Bruusgaard 2020

Journal of Strategic Studies
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Russian nuclear strategy and conventional

inferiority
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
To cite this article: Kristin Ven Bruusgaard (2021) Russian nuclear strategy and conventional
inferiority, Journal of Strategic Studies, 44:1, 3-35, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2020.1818070
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JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
2021, VOL. 44, NO. 1, 3–35
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1818070
ARTICLE
Russian nuclear strategy and conventional inferiority

Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
ABSTRACT
Contemporary debates on Russian nuclear strategy focus on making sense
of Russia’s nuclear capabilities, signalling and nuclear declarations. This
paper argues that understanding how nuclear capabilities and strategy
interact with conventional capabilities is fundamental to understanding
nuclear strategy. It offers the Conventional Balance of Forces thesis for
explaining change in Russia’s nuclear strategy after the Cold War. It
shows how Russian nuclear debates and strategy decisions have been
affected by perceived conventional vulnerabilities, and how the orthodox
Western interpretation of Russian nuclear strategy today as one of ‘escalat
ing to de-escalate’ comes short of explaining when Russia would go nuclear
in conflict, and why.
KEYWORDS Russia; nuclear weapons; strategy; deterrence; conventional forces
Introduction
For Russia and other potential military adversaries, it is US conventional
superiority, rather than its nuclear preponderance, that produces the
most severe security dilemma. Russia, the largest nuclear weapons state
in the world, perceives US conventional capabilities as a potential secur
ity threat that could jeopardize its very existence. Russia has in the entire
post-Cold War period explicitly threatened nuclear first use in response to
large-scale conventional aggression. But the nature of the Russian first
use threat has changed over time. As Russia has improved its conven
tional capabilities, its reliance response options to conventional regional
threats have receded.
Despite this close link between conventional and nuclear strategy, the
nuclear strategy literature tends to focus on nuclear posturing, and particu
larly on nuclear capabilities, without considering the other military and non-
military capabilities states use to enhance their security. Theories about the
relationship between conventional forces and nuclear strategy outcomes
remain scant. The most prominent thesis has been that conventional
CONTACT Kristin Ven Bruusgaard k.v.bruusgaard@stv.uio.no Department of Political Science,

University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered,
transformed, or built upon in any way.
4 K. VEN BRUUSGAARD
inferiority produces increased reliance on nuclear threats.1 But this thesis

does not address whether or why states would seek to overcome nuclear
dependency by improving conventional capabilities, nor how improved con
ventional capabilities impact nuclear strategy. This paper offers
a Conventional Balance of Forces thesis of nuclear strategy, to explain how
perceived conventional vulnerabilities and evolving conventional response
options have affected Russian nuclear strategy over time. Russia is not
a unique nuclear actor who, unlike all other nuclear states, perceives of
nuclear weapons as uniquely suited for pursuing revisionist ambitions.
Russian nuclear strategy resembles that of other states who have sought to
compensate for conventional shortcomings with nuclear tools.
Predominant Western analysis has paid insufficient attention to how
improved conventional capabilities have affected Russian strategy for
using nuclear weapons to influence conventional regional conflicts. In
the early 2000s, Russian conventional capabilities were so inferior, com
pared to NATO’s military capabilities, that Russia deemed it necessary to
threaten the early and limited use of nuclear weapons in the face of
conventional threats. Since then, Russia has acquired conventional preci
sion strike and improved air and missile defence capabilities, and its need
to convey a low threshold for nuclear use has receded. Russia now has
more credible conventional options that it can use for deterring and
managing escalation in regional conflicts of scale that do not threaten
state existence.
This does not mean that nuclear options are no longer relevant for Russian
responses to conventional aggression. Russia continues to rely on nuclear weap
ons to deter and manage escalation in regional conflicts that threaten its exis
tence. Russian strategists are still concerned about conventional inferiority in
a large-scale or regional conflict with an adversary such as NATO. Nuclear threats
or use are relevant escalation management tools if Russia had exhausted available
conventional escalation tools, and was unwilling to back down, even at the risk of
nuclear conflict. Russian nuclear threats or nuclear weapons use would convey
a willingness to risk further escalation, rather than confidence that such escalation
can be avoided.
This article makes three key contributions to the debate on nuclear strategy
and the case of Russia. First, it explains how and why Russian nuclear strategy has
changed in the past two decades, something existing works pay insufficient
attention to. Some scholars suggest a link between Russian conventional and
nuclear strategy, but do not examine how one affects the other.2 Some argue that
strategic culture explains Russian strategy choices, but do not posit a causal
1
For an updated take on this, see Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution.
Power politics in the atomic age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020). Chapter 4
2
Olga Oliker, ‘Moscow's Nuclear Enigma. What is Russias arsenal really for?,’ Foreign Affairs November/
December, Special Issue: Do Nuclear weapons matter? (2018).
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 5
relationship that predicts future strategy change.3 Accounts of Russian strategy

deliberations describe, rather than explain, why strategy has changed over time.4
The predominant interpretation of Russian nuclear strategy today assumes that
changes in Russian political intentions have produced a strategy of ‘de-
escalation’, an assumption that has not been tested and that cannot be proved
empirically.5
Second, it adds detail and nuance to existing theories about how conven
tional and nuclear forces and strategy interact. In a period when Western
strategists, too, advocate integrating nuclear and conventional options, in
part because of a realisation that actors such as China and Russia do so, we
need detailed theoretical explorations of the conventional-nuclear nexus.6
This article builds upon existing theories about nuclear compensation of
conventional inferiority.7 It produces novel insights into how change in the
conventional balance of forces may produce change in nuclear strategy.
Third, this article engages the debate on the impact of emerging technol
ogies on nuclear strategy,8 albeit with a focus on a technology that is
relatively old: conventional precision strike. Russian strategists have sought
to capitalise on the strategic utility of dual-capable missiles in a way that
challenges traditional understandings of the relationship between conven
tional and nuclear forces. This suggests that mirror imaging Western concepts
and thinking when seeking to understand non-Western states nuclear strat
egy may produce misguided deterrent policies. Such policies can increase the
likelihood of inadvertent escalation and the chance that Russia or the West
resorts to nuclear weapons as a result of misguided fear of the other’s
proclivity to do so.9
The paper seeks to avoid this trap of mirror imaging and instead to
understand Russian nuclear strategy on Russian terms. It uses Russian-
language sources to trace debates on how the conventional and nuclear
3
Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, ‘From Moscow with coercion: Russian deterrence theory and strategic culture’,
Journal of Strategic Studies 41/1–2 (2018).
4
Anya Fink Michael Kofman, Jeffrey Edmonds, ‘Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of
Key Concepts’, CNA Report April (2020); Dave Johnson, “Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike
Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds “ Livermore Papers on Global Security 3,
February (2017).
5
Mark B. Schneider, ‘Russian nuclear “de-escalation” of future war’, Comparative Strategy 37, 5 (2018).
6
Vincent A. Manzo and Aaron R. Miles, ‘The Logic of Integrating Conventional and Nuclear Planning’,
Arms Control Today 46/9 (November 2016). Justin Anderson Robert Peters, and Harrison Menke,
‘Deterrence in the 21st Century: Integrating Nuclear and Conventional Force’, Strategic Studies
Quarterly Winter (2018). Fiona Cunningham, ‘Maximizing Leverage: Chinas Strategic Force Posture
Choices in the Information Age’, Manuscript presented at the Nuclear Scholars Research Initiative (NSRI)
Seminar, Hamburg, December (2019).
7
Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era. Regional powers and International Conflict (Princeton
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014). Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution. Power politics in
the atomic age, 112–13.
8
Todd S. Sechser, Neil Narang & Caitlin Talmadge (Eds.) ‘Special Issue: Emerging Technologies and
Strategic Stability’, Journal of Strategic Studies 42, 6 (2019).
9
Konstantin Bogdanov, ‘Not-so-Nuclear War’, Russian International Affairs Council Article, 10 March (2020).
6 K. VEN BRUUSGAARD
balance of forces affects military strategy. It consults debates on what pro

blems the Russian military believes it must solve, to understand the logic
underlying its strategy. Although strategic debates, capabilities and military
doctrines cannot authoritatively predict what leaders will do in crisis, they
constrain and shape what it may be possible for leaders to do. When it comes
to nuclear strategy, such insights are crucial in seeking to ensure that leaders’
theories about the utility of nuclear weapons in war will never be tested.10
The article first reviews contemporary debates about Russian nuclear
strategy and makes the case for a Conventional Balance of Forces thesis to
explain nuclear strategy choices. It then uses this thesis as an explanatory
framework to examine Russian nuclear strategy as exhibited in three cases:
2000, 2010 and the period 2014–2020. Finally, it discusses the findings and
their implications.
The debate about Russian nuclear strategy

