing on the treaty’s status as a formal instrument.92 Furthermore,
they do not contain any element of customary international law either. What they do
contain is a picture of treaty adherence, and it is to this extent that they possess
evidentiary value.
The only time when depositary records fail to provide conclusive evidence about the
status of a given treaty is when the potential successor state does not take any steps in
this regard. Legal doctrine remains silent on whether a successor state should lose its
right of succession to an inheritable treaty after a certain period of time. The silence of
a successor state does not necessarily rule out succession.93 Blank entries in depositary
records in this regard reflect unsettling gaps. It has been held that where no succession
takes place, it is impossible to infer an automatic succession.94 This conclusion,
however, does not strike one as logically inevitable. It is not impossible to treat blank
entries as indicators of automatic succession, since the absence of any formal
communication on the part of a state may be a sign of its treating the succession as
implicit. In any event, no magic formula is available, which means that the final
answer must depend on the particular circumstances of the case. To this extent
depositary records are somewhat probatively inadequate for our purposes.
The situation, however, is different for unambiguous accessions. Then depositary
records are at their best as an evidentiary source. They unambiguously convey the
nature of adherence and the position a given state party takes with regard to the
inheritable treaty. Even if we accept that the automaticity argument is not necessarily
undermined by the non-submission of a note of succession, it is impossible to disagree
that the submission of an accession instrument effectively ends the argument.
Accession notes have an unequivocally constitutive effect. They always indicate
support for a ‘clean slate’, and are squarely irreconcilable with the concept of
continuity and, hence, automatic succession.
Some commentators remark that it is ‘unclear what effect can be given to the use of
technical expressions such as “accession” or “succession” in the instruments sent by
successor states to depositaries’.95 However, it is submitted here that, to the extent to
which the concept of legal formality applies in international law, the employment of
Furthermore, at least within the meaning of Article 17 of the Vienna Convention, notes of succession
are also seen as definitive expressions of consent to be bound. Thus, Judge Kreca comments that a note of
succession is ‘a unilateral act of the State, constitut[ing] a basis for a collateral agreement in simplified
form between the new State and the individual parties to its predecessor’s treaties.’ Judge Kreca, supra
note 60, at 785–786, para. 116.
92
Summary of Practice, supra note 28, at 89, para. 306.
93
Thus, FYROM deposited its note of succession to the World Heritage Convention (see infra note 144) only
in 1997.
94
Klabbers, ‘State Succession and Reservations to Treaties’, in Klabbers and Lefeber, supra note 59, 107, at
115.
95
Koskenniemi, supra note 65, at 105.
such ‘technical expressions’ can be relied on as being conclusive, for any other variant
would indicate a denial of predictability of terminology in the international legal
discourse, which would effectively mean the cessation of the legal nature of the said
discourse.
B Automatic Succession to Humanitarian Treaties — Observations on

