The main feature, and until lately sounds like something from

cover story, of this issue science fiction. Used invarious primitiveways

of ARMOR celebrates the in the past, robots are time-saving and effort-
150th anniversary of the saving devices that heavy industry has already
oldest continuously serv- adopted. Many of them may have life-saving
ing regiment of the United implicationsfor our soldiers on the next battle-
States Army: t h e 2d field. I commend the feature to you both for
Armored Cavalry Regi- thought and as a view of the future.
ment. Major Christopher The need for mobility on the battlefield
Thompson and Sergeant First Class Kenneth brought about the need for the tank in great
E. Morrison provide a detailed and enjoyable part. Retaining that mobility in the face of
history of "The Second Dragoons." obstacles is a requirement for success on the
Most of us realize that "blitzkrieg" came to battlefield. First Lieutenant Randall Grant's
the forefront in the early days of World War II, feature, "Minerollers: Mobility for the Armor
but few of us have studied the training and Task Force," provides us with useful historical
testing ground for that conflict: the Spanish and technical views of this way that armor
Civil War. In "The Role of Italian Armor in the forces use to maintain mobility.
Spanish Civil War," we are able to view the In several issues of ARMOR over the past
first "modern" use of tanks. This story, writ- year, you have read briefly about the Excel-
ten by Pierangelo Caiti and Alberto Pirella. lence-in-Armor Program and the Tank Com-
shows us mechanized warfare in transition mander's Certification Test. These two pro-
from the purely infantry support role of WWI to grams will have a major impact on training,
the mobile "lightning" battles of WWII. The promotions, and selection for key leadership
feature was translated for ARMOR by Captain positions in armor units. In "Pursuit of Excel-
Edward De Lia. lence in Armor," the Office of the Chief of
Smoke operations change the battlefield. Armor has capsulizedthis program to describe
Anyone who has fought at the NTC or Hohen- how it works.
fels FRG knows that. In "Countering Soviet Another feature I recommend to you is
Smoke," Captain Mark Reardon provides "Taking Charge," by Captain R o Tyson. This
useful information on howthe potential threat story, part of the how-would-you-do-it series,
uses smoke andwhat we can do to counter it. I puts a young officer in the position of assum-
commend the article to you; it is "on target." ing leadership of his first platoon under com-
Since the first tanks appeared on the battle- bat conditions. The feature is well-written,
fields of WWI, a constant debate has raged challenging, and to the point.
over whether the tank should be heavily ar- As I mentioned at the beginning of this
mored and gun armed or lightly armored and column, May marks the 150th anniversary of
perhaps armed with missiles. Craig Koerner the oldest continuously serving regiment of
and Michael O'Connor believe that "The our our Army. I and the staff of ARMOR
Heavily-Armored, Gun-Armed Main Battle congratulate the 2d ACR for their long and
Tank Is Not Optimized For Mechanized War- distinguished service.
fare." They offer some interesting strategic Their history stretches
and tactical arguments for a lower silhouette, from the fighting in the
lighter weight, greater acceleration, and su- swamps of the Seminole
personic missiles in the tank of the future. Wars to today when they
This issue of ARMOR also contains a story stand as one of the first
on a technology that is rapidly coming to the units to meet any poten-
foreground in a military sense. "Military Ap- tial Warsaw Pact aggres-
plications of Robotics" by Captains Ricky sor in Europe. Happy Birth-
Lynch and Michael Nugent describes what day Dragoons! - GPR
 ~~

Magazine Staff
Editor-in-Chief
FEATURES
MAJOR G. PATRICK RllTER
9 The Heavily Armored Gun-Armed MBT
Managing Editor Is Not Optimized for Mechanized Warfare
JON T. CLEMENS
by Craig Koerner and Michael O'Connor
Assistant Editor
ROBERT E. ROGGE 17 Pursuit of Excellence in Armor
Production Assistant
VIVIAN THOMPSON 20 How Would You D o It?Taking Charge
Contributing Artist by Leadership Branch, C&S Dept., USAARMS
SFC ROBERT TORSRUD
22 The Second Dragoons Mark Their 150th
Anniversary of Continuous Service
United States Army Armor School
by Major Christopher P. Thompson and Sergeant First
Commandant Class Kenneth E. Morrison
M G FREDERIC J. BROWN
Assistant Commandant 30 Minerollers: Mobility for the Armor Task Force
BG PAUL E. FUNK by First Lieutenant (P)Randall L. Grant
Deputy Assistant commandant
COL CLAUDE L. CLARK 36 Countering Soviet Smoke
Chief of Staff by Captain Mark J. Reardon
COL RALPH R. WOLFE
Command Sergeant Major
40 The Role of Italian Armor in the Spanish Civil-War
CSM JOHN M. STEPHENS Translated by Captain Edward De Lia
Maintenance (Reprinted from Rivista ltaliana Difesa)
COL G. L. THOMAS
45 Military Applications of Robotics
Command and Staff
COL ROBERT D. HURLEY The USAARMS Approach
by Captain Ricky Lynch and Captain Michael F. Nugent
Weapons
COL DAVID V. HARBACH
53 Armor's Heritage: The Father of the Armored Force ~

Training Group
LTC JAMES L. KLUENDER
NCO Academy/
DEPARTMENTS
Drill Sergeant School
CSM JAMES M. GREENWELL 2 Letters 51 Regimental Review
5 Commander's Hatch 51 The Bustle Rack/
Evaluation and Standardization
MR. CLAYTON E. SHANNON
8 Driver's Seat Armor Branch Notes
49 ProfessionalThoughts 52 Books
Training and Doctrine 50 Driver's Seat
COL CLAUDE W. ABATE
~

Combat Developments ARMOR magazine (ISSN 0004-2420) is CORRESPONDENCE: Address all

COL ROBERT W. DeMONT published bi-monthly by the U.S. Army Armor correspondence to U.S. Army Armor Center,
Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox. ATTN: ATSB-MAG, Fort Knox. Kentucky, 40121.
Units Kentucky 40121. Unless otherwise stated, (Telephone: AUTOVON 464-2249/2610 or
material does not represent policy, thinking, or commercial (502)624-2249/2610.)
2d Armor Training Brigade endorsement by any agency of the US. Army. SECOND class postage paid at Fort Knox,
COL DOMINIC W. RUGGERIO Use of appropriated funds for printing of this Kentucky and additional mailing office.
1st Armor Training Brigade publication was approved by the Department of
the Army 6 January 1984.
COL ROBERT B. FRANKLIN, JR.
ARMOR is not a copyrighted publication but
4th Training Brigade may contain some articles which have been
COL JOHN N. SLOAN copyrighted by individual authors. Material SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Individual
which is not under copyright may be reprinted if subscriptions to ARMOR are available through
194th Armored Brigade credit is given to ARMOR and the author. the US. Armor Association, Post Office Box
COL SAMUEL D. WILDER, JR. Permission to reprint copyrighted materi- 607, Fort Knox. Kentucky 40121. Telephone
al must be obtained from the author. (502)942-8624.
Domestic: $16.00 one year; $27.75 two years;
Directorate of ARMOR may be forwarded to military personnel $39.50 three years. Foreign: $23.50 one year;
Reserve Component Support whose change of address is caused by official $36.75 two years. Single copies, $2.50.
orders (except at APO addresses) without
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COL JAMES E. DlERlCKX must notify the postmaster.

May-June 1986 Vol XCV No. 3 USPS 467-970

 Merkava Debate
Merkava. if it is used strictly as a tank. would contribute nothing to its primary
Dear Sir, Perhaps for their needs it is adequate in role of engaging the enemy with its main
I read with extreme interest the article the role of a tank. However, for the rest of armament, except for increasing the num-
by Richard Ogorkiewicz, "Israel's Mer- us who must be prepared to fight in a ber of potential casualties.
kava Mark 2 Battle Tank," in the Novem- greater range of contingencies under the A tank-cum-infantry carrier hybrid is
ber-December issue of ARMOR. This de- doctrineof combined arms, the Merkava is not, therefore, the way to implement the
sign is clearly the most innovative in the first truly integrated combined arms doctrine of combined arms. What that
recent armoredfightingvehicle(AFV) his- fighting vehicle. Who knows, maybe we requires is a close combination of opti-
tory. can persuade the powers-that-be to mized battle tanks with separate, properly
I was fascinated not only by the incor- stretch an M1A1 a coupleof feet in length, designed armored infantry carriers.
poration of the various features but also several inches in height, move the drive
by the realization that the Israelis had train to the front, add some armored bulk- RICHARD M. OGORKIEWICZ
adopted a radically new concept in their heads, modify the rear to accommodate London, England
approach to designing this new AFV. The troops, and add a 60-mm mortar. As a
international trend since Wll in tank tanker who believes in the necessity of
design has been simple - more fire- combined arms, I want onel I want the "Unacceptable Cover"
power, more speed, and more protection. infantry with me all the time, I want my
Each new tank has basically been an own indirect fire support all the time, I Dear Sir,
improvement on its predecessors. Even want my own airdefenseall thetime, and I I find the cover of your January-Febru-
our M1, quantum leap that it is, still fits want all of my team together for training ary 1986 issue fundamentally and per-
this characterization. The Merkava is also -all the time1 sonally offensive.
a quantum leap forward but on a new The United States Army stands for
path. RAYMOND JOEL REHRER values and principles totally antithetical
Mr. Ogorkiewicz's descriptions and ex- CPT, Armor to those represented by the uniformed SS
planations of the Merkava's design fea- FRG men on your magazine's cover. Conse-
tures are excellent. What disturbs me is quently, a cover that seems to glorify an
his insistence it is not "some kind of tank- SS tank crew prepared to do its deadly
cum-infantry carrier." It is precisery this The Author Replies business in support of unmitigated evil is
capability and the opportunities that this utterly unacceptable.
affords that make it such a revolutionary Dear Sir, I do not object to historical analysis of
AFV. If we accept Mr. Ogorkiewicz's as- I was pleased to read that Captain military actions such as found on page 26
sertion that the Merkava is first, foremost, Rehrer found my article on the Merkava of the same issue, to which the cover
and exclusively a tank, then we must Mark 2 interesting. But I shall have to apparently refers. Ido not contend that the
evaluate it purely as a tank. disappoint him by reemphasizing that the tank crew depicted was personally re-
A tank is a weapons system that opti- Merkava is not some kind of tank-cum- sponsible for any of the unspeakable hor-
mally balances mobility, firepower, and infantry carrier but a battle tank - and a rors undertaken, as a matter of deliberate
protection. Mobility is speed; how fast a fine one at that. policy, by the government they served. I
tankcangetfroma hideposition toafiring So far as its characteristics are con- do, however, contend that each of us must
position, from one battle position to a cerned, mobility is not solely a matter of think beyond the mere technical skills
subsequent one, how rapidly it can sweep vehicle speed. In any case, the Merkava is required of armor soldiers and keep clear-
around an enemy force's flank, or bypass not "woefully slow" when it comes to l y i n mindthe moral imperativesforwhich
an obstacle. By current standards, the movement over battlefield terrain and it we stand prepared to do our deadly
Merkava is woefully slow. For firepower, will be even less so when the higher business,
the Merkava mounts the M-68 cannon output engines envisaged for it are avail- If you must give us cover portraits of
which is fast becoming obsolete for MET able. Similarly, the effectiveness of the Wll soldiers in uniforms bearing the
killing. Along with its ammunition it has main armament is not only a question of swastika, I suggest you choose those sol-
nearly reached its maximum potential caliber, and the gun of the Merkava is no dierswho had not onlythecouragetofight
against the current generation of Soviet less effective than the 105-mm gun of all on the battlefield, but also the courage to
,tanks. This is why the British, then the the U.S. M1 tanksproduced until recently. risk (and misfortune to lose) their lives in
Germans, and now the Americans have The MlA1, which is now coming into attempting to rid their nation of the evil
upgunned to a 120-mm cannon. By the service, is, of course, armed with a 120- incarnate that had risen to its leadership.
author's point-of-view, the .50 cat. ma- mm gun and the Merkava can be similarly
chine gun (MG) is an obsolete weapon. In upgunned when this becomes necessary. HARTMUT LAU
certain respects I agree. Except for a With regard to the capability which LTC, Armor
lesser maximum effective range, the Captain Rehrer ascribes to the Merkava Boston, MA
7.62-mm MG is adequate against troops and which allegedly makes it "revolution-
and soft targets. The .50 cat. MG is also ary," it is simply not there. In other words,
inadequate against most of the lightly the Merkava is not and cannot be simul- German TC Survived, Books Say
armored carriers and infantry fighting ve- taneously a battle tank and a carrier of
hicles (IFV) now fielded. However, the .50 infantry. Any hybrid vehicle designed to Dear Sir,
cat. MG is still the best antiaircraft weap- combine the two roles would be ridicu- I just finished reading the article, 'The
on that we can conceivably mount on an lously large and heavy and at a time when Defense of the Vienna Bridgehead," by
IFV or tank. In the protection category I strenuous efforts are being made the First Lieutenant Peter R. Mansoor. This
totally agree with Mr. Ogorkiewicz. In- world over to reduce the size of the target excellent article does contain one error. It
deed, 1 think the Israelis made this their which tanks offer, even to the extent of states that SS Oberscharfuhrer Bark-
highest priority and they have succeeded reducing the crew from four to three men, mann and his crew were killed during the
admirably. As our master gunner ex- it would be foolish to do the opposite by battle when their Panther tank was hit.
claimed, "I want to go to war with the making them larger in order to accom- While Barkmann's crew may have been
Israelis - they care about casualtiesl" modate some infantrymen. killed, he himself survived, according to
Overall, the Israelis have taken one step Moreover, as I have tried to point out two books in my possession. Panzers in
forward and two steps backward with the already, carrying infantrymen in a tank Normandy-ThenandNowby Eric LeFevre,

2 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

states that Barkmann's last known where- and performance, to justify the adoption of mortars and maintenance are concerned.
abouts were when he was registered as a the vehicle as the new infantry squad There are two each, tank and scout pla-
POW of the British Army in May, 1945. vehicle. Although it iscertainly too early to toons, per troop.
The other book, Their Honor Was Loyalty, frame a definitive statement of intent on While some readers may feel this is a
by Jost W. Schneider, states that as of the part of the Soviets, recent photo- hybrid squadron, we can assure you that
1977, Barkmann was living as a farmer in graphs seem to suggest that the BMP-2 we have pressed our positions both with
Schleswig-Holstein, and now goes by the may be a vehicle designed as a follow-on the tactical community in our division and
name of Ernst Schmuck-Barkmann. to the first generation BMP-R reconnais- through our commander to the highest
This mention of Oberscharfuhrer Bark- sance vehicle. Adopting the two-man tur- levels of military review. We feel the
mann's death was the only error I found, ret designed for that vehicle, it may be that retention of armor is critical for staying
and Lieutenant Mansoor is to be compli- the BMP-2 is a "cavalry" version of the power on the non-linear battlefield of
mented on writing such an interesting and BMP-1 infantry vehicle, designed for re- tomorrow.
informative article. connaissance, advance guard and econo- But even with the retention of 18 tanks,
my-of-force missions. we lack over one-third of the combat
ROBERT V. HODGE The critical shortcoming of the BMP-2 power we enjoyed under the old "H"
Bloomington, IL design, as that of the BMP-1, is certainly MTOE, and nearly a ninth less air cavalry
the limited armored protection afforded power as well. Clearly, we need rein-
the crew. Following long debate in the forcement to move outside the division's
BMP-2 Comments Soviet military press about this problem tactical area, if such missions are under-
and the best means to mitigate the prob- taken.
Dear Sir, lem, it appears that the only solution Lastly, let me be placed on record that
Iread with interest the staff study on the readily agreed upon by all involved was to the proponents of the fighting cavalry are
features of the new Soviet BMP-2 and place the vehicle in the second echelon not gone nor silent. We expect to meet any
would like to share a few thoughts. position. Apparently it was felt that by change with professional resolve, and we
First, I would agree that the Soviets such mission assignment, the armor would expect the Army leadership to provide
probably have a concern about air defense besufficienttoallowthevehicleforceasa adequate tools to do that job well. In our
against helicopters and low-level, fixed- whole to pass through any surviving ene- case, the retention of at least a majority of
wing aircraft. Very likely the 30-mm can- my antiarmor positions at high speed on our armor capability reaffirmsour trust in
non could effectively deal with the NATO the way into the NATO rear area. While that leadership.
threat in this quarter, but even a precur- perhaps true, it is interesting to contem-
sory external review of the optics and plate how effective the armor would be in DANIEL L. KIRTLAND
vision ports on the vehicle suggests that the much sought after meeting engage- MAJ, Cavalry
visibility for aerial targets other than ment with the numerous NATO rapid fire 1/18 Cav, California ARNG
those directly ahead of the vehicle (turret cannons most likely to be found in the
orientation) and at or near ground level reserve forces encountered.
would be minimal at best. Iwould suggest Mycomplimentsto theARMORstaff for More on C&C Vehicles
that the elevation capability is more likely their concise overview of this new and
designed for the purpose of combating very interesting combat vehicle. Dear Sir,
troops on higher terrain elevations, in- I hope I am not too late to respond to
cluding buildings, as combats with Af- JOSEPH R. BURNIECE Major Geier'sfine article, "Battalion Com-
ghan guerrillas have demonstrated the Arlington, VA mand and Control," which appeared in
severe shortcomings of the BMP-1 in this your September-October issue and Cap-
regard. tain Sayles' well-researched reply in the
Armor penetration of the cannon is Some Cavalry MTOE Changes November-December letters column...
necessarily very limited compared with I most emphatically agree with Captain
the PG-9 HEAT grenade. However, as Dear Sir, Sayles that a company-level commander
noted in the study, the probability of ob- Thanks for the interesting views pre- must lead from a fully combat-capable
taining a hit, or numerous hits, is con- sented on Division 86 Cavalry in Major fighting vehicle. It is, as he well put it, his
siderably higher with the cannon. More Kindsvatter's article in the September- duty to be where he can use his command
importantly, however, the shift to the October 1985 issue of ARMOR. presence, leadership, expertise, tactical
rapid-fire cannon seems to suggest a Since his article appeared, we have knowledge and firepower to influence his
move awayfrom the apparent original role reviewed pending MTOE changes that will portion of the overall battle and accom-
of a swimming, self-propelled squad/pla- affect our squadron, which is the division plish his company's mission. In combat,
toon antitank platform so important to cavalry for the 40th Inf Div (Mech), the most of his time will be spent within range
Soviet river crossing tacticaVoperationa1 Sunburst Division. On the basis of the last (hopefully not within sight) of the enemy
doctrine to provide protection for newly- review of our MTOE, the following signifi- and his personal mount is part of his
established bridgeheads. The adoption of cant differences may be of interest to your company's firepower.
the new system seems to suggest that the readers: Unfortunately, comparing his position
Soviet emphasis on developing multiple There is no provision for either a motor- with that of Major Geier (at a heavy task
meeting engagements with the second cycle or sensor platoon. force HQ) puts us in an "apples and
echelon BMP-2 force has taken preemi- There is a long range surveillance de- 0ranges"situation. Captain Sayles has no
nent position as regardsvehicle design. In tachment (LRSD)which isa separate para- business "...one terrain feature behind
such operations, vehicle speed and limita- graph/ Iine in our MTOE. I t is a ranger/air- the FLOT...", where Major Geier'sTAC CP
tions on combat halts strongly militates in borne unit. M577 is located, unless ordered there by
favor of the rapid fire cannon with fire-on- Unlike the original proposal, we do re- his commander. On the other hand, the
the-move capability. tain armor; two platoons of four tanks CO of the 1-13th Armor usually has no
One question remains which only time each per troop. A ninth tank is assigned to business up on the FLOT adding the fire-
will answer. It is whether or not the BMP- the troop HQ and manned by separate power of his command tank to that of one
2, with the reduced dismounted squad crew. That totals 18 tanks. of Captain Sayles' platoons. His job is to
size of six (or seven, should one occupy The NBC recon platoon consists of 20 coordinate and orchestrate the activities
the now vacant former commander's seat personnel and six vehicles. Original ve- of half a hundred main battle tanks plus
behind the driver), now without a squad hicle density was reported to be nine assorted ITVs, CFVs, mortars, antiaircraft
leader - given his new role as combat vehicles and the reason for the change is he "owns," as well as any attached infan-
vehicle commander and primaryweapons unclear. try, engineers, etc. and combat support
operator-will be effectiveenough,given The organization of our ground cavalry and service support assets he has sup-
the limitations on Soviet infantry training troop is unchanged insofar as the HQ, porting him. An LTC has no business

May-June 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 3

 acting like an E-6 except in very unusual coordinate the activities of several hun- Operating as described above, the FIST'S
situations. dred subordinates, keep my brigade CO movements must be carefully orchestrat-
As Major Geier states, successful armor informed and tell half a dozen support ed. Much like the movement of the task
commanders must both leadfrom up front, elements what I need and where Iwant it force's mortar platoon, the FIST should
where decisions need to be made on the put. On the other hand, if Captain Sayles move from onepre-planned position tothe
spot, and live long enough to make and and the others at Ft. Knox can rig me a next as the, battle progresses. Primary,
announce those decisions. That presup- mount that can blow away T-72s without alternate, and supplementary positions
poses a bulletproof and shell-repellent having to wrestle shells one at a time out should be planned. The addition of a Com-
mount; ideally, a tank. Heinz Guderian of the reserve racks, I shall be most bat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) to
went into both Poland and Russia riding a grateful! the maneuvercompanywould allow move-
Panzerkampfwagen IBefehlspanzer, All tankers must be able to shoot, scoot ment of fire support assets in echelon, but
which lacked even a turret. It was basical- and communicate. However, field grade continuous fire support can be provided
ly a bulletproof portable radio and its tankers, the kind Major Geierwroteabout, while the FIST-V is on the move without
"main gun" was an MG34 light machine have to do a lot of communicating and the COLT. First, the FIST officer or NCO
gun. No one I've read has ever called scooting and minimal shooting. With all could ride with the company commander
Guderian an unsuccessful armor com- the people we have to talk to, we don't and provide firesupport while the FIST-V
manderl Later, the Panzerkampfwagen Ill have time for much shooting. Of course, is on the move. Second, the platoon lead-
Befehlspanzercame out. It kept the turret when we do need to shoot, it is vital that ers of the tank platoons and the forward
but 1ostthegunforradios.To-in Captain we be able to do so. Major Geier, thanks observer of the infantry platoon will con-
Sayles' phrase -disguise a CP vehicle as for an excellent mini-manual on the run- tinue to provide fire support for their
a tank, a wooden pole was stuck through ning of a heavytask force. Captain Sayles. individual elements.
the mantlet to look likea cannon1Not until you hurry and get me that more combat Experience at the National Training
the Panther came out did a German tank capable iron horse you described so I'll Center, Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site, and
battalion or regimental commander get live long enough to do my main job. here at Fort Carson has shown time and
thecapabilityto killa tankwith hisown CP time again that tanks and mechanized
vehicle. While the Germans lost WWII, it WILLIAM L. SMITH infantry operating at high speeds across
was not due to their unsuccessful armor MAJ(P), IN/SF, USAR open terrain will be killed as easily if not
commanders. Neither was it due to the Columbia, SC easier than those combat vehicles which
reduced ammocapacityof their command move more slowly using proper terrain
tanks. march techniques. Inthe latter scenario, it
There is plenty of precedent for senior is not necessary for the FIST to have a
officers getting "personally involved" in
FIST-V high-speed vehicle which can keep up
combat. In WWII, Major General Ridgway "A Significant Improvement" with the Bradley or the Abrams on the
was once almost shot by one of his out- battlefield.
posts while entering his division's lines Dear Sir, Another problem I have with Captain
after a nocturnal visit to the Germans' I am writing in response to Captain Robel's letter is his statement that be-
outpost line with an M1903A3 Springfield Robel's letter regarding the FIST-V in the cause of all of its internal equipment, the
for a "sidearm." However, most of Major January-February issue of ARMOR. While FIST-V "is not suitable to be taken over for
General Ridgway's time was spent run- not having had the advantage of seeing command and control purposes, as is a
ning the l O l s t Airborne Division doing the FIST-V in action, I believe most artil- standard M113." The fact of the matter is
other things than sniping. lerymen would strongly agree with Cap- that the FlSTvehicle. whether an M1130r
Ideally, Captain Sayles is the ace tank tain Robel's contention that a converted a FIST-V, is a poor choice as a back-up
commander of his company and, when Bradley Fighting Vehiclewould bea much command vehicle.
they go to the range, Captain Sayles takes better FIST-V than the one which the Not being totally familiar with the TO&E
his tank downrange and shoots a score Army has purchased. However, fiscal re- of an armor or mechanized infantry com-
the rest of his company has to sweat hard ality in the era of Gramm-Rudman has pany, I cannot address Captain Robel's
to match. That is his job. His proficiency as dictated that we must settle for something contention that the FIST-V's secure radio
a tanker is the standard of his company, less than the optimal solution for the time capability make it an ideal solution'for a
the same as his shave, haircut and spit- being. back-up command track. Yet this seems a
shine are its standard of appearance. The All this considered, I believe Captain poor reason to turn the FIST-V and its
same, however, does not apply to his Robel has missed some of the salient occupants into a battlefield taxi, causing
battalion CO. In Viet Nam from May 1967 points regarding employment of the FIST the FIST to lose much of its ability to
to July 1969 (26 months and 6 campaign and the FIST-V. Captain Robel has ex- properly support the company. Maneuver
stars), I was by far the best rifle shot in the pressed the concern that the FIST-V is too company commanders need to thoroughly
scout platoon I led and the SF "A"Team I underpowered to keep up with its sup- think this problem through and devise a
commanded, not to mention the CIGD/ ported company. I contend that not only is better solution.
Montagnards we worked with. I've killed it not necessary for the FIST to physically In short, because of its ability to ac-
more of my country's enemies than any keep up with the maneuver company curately locate targetsfor both guided and
man in either of those units and the two commander, but is is often times unde- conventional munitions, its excellent com-
USAR battalions I've commanded since sirable. We in the artillery community are munications capabilities, and its ability to
then. I've also got 14% air hours as a guilty of schooling maneuver company be in hull defilade and still see the battle-
volunteer gunner on pre-Cobra Hueygun- commanders to keep their FIST "in his field, I believe the FIST-V is a significant
ships and 105 days in Sam's hospitals. I hip-pocket." Translated into action, this improvement over the straight M113.
am entirely willing to "get my hands dirty has meant that the FIST followed the
(bloody?)" when there is fighting to be company commander wherever he went DAVID J. FITZPATRICK
done. Having established my credibilityas on the battlefield. The results have been CPT, Field Artillery
a soldier, let me now say that "personal that the FIST was being "killed" early in Ft. Carson, CO
involvement" is no longer my main job. the battle or the FIST was unable to
If DA ever allows this unrepentant old properly see the battlefield. The FIST Y
Because of space considerations.
SF trooper to command a heavy battalion needs to be in hull defilade on a piece of
task force in WWlll (or any other occasion), terrain where he can see his company's Recognition Quiz does not appear in
the C&C procedures in Major Geier's arti- zoneof action;the FIST-Vwith its hammer- this issue. Last issue's quiz also con-
clewill form the basisof mycommandand head is ideally suited for this mission. If tained an error: Photos 1 and 2 were
control SOP; to include the configuration the FIST has FM-voice with hiscommand- switched when the page negative
ofthetwoHQtankstoenablemetotalkto er, he is still in the commander's "hip- was assembled. - Editor
all the people to whom I'll have to talk to pocket."

