Compiled Session 3

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128448. February 1, 2001.]
SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MIRASOL and LILIA E. MIRASOL , petitioners,

vs . THE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, and
PHILIPPINE EXCHANGE CO. INC. , respondents.
Alejandro M. Mirasol & Associates and Rodolfo V. Gumban & Carlos S. Ayeng for
petitioners.
The Chief Legal Counsel for respondent PNB.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner spouses, sugarland owners and planters, entered into several crop loan
nancing schemes secured by chattel and real estate mortgages with respondent PNB.
The latter was authorized to negotiate and sell sugar produced and to apply the proceeds
to the payment of their obligations. Respondent PHILEX, under P.D. No. 579 (Rationalizing
and Stabilizing The Export of Sugar and For Other Purposes) was authorized to purchase
sugar allotted for export with PNB. An accounting was requested by petitioners, but PNB
failed to comply. Petitioners conveyed several properties to PNB as dacion en pago when
asked to settle their accounts. Petitioners reiterated their request for accounting, but PNB
again failed to heed the same. Thus, the ling of Civil Case No. 14725 for accounting,
speci c performance and damages against PNB. PHILEX was impleaded as party
defendant. The parties limited the issues to the constitutionality of PD No. 579, among
others, and the amount due to the parties. During the trial, petitioners alleged that the loans
granted them by PNB had been fully paid by virtue of compensation with the unliquidated
amounts owed to them by PNB. The trial court, without notice to the Solicitor General,
rendered judgment holding PD No. 579 unconstitutional, ordering private respondents to
pay petitioners the whole amount corresponding to the residue of the unliquidated actual
cost price of sugar exported and to pay moral damages and attorney's fees. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals declared the dacion en pago valid and ordered PNB to render an a
counting.
It was held that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to rule on
the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree or executive order. However, Section
3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court provides that the Solicitor General must be noti ed of any
action assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order or proclamation.
Without the required notice the government is deprived of its day in court and it was
improper for the trial court to pass upon the constitutionality of the questioned PD.
Courts, as a rule, should not resolve the constitutionality of a law if the controversy
can be settled on other ground.
Compensation or set off cannot take place where neither of the parties are mutually
creditors and debtors of each other and where one claim is still the subject of litigation.
Moral damages and attorney's fees are recoverable where fraud or bad faith are duly
proved.
SYLLABUS
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1. REMEDIAL LAW; REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS; WITH AUTHORITY AND
JURISDICTION TO RULE ON CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
OR EXECUTIVE ORDER. — It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive
order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts . . . .
Furthermore, B.P. Blg. 129 grants Regional Trial Courts the authority to rule on the
conformity of laws or treaties with the Constitution.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTICE TO SOLICITOR GENERAL, MANDATORY. — It is basic legal
construction that where words of command such as "shall," "must," or "ought" are
employed, they are generally and ordinarily regarded as mandatory. Thus, where, as in Rule
64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the word "shall" is used, a mandatory duty is imposed,
which the courts ought to enforce. The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section
3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action
assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such
notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that,
contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions
involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is
required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no
ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. In all actions
assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice
to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO NOTIFY SOLICITOR GENERAL; CASE AT BAR.
— In this case, the Solicitor General was never noti ed about Civil Case No. 14725. Nor did
the trial court ever require him to appear in person or by a representative or to le any
pleading or memorandum on the constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court
of Appeals did not err in holding that lack of the required notice made it improper for the
trial court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the questioned presidential decrees.
HTcADC
4. ID.; SUPREME COURT; REQUISITES FOR EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW. —

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First,
there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review.
Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of
constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
5. ID.; ACTIONS; COURTS, AS A RULE, WILL NOT RESOLVE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
LAW IF CONTROVERSY CAN BE SETTLED ON OTHER GROUNDS. — As a rule, the courts will
not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy can be settled on other
grounds. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to
presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based
on the doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the measure had rst been
carefully studied by the legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord
with the Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The present case was instituted primarily for
accounting and speci c performance. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that PNB's
obligation to render an accounting is an issue, which can be determined, without having to
rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. In fact there is nothing in P.D. No. 579, which is
applicable to PNB's intransigence in refusing to give an accounting. The governing law
should be the law on agency, it being undisputed that PNB acted as petitioners' agent. In
other words, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis
mota of the case is absent. Thus we cannot rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579.
7. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; IMPLIED REPEAL, NOT FAVORED. — Petitioners
further contend that the passage of R.A. No. 7202 rendered P.D. No. 579 unconstitutional,
since R.A. No. 7202 a rms that under P.D. 579, the due process clause of the Constitution
and the right of the sugar planters not to be deprived of their property without just
compensation were violated. A perusal of the text of R.A. No. 7202 shows that the
repealing clause of said law merely reads: "SEC. 10. All laws, acts, executive orders and
circulars in con ict herewith are hereby repealed or modi ed accordingly." The settled rule
of statutory construction is that repeals by implication are not favored. R.A. No. 7202
cannot be deemed to have repealed P.D. No. 579. In addition, the power to declare a law
unconstitutional does not lie with the legislature, but with the courts. Assuming arguendo
that R.A. No. 7202 did indeed repeal P.D. No. 579, said repeal is not a legislative
declaration finding the earlier law unconstitutional.
8. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT BY COURT OF APPEALS, CONCLUSIVE AND
BINDING. — Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding upon this
Court unless said ndings are not supported by the evidence. Our jurisdiction in a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited only to reviewing questions of law
and factual issues are not within its province. In view of the aforequoted nding of fact, no
manifest error is chargeable to the respondent court for refusing to pierce the veil of
corporate fiction.
9. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; COMPENSATION; REQUISITES. —
For legal compensation to take place, the requirements set forth in Article 1278 and 1279
of the Civil Code must be present. Said articles read as follows: "Art. 1278. Compensation
shall take place when two persons, in their own right, are creditors and debtors of each
other. Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary: (1) That each
one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal
creditor of the other; (2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due
are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has
been stated; (3) That the two debts are due; (4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third
persons and communicated in due time to the debtor."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the present case, set-off or compensation cannot
take place between the parties because: First, neither of the parties are mutually creditors
and debtors of each other. Under P.D. No. 579, neither PNB nor PHILEX could retain any
difference claimed by the Mirasols in the price of sugar sold by the two rms, P.D. No. 579
prescribed where the pro ts from the sales are to be paid . . . . Thus, as correctly found by
the Court of Appeals, "there was nothing with which PNB was supposed to have off-set
Mirasols' admitted indebtedness." Second, compensation cannot take place where one
claim, as in the instant case, is still the subject of litigation, as the same cannot be deemed
liquidated.
11. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT, AFFIRMED
BY APPELLATE COURT, CONCLUSIVE ON APPEAL. — With respect to the duress allegedly
employed by PNB, which impugned petitioners' consent to the dacion en pago, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals found that there was no evidence to support said
claim. Factual ndings of the trial court, a rmed by the appellate court, are conclusive
upon this Court.
12. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT; FRAUD
OR BAD FAITH MUST BE DULY PROVED; CASE AT BAR. — An agent's failure to render an
accounting to his principal is contrary to Article 1891 of the Civil Code. The erring agent is
liable for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil Code . . . . Article 1170 of the Civil Code,
however, must be construed in relation to Article 2217 of said Code . . . . Moral damages
are explicitly authorized in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith. Good faith, however, is always presumed and any person who seeks to be
awarded damages due to the acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter
acted in bad faith, with malice, or with ill motive. In the instant case, petitioners have failed
to show malice or bad faith on the part of PNB in failing to render an accounting. Absent
such showing, moral damages cannot be awarded.
13. ID.; ID.; ATTORNEY'S FEES; BAD FAITH MUST BE PROVED. — Under Article 2208
(5) of the Civil Code, attorney's fees are allowed in the absence of stipulation only if "the
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly
valid, just, and demandable claim." As earlier stated, petitioners have not proven bad faith
on the part of PNB and PHILEX.
DECISION
QUISUMBING , J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 22, 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38607, as well as of its resolution of January 23,
1997, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The challenged decision reversed
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 42 in Civil Case No.
14725.
The factual background of this case, as gleaned from the records, is as follows:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. In 1973-1974, they produced
70,501.08 piculs 1 of sugar, 25,662.36 of which were assigned for export. The following
crop year, their acreage planted to the same crop was lower, yielding 65,100 piculs of
sugar, with 23,696.40 piculs marked for export.
Private respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) nanced the Mirasols' sugar
production venture for crop years, 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 under a crop loan nancing
scheme. Under said scheme, the Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage
on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage
empowered PNB as the petitioners' attorney-in-fact to negotiate and to sell the latter's
sugar in both domestic and export markets and to apply the proceeds to the payment of
their obligations to it.
Exercising his law-making powers under Martial Law, then President Ferdinand
Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 579 2 in November, 1974. The decree
authorized private respondent Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar
allocated for export to the United States and to other foreign markets. The price and
quantity was determined by the Sugar Quota Administration, PNB, the Department of
Trade and Industry, and finally, by the Office of the President. The decree further authorized
PNB to nance PHILEX's purchases. Finally, the decree directed that whatever pro t
PHILEX might realize from sales of sugar abroad was to be remitted to a special fund of
the national government, after commissions, overhead expenses and liabilities had been
deducted. The government o ces and entities tasked by existing laws and administrative
regulations to oversee the sugar export pegged the purchase price of export sugar in crop
years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 at P180.00 per picul.
PNB continued to nance the sugar production of the Mirasols for crop years 1975-
1976 and 1976-1977. These crop loans and similar obligations were secured by real
estate mortgages over several properties of the Mirasols and chattel mortgages over
standing crops. Believing that the proceeds of their sugar sales to PNB, if properly
accounted for, were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for
an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar. PNB ignored the request.
Meanwhile, petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded
withdrawals from their current accounts with said bank. PNB then asked petitioners to
settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result of these demands for payment,
petitioners on August 4, 1977, conveyed to PNB real properties valued at P1,410,466.00
by way of dacion en pago, leaving an unpaid overdrawn account of P1,513,347.78.
On August 10, 1982, the balance of outstanding sugar crop and other loans owed by
petitioners to PNB stood at P15,964,252.93. Despite demands, the Mirasols failed to
settle said due and demandable accounts. PNB then proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose
the mortgaged properties. After applying the proceeds of the auction sale of the
mortgaged realties, PNB still had a deficiency claim of P12,551,252.93.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds of the sale of their
export sugar for crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, insisting that said proceeds, if
properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations with the bank. PNB
remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account
since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National
Government and were subject to the disposition of the President of the Philippines for
public purposes.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols led a suit for accounting, speci c performance,
and damages against PNB with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 14725.
On June 16, 1987, the complaint was amended to implead PHILEX as party-
defendant.
The parties agreed at pre-trial to limit the issues to the following:
"1. The constitutionality and/or legality of Presidential Decrees numbered
338, 579, and 1192;
"2. The determination of the total amount allegedly due the plaintiffs from
the defendants corresponding to the allege(d) unliquidated cost price of export
sugar during crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975." 3
After trial on the merits, the trial court decided as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Philippine National
Bank (PNB) and Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX):
(1) Declaring Presidential Decree 579 enacted on November 12, 1974 and
all circulars, as well as policies, orders and other issuances issued in furtherance
thereof, unconstitutional and therefore, NULL and VOID being in gross violation of
the Bill of Rights;
(2) Ordering defendants PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiffs the whole amount corresponding to the residue of the unliquidated
actual cost price of 25,662 piculs in export sugar for crop year 1973-1974 at an
average price of P300.00 per picul, deducting therefrom however, the amount of
P180.00 already paid in advance plus the allowable deductions in service fees
and other charges;
(3) And also, for the same defendants to pay, jointly and severally, same
plaintiffs the whole amount corresponding to the unpaid actual price of 14,596
piculs of export sugar for crop year 1974-1975 at an average rate of P214.14 per
picul minus however, the sum of P180.00 per picul already paid by the
defendants in advance and the allowable deducting (sic) in service fees and other
charges. CHDTIS
"The unliquidated amount of money due the plaintiffs but withheld by the
defendants, shall earn the legal rate of interest at 12% per annum computed from
the date this action was instituted until fully paid; and, finally —
(4) Directing the defendants PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 in moral damages and the amount of
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of this litigation.
"SO ORDERED." 4
The same was, however, modi ed by a Resolution of the trial court dated May 14,
1992, which added the following paragraph:
"This decision should however, be interpreted without prejudice to whatever
bene ts that may have accrued in favor of the plaintiffs with the passage and
approval of Republic Act 7202 otherwise known as the 'Sugar Restitution Law,'
authorizing the restitution of losses suffered by the plaintiffs from Crop year
1974-1975 to Crop year 1984-1985 occasioned by the actuations of government-
owned and controlled agencies. (Emphasis in the original).
"SO ORDERED." 5
The Mirasols then led an appeal with the respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R CV
No. 38607, faulting the trial court for not nullifying the dacion en pago and the mortgage
contracts, as well as the foreclosure of their mortgaged properties. Also faulted was the
trial court's failure to award them the full money claims and damages sought from both
PNB and PHILEX.
On July 22, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment REVERSING the appealed
Decision and entering the following verdict:
"1. Declaring the dacion en pago and the foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties valid;
"2. Ordering the PNB to render an accounting of the sugar account of the
Mirasol[s] speci cally stating the indebtedness of the latter to the former and the
proceeds of Mirasols' 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 sugar production sold pursuant
to and in accordance with P.D. 579 and the issuances therefrom;
"3. Ordering the PNB to recompute in accordance with RA 7202 Mirasols'
indebtedness to it crediting to the latter payments already made as well as the
auction price of their foreclosed real estate and stipulated value of their properties
ceded to PNB in the dacon (sic) en pago;
"4. Whatever the result of the recomputation of Mirasols' account, the
outstanding balance or the excess payment shall be governed by the pertinent
provisions of RA 7202.
"SO ORDERED." 6
On August 28, 1996, petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the appellate
court denied on January 23, 1997.
Hence, the instant petition, with petitioners submitting the following issues for our
resolution:
"1. Whether the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute
unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have
agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.
"2.. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances 7 thereof are
unconstitutional.
"3. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed manifest error in
not applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil between respondents PNB
and PHILEX.
upholding the validity of the foreclosure on petitioners property and in upholding
the validity of the dacion en pago in this case.
not awarding damages to petitioners grounds relied upon the allowance of the
petition. (Underscored in the original)" 8
On the rst issue . It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive
order. 9 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts 1 0 In J.M.
Tuason and Co. v. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 696 (1961) we held:
"Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks
of appellate review of nal judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." 1 1
Furthermore, B.P. Blg. 129 grants Regional Trial Courts the authority to rule on the
conformity of laws or treaties with the Constitution, thus:
"SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;"
The pivotal issue, which we must address, is whether it was proper for the trial court
to have exercised judicial review.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in nding that it was improper for
the trial court to have declared P.D. No. 579 1 2 unconstitutional, since petitioners had not
complied with Rule 64, Section 3, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that said Rule
speci cally refers only to actions for declaratory relief and not to an ordinary action for
accounting, specific performance, and damages.
Petitioners' contentions are bereft of merit. Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides:
"SECTION 3. Notice to Solicitor General. — In any action which involves the
validity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be
noti ed by the party attacking the statute, executive order, or regulation, and shall
be entitled to be heard upon such question."
This should be read in relation to Section 1 [c] of P.D. No. 478, 13 which states in
part:
"SECTION 1. Functions and Organizations — (1) The O ce of the Solicitor
General shall . . . have the following specific powers and functions: SDECAI
xxx xxx xxx

"[c] Appear in any court in any action involving the validity of any treaty,
law, executive order or proclamation, rule or regulation when in his judgment his
intervention is necessary or when requested by the court."
It is basic legal construction that where words of command such as "shall," "must,"
or "ought" are employed, they are generally and ordinarily regarded as mandatory. 1 4 Thus,
where, as in Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the word "shall" is used, a mandatory
duty is imposed, which the courts ought to enforce.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor
General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law
or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to
depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the
mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and
similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not
just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in
the rule, there is no room for construction. 1 5 In all actions assailing the validity of a statute,
treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is
mandatory.
In this case, the Solicitor General was never noti ed about Civil Case No. 14725. Nor
did the trial court ever require him to appear in person or by a representative or to le any
pleading or memorandum on the constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court
of Appeals did not err in holding that lack of the required notice made it improper for the
trial court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the questioned presidential decrees.
As regards the second issue, petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its
implementing issuances are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition
against the taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this
Court to exercise its power of judicial review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power:
First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the
person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the
question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly,
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 1 6
As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy
can be settled on other grounds. 1 7 The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are
valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the
measure had rst been carefully studied by the legislative and executive departments and
found to be in accord with the Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved. 1 8
The present case was instituted primarily for accounting and speci c performance.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that PNB's obligation to render an accounting is an
issue, which can be determined, without having to rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No.
579. In fact there is nothing in P.D. No. 579, which is applicable to PNB's intransigence in
refusing to give an accounting. The governing law should be the law on agency, it being
undisputed that PNB acted as petitioners' agent. In other words, the requisite that the
constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case is absent. Thus we
cannot rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579.
Petitioners further contend that the passage of R.A. No. 7202 1 9 rendered P.D. No.
579 unconstitutional, since R.A. No. 7202 a rms that under P.D. 579, the due process
clause of the Constitution and the right of the sugar planters not to be deprived of their
property without just compensation were violated.
A perusal of the text of RA. No. 7202 shows that the repealing clause of said law
merely reads:
"SECTION 10. All laws, acts, executive orders and circulars in con ict
herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly."
The settled rule of statutory construction is that repeals by implication are not
favored. 2 0 R.A. No. 7202 cannot be deemed to have repealed P.D. No. 579. In addition, the
power to declare a law unconstitutional does not lie with the legislature, but with the
courts. 2 1 Assuming arguendo that R.A. No. 7202 did indeed repeal P.D. No. 579, said
repeal is not a legislative declaration finding the earlier law unconstitutional.
To resolve the third issue, petitioners ask us to apply the doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate ction with respect to PNB and PHILEX. Petitioners submit that PHILEX was
a wholly-owned subsidiary of PNB prior to the latter's privatization.
We note, however, that the appellate court made the following finding of fact:
"1. PNB and PHILEX are separate juridical persons and there is no reason
to pierce the veil of corporate personality. Both existed by virtue of separate
organic acts. They had separate operations and different purposes and powers."
22
Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding upon this Court
unless said ndings are not supported by the evidence. 2 3 Our jurisdiction in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited only to reviewing questions of law and
factual issues are not within its province. 2 4 In view of the aforequoted nding of fact, no
manifest error is chargeable to the respondent court for refusing to pierce the veil of
corporate fiction.
On the fourth issue, the appellate court found that there were two sets of accounts
between petitioners and PNB, namely:
"1. The accounts relative to the loan nancing scheme entered into by the
Mirasols with PNB (PNB's Brief, p. 16) On the question of how much the PNB lent
the Mirasols for crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, the evidence recited by the
lower court in its decision was de cient. We are offered (sic) PNB the amount of
FIFTEEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY TWO PESOS and NINETY THREE Centavos (Ps15,964,252.93) but this is
the alleged balance the Mirasols owe PNB covering the years 1975 to 1982.
"2. The account relative to the Mirasol's current account Numbers 5186
and 5177 involving the amount of THREE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
Pesos (P3,400,000.00) PNB claims against the Mirasols. (PNB's Brief, p. 17)
"In regard to the first set of accounts, besides the proceeds from PNB's sale
of sugar (involving the defendant PHILEX in relation to the export portion of the
stock), the PNB foreclosed the Mirasols' mortgaged properties realizing therefrom
in 1982 THREE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THIRTEEN THOUSAND Pesos
(P3,413,000.00), the PNB itself having acquired the properties as the highest
bidder.
"As to the second set of accounts, PNB proposed, and the Mirasols
accepted, a dacion en pago scheme by which the Mirasols conveyed to PNB
pieces of property valued at ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX Pesos (Ps1,410,466.00) (PNB's Brief, pp. 16-17)." 2 5
Petitioners now claim that the dacion en pago and the foreclosure of their
mortgaged properties were void for want of consideration. Petitioners insist that the loans
granted them by PNB from 1975 to 1982 had been fully paid by virtue of legal
compensation. Hence, the foreclosure was invalid and of no effect, since the mortgages
were already fully discharged. It is also averred that they agreed to the dacion only by
virtue of a martial law Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order (ASSO).
We nd petitioners' arguments unpersuasive. Both the lower court and the appellate
court found that the Mirasols admitted that they were indebted to PNB in the sum stated
in the latter's counterclaim. 2 6 Petitioners nonetheless insist that the same can be offset by
the unliquidated amounts owed them by PNB for crop years 1973-74 and 1974-75.
Petitioners' argument has no basis in law. For legal compensation to take place, the
requirements set forth in Articles 1278 and 1279 of the Civil Code must be present. Said
articles read as follows:
"ARTICLE 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their
own right, are creditors and debtors of each other.
"ARTICLE 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at
the same time a principal creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are
consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter
has been stated;
(3) That the two debts are due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy,

commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor."
In the present case, set-off or compensation cannot take place between the parties
because:
First, neither of the parties are mutually creditors and debtors of each other. Under
P.D. No. 579, neither PNB nor PHILEX could retain any difference claimed by the Mirasols
in the price of sugar sold by the two rms. P.D. No. 579 prescribed where the pro ts from
the sales are to be paid, to wit:
"SECTION 7. . . . After deducting its commission of two and one-half (2-
1/2%) percent of gross sales, the balance of the proceeds of sugar trading
operations for every crop year shall be set aside by the Philippine Exchange
Company, Inc,. as pro ts which shall be paid to a special fund of the National
Government subject to the disposition of the President for public purposes."
Thus, as correctly found by the Court of Appeals, "there was nothing with which PNB
was supposed to have off-set Mirasols' admitted indebtedness." 2 7
Second, compensation cannot take place where one claim, as in the instant case, is
still the subject of litigation, as the same cannot be deemed liquidated. 2 8
With respect to the duress allegedly employed by PNB, which impugned petitioners'
consent to the dacion en pago, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
there was no evidence to support said claim. Factual ndings of the trial court, a rmed by
the appellate court, are conclusive upon this Court. 2 9
On the fth issue, the trial court awarded petitioners P50,000.00 in moral damages
and P50,000.00 in attorney's fees. Petitioners now theorize that it was error for the Court
of Appeals to have deleted these awards, considering that the appellate court found PNB
breached its duty as an agent to render an accounting to petitioners.
An agent's failure to render an accounting to his principal is contrary to Article 1891
of the Civil Code. 3 0 The erring agent is liable for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil
Code, which states:
"Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages."
Article 1170 of the Civil Code, however, must be construed in relation to Article 2217
of said Code which reads:
"Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission."
Moral damages are explicitly authorized in breaches of contract where the

defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. 3 1 Good faith, however, is always presumed
and any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to the acts of another has the
burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith, with malice, or with ill motive. In the
instant case, petitioners have failed to show malice or bad faith 3 2 on the part of PNB in
failing to render an accounting. Absent such showing, moral damages cannot be awarded.
Nor can we restore the award of attorney's fees and costs of suit in favor of
petitioners. Under Article 2208 (5) of the Civil Code, attorney's fees are allowed in the
absence of stipulation only if "the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just, and demandable claim." As earlier stated,
petitioners have not proven bad faith on the part of PNB and PHILEX. IECcaA
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the
respondent court in CA-G.R. CV 38607 AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. One picul is equivalent to 63.25 kilograms.

2. The decree was entitled "Rationalizing and Stabilizing The Export of Sugar And For Other
Purposes."
3. Rollo, p. 78.
4. Id. at 104-105.
5. Id. at 110.
6. Id. at 88-89.
7. These include Circular Letter No. 24 dated October 25, 1974 which designates PHILEX to
undertake the liquidation, buying and disposition of "B" sugar quedans; Circular Letter
No. 13 s. 1974-1975 issued on May 5, 1975 which outlines the revision of the pricing
policy for sugar for crop year 1974-1975; and Circular Letter No. 24 s. 1974-1975 which
outlines the fixing of the price of sugar covering production starting May 5, 1975.
8. Supra Note 6, at 32-33.
9. Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135, 139 (1994).

10. CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (2).
11. 3 SCRA 696, 703-704 (1961).
12. Rationalizing and stabilizing the export of sugar and for other purposes.
13. Defining the powers and functions of the Office of the Solicitor General.

14. Brehm v. Republic, 9 SCRA 172, 176 (1963).
15. Republic v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199, 227 (1998).
16. Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 103 (1996) citing Garcia vs. Executive Secretary,
204 SCRA 516, S22 (1991); Santos vs. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256, 261
(1992).
17. Ty v. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500, 520 (1995).
18. Drilon v. Lim, supra.

19. An Act Authorizing the Restitution of Losses Suffered by Sugar Producers from Crop Year
1974-1975 to Crop Year 1984-1985 Due to the Actions of Government-Owned and
Controlled Agencies.
20. Manzano v. Valera, 292 SCRA 66, 76 (1998); Garcia v. Burgos, 291 SCRA 547, 575 (1998)
citing Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727, 743-744 (1996).
21. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 175 (1936).
22. Rollo, p. 78.

23. Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 670, 678 (1998).
24. Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 385, 391-
392 (1998).
25. Rollo, p. 85.
26. Id. at 86.
27. Id. at 87.

28. Silahis Marketing Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 180 SCRA 21, 25 (1989); Compania
Maritima v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 593 (1985).
29. Salao v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 493, 498 (1998) citing Catapusan v. Court of Appeals,
264 SCRA 534 (1996); People vs. Flores, 243 SCRA 374 (1995); Lufthansa German
Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 600 (1995).
30. Article 1891 of the Civil Code reads:
"Every agent is bound to render an account of his transactions and to deliver to the
principal whatever he may have received by virtue of the agency, even though it may
not be owing to the principal.
"Every stipulation exempting the agent from the obligation to render an account
shall be void."
31. Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 158, 172 (1997) citing CIVIL CODE, ART. 2220.
32. BPI Express Card Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 260, 272 (1998) citing Barons
Marketing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 96 (1998).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 59524. February 18, 1985.]
JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO,

Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XVIII (Quezon City), HON. JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXXI (Quezon City) CITY FISCAL SERGIO APOSTOL of
Quezon City; COL. BALBINO DIEGO and COL. ROMAN
MADELLA, respondents.
Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Corpuz, and Padlan for petitioner.

Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; DENIAL OF A MOTION

TO QUASH OR TO DISMISS CANNOT BE QUESTIONED BY CERTIORARI; RULE NOT
APPLICABLE WHERE THERE IS FAILURE TO SHOW PRIMA FACIE THAT A PERSON
IS GUILTY. — The respondents call for adherence to the consistent rule that the
denial of a motion to quash or to dismiss, being interlocutory in character, cannot
be questioned by certiorari; that since the question of dismissal will again be
considered by the court when it decides the case, the movant has a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that public interest
dictates that criminal prosecutions should not be enjoined. The general rule is
correctly stated. However, the respondents fail to appreciate or take into account
certain exceptions when a petition for certiorari is clearly warranted. The case at
bar is one such exception. In the light of the failure to show prima facie that the
petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime, the initial
disregard of petitioner's constitutional rights together with the massive and
damaging publicity made against him, justifies the favorable consideration of this
petition by this Court.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; "PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE"; EVIDENCE MUST BE SUFFICIENT
TO OVERCOME PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. — Infinitely more important than
conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the
citizen's fight to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also
from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a democratic
society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of around forty
persons when on the very face of the record no evidence linking him to the
alleged conspiracy exists. The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence
which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it
supports or to establish the facts, or to counterbalance the presumption of
innocence to warrant a conviction.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

3. ID.; ID.; HEARSAY RULE; TESTIMONY BASED ON ANOTHER PERSON'S
AFFIDAVITS ARE HEARSAY AND HAS NO PROBATIVE VALUE; INQUEST JUDGE
SHOULD CONFINE INVESTIGATION TO SOLE WITNESS. — Col. Diego, on the
other hand, when asked what evidence he was able to gather against the
petitioner depended only on the statement of Lovely "that it was the residence
of ex-Senator Salonga where they met together with Renato Tanada, one of the
brains of the bombing conspiracy . . . and the fact that Sen. Salonga has been
meeting with several subversive personnel based in the U.S.A. was also revealed
to me by Victor Burns Lovely"; and on the group pictures taken at former
Congressman Raul Daza's birthday party. In concluding that a conspiracy exists
to overthrow by violent means the government of the Philippines in the United
States, his only bases were "documentary as well as physical and sworn
statements that were referred to me or taken by me personally," which of course
negate personal knowledge on his part. Testimony based on affidavits of other
persons and purely hearsay, can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of
subversion. It should not have been given credence by the court in the first place.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value as the
affiant could not have been cross-examined on the facts stated therein. (See
People v. Labinia, 115 SCRA 223; People v. Valero, 112 SCRA 661). Moreover, as
Victor Lovely, himself, was personally examined by the court, there was no need
for the testimony of Col. Diego. Thus, the inquest judge should have confined his
investigation to Victor Burns Lovely, the sole witness whose testimony has
apparently implicated petitioner in the bombings which eventually led to the
filing of the information.
4. ID.; ID.; INDICTING A PERSON BECAUSE PLOTTERS MET IN HIS HOUSE, A
DANGEROUS PRECEDENT. — The jump from the "contact point" theory to the
conclusion of involvement in subversive activities in the United States is not only
inexplicable but without foundation. The respondents admit that no evidence
was presented directly linking petitioner Salonga to actual acts of violence or
terrorism. There is no proof of his direct participation in any overt acts of
subversion. The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the "guilt by
visit or guilt by association" theory is too tenuous a basis to conclude that
Senator Salonga was a leader or mastermind of the bombing incidents. To indict a
person simply because some plotters, masquerading as visitors, have somehow
met in his house or office would be to establish a dangerous precedent. The right
of citizens to be secure against abuse of governmental processes in criminal
prosecutions would be seriously undermined.
5. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TESTIMONY THAT PETITIONER WHO
WAS DEAF AND ANOTHER WHISPERED TO EACH OTHER IS INCONSISTENT. —
The testimony of Victor Lovely against petitioner Salonga is full of
inconsistencies. Senator Salonga and Atty. Renato Tanada could not have
whispered to one another because the petitioner is almost totally deaf. Lovely
could not have met Senator Salonga at a Manglapus party in Washington, D.C. in
1977 because the petitioner left for the United States only in November, 1978.
Senator Salonga denies having known Mr. Lovely in the United States or in the
Philippines. He states that he has hundred of visitors from week to week in his
residence but cannot recall any Victor Lovely.
6. ID.; ID.; PHOTOGRAPH; PRESENCE IN A GROUP PICTURE IS NOT PROOF OF
CONSPIRACY. — The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul
Daza's birthday party in Los Angeles where Senator Salonga was a guest is not
proof of conspiracy. As stated by the petitioner, in his many years in the
turbulent world of politics, he has posed with all kind of people in various groups
and various places and could not possibly vouch for their conduct. Commenting
on the matter, newspaper columnist Teodoro Valencia stated that Filipinos love to
pose with important visitors and the picture proves nothing. More credible and
stronger evidence is necessary for an indictment. Nonetheless, even if we
discount the flaws in Lovely's testimony and dismiss the refutations and
arguments of the petitioner, the prosecution evidence is still inadequate to
establish a prima facie finding.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND
EXPRESSION; OPINION ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF A VIOLENT STRUGGLE, A
LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF FREEDOM. — The alleged opinion of the petitioner
about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are
not instituted, assuming that he really stated the same, is nothing but a
legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. No man deserves
punishment for his thoughts. Cogitationis poenam nemo meretur. And as the
late Justice Oliver W. Holmes stated in the case of U .S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S.
644, ". . . if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls
for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought — not free
thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; A PREFERRED RIGHT; POLITICAL DISCUSSION CANNOT BE
INDICTED. — We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a
"preferred" right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive
economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of
expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. (Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As explained by Justice Cardozo in Palko
v. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this must be so because the lessons of history,
both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the
indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is
especially mandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly concerned
when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed upon mere
criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is essential to the
ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments. In
the case before us, there is no teaching of the moral propriety of a resort to
violence, much less an advocacy of force or a conspiracy to organize the use of
force against the duly constituted authorities. The alleged remark about the
likelihood of violent struggle unless reforms are instituted is not a threat against
the government. Nor is it even the uninhabited, robust, caustic, or unpleasantly
sharp attack which is protected by the guarantee of free speech. Parenthetically,
the American case of Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444) states that the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action. The words which petitioner allegedly used
according to the best recollection of Mr. Lovely are light years away from such
type of proscribed advocacy.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; STATEMENT THAT HIS MISSION WAS AGAINST A
PARTICULAR FAMILY NEGATES POLITICALLY MOTIVATED ASSIGNMENT. — Lovely
also declared that he had nothing to do with the bombing on August 22, 1980,
which was the only bombing incident that occurred after his arrival in Manila on
August 20, 1980, and before the YMCA explosion on September 6, 1980. He
further testified that: (his) bombing mission was directed against the particular
family (referring to the Cabarrus family). Such a statement wholly negates any
politically motivated or subversive assignment which Lovely was supposed to
have been commissioned to perform upon the orders of his co-accused and which
was the very reason why they were charged in the first place.
10. ID.; ID.; BY ADOPTING DEFENSE WITNESS AS ITS OWN, PROSECUTION IS

BOUND BY HIS DISCLAIMER. — It should be noted that after Lovely's testimony,
the prosecution manifested to the court that is was adopting him as a
prosecution witness. Therefore, the prosecution became irreversibly bound by
Lovely's disclaimers on the witness stand, that it was not his intention "to do
some kind of bombing against the government" and that he "did not try to
implicate Salonga," especially since Lovely is the sole witness adopted by the
prosecution who could supposedly establish the link between the petitioner and
the bombing incidents. The respondent court should have taken these factors into
consideration before concluding that a prima facie case exists against the
petitioner.
11. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE MUST COME NOT ONLY FROM A CREDIBLE WITNESS BUT
MUST BE CREDIBLE IN ITSELF. — Evidence must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. (People v. Dayad, 56 SCRA 439) In the case at bar, the prosecution
cannot even present a credible version of the petitioner's role in the bombings
even if it ignores the subsequent disclaimers of Lovely and without relying on
mere affidavits including those made by Lovely during his detention.
12. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; PURPOSE; TRIAL
JUDGE HAS DUTY TO SPARE ACCUSED FROM PAIN OF TRIAL IF THERE IS
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. — The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to
protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless
and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241, citing Hashim v. Boncan,
71 Phil. 216) The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to
withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process. (See People v.
Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is
not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of
making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary
investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a
part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the
case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it
is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or
that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the
accused.

13. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EXTENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE; COURT'S FUNCTION IS TO EDUCATE BENCH AND BAR THEREON. —
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State
authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as
constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of
Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J : p
The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been
established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him.
Petitioner asks this Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the
iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the
democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The background of this case is a matter of public knowledge.
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August,
September and October of 1980. On September 6, 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely,
Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed
himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a
small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's
possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken
sometime in May, 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza
held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga
and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures
together with other guests, including Lovely.
As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military
and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was
place in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all
direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security
Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and
Baltazar Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives,
and damage to property.
On September 12, 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including
one which resulted in the death of an American lady who was shopping at
Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of
persons.
On September 20, 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press
conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was
presented during the conference. In his interview, Romeo stated that he had
driven his elder brother, Victor, to the petitioner's house in Greenhills on two
occasions. The first time was on August 20, 1980. Romeo stated that Victor did
not bring any bag with him on that day when he went to the petitioner's
residence and did not carry a bag when he left. The second time was in the
afternoon of August 31, 1980 when he brought Victor only to the gate of the
petitioner's house. Romeo did not enter the petitioner's residence. Neither did he
return that day to pick up his brother.
cdll
The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in
effect that petitioner had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1980, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's
intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col. Madella where he was
held incommunicado for sometime.
On the night of October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at
three big hotels in Metro Manila, namely: Philippine Plaza, Century Park Sheraton
and Manila Peninsula. The bombs injured nine people. A meeting of the General
Military Council was called for October 6, 1980.
On October 19, 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his
speech before the International Conference of the American Society of Travel
Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, a small bomb
exploded. Within the next twenty-four hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders
(ASSOs) were issued against persons who were apparently implicated by Victor
Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. One of them was herein
petitioner Victor Lovely offered himself to be a "state witness" and in his letter to
the President, he stated that he will reveal everything he knows about the
bombings.
On October 21, 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of the
petitioner at the Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his
recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest.
The arresting officer showed the petitioner the ASSO form which however did not
specify the charge or charges against him. For some time, the petitioner's
lawyers were not permitted to visit him in his hospital room until this Court in
the case of Ordoñez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., (G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980)
issued an order directing that the petitioner's right to be visited by counsel be
respected.
On November 2, 1980, the petitioner was transferred against his objections from
his hospital arrest to an isolation room without windows in an army prison camp
at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. The petitioner states that he was not informed why he
was transferred and detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any
military or civil authority.
Subsequently, on November 27, 1980, the petitioner was released for
humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed "under house arrest in
the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation
or charges.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a "Notice
of Preliminary Investigation" in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which
included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that "the preliminary investigation
included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that "the preliminary investigation
of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o'clock p.m. on December 12,
1980" and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge
sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The
petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981,
and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the
charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
On February 9, 1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge
Advocate General's Office to the Ministry of Justice.
On February 24, 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing
petitioner, among others of having violated Republic Act No. 1700, as amended
by P.D. 885 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 in relation to Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code. The inquest court set the preliminary investigation for March 17,
1981.
On March 6, 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the country to attend a
series of church conferences and undergo comprehensive medical examinations
of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left
eye to save his right eye. Petitioner Salonga almost died as one of the principal
victims of the dastardly bombing of a Liberal Party rally at Plaza Miranda on
August 20, 1971. Since then, he has suffered serious disabilities. The petitioner
was riddled with shrapnel and pieces still remain in various parts of his body. He
has an AV fistula caused by a piece of shrapnel lodged one millimeter from his
aorta. The petitioner has limited use of his one remaining hand and arms, is
completely blind and phthisical in the left eye, and has scar like formations in the
remaining right eye. He is totally deaf in the right ear and partially deaf in the
left ear. The petitioner's physical ailments led him to seek treatment abroad. Cdpr
On or around March 26,1981, the counsel for petitioner was furnished a copy of
an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated March 12, 1981,
charging the petitioner, along with 39 other accused with the violation of R.A.
1700, as amended by P.D. 885, Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 and P.D. 1736. Hearings
for preliminary investigation were conducted. The prosecution presented as its
witnesses Ambassador Armando Fernandez, the Consul General of the Philippines
in Los Angeles, California, Col. Balbino Diego, PSC/NISA, Chief, Investigation and
Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command and Victor Lovely himself.
On October 15, 1981, the counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
charges against petitioner for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie
case against him.
On December 2, 1981, the respondent judge denied the motion. On January 4,
1982, he issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of
the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against forty (40) people, including
herein petitioner.
The resolutions of the respondent judge dated December 2, 1981 and January 4,
1982 are now the subject of the petition. It is the contention of the petitioner
that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the
filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further
prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no
rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the evidence offered by
the prosecution utterly insufficient to establish a prima facie case against the
petitioner. We grant the petition.
However, before going into the merits of the case, we shall pass upon a
procedural issue raised by the respondents.
The respondents call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a
motion to quash or to dismiss, being interlocutory in character, cannot be
questioned by certiorari; that since the question of dismissal will again be
considered by the court when it decides the case, the movant has a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that public interest
dictates that criminal prosecutions should not be enjoined.
The general rule is correctly stated. However, the respondents fail to appreciate
or take into account certain exceptions when a petition for certiorari is clearly
warranted. The case at bar is one such exception.
In the case of Mead v. Angel (115 SCRA 256) the same contentions were
advanced by the respondents to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
". . . Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed by
an accused in a criminal case shall be denied, the remedy of the accused-
movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus or prohibition,
the proper recourse being to go to trial, without prejudice to his right to
reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash if an adverse
judgment is rendered against him, in the appeal that he may take
therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill v. People, et al., 101 Phil.
599; Echarol v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309.)
On this argument, we ruled:

"There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the
respondents. However, it is also recognized that. under certain situations,
recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is considered
proper in the interest of 'more enlightened and substantial justice', as was
so declared in 'Yap v. Lutero', G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969."
Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of

criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from
arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is
carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of
the record no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists.
Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, himself a victim of the still unresolved and heinous
Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical Center while
hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the
nature of the charges against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him
until this Court intervened through the issuance of an order directing that his
lawyers be permitted to visit him (Ordoñez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., G.R. No.
55345, October 28, 1980). Only after four months of detention was the
petitioner informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against him.
After the preliminary investigation, the petitioner moved to dismiss the
complaint but the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge issued a
resolution ordering the filing of an information after finding that a prima facie
case had been established against all of the forty persons accused.
In the light of the failure to show prima facie that the petitioner was probably
guilty of conspiring to commit the crime, the initial disregard of petitioner's
constitutional rights together with the massive and damaging publicity made
against him, justifies the favorable consideration of this petition by this Court.
With former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. now deceased, there are at least 38
other co-accused to be tried with the petitioner. The prosecution must present
proof beyond reasonable doubt against each and every one of the 39 accused,
most of whom have varying participations in the charge for subversion. The
prosecution's star witness Victor Lovely and the only source of information with
regard to the alleged link between the petitioner and the series of terrorist
bombings is now in the United States. There is reason to believe the petitioner's
citation of international news dispatches ** that the prosecution may find it
difficult if not infeasible to bring him back to the Philippines to testify against the
petitioner. If Lovely refused to testify before an American federal grand jury how
could he possibly be made to testify when the charges against the respondent
come up in the course of the trial against the 39 accused. Considering the
foregoing, we find it in the interest of justice to resolve at this stage the issue of
whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the
questioned resolutions.
The respondents contend that the prosecution will introduce additional evidence
during the trial and if the evidence, by then, is not sufficient to prove the
petitioner's guilt, he would anyway be acquitted. Yes, but under the
circumstances of this case, at what cost not only to the petitioner but to the basic
fabric of our criminal justice system?
The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish
the facts, or to counterbalance the presumption of innocence to warrant a
conviction. The question raised before us now is: Were the evidences against the
petitioner uncontradicted and if they were unexplained or uncontradicted, would
they, standing alone, sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence and
warrant his conviction?
We do not think so.
The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent
judge relied only on the testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely.
Ambassador Armando Fernandez, when called upon to testify on subversive
organizations in the United States nowhere mentioned the petitioner as an
organizer, officer or member of the Movement for Free Philippines (MFP), or any
of the organizations mentioned in the complaint. Col. Diego, on the other hand,
when asked what evidence he was able to gather against the petitioner
depended only on the statement of Lovely "that it was the residence of ex-
Senator Salonga where they met together with Renato Tañada, one of the brains
of the bombing conspiracy . . . and the fact that Sen. Salonga has been meeting
with several subversive personnel based in the U.S.A. was also revealed to me by
Victor Burns Lovely; " and on the group pictures taken at former Congressman
Raul Daza's birthday party. In concluding that a conspiracy exists to overthrow by
violent means the government of the Philippines in the United States, his only
bases were "documentary as well as physical and sworn statements that were
referred to me or taken by me personally," which of course negate personal
knowledge on his part. When asked by the court how he would categorize
petitioner in any of the subversive organizations, whether petitioner was an
organizer, officer or a member, the witness replied: prcd
"A. To categorize former Senator Salonga if he were an organizer, he

is an officer or he is a member, your Honor, please, we have to
consider the surrounding circumstances and on his
involvement: first, Senator Salonga wanted always to travel to
the United States at least once a year or more often under the
pretext of to undergo some sort of operation and participate
in some sort of seminar. (t.s.n., April 21, 1981, pp. 14-15)
Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay,
can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of subversion. It should not have been
given credence by the court in the first place. Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, has no probative value as the affiant could not have been
cross-examined on the facts stated therein. (See People v. Labinia, 115 SCRA
223; People v. Valero, 112 SCRA 661). Moreover, as Victor Lovely, himself, was
personally examined by the court, there was no need for the testimony of Col.
Diego. Thus, the inquest judge should have confined his investigation to Victor
Burns Lovely, the sole witness whose testimony had apparently implicated
petitioner in the bombings which eventually led to the filing of the information.
Lovely's account of the petitioner's involvement with the former's bombing

mission is found in his sworn statement made before Col. Diego and Lt. Col.
Madella and taken on October 17, 1980 at the AFP Medical Center. Lovely was
not presented as a prosecution or state witness but only as a defense witness for
his two younger brothers, Romeo and Baltazar, who were both included in the
complaint but who were later dropped from the information. Victor Lovely was
examined by his counsel and cross-examined by the fiscal. In the process, he
identified the statement which he made before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella.
After Lovely's testimony, the prosecution made a manifestation before the court
that it was adopting Lovely as a prosecution witness.
According to Lovely's statement, the following events took place:
"36. Q. Did Psinakis tell you where to stay?
"A. Yes, at first he told me to check-in at Manila Hotel or the Plaza
Hotel where somebody would come to contact me and give
the materials needed in the execution of my mission. I thought
this was not safe so I disagreed with him. Mr. Psinakis changed
the plan and instead told me to visit the residence of Ex-Sen.
Jovito Salonga as often as I can and someone will meet me
there to give the materials I needed to accomplish my mission.
"37. Q. Did you comply as instructed?
"A. Yes, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980 and stayed at the
residence of Mr. Johnny Chua, husband of my business
partner, then I went to the Hospital where I visited my mother
and checked-in at Room 303 of the YMCA at Concepcion
Street, Manila.
"38. Q. Did you visit the residence of former Senator Jovito Salonga
as directed by Psinakis?
"A. I visited Sen. Salonga's place three (3) times, the first visit was
August 20 or 21, and the last was 4:00 P.M. of August 31,
1980. In addition to these visits, I TALKED to him on the phone
about three or four times. On my first visit, I told him 'I am
expecting an attache case from somebody which will be
delivered to your house,' for which Sen. Salonga replied 'Wala
namang nagpunta dito at wala namang attache case para sa
iyo.' However, if your attache case arrives, I'll just call you.' I
gave him my number. On my second visit, Salonga said, 'I'll be
very busy so just come back on the 31st of August at 4 P.M.'
On that date, I was with friends at Batulao Resort and had to
hurry back to be at Salonga's place for the appointment. I
arrived at Salonga's place at exactly 4 P.M.
"39. Q. What happened then?
"A. I was ushered to the sala by Mrs. Salonga and after five minutes,
Sen. Salonga joined me in the sala. Sen. Salonga informed me
that somebody will be coming to give me the attache case but
did not tell me the name.
"40. Q. Are there any subject matters you discussed while waiting
for that somebody to deliver your materials?
"A. Yes, Salonga asked if Sen. Aquino and I have met, I explained to
him the efforts of Raul Daza in setting up that meeting but I
have previous business commitments at Norfolk, Virginia. I
told him, however, that through the efforts of Raul Daza, I was
able to talk with Ninoy Aquino in the airport telephone booth in
San Francisco. He also asked about Raul Daza, Steve Psinakis
and the latest opposition group activities but it seems he is well
informed.
"41. Q. How long did you wait until that somebody arrived?
"A. About thirty (30) minutes.
"42. Q. What happened when the man arrived?

"A. This man arrived and I was greatly surprised to see Atty. Renato
Tañada. Jovy Salonga was the one who met him and as I
observed parang nasa sariling bahay si Tañada nung dumating.
They talked for five (5) minutes in very low tones so I did not
hear what they talked about. After their whispering
conversations, Sen. Salonga left and at this time Atty. 'Nits'
Tañada told me 'Nasa akin ang kailangan mo, nasa kotse.'
"43. Q. Were the materials given to you?
"A. When Sen. Salonga came back, we asked to be permitted to leave

and I rode in Atty. Nits Tañada's old Pontiac car colored dirty
brown and proceeded to Broadway Centrum where before I
alighted, Atty. Tañada handed me a 'Puma' bag containing all
the materials I needed.
xxx xxx xxx

"45. Q. What were the contents of the Puma bag?
"A. Ten (10) pieces of Westclox pocket watch with screw and wirings,
ten (10) pieces electrical blasting caps 4" length, ten (10)
pieces non-electrical blasting caps 1" length, nine (9) pieces
volts dry cell battery, two (2) improvised electrical testers, ten
(10) plastic packs of high explosive about 1 pound weight
each.
However, in his interview with Mr. Ronnie Nathanielz which was aired on
Channel 4 on November 8, 1980 and which was also offered as evidence by the
accused, Lovely gave a different story which negates the above testimony insofar
as the petitioner's participation was concerned:
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. Who were the people that you contacted in Manila and for what
purpose?
"A. Before I left for the Philippines, Mr. Psinakis told me to check-in at
the Manila Hotel or the Plaza Hotel, and somebody would just
deliver the materials I would need. I disapproved of this, and I
told him I would prefer a place that is familiar to me or who is
close to me. Mr. Psinakis suggested the residence of Sen.
Salonga.
"And so, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980, I made a call to Sen.
Salonga, but he was out. The next day I made a call again. I
was able to contact him. I made an appointment to see him. I
went to Sen. Salonga's house the following day. I asked Sen.
Salonga if someone had given him an attache case for me. He
said nobody. Afterwards, I made three calls to Sen. Salonga.
Sen. Salonga told me 'call me again on the 31st of August. I did
not call him, I just went to his house on the 31st of August at
4 P.M. A few minutes after my arrival Atty. Renato Tañada
arrived. When he had a chance to be near me, he (Atty.
Tañada) whispered to me that he had the attache case and the
materials I needed in his car. These materials were given to me
by Atty. Tañada when I alighted at the Broadway Centrum.'
(Emphasis supplied)
During the cross-examination, counsel for petitioner asked Lovely about the so-
called destabilization plan which the latter mentioned in his sworn statement:
"Q. You mentioned in your statement taken on October 17, 1980,
marked Exhibit 'G' about the so-called destabilization plan of
Aquino. When you attended the birthday party of Raul Daza
wherein Jovito Salonga was also present, was this
destabilization plan as alleged by you already formulated?
WITNESS:
"A. Not to my knowledge.
COURT TO WITNESS:
"Q. Mr. Witness, who invited you to the party?
"A. Raul Daza, your Honor.

"Q. Were you told that Mr. Salonga would be present in the party?
"A. I am really not quite sure, your Honor.
"Q. Alright. You said initially it was social but then it became political.
Was there any political action taken as a result of the party?
"A. Only political discussion, your Honor." (TSN, July 8, 1981, pp. 69-
84)
Counsel for petitioner also asked Lovely whether in view of the latter's
awareness of the physical condition of petitioner, he really implicated petitioner
in any of the bombings that occurred in Metro Manila. The fiscal objected without
stating any ground. In sustaining the objection, the Court said:
"Sustained . . . The use of the word 'implicate' might expand the role of
Mr. Salonga. In other words, you are widening the avenue of Mr.
Salonga's role beyond the participation stated in the testimony of this
witness about Mr. Salonga, at least, as far as the evidence is concerned, I
supposed, is only being in the house of Mr. Salonga which was used as
the contact point. He never mentions Mr. Salonga about the bombings.
Now these words had to be put in the mouth of this witness. That would
be unfair to Mr. Salonga." (TSN. July 8, 1981, p. 67)
Respondent judge further said:

"COURT:
"As the Court said earlier, the parts or portions affecting Salonga
only refers to the witness coming to Manila already then the
matter of . . . I have gone over the statement and there is no
mention of Salonga insofar as activities in the United States is
concerned. I don't know why it concerns this cross-
examination.
"ATTY. YAP:
"Because according to him, it was in pursuance of the plan that he

came to Manila.
"COURT:
"According to him it was Aquino, Daza, and Psinakis who asked him
to come here, but Salonga was introduced only when he
(Lovely) came here. Now, the tendency of the question is also
to connect Salonga to the activities in the United States. It
seems to be the thrust of the questions.
"COURT:
"In other words, the point of the Court as of the time when yon
asked him question, the focus on Salonga was only from the
time when he met Salonga at Greenhills. It was the first time
that the name of Salonga came up. There was no mention of
Salonga in the formulation of the destabilization plan as
affirmed by him. But you are bringing this up although you are
only cross-examining for Salonga as if his (Lovely's) activities
in the United States affected Salonga." (TSN, July 8, 1981, pp.
73-74)
Apparently, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by

limiting the petitioner's alleged "participation" in the bombing mission only to
the fact that petitioner's house was used as a "contact point" between Lovely
and Tañada, which was all that Lovely really stated in his testimony.
However, in the questioned resolution dated December 2, 1981, the respondent
judge suddenly included the "activities" of petitioner in the United States as his
basis for denying the motion to dismiss: LLpr
"On the activities of Salonga in the United States, the witness, Lovely, in
one of his statements declared: 'To the best of my recollection he
mentioned of some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most
likely should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately.'
"It is therefore clear that the prosecution's evidence has established facts
and circumstances sufficient for a finding that excludes a Motion to
Dismiss by respondent Salonga. The Movement for Free Philippines is
undoubtedly a force born on foreign soil, it appears to rely on the
resources of foreign entities, and is being (sic) on gaining ascendancy in
the Philippines with the use of force and for that purpose it has linked
itself with even communist organizations to achieve its end. It appears to
rely on aliens for its supporters and financiers."
The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in
subversive activities in the United States is not only inexplicable but without
foundation.
The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner
Salonga to actual acts of violence or terrorism. There is no proof of his direct
participation in any overt acts of subversion. However, he is tagged as a leader of
subversive organizations for two reasons —
(1) Because his house was used as a "contact point"; and
(2) Because "he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being
most likely should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately."

