IBTSMUN’17

NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANISATION

BACKGROUND GUIDE

AGENDA: NATO’S SOUTHERN

DIMENSION: IRAQ, SYRIA AND THE
ISIS NEXUS ALONG WITH SUPPORT
FOR TURKEY & THE THREAT OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CHAIRPERSON: AKHILA MISRA

VICE-CHAIRPERSON: YASH GUPTA
 Letter from the Executive
Board
The Executive Board would like to welcome you to the simulation of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization at the IBTSMUN‘17. In the committee our main
focus would be on NATO’s southern dimension and how it has affected
countries like Turkey. We will also focus on the threat of nuclear weapons. For
the sake of research and analysis, we have specifically added research links in
the later section of this guide, which will be of utmost importance to you, and
we therefore deliberate on the fact that these research links are not to be
accepted as credible proof in the council, but only there to help you get a better
understanding of the background guide, and under no circumstances will any
quotation be admissible in the committee without prior notification to the
directors.
Secondly, we see a lot of delegates come in and expect a cut and dry debate on
the Agenda. Going through a bunch of reports and reading their conclusions
out is not going to work here. What this Executive Board expects is that you
express an analysis of the information you have, debate on the solutions and
conclusions. Do not be afraid of being wrong, because the best experience of
being a Delegate at an MUN Conference is to completely give in to becoming
the delegate and feel the responsibility and dedication to representing the
nations.
Regarding Rules of Procedure, we ask you to be conversant in them but not
regard them as strict and unbreakable. Rules of Procedure were made to aid
debate, not hamper it, so we would like to keep the Points of Orders for usage
of personal pronouns to a minimum. Further, we would encourage the
delegates to converse amongst themselves and promptly let the Executive
Board know if they wish for any rules to be amended to improve debate.
Also, try to document every part of debate after every few hours, because this
will help you prepare a proper document at the end of the two days, as opposed
to trying to do all the documentation work on the last day and not achieving
fulfilling debate or an end document.
Don’t limit your research to this background guide and under no circumstance
will anything from this background will be considered credible. This guide is
merely for the basic understanding of the agenda and about the committee. We
expect all the delegates to be well informed about the agenda and their
respective countries. We would encourage that all proofs and evidences be
ready. We have supplied in this background guide all the details regarding our
committee and its agenda for the delegate to be sure and confident. Do not get
scared or fear to be wrong as our aim here is to better the experience of an
MUN conference for the delegate as mentioned earlier.
Please note that every single country has its own foreign policy, and areas of
interest where they cannot and will not compromise. As delegates, you will be
expected to be thorough with your research and base your analysis and
conclusions on the same during debate. Please remember, a committee is only as
strong as its individual delegates, and that the Executive Board is here merely to
guide debate, not to take part in it.

Lastly, we need to understand as to how the Article 5 of NATO has not fully
been exercised and countries haven’t supported each other many at times.
Wishing you best of luck and hoping to see all of you in high spirits.
Regards,
Executive Board – NATO
CHAIR: Akhila Misra
EMAIL & CONTACT: akhilatejaswini@ymail.com ; 8826401265
VICE-CHAIR: Yash Gupta
EMAIL & CONTACT: ygupta497@gmail.com ; 9810816888
NATURE OF PROOF AND EVIDENCE
Evidence or proof is acceptable from the following sources:

1. News Sources:

➢ REUTERS – Any Reuters article which clearly makes mention of the fact or is
in contradiction of the fact being stated by a delegate in council.
(http://www.reuters.com/)

➢ State operated News Agencies – These reports can be used in the support of or
against the State that owns the News Agency. These reports, if credible or
substantial enough, can be used in support of or against any Country as such
but in that situation, they can be denied by any other country in the council.
Some examples are,
● RIA Novosti (Russia) http://en.rian.ru/
● IRNA (Iran) http://www.irna.ir/ENIndex.htm
● BBC (United Kingdom) http://www.bbc.co.uk/
● Xinhua News Agency and CCTV (P.R. China)
http://cctvnews.cntv.cn/