4 ARMOR. The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 c
, - .

MG Frederic J. Brown
Commanding General
U.S. Army Armor Center

Armor Assessment, Part 111:

Training and Equipment
The individual officer and non- improve their tactical and tech- cessful if it is applied with rigor
commissioned officer must be nical competence. All of these char- within the unit. In fact, it is a
trained to be tactically and tech- acteristics must be present in the common tactical base from which
nically competent so that he cannot training system if we are to capital- commanders are expected to de-
only employ and sustain the force ize on our strengths as a nation and part, consistent with their indivi-
within his charge effectively and as a n Army. dual METT-T (mission, enemy,
efficiently, but also such that he troops, terrain and time available).
can train his subordinates. Training: W h e r e W e Stand The way is that which is required
This competence must be accom- The training system required is within the unit, given METT-T, a
panied by a n ability to focus direct almost in place. It is a fully inte- way is a proven program that is the
and indirect fire in time and space grated training strategy which measure of training within the
in the face of unanticipated chal- presents a way to train to profi- school.
lenges on the battlefield. This abili-ciency and which has been struc- Training must also reinforce the
ty to synchronize should be accom- tured to reinforce the assimilation ability of the Army to rapidly as-
panied with a sense of the battle- of rapidly changing capabilities. It similate new capabilities; in fact,
field - almost a sixth sense for is fully integrated because it is our training exercises are designed
opportunity and challenge. based upon common tasks, condi- to stretch new capabilities of our
The commander must also be tions, and standards which are uni- equipment -particularly mobility,
aware of and sensitive to the intent formly taught from the individual visibility in limited observation
of his senior commander once to echelon (officer, noncommissioned situations, and protection. As a
twice removed. This sensitivity officer, and enlisted soldier) through matter of course, leaders are placed
should be inculcated within the the collective echelon from platoon in basic tactical situations demand-
training base. With it, we would to brigade. There are common stan- ing the aggressive use of new equip-
hope to develop a leader who is dard operating procedures associ- ment. The training system is ad-
comfortable with fighting a n d ated with a common exercise struc- mirably suited to accelerate assimi-
maintaining new technologies and ture, modified as appropriate to the lation of new capabilities across
who is prepared to encourage inno- particular echelon being trained the force; and we believe we can, in
vation on the part of his subor- through common scenarios. This is fact, exercise this capability far
dinates, an individual who under- reinforced by training practices more effectively than any other
stands standards of excellence and and procedures within the school- Army.
is prepared to nurture excellence in house, which are designed to dupli- Training must relate to the entire
his organization. cate how we expect training to oc- force - to the total force trained to
cur within the unit. higher standards with rational re-
Lastly, and as a function of excel- The training system describes a sources and justifiable programs.
lence, we must develop leaders who way to train - a “how to” -that is The training has been improved to
have a burning desire to continue to guaranteed by the School to be suc- a notable degree. We have more

May-June 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 5

efficient and effective training em- which we can use to teach the rigor of the training base in the
ploying the systems approach and bricks, the routine exercises which field environment.
our training is combined with ex- need to be practiced to perfection in
cellent simulation devices - the time of peace. And we have estab- Training Constraints
VIGS and UCOFT are fine exam- lished a training program requir- The training system, virtually in-
ples. We have structured the after- ing multiple repetitions of precise, tact today, is now far better under-
action review process to be a posi- finite, individual and collective stood as a major contributor to our
tive learning experience as well as tasks. They are the situational combat effectivensss. The payoff -
a n opportunity for significant de- training exercises and the tank our readiness to fight - is becom-
velopment between and among combat tables. These should be ing increasingly evident. There are
peers. The training is more realis- done with precision and great at- however, significant challenges
tic, employing tactical engagement tention to detail. Simultaneously, which remain. Training is becom-
simulation (MILES) in tank com- however, commanders need to be ing more difficult in Europe. Al-
bat tables and our situational train- stimulated to develop flexible, in- though the resources differ some-
ing exercises. The Combined Arms novative combat operations - a what, the training environment in
Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX) has responsibility of the School in train- USAREUR is now similar to the
been tied to the multipurpose range ing officers, but more critically the training environment within the
complex. All are grounded in uni- fundamental responsibility of the United States, particularly for the
form, more precise material provid- unit. National Guard. This comparison
ed to support quality distributed is particularly relevant when one
training. The Armor School has embarked examines the days of quality unit
Simultaneously, we have de- upon a program to significantly up- training in the field available to the
manded considerably higher stan- grade the instruction by basing con- average forward deployed heavy
dards in training. Tank gunnery tent on diagnostic evaluation of the force battalion. It is not grossly
has become considerably more dif- student, and, more critically, by dissimilar from that available to
ficult. The detail of the ARTEP and placing the student in a n intensely the National Guard.
AMTEP has been expanded. There stimulating and rewarding indivi- A second challenge is the ground
is the absolute necessity of training dual learning environment. We at force “flying-hour program.” As
as combined arms teams and task Knox call this Cold Reason. It is a the cost of day-to-day training in-
forces to ensure the synergistic ef- method of bringing the schoolhouse creases, there is every-growing
fect that such a combination brings to the field to provide a more realis- scrutiny of Class 111, Class V, and
to the battlefield. And, most impor- tic officer and noncommissioned Class IX training costs. OPTEMPO
tantly, there is the rigor of an “un- officer training environment. is with us, and it will become a n
controlled” OPFOR. Training in theinstitution is only increasing factor in our scale of
It has been particularly difficult the beginning. The true training to training in the future.
to establish justifiable training readiness must occur in the field in Lastly, because of resource con-
programs. This now has been done. the deployed unit, which trains as straints, we will have mixes of
The STRAC is supplemented by a n the combined arms company team tanks on the battlefield. We simply
annual training program validated or battalion task force. cannot afford to equip our entire
by the 194th Brigade at the Na- To support this, there must be force with our most modem capa-
tional Training Center over a three- training material designed to ex- bility. We find - both within the
year period. This now is in the tend the precision and quality of Active force and between the Ac-
process of being tied to a respon- the training base to the ever-busy tive and Reserve forces - consider-
sive, yet flexible, annual training field unit. This has been accom- able variation in the quality of
program using predictable resource plished by developing uniform pro- equipment, a particular challenge
support. It now remains to tie these cedures for teaching the basic drills to the individual who is expected to
programs which train to proficien- - the basic building blocks - for be tactically and technically profi-
cy to some form of training model. the development of unit proficiency cient as a competent leader in the
Furthermore, the various training going from individual tank through tank of the unit to which he is
device packages which have been battalion task force in a series of assigned. This may require profi-
developed need to be tied to specific recommended exercises which have ciency in multiple tanks.
performance requirements. This is, been proven over the past several But having noted this, the train-
in fact, now being developed through years. Aiding this process are qual- ing situation is fundamentally
coordination between TRADOC and ity facilities - the National Train- quite optimistic. We are now begin-
AMC. ing Center is a prime example -but ning to reap the fruits of a signifi-
The end point of training is not it is now joined by the Multipurpose cant and controversial decision,
responsible consumption of resourc- Range Complex in the process of made over a decade ago, to improve
es; it is the development of indivi- construction, by the exported Tank significantly the quality of train-
duals and units prepared to fight Commander’s Course presently be- ing in the Army. This has been
and win the AirLand Battle. Train- ing taught a t Gowen Field, by Range done. We are the beneficiaries. It is
ing, increasingly, must be designed 301 at Grafenwoeher, and by the now our challenge to apply this
to inculcate and train uniform stan- programmed development of a Com- capability to enhance our combat
dards of excellence while at the bined Arms Training Center a t effectiveness vis-a-vis the Warsaw
same time encouraging innovative Hohenfels, West Germany. All of Pact.
initiative down the chain of com- these quality training support fa- People and training are the pre-
mand. We have developed drills cilities are intended to sustain the requisites to battlefield success, but
~

6 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

they alone are not sufficient. They sensor could be the human eyeball, The thermal sight has effectively
must have reliable, capable equip- as at present, or the FLIR or milli brought the processed image into
ment, equipment designed to take meter-wave radar, a n acoustic the tank force a t the officer and
advantage of our strengths. We sensor, or perhaps some other noncommissioned officer levels; we
should capitalize not only on the means. Information could be pro- should not underestimate how im-
general mechanical awareness of vided using Battlefield Manage- portant it is to develop equipment
our population, but also on the re- ment/Integrated Command and which is not only understood but
markable advances in the under- Control Systems to communicate to also fully accepted by our force.
standing of data which have been the leader information concerning
made by young people as they be- the friendly and enemy situations. . Organizational Changes
come accustomed to microproces- All of these changes could be made Last - but certainly not least in
sors in video arcade games. We also to a vehicle so that the particular developing a winning capability -
need to capitalize on our ability to capabilities of the vehicle are not is the integration of people, train-
train, both effectively and efficient- apparent to the enemy. In fact, it ing, and equipment into organiza-
ly, our officers and higher-skill-level may be possible with a new family tions which can carry out our doc-
noncommissioned officers, our tank of vehicles to conceal not only the trine. Our organizations have been
commanders. components of the tank, but also to under continuing review, particu-
From this base, we have devel- conceal the different missions of larly since the Arab-Israeli conflict
oped a concept of employing mobile- the constituent parts of the com- of 1973. Led by the division re-
protected space within the com- bined arms heavy force. These are structuring effort and subsequent-
bined arms team. The rationale is long-term development efforts un- ly Division 86, there has been a
straightforward. As we know from derway at Fort Knox. major effort to adapt our organiza-
the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, what More immediate programs are al- tions to t h e characteristics of
can be seen can be hit; and what SO being pursued. For twu years we modernized equipment. After con-
can be hit can be killed. Therefore, have demonstrated improved com- siderable study, we moved to the
it becomes very important not to be mand and control configurations four-tank platoon and standardized
seen. This is reinforced as we apply for the M60, M1, M3 and M113. heavy Cavalry organizations, based
high technology to our fighting sys- Validated at Fort Hood and at the upon the four-tank platoon or the
tems. The technology is, almost Naitonal Training Center, we are six-vehicle Cavalry platoon. Both
without exception, inordinately ex- confident that we have provided a were designed to increase the ratio
pensive. We cannot afford it on all significant improvement in com- of leaders-to-led and to simplify the
of our vehicles. We need to vary mand and control to the deployed leader task by giving them pure
capabilities and we must, there- force. organizations. A further benefit of
fore, have the ability to conceal the We are also working to affect this has been the establishment of
high-capability systems on the bat- immediate improvements in com- the tank and wingman relation-
tlefield. And a s we develop our bat service support. Coordinating ship, particularly in a tank pla-
equipment, we should take advan- with the Infantry Center, the Com- toon. An officer or experienced
tage of our technologies to develop bined Arms Center, and the Logis- noncommissioned officer as the pla-
the sought-after “leap aheads,” tics Center, we have developed im- toon leader or platoon sergeant is
advantages which keep the Soviet proved combat service support or- followed by a subordinate junior
Union off balance. These can serve ganizations, policies, a n d pro- noncommissioned officer, who is
to invalidate the enormous and grams. We intend to test these in the buddy watching his leader and
ever-building Soviet inventories. the near future and to recommend doing as he does. In this way, he
We think this is entirely possible. them for fielding across the force. learns the position of platoon ser-
Combining the power of the micro- These ambitious programs are geant or platoon leader as he ob-
processor with the initiative and not without cautions. first and serves.
innovation of the average Ameri- foremost, electrons can fail - in We’ve reduced the complexity of
can, we can develop significant peace through maintenance prob- requirements placed upon battle-
variances in our mounted combat lems, in war through direct enemy field leadership by moving func-
vehicle family. We could vary the action. We must always have me- tions from company to battalion.
killing capability, the protection, chanical fallbacks to include direct- More battlefield functions are in-
the sensor, or the information avail- vision optics, so that if all fails tended to be accomplished at bat-
able to the commander. It is feasi- electrically and hydraulically, we talion or even brigade level, where
ble that we could shift the killing have a direct, mechanically-linked there is a staff as well as a more
mechanism from chemical energy way to fight. The equipment must experienced commander. This pos-
to kinetic energv - as we do today also be maintainable by average es a risk of reduced flexibility; there
- to other kill mechanisms. The soldiers at reasonable costs. There is less built-in redundancy to re-
armor could be variable. If it is great promise in bussing and in spond to unforeseen opportunities
were to be modular, it could be re- vetronics, but we must ensure that and challenges. And this has been
placed o r changed t o s u i t an what we develop is, in fact, fully a particularly difficult issue as
evolving tactical situation. A move supportable. Lastly, we must stress maintenance has been consolidated
from the classic metal solution to development of equipment which a t battalion, rather than company
other armor recipes (ceramics) is fully understood by average peo- echelon.
would be acceptable if protection ple under stress who would em- The purpose here is not to support
levels are maintained or improved ploy it in war. The rate of accep- or to oppose any organizational
and weight burdens reduced. The tance of new concepts is increasing. configuration; it is merely to indi-

May-June 1986 ARMOR:The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 7

 reviewing combined arms units,
potentially at the battalion task
force level; t h a t is, a battalion
which would consist of a mix of
tank and infantry companies. Last-
ly, we are reviewing different com-
binations of combat service support
responsibility. We have moved .the
focus of maintenance from compa-
ny to battalion. There is some
analysis that would suggest that
we should look a t the focus going to
brigade, particularly if we were to
have a fixed organization. Of
course, all of these organizations
must be thought through from the
standpoint both of the Active force
and the Reserve Component. We
advocate no particular solution at
present; however, we are looking
aggressively at the organizational
implications of not only our doc-
trine but also of the new equipment
- such as elevated sensors and
battlefield management - which
we see coming in the near future.
In this series of columns, we have
discussed some major forces which
are acting on our maneuver heavy
force. We have severe challenges,
but we also have great strengths. I
believe that the strengths far out-
weigh the challenges if we can ex-
ploit them properly. We have indi-
catedsome ways that we are mov-
ing in the areas of personnel, train-
ing, equipment, and doctrine to pro-
vide the close combat heavy force
cate that there are subtle but very tank battalion which, when cross- our country needs. The path is laid
important relationships associated reinforced, can create a very diffi- out. The most critical ingredient is
with organizational design. We cult situation if the companies have skilled leaders who care - leaders
have continuing challenges. For been further cross-reinforced ,creat- who have been educated and trained
example, many believe that the tank ing company teams. The tank com- to innovate responsibly within the
company today is too small, that it pany has HEMTTs; the infantry intent of their commander. That is
is simply not a viable unit in peace- company has 5-tons.The tank com- the challenge of leadership which
time and does not have the redun- pany may have the Recovery Ve- must thrive across our force. I am
dancy of trained personnel which hicle 90; the infantry company will confident as to the outcome.
would be required for continuous have the M88, of marginal utility Forge the Thunderbolt!
operations in war. We at Knox be- with the M1A1. Similar issues like
lieve that the security squad should this need to be scrubbed to ensure P.S. After three and one half de-
be reinstituted into the tank com- that we have a fully integrated lightful years, my tenure as Chief
pany to allow for crew replacement. tank company team capability. of Armor and Cavalry has come to
But it remains to be seen whether We are also reviewing other more a close. As I mention above - the
this can be documented, given pres- fundamental organizational issues. path is laid out. Now it needs to be
ent constraints on personnel. They include the desirability and honed and improved by others more
There is also a clear need for more feasibility of establishing a fixed capable than I. My successor fits
effort in combined arms integra- brigade, similar to the German or- the bill perfectly - a superb mount-
tion, particularly of the tank-infan- ganization. The direct support ar- ed force leader and old friend. I ask
try team in both command and tillery battalion and the forward you to support him as you have me
control and combat service support. support battalion would be organic - magnificently.
There are discontinuities now be- to the brigade, which would be com- I have been honored to serve you
tween the capabilities of the mech- posed of a fixed number of tank and Armored Force leaders past and
anized infantry battalion and the infantry battalions. We are also present. Thank you.

a ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 The Heavily-Armored
Gun-Armed Main Battle Tank
Is Not Optimized For Mechanized Warfare
by Craig Koerner and Michael O’Connor

Foreward
The tank is the decisive weapon
of modem land warfare.’ NATO’s
success in a war will depend heavi-
ly on the number and tactical ca- Exploiting Tactical
pabilities of its main battle tanks Relationships
(MBTs). Unfortunately, their cost-
effectiveness is markedly reduced The German Pzkw IV.
by the limited usefulness of heavy right. with a long 75-mm
armor, the tactical limitations im- main gun, was able to
posed by gun armament, and the outrange its W I I desert
opponents.
high costs of both. An unconven- The British Churchill. at
tional tank design strategy offers right. used its hill-climb-
NATO the chance to alter t h e ing advantage in Tunisia
balance of forces in its favor. This in 1943.
can be done by abandoning the Until heavier A T guns
heavy armor and gun armament of were used against it, the
MBTs, while improving other as- British Matilda. below,
pects of tank performance. These exploited its thick armor
changes result in less costly and advantage.
individually more effective tanks.
Design Philosophy
The art of designing effective
tanks lies in finding the mix of
technical characteristics that, in
conjunction with enemy responses,
determines the most favorable com-
bination of the tactical relation-
ship and the costs relationship.
Analyzing this momentarily in
terms of the tanks on the NATO
central front, the tactical relation-
ship is formed by the combination
of NATO and Warsaw Pact (WP)
tanks’ tactical capabilities versus
a n opponent, for example, their power, mobility, a n d armor deter- man Panzer IVs with the long 75
frontal arc invulnerability to tank mine its tactical capabilities and firing from beyond the range of
gun fire from beyond a certain its optimal battlefield tactics. His- effective British AT fire in the first
range, or their mobility over soft torically, tanks with a marked su- battle of El Alu~mein.~
ground. The costs relationship is periority in one of these charac- Tanks without some marked su-
formed by a combination of cost teristics often possessed tactical op- periority as exemplified above, rely
ratios, such as those of tanks to tions unavailable to their oppo- on weight of numbers for battle-
enemy tanks, or to enemy infantry nents, and were thus able to fight field success unless their design
antitank guided missile (ATGM) one-sided battles. Such superiority facilitates the stalking and am-
units. Both of these relationships may be achieved not through any bush tactics dictated by their tac-
are changed by the introduction of technology unknown to the enemy, tical capabilities. These tactics are,
a new weapon, and are inevitably but through emphasis on the rele- in essence, the tank hunting tactics
changed further by enemy re- vant aspect in the tanks’ designs. of WWII. Thus a n effective tank
sponses to that weapon’s introduc- Examples are the crushing attacks design facilitates and encourages
tion. of the heavily armored British Ma- the use of these optimal battlefield
tilda 11s in France and the desert tactics. For example, the MBTs
Tactical Relationship until 1942,2the British Churchills’ used on both sides in the Middle
A new tank design may alter the monopoly on movement in the Tu- Eastern wars are vulnerable to op-
balance of forces by changing the nisian highlands in the Battle for posing tank fire at most combat
tactical relationship. A tank’s fire- the Hilltops in 1943,3 and the Ger- ranges. The US and UK tanks used

May-June 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 9

by Israel could depress their guns
ten degrees; the Soviet tanks used
by Egypt and Syria had only five
degrees of negative gun eleva-
tion. Israeli tanks fired from def-
ilade, shooting from the reverse
slope of a hill with only the gun
and turret exposed over the crest,
Syrian and Egyptian tanks rode
atop the crest, exposing more of the
tank for a longer time when firing.
Consequently, Israeli tanks were
more difficult to detect and hit,
giving them marked advantages in
stalking and a m b ~ s h i n gA
. ~more Fighting in the Golan in 1973. Israelis capitalized on the greater depression of
extreme use of stealth was made by their tank guns to engage and defeat Syrian tanks from more survivable defilade
a small German tank unit in Tu- positions;
nisia just after the battle of Kas-
serine Pass. I n a nighttime armor from east to west. When the ground move between shots. Tanks with
and infantry battle, the Pzkw 111s was too rough or broken for the low silhouette weapons, such as
faced American M3 Grant medium Israeli tanks, bulldozers cleared a overhead-mounted guns or retracta-
tanks. Both tanks’ armaments path. The tanks would deploy in ble missile launchers, might safely
were capable of penetrating their defilade on high ground with wide deploy in defilade positions and
enemy’s frontal armor at short to fields of fire; when nature did not fire multiple shots. Tanks moving
medium ranges. The Pzkw 111s supply the defilade, Israeli bulldoz- under fire should jump between
were unusual in being able to move ers did. During engagements, the points of cover, perhaps maneuver-
inaudibly from 200-300 meters at tank commanders directed from ing evasively when in the open.
minimum speed.6 They crept up on open turret hatches for greater all- Fire on the move would be of little
the Grants and destroyed them by around vision. The Syrians would use, as moving tanks have little
firing at their gunflashes.7 With reply with tank and artillery fire, chance of finding targets during
both t h e Israeli tanks and the the latter causing most of the 7th their brief exposures.”
Panzer IIIs, design features that Brigade’s casualties, especially From the above examples and
reduced detectability allowed them among tank commanders. Ben Gal’s illustrations, the success or failure
to engage in one-sided battles by tanks would then retreat, to evade of tank units depends on the ability
use of the stealth tactics appropri- the artillery fire, draw their pur- of tanks to evade fire from spe-
ate to tanks that cannot survive suers into another ambush, or re- cialized AT weapons, and also of
hits from enemy tanks’ main arma- supply. In one such engagement, the ability of all vehicles to absorb
ment. “...more than 40 Syrian tanks had fire from area weapons, mainly ar-
been destroyed for the loss of only tillery fire, without ill effects. The
Optimal Battlefield Tactics half a dozen Israeli. Nor was this destruction of fuel supplies by area
The most effective tactics for ratio unusual.”S Thus, in many bat- weapons, and of bridgelaying and
tanks without frontal invulnerabili- tles, the Syrian strength was erod- mineclearing tanks by direct fire,
ty to the enemy’s primary AT weap- ed. During much of this time, the will stop an armored formation as
ons are ambush tactics, which min- Israeli Air Force attacked the unar- effectively as the destruction of the
imize movements of individual mored Syrian supply columns, in- tanks themselves.
tanks under fire, firing exposure terrupting the flow of fuel and am-
times and silhouettes, and the pre- munition to the advancing units. Inflicting Costs
dictability of units’ movement be- After two days, the Syrians broke The second way a new NATO
tween engagements. Ambush tac- off their attacks. Ben Gal had lost t a n k design may influence the
tics were exemplified in the defense half of his tanks; the Syrians had balance of forces is by inflicting
of North Golan in the first two days lost 260 tanks and perhaps 200 costs on t h e W P . NATO may
of the Yom Kippur W a r by Col. infantry carriers and supply ve- change some MBT characteristics
Avigdor Ben Gal’s 7th Armored hicles. It was later discovered that by changing t h e tank’s design
Brigade. The Syrians, with a five- one quarter of the tanks Syria lost within the current technology, in-
fold superiority in tanks and a had simply been abandoned for creasing its performance and rais-
thirty-fold superiority in mecha- lack of fuel, even though Golan is ing its cost. The W P may respond
nized infantry.8 advanced down only 17 miles in depth.10 by altering their tank design to
the road axes of Golan, attacking Stalking, evasion, and minimal increase performance, preserving
continuously for the first 48 hours. exposures for observing and firing the previous tactical relationship
Ben Gal divided his 100 tanks into are the optimal microtactics for between opposing tanks for a cer-
two combat teams and a small re- tanks vulnerable to specialized AT tain increase in WP tank costs. If
serve. The Israeli tanks often moved weapons. Ideally, turreted tanks the change in NATO design threat-
over the rough terrain between would fire single shots during mo- ens to change the tactical relation-
roads, moving north and south to mentary exposures of the gun and ship drastically in NATO’s favor,
attack Syrian columns moving turret above a crest, and would the W P is very likely to engage in

10 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

such a tank redesign, and incur the counterweapons design to nullify greater portion of the battlefield,13
greater tank costs. These higher the extra or additional tank com- and maintains morale, which gives
tank costs result in fewer tanks, ponent. This criterion does not im- the crewmembers confidence to
less resources available for other ply a process of design and counter- carry out their mission.14 It also
weapons systems, or a greater design that occurs over time; rath- facilitates repair and reuse of dis-
burden on their national economy. er, optimal design innovations are abled tanks.15
In the words of Richard Simpkin: cost effective even if the enemy A straightforward method of in-
“The need to armor against reactions are instantaneous. creasing protection is simply thick-
all weapons on the battlefield, A part of the tank designer’s task ening the armor, which increases
bar the primary antitank at- is to choose a weapon system that, weight and cost if tank mobility is
tack, is indisputable. Argua- by combination of long-range ac- not allowed to decline simultane-
bly the role of direct protec- curacy, low mean engagement ously. Cost increases from thick-
tion above this level is not to times, and other factors, gives a ening armor are likely to be signifi-
confer system survivability on high absolute kill probability. Re-
the tank that has it but to membering that various aspects of
impose a restriction on the weapon performance also affect
enemy by raising the ante - indirect protection, it is also critical
by forcing him to develop,
field and support even more
that the weapon’s kill probability
be high relative to the opponent’s
” ...A straightforward
powerful antitank weapon kill probability against tanks armed method of increasing
systems.”l2 with the chosen weapon. Another protection is simply
A NATO tank design change may one of the designer’s tasks is to
produce a net improvement in the identify t h e weapons a g a i n s t thickening the armor,
force balance if the threatened which, given intelligent responses which increases
change in the tactical relationship by the enemy, armoring remains
more than compensates for the in-
crease in costs and corresponding
cost-effective,provide armor protec-
tion against those weapons, and to
weight and cost ...8.

decrease i n numbers of NATO facilitate within the tank design

tanks and/or other weapon sys- the optimal tactics for evading the
tems. It will produce this improve- weapons that will defeat the tank’s
ment if it also costs little compared armor.
with the W P weapons redesign that cant. The heavy frontal arc armor-
restores the old tactical relation- Current Weaponry/ ing of current MBTs in itself ac-
ship. I n this case, the W P is pressed Current Armoring counts for 20 to 25 percent of their
between two unattractive alterna- The spectrum of weapons facing weight,16 not including increases in
tives. The Pact may retain its old MBTs in the conventional land engine and suspension system size
designs and suffer the resulting battle ranges from specialized AT and weight to maintain mobility
loss of tactical capabilities against weapons of high individual lethali- levels; the total figure is probably
NATO tanks. Alternately, it may ty against armored targets to area around one third ofa tank’s weight.
design new tanks and AT weapons weapons of widespread destructive- The cost of these MBTs, excluding
whose costs increase more than pro- ness against unarmored targets. optical and electronic fire control
portionately with the costs of the The primary AT weapons are tank gear, increases in direct proportion
new NATO tanks. This unfavor- gun rounds, ATGMs, and develop- with tank weight,17 and the pro-
able change in the costs relation- mental homing munitions. In the gram costs over the expected ser-
ship for the WP would cause a reduc- middle of the spectrum lie artillery vice lives of western tanks total ten
tion in their numerical superiority. and air-delivered, AT submunitions times the tanks’ acquisition costs.ls
Therefore, a design innovation will and hull-penetrating minelets, and Therefore, the costs inflicted on a n
be cost-effective,changing the over- track-cutting minelets. Finally, opponent who is induced to up-
all force balance favorably, if it there are the area weapons, such as armor are quite large in percentages
yields a net advantage against the high explosive rounds from artil- of the total tank cost.
current enemy force and if it costs lery and small arms fire from infan-
little relative to a n opponent’s try, which carpet the modem bat- Optimal Armoring
countermeasures. The cost effec- tlefield, but have minimal capabili- The appropriate level of armor-
tiveness of a n innovation, in this ties of armor penetration. ing is found by comparing the costs
context, is a measure of the costs Moving a weapon and its crew of increasing protection with the
inflicted on a n opponent relative to through some type of enemy fire is costs of increasing weapon perfor-
those incurred by the innovating fundamental to the widest interpre- mance to defeat the increased pro-
force. tation of the tank concept. MBTs tection. The costs of increased pro-
A principle of optimal design is are alone among current armored tection lie mainly in the weight
that any component of a tank -for fighting vehicles in having heavy increases from extra armor, while
instance a n extra subsystem or a n frontal armor designed to degrade the costs of increasing a weapon’s
additional unit of armor thickness the effects of specialized AT weap- performance depend on its speciali-
- increases costs to the tank buyer ons significantly. This protection, zation in the AT role.
by less than the additional cost to in theory, increases survivability, It is inevitably less cost-effective
a n enemy, who must change his which allows movement over a to armor tanks against specialized