The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the "guilt by visit or guilt
by association" theory is too tenuous a basis to conclude that Senator Salonga
was a leader or mastermind of the bombing incidents. To indict a person simply
because some plotters, masquerading as visitors, have somehow met in his
house or office would be to establish a dangerous precedent. The right of citizens
to be secure against abuse of governmental processes in criminal prosecutions
would be seriously undermined.
The testimony of Victor Lovely against petitioner Salonga is full of
inconsistencies. Senator Salonga and Atty. Renato Tañada could not have
whispered to one another because the petitioner is almost totally deaf. Lovely
could not have met Senator Salonga at a Manglapus party in Washington, D.C. in
1977 because the petitioner left for the United States only on November, 1978.
Senator Salonga denies having known Mr. Lovely in the United States or in the
Philippines. He states that he has hundred of visitors from week to week in his
residence but cannot recall any Victor Lovely.
The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birthday party
in Los Angeles where Senator Salonga was a guest is not proof of conspiracy. As
stated by the petitioner, in his many years in the turbulent world of politics, he
has posed with all kinds of people in various groups and various places and could
not possibly vouch for their conduct. Commenting on the matter, newspaper
columnist Teodoro Valencia stated that Filipinos love to pose with important
visitors and the picture proves nothing.
It is likewise probable that a national figure and former politician of Senator
Salonga's stature can expect guests and visitors of all kinds to be visiting his
home or office. If a rebel or subversive happens to pose with the petitioner for a
group picture at a birthday party abroad, or even visit him with others in his
home, the petitioner does not thereby become a rebel or subversive, much less a
leader of a subversive group. More credible and stronger evidence is necessary for
an indictment. Nonetheless, even if we discount the flaws in Lovely's testimony
and dismiss the refutations and arguments of the petitioner, the prosecution
evidence is still inadequate to establish a prima facie finding.
The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could
positively link the petitioner to any proscribed activities of the Movement for
Free Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the complaint.
Lovely had already testified that during the party of former Congressman Raul
Daza which was alleged to have been attended by a number of members of the
MFP, no political action was taken but only political discussion. Furthermore, the
alleged opinion of the petitioner about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in
the Philippines if reforms are not instituted, assuming that he really stated the
same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression.
No man deserves punishment for his thoughts. Cogitationis poenam nemo
meretur. And as the late Justice Oliver W. Holmes stated in the case of U.S. v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, ". . . if there is any principle of the Constitution that
more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free
thought — not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the
thought that we hate."
We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right
and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other
liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a
fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. (Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As explained by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut
(302 U.S. 319) this must be so because the lessons of history, both political and
legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition
of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for
political discussions. This Court is particularly concerned when allegations are
made that restraints have been imposed upon mere criticisms of government
and public officials. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of
political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments.
The United States Supreme Court in Noto v. United States (367 U.S. 290)
distinguished between the abstract teaching of the moral propriety or even
moral necessity for a resort to force and violence and speech which would
prepare a group for violent action and steel it to such action. In Watts v. United
States (394 U.S. 705), the American court distinguished between criminal
threats and constitutionally protected speech.
It stated:
"We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by
petitioner fits within that statutory term. For we must interpret the
language Congress chose against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (376 U.S. 254). The
language of the political arena, like the language used in labor disputed is
often vituperative, abusive, and inexact. We agree with petitioner that his
only offense was a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a
political opposition to the President."
In the case before us, there is no teaching of the moral propriety of a resort to
violence, much less an advocacy of force or a conspiracy to organize the use of
force against the duly constituted authorities. The alleged remark about the
likelihood of violent struggle unless reforms are instituted is not a threat against
the government. Nor is it even the uninhibited, robust, caustic, or unpleasantly
sharp attack which is protected by the guarantee of free speech. Parenthetically,
the American case of Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444) states that the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action. The words which petitioner allegedly used
according to the best recollections of Mr. Lovely are light years away from such
type of proscribed advocacy. llcd
Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is

within the protective clause of freedom of speech and expression. The same
cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership
in a subversive organization. Under Presidential Decree No. 885, Section 3,
paragraph 6, political discussion will only constitute prima facie evidence of
membership in a subversive organization if such discussion amounts to:
"(6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or
organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof ."
As stated earlier, the prosecution has failed to produce evidence that would
establish any link between petitioner and any subversive organization. Even if
we lend credence to Lovely's testimony that a political discussion took place at
Daza's birthday party, no proof whatsoever was adduced that such discussion
was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government through illegal
means. The alleged opinion that violent struggle is likely unless reforms are
instituted by no means shows either advocacy of or incitement to violence or
furtherance of the objectives of a subversive organization.
Lovely also declared that he had nothing to do with the bombing on August 22,
1980, which was the only bombing incident that occurred after his arrival in
Manila on August 20, and before the YMCA explosion on September 6, 1980. (See
TSN, pp. 63-63, July 8, 1981). He further testified that:
"WITNESS:
"Actually, it was not my intention to do some kind of bombing

against the government. My bombing mission was directed
against the particular family (referring to the Cabarrus family).
[TSN, p. 11, July 9, 1981] [Rollo, p. 10]
Such a statement wholly negates any politically motivated or subversive

assignment which Lovely was supposed to have been commissioned to perform
upon the orders of his co-accused and which was the very reason why they were
charged in the first place. The respondent judge also asked Lovely about the
possible relation between Cabarrus and petitioner:
"COURT:
"Q. Did you suspect any relation between Cabarrus and Jovito
Salonga, why did you implicate Jovito Salonga?
"A. No, your Honor. I did not try to implicate Salonga.
It should be noted that after Lovely's testimony, the prosecution manifested to

the court that it was adopting him as a prosecution witness. Therefore, the
prosecution became irreversively bound by Lovely's disclaimers on the witness
stand, that it was not his intention "to do some kind of bombing against the
government" and that he "did not try to implicate Salonga", especially since
Lovely is the sole witness adopted by the prosecution who could supposedly
establish the link between the petitioner and the bombing incidents.
The respondent court should have taken these factors into consideration before
concluding that a prima facie case exists against the petitioner. Evidence must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in
itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve
as probable under the circumstances. (People v. Dayad, 56 SCRA 439). In the case
at bar, the prosecution cannot even present a credible version of the petitioner's
role in the bombings even if it ignores the subsequent disclaimers of Lovely and
without relying on mere affidavits including those made by Lovely during his
detention.
The resolution dated January 4, 1982 suffers from the same defect. In this
resolution, Lovely's previous declarations about the bombings as part of the
alleged destabilization plan and the people behind the same were accorded such
credibility by the respondent judge as if they had already been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Cdpr
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against

hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open
and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public
trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v.
Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a
preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to
transgress constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277)
However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the
preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a
transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves
not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees
of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is,
therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve
the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause
exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is
no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the
same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations
and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the
judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts
before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons (See La Chemise
Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should
not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might
later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right
which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives
up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has
been before. It should continue to be so. (Mercado v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal, 116 SCRA 93)
The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's
judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for
concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985,
respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal
Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to
instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and
decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused
in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge
to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures
and to place it once again in the Court's crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion
charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the
action of the prosecution.
Respondent Fiscal Sergio Apostol correctly points out, however, that he is not
precluded from filing new charges for the same acts because the petitioner has
not been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply. In that sense, the case is
not completely academic.
Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well
known aspect of the Supreme Court's functions.
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State
authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as
constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of
Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
I n dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a
P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and, therefore, constitutionally void,
escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition
became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision and
stated:
"The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this
Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the
obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal
command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required."
I n Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the
Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by
Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's
legislative powers under martial law. Still, this Court discussed the constitutional
mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national
identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution)
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), during the
pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released from custody and one
withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of
murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition
was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic
function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in
the Reports. LibLex
In this case, the respondents agree with our earlier finding that the prosecution
evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner,
either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government
or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. They have taken the
initiative of dropping the charges against the petitioner. We reiterate the rule,
however, that this Court will not validate the filing of an information based on
the kind of evidence against the petitioner found in the records. prLL
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Escolin, Relova and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Aquino, De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
Del Castillo vs. Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 62119, August 27, 1984, 131 SCRA 405,
was a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Before this Court could finally act on
the petition, the subject was released and for that reason the majority of this
Court resolved to dismiss the petition for having become moot and academic.
Justice Teehankee and the undersigned disagreed with the majority; we
expressed the view that despite the release of the subject, the petition should
have been resolved on the merits because it posed important legal questions.
Babst, et al. vs. National Intelligence Board, Special Committee No. 2, et al., G.R.
No. 62992, Sept. 2, 1984, was a petition for prohibition to restrain the
respondents from interrogating the petitioners, members of the print media, on
various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and
even their private lives. Again the majority of this Court dismissed the petition
because the assailed proceedings had come to an end thereby rendering the
petition moot and academic. In dismissing the petition a short and mild note of
concern was added. And again Justice Teehankee and the undersigned disagreed
with the majority. We expressed the view that this Court should rule squarely on
the matters raised in the petition rather than dismiss it for having become moot
and academic. prLL
I am glad that this Court has abandoned its cavalier treatment of petitions by
dismissing them on the ground that they have become moot and academic and
stopped there. I am glad it has reverted to De la Camara vs. Enage, Gonzales vs.
Marcos and Aquino vs. Enrile which are mentioned in the ponencia of Justice
Gutierrez.
I agree with the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez that because the subversion
charges against the petitioner had been dropped by the trial court on January 18,
1985, there is no longer any need to prohibit the respondents from prosecuting
Criminal Case No. Q-18606 insofar as he is concerned.
I am not revealing any confidential matter by saying that the initial action of this
Court was to grant the petition, i.e. prohibit the prosecution of the petitioner.
This is manifest from the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez. I regret that on this
matter the Court has been pre-empted by a "first strike" which has occurred once
too often. prcd
Justice Gutierrez states that, "The Court had already deliberated on this case, and
a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived at." Let me add that the
consensus had taken place as early as October 24, 1984, and the decision started
to circulate for signature on November 2, 1984. Alas, on January 18, 1985, the
decision was still circulating - overtaken by events. The decision could have had a
greater impact had it been promulgated prior to the executive action.
Footnotes
** In the Philippines Daily Express, dated December 8, 1981, Lovely was quoted as
having said in the United States that "I was not the bomber, I was bombed."
"Lovely, who was granted immunity in the United States, reportedly
would not testify before a San Francisco federal grand jury and instead
said, "Your Honor, I came back to tell what happened in the Philippines. I
was not the bomber, I was bombed."
The United Press International dispatch from San Francisco, U.S., written by
Spencer Sherman, gives a fuller account, thus:
"With the grand jury present in the courtroom Lovely alleged it was
Philippine authorities who were responsible for his injuries. It was they,
not him, who placed the bomb in his hotel room, he said.
"I came back to the States to tell what happened in the Philippines. I was
not the bomber. I was bombed. There are so many secrets that will come
out soon. I cannot (testify) even if I will be jailed for lifetime. I welcome
that."
— UPO press dispatch from

San Francisco, November 24, 1981.
The Philippine News, a San Francisco-based weekly, in its issue of December

23, 1981, contains the same account, with the following words:
"Your Honor .. I am not going to participate I was almost murdered. I cannot
continue. My friends were murdered before I came to the United States .. I
came back to the United States to tell what happened in the Philippines. I was
not the bomber, I was bombed. There are many secrets that will come out
very soon I cannot. Even if I will be jailed for lifetime. I welcome that."

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23127. April 29, 1971.]
FRANCISCA SERRANO DE AGBAYANI, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
OF PANGASINAN, defendants, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
defendant-appellant.
Dionisio E. Moya for plaintiff-appellee.

Ramon B. de los Reyes for defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL REVIEW; EFFECTS OF THE DECLARATION OF

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY; ORTHODOX VIEW; MODIFIED IN CASE AT BAR. — The
decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act,
for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering
from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it
justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law
once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere
scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to
be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not
however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the
declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been
in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect.
Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What
could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what
has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to
its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to
reflect awareness that precisely because the judicially is the governmental organ
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is
valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of
judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the
law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what
had transpired prior to such adjudication. In the language of an American
Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct private and official."
(Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 (1940)
This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93
Phil. 1002 (1953) and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores, (99 Phil.
738 (1956). An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar
speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co., 21 SCRA 1095.
2. ID., ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTION PERIOD, TOLLED DURING THE EFFECTIVITY OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 32. — Precisely though because of the judicial
recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of
the debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a
sense of cases impressive in their number and unanimity that during the eight-
year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 312 were in force,
prescription did not run. So it has been held from Day v. Court of First Instance,
94 Phil. 816 decided in 1954, to Republic v. Hernaez, L-24137, January 30, 1970
handed down only last year. What is deplorable is that as of the time of the
lower court decision on January 27, 1960, a least eight decisions had left no
doubt as to the prescriptive period being tolled in the meanwhile prior to such
adjudication of invalidity. Speaking of the opposite view entertained by the lower
court, the present Chief Justice, in Liboro v. Finance and Mining Investments
Corp. has categorized it as having been "explicitly and consistently rejected by
this Court." The error of the lower court in sustain plaintiff's suit is thus
manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time
consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled,
however. from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May
18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering
eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously then, when report was had
extrajudicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to
spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J : p
A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the effect, if any, to be

attached to a statute subsequently adjudged invalid, is decisive of this appeal
from a lower court decision. Plaintiff Francisca Serrano de Agbayani, now
appellee, was able to obtain a favorable judgment in her suit against defendant,
now appellant Philippine National Bank, permanently enjoining the other
defendant, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan, from proceeding with an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale of land belonging to plaintiff mortgaged to appellant
Bank to secure a loan declared no longer enforceable, the prescriptive period
having lapsed. There was thus a failure to sustain the defense raised by appellant
that if the moratorium under an Executive Order and later an Act subsequently
found unconstitutional were to be counted in the computation, then the right to
foreclose the mortgage was still subsisting. In arriving at such a conclusion, the
lower court manifested a tenacious adherence to the inflexible view that an
unconstitutional act is not a law, creating no rights and imposing no duties, and
thus as inoperative as if it had never been. It was oblivious to the force of the
principle adopted by this Court that while a statute's repugnancy to the
fundamental law deprives it of its character as a juridical norm, its having been
operative prior to its being nullified is a fact that is not devoid of legal
consequences. As will hereafter be explained, such a failing of the lower court
resulted in an erroneous decision. We find for appellant Philippine National Bank,
and we reverse.
There is no dispute as to the facts. Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of
P450.00 from defendant Bank dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944,
secured by real estate mortgage duly registered covering property described in
T.C.T. No. 11275 of the province of Pangasinan. As of November 27, 1959, the
balance due on said loan was in the amount of P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of
the same year, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the
office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the
balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against
both defendants on August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the
mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having
elapsed from the date of maturity, July 19, 1944. She sought and was able to
obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff,
which was made permanent in the decision now on appeal. Defendant Bank in
its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own theory
the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10,
1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the
subsequent legislative act 2 extending the period of moratorium was declared
invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which the
bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As noted, the lower court
did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.
Hence this appeal, which, as made clear at the outset, possesses merit, there
being a failure on the part of the lower court to adhere to the applicable
constitutional doctrine as to the effect to be given to a statute subsequently
declared invalid.
1. The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional
act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering
from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it
justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law
once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere
scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to
be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. 3 It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not
however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the
declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been
in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect.
Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What
could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what
has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to
its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to
reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is
valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of
judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the
law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what
had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of

a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always he erased by a new judicial declaration.— The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, - with
respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct,
private and official." 4 This language has been quoted with approval in a
resolution in Araneta v. Hill 5 and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. 6
An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the
Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. 7
2. Such an approach all the more commends itself whenever police power
legislation intended to promote public welfare but adversely affecting property
rights is involved. While subject to be assailed on due process, equal protection
and non-impairment grounds, all that is required to avoid the corrosion of
invalidity is that the rational basis or reasonableness test is satisfied. The
legislature on the whole is not likely to allow an enactment suffering, to
paraphrase Cardozo, from the infirmity of outrunning the bounds of reason and
resulting in sheer oppression. It may be of course that if challenged, an adverse
judgment could be the result, as its running counter to the Constitution could still
be shown. In the meanwhile though, in the normal course of things, it has been
acted upon by the public and accepted as valid. To ignore such a fact would indeed
be the fruitful parent of injustice. Moreover, as its constitutionality is conditioned
on its being fair or reasonable, which in turn is dependent on the actual situation,
never static but subject to change, a measure valid when enacted may
subsequently, due to altered circumstances, be stricken down.
That is precisely what happened in connection with Republic Act No. 342, the
moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the
then President Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and
other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers. So it was explicitly held in
Rutter v. Esteban 8 where such enactment was considered in 1953 "unreasonable
and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the
same should be declared null and void and without effect." 9 At the time of the
issuance of the above Executive Order in 1945 and of the passage of such Act in
1948, there was a factual justification for the moratorium. The Philippines was
confronted with an emergency of impressive magnitude at the time of her
liberation from the Japanese military forces in 1945. Business was at a standstill.
Her economy lay prostrate. Measures, radical measures, were then devised to
tide her over until some semblance of normalcy could be restored and an
improvement in her economy noted. No wonder then that the suspension of
enforcement of payment of the obligations then existing was declared first by
executive order and then by legislation. The Supreme Court was right therefore
in rejecting the contention that on its face, the Moratorium Law was
unconstitutional, amounting as it did to the impairment of the obligation of
contracts. Considering the circumstances confronting the legitimate government
upon its return to the Philippines, some such remedial device was needed and
badly so. An unyielding insistence then on the rights to property on the part of
the creditors was not likely to meet with judicial sympathy. Time passed
however, and conditions did change.
When the legislation was before this Court in 1953, the question before it was
its satisfying the rational basis test, not as of the time of its enactment but as of
such date. Clearly, if then it were found unreasonable, the right to non-
impairment of contractual obligations must prevail over the assertion of
community power to remedy an existing evil. The Supreme Court was convinced
that such indeed was the case. As stated in the opinion of Justice Bautista
Angelo: "But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been
pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and
32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-
year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to
rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would
have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could affect a
liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to
us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible,
and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who
are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection
becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the
injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to
pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the
United States." 10 The conclusion to which the foregoing considerations
inevitably led was that as of the time of adjudication, it was apparent that
Republic Act No. 342 could not survive the test of validity. Executive Order No. 32
should likewise be nullified. That before the decision they were not
constitutionally infirm was admitted expressly. There is all the more reason then
to yield assent to the now prevailing principle that the existence of a statute or
executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached.
3. Precisely though because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a
valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers,
this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in their number
and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and
Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run. So it has been held
from Day v. Court of First Instance, 11 decided in 1954, to Republic v. Hernaez, 12
handed down only last year. What is deplorable is that as of the time of the
lower court decision on January 27, 1960, at least eight decisions had left no
doubt as to the prescriptive period being tolled in the meanwhile prior to such
adjudication of invalidity. 13 Speaking of the opposite view entertained by the
lower court, the present Chief Justice, in Liboro v. Finance and Mining
Investments Corp. 14 has categorized it as having been "explicitly and
consistently rejected by this Court." 15
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff's suit is thus manifest. From
July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six
days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled, however, from
March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953,
when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years,
two months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially
to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before
prescription could be availed of as a defense.
WHEREFORE, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit of
plaintiff filed August 10, 1959 dismissed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Under Executive Order No. 32 providing for a debt moratorium, it was specifically
stated: "Enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations
payable within the Philippines, except debts and other monetary obligations
entered into in any area after declaration by Presidential Proclamation that such
area has been freed from enemy occupation and control, is temporarily
suspended pending action by the Commonwealth Government." Executive
Order No. 32 was issued on March 10, 1945. Executive Order No. 32 amended
Executive Order No. 25 (1944).
2. According to the declaration of policy in Republic Act No. 342 (1948), Executive
Order No. 32 remains in full force and effect for the war sufferers as for them
the emergency created by the last war was still existent. Then came this
specific provision: "All debts and other monetary obligations payable by private
parties within the Philippines originally incurred or contracted before December
8, 1941, and still remaining unpaid, any provision or provisions in the contract
creating the same or in any subsequent agreement affecting such obligation to
the contrary notwithstanding, shall not be due and demandable for a period of
eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor
by the United States Philippine War Damage Commission, without prejudice,
however, to any voluntary agreement which the interested parties may enter
into after the approval of this Act for the settlement of said obligations." Sec. 2.
3. ART. 7. In the classic language of Justice Field: "An unconstitutional Act is not a law;
it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been."
Norton v. Shelly County, 118 US 425 (1886).
4. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 (1940).
5. 93 Phil. 1002 (1953).
6. 99 Phil. 738 (1956).
7. L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095.
8. 93 Phil. 68 (1953). Rutter v. Esteban was subsequently cited in the following cases:
Araneta v. Hill, 93 Phil. 1002 (1953); Londres v. National Life Insurance Co., 94
Phil. 627 (1954); Dizon v. Ocampo, 94 Phil. 803 (1954); De Leon v. Ibañez, 95
Phil. 119 (1954); Picornell and Co. v. Cordova, 95 Phil. 632 (1954); Berg v. Teus,
96 Phil. 102 (1954); Herrera v. Arellano, 97 Phil. 776 (1955); Chua Lamko v.
Dioso, 97 Phil. 821 (1955); Rio y Cia v. Sandoval, 100 Phil. 407 (1956); Gonzaga
v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp., 100 Phil. 892 (1957); Pacific Commercial Co. v.
Aquino, 100 Phil. 961 (1957); Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Chua Tua Hian, 101
Phil. 184 (1957); Liboro v. Finance and Mining Investment Corp., 102 Phil. 489
1957); Rio y Compania v. Jolkipli, 105 Phil. 447 (1959); People v. Jolliffe, 105 Phil.
677 (1959); Uy Hoo and Co., Inc. v. Tan, 105 Phil. 717 (1959); Compania
Maritima v. Court of Appeals and Libby, McNeill and Libby (Phil.), Inc., 108 Phil.
469 (1960).
9. Ibid., p, 82. The same conclusion obtains in the opinion of the Court as regards
Executive Order No. 32.
10. Ibid., p. 77.
11. 94 Phil. 816.
12. L-24137, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 219, citing Republic v. Grijaldo, L-20240,
December 31, 1965, 15 SCRA 681; Republic v. Rodriguez, L-18967, January 31,
1966, 16 SCRA 53; Nielson and Co., Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-
21601, December 28, 1968, 26 SCRA 540.
13. Day v. Court of First Instance of Tarlac, 94 Phil. 816 (1954); Montilla v. Pacific
Commercial Company, 98 Phil 133 (1955); Pacific Commercial Co. v. Aquino,
100 Phil. 961 (1957); Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Chua Tua Tian, 101 Phil. 184
(1957); Liboro v. Finance and Mining Investment Corp., 102 Phil. 489 (1957); Rio
y Compania v. Jolkipli, 105 Phil. 447 (1959); People v. Jollifee, 105 Phil. 677
(1959); Uy Hoo & Co., Inc. v. Tan, 105 Phil. 716 (1959).
14. 102 Phil. 489 (1957).
15. Ibid., p. 493.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 81510. March 14, 1990.]
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS D.

ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE
MARQUEZ, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; WARRANTS OF SEARCH AND ARREST; MAY BE ISSUED

ONLY BY A JUDGE; EXCEPTION. — Under the new Constitution, which states: . . .
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. It is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and
search. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens,
whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested,
following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
2. ID.; ID.; SECRETARY OF LABOR; NO LONGER AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE
WARRANT. — The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue
search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial
process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
3. ID.; ID.; IDENTIFY CLEARLY THE THINGS TO BE SEIZED. — We have held that a
warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and
void, thus: . . .Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of
general warrants. . . . In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which
authorized the search for `books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the
Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in
Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like
manner, directions to 'seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC
13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search
warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used
to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing
with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore
invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search
warrants in question cannot be characterized differently. . . .

DECISION
SARMIENTO, J : p
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue
warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting
illegal recruitment. LibLex
The facts are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street,

Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged
petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz.:
"04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay?
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card

ay ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. — Horty Salazar —
615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap ang ginawang panloloko sa

iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
S: Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.
06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?
S: Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha ang

PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng Booking sa Japan.
Mag-9 months na ako sa Phils. ay hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So
lumipat ako ng ibang company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC
Card ko.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to

whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following
telegram:
"YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE

MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA
BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON
NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL
NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW."
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license
to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas
D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO.
1205 which reads:
"HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No.
1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE
of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos
St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents
and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means
of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and

Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of

the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same
code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under

existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3rd day of November, 1987."
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty.

Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty.
Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a
team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so,
the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo
of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the
residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance
Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and
Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them
entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that
Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.).
However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce
any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers
— practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting
outside. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly
receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora
Salazar. cdphil
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:
"Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong,

Metro Manila, we respectfully request that the personal properties
seized at her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately
returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and
against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the
following:
1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence
the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3,
1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1,
Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution
which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose."
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdie Marquez and five (5)
others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of
the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the
seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client
were without her consent and were done with unreasonable
force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color
of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile
under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND

PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for
shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from
your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil
and criminal, to protect our client's interests.
We trust that you will give due attention to these important
matters."
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner
filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint
against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the
acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition
too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public
interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of
search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an
issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case,
it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power:
xxx xxx xxx
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been
described is the state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law
has since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the
power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of
arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power
on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987
Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987; the date of its
ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that
thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on
the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants; may be validly
exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the
present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said
1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary
investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:

We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or
was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it
cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the
existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a
magistraté, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his
case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily
to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as
the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search
warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and
jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to
that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an
amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President
Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his
legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the
latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers: prLL
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have
the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person
engaged in illegal recruitment. 6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the
avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal
recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause
the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority
if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a
danger to national security and public order or will lead to further
exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of
companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been
licensed or authorized to do so. 7
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018,
giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of
such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is
determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and
public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister
shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of
documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal
recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and
entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 8
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of
authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue
search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial
process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken.
Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised
Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled
that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the
President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final
decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized
supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11
xxx xxx xxx
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco
Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That
power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such
action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation."
Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there
are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the
public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport
them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In
re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).cdll
"The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued

presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified" (Tiu
Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director
of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is,
obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend
to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of
the courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia
argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general
warrant:

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920
and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your
recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of
the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same
code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under

existing laws. 13
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized,
otherwise, it is null and void, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general
warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized
in this wise:
"1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo
equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used an/or connected in the printing of the 'WE FORUM'
newspaper and any and all documents/communications, letters and
facsimile of prints related to the 'WE FORUM' newspaper.
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the
subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines,
Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and
3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the 'WE
FORUM' and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2) DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665;

and
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with
marking 'Bagong Silang.'"
In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the

search for 'books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the
Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party
in Texas,' was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to 'seize any evidence in connection
with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too
general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the
seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197
of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The
description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants
in question cannot be characterized differently.LLpr
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable
chapter in English history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor
Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were
given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to
suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan."
Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is
not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or
publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no
clear and imminent danger to state security. 14
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no
other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search;
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom
the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following
a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor
Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are
ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of
Search and Seizure Order No. 1205. cdrep
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, 19-24; emphases in the original.
2. CONST., art. III, sec. 2.

3. See Ponsica v. Ignalaga, No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 647; Presidential Anti-
Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83578, March 16, 1989.
4. Ponsica, supra, 662-663.
5. Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, supra, 21.

6. Pres. Decree No. 1693, "FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLE 38 OF THE LABOR CODE BY
MAKING ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT A CRIME OF ECONOMIC SABOTAGE."
7. Supra, sec. 1.
8. Pres. Decree No. 2018, "FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLES 38 AND 39 OF THE LABOR
CODE BY MAKING ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT A CRIME OF ECONOMIC SABOTAGE
AND PUNISHABLE WITH IMPRISONMENT."
9. No. L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562.
10. Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, No. L-10280, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA
27; Vivo v. Montesa, No. L-24576, 24 SCRA 155.
11. Go Tek v. Deportation Board, No. L-23846, September 9, 1977, 79 SCRA 17.
12. Supra, 21-22.
13. Rollo, id., 15.

14. Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, No. 64261, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800,
814-816.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 187167. August 16, 2011.]
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C.
ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA
ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR
BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN
MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO,
RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE
CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL
MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK
FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE
MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA
ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III , petitioners, vs . HON. EDUARDO
ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY,
and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS , respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO , J : p
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 1 (RA
9522) adjusting the country's archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories. EScAID
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as
an archipelagic State. 3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958
(UNCLOS I), 4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which,
however, was left undetermined. Attempts to ll this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS
II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly ve decades, save for legislation passed in 1968
(Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in
North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was
prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III), 5 which the Philippines rati ed on 27 February 1984. 6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio,
length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for
the extended continental shelf. 8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location
of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classi ed adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group
(KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or . . .
legislators," 9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces
Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state's sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the
1987 Constitution, 1 0 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris 1 1 and ancillary treaties, 1 2 and (2) RA 9522 opens the
country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty
and national security, contravening the country's nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions. 1 3
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522's treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence shermen. 1 4 To buttress their argument of territorial
diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included — its failure to reference either the Treaty of
Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III's framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent o cials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition's compliance with
the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners' alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the
propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents
defended RA 9522 as the country's compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or
Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country's security, environment and economic
interests or relinquish the Philippines' claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners' assertion that what Spain ceded
to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular
area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners' prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily —
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court

On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs
of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we nd no basis to
declare RA 9522 unconstitutional. SHEIDC
On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition
alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative 1 5 nor misuse of public funds, 1 6 occasioned by the passage and
implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners' locus standi as citizens with constitutionally su cient
interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national signi cance necessitating urgent
resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably di cult to nd other litigants possessing "a
more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing. 1 7
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the o ces of
the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the
exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of
petitioners. 1 8
Respondents' submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial
review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the
constitutionality of statutes, 1 9 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. 2 0 Issues of constitutional import are
sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such
relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably nds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon
the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is
one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Country's
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory" 2 1 because it discards the pre-
UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the
de nition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional
de nition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial
sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from
the Treaty of Paris' technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles
around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. 2 2
Petitioners' theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others,
sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves
that UNCLOS III delimits. 2 3 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to
codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world's oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic
States' graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out speci c
basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like
ours could not be any clearer: TaEIcS
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf. — The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the
extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the
scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise
of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, scal, immigration, and sanitation laws in
the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
(Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners' theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular
area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522
because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the
boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and
drying reefs of the archipelago." 2 4
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution
of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation,
accretion, cession and prescription, 2 5 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty's terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features
are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. 2 6
RA 9522's Use of the Framework
of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines' Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522's use of UNCLOS III's regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to
measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that area. 2 7 Petitioners
add that the KIG's (and Scarborough Shoal's) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about
15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence shermen. 2 8 A comparison of the
con guration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law,
coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines' obligations under
UNCLOS III, belie this view.
The con guration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the
basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints
and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III's limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under
RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine
archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners' argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory
renunciation of the Philippines' claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners' assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly
unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines'
total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical
miles, as shown in the table below: 2 9
Extent of maritime
Extent of maritime area
area using RA 9522,
using RA 3046, as amended,
taking into account
taking into account the
UNCLOS III (in
Treaty of Paris' delimitation
square nautical
(in square nautical miles)
miles)
Internal or
archipelagic 166,858 171,435
waters
Territorial
274,136 32,106
Sea
Exclusive
Economic
Zone
382,669
——————— ———————
TOTAL 440,994 586,210
======= =======
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond
the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive
economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with
UNCLOS III. 3 0

[image]
Further, petitioners' argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws
do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines' continued claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): aTEACS
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse
legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article
47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
con guration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed
100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles. 3 1
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG 3 2 and the Scarborough Shoal for several
decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, 3 3
such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the
foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are
outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision
of international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
con guration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang
Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim
them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our con guration. We see that our archipelago is de ned by the orange line which
[we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong
malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa
natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi
na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural con guration of the archipelago . 3 4
(Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III's limits. The need to shorten this baseline,
and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones
including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As de ned by R.A. 3046, as
amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical
miles . . . . This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that "The
length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of
baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system.
This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods.
Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be
located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47. 3 5
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines' claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress' decision to
classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "'Regime[s] of Islands' under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with
Article 121" 3 6 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State's responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation
under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, quali es under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their
own applicable maritime zones. 3 7
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners' argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines' claim over Sabah in North
Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of
Sabah:
Section 2. The de nition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is
without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
(Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

Incompatible with the Constitution's
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their nal argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts"
internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under
UNCLOS III, including over ight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters
to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. 3 8 ACcISa
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution 3 9 or as "archipelagic waters" under
UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines,
including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. —
1. T h e sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect
the status of the archipelagic waters , including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic
State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources
contained therein . (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting
the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically,
the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass
legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. 40 Indeed, bills
drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress. 4 1
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codi ed in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent
passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty's limitations and conditions for their exercise.
4 2 Signi cantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, 4 3 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus
of Philippine law. 4 4 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised
in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea
lanes passage 4 5 does not place them in lesser footing vis-Ã -vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial
sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these
passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their
right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic
waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States' archipelago and the
waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under
UNCLOS III. 4 6 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than
24 nautical miles beyond the States' territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS
III. 4 7
Petitioners' invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies) 4 8 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides,
which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights . . . ." 4 9 Article II provisions serve
as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the
Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran 5 0 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II
as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other
provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2) 5 1 and subsistence
fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7), 5 2 are not violated by RA 9522. cDAISC
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely
to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the
international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to
UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space — the
exclusive economic zone — in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to
exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. 5 3 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines' Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522. 5 4
We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III 5 5 and we nd petitioners' reading plausible. Nevertheless, the
prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes
at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will nd itself
devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured.
This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the
resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country's case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in
RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines' maritime zones and continental
shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with
the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE , we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED .
Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Sereno,
JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., please see concurring opinion.
C.J. Corona certifies that Mr. Justice Abad left his concurring role.
Separate Opinions
VELASCO, JR. , J., concurring :
I concur with the ponencia and add the following complementary arguments and observations:
A statute is a product of hard work and earnest studies of Congress to ensure that no constitutional provision,
prescription or concept is infringed. Withal, before a law, in an appropriate proceeding, is nulli ed, an unequivocal breach of, or a
clear con ict with, the Constitution must be demonstrated in such a way as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. 1 In the
same token, if a law runs directly afoul of the Constitution, the Court's duty on the matter should be clear and simple: Pursuant
to its judicial power and as nal arbiter of all legal questions, 2 it should strike such law down, however laudable its purpose/s
might be and regardless of the deleterious effect such action may carry in its wake.
Challenged in these proceedings is the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA 9522) entitled "An Act to Amend Certain
Provisions of [RA] 3046, as Amended by [RA] 5446 to De ne the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines and for Other
Purposes." For perspective, RA 3046, "An Act to De ne the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines," was enacted in
1961 to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) I. Eight years later, RA 5446 was enacted
to amend typographical errors relating to coordinates in RA 3046. The latter law also added a provision asserting Philippine
sovereignty over Sabah. IaAScD
As its title suggests, RA 9522 delineates archipelagic baselines of the country, amending in the process the old baselines
law, RA 3046. Everybody is agreed that RA 9522 was enacted in response to the country's commitment to conform to some
1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) or UNCLOS III provisions to de ne new archipelagic baselines through legislation, the
Philippines having signed 3 and eventually rati ed 4 this multilateral treaty. The Court can take judicial notice that RA 9522 was
registered and deposited with the UN on April 4, 2009.
As indicated in its Preamble, 5 1982 LOSC aims, among other things, to establish, with due regard for the sovereignty of
all States, "a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful
uses of the seas and oceans." One of the measures to attain the order adverted to is to have a rule on baselines. Of particular
relevance to the Philippines, as an archipelagic state, is Article 47 of UNCLOS III which deals with baselines:
1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the
outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands
and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.
2. The length of such baseline shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of
baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles.
3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago .
xxx xxx xxx

9. The archipelagic State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical co-ordinates and shall deposit a
copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 6 (Emphasis added.)
To obviate, however, the possibility that certain UNCLOS III baseline provisions would, in their implementation, undermine
its sovereign and/or jurisdictional interests over what it considers its territory, 7 the Philippines, when it signed UNCLOS III on
December 10, 1982, made the following "Declaration" to said treaty:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP] hereby manifests that in signing the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, it does so with the understandings embodied in this declaration, made under the
provisions of Article 310 of the Convention, to wit:
The signing of the Convention by the [GRP] shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign rights
of the [RP] under and arising from the Constitution of the Philippines;
Such signing shall not in any manner affect the sovereign rights of the [RP] as successor of the United States of America
[USA], under and arising out of the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States of America of December 10, 1898,
and the Treaty of Washington between the [USA] and Great Britain of January 2, 1930;
xxx xxx xxx

Such signing shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereignty of the [RP] over any territory over which it
exercises sovereign authority, such as the Kalayaan Islands, and the waters appurtenant thereto ;
The Convention shall not be construed as amending in any manner any pertinent laws and Presidential Decrees or
Proclamations of the Republic of the Philippines. The [GRP] maintains and reserves the right and authority to make any
amendments to such laws, decrees or proclamations pursuant to the provisions of the Philippine Constitution;
The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify or impair the sovereignty of the
Philippines as an archipelagic state over the sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its
sovereignty independence and security; ADSTCI
The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under the Constitution of the Philippines, and
removes straits connecting these waters with the economic zone or high sea from the rights of foreign vessels to transit
passage for international navigation. 8 (Emphasis added.)
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 9522 on the principal ground that the law violates Section 1, Article I of
the 1987 Constitution on national territory which states:
Section 1.The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago , with all the islands and waters embraced therein,
and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction , consisting of its terrestrial,
uvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine
areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago , regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
According to Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., himself a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987
Constitution, the aforequoted Section 1 on national territory was "in substance a copy of its 1973 counterpart." 9 Art. I of the
1973 Constitution reads:
Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago , with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title , including the territorial
sea, the air space, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago , regardless of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. (Emphasis added.)
As may be noted both constitutions speak of the "Philippine archipelago," and, via the last sentence of their respective
provisions, assert the country's adherence to the "archipelagic principle." Both constitutions divide the national territory into two
main groups: (1) the Philippine archipelago and (2) other territories belonging to the Philippines. So what or where is Philippine
archipelago contemplated in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions then? Fr. Bernas answers the poser in the following wise:
Article I of the 1987 Constitution cannot be fully understood without reference to Article I of the 1973 Constitution. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . To understand [the meaning of national territory as comprising the Philippine archipelago], one must look into the
evolution of [Art. I of the 1973 Constitution] from its first draft to its final form.
Section 1 of the rst draft submitted by the Committee on National Territory almost literally reproduced Article I of the 1935
Constitution . . . . Unlike the 1935 version, however, the draft designated the Philippines not simply as the Philippines but as
"the Philippine archipelago. 1 0 In response to the criticism that the de nition was colonial in tone . . ., the second draft further
designated the Philippine archipelago, as the historic home of the Filipino people from its beginning. 1 1
After debates . . ., the Committee reported out a nal draft, which became the initially approved version: "The national
territory consists of the Philippine archipelago which is the ancestral home of the Filipino people and which is composed of
all the islands and waters embraced therein . . ."
What was the intent behind the designation of the Philippines as an "archipelago"? . . . Asked by Delegate
Roseller Lim (Zamboanga) where this archipelago was, Committee Chairman Quintero answered that it was the area
delineated in the Treaty of Paris . He said that objections to the colonial implication of mentioning the Treaty of Paris
was responsible for the omission of the express mention of the Treaty of Paris.
Report No. 01 of the Committee on National Territory had in fact been explicit in its delineation of the expanse of this
archipelago. It said:
Now if we plot on a map the boundaries of this archipelago as set forth in the Treaty of Paris, a huge or giant rectangle will
emerge, measuring about 600 miles in width and 1,200 miles in length. Inside this giant rectangle are the 7,100 islands
comprising the Philippine Islands. From the east coast of Luzon to the eastern boundary of this huge rectangle in the Paci c
Ocean, there is a distance of over 300 miles. From the west coast of Luzon to the western boundary of this giant rectangle in
the China sea, there is a distance of over 150 miles. THEDCA
When the [US] Government enacted the Jones Law, the Hare-Hawes Cutting Law and the Tydings McDu e Law, it in reality
announced to the whole world that it was turning over to the Government of the Philippine Islands an archipelago (that is a
big body of water studded with islands), the boundaries of which archipelago are set forth in Article III of the Treaty of Paris.
It also announced to the whole world that the waters inside the giant rectangle belong to the Philippines — that they are not
part of the high seas.
When Spain signed the Treaty of Paris, in effect she announced to the whole world that she was ceding to the [US] the
Philippine archipelago . . ., that this archipelago was bounded by lines speci ed in the treaty, and that the archipelago
consisted of the huge body of water inside the boundaries and the islands inside said boundaries.
The delineation of the extent of the Philippine archipelago must be understood in the context of the
modi cations made both by the Treaty of Washington of November 7, 1900 , and of the Convention of January 12,
1930, in order to include the Islands of Sibutu and of Cagayan de Sulu and the Turtle and Mangsee Islands. However, . . . the
de nition of the archipelago did not include the Batanes group[, being] outside the boundaries of the Philippine archipelago
as set forth in the Treaty of Paris. In literal terms, therefore, the Batanes islands would come not under the Philippine
archipelago but under the phrase "all other territories belong to the Philippines." 1 2 . . . (Emphasis added.)
From the foregoing discussions on the deliberations of the provisions on national territory, the following conclusion is
abundantly evident: the "Philippine archipelago" of the 1987 Constitution is the same "Philippine archipelago" referred to in Art. I
of the 1973 Constitution which in turn corresponds to the territory de ned and described in Art. 1 of the 1935 Constitution, 1 3
which pertinently reads:
Section 1.The Philippines comprises all the territory ceded to the [US] by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the [US] and
Spain on the tenth day of December, [1898], the limits of which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the
islands in the treaty concluded at Washington, between the [US] and Spain on November [7, 1900] and the treaty concluded
between the [US] and Great Britain . . . .
While the Treaty of Paris is not mentioned in both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, its mention, so the nationalistic
arguments went, being "a repulsive reminder of the indignity of our colonial past," 1 4 it is at once clear that the Treaty of Paris
had been utilized as key reference point in the definition of the national territory.
On the other hand, the phrase "all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction," found in the
1987 Constitution, which replaced the deleted phrase "all territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title"
1 5 found in the 1973 Constitution, covers areas linked to the Philippines with varying degrees of certainty. 1 6 Under this
category would fall: (a) Batanes, which then 1971 Convention Delegate Eduardo Quintero, Chairperson of the Committee on
National Territory, described as belonging to the Philippines in all its history; 1 7 (b) Sabah, over which a formal claim had been
led, the so-called Freedomland (a group of islands known as Spratleys); and (c) any other territory, over which the Philippines
had led a claim or might acquire in the future through recognized modes of acquiring territory. 1 8 As an author puts it, the
deletion of the words "by historic right or legal title" is not to be interpreted as precluding future claims to areas over which the
Philippines does not actually exercise sovereignty. 1 9
Upon the foregoing perspective and going into speci cs, petitioners would have RA 9522 stricken down as
unconstitutional for the reasons that it deprives the Philippines of what has long been established as part and parcel of its
national territory under the Treaty of Paris, as supplemented by the aforementioned 1900 Treaty of Washington or, to the same
effect, revises the de nition on or dismembers the national territory. Pushing their case, petitioners argue that the
constitutional de nition of the national territory cannot be remade by a mere statutory act. 2 0 As another point, petitioners
parlay the theory that the law in question virtually weakens the country's territorial claim over the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG)
and Sabah, both of which come under the category of "other territories" over the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
Petitioners would also assail the law on grounds related to territorial sea lanes and internal waters transit passage by foreign
vessels.
It is remarkable that petitioners could seriously argue that RA 9522 revises the Philippine territory as de ned in the
Constitution, or worse, constitutes an abdication of territory. SDTIaE
It cannot be over-emphasized enough that RA 9522 is a baseline law enacted to implement the 1982 LOSC, which in turn
seeks to regulate and establish an orderly sea use rights over maritime zones. Or as the ponencia aptly states, RA 9522 aims to
mark-out specific base points along the Philippine coast from which baselines are drawn to serve as starting points to measure
the breadth of the territorial sea and maritime zones. 2 1 The baselines are set to de ne the sea limits of a state, be it
coastal or archipelagic, under the UNCLOS III regime. By setting the baselines to conform to the prescriptions of
UNCLOS III, RA 9522 did not surrender any territory, as petitioners would insist at every turn, for UNCLOS III is
concerned with setting order in the exercise of sea-use rights, not the acquisition or cession of territory. And let
it be noted that under UNCLOS III, it is recognized that countries can have territories outside their baselines. Far
from having a dismembering effect, then, RA 9522 has in a limited but real sense increased the country's
maritime boundaries . How this situation comes about was extensively explained by then Minister of State and head of the
Philippine delegation to UNCLOS III Arturo Tolentino in his sponsorship speech 22 on the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa with the LOSC:
xxx xxx xxx
Then, we should consider, Mr. Speaker, that under the archipelagic principle, the whole area inside the archipelagic base lines
become a uni ed whole and the waters between the islands which formerly were regarded by international law as open or
international seas now become waters under the complete sovereignty of the Filipino people. In this light there would be an
additional area of 141,800 square nautical miles inside the base lines that will be recognized by international law as
Philippine waters, equivalent to 45,351,050 hectares. These gains in the waters of the sea, 45,211,225 hectares outside the
base lines and 141,531,000 hectares inside the base lines, total 93,742,275 hectares as a total gain in the waters under
Philippine jurisdiction.
From a pragmatic standpoint, therefore, the advantage to our country and people not only in terms of the legal uni cation of
land and waters of the archipelago in the light of international law, but also in terms of the vast resources that will come
under the dominion and jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines, your Committee on Foreign Affairs does not hesitate
to ask this august Body to concur in the Convention by approving the resolution before us today.
May I say it was the unanimous view of delegations at the Conference on the Law of the Sea that archipelagos are among
the biggest gainers or beneficiaries under the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Lest it be overlooked, the constitutional provision on national territory, as couched, is broad enough to encompass RA
9522's de nition of the archipelagic baselines. To reiterate, the laying down of baselines is not a mode of acquiring or asserting
ownership a territory over which a state exercises sovereignty. They are drawn for the purpose of de ning or establishing the
maritime areas over which a state can exercise sovereign rights. Baselines are used for xing starting point from which the
territorial belt is measured seawards or from which the adjacent maritime waters are measured. Thus, the territorial sea, a
marginal belt of maritime waters, is measured from the baselines extending twelve (12) nautical miles outward. 2 3 Similarly, Art.
57 of the 1982 LOSC provides that the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) "shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." 2 4 Most important to note is that the baselines indicated
under RA 9522 are derived from Art. 47 of the 1982 LOSC which was earlier quoted.
Since the 1987 Constitution's de nition of national territory does not delimit where the Philippines' baselines are located,
it is up to the political branches of the government to supply the de ciency. Through Congress, the Philippines has taken an
o cial position regarding its baselines to the international community through RA 3046, 2 5 as amended by RA 5446 2 6 and RA
9522. When the Philippines deposited a copy of RA 9522 with the UN Secretary General, we effectively complied in good faith
with our obligation under the 1982 LOSC. A declaration by the Court of the constitutionality of the law will complete the bona
fides of the Philippines vis-a-vis the law of the sea treaty.
It may be that baseline provisions of UNCLOS III, if strictly implemented, may have an imposing impact on the signatory
states' jurisdiction and even their sovereignty. But this actuality, without more, can hardly provide a justifying dimension to
nullify the complying RA 9522. As held by the Court in Bayan Muna v. Romulo , 2 7 treaties and international agreements have a
limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary acts, states may decide to
surrender or waive some aspects of their sovereignty. The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the
greater bene ts derived from a pact or reciprocal undertaking. On the premise that the Philippines has adopted the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating
the Constitution. aSEDHC
As a signatory of the 1982 LOSC, it behooves the Philippines to honor its obligations thereunder. Pacta sunt servanda, a
basic international law postulate that "every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith." 2 8 The exacting imperative of this principle is such that a state may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its
laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty." 2 9
The allegation that Sabah has been surrendered by virtue of RA 9522, which supposedly repealed the hereunder provision
of RA 5446, is likewise unfounded.
Section 2. The de nition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is
without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
There is nothing in RA 9522 indicating a clear intention to supersede Sec. 2 of RA 5446. Petitioners obviously have read
too much into RA 9522's amendment on the baselines found in an older law. Aside from setting the country's baselines, RA
9522 is, in its Sec. 3, quite explicit in its reiteration of the Philippines' exercise of sovereignty, thus:
Section 3. This Act a rms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all
portions of the national territory as de ned in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without
limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.
To emphasize, baselines are used to measure the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf. Having KIG and the Scarborough Shoal outside Philippine baselines will not diminish
our sovereignty over these areas. Art. 46 of UNCLOS III in fact recognizes that an archipelagic state, such as the
Philippines, is a state "constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands." (emphasis
supplied) The "other islands" referred to in Art. 46 are doubtless islands not forming part of the archipelago but are
nevertheless part of the state's territory.
The Philippines' sovereignty over KIG and Scarborough Shoal are, thus, in no way diminished. Consider: Other countries
such as Malaysia and the United States have territories that are located outside its baselines, yet there is no territorial question
arising from this arrangement. 3 0
It may well be apropos to point out that the Senate version of the baseline bill that would become RA 9522 contained the
following explanatory note: The law "reiterates our sovereignty over the Kalayaan Group of Islands declared as part of the
Philippine territory under Presidential Decree No. 1596. As part of the Philippine territory, they shall be considered as a 'regime
of islands' under Article 121 of the Convention." 3 1 Thus, instead of being in the nature of a "treasonous surrender" that
petitioners have described it to be, RA 9522 even harmonizes our baseline laws with our international agreements, without
limiting our territory to those confined within the country's baselines.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, the classi cation of KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as falling under the Philippine's
regime of islands is not constitutionally objectionable. Such a classi cation serves as compliance with LOSC and the
Philippines' assertion of sovereignty over KIG and Scarborough Shoal. In setting the baseline in KIG and Scarborough Shoal, RA
9522 states that these are areas "over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction." It is, thus, not
correct for petitioners to claim that the Philippines has lost 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters upon making this
classi cation. Having 15,000 square nautical miles of Philippine waters outside of our baselines, to reiterate, does not translate
to a surrender of these waters. The Philippines maintains its assertion of ownership over territories outside of its baselines.
Even China views RA 9522 as an assertion of ownership, as seen in its Protest 3 2 led with the UN Secretary-General upon the
deposit of RA 9522.
We take judicial notice of the effective occupation of KIG by the Philippines. Petitioners even point out that national and
local elections are regularly held there. The classification of KIG as under a "regime of islands" does not in any manner affect the
Philippines' consistent position with regard to sovereignty over KIG. It does not affect the Philippines' other acts of ownership
such as occupation or amend Presidential Decree No. 1596, which declared KIG as a municipality of Palawan. DTSIEc
The fact that the baselines of KIG and Scarborough Shoal have yet to be de ned would not detract to the
constitutionality of the law in question. The resolution of the problem lies with the political departments of the government.
All told, the concerns raised by the petitioners about the diminution or the virtual dismemberment of the Philippine
territory by the enactment of RA 9522 are, to me, not well grounded. To repeat, UNCLOS III pertains to a law on the seas,
not territory . As part of its Preamble, 3 3 LOSC recognizes "the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due
regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans . . . ."
This brings me to the matter of transit passage of foreign vessels through Philippine waters.
Apropos thereto, petitioners allege that RA 9522 violates the nuclear weapons-free policy under Sec. 8, in relation to Sec.
16, Art. II of the Constitution, and exposes the Philippines to marine pollution hazards, since under the LOSC the Philippines
supposedly must give to ships of all states the right of innocent passage and the right of archipelagic sea-lane passage.
The adverted Sec. 8, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution declares the adoption and pursuit by the Philippines of "a policy of
freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory." On the other hand, the succeeding Sec. 16 underscores the State's rm
commitment "to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." Following the allegations of petitioners, these twin provisions will supposedly be violated inasmuch as RA
9522 accedes to the right of innocent passage and the right of archipelagic sea-lane passage provided under the LOSC.
Therefore, ships of all nations — be they nuclear-carrying warships or neutral commercial vessels transporting goods — can
assert the right to traverse the waters within our islands.
A cursory reading of RA 9522 would belie petitioners' posture. In context, RA 9522 simply seeks to conform to our
international agreement on the setting of baselines and provides nothing about the designation of archipelagic sea-lane
passage or the regulation of innocent passage within our waters. Again, petitioners have read into the amendatory RA 9522
something not intended.
Indeed, the 1982 LOSC enumerates the rights and obligations of archipelagic party-states in terms of transit under Arts.
51 to 53, which are explained below:
To safeguard, in explicit terms, the general balance struck by [Articles 51 and 52] between the need for passage through the
area (other than straits used for international navigation) and the archipelagic state's need for security, Article 53 gave the
archipelagic state the right to regulate where and how ships and aircraft pass through its territory by designating specific sea
lanes. Rights of passage through these archipelagic sea lanes are regarded as those of transit passage:
(1) An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, suitable for safe, continuous and
expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea.
(2) All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in such sea lanes and air routes.
(3) Archipelagic sea lanes passage is the exercise in accordance with the present Convention of the rights of navigation
and over ight in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. 3 4
But owing to the geographic structure and physical features of the country, i.e., where it is "essentially a body of water
studded with islands, rather than islands with water around them," 3 5 the Philippines has consistently maintained the conceptual
unity of land and water as a necessary element for territorial integrity, 3 6 national security (which may be compromised by the
presence of warships and surveillance ships on waters between the islands), 3 7 and the preservation of its maritime resources.
As succinctly explained by Minister Arturo Tolentino, the essence of the archipelagic concept is "the dominion and sovereignty
of the archipelagic State within its baselines, which were so drawn as to preserve the territorial integrity of the archipelago by
the inseparable unity of the land and water domain. " 3 8 Indonesia, like the Philippines, in terms of geographic reality, has
expressed agreement with this interpretation of the archipelagic concept. So it was that in 1957, the Indonesian Government
issued the Djuanda Declaration, therein stating: SHIETa
[H]istorically, the Indonesian archipelago has been an entity since time immemorial. In view of the territorial entirety and of
preserving the wealth of the Indonesian state, it is deemed necessary to consider all waters between the islands and entire
entity.
. . . On the ground of the above considerations, the Government states that all waters around, between and connecting,
the islands or parts of islands belonging to the Indonesian archipelago irrespective of their width or dimension are
natural appurtenances of its land territory and therefore an integral part of the inland or national waters
subject to the absolute sovereignty of Indonesia . 3 9 (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the Philippines maintains the sui generis character of our archipelagic waters as equivalent to the internal
waters of continental coastal states . In other words, the landward waters embraced within the baselines determined by RA
9 5 2 2 , i.e., all waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. 4 0 Accordingly, such waters are not covered by the jurisdiction
of the LOSC and cannot be subjected to the rights granted to foreign states in archipelagic waters, e.g., the right of innocent
passage, 4 1 which is allowed only in the territorial seas, or that area of the ocean comprising 12 miles from the baselines of our
archipelago; archipelagic sea-lane passage; 4 2 over flight; 4 3 and traditional fishing rights. 4 4
Our position that all waters within our baselines are internal waters, which are outside the jurisdiction of the 1982 LOSC,
45 was abundantly made clear by the Philippine Declaration at the time of the signing of the LOSC on December 10, 1982. To
reiterate, paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Declaration state:
5. The Convention shall not be construed as amending in any manner any pertinent laws and Presidential decrees of
Proclamation of the republic of the Philippines; the Government . . . maintains and reserves the right and authority
to make any amendments to such laws, decrees or proclamations pursuant to the provisions of the Philippine
Constitution ;
6. The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify or impair the
sovereignty of the Philippines as an archipelagic State over the sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority to enact
legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence and security ;
7. The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under the Constitution of
the Philippines and removes straits connecting this water with the economic zone or high seas from the rights
of foreign vessels to transit passage for international navigation . (Emphasis supplied.) 4 6
More importantly, by the rati cation of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987, the integrity of the Philippine state as
comprising both water and land was strengthened by the proviso in its rst article, viz.: "The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the [Philippine] archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal waters of the Philippines . (emphasis supplied)
In effect, contrary to petitioners' allegations, the Philippines' rati cation of the 1982 LOSC did not matter-of-factly open
our internal waters to passage by foreign ships, either in the concept of innocent passage or archipelagic sea-lane passage, in
exchange for the international community's recognition of the Philippines as an archipelagic state. The Filipino people, by
ratifying the 1987 Constitution, veritably rejected the quid pro quo petitioners take as being subsumed in that treaty.
Harmonized with the Declaration and the Constitution, the designation of baselines made in RA 9522 likewise designates
our internal waters, through which passage by foreign ships is not a right, but may be granted by the Philippines to foreign
states but only as a dissolvable privilege.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
Footnotes
1.Entitled "An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic
Baselines of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes."
2.Entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines."
3.The third "Whereas Clause" of RA 3046 expresses the import of treating the Philippines as an archipelagic State:
"WHEREAS, all the waters around, between, and connecting the various islands of the Philippine archipelago, irrespective of their width
or dimensions, have always been considered as necessary appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland waters of
the Philippines."
4.One of the four conventions framed during the first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in Geneva, this treaty, excluding the
Philippines, entered into force on 10 September 1964.
5.UNCLOS III entered into force on 16 November 1994.

6.The Philippines signed the treaty on 10 December 1982.
7.Article 47, paragraphs 1-3, provide:
1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs
of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of
the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.
2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles.
3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
8.UNCLOS III entered into force on 16 November 1994. The deadline for the filing of application is mandated in Article 4, Annex II: "Where a
coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it
shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible
but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State. The coastal State shall at the same time
give the names of any Commission members who have provided it with scientific and technical advice." (Underscoring supplied)
In a subsequent meeting, the States parties agreed that for States which became bound by the treaty before 13 May 1999 (such as the
Philippines) the ten-year period will be counted from that date. Thus, RA 9522, which took effect on 27 March 2009, barely met the
deadline.
9.Rollo, p. 34.
10.Which provides: "The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains,
including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines."
11.Entered into between the United States and Spain on 10 December 1898 following the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. Under
the terms of the treaty, Spain ceded to the United States "the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands" lying within its technical
description.
12.The Treaty of Washington, between Spain and the United States (7 November 1900), transferring to the US the islands of Cagayan,
Sulu, and Sibutu and the US-Great Britain Convention (2 January 1930) demarcating boundary lines between the Philippines and
North Borneo.
13.Article II, Section 7, Section 8, and Section 16.
14.Allegedly in violation of Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 and Article XIII, Section 7 of the Constitution.
15.Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 320 Phil. 171, 186 (1995).

16.Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. COMELEC, 165 Phil. 303 (1976).
17.Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 899 (2003) citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, 5 May
1994, 232 SCRA 110, 155-156 (1995) (Feliciano, J., concurring). The two other factors are: "the character of funds or assets
involved in the controversy and a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition." Id.
18.Rollo, pp. 144-147.
19.See e.g., Aquino III v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617 SCRA 623 (dismissing a petition for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, not for the impropriety of remedy but for lack of merit); Aldaba v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA 137 (issuing the writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic
Act No. 9591); Macalintal v. COMELEC, 453 Phil. 586 (2003) (issuing the writs of certiorari and prohibition declaring
unconstitutional portions of Republic Act No. 9189).
20.See e.g., Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008, 549 SCRA
77 (granting a writ of certiorari against the Philippine Senate and nullifying the Senate contempt order issued against petitioner).
21.Rollo, p. 31.
22.Respondents state in their Comment that petitioners' theory "has not been accepted or recognized by either the United States or Spain,"
the parties to the Treaty of Paris. Respondents add that "no State is known to have supported this proposition." Rollo, p. 179.
23.UNCLOS III belongs to that larger corpus of international law of the sea, which petitioner Magallona himself defined as "a body of
treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction
over maritime regimes. . . ." (MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, Primer on the Law of the Sea 1 [1997]) (Italicization supplied).
24.Following Article 47 (1) of UNCLOS III which provides:
An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying
reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the
area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. (Emphasis supplied)
25.Under the United Nations Charter, use of force is no longer a valid means of acquiring territory.
26.The last paragraph of the preamble of UNCLOS III states that "matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the
rules and principles of general international law."
27.Rollo, p. 51.
28.Id. at 51-52, 64-66.

29.Based on figures respondents submitted in their Comment (id. at 182).
30.Under Article 74.

31.See note 7.
32.Presidential Decree No. 1596 classifies the KIG as a municipality of Palawan.
33.KIG lies around 80 nautical miles west of Palawan while Scarborough Shoal is around 123 nautical west of Zambales.
34.Journal, Senate 14th Congress 44th Session 1416 (27 January 2009).
35.Rollo, p. 159.
36.Section 2, RA 9522.
37.Article 121 provides: "Regime of islands. —
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf
of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf."
38.Rollo, pp. 56-57, 60-64.