2. Government Reports: These reports can be used in a similar way as the State
Operated News Agencies reports and can, in all circumstances, be denied by another
country. However, a nuance is that a report that is being denied by a certain country
can still be accepted by the Executive Board as credible information. Examples are:

➢ Government Websites like the State Department of the United States of

America (http://www.state.gov/index.htm)
➢ or the Ministry of Defense of the Russian (Federation
http://www.eng.mil.ru/en/index.htm)
➢ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of various nations like India
(http://www.mea.gov.in/), People’s Republic of China
(http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/) , France
(http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/) , Russian Federation
(http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/main_eng )
 ➢ Permanent Representatives to the United Nations Reports
(http://www.un.org/en/members/ (Click on any country to get the website
of the Office of its Permanent Representative)
➢ Multilateral Organizations like the NATO
(http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm ),
ASEAN(http://www.aseansec.org/ ), OPEC
(http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/ ), etc.

3. UN Reports: All UN Reports are considered are credible information or evidence

for the Executive Board.

UN Bodies like

1. The SC (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/),
2. GA (http://www.un.org/en/ga/ ),
3. HRC (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/HRCIndex.aspx),
etc.

UN Affiliated bodies like

1. the International Atomic Energy Agency (http://www.iaea.org/) ,

2. World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/),
3. International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm),
4. International Committee of the Red Cross (http://www.icrc.org/eng/index.jsp),
etc.
5. Treaty Based Bodies like the Antarctic Treaty System
(http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm),
6. the International Criminal Court (http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC)

Under no circumstances will sources like

 Wikipedia (http://www.wikipedia.org/),
 Amnesty International (http://www.amnesty.org/),
 Human Rights Watch (http://www.hrw.org/) or
  newspapers like the Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/), Times of
India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/), etc.

be accepted as credible proof, though they might be used for general information.

*NOTE: In no circumstances reports of any other news agency except those

mentioned above will be accounted as a credible proof for any statement made
during the conference.

IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS
Following is the list of documents that need to be perused by all delegates before they
come to the council. Please understand that you need to know the following aspects
regarding each of the mentioned documents:

❖ The reason why this document exists (for e.g. the Geneva Conventions were
enacted to lay down the rules of war and for the treatment of all parties concerned
in the wars.)
❖ The nature of the document and the force it carries, i.e. whether it is a treaty, a
convention, a doctrine, or a universally accepted custom or norm.
❖ The areas where the document can be applied or has jurisdiction on (for e.g.
international humanitarian law applies only to situations of armed conflict,
whereas the human rights laws applies at all times of war and peace alike.)
❖ The contents of the document at hand. You need not memorize any articles or
rules of any convention or treaty, but should know what the document has to say
in various situations that may arise in the council.
The delegates must have the understanding of the following:

1. UN Charter -The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June

1945 at San Francisco by the nations represented at the United Nations
Conference on International Organisation, most of them earlier allies in the
Second World War. The allies began being referred to as the 'United
Nations' towards the end of that war. The Charter came into force on
October 24 1945. Since that time all members joining have had to declare
themselves bound by both documents - though practice has demonstrated
on too many occasions that that declaration has not been taken too
 seriously. Once again, a written constitution is one thing, actual behaviour
is another.
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/

http://research.un.org/en/docs/charter

2. Geneva Conventions - The Geneva Conventions comprise four treaties,

and three additional protocols, that establish the standards of international
law for the humanitarian treatment of war. The singular term Geneva
Convention usually denotes the agreements of 1949, negotiated in the
aftermath of the Second World War (1939–45), which updated the terms of
the first three treaties (1864, 1906, 1929), and added a fourth treaty. The
Geneva Conventions extensively defined the basic, wartime rights of
prisoners (civil and military); established protections for the wounded; and
established protections for the civilians in and around a war-zone.
Moreover, the Geneva Convention also defines the rights and protections
afforded to non-combatants, yet, because the Geneva Conventions are
about people in war, the articles do not address warfare proper — the use of
weapons of war — which is the subject of the Hague Conventions (First
Hague Conference, 1899; Second Hague conference 1907), and the bio–
chemical warfare Geneva Protocol (Protocol Prohibition of the Use in War
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare, 1925).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva_Conventions

https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions

3. Customary International Law / Customary International Humanitarian

Law -Customary international law consists of rules that come from "a
general practice accepted as law" and exist independent of treaty law.
Customary IHL is of crucial importance in today’s armed conflicts because
 it fills gaps left by treaty law and so strengthens the protection offered to
victims.

a. https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law

b. https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/Home

c. http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law

And so on.