the Real Opinio Juris
An attentive review of the documents containing the opinio juris shared by those
organs that ought to be the most receptive to the Kamminga model leads to an
unambiguous conclusion about the model’s accuracy as a descriptive statement
about the reality of international law.
On 5 March 1993, the UN Commission on Human Rights issued Resolution
1993/23, entitled ‘Succession of States in respect of international human rights
treaties’, in which it called upon successor states to confirm their succession to the
relevant treaties with the appropriate depositaries.96 On 25 February 199497 and 25
February 1995,98 it repeated this appeal. In 1993, the Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination adopted General Recommendation XII (42) that also
encouraged all successor states that had not yet done so to confirm their succession to
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.99 The fifth
meeting of the persons chairing the human rights treaty bodies in December 1994
addressed the successor states with the same request.100 The Human Rights
Committee in turn has continually taken a position that rejects any theory of
automatic succession, as it required the successor states to manifest their succession
in a formal way.101
Thus, human rights bodies, through their practice, have elected to view succession
notes as constitutive acts, which, of course, leaves no place for the Kamminga model in
the framework of whatever opinio juris they may have.102 Intriguingly, some of these
bodies have persisted in repeating that the obligations under various humanitarian
treaties continue automatically to bind successor states.103 Unless the said treaties are
believed to reflect customary international law in their entirety, it is unclear how such
statements can be reconciled with the statements mentioned earlier. The most
optimistic diagnosis in any case is that the treaty-monitoring bodies seem to have
second thoughts about the invalidity of the Kamminga model.104 Considering that
these bodies should be the staunchest defenders of this model, such a state of affairs
leaves the model’s proponents little cause for optimism.
As though that were not enough, the depositary formalism delivers a further blow.
96
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/68, at para. 1.
97
98
99
100
UN Doc. A/49/537, at para. 31.
101
Rosenne, supra note 59, at 105.
102
Ibid., at 100; Koskenniemi, supra note 65, at 106.
103
UN Doc. A/49/537, at para. 32.
104
See also Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1974 (2) 172.
158 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
The observation made three decades ago that ‘despite the humanitarian objects of the
[1949 Geneva Conventions] and the character of [the provisions] they contain . . ., the
[Swiss] Federal Council has not treated a newly emerged State as automatically a
party in virtue of its predecessor’s ratification or accession’105 still holds true and
applies in respect of all humanitarian treaties.106
As not even human rights bodies appear to support the Kamminga model, it is hardly
surprising that successor states themselves do not hold it in favour. Even the most
discursive examination reveals a persistent enthusiastic support for a ‘clean slate’ that
does not discriminate against the treaties’ substance.
First, all of the successor states that emerged from the dissolution wave that swept
over the Socialist bloc ten years ago have formally announced the lists of inherited
humanitarian treaties. Such a pattern of succession clearly reflects a pick-and-choose
approach, characteristic only of the ‘clean slate’ position. Succession to treaties in
such conditions becomes a matter of political decision-making as opposed to rule
application. A relatively small difference it may be in practical terms, but in the
theoretical reality of international law this is a vast abyss.107
Then, on a few occasions some successor states chose to file reservations together
with their succession notes. This happened, for example, with the Convention on the
Rights of the Child108 when Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina succeeded to it.109 Such
actions are also more indicative of a ‘clean slate’ approach than any variation of
automatic succession.110 Notwithstanding the dubious lawfulness of such reser-
vations in the law of treaties,111 the fact of their filing clearly reveals a conviction on
the part of successor states that succession notes have a constitutive effect for
humanitarian treaties. Jennings’ verdict thus remains valid: the ‘tendency to carry
over certain categories of treaties seems to be based on voluntary novation rather
than a rule of succession’.112
In fact, an in-depth inquiry reveals that in the whole recent wave of state succession
there was only one case of a genuine automatic succession to a humanitarian treaty.
It occurred in 1992, when Bosnia-Herzegovina submitted, at the request of the
Human Rights Committee, its first report under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, without having first confirmed its succession thereto.113 It is
noteworthy, however, that the immediate reaction of the Committee was to request
the Bosnian government to formalize its succession to the Covenant by a succession
note,114 which implies that it saw the automatic succession it induced as illegitimate
105
See Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1970 (2) 35.
106
‘To arrive from [the extant state practice] into a general position regarding automatic succession [to
humanitarian treaties]. . . require[s] a bold interpretation.’ Koskenniemi, supra note 65, at 105.
107
Jennings, supra note 1, at 445.
108
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, 1577 UNTS 3.
109
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/68, at paras 13, 20.
110
Vienna Convention, Art. 20.
111
Beemelmans, supra note 21, at 91, note 79 (arguing such qualifiers are out of place in international law);
cf. Klabbers, supra note 94, at 113.
112
113
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/80.
114
HRC Concluding Observations (Bosnia-Herzegovina), CCPR/C/79/Add.14.
or deficient. The precise content of the Committee’s opinio juris in this case remains a
mystery, although it is clear that it did not favour the Kamminga model. The lack of
appropriate conviction on the part of the main actors involved renders statements
pronouncing automatic succession for humanitarian treaties prima facie invalid.
However, in order to settle the issue conclusively, it is necessary to examine the actual
practice of successor states in more detail.
C Automatic Succession to Humanitarian Treaties — The Real State

Practice
Not all scholars who agree with the basic assertions underlying the Kamminga model
subscribe to its radical version. Some of them endorse a more moderate claim of de
facto continuity. They argue that even though formalities in treaty succession are
practically performed, states view them as nothing more than just formalities, which
means that from a legal perspective they continue treaties in a quasi-automatic mode.
Naturally, this argument applies only to so-called law-making treaties, of which
humanitarian treaties are a subclass.115 The link between this line of reasoning and
the Kamminga model comes from a promise that the normal will turn into the norm:
there is no customary rule yet to support Kamminga’s argument, but it is taking
shape, soon it will materialize. In other words, acording to this light version of the
Kamminga model, automatic succession to humanitarian treaties may start as a
matter of convenience rather than as law. At some stage, however, because every
state chooses to continue its humanitarian treaties, some successor states will start to
believe they are under a legal duty to succeed. Then a full-blown Kamminga model will
come into existence.
Obviously, the practical relevance of this argument hinges on the availability of
supporting evidence. If it is shown that successor states uniformly prefer to continue
their inheritable humanitarian treaties, even though this succession may not be ipso
jure, there is a future for the Kamminga model. To verify, we must, as discussed earlier,
examine depositary records.
Since, as we mentioned before, the recent wave of state succession produced only
15 ‘proper’ successor states, we limited out sampling of depositary entries only to
them. To obviate an unnecessary inspection of several dozen treaties as well as to
avoid departing from the immediate subject of our inquiry, we further limited
outselves at this stage to examining only the records kept in respect of humanitarian
treaties. Defining our ‘search’ options this way, the results we obtained have been
summarized in the form of two tables below. The first table contains the records for
some exemplary IHRL conventions: the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (GC) 1948,116 the Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery
115
See, e.g., Stefan Oeter’s arguments, as quoted in Koskenniemi, supra note 65, at 104. See also R. Jennings,
Collected Writings, vol. 1 (1998), 113, at 115; Shearer, supra note 53, at 295.
116
Supra note 32. In the Application of the Genocide Convention case, Judge Kreca commented that the
Genocide Convention is not humanitarian in nature, but penal. See the dissenting opinion of Judge
Kreca, supra note 60, at 774, para. 108. His reading of the term ‘humanitarian’ in that context, however,
appears too narrow.
160 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
(SC) 1956,117 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) 1966,118 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
1966,119 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) 1966,120 the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) 1979,121 the Convention against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 1984,122 and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CC) 1989.123 The second table contains the
records relevant to the core IHL documents, the four Geneva Conventions and
the protocols thereto. The tables are drawn up on the basis of depositary records held
by the UN Secretary-General and the information provided by the International
Committee of the Red Cross.124
State Succession to International Human Rights Law Treaties
State DC SC CERD ICESCR ICCPR CEDAW CAT CC