May-June 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 11

 AT weapons t h a n against area manding. Modem tanks with semi- for very little cost. Up-armoring
weapons. The specialized weapons, active or active armor, though, may against small-caliber autocannon
by nature of their complex fire con- have frontal invulnerability does absolutely nothing to help a
trol gear and gun or missile sys- a g a i n s t some current ground- tank survive ATGMs mounted on
tems, have only a small percentage launched ATGMs.23 If even the these same vehicles.
of their costs in the actual warhead, present NATO ATGMs have been There is another fundamental dis-
and may thus be upgraded to in- rendered ineffective by this armor, advantage to armoring against spe-
crease armor penetration for small changes in warhead design that cialized AT weapons: It is less cost-
cost changes in percentage terms. increase cost but involve no new ly to redesign weapons for attack
If only the warhead cost, but not technology would reverse this situ- on the lightly armored areas of
the size and weight, is changed in ation. HEAT warhead lethality is tanks than it is to reconfigure tank
increasing performance, then there increased by using higher-powered armoring for protection of these
is no change in other elements of explosives, more finely machined newly vulnerable areas. For exam-
life cycle costs, and the new war- warhead components,and by chang-
head costs are the only addition to ing the metal used in the charge
total program costs.lg Area weap- liner. Missiles become even more
ons, by contrast, have a large frac- deadly if their size is increased, or “It is less costly to
tion of their total system cost in the two to three tandem warheads are
size and weight of munitions and used, as on Hellfire.24 The US TOW redesign weapons for
the vehicles needed to carry them, and the European HOT and Milan attack on the lightly
so increasing the AT effectiveness ATGMs were modified in some of
of area weapons increases their these ways when the T64 and T72 a r m o r e d areas o f
total life cycle costs by a large were depl0yed.~5As increasing the
amount in percentage terms. There- size of a tank’s missiles is cheaper tanks, than it is to re-
fore, up-armoring against special- than increasing the size and weight configure tank armor-
ized AT weapons is generally not of the tank as a whole, the cost of
cost-effective, while armoring defeating up-armored tanks with ing... I 8

against area weapons usually is. such ATGMs is much less than the
Armoring the tank frontal arc costs of the up-amoring itself.
against gun rounds is not cost-ef- This is one fundamental disad-
fective; the costs inflicted on those vantage in armoring tanks against
upgrading weapons to retain AT specialized AT weapons. Up-armor- ple, a new Swedish ATGM has a
firepower are far less than the costs ing greatly increases tank weight, downward-pointing HEAT warhead
incurred by the up-armoring force. with corresponding and dispropor- to attack the thin top armor of
Current tank armoring schemes tionate increases in the costs of MBTS.~ Extending
~ current frontal
do not confer frontal arc invulnera- procurement, maintenance, logis- arc protection levels to the roof
bility against modern tank guns. tic support, and other factors. Yet results in a tank of 150-200 tons.27
French tank designers contend up-armoring may be defeated by Not only is this in itself crippling; it
that all present NATO 105-120-mm redesigned weapons that add little involves the deployment of what is
APFSDS rounds can penetrate any to each of these factors in the oppo- virtually a new tank in response to
current W P tank, and their tests nent’s tanks. In the most extreme a change in enemy missiles alone.
I
I show that up-armoring to attain case, the missile user defeats the This demonstrates the second un-
frontal invulnerability would raise up-armored tank with redesigned derlying disadvantage of up-armor-
the tank‘s weight to between 80 and ATGMs, causing only the most ing: It is the least flexible of all
100tons.20However, even if the W P minor changes i n the size and, weapon countermeasures.
up-armoring from T62 to T72, with especially, weight of the ATGM The inflexibility of armoring
its resulting 12.5 percent tank launch vehicle. Even a major in- makes it even less suitable for coun-
weight increase,21causes NATO to crease in ATGM cost translates in- tering artillery and aircraft-deliv-
up-gun its tanks, the costs to NATO to a relatively small increase in ered mines a n d submunitions.
will be small. Mounting the 120- total life cycle costs for a n ATGM- Weak aspects of the tank would be
‘mmgun instead of the 105-mmgun firing tank. Thus, the tactical rela- phasized in artillery and air at-
on the M1 would have raised its tionship is not changed in the up- tacks, with submunitions for thin
program life cycle cost only “two to armorer’s favor, while the costs re- top armor, and minelets for thin
six percent.”22 Therefore, the costs lationship is altered to his oppo- bottom armor. The inevitable up-
inflicted on NATO are small rela- nents’s advantage. armorhp-weapon cycle, played out
tive to the change in life cycle costs Parallel reasoning shows theirrele- with armor being thickened over
of W P MBTs. vance of armoring tanks against the top and bottom of the tank,
Armoring against HEAT war- the 20-35-mm autocannons on in- would again cost tank producers
heads in aircraft, helicopter, tank fantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and far more than munitions producers,
and infantry-launched ATGMs, in- attack helicopters. Virtually all and result in a n unmovable tank as
fantry AT rockets, and in-homing IFVs and attack helicopters also well.
artillery and mortar rounds, ulti- have ATGM launchers; any vehicle Protection from general purpose
mately fails for the same reasons. capable of mounting the large, area weapons stands in a category
Defense against the larger air- heavy, recoil-producing cannon by itself; it is the most critical
launched missiles is absurdly de- may have an ATGM launcher added function of a tank’s armored enve-

12 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

lope. Conventional armor protec- tion would be difficult targets in,
tion against small arms fire and for example, typical European ter-
high-explosive/fragrnentation(SAF- rain. The tank could speed between
HE/F) is inexpensive28 and abso- points of cover in less time than is
lutely vital for battlefield surviva- usually taken in locating and aim-
bility. Statistically, the greatest ing at a target.31 Such mobility,
source of personnel casualties in combined with these tactics, radi-
modern war is area weaponry, cally reduces exposure time. When
mainly indirect artillery fire.29 In- “movement exposure times start to
fantrymen and vehicles with less come down towards mean acquisi-
than this level of armoring are in tion time - let alone fall below it
the predicament of WWI footsol- -the chance that a (moving tank)
diers: All movement exemplifies target offered will be killed starts to
either stealth or suicide. As shown fall d r a m a t i ~ a l l y . ” ~ ~
in Golan, tanks with exposed crew- An ultrahigh acceleration tank
members or subsystems such as threatens an opponent with a signi-
sighting gear suffer serious perfor- ficant, unfavorable change in the
mance loss in a high-artillery en- tactical relationship. This oppo-
vironment, even if few tanks are nent might resort to a n even more
destroyed by artillery fire alone. capable gun fire-control system
For tanks in a n artillery-dense area than the current sophisticated and
such as the NATO central front, complex electronic fire-control
anything worth having is worth gear,33 which already accounts for
“frag-proofing.” between 50 and 60 percent of the
The optimal strategy for tank basic cost of current MBTs,~‘ or
armoring is not to enable the tank perhaps employ a n automatic tar-
to absorb hits from all or most get detection and evaluation sys-
specialized AT weapons arrayed tem of still greater complexity, vul- “Smart” indirect-fire weapons, like
nerability to countermeasures, and the SADARM, seen in tests, above,
against it. Optimal armoringforces attack weak top armor.
the enemy to commit units to ex- with a reduction of indirect protec-
posed positions to deliver and sub- tion.35 It seems probable that the If there is any single point at
ject themselves to direct fire, and/ total costs of supporting such sys- which increasing weight abruptly
or forces the enemy to attack with tems exceeds that of deploying ul- reduces mobility, it would be where
minelets, submunitions, and costly trahigh acceleration tanks; coun- the tank ceases to be amphibious,
homing weapons, all of which are tering the change in the tactical necessitating the use of armored
relatively susceptible to counter- relationship caused by such tanks bridgelayers in tank units. The US
measures. Optimal armoring in- results in a n adverse change in the M2/M3 is armored against SAF-
flicts tactical constraints and dis- costs relationship. An ultrahigh HE/F and is amphibious, so it
proportionate weapons costs on a n acceleration mobility system is seems feasible to make a similar
opponent; it does not allow tanks to therefore cost-effective due either to vehicle with ultrahigh acceleration,
absorb hits from specialized AT its microtactical effects on move- low ground pressure, and large
weapons. ment exposure times and surviva- stores of fuel. This results in a
All of this suggests a new tank bility, or alternately from its effect highly mobile tank with far less
design strategy, in which the costly on the tank-to-tank cost ratio. dependence on vulnerable bridge-
armoring of current heavy tanks is Effective mobility is increased by layers and logistic tail than current
abandoned in favor of mobility, greater independence from vulner- MBTs have.
firepower, and stealth. I n the new able engineering and supply ve-
design, the cost and weight savings hicles. Under current practices, Optimal Weaponry
from reducing t h e armor level total engineering and logistic effort The attributes of a n ideal weapon
would be used to augment design probably increases with the cube of system derive from the optimal tac-
factors that facilitate the use of tank weight. The logistic tail is tics and microtactics for tanks ar-
optimal battlefield tactics. difficult to disperse or hide, has mored against SAF-HE/F. Lethali-
lower cross-country mobility than ty against heavily-armored MBTs
Optimal Mobility combat vehicles, and is extremely is absolutely vital, but is in fact less
Increasing mobility increases vulnerable to area weapons. All of demanding on the weapon system
survivability. A tank’s agility re- this decreases an armored unit’s than many other factors, such as
duces its exposure to direct fire AT capability to fight in, or even move the capability to locate and hit tar-
weapons, and a tank unit’s mobili- through, areas within range of en- gets that are at very long range
ty over rough or soft ground and emy artillery.36 Giving fuel and and/or maneuvering evasively.
over rivers aids in evading both ammunition carriers and light re- Perhaps even more demanding and
line-of-sight weapons a n d area pair vehicles tank-like cross-coun- important is minimizing the firing
weapons.30 In these ways, mobility try mobility and resistance to SAF- signature, exposure time, and pre-
may be substituted for direct pro- HE/F would solve only some of sented cross section of the firing
tection. these problems, and at considera- vehicle during engagements. Con-
Tanks with ultrahigh accelera- ble cost. versely, the microtactics of evasion,
~

May-June 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 13

in which the tank darts between
firings from defilade positions, de-
crease the usefulness of both the
weapon rate of fire and of fire-on-
the-move capability. Unless unre-
alistically high exchange rates are
considered, the amount of ammuni-
tion that may be useful is far lower
than that in modem tanks. This
reduces the importance of carrying
a large number of ammunition
rounds, and thus makes their size
less critical.
The long-range accuracy,in-flight
guidance, a n d less conspicuous
launch signatures of recoilless
ATGMs make them the ideal weap-
ons for a war of stalking and am-
bushing. Accurate and lethal fire-
power out to 6,000 meters could be
provided by ATGMs, with their
relatively inexpensive fire-control,
systems, and an autoloader could
be fitted. The in-flight guidance of
ATGMs would aid in hitting ultra- A TOW missile leaves its Bradley launcher. Authors contend that future tanks
would be more effective and survivable if armed with missiles.
high acceleration tanks. The low
f l i g h t t i m e of h y p e r v e l o c i t y Additionally, the number of poten- length” which “will last for more
ATGMs, such as ADATS,37 could tial defilade positions would be in- than five min~tes.”~6 The rockets
further reduce such tanks’ ability creased.43 Vertical obstacles, such could be fired from ATGM-sized
to evade fire. Also, the “launch as buildings, could also be used as canisters with several rounds in
signature of a n ATGM is - or defilade, which is an option una- each, using the ATGM launcher.
should be - less prominent” than vailable to gun-armed tanks. The This allows the vehicle to search
those from tank-killing guns.38 ability to use buildings as defilade with two sets of eyes, fire ATGMs,
The use of recoilless ATGMs al- increases tank survivability. One various HE rounds, and create
lows the target presented by a tank study found that “...in every square multi-kilometer long smoke screens,
firing from defilade to be mini- kilometer [of German countryside] all from behind the cover of defi-
mized by mounting a n ATGM there is, on average, a village of 230 lade or buildings.
launcher on a telescoping a r m inhabitants with houses of solid The combination of hyperveloci-
mount (TAM) or a mechanical arm st0ne.”~4 ty rockets a n d helmet-mounted
similar to that on the Northrop A tank would ideally have two sights would minimize total target
proposal for the Improved TOW- TAMS, a sensor TAM for sighting engagement times a t close range.
firing Vehicle.39 Only the launch gear and a weapons TAM with mis- ATGM-guiding sights can be made
tubes and sighting gear are ex- sile launch tubes and, perhaps, integral with the crew’s helmets,
posed while firing TAM-mounted sights as well. This assures con- and the approximate direction of a
ATGMs from cover. The size of the tinual observation while reloading, selected helmet can be fed to the
launch unit would make it very and allows two crewmen to search controls orienting the launcher, so
difficult to detect until the weapon for targets simultaneously from the missile is fired into the sight’s
was fired.40 With a retractable behind cover. field of view and would be guided
weapon “...in an engagement at ATGM-firing t a n k s c a n be from there. T h i s arrangement
long range it may actually become equipped with a range of ammuni- would be similar to that used to aim
impossible for a n enemy gunner to tion types comparable to that avail- the US AH64 attack helicopter’s
score a hit because of his reaction able for guns, HOT-like missiles automatic cannon,47although less
time and the time of flight of the with fuel-air explosive (FAE) war- costly since less accuracy is re-
projectile ...”41 The hit probabilities heads,45 having far greater power quired in orienting the launcher.48
of a 105-mm gun with full fire con- than conventional HE rounds, can This system also reduces training
trol gear against a moving, tank- provide general purpose HE fire- requirements, by simplifying the
sized target have been estimated a t power. Two-inch rockets would aug- aiming and firing procedure signi-
greater than 90 percent a t 1km, 60 ment this, because they arerelative- ficantly.
percent a t 2 km, and just over 30 ly small rounds useful for anti-
percent at 3 km. However, the hit infantry missions. They also give Specific Proposals
probabilities against a weapon the tank greater smoke-laying ca- “his is the basic configuration of
such as a n overhead gun, or, pre- pabilities than current MBTs pos- a t a n k designed for long-range
sumably, a n ATGM launcher, are sess; for example, a ripple of 19 firepower and the tactics of evad-
only about 15percent a t 0.5 km, and M259 2.75-inch smoke rockets cre- ing fire from specialized AT weap-
less than 10 percent at 1 km.42 ates a screen “several kilometers in ons. The following specific subsys-

14 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 An ADATS missile system, mounted here on an Mll3-series chassis, can engage air and armor targets with hypewelocity. laser
beam-riding missiles which travel 6 km in 6 seconds.
tems. when added to a bae vehicle machine gun as secondary arma- mented by jettisonable (and self-
with’a crew of three, would further ment. sealing) external fuel tanks.
contribute to the tank’s tactical ef- The armor would be semi-active
fectiveness and/or inflict costs on a or active, making the tank resis- Conclusion
opponent. tant to SAF-HE/F while increasing Designers of combat vehicles
ADATS missiles with advanced protection against HEAT rounds. have a tremendous opportunity:
HEAT warheads, specialized in the To provide protected head-outside they can reinvent the tank. Current
AT role, would be used. This spe- position for all crewmembers and tanks are not designed to facilitate
cialization would include altering allow collective NBC-proofing,each the stalking tactics most effective
the warhead to arm itself within crewmember would have a trans- in mechanized warfare. The modem
meters of the launch tube, eliminat- parent hemisphere, or “bubble,” tank is a product of tunnel-vision,
ing problems with a n ATGM’s min- that has the same resistence to with the focus on the penetration
imum range. The ADATS missiles SAF-HE/F as the armored versus passive protection contest,
would be fired from a twin auto- All external subsystems, most nota- combined with a n ill-reasoned
loaded ATGM launcher on a TAM, bly the TAMS and suspension sys- preference for guns over ATGMs.
minimizing engagement times and tem, would also be armored against The armoring, in particular, has
exposures. The missile flies down a SAF-HE/F. The TAMS would thus been a phenomenally expensive
laser beam that is aimed slightly be armored, and have armored shut- exercise in futility. The tanks of the
above the line of sight to the target, ters for the sights. The TAM would Yom Kippur W a r rode into battle
and is aimed directly at the target also be modular, allowing quick with enough armor to protect them-
just before i m p a ~ t , ~making
S the replacement of battle-damaged selves against anything - except
system almost immune to counter- TAMS on the battlefield. the infantry AT rockets, ATGMs,
measures. The missile is said to be The mobility system would be and tank guns that faced them. The
smokeless, so firing would not re- similar to that of the HIMAG test- heavy armoring on tanks has con-
veal the launcher location.50 HOT bed vehicle, but with high cross- tributed to their vulnerability by
ATGMs, which are less costly, country speed sacrificed for still prompting a sacrifice of tank-borne
would be mounted on a portion of greater acceleration. Run-silent fea- vision, concealability, mobility, au-
the tanks in place of ADATS. HOT, tures, which reduce noise and heat tonomy from a vulnerable logistical
TOW, and other second-generation signatures a t low speeds, would be tail, and other characteristics that
wireguided ATGMs may be modi- installed.54 Tracks would be a t bring success on the battlefield.
fied to fire from behind cover, least as wide as those on current This armoring has also increased
guided by sights above defilade, MBTs to increase this lighter tank’s tank costs to the point at which
thus concealing the l a ~ n c h . 5This
~ mobility over soft ground such as NATO’s numerical inferiority is
is now being done for develop- sand or mud. A bulldozer blade guaranteed. Simultaneously, weap-
mental helicopter-mounted TOW would be fitted for creating paths onry has advanced to make frontal
systems, in which the ATGM is and preparing defilade positions. arc invulnerability to specialized
guided by sights mounted above The vehicle would be made fully AT weapons less feasible than ever
the helicopter’s rotor.52 amphibious. A very large fuel sup- before, while threats to other areas
The vehicle would also carry a ply would be carried, perhaps aug- of the tank continue to grow. A

May-June 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 15

more sensible tank design stratem Non-Conformist Weapon,” ZDR, 5/1982. pp. 48Robin Fletcher, “From Tank Turret tq
is to replace each heavy tank with 607-610; “Satory I X Infantry Anti-Tank Overhead Gun.”
Weapons,”ZDR,8/1983,pp. 1121-1122;“Thir$ ‘This operation isdone automatically, by a
many light, scarely detectable, ex- Generation Anti-Tank Missiles for NATO, computer with the ADATS flight parametera
tremely mobile tanks possessing ZDR, 1/1980, p. 22; R.D.M. Furlong, “Euro- programmed into it.
far greater long-range firepower. peans Oppose Single-Type Standardization 50C01. E.J. Everett-Heath, Mark Hewish,
This will reduce the W P numerical of NATO Anti-Tank Missiles,” IDR, 2/1981, “Oerlikon-Buhrle Launches Dual-Purpose
pp. 141-142; Hellfire has two tandem war- Missile System.”
superion@ and simultaneously give heads. See US Army Greenbook 1982-83, p. 51Jane’sZnfantry W a p o ~ p.. 493.
NATO many new tactical advan- 408. 52“AUSA ’81 Part 2 Weapons and Sen-
tages. 25“AUSA’81P a r t 2 Weapons and Sensors,” sors,” IDR, 2/1982.
ZDR, 211982, pp. 105212; “Euromissile and 53Richard Simpkin. Human Factors in
Footnotes EMDG,” IDR, 9/1984. Mechanized Warfare, Brassey’s Publishera
1Generalleutnant Dr. F.M. von Senger und 26MarkHewish, “Bofors RBS56 ‘Bill’: Top Ltd., NY,1983, pp. 134-136.
Etterlin, Introduction, in R.E. Simpkin. Tank Attack to Counter Modem Tanks,” ZDR. Y3impkin. Antitank, p. 42. See Also Avra-
Warfare, Crane Russak & Co, Inc., NY, 1979, 7/1982. pp- 925-926. ham “Bren” Adan, On the Banks of the Suez,
p. 11. 27Mark Hewish, “Tank Breaker,” ZDR. Presidio Press, 1980, p. 340.
2Bame Pitt, The Crucible of War: The 911982, pp. 1212-1215.
Western Desert 1941. Jonathan Cape Ltd., 28Simpkin,Tank Warfare, p. 11.
London. 1980, pp. 87, 102-103, 106-107; Ali- 291ndirectartillery fireis delivered without
stair Home, To Lose a Battle: France 1940, a line of sight between the artillery and the
Penguin Books, NY,1979, pp. 562569. target. See, for statistics, A.J. Barker, The
3Kenneth Macksey, Crucible of Power. Yom Kippur War. Ballantine Books, NY.1974.
Hutchinson of London. London, 1969, pp. 268, pp. 157-158.
281. 30Simpkin,Red Armor, pp. 48.112-113.
‘Kenneth Macksey. Tank Warfare, pp 191- 31Paul-WernerKrapke, op eit.
192; Maj. Gen. F.W. von Mellenthin, Panzer 32Simpkin,Antitank, p. 126,; see also pp. 42,
Battles, Cassel and Co. Ltd.. London, 1956, p. 86.
139. 33J.M. Ballantine, “The Barr & Stroud DF3
T h e Yom Kippur War, Insight Team of the Fire Control System,” ZDR, 4/1980, pp.
London Sunday Times. Doubleday, Garden 536-538.
City, NY,1974, pp. 292-295. 34Simpkin,Tank Warfare, p. 97. Admitted-
6Simpkin. Antitank, p. 42. ly, some of this cost (one fifth of the total cost
?Kenneth Macksey, Crucible of Power, p. in the case of the M1) is due to fire-on-the-
163. move capability..
6A.J. Barker, The Yom Kippur War, Ballan- 35Simpkin,Antitank, pp. 52.126.
tine Books, NY. 1974, p. 69. Wimpkin, Tank Warfare, pp. 100-103; See
SZnsight Team of theLondon Sunday Times. also: Simpkin, Antitank, pp. 2527; Lt. Col. M I C H A E L O’C 0 N N 0 R
p. 178. Bloomer D. Sullivan, “Logistic Support for was a third-year medical
IOZnsight Teamof theLondon Sunday Times, the AirLand Battle,” Military Review, Feb- student at the University of
pp. 134-135,154-161.177-183,292-295; Chaim ruary 1984. pp. 2-6.
37MarkHewish, “Oerlikon-Buhrle Launch- Chicago’s Pritzker School of
Henog, The War of Atonement. Wiedenfeld
and Nicolson, London, 1975, pp. 67, 80-82, es Dual-Purpose Missile System.” ZDR. Medicine when he co-auth-
’%-115; Trevor Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 5/1981, pp. 512-513. ADATS flies to ita maxi- ored this article in 1985. The
zper and Row, NY, 1978, pp. 445-460. mum range of 6 km in 6 seconds. holder of a bachelor‘s degree
”Richard Simpkin. Antitank, pp. 5051, 36Simpkin,Antitank, p. 50; Robin Fletcher, in Chemistry from the Uni-
110; Richard Simpkin, Tank Warfare, pp. 97, “From Tank Turret to Overhead Gun,” IDR, versity of Chicago, he also
145146. 111984, pp. 43-50. (Seematerial on thermal designs image-processing
’ZSimpkin, Tank Warfare, p. 119. imagers spotting the hot gun muzzle.) software at a physics lab on
13Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, “Tanks and 39For some information on the Northrop campus.
Anti-Tank Weapons,” Adelphi Papers #144. ITV and its unfortunate rejection, see Armed
London, IISS (International Institute for Forces Journal International, November
Strategic Studies), 1978, pp. 38-44. 1976, p. 16; March 1977, pp. 5-6, September
“Richard Simpkin. Antitank, p. 35. 1977, p. 6.
IsRichard Simpkin, Human Factors in 4oSimp%in,Antitank,pp.110-111(Thisisby
Mechanized Warfare, Brassey’s Publishers analogy to Simpkin’s discussion of overhead-
Ltd., NY, 1983, pp. 106-113. mounted guns). See also: Simpkin, Red Ar-
‘%impkin, Tank Warfare, pp. 135-136. mor, p. 50.
‘?See, for instance, Simpkin, Human Fac- “Robin H. Fletcher, “Hit Avoidance and
tors in Mechanized Warfare, p. 136. the Tank Gun,” ZDR, 5/1984, pp. 597402,
18Paul-WernerKrapke, “A Design Concept (This is by analogy to his discussion of rais-
fora HeavyTank Destroyer,”IDR3/1983,pp. able guns.)
467-471. ‘2F.Gamer, “The Survival Probability of a
’SThis was done with Milan, and “The cost Tank in Action,” ZDR, 5/1984, pp. 609-612.
of this modificatiou was quite reasonable 43Simpkin,Antitank, pp. 110-111. (This is
since no changes had to be made in other by analogy to Simpkin’s discussion of over-
parts of the [infantry-portable launcher] sys- head-mounted guns.)
tem.” See: “Euromissile and EMDG,” ZDR, “Udo Philipp, “NATO Strategy UnderDis-
9/1984, pp. 1379-1381. cussion in Bonn,”ZDR. 9/1980, pp. 1367-1371,
20Anthony H. Cordeman. “France’s Satory see subsection “Uhle-Wettler’s Proposals.” CRAIG KOERNER is cur-
D(.The Year of the Tank,” AFJZ, August ‘”HOT: The 175-mm diameter, 4000-meter- rentlyworkingon hisPh.D. in
1983, pp. 24-30. range FrancoGerman ATGM. FAE: Fuel-Air Economics at the University
ZlSimpkin, Red Armor, p. 42. Explosive. FAE warheads on small (5”ZUNI) of Chicago, having completed
22“120-mm Choice Doubles Gun Costs,” rocketa already exist. See Eric C. Ludvigsen, masters’workthere in 1982.
Armed Forces Journal Znternational, March “Army Weaponry,” Army, October 1982, p.
1978, p. 14. 386. See specifically: SLUFAE. He also holds a bachelor’s
23Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, “Tanks and 4aLt. Col. John P. Bulger, “ObscuranEe: degree in economics from
Anti-Tank Weapons;” B. Fritz, “The AC300 Countermeasure to Modern Weapons,” Mili- UCLA. Both O’Connor and
Jupiter: Luchiare’s New Anti-Tank weapon,” tary Review, May 1982, pp. 4553. Koerner are avid readers of
IDR 1/1982, pp. 71-74, see p. 74; Simpkin, ‘?Col. E.J. Everett-Heath, “The Develop- military histories and tech-
Antitank, pp. 71-72. ment of Helicopter Air-to-Ground Arma- nical military journals.
*‘Mark Hewish, “Manhurin’s Apilas: A ment,” ZDR, 3/1983, pp. 321329.

