Prospects of Engaging India and Pakistan in Nuclear Arms Limitations

INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
PROSPECTS OF ENGAGING INDIA AND PAKISTAN

IN NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATIONS
Edited by Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin

and Sergey Oznobishchev
Moscow
IMEMO RAN
2012
УДК 327.37→341.67(54)
ББК 66.4(0)(57)
Pro 93
Foreword by Academician Alexander A. Dynkin at the Conference

―Prospects of Engaging India and Pakistan in Nuclear Arms
Limitations‖
Authors: Alexei Arbatov, A. Sultan, Pyotr Topychkanov, Vyacheslav

Trubnikov, Sheel Kаnt Sharma
Перс 278
Prospects of Engaging India and Pakistan in Nuclear Arms Limitations.
Edited by Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin and Sergey Oznobishchev
– Moscow, IMEMO RAN, 2012, 54 pages.
ISBN 978-5-9535-0358-7
Prospects of Engaging India and Pakistan in Nuclear Arms Limitations

This is the tenth publication of the series titled ―Russia and the Deep
Nuclear Disarmament‖, which is to be issued in the framework of joint project
implemented by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations
(IMEMO) and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Inc. (NTI). It is based on the
discussion at the conference held in IMEMО RAN on October 18, 2012.
This research report was commissioned by the Nuclear Security Project
(NSP) of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). For more information see the NSP
website at http://www.nuclearsecurity.org. The views expressed in this paper
are entirely the authors' own and not those of the IMEMO or NSP.
Publications by IMEMO RAN are available at http://www.imemo.ru
ISBN 978-5-9535-0358-7 © IMEMO RAN, 2012
2
CONTENTS
FOREWORD by Academician Alexander A. Dynkin, Director

of IMEMO RAN ................................................................................ 5
SUMMARY ....................................................................................... 7
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 9
1. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR STATUS IN INDIA‘S AND
PAKISTAN‘S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY.
RUSSIA‘S PERSPECTIVE
Vyacheslav Trubnikov .................................................................... 11
2. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP: INDIA PAKISTAN
Sheel Kant Sharma ........................................................................... 19
3. PAKISTAN‘S APPROACH TOWARDS NUCLEAR ARMS
CONTROL
A. Sultan ........................................................................................... 25
4. MILITARY STRATEGIC RELATIONS OF INDIA AND
PAKISTAN
Pyotr Topychkanov .......................................................................... 29
5. PROSPECTS OF ENGAGING INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN
NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATIONS
Alexei Arbatov ................................................................................. 40
CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................. 45
ANNEX 1
Abbreviations ................................................................................... 49
ANNEX 2
Participants in the Conference .......................................................... 51
3
4
Foreword
FOREWORD
by Academician Alexander A. Dynkin, Director

of IMEMO RAN
Dear participants in the Conference,

I would like to thank you for answering our invitation to
partake in today‘s Conference. Special thanks goes to Ambassador
Sheel Kant Sharma, an authoritative Indian security expert well known
to all of the international strategic community, for kindly accepting our
invitation and making a presentation at today‘s meeting. I would also
like to express my gratitude to the officials of the embassies of India,
Pakistan and other countries to Moscow for joining us today.
The topic of our today‘s discussion is ―The Prospects of
Engaging India and Pakistan in Nuclear Arms Limitation‖. Let me
remind you that this is the last of the three conferences scheduled for
2012 as part of the second round of the joint project by IMEMO RAN
and the US Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). As you know, NTI is co-
chaired by the world-renowned US political figures Ted Turner and
Senator Sam Nunn.
At the moment the US and Russia differ greatly on matters of
nuclear disarmament. However, they do have a common ground, as
both countries recognize the need for expanding the list of participants
in the nuclear disarmament process. After the two decades of deep
nuclear arms reductions by the US and Russia, time has come to raise
the issue of engaging the third nuclear-weapon states in the process.
This is the assumption underlying this year‘s IMEMO-NTI project.
The two previous conferences closely examined the issues of
bringing the UK, France and China to participate in nuclear
disarmament. The analysis yielded results that proved quite interesting
and led to a heated discussion among experts and policy-makers. Many
issues are to be further studied in greater detail. The outcome of the
conferences was published in two brochures, each in English and
Russian languages.
Our first conclusion was that the military and strategic
relations among the existing nine nuclear-weapon states (including
5
Foreword
North Korea) are far from homogenous, with mutual nuclear

deterrence — on which the nuclear arms limitations and reductions by
the USSR/Russia and the US are based — being an exception rather
than a rule. Save for the US and Russia one can hardly find two other
nuclear-weapon states tied by this type of relations.
However, the only exception are India and Pakistan. Although
their relations form a military-strategic basis, which is relatively
conducive to arms control, they are also burdened by enormous
political obstacles preventing the two countries from engaging in the
dialogue on arms reduction. Those obstacles include the factor of
China, the third party in this regional nuclear balance.
To put it shortly, this is what makes our today‘s topic so
unique, complex and important. I hope that this will encourage us to
develop a deeper understanding of the issue and advance towards its
solution.
May I wish all the participants in the conference challenging and
fruitful work in our Institute.
6
Summary
SUMMARY
This research based on the outcome of the conference hosted by

IMEMO RAN, assesses the prospects and possibilities of engaging India
and Pakistan in nuclear arms limitations.
The very fact that these two countries have acquired and
developed nuclear weapons poses a challenge to the nuclear non-
proliferation regime and vividly illustrates the crisis this regime is
currently experiencing. This in fact is tantamount to the escalation of
arms race both between India and Pakistan and in South Asia in general,
and the increasing risk of use of nuclear weapons in this region.
In this paper, the experts of renown analyze in great detail the
internal and external factors pushing the two countries to opt for nuclear
weapons. Indian and Pakistani contributors explain their respective
countries‘ reasoning for the need to develop nuclear capabilities. Russian
experts in the issues of this region review in a careful manner the features
of the two sides‘ nuclear programmes and their development, as well as
the two countries‘ perception of the role of nuclear weapons and the
concepts governing its use.
There is every reason to believe that at this stage India and
Pakistan far from seek agreements on nuclear arms limitation, not to
mention nuclear arms reduction. Their recurrent tensions that can
ultimately lead to the use of nuclear weapons make it imperative that the
international community take urgent steps to thwart New Delhi‘s and
Islamabad‘s nuclear ambitions and enhance security in the region in
general.
The brochure presents a number of practical recommendations on
possible ways to engage India and Pakistan in nuclear arms limitations.
7
8
Introduction
INTRODUCTION
The crisis of the non-proliferation regime, which has recently

been one of the most pressing international security issues, has clearly
manifested itself in South and South-East Asia. In addition to the North
Korean and Iranian nuclear and missile programmes that have
undermined the nuclear non-proliferation regime for many years now,
international community is gravely concerned over the escalating nuclear
missile standoff between India and Pakistan. Indeed, a new spot of
nuclear missile arms race has emerged, posing a threat to regional and
global security.
The situation is all the more complex, as there is a whole set of
related issues inciting this arms race. Those include a simmering
territorial dispute over Kashmir that has repeatedly caused armed clashed
between India and Pakistan and can subsequently escalate and bring
about the exchange of nuclear strikes. There has also been an
increasingly urgent issue of terrorism that has lately been gradually
transforming into an inter-state confrontation. Finally, there are religious
differences, internal political instability in Pakistan, etc.
All of the above results in an extremely low level of cooperation
in nuclear threat reduction and is further complicated by the lack of any
significant body of treaties in this field. As if that was not enough, both
India and Pakistan are facing the typical issues relating to the initial
stages of development of nuclear capabilities. Their nuclear assets are
high vulnerable at their location sites, their command and control and
early warning systems lack efficiency, their official doctrines governing
the role of nuclear weapons in national military strategies and rules of
engagement are immature, ambiguous and are constantly changing.
Furthermore, the current general stagnation in the arms reduction
and limitation process, the apathy and the changing tone of the US-
Russian dialogue, their differences as to the ―Arab spring‖ and the issues
of Syria and Iran, as well as the diminishing influence of Moscow and
Washington on New Delhi‘s and Islamabad‘s policy have not made
things easier. On top of it, the leading powers are much more
preoccupied by searching ways to overcome financial and economic
crisis.
9
Introduction
As a result, there is an obvious lack of incentives and possibilities

for addressing the escalating nuclear missile standoff between India and
Pakistan. Neither the leading nuclear powers, nor the international
community in general have reached consensus on any conceptual and
institutional solutions for this issue.
This brochure is based on the findings of the conference hosted
by IMEMO RAN on October 18, 2012 as part of the joint IMEMO-NTI
(Nuclear Threat Initiative, Inc.) project and aims at proposing certain
practical recommendations to alleviate tension and settle the Indo-
Pakistani nuclear missile confrontation.
10
India‘s and Pakistan‘s Nuclear Status. Russia‘s Perspective
1. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR STATUS IN INDIA’S

AND PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC
POLICY. RUSSIA’S PERSPECTIVE
Vyacheslav Trubnikov
October 20, 2012 marked the 50th anniversary of a key event in

the modern history of relations between independent India and the
People‘s Republic of China. Indian Armed Force suffered a crushing and
what India still believes to be a humiliating defeat in a conflict with the
People‘s Liberation Army of China in the deserted Himalayan region.
The only thing that saved India from a complete defeat was the fact that
in a month China unilaterally ceased fire and withdrew its troops to the
positions that today are referred to as the Line of Actual Control. British
rule had left young independent India (as well as Pakistan) a legacy of
both the open wound of the partition, and the undemarcated northern
border with Tibet, the McMahon Line and the McCartney-McDonald
Line between whom and British-controlled India had never been
mutually recognized as Sino-Indian border. The consequences of this
territorial and border conflict still exist. What is more, it is them that
divide the two countries most, impacting every aspect of India‘s and
China‘s foreign, military and domestic policy.
In late 1950s India tried to solve the issue and restore the status
quo in the Himalayas by means of the Forward Policy inherited from the
British, that is by drawing its armed forces to the line it considered as its
national border. However, China‘s smashing response demonstrated the
inefficiency of that policy and made India see its neighbour in a
completely different light, both as a competitor in the struggle for
influence in the region, and a strong Asian military power necessitating
adequate measures on the part of India in order to restore the strategic
balance.
These particular developments were at the root of India‘s struggle
to secure a nuclear status that started after China held it first test nuclear
explosion in 1964. Having assessed the international environment Indian
government concluded that there was nobody but India itself to ensure its
11
security. In fact, it even had a solid research capability for that purpose
consisting of relevant research centers headed by world-famous Indian
scientists such as nuclear physicist Homi J. Bhabha and the father of
India‘s space programme Vikram Sarabhai. They founded leading India‘s
research centers, the Atomic Energy Commission and Indian National
Committee for Space Research both of which are still successfully
functioning. These particular bodies enjoying extensive ties with the
relevant institutions of the leading nuclear missile powers, previously
USSR and now Russia, the US, the UK, have implemented the country‘s
nuclear weapons and missiles programmes. India has built up its
capacities by sending its specialists abroad to study in the leading
universities and receive practical training in research institutes, such as
the USSR‘s Intercosmos and the US NASA, and the Voronezh nuclear
power plant in the USSR and subsequently Russia. To India‘s credit, it
should be stressed that it has always had an impeccable record of a
country that has never faced a single accusation of taking part in
activities causing doubts in terms of nuclear missile proliferation. India
has built up both its nuclear and missile capabilities through legitimate
international cooperation and domestic efforts.
Nevertheless, the detonation of the first Indian ―peaceful nuclear
explosive device‖ in 1974 took the world community, especially the
members of the so called ―nuclear club‖ by surprise. No western
intelligence service informed its government that Indira Gandhi‘s
government had taken the relevant political decision. Neither did it
inform its government that India had prepared in any way to implement
such plans at its Pokhran underground test range in the desert of Rajastan
near Pakistani border. Yet it was this particular explosion that turned out
to be a crucial step on India‘s way towards acquiring nuclear status,
which it announced after a series of nuclear explosions in May 1998.
Pakistan — who had a hard time after the defeat in the 1971 conflict with
India which had resulted in the loss of its Eastern part and the emergence
of a new South Asian state, Bangladesh — gave the 1974 Indian
explosion a serious thought and was quick to respond. On May 28 and 30
it detonated two nuclear explosive devices which signified the country‘s
de-facto claim of a nuclear status. Thus, the confrontation of the two
South-Asian states with a record of three armed conflicts acquired a
nuclear dimension, which brought their conventional arms race won by
India to a critical, and in the worst case, catastrophic point.
12
It should be stressed that in this case the term ―nuclear status‖ as