Western debates on Russian nuclear strategy picked up significantly after
the invasion of Crimea in 2014.11 The perception of changed Russian
foreign policy intentions, a modernised nuclear arsenal, and a reduced
Russian interest in preserving arms control produced renewed debate on
the content of Russian nuclear strategy. Contemporary debates revolve
around whether Russia has a strategy that involves the early and limited
use of sub-strategic nuclear weapons: a doctrine that has been called
‘escalating to de-escalate’.12 US nuclear policy officially diagnoses Russian
nuclear strategy according to this thesis.13 The key proposition is that
Russia’s threshold of nuclear weapons use is low and that it would use
nuclear weapons early and in a limited manner in conflict in order to ‘de-
escalate’ it and bring it to an early and decisive end.14 The potentially
coercive utility of nuclear weapons may provide a temptation for Russian
policymakers to pursue aggressive or revisionist ambitions against NATO
states.15 According to this school, Russia believes the West is risk-averse
10
I am grateful to Brendan Rittenhouse Green for elucidating this point.
11
Brad Roberts, The Case for US Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Stanford Security Studies, (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2016); Stephen J. Cimbala & Roger N. McDermott, ‘Putin and the Nuclear
Dimension to Russian Strategy’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29/4 (October 2016); Anya
Loukianova Fink & Olga Oliker, ‘Russias Nuclear Weapons in a Multipolar World: Guarantors of
Sovereignty, Great Power Status & More’, Daedalus 149/2 (2020).
12
Nikolai Sokov, ‘Why Russia calls a limited nuclear strike “de-escalation”‘, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 13
(March 2014).
13
Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, (2018).
14
Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, ‘If war comes tomorrow: Russian thinking about “Regional Nuclear
Deterrence”‘, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 27/1 (2014). See also Roberts, The Case for US
Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, 131.
15
Paul K. Davis, J. Michael Gilmore David R. Frelinger, Edward Geist, Christopher K. Gilmore, Jenny
Oberholtzer, Danielle C. Tarraf, ‘Exploring the Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian
Threats to the Baltics’, RAND Corporation Research Report (2019).
and would be unable to remain united in a severe crisis.16 Russia could

use nuclear weapons to uphold a changed status quo and to force
a Western surrender.17
Although this interpretation has gained prominence in Western policy
circles, a closer examination of its logic and assumptions demonstrates
three key shortcomings. First, it mirrors Western Cold War theories about
the coercive utility of rapid nuclear escalation onto Russian strategy. It
assumes that Russian leaders believe that it is possible to control escalation
because the adversary would be unwilling or incapable of matching it. Yet,
a closer examination of the evidence conveys a sustained Russian debate on
the problem of controlling escalation. Russian strategists debate the utility
and credibility of a lowered nuclear threshold and the appropriate criteria for
when to use nuclear weapons in conflict.18 This debate has produced a push
for improved conventional options as a supplement to limited nuclear
options. This debate about how conventional and nuclear capabilities com
bined convey deterrent credibility is crucial to understanding Russian nuclear
strategy today.
Second, this Western interpretation of Russian strategy fails to reflect how
Russian planners conceptualise the utility of nuclear weapons differently
based on different conflict types.19 The interpretation takes cues from limited
war scenarios and limited objectives, derived from Russia’s 2008 war with
Georgia and 2014 war in Ukraine. The coercive fait accompli model from the
Crimean annexation is taken as key evidence of Russian ambitions to coerce
NATO.20 However, this model of potential nuclear weapons use disregards
the context in which Russian strategists debated early and limited nuclear
weapons use: a regional war in which Russia was threatened by large-scale
conventional aggression.21 Russian strategists never argued that Russia
should employ nuclear de-escalation in limited wars that were about limited
objectives. Yet, Western debates have fixated on Russian limited nuclear use
in limited war.22
Third, this interpretation of Russian nuclear strategy applies a static and
potentially outdated model of how nuclear weapons compensate for con
ventional inferiority. It fails to account for the significant evolution in Russian
16
Matthew Kroenig, A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes, Atlantic Council
(Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, 2018).
17
Vince A. Manzo & John K. Warden, ‘After Nuclear First Use, What?’, Survival 60/3 (2018).
18
Michael Kofman, ‘Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts.’
19
Fiona Cunningham and Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Why go first? Distinguishing Strategies of Nuclear First-
Use in Great Power Conflict’, George Washington University/University of Oslo Manuscript (2020).
20
Kroenig, A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes.
21
S. V. Kreidin, ‘Global’noye i regional’noye yadernoye sderzhivaniye: K sisteme printsipov i kriteriev’,
Voennaia Mysl’ 4 (1999); A. V. Nedelin V.I. Levshin, M. E. Sosnovsky, ‘O primenenii Iadernogo Oruzhiia
Dlia Deeskalatsii Voennikh Deistvii’, Voyennaya Mysl’ 3 (1999).
22
Kroenig, A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes. Paul K. Davis, ‘Exploring the Role
Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltics.’
8 K. VEN BRUUSGAARD
conventional capabilities in the post-Cold War period and for how this has
affected Russia’s reliance on nuclear threats. Much of the evidence used to
back up the predominant Western interpretation of Russian strategy is from
strategy debates and official statements of the late 1990s and early 2000s.23 In
this period, Russia did signal a reduced nuclear threshold, due to its lack of
conventional response options.
But even then, Russian strategists identified the key vulnerability in nuclear
de-escalation, that of credibility and escalation management, and sought
improved conventional capabilities to remedy for this vulnerability.24 In the
twenty years since, Russian strategy has evolved conceptually in how con
ventional and nuclear tools can influence an adversary, and materially in the
balance of nuclear and conventional capabilities. States that face
a conventionally superior adversary do not necessarily lean back and rest
on their nuclear laurels: some seek to rectify their conventional inferiority.
This suggests a need to re-examine existing theories about how conventional
and nuclear forces and strategy affect each other.
A conventional balance of forces thesis of nuclear strategy

The strategic problem of deterring conventional aggression with nuclear
weapons is as old as nuclear weapons themselves. Threatening a nuclear
response to a conventional attack was fundamental to early nuclear
strategising.25 A nuclear threat could be used to manipulate the adversary,
as the risk of a horrific nuclear war would influence its behaviour, given the
unprecedented ‘threat value’ of nuclear weapons.26 Nuclear weapons offered
novel tools for deterring conventional aggression and for influencing the
course of war. During the early Cold War, both the US and USSR warned of
massive nuclear retaliation in response to conventional strikes. US war plans
in the 1940s included of an ‘atomic blitz’ to halt a Soviet advance.27
However, with the advent of the hydrogen bomb and the growth of
secure second-strike capabilities, strategies of massive retaliation seemed
increasingly suicidal. The threat of a more limited nuclear response seemed
more credible.28 Some speculated that nuclear weapons could produce
coercive and controllable bargaining power in conventional wars if nuclear
23
Schneider, ‘Russian nuclear “de-escalation” of future war.’
24
Michael Kofman, ‘Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts’, 54–55.
Citing for example V. N. Tsygichko and A. A. Piontkovskiy, ‘Vozmozhnye vyzovy natsionalnoy bezo
pasnosti Rossii v nachale XXI veka’, Voennaia Mysl’ 2 (2001).
25
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).
26
Marc Trachtenberg, History & Strategy, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 7. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966).
27
Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Third ed. ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2003), 52–53.
28
Trachtenberg, History & Strategy, 7.
escalation could be contained at different rungs of an ‘escalation ladder’.29

Such ideas remain controversial and subject to debate,30 but continue to
influence nuclear strategy.31
While a stronger conventional power may find conventional deterrence
sufficient,32 deterring conventional aggression with nuclear weapons remains
a pressing concern for conventionally inferior states.33 There exists a range of
views about what type of nuclear strategy most efficiently deters conventional
wars.34 An elementary claim is that conventional inferiority produces nuclear
compensation, creating incentives for conveying a credible nuclear threat in
response to conventional aggression. This can offer (1) a deterrent purpose,
reducing the likelihood that an adversary will risk conflict; (2) an escalation
management tool, as threat or use of nuclear weapons should force the adversary
to rethink its aggressive ambitions; and (3) a warfighting purpose, by creating
favourable military outcomes.
The US strategy called ‘flexible response’ is often cited as the first example of
a nuclear policy designed to capitalise on the deterrent power of limited nuclear
use in the face of conventional inferiority. It proposed a limited nuclear response to
Soviet conventional aggression in order to offset US/NATO conventional
inferiority.35 A leader who knew he could fight a nuclear war would be in a more
credible bargaining position.36 Limited nuclear options could substitute for inferior
manpower and firepower.37 Scholars later demonstrated that truly limited nuclear
responses were not available to the United States at the time of ‘flexible response’.38
Still, the theory of threatening limited nuclear escalation in response to conven
tional attack remains influential among nuclear strategists.39 Pakistan’s ‘asymmetric
escalation’ strategy is a prominent example of this today threatening rapid nuclear
retaliation in response to any Indian conventional attack.40
29
Herman Kahn, On escalation: Metaphors and scenarios (London: Pall Mall, 1965).
30
Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017).
31
Nuclear Operations, (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019).
32
Joshua Rovner, “ISSF Article Review 6 on ‘No First Use: The Next Step for U.S: Nuclear Policy’, H-Diplo
4 February (2011).
33
Nina Tannenwald, ‘Its Time for a U.S. No-First-Use Nuclear Policy’, Texas National Security Review 2/3
(May 2019).
34
Lieber and Press distinguish between optimistic views, where nuclear weapons existence or the
manipulation of risk will be sufficient to deter conventional aggression, and pessimistic views, where
expansive nuclear options are needed to make nuclear threats credible. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear
Revolution. Power politics in the atomic age, 97–101.
35
The strategy also served other purposes, such as handling the NATO Alliance and the German question
in Europe. See Francis J. Gavin, ‘The Myth of Flexible Response: United States Strategy in Europe during
the 1960s’, The International History Review 23/4 (2001).
36
Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 357.
37
Henry A. Kissinger, ‘Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear? A Reappraisal’, Daedalus 89/4 (Fall 1960).
38
Gavin, ‘The Myth of Flexible Response: United States Strategy in Europe during the 1960s.’
39
John K. Warden, ‘Limited Nuclear War: The 21st Century Challenge for the United States’, Livermore
Papers on Global Security 4 (July 2018).
40
Vipin Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability’, International
Security 34/3 (Winter 2009/10).
10 K. VEN BRUUSGAARD
The conventional inferiority thesis rests on two implicit assumptions that