16 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 Pursuit of Excellence in Armor
The Armor Force is equipment-
oriented with a considerable degree
of sophistication, and its mission is
to close with the enemy in violent
combat, to break through that en-
emy, and exploit into his rear areas.
These are essential capabilities for
execution of AirLand Battle offen-
sive operations.
Though the Armor Force is equip-
ment-oriented, man - the soldier
-remains the basic element of that
force. Rapid modernization is on-
going; however, our war-fighting
capability depends on the soldiers
i;
who use that modern equipment.
Succinctly put, man remains the
decisive factor. Armor operations
require men with the elan, morale,
discipline, and the will to overcome
all obstacles to mission accomplish-
ment. Initiative in all grades and
the mental alertness, aggressive- and ability to learn) - in other training, primarily in tank gun-
ness and ability to think, act, and words, his charteristics across nery subjects.
quickly seize the initiative in high- the quality spectrum. Additionally, In addition to the active com-
ly mobile platforms possessing re- the soldier’s gaining unit receives ponent soldiers participating in the
markable firepower are absolutely notification of his participation in EIA Program, the reserve compo-
essential to our success on the the program, and his records reflect n e n t soldiers attending OSUT
close combat-heavy battlefield. I n his successful completion of EIA at training have also participated
order to encourage a n d reward the training base in order for him to with 25 percent of the EIA promo-
those attributes, the Excellence in remain eligible for additional ac- tions going to reserve component
Armor (EIA) Program, begun in celerated promotions and training. soldiers. Although subsequent pro-
late FY 84 as a n experiment, now is Once the soldier arrives at his motions in the reserve components
one of the Armor Force’s primary unit, the chain-of-command must (USAR and ANG) will be driven by
efforts at providing the best possi- determine whether the soldier con- unit vacancies, the RC EIA soldier
ble leaders for our force. tinues in the EIA program. If the should be able to compete success-
The key points of the EIA pro- chain-of-command believes t h a t fully for those vacancies, having
gram are targeted in the identifica- the soldier’s performance does not demonstrated superior levels of
tion of quality soldiers in a con- warrant continuance, they should performance through the EIA pro-
certed effort to develop qualified remove him from the program. gram.
and competent NCOs quickly. The Thus the unit is the key imple- The smart commander will proba-
program identifies the high achiev- mentor of the EIA program, both bly use a most valuable company
er early on during One Station Unit for continuation for the soldiers asset to assist and plan the train-
Training (OSUT), and he receives entering the unit from the training ing - the company master gunner.
50 additional hours of training base and for identification and se- I n order to track the soldiers ad-
within the current OSUT Program lection of soldiers assigned to the mitted into the program at the unit,
of Instruction (POI). The specific unit on participation in the Excel- the commander should send a letter
number of additional hours varies lence Program. to Ft. Knox, ATTN: ATZK-AR-P,
by MOS and type of tank, but con- for documentation and permanency
sists of gunnery instruction, the fir- Briefly stated, the unit process of records, These unit-selected sol-
i n g of a d d i t i o n a l m a i n g u n should identify and evaluate poten- diers for EIA will be as closely fol-
rounds, the doubling the amount of tial candidates for EIA by using the lowed a s t h o s e selected from
driving time, and the execution of same criteria described above, OSUT and their progress document-
the moving tank live-fire gunnery which includes conducting a board ed as they advance to potential
tables. for the development of the Order of selection for the Master Gunner
There are rewards for the soldier Merit List (OML) and subsequent Course.
upon successful completion of the selection by the company com- Another major facet of the EIA
EIA program. For example, he is mander. The commander will then effort involves the development
eligible for early promotion to E3, incorporate the unit-selected sol- and sustainment of increased tech-
(based upon his performance, mo- diers with those identified from the nical and tactical expertise. We
tivation, leadership potential, phys- training base and ensure that the have developed a certification pro-
ical fitness, technical proficiency, EIA soldiers receive additional gram to determine and maintain

May-June 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 17

the proficiency of tank crews and
master gunners. The process - de-
veloped in close coordination with
the field -encompasses three levels
of Certification.
The first level is appropriately
named Level I, and involves all ”The Armor Center
Armor soldiers from PVT through
LTC. Level I is based on the as- has developed the
sumption that the abilities of the
tank commander must be assured Level II Certificate of
before he is charged with the re- Certification ...”
sponsibility of commanding a tank.
Essentially, Level I certification is
the Tank Commander’s Gunnery
Skills Tests (TCGST) as stated in
the appropriate tank combat tables
(FM 17-12)for that tank (e,g., M1,
M60YM48,and M60A3). The certi-
fication tests are, for the most part,
hands-on, technically-oriented,
written for field use, and designed of sergeant (E5)who have success- Course. l’n FY87,passing Level I1
to take no more than one day to fully completed BNCOC and who will be a prerequisite for attendance
administer in the unit. are involved in the EIA Program. at the Master Gunner Course, and
The second level of certification, Successful completion of Level I1 may be attempted more than once
Level 11, is designed to be a written certification will mean 50 promo- by SSGs, SFCs, and MSGs prior to
assessment of the tank command- tion points to the soldier and the selection for course attendance.
er’s skills and knowledge. Level.11 possibility of rapid promotion to The purpose of Level I11certifica-
is a comprehensive test of those SSG. A sergeant. (E5) will be per- tion is to sustain the proficiency of
tasks critical to the performance of mitted to take the Level I1 test only master gunners serving in TOE
the tank commander’s duties, to once for early promotion to SSG. positions. Senior master gunners
include gunnery, tactics, communi- Additionally, any soldier who suc- (e.g., corps, division, regimental,
cations, land navigation, mines cessfully completes Level I1 certifi- separate brigade) currently attend
and maintenance. It is available cation will be identified for possible a refresher course at Ft. Knox, and
only to Armor soldiers in the rnak attendance at the Master Gunner upon recertification, these master
Figure 1
CMF 19 Active Component Tank Commander Certification Programmed

Level Testee Test Frequency Test Location: Benefits

I E3-E5 Annually beginning FY86 or 6 Unit/CoJTrp Eligible for reenlistment if
Crewmen months prior to gunnery SOT passed. Level IICertifi-
cation eligible.
I E5-E7: Annually beginning FY 86 or 6 UnitlCo/Trp) BNCOC grad requirement
vehicle months prior to gunnery Level II certification eligible.
commander (E5 only)
II BNCOC grad; Annually beginning M86 TSO Eligible for early promotion to
passing per- E6 with TIS of 4 yrs, program
centile on MILPERCEN for master gunner school.
SQT: Level Eligible for reenlistment if
I pass; COk SQTpassed. I

recommenda-
tion.
111 Master BienniaI beginning FY86 USAARMC (for corp Maintain master gunner AS1
Gunners or thru master gunner transi- division/regt/sep bn
tion under.force mobilization master gunners); unit
(within the division)
~~ ~~~

18 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 TCCT-II
Flow Chart
MILPERCEN PROGRAMS
TCCT-II GRADUATES
FOR MASTER GUNNER CRS.

DA MILPERCEN
GRADES TEST,
NOTIFIESUNIT CMDR.
MAILS CERTIFICATES NOTIFIES DA

ELIGIBLEFOR LEVEL I1

I
80 DAYS PAEPARAllON
‘SOT LEVELIBNCOC FOR TEST (FM/TM/DA PAMSI COMMANDER AWARDS
CERTlFKATETO SOLDIER

I
FORM 4187 IS SEWTHROUGH
PAC TO LOCAL MlLPO
I
MILPO RECEIVES FORM 4187
AND ANNOTATES DA FORM 2

I
AR 600-2M) PROMOTION POINT
‘WORKSHEET - 50 ADDITIONALPTS.

Figure 2

gunners then return to their units Armor Center has developed the The certification process and the
with a training and evaluation Level I1Certificate of Certification, EIA a n d EIC programs are de-
package for use in the recertifica- which will provide formal acknow- signed to function as tools to im-
tion of subordinate master gunners ledgement from the Chief of Armor. prove the quality of the Armor
within their units. Certification is Chief of Armor. Force. To this end, the Armor Cen-
conducted biennially (every two Up to now, the thrust of EIA and ter is exploring policies involving
years); failure to pass Level I11may certification has dealt with Armor the SQT and certification with re-
result in the loss of the ASI. soldiers - tankers. Another equal- gard to retention. The purpose is to
At Figure 1 is a chart which de- ly important MOS within CMF 19 ensure the sustainment of quality
picts the Tank Commander Certifi- is 19D - the cavalry scout. The which is so important to the Armor
cation Program, Level I through quality of mission performance Force. Sustainment of quality, how-
111. It delineates the level of certifi- that the scout provides is critical to ever, ultimately rests with the
cation with respect to the soldiers any combat operation. The Armor chain-of-command.
involved, level of frequency, test Center recognizes the importance The characteristics of the Air-
location, and benefits to the sol- of this valuable member of the Land Battlefield, our modem equip-
diers. Since Level I1 certification is combined arms team and is devel- ment, and the potential threat forces
new to the system, at Figure 2 is a oping a program for scouts that we may have to face, require us -as
flow chart which identifies the re- parallels the one for tankers. The leaders - to ensure quality i n
sponsibilities of the unit, TSO, 1st Armor Training Brigade, Ft. our Armor Force. The EIA Program
USAARMS, DA MILPERCEN, Knox. has received the aDDroval does just that through efforts in the
and the commander involved. In from HQDA to test the Excdllence training base and commander in
order to recognize the soldier’s ac- i n C a v a l r y (EIC) Program i n the field to identify, develop, and
complishment under TCCT-11, the OSUT. , certify our Armor Force leaders.

May-June 1986 ARMOR:The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 19

 How Would You Do It? platoons are led by solid perform-
ing lieutenants, except third pla-
Taking Charge toon. I relieved their platoon leader
last week for indecisiveness and
inability to get along with the pla-
and strained with dark.circles un- toon sergeant. I’m concerned the
Situation der both eyes. platoon is suffering some unneces-
After a long plane ride and a “Welcome to Alpha Company,” sary stress and hardship because of
never-ending ride in the back of a he says. “The best company this the past leadership problems. I
deuce-and-a-half, you a m v e a t the side of the Mississippi River. Been want you to take charge of that
battalion Sl’s track. After a hur- expectin’ ya!” platoon. Get involved and get it
ried in-processing, you study the The sarcasm and thousands of. back on its feet. You’ve got a lot to
battalion and company SOPs in miles between you and the mighty do before we attack tomorrow, so let
preparation for assignment to Al- Mississippi River comes through me turn you over to the first ser-
pha Company. Luckily, both are loud and clear. geant and I’ll send the XO to take
similar to the Armor. School SOPs You drop your salute as t h e cap- you to third platoon’s area. You’ve
and you have an easy time relearn- tain continues. “Glad to have ya got three Mls and nine men. Take
ing procedures. The next day you with us, lieutenant- Have-a seat, care of ’em. You ain’t gonna get any
are finally sent to Alpha Company. listen up and take note! I don’t have more!
A dirty, red-eyed soldier jerks a much time. As you’ve probably “See ya here for the OPORDER
thumb toward a bombed-out farm- heard, we’ve been in combat about at 1300 hours. My watch says it’s
house when you ask him where you thirty days now and we’re to con- 0833 hours. Top, you answer any
can find the company commander. tinue the attack tomorrow at 0430 questions the lieutenant has. I’ve a
You find the company commander hours. We been pushing forward for meeting at battalion in 10 minutes.
talking to the 1SG as you enter and the last two weeks against a very We’ll talk more with the lieutenant
prop your duffle bag against the aggressive and mobile enemy force. after I return.”
wall. They both look up as you snap The company has sustained light After a short briefing by the lSG,
to attention and salute smartly. casualties and continues to func- you talk to the company XO as you
The captain returns your salute tion quite well. This is a good unit walk to your platoon area. You no-
with a half smile. He looks tired with a n excellent record. All the tice he talks slightly slurred, smokes
constantly and never walks out in-
to the open. His eyes dart nervously
from object to object, and he walks
with his head cocked slightly to the
side as if listening for some inevita-
ble sound. He introduces you to
your platoon sergeant, SFC Aikens,
then hurries off.
You observe the tanks spread out
under the trees and covered with
camouflage nets. You shift position
downwind from SFC Aikens and
detect the smell of alcohol. You look
at SFC Aikens and evaluate what
you see - dirty hands, face and

20 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

clothes; red, bloodshot eyes; clean
9-mm pistol; one dog tag attached
to the left boot. In talking with him,
he informs you about the problems
within the platoon and the forth-
coming attack. You have him as-
semble the rest of the platoon, in-
troduce yourself, and speak to them
about the mission facing them and
of the platoon’s responsibility in
supporting the company.
As you talk with the men, you
hear several things which indicate as leaders you don’t criticize the your crew. You can’t expect to func-
a need for more Class I, I11 and IX system, but make it work. Leaders tion well if you don’t train together.
items, better maintenance support, should not voice criticism among Practice some dry-fire commands
more sleep, sundry packs, and clean the troops, but seek ways to antici- and crew drills. Practice laying the
clothes. SFC Aikens is most out- pate and provide for the soldiers’ gun, etc. Your gunner is probably
spoken a n d critical. When you needs. Make him understand that second in charge of your tank. Talk
promise to look into their concerns, you need and expect his criticism, to him separately about operational
they hardly seem to care. but just to you. Get the rest of the procedures and vehicle problems.
It is now 1015hours. You sit down people cleaned up (use your gear if e. Make certain you understand
and begin analyzing your situa- necessary). company report and operation pro-
tion, the available time and what c. Tell him you can see he’s good cedures. Ask SFC Aikens about
you want to accomplish by dark. at what he does because of the special procedures not covered in
camouflaged tanks, clean personal the SOP.
Problem weapon and because he has sur- f. Work out your version of the
1. What are your instructions to vived. Encourage him to continue OPORDER with SFC Aikens for
your platoon sergeant and your to do his job to the highest of stan- presentation to your platoon.
men? dards. g. Prevent rumors and keep ev-
2. What do you want to accom- d. Encourage him to be open and eryone informed - both up and
plish prior to 2000 hours? honest in all dealings. You need down the chain of command.
him for his experience and exper- h. Start building pride back in-
Solution tise. Together, you can work to to the unit by making them feel and
Your talk probably had little ef- make the platoon a continued suc- look like winners.
fect on your platoon. Initially, your cess and keep all of them alive. i. After dark, consider pulling
soldiers will be apprehensive of e. Tell him to list all the needs of the vehicles together if permissible.
your leadership abilities. You must the platoon and its equipment. You Post guards and get everyone as
quickly assess your unit’s strengths need this information to begin solv- much sleep as possible.
and weaknesses, and take action. ing its problems. j. Participate in as many details
You need to demonstrate your com- f. Tell him to continue the prep- (like guard duty and cleaning your
petence, concern, and willingness aration for the attack and that you own weapons) as possible. Show
to help your men resolve problems. will be back to take him with you to your willingness to share the load
You need to show strength of char- the OPORDER a t 1300 hours. of the platoon.
acter and assertiveness in every 2. What you want to accomplish k. Begin establishing mutual
way possible without belittling prior to 2000 hours. trust, respect and confidence be-
your soldiers’ abilities and experi- a. Attend the OPORDER. tween the soldiers and their chain
ence. Recognize that almost every- b. Do a recon (or have SFC ,of command. Solve as many of the
one is suffering from varying de- Aikens recon). soldiers’ problems as you can. Dem-
grees of stress. This overall obser- c. Contact the company XO or onstrate that you care!
vation should guide your initial 1SG about: 1. Work out your method of op-
actions. Be aware of the limited Getting hot food for your. eration with SFC Aikens. You have
time you have and plan to use it to platoon. similar and complimentary duties,
your advantage. In this particular Maintenance support prob- but not the same duties. Get every-
case, it might be best to concentrate lems. thing straight to start with. This
on relieving as much stress as pos- Class I, I11and IX and why first attack might be best conduct-
sible and trying to solve obvious they are problems. ed under SFC Aiken’s control.
problems. Inquire if clean clothes are Work it out with him.
1. Talking to the Platoon Ser- available or can be made available. (If you are interested, refer to Fort
geant. Try to get sundry packs for Knox FC 17-15-3(Appendix E) for a
a. Does he have soap, razor, your platoon. precombat inspection checklist, and
comb, etc.? If not, loan him yours (These are normally NCO jobs, FC 23-200-1 for M1 Combat Load
and tell him that you want him to but in this case you should get in- Plans.)
set a good example as a leader and volved to demonstrate your concern This problem was developedand written
to get cleaned up. And caution him for the men and equipment under by Captain Ro Tyson of the Leadership
to stop the drinking! your care. Branch. Command and Staff Dept..
b. Discuss with SFC Aikens that d. Plan some time to work with USAARMS.

May-June 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 21

 “Remember Your Regiment.. .” Two M l s of the Second ACR ma-
neuver near the Czech border.

The Second Dragoons

Mark Their 150th Anniversary
Of Continuous Service
By Major Christopher P. Thompson and Sergeant First Class Kenneth E. Morrison
Preface
“In theory and practice, it (the and I would therefore recommend Heart, which is the nation’s oldest
cavalry) was the arm of mobility, of the Establishment of one or more military de~oration.~
shock and firepower. It supplied the Corps, in addition to those already After the Revolution, the Army
screen of time and information, de- raised in Virginia.”2 disbanded rapidly, so that by No-
nying the enemy that talisman so Major Elisha Sheldon, command- vember, 1783, every regular mount-
vital to success - surprise. Con- er of the 5th Regiment of Con- ed regiment had been officially dis-
versely, it provided that very same necticut Light Horse, was commis- charged and the U.S. Cavalry had
thing itself - the means of sur- sioned as lieutenant colonel-com- ceased to exist.5
prise, and probably the destruction manding. He recruited six troops of Twenty-nine years passed before
of the enemy...”’ cavalry that became the 2d Regi- the 2d Dragoons were reconstituted,
Two hundred and eleven years ment of Continental Dragoons serving from 1812 to 1815 before
ago, General Washington led his (Sheldon’s Horse). Three years la- they were again disbanded.6
battered Continental Army on a ter, the 2d was furloughed, and late The unit remained inactive for
grueling retreat from New York, in November, 1783, the unit was another 21 years. Then, in May
through New Jersey, a n d into disbanded after having served in 1836, the regiment we know today
Pennsylvania. During that retreat, ten battles of the Revolution, in- as the 2d Armored Cavalry was
he had benefited from the services cluding the decisive one a t Sara- again raised for service i n the
of several ad hoc cavalry forma- toga, N.Y .3 guerilla war against the Seminole
tions. I n a letter to the Continental The 2d Dragoons’ long record of Indians in Florida.
Congress in December, 1776, he ac- battlefield bravery was established The 2d Dragoons have been on
knowledged this help: during t h e Revolutionary War, active service since then, and as
“From the Experience I have had when Sergeant Elijah Churchill they approach their 150th anniver-
in this Campaign, of the Utility of was personally ‘decorated by Gen- sary this month, the 2d is the oldest
Horse, I am convinced there is no eral Washington with the Badge of continuously serving regiment in
carrying on the W a r without them, Military Merit, today’s Purple the United States Army.

22 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 Captain Charles A. May’s orders to
his troops prior to the charge at the
Battle of Resaca de la Palma gave the
regiment its motto: “Remember
Your Regiment and Follow Your
Officers.”

The Seminole Wars

The 2d Dragoons were reacti-
vated by President Andrew Jack-
son, with congressional approval,
for the fight against the Seminoles,
with the first five companies -
recruited in New York and South was his failure to appoint William Palma, the words were spoken that
Carolina - arriving in Florida in S. Harney as commander of the give the Regiment its motto. As
December, 1836. Five additional Army of the Potomac in 1861. In Captain Charles A. May prepared
companies formed at Jefferson Bar- 1985, the new gymnasium a t Fort to charge a Mexican battery guard-
racks, MO, were put through the Leavenworth, Kansas, was named ing the Matamoros road, he issued
School of the Trooper and joined after this distinguished dragoon. the order of the day, “Remember
the rest of the unit in Florida in The Seminole war came to its Your Regiment and Follow Your
October, 1837, after riding 1,200 conclusion in October 1841, and by Officers.” With those words ring-
miles in 55 days, much of the way late the following April, the Regi- ing in their ears, May’s troopers
cross-country. ment had departed from Florida made a dashing charge, capturing
At the unit’s reactivation, Colonel with elements either enroute to or the battery along with a Mexican
David E. Twiggs was appointed the already established in the Arkansas general.
first Colonel of the Regiment. Temtory.
Twiggs was a powerfully-built and But in August 1842, the House of Action in the West
robust man, known as “Old Davey” Representatives passed a bill to cut After a brief period of occupation
or the “Bengal Tiger.” Some troops military spending, a bill that called duty, the Dragoons moved further
claimed he could “curse them right for - among other things - the west to secure new territory for an
out of their boots.” elimination of the 2d Dragoons. influx of settlers. In 1854, the 2d
But it was Lieutenant Colonel The Senate disagreed, and com- Dragoons met and defeated the
William S. Harney, Twiggs’ depu- promised by dismounting the Dra- Brule Sioux at Ash Hollow, Ne-
ty, who became the de facto com- goons and redesignating them as a braska, and forced a treaty upon
mander, as Colonel Twiggs was rifle regiment. After intense lobby- them. Colonel Harney, still the
absent frequently. It was actually ing - and a great deal of marching second Colonel of the Regiment,
Harney who set the standards and - the Regiment was able to re- became known to the Sioux as “the
forged the character of the regi- mount itself a year later. man who always kept his word.”
ment in the hot sun and sweltering In 1857, Lieutenant Colonel Phil-
marshes of Florida. The Mexican War lip St. George Cooke, the third
(Later, in 1861, General David E. In April 1846,the Mexican Army Colonel and the foremost Indian
Twiggs - by then a spry 70-year- crossed the Rio Grande. Two com- fighter of his day, led the Regiment
old, would have the distinction of panies of the 2d Dragoons, perform- on a grueling winter march to
being named by Jefferson Davis ing area reconnaissance, unwisely Utah, part of a successful cam-
the Senior General Officer in the challenged 1,600 Mexican cavalry- paign to bring dissident Mormon
Confederate Army.) men, suffering eleven dead, six factions back under federal control.
As in any guerilla war, imagina- wounded, and forty captured. This St. George Cooke shortly after-
tion and deception were necessities provided the excuse that President wards completed a new and simpli-
in Florida. Understanding this, James K. Polk had been seeking to fied version of Tactics and Regula-
Harney went so far as to dress some invade Mexico and further the ex- tions for Cavalry which served as
of his scouts as Seminoles in the pansion of the United States in the standard doctrine for Union caval-
quest for intelligence. I n 1838-39, Southwest. ry during the Civil War.
he privately purchased a total of On 8 May 1846,while performing Colonel St. George Cooke, a Vir-
100 Colt revolving carbines, and a flank guard mission for General ginian and the only cavalry regi-
issued them to picked dragoon Zachary Taylor’s army near Palo mental commander (out of five)
sharpshooters. Harney’s long ca- Alto, Texas, the Regiment was who did not side with the Confed-
reer ended in retirement in 1863 as largely responsible for the success eracy, would see his entire family
a Major General. of a counterattack which collapsed oppose his politics. As a general, he
President Lincoln later was to the enemy’s left. would soon meet his son-in-law and
write that one of his major errors The next day, at Resaca de la fellow cavalryman, J.E.B. Stuart,

May-June 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 23

 CaptainWesley Merritt of the Second
Cavalry dashing across Beverly Ford
in Virginia. 1862.

more than once in battle while his

eldest son would become the sur-
geon general of the Confederate
Army’s Medical Corps.
The Civil War Years
I n 1861, the 2d Dragoons, newly
redesignated as the Second US Cav- The Regiment was also instru- US.regulars to fight in Cuba. Im-
alry and full of Indian war vet- mental in the surrender of Chief pressed with theirtenacity and drive
erans, headed east to participate in Joseph’s Nez Perce Indians. a t San J u a n Hill, Teddy Roosevelt
the American Civil War. The Reg- During the Indian Wars, fifteen declared “The 2d Cavalrymen are
iment became part of the First more members of the 2d Dragoons everywhere. All day long you see
Cavalry Division, Army of the PO- were awarded the Medal of Honor, them. All night long you hear their
tomac, and participated in the bat- including one Sergeant - Patrick clattering hooves.”
tles at Antietam, Chancellorsville, Leonard - who became a double Journeying to the Pacific in 1905,
Gettysburg, the Wilderness, Manas- Medal of Honor winner, one of only the Regiment fought in the Philip-
sas, Spotsylvania, and Cold Har- five in the history of the award. pine Insurrection against Mor0
bor. During the Civil War, five Another, Captain Eli Huggins, tribesmen as a part of General
Medals of Honor were awarded to would later become the 12th Colonel Pershing’s command.
Second Cavalry troopers. of the Regiment. Lloyd Brett, who
With the end of the Civil War, the was awarded the Medal of Honor as Bandits on the Border
Regiment again headed west and a second lieutenant in the 2d Cav- Returning home in 1912, the 2d
was scattered over many states and alry, in 1927became theregimental Cavalry was assigned patrol duty
temtories, frequently with but a commander of the 3d Cavalry. Such on the US.-Mexican border from El
single troop occupying a post. The was the cut of man in “dirty shirt Paso to Presidio, Texas, a distance
Regiment campaigned against the blue.” of 262 miles. I n 1915, the Regiment
Cheyennes, Bannocks, Nez Perces, joined General Pershing for the
and the Sioux. Lieutenant Colonel On San Juan Hill Punitive Expedition into Mexico.
George A. Custer of the Seventh When the war with Spain broke Some remarkable riding and fight-
Cavalry was offered attachment of out in 1898,the 2d Cavalry was sta- ing by the 2d Dragoons helped put a
the “Montana” battalion of the tioned at F o r t S a m Houston, stop to the exploits of that elusive
Regiment (so named from the vari- Texas. “Always Ready,” they joined Mexican bandit general, Pancho
ous troops stationed in that terri- Theodore Roosevelt’s “Rough Rid- Villa.
tory), which he most unwisely de- ers,,’ becoming the only mounted When the United States entered
clined. The next day, Custer met his
fate on the hills above the Little Big
Horn. The Second Cavalry, after
assisting in the grisly police of the
battlefield, spent the next few years
tracking down those responsible
for Custer’s massacre, as did much
of the Repular Armv.

Medal of Honor recipient 2d LT Uoyd

M. Brett, seen driving off a Sioux
pony herd at O’Fallon’s Creek, Mon-
tana, later became regimental com-
mander of the 3d Cavalry.

24 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 WWI, the 2d Cavalry again was
called to serve with General Persh-
ing, first as his personal escort,
later performing military police du-
ties and managing remount depots.
A provisional squadron - com-
posed of Troops B, D, F, and H -
became the only American unit to
fight as horse-mounted cavalry in
that war. They were engaged in the
Allied September 1918 offensive.
After a brief period of occupation
duty in Germany, the Regiment
returned to Fort Riley, Kansas, and
served as the school training regi-
ment for the Cavalry School.
The Dawn of Mechanization
During the mid-19308, the Regi-
The Second Cavalry sewed in the Philippines in 1905.
ment experimented with armored
cars and mechanized cavalry, and
in 1936, participated in the first
joint armored and horse cavalry
maneuver held at Fort Riley, Kan-
sas. Teaming with the 1st and the
13th Regiments (Mechanized) in
1938, and with the addition of artil-
lery and light planes, the 2d Cavalry
helped to develop coordination in
the use of combined arms.
By 1942, oats and hay gave way
to gasoline, and grease and oil re-
placed saddle soap, a s horses were
exchanged for armored cars, half
tracks, and light tanks. In June
1943, the Regiment was renamed
the 2d Cavalry Group, Mechanized.
In December, it was again reor-
ganized with elements constituted
as Headquarters and Headquarters
Troop, 2d Cavalry Group, Mecha-
nized with the 2d, (now 1st Squad-
ron) and 42d (now 2d Squadron)
Troops of the Second Cavalry are seen in Koblenz Cologne, Germany, as part of the Cavalry Reconnaissance Squad-
occupation following W I . rons, Mechanized. Other elements
were assigned to several different
divisions.
The War in Europe
Landing in France in July 1944,
the Regiment soon was performing
such daring reconnaissance for Pat-
ton’s Third Army that the Germans
described them as “The Ghosts of
Patton’s Army,” since they seemed
to materialize anywhere at almost
any time.
When the 5th Panzet Army tried
to reduce the Nancy salient in Sep-
tember 1944, their attack fell short
as a result of alertreporting and the
time gained bv the 2d Cavalry’s

At Fort Riley. Kansas, in the mid-

1930s. the Second Cavalry experi-
mented with armored cars.