applied to India and Pakistan has no implications in terms of international
law. Neither of these two ―nuclear-weapon states‖ can be recognized as
such in accordance with the international law.
The term ―nuclear-weapon state‖ refers in accordance with the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) only to those
states which had exploded a nuclear weapon before the Treaty opened for
signature in 1967. Hence, neither New-Delhi, nor Islamabad can claim
such status in accordance with the terms set forth in the NPT.
Revising the Treaty and recognizing India and Pakistan as
nuclear-weapon states will, no doubt, put an end to the Treaty and
destroy the entire NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation regime. Such
dramatic alterations to the Treaty would logically demonstrate that the
countries that failed to sign the NPT and place their nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards but succeeded in developing their nuclear-
weapons programmes have acquired considerable political benefits
instead of becoming the rogues in the eyes of the law-abiding rest of the
international community complying with the NPT provisions. In all
probability, this would cause a sharp negative response on the part of the
countries voluntarily foregoing their nuclear weapon programmes and
acceding to the NPT (South Africa, Brazil, Argentina), which may push
them to revise their policy in this sphere. The collapse of the nuclear non-
proliferation system today, when sensitive nuclear technologies become
increasingly available, would have extremely negative consequences for
all countries, including the NPT nuclear-weapon states. For this
particular reason no one rushes to legally recognize India and Pakistan as
nuclear-weapon states despite the fact that they do possess nuclear
weapons.
However, as time passes, the situation appears increasingly
absurd. No doubt, it would be more than unadvisable to officially
recognize of the two South Asian nuclear-weapon states. However,
ignoring the fact that they do possess nuclear capability one would
behave just like an ostrich with its head in the sand, as neither India, nor
Pakistan show any intention to heed to the calls to join the NPT as non-
nuclear-weapon states. It appears that to break this vicious circle one
needs to take a cautious and reasoned approach and study with utmost
care all the legal aspects of the issue. Basically, the discussions at today‘s
conference are intended precisely to search for such approaches.
13
It would be advisable to discuss India‘s and Pakistan‘s nuclear

status by comparing or contrasting the role of nuclear missiles in the two
states‘ foreign and domestic policy.
For India, its nuclear status de-facto places it among the powers
with both regional and global ambitions and corresponding positions
enabling them to lobby in bilateral and multilateral formats, primarily in
the UN and its Security Council, a seat in which India has consistently
yet vainly struggled to secure. The possession of nuclear weapons de-
facto renders India equal to the P-5, the nuclear-weapon states with
permanent seats on the UN Security Council whose reform and
modernization India has anxiously expected and advocated. India aspires
to advance its positions in this universal international body, relying on
the support of Russia, its tried strategic partner, and with the help of the
US the relations with whom, including in the framework of the 2008
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement (the 123 Agreement) is getting
increasingly close and multidimensional. The permanent membership in
the UN Security Council would level India‘s international status with
those of its main Asian rival, China, and enable the country to use veto
rather than be an object of veto used by the great powers.
As for Pakistan, the status of a nuclear-weapon state enables it to
secure leadership and authority in the Islamic countries, Pakistan being
the only Muslim country possessing nuclear missiles. As a result of the
activity of Abdul Qadeer Khan, a scientist and now a politician, Pakistan
has been perceived as a nuclear missile technologies proliferator country.
Strangely, this has benefitted Pakistan in a certain way, turning it into
potential donor of such technologies in the eyes of many Islamic states,
among which international experts quite often name Saudi Arabia, who
has been generously funding Islamabad‘s military orders abroad.
In terms of international politics, Pakistan also takes certain
advantage of its nuclear status as a member of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), being the only country,
besides India, possessing nuclear weapons and hence claiming the role of
a political balance to the undisputed leader of the organization
From the military perspective, India‘s nuclear weapons are
intended to deter China named as the country‘s main strategic rival by
most international political and military experts, including Indian ones.
India is naturally concerned over rapid and consistent build-up of China‘s
military capability, in particular, over notable strengthening of PLAN and
their activities in South China Sea with its disputed islands and rich
14
hydro-carbon resources. In addition to this and the unsettled Sino-Indian

border disputes, including over territories in the state of Jammu and
Kashmir and in Arunachal Pradesh, there is a clear vector to India‘s
foreign policy aimed at enhancing the country‘s influence in the key
neighbouring regions, in particular, South-East Asia.
China‘s active penetration in South-Asian economy accompanied
by its increased military activity in South Asian Seas can turn this
particular region into the area of possible direct clash of India‘s and
China‘s political and military interests.
India‘s international policy and military planning over the last
decade has shown that the ―China factor‖ has always had a major effect
on Delhi‘s decisions. According to British experts, the rapid increase in
the activity of Indian fleet in South Asian Seas since mid-1990s is a
direct result of the intention to curb the expanding dominance of the
Chinese navy. Jane‘s Defense Weekly stresses that while India had
attached little importance to South Asian Seas before mid-1990s, in early
21st century it has become Delhi‘s strategic ambition to ensure control
over the Strait of Malacca, or at least secure a possibility to threaten it.
At the moment, the balance of conventional armed forces
between India and China is far from favouring India, as a number of
researchers, including from Jane‘s have demonstrated. Indeed, PLAAF
modernization programme is aimed, inter alia, at establishing rapid
reaction force with a strength of 10 to 15 percent of the total strength of
PLAAF, that is 200 to 300 thousand troops. This force is to serve as an
advance party capable of deployment in a required area within 24 hours.
Thus China will be capable of rapidly moving troops to any part of the
country, obviously including the border with India, with the strength of
these troops equaling that of a third part of all Indian ground force. At the
moment no analyst doubts that China has general overwhelming
superiority over India in any service branch, and taking in consideration
the dramatic modernization of the Armed Forces carried out by China
Beijing can attain an even greater military advantage.
All this highlights the importance of India‘s nuclear status as a
means of deterring its rival, China. It should be stressed that right before
the test explosions in May 1998 Delhi represented by its then Minister of
Defense George Fernandes officially named ―Chinese threat‖ as the main
factor that had pushed India to clear the nuclear threshold. India‘s current
military nuclear doctrine contains all the elements corroborating such
15
interpretation of India‘s nuclear status. These can be summarized as

follows:
India intends to develop a capability for credible minimum
deterrence;
India commits to no-first-use of nuclear weapons, admitting the
use of nuclear weapons exclusively in response to a nuclear
aggression against its territory or armed forces irrespective of their
location;
a retaliatory strike that may only be mounted on the authorization
of the country‘s political leadership will be massive and intended
to inflict irrecoverable damage;
nuclear weapons cannot be used against a non-nuclear-weapon
state;
India reserves the right to a retaliatory nuclear strike in case of a
massive aggression against itself or its armed forces using
chemical or biological weapons;
India continues to strictly comply with international regimes of
export control over nuclear and missile materials and technologies;
India reiterates its willingness to participate in negotiations on a
fissile material cut-off treaty, adheres to its moratorium on nuclear
tests, and reiterates its commitment to general and complete
nuclear disarmament.
From the military perspective these elements of Indian nuclear

doctrine as applied to Pakistan — whatever unclear they are and
whatever ambiguous India's understanding of the ―credible minimum
deterrence‖ proclaimed by its leadership is — in fact, mean that India
should be able to inflict inadmissible damage to Pakistan with a
retaliatory nuclear strike. Taking in consideration Pakistan‘s economic
and military, including nuclear, capability — which some overly
optimistic Indian policy-makers believe to be at best equal to that of
Greater Mumbai — realistic Pakistani political and military leaders will
hardly think of being the first to use nuclear weapons to mount a
disarming strike against India. It would be more logical for them to think
along the lines of striking against India‘s densely populated cities which
would be politically unacceptable for India. That is the raison d‘être for
Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons.
Finally, one cannot but mention the role of the nuclear status in
India’s and Pakistan’s domestic policy. In India, nuclear weapons are
16
the subject of complete consensus between the two major national parties
competing for power, The Indian National Congress (INC) and Hindu
political force Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). However, they tend to use
the nuclear issue as a tactical means in critical moments of their political
clashes. In particular, the decision to conduct the latest nuclear test was
made by coalition government headed by BJP who had promised to cross
the nuclear threshold in their election manifesto. This decision came
amid the difficulties facing the party in early 1998, when it had a narrow
and unstable majority in the parliament. The party also took into account
that the nuclear option was widely supported as a basis of the country‘s
defense capability and independence, while foregoing it would be
considered as the betrayal of the national interests. In that circumstances,
complying with one of its election promises and crossing the nuclear
threshold BJP expected to stabilize the situation in the country and
strengthen the position of the governing coalition.
Their plan worked well. The public opinion poll held on May 26-
27, 1998 after the nuclear test showed that over 80 percent of the
country‘s population approved of the government‘s decision to conduct
the test and 65 percent agreed that the test served national security
interests. That rise of nationalist feelings enabled the government to
strengthen its positions.
In Pakistan, nuclear capability has been generally perceived as a
means of enhancing national security and deterring the military strength
of the neighbouring India. Thus, the country‘s nuclear status has served
as the subject of equally solid consensus among different political forces.
One can hardly point at any notable difference in the positions on the
matter between the authoritarian military regime of General Musharraf,
who adequately responded to India‘s nuclear test of May 1998, and any
of the subsequent democratic governments of Pakistan. Thus the
country‘s nuclear status foments the ties of different ethnic provinces and
territories within the country, which, unlike India, remains unaccustomed
to resolving complex domestic issues and maintaining political stability
through democratic means.
At the same time, any deterioration in stability resulting from
either internal or external factors causes increased concerns on the part of
the international community, including India, Russia and the US, over the
safety of Pakistan‘s nuclear missile capability under the control of
responsible political and military leadership in order to prevent this lethal
17
weapons from falling into the hands of Islamic terrorists that abound in
Pakistan.
No doubt, the issue of India‘s and Pakistan‘s nuclear status is not
as simple and acute as this chapter may have portrayed it. Bilateral and
multilateral factors exist and develop in the relations between India and
China and India and Pakistan contributing to the scaling down of military
confrontation. These factors have not yet prevailed over competition,
rivalry and confrontation, but they might still do so in the future.
18
Strategic Relationship: India Pakistan
2. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP: INDIA