can be questioned. First, it assumes that nuclear weapons provide a more
attractive deterrent option than conventional military options.41
Conventional inferiority is treated as a given rather than as a variable, and
states will prioritise nuclear over conventional capability improvements. This
channels resources away from improving conventional capabilities, through
competition for finance, hardware and doctrinal supremacy.42 But domestic
or bureaucratic politics and intra-alliance bargaining may affect how or
whether nuclear or conventional capabilities are improved.43 The thesis
does not explicitly address why states would choose to improve nuclear
over conventional forces or examine how a changed balance of conventional
forces would affect the compensatory role of nuclear weapons. When seeking
to deter conventional threats, different states will make different decisions
regarding whether to remain dependent on nuclear options or to improve
conventional options, considering, among other things, the types of threats
they face.
Second, the conventional inferiority thesis assumes that states are con
fident in their ability to control escalation. NATOs ‘flexible response’ strategy
and Pakistani nuclear strategy are both cases where states promise rapid and,
some would argue, irrational escalation of any conventional conflict. And yet,
states who rely on nuclear compensation may view the coercive utility of
nuclear weapons differently. If states presume that escalation can be con
trolled, then limited nuclear aggression may seem an attractive foreign policy
option. But states with less confidence in escalatory dynamics may believe
that below certain thresholds, conventional forces pose a more credible
deterrent.44 They may choose to abandon limited nuclear war strategies,45
for example by improving their conventional capabilities for dealing with
conventional contingencies. Such decisions influence how nuclear weapons
compensate for conventional inferiority.
To examine these dynamics that the conventional inferiority thesis leaves
unexplored, I offer the Conventional Balance of Forces thesis of nuclear strat
egy, positing that conventional capabilities provide an alternative, more
flexible or more credible tool for escalation management. It questions the
claim that the deterrent value of nuclear weapons cannot be substituted by
conventional arms.46 Conventional inferiority may produce nuclear
41
Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution. Power politics in the atomic age, 94.
42
Christopher J. Watterson, ‘Nuclear weapons and limited war: A return to the nuclear battlefield?’,
Comparative Strategy 39, 1 (2020).
43
Elizabeth N. Saunders, ‘The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices: A Review Essay’, International Security
44/2 (Fall 2019).
44
Gary L. Guertner, ‘Deterrence and conventional military forces’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 11, 2 (2000).
45
Watterson, ‘Nuclear weapons and limited war: A return to the nuclear battlefield?.’
46
Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe’, International
Security 8/3 (Winter 1983–1984).
compensation, but this is not a static choice. Changes in conventional threats

and capabilities can produce change in nuclear strategy, reducing reliance on
limited nuclear options. Some states may seek to reduce their reliance on
nuclear responses, precisely because of a concern with the possibility of
controlling escalation.
If such a thesis were true, we would expect to see: (i) Perceived conven
tional inferiority correlating with enhanced nuclear threats and focus on
limited nuclear options, and (ii) Conventional improvements correlating
with reduced nuclear threats and a reduced focus on limited nuclear options.
Several examples suggest that this may ring true. NATOs flexible response
strategy re-emphasised conventional options by the late 1960s, in part due to
concerns about escalation control.47 China continues to reject limited nuclear
options for handling conventional threats, relying instead on improving other
military capabilities.48 Pakistan remains an outlier, living comfortably with
nuclear compensation. But Russian nuclear strategy suggests a reduced reli
ance on nuclear options as conventional capabilities have improved.49 Below,
I examine this case in detail, exploring the impact of conventional inferiority
and conventional modernisation on Russian nuclear strategy since 2000.
The conventional balance of forces and Russian nuclear strategy

2000–2020
Ample Russian sources shed light on strategy deliberations in Russia. There is
an active strategy debate in expert military and civilian outlets and substan
tial reporting on military developments. Western publications provide annual
estimates on Russian nuclear and conventional military capabilities that are
comparable over time. Russian and English language sources report on
nuclear signalling. Publicly available military doctrines from 1993, 2000,
2010, 2014 contain declarations about potential nuclear weapons use, as
does a new official 2020 nuclear deterrence strategy. I use three official
military doctrines as starting points for examining three cases of Russian
nuclear strategy. I examine the 2000 case, when Russian conventional military
capabilities were inferior, and we would expect a nuclear strategy of com
pensation. I study the 2010 case, when conventional modernisation was
slowly starting, and end with an examination of the doctrine from 2014 and
the period after, up to the 2020 Nuclear Deterrence Strategy, when conven
tional capabilities improved and when we would expect reduced nuclear
compensation.
47
Watterson, ‘Nuclear weapons and limited war: A return to the nuclear battlefield?.’
48
Cunningham, ‘Maximizing Leverage: Chinas Strategic Force Posture Choices in the Information Age.’
49
Michael Kofman, ‘Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts.’; Kristin Ven
Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, Survival 58/4 (2016); Adamsky, ‘From Moscow with coer
cion: Russian deterrence theory and strategic culture.’
For each case, I examine Russian perceived vulnerability to adversary

conventional capabilities as expressed in strategy debates and official docu
ments. The description of such threats in official documents suggests that
perceived vulnerability has taken hold among Russian military and civilian
leaders and affects strategy formulation. I describe available conventional
response options to such threats. I then examine how conventional inferiority
affects nuclear strategy, defined as nuclear capabilities, nuclear signalling,
and declaratory strategy. I focus on non-strategic nuclear capabilities, as
these are best suited to enhance the credibility of the threat to use nuclear
weapons first in response to conventional attack.50 I do not explore in detail
the evolution of the strategic nuclear arsenal. I examine training, exercises,
and displays of nuclear capabilities that are likely to affect the credibility of
nuclear threats,51 and examine official declarations about potential nuclear
weapons use. Although some argue that nuclear declarations are unimpor
tant, most nuclear states spend time and resources crafting declarations
about when they would use nuclear weapons. Changes in such messaging
may convey change in nuclear intentions and seem worthy of examination.
2000: Russian conventional inferiority produces emphasis on

early nuclear use
Soviet strategists were among the first to identify the revolutionary effect of
conventional precision strike capabilities on modern warfare.52 The first Gulf
War demonstrated how ‘smart’ conventional weapons could carry out mis
sions that previously called for nuclear forces.53 This led the Russian General
Staff to model scenarios displaying the country’s vulnerability to large-scale
conventional strikes. In one scenario, an adversary carried out conventional
strategic strikes against Russia’s strategic forces in the Far East and destroyed
25% of the force in three days.54 The increasingly unfavourable correlation of
conventional forces resulted in Russia dropping Soviet declaratory strategy of
no first use of nuclear weapons.55
By the late 1990s, Western conventional military capabilities had evolved
far above and beyond Russian capabilities. Western precision strike
50
Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear
Escalation’, International Security 44/2 (Fall 2019).
51
Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Signals of strength: Capability demonstrations and perceptions of military
power’, Journal of Strategic Studies 43/2 (2020).
52
Roger N. McDermott and Tor Bukkvoll, ‘Russia in the Precision-Strike regime – military theory,
procurement and operational impact’, FFI-Rapport (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment) 17/
00979 (2017).
53
Guertner, ‘Deterrence and conventional military forces.’; Michael S. Gerson, ‘No First Use: The Next Step
for U.S. Nuclear Policy’, International Security 35/2 (Fall 2010).
54
A. G. Savelyev, Politicheskie i voenno-strategicheskie aspekty dogovor SNV-1 i SNV-2 (Moskva: Rossiiskaya
Akademiya Nauk Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, 2000).
55
‘Osnovnye polozheniya voennoy doktriny Rossiiskoy Federatsii’, Krasnaia Zvezda 19 November (1993).
capabilities were perceived as a growing threat to Russian security, with an

ability to define future war.56 Conventional capabilities could be used in what
Russian strategists started calling strategic first strikes, potentially inflicting
critical or unacceptable damage on an adversary. This notion that advanced
conventional precision weapons could have a destructive potential like
nuclear weapons would have severe repercussions for how Russian strate
gists sought to influence adversary intentions.57
NATO’s 1999 Kosovo intervention produced a significant wake-up call in
Moscow. Politically, Moscow was shocked at NATO’s willingness to intervene
in a sovereign country without a UN Security Council mandate and despite
vehement Russian protests. Militarily, the operation scripted a worst-case
scenario for Russian planners. They feared the potential damage of
a Western conventional surgical air strike campaign, for example as
a punitive response to Russia’s war in Chechnya:
Such strikes would target industrial, infrastructure and military targets, against
nuclear forces and C3I sites, be sufficiently selective not to provoke a nuclear
response, but enough to destroy Russia’s nuclear deterrent capability within
days or weeks.58
In addition to the increasing technological gap between Western and Russian

military capabilities for waging modern wars, NATO expansion and out-of-
area operations was increasingly perceived as a potential threat in Moscow.59
In sum, military-technological and military-political developments were seen
as potentially undermining Russian security.
Russian conventional response options in 2000

