6

Conclusion and Epilogue

(April 1996)

As Kashmir emerges from its seventh winter of war, the future of

its people remains bleak and desolate, and prospects of a turn for
the better seem as distant as ever. The underlying reasons for the
deadlock are powerful ones:

For India and Pakistan, Kashmir is still about their respective

strengths and sovereignties and senses of security, about their
titles to land and peoples, about their statures in the region and
the world.... Their diplomacies seem inexorably wedded to their
mutual distrust, and their domestic politics echo their fears.
Neither India nor Pakistan wants to accommodate the strategic J
changes that would, at the very least, include Kashmiris in
discussions about their future. Neither wants to revise its politi-
cal philosophies, or alter the reflexive domestic opinion that
supports Indian army powers on the one side, and jihad on the
other. Neither wants to shed the light of democratic debate on
the contentious subjects of nationalism and self-determination.
Neither has been willing to see Kashmir in itself or for itself,
or to forego the easy prospect of squeezing Kashmir as a way
to torment each other.... Having marginalised Kashmir while
fighting about it, both countries have allowed war to become the
dominant metaphor for the subcontinent's politics. Political dia-
logue has been sacrificed to bellicose posturing ... (Newberg
1995: 72-74).

Yet it remains true that

138 The Challenge in Kashmir

[while] the Indian government may be able to wear down the

insurgency, it cannot obliterate the sentiments that have pro-
pelled many Kashmiris to support the insurgency—and the rest
to tolerate its effects.... Even if India wins the military battle
with superior numbers and machinery, it is unlikely to win the
political war (ibid.: 74).

It has become increasingly clear during 1995 and 1996 to first-

hand observers of the Kashmir situation that there is indeed a
growing possibility that the Indian state may be able to implement
a de facto military solution to the present crisis. This turn of events
is the cumulative consequence of several interactive factors: the
fragmentation and demoralisation in the azaadi movement, and its
relative lack of effective direction and leadership; the massive
superiority in numbers and firepower of the Indian forces and the
Indian military regime's ruthless implementation of such horrific
practices as the catch-and-kill policy, which has simply wiped out
large numbers of Kashmiri youth and compelled others to surrender
or go on the run; and Pakistan's cynically exploitative and ma-
nipulative strategies towards the Kashmiri struggle. If this does
happen, there is a related possibility: that the Kashmiri people,
defeated in war by an incomparably stronger antagonist and effec-
tively stabbed in the back by their self-proclaimed international
advocate, may end up with absolutely nothing to show for years
of suffering and sacrifice.
Yet for the 'victors' to anticipate triumph, even if this possible
scenario does materialise, may be both premature and misplaced. For
any attempt to restore the pre-uprising status quo will have to contend
with the one reality that has been irrevocably changed by the war:

Before 1989, India and Pakistan fought over Kashmir. Since late
1989, it is Kashmiris who have done the fighting [and, one might
add, the great bulk of the dying].... If the insurgency has taught
anything, it is that Kashmiris are no longer willing to be con-
sidered dependent or unimportant. They have demonstrated that
they mean to be taken seriously ... whatever their problems with
one another ... (Newberg 1995: 74).

Robert Dahl (1991: 493) has remarked that 'in practice, as distinct
from theory, the usual solution [to 'national liberation' wars and
 Conclusion and Epilogue (April 1996) 139

insurgencies] has been force plus time'. 'Force plus time' is pre-
cisely the linchpin of the Indian state's strategy of attrition in
Kashmir. Yet the new-found political maturity and determination
of the Kashmiris makes it an open question whether this strategy,
however ruthless its implementation, will be able to lay the
Banquo-like ghost of the Kashmir question to rest in perpetuity.