❖ Please note: This is not an exhaustive list! There are many more sources that you
may find very useful as a delegate within committee proceedings. Feel free to
research on them and use them as part of your argument.

SUGGESTED PATTERN FOR RESEARCH

Following is a suggested pattern for researching, and because we believe in the
ideology of a successful committee which has all the resources, and has a given
direction;

Remember: Researching and understanding the United Nations and the

Committee/Council being simulated – Its Mandate, including understanding
historical work done on the agenda.

1. Research on the allotted country, understanding its polity, economy,

culture, history etc., comprehending the Foreign Policy of the allotted
country. It includes understanding the ideology and principles adopted by
the country on the agenda. It further includes studying past actions taken by
the country on the agenda and other related issues –specifically analysing
their causes and consequences.
2. Reading the background guide thoroughly.
3. Researching further upon the agenda using the footnotes and links given in
the guide and from other sources such as academic papers, institutional
reports, national reports, news articles, blogs etc.
 4. Understanding policies adopted by different blocs of countries (example:
EU etc.) and major countries involved in the agenda. Including their
position, ideology and adopted past actions.
5. Characterizing the agenda into sub-topics and preparing speeches and
statements on them. It is the same as preparing topics for the moderated
caucuses and their content.
6. Preparing a list of possible solutions and actions the UNSC and UNGA can
adopt on the issue as per your country’s policies.
7. Assemble proof/evidence for any important piece of information/allegation
you are going to use in committee
8. Keeping your research updated using various news sources, especially news
websites given in the proof/evidence section.
Again, this is not by any means an exhaustive list. It is only indicative of what all can
be done by delegates to refine their research. Always remember winners don’t do
different things, they do the same thing, differently.

RESEARCH LINKS:
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/UNND807.pdf

https://www.mckendree.edu/student-life/involvement/org/departmental/model-
un/generalassemblyspring2015.pdf

http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ga.shtml

http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r210.htm

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/terrorism/

http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Terrorism/Pages/SRTerrorismIndex.aspx

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Terrorism/Pages/SRTerrorismIndex.aspx

http://ue.eu.int/policies/fight-against-terrorism?lang=bh
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/196-1.htm#ART20

http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport_Terrorism/Docs%202010/1st
%20Cttee%20-%20IO%20replies%20-
%202010/League%20of%20Arab%20States%20-%20English%20%20-%20post.pdf

http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/aug/07/july7.terrorism1

https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&cad=rj
a&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjF_NuRo5TOAhWDHZQKHWTlC1wQFghNMAc&ur
l=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F146680
%2Fipublicationdocument_singledocument%2Ffd8d925b-6648-43e4-baf5-
8b14b54fa96d%2Fen%2Fe-book_guide-to-un-
counterterrorism.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHKUeMkG_rrNomGeNb7nP_NPnpFNw&sig
2=TsrXD4HCHvKaAvnx5jB9Zw&bvm=bv.128153897,d.dGo

http://globalcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/North_Africa_Report_Final.pdf
Introduction to NATO
Composed of 28 member countries, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
is the result of the North Atlantic Treaty (signed 4 April 1949) in the form of
an intergovernmental military alliance. The aim of this organisation is to
provide the member countries with a system of collective defence referring
to mutual defence in response to an attack by any external party (terrorist
organisations, rebel outfits, insurgent troops and the like). NATO is
committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. If diplomatic efforts fail, it
has the military capacity needed to undertake crisis-management
operations. These are carried out under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty -
NATO’s founding treaty - or under a United Nations mandate, alone or in
cooperation with other countries and international organizations.

