A Useful Four-valued Logic

Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

First-Degree Entailment

Daniel Bonevac

March 5, 2013

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Relevance Logics

I Relevance logics are non-classical logics that try to avoid the

paradoxes of material and strict implication:

p ⊃ (q ⊃ p )
¬p ⊃ (p ⊃ q)
(p ⊃ q) ∨ (q ⊃ r )
(p ∧ ¬p ) ⊃ q
p ⊃ (q ⊃ q )
p ⊃ (q ∨ ¬ q )

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Counterintuitive?

I Many philosophers, beginning with Hugh MacColl (1908),

have claimed that these theses are counterintuitive.
I Relevance logicians object that, in each of them, the
antecedent seems irrelevant to the consequent—a property
shared by the classically valid inferences that correspond to
the conditionals above.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Variable Sharing

I One might say that what is wrong with the above is that is that
the antecedents and consequents (or premises and
conclusions) are on completely different topics.
I There is a formal principle that relevant logicians apply to
force theorems and inferences to stay on topic: the variable
sharing principle.
I No formula A ⊃ B should be provable if A and B do not have
at least one propositional parameter in common.
I Similarly, no inference can be valid if the premises and
conclusion do not share at least one propositional parameter.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Syntax and Semantics

I This is a syntactic principle, which goes only part way toward

capturing the central idea of relevance logic.
I As Anderson, Belnap, and others have developed the
syntactic approach, the key idea is to keep track of the use of
the premises of an inference.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Explosion

I A central problem is the problem of explosion: contradictions,

in classical logic, entail anything—even something completely
unrelated to the propositions involved in the contradiction.
I But that seems implausible.
I Naive set theory is inconsistent, but it’s possible to work with it
so long as one stays away from the contradictions. No one
would say that unions of sets are not always sets in naive set
theory, merely on the ground that such an assertion follows
from Russell’s paradox.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Disjunctive Syllogism

I If we look closely at explosion, we see that it depends on two

principles:
1. A
2. ¬A
3. A ∨ B (Disjunction Introduction)
4. B (Disjunctive Syllogism)

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Disjunctive Syllogism

I Relevance logicians tend to reject DS.

I It might seem more plausible, intuitively, to reject Disjunction
Introduction, for it introduces the irrelevant element B. But
A ∨ B does share vocabulary with A , and it is hard to give a
semantics for disjunction that makes Disjunction Introduction
invalid. Nevertheless various people have explored this and
other options.
I For some time, the approach to relevance logic was chiefly
syntactic; as with modal logic, the semantics came later.
I There are now several different semantics for relevance
logic—even for the fairly simple system FDE.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

LP

I LP is a three-valued logic that is identical to K3, except that

D = {1, i }.
I It amounts to K3 with an altered definition of validity:
An argument is valid if and only if, if its conclusion is
false, at least one premise must be false.

I In LP, we might think of i as representing not indeterminacy, is

neither true nor false, but inconsistency, is both true and false.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

LP

I The law of excluded middle is valid in LP.

I In fact, the logical truths of LP are just those of classical logic.
I But LP is nonclassical when applied to arguments.
I Contradictions do not imply everything. (Assign p and ¬p i,
and q 0.)
I Also, modus ponens fails. (Let p and p ⊃ q be i and q 0.)

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

RM3

I To regain modus ponens, we can change the truth conditions

for the conditional, letting it be i iff both components are i.
I This yields RM3.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Post’s Cyclic Negation

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Post’s Cyclic Negation

I One way to do this is to add Post’s cyclic negation function:

Table: Post’s Cyclic Negation

A yA
1 i
i 0
0 1

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

K3+

I Call this logic K3+.

I K3+ is functionally complete.
I Unlike K3, it has valid formulas, such as A ≡ yyy A ,
A ∨ y A ∨ yy A , and y (A ∧ y A ∧ yy A ).

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Truth-value Gaps

I K3+ seems to need a stronger notion of implication

I If we allow for truth-value gaps, implication in the sense of
truth preservation seems too weak
I Contrast three connectives: negation, “strong” negation, and
Post’s cyclic negation

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Negations

A ¬A A y A
1 0 0 i
I
i i 0 0
0 1 1 1
I These are true in exactly the same circumstanceswhen A is
false
I But they are not intersubstitutable salva veritate; their
negations aren’t equivalent

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Equivalence

I So, are ¬A , A , and y A equivalent?