Russian conventional military capabilities in the late 1990s reflected a limited
ability to respond to advanced conventional threats. Two military campaigns
in Chechnya revealed significant shortcomings in Russian capabilities for
waging modern war. The range of military challenges produced intense
debates in Moscow about whether to prioritise conventional or nuclear
modernisation.60 Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev clashed publicly with his
General Staff Chief, Anatoly Kvashnin, over these prioritisations.61 General
56
Yevgenii A. Fedosov and Igor D. Spasskiy, ‘Vysokotochnoye oruzhie zanyalo mesto boga voiny’,
Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie 23 July, no. 28 (1999).
57
Roger N. McDermott & Tor Bukkvoll, ‘Tools of Future Wars – Russia is Entering the Precision-Strike
Regime’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 31/2 (2018).
58
Alexei G. Arbatov, The transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons learned from Kosovo and
Chechnya, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (2000). p. 18.
59
Arbatov, The transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons learned from Kosovo and Chechnya.
60
Alexandr Golts, Military Reform and Militarism in Russia, Uppsala Studies in Eastern Europe 7, (Uppsala:
Uppsala Universitet, 2017).
61
Ivan Safronov, Ilya Bulavinov, ‘Yaderniy Sintez Pod Upravleniem Marshala Sergeeva’, Kommersant Vlast’,
11 May 1999.
Kvashnin, whose formative military experience had been Afghanistan and

Chechnya, argued that Russia needed a modernised conventional force
better suited to fight wars such as counterinsurgencies. Sergeyev, a former
commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, argued that Russia
needed an enhanced capability for strategic deterrence of large-scale con
ventional attack by a technologically superior adversary.62
Russia’s ability to defend against advanced conventional military technol
ogy was severely limited. Russian early warning capabilities were geared
toward detecting a massive ballistic missile attack: it was never set up to
detect individual missile launches, let alone cruise missiles.63 Several former
Soviet early warning sites were now located beyond Russian borders and no
longer operational.64 Russia’s warning capability remained insufficient and
plagued by bureaucratic struggles.65 Russian air and missile defence systems
covered Moscow but relied on nuclear munitions, and its ability to protect
command and control facilities against conventional precision strike muni
tions was insufficient.66
Russian conventional options for pre-empting or responding to an adversary’s
advanced conventional strike campaign were also lagging. Russia had started
developing a successor to the Scud short-range land-based ballistic missile, the
Iskander.67 Medium-range, land-based missiles were outlawed by the INF Treaty.
Conventionally armed sea- and air-based cruise missiles with longer ranges were
still largely on the drawing board. Still, Russian strategists had started debating
non-nuclear or pre-nuclear deterrence and the need for conventional precision
strike capabilities that could effectively contribute to deterring conventional
threats.68 The acquisition of such capabilities was still a distant ambition.
Nuclear response options and Russian nuclear strategy in 2000

The Russian debate about the utility of nuclear weapons starts from a distinct
conceptual framework distinguishing different conflict types with different
roles for nuclear weapons.69 The Soviet and Russian military lexicon differ
entiates local, regional, and large-scale wars. Nuclear weapons traditionally
played a limited role in local wars,70 but were instrumental to deterring and
62
Jacob W. Kipp, ‘Russia’s Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons’, Military Review May-June (2001).
63
Pavel Podvig, ‘History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System’, Science & Global
Security 10 (2002).
64
‘Russia’, Military Balance 100/1 (2000).
65
Podvig, ‘History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System.’
66
Spasskiy, ‘Vysokotochnoye oruzhie zanyalo mesto boga voiny.’
67
‘Russia.’
68
Bukkvoll, ‘Tools of Future Wars – Russia is Entering the Precision-Strike Regime.’
69
Bruusgaard, ‘Why go first? Distinguishing Strategies of Nuclear First-Use in Great Power Conflict.’
70
Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, The Voroshilov Lectures Materials form the Soviet General Staff Academy Vol 1
Issues of Soviet Military Strategy, ed. Jr. Graham Hall Turbiville (Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, 1989).
influencing large-scale wars. Large-scale, nuclear wars have set the require
ments for Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Regional wars, the conflict cate
gory between these two, would involve two or more states, and could involve
conventional or nuclear weapons.71 The Soviets had wanted to develop an
ability to sustain such a conflict for an extended period without employing
nuclear weapons.72 By the 1990s, Russian theorists had started debating
whether Russia would have to choose between defeat and all-out nuclear
war in regional conflicts because of the degraded state of Russian conven
tional forces.73 They argued sub-strategic nuclear weapons offered
a potential way to defeat an adversary in the theatre of military operations.
The threat of early nuclear escalation and an ability to inflict ‘deterrent
damage’ on an adversary using limited nuclear means could influence the
adversary’s perception of the balance between the advantages and the costs
of aggression.74
Russia’s existing non-strategic [nuclear] capabilities can compensate for the
disrupted balance of conventional forces, and their use during military hosti
lities can contribute to prevent the adversary’s superiority in given strategic
(operational) directions.75
Other strategists pushed back against this idea, arguing that a lowered
nuclear threshold would not enhance credibility, and worrying that nuclear
escalation could not be controlled.76 Some argued that strategic nuclear
weapons could do the job of deterring also these types of wars. But the
idea that sub-strategic nuclear weapons could help manage the escalation of
regional war was established in the Russian strategic discourse.
Vulnerability to conventional strikes produced an increased Russian reliance
on non-strategic nuclear capabilities in the early 2000s. An intergovernmental
Security Council group was reformulating nuclear strategy in this period.77
They decided to preserve and upgrade both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear
forces,78 and to develop a new low-yield nuclear warhead.79 They discussed the
71
Kremlin, Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, (Moscow: Kreml: Prezident Rossiiskoi Federatsi, 2014).
72
Michael Kofman, ‘Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts’, 53.
73
S. V. Kreidin, ‘Problemy Yadernogo sderzhivaniya: Boyevaya ustoichivost’’, Voennaia Mysl’ 3 (2000). V.I.
Levshin, ‘O primenenii Iadernogo Oruzhiia Dlia Deeskalatsii Voennikh Deistvii.’
74
75
A. S. Pis’yakov and A. I Khryapin V. A. Ivasik, ‘Yadernye oruzhie i voennaia bezopasnost Rossii’, Voennaia
Mysl’ 4 (1999).
76
Jacob W. Kipp, ‘Russian military forecasting and the revolution in military affairs: a case of the oracle of
Delphi or Cassandra?’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 9/1s (1996). Aleksandr Golts, ‘Sderzhivaniye’,
Itogi 18/20 (May 1999).
77
Oleg Falichev, ‘General-Polkovnik Manilov: Novaya Voyennaya doktrina Rossii – adekvatniy otvet na
vyzov vremeni’, Krasniy Voin 13/80 (October 1999).
78
Andrei A. Kokoshin, Strategicheskoye upravleniye: Teoriya, istroricheskii opit, sravnitelniy analiz, zadachi
dlya Rossii (Moskovskiy Gosudarstvenniy Institut Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniyakh: ROSSPEN, 2003).
p. 313; Yuri Golotyuk, ‘Rossiya peresmatrivayet svoyo “yadernyuo argumentatsiyo”‘, Izvestia 27 April,
(1999).
79
Nikolai Sokov, ‘The April 1999 Russian Federation Security Council Meeting on Nuclear Weapons’, NTI
Analysis 1 June (1999).
role of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in deterring regional wars.80 The air leg
of the triad was identified as a particularly flexible tool for limited nuclear
strikes in regional wars.81 Existing and new ALCMs would be particularly
relevant for this mission.82
The overhaul of nuclear strategy also resulted in increased nuclear signal
ling. In the late 1990s, Russian strategic nuclear forces were in a poor state.83
Russia had no operational strategic submarines on patrol for several months
in early 1998, due to safety concerns.84 Russian leaders became determined
to change this balance. In 1998, Yeltsin announced that Russian strategic and
attack submarines had re-established the Northern strategic bastion, patrol
ling of a defensive perimeter in the North Atlantic out to the Greenland-
Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap.85 Russia demonstrated the survivability of its nuclear
retaliatory capability. Russia also signalled that it would consider limited
nuclear strikes as a response to aggression. The first large strategic exercise
since the Cold War, Zapad-1999, simulated an attack with a nuclear-armed air-
launched cruise missile, the Kh-55, against targets in Norway and the United
States.86 Defence Minister Sergeyev explained the purpose of the display:
The exercise rehearses one provision of Russian military doctrine: the use of
nuclear forces when all measures of conventional defences against aggression
have failed.87
Perceived conventional inferiority also produced changed declaratory strat

