Republic of the Philippines the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown

SUPREME COURT that there was a direct causal connection between such
Manila negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.
Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing
SECOND DIVISION factor in the causation of the accident is not the
proximate cause of an injury. Gaid vs. People, 584 SCRA
G.R. No. 171636 April 7, 2009 489, G.R. No. 171636 April 7, 2009

NORMAN A. GAID, Petitioner, DECISION

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. TINGA, J.:

Civil Law; Negligence; Definition of Negligence; Before the Court is a petition for review on
Elements of Simple Negligence; Standard test in certiorari1 assailing the 12 July 2005 Decision2 of the
determining whether a person is negligent in doing Court of Appeals and its subsequent
an act whereby injury or damage results to the Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for
person or property of another.—Negligence has reconsideration.
been defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that Petitioner Norman A. Gaid was charged with the crime
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide in an
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other information which reads as follow:
person suffers injury. The elements of simple
negligence: are (1) that there is lack of pre-caution on That on or about 12:00 high noon of October 25, 2001,
the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage infront of the Laguindingan National High School,
impending to be caused is not immediate or the Poblacion, Laguindingan, Misamis Oriental, Philippines
danger is not clearly manifest. The standard test in and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
determining whether a person is negligent in doing an said accused mentioned above while driving a
act whereby injury or damage results to the person or passenger’s jeepney color white bearing plate no. KVG-
property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the 771 owned by barangay captain Levy Etom has no
position of the person to whom negligence is precautionary measure to preempt the accident, did
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ran
reasonable consequence of the course actually [sic] over Michael Dayata resulting of [sic] his untimely
pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to death as pronounced by the attending physician of
refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard Northern Mindanao Medical Center Hospital, Cagayan
against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so de Oro City.
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this CONTRARY TO LAW.4
provision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist.
Petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial
ensued.
Same; Same; Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases;
Definition of Proximate Cause; In order to establish
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of
a vehicle; it must be shown that there was a direct
causal connection between such negligence and the At around 12:00 noon on 25 October 2001, petitioner
injuries or damages complained of.—Assuming was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane
arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must road where the Laguindingan National High School is
be shown that his negligence was the proximate cause located toward the direction of Moog in Misamis
of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that Oriental. His jeepney was filled to seating capacity.5 At
which, in the natural and continuous sequence, the time several students were coming out of the
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces school premises.6Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old
the injury, and without which the result would not have student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by
occurred. In order to establish a motorist’s liability for eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a
store on the left side of the road. From where he was guilty only of simple negligence resulting in
at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand homicide.1avvphi1.zw+
to flag down petitioner’s jeepney7 which was traveling
on the right lane of the road.8 However, neither did The Court of Appeals exonerated petitioner from the
petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos charge of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide
(Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to on the ground that he was not driving recklessly at the
ride at that point.9 time of the accident. However, the appellate court still
found him to be negligent when he failed "to promptly
The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata’s feet was pinned stop his vehicle to check what caused the sudden
to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat jotting of its rear tire."22
on the ground behind the jeepney.10 Another
prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who was In its 6 February 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
also situated on the left side of the street but directly denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.23
in front of the school gate, heard "a strong impact
coming from the jeep sounding as if the driver forced Hence, the instant petition.
to accelerate in order to hurdle an obstacle."11 Dayata
was then seen lying on the ground12and caught in
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in
between the rear tires.13 Petitioner felt that the left rear
finding that "there is (sic) absolutely lack of precaution
tire of the jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted
on the part of the petitioner when he continued even
to the right side.14
after he had noticed that the left rear tire and the jeep
tilted to its right side."24 Petitioner stressed that he, in
Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was run over, fact, stopped his jeep when its left rear tire bounced
prompting him to jump off the jeepney to help the and upon hearing that somebody had been ran over.
victim. Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos carrying
the body of the victim.15 Mellalos loaded the victim on
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals
a motorcycle and brought him to the hospital. Dayata
committed a grave abuse of discretion in convicting
was first brought to the Laguindingan Health Center,
him of the offense of simple negligence resulting in
but it was closed. Mellalos then proceeded to the El
homicide. Assuming arguendo that he failed to
Salvador Hospital. Upon advice of its doctors, however,
promptly stop his vehicle, petitioner maintains that no
Dayata was brought to the Northern Mindanao
prudent man placed in the same situation could have
Medical Center where he was pronounced dead on
foreseen the vehicular accident or could have stopped
arrival.16
his vehicle in time when its left rear tire bounced due
to the following reasons: (1) the victim was only a
Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio- trespasser; (2) petitioner’s attention was focused on the
cerebral injuries as the cause of death.17 She testified road and the students outside the school’s gate; and
that the head injuries of Dayata could have been (3) the jeepney was fully loaded with passengers and
caused by having run over by the jeepney.18 cargoes and it was impossible for the petitioner to
promptly stop his vehicle.25
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Laguindingan19 found petitioner guilty beyond The Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The lower that petitioner was negligent when he continued to run
court held petitioner negligent in his driving towards the direction of Moog, Laguindingan,
considering that the victim was dragged to a distance dragging the victim a few meters from the point of
of 5.70 meters from the point of impact. He was also impact, despite hearing that a child had been run
scored for "not stopping his vehicle after noticing that over.26
the jeepney’s left rear tire jolted causing the vehicle to
tilt towards the right."20 On appeal, the Regional Trial
The presence or absence of negligence on the part of
Court (RTC)21 affirmed in toto the decision of the
petitioner is determined by the operative events
MCTC.
leading to the death of Dayata which actually
comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while
judgment with modification in that it found petitioner positioned on the left side of the road and ended when
he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage A The jeep was moving slowly and I noticed
covered the span between the moment immediately that there was something that [sic] the jeep a
after the victim was run over and the point when little bit bounced up as if a hump that’s the
petitioner put the jeepney to a halt. time I heard a shout from outside.32