Armenia A X A A A A A A
Azerbaijan A A A A A A A A
Kazakhstan A X A X X A A R
Kyrgyzstan A A A A A A A A
Moldova A X A A A A A A
Tajikistan X X A A A A A A
Turkmenistan X A A A A A A A
Uzbekistan A X A A A A A A
Georgia125 A X A A A A A A
Czech Republic S S S S S S S S
Slovakia S S S S S A S S
Bosnia- S S S S S S A S
Herzegovina
Croatia S S S S S S S S
Slovenia S S S S S S A S
FYROM S S S S S S S S
S — succession A — accession R — ratification X — not reported as party
117
266 UNTS 3.
118
660 UNTS 195.
119
Supra note 8.
120
Ibid.
121
1249 UNTS 13.
122
1465 UNTS 85.
123
Supra note 108.
124
Available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI and http://www.
icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebNORM?OpenView respectively.
125
Georgia is set apart from the rest of the USSR successor states, as it is not a party to the Alma-Ata
Declaration, supra note 64, and is therefore not bound by its provisions. Arguably, therefore, its position
should be relatively more symptomatic of the stance the former Soviet republics took vis-à-vis the
Kamminga model, as its choices in treaty succession were not in any way affected by the Alma-Ata
undertakings.
The first conclusion that can be made by looking at the two tables is that there is not
much evidence to support a claim of de facto continuity with respect to the listed
treaties. The highest number of succession notes was 10, in the case of the IHL
conventions. This indicates a one-third deviance rate, which, other considerations
aside, seriously undermines the case for constant and uniform practice.126 That IHL
fared better than IHRL (IHRL conventions gathered only six succession notes apiece,
with the exception of the CEDAW and the CAT, which received only five and four
succession notes respectively127) can be explained as a special achievement of the
ICRC,128 or as a consequence of the Geneva Conventions generally being the most
adhered to treaties in the reality of conventional international law.129 In any event,
the main conclusion is obvious: there is no general factual pattern of continuity for
humanitarian treaties.
State Succession to International Humanitarian Law Treaties
State Gen. Gen. Gen. Gen. Prot. I Prot. II

Con. ’I Con. ’II Con. ’III Con. ’IV
Armenia A A A A A A
Azerbaijan A A A A X X
Kazakhstan S S S S S S
Kyrgyzstan S S S S S S
Moldova A A A A A A
Tajikistan S S S S S S
Turkmenistan S S S S S S
Uzbekistan A A A A A A
Georgia A A A A A A
Czech Republic S S S S S S
Slovakia S S S S S S
Bosnia- S S S S S S
Herzegovina
Croatia S S S S S S
Slovenia S S S S S S
FYROM S S S S S S
S — succession A — accession X — not reported as party
Broadening the scope of examination to include more treaties further corroborates

this conclusion:
126
See Asylum Case (Peru v. Colombia), ICJ Reports (1950) 266.
127
Note Kazakhstan’s ratification of the Child Convention.
128
129
According to the ICRC, the number of states parties to the four Geneva Conventions has reached 189:
www.icrc.org/eng/party gc噛7.
162 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
● Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have