egy. Russian theorists argued that lowering the nuclear threshold would
increase the danger of nuclear use and thus constitute more effective deter
rence of less intense conflicts.88 The 1993 military doctrine had said nothing
about potential nuclear use. The 2000 doctrine provided more specificity:
The Russian Federation retains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to
the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies,
as well as in response to large-scale aggression with conventional weapons
in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.89
80
Yaderniye sily – garant natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossii, (Vestnik Voennoy Informatsii, 1999). Kipp,
‘Russia’s Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons.’
81
Nikolai Sokov, Russian Strategic Modernization Past and Future (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2000), 145.
82
‘Russian Nuclear Forces, 2000’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56/4 (2000). V. P. Sinitsyn, ‘Voenno-
Vosdushniye sily: itogi preobrazovaniya i napravleniya razvitia’, Voennaia Mysl’ 1 (1999).
83
‘Russian Nuclear Forces, 2000.’
84
‘Russia’, Military Balance 100/1 (2000), pp. 109–26.
85
Kristian Åtland, ‘The introduction, adoption and implementation of Russia’s “Northern Strategic
Bastion” Concept, 1992–1999’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20/4 (2007).
86
Sokov, Russian Strategic Modernization Past and Future. p. 171; See also Sergei Sokut, ‘Krug pocheta nad
Islandiei’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie 02 July (1999).
87
‘Russia.’
88
Spasskiy, ‘Vysokotochnoye oruzhie zanyalo mesto boga voiny.’
89
Kremlin, Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, (Moscow: Kreml: Prezident Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2000).
Section 8.
The doctrine defined such threats as ‘Actions designed to undermine global

and regional stability (. . .), to disrupt the operation of strategic nuclear forces,
missile attack warning systems, ballistic missile defences and space control
systems and systems ensuring their combat stability’.90 In 2000, Russia faced
significant conventional inferiority and enhanced its non-strategic nuclear
capabilities, signalling and declaratory strategy to offset this inferiority. At the
same time, military strategists and leaders pointed to the need to modernise
conventional military capabilities to reduce this dependency on limited
nuclear responses in a broad range of scenarios.
2010: Conventional modernisation reduces Russian emphasis on

early nuclear use
By 2010, conventional vulnerabilities and political developments still caused
concern for Russian strategic planners. The military doctrine officially described
high-precision conventional systems as military dangers that could become direct
military threats.91 A group of former officials argued that the increasing number
of US conventional sea- and air-launched cruise missiles warranted a further
lowering of Russia’s nuclear threshold.92 Russia remained committed to reducing
the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons, as agreed to in the SORT Treaty in
2002 and in New START in 2010. But Russia would discuss reductions in non
strategic nuclear weapons only if the West would limit its conventional
capabilities.93 The conventional and nuclear balance of forces remained inti
mately linked.
Although Russia’s reaction to the US withdrawal from the Anti–Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 had been muted, its concerns about a European
missile defence system were growing.94 Western interlocutors played down
this Russian concern, as missile defence capabilities in Europe could not
defend against Russian ICBMs. But the Russian deterrence concepts as con
ceived in 2000 made limited nuclear strikes relevant for deterring or mana
ging a NATO conventional strike, and missile defence could potentially
degrade such options.95 The combined threat of Western precision-guided
90
Ibid., Part I, Section 5
91
Kremlin, Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Section 8, point G (Moscow: Kreml: Prezident Rossiiskoi
Federatsii, 2010).
92
S. Rogov, Zolotaryev, P., Yesin, V., Yarynich, V., ‘Sud’ba Strategicheskikh Vooruzheniiy posle Pragi’,
Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie 32: 27 August (2010).
93
Roger N. McDermott, ‘Russias Conventional Military Weakness and Substrategic Nuclear Policy’, U.S.
Army Foreign Military Studies Office Report (2011).
94
Mikhail Tsypkin, ‘Russian politics, policy-making and American missile defence’, International Affairs 85/
4 (2009).
95
For a translated Russian theorist’s chart describing how missile defence diminishes the utility of
demonstration strikes, see Michael Kofman, ‘Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution
of Key Concepts’, 26.
munitions and an enhanced missile defence capability that could mop up any
scattered nuclear retaliation caused concern in Russia.96
Russian conventional response options in 2010

The utility of nuclear weapons for deterrence or escalation management
was determined not only by the scale or type of conflict, but also by the
nature and type of threat. Some Russian strategists were increasingly
worried that nuclear weapons were not sufficient to deter all the threats
Russia was facing. Nuclear weapons could not effectively deter ‘colour
revolutions’, public calls for democratic change, or military interventions
producing regime change.97 Deterring modern military threats would
require credible responses to such informational, political, and economic
threats, and nuclear responses were not necessarily a credible solution to
such challenges.98 The landscape of political threats was becoming more
complex, and Russia needed more effective deterrence to hold off such
threats.
By 2010, Russian theorists were developing a more comprehensive concept of
non-nuclear deterrence.99 Some of Russia s leading theorists argued that in
modern (sixth-generation) warfare, conventional weapons could replace nuclear
weapons, given the higher credibility of their use.100 Victory would pivot on the
destruction of the enemy’s economic infrastructure, and operational and strategic
objectives could be met by massive precision bombings, rendering nuclear
weapons obsolete.101 Neither nuclear weapons nor people would do the brunt
of the fighting, according to General Staff Chief Makarov: ‘The focus is on
conventional high-precision weapons, and other weapons based on new physical
principles’.102
Improved economic prospects combined with poor military perfor
mance in the 2008 Georgia war produced a decisive push to
modernise Russia’s armed forces.103 By 2010, a comprehensive overhaul
96
Andrei A. Kokoshin, Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions
(Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2011).
97
M.A. Gareev, ‘Problemy strategicheskogo sderzhivaniya v sovremennykh usloviyakh’, Voennaia Mysl’ 4
(2009); A. S. Rukshin, ‘Doktrinalnye vzglyady po voprosam primeneniya i stroitelstva vooruzhennykh sil
Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Voennaia Mysl’ 3 (2007).
98
V. M. Burenok and O. B. Achasov, ‘Neyadernoye Sderzhivaniye’, Voennaia Mysl’ 12 (2007).
99
‘“Strategicheskoye sderzhivanie” – Novaya konseptsiya voennoi bezopasnosti Rossii’, Regnum 2008,
A. A. Kokoshin, O sisteme neyadernogio (predyadenogo) sderzhivaniya v oboronnoy politike Rossii
(Moscow: Isdatelsvto Moskovskogo Universiteta, 2012).
100
Tor Bukkvoll, ‘Iron Cannot Fight – The Role of Technology in Current Russian Military Theory’, Journal
of Strategic Studies 34/5 (2011).
101
Roger N. McDermott, ‘Russian Perspective on Network-Centric Warfare: The Key Aim of Serdyukovs
Reform’, Foreign Military Studies Office Report (2011): 8.
102
Bukkvoll, ‘Iron Cannot Fight – The Role of Technology in Current Russian Military Theory.’
103
Bettina Renz, ‘Why Russia is Reviving its Conventional Military Power’, U.S. Army War College
Parameters 46/2 (Summer 2016).
was taking shape, restructuring the entire military organisation.104 Russia

launched a State Armaments Program for spending an unprecedented 20
trillion RUR on upgrading up to 70% of the military inventory.105 This
included procurement plans for advanced conventional precision-strike
capabilities, which were only slowly improving by 2010. Russia had
deployed its new land-based short-range ballistic and cruise missile that
could carry both conventional and nuclear warheads, the Iskander. In
2008, President Dmitry Medvedev threatened to deploy it to Kaliningrad
to offset the threat posed by NATO’s ballistic missile defence.106 Russia
was probably also developing a land-based intermediate-range missile,
the 9M729: US authorities accused Russia of the violation publicly in
2014.107 Russia was (still) producing the new air-based cruise missile,
the Kh-101, and a new sea-launched cruise missile, the Kalibr.108 This
suite of conventional capabilities would be optimal holding targets across
the European and American theatres at risk, and for responses to Western
conventional precision strikes. However, despite explicit ambitions and
aspirational concepts, only the Iskander missile was part of the opera
tional Russian inventory in 2010.
The State Armaments Program made evident the central role that air
and missile defences would play in defeating modern threats. Such
capabilities could deter adversaries from provocative actions in peace
time and facilitate the effectiveness of the general-purpose forces and
decrease losses in war.109 A future Russian reconnaissance-strike complex
would integrate air and space defence forces and assets for Command,
Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR).110 In 2010,
Russian air and space defence forces were merged into one service, and
some short- and medium-range air defence systems were coming online,
including the Pantsir and the S-400.111 The Russian ambition for
a strategic network of radars, integrated air defence, tactical aviation
and missile defence was becoming apparent,112 but the shape of an
integrated force was only nascent.
104
Greg Whisler, ‘Strategic Command and Control in the Russian Armed Forces: Untangling the General
Staff, Military Districts, and Service Main Commands (Part Two)’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies
33/1 (2020).
105
Susanne Oxenstierna & Fredrik Westerlund, ‘Arms Procurement and the Russian Defense Industry:
Challenges Up to 2020’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 26/1 (2013).
106
President Dmitry Medvedev, Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, (2008).
107
Ulrich Kühn and Anna Pêczeli, ‘Russia, NATO and the INF Treaty’, Strategic Studies Quarterly 11/1
(Spring 2017).
108
Office of Naval Intelligence, The Russian Navy A historic transition (2015).
109
O. B. Achasov, ‘Challenges with providing support for a balanced developments of components of
VKO system’, Strategic Stability 1 (2012). Cited in Michael Kofman, ‘Russian Strategy for Escalation
Management: Evolution of Key Concepts’, 17.
110
McDermott, ‘Russian Perspective on Network-Centric Warfare: The Key Aim of Serdyukovs Reform’, 17.
111
Bukkvoll, ‘Iron Cannot Fight – The Role of Technology in Current Russian Military Theory.’
112
Michael Kofman, ‘Russian A2/AD: Its is not overrated, just poorly understood’, 1 March (2020).
Nuclear response options and Russian nuclear strategy in 2010