This baptism by blood and fire since 1989 is also the major
reason why many Kashmiris react with hostility and derision to
the Indian government's plans to revive the Jammu & Kashmir
legislative assembly as a panacea to the Kashmir crisis. This
response, rather than being a manifestation of irrational intransi-
gence or surly rejectionism, is understandable when viewed in the
context of the actual situation on the ground.
Kashmir's social fabric has been terribly scarred in the last seven
years by continuous violence, above all the massive and systematic
violence, directed against the population in general, sponsored by
the state and perpetrated by its agents. And ever more anguish,
suffering and indignity continues to be inflicted daily on the people,
as anyone who has taken the trouble to visit the Valley and other
affected areas in the recent past and interact with the citizenry well
knows. In this context, the imposition of an 'election' to the
assembly at gunpoint would, in popular perception, be tantamount
to rubbing a lot of salt into very raw wounds, the final insult to
compound many injuries:

We know what the government's elections mean [a group of

elderly men in Kupwara town told me]: we have witnessed every
kind of fraud and hoax here, all in the name of democracy. This
time, what they will do is pump in more forces, take us from
our homes and line us up at gunpoint. Then Doordarshan [Indian
state television] cameras will come and film us, and a deception
about Kashmir will be played, once again, on the Indian public.1

A coercive and fraudulent exercise cannot, in any event, be

dignified as a reintroduction of democratic processes. As one
Kashmiri told me, 'the root cause of all problems here has been
government of the centre [i.e., New Delhi], by the centre, for the
centre'. But even though they are exhausted by incessant violence
and repression, most Kashmiris are today no longer willing to
140 The Challenge in Kashmir

passively tolerate the imposition from Delhi of unrepresentative,

unaccountable and corrupt puppet cliques. Even the small poten-
tially 'pro-India' segment of opinion in the Valley (which is fed
up with violence and uncertainty, is deeply suspicious of Pakistan's
intentions, remains unconvinced by the independence demand,
which seems to them to be little more than a romantic slogan, and
is increasingly nostalgic about the pre-insurgency days) is un-
equivocal on this score: the mere imposition of essentially discred-
ited politicians like Farooq Abdullah or Congress leader Ghulam
Rasool Kar would be an affront to the Kashmiris' dignity, sense
of pride and self-respect, and would put the clock back even
further, in the longer run, on prospects of a lasting peace.2
As for the Indian government's periodic announcements of plans
to solve the Kashmir problem through infrastructure development
and employment-generation schemes,3 it is unlikely that the sudden
emphasis on the economic well-being of Kashmir is much more
than a diversionary, tactical device to avoid the substantive political
issues that lie at the heart of this conflict. As such, talk of roads
and bridges does not interest very many Kashmiris. As Hurriyat
Conference leader Abdul Ghani Lone put it to me in Srinagar:
'Will they tell a man whose virgin daughter has been raped that
they will put a paved road through his village, on condition he
agrees to be loyal to India?'
Moreover, while guerrilla activity can be curbed or contained,
it is folly to imagine (as Indian bureaucrats and police and military
officials are frequently inclined to do) that it can be eliminated
permanently and completely. Specifically, Hizbul Mujahideen, the
most powerful insurgent outfit, while certainly on the defensive,
is still far from being a spent force. Indeed, a senior HM spokesman
confirmed to me in August 1995 that 'they [HM fighters] have
received instructions from across [the border] to lie relatively low
for the time being, and step up their actions at a later juncture'.
Information available with pro-independence sources indicates that
HM hardliners have stockpiled large quantities of weaponry in the
Valley and Doda with the objective of keeping a protracted armed
struggle alive at any cost. Thus, it is not possible to rule out a
re-escalation of militant violence,4 with the attendant risk of dra-
conian reprisals on the civilian population by the security forces.
If this happens, the government's hopes of 'normalisation' could
rapidly evaporate.
 Conclusion and Epilogue (April 1996) 141

But there are even more compelling arguments against forcing

elections. Elections free of coercion will almost certainly evoke a
major boycott throughout the Kashmir Valley. Partial but sig-
nificant boycotts are also likely to occur in Doda district as well
as in Rajouri and Poonch districts of Jammu (though the latter two
districts have low levels of militant activity, there is a subtle but
definite undercurrent of sympathy for the Kashmiri cause among
the Rajput and Gujjar Muslim groups that dominate the population
there), and perhaps also in Shia-majority Kargil district in Ladakh.5
In this scenario, any election, which will in effect be reduced to a
referendum on patriotic allegiance to the Indian Union, could well
lead to greater communal polarisation, with only a cross-section
of Hindus in Jammu and Buddhists in Ladakh's Leh district turning
out to vote in really substantial numbers.6
Communal polarisation will be further aggravated if members
of the Valley's Pandit minority who have migrated to Jammu and
Delhi are allowed to cast absentee ballots, and if some Kashmir
Valley seats are decided principally on the basis of those ballots.7
Such a pointless exacerbation of the sectarian divide between the
different communities of Jammu & Kashmir can only set the clock
back even further on prospects of a just, serious and lasting solution
(i.e., mutually agreed between the parties to the conflict and the
different religious and regional groups of Jammu & Kashmir).8