39.Paragraph 2, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution uses the term "archipelagic waters" separately from "territorial sea." Under
UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State may have internal waters — such as those enclosed by closing lines across bays and mouths of
rivers. See Article 50, UNCLOS III. Moreover, Article 8 (2) of UNCLOS III provides: "Where the establishment of a straight baseline in
accordance with the method set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously
been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters." (Emphasis
supplied)
40.Mandated under Articles 52 and 53 of UNCLOS III:
Article 52. Right of innocent passage. —

1. Subject to article 53 and without prejudice to article 50, ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage through
archipelagic waters , in accordance with Part II, section 3.
2. The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of
its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security. Such
suspension shall take effect only after having been duly published. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 53. Right of archipelagic sea lanes passage. —

1. An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, suitable for the continuous and expeditious passage of
foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea.
2. All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in such sea lanes and air routes .
3. Archipelagic sea lanes passage means the exercise in accordance with this Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight in
the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.
4. Such sea lanes and air routes shall traverse the archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea and shall include all normal
passage routes used as routes for international navigation or overflight through or over archipelagic waters and, within such routes,
so far as ships are concerned, all normal navigational channels, provided that duplication of routes of similar convenience between
the same entry and exit points shall not be necessary.
5. Such sea lanes and air routes shall be defined by a series of continuous axis lines from the entry points of passage routes to the exit
points. Ships and aircraft in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall not deviate more than 25 nautical miles to either side of such axis
lines during passage, provided that such ships and aircraft shall not navigate closer to the coasts than 10 per cent of the distance
between the nearest points on islands bordering the sea lane.
6. An archipelagic State which designates sea lanes under this article may also prescribe traffic separation schemes for the safe
passage of ships through narrow channels in such sea lanes.
7. An archipelagic State may, when circumstances require, after giving due publicity thereto, substitute other sea lanes or traffic
separation schemes for any sea lanes or traffic separation schemes previously designated or prescribed by it.
8. Such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes shall conform to generally accepted international regulations.
9. In designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or substituting traffic separation schemes, an archipelagic State shall refer
proposals to the competent international organization with a view to their adoption. The organization may adopt only such sea
lanes and traffic separation schemes as may be agreed with the archipelagic State, after which the archipelagic State may
designate, prescribe or substitute them.
10. The archipelagic State shall clearly indicate the axis of the sea lanes and the traffic separation schemes designated or prescribed by
it on charts to which due publicity shall be given.
11. Ships in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall respect applicable sea lanes and traffic separation schemes established in
accordance with this article.
12. If an archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes or air routes, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may be exercised
through the routes normally used for international navigation. (Emphasis supplied)
41.Namely, House Bill No. 4153 and Senate Bill No. 2738, identically titled "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES IN
THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS, PRESCRIBING THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF FOREIGN SHIPS AND AIRCRAFTS
EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES PASSAGE THROUGH THE ESTABLISHED ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES AND
PROVIDING FOR THE ASSOCIATED PROTECTIVE MEASURES THEREIN."
42.The relevant provision of UNCLOS III provides:
Article 17. Right of innocent passage. —
Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 19. Meaning of innocent passage. —

1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take
place in conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law.

2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the
territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other
manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;

(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage
Article 21. Laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to innocent passage. —
1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of
international law, relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic;

(b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or installations;
(c) the protection of cables and pipelines;
(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea;

(e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State;
(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof;
(g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys;

(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State.
2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving
effect to generally accepted international rules or standards.
3. The coastal State shall give due publicity to all such laws and regulations.
4. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and
all generally accepted international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea.
43.The right of innocent passage through the territorial sea applies only to ships and not to aircrafts (Article 17, UNCLOS III). The right of
innocent passage of aircrafts through the sovereign territory of a State arises only under an international agreement. In contrast, the
right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters applies to both ships and aircrafts (Article 53 (12), UNCLOS III).
44.Following Section 2, Article II of the Constitution: "Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." (Emphasis supplied)
45."Archipelagic sea lanes passage is essentially the same as transit passage through straits" to which the territorial sea of continental
coastal State is subject. R.R. CHURABILL AND A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 127 (1999).
46.Falling under Article 121 of UNCLOS III (see note 37).
47.Within the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the following rights under UNCLOS III:
Article 58. Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone. —
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention,
the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and
submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not
incompatible with this Part.
xxx xxx xxx
Beyond the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the freedom of the high seas, defined under UNCLOS III as follows:
Article 87. Freedom of the high seas. —
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid
down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;

(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;

(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area.
48.See note 13.

49.Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 698 (1995); Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 580-581 (1997).
50.G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792.
51."The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve
its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens."
52."The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal
marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology
and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop,
and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign
intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources."
53.This can extend up to 350 nautical miles if the coastal State proves its right to claim an extended continental shelf (see UNCLOS III,
Article 76, paragraphs 4 (a), 5 and 6, in relation to Article 77).
54.Rollo, pp. 67-69.
55.Article 47 (1) provides: "An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which
the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1." (Emphasis supplied)
VELASCO, JR., J., concurring:
1.League of Cities of the Phil. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 636.
2.Under Art. VIII, Sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court is empowered to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: all cases in which the
Constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law , presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Emphasis supplied.)
3.December 10, 1982.
4.May 8, 1984.
5.Available on <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm> (visited July 28, 2011).
6.UNCLOS, Art. 47, December 10, 1982.
7.J. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES A COMMENTARY 57 (2003).
8.See J. Batongbacal, The Metes and Bounds of the Philippine National Territory, An International Law and Policy Perspective, Supreme
Court of the Philippines, Philippine Judicial Academy Third Distinguished Lecture, Far Eastern University, June 27, 2008.
9.J. Bernas, supra note 7, at 10.
10.Citing Report No. 01 of the Committee on National Territory.
11.Citing Report No. 02 of the Committee on National Territory.

12.J. Bernas, supra note 7, at 11-14.
13.Id. at 14.
14.Id. at 9; citing Speech, Session February 15, 1972, of Delegates Amanio Sorongon, et al.
15.The history of this deleted phrase goes back to the last clause of Art. I of the 1935 Constitution which included "all territory over which
the present Government of the Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction". See J. Bernas, supra note 7, at 14.
17.Id.; citing deliberations of the February 17, 1972 Session.
18.Id.
19.De Leon, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION 62 (2011).
20.Petition, pp. 4-5.
21.Art. 48 of UNCLOS III provides that the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf shall be measured from the archipelagic baseline drawn in accordance with Art. 47.
22.R.P. Lotilla, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL TERRITORY: A COLLECTION OF RELATED DOCUMENTS 513-517 (1995); citing Batasang
Pambansa, Acts and Resolution, 6th Regular Session.
24.UNCLOS III, Art. 57.
25.June 17, 1961.

26.September 18, 1968.
27.G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011; citing Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18.
28.Art. 26, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.

29.Art. 13, Declaration of Rights and Duties of States Adopted by the International Law Commission, 1949.
30.See J. Batongbacal, supra note 8.
31.Id.
32.The Protest reads in part: "The above-mentioned Philippine Act illegally claims Huangyan Island (referred as "Bajo de Masinloc" in the
Act) of China as "areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction." The Chinese Government hereby
reiterates that Huangyan Island and Nansha Islands have been part of the territory of China since ancient time. The People's
Republic of China has indisputable sovereignty over Huangyan Island and Nansha Islands and their surrounding areas. Any claim
to territorial sovereignty over Huangyan Island and Nansha Islands by any other State is, therefore, null and void." Available on
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/communicationsredeposit/mzn69_2009_chn.pdf>
(visited August 9, 2011).
33.Supra note 5.
34.C. Ku, The Archipelagic States Concept and Regional Stability in Southeast Asia, Case W. Res. J. Int'l L., Vol. 23:463, 469; citing 1958
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records 44, Doc. A/Conf. 13/42.
35.Id.
36.Hiran W. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in International Law, AD Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 103 (1990).
37.Id. at 112.
38.UNCLOS III Off. Rec., Vol. II, 264, par. 65, and also pars. 61-62 and 66; cited in B. Kwiatkowska, "The Archipelagic Regime in Practice in
the Philippines and Indonesia — Making or Breaking International Law?", International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law, Vol. 6,
No. 1, pp. 6-7.
39.4 Whiteman D.G., INTERNATIONAL LAW 284 (1965); quoted in C. Ku, supra note 34, at 470.
40.1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. I.

41.LOSC, Arts. 52 and 54.
42.LOSC, Art. 53, par. 2.

44.LOSC, Art. 51.
46.Cf. B. Kwiatkowska, supra note 38; citing J.D. Ingles, "The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Implications of Philippine
Ratification," 9 Philippine Yil (1983) 48-9 and 61-2; and Congress of the Philippines, First Regular Session, Senate, S. No. 232,
Explanatory Note and An Act to Repeal Section 2 (concerning TS baselines around Sabah disputed with Malaysia) of the 1968 Act
No. 5446.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26379. December 27, 1969.]
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Quasha, Asperilla, Blanco, Zafra & Tayag for petitioner.

Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R.
Rosete, Solicitor Lolita O. Gallang and Special Attorney Gamaliel H . Mantolino for
respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PHILIPPINES, A SOVEREIGN STATE; SCOPE OF

AUTHORITY. — The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority
may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is
beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must
submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is
a diminution of its sovereignty.
2. ID.; ID.; AUTO-LIMITATION CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY, EFFECT. — Any state
may by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign
rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in
character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the
succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has
the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A state
then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence. Its laws may as to some person found within its territory
no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from
allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over
certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such
areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as
native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be
diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the
American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They
are not and cannot be foreign territory.
3. ID.; ID.; CLARK AIR FORCE BASE, NOT FOREIGN SOIL; SALE THEREIN SUBJECT
TO TAX. — Petitioner was liable for the income tax arising from a sale of his car in
the Clark Field Air Base, which clearly is and cannot otherwise be other than,
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines to tax. The Military Bases
agreement does not lend support to the assertion that said base has become a
foreign soil or territory.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXEMPTION CLAUSE IN MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT, NOT
APPLICABLE. — Petitioner, at one time a civilian employee of an American
Corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the
Philippines, would seek to impart plausibility to his claim of not being subject to
tax for the sale of his car in the Clark Field Air Base, by the ostensible invocation
of the exemption clause in the Military Bases Agreement by virtue of which a
"national of the United States serving in or employed in the Philippines in
connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases
and residing in the Philippines only by reason of such employment" is not to be
taxed on his income unless derived from the Philippine sources or sources other
than the United States sources. The contention on its face is devoid of merit as
the source in the instant case clearly was Philippines.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J : p
A question novel in character, the answer to which has far-reaching

implications, is raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian
employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the
United States Air Force in the Philippines. He would dispute the payment of
the income tax assessed on him by respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a
member of the United States Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place
at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and
earnestly pressed, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside
Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax.
Such a plea, far-fetched and implausible, on its face betraying no kinship with
reality, he would justify by invoking, mistakenly as will hereafter be more fully
shown an observation to that effect in a 1951 opinion, 1 petitioner ignoring that
such utterance was made purely as a flourish of rhetoric and by way of
emphasizing the decision reached, that the trading firm as purchaser of army
goods must respond for the sales taxes due from an importer, as the American
armed forces being exempt could not be taxed as such under the National
Internal Revenue Code. 2 Such an assumption, inspired by the commendable aim
to render unavailing any attempt at tax evasion on the part of such vendee,
found expression anew in a 1962 decision, 3 coupled with the reminder however,
to render the truth unmistakable, that "the areas covered by the United States
Military Bases are not foreign territories both in the political and geographical
sense. "As thus clarified, it is manifest that such a view amounts at most to a
legal fiction and is moreover obiter. It certainly cannot control the resolution of
the specific question that confronts us. We declare our stand in an unequivocal
manner. The sale having taken place on what indisputably is Philippine territory,
petitioner's liability for the income tax due as a result thereof was unavoidable.
As the Court of Tax Appeals reached a similar conclusion, we sustain its decision
now before us on appeal.
In the decision appealed from, the Court of Tax Appeals, after stating the nature
of the case, started the recital of facts thus: "It appears that petitioner, a citizen
of the United States and an employee of Bendix Badio, Division of Bendix
Aviation Corporation, which provides technical assistance to the United States Air
Force, was assigned at Clark Air Base, Philippines, on or about July 7, 1959 . . .
Nine (9) months thereafter and before his tour of duty expired, petitioner
imported on April 22, 1960 a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car with accessories valued
at $6,443.83, including freight, insurance and other charges." 4 Then came the
following: "On July 11, 1960, more than two (2) months after the 1960 Cadillac
car was imported into the Philippines, petitioner requested the Base Commander,
Clark Air Base, for a permit to sell the car, which was granted provided that the
sale was made to a member of the United States Armed Forces or a citizen of the
United States employed in the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. On the
same date, July 11, 1960, petitioner sold his car for $6,600.00 to a certain Willie
Johnson, Jr. (Private first class), United States Marine Corps, Sangley Point,
Cavite, Philippines, as shown by a Bill of Sale . . . executed at Clark Air Base. On
the same date, Pfc. Willie (William) Johnson, Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for
P32,000.00 as evidenced by a deed of sale executed in Manila." 5
As a result of the transaction thus made, respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, after deducting the landed cost of the car as well as the personal
exemption to which petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net taxable income
arising from such transaction the amount of P17,912.34, rendering him liable for
income tax in the sum of P2,979.00. After paying the sum, he sought a refund
from respondent claiming that he was exempt, but pending action on his request
for refund, he filed the case with the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the
sum of P2,979.00 plus the legal rate of interest.
As noted in the appealed decision: "The only issue submitted for our resolution is
whether or not the said income tax of P2,979.00 was legally collected by
respondent for petitioner." 6 After discussing the legal issues raised, primarily the
contention that the Clark Air Base "in legal contemplation, is a base outside the
Philippines" the sale therefore having taken place on "foreign soil". the Court of
Tax Appeals found nothing objectionable in the assessment and thereafter the
payment of P2,979.00 as income tax and denied the refund on the same. Hence,
this appeal predicated on a legal theory we cannot accept. Petitioner cannot
make out a case for reversal.
1. Resort to fundamentals is unavoidable to place things in their proper
perspective, petitioner apparently feeling justified in his refusal to defer to basic
postulates of constitutional and international law, induced no doubt by the
weight he would accord to the observation made by this Court in the two
opinions earlier referred to. To repeat, scant comfort, if at all, is to be derived
from such an obiter dictum, one which is likewise far from reflecting the fact as it
is.
Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no
portion there of that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are
supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction,
both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it
were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit
to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what
otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as
auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a
state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination
and self-restriction." 7 A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise
of what otherwise is illimitable competence.
Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor
does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its
territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed
with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still
subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not
disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by
virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be
foreign territory.
Decisions coming from petitioner's native land, penned by jurists of repute,
speak to that effect with impressive unanimity. We start with the citation from
Chief Justice Marshall, announced in the leading case of Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon, 8 an 1812 decision: "The jurisdiction of the nation within its own
territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation
not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external
source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the
restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that
power which could impose such restriction." After which came this paragraph: "All
exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own
territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow
from no other legitimate source."
Chief Justice Taney, in an 1857 decision, 9 affirmed the fundamental principle of
everyone within the territorial domain of a state being subject to its commands:
"For undoubtedly every person who is found within the limits of a government,
whether the temporary purposes or as a resident, is bound by its laws." It is no
exaggeration then for Justice Brewer to stress that the United States
government "is one having jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory,
and acting directly upon each [individual found therein]; . . ." 10
Not too long ago, there was a reiteration of such a view, this time from the pen
of Justice Van Devanter. Thus: "It now is settled in the United States and
recognized elsewhere that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the
land areas under its dominion and control the ports, harbors, bays, and other
inclosed arms of the sea along its coast, and a marginal belt of the sea extending
from the coast line outward a marine league, or 3 geographic miles." 11 He could
cite moreover, in addition to many American decisions, such eminent treatise-
writers as Kent, Moore, Hyde, Wilson, Westlake, Wheaton and Oppenheim.
As a matter of fact, the eminent commentator Hyde in his three-volume work on
International Law, as interpreted and applied by the United States, made clear
that not even the embassy premises of a foreign power are to be considered
outside the territorial domain of the host state. Thus: "The ground occupied by an
embassy is not in fact the territory of the foreign State to which the premises
belong through possession or ownership. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of acts
there committed is determined by the territorial sovereign. If an attach commits
an offense within the precincts of an embassy, his immunity from prosecution is
not because he has not violated the local law, but rather for the reason that the
individual is exempt from prosecution. If a person not so exempt, or whose
immunity is waived, similarly commits a crime therein, the territorial sovereign,
if it secures custody of the offender, may subject him to prosecution, even
though its criminal code normally does not contemplate the punishment of one
who commits an offense outside of the national domain. It is not believed,
therefore, that an ambassador himself possesses the right to exercise jurisdiction,
contrary to the will of the State of his sojourn, even within his embassy with
respect to acts there committed. Nor is there apparent at the present time any
tendency on the part of States to acquiesce in his exercise of it." 12
2. In the light of the above, the first and crucial error imputed to the Court of Tax
Appeals to the effect that it should have held that the Clark Air Force is foreign
soil or territory for purposes of income tax legislation is clearly without support
in law. As thus correctly viewed, petitioner's hope for the reversal of the decision
completely fades away. There is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that
lends support to such an assertion. It has not become foreign soil or territory. This
country's jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax,
have been preserved. As to certain tax matters, an appropriate exemption was
provided for.
Petitioner could not have been unaware that to maintain the contrary would be
to defy reality and would be an affront to the law. While his first assigned error is
thus worded, he would seek to impart plausibility to his claim by the ostensible
invocation of the exemption clause in the Agreement by virtue of which a
"national of the United States serving in or employed in the Philippines in
connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases
and residing in the Philippines only by reason of such employment" is not to be
taxed on his income unless "derived from Philippine source or sources other than
the United States sources." 13 The reliance, to repeat, is more apparent than real
for as noted at the outset of this opinion, petitioner places more faith not on the
language of the provision on exemption but on a sentiment given expression in a
1951 opinion of this Court, which would be made to yield such an unwarranted
interpretation at war with the controlling constitutional and international law
principles. At any rate, even if such a contention were more adequately pressed
and insisted upon, it is on its face devoid of merit as the source clearly was
Philippine.
In Saura Import and Export Co. v. Meer, 14 the case above referred to, this Court
affirmed a decision rendered about seven months previously, 15 holding liable as
an importer, within the contemplation of the National Internal Revenue Code
provision, the trading firm that purchased army goods from a United States
government agency in the Philippines. It is easily understandable why. If it were
not thus, tax evasion would have been facilitated. The United States forces that
brought in such equipment later disposed of as surplus, when no longer needed
for military purposes, was beyond the reach of our tax statutes.

Justice Tuason, who spoke for the Court, adhered to such a rationale, quoting
extensively from the earlier opinion. He could have stopped there. He chose not
to do so. The transaction having occurred in 1946, not so long after the liberation
of the Philippines, he proceeded to discuss the role of the American military
contingent in the Philippines as a belligerent occupant. In the course of such a
dissertion, drawing on his well-known gift for rhetoric and cognizant that he was
making an as if statement, he did say: "While in army bases or installations
within the Philippines those goods were in contemplation of law on foreign soil."
It is thus evident that the first, and thereafter the controlling, decision as to the
liability for sales taxes as an importer by the purchaser, could have been reached
without any need for such expression as that given utterance by Justice Tuason.
Its value then as an authoritative doctrine cannot be as much as petitioner
would mistakenly attach to it. It was clearly obiter not being necessary for the
resolution of the issue before this Court. 16 It was an opinion "uttered by the
w ay." 17 It could not then be controlling on the question before us now, the
liability of the petitioner for income tax which, as announced at the opening of
this opinion, is squarely raised for the first time. 18
On this point, Chief Justice Marshall could again be listened to with profit. Thus:
"It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion,
are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.
If they go beyond the case. they may be respected, but ought not to control the
judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision." 19
Nor did the fact that such utterance of Justice Tuason was cited in Co Po v.
Collector of Internal Revenue, 20 a 1962 decision relied upon by petitioner, put a
different complexion on the matter. Again, it was by way of pure embellishment,
there being no need to repeat it, to reach the conclusion that it was the
purchaser of army goods, this time from military bases, that must respond for
the advance sales taxes as importer. Again, the purpose that animated the
reiteration of such a view was clearly to emphasize that through the
employment of such a fiction, tax evasion is precluded. What is more, how far
divorced from the truth was such statement was emphasized by Justice Barrera,
who penned the Co Po opinion, thus: "It is true that the areas covered by the
United States Military Bases are not foreign territories both in the political and
geographical sense." 21
Justice Tuason moreover made explicit that rather than corresponding with
reality, what was said by him was in the way of a legal fiction. Note his stress on
"in contemplation of law." To lend further support to a conclusion already
announced, being at that a confirmation of what had been arrived at in the
earlier case, distinguished by its sound appreciation of the issue then before this
Court and to preclude any tax evasion, an observation certainly not to be taken
literally was thus given utterance.
This is not to say that it should have been ignored altogether afterwards. It could
be utilized again, as it undoubtedly was, especially so for the purpose intended,
namely to stigmatize as without support in law any attempt on the part of a
taxpayer to escape an obligation incumbent upon him. So it was quoted with that
end in view in the Co Po case. It certainly does not justify any effort to render
futile the collection of a tax legally due, as here. That was farthest from the
thought of Justice Tuason.
What is more, the statement on its face is, to repeat, a legal fiction. This is not to
discount the uses of a fictio juris in the science of the law. It was Cardozo who
pointed out its value as a device "to advance the ends of justice" although at
times it could be "clumsy" and even "offensive". 22 Certainly, then, while far
from objectionable as thus enunciated, this observation of Justice Tuason could be
misused or misconstrued in a clumsy manner to reach an offensive result. To
repeat, properly used, a legal fiction could be relied upon by the law, as
Frankfurter noted, in the pursuit of legitimate ends. 23 Petitioner then would be
well-advised to take to heart such counsel of care and circumspection before
invoking not a legal fiction that would avoid a mockery of the law by avoiding tax
evasion but what clearly is a misinterpretation thereof, leading to results that
would have shocked its originator.
The conclusion is thus irresistible that the crucial error assigned, the only one
that calls for discussion to the effect that for income tax purposes the Clark Air
Force Base is outside Philippine territory, is utterly without merit. So we have
said earlier.
3. To impute then to the statement of Justice Tuason the meaning that petitioner
would fasten on it is, to paraphrase Frankfurter, to be guilty of succumbing to the
vice of literalness. To so conclude is, whether by design or inadvertence, to
misread it. It certainly is not susceptible of the mischievous consequences now
sought to be fastened on it by petitioner.
That it would be fraught with such peril to the enforcement of our tax statutes
on the military bases under lease to the American armed forces could not have
been within the contemplation of Justice Tuason. To so attribute such a bizarre
consequence is to be guilty of a grave disservice to the memory of a great jurist.
For his real and genuine sentiment on the matter in consonance with the
imperative mandate of controlling constitutional and international law concepts
was categorically set forth by him, not as an obiter but as the rationale of the
decision, in People v. Acierto 24 thus: "By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it
should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United
States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a
matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein."
Nor did he stop there. He did stress further the full extent of our territorial
jurisdiction in words that do not admit of doubt. Thus: "This provision is not and
can not on principle or authority be construed as a limitation upon the rights of
the Philippine Government. If anything, it is an emphatic recognition and
reaffirmation of Philippine sovereignty over the bases and of the truth that all
jurisdictional rights granted to the United States and not exercised by the latter
are reserved by the Philippines for itself." 25
It is in the same spirit that we approach the specific question confronting us in
this litigation. We hold, as announced at the outset, that petitioner was liable for
the income tax arising from a sale of his automobile in the Clark Field Air Base,
which clearly is and cannot otherwise be other than, within our territorial
jurisdiction to tax.
4. With the mist thus lifted from the situation as it truly presents itself, there is
nothing that stands in the way of an affirmance of the Court of Tax Appeals
decision. No useful purpose would be served by discussing the other assigned
errors, petitioner himself being fully aware that if the Clark Air Force Base is to
be considered, as it ought to be and as it is, Philippine soil or territory, his claim
for exemption from the income tax due was distinguished only by its futility.
There is further satisfaction in finding ourselves unable to indulge petitioner in
his plea for reversal. We thus manifest fealty to a pronouncement made time
and time again that the law does not look with favor on tax exemptions and that
he who would seek to be thus privileged must justify it by words too plain to be
mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted. 26 Petitioner had not done so.
Petitioner cannot do so.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of May 12, 1966 denying
the refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed. With
costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C . J ., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Teehankee, JJ
., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J ., concurs in the result.
Barredo, J ., did not take part.
Footnotes
1. Saura Import and Export Co. v. Meer, 88 Phil. 199, 202 affirming Go Cheng Tee v.
Meer, 87 Phil. 18 (1950).
2. Sec. 186, National Internal Revenue Code.

3. Co Po v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 5 SCRA 1057.
4. Decision, Annex 4, Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, pp. 20-21.
5. Ibid., p. 21.
6. Ibid., p. 23.
7. Jellinek as quoted in Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty, p. 35 (1937).

8. 7 Cranch 116, 136.
9. Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194.
10. In re Debs. 158 US 564 (1894).
11. Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 US 100 (1922).
12. 2 Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States,
pp. 1285-1286 (1947).
13. Act XII of the Military Bases Agreement, par. 2, reads: "No national of the United
States serving in or employed in the Philippines in connection with the
construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases and residing in
the Philippines by reason only of such employment, or his spouse and minor
children and dependent parents of either spouse, shall be liable to pay income
tax in the Philippines except in respect of income derived from Philippine source
or sources other than the United States sources." (1 Philippine Treaty Series,
357, 362 [1968]).
14. 88 Phil. 199 (1951).
15. Go Cheng Tee v. Meer, 87 Phil. 18 (1950).
16. Uy Po v. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil. 153 (1916); Morales v. Paredes, 55 Phil.
565 (1930); Abad v. Carganillo Vda. de Yance, 95 Phil. 51 (1954).
17. People v. Macadaeg, 91 Phil. 410 (1952).
18. Cf. de los Reyes v. de Villa, 48 Phil. 227 (1925).
19. 6 Wheat, 264, 399 (1821) reiterated in Myers v. United States, 272 US 52, (1926).
Cf. Northern Nat. Bank v. Porter Township, 110 US 608 (1884); Weyerhaeuser
v. Hoyt, 219 US 380 (1911); Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line v. United States, 300 US
98; Wright v. United States, 302 US 583 (1938); Green v. United States, 355 US
184 (1957).
20. 25 SCRA 1057.
21. Ibid., p. 1059.
22. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, 34 (1928).
23. Nashville C. St. Louis Ry v. Browning, 310 US 362 (1940).
24. 92 Phil. 534, 542 (1953).

25. Ibid., p. 534.
26. Cf. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero, 21 SCRA 180 (1967) and the
cases therein cited. See also E. Rodriguez, Inc. v. Collector of Internal Revenue,
28 SCRA 1119 (1969).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-36409. October 26, 1973.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. LORETA

GOZO , defendant-appellant.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor
Norberto P. Eduardo for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose T . Nery for defendant-appellant.
DECISION
FERNANDO , J : p
Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit
from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any
modi cation, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity, or at the
very least, its applicability to her, by invoking due process, 1 a contention she would
premise on what for her is the teaching of People v. Fajardo. 2 If such a ground were far
from being impressed with solidity, she stands on quicksand when she would deny the
applicability of the ordinance to her, on the pretext that her house was constructed within
the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled
doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she would, in effect, seek
to emasculate our sovereign rights by the assertion that we cannot exercise therein
administrative jurisdiction. To state the proposition is to make patent how much it is
tinged with unorthodoxy. Clearly then, the lower court decision must be a rmed with the
sole modi cation that she is given thirty days from the nality of a judgment to obtain a
permit, failing which, she is required to demolish the same.
The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision of the lower court: "The accused
brought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another one in
its place, without a building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, because she was
told by one Ernesto Evalle, a assistant in the City Mayor's o ce, as well as by her
neighbors in the area, that such building permit was not necessary for the construction of
the house. On December 29, 1966, Juan Malones, a building and lot inspector of the City
Engineer's O ce, Olongapo City, together with Patrolman Ramon Macahilas of the
Olongapo City police force apprehended four carpenters working on the house of the
accused and they brought the carpenters to the Olongapo City police headquarters for
interrogation. . . . After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charged with violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with City Fiscal's O ce." 3 . The City Court of
Olongapo City found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964 and
sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the costs. The Court of
First Instance of Zambales, on appeal, found her guilty on the above facts of violating such
municipal ordinance but would sentence her merely to pay a ne of P200.00 and to
demolish the house thus erected. She elevated the case Court of Appeals but in her brief,
she would put in the validity of such an ordinance on constitutional or at the very least its
applicability to her in view location of her dwelling within the naval base. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals, in a resolution of Juan 1973, noting the constitutional question raised,
the case to this Court.
There is, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this petition, no support in law for the
stand taken by appellant.
1. It would be fruitless for her to assert that government units are devoid of authority
to require building permits. This Court, from Switzer v. Municipality of Cebu, 4 decided in
1911, has sanctioned the validity of such measures. It is much too late in the day contend
that such a requirement cannot be validly imposed. Even appellant, justi ably concerned
about the unfavorable impression that could be created if she were to deny that such
competence is vested in municipal corporations and chartered cities, had to concede in
her brief: "If, at all; the questioned ordinance may be predicated under the general welfare
clause . . ." 5 Its scope is wide, well-nigh all embracing, covering every aspect of public
health, public morals, public safety, and the well being and good order of the community. 6
It goes without saying that such a power is subject to limitations. Certainly, if its exercise
is violative of any constitutional right, then its validity could be impugned, or at the very
least, its applicability to the person adversely affected could be questioned. So much is
settled law. Apparently, appellant has adopted the view that a due process question may
indeed be raised in view of what for her is its oppressive character. She is led to such a
conclusion, relying on People v. Fajardo. 7 A more careful scrutiny of such a decision would
not have led her astray, for that case is easily distinguishable. The facts as set forth in the
opinion follow: "It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-
appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the
municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows: '. . . 1. Any person
or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing,
obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. . . . 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should
be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued. . . . 3.
[Penalty] - Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the
violator liable to pay a ne of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not
less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said
building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be
removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. . . ." Four years later, after
the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law, appellant
Babilonia, led a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in
Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by
a creek . . . .On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that
the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza . . . On January
18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a building permit . . ., but again the
request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the
construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence
very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had
been living on leased property." 8
Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance to Fajardo was oppressive. A conviction
therefore for a violation thereof both in the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines
Sur as well as in the Court of First Instance could not be sustained. In this case, on the
contrary, appellant never bothered to comply with the ordinance. Perhaps aware of such a
crucial distinction, she would assert in her brief: "The evidence showed that even if the
accused were to secure a permit from the Mayor, the same would not have been granted.
To require the accused to obtain a permit before constructing her house would be an
exercise in futility. The law will not require anyone to perform an impossibility, neither in
law or in fact: . . ." 9 "It would be from her own version, at the very least then, premature to
anticipate such an adverse result, and thus to condemn an ordinance which certainly lends
itself to an interpretation that is neither oppressive, unfair, or unreasonable. That kind of
interpretation su ces to remove any possible question of its validity, as was expressly
announced in Primicias v. Fugoso. 1 0 So it appears from this portion of the opinion of
Justice Feria, speaking for the Court: "Said provision is susceptible of two constructions:
one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or
refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that
the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by Mayor, subject only to the
latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be
used for the purpose, with a view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. After a mature deliberation, we have
arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second construction, that is, construe the
provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power
to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or
specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the
meeting may be held." 1 1 If, in a case affecting such a preferred freedom as the right to
assembly, this Court could construe an ordinance of the City of Manila so as to avoid
offending against a constitutional provision, there is nothing to preclude it from a similar
mode of approach in order to show the lack of merit of an attack against an ordinance
requiring a permit. Appellant cannot therefore take comfort from any broad statement in
the Fajardo opinion, which incidentally is taken out of context, considering the admitted
oppressive application of the challenged measure in that litigation. So much then for the
contention that she could not have been validly convicted for a violation of such ordinance.
Nor should it be forgotten that she did suffer the same fate twice, once from the City Court
and thereafter from the Court of First Instance. The reason is obvious. Such ordinance
applies to her.
2. Much less is a reversal indicated because of the alleged absence of the rather novel
concept of administrative jurisdiction on the part of Olongapo City. Nor is novelty the only
thing that may be said against it. Far worse is the assumption at war with controlling and
authoritative doctrines that the mere existence of military or naval bases of a foreign
country cuts deeply into the power to govern. Two leading cases may be cited to show
how offensive is such thinking to the juristic concept of sovereignty, People v. Acierto, 1 2
and Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 1 4 There was a reiteration of such a view
in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof
that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its
terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily,
likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of it sovereignty." 1 5
Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted
that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in
character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct
language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive
capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.' A state then, if it chooses to, may
refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." 1 6 The opinion was
at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional
rights, not it appearance. The words employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons
found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not
precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right
over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas
become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are
still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear.
So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military
bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory." 1 7
Can there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a turnabout, unwarranted and
unjusti ed, from what is settled and orthodox law can fend the slightest degree of
plausibility to the contention of absence of administrative jurisdiction. If it were otherwise,
what was aptly referred to by Justice Tuason "as a matter of comity, courtesy, or
expediency" becomes one of obeisance and submission. If on a concern purely domestic
in its implications, devoid any connection with national security, the Military-Bases
Agreement could be thus interpreted, then sovereignty indeed becomes a mockery and an
illusion. Nor does appellant's thesis rest on less shaky foundation by the mere fact that
Acierto and Reagan dealt with the competence of the national government, while what is
sought to be emasculated in this case is the so-called administrative jurisdiction of a
municipal corporation. Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are
vested upon it may be validly exercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred,
whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to the national government, not to an alien country.
What is more to be deplored in this stand of appellant is that no such claim is made by the
American naval authorities, not that it would do them any good if it were so asserted. To
quote from Acierto anew: "The carrying out of the provisions of the Bases Agreement is
the concern of the contracting parties alone. Whether, therefore, a given case which by the
treaty comes within the United States jurisdiction should be transferred to the Philippine
authorities is a matter about which the accused has nothing to do or say. In other words,
the rights granted to the United States by the treaty insure solely to that country and can
not be raised by the offender." 1 8 If an accused would suffer from such disability, even if
the American armed forces were the bene ciary of a treaty privilege, what is there for
appellant to take hold of when there is absolutely no showing of any alleged grant of what
is quaintly referred to as administrative jurisdiction? That is all, and it is more than enough,
to make manifest the futility of seeking a reversal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is a rmed insofar as it found
the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a ne of P200.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and modi ed insofar as she is required to
demolish the house that is the subject matter of the case, she being given a period of thirty
days from the nality of this decision within which to obtain the required permit. Only upon
her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision requiring demolition be
enforced. Costs against the accused.
Makalintal, C .J ., Zaldivar, Castro Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ ., concur.
Barredo, J ., did not take part.
Footnotes
1. According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 1 of Constitution: "No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws."
2. 104 Phil. 443 (1958).

3. Decision, Appendix A to the Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 1A-1B.
4. 20 Phil. 111 Cf. People v. Cruz, 54 Phil. 25 (1929); Tan Chat v. Municipality of Iloilo, 60
Phil. 465 (1934); Hipolito v. City of Manila, 87 Phil. 180 (1950); Uy Matiao and Co. v. The
City of Cebu, 93 Phil. 300 (1953); University City of the East v. City of Manila, 96 Phil.
316 (1954); Verzosa v. City of Baguio, 109 Phil. 571 (1960); Lopera v. Vicente, L-18102,
June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 549; People v. Soria, L-18982, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 242.
5. Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 10. She would cite Sec. 2238 of the Revised
Administrative Code, but strict accuracy would demand that she should refer to the
specific provision in the Olongapo city charter.
6. Cf. United States v. Alexander, 8 Phil. 29 (1907): Punzalan v. Ferriols, 19 Phil. 214 (1911);
United States v. Espiritusanto, 23 Phil. 610 (1912); United States v. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1
(1912); United States v. Abundan, 24 Phil. 165 (1913); Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil.
250 (1913); United States v. Hilario, 24 Phil. 392 (1913); United States v. Chan Tienco, 25
Phil. 89 (1913); United States v. Joson, 26 Phil. 1 (1913); Rivera v. Campbell, 34 Phil. 348
(1916); United States v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 103 (1918); Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 41
Phil. 103 (1920); Vinco v. Municipality of Hinigaran, 41 Phil. 790 (1917); People v. Cruz,
54 Phil. 24 (1929); Tan Chat v. Municipality of Iloilo, 60 Phil. 465 (1934); People v.
Lardizabal, 61 Phil. 360 (1935); Malabon Sugar Co. v. Municipality of Malabon, 61 Phil.
717 (1935); People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 (1938); People v. Sabarre, 65 Phil. 684 (1938);
People v. Esguerra, 81 Phil. 33 (1948); Eboña v. Municipality of Daet, 85 Phil. 369 (1950)
Manila Race Horse Trainers Asso. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951); Vega v. Municipal
Board of the City of Iloilo, 94 Phil. 949 (1954); Co Kiam v. City of Manila, 96 Phil. 649
(1955); Physical Therapy Org. of the Phil. v. Municipal Board of Manila, 101 Phil. 1142
(1957); Uy Ha v. City Mayor, 108 Phil. 400 (1960); Gaerlan v. Baguio City Council, 109
Phil. 1100 (1960); Gerena v. City of Manila, 110 Phil. 958 (1961).
7. 104 Phil. 443 (1958).
8. Ibid, 444-445.
9. Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 11.
10. 80 Phil. 71 (1948).
11. Ibid, 77.

12. 92 Phil. 534 (1953).
13. L-26379, Dec. 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 968.

14. 92 Phil. 534, 542.
15. 30 SCRA 968, 973.

16. Ibid.
17. Ibid, 973-974.
18. 92 Phil. 534, 542.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145951. August 12, 2003.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND

DIV.), and JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., JULIAN ALZAGA, ATTY. MANUEL
SATUITO, ELIZABETH LIANG and JESUS GARCIA , respondents.
Solicitor General for petitioner.

Vicente J. Cuna & Associates for J. Garcia & E. Liang.
Madrid & Associates and Garayblas & Associates for J. Ramiscal.
Castriciones & Associates for M. Satuito.
SYNOPSIS
Respondents Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and
Jesus Garcia were all charged with Malversation through Falsi cation of Public
Documents before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25741. The information alleged
that respondents misappropriated and converted for their personal use the amount of
P250,318,200.00 from the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and
Separation Bene t System (AFP-RSBS). Respondents led with the Sandiganbayan an
"Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest," urging that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the case because the AFP-
RSBS is a private entity. The Sandiganbayan initially denied the Urgent Motion, but on
motion for reconsideration, sustained respondents' contention that said entity is a private
entity. It ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 25741 and denied the prosecution's
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant special civil action for certiorari led by the
prosecution on the ground of lack or in excess of jurisdiction of respondent court in
issuing the assailed resolution.
On the procedural issue, the Supreme Court ruled that the proper remedy in this
case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and not certiorari under Rule 65, but the Supreme Court has the power to
suspend the Rules and in such cases, allow the special civil action of certiorari
notwithstanding the availability of the remedy of appeal where the issue raised is one
purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency. On the substantive
issue, the Supreme Court ruled that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are
imbued with public interest and as such is a government entity and its funds are in the
nature of public funds. Accordingly, Criminal Case No. 25741 was ordered REINSTATED
and the Sandiganbayan was DIRECTED to resume proceedings.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; DECISIONS AND FINAL ORDERS OF THE

SANDIGANBAYAN; PROPER REMEDY THEREFROM IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT. — Considering that the Resolution
of then Sandiganbayan which dismissed Criminal Case No. 25741 was a nal order which
nally disposed of the case, the proper remedy therefrom is a petition for review on
certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7975.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
CANNOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR LOST REMEDY OF APPEAL. — Basic is the rule that a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of only
where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law
and cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — The foregoing rule, however, may be
relaxed where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in
case of urgency. In such cases, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and
availability of the remedy of appeal. Certiorari may also be availed of where an appeal
would be slow, inadequate and insu cient. If the strict application of the Rules will tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the power of this Court to suspend
the rules or except a particular case from its operation.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE IN GENERAL CONCLUSIVE;
EXCEPTIONS. — Generally, factual ndings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive. This rule,
however, admits of exceptions, such as where (1) the conclusion is a nding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise, conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; and (5) the ndings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised
on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF SANDIGANBAYAN IN CASE AT BAR, A CASE
OF. — The Sandiganbayan based its ruling that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity on its
ndings that the Government does not provide counterpart contribution to the System;
that the employees of the AFP-RSBS do not receive any salary from the government and
are not covered by the salary standardization law; that their remittances and contributions
were made by the Social Security System and not to the Government Service Insurance
System; and that the contribution to the System of the sum of P200,000,000.00 under
Presidential Decree 361 can not be deemed as equity of the government in the system but
rather, a donation or "seed money' which was never increased thereafter... Indeed, the clear
import of Section 2 of P.D. 361 is that while it may be true that there have been no
appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the government is not
precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide additional bene ts to the
men in uniform.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATION; AFP-RSBS IS A GOVERNMENT ENTITY WHOSE FUNDS ARE PUBLIC
FUNDS; PURPOSE AND FUNCTIONS AKIN TO THOSE OF THE GSIS AND THE SSS. — The
AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree No. 361. Its purpose and functions are akin
to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the retirement
and pension funds of those in the military service. Members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police are expressly excluded from the coverage of
The GSIS Act of 1997. Therefore, soldiers and military personnel, who are incidentally
employees of the government, rely on the administration of the AFP-RSBS for their
retirement, pension and separation bene ts. For this purpose Presidential Decree No. 361,
Sec. 4 provides that the contribution by military o cers and enlisted personnel to the
System shall be compulsory.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM AND INVESTMENT OF FUNDS
ARE DECIDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. — Its enabling law further
mandates that the System shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines through an agency, group, committee or board, which may be created
and organized by him and subject to such rules and regulations governing the same as he
may, subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to
time. Moreover the investment of funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the Approval of the Secretary of National
Defense.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CHARACTER AND OPERATIONS IMBUED WITH PUBLIC
INTEREST. — The above considerations indicate that the character and operations of the
AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, we hold that the same is a government
entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p
Respondents Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang
and Jesus Garcia were all charged with Malversation through Falsi cation of Public
Documents before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25741. The Information
alleged that respondents misappropriated and converted for their personal use the
amount of P250,318,200.00 from the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). 1
On November 12, 1999, respondent Ramiscal led with the Sandiganbayan an
"Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest." 2 He argued, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case
because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later adopted by
respondents Alzaga and Satuito.
The Urgent Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated
on January 6, 2000. 3 Respondents led a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution
issued on May 12, 2000, the Sandiganbayan sustained respondents' contention that the
AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 25741. Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, the
prosecution led the instant special civil action for certiorari anchored on the following
grounds: cADEHI
I
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTION DATED
MAY 9, 2000 INSOFAR AS IT DISMISSED THE CASE FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PROSECUTION'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED JUNE 1, 2000, SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DATED JULY 10, 2000 AND SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED MAY 12, 2000. 4
Considering that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which dismissed Criminal

Case No. 25741 was a nal order which nally disposed of the case, the proper remedy
therefrom is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 5
Section 1 of said Rule 45 explicitly provides:
Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment or nal order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may le with the Supreme Court a veri ed petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Moreover, Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Section 3 of

Republic Act No. 7975, states:
Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. —
xxx xxx xxx
Decisions and nal orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of
law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Basic is the rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
may be availed of only where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. 6 Certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost
remedy of an ordinary appeal. 7
The foregoing rule, however, may be relaxed where the issue raised is one purely of
law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency. In such cases, certiorari is
allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal. Certiorari
may also be availed of where an appeal would be slow, inadequate and insu cient. 8 If the
strict application of the Rules will tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always
within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation. 9
We now come to the substantive issue of whether the AFP-RSBS is a government-
owned or controlled corporation or a private corporation and, corollarily, whether its funds
are public or private. The Sandiganbayan based its ruling that the AFP-RSBS is a private
entity on its ndings that the Government does not provide counterpart contribution to the
System; that the employees of the AFP-RSBS do not receive any salary from the
Government and are not covered by the salary standardization law; that their remittances
and contributions were made to the Social Security System and not to the Government
Service Insurance System; and that the contribution to the System of the sum of
P200,000,000.00 under Presidential Decree 361 can not be deemed as equity of the
government in the System but rather, a donation or "seed money" which was never
increased thereafter. 1 0
Generally, factual ndings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive on us. This rule,
however, admits of exceptions, such as where: (1) the conclusion is a nding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; and (5) the ndings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised
on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record. 1 1
The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree No. 361. Its purpose and
functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that
manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military service. Members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are expressly excluded
from the coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997. 1 2 Therefore, soldiers and military personnel,
who are incidentally employees of the Government, rely on the administration of the AFP-
RSBS for their retirement, pension and separation bene ts. For this purpose, the law
provides that the contribution by military o cers and enlisted personnel to the System
shall be compulsory, thus:
O cers and enlisted personnel in the active service shall contribute to the
System an amount equivalent to four per cent (4%) of their monthly base and
longevity pay, which contribution shall be deducted from their pay from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and paid to the System: Provided, however, That
any o cer or enlisted person who is due for compulsory retirement or is
optionally retirable and actually elects to retire within one year from the approval
of this Act, shall no longer be required to contribute to the System: Provided,
further, That any o cer or enlisted person who is separated through no fault of
his own and is not eligible for either retirement or separation bene ts shall upon
his separation, be refunded in one lump sum all his actual contributions to the
System plus interest at the rate of four per cent (4%). 1 3
Its enabling law further mandates that the System shall be administered by the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines through an agency, group, committee or
board, which may be created and organized by him and subject to such rules and
regulations governing the same as he may, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
National Defense, promulgate from time to time. Moreover, the investment of funds of the
System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with
the approval of the Secretary of National Defense. 1 4
In connection with the Sandiganbayan's nding that the funds of the AFP-RSBS,
except for the initial seed money, come entirely from contributions and that no part thereof
come from appropriations, Section 2 of P.D. 361 states:
SECTION 2. The System shall be funded as follows:
(a) Appropriations and contributions;

(b) Donations, gift, legacies, bequest and others to the System;
(c) All earnings of the System which shall not be subject to any tax
whatsoever.
Indeed, the clear import of the above-quoted provision is that, while it may be true
that there have been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the
Government is not precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide
additional benefits to the men in uniform.
The above considerations indicate that the character and operations of the AFP-
RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, we hold that the same is a government
entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated May 12, 2000 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 25741 is ordered REINSTATED, and the Sandiganbayan is
DIRECTED to resume proceedings thereon with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 41-43.
2. Id., pp. 213-235.
3. Id., pp. 45-49.
4. Id., p. 10.
5. Africa v. Sandiganbayan, 350 Phil. 846, 856 [1998].
6. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65, Section 1.
7. Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110701, 12 March
2002.
8. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 336 Phil. 304, 311-312 [1997].
9. Coronel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 149022, 8 April 2003.
10. Rollo, pp. 37-40.
11. Agullo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 132926, 20 July 2001.
12. Republic Act No. 8291, Sec. 3.
13. Presidential Decree No. 361, Sec. 4.
14. Presidential Decree No. 361, Sec. 6.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 155650. July 20, 2006.]
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY , petitioner, vs . COURT OF

APPEALS, CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE, SANGGUNIANG
PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAÑAQUE, CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAÑAQUE, and CITY
TREASURER OF PARAÑAQUE , respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO , J : p
The Antecedents
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903, otherwise known as the
Revised Charter of the Manila International Airport Authority ("MIAA Charter"). Executive Order No. 903
was issued on 21 July 1983 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Subsequently, Executive Order
Nos. 909 1 and 298 2 amended the MIAA Charter.
As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and
equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600
hectares of land, 3 including the runways and buildings ("Airport Lands and Buildings") then under the
Bureau of Air Transportation. 4 The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land
transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless speci cally approved
by the President of the Philippines. 5
On 21 March 1997, the O ce of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No.
061. The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real
estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with
respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of
the real estate tax already due.
On 28 June 2001, MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of
Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA's real estate tax delinquency is broken down as
follows:
TAX DECLARATION TAXABLE YEAR TAX DUE PENALTY TOTAL
E-016-01370 1992-2001 19,558,160.00 11,201,083.20 30,789,243.20

E-016-01374 1992-2001 111,689,424.90 68,149,479.59 179,838,904.49
E-016-01375 1992-2001 20,276,058.00 12,371,832.00 32,647,890.00
E-016-01376 1992-2001 58,144,028.00 35,477,712.00 93,621,740.00
E-016-01377 1992-2001 18,134,614.65 11,065,188.59 29,199,803.24
E-016-01378 1992-2001 111,107,950.40 67,794,681.59 178,902,631.99
E-016-01379 1992-2001 4,322,340.00 2,637,360.00 6,959,700.00
E-016-01380 1992-2001 7,776,436.00 4,744,944.00 12,521,380.00
*E-016-013-85 1998-2001 6,444,810.00 2,900,164.50 9,344,974.50
*E-016-01387 1998-2001 34,876,800.00 5,694,560.00 50,571,360.00
*E-016-01396 1998-2001 75,240.00 33,858.00 109,098.00
GRAND TOTAL P392,435,861.95 P232,070,863.47 P624,506,725.42
1992-1997 RPT was paid on Dec. 24, 1997 as per O.R. #9476102 for P4,207,028.75
#9476101 for P28,676,480.00

#9476103 for P49,115.00 6
On 17 July 2001, the City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and
warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to
sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax
delinquency. MIAA thus sought a clarification of OGCC Opinion No. 061.
On 9 August 2001, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying OGCC Opinion No. 061. The
OGCC pointed out that Section 206 of the Local Government Code requires persons exempt from real
estate tax to show proof of exemption. The OGCC opined that Section 21 of the MIAA Charter is the
proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax.
On 1 October 2001, MIAA led with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and
injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to
restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for
public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66878.
On 5 October 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because MIAA led it beyond
the 60-day reglementary period. The Court of Appeals also denied on 27 September 2002 MIAA's
motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, MIAA led on 5
December 2002 the present petition for review. 7
Meanwhile, in January 2003, the City of Parañaque posted notices of auction sale at the
Barangay Halls of Barangays Vitalez, Sto. Niño, and Tambo, Parañaque City; in the public market of
Barangay La Huerta; and in the main lobby of the Parañaque City Hall. The City of Parañaque published
the notices in the 3 and 10 January 2003 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. The notices announced the public auction sale of the Airport Lands and
Buildings to the highest bidder on 7 February 2003, 10:00 a.m., at the Legislative Session Hall Building
of Parañaque City.
A day before the public auction, or on 6 February 2003, at 5:10 p.m., MIAA led before this Court
an Urgent Ex-Parte and Reiteratory Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. The
motion sought to restrain respondents — the City of Parañaque, City Mayor of Parañaque, Sangguniang
Panglungsod ng Parañaque, City Treasurer of Parañaque, and the City Assessor of Parañaque
("respondents") — from auctioning the Airport Lands and Buildings.
On 7 February 2003, this Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) effective immediately.
The Court ordered respondents to cease and desist from selling at public auction the Airport Lands
and Buildings. Respondents received the TRO on the same day that the Court issued it. However,
respondents received the TRO only at 1:25 p.m. or three hours after the conclusion of the public
auction. DTSaIc
On 10 February 2003, this Court issued a Resolution confirming nunc pro tunc the TRO.
On 29 March 2005, the Court heard the parties in oral arguments. In compliance with the
directive issued during the hearing, MIAA, respondent City of Parañaque, and the Solicitor General
subsequently submitted their respective Memoranda.
MIAA admits that the MIAA Charter has placed the title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in the
name of MIAA. However, MIAA points out that it cannot claim ownership over these properties since
the real owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings is the Republic of the Philippines. The MIAA Charter
mandates MIAA to devote the Airport Lands and Buildings for the bene t of the general public. Since
the Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use and public service, the ownership of these
properties remains with the State. The Airport Lands and Buildings are thus inalienable and are not
subject to real estate tax by local governments.
MIAA also points out that Section 21 of the MIAA Charter speci cally exempts MIAA from the
payment of real estate tax. MIAA insists that it is also exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 of
the Local Government Code because the Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. To
justify the exemption, MIAA invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself. MIAA points
out that the reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public
advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.
Respondents invoke Section 193 of the Local Government Code, which expressly withdrew the
tax exemption privileges of "government-owned and-controlled corporations " upon the effectivity
of the Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is
that the express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not
among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus, respondents
assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
Respondents also cite the ruling of this Court in Mactan International Airport v. Marcos 8
where we held that the Local Government Code has withdrawn the exemption from real estate tax
granted to international airports. Respondents further argue that since MIAA has already paid some of
the real estate tax assessments, it is now estopped from claiming that the Airport Lands and Buildings
are exempt from real estate tax.
The Issue
This petition raises the threshold issue of whether the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are
exempt from real estate tax under existing laws. If so exempt, then the real estate tax assessments
issued by the City of Parañaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant to such assessments, are void. In
such event, the other issues raised in this petition become moot.
The Court's Ruling
We rule that MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by
local governments.
First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the
National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are
owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.
1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation
Respondents argue that MIAA, being a government-owned or controlled corporation, is not
exempt from real estate tax. Respondents claim that the deletion of the phrase "any government-
owned or controlled so exempt by its charter" in Section 234(e) of the Local Government Code
withdrew the real estate tax exemption of government-owned or controlled corporations. The deleted
phrase appeared in Section 40(a) of the 1974 Real Property Tax Code enumerating the entities exempt
from real estate tax.
There is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled corporation is not exempt from real
estate tax. However, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Section 2(13) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 de nes a government-owned or controlled
corporation as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. — . . .