PAKISTAN
Sheel Kant Sharma
On the situation in India and Pakistan. It will be useful to

begin with short narratives of India and Pakistan. For India it is India‘s
due place in world which figures high for a country of its size,
democracy; pluralism and secular ethos as also its economy and
mammoth reach and contribution to the UN system. At the same time
India is acutely aware of its substantial limitations too as a developing
country and the categorical imperative for internal comprehensive
transformation of its socioeconomic situation. India expects, nonetheless,
due recognition of its prowess in nuclear, space, and other High
Technology, the reach and span of its human resource potential and its
fast emerging economy.
As for Pakistan, its narrative is that of the sole nuclear armed
Islamic nation and of a no-holds-barred quest to be the peer and rival of
India. Its profile as a state has been characterized by the Army‘s hold on
political economy. Pakistan has sensitivity about its identity and in recent
decades has pushed identity politics to extremes. Pakistan is going
through a phase of critical internal instability and economic mess and
grappling with extremists and terrorists. At the same time it is ambivalent
on Jihad & epicenters of terrorism within its territory and serious
allegations about it using terrorism as instrument of state policy.
Both India and Pakistan are heavily populated and comprise a
vital and heterogeneous sub-region of Asia which might figure just above
Sub-Saharan Africa in most human development indices but has
enormous potential. India is six times that of Pakistan, and its economy
even larger. Ever since Pakistan‘s acquisition of nuclear capability the
region is subject to nuclear brinkmanship because of the implicit risks of
any bilateral conflict between the two escalating to nuclear.
There are essentially three factors of instability in the situation,
namely, potential of armed conflict escalating to nuclear, internal
instability in Pakistan blowing over, and risks involving nuclear first use
19
Sheel Kant Sharma
due to accident, misjudgment, miscalculation or inadequate security of

the arsenal.
As regards possible approaches to dealing with this situation and
the problem of stability it is important to recognize the variance in
perception of their situation by India and Pakistan, how they project their
respective views of it, how they take this situation on board their bilateral
dialogue process and, finally, how external powers impact the situation
and exercise their leverage.
Manifestations of instability. Coming to dimensions of
instability, in so far as an armed conflict might escalate to nuclear there
are the past instances variously cited by commentators within the region
and outside.
Operation Brass Tracks 1987. During this operation massive
Indian military exercise close to India-Pakistan border led to Pakistan‘s
panic mobilization of troops on the border and amidst rising risk of an
outbreak of border clashes Pakistan chose to reveal possession of a
nuclear weapon through a contrived interview by Abdul Qadir Khan to
an Indian journalist in London. This was viewed as implied threat of a
nuclear flare up and was resolved by bilateral negotiations by both
governments.
Gates Mission 1990. After the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan Pakistan was seen by India to have diverted its jihadi
fighters from the Afghan border to Indian portion of Jammu and Kashmir
leading to wide scale violence and public chaos which led India, in turn,
to deploy troops in J&K. US Deputy Secreatry of Defence Robert Gates
visited J&K in May 1990 to defuse the situation, which was accentuated
by revelation that Pakistan had nuclear weapons.
Kargil War 1999. Pakistani regular troops dressed as jihadis
occupied Indian side of the line of control (LOC) in Kashmir controlling
tactically critical heights in Kargil. India had to finally mobilize its Army
and air force to evict the Pakistani occupiers in a set of fierce battles in
the summer of 1999 when risk of nuclear escalation was heightened.
Operation Parakram 2001-2002. Following terrorist attack on
India‘s parliament in session in December 2001 which was traced to
Pakistan, India mobilized full wartime alert on the entire border with
Pakistan. This led to a Pakistani tit for tat response coupled with nuclear
threat. Both sides‘ troops faced each other for ten months during which
on two occasions tension peaked. Situation was deescalated in October
2002.
20
Crisis after events of November 26, 2008. Audacious attack by

Pakistani terrorists in the city of Bombay on November 26, 2008
comprised sea borne terrorist landing, followed by indiscriminate firing
in busy central train station as well as holding of hostage in two five star
hotels in the city and a Jewish Guest House. Indian commandos took
three days to get the militants killed and hostages released but hundreds
including hotel guests, commuters and foreign tourists lost lives. Indian
government had proof of operations being conducted and controlled from
Pakistan including the Pakistani army and ISI and a Pakistani was
captured alive by Police in Bombay. Situation contained seeds of serious
escalation as the nation was enraged. Pakistani stock denials were
accompanied by nuclear threats.
Pakistan’s stated policy posture about being ready for nuclear
weapons’ use has been a key factor to these crises.
As regards Instability in Pakistan there are a number of factors
such as stories abound of Talibanisation in Pakistani army, growing cost
in material and troops of Pakistan fighting Taliban, reports about politics
in Pakistan being jihadi-driven, with leading political formations
virtually having their backs to the wall, and two serious instances when
militant extremists attacked heavily guarded military installations near
Islamabad and Karachi leading to rising voices of fear that radical
jihadis might some day gain access to nuclear weapons .
An aggravation in all these situations involves risks of nuclear
weapons use. Pakistan has no nuclear doctrine as such but has
operational India-specific posture to use nuclear weapons if, as stated by
one senior Pakistani defense official, certain redlines were crossed,
namely:
space – if Pakistan were attacked and large territory conquered;
military – destruction of large part of Pakistan‘s Air/Land forces;
economic – economic strangling of Pakistan by India;
domestic – domestic Political destabilization in Pakistan or
subversion pushed by India
In the view of another senior opinion leader in Pakistan the
purpose of its nuclear weapons is, inter alia, to ‖induce India to modify
its goals, strategies, tactics and operations‖. A deliberate pitch for the
irrational and limitless scope for nuclear use is inherent and implicit in
these.
21
Sheel Kant Sharma
As against this India‘s Nuclear Doctrine is that of no-first-use

but includes assured massive retaliation in the event of a first strike with
nuclear weapons against India.
Both India and Pakistan claim credible minimum deterrence as
key to their security.
India and Pakistan: different approaches. As to how to cope
with the situation, Indian approach consists of using diplomatic means to
ensure stopping of anti India terrorist acts originating in Pakistan, trial
and conviction of accused of 26/11, including terrorist organization LeT.
This in Indian view would lead to reduction of trust-deficit between the
two countries. India seeks at the same time engagement and dialogue to
build trust, promotes expansion of bilateral trade, including grant of
MFN status to India by Pakistan and is ready for a qualified non-
reciprocity in trade concessions. India stresses people to people
connectivity and has joined Pakistan in a bilateral dialogue on CBMs,
albeit an interrupted one. India position is that its security matrix is vastly
different from Pakistan‘s and it finds the role of external military, nuclear
and missiles related assistance to Pakistan a factor for exacerbation of
regional stability.
Pakistan on the other hand approaches the situation with stout
Denial of involvement in anti India terrorism and claims itself as victim
of terrorist acts. It demands conflict resolution and dispute settlement
with India and advances lack of it as source of problems. Pakistan is
cautious on expanding trade and people to people contact and is
protective about their domestic impact. It asserts that its support to
terrorists in J&K is political and will remain undiminished and it would
like to involve external powers in every which way to attain parity with
India. Pakistan continues build up of nuclear warheads & missiles with
India-specific security concerns.
Both countries have been in talks with each other off and on.
Bilateral dialogue has been interrupted however due to terrorist acts in
India, allegedly from Pakistan. Meetings take place at all levels from the
heads of state and governments to the ministerial including for external
affairs, trade &commerce, interior/home as well as at the level of
foreign secretaries but progress in these meetings has been slow and
limited to a narrow agenda. Both sides harbor considerable trust deficit
which is the bane of bilateral moves in security matters. Both nonetheless
swear by dialogue and engagement and have kept back channel contacts
on.
22
Important to the bilateral discourse and the overall situation is

how external powers impact or perceive it. In historical perspective these
can be described in terms of cold War and considerations of realpolitik.
Pakistan received unflinching support and military assistance through its
cold war ties while nonaligned India‘s special relationship with the
Soviet Union was vital. Chinese realpolitik consisted of lasting all
weather friendship with Pakistan including substantial nuclear and
missile proliferation links that endure. Great Powers and Great Game
history of geostrategic importance of the Pakistan Afghanistan region
also plays a key role as great power rivalry in the region has been a
legacy from a period much before the cold war or even the Soviet Union.
This stubbornly manifested in the region in military alliances entered into
by Pakistan since early years of independence. In addition, both countries
seek a major role UN, Regional and Inter-regional Organizations.
Pakistan tries to involve the UN and other external actors but India insists
on coping with the political problems bilaterally, as agreed in the 1972
Simla Agreement, for instance. But on arms control India insists on
multilaterally negotiated measures under UN auspices. As regards
proliferation linkages, the role played by the AQ Khan network was
substantial in spreading Pakistan‘s influence in the Islamic world.
External powers have also expressed concerns about failing States
and off and on commentaries in this regard include Pakistan,
unjustifiably perhaps, due to mounting terrorist menace and economic
difficulties. They issue travel advisories from time to time, the business
impact of which on both sides can be leveraged towards defusing crisis
situations.
On the way to dialogue. Thus the deterrent relationship between
the two has that much less autonomy and resist parallel with the
relationship of the erstwhile superpowers. Finally, with the economic
morass sorted out both are also viewed with huge possibilities as actual
or potential emerging economies; especially if more and more reforms
are brought about and stable relations prevail.
India and Pakistan have been engaged in dialogue for CBMs both
officially as well as in track II. The official dialogues can be broadly
characterized by preliminary exploration on need for clarity on doctrines,
transparent information exchanges on tests/maneuvers, on avoidance of
destabilizing steps, miscalculation, accidental nuclear use, early warnings
and securing of hotlines and channels of communications between
military commanders like DGMOs and also conflict resolution.
23
Sheel Kant Sharma
In the foregoing description of multiple facets of their strategic

interrelationship, arms control does not figure since India does not
envision nuclear arms control or disarmament except in multilateral
negotiations under UN with participation of all nuclear weapon states.
India thus supports launching FMCT negotiations in CD. Pakistan is not
ready for it. India maintains a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests as
de facto observance of a test ban. Pakistan does the same. Signing the
CTBT for both does not appear to be on cards at present. India has been
on record to say that it would not be in the way of the entry into force of
CTBT. India rules out any bilateral steps with Pakistan on CTBT.
It is important to note that to strategic community in India any
dialogue with Pakistan without including China in the process does not
seem to be tenable since China‘s nuclear weapons/missiles related
assistance and linkages are by now too well documented in strategic
literature globally. India‘s approach to China has been to forge good
bilateral relations spanning trade investment and all other dimensions of
good neighbourly ties. Discussions between India and China on the
nuclear question are rather narrowly confined by the latter to UN centric
multilateral agenda.
Conclusion. The foregoing description of the broad setting of
bilateral relationship of India and Pakistan may have some difference of
nuance depending on the observers own frame of reference. Common
factors in approaches of both sides and those of external actors have been
few and far between except in times of acute crisis when all have
managed so far to agree on de-escalation and withdrawing from the
brink. A premature rush for measures mimicking situations elsewhere has
no workable precedent in South Asia due largely to persisting lack of
trust apart from dissimilarities with the models proffered. Close
proximity of both lends an uncertain edge to confidence building which
is highly desirable in the context of nuclear weapons and missiles build
up.
24
Pakistan‘s Approach Towards Nuclear Arms Control
3. PAKISTAN’S APPROACH TOWARDS NUCLEAR