How, then, might real progress be made towards a de-escalation

of the conflict and the eventual goal of such a settlement?
Abdul Qayoom, 60, leader of the (largely notional) Kashmir unit
of the Janata Dal party, a former education minister of Jammu &
Kashmir, and a rare 'pro-India' politician to have stayed on in
Srinagar since the troubles began (albeit in the city's heavily-guarded
'security zone'), is convinced that 'holding [assembly] elections will
be totally counterproductive, and have disastrous consequences'.
Instead, he argues passionately for 'taking the people of Kashmir
into confidence', and for 'applying a healing touch to this bleeding
society'. When I asked him (in July 1995) what such phrases might
connote in more tangible terms, he responded that he meant, above
all, 'a completely open, unconditional dialogue with all popular
forces in Jammu & Kashmir, and those of the Valley in particular'.
Qayoom's prognosis and prescription found enthusiastic support
from an unlikely quarter: Altaf Ahmad Khan alias Azam Inquillabi,
142 The Challenge in Kashmir

a veteran Kashmiri nationalist rebel and a mastermind behind the

insurrection that erupted in 1989-90.9 While remaining fully com-
mitted to his ideal of an independent Jammu & Kashmir, Inquillabi
now believes, as he himself told me in Srinagar, that dialogue and
negotiations are the only route to making meaningful progress
towards a lasting solution. A strong advocate of non-official dis-
cussions and consultations on the Kashmir issue between open-
minded intellectual and professional leaders of India, Pakistan and
various social and political groups in Jammu & Kashmir, Inquillabi
also sounded a sombre note of warning in this regard: 'If this
conflict is allowed to fester indefinitely, there is a real risk that the
politically conscious and articulate voices of Kashmir will one by
one be liquidated or marginalised. The gun has largely served its
purpose—now politics must take over'.
It is therefore indeed a pity that those who rule India do not
seem, as yet, to have the courage and confidence to recognise the
same reality. This resistance to the notion of a substantive, open,
democratic dialogue is all the more inexplicable because the ulti-
mate guarantee of the Indian state's 'security' and 'integrity', the
several hundred thousand heavily-armed police, paramilitary and
military troops, are, for the present and foreseeable future at least,
very much in place throughout Indian-administered Jammu &
Kashmir, including its borders with neighbouring countries.
Unfortunately, however, the most recent developments in Kash-
mir do not provide grounds for optimism that the Indian state's
policy perspective on the conflict may undergo any major revision
in the immediate future. The current Indian strategy vis-a-vis the
problem consists of three basic elements: first, continue the policy
of sustained repression and further weaken the insurgents; second,
arm and sponsor criminalised gangs that have broken away from
the militant ranks and are now operating in the role of auxiliaries
for the security forces, and use them to intimidate and demoralise
the public as much as possible;10 and third, try and undermine the
Hurriyat Conference's standing by playing up allegations (some
true) of corruption and ineptitude against some of its leading
figures.11 While all these are unmistakably signs of a mentality that
views the Kashmir crisis purely in terms of a war that must be
ruthlessly fought and won, indications of a sincere, politically-
oriented, democratic and humane approach remain as feeble as ever.
 Conclusion and Epilosue (April 1996) 143