During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be Petitioner stated that he was driving at no more than
negligent. 15 kilometers per hour.33

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or It appears from the evidence Dayata came from the left
failing to do, without malice, an act from which material side of the street. Petitioner, who was driving the
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of jeepney on the right lane, did not see the victim flag
precaution on the part of the person performing or him down. He also failed to see him go near the
failing to perform such act.27 jeepney at the left side. Understandably, petitioner was
focused on the road ahead. In Dayata’s haste to board
In Manzanares v. People,28 this Court convicted the jeep which was then running, his feet somehow got
petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting pinned to the left rear tire, as narrated by Bongolto.
in multiple homicide and serious physical injuries when Actub only saw Dayata after he heard a strong impact
he was found driving the Isuzu truck very fast before it coming from the jeep.
smashed into a jeepney.29 Likewise, in Pangonorom v.
People,30 a public utility driver, who was driving very With the foregoing facts, petitioner can not be held
fast, failed to slow down and hit a swerving car. He was liable during the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be
found negligent by this Court. held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate
In the instant case, petitioner was driving slowly at the cause of the accident and the death of the victim was
time of the accident, as testified to by two definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with
eyewitnesses. Prosecution witness Actub affirmed this the moving jeepney to get a ride.
fact on cross-examination, thus:
In the instant case, petitioner had exercised extreme
ATTY. MACUA: precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the
vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not
(to the witness) having seen the victim who came from behind on the
left side.

Q Mr. Witness, when the passenger jeepney

passed by the gate of the Laguindingan However, the Court of Appeals found petitioner guilty
National High School, is it running slowly, am of simple negligence resulting in homicide for failing to
I correct? stop driving at the time when he noticed the bouncing
of his vehicle. Verily, the appellate court was referring
to the second stage of the incident.
A Yes, he was running slowly.31

Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe

The slow pace of the jeepney was seconded
for the protection of the interests of another person
by Mellalos:
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
Q You testified that you heard somebody person suffers injury.34
outside from the vehicle shouting that a boy
was ran over, am I correct?
The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is
lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2)
A Yes, Sir. that the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.35
Q Now, before you heard that shouting, did
you observe any motion from the vehicle? The standard test in determining whether a person is
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: produces the injury, and without which the result would
could a prudent man, in the position of the person to not have
whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the occurred.41 In order to establish a motorist's liability for
course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown
on the actor to refrain from that course or to take that there was a direct causal connection between such
precautions to guard against its mischievous results, negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.
and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring factor in the causation of the accident is not the
of the admonition born of this provision, is always proximate cause of an injury.42
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.36
The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of
In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. impact proved to be the immediate cause of his death,
Court of Appeals,37 the petitioner was the franchisee as indicated in the post-mortem findings.43 His skull
that operates and maintains the toll facilities in the was crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner
North and South Luzon Toll Expressways. It failed to immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not
exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX have saved the life of the victim as the injuries he
safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers suffered were fatal.
on the highway were removed even as flattened
sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The highway The evidence on record do not show that the jeepney
was still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened dragged the victim after he was hit and run over by the
sugarcanes. The petitioner should have foreseen that jeepney. Quite the contrary, the evidence discloses that
the wet condition of the highway would endanger the victim was not dragged at all. In fact, it is the other
motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours of the way around. Bongolto narrated that after the impact,
morning.38 Consequently, it was held liable for he saw Dayata left behind the jeepney.44 Actub saw
damages. Dayata in a prone position and bleeding within seconds
after impact.45 Right after the impact, Mellalos
In an American case, Hernandez v. Lukas,39 a motorist immediately jumped out of the jeepney and saw the
traveling within the speed limit and did all was possible victim lying on the ground.46 The distance of 5.70
to avoid striking a child who was then six years old only. meters is the length of space between the spot where
The place of the incident was a neighborhood where the victim fell to the ground and the spot where the
children were playing in the parkways on prior jeepney stopped as observed by the trial judge during
occasions. The court ruled that it must be still proven the ocular inspection at the scene of the accident.47
that the driver did not exercise due care. The evidence
showed that the driver was proceeding in lawful Moreover, mere suspicions and speculations that the
manner within the speed limit when the child ran into victim could have lived had petitioner stopped can
the street and was struck by the driver’s vehicle. Clearly, never be the basis of a conviction in a criminal
this was an emergency situation thrust upon the driver case.48 The Court must be satisfied that the guilt of the
too suddenly to avoid. accused had been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.49 Conviction must rest on nothing less than a
In this case, the courts below zeroed in on the fact that moral certainty of the guilt of the accused. The
petitioner did not stop the jeepney when he felt the overriding consideration is not whether the court
bouncing of his vehicle, a circumstance which the doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it
appellate court equates with negligence. Petitioner entertains doubt as to his guilt.50
contends that he did not immediately stop because he
did not see anybody go near his vehicle at the time of Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish
the incident.40 that the proximate cause of the victim’s death was
petitioner’s alleged negligence, if at all, even during the
Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been second stage of the incident.
negligent, it must be shown that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is If at all again, petitioner’s failure to render assistance to
defined as that which, in the natural and continuous the victim would constitute abandonment of one’s
sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, victim punishable under Article 275 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, the omission is not covered by Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
the information. Thus, to hold petitioner criminally and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
liable under the provision would be tantamount to a certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
denial of due process. had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Therefore, petitioner must be acquitted at least on Division.
reasonable doubt. The award of damages must also be
deleted pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code which REYNATO S. PUNO
states that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the Chief Justice
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. Footnotes

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of 1 Rollo, pp. 27-43.

the Court of Appeals dated 12 July 2005 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Norman A. Gaid is 2Id. at 8-21; Penned by Associate Justice
ACQUITTED of the crime of Simple Negligence Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal, and concurred in by
Resulting in Homicide as found by the Court of Appeals Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores
and of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in and Edgardo A. Camello.
Homicide in Criminal Case No. 1937 of the MCTC of
Laguindingan, Misamis Oriental. 3 Id. at 23-24.

SO ORDERED. 4 CA rollo, p. 84.

DANTE O. TINGA 5 Vide t.s.n., Records, p. 209.

Associate Justice
6 Id. at 264.
WE CONCUR:
7 Records, p. 69.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
8 Vide: TSN, Records, p. 209.

9 Id. at 251 and 265.

CONCHITA CARPIO PRESBITERO J.
MORALES VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
10 Id. at 229.

11 Id. at 235.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
12 Id.

ATTESTATION
13 Id. at 208-211.

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had

been reached in consultation before the case was
14 Id.
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
15 Id. at 264-265.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
16 Id. at 248-252.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division 17 Id. at 65.

CERTIFICATION 18 Id. at 148.

19CA rollo, pp. 84-92. Presided by Judge 39 432 N.E.2d 1028.
Teofilo T. Adilan. Promulgated on 30 July
2003. 40 Records, p. 271.

20 Rollo, p. 74. 41Calimutan v. People, G.R. No. 152133, 9

February 2006, 482 SCRA 44, 60; Lambert v.
21CA rollo, pp. 274-276. Penned by Acting Heirs of Roy Castillon, G.R. No. 160709, 23
Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara. February 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 291; St. Mary’s
Academy v. Carpitanos, 426 Phil. 878, 886
22 Rollo, p. 18. (2002); Raynera v. Hiceta, 365 Phil. 546, 553
(1999).
23 Supra note 3.
42 8 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles §426,
24
Rollo, p. 35. citing Branstetter v. Gerdeman, 364 Mo. 1230,
274 S.W.2d 240 (1955)and Salerno v. LaBarr,
159 Pa. Commw. 99, 632 A.2d 1002 (1993).
25 Id. at 37.
43 Records, p. 65.
26 Id. at 92.
44 Vide TSN, Records, p. 228.
27People v. Garcia, 467 Phil. 1102, 1108-1109
(2004; People v. Agliday, 419 Phil. 555, 566
(2001)..
45 Id. at 235.