ARMS CONTROL
A. Sultan
Pakistan was one of the leading proponents of the nuclear

nonproliferation treaty (NPT) during its negotiations in late 60s; mainly
to prevent neighboring India from following the nuclear weapons path
and to preclude the nuclearization of South Asia. Once India refused to
sign the NPT by labeling it as ‗discriminatory‘ and ‗nuclear apartheid‘,
Pakistan also decided not to accept any legally binding obligations and
refrained from signing the nonproliferation treaty. Subsequently, India‘s
nuclear test of 1974 had a decisive impact on Pakistan‘s approach
towards nuclear nonproliferation efforts. On one side, it proposed several
regional measures that could help reverse the nuclearization process,
while on the other side, it started moving towards acquisition of its own
nuclear capability that eventually led Pakistan to follow a cautious
approach towards various international nonproliferation initiatives. After
becoming an overt nuclear weapon state, Pakistan would like to engage
with various international nonproliferation efforts on the basis of
reciprocity, and through collaborative and non-discriminatory
approaches.
Early nonproliferation efforts. Sensing the obstacles and serious
consequences of the regional nuclear competition, Pakistan in 1974
offered South Asia to be declared as a nuclear weapons free zone
(NWFZ). In 1978, it proposed that both India and Pakistan renounce the
acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, and agree to mutual
inspection of each other's nuclear facilities. In 1979, Pakistan also
suggested that both regional countries may accept full-scope IAEA
safeguards and give up their individual weapons pursuits. These
proposals were intended mainly to reverse India‘s nuclear weapons
program, as allowing India to build weapons capability would
permanently shift the strategic balance in India‘s favor, and thus
remained unacceptable for Pakistan.
25
A. Sultan
Subsequently, once it became evident that ‗unproliferation‘ of

South Asia may not be possible, Pakistan‘s arms control efforts became
more pragmatic and focused towards restraining the nuclearization
process at the regional level, instead of calling for its complete reversal.
Therefore in 1987, despite the fact that India had already tested a nuclear
device earlier, Pakistan proposed a regional nuclear test ban treaty that if
agreed by India could have precluded the possibility of 1998 nuclear tests
by both the countries. This was followed by another proposal of
declaring the South Asia a Zero Missile Zone, and in 1997, Pakistan also
proposed a non-aggression pact between the two South Asian neighbors.
The most comprehensive proposal offered to India in 1999, after
both India and Pakistan had become overt nuclear weapon states was the
suggestion to establish Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) in South Asia.
This proposal had three inter-locking principles; conflict resolution,
missile and nuclear restraint regime, and conventional balance in the
region. Like all other previous proposals, India did not find merit in
engaging with Pakistan on discussions to establish SRR in the region,
which could have helped address all aspects of political and military
competition between the two regional rivals.
The failure of arms control efforts in South Asia could be
accredited to asymmetrical regional power structure and divergent
national priorities. India justifies its conventional and nuclear build up
against ‗perceived‘ Chinese threat, and also refuses to join international
arms control arrangements citing these as ‗discriminatory‘ in nature.
Pakistan‘s approach towards arms control, on the other hand, has been
shaped mainly by the Indian actions or lack of it, as it directly or
indirectly affects Pakistan‘s security calculus.
Recent developments impacting Pakistan’s strategic thinking.
Some of the more recent developments that have complicated arms
control debate, both globally as well as at the regional level include; the
2006 India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement and the 2008 India-
specific waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) from its export
control guidelines. These developments have serious long term political
as well as security implications, as it legitimizes the status of India as a
nuclear weapon state outside the NPT while ignoring Pakistan that is also
seeking a similar recognition.
After the India-US nuclear deal and the India-specific NSG
exemption, India has emerged as the only country eligible to enter into
nuclear trade with other members of the NSG, without any reciprocal
26
Pakistan‘s Approach Towards Nuclear Arms Control
nonproliferation obligations. Pakistan‘s plea for an equitable treatment

has not been viewed with favor as yet by major NSG countries for their
own political and commercial considerations. This from a Pakistani
perspective is discriminatory and would lead to further friction between
the two regional nuclear powers, and Pakistan‘s interaction with various
ongoing international nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives.
The India-US nuclear agreement, besides undermining the
established global nonproliferation norms has also serious security
implications for Pakistan. The nuclear deal allows India to maintain at
least eight nuclear facilities outside the IAEA safeguards. India has also
been given unprecedented concession to reprocess US supplied fuel in
two dedicated facilities. In the past such largesse was extended only to
the closest of US allies, i.e. Japan and Euratom. The US assurance of fuel
supplies in perpetuity would further allow India to devote more of its
domestic uranium to beef up its nuclear arsenal, whereas the imported
fuel would be used mainly to furbish its nuclear power plants.
Pakistan‘s security managers during the past few years have also
been highlighting several other factors that could affect regional security
dynamics and adversely affect Pakistan‘s threat perception. Some of
these include; India‘s bid to build anti ballistic missile system that could
undermine Pakistan‘s nuclear posture of credible minimum deterrence;
India‘s military doctrines of 'Cold Start' and 'Pro Active Operations' –
aimed to punish Pakistan militarily by exploiting the ‗perceived‘ gap
below Pakistan‘s nuclear threshold; the growing conventional imbalance
due to massive increase in Indian defense budget over the past few years;
and also India's bid to acquire sea-launched second strike nuclear
capability.
These developments have not only impacted adversely on the
global nonproliferation and arms control efforts, but have had a major
impact on Pakistan‘s approach on various issues, especially the ongoing
debate on FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). This was
evident from the statement issued by Pakistan‘s National Command
Authority (NCA) – the highest forum for all nuclear related decision
making in the country, once it stated that:
"Pakistan’s position will be determined by its national security
interests and the objectives of strategic stability in South Asia.
Selective and discriminatory measures that perpetuate regional
instability, in any form and manner, derogate from the objectives
of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and, therefore,
27
A. Sultan
cannot be accepted or endorsed. Pakistan will not support any

approach or measure that is prejudicial to its legitimate national
security interests."1
From a Pakistani perspective, FMCT is considered a vital national
security issue because it has direct bearing on regional stability. The long
history of mutual distrust and suspicion leading to numerous crises
between India and Pakistan does not allow for de-hyphenation of South
Asian security equation. Senior decision makers in Pakistan have
repeatedly stated that Pakistan does not intend indulging into an arms
race with India, but it cannot agree to any arms control measures that
could undermine its security interests in the long run.
The way forward. The international non-proliferation regime
could only become more secure and inclusive with the involvement of
the non-NPT NWS, mainly India and Pakistan that are established
nuclear weapon states. Unless these states are integrated into the
mainstream nonproliferation regime through non-discriminatory
approaches, it is unlikely that the regime could be universalized and
strengthened to prevent the regime from further fracture. The former DG
IAEA Mr El Bradei, soon after the conclusion of India-US nuclear deal
also warned about such a possibility, once he wrote that the traditional
strategy of treating non-NPT states as outsiders – is no longer a realistic
method of bringing these into the fold. He therefore urged that other
strategies must be found to enlist countries like Pakistan and others as
partners in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation.
If Pakistan has to be enlisted as one of the major stake holders in
global arms control and nonproliferation efforts, it may only be possible
by accepting the established ground realities and its integration into
mainstream nonproliferation regime through non-discriminatory
measures. Collaborative approaches based on principles could help
reduce Pakistan‘s India-specific anxieties and encourage it to engage in
various ongoing nonproliferation efforts more proactively. This would
not only be useful for the regional security but could also strengthen
global arms control and nonproliferation efforts.
1
Statement by Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) of 13 Jan 2010.
(http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2010/1/13)
28
Military Strategic Relations of India and Pakistan
4. MILITARY STRATEGIC RELATIONS OF INDIA

AND PAKISTAN
Pyotr Topychkanov
India and Pakistan have dynamic nuclear weapons programmes.

Meanwhile, the two countries‘ political relations have considerable
potential for conflict. They are complicated by territorial and water-
sharing disputes, terrorism and extremism, and the influence of third
countries. The lack of mutual confidence and instability of political
dialogue exacerbate permanent threat of conflict. With this tangle of
contradictions, escalating military confrontation and the nuclear arms
development - South Asia has turned into a region facing a highest risk of
war with the use of nuclear weapons.
The genesis of nuclear option. In 1980s the security challenges
that faced India and Pakistan led to a situation of ―latent deterrence‖, i.e.
virtual mutual deterrence between countries that were about to cross
nuclear threshold. It was in 1980s when the two countries acquired
technologies and materials necessary for the production of nuclear
weapons.
In 1974 India held a so-called peaceful nuclear explosion at the
Pokharan test range in Rajasthan. However its final claim of membership
in the nuclear club came on May 11, 1998 after the three test explosions
of nuclear devices with a yield of 45 kt, 15 kt and 1 kt. On May 13 it
detonated two more devices with a yield of less than 1 kt. Pakistan was
obviously well prepared and responded in a symmetrical manner
exploding the same number of six devices in the course of two days (in
1998 India exploded five devices, which in addition to the one tested in
1974 makes six).
According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials, India
may presently have 80-100, and Pakistan 90-110 nuclear warheads. Both
countries are capable of further building up their nuclear arsenals2.
2
Countries: India // International Panel on Fissile Materials
(http://fissilematerials.org/countries/india.html); Countries: Pakistan // International Panel on
Fissile Materials (http://fissilematerials.org/countries/pakistan.html).
29
Pyotr Topychkanov
Table 1.
Fissile Material Production in South Asia, 2012