I In one sense, yes: they imply one another in the
truth-preservation sense
I In another, no: they have different semantic values; they arent
intersubstitutable, even in extensional contexts

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Concepts of Implication

I X |= A iff
I No model of X makes A false (rules out 1–0)
I Every model of X is a model of A (rules out 1–0 and 1–i)
I Any model making A false makes something in X false (rules
out 1–0 and i–0)
I All of the above (rules out 1–0, 1–i, i–0)

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

No decline

I Suppose we go with the last, all of the above, “no decline in

truth value” conception for X ⇒ A
I Then equivalence does guarantee substitutability salva
veritate
I But that concept can’t be explained in terms of preservation of
truth or designated value

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

K3+ with ⇒

I What logic do we get if we use K3+ with that conception of

implication?
I The ¬, ∨, ∧ fragment is FDE, First-Degree Entailment
I This is a way to get FDE with three values, retaining
valuations as functions
I It relies upon the fact that FDE = K3 ∩ LP
I But FDE does not fit the standard definition of a many-valued
logic; one cannot isolate a set of designated values

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Four Truth Values

I Suppose we want to allow for the possibility of truth value

gluts and truth value gaps, recognizing that they are different.
I We might also want to reflect the epistemic state of an agent
or a database: we might have information that p is true, or
false; we might have no information about p; or we might have
information that p is true and that p is false.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Nuel Belnap

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Four Truth Values

I Let’s introduce four values, 1, 0, n, and b, as Belnap does in

his “Useful 4-valued Logic.”
I Belnap defines negation, conjunction, and disjunction for such
a logic.
I It turns out to be close to classical logic, but it is
paraconsistent.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Four Truth Values

I Belnap’s idea is that a natural logic for information systems,

including human beings, should have four values:
I I have information that the proposition is true (1),
I I have information that it is false (0),
I I have information that it is true and information that it is false
(b), and
I I have no information about its truth value (n).
I We might, as Belnap does, construct on this basis a
four-valued logic.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Four Truth Values

I Consider a lattice with 1 as top element and 0 as bottom, with

n and b in between.
I Then we can define v (A ∧ B ) = glb (v (A ), v (B ));
v (A ∨ B ) = lub (v (A ), v (B )).
I v (¬A ) = 1 ⇔ v (A ) = 0; v (¬A ) = 0 ⇔ v (A ) = 1; v (¬A ) =
n ⇔ v (A ) = n; v (¬A ) = b ⇔ v (A ) = b.
I Take 1 and b as designated values.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

FDE Negation

I This gives us the truth tables:

A ¬A
1 0
b b
n n
0 1

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

FDE Conjunction

∧ 1 b n 0
1 1 b n 0
b b b 0 0
n n 0 n 0
0 0 0 0 0

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

FDE Disjunction

∨ 1 b n 0
1 1 1 1 1
b 1 b 1 b
n 1 1 n n
0 1 b n 0

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

FDE

I The logic that results is new.

I But suppose that an interpretation assigns nothing b; that is,
suppose that there are no truth value gluts.
I Then the logic that results is exactly K3.
I Suppose, alternatively, that we assume that there are no truth
value gaps, so that nothing gets value n.
I Then the logic that results is exactly LP.
I If there are neither gaps nor gluts, the result is classical logic.
I So, this logic, which we may call First-Degree Entailment
(FDE), is a normal logic.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

J. Michael Dunn

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Relational Valuations

I Alternatively, we might think of a valuation not as a function

from propositions to truth values, as we have up to now, but
instead as a relation between propositions and the truth
values {0, 1}.
I A function assigns each element of its domain one and only
one value; a relation may assign no value (thus producing a
truth value gap) or more than one value (thus producing a
truth value glut).

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

FDE Interpretations

I Let’s begin with three connectives, ¬, ∧, and ∨, and define

A ⊃ B as ¬A ∨ B.
I An FDE-interpretation is a relation ρ relating propositional
parameters to truth values {0, 1}.
I We extend this to the entire language by means of the truth
clauses:

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

FDE Truth Clauses

I A ∧ B ρ1 ⇔ A ρ1 and B ρ1
I A ∧ B ρ0 ⇔ A ρ0 or B ρ0
I A ∨ B ρ1 ⇔ A ρ1 or B ρ1
I A ∨ B ρ0 ⇔ A ρ0 and B ρ0
I ¬A ρ1 ⇔ A ρ0
I ¬A ρ0 ⇔ A ρ1

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Normality

I These are the obvious correlates of classical truth conditions.

I Plainly, then, FDE is normal, agreeing with classical logic
whenever the propositional parameters involved have exactly
one truth value.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Entailment

I As with any many-valued logic, there are choices to be made

concerning the concepts of entailment, validity, etc.
I FDE stays with truth preservation.
I Say that X ρ1 iff, for all B ∈ X , B ρ1:

X |= A ⇔ (X ρ1 ⇒ A ρ1).