28G.R. Nos. 153760-61, 16 October 2006, 504

46 Id. at 255.
SCRA 354.
47Id. at 283. These two separate spots are
29 Id. at 376-377. marked as Exhs. "F-3" and "F-4" on the sketch
of the accident scene drawn by witness
Bongolto, Exh. "F" and "Exh. "2." Records, p.
30G.R. No. 143380, 11 April 2005, 455 SCRA
88.
211.
48People v. Ador, G.R. No. 140538-39, 14 June
31 Records, p. 237.
2004.
32 Id. at 250. 49 People v. Sol, G.R. No. 118504, 7 May 1997.
33 Id. at 275. 50 Supra note 50.
34Fernando v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
DISSENTING OPINION
92087, 8 May 1992, 208 SCRA 714, 718.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

35Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, 15th
ed., p. 1002.
With all due respect to my esteemed colleague, Mr.
Justice Tinga, who has, as usual, prepared a well-written
36Philippine National Construction
and comprehensive ponencia, I regret my inability to
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
share the view that petitioner Norman A.
159270, 22 August 2005, 467 SCRA 569, 581.
Gaid http://www.geocities.com/afdb/Hold/8180.htmsh
ould be acquitted of the crime of Simple Negligence
37 Supra note 36 at 569. Resulting in Homicide.

38 Id.
Simple negligence was shown on the part of petitioner dragging the victim a few meters from the point of
at the second stage of the operative events leading to impact. His lack of care was, thus, perceivable.
the death of Dayata. The second stage constituted the
time between the moment immediately after the victim Indeed, petitioner could not exonerate himself from his
was run over and the point when petitioner stopped negligent act. He failed the test of being a prudent
the jeepney. man. The test for determining whether or not a person
is negligent in doing an act that results in damage or
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines injury to the person or property of another is: Would a
"simple negligence" as one that "consists in the lack of prudent man, in the position of the person to whom
precaution displayed in those cases in which the negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
the danger clearly manifest." about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty
on the doer to refrain from that course or take
The elements of simple imprudence are (1) that there precaution against its mischievous results, and the
is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable
that the damage impending to be caused is not foresight of harm, followed by ignoring the admonition
immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.1 As borne of this prevision, is the constitutive fact in
early as in People v. Vistan,2 the Court defined simple negligence.3
negligence, penalized under what is now Art. 365 of the
RPC, as "a mere lack of prevision in a situation where Even the Death Certificate of the victim and the
either the threatened harm is not immediate or the testimonies of Dr. Remedios L. Uy and Dr. Tammy L. Uy
danger not openly visible." Elsewise put, the gravamen of the National Bureau of Investigation proved that the
of the offense of simple negligence is the failure to victim died of injuries caused by the force or impact
exercise the diligence necessitated or called for by the and found extensive/serious fractures and
situation which was not immediately life-destructive disfigurement as described in the Autopsy Report.4
but which culminated, in the present case, in the death
of a human being. Dr. Tammy further testified that based on the type,
multiplicity, and severity of the injuries to the victim’s
On October 25, 2001, on or about 12:00 high noon, the head, he believed that the head was run over and
victim Dayata was waiting for a ride home in front of subsequently, the body was dragged also based on the
the gate of Laguindingan National High School, multiplicity of the abrasions.5
Misamis Oriental when he was run over by a passenger
utility jeep, driven by petitioner. Dayata was dragged to The degree of precaution and diligence required of an
a distance of 5.7 meters from the point of impact individual in any given case so as to avoid being
before petitioner stopped the jeep which was running charged with recklessness varies with the degree of the
at an estimated speed of 15 kilometers per hour. danger. If the danger of doing harm to a person or to
Petitioner did not get off to attend to the victim; only another’s property, on account of a certain line of
the conductor did. The conductor loaded the victim on conduct, is great, the individual who chooses to follow
a motorcycle, and brought the victim to the hospital. that particular course of conduct is compelled to be
The victim was declared dead on arrival. Petitioner very careful in order to prevent or avoid the damage or
claimed that he did not see the victim prior to the injury. On the other hand, if the danger is small, very
accident and was unaware of how it happened because little care is required. It is, thus, possible that there are
the passenger jeep was fully loaded. infinite degrees of precaution or diligence, from the
most slight and instantaneous thought or the transitory
The evidence shows that petitioner continued on his glance of care to the most vigilant effort. The duty of
route even after sensing that he had run over a "hard the person to employ more or less degree of care in
object." At this point, petitioner should have displayed such cases will depend upon the circumstances of each
precaution by stopping on his tracks. Unfortunately, particular case.6
this was not done. Instead, even after he heard the
shout "adunay bata naligsan!" which means "a child has An example of simple imprudence is a case where the
been run over," petitioner nonetheless continued to driver of a cart, passing along the street of a city at the
run towards the direction of Moog, Laguindingan, speed prescribed by the ordinances and leading his
team from the side by a strap attached to the bridle or
head of one of the horses, on turning a corner and in a circumstances. What the Court said in De los Santos is
moment of distraction, does not see a child asleep in apropos that "[A] man must use common sense, and
the gutter on the side of the team opposite to him, by exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be
reason whereof the child is run over by the cart and cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then
killed. The act cannot be denominated as purely through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible
accidental, because, if the cart driver had been paying for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts
attention to his duty, he would have seen the child and which no one would have performed except through
very likely would have been able to avoid the accident. culpable abandon."9
Nor can it be called gross or reckless negligence,
because he was not able to foresee the extremely In the instant case, like in De los Santos, petitioner’s
unusual occurrence of a child being asleep in the offense is in not applying the brakes when he heard the
gutter.7 shout and felt the bump that he ran over something.
These are not denied by petitioner. Petitioner, thus,
In the fairly similar case of People v. De los failed to show lack of precaution given the
Santos,8 where petitioner Glenn De los Santos run over circumstances.
several Philippine National Police (PNP) trainees doing
their jogging, killing 11 of them and injuring another Therefore, I vote to affirm the finding of the Court of
10, this Court set aside the Regional Trial Court’s Appeals that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable
conviction of Glenn for the complex crime of multiple doubt of the lesser offense of Simple Negligence
murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple Resulting in Homicide under Art. 365 of the RPC, with
attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as the the corresponding penalty of four (4) months
qualifying circumstance. We held that what happened imprisonment, including the awards of civil indemnity,
in the wee hours of the morning with overcast skies and moral and actual damages, plus costs.
the PNP trainees who were hard to discern due to their
dark attire and running at the wrong side of the road FROM ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, I, therefore,
was an accident. Glenn was, however, found to be vote for the outright DISMISSAL of the instant petition
negligent in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his for lack of merit.
vehicle to the left or to a safe place the moment he
heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he done so,
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
many trainees would have been spared.
Associate Justice

It is true that in the instant case, it could be argued that

Footnotes
victim Dayata might have died instantaneously upon
being run over by the left rear tire of petitioner’s
jeepney. Nonetheless, that is already academic at this
1 2 L.B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code 988
point. Had petitioner promptly applied the brakes (12th ed.).
when he heard the shout that he ran over someone and
felt the bump, could the victim had survived? Alas, that
2 G.R. No. 17218, September 8, 1921.
cannot be answered as the victim was dragged for
approximately 5.7 meters. If indeed petitioner’s 33 R.C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code 602-
jeepney was running at only around 15 kilometers per 603 (1988); citing Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809,
hour, it would be easy to stop the jeepney within a 813 (1918).
distance of five (5) feet. Had he instantly applied the
brakes and put the jeepney to a sudden stop, hence, 4 Records, p. 83.
the life of Dayata could have been saved. Worse, the
lack of care and precaution of petitioner was shown in 5 Id. at 148. TSN, June 24, 2002, p. 13.
his utter lack of concern towards the victim. It was only
his conductor who brought the victim on a motorcycle 6R.C. Aquino, supra note 3, at 603; citing
to the hospital when petitioner was duty-bound to do
Vistan, supra note 2.
so.
7 Id. at 607; citing U.S. v. Reodique, 32 Phil. 458
Clear to my mind is that petitioner did not exercise the
(1915); U.S. v. Clemente, 24 Phil. 178.
necessary care expected of him given the
8G.R. No. 131588, March 27, 2001, 355 SCRA
415.

9Id. at 430; citing U.S. v. Meleza, 14 Phil. 468,

470 (1909), cited in People v. Pugay, No. L-
74324, November 17, 1988, 167 SCRA 439,
448.