Country Uranium enrichment Plutonium production
Facility Total Facility Total
HEU stockpile of
stockpile weapon-
(90%) grade
plutonium
India Enrichment facility at 0.22- The Bhabha Atomic 0.15±0.15 t
the Bhabha Atomic 0.56 t Research Center
Research Center (Trombay), Tarapur-1,
(Rattehalli) Tarapur-2, Kalpakkam
Pakistan A.Q. Khan Research 2.6 t ―New Laboratories‖ of 100 kg
Laboratories the Pakistan Institute of
(Kahuta); Gadwal, Nuclear Science and
Golra and Sihala Technology (Nilore)
enrichment plants
Sources: International Panel on Fissile Materials (http://fissilematerials.org/); Standing
Committee on Defense & Defense Production, Senate of Pakistan
(http://www.senatedefencecommittee.com.pk/index.php?pageid=home).
Both India and Pakistan strive to develop nuclear triad using

aircraft and ground-launched missiles as delivery vehicles for their
nuclear weapons and also develop submarine-launched missiles and sea-
based launch platforms. Indeed, India has multipurpose Mirage 2000H
fighters which can deliver gravity bombs. It is reported that Jaguar IS
Shamsher tactical strike fighters and multi-purpose SU-30MKI fighters
may also be used for this purpose3. Pakistan can deploy its nuclear
warheads on multi-purpose F-16A/B and Mirage 3/4 fighters4. Some
Indian experts believe that this role may also be assigned to Sino-
Pakistani JF-17 multi-purpose fighter5 equipped with Russian RD-93
engine6.
Unlike India, Pakistan is ready to arm its fighters with Ra‘ad
(Hatf-8) cruise missiles in the foreseeable future. The missile is currently
3
Kile Sh.N., Schell Ph., Kristensen H.M. Indian Nuclear Forces // SIPRI Yearbook 2012:
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security / Ed. by Bates Gill. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012. P. 334.
4
Ibid. P. 338.
5
Pant H.V. Pakistan Thorn in China-India-U.S. Relations // The Washington Quarterly. Winter,
2012. P. 85.
6
JF-17 лучше «Сухих» – минобороны Пакистана. 11 августа 2010 // Перископ 2: новости
ОПК и ВТС России (http://periscope2.ru/2010/08/11/2684/).
[Pakistan‘s Defense Ministry says JF-17s are better than Sukhoys. August 11, 2010, Periskop 2:
Novosti OPK i VTS Rossii (http://periscope2.ru/2010/08/11/2684/ (in Russian)).]
30
undergoing a series of tests. According to official data ―the state of the

art Ra'ad Cruise Missile with Stealth Capabilities is a Low Altitude,
Terrain Hugging Missile with high maneuverability, and can deliver
nuclear and conventional warheads with great pin point accuracy‖7. The
Ra‘ad cruise missile can also become the main weapon system of the
Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC) established in May 2012 as the
custodian of the nation‘s 2nd strike capability8. It remains unclear
whether the sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) are to be deployed on
surface ships or on submarines. The latter appears less likely, as no open
source gives any account of Pakistan having conducted submarine
missile test launches.
India repeatedly conducted such launches, with the last of them
held in March 2012 using a sub-surface platform. That was a test of the
K-15 (Sagarika) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a
range of 750 km and a payload of 500 to 1000 kg according to different
estimations. India is also working on the K-4 SLBM with a range of up to
3500 km and a payload of up to 1000 kg. These missiles may be
deployed on the Arihant class submarines, sea trial of which has
commenced in 2012. This submarine has four launchers and can carry 12
K-15 missiles or four K-4 missiles. Arihant is to enter service in 20129.
These plans can be implemented to a great extent thanks to the valuable
experience India has acquired renting Russian multi-purpose Nerpa
(Chakra) nuclear-powered submarine that entered service of the Indian
Navy in 2012. It is used for the training of crews which will subsequently
sail Indian-made submarines10.
Despite certain advances in the development of the air and sea-
based components of their respective nuclear triads India‘s and
Pakistan‘s nuclear capabilities continue to rely mostly on ground-
launched missiles, which will retain their leading role in the foreseeable
future.
7
Press Release No. PR104/2011-ISPR. April 29, 2011 // ISPR — Inter Services Public Relations
(http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2011/4/29).
8
Press Release No. PR122/2012-ISPR. May 20, 2012 // ISPR — Inter Services Public Relations
(http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2012/5/19).
9
Pandit R. India Quietly Gate Crashes Into Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles Club? //
Times of India. July 31, 2012.
10
Емельяненков А. «Нерпа» вошла в состав ВМС Индии // Российская газета. 4 апреля
2012 г.
[Yemelyanenkov A. Nerpa enters the service of the Indian Navy// Rossiyskaya Gazeta. April 4,
2012, {in Russian).]
31
Pyotr Topychkanov
India’s Missile Capability. In mid 1980s Indira Gandhi‘s

government commissioned the Defense Research and Development
Organization (DRDO) to conduct research and development in three
areas, including on different classes of missiles. Since early 1980s Bharat
Dynamics Limited (BDL) has been the main defense agency of the
Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP).
In 1983, Prithvi-1 tactical missile capable of carrying both
nuclear and conventional warheads was the first project approved under
the IGMDP. According to some estimates, 5 to 10 percent technologies
used in this missile were foreign-based, including liquid propulsion and
guidance systems11. The missile was successfully flight-tested in 1988
for the first time, with a total of 14 flight tests held, of which only one
proved a failure. In 1994 BDL started serial production of Prithvi-112.
The first liquid-propulsion tactical missile of the Prithvi family
was followed by other types: Prithvi-2 (first flight test held in 1992)
intended for the Air Force, and Dhanush (2000) and Prithvi-3 (2004) for
the Navy. By now BDL may have manufactured over 150 Prithvi-1
missiles and over 70 Prithvi-2 missiles (See Table 2). As for Prithvi-3, if
BDL has completely fulfilled the Navy‘s order, India should possess over
80 missiles of this modification. However these missiles cannot be
deployed yet, as India has no ships with the required launchers.
The Prithvi system is also considered for export. As far back as in
1996 Indian authorities included Prithvi missiles in their exports lists13.
The Agni medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) was the
second project under the IGMDP approved in 198314. It was developed
by the Advanced Systems Laboratory (Hyderabad), while BDL was
tasked with its production15. The so-called Agni technology demonstrator
was first test-launched in 1989, and in 1992 and 1994 more test launches
were held.
Based on the results in 1995 India decided to develop Agni-2
operational weapon system. Its first test launch in 1999 was shortly
followed by the tests of other missiles of the family: Agni-1 (2002),
11
India Defence Industry. October 16, 2002 // Central Investigation Agency
(http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/research_supported_by_nic/conference_paper/bristow.htm).
12
BDL Milestones // Bharat Dynamics Limited (http://bdl.ap.nic.in/milestones.htm).
13
Kumar D. Prithvi, Other Missiles Available For Export // Times of India. January 14, 1996;
Pandit R. New Delhi Planning to Sell Missiles to Friends // Times of India. May 2, 2003.
14
Subramanian T.S. A Success Story // Frontline. 2005. Vol. 22. Issue 20.
15
Missile Defense Headlines Update. May 14, 2010 – May 20, 2010 / Ed. by P. Lahr. Alexandria:
Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 2010. P. 32.
32
Agni-2 Prime/Plus (2010), Agni-3 (2006), with Agni 4/5 being currently
developed. It is assumed that only one-stage Agni-1 solid-propellant
tactical missile and two-stage Agni-2 solid propellant MRBM entered
service16, with Agni-1 manufactured since 2004, and Agni-2 since 2001.
On April 19, 2012 India conducted the test launch of Agni-5
missile, after which its officials announced that India joined the ―elite
missile club‖ of states possessing inter-continental missiles17. In reality
Agni-5 is essentially a medium-range missile, which may enter service
in 2015, should a series of its test prove successful18.
Table 2.
India’s Ballistic Missile Capability

No. of
Total No.
Designatio Produced pieces Cost per
Class Warhead of pieces
n since produced missiles
produced
annually
Prithvi-1 Ttactical Conventional 1994 ~150
Prithvi-2 Ttactical Conventional 2004? 10-50 ~70 About
missiles of $500,000
Prithvi-3 Ttactical Nuclear 2004? the Prithvi ~80 per a
Dhanush Ttactical Nuclear 2003? family Over 25 missile
Sagarika Ttactical Nuclear ? ?
Agni-1 Ttactical Nuclear 2004 ? ? ?
$4.8-6.6
Agni-2 MRBM Nuclear 2001 10-18 ~100
million
Agni-3 Ttactical Nuclear ? ? ? ?
Agni-4/5 MRBM Nuclear ? ? ? ?
Source: Compiled by the author
Pakistan’s Missile Capability. Pakistan has closely cooperated

with other countries to develop its nuclear weapon programme. There are
also suspicions that Pakistan has transferred the technology for the
production and testing of nuclear weapons to DPRK since 1997 in
exchange for the medium-range ballistic missiles technology. The
missiles in question are Pakistan‘s Ghauri-1, 2 and 3 liquid-propellant
missiles (test launched respectively on April 6, 1998, April 14, 1999, and
16
Pandit R. Op. cit.
17
India Test-Fires Agni-V; Joins Elite Missile Club // Deccan Herald. — 2012. — Apr. 19.
18
Pandit R. India Quietly Gate Crashes Into Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles Club? //
Times of India. July 31, 2012.
33
Pyotr Topychkanov
possibly August 15, 200019). According to certain estimates, Pakistan‘s

Ghauri-1 is a full copy of the North Korean Nodong missile, while
Ghauri-2 and 3 are a combination of North Korean and domestic
technologies20.
Shaheen missile family was developed with the help of China.
Indeed, Shaheen-1 is a Pakistani version of the Chinese DF-15 missile.
The first test launch of Shaheen-1 took place on April 15, 1999. At a
military parade in 2000 Islamabad demonstrated the two-stage Shaheen-2
medium-range missile and a missile with a range of 2,500 km capable of
carrying a payload of 700 kg21.
All Pakistan‘s missiles can carry both conventional and nuclear
warheads, while the country‘s leadership reportedly decided to arm Hatf-
1 and Hatf-2/Abdali missiles exclusively with conventional warheads
(similarly to India which uses conventional warheads on its Prithvi-1 and
Prithvi-2 missiles)22. However, at the moment Pakistan possesses barely
enough nuclear warheads to arm 100 of the total of its 360 missiles (See
Table 3). It is assumed that Pakistan is currently working to shift its
nuclear weapon programme from uranium enrichment to plutonium
production23. As Pakistan and India implement no confidence-building
measures with regard to nuclear and conventional warheads on their
missiles, a conventional missile launched by any of the parties may
always be mistaken for a nuclear one and provoke the other side‘s
nuclear response.
At peacetime both India‘s and Pakistan‘s nuclear forces remain
de-alerted. To make their nuclear forces operational, the two countries
would need about the same time they would need to assess the
consequences of the other side‘s missile strike. However, when the two
19
Тронов А.М., Лукоянов А.К. Средства доставки ядерного оружия Пакистана, May 17,
2006 // Институт Ближнего Востока, (http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2006/17-05-06b.htm)
[Tronov A.M., Lukoyanov A.K. Pakistan‘s Nuclear Weapons Delivery Means. May 17, 2006,
Institute of the Middle East Studies, (http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2006/17-05-06b.htm.), in
Russian.]
20
Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous counter-trades // IISS Strategic Comments. November
2002. Vol. 8. Issue 9. P. 1; Cirincione J., Wolfsthal J.B., Rajkumar M. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Threats. Washington, 2005. P. 108-109.
21
Тронов А.М., Лукоянов А.К. Указ. соч.
[Tronov A.M., Lukoyanov A.K. Op. cit.]
22
Kumar A., Vannoni M. Op. cit. P. 42.
23
Moskalenko V., Topychkanov P. Nuclear Pakistan: Possibilities of Neutralizing the Threats to
the NPT Regime // Russia: Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security / IMEMO
Supplement to the Russian Edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2009 / Ed. by A. Kaliadine, A.
Arbatov. Moscow: IMEMO, 2010. P. 135.
34
states are in conflict and their nuclear forces may be put on alert, this
scenario of a nuclear exchange by miscalculation seems more probable.
Of all Pakistan‘s missiles, only Hatf-6/Shaheen-2 MRBMs are
capable of reaching targets in any part of India‘s territory. It is assumed
that all the missiles of this type (totaling over 10) are on launchers24.
Pakistan also possesses other missiles with a range sufficient to threaten
critical Indian military, administrative and industrial facilities, including
the country‘s capital, New Delhi.
In addition to nuclear strikes against India‘s administrative and
industrial centers, Pakistan presumably plans nuclear strikes against
India‘s armed force, including use of nuclear weapons on its own
territory in case of invasion25. This explains the diversity of Pakistani
tactical missiles, including the developed Hatf-9/NASR missile.
According to official data, this high-accuracy missile has a range of
60 km and is launched from mobile launchers, which makes it possible to
quickly change firing positions26.
Table 3.
Pakistan’s Ballistic Missile Capability