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized
as a stock or non-stock corporation , vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the
extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be "organized as a stock or non-stock

corporation ." MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock
corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares . MIAA has no stockholders or
voting shares. Section 10 of the MIAA Charter 9 provides:
SECTION 10. Capital. — The capital of the Authority to be contributed by the National
Government shall be increased from Two and One-half Billion (P2,500,000,000.00) Pesos to
Ten Billion (P10,000,000,000.00) Pesos to consist of:
(a) The value of fixed assets including airport facilities, runways and equipment and
such other properties, movable and immovable[,] which may be contributed by the National
Government or transferred by it from any of its agencies, the valuation of which shall be
determined jointly with the Department of Budget and Management and the Commission on
Audit on the date of such contribution or transfer after making due allowances for depreciation
and other deductions taking into account the loans and other liabilities of the Authority at the
time of the takeover of the assets and other properties;
(b) That the amount of P605 million as of December 31, 1986 representing about
seventy percentum (70%) of the unremitted share of the National Government from 1983 to
1986 to be remitted to the National Treasury as provided for in Section 11 of E.O. No. 903 as
amended, shall be converted into the equity of the National Government in the Authority.
Thereafter, the Government contribution to the capital of the Authority shall be provided in the
General Appropriations Act.
Clearly, under its Charter, MIAA does not have capital stock that is divided into shares.
Section 3 of the Corporation Code 1 0 de nes a stock corporation as one whose "capital stock
is divided into shares and . . . authorized to distribute to the holders of such shares
dividends . . . . " MIAA has capital but it is not divided into shares of stock. MIAA has no stockholders
or voting shares. Hence, MIAA is not a stock corporation.
MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. Section 87 of the
Corporation Code de nes a non-stock corporation as "one where no part of its income is distributable
as dividends to its members, trustees or o cers." A non-stock corporation must have members. Even
if we assume that the Government is considered as the sole member of MIAA, this will not make MIAA
a non-stock corporation. Non-stock corporations cannot distribute any part of their income to their
members. Section 11 of the MIAA Charter mandates MIAA to remit 20% of its annual gross operating
income to the National Treasury. 1 1 This prevents MIAA from qualifying as a non-stock corporation.
Section 88 of the Corporation Code provides that non-stock corporations are "organized for
charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal, literary, scienti c, social,
civil service, or similar purposes, like trade, industry, agriculture and like chambers." MIAA is not
organized for any of these purposes. MIAA, a public utility, is organized to operate an international and
domestic airport for public use.
Since MIAA is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation, MIAA does not qualify as a
government-owned or controlled corporation. What then is the legal status of MIAA within the National
Government?
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform e ciently its
governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that
MIAA is vested with corporate powers. Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code defines a government "instrumentality " as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. –– . . .
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers , administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy , usually through a charter. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does
not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also
corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, 1 2 police
authority 1 3 and the levying of fees and charges. 1 4 At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of
a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Executive Order." 1 5
Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous , the
instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although not integrated with the
department framework. The MIAA Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA into a "separate
and autonomous body" 1 6 will make its operation more "financially viable." 1 7
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become
stock or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is
deemed a government-owned or controlled corporation. Examples are the Mactan International Airport
Authority, the Philippine Ports Authority, the University of the Philippines and Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas. All these government instrumentalities exercise corporate powers but they are not organized
as stock or non-stock corporations as required by Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code. These government instrumentalities are sometimes loosely called government
corporate entities. However, they are not government-owned or controlled corporations in the strict
sense as understood under the Administrative Code, which is the governing law de ning the legal
relationship and status of government entities.
A government instrumentality like MIAA falls under Section 133(o) of the Local Government
Code, which states:
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units . —
Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following :
xxx xxx xxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities and local government units. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Section 133(o) recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national
government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. While the
1987 Constitution now includes taxation as one of the powers of local governments, local
governments may only exercise such power "subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide." 1 8
When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such
power is construed strictly against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and
there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity
is taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local governments
seek to tax national government instrumentalities.
Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the
exemption. However, when Congress grants an exemption to a national government instrumentality
from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national government
instrumentality. As this Court declared in Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr. :
The reason for the rule does not apply in the case of exemptions running to the bene t
of the government itself or its agencies. In such case the practical effect of an exemption is
merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be handled by government in the course of
its operations. For these reasons, provisions granting exemptions to government agencies may
be construed liberally, in favor of non tax-liability of such agencies. 1 9
There is, moreover, no point in national and local governments taxing each other, unless a sound and
compelling policy requires such transfer of public funds from one government pocket to another.
There is also no reason for local governments to tax national government instrumentalities for
rendering essential public services to inhabitants of local governments. The only exception is when
the legislature clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of
essential public services for sound and compelling policy considerations . There must be
express language in the law empowering local governments to tax national government
instrumentalities. Any doubt whether such power exists is resolved against local governments.
Thus, Section 133 of the Local Government Code states that "unless otherwise provided " in
the Code, local governments cannot tax national government instrumentalities. As this Court held in
Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation :
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in
any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry
into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local
governments.
"Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire
absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the
instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be
agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in
such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to
seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them." (Antieau, Modern Constitutional
Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of
what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to
tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42). TAScID
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc
Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the
very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. 2 0
2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic

a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore
owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines . The Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion :
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State , banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use
or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code,
like "roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State ," are owned by
the State. The term "ports" includes seaports and airports . The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings
constitute a "port " constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport
Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of
the Philippines.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public
for international and domestic travel and transportation . The fact that the MIAA collects
terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands
and Buildings as properties for public use. The operation by the government of a tollway does not
change the character of the road as one for public use. Someone must pay for the maintenance of the
road, either the public indirectly through the taxes they pay the government, or only those among the
public who actually use the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the road. The tollway system
is even a more efficient and equitable manner of taxing the public for the maintenance of public roads.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is
of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code de nes property of public dominion as one
"intended for public use." Even if the government collects toll fees, the road is still "intended for public
use" if anyone can use the road under the same terms and conditions as the rest of the public. The
charging of fees, the limitation on the kind of vehicles that can use the road, the speed restrictions and
other conditions for the use of the road do not affect the public character of the road.
The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to
airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such
fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed
user's tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing
all the public including those who never use the particular public facility. A user's tax is more equitable
— a principle of taxation mandated in the 1987 Constitution. 2 1
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its Charter calls the "principal airport of the
Philippines for both international and domestic air tra c," 2 2 are properties of public dominion
because they are intended for public use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably
belong to the State or the Republic of the Philippines .
b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and thus are properties of
public dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are
outside the commerce of man . The Court has ruled repeatedly that properties of public dominion
are outside the commerce of man. As early as 1915, this Court already ruled in Municipality of Cavite
v. Rojas that properties devoted to public use are outside the commerce of man, thus:
According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in
towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public
waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by said towns or
provinces."
The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of
Cavite could not in 1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease
it for the sole bene t of the defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said plaza or public
place to the defendant for private use the plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the
exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a thing of which it could not dispose, nor is
it empowered so to do.
The Civil Code, article 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside the
commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this
commerce , as was decided by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of February 12, 1895,
which says: "Communal things that cannot be sold because they are by their very
nature outside of commerce are those for public use, such as the plazas, streets,
common lands, rivers, fountains, etc ." (Emphasis supplied) 2 3
Again in Espiritu v. Municipal Council , the Court declared that properties of public dominion
are outside the commerce of man:
. . . Town plazas are properties of public dominion , to be devoted to public use and
to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties. While in case of
war or during an emergency, town plazas may be occupied temporarily by private individuals,
as was done and as was tolerated by the Municipality of Pozorrubio, when the emergency has
ceased, said temporary occupation or use must also cease, and the town o cials should see
to it that the town plazas should ever be kept open to the public and free from encumbrances
or illegal private constructions. 2 4 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man,
cannot be the subject of an auction sale. 2 5
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any
property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will
stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This
will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare
runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.
Before MIAA can encumber 2 6 the Airport Lands and Buildings, the President must rst
withdraw from public use the Airport Lands and Buildings. Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land
Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141, which "remains to this day the existing general law governing the
classi cation and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands," 2 7
provide:
SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the
public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or of any of its
branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this
purposes, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including
reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems,
communal pastures or lequas communales, public parks, public quarries, public shponds,
working men's village and other improvements for the public benefit.
SECTION 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of
Section eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation,
entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared alienable under the
provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the President . (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the Airport Lands and Buildings
from public use, these properties remain properties of public dominion and are inalienable . Since the
Airport Lands and Buildings are inalienable in their present status as properties of public dominion,
they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale. As long as the Airport Lands and Buildings
are reserved for public use, their ownership remains with the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
The authority of the President to reserve lands of the public domain for public use, and to
withdraw such public use, is reiterated in Section 14, Chapter 4, Title I, Book III of the Administrative
Code of 1987, which states:
SEC. 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public and Private Domain of the
Government. — (1) The President shall have the power to reserve for settlement or
public use, and for speci c public purposes, any of the lands of the public domain,
the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. The reserved land shall thereafter
remain subject to the speci c public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by
law or proclamation ;
xxx xxx xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no question, therefore, that unless the Airport Lands and Buildings are withdrawn by law or
presidential proclamation from public use, they are properties of public dominion, owned by the
Republic and outside the commerce of man. DSAICa
c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic

MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section
48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold
title to real properties owned by the Republic , thus:
SEC. 48. O cial Authorized to Convey Real Property . — Whenever real property of
the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed
in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another
officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in
the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality ,
by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
In MIAA's case, its status as a mere trustee of the Airport Lands and Buildings is clearer because
even its executive head cannot sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of the Republic. Only the
President of the Republic can sign such deed of conveyance. 2 8
d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization
The MIAA Charter, which is a law, transferred to MIAA the title to the Airport Lands and Buildings
from the Bureau of Air Transportation of the Department of Transportation and Communications. The
MIAA Charter provides:
SECTION 3. Creation of the Manila International Airport Authority . — . . .
The land where the Airport is presently located as well as the surrounding
land area of approximately six hundred hectares, are hereby transferred, conveyed
and assigned to the ownership and administration of the Authority, subject to
existing rights, if any . The Bureau of Lands and other appropriate government agencies
shall undertake an actual survey of the area transferred within one year from the promulgation
of this Executive Order and the corresponding title to be issued in the name of the Authority.
Any portion thereof shall not be disposed through sale or through any other mode
unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines . (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 22. Transfer of Existing Facilities and Intangible Assets . — All existing public
airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other property , movable or immovable,
belonging to the Airport, and all assets, powers, rights, interests and privileges belonging to
the Bureau of Air Transportation relating to airport works or air operations, including all
equipment which are necessary for the operation of crash re and rescue facilities, are hereby
transferred to the Authority. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 25. Abolition of the Manila International Airport as a Division in the Bureau of
Air Transportation and Transitory Provisions . — The Manila International Airport including the
Manila Domestic Airport as a division under the Bureau of Air Transportation is hereby
abolished.
xxx xxx xxx.
The MIAA Charter transferred the Airport Lands and Buildings to MIAA without the Republic
receiving cash, promissory notes or even stock since MIAA is not a stock corporation.
The whereas clauses of the MIAA Charter explain the rationale for the transfer of the Airport
Lands and Buildings to MIAA, thus:
WHEREAS, the Manila International Airport as the principal airport of the Philippines for
both international and domestic air tra c, is required to provide standards of airport
accommodation and service comparable with the best airports in the world;
WHEREAS, domestic and other terminals, general aviation and other facilities, have to be
upgraded to meet the current and future air tra c and other demands of aviation in Metro
Manila;
WHEREAS, a management and organization study has indicated that the objectives of
providing high standards of accommodation and service within the context of a
nancially viable operation, will best be achieved by a separate and autonomous
body ; and
WHEREAS, under Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1772, the President of the Philippines is given continuing authority to reorganize the
National Government, which authority includes the creation of new entities,
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government [.] (Emphasis supplied)

The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA
was not meant to transfer bene cial ownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The
purpose was merely to reorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a
separate and autonomous body . The Republic remains the bene cial owner of the Airport Lands
and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over
MIAA's assets adverse to the Republic.
The MIAA Charter expressly provides that the Airport Lands and Buildings "shall not be
disposed through sale or through any other mode unless speci cally approved by the
President of the Philippines ." This only means that the Republic retained the bene cial ownership of
the Airport Lands and Buildings because under Article 428 of the Civil Code, only the "owner has the
right to . . . dispose of a thing." Since MIAA cannot dispose of the Airport Lands and Buildings, MIAA
does not own the Airport Lands and Buildings.
At any time, the President can transfer back to the Republic title to the Airport Lands and
Buildings without the Republic paying MIAA any consideration. Under Section 3 of the MIAA Charter,
the President is the only one who can authorize the sale or disposition of the Airport Lands and
Buildings. This only confirms that the Airport Lands and Buildings belong to the Republic.
e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable
Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code exempts from real estate tax any "[r]eal property
owned by the Republic of the Philippines." Section 234(a) provides:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax . — The following are exempted
from payment of the real property tax :
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its
political subdivisions except when the bene cial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person ;
This exemption should be read in relation with Section 133(o) of the same Code, which prohibits
local governments from imposing "[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities . . . ." The real properties owned by the Republic are titled either in the
name of the Republic itself or in the name of agencies or instrumentalities of the National Government.
The Administrative Code allows real property owned by the Republic to be titled in the name of
agencies or instrumentalities of the national government. Such real properties remain owned by the
Republic and continue to be exempt from real estate tax.
The Republic may grant the bene cial use of its real property to an agency or instrumentality of
the national government. This happens when title of the real property is transferred to an agency or
instrumentality even as the Republic remains the owner of the real property. Such arrangement does
not result in the loss of the tax exemption. Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code states that
real property owned by the Republic loses its tax exemption only if the "bene cial use thereof has been
granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person ." MIAA, as a government instrumentality,
is not a taxable person under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code. Thus, even if we assume
that the Republic has granted to MIAA the bene cial use of the Airport Lands and Buildings, such fact
does not make these real properties subject to real estate tax.
However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not
exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to
private corporations is subject to real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the bene cial use of
such land area for a consideration to a taxable person and therefore such land area is subject to real
estate tax. In Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City , the Court ruled:
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as
those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the
other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used
for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes. 2 9

3. Refutation of Arguments of Minority
The minority asserts that the MIAA is not exempt from real estate tax because Section 193 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the tax exemption of "all persons, whether natural or
juridical " upon the effectivity of the Code. Section 193 provides:
SEC. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges — Unless otherwise provided

in this Code , tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except
local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-pro t
hospitals and educational institutions are hereby withdrawn upon effectivity of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied) ESacHC
The minority states that MIAA is indisputably a juridical person . The minority argues that since
the Local Government Code withdrew the tax exemption of all juridical persons , then MIAA is not
exempt from real estate tax. Thus, the minority declares:
It is evident from the quoted provisions of the Local Government Code that
the withdrawn exemptions from realty tax cover not just GOCCs, but all persons . To
repeat, the provisions lay down the explicit proposition that the withdrawal of realty tax
exemption applies to all persons. The reference to or the inclusion of GOCCs is only
clarificatory or illustrative of the explicit provision.
The term "All persons" encompasses the two classes of persons recognized
under our laws, natural and juridical persons. Obviously, MIAA is not a natural
person. Thus, the determinative test is not just whether MIAA is a GOCC, but
whether MIAA is a juridical person at all . (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
The minority posits that the "determinative test " whether MIAA is exempt from local taxation is
its status — whether MIAA is a juridical person or not . The minority also insists that "Sections
193 and 234 may be examined in isolation from Section 133(o) to ascertain MIAA's claim
of exemption ."
The argument of the minority is fatally awed. Section 193 of the Local Government Code
expressly withdrew the tax exemption of all juridical persons "[u]nless otherwise provided in this
Code ." Now, Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code expressly provides otherwise ,
speci cally prohibiting local governments from imposing any kind of tax on national government
instrumentalities. Section 133(o) states:
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government
Units . — Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the
following :
xxx xxx xxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities , and local government units . (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
By express mandate of the Local Government Code, local governments cannot impose any
kind of tax on national government instrumentalities like the MIAA. Local governments are devoid
of power to tax the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities . The taxing
powers of local governments do not extend to the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, "[u]nless otherwise provided in this Code" as stated in the saving clause of Section
133. The saving clause refers to Section 234(a) on the exception to the exemption from real estate tax
of real property owned by the Republic.
The minority, however, theorizes that unless exempted in Section 193 itself, all juridical
persons are subject to tax by local governments. The minority insists that the juridical persons
exempt from local taxation are limited to the three classes of entities speci cally
enumerated as exempt in Section 193 . Thus, the minority states:
. . . Under Section 193, the exemption is limited to (a) local water districts; (b)
cooperatives duly registered under Republic Act No. 6938; and (c) non-stock and
non-pro t hospitals and educational institutions . It would be belaboring the obvious
why the MIAA does not fall within any of the exempt entities under Section 193. (Emphasis
supplied)
The minority's theory directly contradicts and completely negates Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code. This theory will result in gross absurdities. It will make the national government,
which itself is a juridical person , subject to tax by local governments since the national government
is not included in the enumeration of exempt entities in Section 193. Under this theory, local
governments can impose any kind of local tax, and not only real estate tax , on the national
government.
Under the minority's theory, many national government instrumentalities with juridical
personalities will also be subject to any kind of local tax, and not only real estate tax . Some of
the national government instrumentalities vested by law with juridical personalities are: Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, 3 0 Philippine Rice Research Institute, 3 1 Laguna Lake Development Authority, 3 2
Fisheries Development Authority, 3 3 Bases Conversion Development Authority, 3 4 Philippine Ports
Authority, 3 5 Cagayan de Oro Port Authority, 3 6 San Fernando Port Authority, 3 7 Cebu Port Authority, 3 8
and Philippine National Railways. 3 9
The minority's theory violates Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code which expressly
prohibits local governments from imposing any kind of tax on national government instrumentalities.
Section 133(o) does not distinguish between national government instrumentalities with or
without juridical personalities . Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Thus, Section 133(o) applies to all national government instrumentalities, with or without juridical
personalities. The determinative test whether MIAA is exempt from local taxation is not whether
MIAA is a juridical person, but whether it is a national government instrumentality under Section
133(o) of the Local Government Code. Section 133(o) is the speci c provision of law prohibiting local
governments from imposing any kind of tax on the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities.
Section 133 of the Local Government Code starts with the saving clause "[u]nless otherwise
provided in this Code ." This means that unless the Local Government Code grants an express
authorization, local governments have no power to tax the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities. Clearly, the rule is local governments have no power to tax the national government,
its agencies and instrumentalities. As an exception to this rule, local governments may tax the national
government, its agencies and instrumentalities only if the Local Government Code expressly so
provides.
The saving clause in Section 133 refers to the exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) of
the Code, which makes the national government subject to real estate tax when it gives the
bene cial use of its real properties to a taxable entity . Section 234(a) of the Local Government
Code provides:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax — The following are exempted
from payment of the real property tax :
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its
political subdivisions except when the bene cial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person .
Under Section 234(a), real property owned by the Republic is exempt from real estate tax. The
exception to this exemption is when the government gives the bene cial use of the real property
to a taxable entity.
The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) is the only instance when the
national government, its agencies and instrumentalities are subject to any kind of tax by
local governments . The exception to the exemption applies only to real estate tax and not to any
other tax. The justi cation for the exception to the exemption is that the real property, although owned
by the Republic, is not devoted to public use or public service but devoted to the private gain of a
taxable person.
The minority also argues that since Section 133 precedes Section 193 and 234 of the Local
Government Code, the later provisions prevail over Section 133. Thus, the minority asserts:
. . . Moreover, sequentially Section 133 antecedes Section 193 and 234. Following an
accepted rule of construction, in case of con ict the subsequent provisions should
prevail . Therefore, MIAA, as a juridical person, is subject to real property taxes, the general
exemptions attaching to instrumentalities under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code
being qualified by Sections 193 and 234 of the same law. (Emphasis supplied)
The minority assumes that there is an irreconcilable con ict between Section 133 on one hand,
and Sections 193 and 234 on the other. No one has urged that there is such a con ict, much less has
any one presented a persuasive argument that there is such a con ict. The minority's assumption of an
irreconcilable conflict in the statutory provisions is an egregious error for two reasons.
First, there is no con ict whatsoever between Sections 133 and 193 because Section 193
expressly admits its subordination to other provisions of the Code when Section 193 states
"[u]nless otherwise provided in this Code ." By its own words, Section 193 admits the superiority
of other provisions of the Local Government Code that limit the exercise of the taxing power in Section
193. When a provision of law grants a power but withholds such power on certain matters, there is no
con ict between the grant of power and the withholding of power. The grantee of the power simply
cannot exercise the power on matters withheld from its power.
Second, Section 133 is entitled "Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local
Government Units ." Section 133 limits the grant to local governments of the power to tax, and not
merely the exercise of a delegated power to tax. Section 133 states that the taxing powers of local
governments "shall not extend to the levy " of any kind of tax on the national government, its
agencies and instrumentalities. There is no clearer limitation on the taxing power than this.
Since Section 133 prescribes the "common limitations " on the taxing powers of local
governments, Section 133 logically prevails over Section 193 which grants local governments such
taxing powers. By their very meaning and purpose, the "common limitations" on the taxing
power prevail over the grant or exercise of the taxing power . If the taxing power of local
governments in Section 193 prevails over the limitations on such taxing power in Section 133, then
local governments can impose any kind of tax on the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities — a gross absurdity.
Local governments have no power to tax the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, except as otherwise provided in the Local Government Code pursuant to the saving
clause in Section 133 stating "[u]nless otherwise provided in this Code." This exception — which is an
exception to the exemption of the Republic from real estate tax imposed by local governments — refers
to Section 234(a) of the Code. The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) subjects real property
owned by the Republic, whether titled in the name of the national government, its agencies or
instrumentalities, to real estate tax if the beneficial use of such property is given to a taxable entity.
The minority also claims that the de nition in the Administrative Code of the phrase
"government-owned or controlled corporation" is not controlling. The minority points out that Section 2
of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code admits that its de nitions are not controlling
when it provides:
SEC. 2. General Terms De ned . — Unless the speci c words of the text, or the
context as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:
xxx xxx xxx
The minority then concludes that reliance on the Administrative Code definition is "flawed."
The minority's argument is a non sequitur. True, Section 2 of the Administrative Code recognizes
that a statute may require a different meaning than that de ned in the Administrative Code. However,
this does not automatically mean that the de nition in the Administrative Code does not apply to the
Local Government Code. Section 2 of the Administrative Code clearly states that "unless the speci c
words . . . of a particular statute shall require a different meaning ," the definition in Section 2 of
the Administrative Code shall apply. Thus, unless there is speci c language in the Local Government
Code de ning the phrase "government-owned or controlled corporation" differently from the de nition
in the Administrative Code, the definition in the Administrative Code prevails. EcSCHD
The minority does not point to any provision in the Local Government Code de ning the phrase
"government-owned or controlled corporation" differently from the de nition in the Administrative
Code. Indeed, there is none. The Local Government Code is silent on the de nition of the
phrase "government-owned or controlled corporation." The Administrative Code, however,
expressly de nes the phrase "government-owned or controlled corporation." The inescapable
conclusion is that the Administrative Code de nition of the phrase "government-owned or controlled
corporation" applies to the Local Government Code.
The third whereas clause of the Administrative Code states that the Code "incorporates in a
uni ed document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of
governance ." Thus, the Administrative Code is the governing law de ning the status and relationship
of government departments, bureaus, o ces, agencies and instrumentalities. Unless a statute
expressly provides for a different status and relationship for a speci c government unit or entity, the
provisions of the Administrative Code prevail.
The minority also contends that the phrase "government-owned or controlled corporation"
should apply only to corporations organized under the Corporation Code, the general incorporation law,
and not to corporations created by special charters. The minority sees no reason why government
corporations with special charters should have a capital stock. Thus, the minority declares:
I submit that the de nition of "government-owned or controlled corporations" under the
Administrative Code refer to those corporations owned by the government or its
instrumentalities which are created not by legislative enactment, but formed and organized
under the Corporation Code through registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In short, these are GOCCs without original charters.
xxx xxx xxx
It might as well be worth pointing out that there is no point in requiring a capital
structure for GOCCs whose full ownership is limited by its charter to the State or Republic. Such
GOCCs are not empowered to declare dividends or alienate their capital shares.
The contention of the minority is seriously awed. It is not in accord with the Constitution and
existing legislations. It will also result in gross absurdities.
First, the Administrative Code de nition of the phrase "government-owned or controlled
corporation" does not distinguish between one incorporated under the Corporation Code or under a
special charter. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Second, Congress has created through special charters several government-owned corporations
organized as stock corporations . Prime examples are the Land Bank of the Philippines and the
Development Bank of the Philippines. The special charter 4 0 of the Land Bank of the Philippines
provides:
SECTION 81. Capital. — The authorized capital stock of the Bank shall be nine
billion pesos, divided into seven hundred and eighty million common shares with a
par value of ten pesos each , which shall be fully subscribed by the Government, and one
hundred and twenty million preferred shares with a par value of ten pesos each, which shall be
issued in accordance with the provisions of Sections seventy-seven and eighty-three of this
Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the special charter 4 1 of the Development Bank of the Philippines provides:

SECTION 7. Authorized Capital Stock — Par value. — The capital stock of the Bank
shall be Five Billion Pesos to be divided into Fifty Million common shares with par
value of P100 per share . These shares are available for subscription by the National
Government. Upon the effectivity of this Charter, the National Government shall subscribe to
Twenty-Five Million common shares of stock worth Two Billion Five Hundred Million which
shall be deemed paid for by the Government with the net asset values of the Bank remaining
after the transfer of assets and liabilities as provided in Section 30 hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Other government-owned corporations organized as stock corporations under their special

charters are the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation, 4 2 Philippine International Trading Corporation,
4 3 and the Philippine National Bank 4 4 before it was reorganized as a stock corporation under the
Corporation Code. All these government-owned corporations organized under special charters as
stock corporations are subject to real estate tax on real properties owned by them. To rule that they
are not government-owned or controlled corporations because they are not registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission would remove them from the reach of Section 234 of the Local
Government Code, thus exempting them from real estate tax.
Third, the government-owned or controlled corporations created through special charters are
those that meet the two conditions prescribed in Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution. The rst
condition is that the government-owned or controlled corporation must be established for the
common good. The second condition is that the government-owned or controlled
corporation must meet the test of economic viability . Section 16, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the
common good and subject to the test of economic viability . (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Constitution expressly authorizes the legislature to create "government-owned or controlled

corporations" through special charters only if these entities are required to meet the twin conditions
of common good and economic viability. In other words, Congress has no power to create
government-owned or controlled corporations with special charters unless they are made
to comply with the two conditions of common good and economic viability . The test of
economic viability applies only to government-owned or controlled corporations that perform
economic or commercial activities and need to compete in the market place. Being essentially
economic vehicles of the State for the common good — meaning for economic development purposes
— these government-owned or controlled corporations with special charters are usually organized as
stock corporations just like ordinary private corporations.
In contrast, government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and performing
governmental or public functions need not meet the test of economic viability. These instrumentalities
perform essential public services for the common good, services that every modern State must
provide its citizens. These instrumentalities need not be economically viable since the government may
even subsidize their entire operations. These instrumentalities are not the "government-owned or
controlled corporations" referred to in Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, the Constitution imposes no limitation when the legislature creates government
instrumentalities vested with corporate powers but performing essential governmental or public
functions. Congress has plenary authority to create government instrumentalities vested
with corporate powers provided these instrumentalities perform essential government
functions or public services . However, when the legislature creates through special charters
corporations that perform economic or commercial activities, such entities — known as "government-
owned or controlled corporations" — must meet the test of economic viability because they compete in
the market place.
This is the situation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank of the
Philippines and similar government-owned or controlled corporations, which derive their income to
meet operating expenses solely from commercial transactions in competition with the private sector.
The intent of the Constitution is to prevent the creation of government-owned or controlled
corporations that cannot survive on their own in the market place and thus merely drain the public
coffers.
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, proponent of the test of economic viability, explained to the
Constitutional Commission the purpose of this test, as follows:
MR. OPLE: Madam President, the reason for this concern is really that when the
government creates a corporation, there is a sense in which this corporation becomes exempt
from the test of economic performance. We know what happened in the past. If a government
corporation loses, then it makes its claim upon the taxpayers' money through new equity
infusions from the government and what is always invoked is the common good. That is the
reason why this year, out of a budget of P115 billion for the entire government, about P28
billion of this will go into equity infusions to support a few government nancial institutions.
And this is all taxpayers' money which could have been relocated to agrarian reform, to social
services like health and education, to augment the salaries of grossly underpaid public
employees. And yet this is all going down the drain.
Therefore, when we insert the phrase "ECONOMIC VIABILITY" together with the "common
good," this becomes a restraint on future enthusiasts for state capitalism to excuse themselves
from the responsibility of meeting the market test so that they become viable. And so, Madam
President, I reiterate, for the committee's consideration and I am glad that I am joined in this
proposal by Commissioner Foz, the insertion of the standard of "ECONOMIC VIABILITY OR THE
ECONOMIC TEST," together with the common good. 4 5
Father Joaquin G. Bernas, a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, explains in his
textbook The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary:
The second sentence was added by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. The
signi cant addition, however, is the phrase " in the interest of the common good and
subject to the test of economic viability ." The addition includes the ideas that they must
show capacity to function e ciently in business and that they should not go into
activities which the private sector can do better . Moreover, economic viability is more
than nancial viability but also includes capability to make pro t and generate bene ts not
quantifiable in financial terms. 4 6 (Emphasis supplied)
DAEcIS
Clearly, the test of economic viability does not apply to government entities vested with
corporate powers and performing essential public services. The State is obligated to render essential
public services regardless of the economic viability of providing such service. The non-economic
viability of rendering such essential public service does not excuse the State from withholding such
essential services from the public.
However, government-owned or controlled corporations with special charters, organized
essentially for economic or commercial objectives, must meet the test of economic viability. These are
the government-owned or controlled corporations that are usually organized under their special
charters as stock corporations, like the Land Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank of the
Philippines. These are the government-owned or controlled corporations, along with government-
owned or controlled corporations organized under the Corporation Code, that fall under the de nition
of "government-owned or controlled corporations" in Section 2(10) of the Administrative Code.
The MIAA need not meet the test of economic viability because the legislature did not create
MIAA to compete in the market place. MIAA does not compete in the market place because there is no
competing international airport operated by the private sector. MIAA performs an essential public
service as the primary domestic and international airport of the Philippines. The operation of an
international airport requires the presence of personnel from the following government agencies:
1. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to document the arrival and departure
of passengers, screening out those without visas or travel documents, or those
with hold departure orders;
2. The Bureau of Customs, to collect import duties or enforce the ban on prohibited
importations;
3. The quarantine office of the Department of Health, to enforce health measures
against the spread of infectious diseases into the country;
4. The Department of Agriculture, to enforce measures against the spread of plant
and animal diseases into the country;
5. The Aviation Security Command of the Philippine National Police, to prevent the
entry of terrorists and the escape of criminals, as well as to secure the airport
premises from terrorist attack or seizure;
6. The Air Traffic Office of the Department of Transportation and Communications,
to authorize aircraft to enter or leave Philippine airspace, as well as to land on, or
take off from, the airport; and
7. The MIAA, to provide the proper premises — such as runway and buildings — for
the government personnel, passengers, and airlines, and to manage the airport
operations.
All these agencies of government perform government functions essential to the operation of an
international airport.
MIAA performs an essential public service that every modern State must provide its citizens.
MIAA derives its revenues principally from the mandatory fees and charges MIAA imposes on
passengers and airlines. The terminal fees that MIAA charges every passenger are regulatory or
administrative fees 4 7 and not income from commercial transactions.
MIAA falls under the de nition of a government instrumentality under Section 2(10) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code, which provides:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. — . . .
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers , administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy , usually through a charter. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The fact alone that MIAA is endowed with corporate powers does not make MIAA a government-
owned or controlled corporation. Without a change in its capital structure, MIAA remains a
government instrumentality under Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code. More importantly, as long as MIAA renders essential public services, it need not comply with
the test of economic viability. Thus, MIAA is outside the scope of the phrase "government-owned or
controlled corporations" under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The minority belittles the use in the Local Government Code of the phrase "government-owned or
controlled corporation" as merely "clari catory or illustrative ." This is fatal. The 1987 Constitution
prescribes explicit conditions for the creation of "government-owned or controlled corporations." The
Administrative Code de nes what constitutes a "government-owned or controlled corporation." To
belittle this phrase as "clarificatory or illustrative" is grave error.
To summarize, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation under Section 2(13)
of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code because it is not organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation. Neither is MIAA a government-owned or controlled corporation under Section 16,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because MIAA is not required to meet the test of economic
viability. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing essential
public services pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. As
a government instrumentality, MIAA is not subject to any kind of tax by local governments under
Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code. The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) does
not apply to MIAA because MIAA is not a taxable entity under the Local Government Code. Such
exception applies only if the bene cial use of real property owned by the Republic is given to a taxable
entity.
Finally, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties devoted to public use and thus
are properties of public dominion. Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or the
Republic . Article 420 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion :
(1) Those intended for public use , such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State , banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character ;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
The term "ports . . . constructed by the State " includes airports and seaports. The Airport
Lands and Buildings of MIAA are intended for public use, and at the very least intended for public
service. Whether intended for public use or public service, the Airport Lands and Buildings are
properties of public dominion . As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings
are owned by the Republic and thus exempt from real estate tax under Section 234(a) of the Local
Government Code.
4. Conclusion
Under Section 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code, which
governs the legal relation and status of government units, agencies and o ces within the entire
government machinery, MIAA is a government instrumentality and not a government-owned or
controlled corporation. Under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, MIAA as a government
instrumentality is not a taxable person because it is not subject to "[t]axes, fees or charges of any
kind" by local governments. The only exception is when MIAA leases its real property to a "taxable
person" as provided in Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, in which case the speci c real
property leased becomes subject to real estate tax. Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and
Buildings leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real estate tax by the City of
Parañaque.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, being devoted to
public use, are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines. Article 420 speci cally mentions "ports . . . constructed by the State," which includes
public airports and seaports, as properties of public dominion and owned by the Republic. As
properties of public dominion owned by the Republic, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Airport
Lands and Buildings are expressly exempt from real estate tax under Section 234(a) of the Local
Government Code. This Court has also repeatedly ruled that properties of public dominion are not
subject to execution or foreclosure sale.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the assailed Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals of 5 October 2001 and 27 September 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66878. We DECLARE the Airport
Lands and Buildings of the Manila International Airport Authority EXEMPT from the real estate tax
imposed by the City of Parañaque. We declare VOID all the real estate tax assessments, including the
nal notices of real estate tax delinquencies, issued by the City of Parañaque on the Airport Lands and
Buildings of the Manila International Airport Authority, except for the portions that the Manila
International Airport Authority has leased to private parties. We also declare VOID the assailed auction
sale, and all its effects, of the Airport Lands and Buildings of the Manila International Airport Authority.
ESHAcI
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio
Morales, Chico-Nazario, Garcia and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., agrees with separate opinion of J. Tinga.

Callejo, Sr., J., concurs with separate opinion of J. Tinga.
Azcuna, J., is on leave.
Tinga, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
TINGA , J., dissenting :
The legally correct resolution of this petition would have had the added bene t of an utterly fair
and equitable result — a recognition of the constitutional and statutory power of the City of Parañaque
to impose real property taxes on the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), but at the same
time, upholding a statutory limitation that prevents the City of Parañaque from seizing and conducting
an execution sale over the real properties of MIAA. In the end, all that the City of Parañaque would hold
over the MIAA is a limited lien, unenforceable as it is through the sale or disposition of MIAA
properties. Not only is this the legal effect of all the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions
applied to this case, it also leaves the room for negotiation for a mutually acceptable resolution
between the City of Parañaque and MIAA.
Instead, with blind but measured rage, the majority today veers wildly off-course, shattering
statutes and judicial precedents left and right in order to protect the precious Ming vase that is the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA). While the MIAA is left unscathed, it is surrounded by the
wreckage that once was the constitutional policy, duly enacted into law, that of local autonomy. Make
no mistake, the majority has virtually declared war on the seventy nine (79) provinces, one hundred
seventeen (117) cities, and one thousand five hundred (1,500) municipalities of the Philippines. 1
The icing on this inedible cake is the strained and purposely vague rationale used to justify the
majority opinion. Decisions of the Supreme Court are expected to provide clarity to the parties and to
students of jurisprudence, as to what the law of the case is, especially when the doctrines of long
standing are modi ed or clari ed. With all due respect, the decision in this case is plainly so, so wrong
on many levels. More egregious, in the majority's resolve to spare the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) from liability for real estate taxes, no clear-cut rule emerges on the important
question of the power of local government units (LGUs) to tax government corporations,
instrumentalities or agencies.
The majority would overturn sub silencio, among others, at least one dozen precedents
enumerated below:
1) Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Hon. Marcos , 2 the leading case penned in
1997 by recently retired Chief Justice Davide, which held that the express withdrawal by the Local
Government Code of previously granted exemptions from realty taxes applied to instrumentalities and
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) such as the Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA). The majority invokes the ruling in Basco v. Pagcor , 3 a precedent discredited in
Mactan, and a vanguard of a doctrine so noxious to the concept of local government rule that the Local
Government Code was drafted precisely to counter such philosophy. The e cacy of several rulings
that expressly rely on Mactan, such as PHILRECA v. DILG Secretary , 4 City Government of San Pablo v.
Hon. Reyes 5 is now put in question.
2) The rulings in National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan , 6 wherein the Court,
through Justice Puno, declared that the National Power Corporation, a GOCC, is liable for franchise
taxes under the Local Government Code, and succeeding cases that have relied on it such as Batangas
Power Corp. v. Batangas City 7 The majority now states that deems instrumentalities as de ned under
the Administrative Code of 1987 as purportedly beyond the reach of any form of taxation by LGUs,
stating "[l]ocal governments are devoid of power to tax the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities." 8 Unfortunately, using the de nition employed by the majority, as provided by
Section 2(d) of the Administrative Code, GOCCs are also considered as instrumentalities, thus leading
to the astounding conclusion that GOCCs may not be taxed by LGUs under the Local Government Code.

3) Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City , 9 wherein a unanimous en banc Court held
that the Lung Center of the Philippines may be liable for real property taxes. Using the majority's
reasoning, the Lung Center would be properly classi ed as an instrumentality which the majority now
holds as exempt from all forms of local taxation. 1 0
4) City of Davao v. RTC , 1 1 where the Court held that the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) was liable for real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994, its previous exemption
having been withdrawn by the enactment of the Local Government Code. 1 2 This decision, which
expressly relied on Mactan, would be directly though silently overruled by the majority.
5) The common essence of the Court's rulings in the two Philippine Ports Authority v. City of
Iloilo, 1 3 cases penned by Justices Callejo and Azcuna respectively, which relied in part on Mactan in
holding the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) liable for realty taxes, notwithstanding the fact that it is a
GOCC. Based on the reasoning of the majority, the PPA cannot be considered a GOCC. The reliance of
these cases on Mactan, and its rationale for holding governmental entities like the PPA liable for local
government taxation is mooted by the majority.
6) The 1963 precedent of Social Security System Employees Association v. Soriano, 1 4 which
declared the Social Security Commission (SSC) as a GOCC performing proprietary functions. Based on
the rationale employed by the majority, the Social Security System is not a GOCC. Or perhaps more
accurately, "no longer" a GOCC.
7) The decision penned by Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban, Light Rail Transit
Authority v. Central Board of Assessment . 1 5 The characterization therein of the Light Rail Transit
Authority (LRTA) as a "service-oriented commercial endeavor" whose patrimonial property is subject to
local taxation is now rendered inconsequential, owing to the majority's thinking that an entity such as
the LRTA is itself exempt from local government taxation 1 6 , irrespective of the functions it performs.
Moreover, based on the majority's criteria, LRTA is not a GOCC.
8) The cases of Teodoro v. National Airports Corporation 1 7 and Civil Aeronautics
Administration v. Court of Appeals , 1 8 wherein the Court held that the predecessor agency of the MIAA,
which was similarly engaged in the operation, administration and management of the Manila
International Agency, was engaged in the exercise of proprietary, as opposed to sovereign functions.
The majority would hold otherwise that the property maintained by MIAA is actually patrimonial, thus
implying that MIAA is actually engaged in sovereign functions.
9) My own unanimous ponencia in Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel , 1 9 wherein
the Court held that the Phividec Industrial Authority, a GOCC, was required to secure the services of the
O ce of the Government Corporate Counsel for legal representation. 2 0 Based on the reasoning of the
majority, Phividec would not be a GOCC, and the mandate of the O ce of the Government Corporate
Counsel extends only to GOCCs.
10) Two decisions promulgated by the Court just last month (June 2006), National Power
Corporation v. Province of Isabela 2 1 and GSIS v. City Assessor of Iloilo City . 2 2 In the former, the Court
pronounced that "[a]lthough as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose taxes, fees, or charges of any kind
on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule admits of an exception, i.e.,
when speci c provisions of the LGC authorize the LGUs to impose taxes, fees or charges on the
aforementioned entities." Yet the majority now rules that the exceptions in the LGC no longer hold,
since "local governments are devoid of power to tax the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities." 2 3 The ruling in the latter case, which held the GSIS as liable for real property taxes, is
now put in jeopardy by the majority ruling.
There are certainly many other precedents affected, perhaps all previous jurisprudence regarding
local government taxation vis-a-vis government entities, as well as any previous de nitions of GOCCs,
and previous distinctions between the exercise of governmental and proprietary functions (a
distinction laid down by this Court as far back as 1916 2 4 ). What is the reason offered by the majority
for overturning or modifying all these precedents and doctrines? None is given, for the majority takes
comfort instead in the pretense that these precedents never existed. Only children should be permitted
to subscribe to the theory that something bad will go away if you pretend hard enough that it does not
exist. ACSaHc
I.
Case Should Have Been Decided
Following Mactan Precedent
The core issue in this case, whether the MIAA is liable to the City of Parañaque for real property
taxes under the Local Government Code, has already been decided by this Court in the Mactan case,
and should have been resolved by simply applying precedent.
Mactan Explained
A brief recall of the Mactan case is in order. The Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) claimed that it was exempt from payment of real property taxes to the City of Cebu, invoking
the speci c exemption granted in Section 14 of its charter, Republic Act No. 6958, and its status as an
instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions. 2 5 Particularly, MCIAA invoked
Section 133 of the Local Government Code, precisely the same provision utilized by the majority as the
basis for MIAA's exemption. Section 133 reads:
Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units .—
Unless otherwise provided herein , the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities and local government units. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
However, the Court in Mactan noted that Section 133 quali ed the exemption of the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities from local taxation with the phrase "unless otherwise
provided herein." It then considered the other relevant provisions of the Local Government Code,
particularly the following:
SEC. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges . — Unless otherwise provided in
this Code, tax exemption or incentives granted to, or enjoyed by all persons, whether
natural or juridical , including government-owned and controlled corporations, except local
water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-pro t
hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
26
SECTION 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax . — A province or city or a

municipality within the Metropolitan Manila area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real
property such as land, building, machinery, and other improvements not hereafter speci cally
exempted. 2 7
SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax . — The following are exempted
from payment of the real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration
or otherwise, to a taxable person;
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and improvements
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious charitable or educational purposes;
(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local
water districts and government-owned and controlled corporations engaged in the
distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power;
(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No.
6938; and
(e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection.
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax
previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or
juridical , including all government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn
upon the effectivity of this Code. 2 8
Clearly, Section 133 was not intended to be so absolute a prohibition on the power of LGUs to
tax the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, as evidenced by these cited provisions
which "otherwise provided." But what was the extent of the limitation under Section 133? This is how
the Court, correctly to my mind, defined the parameters in Mactan:
The foregoing sections of the LGC speak of: (a) the limitations on the taxing powers of
local government units and the exceptions to such limitations; and (b) the rule on tax
exemptions and the exceptions thereto. The use of exceptions or provisos in these sections, as
shown by the following clauses:
(1) "unless otherwise provided herein" in the opening paragraph of Section
133;
(2) "Unless otherwise provided in this Code" in Section 193;
(3) "not hereafter specifically exempted" in Section 232; and
(4) "Except as provided herein" in the last paragraph of Section 234
initially hampers a ready understanding of the sections. Note, too, that the
aforementioned clause in Section 133 seems to be inaccurately worded. Instead of the clause
"unless otherwise provided herein," with the "herein" to mean, of course, the section, it should
have used the clause "unless otherwise provided in this Code." The former results in absurdity
since the section itself enumerates what are beyond the taxing powers of local government
units and, where exceptions were intended, the exceptions are explicitly indicated in the next.
For instance, in item (a) which excepts income taxes "when levied on banks and other nancial
institutions"; item (d) which excepts "wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the
local government unit concerned"; and item (1) which excepts taxes, fees and charges for the
registration and issuance of licenses or permits for the driving of "tricycles." It may also be
observed that within the body itself of the section, there are exceptions which can be found
only in other parts of the LGC, but the section interchangeably uses therein the clause, "except
as otherwise provided herein" as in items (c) and (i), or the clause "except as provided in this
Code" in item (j). These clauses would be obviously unnecessary or mere surplusages if the
opening clause of the section were "Unless otherwise provided in this Code" instead of "Unless
otherwise provided herein." In any event, even if the latter is used, since under Section 232 local
government units have the power to levy real property tax, except those exempted therefrom
under Section 234, then Section 232 must be deemed to qualify Section 133.
Thus, reading together Sections 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, we conclude
that as a general rule, as laid down in Section 133, the taxing powers of local
government units cannot extend to the levy of, inter alia, "taxes, fees and charges
of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and
local government units"; however, pursuant to Section 232, provinces, cities, and
municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax
except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any
of its political subdivisions except when the bene cial use thereof has been
granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person," as provided in item (a)
of the first paragraph of Section 234.
As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural
or judicial persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations,
Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon
the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-pro t
hospitals and educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the LGC.
The latter proviso could refer to Section 234 which enumerates the properties
exempt from real property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further
quali es the retention of the exemption insofar as real property taxes are
concerned by limiting the retention only to those enumerated therein; all others not
included in the enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC.
Moreover, even as to real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any
of its political subdivisions covered by item (a) of the rst paragraph of Section
234, the exemption is withdrawn if the bene cial use of such property has been
granted to a taxable person for consideration or otherwise.
Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the
effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to
natural or juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is,
undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its
exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its Charter, R.A. No. 6958, has
been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can only be justi ed if the petitioner can
seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not under
Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the said section is quali ed
by Sections 232 and 234. 2 9
The Court in Mactan acknowledged that under Section 133, instrumentalities were generally
exempt from all forms of local government taxation, unless otherwise provided in the Code. On the
other hand, Section 232 "otherwise provided" insofar as it allowed LGUs to levy an ad valorem real
property tax, irrespective of who owned the property. At the same time, the imposition of real property
taxes under Section 232 is in turn quali ed by the phrase "not hereinafter speci cally exempted." The
exemptions from real property taxes are enumerated in Section 234, which speci cally states that only
real properties owned "by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions" are
exempted from the payment of the tax. Clearly, instrumentalities or GOCCs do not fall within the
exceptions under Section 234. 3 0
Mactan Overturned the

Precedents Now Relied
Upon by the Majority
But the petitioners in Mactan also raised the Court's ruling in Basco v. PAGCOR , 3 1 decided
before the enactment of the Local Government Code. The Court in Basco declared the PAGCOR as
exempt from local taxes, justifying the exemption in this wise:
Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All
of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate
powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers . . .
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the
Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is
exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to
control by a mere Local government. TIaCHA
"The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard impede, burden or in any
manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into
execution the powers vested in the federal government." ( McCulloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4
L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local
governments.
"Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence
of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities
of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland , 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or
political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from
consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment
of them." (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of
what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activates or enterprise using the power to
tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy"
(McCulloch v. Maryland, supra ) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of
the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. 3 2
Basco is as strident a reiteration of the old guard view that frowned on the principle of local
autonomy, especially as it interfered with the prerogatives and privileges of the national government.
Also consider the following citation from Maceda v. Macaraig , 3 3 decided the same year as Basco.
Discussing the rule of construction of tax exemptions on government instrumentalities, the sentiments
are of a similar vein.
Moreover, it is a recognized principle that the rule on strict interpretation does not apply
in the case of exemptions in favor of a government political subdivision or instrumentality.
The basis for applying the rule of strict construction to statutory provisions
granting tax exemptions or deductions, even more obvious than with reference to the
a rmative or levying provisions of tax statutes, is to minimize differential treatment
and foster impartiality, fairness, and equality of treatment among tax payers.
The reason for the rule does not apply in the case of exemptions running to the
bene t of the government itself or its agencies. In such case the practical effect of an
exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be handled by
government in the course of its operations. For these reasons, provisions granting
exemptions to government agencies may be construed liberally, in favor of non tax-
liability of such agencies.
In the case of property owned by the state or a city or other public corporations, the
express exemption should not be construed with the same degree of strictness that applies to
exemptions contrary to the policy of the state, since as to such property "exemption is the rule
and taxation the exception." 3 4
Strikingly, the majority cites these two very cases and the stodgy rationale provided therein. This
evinces the perspective from which the majority is coming from. It is admittedly a viewpoint once
shared by this Court, and en vogue prior to the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991.
However, the Local Government Code of 1991 ushered in a new ethos on how the art of
governance should be practiced in the Philippines, conceding greater powers once held in the private
reserve of the national government to LGUs. The majority might have private qualms about the wisdom
of the policy of local autonomy, but the members of the Court are not expected to substitute their
personal biases for the legislative will, especially when the 1987 Constitution itself promotes the
principle of local autonomy.
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Article X. Local Government
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system
of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the quali cations, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local o cials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.

xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court in Mactan recognized that a new day had dawned with the enactment of the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. Thus, it expressly rejected the contention of the
MCIAA that Basco was applicable to them. In doing so, the language of the Court was dramatic, if only
to emphasize how monumental the shift in philosophy was with the enactment of the Local
Government Code:
Accordingly, the position taken by the [MCIAA] is untenable. Reliance on Basco v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation is unavailing since it was decided
before the effectivity of the [Local Government Code]. Besides, nothing can prevent
Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the Government
performing governmental functions may be subject to tax. Where it is done
precisely to ful ll a constitutional mandate and national policy, no one can doubt
its wisdom . 3 5 (emphasis supplied)
The Court Has Repeatedly

Reaffirmed Mactan Over the
Precedents Now Relied Upon
By the Majority
Since then and until today, the Court has been emphatic in declaring the Basco doctrine as dead.
The notion that instrumentalities may be subjected to local taxation by LGUs was again a rmed in
National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan , 3 6 which was penned by Justice Puno. NPC or
Napocor, invoking its continued exemption from payment of franchise taxes to the City of Cabanatuan,
alleged that it was an instrumentality of the National Government which could not be taxed by a city
government. To that end, Basco was cited by NPC. The Court had this to say about Basco.
. . . [T]he doctrine in Basco vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
relied upon by the petitioner to support its claim no longer applies. To emphasize,
the Basco case was decided prior to the effectivity of the LGC, when no law
empowering the local government units to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government was in effect. However, as this Court ruled in the case of Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) vs. Marcos, nothing prevents Congress from
decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the government performing
governmental functions may be subject to tax. In enacting the LGC, Congress
exercised its prerogative to tax instrumentalities and agencies of government as it
sees t. Thus, after reviewing the speci c provisions of the LGC, this Court held
that MCIAA, although an instrumentality of the national government, was subject to
real property tax. 3 7
In the 2003 case of Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo , 3 8 the Court, in the able ponencia of
Justice Azcuna, a rmed the levy of realty taxes on the PPA. Although the taxes were assessed under
the old Real Property Tax Code and not the Local Government Code, the Court again cited Mactan to
refute PPA's invocation of Basco as the basis of its exemption.
[Basco] did not absolutely prohibit local governments from taxing government instrumentalities.
In fact we stated therein:
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to
"limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since P.D. 1869 remains an "operative" law
until "amended, repealed or revoked". . . its "exemption clause" remains an exemption to the
exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees.
AHDacC
Furthermore, in the more recent case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos ,
where the Basco case was similarly invoked for tax exemption, we stated: "[N]othing can prevent
Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the Government performing
governmental functions may be subject to tax. Where it is done precisely to ful ll a constitutional
mandate and national policy, no one can doubt its wisdom." The fact that tax exemptions of
government-owned or controlled corporations have been expressly withdrawn by the present Local
Government Code clearly attests against petitioner's claim of absolute exemption of government
instrumentalities from local taxation. 3 9
Just last month, the Court in National Power Corporation v. Province of Isabela 4 0 again rejected
Basco in emphatic terms. Held the Court, through Justice Callejo, Sr.:
Thus, the doctrine laid down in the Basco case is no longer true. In the Cabanatuan case,
the Court noted primarily that the Basco case was decided prior to the effectivity of the LGC,
when no law empowering the local government units to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government was in effect. It further explained that in enacting the LGC, Congress empowered
the LGUs to impose certain taxes even on instrumentalities of the National Government. 4 1
The taxability of the PPA recently came to fore in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo 4 2
case, a decision also penned by Justice Callejo, Sr., wherein the Court a rmed the sale of PPA's
properties at public auction for failure to pay realty taxes. The Court again reiterated that "it was the
intention of Congress to withdraw the tax exemptions granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, upon the effectivity" of the Code. 4 3 The Court
in the second Public Ports Authority case likewise cited Mactan as providing the "raison d'etre for the
withdrawal of the exemption," namely, "the State policy to ensure autonomy to local governments and
the objective of the [Local Government Code] that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities. . . ." 4 4
Last year, the Court, in City of Davao v. RTC , 4 5 a rmed that the legislated exemption from real
property taxes of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was removed under the Local
Government Code. Again, Mactan was relied upon as the governing precedent. The removal of the tax
exemption stood even though the then GSIS law 4 6 prohibited the removal of GSIS' tax exemptions
unless the exemption was speci cally repealed, "and a provision is enacted to substitute the declared
policy of exemption from any and all taxes as an essential factor for the solvency of the fund." 4 7 The
Court, citing established doctrines in statutory construction and Duarte v. Dade 4 8 ruled that such
proscription on future legislation was itself prohibited, as "the legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of repeal." 4 9
And most recently, just less than one month ago, the Court, through Justice Corona in
Government Service Insurance System v. City Assessor of Iloilo 5 0 again a rmed that the Local
Government Code removed the previous exemption from real property taxes of the GSIS. Again Mactan
was cited as having "expressly withdrawn the [tax] exemption of the [GOCC]. 5 1
Clearly then, Mactanis not a stray or unique precedent, but the basis of a jurisprudential rule
employed by the Court since its adoption, the doctrine therein consistent with the Local Government
Code. Corollarily, Basco, the polar opposite of Mactan has been emphatically rejected and declared
inconsistent with the Local Government Code. cDTSHE
II.
Majority, in Effectively Overturning Mactan,
Refuses to Say Why Mactan Is Wrong
The majority cites Basco in support. It does not cite Mactan, other than an incidental reference
that it is relied upon by the respondents. 5 2 However, the ineluctable conclusion is that the majority
rejects the rationale and ruling in Mactan. The majority provides for a wildly different interpretation of
Section 133, 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code than that employed by the Court in Mactan.
Moreover, the parties in Mactan and in this case are similarly situated, as can be obviously deducted
from the fact that both petitioners are airport authorities operating under similarly worded charters.
And the fact that the majority cites doctrines contrapuntal to the Local Government Code as in Basco
and Maceda evinces an intent to go against the Court's jurisprudential trend adopting the philosophy of
expanded local government rule under the Local Government Code.
Before I dwell upon the numerous aws of the majority, a brief comment is necessitated on the
majority's studied murkiness vis-à-vis the Mactan precedent. The majority is obviously inconsistent
with Mactan and there is no way these two rulings can stand together. Following basic principles in
statutory construction, Mactan will be deemed as giving way to this new ruling.
However, the majority does not bother to explain why Mactan is wrong. The interpretation in
Mactan of the relevant provisions of the Local Government Code is elegant and rational, yet the
majority refuses to explain why this reasoning of the Court in Mactan is erroneous. In fact, the majority
does not even engage Mactan in any meaningful way. If the majority believes that Mactan may still
stand despite this ruling, it remains silent as to the viable distinctions between these two cases.
The majority's silence on Mactan is ba ing, considering how different this new ruling is with the
ostensible precedent. Perhaps the majority does not simply know how to dispense with the ruling in
Mactan. If Mactan truly deserves to be discarded as precedent, it deserves a more honorable end than
death by amnesia or ignonominous disregard. The majority could have devoted its discussion in
explaining why it thinks Mactan is wrong, instead of pretending that Mactan never existed at all. Such
an approach might not have won the votes of the minority, but at least it would provide some degree of
intellectual clarity for the parties, LGUs and the national government, students of jurisprudence and
practitioners. A more meaningful debate on the matter would have been possible, enriching the study
of law and the intellectual dynamic of this Court.
There is no way the majority can be justi ed unless Mactan is overturned. The MCIAA and the
MIAA are similarly situated. They are both, as will be demonstrated, GOCCs, commonly engaged in the
business of operating an airport. They are the owners of airport properties they respectively maintain
and hold title over these properties in their name. 5 3 These entities are both owned by the State, and
denied by their respective charters the absolute right to dispose of their properties without prior
approval elsewhere. 5 4 Both of them are not empowered to obtain loans or encumber their properties
without prior approval the prior approval of the President. 5 5
III.
Instrumentalities, Agencies
And GOCCs Generally
Liable for Real Property Tax
I shall now proceed to demonstrate the errors in reasoning of the majority. A bulwark of my
position lies with Mactan, which will further demonstrate why the majority has found it inconvenient to
even grapple with the precedent that is Mactan in the first place.
Mactan held that the prohibition on taxing the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities under Section 133 is quali ed by Section 232 and Section 234, and accordingly, the
only relevant exemption now applicable to these bodies is as provided under Section 234(o), or on "real
property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person."
It should be noted that the express withdrawal of previously granted exemptions by the Local
Government Code do not even make any distinction as to whether the exempt person is a
governmental entity or not. As Sections 193 and 234 both state, the withdrawal applies to "all persons,
including [GOCCs]", thus encompassing the two classes of persons recognized under our laws, natural
persons 5 6 and juridical persons. 5 7
The fact that the Local Government Code mandates the withdrawal of previously granted
exemptions evinces certain key points. If an entity was previously granted an express exemption from
real property taxes in the rst place, the obvious conclusion would be that such entity would ordinarily
be liable for such taxes without the exemption. If such entities were already deemed exempt due to
some overarching principle of law, then it would be a redundancy or surplusage to grant an exemption
to an already exempt entity. This fact militates against the claim that MIAA is preternaturally exempt
from realty taxes, since it required the enactment of an express exemption from such taxes in its
charter.
Amazingly, the majority all but ignores the disquisition in Mactan and asserts that government
instrumentalities are not taxable persons unless they lease their properties to a taxable person. The
general rule laid down in Section 232 is given short shrift. In arriving at this conclusion, several leaps in
reasoning are committed.
Majority's Flawed Definition
of GOCCs.
The majority takes pains to assert that the MIAA is not a GOCC, but rather an
instrumentality. However, and quite grievously, the supposed foundation of this assertion
is an adulteration.
The majority gives the impression that a government instrumentality is a distinct concept from a
government corporation. 5 8 Most tellingly, the majority selectively cites a portion of Section 2(10) of
the Administrative Code of 1987, as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. . . . 5 9 (emphasis omitted)
However, Section 2(10) of the Administrative Code, when read in full, makes an important
clari cation which the majority does not show. The portions omitted by the majority are highlighted
below:
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government — owned or controlled corporations . 6 0
Since Section 2(10) makes reference to "agency of the National Government," Section 2(4) is
also worth citing in full:
(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, o ce, instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation , or a local government or a distinct unit therein. (emphasis supplied)
61
Clearly then, based on the Administrative Code, a GOCC may be an instrumentality or an

agency of the National Government . Thus, there actually is no point in the majority's assertion that
MIAA is not a GOCC, since based on the majority's premise of Section 133 as the key provision, the
material question is whether MIAA is either an instrumentality, an agency, or the National Government
itself. The very provisions of the Administrative Code provide that a GOCC can be either an
instrumentality or an agency, so why even bother to extensively discuss whether or not MIAA is a
GOCC?
Indeed as far back as the 1927 case of Government of the Philippine Islands v. Springer , 6 2 the
Supreme Court already noted that a corporation of which the government is the majority stockholder
"remains an agency or instrumentality of government." 6 3
Ordinarily, the inconsequential verbiage stewing in judicial opinions deserve little rebuttal.
However, the entire discussion of the majority on the de nition of a GOCC, obiter as it may ultimately
be, deserves emphatic refutation. The views of the majority on this matter are very dangerous,
and would lead to absurdities, perhaps unforeseen by the majority. For in fact, the majority
effectively declassi es many entities created and recognized as GOCCs and would give
primacy to the Administrative Code of 1987 rather than their respective charters as to the
definition of these entities .
Majority Ignores the Power
Of Congress to Legislate and
Define Chartered Corporations
First, the majority declares that, citing Section 2(13) of the Administrative Code, a GOCC must be
"organized as a stock or non-stock corporation," as de ned under the Corporation Code. To insist on
this as an absolute rule fails on bare theory. Congress has the undeniable power to create a
corporation by legislative charter, and has been doing so throughout legislative history. There is no
constitutional prohibition on Congress as to what structure these chartered corporations should take
on. Clearly, Congress has the prerogative to create a corporation in whatever form it chooses, and it is
not bound by any traditional format. Even if there is a de nition of what a corporation is under the
Corporation Code or the Administrative Code, these laws are by no means sacrosanct. It should be
remembered that these two statutes fall within the same level of hierarchy as a congressional charter,
since they all are legislative enactments. Certainly, Congress can choose to disregard either the
Corporation Code or the Administrative Code in de ning the corporate structure of a GOCC, utilizing
the same extent of legislative powers similarly vesting it the putative ability to amend or abolish the
Corporation Code or the Administrative Code. aATHES
These principles are actually recognized by both the Administrative Code and the Corporation
Code. The de nition of GOCCs, agencies and instrumentalities under the Administrative Code are laid
down in the section entitled "General Terms Defined," which qualifies:
Sec. 2. General Terms De ned . — Unless the speci c words of the text, or the
context as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning :
(emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Similar in vein is Section 6 of the Corporation Code which provides:

SEC. 4. Corporations created by special laws or charters. — Corporations created by
special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or
charter creating them or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code,
insofar as they are applicable. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the clear doctrine emerges — the law that governs the de nition of a corporation or
entity created by Congress is its legislative charter. If the legislative enactment de nes an
entity as a corporation, then it is a corporation, no matter if the Corporation Code or the
Administrative Code seemingly provides otherwise. In case of con ict between the
legislative charter of a government corporation, on one hand, and the Corporate Code and
the Administrative Code, on the other, the former always prevails .
Majority, in Ignoring the
Legislative Charters, Effectively
Classifies Duly Established GOCCs,
With Disastrous and Far Reaching
Legal Consequences
Second, the majority claims that MIAA does not qualify either as a stock or non-stock
corporation, as de ned under the Corporation Code. It explains that the MIAA is not a stock
corporation because it does not have any capital stock divided into shares. Neither can it be
considered as a non-stock corporation because it has no members, and under Section 87, a non-stock
corporation is one where no part of its income is distributable as dividends to its members, trustees or
officers.
This formulation of course ignores Section 4 of the Corporation Code, which again provides that
corporations created by special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the
special law or charter, and not the Corporation Code.
That the MIAA cannot be considered a stock corporation if only because it does not have a stock
structure is hardly a plausible proposition. Indeed, there is no point in requiring a capital stock structure
for GOCCs whose full ownership is limited by its charter to the State or Republic. Such GOCCs are not
empowered to declare dividends or alienate their capital shares.
Admittedly, there are GOCCs established in such a manner, such as the National Power
Corporation (NPC), which is provided with authorized capital stock wholly subscribed and paid for by
the Government of the Philippines, divided into shares but at the same time, is prohibited from
transferring, negotiating, pledging, mortgaging or otherwise giving these shares as security for
payment of any obligation. 6 4 However, based on the Corporation Code de nition relied upon by the
majority, even the NPC cannot be considered as a stock corporation. Under Section 3 of the
Corporation Code, stock corporations are de ned as being "authorized to distribute to the holders of
its shares dividends or allotments of the surplus pro ts on the basis of the shares held." 6 5 On the
other hand, Section 13 of the NPC's charter states that "the Corporation shall be non-pro t and shall
devote all its returns from its capital investment, as well as excess revenues from its operation, for
expansion." 6 6 Can the holder of the shares of NPC, the National Government, receive its surplus pro ts
on the basis of its shares held? It cannot, according to the NPC charter, and hence, following Section 3
of the Corporation Code, the NPC is not a stock corporation, if the majority is to be believed.
The majority likewise claims that corporations without members cannot be deemed non-stock
corporations. This would seemingly exclude entities such as the NPC, which like MIAA, has no
ostensible members. Moreover, non-stock corporations cannot distribute any part of its income as
dividends to its members, trustees or o cers. The majority faults MIAA for remitting 20% of its gross
operating income to the national government. How about the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation,
created with the "status of a tax-exempt government corporation attached to the Department of
Health" under Rep. Act No. 7875. 6 7 It too cannot be considered as a stock corporation because it has
no capital stock structure. But using the criteria of the majority, it is doubtful if it would pass muster as
a non-stock corporation, since the PHIC or Philhealth, as it is commonly known, is expressly
empowered "to collect , deposit, invest, administer and disburse " the National Health Insurance Fund.
6 8 Or how about the Social Security System, which under its revised charter, Republic Act No. 8282, is
denominated as a "corporate body." 6 9 The SSS has no capital stock structure, but has capital
comprised of contributions by its members, which are eventually remitted back to its members. Does
this disqualify the SSS from classi cation as a GOCC, notwithstanding this Court's previous
pronouncement in Social Security System Employees Association v. Soriano? 7 0
In fact, Republic Act No. 7656, enacted in 1993, requires that all GOCCs, whether stock or non-
stock, 7 1 declare and remit at least fty percent (50%) of their annual net earnings as cash, stock or
property dividends to the National Government. 7 2 But according to the majority, non-stock
corporations are prohibited from declaring any part of its income as dividends. But if Republic Act No.
7656 requires even non-stock corporations to declare dividends from income, should it not follow that
the prohibition against declaration of dividends by non-stock corporations under the Corporation Code
does not apply to government-owned or controlled corporations? For if not, and the majority's illogic is
pursued, Republic Act No. 7656, passed in 1993, would be fatally awed, as it would contravene the
Administrative Code of 1987 and the Corporation Code.
In fact, the ruinous effects of the majority's hypothesis on the nature of GOCCs can be illustrated
by Republic Act No. 7656. Following the majority's de nition of a GOCC and in accordance with
Republic Act No. 7656, here are but a few entities which are not obliged to remit fty (50%) of its
annual net earnings to the National Government as they are excluded from the scope of Republic Act
No. 7656:
1) Philippine Ports Authority 7 3 — has no capital stock 7 4 , no members, and obliged
to apply the balance of its income or revenue at the end of each year in a general reserve. 7 5
2) Bases Conversion Development Authority 76 — has no capital stock, 7 7 no

members.
3) Philippine Economic Zone Authority 7 8 — no capital stock, 7 9 no members.