ignored the Apartheid Convention altogether;130
● in the case of the International Convention against Apartheid in Sports,131 the
nine former USSR republics, Slovenia, FYROM, and Slovakia are not listed as
parties at all, whether by succession or accession, although the USSR, the SFRY,
and Czechoslovakia had all ratified the Convention between 1987 and 1989,
and, what is even more confusing, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Czech
Republic notified their succession to the treaty in 1992–93;132
● all five Central Asian states have ignored the Convention on the Non-applicability
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity,133 and of
the remaining 10 ‘proper’ successor states only five succeeded to this treaty;134
● although the USSR adhered in 1955 to all ‘Hague law’ instruments ratified by
Tsarist Russia, of the former USSR republics only Belarus and Russia are listed as
parties today.135
The actual scale of de facto continuity thus appears increasingly insufficient to
secure the establishment of a general custom favouring the Kamminga model.
Nevertheless, consistent patterns of continuity do exist. But they do not exist for
treaties.
A recurring feature that is immediately observable in both tables is the concen-
tration of succession marks in their middle and lower parts, where the successors to
the former Czechoslovakia and the SFRY are listed. The pro-succession trend which
these marks reflect is, however, limited to particular states, not treaties. What is more,
it cuts across the board, i.e., is valid for all multilateral treaties.
With a few exceptions (such as the CEDAW and the Apartheid in Sports
Convention), the Czech Republic and Slovakia succeeded to all the treaties of their
predecessor state, producing what is arguably the most orderly and civilized example
of a large-scale state succession to date. The SFRY successor states also attempted
consistently to pursue the succession path. In their case, however, deviations and
exceptions were more numerous. Thus, although the four ‘proper’ successors
succeeded to the Genocide Convention, Yugoslavia chose to accede.136 In the case of
the CAT, only Croatia (1992), the FYROM (1994), and Yugoslavia (2001) succeeded.
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia both chose to accede. In the light of a strong
presumption that all successors with a common predecessor are supposed to have
identical lists of inherited treaties, these discrepancies are difficult to explain,
130
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty8.asp.
131
1500 UNTS 161.
132
133
754 UNTS 73.
134
135
See, for example, the records for the Hague Convention IV respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebNORM?OpenView&Start=1&Count=30&Expand=15.1噛15.1.
136
UN Secretary General Depositary Notification Ref. No. C.N.164.2001.TREATIES-1.
especially since both conventions incorporate jus cogens norms. Likewise, while all
other SRFY successors succeeded to the Convention on the Non-applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity,137 Slovenia chose
to accede.138
It still remains to be seen what bearing the FRY’s decision to accede anew to the
Genocide Convention may have on the implicit finding by the Badinter Commission
that the FRY as SFRY’s successor is (was) bound by the latter’s treaties, including the
Genocide Convention, as of 27 March 1992,139 which was echoed in the ICJ’s decision
that the FRY was bound by the Genocide Convention as of 1993.140 It is not readily
apparent which of these three positions ought to be given greater weight. In any
event, the Yugoslav note of 12 March 2001 not only augurs complications for the
Application of the Genocide Convention case,141 but also gravely undermines Kam-
minga’s argument.
Finally, the case of the former Soviet republics merits a special mention. The chaos
that accompanied the dissolution of the USSR will long haunt any proponent of the
Kamminga model. Acceding and succeeding to their inheritable treaties in the spirit of
pure voluntarism, the ex-USSR republics ditched, without any apparent regrets, the
Alma-Ata Declaration, which incidentally was their general note of succession. If
anything else, their behaviour clearly reflected a ‘clean slate’ mindset.142 Thus, the
government of Armenia, for example, announced that ‘Armenia does not succeed to
[the] Soviet Union in regard to international treaties and has no practice of succession
[but] follows a constitutional procedure of accession to multilateral treaties.’143 Even
Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, the two most pro-succession states in the CIS, have been
more prone to accede to the inheritable treaties. On several occasions some of the
republics even opted for ratification while others were succeeding and acceding.144 As
137
Supra note 131.
138
Supra note 132.
139
Supra note 29.
140
Application of the Genocide Convention, at 610, para. 17.
141
See further the ICJ’s Press Release 2001/12, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2001/
ipresscom2001–12 20010424.htm. It is unclear what further effect this note may have on the similar
case of Croatia v. Yugoslavia, currently before the Court, in which Croatia alleges violations of the
Genocide Convention by the FRY between 1991 and 1995.
142
Klabbers, supra note 94, at 113.
143
See Koskenniemi, supra note 65, at 102, quoting a letter by Y. Chanchurjan, the acting head of the Legal
Department of Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Koskenniemi later reports a similar pattern for
Azerbaijan (ibid., at 112).
144
See the records in respect of the Child Convention. For proof that such disparity is not limited only to
humanitarian treaties, see the Paris Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970. (Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan
ratified, Kyrgyzstan acceded, Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan succeeded, and Kazakhstan, Moldova,
and Turkmenistan chose to remain silent.) See http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/1970/html
eng/page3.shtml.
The same depositary in respect of the Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage, 1972, 1037 UNTS 151, lists Armenia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as parties
through succession, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as parties through accession, and Azerbaijan as a party
through ratification. See www.unesco.org/whc/wldrat.htm噛debut.
164 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
a result of such variation, lengthy accountability gaps were created in a number of