Designation Range, km Payload, kg Warhead Entered
service
Hatf-1 70-100 500 Conventional 1992
Hatf-2 / Abdali 180-260 250-450 Conventional 2005
Hatf-3 / Ghaznavi 400 500 Nuclear 2004 (?)
Hatf-4 / Shaheen-1 >450 700-1,000 Nuclear 1999
Hatf-5 / Ghauri-1 1,300 1,000 Nuclear 1998
Hatf-5А / Ghauri-2 1,500-1,800 700 Nuclear 1999 (?)
Hatf-6 / Shaheen-2 2,500 700 Nuclear 2005 (?)
Source: Compiled by the author
24
Kristensen H. Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2007. May 9, 2007 // FAS Strategic Security Blog
(http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/05/article_pakistani_nuclear_forc.php). In 2007, Hans
Kristensen assumed that Pakistan was preparing to deploy Hatf-6/Shaheen-2 missiles, in response
to which Tasneem Aslam, the spokesperson of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, said, ―This is
speculation which contains some truth and some fiction‖ (Quoted from: A Day Later, Pak Plays
Down Report on GeNext N-Missile // The Times of India. — 2007. — May 11).
25
The author‘s communication with a Pakistani government official who requested anonymity
(Islamabad, October 27, 2010).
26
Press Release No. PR94/2011-ISPR. April 19, 2011 // ISPR — Inter Services Public Relations
(http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721).
35
Pyotr Topychkanov
India’s and Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrines. Neither India, nor

Pakistan have official nuclear doctrines. Still it is possible to get a
general idea of their perception of the role of nuclear weapons from
official statements and documents. In accordance with the decision of the
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) dated January 4, 2003, ―India‘s
nuclear doctrine can be summarized as follows: 1) building and
maintaining a credible minimum deterrent; 2) a posture of "No First
Use": nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear
attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere; 3) nuclear
retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict
unacceptable damage...‖27
As Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said on May 20, 1999,
―nuclear restraint, stabilization and minimum credible deterrence
constitute the basic elements of Pakistan's nuclear policy‖28.
There are certain contradictions in India‘s and Pakistan‘s
concepts of minimum credible deterrence:
First, how India can match ―minimal deterrence‖ with the concept
of having a capability for a massive retaliatory strike?
Second, will India strictly comply with its no-first-use
commitment, if it faces an imminent threat of nuclear attack before it has
deployed missile defense system or developed robust retaliatory
capability?
Third, would Pakistan abstain from building up its nuclear
capability and raising its alert level at peacetime if India deploys a
missile defense system and acquires powerful retaliatory strike capability
relying on much shorter time of bringing forces to high operational
readiness?
Arms Control. India and Pakistan have no arms control
agreements, despite having a mutual nuclear deterrence relationship and
approximate parity of nuclear forces. This may be explained by the
following reasons.
27
Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalization India‘s Nuclear
Doctrine // Press Information Bureau, Government of India, January 4, 2003
(http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html).
28
Remarks of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, on Nuclear Policies and the CTBT,
National Defence College, Islamabad, May 20, 1999 (Quoted from: Ayaz Ahmed Khan. Indian
Offensive in the Kargil Sector // Defence Journal. June, 1999
(http://www.defencejournal.com/jun99/indian-offensive.htm)
36
First, India and Pakistan are in the process of building up and

modernizing their nuclear forces in pursuit of advantage over each other
and do not want to be constrained by any agreed limitations.
Second, so far India has not viewed Pakistan as an equal state and
is unwilling to legalize any equality with it through arms limitation
agreements (which by definition imply equality of the parties).
Third, India‘s nuclear forces are directed at China as well as
Pakistan, and equal limitations for India and Pakistan would weaken New
Delhi‘s position in the military balance with Beijing.
Fourth, Pakistan strives to secure advantage over India in nuclear
forces in order to make up for India‘s overwhelming superiority in
general purpose forces.
Fifth, India is unwilling to exchange even basic information on
the composition and structure of its nuclear forces with Pakistan in order
to prevent its leakage to India‘s other potential adversary, China.
Sixth, India and Pakistan declare their commitment to minimum
credible deterrence, but they are unwilling to legalize their postures in
any binding manner fearing that the other party may cheat or circumvent
the limitations in some other manner.
At the same time, India and Pakistan have signed some
agreements pertaining to confidence-building measures:
the 1991 agreement banning attacks on nuclear facilities;
the 2005 agreement on advance notice of ballistic missile
tests;
the 2007 agreement to prevent any emergencies involving
nuclear weapons.
Neither of these agreements provides for any verification
mechanisms and procedures. It can be assumed that with the geographic
vicinity of the two countries and high activity of the intelligence services,
they feel no need for special verification mechanisms in certain spheres.
For example, either country‘s preparations for a missile test would hardly
remain unnoticed by the other. Hence both are ready to notify each other
of the test to avoid any misinterpretation. Nevertheless, in the absence of
agreed verification mechanisms India and Pakistan have more chances
for unilateral steps which may destabilize the military environment in the
region.
The two states elaborated confidence-building measures most
actively at the time of their Comprehensive Dialogue of 2004-2008. The
idea of this dialogue was put forward by Pakistan in 1998 as part of the
37
Pyotr Topychkanov
proposal to establish a ―Strategic Restraint Regime‖. Although India did

not accept the proposal, some of its components were reflected in the
1999 Lahore Declaration, for example: ―[The two Governments] shall
take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized
use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to
elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and
conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict‖.
The 2005-2007 bilateral agreements on confidence-building
measures came as a direct result of the Comprehensive Dialogue, which
was phased out after the 2008 terrorist attack on Indian city of Mumbai,
as India accused Pakistan of supporting the terrorists. The Dialogue was
resumed in 2012, but has not so far brought about the discussion of
―concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for
confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields‖.
As India and Pakistan advance in the development of their
strategic capabilities, they continuously review the key principles of their
nuclear posture - primarily the principles of minimal credible deterrence.
Both qualitative and quantitative characteristics of Indian and Pakistani
nuclear arsenals change incessantly.
Although India is committed to no-first-use of nuclear weapons,
and plans a retaliatory strike only, its nuclear forces are hardly survivable
and reliable enough to endure potential adversary‘s nuclear attack.
India is applying huge resources for developing a nuclear force
capable of mounting a retaliatory strike against major political, economic
and military targets in the territory of potential adversary: Pakistan and
China, under any circumstances. India is probably planning to develop a
non-nuclear counterforce capability against Pakistan, as well as BMD
system.
In contrast to India, Pakistan plans to use its nuclear weapons not
only against political and economic centers, but also against conventional
forces in India‘s territory, or in Pakistan‘s own territory, should they
invade.
There is a danger that India‘s expanding capabilities in both
defensive and offensive arms may provoke an asymmetric response on
the part of Pakistan, including sabotage and terrorism. Pakistani experts
realize that such response would have an extremely destabilizing effect,
but this choice can be driven by internal factors and implemented despite
the experts‘ opinion.
38
To prevent the worst scenario India, Pakistan with the help of the
third states should pay most serious attention to preventing conflicts
between the two countries, with a special emphasis on the prevention of
possible use of nuclear weapons.
To this end the two countries could provide for partial
transparency of their nuclear forces with regard to their capabilities and
location, for example, by signing a verifiable agreement on the non-
deployment of nuclear weapons in border areas. Even if such agreement
makes no military sense (as it can quickly be reversed in a crisis
situation), politically it could have a positive effect on Indo-Pakistani
bilateral relations.
The two countries could also contribute to reducing the risk of a
nuclear conflict by agreeing on mutual obligations not to deploy nuclear
weapons in disputed areas.
These goals can also be achieved through mutual de-alerting of
tactical missiles (i.e. through legal obligations to observe the existing
practice of separate storage of nuclear warheads and their delivery
means) and notifying any changes to this status in case of military
exercises. This would not affect Indian and Pakistani ability to
unilaterally change the level of alert of their medium-range, and possible
future intercontinental missiles which they can target against each other
and states outside South Asia.
India and Pakistan could also officially adopt national nuclear
doctrines providing for the no-firs- use of nuclear weapons which would
contribute to strengthening stability in the region. So far Pakistan has
found this unacceptable due to India‘s advantage in general purpose
forces (in fact, Russia and Israel are guided by the same doctrinal logic).
Therefore, future comprehensive military settlement will also
require agreements limiting quantitative levels and location of the
parties‘ general purpose forces, and envisaging confidence-building and
transparency measures. Many elements of the experience of the US,
Russia and China in limiting conventional forces and arms in Europe and
along Russian-Chinese border could be used in South Asia.
It goes without saying that such agreements could be attained
only after the parties have settled their territorial dispute and other issues
of bilateral relations.
39
Alexei Arbatov
5. PROSPECTS OF ENGAGING INDIA AND

PAKISTAN IN NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATIONS
Alexei Arbatov
Political and military relations among the nine nuclear-weapon

states differ greatly, which makes the environment within this group
highly heterogenius. Many of these states are not tied by any relations at
all, which is the case of Israel and North Korea (DPRK), who have
nothing to negotiate with each other.
Therefore, nine-party multilateral negotiations appear to be highly
unlikely. North Korea is viewed by many as an ―illegal‖ nuclear-weapon
state who withdrew from the Treaty breaching its provisions. There is
also an ―unacknowledged‖ nuclear-weapon state, Israel, who neither
acknowledges nor denies the possession of nuclear arms. What would
serve as a basis for negotiations to limit it?
This immediately leads one to a question of whether the number
of parties should be brought down to seven instead of nine? Nevertheless,
there is an almost inseparable linkage between the nuclear postures of
India and Pakistan, while India‘s one is also strongly dependent on those
of China. Hence, the nuclear forces of India and Pakistan, their levels and
modernization are determined within these bilateral and trilateral formats.
They are by no means driven by the US and Russia‘s nuclear
capabilities and their limitations. The US and Russia‘s nuclear arms
reductions are strategically interdependent (despite their declarations at
the UN), but are not linked in any way to the reduction of India‘s and
Pakistan‘s forces.
So, should the negotiations involve five parties, rather than
seven? The discussion of the nuclear weapons of the P-5 states is already
underway. However, it will hardly ever transform in any practical
negotiations on arms limitations. The US, the UK and France are allies in
NATO, their forces complementing each other to a great extent. The
arms limitation by the US depends on the limitations by Russia (and in
the future also by China), but not those by the UK and France.
Limitation of China‘s forces and programmes cannot be weighed
against those of the European nuclear-weapon states, as unlike these
40
states China is not allied to anyone and cannot enjoy anyone‘s security
guarantees. China‘s nuclear forces are intended to deter the US, India and
probably Russia by default, rather than the UK and France. Any possible
limitations by China would depend on the limits observed by the US,
Russia and India, but not any common criteria established within the P-5.
As soon as India is involved in this once again, the number of the
parties turns to six instead of five. Yet it is pointless to engage India
while ignoring Pakistan, which brings us back to seven. This is a vicious
circle of the multilateral format.
Certainly, it is possible, and in fact rather pleasant to discuss these
issues in the P-5 format. Why not? However, from a practical perspective
such negotiations would produce another, yet smaller, conference on
disarmament similar to the one in Geneva. The expansion of the list of
participants from five to seven, eight, or even to nine would yield
nothing. Rather, it would further affect the quality of the discussion. One
can easily imagine what other states would say to Russia and the US and
what reply those would give. The former would say that Russia and the
US should engage in further reductions, promising to join them at some
point in the future, while the latter would respond that further reductions
cannot be pursued unless the third countries are engaged. This is another
vicious circle of the multilateral format.
Nevertheless, the multilateralization of nuclear disarmament is
still possible. This can be attained through establishing new bilateral fora
of states, where negotiations would rest on a sound basis provided by
mutual nuclear deterrence, rather than through engaging new states in the
current negotiating process.
Indeed, the principle ―I concede if you concede‖ underpins any
disarmament deal. Israel has nothing to negotiate with North Korea,
while the UK and France have nothing to negotiate with the US, although
the reasons might differ. Other states, such as the US and China, or the
UK and Russia, might have subjects for negotiations, but their nuclear
forces are too unequal in strength, which is a major obstacle to
agreements in this sphere that usually rest on approximate equality of
parties and suggest the parties‘ equal rights in the balance of
compromises.
In this context, India and Pakistan make an absolutely unique
pair, a sort of a ―dipole‖ in this multilateral nuclear balance including
nine nuclear-weapon states and some more threshold countries. As a
matter of fact, these two countries have relations of mutual nuclear
41
Alexei Arbatov
deterrence and possess approximately equal nuclear capabilities. They