May-June 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 25

 Troops of the Second Cavalry parti-
cipate in the liberation of Luneville.
France, in September, 1944.

delaying action. This was the larg-

est concentration of German armor
in the west since June 1944. The
enemy’s armor losses were so ex-
tensive that the Germans were un-
able to mount another major offen-
sive until the Battle of the Bulge.
One reason that this action around
Luneville, France, remains obscure 1948, the 2d Armored Cavalry Reg-
today was that the drama of Opera- iment. Since the end of the war, the
tion Market Garden was taking Regiment has had the additional
place several hundred kilometers to mission of border surveillance, op-
the north. The ill-fated airborne erating first from the cities of Freis-
assault in Holland captured most ing and Augsburg. In 1951, the
of the press corps’ attention. Regimental Headquarters was es-
Other elements detached from tablished in Nurnberg. In 1955,the
the Regiment assisted in the relief Regiment participated in Operation
of the 10lst Airborne Division at Gyroscope, a large scale “Cohort”
Bastogne, crossed a t the Remagen exchange with the 3d Armored Cav-
Bridgehead, and even island-hopped alry Regiment from Fort Meade,
in the Pacific, fightingin the Philip- Maryland. In 1958, the Regiment
pines and on Okinawa. returned to USAREUR and the
I n Europe, the 2d Cavalry con- border where it has been stationed
tinued to advance, penetrating well ever since.
into Czechoslovakia by early May I n May 1963, the 2d Dragoons
1945. In a daring raid through Rus- became the first American unit ever
sian lines, the Regiment rescued honored by the German Bundes-
the world famous Lippizaner stal- wehr with the “Grosser Zapfen-
lions. (In 1960,Walt DisneyProduc- streich,” or “Grand Tattoo” cere-
tions made a full-length, though mony. This centuries-old ceremony Creighton W. Abrams, laterthe Chief
of Staff of the Army, was the 39th
historically flawed, motion picture has remained Nurnberg’s major Colonel of the Regiment.
of this event entitled The Miracle of military event since the end of the
the White Stallions.) I n August war and a fitting honor for the
1985, the city of Vienna and the Army’s oldest continuously serving
Austrian government formally regiment.
thanked the Regiment for its efforts
during this period.
Postwar Assignments
After the war, the Regiment was
first renamed the 2d Constabulary
Regiment, becoming finally, in

In May, 1945. troopers of the Second

Cavalry Group, Mechanized, cleared
a city of Czechoslovakiaas the Nazis
teetered o n the brink of collapse.
~ ~~

26 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 Today and Tomorrow
In recent years, the Regiment has
undergone tremendous changes in
equipment and training. The 2d
Dragoons will soon receive the M3
Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicle
to complement their M1 Abrams
main battle tanks, TACFIRE and
M109A2 howitzers, AHlS attack
helicopters, and sophisticated elec-
tronic warfare equipment. With the
addition of the Bradley, the tradi-
tional ability of cavalry to move
fast and strike hard will be greatly
enhanced. The Regiment will also
receive the HEMTT and FAASV
systems during 1986. The 2d Com-
bat Aviation Squadron (2CAS) is
The shell-pocked exterior of the Merrell Barracks, damaged in WWII, is now being
scheduled to receive the UH-60
refurbished, one of the many improvements now being carried out by the Regiment.
Blackhawk helicopter in the near
future.
A support squadron will be acti-
vated in 1986 also, and will consist
of a headquarters and headquarters
troop, a materiel management cen-
ter, a maintenance troop, a medical
troop, and a supply and transporta-
tion troop. With the addition of its
support squadron, the Regiment
will become a self-contained, self-
sufficient, fighting force consisting
of three armored cavalry squad-
rons (each with a tank company
and a howitzer battery), one com-
bat aviation squadron, one com-
mand and control squadron (head-
quarters and headquarters troop,
combat engineer company, chem-
ical company, and CEWI compa-
ny), and one support squadron. The
Regiment will then total nearly
5,000 soldiers and will possess the
firepower of half a heavy division.
An M 1 maneuvers in a field near the border, but maneuver damage constraints
prevent full tactical employment.
Regimental headquarters is lo-
cated in the historic city of Nurn-
berg, at Merrell Barracks. With the
exception of the 84th Engineer Com-
pany, located in Bayreuth, all of the
command and control squadron
units and the soon-to-be-formed
support squadron are also located
at this Kaserne. The 2d Combat
Aviation Squadron is located a t
Feucht Army Airfield in a suburb of
Nurnberg. The First Squadron is
located at Christensen Barracks,
on a high bluff overlooking the city
of Bayreuth. Second Squadron
shares the military community of
Bamberg with the 3d Brigade, 1st

Two of the 2d ACR's M l s rumble

through a village in Germany.

May-June 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 27

 CAMP PITMAN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
1/1stCav, lstAD
Regimental HQ NUERNBERG AMBERG.
Command and Control Squadron
FEUCHT 3d squadron CAMP RE&
2d Combat Aviation Squadron 3d Squadron

WEST GERMANY
MUNICH

Armored Division, and other non- erations from five “Border Camps” capes per year in the Regiment’s
divisional units at Warner Barracks with sectors tracing along 651 kilo- sector.
11. Third Squadron is the furthest meters of the East German and Reports are sent from border pa-
south at Pond Baracks in Amberg. Czech border. trols up through troop and squad-
The border, at first glance, is ron operation centers to the Regi-
On “Freedom’s Frontier” deceivingly serene and peaceful. mental Operations Center in Nurn-
I n addition to home station gun- Closer examination, however, re- berg. The border surveillance mis-
nery programs, qualification, live- veals a system of fences, mine- sion also ties the Regiment to our
fire exercises, and tactical maneu- fields, guard towers, and booby NATO Allies. Both the German
ver exercises common to any armor traps all located systematically to Federal Border and Customs Police
or armored cavalry unit, the Regi- prevent anyone from leaving the also conduct daily, and sometimes
ment is also charged with the con- Eastern zone. The deadly efficiency joint, patrols and exchange intelli-
tinuous surveillance of “Freedom’s of the border fortification is reflect- gence information with the Regi-
Frontier.” ed by the fact that there are gen- ment, as do the Bavarian Border
The Regiment controls border op- erally fewer than 25 successful es- Police.

28 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 Map a t left shows location of the 2d
ACR’s subunits. A t right, a trooper
t
and an officer of the Federal Border
Police conduct a joint patrol along
“Freedom’s Frontier.”
Below, left, a view of Czechoslovakia
is a common sight for 2d ACR troop-
ers sewing along the border. Below,
East German border guards can be
seen photographing activities of a
patrol near Blankenstein, Germany, a
small, divided city in the Hof sector.

Continuous border surveillance,

rigorous combat training, active
force modernization, and a strong Footnotes
concern for quality-of-life issues IS.E. Whitman. The Troopers:Anlnformal MAJOR CHRISTOPHER P.
represent the focus of today’s 2d History ofthe Plains Cavalry. 1865-1890,pp. THOMPSON, now assigned
Armored Cavalry Regiment. Duty 10-11.
1962.
Hasting House Publishers, New York,
to the 1st Brigade, 3d Ar-
in the 2d Dragoons is fast-paced, *Gregory J. W. Urwin, The United States mored Division, FRG, was
exciting, and realistic. Cavalry, Annluntrated History, p. 13. Bland- the RS-5/PAO of t h e 2 d
The 2d Armored Cavalry Regi- ford Press, Poole, Dorset, England, 1983. ACR. A 1972 graduate of In-
3Arrny Lineage Series. pp. 34.5-346. U.S. diana University, Blooming-
ment has written a full and event- Army Center for Military History, Washing-
ful history in the past 150 years. ton,D.C. ton, Indiana, he has served in
command and staff assign-
From the swamps of Florida to the ‘The United States Cavalry, op cit., p. 29.
ments in armor and cavalry
plains of Central Europe, the Reg- 5A.G. Brackett, History of the US.Caval-
units in CONUS, Korea, and
iment has been and will continue to ry,‘MG
p. 23. Greenwood Press, New York, 1968.
John K.Herr (USA, Ret.), Story of the the FRG, and with Infantry
be “Always Ready” - “Toujours US.Cavalry, 1775-1942,p. 29, Little, Brown units in the RVN.
Pret.” & Company, Boston, MA, 1953.
SERGEANT FIRST CLASS
KENNETH E. MORRISON,
a German linguist, is RS-5/
PA0 NCOIC of 2d ACR. A
cavalry scout, he has previ-
ously served in a variety of
armor and instructor assign-
ments and possesses an as-
sociate’s degree. SFC Mor-
rison is an avid historian and
has done extensive research
into cavalry equipment, or-
ganization, and tactics used
during the Civil War period,
and has been a frequent par-
ticipant in Civil War reenact-
ments throughout the south-
east United States as com-
mander of the 51 st Alabama
Cavalry (Partisan Rangers)
(Reactivated).

May-June 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 29

Current Tracked-Width. Tank-MountedMine-ClearingRollerevolvedafter a long period of experimentation beginning in WWII.

Minerollers:
Mobility For the Armor Task Force
by First Lieutenant (P) Randall L. Grant
An apparent contradiction exists These mines are spaced 4 to 5.5 particularly noteworthy in North
between U S . Army offensive doc- meters apart, and typical AT mine- Africa and Italy, accounting for a
trine and Threat defensive employ- fields have densities of 750-1,000 large percentage of British and
ment of mines. AirLand Battle, the mines per kilometer of front.2 Mine- American tank losses. In fact, the
current U S . Army operational con- fields are planned throughout the Germans laid more mines (500,000)
cept, stresses continuously seizing depth of the Threat defense and are a t their El Alamein positions prior
and maintaining the initiative by most often covered by fire. Although to the battle than the Russians did
attacking the enemy to the depth of the major purpose of minefields is (400,000) at their positions prior to
his defenses; indeed, this is the very to stop or slow a n attacking enemy the great battles of Kursk and Orel.5
hallmark which distinguishes Air- force, Threat doctrine has further While the employment of these
Land Battle from its predecessor, designated that minefields func- mines did not win the battle for the
Active Defense. This new doctrine. tion to “strip away the [enemy] Axis, they did reduce British bat-
repeatedly emphasizes rapid ma- infantry’s supporting armor.”3 tlefield and tactical mobility “to
peuver and fast-paced operations How, then, will attacking U S . ar- the point of near-containment”6
which will prevent the enemy from mored forces overcome these exten- and induced caution into future ad-
taking effective countermeasures sive Threat minefields? vances. The Allies developed a wide
(i.e. massing forces to blunt the variety of countermine equipment
attack). “Speed has always been M i n e W a r f a r e in WW I1 throughout the war; one of these
important, but it will be even more American forces faced a similar was the tank-mounted mine-clear-
important on t h e next battle- impasse during WW 11. The Ger- ing roller.
field...”’ man Army, one of the leaders in the The first American-built mine-
Threat forces, however, are not pre-war development of mine war- roller system was the T-1 Roller.
unprepared for such eventualities. fare devices and techniques, made Developed in 1942 from a similar
The Soviet Army stresses the ex- extensive use of mines, which they French d e ~ i g nthe
, ~ device consist-
tensive use of mines in the defense, considered “a most effective defen- ed of three sets of five articulating
particularly antitank (AT) mines. sive weapon.”4 Their efforts were steel discs. One set was pushed in

30 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

front of each track and the other set
trailed behind the tank. The T-1
was approximately 50 percent effec-
tive against mines buried up to
three inches deep. Its main short-
comings, however, were its speed
(1%miles per hour) and lack of
maneuverability, and the device
was thus never mass-produced.8
The next version of the T-1family
of minerollers, the T l E l Mine Ex-
ploder (nicknamed “Earthworm”),
eliminated many of the deficiencies
of the T-1. Manufactured in late
1943, this system was mounted on
a n M32-model Tank Recovery Ve-
hicle and consisted of three sets of
six solid armor-plate discs, with
one set in front of each track and The 1942-era T-1 mineroller also included a trailing section.
the third set centered between and
forward of the other two sets. As
was the case with many of the T-1
series of minerollers (TlE1, TlE2,
TlE3, TlE5),the disc assemblies in
front of the tracks were connected
to the sprockets on each side of the
tank. .The third set was connected
to the tank recovery vehicle by a
yoke, the movement of which was
controlled by the boom and hoist
cable of the vehicle; this greatly
improved the ability of the system
to negotiate rough terrain. The discs
were practically indestructable,
and testing of the system went so
well that 75 modified T l E l Mine
Exploders were sent to the Euro-
pean Theater of operation^.^
The only other member of the T-1
family to see action during WW I1
was the T1E3 (nicknamed “Aunt
Jemima”). Propelled by a n M4 The T1 E l mineroller set, used in W I I , was mounted on the M32 Recovery
(Sherman) tank, this system con- Vehicle. The boom attachment greatly improved performance on rough
sisted of two sets of five discs -one terrain, despite weight of armor discs.
set in front of each track. Each disc The T l E 3 . below, another WWll design, had very large roller discs, but
was eight feet in diameter, and the powered drive increased mobility.
entire system weighed 29 tons. Un-
like the earlier T-1 model rollers,
the T1E3 would only clear a n area
2.8 feet wide in front of each track.
Another major difference was that
each set of discs was driven by a
mechanism attached to the final
drive shaft of the tank; this ar-
rangement greatly improved the
mobility of the mineroller. Aber-
deen Proving Ground personnel re-
ported highly satisfactory test per-
formance of the device and, in 1944,
100 of the minerollers were pur-
chased and sent to Europe.10
Postwar Research B-

The end of the war saw the end of

the T-1 series of mine-exploding

May-June 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 31

 rollers. The remaining minerollers
.in this category were never accepted
into the US. Army inventory, the
T1E8 being the only exception. Al-
though in some cases substandard
performance played a part in this,
the main reason for abandoning
the T-1 series program was the de-
velopment of the M46 (Pershing)
medium tank.” The M46 was wider
than the M4 tank which had pro-
pelled the T-1 family of rollers, and
thus required a wider roller device.
In order to satisfy this new require-
ment, the T l E 8 mineroller w a s
developed.
The T1E8 Heavy, Tank-Mounted,
Mine-Clearing Roller - later nick-
named “High Herman” -consisted The T1 E8 was developed for the wider M46 “Pershing” tanks.
of a five-ton boom attached to the
front of a n M46 tank and a 31-ton gun on a n improved model: the against mines buried up to eight
exploder assembly. The exploder Light, Mine-Clearing Roller, nick- inches’s; excellent maneuverabili-
assembly - a frame containing 25 named “Larruping Lou.” Model I ty in turns and over rough and
individually-articulating armor- weighed 21 tons and consisted of varied terrain; and able to obtain
steel discs - was towed in front of two sets of eight discs, with each set speeds up to 26.4 miles per hour.17
the tank by the boom. The device clearing an area of 1%-trackwidth. The Larruping Lou remained the
cleared a 15-footpath in front of the Each disc was able to articulate standard against which other mine-
tank, and it could be jettisoned plus or minus 20 inches and the rollers were tested for almost 20
from the tank in a n emergency by entire assembly could move ver- years, but it was never procured in
use of explosive cartridges.’* Per- tically plus or minus one foot. The any great numbers.
formance testing of the device in discs were suspended from a cross- Beginning in the mid 1950s, re-
1951indicatedthatithadamjnimum arm which, in turn, was connected search began on an “expendable”
efficiency of 86 percent against t o t h e front of t h e t a n k by a mine-clearing roller (i.e. one that
pressure-activated mines and that “tongue” attachment. Weaknesses consisted of lowcost roller parts
it was impervious to blast effect. were found in the structure of the which, when destroyed by blast,
The tank could load and unload the device, however, and Model I1 was, could be easily replaced while leav-
exploder onto and from a 6O-ton therefore, developed. Model I1 had ing the nonexpendable weight trans-
trailer under its own power, and as- only six discs per set, a more re- fer mechanism undamaged). The
sembly of the unit by the crew took liable jettisoning system, and a basic designs which the U.S. Army
two hours. However, there were strengthened tongue and cross- Engineer Research and Develop-
several drawbacks to the device: arms. ment Laboratories tested in the late
visibility of the tank driver was Further tests were conducted in- 1950s were Model I, a drum-roller
severely limited; the great weight volving M46, M47, M48, and, final- assembly, and Model 11, a n articu-
of the unit (36 tons) placed a severe ly, M6O-series tanks, with extreme- lated tank road wheel assembly.
strain on track suspension, trans- ly satisfactory results: minimal Initial reports indicated completely
mission, and final drives; and, with damage to the device from blast; unsatisfactory performance by
regard to maneuverability, soft minimum 94 percent effective these devices.18 Research on tank-
soil, heavy woods, narrow roads, -
large ditches, and grades greater
than 22 percent effectively rendered
the roller u~eless.’~ In spite of this,
a few copies of the roller were sent
to Korea in early 1952 for addi-
tional testing, the results of which
were ‘‘encouraging.”l4 The En-
gineer Research and Development
Laboratories personnel recommend-
ed in Report 1231, dated 13 May
1952,that “the roller be procured on
a limited basis until a more satis-
factory device is available,” and
that “development of mine-clear-
ing rollers continue with the view
toward lightening the load on the
tank.”15
The “Larmping Lou” Era
Based on those recommenda- The mid-50s “Larruping Lou” roller was a standard for 20 years.
tions, design and testing were be-

32 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

mounted minerollers lapsed until wheels, operates indeDendentlv of sDacinrr narrower than the 72-inch
1967, when interest in them, was the other and is able to-freely foilow uncleared center lane, or those
renewed due to Viet Cong mining the contour of the terrain. The wandering out of the path cleared
activity in the Republic of Vietnam. rollers are capable of neutralizing by the roller banks. Another disad-
Despite its many shortcomings, the tilt rod and single impulse, pres- vantage is the severe degradation
Model I1 expendable mineroller sure-activated mines buried up to of cross-country speed caused by
(redesignated Model Ib) was retest- four inches deep; the dog bone and the rollers. Since minerollers would
ed and determined to be of value in chain are designed to detonate tilt be required for any attack on a
a limited war scenario. In early rod mines between the roller paths. deliberate Threat defense, this fac-
1970, several rollers were shipped Each roller bank can be released tor would seriously impact on the
to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regi- from the tank by means of a quick mobility of the armor task force.
ment Republic of Vietnam, where disconnect mechanism, operated
they performed with mixed re- either hydraulically or manually. Mineroller Limitations
s u l t ~After
. ~ ~ 1972, work on the ex- The total system weighs approxi- Two other significant factors in-
pendable mineroller ceased. As a mately ten tons and, when not fluencing mineroller effectiveness
1968 report explained: “Against mounted, is transported by a trac- are blast effect and roller path sig-
the simple pressure fuzes used by tor-trailer combination.23 Current- nature. Due to its relative light
the enemy there (i.e. in Vietnam), ly, there are seven mineroller sets weight and system configuration,
the roller is very effective, but it in Europe and one set in Korea. each roller bank is only able to
would be practically useless against Initial fielding of minerollers to explode up to four antitank mines
sophisticated European mine fuz- Korea, POMCUS stocks and war (equivalent of 22 lbs. high explo-
es.”20 reserve, will be in 4th Quarter Fis- sive) before it is considered unser-
Soviet Designs Studied cal Year 1986 (4QFY86). viceable, thereby limiting its nseful-
In 1973,the U.S. Army obtained a The track-width, tank-mounted ness as a breaching mechanism.
copy of the Soviet-made mineroller, mine-clearing roller incorporates The second factor, roller path sig-
PT-54, and began operational test- many improvements ‘overprevious nature, refers to the visible ground
ing of the roller. I n one such test of designs. Mine-clearing capability trace created by the mineroller as it
mobility and reliability, the PT-54 is, of course, the primary criterion clears a path through a minefield.
was pitted against the “Larruping by which a l l minerollers a r e Testing has shown that, unless the
Lou” and another mineroller sys- gauged. An evaluation report, pub- ground is somewhat soft, those ve-
tem developed by Southwest Re- lished in 1983, indicated that mine- hicles following the roller tank will
search Corporation. The conclu- rollers had a neutralization capa- have great difficulty in finding the
sions of the study indicated that the bility of more than 97 percent24 entrance to the cleared lane and the
performance of the PT-54 (attached against those mines which they path that the rollers create.27This
to anM6OAl tank) was far superior encountered (i.e. all mines in the would result in unnecessary casual-
to the other two rollers both in path of the roller wheels and tilt rod ties and delay for the attacking
terms of mobility (greater cross- mines contacted by the dog bone force.
country speed, slope-climbing, and and chain). The minerollers suc-
turning ability) a n d reliability cessfully cleared lanes through sim- The System Solution
(blast energy dissipation, ease of ulated minefields at a mean speed Recognizing these limitations, the
jettisoning, and maintenance).21In of 6.4 miles per hour (MPH) for the U.S. Army Armor and Engineer
1975, another version of the Soviet M60 and 7.5 MPH for the M1. Also, Board, in cooperation with other
mineroller, the KMT-5,was obtained mounting time had been greatly research and development agen-
and underwent limited testing. reduced over previous models - cies, has decided not to depend on
Using the best features of the two under 14minutes average -as well any single item of equipment, such
Russian designs, the U S . Army as faster disconnect times - con- as the mineroller. Instead, a n en-
Mobility Equipment Research and sistently less t h a n 3 minutes.25 tire countermine package, called
Development Command (MERAD- Clearly, the new mineroller will the Armor Organic Countermine
COM) developed the current Track- provide armor units with a n effec- System, will be fielded. This system
Width, Tank-Mounted Mine-Clear- tive and highly mobile counter- will consist of the following items:
ing Roller.22 mine capability. one M818 five-ton tractor; one
The new mineroller system is de- As with all items of equipment, M172A1 low-bed trailer; one each
signed for mounting on M60- and however, the new minerollers are left- and right-side roller banks;
M1-series main battle tanks. The not without their limitations. Al- three mineroller mounting kits (or
M6O-series tanks accepting the though their mine-clearing record RAKs); three Track-Width Mine
mineroller must be previously fit- is impressive, testing indicated Plows (TWMP); and one Cleared
ted with both a retrofit kit and a that a significant number of mines Lane Marking System (CLAMS).
mounting kit, while the M1 tanks - up to 40.9 percentz6 - still re- The Armor Organic Countermine
require a Roller Adapter Kit (RAK) mained i n t h e “cleared” lane. System will be fielded as a package,
onto which the minerollers attach. These mines include those pressure- beginning 2QFY88 to M1-equipped
The mine-clearing roller consists of activated devices which pass be- units and sometime thereafter to
a left side pushbeam and roller tween the two roller banks, as well M6O-equipped units. Current allo-
assembly, a right side pushbeam as any mines with more sophisti- cation is one system per t a n k
and roller assembly, and a “dog cated methods of fuzing (i.e. multi- company/armored cavalry troop
bone” and chain assembly suspend- ple impulse and magnetic). These (with tanks). In addition, the Ar-
ed between the roller banks. mines would be encountered by mor School and Ordnance School
Each roller assembly, consisting those following vehicles - such as will each receive one system for
of five articulating armored roller a n M113 - which possess track- training.

May-June1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 33

 The Track-Width Mine Plows
(”WMP) are 3%-ton systems which,
unlike thamineroller, attach direct-
ly to the front of either an M60- or
M1-series tank without modifica-
tion to thedank itself. This system
consists of left-and right-side skids
(to control depth) and moldboards
with tines (to extract and cast
mines to the side). The plow does
not have to be dismounted from the
tank after use, since it causes little
or no degradation of speed or ma-
neuverability while in the carry
position. Most significantly, the
mine plow clears allmines from the
path of the tank tracks, regardless
of type of fuzing, leaving only a 26-
inch uncleared center lane. Also,
the visible trace left by the plow is
much easier to4dentify and follow
:than that of the mineroller. For
these reasons, the TWMP, working
with the tank-mounted mineroller;
has been designated “...Armor’s Rather than being a purely doc- of equipment with a countermine
primary organic minefield breach- trinal question. This decision should capability.
ing system.”28 be made on the basis .of accurate
The Cleared Lane Marking Sys- intelligence data gained from ag- Training to Breach
tem is a device, attached to the rear gressive reconnaissance. These re- As with all other formsof tactical
of the mineroller tank, which dis- con elements should be trained*to maneuver, the key to successful
penses markers at preset intervals seek out enemy defensive obstacles countermine operations is proper
into the center of the cleared lane of and pinpoint their locations and training. As a basis for this train-
the minefield. These markers are dimensions, to include existing ing, it is essential that each com-
weighted chemiluminescent light lanes and gaps. Combat engineers, p a n y / t r o o p h a v e a n S O P for
sticks (chem-lights),which improve if available, should be attached to breaching operations, to include:
the nighttime observability of the these elements. This reconnaissance crew drills; platoon battle drills for
cleared lane. The entire system philosophy is part of Threat doc- the breach force, assault force, and
consists of a dispenser, a refill kit of trine, a n d t h e opposing force support force; the use of smoke and
150 individual markers, a mount- (OPFOR) unit at the National other obscurants; and company/
ing kit and a n operator’s control Training Center (NTC) practices troop command and control tasks.
assembly. Testing has proven the this with great suceess.31 Even more vital is that each unit
utility and value of this device.29 rehearse those techniques regular-
Employment of the armor Organ- Upon detection of the minefield, ly. Information on countermine op-
ic Countermine System will signi- the mineroller tank will move back erations is available in the follow-
ficantly improve the speed ofbreach- to a defilade position where it can ing references:
ing operations, thus allowing ar- support the breaching force by fire. The Handbook of Employment
mor units to maintain the initiative If bypass is either impossible or not Concepts for Mine Warfare Sys-
and reduce tank losses. Although desired, then the tanks equipped tems; ST 17-15-15Countermine Op-
the fundamentals of breaching op- with mine plows begin clearing a erations at Battalion Level; FM 71-
erations remain t h e same, t h e usable lane through the minefield. 1J (Draft) Tank and Mechanized
actual conduct of the breach will be The plows are followed by the mine- Infantry Company/Team; FC 17-
radically altered. Initial detection roller, which proofs the cleared 16-1Division 86 Tank-Heavy Com-
of the minefield(s) should be made lane for any remaining mines and pany/Team ARTEP; FC 17-15-1
by the mineroller tank. Due to the marks the lane with CLAMS. The Tank Platoon ARTEP Mission
loss of momentum which occurred company/team/troop then contin- Training Plan, and FM 17-15(Test)
in testing when minerollers were ues its tactical movement. Tank Platoon Division 86.
mounted only after the discovery of An expedient means of minefield In order to accomplish their mis-
a minefield, doctrine now states clearance which is already fielded sions during offensive operations,
that the preferred method of em- is the M9 tank-mounted bulldozer, US.Army armor units require a n
ployment is for rollers to be con- currently issued one per tank com- effective, highly mobile counter-
nected to the t a n k prior to the pany. The dozer blade can scrape a mine capability. Once deployed,
attack.30 Because the roller has a path 160 inches wide, and use of it the Armor Organic Countermine
certain degrading effect on the in a mine-clearing role was actually System will provide those units
cross-country mobility of the tank tested in 1982 and determined 57.9 with the ability to successfully at-
(and, hence, the unit), battalion percent effective against surface- tack a deliberate Threat defense.
task force commanders will have to laid mines.32While the results are There again - as it was in WW I1
decide whether mounting of the far from desirable, the tank-mount- -in the forefront of that attack will
rollers will be a worthwhile option. ed bulldozer represents another item be a tank-mounted mineroller.