HIGHLIGHTS OF ARTICLE 5
The principle of collective defence is at the very heart of NATO’s founding
treaty. It remains a unique and enduring principle that binds its members
together, committing them to protect each other and setting a spirit of
solidarity within the Alliance.
 Collective defence means that an attack against one Ally is considered
as an attack against all Allies.
 The principle of collective defence is enshrined in Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty.
 NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history after the 9/11
terrorist attacks against the United States.
 NATO has taken collective defence measures on several occasions,
for instance in response to the situation in Syria and in the wake of
the Russia-Ukraine crisis.
 NATO has standing forces on active duty that contribute to the
Alliance’s collective defence efforts on a permanent basis.
INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA
As the first half of our agenda suggests, we will be discussing the current
situation in Iraq, Syria and the ISIS nexus. We’ve also brought in Turkey,
and will be discussing the ways in which we can support the country. To
begin with, we shall give a brief account of what has been going on in these
middle-eastern countries along with how ISIS is influencing them.

NATO AND IRAQ

Let us begin with the situation in Iraq which has been going on over the
past few years. In 2014, the Iraqi insurgency escalated into a civil war with
the conquest of Fallujah and Mosul and major areas in northern Iraq by the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS). This has resulted in the
forced resignation of the Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, airstrikes by the
United States, Iran, Syria, and at least a dozen other countries, the
participation of Iranian troops and military aid provided to Iraq by Russia.
The current situation in Iraq is bad and is worsening day by day due to the
presence of the ISIS as well as the political instability. The March 2003
campaign against Iraq was conducted by a coalition of forces from different
countries, some of which were NATO member countries and some were
not. NATO as an organization had no role in the decision to undertake the
campaign or to conduct it. Iraq was suspected of possessing weapons of
mass destruction and was requested to comply with its disarmament
obligations. On 8 November 2002, the UN Security Council issued
Resolution 1441 to offer Iraq a final chance to comply with its disarmament
obligations that had been repeatedly stated in previous UN Security Council
Resolutions (UNSCR). Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein, refused to comply
and therefore raised suspicions among Security Council members. This
prompted some to support immediate military action and others to insist
that the weapon inspectors be given more time to conduct their work. The
US-led coalition, Operation Iraqi Freedom, ousted the Saddam Hussein
regime. With tensions escalating prior to events, in February 2003 Turkey
requested NATO assistance under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The Alliance undertook several precautionary defensive measures to ensure
Turkey's security in the event of a potential threat to its territory or
population as a consequence of the crisis. Following a request by Turkey,
NATO deployed surveillance aircraft and missile defenses on Turkish
territory from 20 February to 16 April 2003. The first NATO defensive
assets arrived in Turkey the day after the decision was made and the last
elements effectively left the country on 3 May. The US-led Multinational
Force (MNF), known by the name of Operation Iraqi Freedom, ousted
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Following the end of the March campaign, the
Polish government requested NATO support in the context of its planned
leadership of one of the sectors in the MNF. The North Atlantic Council
agreed to this request on 21 May and tasked NATO’s military authorities to
provide advice on what type of support could be given. On 2 June,
following a review of this advice, the Council agreed to aid Poland in a
variety of supporting roles, including force generation, communications,
logistics and movements. However, NATO did not have any permanent
presence in Iraq. Poland formally assumed command of the Multinational
Division (MND) Central South in Iraq on 3 September 2003. It withdrew
from the coalition in October 2008.

NTM-1 2004
The March 2003 campaign against Iraq was conducted by a coalition of
forces from different countries, some of which were NATO member
countries and some were not. NATO as an organization had no role in the
decision to undertake the campaign or to conduct it. The Alliance
demonstrated its commitment to helping Iraq create effective armed forces
and, ultimately, provide for its own security by establishing the NATO
Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) in 2004. It was set up at the request of the
Iraqi Interim Government in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1546.
NTM-I focused on training and mentoring, and on equipment donation and
coordination. By providing mentoring, advice and instruction support
through in- and out-of-country training and the coordination of deliveries of
donated military equipment, NTM-I made a tangible contribution to the
rebuilding of military leadership in Iraq and the development of the Iraqi
Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In 2007, Allies
decided to extend their training assistance to Iraq by including gendarmerie-
type training of the federal police in order to bridge the gap between routine
police work and military operations. The NATO mission was a distinct
mission, under the political control of NATO’s North Atlantic Council.
Nonetheless, NATO’s training missions were coordinated with Iraqi
authorities and the US Forces-Iraq (USF-I). It was withdrawn from Iraq on
31 December 2011 when the mandate of the mission expired and agreement
could not be reached on the legal status of NATO troops operating in the
country.