In March 1996, officials of the Indian government's home min-

istry attracted considerable media attention when they announced
'unconditional talks' in New Delhi with several former high-ranking
leaders of avowedly pro-Pakistan guerrilla organisations. The
half-dozen Kashmiris who attended a single meeting with India's
home minister in mid-March included such former militant lumi-
naries as Imran Rahi, one-time deputy chief of Hizbul Mujahideen,
Babar Badr, one-time chief of the rather picturesquely named
Muslim Jaanbaaz Force, and Parvez Haider, former chief of
Al-Jehad.12 However, the promised 'unconditional talks' with these
figures (none of whom enjoy any political standing in Kashmiri
society and have all been disowned, moreover, by their former
comrades-in-arms) seemed more like a photo-opportunity to com-
memorate the unconditional capitulation to the government of a
group of former gunmen who have lost heart and given up on their
cause. The propaganda value of the event for the government lay
chiefly in the fact that all these erstwhile advocates of Kashmir's
integration with Pakistan now unequivocally stated that direct talks
between Kashmiri groups and New Delhi to resolve the Kashmir
conflict should exclude Pakistan.13 Reinforcing the impression that
the Indian authorities viewed the entire exercise as a propaganda
stunt-cum-intelligence operation, the committee set up by the gov-
ernment to liaise with the Kashmiri group consisted of two home
ministry bureaucrats and an intelligence official.14
Around the same time, meanwhile, JKLF leaders Yasin Malik
and Shakeel Bakshi were brutally assaulted by a gang of sarkari
militants (who were, as usual, protected by a large contingent of
security forces as they went about their business) when Malik was
addressing a mosque congregation in the southern Valley town of
Anantnag reiterating the right to self-determination and condemn-
ing the depredations of 'renegade' groups. Interestingly, the attack
on Malik was organised only a week after the JKLF leader had
held a successful rally in the northern Valley town of Sopore, and
coincided with another incident in which the popular Kashmiri
political figure Shabbir Shah (who has spent twenty of his
forty-three years in Indian prisons) was prevented by the security
forces from speaking at another scheduled public meeting in the
southern Valley district of Badgam. All this points to another
144 The Challenge in Kashmir

apparent component of the Indian state's current strategy in Kash-

mir—to prevent genuinely popular political leaders who retain
credibility and a commitment to principles, and who can, therefore,
keep up the sagging morale of the population, from holding even
peaceful meetings and marches. This, in turn, suggests that Indian
officialdom still views individuals and organisations who are genu-
inely representative of Kashmiri popular aspirations as threats, rather
than as potential partners in a substantive, serious process of dialogue.
In late March 1996, public demonstrations erupted in Srinagar
when Jalil Andrabi, a prominent Kashmiri human rights lawyer,
was discovered tortured and shot to death after reportedly having
been abducted by army soldiers and renegade militants a couple
of weeks earlier (see Appendix). Around the same time, a stand-off
between security forces and a group of armed militants near Sri-
nagar's Hazratbal shrine ended with the killing of over thirty
members of the group, a splinter-faction of the JKLF.
This latter incident seemingly revealed, once again, a disturbing
proclivity on the part of the then Congress government in Delhi
to use the Kashmir issue for partisan purposes—this time in the,,
run-up to India's parliamentary elections. By finishing off a few
dozen Kashmiri guerrillas who were, by all accounts, surrounded
by hundreds of police-commandos and paramilitary troops (in two
'fierce gunbattles' in which the security forces suffered minimal
casualties), the government demonstrated its tough stance on 'ter-
rorism' and 'national security' to susceptible sections of the Indian
electorate, thereby presumably appropriating or undercutting key
planks of BJP, the main opposition. The guerrillas who were wiped
out in the process represented a particularly vulnerable target, since
they belonged to a splinter group with very limited popular support
and military strength, and did not even enjoy the formal recognition
of the Hurriyat Conference (which recognises only Yasin Malik's
organisation as the legitimate JKLF). Such incidents, and what they
reveal, obviously do not bode well for prospects of an end to the
violence in Kashmir and the initiation of a process of dialogue
aimed at developing the framework for a peaceful, honourable and
workable solution.15