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Tableau Rules

I Entries have the forms A , + or A , −, representing A ρ1 and

A ρ0, respectively.
I Tableaux begin with an initial list X , +, A , −.
I Rules for disjunctions and conjunctions are as expected.
I Those for negated conjunctions and disjunctions are
DeMorgan’s laws; there are also rules for double negation.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Tableau Rules

I Define the rules as in Priest (except that I have played out the
DeMorgan rules, which actually stresses the parallel between
them and the corresponding classical rules):

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Tableau Rules

¬¬A , + ¬¬A , −

A, + A, −

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Tableau Rules

A ∧ B, + A ∧ B, −

A, + A, − B, −
B, +

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Tableau Rules

A ∨ B, + A ∨ B, −

A, + B, + A, −
B, −

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Tableau Rules

A ⊃ B, + A ⊃ B, −

¬A , + B, + ¬A , −
B, −

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Tableau Rules

¬(A ∧ B ), + ¬(A ∧ B ), −

¬A , + ¬B , + ¬A , −
¬B , −

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Tableau Rules

¬(A ∨ B ), + ¬(A ∨ B ), −

¬A , + ¬A , − ¬B , −
¬B , +

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Tableau Rules

¬(A ⊃ B ), + ¬(A ⊃ B ), −

A, + A, − ¬B , −
¬B , +

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Tableau Rules

I Branches close if they have nodes of the form A , + and A , −.

I Open branches determine countermodels.
I These rules are sound and complete for FDE.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Exclusion

I We can derive tableau systems for K3 and LP by adding new

constraints and rules.
I Suppose that an interpretation obeys Exclusion: for no p, p ρ1
and p ρ0.
I Then there are no truth value gluts.
I So, count a branch as closed if there are nodes of the form
A , +, ¬A , +.
I This yields sound and complete tableaux for K3.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Exhaustion

I Suppose that an interpretation obeys Exhaustion: for all p,

p ρ1 or p ρ0.
I Then there are no truth value gaps.
I So, count a tableau branch as closed if it contains nodes of
the form A , −, ¬A , −.
I This yields a sound and complete system for LP.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

FDE Valid

I All K3 interpretations are FDE interpretations (those that obey

Exclusion); all LP interpretations are also FDE interpretations
(those that obey Exhaustion).
I So, FDE is a proper sublogic of K3 and of LP.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

FDE Valid

I That means, of course, that FDE, like K3, has no valid

formulas.
I But K3 and FDE aren’t as radical a departure from classical
logic as that makes it appear.
I Most classical rules and inference patterns survive in K3 and
FDE.
I All these, for example, hold in both (taking A ⊃ B as ¬A ∨ B):

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

FDE Valid

I Double Negation: ¬¬A ⇔ A

Conjunction Exploitation: A ∧ B |= A ; A ∧ B |= B
Conjunction Introduction: A , B |= A ∧ B
Disjunction Introduction: A |= A ∨ B; B |= A ∨ B

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

FDE Valid

I Absorption: A ⊃ B |= A ⊃ (A ∧ B )
Tautology: A ⇔ A ∧ A ; A ⇔ A ∨ A
DeMorgan’s Laws: ¬(A ∧ B ) ⇔ ¬A ∨ ¬B;
¬(A ∨ B ) ⇔ ¬A ∧ ¬B
Exportation: A ⊃ (B ⊃ C ) ⇔ (A ∧ B ) ⊃ C

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

FDE Valid

I Contraposition: A ⊃ B ⇔ ¬B ⊃ ¬A
Commutativity: A ∧ B ⇔ B ∧ A ; A ∨ B ⇔ B ∨ A
Associativity: A ∧ (B ∧ C ) ⇔ (A ∧ B ) ∧ C;
A ∨ (B ∨ C ) ⇔ (A ∨ B ) ∨ C
Distribution: A ∧ (B ∨ C ) ⇔ (A ∧ B ) ∨ (A ∧ C );
A ∨ (B ∧ C ) ⇔ (A ∨ B ) ∧ (A ∨ C )

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

K3 but not FDE

These, in addition, are valid in K3:

Disjunction Exploitation (Proof By Cases):
A ∨ B , A ⊃ C , B ⊃ C |= C
Constructive Dilemma: A ∨ B , A ⊃ C , B ⊃ D |= C ∨ D
Disjunctive Syllogism: A ∨ B , ¬A |= B; A ∨ B , ¬B |= A

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

K3 but not FDE

Modus Ponens: A ⊃ B , A |= B
Modus Tollens: A ⊃ B , ¬B |= ¬A
Hypothetical Syllogism: A ⊃ B , B ⊃ C |= A ⊃ C
Another Proof By Cases: A ⊃ B , ¬A ⊃ B |= B
Explosion: A , ¬A |= B

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

FDE and Classical Logic

I This is interesting, for this is a complete set of inference rules

for classical propositional logic!
I Or, at least, it almost is: the only thing missing is a tautology,
such as A ∨ ¬A or A ⊃ A .

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Richard Routley

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Routley Semantics

I Routley and Routley (1972) adopt a new strategy for the

semantics of relevance logic, treating negation as an
intensional operator.
I Classical negation defines the truth of ¬A at w solely in terms
of what holds or fails to hold at w.
I Routley semantics defines it in terms of what happens at
another world.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Star Worlds

I Assume that each world w has a star world w ∗ such that ¬A

is true at w if A is false at w ∗ .
I If w = w ∗ , this is classical.
I It isn’t easy to see what the star world is—van Benthem
(1979) considers it solely a technical trick without any
philosophical motivation, and Priest seems to agree.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Star Worlds

I Dunn (1993) gives perhaps the best understanding of it: w ∗ is

the maximal world—the world containing the most
information—compatible with w.
I So, we might think of w ∗ as the completion of w.
I This makes it strange, however, to think of w ∗∗ as being the
same as w.
I Dunn characterizes it as follows: roughly speaking, ¬A is true
in a world w iff A is false in every world w 0 compatible with w.
I The compatibility relation must be taken to be symmetric,
directed, and convergent.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Star Worlds

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Gaps and Gluts

I Another possible interpretation is this.

I Imagine that we take Belnap’s four-valued logic as our
understanding of FDE.
I Take w ∗ to be like w, except that n and b are swapped.
I That is, all truth value gaps in w become truth value gluts in
w ∗ , and all truth value gluts in w become truth value gaps in
w ∗.
I The semantics for negation then make sense.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Routley Semantics

I In Routley semantics, every propositional parameter is

assigned 1 or 0 in each world.
I (Think of 0 as representing, not false, but simply not true.)
I So, we want, for truth value gaps, both p and ¬p to get the
value 0.
I For gluts, we want both p and ¬p to get 1.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Gaps and Gluts

I Consider a sentence that might plausibly get a glut, say, The

sentence in italics in this paragraph is false. (Call it p.)
I We don’t want to say that ¬p is true in w iff p is false in w;
since p gets 1 at w, ¬p would get 0, and we would not have a
glut after all.
I But consider w ∗ , which swaps gluts and gaps.
I p gets 0 there, and so does ¬p (for p gets 1 at w ∗∗ = w).
I The Routley truth condition gives the right result; ¬p gets 1 at
w because p gets 0 at w ∗ .

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Gaps and Gluts

I Consider a sentence that gets a truth value gap in w, say, The

present King of France is bald. (Let’s call that sentence p.)
I How do we interpret The present King of France is not bald?
I We don’t want to say that it gets 1 in w iff p gets 0 in w,
because then it would get 1, and we would no longer have a
truth value gap.
I If p and ¬p are both 0 in w, however, then, swapping gaps
and gluts, both are 1 in w ∗ .
I So, ¬p gets 0 at w, for p gets 1 at w ∗ .

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Routley interpretations

I A Routley interpretation is a triple < W , ∗, v >, where W is a

set of worlds, * a function from W to W such that ∗ ∗ w = w,
and v assigns each propositional parameter 1 or 0 at each
world.
I Truth clauses for conjunction and disjunction are classical.
I For negation:

vw (¬A ) = 1 ⇔ vw ∗ (A ) = 0.
I Validity is truth preservation in all worlds in all models. (NB:
vw ∗ (¬A ) = 1 ⇔ vw ∗∗ (A ) = 0 ⇔ vw (A ) = 0.)

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Disjunctive Syllogism

I FDE is paraconsistent; it escapes the problem of explosion.

I Contradictions do not imply anything.
I Disjunctive syllogism also fails.
I Once one realizes that truth value gluts are possible, it is easy
to see why.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Disjunctive Syllogism

I Suppose that p is a truth value glut, so p ρ1 and p ρ0.

I (For Routley semantics, p and ¬p are both 1 at w; for Belnap,
p gets b.)
I Then (p ∨ q)ρ1, but it does not follow that qρ1; nothing at all
follows about the truth value of q.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment

 A Useful Four-valued Logic
Relational Semantics
Tableaux for FDE
Routley Semantics
Paraconsistency

Disjunctive Syllogism

I One may object that we need DS for ordinary reasoning;

indeed, as Sextus Empiricus noted, dogs seem to use it!
I But it is perfectly fine as long as the situation in which we find
ourselves is consistent.
I Only inconsistent information can lead to a failure.
I That suggests an analogy with nonmonotonic reasoning; we
may ordinarily operate with rules that are sound so long as
our information is consistent, but fall back to stricter rules
when consistency is in question.

Daniel Bonevac First-Degree Entailment