NATO AND SYRIA

NATO countries like the United States are working with a NATO ally,
Turkey, to deal with the violent situation in Syria and combat the Islamic
State, which some refer to as ISIL. And there are some differences of
opinion over this conflict. Several proxy wars are waging in Syria.
Back in 2013, US President, Barack Obama, authorized strikes against
Syria, blaming Assad’s government for a sarin gas attack on a rebel-held
suburb of Damascus. But Russia’s involvement managed to avert NATO
attacking the country as Moscow brokered a deal, during which Syria
renounced its chemical weapons arsenal and joined the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. Since then, Russia and USA
have held direct talks to stop the enraging war in Aleppo and other war torn
regions of Syria in the interest of international peace and cooperation. Both
NATO and the Russian forces have indulged in blame games regarding the
tactics that both parties have used to curb the escalating situation in Syria.
But what cannot be disputed is the fact that both the NATO alliance and
Russia have contributed to the tense situation in the region today.
Keeping in mind the current political unrest in Syria, a simple but necessary act
must be enforced to save the lives of Syrian refugees without the use of military
power.
The battle of Aleppo and other parts of Syria is being fought by proxy
powers, especially the Russian air force and Syrian fighter planes. These
planes are causing the major damage among civilians because they are able
to act with impunity in Syria, making them the victims of daily carnage.
Pushing for a no-fly zone might be the best way to stop this carnage but
short of bombing the Syrian runways and controlling the skies, the attacks
from the air are unlikely to stop. In any war that includes fighter planes, or
even rockets, a national plan is usually in place to warn the public and to
allow them to take refuge. Sophisticated satellite and other hi-tech
equipment in the possession of the US military can easily detect fighters
planning to bomb Aleppo or other Syrian cities enough time before the
bombs hit the ground. Such sophisticated technology provides sensitive
time-based information that can mean the difference between life and death.
All that is needed is to make this time-sensitive information available to the
people who are on the ground.
The violence in Syria has become one of the deadliest conflicts in the world
towards civilians. All parties to the conflict, including the Russian and
Syrians, regularly claim that they are not targeting civilians. The idea of the
UN or NATO sharing information about Russian and Syrian flight patterns
might be considered an act of war because it weakens the surprise factor.
But this non-violent form of protecting civilians cannot be compared to the
more direct operational military actions.

ISIS’S ROLE
The ISIL has attracted hundreds of foreign fighters from Western countries
to join its ranks. These foreign fighters, some with solid academic and
educational backgrounds and intellectual knowledge, have joined the cause
and continue to do so every day. Furthermore, ISIL’s success is based on an
effective media strategy of looking at the utmost possible “news effect” of
their attacks. Together with their access to high levels of funding, these three
elements bear the real risk of the group turning into practice a largely a
theoretical possibility: to employ weapons of mass destruction or CBRN
material in terrorist attacks.
Worrying reports confirm that ISIL has gained access to former chemical
weapons storage sites in Iraq. There are press reports about nuclear material
from Iraqi scientific institutes having been seized by ISIL. This
demonstrates that while no full-scale plots have been unveiled so far, the
world community needs to be on alert. Generating improved military and
civil prevention and response capabilities should be a high priority and
should not fall victim to limited budgets in times of economic crisis. Over
more than 15 years, NATO, as well as individual Allies, have built up
capacities to prevent, protect and recover from WMD attacks or CBRN
events.
NATO is looking to train Iraqi officers and provide other direct support in
the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to alleviate the burden
on U.S. and other coalition members' resources. The training would be of
an advisory nature, such as helping the government reform its defense
community, learning how to do long term defense planning and counter
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and providing logistics and medical
care for troops. Currently, about 500 or 600 Iraqis are being trained in
Jordan, but NATO is looking to train them inside Iraq and improve the
preparedness rate of the troops.
The group has been operating independently of other jihadist groups in
Syria such as the al-Nusra Front, the official al-Qaeda affiliate in the
country, and has had a tense relationship with other rebels. The
organisation is recruiting the youth from these two war torn countries.