4) Light Rail Transit Authority 8 0 — no capital stock, 8 1 no members.
5) Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 8 2 — no capital stock, 8 3 no members, required to
remit fifty percent (50%) of its net profits to the National Treasury. 8 4
6) National Power Corporation 8 5 — has capital stock but is prohibited from

"distributing to the holders of its shares dividends or allotments of the surplus pro ts on the
basis of the shares held;" 8 6 no members.
7) Manila International Airport Authority — no capital stock 8 7 , no members 8 8 ,

mandated to remit twenty percent (20%) of its annual gross operating income to the National
Treasury. 8 9
Thus, for the majority, the MIAA, among many others, cannot be considered as within the
coverage of Republic Act No. 7656. Apparently, President Fidel V. Ramos disagreed. How else then
could Executive Order No. 483, signed in 1998 by President Ramos, be explained? The issuance
provides:
WHEREAS, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7656 provides that:
"Section 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that in order for the National Government to realize additional revenues,
government-owned and/or controlled corporations, without impairing their viability and
the purposes for which they have been established, shall share a substantial amount of
their net earnings to the National Government."
WHEREAS, to support the viability and mandate of government-owned and/or
controlled corporations [GOCCs], the liquidity, retained earnings position and
medium-term plans and programs of these GOCCs were considered in the determination
of the reasonable dividend rates of such corporations on their 1997 net earnings.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 5 of RA 7656, the Secretary of Finance
recommended the adjustment on the percentage of annual net earnings that shall
be declared by the Manila International Airport Authority [MIAA] and Phividec
Industrial Authority [PIA] in the interest of national economy and general welfare.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. The percentage of net earnings to be declared and remitted by the
MIAA and PIA as dividends to the National Government as provided for under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7656 is adjusted from at least fty percent [50%] to
the rates specified hereunder:
1. Manila International Airport Authority - 35% [cash]
2. Phividec Industrial Authority - 25% [cash]
SECTION 2. The adjusted dividend rates provided for under Section 1 are only applicable
on 1997 net earnings of the concerned government-owned and/or controlled corporations.
Obviously, it was the opinion of President Ramos and the Secretary of Finance that MIAA is a
GOCC, for how else could it have come under the coverage of Republic Act No. 7656, a law applicable
only to GOCCs? But, the majority apparently disagrees, and resultantly holds that MIAA is not obliged
to remit even the reduced rate of thirty ve percent (35%) of its net earnings to the national
government, since it cannot be covered by Republic Act No. 7656. TCaSAH
All this mischief because the majority would declare the Administrative Code of 1987 and the
Corporation Code as the sole sources of law de ning what a government corporation is. As I stated
earlier, I nd it illogical that chartered corporations are compelled to comply with the templates of the
Corporation Code, especially when the Corporation Code itself states that these corporations are to be
governed by their own charters. This is especially true considering that the very provision cited by the
majority, Section 87 of the Corporation Code, expressly says that the de nition provided therein is laid
down "for the purposes of this [Corporation] Code." Read in conjunction with Section 4 of the
Corporation Code which mandates that corporations created by charter be governed by the law
creating them, it is clear that contrary to the majority, MIAA is not disquali ed from classi cation as a
non-stock corporation by reason of Section 87, the provision not being applicable to corporations
created by special laws or charters. In fact, I see no real impediment why the MIAA and similarly
situated corporations such as the PHIC, the SSS, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Commission, or
maybe even the NPC could at the very least, be deemed as no stock corporations (as differentiated
from non-stock corporations).
The point, stripped to bare simplicity, is that entity created by legislative enactment is a
corporation if the legislature says so. After all, it is the legislature that dictates what a corporation is in
the rst place. This is better illustrated by another set of entities created before martial law. These
include the Mindanao Development Authority, 9 0 the Northern Samar Development Authority, 9 1 the
Ilocos Sur Development Authority, 9 2 the Southeastern Samar Development Authority 9 3 and the
Mountain Province Development Authority. 9 4 An examination of the rst section of the statutes
creating these entities reveal that they were established "to foster accelerated and balanced growth" of
their respective regions, and towards such end, the charters commonly provide that "it is recognized
that a government corporation should be created for the purpose," and accordingly, these
charters "hereby created a body corporate ." 9 5 However, these corporations do not have capital
stock nor members, and are obliged to return the unexpended balances of their appropriations and
earnings to a revolving fund in the National Treasury. The majority effectively declassi es these entities
as GOCCs, never mind the fact that their very charters declare them to be GOCCs.
I mention these entities not to bring an element of obscurantism into the fray. I cite
them as examples to emphasize my fundamental point — that it is the legislative charters
of these entities, and not the Administrative Code, which de ne the class of personality of
these entities created by Congress. To adopt the view of the majority would be, in effect, to
sanction an implied repeal of numerous congressional charters for the purpose of
declassifying GOCCs. Certainly, this could not have been the intent of the crafters of the
Administrative Code when they drafted the "Definition of Terms" incorporated therein.
MIAA Is Without
Doubt, A GOCC
Following the charters of government corporations, there are two kinds of GOCCs, namely:
GOCCs which are stock corporations and GOCCs which are no stock corporations (as
distinguished from non-stock corporation). Stock GOCCs are simply those which have
capital stock while no stock GOCCs are those which have no capital stock . Obviously these
de nitions are different from the de nitions of the terms in the Corporation Code. Verily, GOCCs which
are not incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission are not governed by the
Corporation Code but by their respective charters.
For the MIAA's part, its charter is replete with provisions that indubitably classify it as a GOCC.
Observe the following provisions from MIAA's charter:
SECTION 3. Creation of the Manila International Airport Authority. — There is hereby
established a body corporate to be known as the Manila International Airport
Authority which shall be attached to the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. The
principal o ce of the Authority shall be located at the New Manila International Airport. The
Authority may establish such o ces, branches, agencies or subsidiaries as it may deem proper
and necessary; Provided, That any subsidiary that may be organized shall have the prior
approval of the President.
and assigned to the ownership and administration of the Authority , subject to existing
rights, if any. The Bureau of Lands and other appropriate government agencies shall undertake
an actual survey of the area transferred within one year from the promulgation of this
Executive Order and the corresponding title to be issued in the name of the Authority .
Any portion thereof shall not be disposed through sale or through any other mode unless
specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 5. Functions, Powers, and Duties. — The Authority shall have the following
functions, powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx

(d) To sue and be sued in its corporate name ;
(e) To adopt and use a corporate seal ;
(f) To succeed by its corporate name ;
(g) To adopt its by-laws, and to amend or repeal the same from time to
time;
(h) To execute or enter into contracts of any kind or nature;
(i) To acquire, purchase, own, administer, lease, mortgage, sell or
otherwise dispose of any land, building, airport facility, or property of whatever
kind and nature, whether movable or immovable, or any interest therein;
(j) To exercise the power of eminent domain in the pursuit of its purposes and
objectives;
xxx xxx xxx

(o) To exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law ,
insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive
Order.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 16. Borrowing Power. — The Authority may, after consultation with the
Minister of Finance and with the approval of the President of the Philippines, as
recommended by the Minister of Transportation and Communications, raise funds,
either from local or international sources, by way of loans, credits or securities, and
other borrowing instruments, with the power to create pledges, mortgages and other
voluntary liens or encumbrances on any of its assets or properties.
All loans contracted by the Authority under this Section, together with all interests and
other sums payable in respect thereof, shall constitute a charge upon all the revenues and
assets of the Authority and shall rank equally with one another, but shall have priority over any
other claim or charge on the revenue and assets of the Authority: Provided, That this provision
shall not be construed as a prohibition or restriction on the power of the Authority to create
pledges, mortgages, and other voluntary liens or encumbrances on any assets or property of
the Authority.
Except as expressly authorized by the President of the Philippines the total outstanding
indebtedness of the Authority in the principal amount, in local and foreign currency, shall not at
any time exceed the net worth of the Authority at any given time.
xxx xxx xxx
The President or his duly authorized representative after consultation with the Minister
of Finance may guarantee, in the name and on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, the
payment of the loans or other indebtedness of the Authority up to the amount herein
authorized.
These cited provisions establish the tness of MIAA to be the subject of legal relations. 9 6 MIAA
under its charter may acquire and possess property, incur obligations, and bring civil or criminal
actions. It has the power to contract in its own name, and to acquire title to real or personal property. It
likewise may exercise a panoply of corporate powers and possesses all the trappings of corporate
personality, such as a corporate name, a corporate seal and by-laws. All these are contained in MIAA's
charter which, as conceded by the Corporation Code and even the Administrative Code, is the primary
law that governs the definition and organization of the MIAA.
In fact, MIAA itself believes that it is a GOCC represents itself as such. It said so
itself in the very rst paragraph of the present petition before this Court . 9 7 So does,
apparently, the Department of Budget and Management, which classi es MIAA as a "government
owned & controlled corporation" on its internet website. 9 8 There is also the matter of Executive Order
No. 483, which evinces the belief of the then-president of the Philippines that MIAA is a GOCC. And the
Court before had similarly characterized MIAA as a government-owned and controlled corporation in
the earlier MIAA case, Manila International Airport Authority v. Commission on Audit. 9 9
Why then the hesitance to declare MIAA a GOCC? As the majority repeatedly asserts, it is
because MIAA is actually an instrumentality. But the very de nition relied upon by the majority of an
instrumentality under the Administrative Code clearly states that a GOCC is likewise an instrumentality
or an agency. The question of whether MIAA is a GOCC might not even be determinative of
this Petition, but the effect of the majority's disquisition on that matter may even be more
destructive than the ruling that MIAA is exempt from realty taxes. Is the majority ready to
live up to the momentous consequences of its flawed reasoning ? ACaDTH
Novel Proviso in 1987 Constitution

Prescribing Standards in the
Creation of GOCCs Necessarily
Applies only to GOCCs Created
After 1987.
One last point on this matter on whether MIAA is a GOCC. The majority triumphantly points to
Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which mandates that the creation of GOCCs through
special charters be "in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability."
For the majority, the test of economic viability does not apply to government entities vested with
corporate powers and performing essential public services. But this test of "economic viability" is new
to the constitutional framework. No such test was imposed in previous Constitutions, including the
1973 Constitution which was the fundamental law in force when the MIAA was created. How then
could the MIAA, or any GOCC created before 1987 be expected to meet this new precondition to the
creation of a GOCC? Does the majority seriously suggest that GOCCs created before 1987 may be
declassified on account of their failure to meet this "economic viability test"?
Instrumentalities and Agencies
Also Generally Liable For
Real Property Taxes
Next, the majority, having bludgeoned its way into asserting that MIAA is not a GOCC, then
argues that MIAA is an instrumentality. It cites incompletely, as earlier stated, the provision of Section
2(10) of the Administrative Code. A more convincing view offered during deliberations, but which was
not adopted by the ponencia, argued that MIAA is not an instrumentality but an agency, considering the
fact that under the Administrative Code, the MIAA is attached within the department framework of the
Department of Transportation and Communications. 1 0 0 Interestingly, Executive Order No. 341,
enacted by President Arroyo in 2004, similarly calls MIAA an agency. Since instrumentalities are
expressly de ned as "an agency not integrated within the department framework," that view concluded
that MIAA cannot be deemed an instrumentality.
Still, that distinction is ultimately irrelevant. Of course, as stated earlier, the Administrative Code
considers GOCCs as agencies, 1 0 1 so the fact that MIAA is an agency does not exclude it from
classi cation as a GOCC. On the other hand, the majority justi es MIAA's purported exemption on
Section 133 of the Local Government Code, which similarly situates "agencies and instrumentalities" as
generally exempt from the taxation powers of LGUs. And on this point, the majority again evades
Mactan and somehow concludes that Section 133 is the general rule, notwithstanding Sections 232
and 234(a) of the Local Government Code. And the majority's ultimate conclusion? "By express
mandate of the Local Government Code, local governments cannot impose any kind of tax
on national government instrumentalities like the MIAA. Local governments are devoid of
power to tax the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities. " 1 0 2
The Court's interpretation of the Local Government Code in Mactan renders the law integrally
harmonious and gives due accord to the respective prerogatives of the national government and LGUs.
Sections 133 and 234(a) ensure that the Republic of the Philippines or its political subdivisions shall
not be subjected to any form of local government taxation, except realty taxes if the bene cial use of
the property owned has been granted for consideration to a taxable entity or person. On the other hand,
Section 133 likewise assures that government instrumentalities such as GOCCs may not be arbitrarily
taxed by LGUs, since they could be subjected to local taxation if there is a speci c proviso thereon in
the Code. One such proviso is Section 137, which as the Court found in National Power Corporation, 1 0 3
permits the imposition of a franchise tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, even if it be a GOCC such
as NPC. And, as the Court acknowledged in Mactan, Section 232 provides another exception on the
taxability of instrumentalities.
The majority abjectly refuses to engage Section 232 of the Local Government Code although it
provides the indubitable general rule that LGUs "may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property
such as land, building, machinery, and other improvements not hereafter speci cally exempted." The
specific exemptions are provided by Section 234. Section 232 comes sequentially after Section 133(o),
1 0 4 and even if the sequencing is irrelevant, Section 232 would fall under the qualifying phrase of
Section 133, "Unless otherwise provided herein." It is sad, but not surprising that the majority is not
willing to consider or even discuss the general rule, but only the exemptions under Section 133 and
Section 234. After all, if the majority is dead set in ruling for MIAA no matter what the law says, why
bother citing what the law does say.
Constitution, Laws and
Jurisprudence Have Long
Explained the Rationale
Behind the Local Taxation
Of GOCCs.
This blithe disregard of precedents, almost all of them unanimously decided, is nowhere more
evident than in the succeeding discussion of the majority, which asserts that the power of local
governments to tax national government instrumentalities be construed strictly against local
governments. The Maceda case, decided before the Local Government Code, is cited, as is Basco. This
section of the majority employs deliberate pretense that the Code never existed, or that the
fundamentals of local autonomy are of limited effect in our country. Why is it that the Local
Government Code is barely mentioned in this section of the majority? Because Section 5 of the Code,
purposely omitted by the majority provides for a different rule of interpretation than that asserted:
Section 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the provisions of this
Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved
in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair
and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor
of the local government unit concerned;
(b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed
strictly against the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Any
tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any local government unit pursuant to
the provisions of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming
it ; . . .
Yet the majority insists that "there is no point in national and local governments taxing
each other, unless a sound and compelling policy requires such transfer of public funds
from one government pocket to another ." 1 0 5 I wonder whether the Constitution satis es the
majority's desire for "a sound and compelling policy." To repeat:
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies

xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Article X. Local Government
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
Or how about the Local Government Code, presumably an expression of sound and compelling
policy considering that it was enacted by the legislature, that veritable source of all statutes:
SEC. 129. Power to Create Sources of Revenue. — Each local government unit shall
exercise its power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges
subject to the provisions herein, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes,
fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government units.
Justice Puno, in National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan , 1 0 6 provides a more "sound
and compelling policy considerations" that would warrant sustaining the taxability of government-
owned entities by local government units under the Local Government Code.
Doubtless, the power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to
nance and support myriad activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic
services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace,
progress, and prosperity of the people. As this Court observed in the Mactan case, "the original
reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned or
controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such privilege resulted in
serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises."
With the added burden of devolution, it is even more imperative for government entities to
share in the requirements of development, scal or otherwise, by paying taxes or other charges
due from them. 1 0 7
I dare not improve on Justice Puno's exhaustive disquisition on the statutory and jurisprudential
shift brought about the acceptance of the principles of local autonomy:
In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the scope of
state activity, and taxation has become a tool to realize social justice and the equitable
distribution of wealth, economic progress and the protection of local industries as well as
public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation assumes even greater signi cance with the
rati cation of the 1987 Constitution. Thenceforth, the power to tax is no longer vested
exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes,
fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Section 5. Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its
own sources of revenue, to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the Local
Governments."
This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can be
achieved only by strengthening local autonomy and promoting decentralization of governance.
For a long time, the country's highly centralized government structure has bred a culture of
dependence among local government leaders upon the national leadership. It has also
"dampened the spirit of initiative, innovation and imaginative resilience in matters of local
development on the part of local government leaders." The only way to shatter this culture of
dependence is to give the LGUs a wider role in the delivery of basic services, and confer them
su cient powers to generate their own sources for the purpose. To achieve this goal, section 3
of Article X of the 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to enact a local government code that
will, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, set the guidelines and limitations to
this grant of taxing powers, viz:
"Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the quali cations, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local o cials, and all
other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units."
To recall, prior to the enactment of the Rep. Act No. 7160, also known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC), various measures have been enacted to promote local
autonomy. These include the Barrio Charter of 1959, the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, the
Decentralization Act of 1967 and the Local Government Code of 1983. Despite these initiatives,
however, the shackles of dependence on the national government remained. Local government
units were faced with the same problems that hamper their capabilities to participate
effectively in the national development efforts, among which are: (a) inadequate tax base, (b)
lack of scal control over external sources of income, (c) limited authority to prioritize and
approve development projects, (d) heavy dependence on external sources of income, and (e)
limited supervisory control over personnel of national line agencies.
Considered as the most revolutionary piece of legislation on local autonomy, the LGC
effectively deals with the scal constraints faced by LGUs. It widens the tax base of LGUs to
include taxes which were prohibited by previous laws such as the imposition of taxes on forest
products, forest concessionaires, mineral products, mining operations, and the like. The LGC
likewise provides enough exibility to impose tax rates in accordance with their needs and
capabilities. It does not prescribe graduated xed rates but merely speci es the minimum and
maximum tax rates and leaves the determination of the actual rates to the respective
sanggunian. 1 0 8
And the Court's ruling through Justice Azcuna in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo 109 ,
provides especially clear and emphatic rationale:
In closing, we reiterate that in taxing government-owned or controlled
corporations, the State ultimately suffers no loss . In National Power Corp. v. Presiding
Judge, RTC, Br. XXV, 38 we elucidated:
Actually, the State has no reason to decry the taxation of NPC's
properties, as and by way of real property taxes. Real property taxes, after all,
form part and parcel of the nancing apparatus of the Government in
development and nation-building, particularly in the local government level.
xxx xxx xxx
To all intents and purposes, real property taxes are funds taken by the State with
one hand and given to the other. In no measure can the government be said to have lost
anything.
Finally, we nd it appropriate to restate that the primary reason for the withdrawal of tax
exemption privileges granted to government-owned and controlled corporations and all other
units of government was that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions
in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises, hence resulting in the need for these
entities to share in the requirements of development, scal or otherwise, by paying the taxes
and other charges due from them. 1 1 0
How does the majority counter these seemingly valid rationales which establish the soundness
of a policy consideration subjecting national instrumentalities to local taxation? Again, by simply
ignoring that these doctrines exist. It is unfortunate if the majority deems these cases or the principles
of devolution and local autonomy as simply too inconvenient, and relies instead on discredited
precedents. Of course, if the majority faces the issues squarely, and expressly discusses why Basco
was right and Mactan was wrong, then this entire endeavor of the Court would be more intellectually
satisfying. But, this is not a game the majority wants to play.
Mischaracterization of this Writer's
Views on the Tax Exemption
Enjoyed by the National Government
Instead, the majority engages in an extended attack pertaining to Section 193, mischaracterizing
my views on that provision as if I had been interpreting the provision as making "the national
government, which itself is a juridical person, subject to tax by local governments since the national
government is not included in the enumeration of exempt entities in Section 193." 1 1 1
Nothing is farther from the truth. I have never advanced any theory of the sort imputed in the
majority. My main thesis on the matter merely echoes the explicit provision of Section 193 that unless
otherwise provided in the Local Government Code (LGC) all tax exemptions enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs, were withdrawn upon the effectivity of the Code. Since
the provision speaks of withdrawal of tax exemptions of persons, it follows that the exemptions
theretofore enjoyed by MIAA which is de nitely a person are deemed withdrawn upon the advent of the
Code. aSDCIE
On the other hand, the provision does not address the question of who are beyond the reach of
the taxing power of LGUs. In ne, the grant of tax exemption or the withdrawal thereof assumes that
the person or entity involved is subject to tax. Thus, Section 193 does not apply to entities which were
never given any tax exemption. This would include the national government and its political
subdivisions which, as a general rule, are not subjected to tax in the rst place. 1 1 2 Corollarily, the
national government and its political subdivisions do not need tax exemptions. And Section 193 which
ordains the withdrawal of tax exemptions is obviously irrelevant to them.
Section 193 is in point for the disposition of this case as it forecloses dependence for the grant
of tax exemption to MIAA on Section 21 of its charter. Even the majority should concede that the
charter section is now ineffectual, as Section 193 withdraws the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by
all juridical persons.
With Section 193 mandating the withdrawal of tax exemptions granted to all persons upon the
effectivity of the LGC, for MIAA to continue enjoying exemption from realty tax, it will have to rely on a
basis other than Section 21 of its charter.
Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City 1 1 3 provides another illustrative example of the
jurisprudential havoc wrought about by the majority. Pursuant to its charter, the Lung Center was
organized as a trust administered by an eponymous GOCC organized with the SEC. 1 1 4 There is no
doubt it is a GOCC, even by the majority's reckoning. Applying the Administrative Code, it is also
considered as an agency, the term encompassing even GOCCs. Yet since the Administrative Code
de nition of "instrumentalities" encompasses agencies, especially those not attached to a line
department such as the Lung Center, it also follows that the Lung Center is an instrumentality, which for
the majority is exempt from all local government taxes, especially real estate taxes. Yet just in 2004, the
Court unanimously held that the Lung Center was not exempt from real property taxes. Can the majority
and Lung Center be reconciled? I do not see how, and no attempt is made to demonstrate otherwise.
Another key point. The last paragraph of Section 234 speci cally asserts that any previous
exemptions from realty taxes granted to or enjoyed by all persons, including all GOCCs, are thereby
withdrawn. The majority's interpretation of Sections 133 and 234(a) however necessarily implies that
all instrumentalities, including GOCCs, can never be subjected to real property taxation under the Code.
If that is so, what then is the sense of the last paragraph speci cally withdrawing previous tax
exemptions to all persons, including GOCCs when juridical persons such as MIAA are anyway, to his
view, already exempt from such taxes under Section 133? The majority's interpretation would
effectively render the express and emphatic withdrawal of previous exemptions to GOCCs inutile. Ut
magis valeat quam pereat. Hence, where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the
court should adopt such reasonable and bene cial construction which will render the provision thereof
operative and effective, as well as harmonious with each other. 1 1 5
But, the majority seems content rendering as absurd the Local Government Code, since it does
not have much use anyway for the Code's general philosophy of scal autonomy, as evidently seen by
the continued reliance on Basco or Maceda. Local government rule has never been a grant of
emancipation from the national government. This is the favorite bugaboo of the opponents of local
autonomy — the fallacy that autonomy equates to independence.
Thus, the conclusion of the majority is that under Section 133(o), MIAA as a government
instrumentality is beyond the reach of local taxation because it is not subject to taxes, fees or charges
of any kind. Moreover, the taxation of national instrumentalities and agencies by LGUs should be
strictly construed against the LGUs, citing Maceda and Basco. No mention is made of the subsequent
rejection of these cases in jurisprudence following the Local Government Code, including Mactan. The
majority is similarly silent on the general rule under Section 232 on real property taxation or Section 5
on the rules of construction of the Local Government Code.
V.
MIAA, and not the National Government
Is the Owner of the Subject Taxable Properties
Section 232 of the Local Government Code explicitly provides that there are exceptions to the
general rule on rule property taxation, as "hereafter speci cally exempted." Section 234, certainly
"hereafter," provides indubitable basis for exempting entities from real property taxation. It provides
the most viable legal support for any claim that an governmental entity such as the MIAA is exempt
from real property taxes. To repeat:
SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax . — The following are exempted from
payment of the real property tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration
or otherwise, to a taxable person:
The majority asserts that the properties owned by MIAA are owned by the Republic of the
Philippines, thus placing them under the exemption under Section 234. To arrive at this conclusion, the
majority employs four main arguments. DTSaHI
MIAA Property Is Patrimonial

And Not Part of Public Dominion
The majority claims that the Airport Lands and Buildings are property of public dominion as
de ned by the Civil Code, and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. But as
pointed out by Justice Azcuna in the first PPA case, if indeed a property is considered part of the public
dominion, such property is "owned by the general public and cannot be declared to be owned by a
public corporation, such as [the PPA]."
Relevant on this point are the following provisions of the MIAA charter:
Section 3. Creation of the Manila International Airport Authority. — . . .
and assigned to the ownership and administration of the Authority , subject to existing
rights, if any. . . . Any portion thereof shall not be disposed through sale or through any other
mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.
Section 22. Transfer of Existing Facilities and Intangible Assets. — All existing
public airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other property, movable or
immovable, belonging to the Airport , and all assets, powers rights, interests and privileges
belonging to the Bureau of Air Transportation relating to airport works or air operations,
including all equipment which are necessary for the operation of crash fire and rescue facilities,
are hereby transferred to the Authority .
Clearly, it is the MIAA, and not either the State, the Republic of the Philippines or the national
government that asserts legal title over the Airport Lands and Buildings. There was an express transfer
of ownership between the MIAA and the national government. If the distinction is to be blurred, as the
majority does, between the State/Republic/Government and a body corporate such as the MIAA, then
the MIAA charter showcases the remarkable absurdity of an entity transferring property to itself.
Nothing in the Civil Code or the Constitution prohibits the State from transferring ownership over
property of public dominion to an entity that it similarly owns. It is just like a family transferring
ownership over the properties its members own into a family corporation. The family exercises
effective control over the administration and disposition of these properties. Yet for several purposes
under the law, such as taxation, it is the corporation that is deemed to own those properties. A similar
situation obtains with MIAA, the State, and the Airport Lands and Buildings.
The second Public Ports Authority case, penned by Justice Callejo, likewise lays down useful
doctrines in this regard. The Court refuted the claim that the properties of the PPA were owned by the
Republic of the Philippines, noting that PPA's charter expressly transferred ownership over these
properties to the PPA, a situation which similarly obtains with MIAA. The Court even went as far as
saying that the fact that the PPA "had not been issued any torrens title over the port and port facilities
and appurtenances is of no legal consequence. A torrens title does not, by itself, vest ownership; it is
merely an evidence of title over properties. . . . It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership over real properties." 1 1 6
The Court further added:
. . . The bare fact that the port and its facilities and appurtenances are accessible to the
general public does not exempt it from the payment of real property taxes. It must be stressed
that the said port facilities and appurtenances are the petitioner's corporate patrimonial
properties, not for public use, and that the operation of the port and its facilities and the
administration of its buildings are in the nature of ordinary business. The petitioner is clothed,
under P.D. No. 857, with corporate status and corporate powers in the furtherance of its
proprietary interests . . . The petitioner is even empowered to invest its funds in such
government securities approved by the Board of Directors, and derives its income from rates,
charges or fees for the use by vessels of the port premises, appliances or equipment. . . . Clearly
then, the petitioner is a pro t-earning corporation; hence, its patrimonial properties are subject
to tax. 1 1 7
There is no doubt that the properties of the MIAA, as with the PPA, are in a sense, for public use.
A similar argument was propounded by the Light Rail Transit Authority in Light Rail Transit Authority v.
Central Board of Assessment, 1 1 8 which was cited in Philippine Ports Authority and deserves renewed
emphasis. The Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a body corporate, "provides valuable transportation
facilities to the paying public." 1 1 9 It claimed that its carriage-ways and terminal stations are immovably
attached to government-owned national roads, and to impose real property taxes thereupon would be
to impose taxes on public roads. This view did not persuade the Court, whose decision was penned by
Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban. It was noted:
Though the creation of the LRTA was impelled by public service — to provide mass
transportation to alleviate the tra c and transportation situation in Metro Manila — its
operation undeniably partakes of ordinary business. Petitioner is clothed with corporate status
and corporate powers in the furtherance of its proprietary objectives. Indeed, it operates much
like any private corporation engaged in the mass transport industry. Given that it is engaged in
a service-oriented commercial endeavor, its carriageways and terminal stations are patrimonial
property subject to tax, notwithstanding its claim of being a government-owned or controlled
corporation.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner argues that it merely operates and maintains the LRT system, and that the
actual users of the carriageways and terminal stations are the commuting public. It adds that
the public use character of the LRT is not negated by the fact that revenue is obtained from the
latter's operations.
We do not agree. Unlike public roads which are open for use by everyone, the LRT is
accessible only to those who pay the required fare. It is thus apparent that petitioner does not
exist solely for public service, and that the LRT carriageways and terminal stations are not
exclusively for public use. Although petitioner is a public utility, it is nonetheless pro t-earning.
It actually uses those carriageways and terminal stations in its public utility business and earns
money therefrom. 1 2 0
xxx xxx xxx
Even granting that the national government indeed owns the carriageways and terminal
stations, the exemption would not apply because their bene cial use has been granted to
petitioner, a taxable entity. 1 2 1
There is no substantial distinction between the properties held by the PPA, the LRTA, and the
MIAA. These three entities are in the business of operating facilities that promote public
transportation.
The majority further asserts that MIAA's properties, being part of the public dominion, are
outside the commerce of man. But if this is so, then why does Section 3 of MIAA's charter authorize the
President of the Philippines to approve the sale of any of these properties? In fact, why does MIAA's
charter in the rst place authorize the transfer of these airport properties, assuming that indeed these
are beyond the commerce of man?
No Trust Has Been Created
Over MIAA Properties For
The Benefit of the Republic
The majority posits that while MIAA might be holding title over the Airport Lands and Buildings, it
is holding it in trust for the Republic. A provision of the Administrative Code is cited, but said provision
does not expressly provide that the property is held in trust. Trusts are either express or implied, and
only those situations enumerated under the Civil Code would constitute an implied trust. MIAA does
not fall within this enumeration, and neither is there a provision in MIAA's charter expressly stating that
these properties are being held in trust. In fact, under its charter, MIAA is obligated to retain up to
eighty percent (80%) of its gross operating income, not an inconsequential sum assuming that the
beneficial owner of MIAA's properties is actually the Republic, and not the MIAA.
Also, the claim that bene cial ownership over the MIAA remains with the government and not
MIAA is ultimately irrelevant. Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code provides among those
exempted from paying real property taxes are "[r]eal property owned by the [Republic] . . . except when
the bene cial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person." In the
context of Section 234(a), the identity of the beneficial owner over the properties is not determinative
as to whether the exemption avails. It is the identity of the bene cial user of the property owned by
the Republic or its political subdivisions that is crucial, for if said bene cial user is a taxable person,
then the exemption does not lie.
I fear the majority confuses the notion of what might be construed as "bene cial ownership" of
the Republic over the properties of MIAA as nothing more than what arises as a consequence of the
fact that the capital of MIAA is contributed by the National Government. 1 2 2 If so, then there is no
difference between the State's ownership rights over MIAA properties than those of a majority
stockholder over the properties of a corporation. Even if such shareholder effectively owns the
corporation and controls the disposition of its assets, the personality of the stockholder remains
separately distinct from that of the corporation. A brief recall of the entrenched rule in corporate law is
in order:
The rst consequence of the doctrine of legal entity regarding the separate identity of
the corporation and its stockholders insofar as their obligations and liabilities are concerned, is
spelled out in this general rule deeply entrenched in American jurisprudence:
Unless the liability is expressly imposed by constitutional or statutory provisions,
or by the charter, or by special agreement of the stockholders, stockholders are not
personally liable for debts of the corporation either at law or equity. The reason is that
the corporation is a legal entity or arti cial person, distinct from the members who
compose it, in their individual capacity; and when it contracts a debt, it is the debt of the
legal entity or arti cial person — the corporation — and not the debt of the individual
members. (13A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. Sec. 6213) AaSIET
The entirely separate identity of the rights and remedies of a corporation itself and its
individual stockholders have been given de nite recognition for a long time. Applying said
principle, the Supreme Court declared that a corporation may not be made to answer for acts or
liabilities of its stockholders or those of legal entities to which it may be connected, or vice
versa. (Palay Inc. v. Clave et al . 124 SCRA 638) It was likewise declared in a similar case that a
bona de corporation should alone be liable for corporate acts duly authorized by its o cers
and directors. (Caram Jr. v. Court of Appeals et.al. 151 SCRA, p. 372) 1 2 3
It bears repeating that MIAA under its charter, is expressly conferred the right to exercise all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, including the right to corporate succession, and
the right to sue and be sued in its corporate name. 1 2 4 The national government made a particular
choice to divest ownership and operation of the Manila International Airport and transfer the same to
such an empowered entity due to perceived advantages. Yet such transfer cannot be deemed
consequence free merely because it was the State which contributed the operating capital of this body
corporate.
The majority claims that the transfer the assets of MIAA was meant merely to effect a
reorganization. The imputed rationale for such transfer does not serve to militate against the legal
consequences of such assignment. Certainly, if it was intended that the transfer should be free of
consequence, then why was it effected to a body corporate, with a distinct legal personality from that
of the State or Republic? The stated aims of the MIAA could have very well been accomplished by
creating an agency without independent juridical personality.
VI.
MIAA Performs Proprietary Functions
Nonetheless, Section 234(f) exempts properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines or its
political subdivisions from realty taxation. The obvious question is what comprises "the Republic of the
Philippines." I think the key to understanding the scope of "the Republic" is the phrase "political
subdivisions." Under the Constitution, political subdivisions are de ned as "the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays." 1 2 5 In correlation, the Administrative Code of 1987 de nes "local
government" as referring to "the political subdivisions established by or in accordance with the
Constitution."
Clearly then, these political subdivisions are engaged in the exercise of sovereign functions and
are accordingly exempt. The same could be said generally of the national government, which would be
similarly exempt. After all, even with the principle of local autonomy, it is inherently noxious and self-
defeatist for local taxation to interfere with the sovereign exercise of functions. However, the exercise
of proprietary functions is a different matter altogether.
Sovereign and Proprietary
Functions Distinguished
Sovereign or constituent functions are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature, while ministrant or proprietary functions are those undertaken by way of
advancing the general interests of society and are merely optional. 1 2 6 An exhaustive discussion on the
matter was provided by the Court in Bacani v. NACOCO: 1 2 7
. . . This institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our
Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive,
and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These
functions are twofold: constituent and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the
very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken
only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional. President
Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows:
"'(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and
property from violence and robbery.
'(2) The xing of the legal relations between man and wife and between
parents and children.
'(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property,
and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.

'(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
'(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
'(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
'(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of

citizens.
'(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state
from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international
interests.'" (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, p. 19.)
The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education,
public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The
principles determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional
functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private
capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which
by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals. (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-
20.)
From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which
our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our
Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those
which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the
people. To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations owned
or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of
our people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call government-
owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one
organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private corporations under the
Corporation Law. 1 2 8
The Court in Bacani rejected the proposition that the National Coconut Corporation exercised
sovereign functions:
Does the fact that these corporations perform certain functions of government make
them a part of the Government of the Philippines?
The answer is simple: they do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do
not come under the classi cation of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the
National Coconut Corporation. While it was organized with the purpose of "adjusting
the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United
States" and of providing "Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the
proper utilization of coconut by-products," a function which our government has
chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a
corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made
subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence
and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any
other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our
government . As this Court has aptly said, "The mere fact that the Government happens to be a
majority stockholder does not make it a public corporation" ( National Coal Co. vs. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 46 Phil., 586-587). "By becoming a stockholder in the National Coal
Company, the Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far as
respects the transactions of the corporation. . . . Unlike the Government, the
corporation may be sued without its consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the
National Coal Company remains an agency or instrumentality of government ."
(Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 288.)
The following restatement of the entrenched rule by former SEC Chairperson Rosario Lopez
bears noting:
The fact that government corporations are instrumentalities of the State does not divest
them with immunity from suit. (Malong v. PNR , 138 SCRA p. 63) It is settled that when the
government engages in a particular business through the instrumentality of a
corporation, it divests itself pro hoc vice of its sovereign character so as to subject
itself to the rules governing private corporations , (PNB v. Pabolan 82 SCRA 595) and is
to be treated like any other corporation. (PNR v. Union de Maquinistas Fogonero y Motormen ,
84 SCRA 223)
In the same vein, when the government becomes a stockholder in a corporation, it does
not exercise sovereignty as such. It acts merely as a corporator and exercises no other power in
the management of the affairs of the corporation than are expressly given by the incorporating
act. Nor does the fact that the government may own all or a majority of the capital stock take
from the corporation its character as such, or make the government the real party in interest.
(Amtorg Trading Corp. v. US 71 F2d 524, 528) 1 2 9
MIAA Performs Proprietary

Functions No Matter How
Vital to the Public Interest
The simple truth is that, based on these accepted doctrinal tests, MIAA performs proprietary
functions. The operation of an airport facility by the State may be imbued with public interest, but it is
by no means indispensable or obligatory on the national government. In fact, as demonstrated in other
countries, it makes a lot of economic sense to leave the operation of airports to the private sector.
The majority tries to becloud this issue by pointing out that the MIAA does not compete in the
marketplace as there is no competing international airport operated by the private sector; and that
MIAA performs an essential public service as the primary domestic and international airport of the
Philippines. This premise is false, for one. On a local scale, MIAA competes with other international
airports situated in the Philippines, such as Davao International Airport and MCIAA. More pertinently,
MIAA also competes with other international airports in Asia, at least. International airlines take into
account the quality and conditions of various international airports in determining the number of ights
it would assign to a particular airport, or even in choosing a hub through which destinations
necessitating connecting flights would pass through. cTDaEH
Even if it could be conceded that MIAA does not compete in the market place, the example of the
Philippine National Railways should be taken into account. The PNR does not compete in the
marketplace, and performs an essential public service as the operator of the railway system in the
Philippines. Is the PNR engaged in sovereign functions? The Court, in Malong v. Philippine National
Railways, 1 3 0 held that it was not. 1 3 1
Even more relevant to this particular case is Teodoro v. National Airports Corporation , 1 3 2
concerning the proper appreciation of the functions performed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA), which had succeeded the defunction National Airports Corporation. The CAA claimed that as an
unincorporated agency of the Republic of the Philippines, it was incapable of suing and being sued. The
Court noted:
Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under Section 3,
to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant concession rights, and
under Section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline,
accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of any property under its management.
These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our opinion, the
power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact
private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration with greater reason should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for
and against the National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and
choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the National Airports
Corporation's creditors access to the courts of justice against the Civil Aeronautics
Administration is to say that the government could impair the obligation of its corporations by
the simple expedient of converting them into unincorporated agencies. 1 3 3
xxx xxx xxx

Eventually, the charter of the CAA was revised, and it among its expanded functions was "[t]o
administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport." 1 3 4
Notwithstanding this expansion, in the 1988 case of CAA v. Court of Appeals 1 3 5 the Court rea rmed
the ruling that the CAA was engaged in "private or non-governmental functions." 1 3 6 Thus, the Court had
already ruled that the predecessor agency of MIAA, the CAA was engaged in private or non-
governmental functions. These are more precedents ignored by the majority. The following observation
from the Teodoro case very well applies to MIAA.
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private
entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports
Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is
essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the
promotion of travel and the convenience of the traveling public. It is engaged in an
enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than
the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. 1 3 7
If the determinative point in distinguishing between sovereign functions and proprietary

functions is the vitality of the public service being performed, then it should be noted that there is no
more important public service performed than that engaged in by public utilities. But notably, the
Constitution itself authorizes private persons to exercise these functions as it allows them to operate
public utilities in this country. 1 3 8 If indeed such functions are actually sovereign and belonging properly
to the government, shouldn't it follow that the exercise of these tasks remain within the exclusive
preserve of the State?
There really is no prohibition against the government taxing itself, 1 3 9 and nothing obscene with
allowing government entities exercising proprietary functions to be taxed for the purpose of raising the
coffers of LGUs. On the other hand, it would be an even more noxious proposition that the government
or the instrumentalities that it owns are above the law and may refuse to pay a validly imposed tax.
MIAA, or any similar entity engaged in the exercise of proprietary, and not sovereign functions, cannot
avoid the adverse-effects of tax evasion simply on the claim that it is imbued with some of the
attributes of government.
VII.
MIAA Property Not Subject to
Execution Sale Without Consent
Of the President.
Despite the fact that the City of Parañaque ineluctably has the power to impose real property
taxes over the MIAA, there is an equally relevant statutory limitation on this power that must be fully
upheld. Section 3 of the MIAA charter states that "[a]ny portion [of the [lands transferred, conveyed and
assigned to the ownership and administration of the MIAA] shall not be disposed through sale or
through any other mode unless speci cally approved by the President of the Philippines. "
140
Nothing in the Local Government Code, even with its wide grant of powers to LGUs, can be
deemed as repealing this prohibition under Section 3, even if it effectively forecloses one possible
remedy of the LGU in the collection of delinquent real property taxes. While the Local Government Code
withdrew all previous local tax exemptions of the MIAA and other natural and juridical persons, it did
not similarly withdraw any previously enacted prohibitions on properties owned by GOCCs, agencies or
instrumentalities. Moreover, the resulting legal effect, subjecting on one hand the MIAA to local taxes
but on the other hand shielding its properties from any form of sale or disposition, is not contradictory
or paradoxical, onerous as its effect may be on the LGU. It simply means that the LGU has to nd
another way to collect the taxes due from MIAA, thus paving the way for a mutually acceptable
negotiated solution. 1 4 1
There are several other reasons this statutory limitation should be upheld and applied to this
case. It is at this juncture that the importance of the Manila Airport to our national life and commerce
may be accorded proper consideration. The closure of the airport, even by reason of MIAA's legal
omission to pay its taxes, will have an injurious effect to our national economy, which is ever reliant on
air travel and tra c. The same effect would obtain if ownership and administration of the airport were
to be transferred to an LGU or some other entity which were not speci cally chartered or tasked to
perform such vital function. It is for this reason that the MIAA charter speci cally forbids the sale or
disposition of MIAA properties without the consent of the President. The prohibition prevents the
peremptory closure of the MIAA or the hampering of its operations on account of the demands of its
creditors. The airport is important enough to be sheltered by legislation from ordinary legal processes.
Section 3 of the MIAA charter may also be appreciated as within the proper exercise of executive
control by the President over the MIAA, a GOCC which despite its separate legal personality, is still
subsumed within the executive branch of government. The power of executive control by the President
should be upheld so long as such exercise does not contravene the Constitution or the law, the
President having the corollary duty to faithfully execute the Constitution and the laws of the land. 1 4 2 In
this case, the exercise of executive control is precisely recognized and authorized by the legislature,
and it should be upheld even if it comes at the expense of limiting the power of local government units
to collect real property taxes.
Had this petition been denied instead with Mactan as basis, but with the caveat that the MIAA
properties could not be subject of execution sale without the consent of the President, I suspect that
the parties would feel little distress. Through such action, both the Local Government Code and the
MIAA charter would have been upheld. The prerogatives of LGUs in real property taxation, as
guaranteed by the Local Government Code, would have been preserved, yet the concerns about the
ruinous effects of having to close the Manila International Airport would have been averted. The parties
would then be compelled to try harder at working out a compromise, a task, if I might add, they are all
too willing to engage in. 1 4 3 Unfortunately, the majority will cause precisely the opposite result of
unremitting hostility, not only to the City of Parañaque, but to the thousands of LGUs in the country.
VIII.
Summary of Points
My points may be summarized as follows:
1) Mactan and a long line of succeeding cases have already settled the rule that under the
Local Government Code, enacted pursuant to the constitutional mandate of local autonomy, all natural
and juridical persons, even those GOCCs, instrumentalities and agencies, are no longer exempt from
local taxes even if previously granted an exemption. The only exemptions from local taxes are those
speci cally provided under the Local Government Code itself, or those enacted through subsequent
legislation. CcEHaI
2) Under the Local Government Code, particularly Section 232, instrumentalities, agencies
and GOCCs are generally liable for real property taxes. The only exemptions therefrom under the same
Code are provided in Section 234, which include real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines
or any of its political subdivisions.
3) The subject properties are owned by MIAA, a GOCC, holding title in its own name. MIAA, a
separate legal entity from the Republic of the Philippines, is the legal owner of the properties, and is
thus liable for real property taxes, as it does not fall within the exemptions under Section 234 of the
Local Government Code.
4) The MIAA charter expressly bars the sale or disposition of MIAA properties. As a result,
the City of Parañaque is prohibited from seizing or selling these properties by public auction in order to
satisfy MIAA's tax liability. In the end, MIAA is encumbered only by a limited lien possessed by the City
of Parañaque.
On the other hand, the majority's flaws are summarized as follows:
1) The majority deliberately ignores all precedents which run counter to its hypothesis,
including Mactan. Instead, it relies and directly cites those doctrines and precedents which were
overturned by Mactan. By imposing a different result than that warranted by the precedents without
explaining why Mactan or the other precedents are wrong, the majority attempts to overturn all these
ruling sub silencio and without legal justi cation, in a manner that is not sanctioned by the practices
and traditions of this Court.
2) The majority deliberately ignores the policy and philosophy of local scal autonomy, as
mandated by the Constitution, enacted under the Local Government Code, and a rmed by precedents.
Instead, the majority asserts that there is no sound rationale for local governments to tax national
government instrumentalities, despite the blunt existence of such rationales in the Constitution, the
Local Government Code, and precedents.
3) The majority, in a needless effort to justify itself, adopts an extremely strained exaltation
of the Administrative Code above and beyond the Corporation Code and the various legislative
charters, in order to impose a wholly absurd de nition of GOCCs that effectively declassi es
innumerable existing GOCCs, to catastrophic legal consequences.
4) The majority asserts that by virtue of Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, all
national government agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from any form of local taxation, in
contravention of several precedents to the contrary and the proviso under Section 133, "unless
otherwise provided herein [the Local Government Code]."
5) The majority erroneously argues that MIAA holds its properties in trust for the Republic of
the Philippines, and that such properties are patrimonial in character. No express or implied trust has
been created to bene t the national government. The legal distinction between sovereign and
proprietary functions, as a rmed by jurisprudence, likewise preclude the classi cation of MIAA
properties as patrimonial.
IX.
Epilogue
If my previous discussion still fails to convince on how wrong the majority is, then the following
points are well-worth considering. The majority cites the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Bangko Sentral)
as a government instrumentality that exercises corporate powers but not organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation. Correspondingly for the majority, the Bangko ng Sentral is exempt from all forms of
local taxation by LGUs by virtue of the Local Government Code.
Section 125 of Rep. Act No. 7653, The New Central Bank Act, states:
SECTION 125. Tax Exemptions . — The Bangko Sentral shall be exempt for a
period of ve (5) years from the approval of this Act from all national, provincial,
municipal and city taxes , fees, charges and assessments.
The New Central Bank Act was promulgated after the Local Government Code. If the BSP is
already preternaturally exempt from local taxation owing to its personality as an "government
instrumentality," why then the need to make a new grant of exemption, which if the majority is to be
believed, is actually a redundancy. But even more tellingly, does not this provision evince a clear intent
that after the lapse of ve (5) years, that the Bangko Sentral will be liable for provincial, municipal and
city taxes? This is the clear congressional intent, and it is Congress, not this Court which dictates which
entities are subject to taxation and which are exempt.
Perhaps this notion will offend the majority, because the Bangko Sentral is not even a
government owned corporation, but a government instrumentality, or perhaps "loosely", a "government
corporate entity." How could such an entity like the Bangko Sentral, which is not even a government
owned corporation, be subjected to local taxation like any mere mortal? But then, see Section 1 of the
New Central Bank Act:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy . — The State shall maintain a central monetary

authority that shall function and operate as an independent and accountable body
corporate in the discharge of its mandated responsibilities concerning money, banking and
credit. In line with this policy, and considering its unique functions and responsibilities, the
central monetary authority established under this Act, while being a government-
owned corporation , shall enjoy fiscal and administrative autonomy.
Apparently, the clear legislative intent was to create a government corporation known as the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. But this legislative intent, the sort that is evident from the text of the
provision and not the one that needs to be unearthed from the bowels of the archival o ces of the
House and the Senate, is for naught to the majority, as it contravenes the Administrative Code of 1987,
which after all, is "the governing law de ning the status and relationship of government agencies and
instrumentalities" and thus superior to the legislative charter in determining the personality of a
chartered entity. Its like saying that the architect who designed a school building is better equipped to
teach than the professor because at least the architect is familiar with the geometry of the classroom.
Consider further the example of the Philippine Institute of Traditional and Alternative Health Care
(PITAHC), created by Republic Act No. 8243 in 1997. It has similar characteristics as MIAA in that it is
established as a body corporate, 1 4 4 and empowered with the attributes of a corporation, 1 4 5 including
the power to purchase or acquire real properties. 1 4 6 However the PITAHC has no capital stock and no
members, thus following the majority, it is not a GOCC.
The state policy that guides PITAHC is the development of traditional and alternative health care,
147 and its objectives include the promotion and advocacy of alternative, preventive and curative health
care modalities that have been proven safe, effective and cost effective. 1 4 8 "Alternative health care
modalities" include "other forms of non-allophatic, occasionally non-indigenous or imported healing
methods" which include, among others "re exology, acupuncture, massage, acupressure" and
chiropractics. 1 4 9
Given these premises, there is no impediment for the PITAHC to purchase land and construct
thereupon a massage parlor that would provide a cheaper alternative to the opulent spas that have
proliferated around the metropolis. Such activity is in line with the purpose of the PITAHC and with
state policy. Is such massage parlor exempt from realty taxes? For the majority, it is, for PITAHC is an
instrumentality or agency exempt from local government taxation, which does not fall under the
exceptions under Section 234 of the Local Government Code. Hence, this massage parlor would not
just be a shelter for frazzled nerves, but for taxes as well. CAHaST
Ridiculous? One might say, certainly a decision of the Supreme Court cannot be construed to
promote an absurdity. But precisely the majority, and the faulty reasoning it utilizes, opens itself up to
all sorts of mischief, and certainly, a tax-exempt massage parlor is one of the lesser evils that could
arise from the majority ruling. This is indeed a very strange and very wrong decision.
I dissent.
Footnotes
1. Dated 16 September 1983.

2. Dated 26 July 1987.
3. Section 3, MIAA Charter.


6. Rollo, pp. 22-23.
7. Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
8. 330 Phil. 392 (1996).
9. MIAA Charter as amended by Executive Order No. 298. See note 2.
10. Batas Pambansa Blg. 68.

11. Section 11 of the MIAA Charter provides:
Contribution to the General Fund for the Maintenance and Operation of other Airports. — Within
thirty (30) days after the close of each quarter, twenty percentum (20%) of the gross operating income,
excluding payments for utilities of tenants and concessionaires and terminal fee collections, shall be
remitted to the General Fund in the National Treasury to be used for the maintenance and operation of
other international and domestic airports in the country. Adjustments in the amount paid by the
Authority to the National Treasury under this Section shall be made at the end of each year based on
the audited financial statements of the Authority.
12. Section 5(j), MIAA Charter.

14. Section 5(k), MIAA Charter.
15. Section 5(o), MIAA Charter.

16. Third Whereas Clause, MIAA Charter.
17. Id.
18. CONSTITUTION, Art. X, Sec. 5.
19. 274 Phil. 1060, 1100 (1991) quoting C. Dallas Sands, 3 STATUTES and STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION 207.
20. 274 Phil. 323, 339-340 (1991).

21. CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 28(1).
22. First Whereas Clause, MIAA Charter.

23. 30 Phil. 602, 606-607 (1915).
24. 102 Phil. 866, 869-870 (1958).

25. PNB v. Puruganan, 130 Phil. 498 (1968). See also Martinez v. CA, 155 Phil. 591 (1974).
26. MIAA Charter, Sec. 16.
27. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506 (2002).
29. G.R. No. 144104, 29 June 2004, 433 SCRA 119, 138.
30. Republic Act No. 7653, 14 June 1993, Sec. 5.
31. Executive Order No. 1061, 5 November 1985, Sec. 3(p).

32. Republic Act No. 4850, 18 July 1966, Sec. 5.
33. Presidential Decree No. 977, 11 August 1976, Section 4(j).

34. Republic Act No. 7227, 13 March 1992, Sec. 3.
35. Presidential Decree No. 857, 23 December 1975, Sec. 6(b)(xvi).

36. Republic Act No. 4663, 18 June 1966, Sec. 7(m).

39. Republic Act No. 4156, 20 June 1964. Section 4(b).

40. Republic Act No. 3844, 8 August 1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 7907, 23 February 1995.
41. Executive Order No. 81, 3 December 1986.

42. Republic Act No. 8175, 29 December 1995.
43. Presidential Decree No. 252, 21 July 1973, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1071, 25 January
1977 and Executive Order No. 1067, 25 November 1985.
44. Executive Order No. 80, 3 December 1986.

45. III RECORDS, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 63 (22 August 1986).
46. 2003 ed., 1181.
47. Manila International Airport Authority v. Airspan Corporation, G.R. No. 157581, 1 December 2004, 445
SCRA 471.
TINGA, J., dissenting:

1. Per Department of the Interior and Local Government. See also "Summary" from the National
Statistical Coordination Board,
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/NSCB_PSGC_SUMMARY_DEC04.pdf.
2. 330 Phil. 392 (1996).
3. G.R. No. 91649, 14 May 1991, 197 SCRA 52.

4. 451 Phil. 683, 698 (2003).
5. 364 Phil. 843, 855 (1999).

6. 449 Phil. 233 (2003).
7. G.R. No. 152675 & 152771, 28 April 2004.

8. Decision, p. 24.
9. G.R. No. 144104, 29 June 2004, 433 SCRA 119.

10. Supra note 8.
11. G.R. No. 127383, 18 August 2005, 467 SCRA 280. Per the author of this Dissenting Opinion.
12. Nonetheless, the Court noted therein GSIS's exemption from real property taxes was reenacted in
1997, and the GSIS at present is exempt from such taxes under the GSIS Act of 1997. Id., at 299.
13. G.R. No. 109791, 14 July 2003, 406 SCRA 88, and G.R. No. 143214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA
175, respectively.
14. 118 Phil. 1354 (1963).

15. 396 Phil. 860 (2000).
16. Supra note 8.

17. 91 Phil 203 (1952).
18. G.R. No. L-51806, 8 November 1988, 167 SCRA 28.
19. G.R. No. 155692, 23 October 2003, 414 SCRA 327.

20. Id. at 333, citing Section 10, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 3, Administrative Code of 1987.
21. G.R. No. 165827, 16 June 2006.
22. G.R. No. 147192, 27 June 2006.
23. Supra note 8.

24, See Mendoza v. De Leon, 33 Phil. 508 (1916).
25. Mactan, supra note 2, at 397-398.
26. Section 193, Rep. Act No. 7160.
27. Section 232, Rep. Act No. 7160.