Conventional military capabilities would not yet have a decisive impact on all
aspects of Russian nuclear strategy, and military observers continued to
emphasise nuclear compensation for conventional weakness.113 Russia had
reduced its tactical nuclear weapons arsenal by 30–60%, in accordance with
the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of the early 1990s.114 The remaining
Russian arsenal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons was still plentiful, at around
2000 warheads.115 Most of Russia’s new conventional land-, sea- and air-
launched missiles would be based on existing platforms designed for nuclear
payloads. The development of new platforms for conventional munitions
would thus entail a modernisation of the nuclear sub-strategic arsenal as
well. Russian bombers were being equipped to carry both nuclear and con
ventional missiles.116
As part of its military modernisation, Russia engaged in increased nuclear
signalling. Strategic nuclear signalling was revitalised to demonstrate
a sustained secure second-strike capability. Russian strategic bombers
resumed Cold War strategic flights patterns from 2007. In 2009, two Russian
Akula attack submarines patrolled off the US Eastern seaboard, demonstrat
ing an ability to hold US targets at risk with existing sea-based nuclear cruise
missiles.117 But Russia also demonstrated an improved operational ability to
carry out theatre nuclear strikes, in the face of conventional regional infer
iority. The strategic exercise Zapad-2009 was premised on a war against
a ‘technologically superior adversary’.118 A Polish source claimed that the
exercise included simulated nuclear strikes against Poland.119 In contrast to
Zapad-1999, Russia did not officially convey such messaging, and internal
NATO reporting describes the use of ‘nuclear-capable’ ballistic missiles.120
Dual-use capabilities such as the Iskander conveyed an implicit nuclear threat,
but also an improved conventional capability to strike critical targets in
Europe.
Impending improvements in conventional capabilities did produce
change in Russian declaratory nuclear strategy. Then chief of the General
Staff Yuri Baluyevskii explained: ‘The 2000 military doctrine focused on pre
venting war with the means available to the state at that point in time. A new
113
Dale R. Herspring, ‘Russian Nuclear and Conventional Weapons: The Broken Relationship’, in Russias
Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, 2011), 25.
114
‘Russia determined to keep tactical nuclear arms for potential aggressors’, Pravda, 31 October 2007.
115
McDermott, ‘Russias Conventional Military Weakness and Substrategic Nuclear Policy.’
116
Kristensen, ‘Russian Nuclear Forces, 2010’.
117
Kristensen, ‘Russian Nuclear Forces, 2010’.
118
Markus Ekstrom, ‘Rysk operativ-strategisk ovringsverksamhet under 2009 och 2010/Russian military
operational-strategic exercises, 2009–2010’, FOI (Swedish Defence Research Agency) Report FOI-R-3022-
SE (2010).
119
Bruno Tertrais, ‘Russia’s Nuclear Policy: Worrying for the Wrong Reasons’, Survival 60, 2 (2018).
120
‘23.11.2009: NATO-RUSSIA: NAC discusses Russian Military Exercises’, Aftenposten (2011).
doctrine should take account of changed internal and external conditions

and [Russia’s] normalised conventional capabilities’.121 It introduced stricter
requirements for nuclear use:
Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to nuclear or

weapons of mass destruction use against it or its allies, and against conven
tional attack on the Russian Federation when the very existence of the state is
under threat (my italics).122
Although this formulation entailed some ambiguity, it was narrower than the
2000 formulation which opened for nuclear responses to ‘threats to national
security’. Many threats to national security would not threaten ‘the very
existence of the state’. A non-trivial contemporary example was defending
ethnic Russians in the former Soviet space. In 2009, Russia had passed new
legislation allowing for the deployment of military forces abroad, without
parliamentary approval, to protect such citizens.123 This caused concern in
the Baltic States about potential Russian aggression under the guise of
protecting the Russian minority. However, the violation of the rights of
Russian citizens in the Baltics could in no way be described as threats to
‘the very existence of the Russian state’, the new doctrinal requirement for
Russian nuclear weapons use.
The formulation ‘threats to the very existence of the state’ produced
significant Western debate. What would constitute such threats? Did they
include, for example, threats to regime survival? As with most declaratory
strategy, this formulation contained ambiguity, leaving adversaries uncertain
about the precise nuclear threshold. The military doctrine stated that attacks
against the Russian state and its military command and control systems,
strategic nuclear forces, warning systems for missile attack, and space forces,
would be seen as military threats.124 Western analysts concluded that threats
to state existence would include, at minimum, conventional strikes on critical
targets in Russia, critical loss levels across forces or key systems, or an inability
to repel an invasion into its interior.125 From 2010, attacks on Russian territory
were thus a prerequisite for a Russian nuclear first strike.
There had been disagreement within the Russian elite regarding this
doctrine. Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev announced that the
2010 military doctrine would contain provisions for nuclear pre-emption,126
121
Yuri Baluyevskiy, ‘Kakoy byt’ novoy Voyennoy Doktrine Rossii?’, Rossiskoye Voyennoye Obozreniye No.2,
(February 2007).
122
Kremlin, Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii. (2010) Section 22
123
Opinion on the amendments to the Federal law on defence of the Russian Federation, Council of Europe,
21 December (2010).
124
Kremlin, Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii. Section 10, Point B
125
126
Nikolai Patrushev, ‘O novoy voyennoy dokrine’, Zaschita i Bezopasnost’ 4 (2009); A. Yashlavskiy,
L. Panchenko, ‘Rossiya skoro smozhet bit’ pyervoy’, Moskovskiy Komsomolets (Moscow),
15 October 2009.
but the published version did not do so. This sparked speculation in the West
about the classified version of the doctrine.127 Authoritative sources indicate
that neither version contained a pre-emption clause, and that a public mili
tary doctrine would not be contradicted by a classified one.128
By 2010, the Russian Ministry of Defence had concluded that theore
tically, conventional strike options could contribute to deter regional
conflicts and manage escalation.129 The 2010 military doctrine reflected
this, stating: ‘In implementing strategic deterrence, provision is made for
using conventional precision weapons’.130 Russian conventional capabil
ities were not yet adequate to this plan; however, and modernisation of
nuclear capabilities and nuclear signalling continued. But Russian declara
tory policy conveyed a changing Russian conventional ambition. The
nuclear compensation for Russian conventional inferiority was changing
by 2010: with a reduced emphasis on a low declaratory threshold for
limited nuclear use, and with more subdued signalling that focused
primarily on strategic nuclear forces.
2014–2020: Substantial conventional advances influence Russian

nuclear threats
From 2014 onwards, the conventional balance of forces changed
between Russia and the West. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014
demonstrated modernised Russian conventional capabilities and
prompted a NATO conventional military reinforcement from the Barents
Sea to the Baltic and the Black Sea. Russian strategists voiced concern
about NATO encroachment from all strategic directions, still perceiving
a capability disadvantage in a protracted conventional war.131 Russia
remained concerned about NATO’s missile defence sites close to
Russian borders, including their potential for reinforcements. Russian
strategy documents continued to list NATO capabilities and US Prompt
Global Strike as military threats.132 The dissolution of the INF Treaty,
ironically, produced Russian concern about future NATO deployment of
offensive strike assets in Europe.133
127
Alex Velez-Green, ‘Why Moscow Might Not Reveal an “Escalate to De-Escalate” Strategy’, CSIS PONI
Next Generation Nuclear Network 8 (May 2018).
128
Author’s Interview with General (Ret.) Pavel Zolotarev, 7 December 2017; Dmitry Litovkin, ‘Iz Soveta
Bezopasnosti. Voennaya doktrina Rossii stala zhestche’, Krasnaia Zvezda 5/22 (February 2010). In 2020,
Russia made a version of the ‘classified’ military doctrine public, an apparent attempt to reduce such
confusion.
129
Michael Kofman, ‘Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts’, 13–14.
130
Kremlin, Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii. Part II, Section 12B
131
Dara Massicot, Scott Boston, ‘The Russian Way of Warfare: A Primer’, RAND Corporation (2017).
132
Kremlin, Short Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii.Part II
133
‘Rakety srednei i menshei mirnosti’, Kommersant 174, 25 September (2019).
Improved Russian conventional response options

