Media Freedom

The Media and its Relations with the Power Holders

Pakistani media has always been very careful in not attacking the military. On the other hand, it has
often been
given a free hand to demonise politicians and the government, as is currently still the case, for
instance with
regard to the Jang Group and its relentless campaign against the Zardari administration.
Where the establishment has not been able to completely subjugate the media, or at least to keep its
most vocal
critics under control, through a patronage-like and benefits-based system, it has always been able to
resort to an
alternative, very effective method: repression.
Chronicles of repression
The first recorded attack on the freedom of the press took place in 1948, with the proscription of
three periodicals
belonging to PPL, by the Muslim League government of Punjab. Another provincial government, that
of Sindh,
followed suit in 1949, by forbidding the circulation of Dawn, due to its violent attacks on the ministry.
Other cases
of harassment of the press, still under the post-independence civilian government, included the 1952
arrest,
under the Public Safety Act, of the editor, one of the owners and the printer of the Dhaka daily
Pakistan Observer.
The main reason for that act of repression was the publication of an editorial which had been very
critical of the
prime minister. In the same year, the Official Secrets Act, a repressive legacy from the colonial past,
was invoked
by the government to muzzle the press on a constitutional process that had gone astray. The
reaction of the press
was immediate and united, with the Nawa-i-Waqt calling the measure ‘a wrong order, grossly
unwarranted’.99 ‘A
study of official reports shows that during the first seven years (1947–1953) of Pakistan, in the
Punjab alone,
31 newspapers were banned’.100
Nationalist ideology was also often used as a compelling argument to harass those publications that
were not
keeping in line with the main dictates of the power holders. Patriotism, or the knowledge of what was
best for
the Pakistani nation, was presented as the exclusive monopoly of the governing class and its
bureaucracy. Only
they knew how to properly give meaning to this concept that was so important to the existence of the
country,
especially in the early years after partition. Therefore, when the weekly publication the New Orient
proclaimed in
1949 to stand for ‘a strong, progressive, sovereign and democratic Pakistan where man-made
inequalities will
be eliminated’ and it demanded ‘a popular democratic constitution’101 upholding fundamental human
rights, it was
forced to close after the publication of only a few issues.
The existence of a set of issues that had to be considered as “untouchable”, since they pertained to
the very
foundations of the country, was further confirmed by other cases of media suppression. The most
emblematic
of these took place in the first few years of Pakistan’s existence. It served as a warning for future
generations
of journalists about the dangers involved in trespassing on the invisible boundaries of news
reporting. Political
analyst Zafarullah Khan mentioned this same event as the first case of military restrictive
intervention towards the
media,102 but from the different sources consulted it is difficult to arrive at this conclusion, because it
concerned
a period under civilian government and the main action was actually undertaken by fellow
newspaper editors.
99 Nawa-i-Waqt, 25th November 1952.
100 Report of the Court Inquiry (Munir Report), Lahore, 1954. p.109.
101 New Orient, Karachi, March 1949.
102 Interview, Zafarullah Khan, Islamabad, 19th January 2010.
Media and Governance in Pakistan • 31
www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu
The case in question is that of the six-month closure of The Civil & Military Gazette, the oldest and
‘once the
most powerful daily in the undivided Punjab and the hinterland of Delhi area’.103 The controversy
started with
the publication of a report, in April 1949, ‘suggesting that a compromise formula on the basis of
partitioning the
State of Jammu and Kashmir was under discussion between India and Pakistan, and an agreement
might be
reached soon’.104 The mere mention of such an eventuality in a territorial dispute that barely two
years before
had unleashed the first of three wars between India and Pakistan for the control of Kashmir was
immediately
labelled an act of treason against the Pakistani state. At least that is the wording that was used in an
editorial
jointly published by 16 dailies from across the political spectrum, condemning the article and
demanding that the
authorities take legal action against the newspaper. The newspaper, where Rudyard Kipling had
once worked,105
was banned for six months and it never recovered from the stigma attached to it and its nefarious
consequences.
Eventually, in 1964, just a few years before completing its first century of operations,106 it was closed.
Self-censorship
Despite all the aforementioned attacks on press freedom that took place in the 11 years of civilian
administration
following Pakistan’s independence, the situation radically worsened with the October 1958 military
coup led by
General Ayub Khan and the resulting promulgation of martial law. The absolute prohibition of any
criticism of
the regime by the press became a constant feature of all the military regimes that followed. Pre-
censorship was
structurally introduced as well as a press advice system, the main purposes of which were to induce
the media
to refrain from publishing anything hostile about the military regime, rather than the regime having to
intervene
afterwards with more repressive and harsher measures.