34 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 A “Larruping Lou” roller is
seen a t left, mounted.on an
M48-series tank. At right,
the test vehicle strikes a
mine in demonstration.

Footnotes gineer Research and Development Labora- December 1983), p. 1-15.

tories, Report 1869, Mineclearing Roller 30Department of the Army, U.S. Army Ar-
1Department of the Army, Field Manual Adapter for the M60 Medium Tank, by Henry mor School, Special Text ( S T ) 17-15-15.
No. 100-5: Operations, (Washington, D.C.: R. Atkinson, (September 1966). pp. 15.20-21. Countermine Operations at Battalion Level,
Government Printing Office, August 1982),p. IsDepartment of the Army, U.S. Army En- (September 1982), p. 4-11.
2-9. gineer Research and Development Labora- 31SFC(P) Richard Wagner, “Lessons from
ZDepartment of the Army, Field Manual tories, Technical Report 1632-TR,Design and the OPFOR.” ARMOR, May-June 1983, p. 35.
No. 100-2-1:The Soviet Army, Operations and Test ofRoller, Mineclearing, Expendable, (13 32USAAEB. Phase Z, Total Countermine
Tactics, (Washington, D.C.: Government May 1960), pp. vii-viii. System, p. 2-11.
Printing Office, July 1 9 8 4 p. 14-4. IgDepartment of the Army, U.S.b y MO-
31bid., p. 6-3. bility Equipment Research and Development
‘Engineer Agency for Resources Inven- Center, Report 2020, Expendable Mine-Clear-
tones, Landmine and Countermine Warfare, ing Roller, by David C. Edwards, (January
Western Europe, World War ZZ, by Robert E. 1972). pp, 70-73.
Gender, (June 1973), p. 177. ZODepmtment of the Army, Army Materiel
5U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military Command, Technical Information Report
History, Army Historical Series, Stalingrad 33.9.1.3, Expendable Tank-Mounted Mine-
to Berlin: T h e German Defeat in the East, clearing Roller, Model Zb, Interim Report,
(Washington, 1968). pp. 133-135. (December 1968), p. 1.
6Ballistic Research Laboratories, Report 21Chrysler Corporation, Defense Division,
No. 1582: Mine and Countermine Warfare in Defense Engineering, A Mobility and Relia-
Recent History, 1914-1970, by Russel H. Stol- bility Effects Study o f Mine-Clearing Rollers
fi, (Aberdeen Proving Ground, April 1973, p. on the M728 and M60 Vehicles, Final Tech-
50. nical Report, by L.P. Wolken, E.G. Hoefle.
‘EARI, L a n d u i n e and Countermine War- and L.J. Goppold, (November 1973), pp. 81-83.
fare, p. 315. 2ZDepartment of the Army, U S . Army Ar-
EDepartment of the Army, U.S.Army Mo- mor and Engineer Board; Tank-Mounted.
bility Equipment Research and Development Mine-Clearing Roller, Operational Test ZZ,
Center, Report 1924, Historical Excerpts o f Final Report, by MAJ Cedrie Fedde and CPT
Mine Warfare Research and Development, Edward M. Burns, (3 February 1978), p. 1-1.
1942-1959,by H.C. Smith, (March 1968), p. 50. 23Department of the Army, Headquarters, FIRST L I E U T E N A N T (P)
SEARI, Landmine and Courttermme War- TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity, RANDALL L. GRANT was
fare, pp. 315-316; USAMERADC, Report TCATA Test Report OT 671, Track-Width, commissioned in armor from
1924, pp. 51-52. Tank-Mounted Mine-Clearing Roller, Final the University of Iowa in
’OIbid.; Ibid, pp. 54-55. Report, (March 1980), pp. 10,12.
24Department of the Army, U.S. Army Ar- 1982 with a BA in German.
l’USAMERADC, Report 1924; p. 58.
12Department of the Army, Continental mor and Engineer Board, Concept Evalua- He i s a graduate of AOBC,
Army Command, Board Number 2, Report o f tion (Phase Z) of Total Countermine System, Airborne School, NBC
Project Number 1702, Test of Roller, HIGH Final Report, by MAJ William B. Rynearson, School, Motor Officer Course,
HERMAN, (24 February 1955), pp. 1-2. (15 February 1983), p. 2-27. and the Engineer Officer Ad-
‘3Department of the Army, Engineer Re- ZbIbid., pp. 2-15 - 2-17. vancedcourse. He has served
search and Development Laboratories, Ob- ZeIbid., p. 2-11. as a tank platoon leader and
stacles and Demolitions Branch, Report 1231: 27TCATA, Report OT 671, pp. 30-31.
tank company XO in 1- 33
Engineenng Tests and Evaluation o f Heauy, 28Department of the Army, U.S. Army. En-
gineer Center and School, The Handbook o f Armor, 3d Armored Division.
Tank-Mounted,Mine-Clearing Roller, “High
Herman”, by Robert N . Hendry, (13 May Employment Concepts for Mine WarfareSys- Currently, he is a platoon
1952), p. 7. tems, (May 1985), p. IV.6. trainer for the Engineer Of-
14CAC, Board No. 2, Project Number 1702, 29Department of the Army, U S . Army Ar- ficer Basic Course at Fort
p. 2. mor and Engineer Board, Concept E u a l w - Belvoir, Virginia.
ISERDL, Report 1231, p. 11. tion (Phase ZZ) of Total Countermine System,
WSAMERADC, Report 1924, pp. 62-64. Final Report, by M A J Michael B. Hunter,
17Department of the Army, U.S. Army En- CPT David H. Eby, and Mr. Roger Mielec, (9

May-June 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 35

 “SSG Zanol bent down at the emerge f r o m t h e impenetrable and electro-optical fire control sys-
commander’s thermal sight to smokescreen some 2,500 meters tems currently deployed by Western
.watch the Soviet reconnaissance away. armies. Soviet tactical doctrine has
troops working along the distant “Gunner, Sabot, Tank!“ “Identi- been modified to take full advan-
woodline. What were they doing? fied, .lasing.” “9995.’’ “‘Re-lase!”, tage of this fact. Their forces are
He was soon distracted by the “9995!” “Great! The laser range- well-equipped with smoke produc-
whine o f distant turbine engines as finder is bouncing o f f the smoke! ing devices, to include smoke gre-
four Sukhoi jets swooped low over Manually index the range into the nades, vehicle engine exhaust
Soviet lines to lay a long, dense fire control computer.”At this time, smoke systems (VEESS), smoke
white cloud. Traversing the turret artillery HE and smoke began fall- barrels, drums, a n d pots, spray
slowly, he focused the sight on the ing directly onto SSG Zanol’s posi- smoke generators, mortar and artil-
smokescreen. To his surprise, the tion. The radio was rendered use- lery smoke rounds, fog oil genera-
TTS could not “see” through the less by jamming, and obscuration tors, and aircraft-delivered smoke
obscuration. Artillery began to prevented anyone from spotting the systems. Such a n investment in
drop along the ridgeline where he Green Star cluster used to signal non-lethal munitions is more ap-
was situated. Frenzied efforts to movement to the next battle posi- parent when Soviet tacticians cal-
don protective mask, gloves,zip up tion. The unattrited Soviet regi- .culate a “blinded” NATO force be-
the MOPP suit, and connect the ment overran the company team comes 10 times less effective in the
mask intercom system, interrupted and continued on to their next ob- defense. Thus, Soviet tanks are
his view of the unfolding battle. jective. able to traverse kill zones with far
When he resumed his scanning, NATO, and particularly the Unit- fewer losses. Western combat de-
he was surprised to note that the ed States, has eagerly embraced velopers have found that target ac-
Soviet reconnaissance troops had the notion that high technology fire quisition through a smoke screen is
been emplacing smoke pots, for a control and acquisition will offset reduced by up to a factor of four and
thick cloud of gray smoke waspour- any enemy superiority in numbers. offensive casualties are twenty-five
ing f r o m the trees and drifting The Soviets, in countering this percent less.
across the engagement area. This wide-range of lethal NATO anti- Several types of smoke are used,
smoke also was opaque to thermal armor systems, have come up with based on probable courses of em-
viewers! The artillery fire was in- a low technology, cost effective, ployment. Smoke can either screen
creasing in tempo when smoke answer through extensive employ- friendly movements, blind enemy
rounds started impacting 1,000 ment of battlefield smoke. positions, or be used in tactical
meters forward o f friendly posi- Soviet planners have realized that deception operations. Screening
tions. Being white phosphorus, the dust, smoke, and obscurants de- smokes are usually generated by
thermal sights could see through it. grade - and often defeat - laser ground or aerial systems and are
Enemy tanks and BMPs began to designators, beam-riding missiles, bi-spectral in nature. This type of
~~

36 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 At left, the OPFOR at the National
Training Center lays down a smoke-
screen to obscure its vehicles until
reachingengagement range. At right.
a new type of infrared screening
smoke is tested at a NATO exercise
area.

smoke obscures the visible through

far-IR spectrum, which defeats ther-
mal viewers.
The purpose of blinding smoke-
screens is to reduce efficiency of
enemy gunners, target acquisition
systems, designation devices, and
observation posts, which restricts
the enemy’s ability to engage So-
viet units. The obscuration proper-
ties of this type of smoke, coupled
with dust, HE combustion effects,
and burning phosphorus, create a n
environment in which fear and con- from the obscured area..The HINDS cises to “familiarize” their soldiers
fusion become additional factors. may also use the smoke to overfly with it; conducting force-on-force,
The Soviets will use an S4 mixture blinded friendly ADA systems and MILES exercises while operating
(aerial-delivered) and white phos- attack high-value targets in the under obscured conditions, degrad-
phorus delivered by artillery, mor- battaliodbrigade rear. ed systems gunnery; and by devis-
tars, or rocket launchers. Soviet smoke thus has a twofold ing smoke “battle drills” (Le. train-
A combination of screening and purpose, the first being to reduce or ing as we will fight).
blinding smokescreens are used by negate long-range attrition and, The most efficiently developed
Soviet deception units in order to second, as a control measure. Each smoke screens are ineffective if em-
produce false assumptions by ene- smoke “phase line” marks a tac- ployment and weather considera-
my planners, cause them to move tical transition point, from march tions are not heeded. Warning cate-
units or to reveal their positions by column to assault formation, a gories for enemy smoke are estab-
opening fire, and generally creat- 1,000-meter marker at which the lished (in much the same manner
ing a more favorable tactical at- tempo of advance is increased, and as MOPP levels) and specifically
mosphere for Soviet forces. the last barrage which marks the addressed in the operations order.
The typical Soviet regimental- objective. The engagement will Close coordination is maintained
level deliberate attack will begin then turn into a violent, short- with weather or aviation units in
with artillery preparatory fires. range encounter in which the at- order to obtain a n accurate fore-
Successive smoke lines will be em- tackers’ mass and momentum will cast. Optimal conditions for Soviet
placed using smoke pots, aerial- prevail. smoke use are:
delivered smoke, VEESS, smoke In the defense, the Soviets use 0 Winds 3 to 5-meters per second
generators, or projected smoke. Ini- smoke to disrupt overwatch ele- in direction of NATO forces.
tially, a screen will be laid to con- ments and to silhouette attacking 0 Air and ground temperatures
ceal the approach of assault co- forces. They also try to use smoke in the same.
lumns. A bi-spectral cloud is pro- screening reference points, with- 0 Overcast skies.
jected closer to the enemy so Soviet drawals, conceal movement of re- No precipitation.
units can deploy unobserved from serve forces, and to portray decep- 0 Relatively high humidity.
march into assault formation. A tion activities such as a dummy Remember that these are the best
third “phase line” consisting of ar- flank attack. conditions for employing smoke.
tillery smoke is delivered within Armor trainers must become Intelligence acquisition systems
1,000 meters of suspected enemy aware of the tactical and techno- t h a t pinpoint smoke generating
positions to deny long-range fires logical effects Soviet smoke will equipment being moved closer to
and observation. A final blinding have on their conduct of the fight. the front, may prove more accurate
barrage is fired atop enemy units, Ultimately, they must train their in forecasting the use of enemy
allowing Soviet forces to overrun soldiers to overcome the difficulties smoke.
the objective without being sub- associated with Soviet smoke em- Training in a smoke environ-
jected to massed aimed fires. ployment on the AirLand battle- ment can be accomplished in local
HIND helicopters may hover on field. This can be done by teaching training areas as well as during
the smoke’s periphery, enabling them to recognize the optimal con- field training exercises. Additional
them t o obtain flanking fires ditions for smoke employment by smoke munitions, to include smoke
against NATO forces withdrawing using heavy smoke in selected exer- pots and smoke grenades, must be

May-June 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 31

 and calls in final protective fires as
friendly platoons move out of the
smoke. At the conclusion of the
FTX, effective countermeasures are
examined and included in the bat-
tle drill.
GSR becomes a definite asset in
the bi-spectral smoke environment.
It can spot enemy concentrations
and assist the commander in pre-
dicting threat avenues of approach.
Indirect fires are placed on that
area to slow movement and impede
enemy engineers trying to remove
obstacles. The GSR is mounted on
a n M113 for survivability and mo-
bility. It is positioned where side
lobes will be absorbed by trees or
hills and then “blinks” into the
smoke screen. Once the enemy is
detected, or after a specified time i n
one location, the GSR moves to
alternate location to minimize de-
tection by Soviet EW systems. Coor-
dination with divisional MI units
forecasted in advance by the bat- tions and limited availability of will lead to effective multi-echelon
talion S3. Training is accomplished smoke munitions. training during force-on-forceexer-
in consonance with the crawl - These skills are imbued in our cises.
walk -run philosophy. Individuals tankers until company-level profi- An appreciation for the Soviet
and crews are taken to a flat area ciency tasks can be run. These are tactical employment of smoke also
with few obstacles in order to learn difficult to orchestrate because should rest at echelons above com-
the effects of smoke on movement they will require chemical com- pany/team. Smoke directly or indi-
and navigation. This training period pany support and tend to obscure rectly affects where and how en-
is also used to teach techniques of large areas. Safety considerations gineers emplace obstacles. Even
moving while using a compass for are many and difficult to control. limited countermobility obstacles
direction. Safety and familiariza- The exercise itself should evolve such as short AT ditches construct-
tion are paramount issues during around conducting a company de- ed perpendicular to the enemy ad-
this phase. These individual tasks fensive scenario, testing engage- vance are useful. Enemy tanks en-
can be expanded to include obser- ment techniques (through live fire counter these unexpectedly and are
vation post drills, masking criteria or against MILES-equipped SAAA hindered. Bypasses constructed by
(Soviets employ smoke loaded with Targets), displacing from a smoked enemy engineers are less effective
toxic agents.), and determining the area (with and without use of radio due to limited visibility. Soviet
approach of tanks by sound. as a control medium), using the tanks and BMPs have trouble lo-
The next phase consists of train- forward observer in a smoke en- cating the breach and may offer
ing in unit tactics under obscured vironment, and employing ground lucrative targets. If heavy use of bi-
conditions. During this phase, pla- surveillance radar (GSR) at com- spectral smoke (TTSdefeating) is
toons train on how to move into and pany level to detect enemy forces predicted against initial defenses,
out of smoke-hidden positions. Sol- moving behind bi-spectral smoke. the obstacles plan is weighted to
diers are taught to mark limited A “Smoke Battle Drill” should be support movement to aid defense of
visibility routes, make range cards developed a t platoon level and fully subsequent battle positions. Friend-
while masked, disengagement se- refined during company operations. ly forces move behind the second
quences for platoon retrogrades, It contains instructions for com- line of obstacles when they dis-
calling final protective fires, etc. pany/team actions when the battle cover that they cannot effectively
‘ Once basic platoon drills are ab- position itself is effectively obscured engage the enemy; the smoke and
sorbed, a MILES, force-on-force and jamming prevents the com- initial barrier efforts slow the So-
maneuver phase is implemented. mander from contacting his pla- viet advance to allow for this.
Tactics (to include firing on range toon leaders. Army aviation units in support of
card targets, station-keeping while If bi-spectral smoke is used, head- a ground maneuver brigade face
advancing, navigation, disengage- quarters tank section, lst, 3d, and operational constraints when the
ment criteria based on slower move- 2d platoon, respectively, fire 5 enemy uses obscurants. The smoke-
ment rates, and degraded gunnery rounds HEAT at TRPs X,Y, Z using screen itself may be up to 400 feet
are emphasized. This type of exer- range card data and move to the high. Should aviators assume in-
cise takes place in a small (1 km closest unobscured battle position strument flight characteristics and
wide x 2 km long), well-defined (BP). The company XO initially ascend from nap-of-the-earth and
maneuver box for safety considera- occupies the subsequent positions very low-level contour flight pro-

38 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

files, they would offer a lucrative tion and guidance. Enemy smoke a factor of ten or greater. In this
target to Soviet AD gunners. At- will have a detrimental effect on instance, battle drill can be ap-
tack helicopters currently lack ther- these systems and the overall de- plied. Integrated with pre-planned
mal sights; thus, acquisition and fensive scheme. Care must be taken obstacles, artillery fires, and GSR
engagement is severely degraded in placing AD weapons so they will input, platoons/sections engage
by smoke. They use their inherent not be obscured and can engage avenues of approach with range
mobility to find a n area through enemy helicopters taking advan- card data and sequenced HEAT
which they can observe targets. tage of smoke to transit the FLOT volleys. These complement the vio-
Coordination with the aviation unscathed. lence of artillery fires and do not
company commander to support a The use of smoke by opposing concede the long-range initiative to
smoke countermeasure plan would forces has a technical impact on the enemy. At the conclusion of
quickly displace aviation units armored units as well. Individual these platoon fires, the commander
along the flank of any obscured gunnery skills and crew drills must decides if movement to subsequent
area. In this manner, they can react be taken into account when train- BPs is warranted, or if circum-
to enemy attack helicopters and ing to overcome the difficulties im- stances support defending at pres-
fire upon Soviet tanks emerging posed by obscurants. A gunner must ent positions. This decision is com-
from and silhouetted by the smoke. be prepared to compensate auto- municated to subordinates by de-
These fires will buy time for ground matically for smoke effects that lineating an “obscuration line.” If
forces to establish themselves in degrade the fire control system. aimed fires cannot be placed on “X”
subsequent BPs. Tank gunnery can be affected by point due to smoke, the platoon/sec-
Included among the combined smoke in many ways. These in- tions will volley fire and move back
arms team affected by smoke is the clude: to alternate positions.
field artillery. Laser designation Toxic effects on the crew. Eventually, technology may pro-
for guided munitions is degraded, False range readings or mul- vide an answer to Soviet smoke
and target location accuracy is se- tiple returns on the laser range- employment, or make its use more
verely limited. FO’s could require finder. hazardous than helpful to the at-
access to a thermal viewer, and this Ineffective laser rangefinders. tacker. Until then, sensible precau-
may necessitate a FIST’S tempo- Obscuration in the daylight tions, reinforced by realistic train-
rarily occupying, for example, the channel, M105D, and other electro- ing, will prepare our soldiers for the
XO’s M60A3/M1 gunner station. optical sights. threat.
In this manner the FO can observe Total obscuration of all sights. I
a smoke-shrouded battlefield and Some of these effects are ad-
transmit targets to the FIST ve- dressed by existing 17-12series de-
hicle’s digital message device graded gunnery solutions applied
(DMD) for targeting. when a portion of the “full up” fire
A more viable alternative is to control is inoperative. Others re-
train tank platoon leaders to adjust quire an innovative approach and
fire while the FIST team monitors a careful evaluation of methods
the net and sends back those fire which overcome failure of the LRF
missions that the company com- and thermal sights.
mander approves. Tank battalion One method which takes into ac-
FSOs and brigade FSCOORDs must count both systems is renewing
be able to advise the commander on tactical emphasis on the range
artillery use and become involved card. When the LRF is unable to
in the training of FIST teams in feed range data into the fire control
Smoke Battle Drill. solution, a series of pre-designated
Through retention of indirect reference points are used for man- CAPTAIN MARK J. REAR-
smoke assets (4.2” mortar smoke, ual range input. All vehicles are DON was commissioned in
etc.), we can erase or alter Soviet required to make a range card to Armor from Loyola College of
smoke “phase lines” and confuse, include laser rangefinder readings Baltimore in 1979 and is a
stall, or mislead his advance. Fi- to various landmarks along a prob- graduate of the AOBC, Air-
nally, artillery disrupts Soviet for- able armored avenue of approach. borne and Ranger courses.
mations by seeding smokescreens When faced with “9995” readings He served with 2d Armored
Division as tank platoon com-
with short duration FASCAM mu- on the LRF, the tank commander mander, scout platoon leader
nitions. This calls for decentralized announces, “Switch to manual” and company XO. He attend-
execution authority based on ob- and chooses a reference point close ed the AOAC, motor officer
scuration criteria and GSR data. to the target. The gunner identifies course, and the joint firepower
FASCAM may have the effect of the correct landmark and indexes course and was assigned to
delaying enemy movement long known range into the computer, 2d Infantry Division as battal-
enough for the smoke to clear and then engages the target. ion S3 (Air) and Bravo Com-
permit fires on a stalled, mass ar- Thermal sight obscuration occurs pany commander. He is cur-
mor array. when bi-spectral smoke is employed rently assigned as a combat
developments analyst with
Air defense weapons found at to screen the approach of Soviet the Concepts Branch, Fort
maneuver battalion/company level units. This smoke will reduce the Rucker, AL.
are dependent on optical acquisi- effectiveness of long-rqnge fires by

May-June 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 39

 The Role of Italian Armor
in the Spanish Civil War
by Pierangelo Caiti and Albert0 Pirella
Translated by Captain Edward De Lia
On 17 July 1936, the Nationalist
Rebellion, provoked by the results
of the general election held several
months earlier, spread from the port
city of Melilla to all of what was
then Spanish Morocco, thus initi-
ating the Spanish Civil War.
The Italian Fascist government,
though sympathetic to the Nation-
alist cause, did not Drovide anv
assistance until 29 Jily. On that
day, 12 S-81 trimotor aircraft left
their bases in Lombardy for Cagli-
ari, on Sardinia, and Nador, in
Spanish Morocco. Since the direct
participation of Italian troops in
the conflict was prohibited, the terparts in the operation of the ve- Borax and Sesena, including a brief
planes were unmarked and their hicles. Due to the intensification of but bloody clash against three Rus-
crews wore civilian attire. The mis- the hostilities, the platoon -mixed sian T-26B tanks, the first of 15
sion was simply to deliver the air- with mixed Spanish and Italian supplied to the Republicans by the
craft and to train Spanish military crews - was added hastily to the Soviets at Cartagena. After charg-
personnel in their operation. How- Nationalist army structure. On 12 ing the Nationalist infantry, the
ever, through the persistent efforts September, it participated in the enemy vehicles were counterat-
of General Francisco Franco -who occupation of San Sebastian, though tacked by three CV 3135s. One of
was by this time undisputed leader without seeing any action. these was hit and was subsequent-
of the Nationalists - the Italian ly overturned. A T-26B, also hit on
expedition received permission from Initial Tank Attack the right track, was forced to a halt
Rome to enroll in the Tercio de On 29 September, a n Italian but later was moved behind a near-
Extraneros - the Spanish Foreign transport ship arrived at Vigo with by wall where it continued to fire
Legion. Accordingly, it was through a complete company of 10 CV 3/35s from hull defilade. One of the
the use of this technicality that the (three of which were equipped with Italian flamethrower tanks, manned
Nationalist enjoyed Italian person- flamethrowers) manned by three by a Spanish driver and an Italian
nel and materiel support during the officers and 25 soldiers. This unit, gunner, moved up boldly to within
initial part of the conflict. augmented by the tank platoon several meters of the enemy, but it
On 5 August, the first Nationalist mentioned earlier, became the First was soon destroyed by a direct hit.
convoy from Spanish Morocco Combat Tank Company of the Thirty minutes later, one of the
reached the port of Algeciras, in Spanish National Army. Though Republican tanks was also hit and
Spain. This marked the beginning initially used only for training destroyed by Nationalist artillery,
of large-scale operations on the Spanish crews, the company - led killing the entire crew a s well.
Iberian Peninsula, which until then by Captain Oreste Fortuna - of- There was a second tank skirm-
had been the scene of only limited fered to enroll in the Tercioto assist ish on 29 October as Republican
hostilities. On the night of 6August, the Nationalists in their advance forces attempted a counterattack in
the first Italian armored vehicles, a on Madrid. The unit set out by rail the Sesena sector. Three Soviet
platoon of five CV 3/35 tanks, ac- for the Torrijos-Talavera zone, tanks were immobilized by artillery
companied by a n officer and 10 where it was joined by several artil- fire and incendiary grenades; how-
tankers, left the Italian port of La lery batteries. ever, as several CV 3135s (equipped
Spezia bound for Melilla. (CVstands The first trial by fire took place only with their 8-mm armament)
for Carro Veloce, or “fast tank”.) on 21 October, during the battle of moved forward in a n attempt to
From Melilla, they were sent to the Navalcarnero. The opposing Re- capture them, they were kept at bay
Galician port of Vigo, and made publican troops, surprised a n d by the 45-mm guns still firing from
available to the Spanish military frightened by the attacking ar- the T-26B turrets. As a result, only
commander at Valladolid. Because mored vehicles, soon retreated, one tank was captured by the end of
Italian troops were still barred though not before knocking out one the day. Additional tank skirmishes
from combat, the Italian crewmen of the tanks. On the 24th, the unit took place during the month of No-
began to train their Spanish coun- was involved in fighting around vember at Cubas, Griuon, Torre-

40 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 -.
joncillo. Torreion de Velasco. and ~