Individuals and organisations genuinely representative of a popu-

lar movement, and with at least some moral integrity and ideological
 Conclusion and Epilogue (April 1996) 145

consistency, cannot be expected to summarily renounce their po-

litical platforms for the sake of uncertain 'talks' with powerful
adversaries who have a demonstrated record of deceit and ruth-
lessness. What this means is that Kashmiri leaders like Shabbir
Shah and Yasin Malik, among others, cannot be expected to simply
agree to being coopted into endorsing some 'package' of minor
concessions or piecemeal reforms drawn up on their adversaries'
terms.16
Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, the top leaders of the
Irish nationalist Sinn Fein party in northern Ireland who are both
former guerrilla commanders in the Irish Republican Army (IRA),
have not abandoned their ideological commitment to the idea of a
reunited Ireland. That did not prevent an extended ceasefire from
coming into effect in northern Ireland, nor did it in itself obstruct
a measure of tentative, halting progress towards a lasting solution
to that conflict. Even the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO),
which had its back to the wall (and very few cards, if any, left to
play) in the struggle against Israel by the 1990s, till recently
formally retained the clause in its founding charter which commit-
ted it to the total annihilation of the Zionist state. That, the
continuing turmoil in the West Bank and Gaza, the deadly attacks
on Israeli targets by members of the military wing of the radical
Islamist movement Hamas, and even the justified anger of Pales-
tinians living outside the Occupied Territories at having been
excluded from the ambit of the very flawed PLO-Israel agreement
struck in September 1993, have not prevented Yasser Arafat and
the Israeli government, very unequal negotiating partners indeed,
from making gradual, fitful progress in their tortuous negotiations.
The constant obstacles and problems encountered in the peace
processes in Ireland, the Middle East and elsewhere vividly dem-
onstrate how extraordinarily difficult it is to devise and implement
equitable political solutions to complex and bitter conflicts. Yet not
even a beginning towards peace could have been made anywhere
if the 'rebels' had continued to be simply demonised, treated as
undeserving of even minimal respect, and their grievances and
aspirations dismissed out of hand as illegitimate and unacceptable.
Responsible political leaders and activists in Kashmir, whatever
their public positions and ideological commitments (which they
cannot be expected to summarily foresake), know perfectly well
146 The Challenge in Kashmir

that the gun alone cannot 'liberate' their people. Indeed, they fully
realise that they themselves, and the political future of their people,
are increasingly being held hostage by the environment of violence
and fear. There are clear indications that some of these important,
popularly-based forces would be willing to participate in a genuine
dialogue without crippling pre-conditions of any kind on any side,
that they recognise the potential efficacy of serious, substantive
talks (not some charade masquerading as dialogue) for their people,
and that they themselves have compelling pragmatic motives to
respond favourably to the initiation of any such process.17
Yet these forces have so far been repressed, rebuffed and denied
recognition as bonafide political actors representing certain deep-
rooted collective aspirations. And so long as large-scale victimisa-
tion of civilians by the security forces in Indian-administered
Kashmir continues, armed resistance is also likely to continue, and
a climate congenial to a cessation of hostilities and commencement
of dialogue, leading eventually to substantive negotiations, cannot
come about.
But in the immediate future, it would be extremely myopic of
the authorities in New Delhi to exploit the military edge over armed
insurgents to trample wantonly on Kashmiri sentiments and aspi-
rations yet again.18 A peace of the graveyard will not only condemn
Jammu & Kashmir to an unpromising, uncertain future, it will also
freeze India-Pakistan relations in their present condition of polar-
ised animosity, to the detriment of prospects of peace, democracy
and development in the entire subcontinent.
Indeed, the international dimension to this conflict is not some-
thing that can simply be wished away. It is less than certain that
any 'solution' (whatever that may be) to the struggle in and over
Kashmir can be stable and final without some level of participation
and acquiescence on the part of the rulers of Pakistan.19 Similarly,
at some future date, some form of international guarantee or
underwriting for a permanent solution may be necessary or advis-
able, given that deceit and bad faith have been the one constant in
the tangled, tortured history of the Kashmir question since 1947.
Perhaps the end of the twentieth century presents an opportune
moment to test Kalhana's words of wisdom, and establish whether
the 'power of spiritual merit', rather than the 'force of soldiers',
remains the best way to conquer the contemporary challenge of
democracy, self-determination and a just peace in Kashmir.
 Conclusion and Epilogue (April 1996) 147