The “press advice system” was actually another legacy of colonial rule. It centred on the creation of
Press Advisory
Boards (later called also Committees or Councils), with a mixed membership of both editors and
government
officials. Those Boards were expected to provide sufficient guarantees to the government that the
press would
abstain from publishing any material that would go against government policies, or that could
endanger the
security or integrity of the country. The system was suppressed on various occasions, but it was
promptly revived
when control over the role of the media had to be tightened, or when the same media could be used
as an extra
means for (war) propaganda.107 Its main feature, however, changed over time, as the advisory
councils were made
redundant by the promulgation of press advice directly from the Information Ministry or the army to
newspapers
and news agencies. Eventually, the press laws and the institutionalisation of “the advice system” ‘left
no room
for objective and investigative reporting’.108 Journalists became the mere messengers of government,
a situation
that, according to many analysts and members of the media, still exists today.
The option of a government-led takeover of dissenting media outlets was not confined to publishing
houses
or newspapers, as already seen in the case of the PPL group. National news agencies also
experienced this
effective method of censorship. In 1949 the Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) was created.
Despite its initial
ambition to become the country’s main source of independent news, it soon became entrapped in
the scheme
of things that determined most of the national media’s behaviour. In other words, APP reduced itself
to the role
of launching pad for all sorts of news, handouts and speeches fed by the establishment. As this
domesticated
performance apparently did not completely satisfy the political masters of the moment, in 1961 the
Ayub regime
proceeded with a formal takeover. The reason given for this intervention was the need to save APP
from a
financial collapse. Its financial position did, in fact, improve after the takeover, but at the same time
the news
agency found itself further removed from its core mission, that is, the ‘supply of unbiased and
reliable news to
the newspapers and agencies in Pakistan and abroad’.109 Especially in those times when national
newspapers
could hardly deploy their own networks of reporters across the country and the access to
international news
agencies was still limited due to technological constraints, the importance and impact of APP was
enormous.
But its evident manipulation of the news created an environment of distrust that, as still witnessed
today, pushed
part of the population (at least those literate in English) to rely more on the foreign press than on the
domestic,
and the manifest attempts to cover up events, such as the loss of East Pakistan in 1971,
occasionally provoked
103 Z. Niazi (1986). Op. cit. p.72.
104 Ibid. p.69.
105 From 1882 to 1887.
106 It had been originally established in Lahore in 1870.
107 The last was the case in the 1965 war between Pakistan and India.
108 Z. Niazi (1986). Op. cit. p.123.
109 As stated in Section 4 of the 15th June 1961 takeover ordinance.
32 • Initiative for peacebuilding
www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu
angry reactions among the population against newsmen and newspapers in general. Subsequently,
under the
civilian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, APP was used to silence, marginalise and sometimes even
attack the
political opposition. In that respect, the media in Pakistan today has to cope with a pervasive lack of
credibility.
The power of advertisement
Another means by which authorities in Pakistan have been effective in controlling the media is the
discriminatory
use that they have made of advertising contracts. Advertisements have always been used ‘as a lever
and financial
pressure against the “erring” newspapers’, as many of them, from time to time, ‘faced the wrath of
the Government
in the form of partial or total stoppage of advertisements’.110 A key player in this field has been, once
again, the
Pakistani army. Due to its extensive presence in the country’s economy, spanning across all the
main sectors,
from agriculture to manufacturing and services, and to its massive financial resources, estimated at
about €15
billion,111 it can be safely assumed that its advertising power is equally pervasive and financially
weighty.
The army’s pervasive influence
Advertising, however, is just one of the many instruments at the army’s disposal with which to control
and influence
the behaviour of the country’s media. More repressive measures are obviously readily at hand (as
already
discussed), as well as other, more surreptitious ones. The buying of alliances and favours (further
elaborated in
the following section) is one, as is the power to induce the media to internalise the army’s
propaganda. One of
the most striking examples of this internalisation of propaganda is provided by the widespread and
unshakable
(at least until the April 2009 Swat offensive – see later in the report for more details) support that the
media has
given to the Taliban movement since its anti-Soviet inception under general Zia ul-Haq. This long-
term process
of indoctrination has been one of the main reasons that prevented a sudden shift in public opinion
about the
role and perception of the Taliban, despite the new course advocated by President Musharraf in the
aftermath
of the events of 11th September. The “unconscious” absorption of a certain rhetoric, which mainly
defined the
Taliban as freedom fighters for the Kashmir cause and as staunch advocates of a puritan form of
Islam, revealed
itself to be more resistant to removal than originally expected by the country’s leaders. In addition,
the situation
in this regard has been further complicated by the alleged support that some elements within the
army have
been providing to the Taliban, even after the public announcement that the Pakistani state was to
take all the
necessary steps to distance itself from any links to the country’s Taliban.