Russia’s conventional means for defending against and responding to con
ventional threats improved markedly by 2014 and would continue to
improve. Significant hardware upgrades and organisational changes had
transformed Russian conventional forces, as the invasion of Ukraine and
subsequent operations demonstrated.134 Russia tested new organisational
concepts such as smaller Battalion Tactical Groups, and intensified training
and exercising that improved Russian fighting power and ability to conduct
large-scale military operations.135 The intervention in Syria from 2015 pro
vided valuable operational experience, including through conducting sus
tained air operations.
The Russian conventional capability for holding targets at risk and for
conventional responses was improved by 2014, significantly so by 2020. By
2012, Russia had deployed the new dual-capable ALCM Kh-101, and in 2015,
the new Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) was launched from a new
attack submarine, the Severodvinsk.136 Russia revealed a new hypersonic air-
launched ballistic missile, the Kinzhal, in 2018, and expanded its land-based
strike assets with an INF-violating intermediate-range missile, the 9M729.
Expanded conventional capabilities could be used to fulfil the functions
previously assigned to nuclear weapons.137 Still, in quantitative terms,
Russia continued to lag behind the West and the United States.
The integrated Aerospace Forces were further developed to enhance
a layered defence and a capability to strike targets at increasing ranges. The
Russian ability to deflect Western conventional strikes have intensified
Western debates about Russia’s A2AD capability.138 These conventional
improvements have, according to Russian strategists, improved Russia’s abil
ity to deter conventional aggressors. The Western debate on Russian A2AD
displays this notion that an attack against Russia is being perceived as
increasingly costly.
Nuclear response options and nuclear strategy 2014–2020

The Conventional Balance of Forces thesis of nuclear strategy would predict
that improved conventional capabilities should produce a reduced emphasis
on limited nuclear options. By the mid-2010s, Russian conventional precision
134
Bettina Renz, Russia’s Military Revival (Cambridge: Wiley, 2018).
135
Johan Norberg, ‘Training for War. Russias Strategic-level Military Exercises 2009–2017’, FOI Report FOI-
R-4627-R, no. October (2018).
136
Kristensen and Norris, ‘Russian Nuclear Forces, 2014’.
137
Johnson, “Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds “
48.
138
Michael Kofman, ‘It’s time to talk about A2/AD: Rethinking the Russian Military Challenge’, War on the
Rocks 5 September (2019); Alexander Lanoszka and Luis Simon, ‘The Post-INF European Missile Balance:
Thinking About NATOs Deterrence Strategy’, Texas National Security Review Summer 2020.
strike capabilities had started to fill a role in the Russian strategic deterrence
concept. But although overall numbers of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weap
ons declined, several new nonstrategic nuclear systems had become
operational.139 All the new sea-, air- and land-based cruise and ballistic
missiles were nuclear (and dual-) capable. Russia also developed new nuclear
gravity bombs.140 In other words, a reduced Russian emphasis on nuclear
capabilities because of emerging conventional assets was not apparent.
Dual-capable systems pose a challenge for the conventional balance of forces
thesis of nuclear strategy. Russia has developed its conventional precision strike
capabilities by building on an area of strength: producing nuclear-capable mis
siles. In part, this is a result of the legacy of the Russian nuclear and missile
industry. Russian design bureaus command resources to develop systems to
the state of flight test or advanced demonstration even without funding from
the Ministry of Defence.141 Decisions to produce some of the dual-capable
systems may have been driven by a need for modernised nuclear missiles. The air-
launched cruise missile was first developed in the period around 2000 when
Russian strategists emphasised sub-strategic nuclear response options. Other
capabilities, such as the Kalibr, may have been attractive in terms of both
conventional and nuclear versions. A sea-based conventional precision strike
capability is an evident asset for the Russian navy. At the same time, this branch
is habitually presented as a keen proponent of nonstrategic nuclear options, as
nuclear weapons balance US naval superiority.142 Current Russian calls for
a moratorium on nuclear-armed land-based intermediate-range missiles in
Europe indicates either that the nuclear version of the 9M729 is not Russia’s key
focus, or that the nuclear version of this missile was not intended for Europe.143
Russian strategists still seek a range of capabilities for escalation manage
ment because of a sustained perception of conventional inferiority, even if
that inferiority is reduced compared to previously. The number of available
conventional strike assets is likely one factor influencing this; the deteriorat
ing political relations with the West another. Russian strategists now deem
a potential conflict with NATO more, not less likely. Russian official strategy
now states that the time, place, and capability chosen for Russian nuclear
escalation of conflict should be unpredictable.144 A suite of non-strategic
nuclear options ensure such flexibility.
139
Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, ‘Russian Nuclear Forces 2020’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76,
Nuclear Notebook, no. 2 (2020).
140
Pavel Podvig, ‘Russia’s Current Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control’, Journal for Peace and Nuclear
Disarmament 1/2 (2018).
141
Podvig, ‘Russia’s Current Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control.’
142
Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v oblasti voenno-morsoki deyatelnosti na period
do 2030 goda, (Moscow: Kreml, 2017). See also Michael Kofman, ‘The Role of Nuclear Forces in Russian
Maritime Strategy’, Russian Military Analysis Blog 12 March (2020).
143
‘Rakety srednei i menshei mirnosti.’
144
Kremlin, Osnovy goudarstvennoy politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v oblasti yadernogo sderzhivaniya,
(Moscow: Prezident Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2020).
In Russian strategy, conventional capabilities do not supplant nuclear

capabilities or vice versa: rather one augments the utility of the other.
Russian deterrence concepts adjusted to capitalise on the military utility
and deterrent effect of interchangeable conventional and nuclear
options.145 Russian theorists discuss how conventional capabilities with
nuclear potential can inflict enough damage on an adversary to a level it
would deem unacceptable.146 Improved conventional capabilities provide
Russia with more options before it would face whether to go nuclear:
If nonnuclear means are unsuccessful in deterring him from initiating or con

tinuing aggression, the transition to nuclear weapons use will be lawful and
unavoidable.147
Russian strategic nuclear signalling has continued at high levels, conveying

a sustained and improved secure second-strike capability. Continuous
Russian nuclear submarine deterrent patrols resumed by mid-2012.148 Since
2014, ‘Russia has continued long-range bomber training with sorties flown
over the Arctic, North Atlantic, and North Pacific, intercepted by NATO and
Japanese fighter aircraft in “scenarios reminiscent of the Cold War”’.149 An
unprecedented 2019 naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea demonstrated
Russia’s ability to protect the Northern Strategic Bastion.150 But the emphasis
on non-strategic nuclear options has been influenced by the integration of
conventional and nuclear assets, such as in the strategic nuclear exercise
Grom-2019.151 The strategic exercises Zapad-2017 had a reduced nuclear
‘tone’ compared to previous exercises, and resulted in no reports on simu
lated strikes against Western targets.152 After 2014, Russian nuclear signalling
of strategic forces has remained at high levels. But a willingness for rapid and
limited nuclear escalation in the face of non-existential conflict, as conveyed
in 2000, has been supplanted by integrated conventional and nuclear
response options.
Russian declaratory strategy also emphasised non-nuclear options after
2014. The 2014 military doctrine introduced the concept non-nuclear deter
rence, ‘a complex of foreign policy, military and military-technical measures
145
V. V. Alferov V. I. Polegayev, ‘O Neyadernom Sderzhivanii, ego roli i meste v sisteme Strategicheskogo
Sderzhivaniya’, Voennaia Mysl’ 7 (2015); Viktor Saksonov, ‘Neyadernoe sderzhivanie’, Nezavisimoye
Voyennoye Obozrenie 12 August (2016).
146
Y. N. Tret’yakov O. Y. Aksienov, E. N. Filin, ‘Osnovnye printsipy sozdaniia sistemy otsenki tekushego
i prognoznogo ushcherba vazhneishim ob’ektam sistemy strategicheskogo sderzhivaniya’, Voennaia
Mysl’ 2 (2015).
147
Achasov, ‘Neyadernoye Sderzhivaniye.’
148
Kristensen and Norris, ‘Russian Nuclear Forces, 2014’.
149
Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2017 (Forsvaret, 2017).
150
Tormod Strand, ‘Secret submarine operation: “The goal is to demonstrate a Russian ability to strike the
United States”‘, NRK, 29 October (2019)
151
Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2020,(Forsvaret, 2020).
152
Michael Kofman, ‘What actually happened during Zapad 2017’, Russian Military Analysis Blog
22 December (2017).
directed at the prevention of non-nuclear aggression against Russia’.153 This

novel concept was a direct translation of new conventional and non-
conventional capabilities into deterrent potential, as described by Russian
strategists.154 Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu stated, ‘The role of nuclear
weapons in deterring a potential aggressor will diminish, primarily thanks
to the development of precision weapons’.155 In 2020, Russia published
a nuclear deterrence doctrine, which again reiterated nuclear weapons
being weapons of last resort.156 Putin has warned of the dangers of lowering
thresholds for nuclear use and of the difficulty of distinguishing dual-use
systems.157 He rejected nuclear pre-emption:
We are prepared . . . [to] use nuclear weapons only when we know, for certain,
that some potential aggressor is attacking Russia, our territory. Our concept is
based on a reciprocal counter strike. Such a counter strike would amount to
a global catastrophe. We cannot be the initiators of such catastrophe because
we have no provision for pre-emptive strike.158
Conventional capability improvements after 2014 have contributed to a high