Notes
1. Indeed, in the second half of 1995, rumours were already circulating in Srinagar
that the Indian government had finalised its (post-election) list of ministers for
Jammu & Kashmir, and that there were plans to unleash groups of surrendered,
government-sponsored ex-militants (in particular, the armed faction led by
Jamshed Shirazi alias Koka Parray, which goes by the name Ikhwan-ul-
Muslimoon) in the run-up to polls to terrorise the people.
2. The Indian government formally proposed holding assembly elections in
Jammu & Kashmir in December 1995, only to have the suggestion shot down
by the country's assertive Election Commission, which ruled that conditions
were still not sufficiently conducive to ensure a minimally free and fair election.
One apparent reason the government wished to stage an election at the height
of winter in a largely Himalayan region (which would be unprecedented in
Kashmir's political history) was that low rates of participation could then be
partly blamed on the weather. However, even Farooq Abdullah's National
Conference party (which still largely exists only in name in its earlier strong-
holds) has refused to take part in any such election unless New Delhi makes
a binding promise to substantively and comprehensively restore Jammu &
Kashmir pre-1953 autonomous status.
3. The Indian finance minister and architect of the Narasimha Rao government's
liberalisation and deregulation programme, Manmohan Singh, visited Kashmir
a few times in 1995 to enquire into the economic problems of the region.
4. A car-bomb blast that killed some thirteen persons (mostly Indian soldiers) in
the heavily-guarded centre of Srinagar in early September 1995, and for which
HM claimed responsibility, may be an early portent of worse to come.
5. After the destruction of the Charar-e-Sharief shrine in May 1995, Doda, Rajouri,
Poonch and Kargil also joined the Kashmir Valley in observing protest hartals
(general strikes).
6. Even this would partly depend on what strategy the BJP, which has some
influence in the towns of Jammu, chooses to adopt. It currently says that it is
opposed to any elections at this stage, till 'terrorism' is completely crushed.
As this book goes to press, elections are scheduled to be held on 23 and 30
May 1996, as part of India-wide parliamentary elections, for the six seats (three
from Kashmir, two from Jammu and one from Ladakh) that constitute Jammu
& Kashmir's representation in the.elected lower house (Lok Sabha) of Parlia-
ment. Parliamentary elections could not be held in Indian-administered Jammu
& Kashmir during the general elections of 1991 because of the violent atmos-
phere, so this is the first time any kind of electoral process is being attempted
there since 1989. Popular participation (or the lack thereof) in this election is
likely to closely approximate the patterns I have just described. In a repeat of
the 1989 parliamentary poll, there will almost certainly be a major boycott in
the Kashmir Valley (even Farooq's NC has declined to put up candidates), and
a partial but significant boycott in one of the two parliamentary constituencies
in the Jammu region. In a revealing indication of the true nature of this election,
the voting in Indian-administered Jammu & Kashmir has been deliberately
scheduled more than two weeks after polling will have been completed (and
148 The Challenge in Kashmir