The far-reaching effects of this kind of internalisation of the army’s discourse by the national media
were recently
confirmed by the debate that took place in the country after the long-announced Kerry-Lugar bill112
was finally
passed in the US Congress at the end of September 2009. As noted by media analyst Zafarullah
Khan113
following that event, all the media reacted in unison and endorsed the harsh critiques that were
expressed by the
Pakistani military towards the legislation. According to Mr Khan, it was no coincidence that the
national media
would take over the Inter Services Public Relations’ (ISPR) argument characterising the Kerry-Lugar
bill as an
attempt by the US ‘to compromise Pakistan’s sovereignty, impinge on Pakistan’s national security
interests, [and]
micromanage any aspect of Pakistani military or civilian operations’.114 The media was simply
responding to the
military’s propaganda and instinctively showing its considerable level of assimilation of the same.
The media and the ISPR
A more direct interaction between the media and the military began to emerge after the end of Zia ul-
Haq’s
regime, as regular briefings were given by the ISPR – the media wing of the military – to journalists.
The ISPR
used to share with journalists some occasional reports, which carried very limited information. After
9/11, the
role of the ISPR increased many-fold, particularly with reference to news about the troops’
deployment in conflict
zones, military operations against the militants and the role of the Pakistani army in the global War
on Terror.
Throughout this period, however, the interaction between the military and the journalists remained
constrained
by two major factors: firstly, the military’s need for secrecy and, secondly, how this need affected the
media’s
110 Z. Niazi (1986). Op. cit. p.111.
111 For more details on the matter, see M. Mezzera and S. Aftab (2009). Pakistan state-society analysis, Initiative for
Peacebuilding. Available
at http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.com/pdf/Pakistan_State_Society_Analysis.pdf.
112 More formally known as the ‘S. 3263: Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008’, which was originally proposed to the
110th
Congress by Senator Joseph Biden.
113 Interview, Zafarullah Khan, Islamabad, 19th January 2010.
114 A. Iqbal. ‘US note dilutes some conditions in Kerry-Lugar bill’, Dawn, 14th October 2009.
Media and Governance in Pakistan • 33
www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu
capacity to understand what was going on within the conflict zones.115 Currently, some analysts
believe that the
liberalisation of the electronic media launched under Musharraf has widened the scope of the media
discourse
and debate. Many long-existing taboos concerning the sensitivity of military-related information have
been
gradually broken. Pakistani media has now started to talk about defence policy and intelligence
agencies in a
way that could not even be imagined in the past.116
The media’s relations with the PPP
The aforementioned process of increasing conservatism, which has engulfed the Pakistani media
since the first
military regime, is reflected, among others, by the history of the media’s responses to the PPP, one
of the two
largest political parties in Pakistan, characterised by secular, left-wing leanings. Leading professor of
journalism
Dr Mehdi Hasan argues that Pakistan’s military establishment and media have been opposing and
campaigning
against the PPP since the party’s establishment. An anti-PPP media campaign was initially launched
during
the Ayub regime. Later in 1970, on the eve of the general elections, all Pakistani newspapers,
except two, were
campaigning against the PPP. From 1972 to 1977 traditional right-wing media continued this
campaign, or media
trial, except some newspapers which were under the government-controlled NPT. During the Zia ul-
Haq regime,
not only did the media maintain its harsh approach to the PPP, but also those journalists having
democratic,
liberal and secular inclinations were often subjected to self-exile, floggings, arrests and trials in
military courts.
Both of Benazir Bhutto’s governments had to face similar media responses from most, if not all, of
the media
groups.117 This kind of systematic “media trial” is not visible to any comparable degree for any of the
right-wing
political parties, which have generally enjoyed broad media support.
The media and religious militancy
In combination with its support for the military establishment and the right-wing political discourse,
the media
has become, advertently or inadvertently, supportive of the extremist and militant tendencies in the
country. The
media was not far behind in the anti-Ahmadiyya disturbances in Punjab in 1953 which made it clear
that it was
more than willing to “play ball” with the undemocratic forces.118 Since then, a part of Pakistan’s
mainstream media
has been manifesting an approach that is very close to the militants’ media. The media barons of
Pakistan cannot
be excluded from the responsibility for creating and promoting an extreme religious or ideological
view in the
country.119 More recent developments – such as the mushrooming growth of the media, especially of
electronic
media, and the accompanying crescendo of media liberalisation – have been regarded by some
analysts as
showing a dubious coincidence, not only chronologically but also in terms of a possible structured
political
framework, with the advent of religious militancy.
The current wave of violence by radical extremists and other terrorists has, however, exposed the
media’s
shortcomings on many levels. Mainstream media, for instance, has failed to inform the people about
the realities
accompanying the rise of extremism in Pakistan, and has been a source of great confusion. The
media has
mostly chosen not to use its tremendous outreach to counter extremist tendencies and propaganda.