have certain nuclear parity, and despite some asymmetries and
differences they are much more comparable than any other two nuclear-
weapon states, save for the US and Russia.
The US-Russian nuclear arms reduction and limitation talks have
historically rested upon this basis. At the same time, in South Asia there
is high potential for the use of nuclear weapons. This should be a
powerful incentive for everyone to facilitate the commencement of Indo-
Pakistani dialogue, and subsequently their practical negotiations on
nuclear arms limitations.
The forty years‘ experience of the USSR-US and Russian-US
talks has demonstrated that nuclear weapons subject to agreements are a
completely different matter as compared to weapons not subject to any
agreements, transparency measures and limitations. Nuclear weapons
make great political sense, and those of them subject to agreements pose
lesser danger to peace than those that are not. Indeed, limitations and
confidence-building and predictability measures reduce the possibility of
their operational use and make it possible to forecast future strategic
situation.
As for other things, Ambassador Sharma from India has rightly
pointed to the lack of trust. Yet the trust cannot appear just out of the
blue, it is gradually won through talks, agreements and complying with
the agreements. There had been no trust between the US and the USSR
until they engaged in negotiations on nuclear arms. Although things ran
far from smoothly and serious differences emerged from time to time,
during these four decades the two sides have built up notable trust in
strategic sphere, and it were talks and treaties that have contributed most.
No doubt, in case of India of Pakistan one has to take into account
the political situation and avoid making projects not grounded in reality.
At the same time one should not confine themselves to the current
political situation and neglect material basis of military relations:
systems, forces and strategies, i.e. all those factors that come to the fore
as soon as practical negotiations begin.
Time goes quickly and many things recede in memory, and
successful negotiations are viewed in idyllic light later on. It should
nevertheless be reminded that four decades back the US-USSR
negotiations took place against an extremely unfavourable background of
the war in Vietnam. As the talks drew to a close in 1972, the bombing of
Hanoi and the mining of Haiphong Harbour followed, due to which
42
Soviet vessels were damaged. President Nixon‘s visit to Moscow, during

which the SALT I Agreement and ABM Treaty were to be signed, was
almost cancelled.
At that time many Soviet government and party officials believed
that political situation precluded any agreements. If Leonid Brezhnev had
heeded to those calls and refused to sign these instruments, the strategic
arms limitation process would very probably have never started. Indeed,
later on other complications followed, such as the fall of South Vietnam,
the developments in the Horn of Africa, Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan,
President Reagan‘s ―Star Wars‖, the deployment of Pershing-2 missiles
in Europe and so on. It is very probable that if the US and the USSR had
not begun this process in 1972, they would have reached nothing in their
nuclear arms reduction by now, or their progress would have been much
more modest.
Therefore, although political relations and trust are pivotal, it is
also important to engage in negotiations which in itself serve as a major
means of improving political relations and confidence-building, rather
than mere struggle for nuclear disarmament.
India and Pakistan could use the US-USSR 1987 Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) as a model and conclude a
similar agreement. Rather than envisaging ―global double-zero‖, such
agreement could set forth equal ceilings for missiles of certain range.
Taking in consideration all the details and understandings that have been
developed so far and enshrined in the INF Treaty the new arrangement
could set forth certain equal levels for relevant weapons covered by the
INF Treaty. This refers to ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles
with a range of 500 to 5,500 km, which prevail in India‘s and Pakistan‘s
arsenals. As an alternative, the parties could begin with limiting their
medium-range missiles (with a range of 1,000 to 5,500 km).
At the same time, Air Force, Navy and intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) would remain outside the scope of such agreement, and
India would be able to rely on this capability in its balance of forces with
China. Pakistan would also enjoy this right, although it will hardly decide
to use it.
Such limitation by a common ceiling, whether of 50, 100 or 150
missiles, would in itself be a great step forward. This scheme seems
worth considering, while certainly taking into account all other political
and psychological aspects, including terrorism, instability within
Pakistan, the two countries‘ territorial disputes, and so on.
43
Alexei Arbatov
It is generally known that India is concerned over China, as well

as over Pakistan, as this is a matter of nuclear standoff in South Asia.
However, it will hardly be possible to make China enter a trilateral
agreement, as its nuclear forces are primarily intended to deter the US,
while treating India as an afterthought.
Such strategic multi-target approach is quite common: so far the
US and the USSR (Russia) have engaged in bilateral strategic arms
limitation and reduction talks, although both countries‘ nuclear
deterrence strategies were also directed to China, while the USSR and
subsequently Russia in addition had the UK and France in mind. There is
little practical possibility of trilateral negotiations among India, Pakistan
and China, with US-Sino-Russian trilateral negotiations being equally
unlikely. At the same time, bilateral US-China nuclear arms limitation
talks could provide additional security guarantees for India, if the latter
consent to limiting certain classes and types of its nuclear weapons under
agreements with Pakistan. Similarly, the US-Russian agreements support,
although indirectly, the security of China, the UK and France.
44
Conclusions
CONCLUSIONS
1. India and Pakistan are states of concern, whose nuclear

status has not been recognized under the existing international law. Any
attempt to legalize them as nuclear-weapon states would undermine the
NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation regime. It would lead to the
revision of the NPT logic and virtually put an end to the Treaty,
destroying the entire NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation regime. Such
dramatic alterations to the Treaty would logically demonstrate that the
countries that failed to sign the NPT and place their nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards but succeeded in developing their nuclear-
weapons programmes can avoid all the pains of this option, accede to the
Treaty as nuclear-weapon states and enjoy considerable political and
military benefit. This would be a tempting example to all the threshold
states and bring about a chain reaction of proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
2. Due to the fact that India and Pakistan possess nuclear
weapons, there exists a threat that any bilateral conflict may escalate to
the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, many experts insist that
nuclear weapons, including in the Indian subcontinent, act as a deterrent.
There is no definite answer to this question. Nuclear weapons might
make the states behave more cautiously, but if they nevertheless engage
in an armed conflict (as was the case in 1999, after both countries had
conducted nuclear tests), its consequences would be much more
catastrophic both on the regional and on the global scale.
3. Mutual deterrence between India and Pakistan is
influenced by other nuclear-weapon states. Neither country has official
nuclear doctrine, which makes it difficult to analyze objectively their
perception of the role of nuclear weapons. However, with the tangle of
contradictions, military confrontation and the intensive development of
weapons, South Asia has become the world‘s region with the highest
potential for the use of nuclear weapons.
4. India‘s nuclear status de-facto places it among the powers
with both regional and global ambitions. From the military perspective,
India‘s nuclear weapons are intended foremost to deter China which is
45
Conclusions
perceived as the country‘s main strategic rival. Besides, according to

Indian nuclear doctrine — whatever unclear and ambiguous it is — India
should be able to inflict unacceptable damage on Pakistan with a
retaliatory nuclear strike.
5. Pakistan‘s nuclear status has been associated with the
leadership in the Islamic world, as Pakistan is the only Muslim state
possessing nuclear arms. What is more, it remains a potential donor of
missile and nuclear technologies for other Islamic states.
Pakistani political and military leaders would hardly think of
mounting a preemptive strike against India. However, taking in
consideration specific characteristics of the balance of forces and the
trends in the modernization of the two countries‘ nuclear weapons, it
could be assumed that Pakistan plans for the first use of nuclear weapons
against India‘s general-purpose forces in case of conflict. It is planning to
inflict unacceptable damage with a retaliatory strike against India‘s
densely populated cities in response to India‘s massive nuclear strike
(after Pakistani first nuclear weapons use at the battlefield). This is a
possible raison d‘être of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons.
In addition, there is a grave concern over the lack of stability
within Pakistan which may under certain circumstances lead to the loss
of control over the country‘s nuclear arsenal or some of its parts.
6. Some of the recent developments lead to further
aggravation of the situation in the region. Indeed, the US-India
agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation and the 2008 decision by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to exempt India from export control
restrictions, have had considerable effect both in political terms and in
terms of security. Both of these events have been viewed as a step
towards India‘s legitimization as a nuclear-weapon state.
India‘s efforts to develop national missile defense system that in
theory can challenge Pakistan‘s nuclear deterrent provides additional
incentive for arms race both within the region and in the Chinese-Indian
context.
Indo-Pakistani relations are characterized by a comparably low
(as compared to the NPT nuclear-weapon states) level of the ―nuclear
culture‖. As the two countries implement no confidence-building
measures as to the type of weapons carried by their missiles, a
conventional missile launched by any of the parties may be mistaken for
a nuclear one and bring about the other side‘s nuclear response.
46
Conclusions
7. Hopefully there are signs that India and Pakistan have

engaged in mutual ―political sounding‖ in order to have a better idea of
each other‘s perceptions of nuclear policy and military preparations. It is
also very encouraging that each of the parties observes their unilateral
moratoria on nuclear tests.
India and Pakistan have no arrangements on arms control. At the
same time, Delhi and Islamabad have signed a number of agreements on
confidence-building measures, which demonstrates the parties‘ ability to
agree.
8. A set of measures should be taken in order to stabilize
Indo-Pakistani bilateral relations and to prevent armed conflicts, in
particular those involving the use of nuclear weapons. To this end the
two countries could provide for partial transparency of their nuclear
forces as to their capabilities and location, for instance, through signing a
verifiable agreement on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in
border areas.
9. The two countries could also contribute to reducing the
risk of a nuclear conflict by mutual obligations not to deploy nuclear
weapons in disputed areas. These goals can also be achieved through
mutual de-alerting of tactical missiles (i.e. through legalizing the existing
practice of separate storage of nuclear warheads and their delivery
means) and notifying any changes to their status in case of military
exercises.
10. As an illustration of possible arms control agreement,
India and Pakistan could use the US-USSR 1987 INF Treaty as a model
and conclude a similar deal. However, rather than envisaging ―global
double-zero‖, it might utilize many details and understandings of the INF
Treaty and establish a certain equal level (of 50, 100 or 150 missiles) for
relevant weapons covered by the INF Treaty. The limitations could apply
to ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to
5,500 km (or at least 1,000 to 5,500 km to begin with), which prevail in
India‘s and Pakistan‘s arsenals.
At the same time, air, naval arms and ICBMs would remain
outside the scope of such agreement, and India would be able to rely on
them in its balance of forces with China.
11. China directs its nuclear forces primarily to deter the US,
while treating India as ―collateral‖. There is little practical possibility of
trilateral negotiations among India, Pakistan and China, and trilateral US-
China-Russia negotiations are equally unlikely. At the same time,
47
Conclusions
bilateral US-China nuclear arms limitation agreements could provide

additional security guarantees for India, if the latter consent to enter into
agreements with Pakistan limiting certain classes and types of its nuclear
weapons.
12. India does not envision nuclear arms control or
disarmament except in multilateral negotiations under the UN auspices
with participation of all nuclear weapon states. This specific position
smacks of propaganda rather than a practical attempt to tackle the issue
and appears to be an excuse for India‘s reluctance to engage in bilateral
talks (matched by Pakistan‘s reluctance to do so).
This, nevertheless, opens certain mediation possibilities for the P-
5 and international agencies with the view to strengthening stability in
Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations and developing both bilateral and
multilateral dialogue on a wide range of nuclear security issues in South
Asia.
48
ANNEX 1
Abbreviations
BDL Bharat Dynamics Limited