cases. Thus, Georgia acceded to the Genocide Convention only in 1999, the same year
that Tajikistan acceded to the two Covenants.145
But even if one claimed there are signs of a regional pattern of de facto continuity in
Eastern and South-eastern Europe, it would still be inappropriate to trumpet the
arrival of the Kamminga model in that region. The opinio juris observed in
Czechoslovakia and the SFRY in the early 1990s did not fit the normative formula that
would lay down the necessary foundation. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that
both the Czech Republic and Slovakia believed they were bound not by a
‘Kammingian’ norm, but by the substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention.146
The former Yugoslav republics did likewise.147
* * * * *
Jennings was correct in stating that state succession is a subject which presents too
rich a diversity of state practice.148 The accuracy of his observation that ‘it is a
bewilderingly hopeless exercise to seek to spell out from this practice any new general
customary principles’149 has not diminished with time.
Although many learned authors have subscribed to the opinion that new states
tend to continue the multilateral treaties of a humanitarian character concluded by
their predecessors,150 state practice does not support this view. Nothing in state
practice suggests that ‘the assumption of [the] predecessor’s human rights obligations
constitutes an implied condition of membership of international community’
either.151 Even where successor states had breached their undertakings to continue
their predecessor’s treaties,152 the international community did not bother to
145
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty1.asp; http://
untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty5.asp
146
See Koskenniemi, supra note 65, at 94; Status of the Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the UN
Secretary General, Chapter XXIII, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/
chapterXXIII/treaty2.asp.
147
Opinion 9 of the Badinter Commission, reprinted in 31 ILM (1992) 1521, mentions that all the ex-SFRY
republics agreed to take the 1978 Vienna Convention and its twin convention of 1983 as the legal
foundation for resolving the issues arising out of their succession to the SFRY. See also Koskenniemi,
supra note 65, at 100.
148
149
Shearer, supra note 53, at 297.
150
Schachter, ‘State Succession: The Once and Future Law’, 33 VJIL (1993) 253, at 259; Jennings, supra
note 115, at 115; Shearer, supra note 53, at 295.
151
Mushkat, ‘Hong Kong and Succession of Treaties’, 46 ICLQ (1997) 181, at 191.
152
It is beyond doubt that the Alma-Ata Declaration, supra note 64, represents a binding undertaking under
international law. At a minimum, it binds its parties as unilateral declaration (see Nuclear Tests case
(Australia v. France), ICJ Reports (1974) 253). One, however, could also argue that it carries the
characteristic features of a treaty within the meaning of Art. 2(a) of the Convention on the Law of
Treaties.
protest.153 Now, one may argue that this was not the right thing for the successor
states and the international community to do: the former should have lived up to their
promises and the latter should have insisted on that. But international law today is
what governments do, not what academics think governments should have done.
This is not to deny the importance of doctrinal teachings — every diplomat and legal
counsel listens to lectures and reads textbooks at some stage in his work and every top
government adviser consults a university professor at least once in his career. But the
reality of international law — or, rather, its official myth — is that it is up to the
community of states to choose the direction of law’s development. In the 1990s this
community chose not to insist on automatic succession for its new members, ignoring
Jennings’ advice that humanitarian treaties should belong to the minimum ‘working
capital of international jural relationships’, i.e. that successor states ought to start
their international existence being parties to those treaties.154
6 Czechoslovakia and the European Convention on Human

Rights — A Case for a Kamminga Model?
In the confusing aftermath of the 1990s, one case stands out that ought to give hope
to those who sympathize with the humanistic thrust of the Kamminga model. The fact
that this case occurred within a framework in which one would have never expected
any succession at all should be even more encouraging.
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a closed multilateral treaty.
Succession to such treaties requires the consent of other parties and therefore cannot
occur ipso jure. In addition to being a closed treaty, the ECHR is a treaty that operates
within the framework of the Council of Europe (COE), which poses another
theoretically insurmountable obstacle to the Kamminga model, since the membership
of international organizations is not inheritable by state succession.155
The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic acceded to the COE on 30 June 1993,
according to the decision of the Committee of Ministers, following the COE
Parliamentary Assembly’s invitations.156 Under normal circumstances, the ECHR
would not have entered into force for either state before that date. In fact, however,
both states are listed as parties to the ECHR and its protocols from 1 January 1993,157
the date when Czechoslovakia ceased to exist.
153
The Dutch government, for example, decided that the practice of the recent wave of state succession
supported the ‘clean slate’ in respect of all states. See Kamminga, supra note 3, at 471, note 14. The
United States, on the other hand, espoused the presumption of continuity. See Williamson and Osborn, ‘A
US Perspective on Treaty Succession and Related Issues in the Wake of the Break-up of the USSR and
Yugoslavia’, 33 VJIL (1993) 261, at 264–265.
154
155
O’Connell, supra note 39, at 65; Koskenniemi, supra note 65, at 107, 146; Vagts, supra note 46, at 293;
Craven, supra note 27, at 134.
156
PACE, Opinions 174 (1993) and 175 (1993) on the applications by the Czech Republic and Slovakia for
membership of the Council of Europe, available at http://stars.coe.fr/ta/ta93/EOPI174.htm and
http://stars.coe.fr/ta/ta93/EOPI175.htm.
157
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/searchsig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=.
166 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
The explanation provided by the Committee of Ministers states that a decision was
taken based on the expressed wishes of both states to list them as parties and to extend
the application of their declarations under Article 25 of the ECHR retroactively, so as
to bypass the six-month admissibility rule.158 Under this arrangement, the three ECHR
regimes — the single Czechoslovak regime on one side and the two separate Czech and
Slovak regimes on the other side — were to be treated as being back-to-back in
temporal terms. So far, so good. The practice of the European Commission on Human
Rights, one of the then judicial bodies of the COE, complicated the situation. The
Commission perceived the situation of the three regimes remarkably differently and
silently erased the hypothetical dividing line drawn by the Committee of Ministers on
1 January 1993.
In Nohejl v. Czech Republic, the Commission, dealing with a claim of property right
violations, accepted the date of the Convention’s entry into force for the Czech
Republic as 18 March 1992159 (the date when the ECHR came into force for
Czechoslovakia), treating the two consecutive regimes as one continuous regime. In
Kajba v. Czech Republic,160 the Commission accepted the prima facie admissibility of a
claim of violation of Articles 5, 6 and 8 in respect of events that took place between 30
March 1992 and 15 January 1994. It thus found the alleged violations justiciable
ratione temporis in the months preceding 1 January 1993, ignoring the limits of its
temporal jurisdiction as the Committee of Ministers would have drawn them.
In Gasparetz v. Slovak Republic161 and Sulko v. Slovak Republic,162 the Commission,
while invoking the ratione temporis ground in defining the limits of its jurisdiction,
equivocally referred to both 18 March 1992 and 1 January 1993 as the possible
starting points of its temporal jurisdiction. In Malfatti v. Slovak Republic163 and P.S. v.
Slovak Republic,164 the Commission expressly accepted as the limitation of its temporal
jurisdiction — and Slovakia’s accountability — the date when the ECHR came into
force for Czechoslovakia,165 citing Brezny and Brezny v. Slovak Republic as authority for
158
COE Doc. H/INF (94)1, at 1. Other examples of retroactive admission of the Czech Republic and Slovakia
are the IMF and the ILO. See Beemelmans, supra note 21, at 83.
159
‘The Commission notes that the transfer of the property to the applicant’s sister was registered on 8
January 1992, which was before 18 March 1992, the date of the entry into force of the Convention in
respect to the Czech Republic (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic), and nothing since then has changed
the applicant’s position.’ Nohejl v. Czech Republic, Appl. No. 00023889/93, Admissibility Decision of 13
May 1996. This and other subsequently cited ECHR cases are all available at http://www.echr.coe.int.
160
Appl. No.00024211/94, Admissibility Decision of 11 January 1995, declared inadmissible on grounds of
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
161
Appl. No.00024506/94, Admissibility Decision of 28 June 1995.
162
Appl. No.00026962/95, Admissibility Decision of 6 September 1995.
163
‘[T]he Commission can only deal with applications against the Slovak Republic concerning matters
which are subsequent to 18 March 1992.’ Appl. No.00038855/97, Admissibility Decision of 1 July
1998.
164
Appl. No.00029024/95, Admissibility Decision of 16 April 1998.
165
‘The Commission first notes that the relevant period did not begin with the institution of the proceedings
in December 1990, but only as from 18 March 1992, when the former Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic ratified the Convention and recognised the right of individual petition.’ (Ibid.)
this approach.166 In this last case, the Commission, examining its ratione personae
competence with respect to Slovakia over the period between 18 March and 31
December 1992,167 hesitantly concluded that Slovakia is Czechoslovakia’s successor
to the ECHR,168 finding the basis for this conclusion in Slovak domestic legislation and
the letter sent by the Slovak government to the COE Secretary-General, in which
Slovakia confirmed its successor status to COE treaties.169
The significance of these findings goes far beyond the exercise by the Commission of
its jurisdiction. What happened, in fact, is that the Commission ‘made’ the Czech
Republic and Slovakia succeed to the ECHR. If this assessment is correct, then what we
have here is a case of automatic succession, since succession notes, due to their
impossibility, have not been submitted. Moreover, as the reasoning on which the
Commission based its findings included a recognition of the special nature of the ECHR
as a treaty, one can arguably see the first signs of the curtain being raised so as to let
the Kamminga model step onto the stage.
7 Conclusion
A critical review of state practice in the 1990s invalidates Kamminga’s conclusions
about the succession patterns for human rights treaties. In international law, the
treaties of humanitarian character are not subject to automatic succession. Apart
from one unique case, no successor state has acted as if succession to a humanitarian
treaty could occur regardless of its will. Notwithstanding general academic support
for the Kamminga model, states in practice jealously guard the ‘clean slate’ paradigm,
even where the actual patterns of their succession reveal de facto continuity. There is
indeed much more to be said for the ‘pick and choose’ approach than generally has
been assumed.170 In a similar vein, various international bodies, in dealing with
succession matters, have been reluctant to allow the principle of consent to be
bypassed. Most of them have repeatedly emphasized the requirement for successor
states to formalize their succession, thus undermining any claims that succession in
those cases could occur ipso jure. Only in one situation did an international body take a
pro-active stance on the issue; but even then the creation of the Kamminga model-like
situation was more of an accidental by-product of the judicial process, and has since
remained unpublicized.
166
Brezny and Brezny contre la République Slovaque, Appl.No.00023131/93, Admissibility Decision of 4
March 1996.
167
‘La Commission doit tout d’abord examiner la question de sa compétence ratione personae, en
l’occurrence, si la République slovaque, en tant que l’un des Etats successeurs de la République fédérative
tchèque et slovaque est liée par la Convention et ses Protocoles pour la période du 18 mars 1992. . . au 31
décembre 1992. . ., période au cours de laquelle l’Etat fédéral était Partie contractante à la Convention.’
(Ibid.)
168
‘[L]a Commission estime qu’elle est compétente ratione personae pour examiner cette affaire.’ (Ibid.)
169
The Commission’s reasoning is open to challenge, since the issue of obtaining the consent of the other