It has done
so either to appease extremists or because it subscribes to the same extremist ideology. Until
recently, most
newspapers and TV channels seemed almost at pains not to dwell on the context of the emergence
of the
Taliban and other extremist elements. Media experts argue that newspapers and TV channels in
Pakistan did not,
and perhaps still do not, perceive the Taliban as a threat to the country or its people. Only one year
ago – before
the launch of the military operation in Swat, which will be discussed later in the report – countless
newspaper
reports and TV talk shows were opposing military action, or justifying the illegal and unconstitutional
demands of
the Taliban, at a moment when they had effectively ended the writ of the state in the Malakand
division and were
attacking security forces personnel, public representatives and common citizens.120
115 As elaborated by Ejaz Haider, a leading journalist associated with SAMAA TV, at an event held on 16th September 2008 at the
Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, US. Summarised text and video recording of the programme are available at http://www.
wilsoncenter.org/ondemand/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.play&mediaid=BE27523E-C0A8-77AC-511504F19B3C19C3.
116 Interview, Zahid Hussain, Islamabad, 20th January 2010.
117 Interview, Dr Mehdi Hasan, Lahore, 26th January 2010.
118 W. Masood (2010). ‘Militant media in Pakistan: Political etymology and professional craft’, A PIPS Research Journal of Conflict
and Peace
Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1.
119 ‘Assessing the reporting, approach and impact of militants’ print media in Pakistan’, PIPS Newsletter, 23rd November 2009.
Available at
http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=events&id=58.
120 N. U. Din (2010). ‘Mainstream media’s response to radical extremism’, A PIPS Research Journal of Conflict and Peace Studies,
Vol. 3, No. 1.
34 • Initiative for peacebuilding
www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu
Infiltration by Corruption
Media freedom has been subject to multiple pressures and threats since partition and the inception
of an
independent Pakistan. As also elaborated in the Executive Summary of this report, press freedom
was inherently
limited by the original mission of the pre-independence media, which had been established, among
other reasons,
as a means to support the policies of the All India Muslim League. The media’s politicised agenda
had triggered
a wide array of repressive legislation and other controlling measures by the colonial administrators.
Once Pakistan came into being, the political value of such a repressive legislation was understood
and further
pursued by wide sections of the military and civilian establishment that were struggling for power in
the country.
The media became part of that power struggle and, at all levels of its operational capacity, from the
editor-owners
to the locally based news reporters, it became susceptible to informal alliances with the various
power brokers.
In that respect, media repression was not always perceived as a negative phenomenon, since the
closure or
takeover of a competing newspaper would open new commercial opportunities for those media
outlets which
had instead chosen to side with the winning party.
In order to make this system of alliances as widespread and as structured as possible, government
agencies,
especially since the first military regime of Ayub Khan, began to actively recruit individual journalists
across
a diverse range of media groups and outlets. Public funds were often misused and diverted towards
these
purposes. Ad hoc institutions were established, such as the “Writers’ Guild” in 1964, which were
meant to corrupt
and buy the loyalties of selected writers through the award of cash prizes. But, once again, this
practice was not a
prerogative of the military regimes. It was probably “institutionalised” by them, but the first seeds had
already been
planted and had sprouted on that substrate of political intrigue and feudal-like patronage that had
emerged soon
after partition. For instance, four vernacular papers which were subsidised by the League
government, allegedly
as part of an anti-illiteracy drive, became mere instruments of the same government’s anti-
Ahmadiyya campaign.
That campaign led ultimately to the 1953 anti-Ahmadiyya riots and to the first martial law in the
country. ‘During
the Bhutto regime, this practice continued on a wider scale than his predecessor’s era’121 (i.e. during
the military
dictatorship of Yahya Khan). That the situation had already deteriorated by 1972 is proven by the
appeal that the
PFUJ made to the government ‘to publish the names of all those journalists who were receiving
money from the
secret funds administered by the Central and Provincial Governments during the dictatorial
regimes’.122 A direct
system of corruption was therefore introduced, which, as indicated during the field work for this
report, seems
to be still very much alive and effective. For instance, a Lahore-based journalist working for one of
the main
television channels in the country, during an interview given to the authors of this report, referred to
a “balance
sheet” of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) which he had allegedly seen and on which the names
of well-known
fellow journalists and anchor persons were listed, together with the annual compensations they were
meant to
receive from the military intelligence agency.
All the infringements and interferences by the country’s establishment described in the report have
left profound
scars. Conformism in news reporting has become the norm, and it is only since the liberalisation of
the electronic
media that some enthusiasm for media independence seems to have resurfaced. However, it still
remains to
be seen whether the current ostentation of political independence is real, or whether it is rather a
new, more
sophisticated, strategy of following a script that has been determined outside the newsrooms and
that does not
necessarily respond to the principle of impartiality in news reporting.
121 Z. Niazi (1986). Op. cit. p.47.
122 Ibid.
Media and Governance in Pakistan • 35
www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu