60 Laude v. Gines Jabalde
60 Laude v. Gines Jabalde
60 Laude v. Gines Jabalde
GINEZ-
JABALDE, et.al
GR NO. 217456
FACTS:
On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude was killed at the Celzone Lodge on
Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL
Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). On October 15, 2014, a Complaint for murder
was filed by Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the Office of
the City Prosecutor which Information was later filed with the RTC in Olongapo City. On
October 22, 2014, Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo. A warrant of arrest
against Pemberton was issued on December 16, 2014.
Petitioners advance that Philippine authorities ought to “have primary jurisdiction over
Pemberton’s person while he is being tried in a Philippine Court” in accordance with
Article V paragraph 3(b) of the Visiting Forces Agreement, which states that: “In cases
where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply: (a)
Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to jurisdiction over all offenses
committed by Uniter States personnel”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement violates Article VIII, Section 5 and Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution?
RULING:
No. The constitutionality of an official act may be the subject of judicial review, provided
the matter is not raised collaterally. The constitutionality of the Visiting Forces
Agreement is not the lis mota of this Petition. Petitioners started their Petition with a
claim that their right to access to justice was violated, but ended it with a prayer for a
declaration of the Visiting Forces Agreement’s unconstitutionality. They attempt to
create the connection between the two by asserting that the Visiting Forces Agreement
prevents the transfer of Pemberton to Olongapo City Jail, which allegedly is tantamount
to the impairment of the Supreme Court’s authority.
On the contention that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power
is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused which violates the equal
protection clause of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, the Court finds no violation
of the Constitution. The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a
substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed
forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. |||
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one's
territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status
of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and
conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining
power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over
the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt
rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally
encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do
not extend or apply — except to the extent agreed upon — to subjects of another State
due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign
armed forces.
DECISION:
The Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of grave abuse of discretion
resulting in lack or excess of jurisdiction. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of
mandatory injunction is likewise DENIED for lack of merit. |||