Gaas v. Mitmug
Gaas v. Mitmug
Gaas v. Mitmug
DECISION
QUISUMBING , J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking a reversal of the Decision 1 dated February 9, 2004 and the Resolution 2 dated
September 9, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56275. The appellate
court a rmed the Decision 3 dated October 23, 1997 of the O ce of the Ombudsman
for Mindanao in Case No. OMB-MIN-ADM-94-042 nding petitioners Genevieve O. Gaas
and Adelina P. Gomera guilty of gross neglect of duty and dismissing them from
government service. ETDSAc
The Municipal Mayor shall implement this decision within ten (10) days
from the date that it shall have become final and executory.
The complaint against Mayor Warlino M. Relova is hereby dismissed,
without prejudice to the result of the investigation of the criminal aspect of
these same acts.
SO DECREED. 7
Petitioners led respective motions for reconsideration which were denied.
Thereafter, they led an appeal before the Court of Appeals which a rmed the decision
of the O ce of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE , the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED . The assailed
Decision dated October 23, 1997 and Order dated February 24, 1998, of the
O ce of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in Case No. OMB-MIN-ADM-94-042 are
hereby AFFIRMED . aCATSI
SO ORDERED . 8
The Court of Appeals, in a rming the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao, ruled that the evidence presented was substantial, su cient to cause the
dismissal of petitioners:
. . . The comprehensive audit report submitted by public respondent
Commission on Audit, Region [XII], Cotabato City, reported that the shortages of
cash by the petitioners was due to the disallowed cash advances (vales or chits)
made by the municipal employees; that such cash advances were made through
the petitioners per instructions of Saturnino Burgos, the Assistant Municipal
Treasurer-OIC, who at that time appointed the petitioners as special disbursing
o cers; that appointing the petitioners as special disbursing o cers was
strictly prohibited since such [positions were] incompatible to the petitioners'
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positions as municipal bookkeeper and unbonded senior clerk. The petitioners
themselves admitted such ndings but raised as a defense the alleged scheme
by Burgos under the guise of designating them as special disbursement o cers
and made them to perform tasks incompatible to their positions. IEcDCa
II.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE OMBUDSMAN VIOLATED ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE,
CONSTITUTING DEPRIVATION OF APPELLANT[S']/PETITIONERS' RIGHTS TO
SPEEDY TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS. 1 0 aSIHcT
As to the rst issue, this Court has held that any appeal or application for remedy
against a decision or nding of the O ce of the Ombudsman may only be entertained
by the Supreme Court on a pure question of law. Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770,
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that "[n]o court shall hear any appeal or
application for remedy against the decision or ndings of the Ombudsman, except the
Supreme Court on a pure question of law." Moreover, Section 27 of the said Act
provides further that "[f]indings of fact by the O ce of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive." 1 2
Findings of fact of the O ce of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported
by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight especially when they
are a rmed by the Court of Appeals. It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion
by the Ombudsman that a review of factual findings may aptly be made. 1 3
We nd no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman and uphold
its nding which was upheld by the Court of Appeals that there is substantial evidence
against petitioners for violating government accounting and auditing rules and making
disbursements without proper documentation. ECcaDT
As to the second issue, we rule that there was no violation of petitioners' rights
to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case.
The right to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to speedy trial, is violated
only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays. In the determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard
must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. The conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such
delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance. A mere mathematical
reckoning of time involved would not be sufficient. 1 4
In this case, although it is true that the Complaint was led on November 18,
1991 and petitioners received an Order 1 5 directing them to submit their counter-
a davits only three years after or on June 16, 1995, they failed to raise the issue of
speedy disposition of the case at that time. Instead, they submitted their counter-
a davits. It was only in this petition that they rst raised the issue. Neither have they
moved for a speedy resolution of the case. It was only when they lost and pursued their
appeal that they rst raised the issue. It cannot therefore be said that the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. Petitioners cannot now
seek the protection of the law to bene t from the adverse effects of their failure to
raise the issue at the rst instance. In effect, they are deemed to have waived their
rights when they led their counter-a davits after they received the Order dated June
16, 1995 without immediately questioning the alleged violations of their rights to a
speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case. HcACST
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 126-134. Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate
Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Jose L. Sabio, Jr. concurring.
3. Id. at 74-81.
4. Id. at 31-32.
5. Id. at 22.
6. Id. at 80.
7. Id. at 81.
8. Id. at 133.
12. Morong Water District v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 116754, March 17,
2000, 328 SCRA 363, 369.
13. Bedruz v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 161077, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 452, 456.
14. Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 146368-69, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 423,
425-426.
15. Rollo, p. 70. DAaEIc