60 Laude v. Gines Jabalde

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MARILOU S. LAUDE AND MESEHILDA S. LAUDE VS. ROLINE M.

GINEZ-
JABALDE, et.al

GR NO. 217456

FACTS:

On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude was killed at the Celzone Lodge on
Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL
Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). On October 15, 2014, a Complaint for murder
was filed by Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the Office of
the City Prosecutor which Information was later filed with the RTC in Olongapo City. On
October 22, 2014, Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo. A warrant of arrest
against Pemberton was issued on December 16, 2014.

On 19 December 2014, Pemberton surrendered personally to the RTC Judge Roline M.


Ginez-Jabalde and was later arraigned. On the same day of Arraignment petitioner
Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
Surrender the Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow
Media Coverage. The motion was scheduled on 22 December 2014, 2PM. According to
petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through
registered mail. In any case, they claim to have also “furnished a copy of the Motion
personally … at the hearing of the Motion. On 23 December 2014, the Urgent Motion
was denied by Judge Ginez-Jabalde for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on January 9, 2015, this was also later denied by Judge Ginez-
Jabalde.

Petitioners advance that Philippine authorities ought to “have primary jurisdiction over
Pemberton’s person while he is being tried in a Philippine Court” in accordance with
Article V paragraph 3(b) of the Visiting Forces Agreement, which states that: “In cases
where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply: (a)
Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to jurisdiction over all offenses
committed by Uniter States personnel”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement violates Article VIII, Section 5 and Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution?

RULING:

No. The constitutionality of an official act may be the subject of judicial review, provided
the matter is not raised collaterally. The constitutionality of the Visiting Forces
Agreement is not the lis mota of this Petition. Petitioners started their Petition with a
claim that their right to access to justice was violated, but ended it with a prayer for a
declaration of the Visiting Forces Agreement’s unconstitutionality. They attempt to
create the connection between the two by asserting that the Visiting Forces Agreement
prevents the transfer of Pemberton to Olongapo City Jail, which allegedly is tantamount
to the impairment of the Supreme Court’s authority.

On the contention that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power
is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused which violates the equal
protection clause of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, the Court finds no violation
of the Constitution. The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a
substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed
forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. |||

The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one's
territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status
of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and
conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining
power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over
the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.

As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt
rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally
encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do
not extend or apply — except to the extent agreed upon — to subjects of another State
due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign
armed forces.

Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from


jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-
recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of
the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another State's
territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II,
Sec. 2).

DECISION:

The Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of grave abuse of discretion
resulting in lack or excess of jurisdiction. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of
mandatory injunction is likewise DENIED for lack of merit. |||

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