28. Section 234, Rep. Act No. 7160. Emphasis supplied.
29. Id. at 411-413.

30. See City of Davao v. RTC, supra note 11, at 293.
31. Supra note 3.
32. Id. at 63-65.
33. G.R. No. 88921, 31 May 1991, 197 SCRA 771.
34. Id. at 799.

35. Mactan, supra note 2, at 419-420.
36. Supra note 6.

37. Id. at 250-251.
38. G.R. No. 109791, 14 July 2003, 406 SCRA 88.
39. Id. at 99-100.
40. Supra note 21.
41. Id.
42. G.R. No. 143214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 175.
43. Id., at 184.
44. Id. at 185-186, citing MCIAA v. Marcos, supra note 2.
45. Supra note 11.
46. P.D. No. 1981. See City of Davao v. RTC, supra note 40, at 289.
47. Id. at 287-288.

48. 32 Phil. 36, 49; cited in City of Davao v. RTC, supra note 40 at 296-297.
49. Id.
50. Supra note 22.
51. Id.
52. Decision, p. 6.
53. MIAA's Charter (E.O No. 903, as amended) provides:

Section 3. Creation of the Manila International Airport Authority. — . . .
The land where the Airport is presently located as well as the surrounding land area of
approximately six hundred hectares, are hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership
and administration of the Authority, subject to existing rights, if any. . . . Any portion thereof shall not
be disposed through sale or through any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of
the Philippines.
Section 22. Transfer of Existing Facilities and Intangible Assets. — All existing public airport
facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other property, movable or immovable, belonging to the
Airport, and all assets, powers rights, interests and privileges belonging to the Bureau of Air
Transportation relating to airport works or air operations, including all equipment which are necessary
for the operation of crash fire and rescue facilities, are hereby transferred to the Authority.
On the other hand, MCIAA's charter (Rep. Act No. 6958) provides:
Section 15. Transfer of Existing Facilities and Intangible Assets. — All existing public airport
facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other properties, movable or immovable, belonging to or
presently administered by the airports, and all assets, powers, rights, interest and privileges relating to
airport works or air operations, including all equipment which are necessary for the operation of air
navigation, aerodrome control towers, crash, fire, and rescue facilities are hereby transferred to the
Authority: Provided, however, That the operational control of all equipment necessary for the operation
of radio aids to air navigation, airways communication, the approach control office and the area
control center shall be retained by the Air Transportation Office. . . .
54. See Section 3, E.O. 903 (as amended), infra note 140; and Section 4(c), Rep. Act No. 6958, which
qualifies the power of the MCIAA to sell its properties, providing that "any asset located in the Mactan
International Airport important to national security shall not be subject to alienation or mortgage by
the Authority nor to transfer to any entity other than the National Government."
55. See Section 16, E.O. 903 (as amended) and Section 13, Rep. Act No. 6958.
56. See Articles 40 to 43, Civil Code.
57. See Articles 44 to 47, Civil Code.
58. This is apparent from such assertions as "When the law vests in a government instrumentality
corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government
instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government
instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers." See Decision, p. 9-10.
59. Decision, p. 9.
60. See Section 2(10), E.O. 292.

61. See Section 2(4), E.O No. 292.
62. 50 Phil. 259 (1927).
63. Id., at 288.

64. See Sec. 5, Rep. Act No. 6395.
65. Section 3, Corporation Code.
66. See Section 13, Rep. Act No. 6395.
68. See Section 16(i), Rep. Act No. 7875.
69. See Section 3, Rep. Act 8282.
70. Supra note 14.
71. See Section 2(b), Rep. Act No. 7656, which defines GOCCs as "corporations organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation . . ."
72. See Rep. Act No. 7656, the pertinent provisions of which read:
c.3. Dividends. — All government-owned or -controlled corporations shall declare and remit at
least fifty percent (50%) of their annual net earnings as cash, stock or property dividends to the
National Government. This section shall also apply to those government-owned or -controlled
corporations whose profit distribution is provided by their respective charters or by special law, but
shall exclude those enumerated in Section 4 hereof: Provided, That such dividends accruing to the
National Government shall be received by the National Treasury and recorded as income of the
General Fund.
Sec. 4. Exemptions. — The provisions of the preceding section notwithstanding, government-owned

or -controlled corporations created or organized by law to administer real or personal properties or
funds held in trust for the use and the benefit of its members, shall not be covered by this Act such as,
but not limited to: the Government Service Insurance System, the Home Development Mutual Fund,
the Employees Compensation Commission, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, and the
Philippine Medical Care Commission.
73. See Pres. Decree No. 857 (as amended).

74. See Section 10, Pres. Decree No. 857.
75. See Section 11, Pres. Decree No. 857.
76. See Rep. Act No. 7227.
79. See Section 47, Rep. Act No. 7916 in relation to Section 5, Pres. Decree No. 66.
80. See Executive Order No. 603, as amended.
81. See Article 6, Section 15 of Executive Order No. 603, as amended.
82. See Rep. Act No. 7653. If there is any doubt whether the BSP was intended to be covered by Rep. Act
No. 7656, see Section 2(b), Rep. Act No. 7656, which states that "This term [GOCCs] shall also include
financial institutions, owned or controlled by the National Government, but shall exclude acquired
asset corporations, as defined in the next paragraphs, state universities, and colleges."
84. See Sections 43 & 44, Rep. Act No. 7653.
86. Supra note 35.
87. See Decision, p. 10.
88. Id. at 10-11.

89. Id.
95. See e.g., Sections 1 & 2, Rep. Act No. 6070.
Section 1. Declaration of Policy . — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to foster
the accelerated and balanced growth of the Province of Ilocos Sur, within the context of national
plans and policies for social and economic development, through the leadership, guidance, and
support of the government. To achieve this end, it is recognized that a government corporation should
be created for the purpose of drawing up the necessary plans of provincial development; . . .
Sec. 2. Ilocos Sur Development Authority created. — There is hereby created a body corporate to be
known as the Ilocos Sur Development Authority . . . . The Authority shall execute the powers and
functions herein vested and conferred upon it in such manner as will in its judgment, aid to the fullest
possible extent in carrying out the aims and purposes set forth below."
96. See Art. 37, Civil Code, which provides in part, "Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations . . ."
97. See rollo, p. 18. "Petitioner [MIAA] is a government-owned and controlled corporation with
original charter as it was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 903 issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on July 21, 1983, as amended by Executive Order No. 298 issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino on July 26, 1987, and with office address at the MIAA Administration Bldg
Complex, MIAA Road, Pasay City." (emphasis supplied).
98. See "Department of Budget and Management — Web Linkages," http://www.dbm.
gov.ph/web_linkages.htm (Last visited 25 February 2005).
99. G.R. No. 104217, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 714; per Quiazon, J.. "Petitioner MIAA is a government-
owned and controlled corporation for the purpose, among others, of encouraging and promoting
international and domestic air traffic in the Philippines as a means of making the Philippines a center
of international trade and tourism and accelerating the development of the means of transportation
and communications in the country". Id. at 716.
100. See Section 23, Chapter 6, Title XV, Book IV, Administrative Code of 1987.
101. Supra note 60.
102. Supra note 8.
103. Supra note 6.
104. Assuming that there is conflict between Section 133(o), Section 193, Section 232 and Section 234
of the Local Government Code, the rule in statutory construction is, "If there be no such ground for
choice between inharmonious provisions or sections, the latter provision or section, being the last
expression of the legislative will, must, in construction, vacate the former to the extent of the
repugnancy. It has been held that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two provisions of the
same statute, the last in order of position is frequently held to prevail, unless it clearly appears that the
intent of the legislature is otherwise." R. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3rd ed., 1995), p.
201; citing Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138 (1922); Cuyegkeng v. Cruz, 108 Phil. 1147 (1960);
Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952).
105. Decision, p. 12.
106. Supra note 6.
107. Id. at 261-262.
108. Id., at 248-250.
109. Supra note 38.
110. Id, at 102; citing National Power Corp. v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. XXV, 190 SCRA 477 (1990).
111. Decision, p. 25.
112. "Unless otherwise expressed in the tax law, the government and its political subdivisions are exempt
therefrom." J. VITUG AND E. ACOSTA, TAX LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE (2nd ed., 2000), at 36.
113. Supra note 9.
114. See P.D. No. 1423.
115. R. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3rd ed., 1995), at 199; citing Javellana v. Tayo, G.R. No.
18919, 29 December 1982, 6 SCRA 1042 (1962); Radiola-Toshiba Phil., Inc. v. IAC, 199 SCRA 373
(1991).
116. PPA v. City of Iloilo, supra note 42.
117. Id., at 186-187.
118. Supra note 15.
119. Id. at 869.
120. Id. at 871.
121. Id. at 872.
122. See Section 10, E.O. No. 903.
123. R. LOPEZ, I THE CORPORATION CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED, pp. 15-16 (1994).
124. See Section 5, E.O. No. 903.
125. See Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which reads: "The territorial and political subdivisions of
the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays . . ."
126. Romualdez-Yap v. CSC, G.R. No. 104226, 12 August 1993, 225 SCRA 285, 294.
127. 100 Phil. 468. (1956)
128. Id., at 471-473.

129. Lopez, supra note 123 at 67.
130. G.R. No. L-49930, 7 August 1985, 138 SCRA 63.
131. "Did the State act in a sovereign capacity or in a corporate capacity when it organized the PNR for
the purpose of engaging in transportation? Did it act differently when it organized the PNR as
successor of the Manila Railroad Company? . . . We hold that in the instant case the State divested
itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor,
the Manila Railroad Company." Id, at 66.
132. Supra note 17.

133. Id., at 206.
134. Section 32(24), Rep. Act No. 776. See CAA v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18, at 36.
135. Supra note 18.
136. Id., at 36.
137. Teodoro v. National Airports Commission, supra note 17, at 207.
138. See Article XII, Section 11, CONST.
139. Vitug & Acosta, supra note 112, at 35; citing Bisaya Land Transportation Co., Inc. v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, L-11812, 29 May 1959, 105 Phil. 1338.
140. See Section 3, E.O. 903, as amended.
141. Indeed, last 4 February 2005, the MIAA filed a Manifestation before this Court stating that its new
General Manager had been conferring with the newly elected local government of Parañaque with the
end of settling the case at mutually acceptable terms. See rollo, pp. 315-316. While this Manifestation
was withdrawn a few weeks later, see rollo, pp. 320-322, it still stands as proof that the parties are
nevertheless willing to explore an extrajudicial settlement of this case.
142. See Section 17, Article VII, Constitution. "The President shall have control of all the executive
departments. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
143. See note 141.

145. See Section 6(s), Rep. Act No. 8423.
146. See Section 6(r), Rep. Act No. 8423.
148. See Section 3(b), Rep. Act No. 8423.
149. See Section 4(d), Rep. Act No. 8423.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 74930. February 13, 1989.]
RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO,

ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO
BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO
and ROLANDO FADUL , petitioners, vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR. ,
respondent.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his co-petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE RESORT

TO COURTS OF LAW MAY BE ALLOWED; EXCEPTIONS. — A settled principles in
administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is
expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law.
The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the
available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities
have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative
forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to
settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved.
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION; EFFECT OF DENIAL
THEREOF. — The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of
power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions
operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to
information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the
whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of
public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to
protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty
words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations
prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
3.ID.; ID.; NOT RESTRICTED BY THE EXERCISE OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE
PRESS. — The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech
and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of
and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of
the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional
policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance
the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking
abuse in government.
4.ID.; ID.; NOT ABSOLUTE. — Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information
is not absolute. The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern",
and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's
policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest", and is "subject
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
5.ID.; RIGHT OF PRIVACY; CANNOT BE INVOKED BY A JURIDICAL ENTITY; RIGHT IS
PURELY PERSONAL IN NATURE. — When the information requested from the government
intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information
and to privacy may arise. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private
capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. A corporation has no
right to privacy since the entire basis of the right to privacy is injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief. Neither
can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature.
6.ID.; RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION; GOVERNMENT AGENCY PERFORMING
PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS, NOT EXCLUDED FROM THE COVERAGE. — The government,
whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the
same function of service to the people. Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans,
was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions
from the coverage and scope of the right to information.
7.ID.; ID.; LIMITATION. — The consideration in guaranting access to information on matters
of public concern does not however, accord to citizen the right to compel custodian of
public records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
such information.
8.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; MANDAMUS; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF
WRIT. — It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the
applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it
is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of
the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific.
DECISION
CORTES , J : p
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction
invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed:
(a)to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean
loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal
note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b)to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing
their respective loans; and/or
(c)to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
[Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing supplied.]
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the
following letter:
June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte
GSIS General Manager

Arroceros, Manila.
Sir:
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am

requesting that I be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of
(the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million
each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez
of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with
the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by us.
If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?
We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom
Constitution of the present regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall

be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the
citizen subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec.
6).
We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your
favorable response on the matter.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE
[Rollo, p. 7.]
To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:
June 17, 1986
Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte

108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City
Dear Companero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal
implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me
for study and reply your letter to him of June 4, 1986 requesting a list of "the
opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean
loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos."
My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the

GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a
duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be
proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a
reputable financial institution, I regret very much that at this time we cannot
respond positively to your request.
Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO
Deputy General Counsel

[Rollo, p. 40.]
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte
wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now
considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to
pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137
former members of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten
(10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.].
Separate comments were led by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor
General. After petitioners led a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course
and the parties were required to le their memoranda. The parties having complied, the
case was deemed submitted for decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a
writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by
the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however did not seek relief from the
GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies
were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz.,
whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their
constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of
the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be
allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of
administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity
and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies
have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to
act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions,
among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board,
106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40
SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The
issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the
constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular
courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a
purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the
general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted. Having disposed of
this procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not
mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be
done, in pursuance of their right to information.
We shall deal rst with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done,
both of which involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to
the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.
This is not the rst time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly
involving the constitutional right to information. In Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915,
April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld the
people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interest and ordered
the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which
states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution,
Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and
artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and
discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under
our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is
delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies
and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people.
Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can
become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated. The postulate of public of ce as a public trust, institutionalized in the
Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental
power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public
concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation
adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather
and the obligation to check the accuracy of information they disseminate. For them, the
freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their
professions. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not
rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an
essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process
of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the
State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open
dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able
to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware
of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech
and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct
of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and
of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure ** and honesty in the public service. *** It is
meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as
well in checking abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute.
As stated in Legaspi, The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public
concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public
interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought
is of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law from the operation
of the constitutional guarantee [ Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.].
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest"
and "public concern". As observed in Legaspi: prcd
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is

no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term
that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives,
or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public. [Ibid. at p. 541.]
In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional
right to information was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws
which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Legaspi, it was the
"legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil
service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles" [ Supra at p. 539.].
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that
certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to
secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election
through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees
and the administrator of various insurance programs for the bene t of the latter.
Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of
P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977),
provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and
other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the
obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay.
Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with
utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and
regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law
(C.A No. 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial
solvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No.
1146.] Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant
`clean loans'." [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to
ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the
bene ts that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed
borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves
appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the rst to see to it
that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of delity and that all its
transactions were above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public of ce
held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public
interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced
through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among
those excluded by law.
Respondent maintains that a con dential relationship exists between the GSIS
and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of con dentiality restricts the
indiscriminate dissemination of information.
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
con dentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle
policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should
be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all
State power.
Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally
protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan
transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information.
llcd
There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the

landmark case of Morfe v. Mutuc [130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court,
speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando, stated:
. . . The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the
basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private
sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector —protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual —has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of
technological age —industrialization, urbanization, and organization —operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society." [at pp. 444-445.]
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy
of a citizen, a potential con ict between the rights to information and to privacy may
arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this
case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right
to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and
governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical
entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co.
[197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire
basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and
a corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the
right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature [ Cf. Atkinson v.
John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.R.A. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis,
147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1895)], and hence may be invoked only by the
person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers
themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering
the public of ces they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been
granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their
newsworthiness, public gures, most especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals,
their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny [ Cf. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v.
Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen v. Marx, 211 P.
2d 321 (1949).].
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of
the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions" only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing
proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of access to
official records. llcd
It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely
incidental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the
constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information which is
applicable only to "official" transactions.
First of all, the "constituent —ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government
function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and
Government Corporations and Of ces [G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29,
1969, 30 SCRA 644], the Court said that the government, whether carrying out its
sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of
service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary
function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and
scope of the right to information.
Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986,
to include government-owned and controlled corporations and transactions entered
into by them within the coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is manifest
from the records of the proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few question?

MR. OPLE.Very gladly.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you.
When we declare "a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions" —
referring to the transactions of the State —and when we say the "State"
which I suppose would include all of the various agencies, departments,
ministries and instrumentalities of the government. . . .
MR. OPLE.Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SUAREZ.Including government-owned and controlled corporations.
MR. OPLE.That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ.And when we say "transactions which should be distinguished from
contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to
the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to
the contract itself?
MR. OPLE.The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated
contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ.This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction.
MR. OPLE.Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional Commission 24-25.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not
binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that
government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by
special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to
the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
In ne, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans
granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate
relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of
the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of
the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the
records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting
Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the second and third alternative
acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the rst act sought by
petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to "access to of cial records," the constitution does not accord them a right to
compel custodians of of cial records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like in their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern. cdrep
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the
applicant has a well-de ned, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and
that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The
corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and
speci c [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29, 1968, 126 SCRA 203;
Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of
the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of
respondent to prepare the list requested.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General
Manager of the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners
access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former
Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, inspection, not incompatible with this
decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C .J ., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J ., concurring :
Instead of merely af xing my signature to signify my concurrence, I write this

separate opinion simply to say I have nothing to add to Justice Irene R. Cortes'
exceptionally eloquent celebration of the right to information on matters of public
concern.
Footnotes
**Art. II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
***Art XI, Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
The following provisions of the 1987 Constitution are further indicative of the policy of
transparency:
Art. VII, Sec. 12.In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the
state of his health. The members of the cabinet in charge of national security and
foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall not
be denied access to the President during such illness.
Art XI, Sec. 17.A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often
thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank,
the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
Art. XII, Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation
of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the
Government shall be made available to the public.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-25843. July 25, 1974.]
MELCHORA CABANAS , plaintiff-appellee, vs . FRANCISCO PILAPIL ,

defendant-appellant.
Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
DECISION
FERNANDO , J : p
The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court decision are the
mother and the uncle of a minor bene ciary of the proceeds of an insurance policy issued
on the life of her deceased father. The dispute centers as to who of them should be
entitled to act as trustee thereof. The lower court applying the appropriate Civil Code
provisions decided in favor of the mother, the plaintiff in this case. Defendant uncle
appealed. As noted, the lower court acted the way it did following the speci c mandate of
the law. In addition, it must have taken into account the principle that in cages of this
nature the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. It is not an unreasonable
assumption that between a mother and an uncle, the former is likely to lavish more care on
and pay greater attention to her. This is all the more likely considering that the child is with
the mother. There are no circumstances then that did militate against what conforms to
the natural order of things, even if the language of the law were not as clear. It is not to be
lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the State as
parens patriae, with an even greater stress on family unity under the present Constitution,
did weigh in the balance the opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that the
welfare of the child called for the mother to be entrusted with such responsibility. We have
to affirm.
The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to the facts." 1 The insured,
Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora
Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was led on October 10, 1964.
The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured
himself and instituted as bene ciary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her
minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the
mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She led the bond
required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount
in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. 2
After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965, rendered judgment
ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Its
main reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The
father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to
the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos,
the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance." 3 The latter states: "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or
may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in
ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental
authority and whose company he lives; . . ." 4
Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the appealed decision:
"The insurance proceeds belong to the bene ciary. The bene ciary is a minor under the
custody and parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor lives with
plaintiff or lives in the company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property by
lucrative title. Said property, therefore, belongs to the minor child in ownership, and in
usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the usufructuary is entitled to
possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds. The trust,
insofar as it is in con ict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void.
In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should le
an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to
raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00." 5
It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the applicability of the two
cited Civil Code provisions can be disputed, the decision must stand. There is no ambiguity
in the language employed. The words are rather clear. Their meaning is unequivocal. Time
and time again, this Court has left no doubt that where codal or statutory norms are cast in
categorical language, the task before it is not one of interpretation but of application. 6 So
it must be in this case. So it was in the appealed decision.
1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for the defendant-
appellant 7 to blunt the force of legal commands that speak so plainly and so unquali edly.
Even if it were a question of policy, the conclusion will remain unaltered. What is
paramount, as mentioned at the outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in consonance with
such primordial end that Articles 320 and 321 have been worded. There is recognition in
the law of the deep ties that bind parent and child. In the event that there is less than full
measure of concern for the offspring, the protection is supplied by the bond required. With
the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any
evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest
scrutiny. It is further forti ed by the assumption, both logical and natural, that in delity to
the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of
an uncle. Manresa, commenting on Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain, the source of
Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus "El derecho y la obligacion de
administrar el patrimonio de los hijos es una consecuencia natural y logica de la patria
potestad y de la presuncion de que nadie cuidar de los bienes de acqullos con mas cariño
y solicitud que los padres. En nuestro Derecho antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba
reconocida de una manera indirecta aquella doctrina, y as! se desprende de la sentencia
cia del Tribunal Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864, que se re ere a la ley 24, tit. XIII de
la Partida 5. De la propia suerte aceptan en general dicho principio los Codigos
extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de que trataremos m s adelante." 8
2. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is
buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State
acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one
who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here,
that family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance
not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be
preferred. It could have been different if the con ict were between father and mother. Such
is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae cannot remain insensible to the
validity of her plea. In a recent case, 9 there is this quotation from an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme
power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature,
and has no a nity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their
liberties." What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It
reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." 1 0 If, as the
Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does
not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still
deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.
WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against defendant-appellant.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Footnotes
1. Decision, Record on Appeal, 24.
2. Cf. Ibid, 24-25.
3. Article 320 of the Civil Code (1950).

4. Article 321 of the Civil Code (1950).
5. Decision, Record on Appeal, 27.

6. Cf. People vs. Mapa, L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164; Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene
Co. v. Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968, 22 SCRA 917; Dequito v. Lopez, L-27757,
March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1352; Padilla v. City of Pasay, L-24039, June 29, 1968, 23
SCRA 1349; Garcia v. Vasquez, L-26808, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 505; La Perla Cigar
and Cigarette Factory v. Capapas, L-27948 and 28001-11, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1085;
Mobil Oil Phil., Inc. v. Diocares, L-26371, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 656; Luzon Surety Co.,
Inc. v. De Garcia, L-25659, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 111; Vda. de Macabenta v. Davao
Stevedore Terminal Co., L-27489, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 553; Republic Flour Mills, Inc.
v. Commissioner of Customs, L-28463, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 269; Maritime Co. of the
Phil. v. Reparations Commission, L-29203, July 26, 1971, 40 SCRA 70; Allied Brokerage
Corp. v. Commissioner of Customs, L-27641, Aug. 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 555; Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals, L-27455, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 381; Vallangca v. Ariola, L-29226,
Sept. 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 139, Jalandoni v. Endaya, L-23894, Jan. 24, 1974, 55 SCRA 261;
Pacis v. Pamaran, L-23996, March 15, 1974.
7. Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 8-9.
8. 2 Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, 38 (1944).

9. Nery v. Lorenzo, L-23096, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 431, 438-439.
10. Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution.

EN BANC
[Adm. Case No. 133-J. May 31, 1982.]
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA , complainant, vs. HONORABLE ELIAS B.

ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte ,
respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Respondent judge was charged for having violated (1) Article 1491 of the New
Civil Code when he acquired by purchase portion of a lot which was involved in a civil
case decided by him; (2) Article 14 of the Code of Commerce, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the Civil Service Rules, and the Canons of Judicial Ethics, when he
associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a
stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance.
The Supreme Court held that there was no violation of Paragraph 5, Article
1491 of the New Civil Code because the sale took place after nality of the
decision; that respondent may not be held liable under paragraphs 1 and 5, Article
14 of the Code of Commerce (which is of Spanish vintage), because the provision
partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between
the government and certain public of cers and employees and as such is deemed
to have been automatically abrogated with the change of sovereignty from Spain
to the United States; that respondent cannot be held liable under Paragraph H,
Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because there is no showing
(a) that he participated or intervened in his of cial capacity in the business or
transaction of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., or (b) that
said corporation gained any undue advantage by reason of respondent's nancial
involvement in it, and because neither the 1935 nor the 1973 Constitution of the
Philippines or any existing law expressly prohibits members of the Judiciary from
engaging or having any interest in any lawful business.
Respondent is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
activities.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; SALES; PROHIBITION TO BUY IN ARTICLE 1491

REFERS TO PROPERTIES UNDER LITIGATION; NO VIOLATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The
prohibition in Article 1491 of the Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of
the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disquali ed therein. WE
have already ruled that " . . . for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property"
(The Director of Lands vs. Ababa, et al., 88 SCRA 513). Consequently, the sale of a
portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the
nality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the
project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation
of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
2. JUDICIAL ETHICS; CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGE'S CONDUCT
SHOULD BE FREE FROM APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY; JUDGE'S TRANSACTIONS
REGARDING PROPERTIES LITIGATED IN HIS COURT, NOT PROPER. — Finally, while it is
true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his
court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be
reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's
of cial conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in
his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." Even if respondent honestly believed that
Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a
third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have
refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which he and
his wife were nancially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was
related in one way or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of
respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his
court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and
the integrity of our courts of justice.
3. MERCANTILE LAW; CODE OF COMMERCE; ARTICLE 14 THEREOF
PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF A POLITICAL LAW. — Although Article 14 of the Code
of Commerce is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of
the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and
certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLITICAL LAW, DEFINED. — Political law has
been de ned as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operation of the governmental organs of the State and de nes the relations of the state
with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887). It must be
recalled that a political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations,
administrative law including the law on public officers and election.
5. MERCANTILE LAW; CODE OF COMMERCE, ARTICLE 14 THEREOF
ABROGATED BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. — Upon the transfer of sovereignty from
Spain to the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with
those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-
enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT;
PROHIBITED PECUNIARY INTEREST UNDER PARAGRAPH H OF SECTION 3 THEREOF
REFERS TO ONE HERE THE PUBLIC OFFICER INTERVENES OR TAKES PART IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY. — Respondent Judge can not be held liable under paragraph 4
Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because there is- no showing that
respondent participated or intervened in his of cial capacity in the business or
transactions of the Traders Manufacturing And Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at
bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no
relation or connection with his of cial of ce. The business of said corporation is not
that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216
of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public of cers against
directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his
of cial duty to intervene, "It is not enough to be a public of cial to be subject to this
crime; it is necessary that by reason of his of ce, he has to intervene in said contracts
or transactions; and hence, the of cial who intervenes in contracts or transactions
which have no relation to his of ce can not commit this crime" (People vs. Meneses,
C.A. 40 C.G. 11th Supp. 134; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol 11(1976).
7. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES NOT PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN
LAWFUL BUSINESS. — There is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of
the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the
Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business. It may be pointed out
that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does
not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said
law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the
practice of the law after of ce hours but with the permission of the district judge
concerned. Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from
engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon
the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in nature.
8. ID.; ID.; CIVIL SERVICE ACT AND RULES PROMULGATED THEREUNDER
NOT APPLICABLE TO MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY. — On the contention of
complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service
Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service
Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the
members of the Judiciary. It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being
a member of the Judiciary, 45 covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service of cers or employees
subject to the disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly.
the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The
Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state thru the
Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260
[1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or second
branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of
Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against
judges because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another
ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act
recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and
inefficiency.
9. ID.; ID.; JUDGES; ENGAGING IN PRIVATE BUSINESS, IMPROPER UNDER
THE CANONS. — Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private
business by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a
stockholder and a ranking of cer, is not violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce and Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as
well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil
Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that: "A judge should
abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved
in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such
investments previously made, longer than a period suf cient to enable him to dispose
of them without serious loss The disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their
shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation,
indicates that ' respondent realized that early that their interest in the corporation
contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve
commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the rm after its incorporation and
before it became involved in any court litigation.
DECISION
MAKASIAR , J : p
In a veri ed complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola

charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a
judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of
then Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on
October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus: llcd
"Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a
complaint for partition led by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs,
against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by
the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and
defendant.
"In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged
among other things that: a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter
of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased
were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring of the rst marriage
of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who
were the children of the deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondes;
c) the properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of the
latter and his rst wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired by
the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be
made, those conjugal properties should rst be partitioned into two parts,
and one part is to be adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of
the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the
share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his
children by his two marriages.
"On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge
Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"'IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a
preponderance of evidence, nds and so holds, and hereby renders
judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene
Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an
illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474,
4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa
Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to
the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership;
(5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the
deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R.
Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras,
as the exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892,
5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said
Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of
one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as belonging to the estate of Francisco
Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half
(1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416;
the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
one fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco
Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco
Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving
widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of one-twelfth (1/12) of
the whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par
2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided
among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant Bernardita R.
Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share of plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent of
two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the
defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal
shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528;
Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties,
within thirty days after this judgment shall have become nal to submit to
this court, for approval, a project of partition of the hereditary estate in the
proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the parties may, by
agreement, deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into
consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and value of the properties
involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-
third (1/3) by the rst named and two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and
(11) Dismissing all other claims of the parties [pp. 27-29 of Exh. C].
"The decision in civil case 3010 became nal for lack of an appeal,
and on October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge
Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project
of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the
respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it
in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted
hereunder in full:
'The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court
for approval the following project of partition:LLjur
'COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled

case, to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of
Partition:
'1. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong
exclusively to Bernardita Reyes Macariola;
'2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square
meters along the eastern part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to
Bernardita R. Macariola;
'3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa
Reyes Bales;
'4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square
meters along the western part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to
Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;
'5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz
Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla
Reyes in equal shares;
'6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after
taking the portions awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded
to Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and
Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that the remaining portion
of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.
'WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition
indicated above which is made in accordance with the decision of the
Honorable Court be approved.
'Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO
Atty. for the
Defendant
Tacloban City
'(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE
Atty. for the Plaintiff
Tacloban City
'While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have
signed this Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both
counsels of the respective parties to this Court that the Project of Partition,
as above-quoted, had been made after a conference and agreement of the
plaintiffs and the defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and
that both lawyers had represented to the Court that they are given full
authority to sign by themselves the Project of Partition, the Court, therefore,
nding the above-quoted project of Partition to be in accordance with law,
hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute
such papers, documents or instrument suf cient in form and substance for
the vesting of the rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated
to the respective parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the
delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to each one in view of said
Project of Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal and
necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition.
'SO ORDERED.
'Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.
'(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION
Judge'
"EXH. B.
"The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November
11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certi cates of title
to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see
Exh. U).
"One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot
1184 or rather one-half thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot,
which according to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased
Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs
Luz, Anacorita, Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal
shares, and when the project of partition was approved by the trial court the
adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into ve lots denominated
as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
"Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in
Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had
an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio
Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer certi cate of title No. 2338 of the
Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).
"On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife sold a portion of
Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and
his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was
declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).
"On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon

conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to 'The Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.' (Exh. 15 & 16). At the time of said
sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan,
Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's
wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs.
Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of
'The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.' which we shall
henceforth refer to as 'TRADERS' were registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E)" [pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola led on August 9, 1968 the instant
complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that
respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those
properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise
violated Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3,
paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking of cer while he was a
judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of
coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely
fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly
advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does
not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and
[4] that there was a culpable de ance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by
respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion led on September 24, 1968 his answer to
which a reply was led on October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In Our
resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia
Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and
recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her
report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be
reprimanded or warned in connection with the rst cause of action alleged in the
complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be warned in
case of a nding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the
third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent
Judge be exonerated. LLpr
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481,
477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R.
Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the
annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case
No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as
well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages.
It appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For
one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no
longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was led, having already
conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on
August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was
dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time
the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was led as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by
her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August
31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Likewise, the
cases against defendants Sera n P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go,
Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R.
Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador
Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the
conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then
Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense Juan
Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION —
"(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the issue of the legality and
validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits 'C'
and 'C-3'] approving the partition;
"(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;
"(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay
defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,
"(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[P400,000.00] for moral damages;
"(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[P200,000.00] for exemplary damages;
"(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for
nominal damages; and

"(d) the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [P10,000.00] for
Attorney's Fees.
"B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA
VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED
GERARDO VILLASIN —
"(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita
Villasin and the heirs of the deceased Gerardo Villasin;
"(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita
Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit.
"C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R.
BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 —
"(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R.
Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng
and Ruperto O. Reyes.
"D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO —
"(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;
"(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo
the cost of the suit.
"SO ORDERED" [pp. 531-533, rec.].
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated
to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971.
I
WE nd that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R.
Macariola, under her rst cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion
violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase
a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil
Case No. 3010.
That Article provides:
"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation
of another:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other of cers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon
an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they
exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession" [italics supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or
assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons
disquali ed therein. WE have already ruled that ". . . for the prohibition to operate,
the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa, et al., 88 SCRA
513, 519 [1979]; Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646
[1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965
a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on
June 8, 1963 was already nal because none of the parties therein led an appeal
within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of
the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's
order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963
approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8,
1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6,
1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio
Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the
plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the
nality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or
more speci cally one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla
Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the
project of partition, and the same was subdivided into ve lots denominated as
Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr.
Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent
Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The
subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon
of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president
and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the nality of the decision in
Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving
the project of partition. LLphil
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11,

1968 an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case
No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders approving
the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances,
the same, however, is of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a
portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the nality of the
decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two
questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the
property was no longer subject of litigation.
The subsequent ling on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234
can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts — that the questioned sale
to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and
consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge
having taken place over one year after the nality of the decision in Civil Case No.
3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during
the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491
of the New Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot
1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R.
Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of
said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of
partition. In this connection, We agree with the ndings of the Investigating Justice
thus:
"And so we are now confronted with this all-important question
whether or not the acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and
the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to 'TRADERS' of which respondent
was the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately related to the
Order of respondent approving the project of partition, Exh. A.
"Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the
transactions between the Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E,
and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon
had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and his wife.
(See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
"On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the
record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere 'dummy' of
respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared
to this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I
believe him when he testi ed that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and
for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any intervention of, or
previous understanding with Judge Asuncion" (pp. 391-394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted
illegally in approving the project of partition although it was not signed by the
parties, We quote with approval the ndings of the Investigating Justice, as
follows:
"1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have
required the signature of the parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola
on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however, whatever
error was committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith
as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo,
the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, that he was authorized by his client
to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn. p. 24, January 20,
1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not
presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to
corroborate the statement of respondent, his af davit being the only one
that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs.
Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the
project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer
to the following documents:
"1) Exh. 9 — Certi ed true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot
1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco
Reyes holds a '1/4 share' (Exh. 9-a). On this certi cate of title the Order
dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was
duly entered and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
"2) Exh. 7 — Certi ed copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by
Bernardita Reyes Macariola on October 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector
Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In
this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of said
one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated to her as her share in
the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was
duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on December 3,
1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
"In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted
that in the project of partition dated October 16, 1963, which was approved
by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on
November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs.
Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr.
Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the preparation of the project
of partition.
"Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter
sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case
3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is
absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one-
fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the
other half of said one-fourth was the share of complainant's mother, Felisa
Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-
fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4).
Complainant became the owner of the entire one fourth of Lot 1154 only by
means of the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold
Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was
well aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased father as per
Exhs. A and B. It is also signi cant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola
admitted during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in
connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn. p. 92, November 28,
1968) from which we can deduce that she could not have been kept ignorant
of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of partition.
"Complainant also assails the project of partition because according
to her the properties adjudicated to her were insigni cant lots and the least
valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any direct and positive
evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and
distribution of the real properties when she could have easily done so by
presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and market
value of said properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in the record
to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of the properties of
complainant's father" (pp. 386-389, rec.).
Finally, while it is true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-
E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have
acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which requires that: "A judge's of cial conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and
in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: ". . . it was unwise
and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion
of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it
to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking of cers at
the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has
the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the
courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his
actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the
uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent,
he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his
actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed
that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing
it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should
nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a
corporation in which he and his wife were nancially involved, to avoid possible
suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to his of cial
actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the
litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in
general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our
courts of justice" (pp. 395-396, rec.). LexLib
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that
respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking of cer, said corporation
having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:
"Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in

person or by proxy, nor can they hold any of ce or have any direct,
administrative, or nancial intervention in commercial or industrial
companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they
discharge their duties:
"1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and of cials of the
department of public prosecution in active service. This provision shall not
be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting
attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the
functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
"5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not
engage in commerce in a determinate territory."
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is
incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of
the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates
the relationship between the government and certain public of cers and
employees, like justices and judges.
Political Law has been de ned as that branch of public law which deals with
the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and de ne
the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto,
43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces
constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law
on public of cers and elections. Speci cally, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the
conduct of certain public of cers and employees with respect to engaging in
business; hence, political in essence.
It is signi cant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish
Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modi cations made by the "Comision de
Codi cacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines
by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on
December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later
on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code
of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is
change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether
compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311
[1912]) that:
"'By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation
to another, either following a conquest or otherwise, . . . those laws which are
political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former
government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty.' (Opinion,
Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
"While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in con ict
with the laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the express
assent or af rmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not.
(Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the
prior sovereignty as are not in con ict with the constitution or institutions of
the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so
declare by af rmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by
Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S.
220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356
Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice
Marshall said:
'On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that
the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their
relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are
created between them and the government which has acquired their territory.
The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those
who remain in it; and the law which may be denominated political, is
necessarily changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and
general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly-
created power of the State.'"
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated
that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the
previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated."
There appears no enabling or af rmative act that continued the effectivity of
the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of
sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the
Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and
binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First
Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated
paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:
"Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public of cers. — In addition to acts
or omissions of public of cers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public of cer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
"(h) Directly or indirectly having nancial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes
or takes part in his of cial capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest."
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph
because there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in his
official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which
respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial
of ce. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent
intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As
was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal
Code which has a similar prohibition on public of cers against directly or indirectly
becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his of cial duty to
intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public of cial to be subject to this crime: it is
necessary that by reason of his of ce, he has to intervene in said contracts or
transactions; and, hence, the of cial who intervenes in contracts or transactions
which have no relation to his of ce cannot commit this crime" (People vs.
Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised
Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. II [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation
gained any undue advantage in its business operations by reason of respondent's
nancial involvement in it, or that the corporation bene ted in one way or another
in any case led by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case
led in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the
corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234
entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein
the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid
corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was led only on
November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D.
Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with the
corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967. cdrep
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because

there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines,
nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from
engaging or having interest in any lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as
the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a
matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in
teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after of ce hours but
with the permission of the district judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from
engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically
upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in
nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code
against the purchase by judges of a property in litigation before the court within
whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge
because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the nality of his
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of
partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made
pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an of cer or employee in the
civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of department, the same, however,
may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a
prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public of cer from having any interest
in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a
violation of the aforesaid rule by any of cer or employee in the civil service, that is,
engaging in private business without a written permission from the Department
Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section

12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959
(R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly
Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said
Section 12: "No of cer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural
or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of
Department . . ."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of
the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known
as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was
then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil
Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and
upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon
its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to
conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section de nes the
grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel
of the Judiciary. cdphil
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The
Commissioner may, for . . . violation of the existing Civil Service Law and rules or of
reasonable of ce regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any
subordinate of cer or employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend
him for not more than one year without pay or ne him in an amount not exceeding
six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for
disciplinary action against civil service officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service of cers
or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil
Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department
to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil
Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the
Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution,
the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X,
1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be
considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to
recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the
discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes
only two grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the
Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o
decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all administrative
cases against permanent of cers and employees in the competitive service, and,
except as provided by law, to have nal authority to pass upon their removal,
separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline,
and ef ciency of such of cers and employees; and prescribe standards,
guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis
supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or
unclassi ed service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is
therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that ". . . in
interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only
permanent of cers and employees who belong to the classi ed service come
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs.
Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710, 713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business
by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder
and a ranking of cer, is not violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil
Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable
because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:
"A judge should abstain from making personal investments in
enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court; and, after
his accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments previously
made, longer than a period suf cient to enable him to dispose of them
without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably
possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the
suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his
impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. . . ."
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his
wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold
their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid
corporation did not in anyway bene t in any case led by or against it in court as
there was no case led in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the
corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the
eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation.
Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation
only 22 days after the in corporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent
realized that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid
Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation
for their immediate withdrawal from the rm after its incorporation and before it
became involved in any court litigation.
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged
that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of
judicial decorum, and that there was culpable de ance of the law and utter
disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the
Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid
causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report
which reads as follows:
"The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that
respondent associated and closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan
who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see
Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does
not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar
as certified to in Exh. K.
The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an
'impostor' and claims that all the time he believed that the latter was a bona
fide member of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of
respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan
represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up
a signboard with his name and the words 'Attorney-at-Law' (Exh. I and I-1) to
indicate his of ce, and it was but natural for respondent and any person for
that matter to have accepted that statement on its face value.
"Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is
guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting
his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that
fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any canon of
judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and
family did not in uence his of cial actuations as a judge where said
persons were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that herein
respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan
or that the latter bene tted in his practice of law from his personal relations
with respondent, or that he used his in uence, if he had any, on the Judges
of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.
"Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to
refrain as much as possible from maintaining close friendly relations with
practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that
his social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in
determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a
Judge does have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground
for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations
beclouded his of cial actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his
friends" (pp. 403-405, rec.).
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of
land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a
private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance
of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be
characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.LibLex
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova
and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J. Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., took no part.
Barredo, J., I vote with Justice Aquino.
Aquino, J., I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 82544. June 28, 1988.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF:

ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL
ELSHOUT , petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION , respondent.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA , J : p
A petition for Habeas Corpus.

Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, are both
American nationals residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna, while Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58 years
old, is a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna.
The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their
respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID)
by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago of the CID. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were
apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Two (2) days after apprehension, or on 29 February 1988, seventeen (17) of the twenty-
two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country. One was
released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but for
working without a valid working visa. Thus, of the original twenty two (22), only the three
petitioners have chosen to face deportation.
Seized during petitioners' apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the
suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in
the sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes.
The "Operation Report" on Andrew Harvey and Richard Sherman dated 29 February 1988
stated:
xxx xxx xxx
"ANDREW MARK HARVEY was found together with two young boys.
"RICHARD SHERMAN was found with two naked boys inside his room."
In respect of Van Den Elshout, the "After Mission Report," dated 27 February 1988 read in
part:
"Noted:
There were two (2) children ages 14 & 16 which subject readily accepted having
been in his care and live-in for quite sometime."
On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being
undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Deportation Case
No. 88-13). The "Charge Sheet" read inter alia:
"Wherefore, this Office charges the respondents for deportation, as undesirable
aliens, in that: they, being pedophiles, are inimical to public morals, public health
and public safety as provided in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code."
On 7 March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for
violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial
against petitioners.
On 14 March 1988, petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging
that their health was being seriously affected by their continuous detention. Upon
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their provisional release, respondent
ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners, who certified that petitioners were healthy.
On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which, however, respondent denied
considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. To avoid
congestion, respondent ordered petitioners' transfer to the CID detention cell at Fort
Bonifacio, but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to the difficulty of transporting
them to and from the CID where trial was on-going.
On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had
"finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at
least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs
the country." On 7 April 1988, the Board of Special Inquiry — III allowed provisional release
of five (5) days only under certain conditions. However, it appears that on the same date
that the aforesaid Manifestation/Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had
already filed the present petition.
On 4 April 1988, as heretofore stated, petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus. A Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard
the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. A Traverse to the Writ was presented by
petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor General. LLjur
Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds:

1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any
authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a
probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.
2) Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid
Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision.
3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the
activities of petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other
suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they
are caught in the act. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any
Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.
We reject petitioners' contentions and uphold respondent's official acts ably defended by
the Solicitor General.
There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons,
including aliens, whether accused of crime or not (Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1
[1948]. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of
arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as
referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that
in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance
thereof" (People vs. Syjuco, 64 Phil. 667 [1937]; Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 [1937]).
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest without a warrant may
be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has
committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence;
and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5). prcd
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close
surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives,
photographs and posters without warrant (See Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, February 28,
1968, 22 SCRA 857; People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, L-41686, November 17,
1980, 101 SCRA 86, cited in CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., p. 143). Those articles
were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence
(Section 12, Rule 126, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception,
the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as
undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7
March 1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69
of the Administrative Code." A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special
Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has
served its purpose. The process of the law is being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, L-39823,
February 25, 1975, 62 SCRA 543). "Where a person's detention was later made by virtue of
a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, his
petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014,
April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 717). "It is a fundamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not
be granted when the confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was
illegal at the beginning" (Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050 [1947]).
That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners
were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being
naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that
petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psycho-sexual perversion involving
children" (Kraft-Ebbing Psychopatia Sexualis, p. 555; "Paraphilia or unusual sexual activity
in which children are the preferred sexual object" (Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665) [Solicitor General's Return of the Writ, on p. 10]. While not a
crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative
of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual,
and social well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution).
At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be
considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from
questioning its validity (Callanta v. Villanueva, L-24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA
377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, L-61770, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 525).
The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with

Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part:
"(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other officer designated by
him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against
the alien;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the summary and
indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise, the very purpose of deportation
proceedings would be defeated.
Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967,
20 SCRA 562). The specific constraints in both the 1935 1 and 1987 2 Constitutions, which
are substantially identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature.
Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of
deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It
need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
"It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a
criminal action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, (Mahler vs. Eby,
264 U.S., 32), it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken
the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders (U.S. vs.
De los Santos, 33 Phil., 397). The deportation proceedings are administrative in
character, (Kessler vs. Stracker, 307 U.S., 22) summary in nature, and need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings (Murdock vs.
Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155). It is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest shall give
the alien sufficient information about the charges against him, relating the facts
relied upon. (U.S. vs. Uhl, 211 F., 628.) It is also essential that he be given a fair
hearing with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced
investigators (Strench vs. Pedaris, 55 F. [2d], 597; Ex parte Jew You On, 16 F. [2d],
153). However, all the strict rules of evidence governing judicial controversies do
not need to be observed; only such as are fundamental and essential, like the right
of cross-examination. (U.S. vs. Hughes, 104 F. [2d], 14; Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F.
[2d], 155.) Hearsay evidence may even be admitted, provided the alien is given the
opportunity to explain or rebut it (Morrell vs. Baker, 270 F., 577; Sercerchi vs. Ward,
27 F. Supp., 437)." (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 [1948]).
The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G. R. No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that "the
issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of
investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3,
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution" (referring to the 1935 Constitution) 3 is not
invocable herein. Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of Arrest issued on 7 March 1988
did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. They
were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code." Before that, deportation proceedings had
been commenced against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was
a step preliminary to their possible deportation. cdrep
"Section 37 of the Immigration Law, which empowers the Commissioner of

Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens is
constitutional. The arrest is a step preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who
had violated the condition of their stay in this country." (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196,
June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562).
To rule otherwise would be to render the authority given the Commissioner nugatory to the
detriment of the State.
"The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, which gives
authority to the Commissioner of Immigration to order the arrest of an alien
temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for failure to put up new bonds
required for the stay, is not unconstitutional.
xxx xxx xxx

". . . Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground
for his deportation under Section 37[a]of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary
interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State."
(Ng Hua To vs. Galang, G.R. No. 10140, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 411).
"The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not

extend to deportation proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai
vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial
and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceedings.
The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (G.
R. No. 10280, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]) reiterated in Vivo vs. Montesa,
supra, that "under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution), it is
therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority
other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause,
leading to an administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated, probable cause had
already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued.
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be
arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance
of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. Thus,
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly provides: LibLex
"Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign

power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from
said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines
except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized
agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such a case the
person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he
shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation of his defense. He shall
also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his
own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses."
The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by

them, was in order because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of
right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that
"any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under
such other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration." The use
of the word "may" in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and
not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly
discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-9700, February 28, 1962,
4 SCRA 442). "Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code
guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to provisional liberty on bail." (Tiu Chun
Hai, et al vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]). As deportation proceedings do not
partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be
invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration,
supra).
Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon
such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest (Lao Tan
Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 [1948]). The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act
done by or under the authority of the sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil.
41[1918]). It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in
the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the
people (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, et al., 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). Particularly so in this case
where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to
assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]).
Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation
proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1[3],
Art. III).
2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." (Section 2,
Art. III).
3. Reiterated in Neria vs. Vivo (L-26611-12, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 701); Tiu vs. Vivo,
L-21425, September 15, 1972, 47 SCRA 23; and Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, L-21426,
October 22, 1975, 67 SCRA 338).

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128195. October 3, 2001.]
ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE, HON. JUDGE JOSE D.

ALOVERA, * Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Roxas City,
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, petitioners, vs . REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND
THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY and THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS , respondents.
Patrocinio S. Palanog for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners, heirs of Lee Liong, sought reconstitution of title of subject parcel of

land in the name of Lee Liong whose transfer certi cate of title was lost or destroyed
during the war. At the trial, they presented documents proving the sale of the land from
the Dinglasans to Lee Liong and the latter's subsequent possession of the property in
the concept of owner. The trial court ordered the reconstitution of title in the name of
Lee Liong. The Dinglasans, however, claimed that Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was
disquali ed to acquire the land in question. The Court of Appeals nulli ed the trial
court's order.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that ownership of the land cannot revert to
the Dinglasans (original sellers), because of the doctrine of pari delicto. The Solicitor
General may le an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, but in this
case, petitioners' acquisition of Philippine citizenship cured the aw in the transaction
and transfer of subject property to them can no longer be impugned. Proof of the
transfer of ownership of subject property, however, must be threshed out in a separate
proceeding. Reconstitution of title cannot also be ordered because it must be based on
an owner's duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the title to
be reconstituted, none of which was presented in this case. cCaDSA
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROSCRIPTION ON SALE OF REAL ESTATE TO

ALIENS; DOCTRINE OF PARI DELICTO APPLICABLE TO VENDOR AND VENDEE THEREIN;
CASE AT BAR. — "In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue
of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have
committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not
afford protection to either party." The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor
General. This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an action
for annulment of judgment of reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than
sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action. Prescription never
lies against the State. Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers,
because of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for
reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set
forth. In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings
because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since
died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners
herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY TRANSFEREE; CASE AT BAR. — The constitutional proscription on alien
ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from
falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public
policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos quali ed to acquire and own such
land. "If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the aw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title
of the transferee is rendered valid." Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to
quali ed Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial
transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands
has been achieved. ASCTac
3. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE; VALID

SOURCES OF THE TITLE TO BE RECONSTITUTED; CASE AT BAR. — Incidentally, it must be
mentioned that reconstitution of the original certi cate of title must be based on an
owner's duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the title to be
reconstituted. In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and technical description
approved by the Land Registration Authority. This renders the order of reconstitution void
for lack of factual support. A judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is void.
DECISION
PARDO , J : p
The case under consideration is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1
of the Court of Appeals nullifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, in
Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, 2 pertaining to Lot 398, Capiz Cadastre, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 3389.
Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes,
Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan sold
to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631 square
meters, designated as Lot 398 and covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 3389,
situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City. 3
However, in 1948, the former owners led with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an
action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. 4 The
plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against
aliens acquiring ownership of private agricultural land, including residential, commercial or
industrial land. Rebuffed in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs appealed to
the Supreme Court. On June 27, 1956, the Supreme Court ruled thus:
". . . granting the sale to be null and void and can not give title to the
vendee, it does not necessarily follow therefrom that the title remained in the
vendor, who had also violated the constitutional prohibition, or that he (vendor)
has the right to recover the title of which he has divested himself by his act in
ignoring the prohibition. In such contingency another principle of law sets in to
bar the equally guilty vendor from recovering the title which he had voluntarily
conveyed for a consideration, that of pari delicto." 5
On July 1, 1968, the same former owners Rafael A. Dinglasan, together with
Francisco, Carmen, Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Rizal,
Jimmy, and Jesse Dinglasan led with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action for
recovery of the same parcel of land. 6 Citing the case of Philippine Banking Corporation v.
Lui She, 7 they submitted that the sale to Lee Liong was null and void for being violative of
the Constitution. On September 23, 1968, the heirs of Lee Liong led with the trial court a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. 8 On October 10, 1968, and
November 9, 1968, the trial court denied the motion. 9 The heirs of Lee Liong elevated the
case to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari. On April 22, 1977, the Supreme Court
annulled the orders of the trial court and directed it to dismiss the case, holding that the
suit was barred by res judicata. 1 0 CTIEac
On September 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee led with the
Regional Trial Court, Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 of the
Capiz Cadastre, formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389 of the Register of
Deeds of Roxas City. 1 1 Petitioners alleged that they were the widows of the deceased Lee
Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the lot. Lee Liong
died intestate in February 1944. On June 30, 1947, Lee Liong's widow, Ang Chia, and his
two sons, Lee Bun Ting and Lee Bing Ho, executed an extra-judicial settlement of the
estate of Lee Liong, adjudicating to themselves the subject parcel of land. 1 2 Petitioner
Elizabeth Lee acquired her share in Lot No. 398 through an extra-judicial settlement and
donation executed in her favor by her deceased husband Lee Bing Hoo. Petitioner Pacita
Yu Lee acquired her share in the same lot by succession from her deceased husband Lee
Bun Ting, as evidenced by a deed of extra-judicial settlement. 1 3
Previously, on December 9, 1948, the Register of Deeds Capiz, Salvador Villaluz,
issued a certi cation that a transfer certi cate of title over the property was issued in the
name of Lee Liong. 1 4 However, the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas City were
burned during the war. Thus, as heretofore stated, on September 7, 1968, petitioners led
a petition for reconstitution of title.
On June 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17, ordered the
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certi cate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the
basis of an approved plan and technical description. 1 5 The dispositive portion of the trial
court's decision reads thus:
"WHEREFORE, in reiteration, the Register of Deeds for the City of Roxas is
ordered to reconstitute the lost or destroyed certi cate of title in the name of Lee
Liong, deceased, of Roxas City, with all the conditions stated in paragraph 2 of
this decision. This decision shall become nal after the lapse of thirty (30) days
from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the Commissioner of LRA of a notice
of such judgment without any appeal having been filed by any of such officials.
"SO ORDERED.
"Given at Roxas City, Philippines,

"June 10, 1994.

"JOSE O. ALOVERA
"Judge" 1 6
On August 18, 1994, the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17
issued an Entry of Judgment. 1 7
On January 25, 1995, the Solicitor General led with the Court of Appeals a petition
for annulment of judgment in Reconstitution Case No. 1928, alleging that the Regional Trial
Court, Roxas City had no jurisdiction over the case. 1 8 The Solicitor General contended that
the petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since their
predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese
citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land.
On April 30, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the
judgment of reconstitution void. 1 9
On May 24, 1996, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee led with the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. 2 0 On February 18, 1997, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion. 2 1
Hence, this petition. 2 2
Petitioners submitted that the Solicitor General was estopped from seeking
annulment of the judgment of reconstitution after failing to object during the
reconstitution proceedings before the trial court, despite due notice. Petitioners alleged
that the Solicitor General merely acted on the request of private and politically powerful
individuals who wished to capitalize on the prime location of the subject land.
Petitioners emphasized that the ownership of the land had been settled in two
previous cases of the Supreme Court, where the Court ruled in favor of their predecessor-
in-interest, Lee Liong. Petitioners also pointed out that they acquired ownership of the land
through actual possession of the lot and their consistent payment of taxes over the land
for more than sixty years.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that the decision in the
reconstitution case was void; otherwise, it would amount to circumventing the
constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring ownership of private or public
agricultural lands.
We grant the petition.
The reconstitution of a certi cate of title denotes restoration in the original form
and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land. 2 3 The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss
or destruction occurred. 2 4
In this case, petitioners sought a reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong,
alleging that the transfer certi cate of title issued to him was lost or destroyed during
World War II. All the documents recorded and issued by the Register of Deeds, Capiz,
which include the transfer certi cate of title issued in the name of Lee Liong, were all
destroyed during the war. The fact that the original of the transfer certi cate of title was
not in the les of the O ce of the Register of Deeds did not imply that a transfer
certi cate of title had not been issued. 2 5 In the trial court proceedings, petitioners
presented evidence proving the sale of the land from the Dinglasans to Lee Liong and the
latter's subsequent possession of the property in the concept of owner. Thus, the trial
court, after examining all the evidence before it, ordered the reconstitution of title in the
name of Lee Liong.
However, there is a question as to whether Lee Liong has the quali cation to own
land in the Philippines.
The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, 2 6 aliens could not
acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. 2 7 Thus, Lee
Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question. 2 8
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate
the transaction, for it was still contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens
acquiring lands of the public or private domain. However, the proper party to assail the
illegality of the transaction was not the parties to the transaction. 2 9 "In sales of real estate
to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution
both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation
and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party." 3 0 The
proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This was what was done in this case
when the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of reconstitution
of title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred
from initiating such action. Prescription never lies against the State. 3 1
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the
doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat
of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth. 3 2
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings
because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since
died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners
herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute. DSHTaC
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private

domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this
case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands
of Filipinos quali ed to acquire and own such land. "If land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the aw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid." 3 3 Thus,
the subsequent transfer of the property to quali ed Filipinos may no longer be impugned
on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. 3 4 The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certi cate of
title must be based on an owner's duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid
sources of the title to be reconstituted. 3 5 In this case, reconstitution was based on the
plan and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority. 3 6 This renders
the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual support. 3 7 A judgment with absolutely
nothing to support it is void. 3 8
As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certi cate
of title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. 3 9 It does not pass upon the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. 4 0 Any change in the
ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit. 4 1 Thus, although
petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out
the issue of ownership of the land.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside the order of
reconstitution of title in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City,
and dismisses the petition, without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., is on official leave.
Footnotes
* Neither the judge nor the Court of Appeals is a proper party as petitioner or respondent
(Rule 45, Sec. 4, Revised Rules of Court).
1. In CA-G.R. SP No. 36274, promulgated on April 30, 1996. Salas, J., ponente, Cañizares-
Nye and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concurring.
2. Dated June 10, 1994.

3. Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting, 99 Phil. 427, 429 [1956].
4. Ibid., at p. 432.
5. Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting, supra, Note 3, p. 431.
6. Civil Case No. V-3064.
7. 21 SCRA 52 [1967].
8. Lee Bun Ting v. Aligaen, 76 SCRA 416, 420 [1977].
9. Ibid., at pp. 421-422.
10. Ibid., at p. 425.
11. Comment, Rollo, pp. 148-160, at p. 149; Memorandum, Solicitor General, Rollo, pp. 199-
211, at pp. 199-200.
12. CA Decision, Rollo, p. 82.
13. Ibid.
14. Petition, Annex "E" (Annex "2"), Rollo, p. 66.
15. In Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17, Judge
Jose O. Alovera, presiding.
16. Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 36-37.
17. Petition, Annex "B", Rollo, p. 38.
18. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36274. CA Rollo, pp. 1-11. On February 17, 1995, the
Republic filed an amended complaint, impleading the Administrator, Land Registration
Authority, as plaintiff (Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36517, CA Rollo, pp. 57-65).
19. CA Decision, CA Rollo, pp. 148-157.
20. Petition, Annex "H", Rollo, pp. 90-100.
21. Rollo, p. 117.

22. Filed on April 3, 1997, Rollo, pp. 12-35. On July 12, 1999, we gave due course to the
petition (Rollo, pp. 182-183). The case was considered submitted for decision on
December 13, 1999 upon the filing of petitioner's memorandum (Rollo, pp. 216-226).
23. Republic v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 110, 118 [1999]; Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 314
Phil. 57 [1995].
24. Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 23; Heirs of Pinote v. Dulay, 187 SCRA 12, 19-
20 [1990].
25. Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 591, 597 [1999].
26. Article XIII, Section 5, 1935 Constitution.
27. Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 [1947]; Halili v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil.
906, 914-915 [1998].
28. Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341, 346 [1994].
29. Lee Bun Ting v. Aligaen, supra, Note 8; Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting, supra, Note 3.
30. Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap, 96 Phil. 447, 451 [1955].
31. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95533, November 20, 2000, citing Reyes v .Court
of Appeals, 356 Phil. 606, 624 (1998); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 721, 734
(1989); de la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 898, 905 [1998].
32. Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827 [1953].

33. United Church Board of World Ministries v. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, 451-452 [1988].
34. Halili v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 27, at p. 917.
35. Heirs of Eulalio Ragua v. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 7 [2000].
36. Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 36-37.
37. Heirs of Eulalio Ragua v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 35.
38. Yangco v. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 183, 191 [1915].
39. Heirs of Eulalio Ragua v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 35, at p. 23 [2000], citing Strait
Times Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 217, 230 [1998]; Stilianopulos v. The City of
Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523, 538 [1999].
40. Strait Times Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 39.

41. Bunagan v. CFI of Cebu, Branch VI, 97 SCRA 72, 76 [1980].

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153883. January 13, 2004.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . CHULE Y. LIM ,

respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court stemmed
from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court led by
respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933.
In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-
an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that
both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays
that they be corrected.
The trial court then issued an Order, 1 which reads:
WHEREFORE, nding the petition to be su cient in form and substance,
let the hearing of this case be set on December 27, 1999 before this Court, Hall of
Justice, Rosario Heights, Tubod, Iligan City at 8:30 o'clock in the afternoon at
which date, place and time any interested person may appear and show cause
why the petition should not be granted.
Let this order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City
of Iligan and the Province of Lanao del Norte once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioner.
Furnish copies of this order the O ce of the Solicitor General at 134

Amorsolo St., Legaspi Vill., Makati City and the O ce of the Local Civil Registrar
of Iligan City at Quezon Ave., Pala-o, Iligan City.
SO ORDERED.
During the hearing, respondent testified thus:

First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has been using
"Yu" in all her school records and in her marriage certi cate. 2 She presented a clearance
from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) 3 to further show the consistency in her
use of the surname "Yu".
Second, she claims that her father's name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu
To (Co Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)."
Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino
considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was
Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to
the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certi cate that she was a legitimate
child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents
were never married.
Placida Anto, respondent's mother, testi ed that she is a Filipino citizen as her
parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughter's father
were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China.
In this connection, respondent presented a certi cation attested by o cials of the
local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record
of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.
The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence
although it actively participated in the proceedings by attending hearings and cross-
examining respondent and her witnesses.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondent's petition and rendered
judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, to set the records of the
petitioner straight and in their proper perspective, the petition is granted and the
Civil Registrar of Iligan City is directed to make the following corrections in the
birth records of the petitioner, to wit:
1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
2. Her father's name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO
TIAN)";
3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to

"NO" in answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and,
4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
SO ORDERED. 4
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial court's decision. 5
Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE
CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT CHULE Y. LIM FROM "CHINESE" TO "FILIPINO"
DESPITE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER DEMONSTRATED ANY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTION OF
CITIZENSHIP.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO CONTINUE

USING HER FATHER'S SURNAME DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT IS
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD. 6

To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondent's
recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what indisputably are substantial
corrections and changes in entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If
the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the recti cation affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of
a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our
ruling in Republic v. Valencia 7 where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted,
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. 8
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the Republic's failure to
cite this error amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court considering that the proceeding can be appropriately classi ed as
adversarial.
Instead, in its rst assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent did not
comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which
provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the
child elected Philippine citizenship. 9 Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers
may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed
and sworn to by the party concerned before any o cer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be led with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines." 1 0
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino
citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent
who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino
mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an
illegitimate, child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon
birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority. acCITS
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar, 1 1 citing In re Florencio Mallare, 1 2
we held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore
himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the
rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (US. vs. Ong Tianse, 29
Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra
vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be
taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship
privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 1 3
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship
when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when
she was 18 years old. 1 4 The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. 1 5
In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals'
decision in allowing respondent to use her father's surname despite its nding that she is
illegitimate.
The Republic's submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow
respondent to use her father's surname. What it did allow was the correction of her father's
misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can remember. In this
regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her father's
surname.
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held:
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from
using her father's surname which she has used for four decades without any
known objection from anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of
the reasons allowed for changing one's name or surname is to avoid confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating
the use of aliases, a person is allowed to use a name "by which he has been
known since childhood."
Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue. In
Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils., 1 6 we held:
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of
aliases, allows a person to use a name "by which he has been known since
childhood" (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio ,
102 Phil. 679; Republic v. Tañada , infra). Even legitimate children cannot
enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De
Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222). 1 7
While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, 1 8 there is no
such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been
using since childhood. 1 9
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression
of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of
name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose
surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. 2 0 In this case, the Republic
has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of
future mischief. In respondent's case, the change in the surname that she has been using
for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in general.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68893 dated May 29, 2002, is
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following
corrections in the birth record of respondent Chule Y. Lim, to wit:
1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
2. Her father's name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)";
3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in
answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and,
4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino". CAIaHS
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Exhibit "B", Records, p. 14.
2. Exhibit "J", Records, p. 35.

3. Exhibit "L", Records, p. 37.
4. Penned by Judge Gerardo D. Paguio.
5. CA-G.R. CV No. 68893, penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes; concurred in by

Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Amelita G. Tolentino; Rollo, pp. 29-40.
6. Rollo, p. 16.
7. 141 SCRA 462, 474, G.R. No. L-32181, March 5, 1986.
8. Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, 382 SCRA 22, 27, G.R. No. 130277, , May
9, 2002.
9. Re: Application for Admission to the Bar, Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, 1 October 1999, 374
Phil. 342, 349.
10. Id., at 350.
11. Supra.
12. In re: Florencio Mallare, Adm. Case No. 533, 12 September 1974, 59 Phil. 45, 52.
13. Re: Application for Admission to the Bar, Ching, supra.

14. TSN, February 13, 2000, p. 7.
15. In re: Florencio Mallare, supra, cited in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 30 July 1991, 199 SCRA 692, 707.
16. No. L-27298, 4 March 1976, 162 Phil. 22, 29.
17. Rollo, pp. 38-39.

18. Civil Code, Art. 376.
19. Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils., No. L-27298, 4 March 1976, 162 Phil. 22, 29.
20. Llaneta v. Hon. Agrava, G.R. No. L-32054, 15 May 1974, 156 Phil. 21, 24.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 160869. May 11, 2007.]
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR

SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER — HECTOR
GUMANGAN CALILUNG , petitioner, vs . THE HONORABLE SIMEON
DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice ,
respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING , J : p
This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Petitioner led the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice
Simeon Datumanong, the o cial tasked to implement laws governing citizenship. 1
Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing
Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No.
63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states,
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29,
2003, reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the

State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act. TIDaCE
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to

the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or a rm) that I will

support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. — The unmarried child, whether

legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who
reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed
citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: DcITaC
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet

the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003"
and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public o ce in the Philippines shall

meet the quali cations for holding such public o ce as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the ling of the
certi cate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public o cer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public o ce shall subscribe and

swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its
duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of o ce: Provided,
That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took
that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the

Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public

office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or TSHEIc
(b) are in the active service as commissioned or

noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which
they are naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. — If any section or provision of this Act is

held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected
thereby shall remain valid and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and

regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect after fteen (15)
days following its publication in the O cial Gazette or two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act
No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of
dual allegiance?
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He
avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not
dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born
or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without
losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows
natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply
taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance. 2 The Constitution,
however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest. ASEcHI
The O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a
state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath
in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino
citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that
the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the
Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical a rmation of his undivided loyalty to the
Republic. 3
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of
Congress is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the
assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow
dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative
deliberations reveals the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two
situations exist — the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and
therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual
allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the
creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the
Constitution. IEAacT
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the
constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said
that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it
addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an
oath. He explained that the problem of dual citizenship is transferred
from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that
will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the
Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added
that this is a matter which the Philippine government will have no concern and
competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern,
when dual allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clari ed that this was precisely his objection to the original
version of the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the
measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is
transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned , he
explained.
xxx xxx xxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not
denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign
government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine
government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship .
However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in Congress
because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a Member of the House.
xxx xxx xxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual
allegiance contrary to national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he
said that the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the
Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy
of the State that all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
Act." He stressed that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship
but says nothing about the other citizenship . cHCSDa
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is
created wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of
allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely
renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that
foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the
present measure, he clari ed, a person is required to take an oath and
the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that
the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of the
Philippines but of the other foreign country . 4 (Emphasis supplied.)
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the
legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth
Act No. 63 5 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize
dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear
out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to
the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet
passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be
justi cation why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that while it is
true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through
Mercado v. Manzano , 6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual
allegiance from dual citizenship. 7
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance
is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues
regarding dual allegiance. 8
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and
it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with
dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. 9 Congress was given a
mandate to draft a law that would set speci c parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance. 1 0 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including
this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. cADTSH
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed
since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance.
Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes
dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan , 1 1 we said that the courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of
the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint
and act with caution and forbearance. 1 2 The doctrine of separation of powers demands
no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual
allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what
acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna,
Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1. Executive Order No. 292, also known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," Book IV, Title
III, Chapter 1 (on the Department of Justice), states:
xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. — To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the
laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens;
xxx xxx xxx

2. Rollo, p. 9.
3. Id. at 48.
4. 11 JOURNAL, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (August 26, 2003).
5. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST
OR REACQUIRED. (Approved on October 21, 1936.)
xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost . — A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship
in any of the following ways and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
xxx xxx xxx
6. G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999, 307 SCRA 630.
7. Id. at 643.
8. Rollo, pp. 55-56.
9. Supra note 7.
10. RECORDS, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 365 (July 8, 1986).
11. G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001, 369 SCRA 394.
12. Id. at 431.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 187567. February 15, 2012.]
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . NORA FE SAGUN ,

respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR. , J : p
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari led by the Solicitor General on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, seeking the reversal of the April 3, 2009 Decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R. The RTC
granted the petition 2 filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun entitled "In re: Judicial Declaration
of Election of Filipino Citizenship, Nora Fe Sagun v. The Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City."
The facts follow:
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City 3 and did not
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and
after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance 4 to the Republic of
the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17,
1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her
application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation
on her birth certi cate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she
sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the
Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth
certificate.
In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and
Tagalog uently and attended local schools in Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy
and the Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed that despite her part-Chinese ancestry,
she always thought of herself as a Filipino. She is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A
of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections
as shown in the Voter Certi cation 5 issued by Atty. Maribelle Uminga of the Commission
on Elections of Baguio City.
She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine
citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to
the issuance of a Philippine passport.
On August 7, 2007, the Of ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as
counsel for the Republic of the Philippines and authorized the City Prosecutor of Baguio
City to appear in the above mentioned case. 6 However, no comment was led by the City
Prosecutor. IDCScA
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3, 2009
granting the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y
Chan is hereby DECLARED [a] FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino
citizenship.
Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is
hereby directed to annotate [on] her birth certi cate, this judicial declaration of
Filipino citizenship of said petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling, petitioner, through the OSG, directly led
the instant recourse via a petition for review on certiorari before us. Petitioner raises the
following issues:
I
Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine

citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible; and,
II
Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after
reaching the age of majority, is considered to have been made "within a
reasonable time" as interpreted by jurisprudence. 8
Petitioner argues that respondent's petition before the RTC was improper on two counts:
for one, law and jurisprudence clearly contemplate no judicial action or proceeding for the
declaration of Philippine citizenship; and for another, the pleaded registration of the oath
of allegiance with the local civil registry and its annotation on respondent's birth certi cate
are the ministerial duties of the registrar; hence, they require no court order. Petitioner
asserts that respondent's petition before the trial court seeking a judicial declaration of
her election of Philippine citizenship undeniably entails a determination and consequent
declaration of her status as a Filipino citizen which is not allowed under our legal system.
Petitioner also argues that if respondent's intention in ling the petition is ultimately to
have her oath of allegiance registered with the local civil registry and annotated on her
birth certificate, then she does not have to resort to court proceedings.
Petitioner further argues that even assuming that respondent's action is sanctioned, the
trial court erred in nding respondent as having duly elected Philippine citizenship since
her purported election was not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and
was not made within a "reasonable time." Petitioner points out that while respondent
executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no af davit of her election
of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered with
the nearest local civil registry was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years
after she reached the age of majority. Accordingly, it was made beyond the period allowed
by law. TDcAaH
In her Comment, 9 respondent avers that notwithstanding her failure to formally elect
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, she has in fact effectively elected
Filipino citizenship by her performance of positive acts, among which is the exercise of the
right of suffrage. She claims that she had voted and participated in all local and national
elections from the time she was of legal age. She also insists that she is a Filipino citizen
despite the fact that her "election" of Philippine citizenship was delayed and unregistered.
In reply, 1 0 petitioner argues that the special circumstances invoked by respondent, like her
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, her having been educated in schools
in the country, her choice of staying here despite the naturalization of her parents as
American citizens, and her being a registered voter, cannot confer on her Philippine
citizenship as the law speci cally provides the requirements for acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by election.
Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondent's petition for
declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence; (2) whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the
decisions, nal resolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of
law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand,
there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether
the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law. 1 1
In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision of the trial court
declaring respondent a Filipino citizen after nding that respondent was able to
substantiate her election of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner contends that respondent's
petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and
jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner has raised questions of law as the
resolution of these issues rest solely on what the law provides given the attendant
circumstances.
In granting the petition, the trial court stated:
This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully substantiate her petition
regarding her election of Filipino citizenship, and the Local Civil Registrar of
Baguio City should be ordered to annotate in her birth certi cate her election of
Filipino citizenship. This Court adds that the petitioner's election of Filipino
citizenship should be welcomed by this country and people because the petitioner
has the choice to elect citizenship of powerful countries like the United States of
America and China, however, petitioner has chosen Filipino citizenship because
she grew up in this country, and has learned to love the Philippines. Her choice of
electing Filipino citizenship is, in fact, a testimony that many of our people still
wish to live in the Philippines, and are very proud of our country.
acIHDA
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y

Chan is hereby DECLARED as FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino
citizenship. 1 2
For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law,
or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. 1 3 There is no
speci c legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a
given person is part of our citizenry. 1 4 This was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic 1 5
citing the early case of Tan v. Republic of the Philippines, 1 6 where we clearly stated:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable
controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an
act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by
law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights
of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is
beyond judicial power. . . .
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a speci c declaration of respondent's
Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the court's competence.
As to the propriety of respondent's petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent is required
under the law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural
requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1 (4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child
born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless,
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "
[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty- ve" are citizens of the Philippines. 1 7 Likewise, this
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which
states that "[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 1 8 It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine
citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a
person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge
under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the
effectivity of the new Constitution. 1 9
Being a legitimate child, respondent's citizenship followed that of her father who is
Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a
settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that
illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality. 2 0 An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him
all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically
becomes a citizen himself. 2 1 But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a
Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority. EAICTS
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, 2 2 enacted pursuant to Section 1 (4), Article IV of the
1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a
valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any of cer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be led with the nearest civil registry.
The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1)
a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the
oath with the nearest civil registry. 2 3
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under
C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the
requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should rst be
required to register as an alien. 2 4 Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is
required to le a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now
Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certi cate of registration based on
his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Of ce will initially decide, based on
the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. 2 5 Afterwards, the same is
elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review. 2 6
It should be stressed that there is no speci c statutory or procedural rule which authorizes
the direct ling of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the
courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested
party to le an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election,
loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent. CETIDH
Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural in rmity, still the trial court's
conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the
records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements
for a valid election. Speci cally, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her
election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent
in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years
after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the
petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondent's oath of allegiance suf ces, its
execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority
and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A.
No. 625. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election
should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. 2 7
Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and
the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the
procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.
Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law
speci cally lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere
exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar
acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of
Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention
of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly
elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching, 2 8 the prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required
of the elector is to execute an af davit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter,
le the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing
requirements, respondent's petition before the trial court must be denied.
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The Decision dated April 3, 2009 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 3 of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE . The petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship led by
respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED .
Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 27-32. Penned by Presiding Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.

2.Records, pp. 1-4.
3.Id. at 60.
4.Id. at 7.
5.Id. at 8.
6.Id. at 28.
7.Rollo, p. 32.
8.Id. at 59.
9.Id. at 43-44.
10.Id. at 48-49.
11.Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, G.R. No. 175910, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 410, 420.
12.Rollo, pp. 31-32.
13.Yung Uan Chu v. Republic, No. L-34973, April 14, 1988, 159 SCRA 593, 597; Board of
Commissioners v. Domingo, No. L-21274, July 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 661, 664.
14.Id. at 598; Tan v. Republic of the Philippines, 107 Phil. 632, 634 (1960).
15.Id. at 597.
16.Supra note 14 at 633; Republic v. Maddela, Nos. L-21664 and L-21665, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 702, 705.
17.Sec. 1 (3), Art. III, 1973 Constitution.
18.Sec. 1 (3), Art. IV, 1987 Constitution.

19.Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar. Vicente D. Ching, Bar Matter No. 914,
October 1, 1999, 316 SCRA 1, 7-8.
20.Go, Sr. v. Ramos, G.R. Nos. 167569-70 and 171946, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 266, 294-
295.
21.Id. at 295.
22.AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH THE OPTION TO ELECT PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP SHALL BE DECLARED BY PERSON WHOSE MOTHER IS A FILIPINO
CITIZEN, approved on June 7, 1941.
23.Ma v. Fernandez, Jr., G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 566, 577.
24.Ronaldo P. Ledesma, AN OUTLINE OF PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS,

Vol. I, 2006 ed., pp. 526.
25.Id. at 527, citing Memorandum Order dated August 18, 1956 of the CID.
26.Id., citing DOJ Opinion No. 182 dated August 19, 1982.
27.Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar. Vicente D. Ching, supra note 19 at 9; Ma
v. Fernandez, Jr., supra note 23 at 578.
28.Id. at 12.

8/25/2018 B.M. No. 914
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE FULL TEXT
The Lawphil Project Arellano Law Foundation
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR vs. VICENTE D. CHING
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
R E S O L U T I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien

father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age
of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the
application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964.
Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a
Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his
Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the
following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the
Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,
Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union
showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
https://www.lawphil.net/courts/bm/bm_914_1999.html 1/7
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3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,
showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was
one of the successful Bar examinees. The oathtaking of the successful Bar examinees
was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's
citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court,
dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same
resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on
Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine
citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of
a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese
citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected
Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG
adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he
could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG
clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must
be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age
of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of
majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted
by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing
Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s.
1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election
done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship
and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the
OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase
"reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his
Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my
school records and other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino
citizens;
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4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before
a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic)
the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised
is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the
affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under
Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of
a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "
(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirtyfive" are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition
by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "
(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however,
that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was
subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new
charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the
new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid
election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized
to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within
which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only
provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of
majority then commenced upon reaching twentyone (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the
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Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing
Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of
State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within
a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has
been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from
reaching the age of

majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year
period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after
reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that
three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under
certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine
citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He
became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on
May 15, 1951, when he was over twentyeight (28) years of age, or over seven
(7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election
has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirtyfive (35)
years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or
over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was
clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise
the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked
by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a
certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot
vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the socalled special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously
labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re:
Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an
alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been
established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928,
and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was
already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s].
These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein
are very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment
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of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to
him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG,
it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was
already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court
stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a
Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
Republic, L4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L4693, Feb. 16,
1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be
taken on the erroneous belief that he is a nonfilipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that
the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age
constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to
have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the
In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those
who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to
elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding.
Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office,
and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an
alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There
is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty
one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have
8/25/2018 B.M. No. 914
resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we
consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the
Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and
jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG.
Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of
fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover,
Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when
needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the
right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped
away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's
application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, GonzagaReyes and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Citing Cu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 89 Phil. 473, 476 (1951).
2 Citing CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., p. 359.
3 Citing Cuenco. vs. Secretary of Justice, 5 SCRA 108, 110 (1962).
4 Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution;
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents
who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been
elected to public office;
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines,
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
8/25/2018 B.M. No. 914
citizenship;
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
5 Sec. 1(1), Article III, 1973 Constitution.
6 Sec. 1(3), Article IV, 1987 Constitution.
7 BERNAS, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; First Ed. (1987),
p. 502.
8 Ibid., citing Convention Session of November 27, 1972 and noting that it is
also applicable to the 1987 Constitution.
9 Art. 402, Civil Code.
10 Lim Teco vs. Collector of Customs, 24 SCRA 84, 88 (1912).
11 Muñoz vs. Collector of Customs, 20 SCRA 494: 498 (1911); Lorenzo vs.
Collector of Customs, 15 SCRA 559, 592 (1910).
12 5 SCRA 108 (1962).
13 Id., at 110.
14 Id.
15 59 SCRA 45 (1974)
16 Id., at 52.
17 Id.
18 199 SCRA 692 (1991).
19 Id., at 707709 (Emphasis supplied).
20 Yu vs. DefensorSantiago, 169 SCRA 364, 379 (1989).

The Lawphil Project Arellano Law Foundation
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 92191-92. July 30, 1991.]
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and JOSE ONG, JR.,
respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 92202-03. July 30, 1991.]
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner, v s . ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES AND HOUSE OF SENATE; SOLE JUDGES OF ALL CONTESTS
RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
MEMBERS. — The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members (See Article VI, Section 17,
Constitution). The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear
and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the
jurisdiction of these Tribunals. The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin vs.
H R E T (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive. And that, " . . . so
long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted
to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of
any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail
it or even affect the same."
2. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENTS THEREOF AS A RULE BEYOND JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE;
EXCEPTION; ARBITRARY AND IMPROVIDENT USE OF POWER RESULTING TO
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS. — In the case of Robles vs. HRET (181 SCRA 780
[1980]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond
judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision
or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial
of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated
ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there
has to be a remedy for such abuse." In the leading case of Morrero vs. Bocar (66
Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is
beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct
perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It comes in only
when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion
so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — In the absence of a showing that the
HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not
decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide (See Marcos
v s . Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]). It has no power to look into what it
thinks is apparent error. As constitutional creations invested with necessary
power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of
the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs —
independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by
the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139 [1936]). In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful
regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the
Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has placed it (See Veloso vs.
Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]).
4. ID.; SUPREME COURT; EXPANDED JURISDICTION UNDER 1987
CONSTITUTION. — The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been
given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other
branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they
have acted within bounds of the Constitution (See Article VIII, Section 1,
Constitution). Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether
or not the government branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view.
5. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS; HOW CONSTRUED; SPIRIT AND
INTENDMENT MUST PREVAIL. — In construing the law, the Courts are not always
to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment
thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter
would result in absurdity and injustice (Casela vs. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279
[1970]). A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective
operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of
the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof (Jarrolt vs . Mabberly,
103 U.S. 580). In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuazon vs. LTA (31
SCRA 413 [1970]); "To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our
Constitution, any constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically, for
the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not
mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are organic living
institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal . . . ."
6. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE IV OF 1987
CONSTITUTION; CONSTRUED. — Article IV of the Constitution provides: "Section
1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: . . . (3) Those born before January
17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; and . . . Section 2. Natural-born Citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." The
Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having
been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision
in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates
against Filipino women. To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987
is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must
also be retroactive. The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship.
If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a
natural-born. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and
those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed in equal footing.
They were both considered as natural-born citizens. Hence, the bestowment of
the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident
of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same
similarly situated members. It is for this reason that the amendments were
enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat
equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
7. ID.; ID.; SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; ELECTION OF
CITIZENSHIP; APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE BORN OF FILIPINO MOTHER AND ALIEN
FATHER BUT NOT TO ONE WHOSE FATHER HAS BEEN NATURALIZED WHEN
MINOR WAS ONLY NINE (9) YEARS OF AGE. — There is no dispute that
respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage.
Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose
to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV
of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The
reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural
born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only
nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973
and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a
sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship in spite of his already having been
a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since
he was nine years old.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE (59 SCRA 45 [1974])
APPLIES IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45
[1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held: "Esteban's
exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act
of election of Philippine citizenship." The private respondent did more than
merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines. For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be
expected to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the
In Re Mallare rule. The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already
Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice
which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving
in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time,
running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.
9. ID.; ID.; AN ATTACK THERETO MAY ONLY BE DONE THROUGH A DIRECT

ACTION. — The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a
naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The
Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his
citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the
son. The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral
approach. This can not be done. In our jurisprudence, an attack on a person's
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity (See Queto vs.
Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970]).
10. ID.; ID.; TO DECLARE THE GRANT THEREOF AS NULL AND VOID VIOLATIVE OF
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE WHERE PERSON INVOLVED HAS BEEN LAID TO REST.
— To ask the Court to declare that grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong
Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong
Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to
defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET: "Ong
Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he
could not rise beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were
this matter to be made a central issue in this case."
11. ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 17 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN SUB-PARAGRAPH 4
THEREOF IN RELATION TO SECTION 4 OF THE PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902, APPLIED
IN CASE AT BAR. — Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who
were considered Spanish Subjects, viz: "ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
. . . (4). Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town
in the Monarchy." The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual
residence. This domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not
be deemed lost until a new one is established (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil
Code of Spain; Zuellig vs. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949]). Ong Te became a
permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a
certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of
Laoang, Samar. The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April
11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this
place where Ong Te set up his business and acquired his real property. Ong Te falls
within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to
the Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said
country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his
domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had
become a Spanish subject. If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having
established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong
Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as
one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II). A priori, there can be no other logical
conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the
provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
12. ID.; ID.; "RESIDENCE"; MEANING THEREOF UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. —
Under the Constitution, the term "residence" has been understood as
synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also
under the 1987 Constitution. The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return
(Ong Huan Tin vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]). The absence of a person from
said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to
be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by
animus revertendi (Ujano vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966]).
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTABLISHMENT THEREOF; OWNERSHIP OF A HOUSE NOT
NECESSARY. — The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns
no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is
misplaced. The properties owned by the Ong family are in the name of the
private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the
private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner
thereof (as a co-heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names
of his parents. Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any
property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. Solidum
(61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a
house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should
live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEMPORARY ABSENCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY CONNOTE
CHANGE THEREOF; "ANIMUS REVERTENDI" ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — It
has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected,
does not constitute loss of residence (Faypon vs. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]).
The private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies
and later to practice his profession. There was no intention to abandon the
residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his
home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
15. ID.; ID.; PROSPECTIVE JUDICIAL RECOMMENDATION; MORE HUMANE AND
LESS TECHNICAL APPROACH TO CITIZENSHIP PROBLEMS. — Our citizens no
doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege
which one must forever cherish. However, in order to truly revere this treasure
of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to
unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness. Under the
overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only
the very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the
indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of
clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so
many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is
time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive,
affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a
Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to
citizenship problems is essential.
16. ID.; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE; CANDIDATES; PROPERTY OWNERSHIP;
NOT A QUALIFICATION. — To require the private respondent to own property in
order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property
qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the
Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified
to run (see Maquera vs. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965]).
17. REMEDIAL LAW; BEST EVIDENCE RULE; EXCEPTION; ORIGINAL HAS BEEN
LOST; REQUIREMENTS THEREOF TO BE ADMISSIBLE; PROPERLY LAID IN CASE AT
BAR. — The petitioners' sole ground in disputing that respondent was a natural-
born Filipino is that the documents presented to prove it were not in compliance
with the best evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent
failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence
and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body upon which the resolution of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention was predicated. On the contrary, the
documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the
best evidence rule. It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that
the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session
of the 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be
found. This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971
Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P. Law Center,
in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is
no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the
1971 Constitutional Convention. The execution of the originals was established
by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. The inability to
produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty.
Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the
law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough
that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found
(see Government of P.I. vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918]). Since the execution of
the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the
contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the
recollection of witnesses.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION THEREOF;
EXPANDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; DECISION OF HOUSE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. — I believe that, contrary to the
respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence to
review the questioned decision of the House Electoral Tribunal and to decide the
present controversy. Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the
tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. But as early as 1938,
it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar (66 Phil. 429), construing Section 4, Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution which provided that " . . . The Electoral Commission shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly." that: "The judgment
rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such and acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, 'upon a clear showing
of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of
due process of law' (Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed.,
867; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23)." And then under the
afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this
Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual controversy, there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — The present controversy, involves
more than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election or a
disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great
legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be
final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional directive, made the sole judge of
contests relating to such matters. The present controversy, however, involves no
less than a determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the
House of Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met.
Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss in the performance of its duties,
as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives,
solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a
case, the tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its power
of judicial review. Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private
respondent for the office of Member of the House of Representatives, are here
controverted by petitioners who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled
to the office illegally held by private respondent. From this additional direction,
where one asserts and earnestly perceived right that in turn is vigorously
resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for this Court
to consider and decide.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS. — The Court, in reviewing the decision
of the tribunal, does not assert supremacy over it in contravention of the time-
honored principle of constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this
instance simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by the
Constitution of interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent provisions
of the Constitution with finality. "It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and,
when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the
context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost
always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that
stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the
Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36)." Moreover, it is
decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to determine whether or
not private respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a public office
which is specifically reserved by the Constitution only to natural-born Filipino
citizens.
4. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; NATURAL-BORN; REQUISITE; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE
AT BAR. — The records show that private respondent was born on 19 June 1948
to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-
born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth, private
respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his
father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the
1935 Constitution which was enforced at the time of private respondent's birth
on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were
considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines
had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to
be considered Filipino citizens. Following the basic definition in the 1987
Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution,
private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born a
Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of
his birth, although from birth, private respondent had the right to elect Philippine
citizenship, the citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of
majority.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 OF THE REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW (C.A. 473);
DID NOT CONFER STATUS OF NATURAL-BORN IN CASE AT BAR. — While under
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a
naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the Philippines prior to the
naturalization of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens, this does not
alter the fact that private respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the
operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a
natural-born citizen merely because he did not have to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
6. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; NATURE THEREOF; PRIVILEGE NOT A RIGHT. —
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as
delicate and exacting nature, affecting public interest of the highest order, and
which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law
therefor."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION; GRANT THEREOF; APPEALABLE; OATH TAKEN BEFORE
EXPIRATION OF THE PERIOD OF APPEAL; IMPROPER. — It is settled that an order
granting a petition to take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has
previously obtained a decision favorable to his application for naturalization, is
appealable. It is, therefore, improper and illegal to authorize the taking of said
oath upon the issuance of said order and before the expiration of the
reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said order. In Cua Sun Ke vs.
Republic (159 SCRA 477), this Court held that: "Administration of the oath of
allegiance on the same day as issuance of order granting citizenship is irregular
and makes the proceedings so taken null and void (Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA
244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil.
1381)."
8 . ID.; ID.; NATURAL-BORN; DEFINED AND INTERPRETED UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION. — Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-
born (Filipino) citizens as: "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens."
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: . . . (3) Those born before
January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority." It would appear then that the intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to
equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children
becoming natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973,
effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers (with
alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino
citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be
deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to the
attainment of the age of majority, may be made before or after 17 January
1973. This interpretation appears to be in consonance with the fundamental
purpose of the Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's
individual interests, and to foster equality among them.
9. ID.; ID.; ELECTION THEREOF; MUST BE MADE EXPRESSLY AS PROVIDED FOR
UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 625. — It is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction
that election of Philippine citizenship must be made in accordance with
Commonwealth Act 625, Sections 1 and 2 of the Act mandate that the option to
elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly, not impliedly.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE (ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
NO. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 1974, [59 SCRA 45]) NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR.
— The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare which held that Esteban
Mallare's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. Mallare, cited by respondent
tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship,
is not applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal failed to consider that
Esteban Mallare reached the age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years
before CA 625 was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years before the
1935 Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE PROVIDED FOR UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO.
625 NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The respondent tribunal erred in
ruling that by operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, providing for
private respondent's acquisition of Filipino citizenship by reason of the
naturalization of his father, the law itself had already elected Philippine
citizenship for him. For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private
respondent's father was valid, and that there was no further need for private
respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had automatically become a
Filipino citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the Revised
Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of Philippine citizenship as
contemplated by the Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship
derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of majority,
not during one's minority. There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private
respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
in 1969 or within a reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625.
Consequently, he cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under Sections
2 and 1 (3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
12. ID.; ELECTION PROTEST; QUESTIONING ELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE-ELECT;

IN EFFECT A QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDING; INELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE-
ELECT RESULTS IN NO-CHOICE. — Neither of the petitioners may take the place
of private respondent in the House of Representatives representing the second
district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal (176 SCRA
1), is controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo
warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City
for the simple reason that as he obtained only the second highest number of
votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
City for mayor of that City. A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not
qualified for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even if it is labelled
an election protest. It is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office
but not necessarily to install the protestant in his place. The general rule is that
the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible
candidate in an election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. In such a case, the electors have failed to
make a choice and the election is a nullity.
13. ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902; REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED THEREIN;
NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The "test," following the premises of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te, private
respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was "an inhabitant of the Philippines
who continued to reside therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If
he met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a
Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen. Petitioners (protestants)
submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W,
X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the "Registro de
Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show that Ong Te was not listed as an
inhabitant of Samar where he is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners
(protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral
Tribunal Exhibit V, a certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records
and Management and Archives Office, stating that the name of Ong Te does not
appear in the "Registro de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These
exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that Ong Te
was NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not
continue residing in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to private
respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs or evidence, private respondent
FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE.
14. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA; NOT APPLICABLE. — The decision of the 1971
Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong was a decision of a political
body, not a court of law. And, even if we have to take such a decision as a
decision of a quasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body exercising quasi-judicial
functions), said decision in the Emil L. Ong case can not have the category or
character of res judicata in the present judicial controversy, because between the
two (2) cases, there is no identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the
other involves private respondent) and, more importantly, there is no, identity of
causes of action because the first involves the 1935 Constitution while the
second involves the 1987 Constitution. As held in Lee vs. Commissioners on
Immigration (G.R. No. L-23446, 20 December 1971, 42 SCRA 561): " . . .
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand."
15. ID; SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION; MUST BE ENFORCED. — It is
regrettable that one (as private respondent) who unquestionably obtained the
highest number of votes for the elective position of Representative
(Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the second district of
Northern Samar, would have to cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision,
if the full membership of the Court had participated in this case, with the result
that the legislative district would cease to have, in the interim, a representative
in the House of Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in case of
this nature is the Constitution and only the Constitution. It has to be assumed,
therefore, that when the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar cast the majority of their votes for private respondent, they seemed and
believed that he was fully eligible and qualified for the office because he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief can not
prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the Constitution.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES; AS SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTEST RELATING TO MEMBERS
THEREOF; ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP INCLUDED; BEYOND JUDICIAL INTERVENTION.
— The question of citizenship is a question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme
Court leaves facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite agreed that
the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the membership in the House, as follows: "Sec. 17. The
Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman." is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its
judgment because it thinks it knows better.
2. ID.; SUPREME COURT; EXPANDED JURISDICTION THEREOF; REVIEW OF FACTS
NOT INCLUDED. — In the case of Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections (88 SCRA
251), it was held that this Court can not review the errors of the Commission on
Elections (then the "sole judge" of all election contests) — in the sense of
reviewing facts and unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is to
see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. It is true that
the new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the Court, but as the
Charter states, our authority is "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government." It is not to review facts.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; "GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION" DEFINED. — "Grave abuse of
discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of power amounting to excess
of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due process of law.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J : p
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a
decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue
before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on
the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET, in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private
respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989.
This was, however, denied by the HRET, in its resolution dated February 22,
1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution). prLL
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete.
The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated
that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is
original and exclusive, viz:
"The use of the word 'sole' emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162).
The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as 'intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature.' (id., at p. 175)
Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice
Malcolm as 'full, clear and complete'. (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral
Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25
SCRA 140 [1968] The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution." (p. 401).
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the
power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken
by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed
by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court
that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-
404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our
constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court
stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save
only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon
a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing
Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the
Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at
pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that
the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in
any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power
as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the
perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the
Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or
correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution calls for remedial action.LLjur
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded
jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and
agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within
the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing
that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it
will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it
thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral
Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are,
in the exercise of their functions independent organs — independent of Congress
and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the
balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain
where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers
of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution,
the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided
political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the
Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less
independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The
degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many
legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test
remains the same — manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due
process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power
of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather,
Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in
the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of
hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from
the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905.
He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was
able to establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his
easy assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity.
As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipina, Agripina Lao.
The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic
faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was
born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to
put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was
set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent,
unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his
life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar of application for
naturalization on February 15, 1954. LibLex
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a
Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring
the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan
may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor
of nine years was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as
the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang,
Samar was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed
another one in place of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than
that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for
better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college
education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a
fire gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family
constructed still another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two
doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed
the CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for
work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner.
Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In
1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother,
as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article
on this subject. cdll
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew
up and spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of
Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management
of their family business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran
for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the
elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their
representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are
combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:.
"SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural born
citizens."
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who,
having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which
discriminates against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
"Mr. Azcuna:
With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the
1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas:
It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of
the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was
done before or after January l7, 1973." (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Trenas:
The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and

Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend
the interpretation of who is a natural-born Citizen as provided in
section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons who
have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall
be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas:
yes."
xxx xxx xxx

"Mr. Nolledo:
And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written
book, he said that the decision was designed merely to
accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition
on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the
Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by
supporting the amendment?

Fr. Bernas:
As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my

thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Rodrigo:
But this provision becomes very important because his election of
Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a
natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress . . .
Fr. Bernas:
Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to
the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo:
I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as
unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January
17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural born citizen."
(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Rodrigo:
The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation.

Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935
Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were
natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but
alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become
Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens." (Records of
the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the
provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation
resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be
hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment
thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter
would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279
[1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation
and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the
provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103
U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
"To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any
constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically, for the
prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not
mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are organic
living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal . . ." (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where
one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the
status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was
not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of
Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were
both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to
depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up
of essentially the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to
remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born
before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before
or after the effectivity of that Constitution. Cdpr
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The

enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then
prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the
time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at
the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the
respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution
accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January
17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when
he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is
obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen
but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years
old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement
in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since
1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual
and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine
years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that
the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
"Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship". (p. 52;
emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He
has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to
have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare
rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no
alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a
Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a
small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government
agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and
getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has
always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to
show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to
indicate any tinge of alien-ness, no acts to show that this country is not his
natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are fully aware of Mr.
Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court
will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him
represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have
considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those
who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to
elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding.
Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office,
and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations of choice for these persons. LLjur
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an

alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is
no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one
(21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted
in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected
citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his
father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor
residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis
supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized
citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of
his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after
the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral
approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v.
Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970]).
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan
as null and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan
has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend
himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET: "Ong
Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he
could not rise beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were
this matter to be made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong
Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse
of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his
natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his
father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not
the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up
to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not
have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine
citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a
problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could
possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed
manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship
has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the
Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that
Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and
accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional
Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference
could only be characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET
decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a
natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands
and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino
citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered
Spanish Subjects, viz:
"ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were
born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any
town in the Monarchy." (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This
domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain;
Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around
1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by
virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on
Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
September 7,1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established m 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it
even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong
Te set-up his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention Ong Te falls within the meaning
of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to
the Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said
country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his
domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had
become a Spanish subject. LibLex
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in

a town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant
of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed
residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe
that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private
respondent was a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that the documents
presented to prove it were not in compliance with the best evidence rule. The
petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the
documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the
proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under
the exceptions to the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the
Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971
Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971
Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P. Law Center,
in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is
no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the
1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN,
January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6,
1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the
Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party
to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as
aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the
inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of
sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent
search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil.
817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were
adequately established, the contents of the questioned documents can be proven
by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence
cited in the Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of
the protest against the private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the
disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election protest against
the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the
Constitutional Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary
session which deliberated on the report on the election protest against Delegate
Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr.
Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have
presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been
declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the
contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely
relied on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence
presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil
Ong to be a member of that body. The HRET, by explicit mandate of the
Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a
member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over
which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full
which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full
presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even
assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as
committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line
between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution.
The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not
only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to
remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
"Mr. Nolledo:
With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place
not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or
is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, 'and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a
period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election'.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile." (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
"Mrs. Rosario Braid:

The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo
has raised the same point that 'resident' has been interpreted at
times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes:
Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid:

Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to
actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes:
But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that
Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to
stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical and actual residence." (Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the
word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent
for business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19
SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no
matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person.
In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi. (Ujano v.
Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966]) cdphil
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his
parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose
Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the
present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET, sufficiently
established that after the fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was
constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a
sixteen-door apartment was built by their family, two doors of which were
reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18, 1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in
Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private
respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private
respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as
a co-heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his
parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar,
the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes D. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935])
held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish
his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or
in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only
requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence
requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate
should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra,
122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice
a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294
[1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of
finishing his studies and later to practice his profession. There was no intention
to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical
journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus
revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an
interracial evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx
of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This
racial diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a
person, for there is none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part
Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of
course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some
Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private
respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a
special privilege which one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the
basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who
qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization
laws only the very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to
suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt
process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to
overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire
citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more
positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to
be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to
citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of
the house of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose
Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Fernan, C .J ., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J ., concurring:
I concur with the majority.

(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of fact, and
as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves facts to the tribunal that determined them. I
am quite agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, as
the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the membership in the House, as
follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman. 1
is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its judgment
because it thinks it knows better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 2 a it was held that this Court
can not review the errors of the Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge"
of all election contests) — in the sense of reviewing facts and unearthing
mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is to see simply whether or not it is
guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has
conferred expanded powers on the Court, 3 but as the Charter states, our
authority is "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." 4 It is not to review facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of power
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due process of law.
5
I find none of that here.

As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion with which
men may differ, but certainly, it is quite another thing to say that the respondent
Tribunal has gravely abused its discretion because the majority has begged to
differ. It does not form part of the duty of the Court to remedy all imagined
wrongs committed by the Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the Tribunal, Jose Ong is a
Filipino citizen and consequently, is possessed of the qualifications to be a
member of the House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question, the Court can
not be more popish than the pope. LibLex
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in question stands exactly on
indefensible grounds. It is to be noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report
dated September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Committee on
Election Protests and Credentials, in which the Committee 6 upheld the
citizenship, and sustained the qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose
Ong's full blood brother. According to the Report, Ong Te, the Ongs' grandfather,
was already a Filipino citizen having complied with the requirements on
Filipinization by existing laws for which his successors need not have elected
Filipino citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx

There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be any doubt that
Ong Te, protestees's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899, and was therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, as well as their children born
subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902). Excepted from the
operation of this rule were Spanish subjects who shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. But under the Treaty of Paris, only
Spanish subjects who were natives of Peninsular Spain had the privilege
of preserving their Spanish nationality. 7
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established residence in the

Philippines in 1895, as shown by the Registro Central de Chinos. He was
also issued a certificate of registration. He established a business here,
and later acquired real property. Although he went back to China for brief
visits, he invariably came back. He even brought his eldest son, Ong
Chuan, to live in the Philippines when the latter was only 10 years old. And
Ong Chuan was admitted into the country because, as duly noted on his
landing certificate, his father, Ong Te, had been duly enrolled under CR
16009-36755 — i.e., as a permanent resident. Indeed, even when Ong Te
went back to China in the 1920's for another visit, he left his son, Ong
Chuan, who was then still a minor, in the Philippines — obviously because
he had long considered the Philippines his home. The domicile he
established in 1895 is presumed to have continued up to, and beyond,
April 11, 1899, for, as already adverted to, a domicile once acquired is not
lost until a new one is gained. The only conclusion then can thus be
drawn is that Ong Te was duly domiciled in the Philippines as of April 11,
1899, within the meaning of par. 4, Art. 17, of the Civil Code of 1889 —
and was, consequently, a Spanish subject, he qualified as a Filipino citizen
under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. 8
It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, subsequently sought
naturalization in the belief that he was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the
Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both Ong Te and his
son, Ong Chuan (protestee's father), appear to have been registered as
Chinese citizens even long after the turn of the century. Worse, Ong
Chuan himself believed he was an alien, to the extent of having to seek
admission as a Filipino citizen through naturalization proceedings. The
point, to our mind, is neither crucial nor substantial. Ong's status as a
citizen is a matter of law, rather than of personal belief. It is what the law
provides, and not what one thinks his status to be, which determines
whether one is a citizen of a particular state or not. Mere mistake or
misapprehension as to one's citizenship, it has been held, is not a
sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture of Philippine citizenship; it does
not even constitute estoppel (Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too,
estoppel applies only to questions of fact and not of law (Tañada v.
Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957). 9
It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved by the Committee,

and on November 28, 1972, approved without any objection by the Convention
in plenary session. 10 10a 10b
I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in
all candor, I speak from experience, because when the Convention approved the
Report in question, I was one of its vice-presidents and the presiding officer. LibLex
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this Court (on a question
involving Emil Ong's qualification to sit as member of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa) 11 in which this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit that the question of
the Ong's citizenship is a settled matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of the Convention as well as
G.R. No. 67201 of this Court, involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit,
however, that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or not we will overturn
the unanimous ruling of 267 delegates, indeed, also of this Court.
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the decision
of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred
to as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which declared private respondent
Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a legal resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal dated 22 February
1990 denying petitioners' motions for reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare private
respondent Ong not qualified to be a Member of the House of Representatives
and to declare him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the highest number of
votes among the qualified candidates, the duly elected representative of the
second legislative district of Northern Samar.
In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court declare private
respondent Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not qualified for
membership in the House of Representatives and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as
the duly elected representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private respondent Jose Ong
Chuan, Jr. were among the candidates for the position of Representative or
Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar during the 11 May 1987
congressional elections. Private respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18
May 1987 with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes over
petitioner Co who obtained the next highest number of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests against private
respondent with the tribunal, docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15
respectively. Both protests raised almost the same issues and were thus
considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar,

in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the same Constitution, for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the congressional
elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held that
respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and was a legal
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior to the May 1987
congressional elections. He was, therefore, declared qualified to continue in office
as Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines,
representing the second legislative district of Northern Samar. cdrep
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in the tribunal
are the following:
"1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses
Ong Chuan also known as Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place
of birth is Laoang which is now one of the municipalities comprising the
province of Northern Samar (Republic Act No. 6132 approved on August
24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution).
"2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived in
Manila on December 16, 1915. (Exhibit ZZ) Subsequently thereafter, he
took up residence in Laoang, Samar.
"3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was
celebrated according to the rites and practices of the Roman Catholic
Church in the Municipality of Laoang (Exh. E).
"4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a
natural-born Filipino citizen, both her parents at the time of her birth being
Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
"5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine
citizenship, filed his petition for naturalization with the Court of First
Instance of Samar, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law.

"6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a
decision approving the application of Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization
and declaring said petitioner a Filipino citizen "with all the rights and
privileges and duties, liabilities and obligations inherent to Filipino citizens.
(Exh. E)
"7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:

'(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and
executory;
'(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding
Certificate of Naturalization in favor of the applicant Ong Chuan
who prefers to take his oath and register his name as Jose Ong
Chuan. Petitioner may take his oath as Filipino citizen under his new
christian name, Jose Ong Chuan.' (Exh. F).
"8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines as prescribed by Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
was issued the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization. (Exh. G)
"9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee
and a son born on July 25, 1937 at Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose
Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was elected delegate from Northern
Samar to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
"10. By protestee's own testimony, it was established that he had

attended grade school in Laoang. Thereafter, he went to Manila where he
finished his secondary as well as his college education. While later
employed in Manila, protestee however went home to Laoang whenever
he had the opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as frequent as
twice to four times a year.
"11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of
Laoang, he registered as a voter therein and correspondingly voted in
said municipality in the 1984 and 1986 elections.
"12. Again in December 1986, during the general re-registration of all
voters in the country, Protestee registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4 of
Barangay Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's affidavit, Protestee
indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since birth." (Exh. 7) 1
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision having been

denied, petitioners filed the present petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's jurisdiction
to review the decision of the House Electoral Tribunal, considering the
constitutional provision vesting upon said tribunal the power and authority to act
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the Members of
the House of Representatives. 2
On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe
that, contrary to the respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and
competence to review the questioned decision of the tribunal and to decide the
present controversy.
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the
House of Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar,
3 construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that ".
. . The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly,"
that:
"The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of
such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in
any event, 'upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use
of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law.' (Barry vs.
US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867; Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)"
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, this Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual
controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived
irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election or a disputed appreciation
of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great legal force and
persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be final and
conclusive, for it is, by constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests
relating to such matters. The present controversy, however, involves no less than
a determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the House of
Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this
Court would be unforgivably remiss in the performance of its duties, as
mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives,
solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a
case, the tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its power
of judicial review. LLjur
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for the
office of Member of the House of Representatives, are here controverted by
petitions who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the office
illegally held by private respondent. From this additional direction, where one
asserts an earnestly perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by another,
there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for this Court to consider and
decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, asserts
supremacy over it in contravention of the time-honored principle of
constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a
function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting, in a
justiciable controversy, the pertinent provisions of the Constitution with finality.
"It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct
constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in
situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that
stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the
Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36)." 4
Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to

determine whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold so important
and high a public office which is specifically reserved by the Constitution only to
natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my considered
opinion that the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned decision
and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution 5 requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must
be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-
list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino)
citizens as:
"Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizen."
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority."
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-quoted
constitutional provisions. The first sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the
basic definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private respondent fall
within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
"Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
because he did not have 'to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.' It bears to repeat that on 15 May 1957, while still a
minor of 9 years he already became a Filipino citizen by declaration of law.
Since his mother was a natural-born citizen at the home of her marriage,
protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship at the moment of
his birth and, consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of CA 473
that he was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his birth without
his having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such Philippine
citizenship." 6
I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such kaleidoscopic

ratiocination. The records show that private respondent was born on 19 June
1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a
natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth,
private respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen)
because his father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen).
Under the 1935 Constitution which was enforced at the time of private
respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of
the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were
citizens of the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens. 7
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen,
in relation to the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese
citizenship of his father at the time of his birth, although from birth, private
respondent had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his
mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority. LLphil
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor
children of a naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the Philippines prior to
the naturalization of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens, 8 this
does not alter the fact that private respondent was not born to a Filipino father,
and the operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of
a natural-born citizen merely because he did not have to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be considered a

natural-born citizen by virtue of the operation of CA 473, petitioners however
contend that the naturalization of private respondent's father was invalid and
void from the beginning, and, therefore, private respondent is not even a Filipino
citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct proceeding
for nullity of naturalization as a Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a
collateral attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in an electoral contest
which does not even involve him (Ong Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the challenge against
Ong Chuan's naturalization must emanate from the Government and must be
made in a proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-naturalization directed
against the proper party, who in such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his
lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded the character
of impregnability under the principle of res judicata. 9 Section 18 of CA 473
provides that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon motion made
in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the
proper provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, 10 this Court held that:
"An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of
citizenship. He may accept the offer and become a citizen upon
compliance with the prescribed conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is
of favor, not of right. He can only become a citizen upon and after a
strict compliance with the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high
privilege is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms upon which alone
the right he seeks can be conferred. It is his province, and he is bound,
to see that the jurisdictional facts upon which the grant is predicated
actually exist, and if they do not he takes nothing by this paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
"Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons, no
other person is entitled to such privilege, nor to a certificate purporting to
grant it, and any such certificate issued to a person not so entitled to
receive it must be treated as a mere nullity, which confers no legal rights
as against the government, from which it has been obtained without
warrant of law."
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as

delicate and exacting nature, affecting public interest of the highest order, and
which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law
therefor." 11
Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the petitioners that
the naturalization of private respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the
Court should make a ruling on the validity of said naturalization proceedings.
This course of action becomes all the more inevitable and justified in the present
case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public
office. 12
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of private
respondent is derived from his father. If his father's Filipino citizenship is void
from the beginning, then there is nothing from which private respondent can
derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring cannot rise higher than its
source. And to allow private respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino
citizenship by virtue of a void naturalization of his father, would constitute or at
least sanction a continuing offense against the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan, took the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Philippine Government, as
prescribed by Section 12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI
issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate
of Naturalization and for the applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath
of allegiance of one who has previously obtained a decision favorable to his
application for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper and illegal
to authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of said order and before
the expiration of the reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said order.
13
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic, 14 this Court held that:

"Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of
order granting citizenship is irregular and makes the proceedings so
taken null and void. (Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the
case of Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381)."
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization of Jose Ong
Chuan (private respondent's father) was null and void. It follows that the private
respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void naturalization of his
father and thus he cannot himself be considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of court to
issue the certificate of naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the
oath of allegiance was final and not appealable, the resulting naturalization of
Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic naturalization of private
respondent, then a minor, as a Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his
acquisition or perfection of the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent acquired
the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that
his mother was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn leads us to an
examination of the second sentencein Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. It expands, in a manner of speaking, in relation to Section 1,
paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen
to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The
right or privilege of election is available, however, only to those born to Filipino
mothers under the 1935 Constitution, and before the 1973 Constitution took
effect on 17 January 1973. cdphil
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of its
jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in
"distorting" the conferment by the 1987 Constitution of the status of "natural-
born" Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship — all in its strained
effort, according to petitioners, to support private respondent's qualification to be
a Member of the House of Representatives. 15
Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3) of Article
IV of the 1987 Constitution contemplates that only the legitimate children of
Filipino mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973 and who would
reach the age of majority (and thus elect Philippine citizenship) after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born
Filipino citizen. 16
The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions'
interpretation, found reason to refer to the interpellations made during the 1986
Constitutional Commission. It said:
"That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the
1987 Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to be endowed,
without distinction, to all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935
Constitution is more than persuasively established by the extensive
interpellations and debate on the issue as borne by the official records of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission." 17
Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was

made irrelevant to the case at bar, since private respondent, contrary to the
conclusion of the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship, as
provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the controversy regarding
the meaning of the constitutional provisions in question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations and opinions
expressed in the 1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in
ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even nebulous constitutional
provisions. Thus —
"The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of
the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers." 18
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2,

Article IV in relation to Section 1(3) of the same Article, appear to negate the
contention of petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before 17
January 1973 and who would elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution, are to be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner Treñas
specifically asked Commissioner Bernas regarding the provisions in question,
thus:
"MR. TRENAS:
The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and
Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend
the interpretation of who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as
provided in Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, by adding that
persons who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I right, Mr.
Presiding Officer?
"FR. BERNAS:
Yes.