Villaverde, bui they were of little or Two tanks commonly used in the
no significance to either side. Spanish Civil War were the Russian
T-26. at left, and the Italian CV 3-
Formation of the Italian ’ 33/35. seen below.
Armored Force
By early November, a second
company of Italian tanks had been
delivered to the Nationalists. I n the
meantime, Franco secured commit-
ments for additional Italian aid in
the form of arms, materiel, and
cadres to be used in the formation consumed enormous amounts of
of mixed Spanish-Italian detach- fuel because of the difficult terrain,
ments. On 13December, the Italian and fuel supplies were often delayed
government finally agreed to send because of congestion along the
their organic units to Spain, al- supply routes.
though by now it was evident that In an attempt to slow the Italian combined attack of armor and in-
the Nationalists would not be able to advance, the Republicans placed fantry, but this was stopped by
take Madrid by the end of the year. two BT-5s along their withdrawal Republican heavy artillery and air
Later that month, a company of 26 route as part of their rear guard, but forces. By 12 March, Palacio Ybar-
Lancia 17M armored cars landed at one of these was destroyed. By 9 ra was the point of maximum pene-
Cadiz. In January, 1937, they were March, the Italians had occupied tration towards Guadalajara. It
joined by two more tank companies Brihuega, but on the same evening, was here that the pro-Republican
and several thousand Italian volun- six BT-5s set up a n ambush in the “Garibaldi” Battalion, made up of
teer troops. Thus was formed a n outlying forest. No sooner had the anti-Fascist Italian volunteers,
armored battalion of four companies Third Italian Division, supported routed the Nationalists with the
of 10 tanks each. This, together by two tank companies and the help of two BT-5s. Not far away, a t
with a second battalion and the armored car company, begun its Los Yebenes, the 4th Italian Divi-
armored car unit, formed the nu- movement at dawn the next day, sion (Littorio)relieved the 3d. On 13
cleus of the armored force for the but they fell into the trap. The March, two BT-5s again ambushed
CTV (Corpo Truppe Volontarie, or Sovie‘t tanks fired their cannon and the Italians, although they were
Italian Volunteer Corps). A third machine guns a t nearly point-blank eventually destroyed.
battalion, manned completely by range. They destroyed two tanks On 18 March, the Republicans
Spaniards, was added later. By the and inflicted many casualties. The began a counteroffensive. In prepa-
end of the war, a total of 149 CV Lancia armored car company, func- ration, they had drawn men and
3135s had been delivered to the tioning as a reconnaissance unit, materiel from other units to amass
CTV. also suffered heavy losses - at at least 60,000 troops and 60 tanks.
least three of its vehicles were cap- The Italians facing them totaled
The Guadalajara Offensive tured and used by the enemy. about 30,000men. The Republicans
On 5 February, Italian detach- On the next day, 11March, three immediately moved their tanks up
ments took p a r t i n operations flamethrower tanks rushed to assist front, placing about 40 of them in
around the city of Malaga, part of a a n infantry column that had run the Brihuega area. Well-supported
new Nationalist offensive along into a series of enemy machine gun by artillery and about 80 aircraft,
the entire front. Malaga was taken nests near Trijueque. One tank was they began their attack that after-
on the 8th, and Italian units oc- hit after having suppressed some of noon. That night, the Republicans
cupied the nearby towns of Nerja the positions, another overturned reoccupied Brihuega and forced the
and Motril. As a result of their when it rolled off the roadbed, and a Italians to fall back several kilo-
success here, the Italians overes- third was destroyed by a n antitank meters. Meanwhile, the Italian
timated the chances for a quick, round. A second lieutenant moved tanks stood idle for lack of fuel. The
decisive victory, and launched a up in his own tank in a n attempt to fighting stopped in a stalemate on
major offensive on 8 March. Two extract any survivors. Hit by a round 21 March, even though the Italians
infantry divisions, each supported from a BT-5, which severed his had advanced about 20 kilometers
by two tank companies, took the arm, he managed to bring his ve- from their original positions of 8
field to find that the terrain had hicle safely back to friendly lines March.
become a vast expanse of thick before he died. Another tank con- After reorganizing at Villasante,
sticky mud because of heavy rains ducting reconnaissance operations the Italians also participated in
that fell the night before. This con- in the direction of Torjia was also operations along the Bay of Biscay,
siderably limited the mobility of hit, but it too was brought backinto a n area stubbornly controlled by
the Italian armor. operation. Two other tanks were pro-Republican Basque forces. The
On the following day, two Italian destroyed by 45-mm rounds from Basques had established a strong
tank units advanced to a point the BT-5s. Obviously, the Italian defense around the city of Bilbao.
about 30 kilometers outside Guada- tanks with their 8-mm machine The Italians attacked on 28 April,
lajara. In various skirmishes, the guns were no match for the BT-5s beginning a long battle around the
Republicans lost nine of the 22 once they got within range. city. On 15 June, Italian tanks at-
tanks they employed. Both sides The Italians then launched a tacked the Basque defensive posi-

May-June 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 41

 I

The German Pzkw I lighttank, at left,

saw service on the Nationalist side in
the Spanish Civl War. The WWI-era
Renault FT-17, at right, was also
used by the Nationalists.

tions at a weak point that had been up, for themost part, of obsolescent
revealed by a deserter. On 19 June, Armor Limitations and poorly maintained vehicles.
they entered and occupied Bilbao, In general, Italian combat ve- There were two regiments - one a t
which had already been evacuated hicles used in the Spanish Civil Madrid and the other a t Zaragoza
by its defenders. War were handicapped by the in- - each including (on paper) a tank
feriority of their armament. They battalion made up of three tank
were no match for the heavier ene- companies. Each company, in turn,
my tanks, armed with rapid-fire 37- was comprised of five Renault FT-
An Italian Commitment mm and 45-mmweapons on rotating 179, two armed with Hotchkiss 8-
in Force turrets. There were other equip- mm machineguns and three with
The Bilbao operation was the pre- ment problems as well; for exam- 37-mm cannons. Although this
lude for another Nationalist offen- ple, the air intake systems on the would make a total of 90 tanks, only
sive on Santander and Oviedowhich tanks and armored cars were not 12 were in any kind of operating
saw the most extensive commit- equipped with appropriate filters to condition by 1936 - six per regi-
ment of Italian troops in the entire protect crewmen from the fine dust ment. At Madrid, the Republicans
conflict. It began on 14 August, so prevalent in the Spanish coun- did have six Schneider CA1 M16
spearheaded by three divisions and tryside. In a n attempt to protect tanks, each armed with a 75-mm
two tank companies. There were their faces and mouths from the howitzer and two 8-mm machine
numerous clashes against enemy dust, the Italians adapted their gas guns. There were also several ar-
armored vehicles, among them masks to serve as dust protectors, mored cars of the “Latil” or “Bil-
Trubia A ~ s ,which were built in but to little avail. bao” series as well as three Trubia
Spain at Santander. There was Italian tankers in Spain faced A ~ s ,Spanish prototypes. This
heavy attrition of men and equip- conditions radically different from brought the total number of tanks
ment, but the Italians secured the those of the Ethiopian War of 1935- in Spain at the start of the conflict
Escudo Pass on 15 August. On the 36, in which the poorly-equipped to 21, eight of which (all FT-17s)
following day, a tank company sup- Ethiopians were overwhelmed by a were in the hands of the Nation-
ported by a motorized machine gun relatively modern Italian Army. alist rebels.
platoon occupied Arija and helped The Italians found the tables turned Besides the 149 CV 3135s sup-
to isolate a Basque strongpoint a t against them in Spain, and this plied by Italy, the Germans con-
Reinosa. Reinosa was successfully was reflected in the relatively high tributed a total of 150Pzkw IAs and
captured, followed by San Pedro del level of their casualties. Even more IBs to the Nationalist cause. While
Romeral, on 19 August, San Vin- significant, however, was that the the first of these tanks were ar-
cente on the 21st, Torrelavaga on Italian General Staff failed to draw riving in September, 1936, the So-
the 23rd, Abadilla on the 24th, and any useful lessons in tank warfare viet Union and the COMINTERN
finally the port city of Santander from the Spanish experience. Ac- began supplying materiel to the
on the 25th. Towards the end of the cordingly, when Italy entered WW Republicans. First, there was a
war, Italian tank units also took I1in 1940,her armored units -still shipment of 15 T-26B Soviet tanks,
part in battles in the Aragon re- comprised mainly of CV 31358, al- followed by FT-17s from Poland, by
gion. Skirmishes around the town though they were renamed L3s - way of intermediaries. In October,
of Huesca continued until adverse would face tanks even more for- the Soviets sent 58 more T-26Bs, 40
weather conditions forced all mili- midable than the BT-5or the T-26B, BA32 armored cars, and 46 FA-ls,
tary activities in the region to halt and the results on the battlefield which were smaller than the BA32.
in October, 1937.Fighting continued were to be disastrous. The Republic of Poland, in a token
in March, 1938, with both sides show of support, followed with a
suffering heavy losses in materiel The Organization and direct shipment of six FT-17s. The
and equipment until Madrid finally Employment of Armor republicans used this group of ve-
fell to the Nationalists on 1 April When the Spanish Civil War be- hicles to form a n armored brigade
1939,the date which marks the end gan in 1936,there were few Spanish comprised of four T-26B battalions
of the Spanish Civil War. armored units, and these were made and a company of BA32s. They

42 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

entrusted the organization of their section of three BA32s to each in- ness. The Soviets finally agreed to
armored force to the Soviet General fantry division. mixed crews for political reasons,
Pavlov. Meanwhile, the first Com- In August, 1937,the Nationalists but this often caused more prob-
bat Tank Company of CV 3/35s had obtained enough tanks to reor- lems and resulted in considerable
was being organized by the Na- ganize their Pzkw Is into four com- squabbling which sometimes de-
tionalists at Caceres. This was panies, a company of captured T- graded mission accomplishment.
soon followed by a battalion of 26Bs, a n antitank company, and a Furthermore, the Republicans were
Pzkw IAs, trained by German in- transportation company. The bat- often known to move their tanks
structors and placed under the con- talion was placed under the control without any artillery preparation
trol of the “Angel” Infantry Regi- of the aforementioned Zaragoza and without the support of infan-
ment. Though initially made up of Regiment and again reorganized try. This made them vulnerable to
only two companies of three sec- into two groups of three companies enemy antitank weapons and even
tions each, with five tanks per sec- each, 15 tanks per company. Four to hand grenades or incendiary de-
tion, the battalion received a third of these units were made up of Pzkw vices. Thus, results on the battle-
complete company i n December, Is, the other two of T-26Bs. field were often disappointing,
1936. even when the Republicans held as
By the end of 1936, the Republi- Tactics and Politics much as a three-to-one vehicle ad-
cans had already surpassed the The tactical employment of ar- vantage. They were most success-
Nationalists in total number of ar- mor during the Spanish Civil War ful in those situations in which
mored vehicles, with 250 tanks and reflected, for the most part, the their more powerful, onboard weap-
armored cars and about 100 other contemporary doctrines of the na- ons gave the Republican tanks no
vehicles of various types. Early in tions providing materiel and train- chance either to close or to with-
1937, they activated a second ar- ing assistance to each side. Accord- draw - for example, when block-
mored brigade made up of four ingly, the Nationalists used a ver- ing known Republican avenues of
BA32 battalions, each comprised of sion of German “blitzkrieg” tactics approach or when conducting ar-
three companies of 10 cars each, or - at other times - a n Italian mored ambushes.
and a battalion command section method of combined arms opera- On the other hand, Nationalist
of two vehicles. Later that year, the tions integrating infantry and ar- armor and antiarmor tactics were
Soviets delivered 312 more T-26B mor. The Republicans were heavily generally more sophisticated and
and BT-5 tanks. This delivery re- influenced by the Soviet practice of effective. Armored attacks were
sulted in the activation of several massed armor attacks. It is interest- preceded by a thorough analysis of
other armored brigades, each or- ing to note that the Soviets were the enemy and the terrain. The
ganized into four battalions and notably reluctant to let Spanish Nationalists compensated for the
including both types of tanks. Sub- crews operate their vehicles. Be- smaller caliber of their tank weap-
sequently, the Republicans again cause they were unfamiliar with ons by falling back at the appro-
reorganized their armor into two the peculiarities of the Spanish ter- priate time to bring enemy tanks
large brigades and a heavy tank rain, this attitude caused them to be within range of the 17-mm guns of
regiment of BT-5s. A company of overly cautious with their tanks, the CTVs, which proved to be excel-
T-26Bswas allocated to each infan- and operations orders initially re- lent antiarmor weapons. The Breda
try brigade and a reconnaissance flected a high degree of indecisive- 35, firing its 20-mm perforation

May-June 1986 ARMOR:The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 43

 The Russian ET-5. while fairly primi-
tive by WWII-era standards, sewed
effectively on the Republican side.
mainly because of its turret and rela-
tively large gun (45-mm), which en-
abled it to fight at standoff ranges.

piece, but even this model never

really passed the prototype phase.
Finally, there was the Euzkadi light
tank, built at Bilbao in 1938 to
support the defense of the Basque
zone. About 20 of these tanks were
manufactured, but they were often
paraded through city streets to give
a psychological boosts to the de-
fenders under seige. The Euzkadi
was thevictim of constant mechani-
cal problems, which often forced its
round, also proved to be a n effective output of armored cars. Of greater crew to restart it with an outside
antitank weapon in dealing with significance were the Union Naval crank. The Spaniards dubbed it
enemy tanks armored with only 13- de Levante workshops in Valencia, “the toy tank,” and it is doubtful it
15-mm of protection. This machine where both Soviet and Spanish en- was ever used in combat.
gun, only recently fielded by the gineers and technicians came up
Italians, quickly acquired an excel- with the BA20, a n armored car with (This article originally appeared, in
lent reputation because of its suc- a chassis similar to the Soviet 3Hc Italian. in Rivista ltaliana Difesa. and is
cess a g a i n s t both ground a n d truck made from parts interchange- reprinted with permission.)
aerial targets. Its popularity was able with those on the FA1 and
such t h a t the Germans refitted BA32 cars. After Valencia suffered
several of their own Pzkw Is with a series of Nationalist and German
the Breda 35, and Franco asked the air raids, production was shifted to
Italians to manufacture a modified Elda, where at least 20 vehicles per
CV 3/35, equipped with the Breda, month were built until the end of
for the Spanish Army after the war. the war. Meanwhile, a n assembly
plant at Sabadell contributed a
Improvised Armor substantial number of BA32s, which
It is appropriate to note here the were modified from the original
m a n y initiatives taken by t h e Soviet model to meet specific re-
Spaniards -especially the Republi- quirements.
cans - to manufacture or impro-
vise their own armored vehicles. Spanish Tanks
Local militia units in Catalonia Finally, four types of tanks were
and the Basque regions were known manufactured in Spain during this
to cover almost any vehicle they period. There was the Trubia, a n
could lay their hands on with metal offshoot of the FT-17. Four proto- CAPTAIN EDWARD N. DE
plates, often bolted or soldered to- types were built, but only six tanks LIA. who translated thisarti-
gether by local blacksmiths. Al- were ever manufactured. Another clefor publication inARMOR.
though little real protection was was the Sadumi de Noya, built in was commissioned in Armor
offered by this method, it did help the Catalonian city of the same from West Point in 1979. He
is a graduate of the AOB and
give Republican sympathizers a n name during March a n d April,
AOA Courses at Fort Knox
advantage (even if only a psycho- 1937. The few that saw any action and served as a tank platoon
logical one) in their initial clashes were mainly used to tow artillery leader and staff officer in
with the Guardia Civil and the pieces. The Verdeja, built in 1938, Europe. He commanded a
Falangists. But it was only in the was apparently a good tank, but it basic training company at
larger cities, where there were rela- was never sufficiently tested on the Fort Knox and most recently
tively modem factories and work- battlefield. Only about 30 were ever was assigned to the M1 (RC)
shops, that military vehicles of any produced and little is known about New Equipment Training
significance were produced. The how they performed. The Nation- Team, Fort Knox.
Constructora Field and Vulcano alists later modified the Verdeja to
Works in Barcelona had a limited serve as a self-propelled artillery

44 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 The “Goliath”. a GermanWWll inven-
i \
tion. was controlled by a trailing ca-
ble, carried up to 125 pounds of high
I s explosives, and was intended to de-
stroy fortifications and clear mine-
fields. It was not very successful.

Military Applications of Robotics

The USAARMS Approach
by Captain Ricky Lynch and Captain Michael F. Nugent

Tomorrow’s battlefield will be a powered by batteries and controlled Remote control technology was
horrifying experience. The lethali- by a cable that trailed from a drum. not confined to ground combat. Al-
ty of the weapons in the world’s Although this device was never so developed by the Germans, the
arsenals today is unsurpassed by employed in combat, the Germans unmanned V-1 “BUZZBomb” fea-
that of any previous conflict. The used a similar unmanned tracked tured a n autopilot and the V-2
most precious commodity that exists vehicle called Goliath in WWII. rocket incorporated the basic com-
in today’s Army is the trained sol- Slightly over 5feet long and weigh- ponents of modern space vehicles,
dier. He must be protected at all ing 650 pounds, Goliath was pro- including a n inertial guidance sys-
costs. The expanding field of ro- duced in two versions, one powered tem. In England, the British called
botic technology can be used to pro- by a n electric motor and one by a attacks by these weapons the “RO-
tect him. Robotic devices can be small gasoline engine. Remotely bot Blitz.” In the United States,
used to perform specific functions controlled via 2,000 feet of wire General Electric developed the fire
in areas that would be hazardous to cable and capable of carrying 100 control system for the B-29 heavy
human operators. The very nature to 125 pounds of high explosives, it bomber, which used electronic re-
of the machine - it doesn’t tire, was developed to clear minefields mote control to swing the guns
experience fear, or become bored and destroy fortified positions. Ap- around as the gunsight was aligned
with repetitive tasks -ensures that proximately 5,000 of these vehicles on a target.
it can be used to increase efficiency were built a n d used i n Italy, WWII saw the birth of several
and effectiveness of operations. France, and Russia. They were other systems incorporating auto-
generally unsuccessful due to their matic control, including the devel-
slow (6-10 MPH) speed and easily opment of radar and its use in the
Military Uses of penetrated light armor. The Ger- high-speed aiming of antiaircraft
Remote Control mans also developed a more ad- guns, pioneering efforts in jet pro-
The idea of removing man from vanced robotic vehicle, the 4 ton B pulsion, and ultimately, the devel-
hazardous situations and of oper- IV which could deliver a heavy (800 opment of the atomic bomb.
ating weapons systems by remote pound) demolition charge to a n ob-
control is not new. Numerous mili- jective, jettison the charge and be Modern Military Robotics
tary devices have been teleoperated retracted prior to detonation. This I n more recent years, robotic
in the past. I n 1918, Mr. E. E. vehicle, controlled from a 4 watt technology has contributed to the
Wichersham of the Caterpillar transmitter, is one of the earliest design of autoloaders and stabilized
Tractor Company designed and examples of remote control or “tele- fire control systems found in the
built a remote control demolitions operation” via radio communica- combat vehicles of nearly every na-
carrier called a “land torpedo,” tion. tion. Remotely piloted vehicles
~ ~ ~ ~ ~~

May-June 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 45

 t

Above, an M114 APC robotized for

use as a noncooperative target tank.

At right, robotic mine-clearing ve-

hicle is equipped with minerollers
and line charge which deploys from
large box in turret ring area. The
vehicle also marks the cleared lane.

Artists conception, at left, shows

General Dynamics Land Systems’
concept for Advanced Ground Ve-
hicle Technology program.

(RPVs) and unmanned aerial ve- panding field. “Perception” in the rear areas, unloading pallets of
hicles (UAVs) are a reality, and the definition implies that the device bulk ammunition and breaking
feasibility of using teleoperated must be able to pick up information them down to smaller user-oriented
vehicles to emplace and breach from its environment via some packages. A robotic platform with
minefields and obstacles has been form of sensors tailored to specific a manipulator mounted on top
demonstrated. In recent years, Fort tasks. “Action” implies that the could be used to perform specific
Knox investigated the feasibility of robotic device must then be able to EOD tasks. The use of robotic de-
using the remote controlled MI14 somehow affect its environment. vices is only limited by the imagina-
armored personnel carrier as a non- The first question that one must tion of the user.
cooperative target. answer when deciding whether true The next obvious question is
It is important at this point to del- robotics has a place in the military whether or not the state-of-the-art
ineate between remote control is whether the advantage that a ofrobotictechnologysupports the pro-
technology and true robotics. Re- robotic device gives the user is desir- posed military uses of robotic de-
mote control devices do indeed re- able. As indicated above, this is vices. The answer to that is a defi-
move the man from the hazardous indeed the case. Common sense dic- nite no. Until recently, research in
environment, but man is still in- tates that a machine is more ex- the realm of robotics has focused on
volved in controlling the device pendable than a man, and if an can industrial applications. The indus-
fulltime. Robotic technology is de- be replaced by the machine, then trial robot is mounted on the ware-
signed to gradually eliminate man that should happen. The actual house floor and is programmed to
from the control loop (autonomous question that should be posed to the perform tasks in which most of the
operations). user community is “what do you operating conditions a r e well-
Robotics can be defined in a want to do with a robotic device.” known, i.e., spray paint a car or per-
number of ways, but the definition The answer to that is a myriad of form a spot weld. The military en-
of Michael Brady of MIT - “the tasks. vironment is totally different.
intelligent connection of perception A robotic combat vehicle could be For example, a robotic manipulator
to action” - contains many subtle- developed that could be used to per- mounted to a semitrailer with the
ties. The fact that the connection is form reconnaissance missions, act required tasks of unloading ammu-
“intelligent” implies that the ro- as a tank-killer, breach or emplace nition pallets faces a variety of
botic device must be able to make obstacles, perform a suicide mis- problems. When the manipulator
decisions based on available infor- sion, etc. A robotic manipulator moves, t h e flexible base upon
mation. This is called artificial in- could be used to expedite the am- which it is mounted also moves,
telligence, in itself a rapidly ex- munition processing procedure in which creates a hostile dynamic for

46 A R M O R The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 “...Common sense dictates that a machine
is more expendable than a man... .. I

the manipulator controller. Some would be capable of a certain d e the Defense Advanced Research
thing is happening which the con- gree of autonomous operation, but Projects Agency (DARPA) Autono-
troller didn’t expect. The pallets would require a human operator to mous Land Vehicle ALV Program
being manipulated may be of vary- enter the control loop to issue com- in order to provide their vehicle
ing weights, depending upon the mands or teleoperate the vehicle to with a n autonomous navigation ca-
type of ammunition and number of critical positions. The human oper- pability. The demonstrations will
rounds. This is also a n unknown ator would operate out of a com- be user-oriented and will be de-
situation. mand and control vehicle, and could sjmed to demonstrate the potential
supervise the operation of many of the military applications of ro-
The Armor Center is currently vehicles. Modules that would be botics. The demonstrations will al-
pursuing many different programs placed on the vehicle would provide so serve to highlight many critical
in the hope of making a robotic direct fire capability, reconnais- issues in the continued develop-
combat vehicle a reality. An opera- sance, obstacle breaching/emplace- ment of a robotic combat vehicle,
tional and organizational (O&O) ment, etc. Realizing the goals out- the most important being:
plan that calls for a family of ro- lined in the O&O plan and expe- The issue of the robotic combat
botic combat vehicles was drafted diting the acquisition process of a vehicle’s mobility and its inherent
a t the Armor Center and is await- robotic vehicle is the ultimate ob- autonomous navigation capabili-
i n g approval by headquarters, jective of the Armor Center’s ro- ties. The ideal robotic combat ve-
TRADOC. This O&O plan calls for botic combat vehicle program. hicle chassis would be highly mo-
a generic robotic chassis which The Armor Center is a n active bile, relatively small and light-
could carry a variety of mission participant in TACOM’s Advanced weight, and very reliable.
modules, depending on the specific Ground Vehicle Technology pro- Data-link issues, focusing on
mission. Ideally, the robotic chas- gram. This program provides for the best way to communicate tac-
sis would be capable of totally the demonstration of a military ro- tically with the robotic combat ve-
autonomous navigation, but unfor- botic vehicle in a route reconnais- hicle from the robotic command
tunately, the state-of-the-art will sance mission in the fall of 1986. center. Ideally, this data link would
not support a totally autonomous The program has two different con- be secure with a low probability of
vehicle in the immediate future. tractors, FMC and General Dy- intercept.
,4,
namics Land Systems, each devel- Soldier-machine interface is-
The O&O plan recognizes this oping their own version of the ve- sues to resolve some of the problems
shortcoming and provides for a su- hicle. Both contractors are tapping associated with remote operation of
pervised autonomous vehicle. It the technological breakthroughs of a vehicle, and
~~ ~

May-June 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 47

 The FMC t e s t vehicle in t h e Ad-
vanced Ground Vehicle Technology
program isan M113-seriespersonnel
carrier. shown here with its sensors
mounted on front slope.

CAPTAIN RlCKY LYNCH

was commissioned as a Com-
bat Engineerfrom theunited
States Military Academy in
1977. He served with the
17th Engineer Battalion 2AD
from 1977 to 1983, com-
manding both a Mobile As-
sault Bridge Company and a
Combat Engineer Company.
A graduate of the Armor Of-
ficer Advanced Course and
CAS3, he recently received
his Master of Science De-
greefrom MITwhere hecon-
centrated in the area of ro-
botics. He is currently as-
Mission module issues t h a t time provide a n estimate a s to signed as the RoboticsProject
when that type of vehicle could be Officer in the Technology
arise when focusing on specific Developments Branch of the
mission applications of the robotic fielded. Directorate of Combat De-
combat vehicle. An additional area of activity at velopments, Fort Knox, Ken-
The Armor Center is also work- the Armor Center is the establish- tucky.
ing with DARPA on administering ment of relationships with key
a contract that provides for the players in the robotic arena (govern-
conduct of a robotic combat vehicle ment, industry and academia) to
mission analysis. This analysis ensure that they are aware of the
would focus on three major areas of sincere desire of the user communi-
concern. ty to pursue military applications
Initially, it would address the is- of robotics, and to spur industry
sue of exactly what does the user interest in research to expedite the
community want to do with a ro- fielding of a truly robotic combat
botic combat vehicle? Once these vehicle. Many major contractors
missions have been identified, they are interested in developing robotic
would be placed in a n order of pri- devices for the military, but they
ority based on which missions are must be assured that a n interest
deemed the most essential. The mis- exists within the military to use the
sions statements would then be devices.
broken down into specific subtasks Specific applications of robotic
to provide the researcher all the technology do exist in the military, CAPTAIN MIKE NUGENT
parameters of the problem to en- but technological advances must was commissioned in Armor
able him to address specific problem be “pulled” to make this a reality. from Indiana University of
areas. Research and development efforts Pennsylvania i n 1980. He
The second issue to be addressed must be properly focused on a has served as a tank and
would be, what degree of autonomy specific goal - building a robotic scout platoon leader, com-
does the user desire for each mis- combat vehicle that will increase pany XO, and S-3 Air in the
3dArmored Division. Agrad-
sion? Contrary to popular belief, the US. Army’s combat effective- uateof the Armor OfficerAd-
the user does not always want total ness on tomorrow’s battlefield vanced Course, he iscurrent-
autonomy in every instance. while at the same time protecting ly assigned as a project of-
The third issue would take the the soldier, the most precious com- ficer in the Technology De-
first two issues into consideration modity we have, from dangerous velopments Branch of the Di-
and would determine cost figures situations. Aggressive pursuit of rectorate of Combat Develop-
for a vehicle that would provide technological advances is the key ments, Fort Knox, Kentucky.
those caDabilities and at the same to success.