TURKEY
Turkey has been an important NATO member since the earliest days of the
Cold War when it joined in 1952. During the Cold War it was one of only
two countries (the other being Norway) that shared a land border with the
Soviet Union and served as the southern anchor of Europe’s defense.
Turkey attaches the utmost importance to NATO’s role in maintaining
security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and in providing a forum for
political-military consultations on topics of interest to its members.
Indivisibility of Alliance security, solidarity among Allies and a fair risk and
burden sharing as well as the consensus rule, are NATO’s guiding principles
and should remain as such. Adherence to these principles as well as
NATO’s ability to adapt to the changing security environment, have made
NATO the most successful military alliance in history. The heated
campaign for the April 16 Turkish referendum, which President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan hoped will deliver him powers verging on the dictatorial,
has created a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and some of its key North
Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. Relations with the Netherlands are all
but broken off, Germany is struggling to remain civil under a barrage of
Erdogan insults, and Denmark is siding with its north European neighbors.
Add to this Turkey's differences with the U.S. and the perennial tension
between Turkey and Greece, and it's no longer clear how much of a NATO
member Erdogan's country really is. Despite its considerable military
strength, Turkey's participation in alliance activities isn't extensive, and its
interests don't necessarily align with those of NATO.
In Syria, the world's biggest war theatre today, Turkey acts as an
independent player and sometime rival to the U.S. That became evident last
year, when Turkey and Russia became co-breakers of a ceasefire and a
peace process that excluded the U.S. This year, the U.S. and Russia found
themselves unlikely situational allies against Turkey near the Syrian town
of Manbij, preventing a Turkish push against Kurdish forces called terrorists
by Erdogan's government but considered useful allies against the Islamic
State by both America and Russia. There's no sign of a U.S.-Turkish joint
strategy, and any U.S. move to help the Kurds will be seen as a betrayal in
the charged post-coup atmosphere of Ankara. All in all, Turkey appears to
have more disputes than friendships with its NATO allies. And its
engagement with the alliance itself, which it joined in 1952, isn't particularly
strong.
According to the just-released NATO annual report for 2016, Turkey only
took part in four of the 18 key NATO exercises held last year.

THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

While it has been more than twenty years since the end of the Cold War,
the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons continues to pose a serious
global threat. The likelihood of a nuclear war between the United States and
Russia has decreased, but the continued presence of large stockpiles makes
the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons a persistent risk.
Many of the countries with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and
Pakistan, are actively engaged in regional conflicts, making the possibility of
regional nuclear war a concern. North Korea illicitly acquired nuclear
weapons, and other countries, including Iran and Syria, have violated their
nuclear safeguards commitments and are suspected of covertly pursuing
nuclear weapons capabilities.
Two countries—the United States and Russia—hold the vast majority of the
world's nuclear weapons. The former Cold War foes account for 93 percent
of the total global stockpile. And more than two decades after the end of the
Cold War, the two countries still keep nearly 2,000 nuclear weapons on
high alert, ready for immediate launch against each other. That leaves both
countries too vulnerable to nuclear launch by accident, miscalculation or
even cyber attacks.
We know that terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons. Today, there are more
than 1,800 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials-highly enriched
uranium (HEU) and plutonium—stored in hundreds of sites across 25
countries, some of them poorly secured. To build a bomb, terrorists won't
necessarily look to the biggest stockpiles; they'll go where nuclear materials
are the most vulnerable. That makes global nuclear security only as strong
as the weakest link in the chain.
For more than two decades, nuclear debates had vanished from the heart of
Western strategic debates. The general perception within the Alliance was that
NATO was not facing direct threats on its territory and borders. NATO was
surrounded by multiple “partners”, many of which were aspiring to membership.
The threat of nuclear weapons seemed remote, and debates focused on the risks of
proliferation or the prospects of a world free of nuclear weapons.
This situation has changed dramatically in the last few years. Major and
regional powers are modernising their nuclear forces and giving them a central
role in their broader strategic posture. In such a context, deterrence is back and
NATO needs to re-establish a robust and credible defence and deterrent vis-à-vis
multiple and diverse threats.
In the East, events in Ukraine and the new posture of Russia challenge the
very foundations of European security. For the first time since the end of the
Cold War, NATO’s defence and deterrence posture could be tested – and is
to a large extent already being tested – by Russian moves. It is all the more
concerning that Russia has developed hybrid tactics that might prove more
difficult to deter than traditional warfare. Furthermore, Russia has been
exercising and using the whole spectrum of non-military and military tools,
ranging from cyber attacks, proxies, special forces, and conventional
capabilities to implicit or explicit nuclear threats including at an early stage
in a crisis. Russia has been successfully pursuing a policy of “aggressive
sanctuarization” with a significant nuclear component, under which it does
not hesitate to use conventional force and nuclear rhetoric to deter external
involvement countering its aggressive behaviour in its immediate
neighbourhood or beyond. In practice, Russia has developed an integrated
defence posture, combining nuclear and conventional capabilities in its
doctrine, training and exercises.
Beyond Russian nuclear policy, it is important for the Alliance to take into
account ongoing missile and nuclear proliferation risks in the Middle East,
nuclear arms race phenomena in Asia, which could all alter the Alliance
security. All these developments suggest that the 21st century might prove
more nuclear than expected. Furthermore, the policies of newcomers as well
as those of some of the established nuclear weapon states demonstrate that
the risk of use cannot be ruled out and that it is essential to preserve the
logic of deterrence.
The review and fostering of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture has
already started and has been given a significant impetus since the Wales
Summit and in the run up to the Warsaw Summit. Beyond the Readiness
Action Plan, it remains however extremely important to deliver the
appropriate messages on the full spectrum of NATO capabilities, as
deterrence can no longer be taken for granted, to address challenges both
from the East and elsewhere.
NATO has a unique set of conventional and nuclear capabilities that –
assuming some adaptation– should deter any potential adversaries from
testing its resolve. Strategic communication regarding deterrence and
defence is essential to re-establish the unequivocal assumption that the
Alliance can and will act decisively should it face aggression.
NATO has provided peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for
decades. Nuclear deterrence played and continues to play a major role in
this regard. Investing in the full spectrum of capabilities for defence and
deterrence posture is a modest price to achieve this objective in the 21st
century.

SUGGESTIONS
In this background guide, we have explained the agenda. However, the
delegates are expected to research further, and not limit their information to
this guide. Following are a few topics on which the delegate can research
on:
1. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
2. NATO’s Resolute Support Mission
Once again, this guide merely exists for the delegate to understand the
agenda. The links provided to the delegate will guide the delegate through
his/her research.
POINTS TO PONDER UPON:
 HOW ARTICLE 5 OF NATO HASN’T BEEN UPHELD
BY THE MEMBERS.
 ISIS HAS BEEN ABLE TO INFLUENCE PEOPLE
EASILY WITH THEIR SPEECHES AND VIDEOS.
 EVEN AFTER VARIOUS ATTACKS BY MANY
COUNTRIES ON SYRIA AND IRAQ NOTHING HAS
CHANGED, THE NUMBER OF ATTACKS HAS
INCREASED.
 WHY ISIS ISN’T SCARED OF ANYONE IN THE
WORLD.
 NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
 RUSSIA’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE AREA OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:

 http://www.mumbaimun.com/studyguides/UNSC.pdf
 http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/06/10/threat-based-strategy-for-nato-
s-southern-flank-pub-63785
 http://munik.iba.edu.pk/studyguide/DISEC.pdf
 https://www.britannica.com/topic/North-Atlantic-Treaty-
Organization