parties to the ECHR was ignored, and the significance of domestic acts for resolving purely international
issues remains highly questionable.
170
See the first epigraph to this article.
168 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
As the law of state succession is essentially rooted in customary law, the fate of the
Kamminga model depends on the contents of state practice. Since all potentially
constructive recent developments in this regard have been limited to Eastern Europe,
the most optimistic assessment could do no more than assert that a regional custom
favouring the Kamminga model is now in formation.171 This is unfortunately spoiled by
the fact that almost all successor states in the 1990s qualified their promises of
continuity with remarks such as ‘if these treaties do not contradict the Constitution or
the domestic legal order’.172 However illegitimate one may consider such statements
to be, they unmistakably reveal an opinio juris that is not anywhere close to what the
model’s supporters would need to bring the model into existence.
For international law this is a reality that, as unpleasant as it is, cannot be ignored.
Complaints and condemnations are hardly productive here. Constructive solutions
need to be sought in order to change the system. The Kamminga model possesses
enough inherent legitimacy to make its way into positive international law. Purposive
customary law-making on the basis of the available building materials seems to be the
only plausible answer.
Thus, the ‘acquired rights’ theory may be transformed in favour of the Kamminga
model.173 In the German Settlers case,174 the Permanent Court of International Justice
pronounced that private property rights acquired by individuals did not cease simply
by virtue of a change of sovereignty, but continued under the successor regime until
modified according to regular procedures. Although ‘acquired rights’ and ‘human
rights’ are not identical notions, reasonable analogies can be drawn here. After all, ‘an
acquired right is any right which, were there no territorial changes, would be
protected by the courts in a lawful State’.175
History provides several examples of situations where human rights were treated
on the basis of an ‘acquisition logic’. Capitulatory treaties, signed by the Sublime Porte
after several major wars up to the end of the eighteenth century, contained clauses
stipulating religious freedoms for the populations residing in the parties’ territories.
Later, the treaties were seen as granting rights of a somewhat permanent nature,
enforceable against the grantors’ successors.176 In the nineteenth century, when
Alsace and Lorraine were transferred from France to Germany as the result of the
171
Even then, the anti-succession position taken by the Baltic States, justifiable as it may be in other terms, is
a weighty argument against the status of the Kamminga model as an Eastern European custom.
172
Koskenniemi, supra note 65, at 100. See the Croatian Act of 26 July 1991 (cited ibid.), as well as the
Alma-Ata Declaration, supra note 64.
173
See Kamminga, supra note 3, at 473, stating that the acquired rights doctrine is a fortiori applicable to
humanitarian treaties. Cf. Müllerson, supra note 12, at 319.
174
Settlers of German Origin in the Territory Ceded by Germany to Poland, 1923 PCIJ Series B, No. 6.
Schwarzenberger and Brown cite the inheritability of acquired rights as the only unquestionable rule of
state succession (supra note 44, at 70). According to Lauterpacht, this rule is unbroken in state practice
and represents a ‘great principle of the rule of law’ (see Lauterpacht, supra note 47, at 136). See further
D. P. O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, vol. 1 (1967) 237 et seq. Cf.,
however, Gosalia v. Agrawal and others (1981), reported in 118 ILR 429.
175
Lauterpacht, supra note 47, at 136.
176
N. Kontou, The Termination and Revision of Treaties in the Light of New Customary International Law (1994),
at 78–79.
Franco-Prussian War, all French treaties applicable to the territories lapsed and were
replaced with the German treaties. Nonetheless, Napoleon’s Concordat with the Holy
See, a document granting, inter alia, certain religious rights to the populations of
Alsace-Lorraine, continued to apply.177 After World War I, when Alsace-Lorraine
returned to France, the Concordat again survived the change of sovereignty,
continuing to apply in that region, despite having ceased to operate in the rest of
France in 1905.178
Although extending the ‘acquired rights’ doctrine to humanitarian treaties would
not necessarily make the treaties themselves automatically inheritable, such a
measure could undoubtedly improve the overall legal environment, which is
currently unreceptive to the Kamminga model.
One of the factors that prevents the Kamminga model from making its way into lex
lata is the general spirit of unaccountability when it comes to state succession. In
practice, different institutional channels are available to reverse this tendency. The
key institution, it seems, is the depositary.
A peculiar phenomenon in international law, the depositary is rarely seen as an
actor whose stance on a particular issue can have any bearing on its legal resolution.
Nevertheless, recent practice in the field of state succession reveals that depositaries
can profoundly influence succession patterns, if not by their actions, then by the lack
thereof. How many times could the Alma-Ata Declaration have been taken by the
depositaries for what it is worth? How many more ‘successor’ entries would there be
today in depositaries’ records? How many depositaries eventually chose to ignore it,179
waiting for specific notes of succession and thus creating leeway for a harmful
desuetude? Considering the influence they exert on matters of state succession, the
role of depositaries under international law is in need of profound review.
The legal regime applicable to depositaries in contemporary international law is
defined by their duty ‘to act impartially’.180 This duty, however, does not entail a
prescription to remain passive. The obligations to register every occasion on which a
would-be successor state sends a potentially wrong instrument of accession and to
bring this discrepancy to the attention of all interested parties so as to enable them to
take the necessary action is not in itself unconducive to impartiality. It would not
destroy the institutional trust placed in depositaries. However, it can certainly boost
the case for the Kamminga model and would generally promote the rule of law in the
international arena.
Furthermore, the power to comment on the legitimacy of accession/succession
notes should not remain the prerogative of the other parties to the treaty. Insofar as
they exist, treaty-monitoring bodies appear to be well-suited to undertake this task as
well. It would only be logical if the bodies overseeing the substantive realization of
humanitarian treaties also monitored the observance of the treaties’ procedural
177
Judge Weeramantry, supra note 2, at 643–644; O’Connell, supra note 41, at 735.
178
Ibid.
179
It appears that the only depositary that correctly interpreted the Alma-Ata Declaration as a confirmation
of succession was the WIPO. See www.wipo.org/eng/ratific/index.htm.
180
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 76(2).
170 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170
aspects. Recent practice of the Human Rights Committee shows some positive
developments in this regard: in at least two cases the Committee, reviewing state
reports under Article 40 of the ICCPR, observed that the ex-USSR republics should be
treated as having succeeded, rather than acceded, to the Covenant.181
Postscript
In April 2002, after this article was written, the International Law Association
released its Rapport final sur la succession en matière de traités.182 While space
constraints preclude an adequate discussion of this lengthy document, it should be
noted that the conclusions drawn in the Report on the present state of customary law
of state succession with respect to humanitarian treaties do not in their essence differ
from those offered in this article.183
181
HRC Concluding Observations (Azerbaijan), CCPR/C/79/Add.38, at para. 3, and HRC Concluding
Observations (Georgia), CCPR/C/79/Add.75, at para. 10. See also the Belilos case, supra note 74, at 23,
para. 47: silence on the part of the depositary and the contracting states does not deprive the convention
organs of the power to make their own assessment.
182
Available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Aspects%20of%20State%20Succession/Aspects%20of%
20State%20Succession%202002.pdf.
183
After discussing the recent state practice in this field, the authors of the Report conclude: ‘si la doctrine a
généralement tendance à être favorable à la continuité dans ce domaine (droit coutumier in statu
nascendi), la pratique étatique n’est pas homogène. De nombreux Etats ont opté pour une adhésion à ces
accords et non pour une succession automatique. En effet, ils tentent de conserver un degré de liberté de
décision dans ces questions’ (at 28).