48 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 Tactical Operations Center Site Selection
On today’s modem battlefield, with its extensive erected among farm buildings, their survivability in-
electronic signatures and lethal weapons systems, no creases dramatically.
issue is more critical than the selection of the site for a 0 The barn prevents detection by IR or thermal
unit’s command and control cell, the tactical opera- imagery since the local surroundings give off the same
tions center (TOC). The Soviets’ sophisticated elec- signatures. The enemy will be unable to tell military
tronic detection equipment, coupled with their ex- from civilian sources.
tensive artillery capability, make TOCs extremely A barn provides for quick set up and tear down
vulnerable. should a move be required. All a unit has to do is back
The ideal TOC location must meet three essential the 577s into the facility, drop the ramp, place 3 map
requirements. First, it must facilitate command and boards on the wall, and the TOC is fully operational
control for the unit commander. Secondly, it must within 5 minutes. Setting up in the woods requires a t
ensure communications to all levels, both up and best 30 minutes or longer to become fully operational.
down. Finally, it must provide survivability. Unfor- While the barn offers significantly more artillery
tunately, the majority of today’s units place their protection, merely locating within a village probably
emphasis on the first two requirements and tend to precludes any artillery fire at all. The likelihood of the
ignore the last. In our unit, survivability is the most Soviets firing on civilian. communities unless they
important: unless our TOC can survive, effective com- receive direct fire from the village is remote. Therefore,
munications and command and control become moot even if the TOC is detected in a village, we are
points. convinced the Soviets will shoot the closest wooded
A survey of battalion and higher units within the 8th hill, believing the hill rather than a village is the
Infantry Division (Mechanized) revealed that better location. We are equally convinced that the Soviets
than 80 percent position their TOCs on top of the will target most hills with their artillery, simply as a
highest, heavily-forested hill in the area of operation. matter of practice because we place so many TOCs on
These locations meet the requirement for effective these locations.
communication and command and control, but fail Trafficability within a village is seldom a prob-
miserably to meet the survivability criteria. There lem. Conversely, on the hillside trafficability often
seems to be a false sense of security about “hiding” in becomes difficult and frequently provides a signature
the woods. I n reality, nothing could be further from the that gives away the location.
truth. Locating the TOC in a village allows the soldiers
It is our experience that the optimum site for the TOC who man the facility to live in a protected environ-
is within a town or village. The 4th Battalion 69th ment. It is our experience that a second barn or house is
Armor has positioned its TOC in a village for the last easy to acquire to billet those soldiers who work in the
12months. The S3Air is responsible for selecting a site TOC. This automatically means a warm, dry, pro-
that meets all three of the previous criteria. What we tected place to sleep and easy access to water, latrines,
look for first is a village that is at a relatively high and hygiene facilities. Soldiers appreciate these small
elevation within the tactical area of operations. Next, conveniences and generally perform better because of
a quick communications check is made to ensure that them. Nowhere in Army doctrine is it written that we
we have effective communications. Finally, a barn or have to practice being miserable.
garage that will accommodate three 577s is located The one significant disadvantage to locating in
and borrowed or rented. (We have been very successful towns or villages is, of course, the exposure of your
in obtaining barns for little or no cost.) The ideal operation to the local inhabitants and the potential of
facility is a large garage built of concrete or stone, but that being passed to enemy sources. TOCs located in
a viable alternative is the standard wood barn. the woods run the same risk, but probably not as
Locating the TOC in a barn within a village offers overtly.
several advantages to the traditional forested hill: The principles presented here are applicable at any
Locating in a village allows the unit to blend in level. They can be used at company level for a CP. As
with the local community. Soldiers can easily be pointed out above, villages work extremely well for
confused with local civilians; generators and engine battalion TOCs and are equally adequate for the
noise blend in with cars or tractors; smoke from stoves BSOCs. Brigade, regiment and division TOCs can also
could be from furnaces; and light at night could come be accommodated, but require several facilities and
from any building. careful organization. Survivability is the key to suc-
Placing the 577s within a barn provides complete cess on the battlefield. If TOCs are to survive so they
concealment from aerial observation, satellite detec- can communicate and provide essential command and
tion, or long-range visual observation. In short, you control, they must be located in a town or village. Any
can’t find it. other choice is suicide!
0 The barn protects the TOC and its personnel from
indirect fire. Six inches of concrete block or three LTC STEWART W. WALLACE
inches of wood provide significantly more protection Commander, 4/69 Armor
than a canvas extension. Additionally, with antennas FRG
_________ _ _ _ _ ~ ~~ ~

May-June 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 49

 Your Records Speak For You
How can you improve your Per- ing, challenge yourself and enroll and tell it like it is!
manent Military Records File? How in college courses, time permitting. First, accurately describe the
can you make yourself more compe- If time is not available, try taking NCO’s job. If he is a platoon ser-
tititve when your records are being the CLEP tests, available a t educa- geant and master gunner, don’t try
reviewed for promotion, NCOES, or tion centers. Your education coun- to impress the world by stating he
a special assignment? How can the selor can assist you in working is a master gunner and omit his
chain of command be more suppor- toward two years of college. Also duties as platoon sergeant. Discuss
tive in preparing records for boards? have your military schools experi- his performance as it relates to the
How can the NCO-support channel ence and MOS evaluated for college mission of the organization. When
be more supportive in assisting credit. discussing an individual’s poten-
soldiers for boards? If you are not being selected for tial, remember the potential of
Do the questions sound familiar? school, a low GT score may be your serving in positions of greater re-
They should! Everytime there is a shortfall. We have dedicated time sponsibility as well as the schools.
promotion or school selection board, to help first-termers improve their A lot of NCOs receive substandard
an after-action report is developed, GT scores, but we have done little SEERS in their first assignments
and each proponent receives a re- for our NCOs. as platoon sergeant and first ser-
view and analysis of the records Don’t shy away from other pro- geant. The rater should leave room
that were reviewed. The review and grams that are considered career- for mistakes: comparing a new 1SG
analysis is then sent to major or- enhancing. Drill sergeant, recruit- to your last lSG, who had 4 years
ganizations by the chief of branch. ing, reserve component, and mas- experience, is not really fair.
Let’s review some of the problems ter gunner assignmets are consid- The best guidance a leader can
in the Armor Branch review and ered very challenging assignments give a subordinate is to urge them
analyze them and suggest some in Armor. Seek one out, but remem- to serve in a demanding leadership
za!utions. ber that one tour in any of those position. Require a sustained per-
First, let’s look at individual positions is all you need or want; formance in the position. There is
problems, because unless the indi- selection boards don’t look a t repe- no magic number, as far as years
vidual ensures his file is complete, titive assignments favorably. Usu- go, but it should continue over suc-
any other action will be useless. ally, it’s the soldier who asks for the cessive rating periods.
The change in requirement from assignment the second time. The The Personnel Qualification Rec-
a negative to a black and white chain of command needs to review ord, DA Forms 2A and 2-1, need to
photo was a great improvement, the individual’s previous assign- remain updated. A few corrections
but it requires the individual to pay ment before approving such re- on the PQR are understandable,
more attention to detail. Remember quests. Master gunners, especially, but some PQRs arrive in illegible
that your photo is your only visual must be given the opportunity to condition. Maintaining and updat-
representation before a board. It serve in leadership positions. ing records is not an easy task
directly reflects the standards the Instructor positions are impor- today, but periodic reviews, con-
soldier is expected to meet. tant assignments, but don’t make a ducted in the unit, allow us to not
Make sure the uniform accouter- habit of them. Instructor assign- only review our records but add
ments are properly placed and the ments, in particular, appear to be important documents to our file.
uniform fits well. Don’t assume. repetitive more frequently than Every year, each of us should
Use the regulation (AR 670-1);let a others. (Fort Knox to 7th ATC to request a copy of our microfiche
peer or your supervisor inspect you Fort Knox is a n old path traveled from Fort Benjamin Hamson to
and, if possible, have him accom- by many.) Repetitive assignments ensure our permanent file is ac-
pany you to the photo lab. Don’t are a chain-of-command problem, curate. (You can do this by writing:
depend on the photographer! more than an individual problem, Commander, USAEREC, ATTN:
Education, both military and because the chain approves or dis- PCRE-RF-I, Fort Benjamin Har-
civilian, is important. The NCOES approves the assignment. Again, rison, IN 46249.)
was established to improve the tech- the best career route is a one-time The chain of command is respon-
nical and tactical competence of shot and back tc a TOE unit. sible for ensuring every soldier has
the noncommissioned officer and As you can see, the chain of com- the opportunity to reach his full
the quality of the NCO corps. Why mand always plays a n important potential. The proper management
would anyone want to avoid a role in a soldier’s career. The chain of his permanent records will en-
school that improves their chance of command a n d NCO-support hance that potential and ensure a
to get ahead? Yet a lot of NCOs channel have the responsibility to strong army for the future.
have not attended any school. The ensure that soldiers do what is best
chain of command must also get for the Army and the soldier’s ca-
involved in this and ensure that reer. The most important tool a t CSM John M. Stephens
NCOs get the school. The chain of hand is the Enlisted Evaluation
command must not support or en- Report and the Senior Enlisted Command Sergeant Major
courage a n NCO’s deletion from a Evaluation Report. If you really U.S. Army Armor Center
school assignment. want to help a n outstanding per-
As YOU complete military school- former, remove all the big words

50 ARMOR:The Magazine of Mobile Warfare ’ May-June 1986

 "Thunderbolt" Reunion Scheduled Viet-Cambodian Vets Reunion Set
The 11t h Armored Division, "Thunderbolt," will hold its The 11t h Armored Cavalry's Veterans of Vietnam and
annual reunion from 13-17 August at Teaneck, NJ. Cambodia announces its reunion at the Rodeway Inn
Interested personnel may contact: Mr. Alfred Pfeiffer, Convention Center in Arlington, TX (Dallas-Ft. Worth
2328Admiral St.,Aliquippa, PA 15001. Phone(412)375- Suburb) on September 5, 6, and 7, 1986. Contact the
6295. "Command Track" c/o Ollie W. Pickral at 1602 Lorrie
Drive, Richardson, TX 75080 for all the details.

Attention Cavalrymen! 704th T D Battalion Reunion

The U S . Horse Cavalry Association's annual bivouac The 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion Association will
will be held on 3-5 October 1986 at El Tropicano Hotel, hold its reunion in Pittsburgh, PA, on 26-28 September.
San Antonio, TX. A l l former horse troopers and sup- Interested personnel should contact Walter C. Righton,
porters are welcome. For information, contact Colonel Secretary, 2 9 W. Wilkins Lane, Plainfield, IL 60544.
John R. Hall, 741 Winfield Circle, San Antonio,TX 78239.
I
I
Big Red One Reunion
The Society of the First Division, composed of veterans The Bustle Ralc
of the Army's First Infantry Division (Big Red One), has
announced t h e group's 1986 reunion i n Buffalo, N e w
York, on September 3-7.
Previously, t h e reunion had been announced f o r
Charleston, South Carolina, but delays in the completion
of the selected hotel prompted the change. The 1987
meeting will be held in Charleston. Information about
either meeting can be obtained from Society of the First
Division, 5 Montgomery Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19118.

Armor Branch Notes "Armor in Battle" is Published

Fort Knox Supplemental Material 17-3-2, Armor in
Regimental System Battle, has recently been published by the Armor School.
By t h e end of FY86, all armor soldiers will be affiliated This 240-page military history anthology revolves around
with a regiment. Affiliation means long-term identifica- small-unit armor actions, starting with the very first
tion with a particular regimental color and crest, as well armor battle in 1916. Thefivechapterscover World War I,
as the perpetuation of the regiment's history, customs World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Arab-Israeli Wars.
and traditions. Copies of FKSM 17-3-2 may be obtained from the Army
Armor soldiers must understandthat while every effort Wide Training Support Branch, Fort Knox, Kentucky,
will be made to provide recurring assignments within AUTOVON: 464-291 4/5715; COMMERCIAL: (502)624-
their regiments, this can't be guaranteed. Soldiers can 2914/5715; FTS: 354-2914/5715.
indicate their preference by notifying the servicing MILPO
or by completing the individual preference statement.
Lieutenants can affiliate n o w or wait until AOAC Leadership Handbooks for Armor Officers
attendance, when they must affiliate. First-term enlisted A three-volume set of leadership handbooks has been
soldiers can affiliate n o w or wait until they reenlist. published for Armor officers, t h e result of a six-month
Armor and Cavalry units currently under the US Army revision of the Handbook for the Armor Leader.
Regimental System are: Volume I: "Thoughts on Leadership" was designed t o
more completely prepare the junior officer for duty and
8th Cavalry (Armor) 72d Armor command. Volume II: "Headaches, Heartbeats and Ham-
32d Armor 73d Armor strings: A Guide to Company Level Duties and Func-
33d Armor 77th Armor tions," providesa guideline for many of the administrative
34th Armor 81 st Armor (Training) actions and details that comprise a significant portion of a
35th Armor 1st Cavalry leader's time. Coverage includes checklists, additional
37th Armor 2d Armored Cavalry duties and the fundamentals of staff position responsi-
40th Armor 3 d Armored Cavalry bility.
63d Armor 4th Cavalry Volume Ill: "Company Command: Your Men, Your
64th Armor 7th Cavalry Mission, and You," will help prepare the officer for
66th Armor 10th Cavalry command and its attendant responsibilities.
67th Armor 1th Armored Cavalry Copies of the three-volume set may be obtained from
68th Armor 12th Cavalry (Training) Army Wide Training Support (AWTS), ATZK-DPT-NRT-
69th Armor 13th Cavalry (Training) AWTS, Fort Knox, KY 401 21 -5000. Copies will also be
70th Armor 15th Cavalry (Training) available through the Defense Technical Information
1 6 Cavalry (Training) Center (DTIC).

May-June 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 51

 High Treason is not a definitive history is not the source for doctrinal appreciation
HIGH TREASON: ESSAYS ON of the RedArmy. It does, however, offer us of fighting the Bradley. Nevertheless, it is
THE HISTORY OF THE RED an important new and comprehensive pic- a succinct treatment of the place of the
ture of this history as well as valuable Bradley in modern warfare, and a concise
ARMY, 1918-1938. byVitalyRapo- insights into the understanding and know- primer for a defense against some of the
port and Yuri Alexeev, Duke University more shallow arguments criticizing the
ledgeof this history by the Soviet public. It
Press, NC, 1985.436 pages. $35.00. Bradley. The book is worth an evening's
clearly shows that Soviet censorship has
not been particularly successful in sup- browse through its forty-eight pages.
To remain silent about the de- pressing or distorting historical events for
struction of the Red Army is to those with the courage to seek the truth. JAMES R. MCDONOUGH
abuse the memory of the innocent This underlying message is the book's LTC, Infantry
dead. To be silent is to betray the most important. Truth cannot remain hid- Fort Hood, TX
interests of the Motherland. With- den forever. There is truth in the Soviet
out the publication of such events Union, and those with the courage to seek RACETO THE SWIFT: Thoughts
- without a merciless analysis of it. May they grow in number. on 2 1 s t Century Warfare, by
them - it is impossible to reach Brigadier Richard Simpkin. Brassey's De-
conclusions vital to us. to our child- GILBERT0 VILLAHERMOSA fence Publishers, London. 375 pages.
ren, andto ourgrandchildren. With- Captain, Armor $32.50.
out such an analysis. there is no Fort Bragg, NC
reason to study history.
THE M2 BRADLEY: INFANTRY Brigadier Richard Simpkin's thoughts
- High Treason - are original, but based on sound military
FIGHTING VEHICLE by Steven J.
Once every few years there emerges a Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 1986. principles. They are innovative, but realis-
book so significant in content that it tic and controversial, yet convincing.
changes the very way we perceive the The book is in five parts, all of which live
~~

world around us. This is such a book. This volume, Number 43 in the Osprey- up to their titles. Part one, "The State of
High Treason is a collection of essayson Vanguard series on military units and the Art," outlines the tacticsAechnology
the history of the Red Army prior to and weapons of 20th Century warfare, offers cycle by exploring the blitzkrieg and the
during the purges inflicted by Stalin. It is an accurate, concise treatment of the tactical evolution to deep battle. Part two,
significant in that no single history of the evolution, characteristics, and doctrinal "The Physics of War," is a scholarly study
early days of the Red Army has been place of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Mr. with uniquegeometrical depictionsof ter-
published todate. It is monumental in that Zaloga, although publishing from Eng- rain, mass, attrition versus maneuver
it was researched, documented, and writ- land, is an American well versed in cur- theory, combat leverage, combat worth
ten in the Soviet Union by a Soviet citizen rent weapons development experience and battlefield simultaneity and tempo.
with considerable information available to within the United States Army. While not Part three, "Luck Management," explores
him. Smuggled out of the Soviet Union by a military professional, his scholarship is technology and chance, surprise and
an undisclosed student, it offers us a such that he captures the essential forces stratagemsand intelligence, riskand luck.
picture of the attitudes, knowledge, and behind the development of this particular Part four, "The Round Boulder," is taken
understanding of history by a segment of vehicle and dissects neatly the contro- from the Sun Tzu quote: "Thus the poten-
that society. versies that surround it. tial of troops skillfully commanded in bat-
The early history of the Red Army is The book is timely, addressing the most tle may be compared to that of round
brought together in a single, well-inte- recent press - Congressional inquiries boulders which roll down from mountain
grated narrative, bringing to light new into the wisdom of the M2/M3 Bradley. heights." This was the part of the book
facts and interpretations on developments The author is an advocate of the M2/M3, judged to be most informative and enter-
such as Stalin's role in the Polish Cam- faces each of the criticisms leveled in taining, for it addresses the human factor
paign, the early purges of military aca- recent months head on. and makes the i n military leadership.
demicians and theoreticians, and the role logical and accurate defense against each This book is not for the casual student of
of Stalin's cronies from Civil War days. one. Moreover, he places the evolution of military science. The many arithmetical
The book offers numerous fascinating the weaponssystem in historical perspec- and geometric models and concepts
anecdotes - most of them "unverifiable tive quite clearly. As he points out, the presented in the first two parts could put
but credible." Depicted are eventssuch as debate as to the survivability of the ar- off a less-than-dedicated reader. But once
the abortive attempt by security forces to mored infantry vehicle is a timeless di- deciphered, these models accurately ex-
arrest Budenny (he dug himself in with lemma. To give the infantry the armor press intuitive tactical truths and insight
machine guns at his country dacha, then protection it needs to equal that of the into past, present, and future battlefields.
openedfireon the Chekists); detailsofthe tank it must accompany is to give it a This book is a must for the serious
elimination of the security head, Ezhov; weight structure that will inflate the costs student of the military art and science. It
Voroshilov's endless blunders, and more. beyond the finances to support it. To contains a wealth of material that will be
High Treason is a wealth of information negate the armored infantry vehicle be- discussed by military professionals, world-
about the Red Army, the Party, and the cause it cannot defend against the anti- wide, and will be the subject of further
personalities that ruled both. tank weaponry it will eventually face on study at high-level military schools. The
That is not to say that this work is the battlefield, is to expose the infantry to author's predictions on the nature of fu-
without shortcomings. The book is, per- lesser weapons, such as artillery or small ture warfare will be controversial. How-
haps, too sympathetic to the Red Army arms, while still leaving the requirement ever, if the quote by Dr. Wernher von
military professionals and hostile to the to keep him apace with the tank with Braun - "That most prophecies err be-
political party and political generals of the which he fights. Mr. Zaloga does not causethey are not bold enough"- istrue,
period, exaggerating the capabilities of resolve that dilemma, but he does offer then Brigadier Simpkin's predictions
the Red Army. It is hard to imagine a Red the view that the Bradley is the best thing could indeed come true.
Army capableof faring significantly better around right now to mitigate it.
against a battle-tested German Army that While there is a section devoted to RICHARD P. GEIER
had the advantages of surprise, mass, and Bradleydoctrine, it barelygoes beyondthe Major, Armor
concentration of force in the initial stages wiring diagram level of the Table of Or- Fort Lewis, WA
of the war. ganization Allowances. Accordingly, this

52 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare May-June 1986

 The Father
of the Armored Force
Like father, like son. I f ever that proverb applied
to two U.S. Army cavalry officers,it most certainly
was the fitting description of Lieutenant General
Adna R. Chaffee, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army from
1904 to 1906, and his son, Major General Adna R.
Chaffee, Jr., the “Father of the Armored Force.” General Chaffee visits his troops training a t Fort Knox
The younger Chaffee was the heart and soul o f
Army mechanization. His valiant, career-long ef- planned and supervised the 1st Cavalry’s exercises
forts were recognized with his deathbed promotion and maneuvers that tested new armor tactics, equip-
to two-star rank and the award of the first oak leaf ment, and doctrine. The horse soldier was begin-
cluster to the Distinguished Service Medal he had ning to give way to the tracked armored fighting
won in France in WWI. man, but the process was slow and fraught with
Adna R. Chaffee,Jr., was born on 23 September opposition from diehard cavalrymen. I t was a time
1884 at Junction City, KS, and was commissioned a of decisiveness for those officers who foresaw and
2d Lieutenant of Cavalry at West Point, N Y , in 1906, believed in armor, but that decisiveness had to be
the year that his distinguished father retired after a tempered with caution, for a too-headstrong ad-
cavalry career that spanned 45 years. Between vocacy of tracks over horse could lead to delays not
them, father and son served the U.S. Army for only to the slowly-developing armorprogram, but to
eighty years and saw the rise of the Cavalry arm the careers of the officers concerned.
during the Civil War and the Indian Wars, and its Adna Chaffee demonstrated time and again, to
decline and eventual demise in WWI and in the all levels of command, his persuasiveness in argu-
early 1930s, when horseflesh succumbed to horse- ment for a separate armor force and his tact in
power. dealing with both superiors and subordinates. I n
Adna Jr. served his first eleven years as a caval- 1936, he was vindicated when a second cavalry
ryman and in a variety of leadership positions of regiment, the 13th Cavalry, was mechanized. I n
increasing importance until the U.S. entered WWI June 1938, Colonel Chaffeewas named commander
in April 1917. During this period, he served on the of the 1st Cavalry, and in November of that year he
s t a f f of the Army War College and attended the was promoted to brigadier general and given com-
French cavalry school at Saumur. mand of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized). The
During WWI, Chaffee, as a General Staff officer, brigade was composed of the 1st and 7th Cavalry
rose from captain to the temporary rank o f colonel regiments. I n 1939 and in 1940, Brigadier General
and was awarded the DSM for his service with the Chaffee led the 7th Brigade in the first large-scale
111 Corps in France. Army maneuvers since WWI.
The ‘leanyears” that followed WWIsaw Chaffee Europe was now at war, and General Chaffee,
reverting to his substantive rank of captain, and it along with other officers advocating mechanized
was not until 1935 that he rose again to full colonel. forces, saw in the German panzer successes in
Two years after he had graduated from the Army Poland the need to step-up the mechanization of the
War College in 1925, Chaffee’s career made its first U.S. Army. Such expansion could only be accom-
step from horse cavalry to mechanization when he plished by the creation of a new and independent
was assigned to the Operations and Training Divi- organization. On 10 July 1940, the War Department
sion of the War Department General Staff. The ordered the creation of the Armored Force with
following decades were to see Chaffee becoming General Chaffeeas its first commander.
increasingly involved in the Army’s mechanization The letter creating the Armored Force and nam-
process. He recommended at an early date a per- ing Chaffeeas its chief, reads in part:
manent, independent mechanized force complete “The I Armored Corps will consist o f a Corps
with tanks, mobile artillery, and motorized infantry Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the
- a combined arms force. His astute recommenda- 1st and 2d Armored Divisions. Brigadier General
tions were adopted by the War Department, and in Adna R. Chaffee, United States Army, is designated
1930 that body organized a permanent mechanized as the Chief of the Armored Force and the Com-
force and named Chaffee as its executive officer. mander of the IArmored Corps.”
Within a year, however, the Chief o f S t a f f - I n less than a year, at the age o f 57, General Adna
General MacArthur - disbanded the force and R. Chaffeewas dead of cancer. His memory and his
ordered all branches of the Army to carryon mecha- legacy live on in ChaffeeAvenue at Fort Knox, the
nization independently. It was a blow to the early road that leads directly to Armor Center Head-
armor advocates, but progress, fueled by such dedi- quarters, and in the M24 light tank that bore his
cated officers as Chaffee, V a n Voorhis, Grow, and proud name from 1944 to the early 1950s.
others, was maintained. General Chaffee is remembered as one o f the true
I n June 1931, Chaffee became the executive of- proponents of the armored force. While he recog-
ficer o f the first cavalry regiment to be mechanized nized the ability of cavalry, he made it clear that
- the 1st Cavalry. He moved to Fort Knox with the infantry and artillery had to assume their roles in a
regiment and became the post executive officer,as combined arms force that today is the Army’s
well. Wearing his two hats with demonstrated ca- combat arm of decision. His obituary in the New
pability, Lieutenant Colonel Chaffeebegan a facili- York Sun, dated 23 August 1941, says: “ H ewas the
ties improvement program at Fort Knox and heart and soul of mechanization in the Army ...”

May-June 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 53

 81st Armor
Supero Omnia
Lineage and Honors

Constituted 28 August 1941in the Army of the United States as 81st Armored Regiment and
assigned t o 5th Armored Division. Activated 1 October 1941 at Fort Knox. Kentucky.
Regiment broken up 20 September 1943 and its elements reorganized and redesignated as
follows: Regiment (less 3d Battalion, Band and Maintenance, Service,.and Reconnaissance
Companies) as 81st Tank Battalion and remained assigned t o 5th Armored Division; 3 d
Battalion as 707th Tank Battalion and relieved from assignment to 5th Armored Division;
Reconnaissance Company as Troop E, 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized,
an element of the 5th Armored Division; and Band, Maintenance and Service Companies
disbanded.
81st Tank Battalion inactivated 8 October 1945 a t Camp Myles Standish. Massachusetts.
Redesignated 18 June 1948 as 81st Medium Tank Battalion, Allotted 25 June 1948 t o the
Regular Army. Activated 6 July 1948at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas. Inactivated 1February 1950
a t Camp Chaffee, Arkansas. Activated 1 September 1950 at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas.
Inactivated 1 6 March 1956 at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas. Relieved 3 February 1 9 6 2 from
assignment t o 5th Armored Division.
707th Tank Battalion assigned 12 July 1945t o 7th Armored Division. Inactivated 8 October
1945 a t Boston Port of Embarkation, Massachusetts. Redesignated 4 November 1950as 94th
Medium Tank Battalion, allotted t o the Regular Army, and remained assigned t o 7th Armored
Division. Activated 24 November 1 9 5 0 a t Camp Roberts, California. Inactivated 15 November
1953 at Camp Roberts, California. Relieved 3 February 1962 from assignment t o 7th Armored
Symbolism Division.
The gold of the shield is the color for Troop E, 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, redesignated 16 June 1945
armor. Thefleurs-de-lis symbolize the msTroop E, 85th Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. Inactivated 11October 1945
Normandyand Northern France Cam- m t Camp Kilmer, New Jersey. Converted and redesignated 18 June 1948 as 505th Replace-
paigns. Thechevron in point embowed ment Company, allotted t o the Regular Army, and assigned to 5th Armored Division. Activated
recalls the Battle of the Bulge during 6 July 1948 at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas. Inactivated 1 February 1950 at Camp Chaffee.
the Ardennes-Alsace Campaign. The Arkansas. Activated 1 September 1950 at Camp Chaffee. Arkansas. Inactivated 16 March
key (occurring frequently in the civic 1956 at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas. Relieved 3 February 1962 from assignment t o 5th Armored
arms of the towns of Rheinprovinz) Division.
symbolizes the Rhineland Campaign; 81st Tank Battalion, 94th Medium Tank Battalion, and 505th Replacement Company
symbolic of the successes of this consolidated, reorganized, and redesignated 3 February 1962as 8 1st Armor, a parent regiment
campaign, it allegorically represents under the Combat Arms Regimental System.
the "Key t o Victory" in Europe. The
battle-axe, a favorite Teutonic weap- Campaign Participation Credit
on, signifies the Central Europe
Campaign.
World War II
The red lion's head is adapted from Normandy
the arms of the Duchy o f Luxem- Northern France
bourg, and the gold tower alludes t o Rhineland
the successful mission in that area. Ardennes-Alsace
The oak leaves symbolize honor, vic- Central Europe
tory, and valor, and the shield, in the
colors of the Luxembourg Croix de
Guerre, alludes t o the award of that
Decorations
decoration.
Luxembourg Croix de Guerre. World War II. streamer embroidered LUXEMBOURG (81st
Tank Battalion cited; DA GO 44, 1 9 5 1)
Distinctive Insignia

The distinctive insignia consists of

the shield and m o n o of the coat of
arms.