results known) for the rest of India, in order to enable 'redeployment' of tens
of thousands of additional security forces from various parts of India to Jammu
& Kashmir.
7. Some vociferous spokespersons for the Pandit community have been demand-
ing that six of the Valley's forty-six assembly seats be 'allotted' to them.
8. Given the near-certainty of a period of instability and flux in India's
national-level politics following the likely outcome of a 'hung parliament'
(i.e., in which no single party or bloc commands a majority) in the elections
of May 1996, there will probably not be another attempt to hold an assembly
election in Jammu & Kashmir before at least autumn 1996.
9. Azam Inquillabi (literally, Azam the Revolutionary) possibly holds the record
for the maximum number of violations of the Line of Control by a single
individual—he has made some thirty clandestine crossings in both directions
between 1969 and 1994.
10. This phenomenon of organised groups of sarkari or government-sponsored
militants emerged during 1995, as morale, cohesion and discipline in many
of the armed groups that had proliferated since 1990 steadily declined, and
drop-out and defection rates rose sharply. Some members of these government-
backed vigilante squads were also motivated by a particular animus towards
the Hizbul Mujahideen, whom they accused of attacking and killing activists
of non-HM guerrilla groups. By 1995-96, several of these 'renegade' or
'contra-guerrilla' outfits had sprouted in the Valley (the largest and most
notorious being the group led by Jamshed Shirazi alias Koka Parray, a
self-styled 'freedom fighter against Pakistan'), and further aggravated the
lawless situation by engaging in acts of murder, rape, kidnapping and extortion
with the active encouragement of the Indian administration and its forces. I
was myself once briefly held up at gunpoint by one of these gangs near Pattan,
a town in Baramulla district not far from Srinagar—the gunmen were operating
virtually under the shadow of a nearby bunker manned by an Indian security
force unit.
11. There is considerable anger and disillusionment among ordinary Kashmiris
especially over charges of rampant corruption and self-enrichment against
several senior Hurriyat leaders—the figures most frequently mentioned in this
connection are Syed Ali Shah Geelani of the Jama'at-i-Islami and Abdul Ghani
Butt of the Muslim Conference, a tiny pro-Pakistan faction. However, what-
ever the Hurriyat's problems may be, the fact remains that the Indian gov-
ernment still does not have a truly credible alternative to project in its place.
12. Indian officials also claimed that the talks had received the approval of Ahsan
Dar, the guerrilla leader who originally founded Hizbul Mujahideen and is
currently still being held in a Jammu prison.
13. The spectacle of former senior leaders of hardline pro-Pakistan groups re-
nouncing and denouncing Pakistan may, among other things, reflect the fact
that the appeal of Pakistan for most Kashmiri Muslims, if it is present at all,
tends to be very superficial and skin-deep. Significantly, no leader of compa-
rable stature of the independentist JKLF has as yet formally renounced the
ideology of independence.
14. See the reports on the meeting in (TS 1996; TT 1996a). The Valley observed
a total strike following the Hurriyat's call to protest these 'talks'. Significantly,
 Conclusion and Epilogue (April 1996) 149

however, the Kashmiri participants at the meeting demanded an end to

offensive military operations by the security forces, the release of most
political prisoners, and the immediate disarming of government-sponsored
armed groups as essential 'confidence-building measures' to pave the way for
more substantive discussions in the future. These are all very constructive
suggestions.
15. Death-squad killings continue unabated in Kashmir. In mid-April 1996, the
body of Ghulam Rasool Sheikh, a newspaper editor in the Valley town of
Pampore, was recovered from the Jhelum river. Sheikh had been active in
documenting allegations of human rights abuses by the security forces; his
family said that he had been kidnapped from his home in mid-March by
army-sponsored 'renegade' militants.
16. It is hardly surprising that there were absolutely no takers in Kashmir for
prime minister Narasimha Rao's offer, made on Doordarshan (government
television network) in November 1995, to negotiate a solution to the Kashmir
crisis on the basis of the 1975 accord between the representatives of Sheikh
Abdullah and Indira Gandhi. As I have pointed out in Chapter 3, the 1975
agreement, far from being a just settlement to Kashmir's grievances, was
actually an abject capitulation by an ageing and exhausted Sheikh Abdullah
to the ruthless power-politics of Delhi. Given this fact, Rao's 'offer' to the
Kashmiris would probably seem amusing at best and insultingly absurd at
worst to anyone truly knowledgeable about the history of the Kashmir ques-
tion. As already noted, even Farooq's National Conference is demanding
restoration of Jammu & Kashmir's pre-1953 autonomy. The fact that even a
group totally aligned with the Indian state is making such a demand is a
reflection of the ground realities in Kashmir, and of the popular mood among
the NC's former constituency.
17. In an interview (IT 1995: 38), for example, JKLF chairman Yasin Malik states
that 'the [Indian] Government should come forward for negotiations on
reasonable terms and without any pre-conditions. All the parties con-
cerned—India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir—should be involved'.
18. Former Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao was given to making seemingly
contradictory statements on the Kashmir problem. During 1995, he predicted
on the one hand that Kashmir would cease to be an issue by the time of the
general elections in India (scheduled for May 1996), implying, presumably,
that the problem would have been settled essentially by force by that time.
He was proved wrong on the matter. On the other hand, he also explicitly
stated during 1995 that the Indian government was prepared to discuss any
arrangements 'short of azaadi' with the Kashmiris.
19. In the words of Yasin Malik, certainly no enthusiast of Pakistan: 'Pakistan is
basically a party to this dispute. You cannot ignore or bypass that' (IT 1995).