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Mendip Communications Job ID: 9407BK--0139-22 5 - 141 Rev: 24-03-2003 PAGE: 1 TIME: 10:00 SIZE: 61,00 Area: JNLS

Revisiting State Succession to

142 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

is centred on the protection of the individual in times of armed conflict.9 It represents

144 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

category of treaties is understood to include those multilateral treaties that uphold

2 Historical Backdrop: The Recent Wave of State Succession

146 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

Despite the non-recognition of the FRY’s claim by the international community,

was no change of sovereignty involved when the respective transfers were

3 General Remarks on the Law of State Succession

148 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

consent. Accordingly, two conceptual mechanisms42 of state succession can be

occurs in highly politicized contexts,48 case-by-case arrangements and negotiations

150 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

4 Can Humanitarian Treaties Qualify for Automatic

● humanitarian treaties have been classified as treaties under which obligations

152 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

● humanitarian treaties often provide for direct access of individuals to inter-

154 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

5 Examination of the Relevant State Practice: the Position

156 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

B Automatic Succession to Humanitarian Treaties — Observations on

158 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

C Automatic Succession to Humanitarian Treaties — The Real State

160 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

State DC SC CERD ICESCR ICCPR CEDAW CAT CC

State Succession to International Humanitarian Law Treaties

State Gen. Gen. Gen. Gen. Prot. I Prot. II

Broadening the scope of examination to include more treaties further corroborates

162 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

● Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have

164 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

a result of such variation, lengthy accountability gaps were created in a number of

6 Czechoslovakia and the European Convention on Human

166 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

168 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

170 EJIL 14 (2003), 141–170

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