BMD ballistic missile defense
CD Conference on Disarmament
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
Defense Research and Development
DRDO
Organization
FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IGMDP Integrated Guided Missile Development Program
IMEMO Institute of World Economy and International
RAN Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences
INC Indian National Congress
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (Treaty
between the United States of America and the
INF Treaty Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and
Shorter-Range Missiles, 1987)
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
LAC Line of Actual Control
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba
MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCA National Command Authority (Pakistan)
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
NPT
Weapons
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NTI Nuclear Threat Initiative
NWFZ nuclear weapon free zone
PLA People‘s Liberation Army (China)
PRC People‘s Republic of China
R&D research and development
49
South Asian Association for Regional
SAARC
Cooperation
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM submarine-launched cruise missile
UN United Nations
50
ANNEX 2
List of Participants in the Conference

Moscow, IMEMO RAN, October 18, 2012
1. Alexander A. Dynkin, Director of IMEMO RAN, Academician of

the Russian Academy of Sciences.
2. Askar Akbayev, First Secretary, Embassy of Kazakhstan.
3. Alexei G. Arbatov, Head of the Center for International Security,
IMEMO RAN, Academician of the Russian Academy of
Sciences.
4. Ildar A. Akhtamzyan, Associate Professor, Department of
International Relations and Foreign Policy of Russia, Moscow
State Institute of International Relations (University) of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (MGIMO(U)).
5. Tasnim Akhtar, Second Secretary, Embassy of the United
Kingdom.
6. Eldar Bayramov, First Secretary, Embassy of Azerbaijan.
7. Vladimir G. Baranovsky, Deputy Director of IMEMO RAN,
Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
8. Oksana L. Bosyuk, Third Secretary, Embassy of Ukraine in
Russia.
9. Robin Brooks, First Secretary, Embassy of the United States.
10. Evgeny P. Buzhinsky, Senior Vice President, PIR Center,
Lieutenant General (rtd).
11. Petr G. Cheremushkin, Political Section, Embassy of the United
States.
12. Dmitry A. Chizhov, Researcher, Strategic Studies Section, Center
for International Security, IMEMO RAN.
13. Margaret Chung, PHD Student, Department of Political Theory,
Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the MFA of
Russia.
14. Gennady I. Chufrin, Board of Directors, IMEMO RAN,
Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
15. Eugeny A. Druzin, Reporter, Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier
newspaper.
16. Vladimir Z. Dvorkin, Chief Researcher, Center for International
Security, IMEMO RAN, Major-General (rtd.).
51
17. Anatoly S. Dyakov, Senior Researcher, Center for Arms Control,
Energy and Environmental Studies.
18. Kobi Haviv, Defense Attaché, Embassy of Israel, Colonel.
19. Vyacheslav M. Ivanov, political observer, Interfax news agency.
20. Stanislav M. Ivanov, Principal Research Associate, Center for
International Security, IMEMO RAN.
21. Alexander A. Khramchikhin, Deputy Director, Institute for
Political and Military Analysis.
22. Elina V. Kirichenko, Director, Center for North American
Studies, IMEMO RAN.
23. Roman Kowalczuk, First Councellor, Embassy of Poland in
Russian Federation.
24. Mikhail B. Kustovsky, First Secretary, Department for Security
Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.
25. Yevgeni V. Miasnikov, Director, Center for Arms Control,
Energy and Environmental Studies.
26. Vladimir E. Novikov, Principle Research Associate, Russian
Institute for Strategic Studies.
27. Sergey K. Oznobishchev, Head of Sector, Center for International
Security, IMEMO RAN.
28. Alexander N. Perendzhiev, Associate Professor, Department of
Political and Social Science, Russian Plekhanov Economic
University.
29. Alexander V. Radchuk, Adviser to the Head of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Colonel (reserve
duty).
30. Vladimir P. Radyukhin, newspaper reporter, The Hindu (India).
31. Natalia P. Romashkina, Researcher, Center for International
32. Vladimir I. Rybachenkov, Principal Research Associate, Center
for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Moscow
Institute of Physics and Technology.
33. Leonid F. Ryabikhin, Head of Sector, Research Center,
Committee of Scientists for Global Security.
34. Vladimir I. Sazhin, Senior Researcher, Institute of Oriental
Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IVRAN).
35. Peter Schroeder, Second Secretary, Embassy of the United States.
52
36. Sheel Kant Sharma, Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power
Studies (New Delhi, India), Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary.
37. Alexander I. Shumilin, Director, Center for Analysis of Middle
East conflicts, Institute of the US and Canadian Studies of the
Russian Academy of Sciences (ISK RAN).
38. Vladimir Yu. Sizov, Head, Center for Military and Strategic
Studies, Institute of the US and Canadian Studies of the Russian
Academy of Sciences (ISK RAN).
39. Yuri V. Tavrovsky, Editor-in-Chief, Diplomat magazine.
40. Petr V. Topychkanov, Senior Researcher, Center for International
41. Sergey V. Tselitsky, Researcher, Strategic Studies Section, Center
for International Security, IMEMO RAN.
42. Anatoly D. Tsyganok, Head of Center for Military Forecasting,
Institute for Political and Military Analysis, Colonel (reserve
duty).
43. Vyacheslav I. Trubnikov, Board of Directors, IMEMO RAN,
General of the Army (rtd.), Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary.
44. Sergey S. Veselovsky, Associate Professor, Department of World
Political Processes, Moscow State Institute of International
Relations of the MFA of Russia.
45. Vadim I. Vladimirov, Senior Researcher, Center for International
46. Boris M. Volkhonsky, Senior Researcher, Sector of Asian
Studies, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies.
47. Alexander V. Vorontsov, Head, Section of Korean and Mongolian
Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of
Sciences.
48. Jacek Wesolowski, Deputy Defense Attaché, Embassy of Poland,
Moscow, Lieutenant-Colonel.
49. Vladimir V. Yevseev, Director, Center for International Security,
IMEMO RAN, Lieutenant Colonel (rtd).
50. Marianna G. Yevtodyeva, Senior Researcher, Center for
International Security, IMEMO RAN.
51. Victor I. Yesin, Chief Researcher, Institute of the US and Canada
Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Colonel General (rtd).
53
52. Alexander Z. Zhebin, Head of Center for Korean Studies, Institute
of the Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
53. Efim L. Zhigun, Director, Institute of Middle East Studies.
54. Irina D.Zvyagilevskaya, Professor, Department of Oriental
Studies, Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the
MFA of Russia.
54

Prospects of Engaging India and Pakistan in Nuclear Arms Limitations

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Prospects of Engaging India and Pakistan in Nuclear Arms Limitations

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Prospects of Engaging India and Pakistan in Nuclear Arms Limitations

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY

AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

PROSPECTS OF ENGAGING INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Edited by Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin

Foreword by Academician Alexander A. Dynkin at the Conference

Authors: Alexei Arbatov, A. Sultan, Pyotr Topychkanov, Vyacheslav

Prospects of Engaging India and Pakistan in Nuclear Arms Limitations

Publications by IMEMO RAN are available at http://www.imemo.ru

ISBN 978-5-9535-0358-7 © IMEMO RAN, 2012

FOREWORD by Academician Alexander A. Dynkin, Director

by Academician Alexander A. Dynkin, Director

Dear participants in the Conference,

North Korea) are far from homogenous, with mutual nuclear

This research based on the outcome of the conference hosted by

The crisis of the non-proliferation regime, which has recently

As a result, there is an obvious lack of incentives and possibilities

1. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR STATUS IN INDIA’S

October 20, 2012 marked the 50th anniversary of a key event in

It should be stressed that in this case the term ―nuclear status‖ as

It would be advisable to discuss India‘s and Pakistan‘s nuclear

hydro-carbon resources. In addition to this and the unsettled Sino-Indian

interpretation of India‘s nuclear status. These can be summarized as

From the military perspective these elements of Indian nuclear

2. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP: INDIA

Sheel Kant Sharma

On the situation in India and Pakistan. It will be useful to

due to accident, misjudgment, miscalculation or inadequate security of

Crisis after events of November 26, 2008. Audacious attack by

As against this India‘s Nuclear Doctrine is that of no-first-use

Important to the bilateral discourse and the overall situation is

In the foregoing description of multiple facets of their strategic

3. PAKISTAN’S APPROACH TOWARDS NUCLEAR

Pakistan was one of the leading proponents of the nuclear

Subsequently, once it became evident that ‗unproliferation‘ of

nonproliferation obligations. Pakistan‘s plea for an equitable treatment

cannot be accepted or endorsed. Pakistan will not support any

4. MILITARY STRATEGIC RELATIONS OF INDIA

India and Pakistan have dynamic nuclear weapons programmes.

Fissile Material Production in South Asia, 2012

Both India and Pakistan strive to develop nuclear triad using

undergoing a series of tests. According to official data ―the state of the

India’s Missile Capability. In mid 1980s Indira Gandhi‘s

India’s Ballistic Missile Capability

Pakistan’s Missile Capability. Pakistan has closely cooperated

possibly August 15, 200019). According to certain estimates, Pakistan‘s

Pakistan’s Ballistic Missile Capability

India’s and Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrines. Neither India, nor

First, India and Pakistan are in the process of building up and

proposal to establish a ―Strategic Restraint Regime‖. Although India did

5. PROSPECTS OF ENGAGING INDIA AND

Political and military relations among the nine nuclear-weapon

deterrence and possess approximately equal nuclear capabilities. They

Soviet vessels were damaged. President Nixon‘s visit to Moscow, during

It is generally known that India is concerned over China, as well

1. India and Pakistan are states of concern, whose nuclear

perceived as the country‘s main strategic rival. Besides, according to

7. Hopefully there are signs that India and Pakistan have

bilateral US-China nuclear arms limitation agreements could provide

BDL Bharat Dynamics Limited