Russian declaratory nuclear threshold and to reduced signalling of early
nuclear escalation with the limited use of sub-strategic nuclear weapons.
But Russia retains an emphasis on nuclear weapons as an escalation manage
ment tool in regional wars where conventional options cannot ensure state
survival. This promise of nuclear first use in the face of grave conventional
threats was reaffirmed in the 2020 nuclear deterrence strategy. Russia’s
retains a range of nuclear capabilities for their complimentary rather than
alternative effect to conventional capabilities.
To sum up, the Conventional Balance of Forces thesis demonstrates that
Russian sub-strategic nuclear weapons compensated for conventional infer
iority, some 20 years ago. This strategy was a product of a lack of a conven
tional response option to a strategic conundrum identified by Russian
strategists. It was not the product of increasing Russian foreign policy ambi
tions, but rather a response to a perceived growing threat. It was also
a response conceived within a specific context: a regional conflict with
a large-scale conventional air strike that could threaten Russian retaliatory
nuclear capability. It was never a strategy associated with expansionist ambi
tions, nor one designed to achieve limited goals by way of limited wars.
153
Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Section 8, point N.
154
V. I. Polegayev, ‘O Neyadernom Sderzhivanii, ego roli i meste v sisteme Strategicheskogo
Sderzhivaniya.’
155
Vladimir Isachenkov, ‘Russia to rely increasingly on non-nuclear deterrent’, AP 21 February (2017);
Russian Ministry of Defence, ‘Ministr oborony Rossii provel ustanovochnyuyu lektskiyu kursa “Armiya
i obshchestvo”‘, (2017).
156
Kremlin, Osnovy goudarstvennoy politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v oblasti yadernogo sderzhivaniya.
157
Vladimir Putin's annual news conference, (Moscow: Kremlin, 2018).
158
‘Vladimir Putin Meets with Members of the Valdai Discussion Club. Full Transcript of the Plenary
Session of hte 15th Annual Meeting’, Valdai Club, no. 18 October (2018).
Russian officials continue to reject this Western interpretation of Russian

strategy.159 It misrepresents both the context and the purpose of potential
Russian nuclear weapons use.
Russian strategists have continued to grapple with two elementary nuclear
strategy problems. They debate the credibility and utility of nuclear threats
and the difficulty of predicting adversary responses to limited nuclear
strikes.160 This has produced a Russian nuclear strategy that emphasises non-
nuclear options to enhance the credibility of nuclear threats. The strategy
now exhibits a novel interrelationship between nuclear and conventional
forces, where improved conventional capabilities do not lead directly to
a reduction of nuclear emphasis, but neither does it leave the role of nuclear
weapons unchanged. It reduces Russian dependency on nuclear options for
handling local and regional wars that do not threaten state existence.
Conventional capabilities have been instrumental to how Russian planners
formulated nuclear strategy.
The fact that Russia retains a broad range of nonstrategic nuclear capabil
ities indicates that military and civilian leaders believe such weapons could
influence the course of conflict or help terminate it. However, this option does
not reflect an interest in using nuclear weapons as a coercive tool to hold an
adversary hostage to Russian revisionist goals. Russian leaders convey that
they would use nuclear weapons only when Russia had exhausted available
conventional escalation tools and was unwilling to back down in the face of
existential threats. Russian nuclear use would convey a Russian willingness to
risk further nuclear escalation, not confidence that it thinks it can avoid or
control escalation.
Conclusion
To nuclear strategists, understanding when and under what circumstances an
adversary would resort to nuclear weapons has always been a central chal
lenge. When a nuclear weapons state reaches that point depends on the
balance of nuclear forces, as well as on conventional threats and response
options. This article demonstrates how studying the conventional balance of
forces produces insights into nuclear strategy deliberations and outcomes.
The interrelationship between conventional forces and nuclear strategy is not
static but dynamic. Conventional inferiority can produce increased reliance
on nuclear threats, but some states seek to improve conventional capabilities
to overcome this dependency. Russia is one such state: its preferred escala
tion management option is not, by default, nuclear weapons.
159
Sergei Lavrov, ‘Statement at the Conference of Disarmament, Geneva’, (28 February 2018).
160
This finding highlights the need for more theoretical and empirical
explorations of the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces
and strategy. Russian strategists expanded on Cold War concepts of nuclear
compensation for conventional inferiority. Their concepts are now tailored to
deter the types of security challenges Russia faces. Other nuclear weapons
states may assess the impact of conventional threats and capabilities on
nuclear strategy differently. States with more advanced conventional cap
abilities may draw different conclusions regarding their need to rely on
nuclear compensation. Prospective nuclear weapons states will value the
utility of potential nuclear capabilities depending on conventional options.
Comparing and contrasting how Western and non-Western states approach
this conventional/nuclear nexus will produce additional insights into how
different states formulate nuclear strategy to face conventional threats.
The Russian case highlights the need to examine the technical, military,
and strategic implications of dual-use capabilities more closely.161 Existing
scholarship explores some effects of these capabilities, such as the potential
for inadvertent escalation.162 But it does not examine the strategic utility of
such capabilities, a utility that Russian strategists have sought to exploit.
Dual-use capabilities may serve different military, political, or bureaucratic
purposes in different political systems, in turn determining their relative
strategic value. Understanding such differences will be crucially important
to stymie conventional and nuclear arms racing, and to achieve arms control
agreements among old and new rivals.
Finally, the conclusions drawn here highlight the need to examine the
iterative dynamics that the nuclear and conventional balance of forces pro
duce between adversaries. Russian strategy is a product of perceptions of its
conventional and nuclear capability compared to the potential adversary.
That perception changed over time, in part because of the adversary’s chan
ging behaviour. Scholars and policymakers should acknowledge that both
conventional and nuclear forces affect their own position and military
options, as well as those of the adversary. Understanding such dynamics
will be central to gauging when, in conflict, an adversary might use nuclear
weapons and what might deter such escalation.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for the constructive and helpful feedback I received from several great
scholars regarding this article. They include Fiona Cunningham, Michael Kofman, Vipin
161
One interesting examination of the impact of missile technology bar their nuclear characteristic is
Robert Ayson & Christine M. Leah, ‘Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear Age’, Journal of Strategic Studies
38/1–2 (2014).
162
James M. Acton, Is it a Nuke? Pre-Launch Ambiguity and Inadvertent Escalation, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace (Washington, DC, 2020).
Narang, Frank Gavin, Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Scott Gates, Even Hellan Larsen,
Henrik Hiim, David Holloway, Lynn Eden, Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Brad
Roberts. I am also grateful for the very constructive advice from the anonymous
reviewers. The manuscript benefited from being workshopped at the Nuclear
Scholars Research Initiative Conference in Hamburg, Germany, in the Oslo Nuclear
Project Reading Group at the University of Oslo, and in the CISAC Nuclear Reading
Group at Stanford University.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard is Postdoctoral Fellow (Assistant Professor) of Political Science
at the University of Oslo, where she is part of the Oslo Nuclear Project.
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Journal of Strategic Studies

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Russian nuclear strategy and conventional

Kristin Ven Bruusgaard

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Russian nuclear strategy and conventional inferiority

KEYWORDS Russia; nuclear weapons; strategy; deterrence; conventional forces

CONTACT Kristin Ven Bruusgaard k.v.bruusgaard@stv.uio.no Department of Political Science,

inferiority produces increased reliance on nuclear threats.1 But this thesis

relationship that predicts future strategy change.3 Accounts of Russian strategy

balance of forces affects military strategy. It consults debates on what pro­

The debate about Russian nuclear strategy

and would be unable to remain united in a severe crisis.16 Russia could

A conventional balance of forces thesis of nuclear strategy

escalation could be contained at different rungs of an ‘escalation ladder’.29

The conventional inferiority thesis rests on two implicit assumptions that

compensation, but this is not a static choice. Changes in conventional threats

The conventional balance of forces and Russian nuclear strategy

For each case, I examine Russian perceived vulnerability to adversary

2000: Russian conventional inferiority produces emphasis on

capabilities were perceived as a growing threat to Russian security, with an

In addition to the increasing technological gap between Western and Russian

Russian conventional response options in 2000

Kvashnin, whose formative military experience had been Afghanistan and

Nuclear response options and Russian nuclear strategy in 2000

Perceived conventional inferiority also produced changed declaratory strat­

The doctrine defined such threats as ‘Actions designed to undermine global

2010: Conventional modernisation reduces Russian emphasis on

Russian conventional response options in 2010

was taking shape, restructuring the entire military organisation.104 Russia

Nuclear response options and Russian nuclear strategy in 2010

doctrine should take account of changed internal and external conditions

Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to nuclear or

2014–2020: Substantial conventional advances influence Russian

Improved Russian conventional response options

Nuclear response options and nuclear strategy 2014–2020

In Russian strategy, conventional capabilities do not supplant nuclear

If nonnuclear means are unsuccessful in deterring him from initiating or con­

Russian strategic nuclear signalling has continued at high levels, conveying

directed at the prevention of non-nuclear aggression against Russia’.153 This

Conventional capability improvements after 2014 have contributed to a high

Russian officials continue to reject this Western interpretation of Russian

Sokut, Sergei, ‘Krug Pocheta Nad Islandiei’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie 25 (2

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balance of forces affects military strategy. It consults debates on what pro

Perceived conventional inferiority also produced changed declaratory strat

If nonnuclear means are unsuccessful in deterring him from initiating or con