"MR. TRENAS:
And does the Commissioner think that this addition to Section 4 of the
1973 Constitution would be contrary to the spirit of that section?
"FR. BERNAS:
Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter really. But whether
it is contrary to the spirit is something that has been debated
before and is being debated even now. We will recall that during the
1971 Constitutional Convention, the status of natural-born
citizenship of one of the delegates, Mr. Ang, was challenged
precisely because he was a citizen by election. Finally, the 1971
Constitutional Convention considered him a natural-born citizen,
one of the requirements to be a Member of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. The reason behind that decision was that a person
under his circumstances already had the inchoate right to be a
citizen by the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a matter of
fact, the 1971 Constitutional Convention formalized that recognition
by adopting paragraph 2 of Section 1 of the 1971 Constitution. So,
the entire purpose of this proviso is simply to perhaps remedy
whatever injustice there may be so that these people born before
January 17, 1973 who are not naturalized and people who are not
natural born but who are in the same situation as we are
considered natural-born citizens. So, the intention of the Committee
in proposing this is to equalize their status." 19
When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens, Commissioner

Bernas replied to Commissioner Azcuna thus:
"MR. AZCUNA:
With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this refer only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the
1935 Constitution?
"FR. BERNAS:
It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of
the provision of the 1935 Constitution, whether the election was
done before or after 17 January 1973." 20
And during the period of amendments, Commissioner Rodrigo explained the

purpose of what now appear as Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article
IV of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
"MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an inequitable
situation. Between 1935 and 1973, when we were under the 1935
Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-
born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers
would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and, if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens, yet, but not
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino
mothers and those born of Filipino fathers. So that from January 17,
1973 when the 1973 Constitution took effect, those born of Filipino
mothers but of alien fathers are natural-born Filipino citizens. Also, those
who are born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers are natural-born Filipino
citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a Filipino
mother and that born of a Filipino father, why do we not give a chance to
a child born before January 17, 1973, if and when he elects Philippine
citizenship, to be in the same status as one born of a Filipino father —
namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a mother
vis-a-vis the child. I would like to state also that we should equalize the
status of a child born of a Filipino mother the day before January 17,
1973 and a child born also of a Filipino mother on January 17 or 24 hours
later. A child born of a Filipino mother but an alien father one day before
January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects Philippine citizenship, but
he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the other child who
luckily was born 24 hours later — may be because of parto laborioso — is
a natural-born Filipino citizen." 21
It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in
defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino
fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino
citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973
Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino
mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to
Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship
upon their reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born
Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of the age of
majority, may be made before or after 17 January 1973. This interpretation
appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the Constitution
which is to protect and enhance the people's individual interests, 22 and to foster
equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January
1973)to a Filipino mother (with an alien spouse) and should have elected
Philippine citizenship on 19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of majority), or
soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen
under the 1987 Constitution, the vital question is: did private respondent really
elect Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that private respondent did
not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to the ruling of the respondent tribunal. cdll
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:

"Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had
exercised the right of suffrage when he came of age, the same
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs.
Mallare) [sic] The acts of the petitioner in registering as a voter,
participating in elections and campaigning for certain candidates were
held by the Supreme Court as sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship. Accordingly, even without complying with the formal
requisites for election, the petitioner's Filipino citizenship was judicially
upheld." 23
I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently erroneous and
clearly untenable, as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled
doctrine in this Jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be made m
accordance with Commonwealth Act 625. Sections 1 and 2 24 of the Act mandate
that the option to elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not
impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare 25 which held that Esteban
Mallare's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied
election of Philippine citizenship, is not applicable to the case at bar. The
respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of
majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was approved and,
more importantly, eleven (11) years before the 1935 Constitution (which
granted the right of election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
"Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to
that effect considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act
625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required to exercise
the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by
Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution." 26
Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he was an

illegitimate (natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus followed her
citizenship. I therefore agree with the petitioners' submission that, in citing
the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the
Revised Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's acquisition of
Filipino citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the law itself had
already elected Philippine citizenship for him. For, assuming arguendo that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was valid, and that there was no
further need for private respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had
automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation
of the Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of Philippine
citizenship as contemplated by the Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine
citizenship derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of
majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a
reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he cannot be
deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the
1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am constrained to state
that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in
contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is disqualified or ineligible to be
a Member of the House of Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of required
residence, inasmuch as the Constitution requires that a Member of the House of
Representatives must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident for at
least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the petitioners can
replace private respondent as the Representative of the second legislative district
of Northern Samar in the House of Representatives.
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may take the
place of private respondent in the House of Representatives representing the
second district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo, Jr.
vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal, 27
is controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto
petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City for the
simple reason that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for
mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in
effect, a quo warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an election protest. 28 It is
a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily to
install the protestant in his place. 29
The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are
cast for an ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle the candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a case,
the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. 30
"Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and
it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless
he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676).
"As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who
lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the
candidate who won is found ineligible for the office to which he was
elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) —
'Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the
office because of fraud or irregularities in the election is quite
different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold
such as office . . . If it be found that the successful candidate
(according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an
illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the
former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is
not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots . . ." 31
The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as a
natural-born Filipino citizen, in relation to the present case.
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L. Ong, both of
them having the same father and mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention 32 to the effect that Emil L. Ong was a natural-born Filipino citizen,
alleged before the House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is himself a
natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially impressive, is, as will
now be shown, flawed and not supported by the evidence. Not even the majority
decision of the electoral tribunal adopted the same as the basis of its decision in
favor of private respondent. The tribunal, in reference to this submission, said:
"Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's disposition of
protestee's citizenship based on an entirely different set of
circumstances, apart from the indisputable fact that the matters
attempted to be brought in issue in connection therewith are too far
removed in point of time and relevance from the decisive events relied
upon by the Tribunal, we view these two issues as being already
inconsequential." 33
The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate its decision on the
alleged citizenship by naturalization of private respondent's father (Ong
Chuan) and on the alleged election of Philippine citizenship by private
respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Electoral protests, numbers EP-07 and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing
and Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his citizenship qualification.
The Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention heard the protests and submitted to the Convention a report dated 4
September 1972, the dispositive portion of which stated: Cdpr
"It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a Filipino citizen

under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty of Paris
of December 10, 1898, thus conferring upon protestee's own father,
Ong Chuan, Philippine citizenship at birth, the conclusion is inescapable
that protestee himself is a natural-born citizen, and is therefore qualified
to hold the office of delegate to the Constitutional Convention." 34
On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional

Convention, the election protests filed against Emil L. Ong were dismissed,
following the report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials. 35
It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong is, to say the least, inconclusive to the case
at bar, because —
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil L. Ong case
involved the 1935 Constitution; the present case, on the other hand
involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of a "natural-
born citizen" of the Philippines; the 1987 Constitution contains a precise
and specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines in Sec.
2, Art. IV thereof and private respondent does not qualify under such
definition in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil
L. Ong was a decision of a political body, not a court of law . And, even if
we have to take such a decision as a decision of a quasi-judicial body (i.e.,
a political body exercising quasijudicial functions), said decision in the Emil
L. Ong case can not have the category or character of res judicata in the
present judicial controversy, because between the two (2) cases, there is
no identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the other involves
private respondent) and, more importantly, there is no identity of causes
of action because the first involves the 1935 Constitution while the
second involves the 1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on procedural rules and logic,
the evidence submitted before the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before
this Court, does not support the allegations made by Emil L. Ong before the 1971
Constitutional Convention and inferentially adopted by private respondent in the
present controversy. This leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L. Ong was a "natural-
born citizen" of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the
"fact" — and this appears crucial and central to its decision — that Emil L. Ong's
grandfather, Ong Te, became a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and, therefore, his descendants like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private
respondent) became natural-born Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional Convention
said:
"Ong Te, Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899 and was therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 as well as their children born
subsequent thereto, 'shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands.' (Section 4, Philippine Bill of 1902)." 36
The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is
whether or not Ong Te, private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was
"an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside therein and was a
Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he met these requirements of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not
a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House
Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, DD, and EE which are copies of
entries in the "Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show that
Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar where he is claimed to have
been a resident. Petitioners (protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence
before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a certification of the Chief of the
Archives Division, Records and Management and Archives Office, stating that the
name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central de Chinos" for the
province of Samar for 1895. These exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners
validly argue, tend to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close to 11
April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing in Samar, Philippines after
11 April 1899, contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face of these
proofs or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR
COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE, except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the majority decision of the
House Electoral Tribunal skirted any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino
citizenship of Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is equally not surprising
that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and father or private respondent, did not even
attempt to claim Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino
citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead applied for Philippine
citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the House Electoral
Tribunal should no longer have reviewed the factual question or issue of Ong Te's
citizenship in the light of the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
finding him (Ong Te) to have become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of
1902. The tribunal had to look into the question because the finding that Ong Te
had become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the central
core of said 1971 resolution but as held in Lee vs. Commissioners of
Immigration: 37
". . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding Court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand."
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court in Emil L. Ong vs.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8 May 1984. In connection with said resolution,
it is contended by private respondent that the resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case was elevated to this Court on
a question involving Emil L. Ong's disqualification to run for membership in the
Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private respondent, this Court allowed
the use of the Committee Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it would help to look into
the circumstances of the case brought before this Court in relation to the Court's
action or disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were both candidates for
the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May 1984 election. Valle filed a petition for
disqualification with the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed as
SPC No. 84-69 contending that Ong is not a natural-born citizen. Ong filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the judgment of the 1971
Constitutional Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the identical issue before the
COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94) The motion was denied by the
COMELEC, thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to file with this Court a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any further
hearing on the disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle vi. Emil Ong (SPC
No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335).
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
"Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and considering that at the hearing this morning, it
was brought out that the 1971 Constitutional Convention, at its session
of November 28, 1972, after considering the Report of its Committee on
Election Protests and Credentials, found that the protest questioning the
citizenship of the protestee (the petitioner herein) was groundless and
dismissed Election Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed against said
petitioner (p. 237, Rollo), the authenticity of the Minutes of said session
as well as of the said Committee's Report having been duly admitted in
evidence without objection and bears out, for now, without need for a full
hearing, that petitioner is a natural-born citizen, the Court Resolved to
ISSUE, effective immediately, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining
respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the
disqualification case entitled Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-
69) scheduled at 3:00 o'clock this afternoon, or any other day, except to
dismiss the same. This is without prejudice to any appropriate action that
private respondent may wish to take after the elections."(emphasis
supplied).
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 67201 was rendered
without the benefit of a hearing on the merits either by the Court or by the
COMELEC and merely on the basis of a Committee's Report to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is quite significant) did
not foreclose any appropriate action that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish
to take after the elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under
the 1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or further proceeding in regard to
the same question and that, consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L. Ong
to such recognition. How much more when the Constitution involved is not the
1935 Constitution but the 1987 Constitution whose provisions were never
considered in all such proceedings because the 1987 Constitution was still
inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private respondent) who
unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes for the elective position of
Representative (Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the second
district of Northern Samar, would have had to cease in office by virtue of this
Court's decision, if the full membership of the Court had participated in this
case, with the result that the legislative district would cease to have, in the
interim, a representative in the House of Representatives. But the fundamental
consideration in cases of this nature is the Constitution and only the
Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when the electorate in the
second legislative district of Northern Samar cast the majority of their votes for
private respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully eligible and
qualified for the office because he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That
erroneous assumption and belief can not prevail over, but must yield to the
majesty of the Constitution. cdrep
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution mandates that
members of the House of Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the
Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court says, "Filipino citizens will
do." This is bad enough. What is worse is, the same voting majority, in effect,
says, "even aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L. Ong Chua,
Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore
NOT QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of the
Philippines.
Narvasa, Paras and Regalado, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

1. CONST., art. VI, sec. 17.
2. Nos. L-49705-09; 49717-21, February 8, 1979, 88 SCRA 251.
3. CONST., supra, art. VIII, sec 1.
4. Supra.
5. Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5,
1990, 181 SCRA 780.
6. Galing v. Ong, Elec. Protest No. EP-07 (Const. Con.), September 4, 1972; Luto v.
Ong, Elec. Protest, No. EP-08 (Const. Con.), September 4, 1972; Liwag, Juan,
Chmn.
7. Rept., Comm. on Election Protests and Credentials (Const. Con.), September 4,
1972, 3.
8. Id., 4-5.
9. Id., 5-6.
10. The Delegates present were as follows:
Delegate Abalos E. Delegate Bacaltos

Delegate Ablan Delegate Badelles
Delegate Abueg Delegate Baguilat
Delegate Abundo Delegate Baradi
Delegate Adi Delegate Barbero
Delegate Alanis Delegate Bautista
Delegate Alano Delegate Belo
Delegate Amante Delegate Blancia

Delegate Anni Delegate Bongbong
Delegate Apalisok Delegate Borja
Delegate Arabejo Delegate Borra
Delegate Borromeo Delegate Laggui
Delegate Buen Delegate Lazo
Delegate Bugnosen Delegate Ledesma C.

Delegate Cainglet Delegate Legaspi
Delegate Calderon C. Delegate Leviste C.
Delegate Calderon P. Delegate Lim P.
Delegate Caliwara Delegate Lim R.
Delegate Camello Delegate Macaraya
Delegate Campomanes Delegate Macias
Delegate Canilao Delegate Madrillejos

Delegate Carrillo Delegate Mamenta
Delegate Castillo P. Delegate Mapupuno
Delegate Castro Delegate Marino
Delegate Catan Delegate Mendiola
Delegate Ceniza Delegate Myares
Delegate Clemente Delegate Misa
Delegate Corpus Delegate Montejo

Delegate David Delegate Montinola
Delegate Davide Delegate Olmedo
Delegate De Guzman Delegate Ong
Delegate De la Serna Delegate Ozamiz
Delegate Encarnacion Delegate Panotes
Delegate Espiritu A.C. Delegate Pepito

Delegate Estaniel Delegate Pimentel A.
Delegate Estrella Delegate Quibranza
Delegate Exmundo Delegate Quintero
Delegate Flores A. Delegate Quirino
Delegate Flores T. Delegate Reyes G.
Delegate Garcia J. Delegate Rodriguez B.
Delegate Gaudiel Delegate Rodriguez P.

Delegate Gonzaga Delegate Romualdo
Delegate Guevara Delegate Sabio
Delegate Guirnalda Delegate Salazar A.
Delegate Guzman Delegate Sangkula
Delegate Hilado Delegate Santillan
Delegate Hocson Delegate Santos O.

Delegate Ignacio Delegate Sarmiento
Delegate Kintanar J. Delegate Serapio
Delegate Lacbmca Delegate Serrano
Delegate Lagamon Delegate Sinco
Delegate Tabuena Delegate Britanico
Delegate Tanopo Delegate Cabal
Delegate Tingson Delegate Calaycay

Delegate Tolentino Delegate Calderon J.
Delegate Trono Delegate Capulong
Delegate Tupaz A. Delegate Castilo N.
Delegate Valdez Delegate Catubig
Delegate Velasco Delegate Cea
Delegate Verzola Delegate Claver

Delegate Villar Delegate Concordia
Delegate Vinzons Delegate Cruz
Delegate Viterbo Delegate De la Cruz
Delegate Yap Delegate De la Paz
Delegate Yulo A. Delegate De Lima
Delegate Yulo J.G. Delegate De los Reyes
Delegate Zafra Delegate De Pio

Delegate Deavit
The President Delegate Esparrago
Delegate Abad Delegate Espina
Delegate Abalos F. Delegate Espiritu R.
Delegate Abubakar Delegate Fajardo
Delegate Aguilar Delegate Falgui
Delegate Albano Delegate Fernan

Delegate Aldaba Delegate Fernandez
Delegate Alfelor Delegate Gangan
Delegate Alonto Delegate Garcia A.

Delegate Amatong Delegate Garcia F.
Delegate Ampatuan Delegate Garcia L.P.

Delegate Angara Delegate Garcia L.M.
Delegate Angala Delegate Gordon
Delegate Antonio Delegate Gunigundo
Delegate Araneta T. Delegate Hermoso
Delegate Aruego Delegate Hortinela
Delegate Astilla Delegate Imperial
Delegate Azcuna Delegate Jamir

Delegate Balane Delegate Johnston
Delegate Balindong Delegate Juaban
Delegate Barrera Delegate Kintanar S.
Delegate Bengzon Delegate Laurel
Delegate Ledesma F. Delegate Raquiza
Delegate Ledesma O. Delegate Restor

Delegate Leido Delegate Reyes B.
Delegate Lobregat Delegate Reyes C.
Delegate Lobrin Delegate Reyes J.
Delegate Locsin J. Delegate Reyes P.
Delegate Locsin M. Delegate Robles
Delegate Madarang Delegate Roco
Delegate Martinez Delegate Rosales

Delegate Mastura Delegate Ruben
Delegate Matas Delegate Sagadal
Delegate Mendoza Delegate Sagmit
Delegate Molina Delegate Saguin
Delegate Montilla Delegate Salazar R.
Delegate Mordeno Delegate Salva
Delegate Nisce Delegate Sambolawan

Delegate Nuguid Delegate Sanchez
Delegate Oca Delegate Santelices
Delegate Opinion Delegate Santiago
Delegate Ordoñez Delegate Santos E.
Delegate Ortega Delegate Sarraga
Delegate Ortiz P. Delegate Sarte

Delegate Ortiz R. Delegate Sawit
Delegate Pacificador Delegate Seares
Delegate Padiernos Delegate Sevilla
Delegate Padua C. Delegate Siguion Reyna
Delegate Padua M. Delegate Sinsuat
Delegate Pangandaman Delegate Sison A.
Delegate Paredes Delegate Sison E.

Delegate Piit Delegate Soroñgan
Delegate Pimentel V. Delegate Suarez
Delegate Pingoy Delegate Syjuco
Delegate Ponchinlan Delegate Teodoro
Delegate Primicias Delegate Teves
Delegate Purisma Delegate Tirador

Delegate Puruganan Delegate Tirol
Delegate Puzon Delegate Tocao
Delegate Quintos Delegate Trillana
Delegate Ramos Delegate Tupaz D.
Delegate Valera Delegate Yaneza
Delegate Veloso D. Delegate Yaranon
Delegate Veloso I. Delegate Yñiguez

Delegate Villadelgado Delegate Yuzon
Delegate Yancha Delegate Zosa.
11. Ong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 67201 , May 8, 1984.

* With the concurrence of Congressmen Mario L. Tagarao, David A. Ponce De Leon,

Simeon E. Garcia, Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan; Justices
Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz, Florentino P. Feliciano and
Congressman Antonio H. Cerilles dissented.
1. G.R. Nos. 92191-92, Rollo, pp. 21-23.
2. Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
3. No. 45352, October 31, 1938, 66 Phil. 429.
4. Chartered Bank Employees Association vs. Ople, G.R. No. 44717, August 28, 1985,
138 SCRA 273.
5. Article VI, Section 6.
6. G.R. No. 92191, Rollo, pp. 41-42.
7. Article III, Section 1 (3) and (4), 1935 Constitution provide:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines. (3) Those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines.(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
8. Burca vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-24252, January 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 186.
9. Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board, No. L-31763, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 478.
10. G.R. No. L-11499, April 29, 1961, 1 SCRA citing U.S. vs. Spooner, 175 Fed. 440.
11. Cuaski Tan Si vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-18006, October 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 545.
12. Labo vs. COMELEC, G.R No. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1.
13. Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-28706, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 353.
14. G.R. No. L-29674, April 8, 1988, 159 SCRA 477.

15. G.R. No. 92191-92, Rollo, p. 7.
16. G.R. No. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 23.
17. G.R No. 92191-92, Rollo, p. 30.
18. Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-78780, July 23, 1987,
152 SCRA 284.
19. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 189.
22. Acar vs. Rosal, G.R. No. L-21707, March 18, 1967, 19 SCRA 625.
23. G.R. No. 92191-92. Rollo, p. 40.
24. Sections 1 and 2, C.A. 625 state:

"SECTION 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection
(4), section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to
be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized
to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said
party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
"SECTION 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make the
statement herein authorized before any officer of the Government of the United
States authorized to administer oaths, and he shall forward such statement
together with his oath of allegiance, to the Civil Registry of Manila."
25. Administrative Case No. 533, September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 45.
26. In Re: Florencio Mallare, supra, p. 52.
27. G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1.
28. Luison vs. Garcia, No. L-10981, April 25, 1958, 103 Phil. 453.
29. Topacio vs. Paredes, No. 8069, October 7, 1912, 23 Phil. 238.
30. Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al. No. L-2470. August 30, 1949, 84 Phil. 490.
31. Geronimo vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 60504, May 14, 1985, 136 SCRA 435.
32. Two (2) of the members of said 1971 Constitutional Convention are now
distinguished members of the Court, namely, Sarmiento and Davide, JJ. and
they are part of the voting majority in this case.
33. G.R. Nos. 92191-92, Rollo, pp. 42-43.
34. G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 196.
35. G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 211.
36. G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 193.
37. G.R. No. L-23446, 20 December 1971, 42 SCRA 561.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001.]
ANTONIO BENGSON III , petitioner, vs . HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ , respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN , J : p
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen." 1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution. 2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States
Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. — A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces
of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance
of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of
an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the
following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact
of alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory
with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino
citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he
does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided,
finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in,
the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned
in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any
election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the
service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full
enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen . . . .
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service
in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. 3 He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won
by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then
running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not
quali ed to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. 4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision 5 dismissing the petition, for quo
warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. 6
Petitioner thus led the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision
on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being
such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part. SDEHCc
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,

amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a
citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship
was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the
fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his
natural-born status. 7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born
Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United
States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV,
Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-
born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2
refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-
born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of
a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. 9
As de ned in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship." 1 0
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as
the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No.
2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. 1 1 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the quali cations 1 2 and none of the disquali cations 1 3 provided by law to
become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory
only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satis ed that during the
intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself
to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the
nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. 1 4
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in
the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. 1 5
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed
by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. 1 6 Under
this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain quali cations 1 7 and none of the disquali cations mentioned in Section 4
of C.A. 473. 1 8
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; 1 9 (2) service in the armed
forces of the allied forces in World War II; 2 0 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United
States at any other time; 2 1 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 2 2 and (5) political
and economic necessity. 2 3
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply
consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided.
In Angara v. Republic, 2 4 we held:
. . . . Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and
2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be
required to le a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil
registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines. [Emphasis in the original.] 2 5
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 2 6 This

means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status
as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in
the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with
Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines.
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.
2 7 It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his
original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since
he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by
the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was rst de ned in Article III,
Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person
must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain
or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution de nition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens
which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born
before January 17, 1973, 2 8 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority,
elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-
born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to
acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to
perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers
before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the majority age as natural-born. After de ning who are natural-born citizens,
Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens."
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is
apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who
are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did
not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode
prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A nal point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole
judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and quali cations of the members of
the House. 2 9 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on
the part of the latter. 3 0 In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the
Court's judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the o ce of a
petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision. 3 1 There is no
such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo and Puno, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., took no part. Chairman of the HRET which rendered the decision under
review.
Vitug, J.,took no part. A member of the HRET which rendered the appealed
judgment.
Mendoza, J., took no part, being ponente of decision under review.
Panganiban, J., please see concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., are on leave.
Pardo, J., concurs on this and the concurring opinion of J. Panganiban.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., also joins concurring opinion of J. Panganiban.
Ynares-Santiago, J., hereby certi es that J. Santiago joins with the majority opinion
of J. Kapunan.

Gutierrez, J., Please see dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN , J., concurring :
I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the House
Electoral Tribunal did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Private Respondent
Teodoro C. Cruz remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible to continue being a
member of Congress. Let me just add a few points.
The Facts in Brief
It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente,
Tarlac, to Filipino parents. He was, therefore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant to Section 1 (2), 1
Article IV of the Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any act to acquire or perfect
the Philippine citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, in
accordance with Section 2 2 of the same Article IV.
It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the
United States Marine Corps from November 1985 to October 1993. On June 5, 1990, he
was naturalized as an American citizen, in connection with his US military service.
Consequently, under Section 1 (4) 3 of CA No. 63, he lost his Philippine citizenship. HAEDCT
Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to the
Philippines and decided to regain his Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994, availing
himself of the bene ts of Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled "An Act Providing for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering Service to,
or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States," 4 Cruz took his oath
of allegiance to the Republic and registered the same with the Local Civil Registry of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same day, he also executed an A davit of Reacquisition
of Philippine Citizenship.
Main Issue
The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason of his repatriation,
Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz had reverted to his original status as a natural-born citizen?
I respectfully submit that the answer is "No." In fact, I believe that the HRET was correct in
its ruling.
1. Repatriation Is Recovery
of Original Citizenship
First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA
2630, a person "who ha[s] lost his citizenship" may "reacquire" it by "taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines." Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, a
noted authority on the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private
International Law. 5 He de nes repatriation as "the recovery of the original nationality upon
ful llment of certain conditions." 6 Webster buttresses this de nition by describing the
ordinary or common usage of repatriate, as "to restore or return to one's country of origin,
allegiance, or citizenship; . . . ." 7 In relation to our subject matter, repatriation, then, means
restoration of citizenship. It is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one's
former or original citizenship.
To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own again." 8 Ergo, since Cruz,
prior to his becoming a US citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen, he "reacquired" the
same status upon repatriation. To rule otherwise — that Cruz became a non-natural-born
citizen — would not be consistent with the legal and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It
would be akin to naturalization, which is the acquisition of a new citizenship. "New,"
because it is not the same as that with which he has previously been endowed.
In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of [its]
claimant . . . ." 9 Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor of private respondent,
who claims to be a natural-born citizen.
2. Not Being Naturalized,
Respondent Is Natural Born
Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed
natural-born, because was not naturalized. Let me explain.
There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2)
naturalized citizens. 1 0 While CA 63 provides that citizenship may also be acquired by
direct act of the Legislature, I believe that those who do become citizens through such
procedure would properly fall under the second category (naturalized). 1 1
Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid
procedure, in which they had to adduce su cient evidence to prove that they possessed
all the quali cations and none of the disquali cations provided by law in order to become
Filipino citizens. In contrast, as stated in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs, 1 2 a
natural-born citizen is a citizen "who has become such at the moment of his birth."
The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, explains
clearly who are considered natural-born Filipino citizens. He traces the concept as rst
defined in Article III of the 1973 Constitution, which simply provided as follows:
"SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship."
Under the above de nition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen
may be considered "natural-born": (1) one must be a citizen of the Philippines from birth,
and (2) one does not have to do anything to acquire or perfect one's Philippine citizenship.
1 3 Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, excluded from the class of "natural-born citizens"
were (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. 1 4
The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens
to include "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof," meaning those covered under class (2) above. Consequently, only
naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered natural-born citizens. Premising therefrom,
respondent — being clearly and concededly not naturalized — is, therefore, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines. 1 5
With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them
separately, they naturally reacquire their original classi cation before the loss of their
Philippine citizenship. In the case of Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon his repatriation
in 1994, he reacquired his lost citizenship. In other words, he regained his original status as
a natural-born Filipino citizen, nothing less.
3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion
on the Part of HRET
Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in holding that
Respondent Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen who is quali ed to be a member of
Congress. I stress that the Court, in this certiorari proceeding before us, is limited to
determining whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Decision. The Court has no power to reverse or
modify HRET's rulings, simply because it differs in its perception of controversies. It
cannot substitute its discretion for that of HRET, an independent, constitutional body with
its own specific mandate.
The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the two
chambers of Congress "shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and quali cations of their respective members." 1 6 In several cases, 1 7 this Court
has held that the power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals are original and
exclusive, as if they remained in the legislature, a coequal branch of government. Their
judgments are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 1 8 In the elegant words of Mr. Justice Hugo
E. Gutierrez Jr.: 1 9
"The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct
perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It comes in only
when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion
so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action."
True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation. But, as
earlier explained, the legal and common de nition of repatriation is the reacquisition of the
former citizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse of discretion? At
best, I can concede that the legal de nition is not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But
an interpretation made in good faith and grounded on reason one way or the other cannot
be the source of grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The HRET did not
violate the Constitution or the law or any settled judicial doctrine. It was de nitely acting
within its exclusive domain.
Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be the
sole judge of the quali cations of members of the House of Representatives, one of which
is citizenship. Absent any clear showing of a manifest violation of the Constitution or the
law or any judicial decision, this Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the
HRET in the latter's actions on matters over which full discretionary authority is lodged
upon it by our fundamental law. 2 0 Even assuming that we disagree with the conclusions of
public respondent, we cannot ipso facto attribute to it "grave abuse of discretion." Verily,
there is a line between perceived error and grave abuse. 2 1
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. "It
must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." 2 2
That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to issue
its Decision upholding the quali cations of Congressman Cruz could not in any wise be
condemned as gravely abusive. Neither can I nd any "patent or gross" arbitrariness or
despotism "by reason of passion or hostility" in such exercise.
4. In Case of Doubt,
Popular Will Prevails
Fourth, the Court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate
of the people. It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan
with fractured legalism. The people of the District have clearly spoken. They
overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted for private respondent to represent them in the
House of Representatives. The votes that Cruz garnered (80,119) in the last elections were
much more than those of all his opponents combined (66,182). 2 3 In such instances, all
possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's eligibility; to rule
otherwise would be to defeat the will of the people. 2 4
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political
laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed through the ballot. 2 5 Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all times,
be the paramount considerations in election controversies. 2 6 For it would be better to err
in favor of the people's choice than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.
27
"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the
sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the
possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort
to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is
merely sound public policy to cause elective o ces to be lled by those who are the
choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's quali cations, the
petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect
to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote." 2 8
5. Current Trend Towards
Globalization
Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards globalization.
2 9 Protectionist barriers are being dismantled. Whereas, in the past, governments frowned
upon the opening of their doors to aliens who wanted to enjoy the same privileges as their
citizens, the current era is adopting a more liberal perspective. No longer are applicants for
citizenship eyed with the suspicion that they merely want to exploit local resources for
themselves. They are now being considered potential sources of developmental skills,
know-how and capital.
More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like
Congressman Cruz, who want to rejoin the Filipino community as citizens again. They are
not "aliens" in the true sense of the law. They are actually Filipinos by blood, by origin and
by culture, who want to reacquire their former citizenship.
It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization in
foreign countries, because of the great economic or social opportunities there. Hence, we
should welcome former Filipino citizen desirous of not simply returning to the country or
regaining Philippine citizenship, but of serving the Filipino people as well. One of these
admirable Filipinos is private respondent who, in only a year after being absent from the
Philippines for about eight (8) years, was already voted municipal mayor of Mangatarem,
Pangasinan. And after serving as such for just one term, he was overwhelmingly chosen by
the people to be their representative in Congress.
I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial interpretation
of the law bar the sovereign will. Let not grave abuse be imputed on the legitimate exercise
of HRET's prerogatives.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting :
With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am
convinced that private respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is not a natural born citizen and,
therefore, must be disqualified as a member of Congress.
Who are natural-born citizens?
The laws on citizenship — its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges, and
immunities of citizens — have given rise to some of the most disputatious and visceral
issues resolved by this Court. The problem is compounded in this petition because
citizenship is taken up in connection with the sovereign right of voters to choose their
representatives in Congress.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court to deny
respondent Teodoro Cruz the right to hold the O ce of Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan because he does not possess the constitutional requirement of
being a natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that he
is quali ed to be elected to Congress considering that by repatriation, he re-acquired his
status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to
Filipino parents, spouses Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted
in the United States Armed Forces and served the United States Marine Corps. While in the
service for almost ve years, he applied for naturalization with the US District Court of
Northern District of California and was issued his Certi cate of Naturalization No.
14556793 as an American citizen. On October 27, 1993, he was honorably discharged
from the US Marine Corps. He then decided to return to the Philippines.
Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship by persons who lost such citizenship by rendering service to or
accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States. On March 17, 1994, he
took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered with
the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an
A davit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. Thus, on April 11, 1994, the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation ordered the cancellation of his Alien Certi cate of
Registration (ACR No. B-04628111) and Immigration Certi cate of Residence (ICR No.
286582) and issued him an Identification Certificate.
The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was a rmed by the Justice Department. On
January 18, 1995, the United States Embassy in Manila issued to him a Certi cate of Loss
of Nationality of the United States.
In the local elections of 1995, Cruz led his certi cate of candidacy for mayor of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. He won and
served as mayor for one term.
Thereafter, Cruz led his certi cate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this time
declaring himself as a natural-born Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of 26,671 votes over
candidate Antonio Bengson, III.
On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in the
Second District of Pangasinan.
Bengson then led a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) on September 14, 1998, claiming that Cruz, not
being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he led his Certi cate of Candidacy on March 15,
1998, is not quali ed to run as a member of the House of Representatives. That he should
be natural-born citizen is a quali cation mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution which provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective
memoranda and supplemental memoranda, the HRET rendered a decision holding that
Cruz reacquired his natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation in 1994 and declaring
him duly elected representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent
Teodoro C. Cruz is hereby DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
"As soon as this Decision becomes nal and executory, let notices and
copies thereof be sent to the President of the Philippines; the House of
Representatives, through the Speaker, and the Commission on Audit, through its
Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio."TDaAHS
On March 13, 2000, Bengson led a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision
but the same was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 00-48.
Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the, HRET Decision
on grounds that:
"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being
such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizen on his part.
"2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a
citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that did not validly acquire his Philippine
citizenship.
"3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship
was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the
fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his
natural-born status."
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines at the time of the ling of his Certi cate of
Candidacy for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution 1 provides:
"SECTION 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. . . . ."
Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase "from

birth" contained in the above provisions.
Petitioner contends that the phrase "from birth" indicates that citizenship must start
at a de nite point and must be continuous, constant and without interruption. The
Constitution does not extend the privilege of reacquiring a natural-born citizen status to
respondent, who at one time, became an alien. His loss of citizenship carried with it the
concomitant loss of all the bene ts, privileges and attributes of "natural born" citizenship.
When he reacquired his citizenship in 1994, he had to comply with the requirements for
repatriation, thus effectively taking him out of the constitutional de nition of a natural-born
Filipino.
For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since he was born to Filipino
parents, he has been a natural-born Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent
characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its literal
sense, but more in its legal connotation.
The very rst natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were
born as Spanish subjects. In Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 2 the Supreme Court traced the
grant of natural-born status from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July 1,
1902 and March 23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of the former with a
proviso which reads:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide
by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
other Insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in
the Philippine Islands who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."
It was further held therein that under the said provision, "every person born after the
11th of April, 1899, of parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued
to reside in this country are at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the
Philippine Islands."
Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second
Philippine Commission, considered as our rst colonial charter or fundamental law, we
were referred to as "people of the Islands," or "inhabitants of the Philippine Islands," or
"natives of the Islands" and not as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The rst
de nition of "citizens of the Philippine Islands" in our law is found in Section 4 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. 3
Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or
even non-existent quali cation. As a requirement for the exercise of certain rights and
privileges, it became a more strict and di cult status to achieve with the passing of the
years.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be
acquired under either the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine. 4
This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law
or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited "citizens of the Philippine
Islands" to resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, their children
born subsequent thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the Philippine
legislature. Only later was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.
Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege
conferred by law directly to those who intended, and actually continued, to belong to the
Philippine Islands. Even at the time of its conception in the Philippines, such persons upon
whom citizenship was conferred did not have to do anything to acquire full citizenship. 5
Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth,
having been born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, he was automatically restored to
that status when he subsequently reacquired his citizenship after losing it.
Public respondent HRET a rmed respondent's position when it pronounced that
the de nition of a natural-born citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution refers to
the classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to wit:
"SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Thus, respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are only two
classes of citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since respondent Cruz is not a
naturalized citizen, then he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution de nes
natural-born citizens as "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follows:
"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY
RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE UNITED STATES, provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering
service to, or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United
States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the
Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines.
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship."
respondent Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino
citizen. He had to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
register his oath with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to
renounce his American citizenship and had to execute an a davit of reacquisition of
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation and construction of a constitution is to give effect to the intention of the
framers and of the people who adopted it. Words appearing in a Constitution are used
according to their plain, natural, and usual significance and import and must be understood
in the sense most obvious to the common understanding of the people at the time of its
adoption.
The provision on "natural-born citizens of the Philippines" is precise, clear and
de nite. Indeed, neither HRET nor this Court can construe it other than what its plain
meaning conveys. It is not phrased in general language which may call for construction of
what the words imply.
In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 6 this Court held:
"Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the
language of the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be
given their ordinary meaning, except where technical terms are employed, in
which case the signi cance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is
not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain
that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much
as possible, should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say."
The de nition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to this

petition according to its natural sense.
Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the "reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
through any of these modes: (naturalization, repatriation and legislation under Section 3,
C.A. No. 63) results in the restoration of previous status, either as a natural-born or a
naturalized citizen" is a simplistic approach and tends to be misleading.
If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen
concerned can not be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to perform certain acts
to become a citizen.
As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug 7 in the instant case, concurred
in by Justice Jose A.R. Melo: 8
"Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationality upon
the ful llment of certain conditions. While an applicant need not have to undergo
the tedious and time consuming process required by the Revised Naturalization
Law (CA 473, as amended), he, nevertheless, would still have to make an express
and unequivocal act of formally rejecting his adopted state and rea rming his
total and exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. It
bears emphasis that, to be considered a natural-born citizen under the rst part of
section 2, Article IV, of the 1987 Constitution, one should not have to perform any
act at all or go through any process, judicial or administrative, to enable him to
reacquire his citizenship. Willoughby opines that a natural-born citizen is one who
is able to claim citizenship without any prior declaration on his part of a desire to
obtain such status. Under this view, the term 'natural born' citizens could also
cover those who have been collectively deemed citizens by reason of the Treaty
of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902 and those who have been accorded by the
1935 Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those born in the Philippines of alien
parents who, before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution had been elected to
public office.)"
The two dissenting Justices correctly stated that the "stringent requirement of the
Constitution is so placed as to insure that only Filipino citizens with an absolute and
permanent degree of allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for membership in Congress,
the branch of the government directly involved and given the delicate task of legislation."
The dissenting opinion further states:
"The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, rst constitutionally de ned in the
1973 Charter, later adopted by the 1987 Constitution, particularly in Section 2,
Article IV thereof, is meant to refer to those 'who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship,' and to those 'who elect Philippine citizenship.' Time and again, the
Supreme Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation — there is
only room for application. The phrase 'from birth' indicates that there is a starting
point of his citizenship and this citizenship should be continuous, constant and
without interruption."
Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress as the Constitution requires
that a member of the House of Representatives must be a "natural-born citizen of the
Philippines."
For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent
citizenship requirement for higher elective o ces, including that of the o ce of a
Congressman. Otherwise, the Constitution should have simply provided that a candidate
for such position can be merely a citizen of the Philippines, as required of local elective
officers.
The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the rst charter framed
and rati ed by the Filipinos (even as the draft had to be approved by President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt of the United States) guides and governs the interpretation of Philippine
citizenship and the more narrow and bounded concept of being a natural-born citizen.
Under the 1935 Constitution, 9 the requirement of natural-born citizenship was
applicable only to the President and Vice President. 1 0 A person who had been a citizen for
only ve (5) years could be elected to the National Assembly. 1 1 Only in 1940, 1 2 when the
rst Constitution was amended did natural-born citizenship become a requirement for
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. 1 3 A Filipino naturalized for at
least ve (5) years could still be appointed Justice of the Supreme Court or a Judge of a
lower court. 1 4
The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the
requirement of being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the years.
Under the 1973 Constitution, 1 5 the President, members of the National Assembly,
Prime Minister, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of inferior courts, the chairmen and
members of the Constitutional Commissions and the majority of members of the cabinet,
must be natural-born citizens. 1 6 The 1987 Constitution added the Ombudsman and his
deputies and the members of the Commission on Human Rights to those who must be
natural-born citizens. 1 7
The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and clear
intendment of the Constitution. It shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier approach to the
meaning and import of natural-born citizen and citizenship in general. caIDSH
It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no less
than the Constitution. Indeed, a deviation from the clear and constitutional de nition of a
"natural-born Filipino citizen" is a matter which can only be accomplished through a
constitutional amendment. Clearly, respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.
Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship has
been restored. He can run for public o ce where natural-born citizenship is not mandated.
But he cannot be elected to high o ces which the Constitution has reserved only for
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition. TCIEcH
Footnotes
1. 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 6.

2. Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution states:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands;
3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship; and
5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

3. An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of
the United States (1960).

4. Said provision reads:
No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty- ve years of
age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
5. Rollo, p. 36.
6. Id., at 69.
7. Id., at 13.
8. Article IV, Section 1.

9. I TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES 188, 1990 Ed.
10. 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 2.

11. During the period under Martial Law declared by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thousands
of aliens were naturalized by Presidential Decree where the screening of the applicants
was undertaken by special committee under Letter of Instructions No. 270, dated April
11, 1975, as amended.
12. Section 2, Act 473 provides the following qualifications:

(a) He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
(b) He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;
(c) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
constituted government and well as with the community in which he is living;
(d) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than ve thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation;
(e) He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal languages;
and
(f) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or
private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines where
Philippine history, government and civic are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
13. Section 4, Act 473, provides the following disqualifications:
(a) He must not be opposed to organized government or a liated with any association or
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) He must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
(c) He must not be a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy;

(d) He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) He must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) He must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines (of not less than six
months before ling his application), mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the
Filipinos;
(g) He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with whom the Philippines is at war, during
the period of such war;
(h) He must not be a citizen or subject of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos
the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
14. Section 1, RA. 530.
15. Section 2, C.A. No. 63.

16. An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired
(1936).
17. 1. The applicant must have lost his original Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country or by express renunciation of his citizenship (Sec. 1[1] and [2], C.A. No.
63);
2. He must be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the Philippines at least
six months before he applies for naturalization (Sec. 3[1], C.A. No. 63);
3. He must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence (of at least six months prior to the ling of the application) in the
Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living (Sec. 3[2], C.A. No. 63);
4. He subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all
faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a
citizen or subject (Sec. 3[3], C.A. No. 63).
18. See note 13.
19. Sec. 4, C.A. No. 63.

20. Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 965 (1953).

23. Ibid.
24. 314 SCRA 438 (1999).

25. Id., at 450.
26. JOVITO R. SALONGA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, P. 165 (1995).

27. See Art. IV, Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution.
28. The date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
29. Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides thus:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
quali cations of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
30. Garcia vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 312 SCRA 353, 364 (1999).
31. Id.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring:

1. "Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx

2. "Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. . . ."
3. "Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. — A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any
of the following ways and/or events:
xxx xxx xxx"
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country: . . ."
4. Sec. 1 thereof provides:
"Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired U.S. citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or
last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation
of any other citizenship."
5. 1995 ed.
6. Ibid., p. 165; cited in the assailed HRET Decision, p. 13. (Italics ours.)
7. Webster's Third New International Dictionary : Unabridged, 1993 ed.

8. Webster's, ibid., defines reacquire as "to acquire again"; and acquire as "to get as one's own."
9. Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil 315, 338 (1912), per Trent, J.; citing Boyd v. Thayer, 143
US 135.
10. Ronaldo P. Ledesma, An Outline of Philippine Immigration and Citizenship Laws, 1999 ed.,
p. 354. See also 14 CJS §1, 1128; 3A Am Jur 2d Aliens and Citizens, §1411.
11. See Ledesma, ibid., p. 355.

12. Supra.
13. Assailed Decision, p. 8.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 9.
16. Sec. 17, Art. VI. (Emphasis ours.)
17. Lazatin v. HRET , 168 SCRA 391, December 8, 1988; Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, July 30, 1991; citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil 139 (1936).
18. Co v. HRET, ibid., citing Robles v. HRET , 181 SCRA 780, February 5, 1990; and Morrero v.
Bocar, 66 Phil 429 (1938). See also Libanan v. HRET , 283 SCRA 520, December 22,
1997.
19. Co v. HRET, ibid.
20. Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998.
21. Ibid.
22. Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
23. "The following were the results of the election:
Teodoro C. Cruz 80,119

Antonio E. Bengson III 53,448
Alberto B. Zamuco 11,941

Manuel R. Castro 622
Mariano A. Padlan 171"
(HRET Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 37-38.)

24. Sinaca v. Mula, 315 SCRA 266, September 27, 1999.
25. Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996; per Panganiban, J.
26. Olondriz v. Comelec, 313 SCRA 128, August 25, 1999.
27. Frivaldo v. Comelec, supra.
28. Ibid.
29. See Paci co A. Agabin, "Globalization and the Judicial Function," Odyssey and Legacy: The
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa Centennial Lecture Series, complied and edited by Atty.
Antonio M. Elicano, published by the Supreme Court Printing Services, 1998 ed. See also
Artemio V. Panganiban, "Old Doctrines and New Paradigms," a lecture delivered during
the Supreme Court Centenary Lecture Series, on February 13, 2001.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting:
1. 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

2. 23 Phil 315 (1912).
3. SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris, December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight.
4. Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra; Lim Teco vs . Collector, 24 Phil 84; (1913) United States
vs. Lim Bin, 36 Phil 924 (1917).
5. Roa vs. Collector of Customs, ibid.
6. 31 SCRA 413 (1970).

7. Member of the HRET.
8. Chairman, ibid.
9. This refers to the 1935 Constitution as adopted by the Philippine Constitutional Convention
on February 8, 1935, signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 23, 1935 and
ratified by Filipino voters in a plebiscite held on May 14, 1935.
10. Section 3, Article VII, 1935 Constitution.
11. Section 2, Article VI, ibid.

12. The 1935 Constitution was amended by Resolution Numbered Seventy-three, adopted by
the Second National Assembly on the 11th day of April 1940, and approved by the
President of the United States on December 2, 1940.
13. Section 4 and 7, Article VI, 1935 Constitution, as amended.
14. Section 6 and 8, Article VIII, ibid.
15. This refers to the 1973 Constitution as approved by the Filipino people in a referendum held
between January 10, 1973 and January 15, 1973 and which became effective on
January 17, 1973.
16. Section 2, Article VII; Section 4, Article VIII; Sections 3 and 4, Article IX; Section 3 (1) and (2),
Article X; Section 1(1) Article XII-B, Section 1(1), Article XII-C; Section 1(1) Article XII-D,
1973 Constitution.
17. Section 8, Article XI; and Section 17(2), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 87193. June 23, 1989.]
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES,
SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
J .L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.

Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.
DECISION
CRUZ, J : p
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of

Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27,
1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League),
represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal
capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo's election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20,1983. In his
answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the
United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he
had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos.
His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of
survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents
abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the
challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition
that should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance
with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was not
a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said
section. prLL
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the
respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20,
1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration
was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this
Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set
aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the
hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required
comments from the respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that
Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine
citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not
qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition
in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo
from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab
initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to be considered as one
for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten days from Frivaldo's
proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of
his naturalization. And assuming that the League itself was not a proper party,
Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the League but also in his personal
capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the
contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not
repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he
was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this
defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the
Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the
private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code
was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not
only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that
they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor
of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his
naturalization as an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In
support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)]
where a German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized
because it had been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could
not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the Special
Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 270 had not yet
been organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a
natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his
active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of
American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his
Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the
move to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code. LLpr
Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court
has decided to resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route
that will after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a long delay.
We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and
the vital principles of public office to be here applied.
It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this
question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city
officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made
by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically
claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him after
consultation with the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore
represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that we may now review.
Exercising our discretion to interpret the Rules of Court and the Constitution, we
shall consider the present petition as having been filed in accordance with Article
IX-A, Section 7, of the Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned Orders of
the COMELEC.
The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a
citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18,1988, as
provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are
merely secondary to this basic question.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the
Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the
Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42
of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be
inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency
where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines,
this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of
the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described
himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any
subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October
20, 1915, was naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and issued
Certificate of Naturalization No. 11690178.
Petition No. 280225.

Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)
ARACELI V. BARENG
Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in
his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a
measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government through
his agents in the United States. cdll
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the
enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a
consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His
feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and
voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as
Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it
necessary — nor do they claim to have been coerced — to abandon their
cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the
United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I
absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have
heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the
Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those
Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine
citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law
principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar.
This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the
Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows: prcd
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall
be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its
law in matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third
State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses,
recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in
which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the
country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most
closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years

when he applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month
before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his
business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared
war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the
ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his
behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held
Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was more closely
connected than with Liechtenstein. cdphil
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict
between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third
state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively
claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or
not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other
nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own
territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for
each State to determine under its law who are its nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in
Liechtenstein whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization
in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless
claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation.
He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States.
Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the
United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose
his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have
the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had
earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of
his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270
because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted
seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation
unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious. Such a conclusion would open the
floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this
country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting
their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends
that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already
effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal
declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned
is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been
convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this
was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be
dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are
seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor
because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner
during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she
have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no
longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established,
and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was
discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged
shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor
in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that
he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of
the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of
this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by
the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in
this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in
the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. LexLib
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is
favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it
should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and
renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours,
for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once
rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant
children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act,
the renewal of his loyalty and love.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is
hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from
serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to
vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the
said province once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary
restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C .J .), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ ., concur.
Sarmiento, J ., took no part.
Cortes, J ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., concurring:
I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the
higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any
procedural infirmities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on
Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a person who by his own
admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of
any province. prcd
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the
finding of a protest — whether quo warranto or election contest — is mandatory
and jurisdictional. 1
As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and
proclamation should have been filed within ten days after the proclamation of
election results. 2 The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests
beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within
which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide
summary proceedings for the settlement of such disputes. 3 The Rules of Court
allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against any
public officer who performs an act which works a forfeiture of his office. 4
However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that there are no good
reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, 5 the Court should allow a
person like respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action. Cdpr
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an

alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines. 6 Where the disqualification is based on age,
residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, 7 I believe that the ten-day
period should be applied strictly.
The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it
inexpedient to wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual
but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of
having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the
procedure pro hac vice.
Footnotes
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
1. Ferrer v. Guiterrez and Lucot, 43 Phil. 795 [1922]; and Nisperos v. Araneta Diaz
and Flores, 47 Phil. 806 [1925].
2. Section 253, Omnibus Election Code, B.P. Blg. 881.
3. Municipal Council of Masantol v. Guevarra, 44 Phil. 580 [1923].
4. Rule 66, Section 1, Rules of Court.
5. Rule 66, Section 2.
6. Section 253, Omnibus Election Code; See Casin v. Caluag, 80 Phil. 758 [1948].
7. Among them are corrupting voters or election officials with money or other material
considerations (Section 68, B.P. 881); committing acts of terrorism to enhance
one's candidacy (id); overspending for election expenses (id); soliciting,
receiving, or making prohibited contributions (Sections 89, 95, 96, 97, and 104
of B.P. 881); the use of a void certificate of candidacy (Section 78, id); engaging
in partisan political activity outside of the campaign period (Section 80, id);
destroying or defacing lawful election propaganda (Section 83, id); using
prohibited forms of certificate election propaganda (Section 83, id); using
prohibited forms of certificate election propaganda (Section 85, id); unlawful use
of mass media (Section 86, id); coercion by a public officer of subordinates to
campaign for or against a candidate (Section 261-d, id); using threats and
intimidation to force a person to campaign or to prevent him from campaigning
for or against a candidate (Section 261-e, id); electioneering within the
prohibited space around or inside a polling place (Section 261-k, id); use of
public funds for certain election purposes (Section 261-u, id); and use of a void
certificate of candidacy (Section 78). Under Section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code, certain persons like ecclesiastics and soldiers in the active
service are disqualified from running for elective municipal office.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 162759. August 4, 2006.]
LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A.

ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC
LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA
DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD,
EVELYN D. NATIVIDAD , petitioners, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ,
respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA , J : p
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as

"duals " or dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under
t he Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 1 (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and register as
absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
The facts:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long
before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and
certi cation as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in
the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated
September 23, 2003 2 , they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack
of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter,
however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for
voter's registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect
merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
Prodded for clari cation by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in
Macalintal vs. COMELEC 3 on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response:
Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality . . ., it is the
Commission's position that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise
the right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not
enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their
citizenship on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence
now stand, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements
of residency, among others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution. 4
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing
to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters,
petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 led on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and
mandamus. DHACES
A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the
COMELEC led a Comment, 6 therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may be
expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) led a Manifestation (in
Lieu of Comment), therein stating that "all quali ed overseas Filipinos, including dual
citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so", observing, however, that the
conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic. 7
The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the
petition moot and academic, but insofar only as petitioners' participation in such political
exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the
petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing "duals" to participate and vote as absentee voter in
future elections, however, remains unresolved.
Observing the petitioners' and the COMELEC's respective formulations of the issues,
the same may be reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners and others who
might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A.
9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
The Court resolves the poser in the a rmative, and thereby accords merit to the
petition.
In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing provisions on
the right of suffrage is, therefore, indicated.
We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively
reading as follows:
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disquali ed by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. . .
..
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide . . . a system for absentee voting by

qualified Filipinos abroad.
In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a

general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes
Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non -resident
may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to
vote.
In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 — the OAVL 8 —
identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following section who cannot,
as follows:
Section 4. Coverage. — All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are
not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of
elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.
Section 5. Disqualifications. — The following shall be disquali ed

from voting under this Act:
(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with
Philippine laws;
(b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship

and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
(c) Those who have . . . [been] convicted in a nal judgment by a court

or tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1)
year, including those who have . . . been found guilty of Disloyalty as de ned
under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, . . . .;
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in

the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an a davit prepared
for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from
approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such a davit shall also state that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be
the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident
from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
(e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or
incompetent by competent authority . . . . (Words in bracket added.)
Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting
mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents in another country opens an exception and quali es the
disquali cation rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional challenge on the
ground that, as narrated in Macalintal, it —
. . . violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that
the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an
election. [The challenger] cites . . . Caasi vs. Court of Appeals 9 to support his
claim [where] the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the [US] is
deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
[The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution
does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be quali ed to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should
not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of
suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the
aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims
that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the
election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution. 1 0 (Words in bracket added.)
As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A.
9189 mainly on the strength of the following premises:
As nally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 speci cally
disquali es an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in
the host country" because immigration or permanent residence in another country
implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same
Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter
for as long as he/she executes an a davit to show that he/she has not
abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in
Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disquali ed by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that
Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual,
physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers
of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee
voting. aEHIDT
Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the a davit itself
is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The a davit required in Section 5(d) is
not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back
and resume residency in the Philippines, but more signi cantly, it serves as an
explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus,
it is not correct to say that the execution of the a davit under Section 5(d)
violates the Constitution that proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by
a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise." 1 1
Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress
enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to

the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
xxx xxx xxx

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.

re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003"
and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public o ce in the Philippines shall

meet the quali cations for holding such public o ce as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the ling of the
certi cate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship . . .;
3) ...;
(4) ...;
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public
office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public o ce in the
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned

o cers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine

citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy . . . political rights,
specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof. caHCSD
Opposing the petitioners' bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites attention to

the same Section 5 (1) providing that "duals" can enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct to
political rights, only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on what at rst blush is the
clashing provisions of the aforecited provision of the Constitution, which, to repeat,
requires residency in the Philippines for a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants a
Filipino non-resident absentee voting rights, 1 2 COMELEC argues:
4. 'DUALS' MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/RESIDENCE IN THE
PHILIPPINES
4.01. The inclusion of such additional and speci c requirements in RA
9225 is logical. The 'duals,' upon renouncement of their Filipino
citizenship and acquisition of foreign citizenship, have practically
and legally abandoned their domicile and severed their legal ties to
the homeland as a consequence. Having subsequently acquired a
second citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then, 'duals' must, for purposes of
voting, rst of all, decisively and de nitely establish their domicile
through positive acts; 1 3
The Court disagrees.

As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law — R.A. 9225 —
requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines rst
before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit
acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1)
the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all
overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter
under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal:
It is clear from these discussions of the . . . Constitutional Commission that
[it] intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to
extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents' domicile
of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them quali ed as voters for the rst
time. DICSaH
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for

Section 2 [Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By
the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, . . ., the strategic
location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for
an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to
quali ed Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that
quali ed Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even
though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the
residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the
subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was
deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in
relation to the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would
agree that the Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, "who shall have resided in
the Philippines." They are permanent immigrants. They have changed
residence so they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked
whether this committee amendment which in fact does not alter the
original text of the bill will have any effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been
asked in various fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the
interpretation here of "residence" is synonymous with "domicile."
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, "domicile" is the intent
to return to one's home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been
physically absent from the Philippines and may be physically a
resident of the United States, for example, but has a clear intent
to return to the Philippines, will make him quali ed as a resident
of the Philippines under this law .
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate
that we — that Congress — must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle
literally as demanding physical presence, then there is no way we
can provide for offshore voting to our offshore kababayan , Mr.
President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in
Section 2 of Article V, it reads: "The Congress shall provide a system for
securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad."
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is "quali ed."
In other words, anything that we may do or say in granting our
compatriots abroad must be anchored on the proposition that
they are quali ed. Absent the quali cation, they cannot vote. And
"residents" (sic) is a qualification .
xxx xxx xxx
Look at what the Constitution says — "In the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election." acHDTA
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros . . . . We are separated only

by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he
resides in Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our Constitution
is. . . . .
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros,
yes, he may do so. But he must do so, make the transfer six months before
the election, otherwise, he is not qualified to vote.
xxx xxx xxx

Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a
point already well-debated even in the constitutional commission of 1986.
And the reason Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately
after the six-month/one-year residency requirement is to
demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes
absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year
residency requirement . That is the rst principle, Mr. President, that one
must remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence . . .
— "residency" has been interpreted as synonymous with "domicile."
But the third more practical reason, . . . is, if we follow the
interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and
constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas
Filipinos who do not physically live in the country, which is quite
ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point of this exercise
— to enfranchise them and empower them to vote . 1 4 (Emphasis
and words in bracket added; citations omitted)
Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting.
According to the poll body:
1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee

voting has been consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also
citizens of other countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in
the pertinent provisions of RA 9225; 1 5
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of
the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that
"duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as
overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise:
"Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which quali ed citizens of the
Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;
"Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is
quali ed to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disquali ed by law,
who is abroad on the day of elections;
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the
expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of
"duals". This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in
R.A. 9225 which reads:
re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed
It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below

eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next
generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and
political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why
the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of
suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such
absurd situation. cEaTHD
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so
holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 , the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 , may exercise the right to
vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189 , the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and
Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Also known as Overseas Absentee Voting Law or "OAVL " for short.
2. Signed by Florentino A. Tuason Jr., as then COMELEC Committee Chairman on Overseas
Absentee Voting; Rollo, p. 33.
3. G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, 405 SCRA 614.

4. Concluding paragraph of letter dated November 4, 2003 of the Comelec to the Balane
Tamase Alampay Law Office (counsel for petitioners); Rollo, pp. 42-51.
5. The other petitioners executed deeds of S pecial P ower o f A ttorney (SPA), therein
authorizing Loida Nicolas Lewis to file the Petition; Rollo, pp. 92-112.
6. Rollo, pp. 53-67.
7. Rollo, pp. 77-78.
8. Published in the February 16, 2003 issues of Today and Daily Tribune.
9. G.R. No. 88831, 8 November 1990, 191 SCRA 229.
10. Macalintal v. COMELEC, supra.
11. Id. at 645.
12. Constitution, Article V, Section 1: . . . at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election . . . .
13. COMELEC's Memorandum, p. 6, appended to the Rollo.
14. Macalintal v. COMELEC, supra, at pp. 641-644.

15. COMELEC's Memorandum, p. 4, appended to the Rollo.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 83820. May 25, 1990.]
JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu) ,

petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO
RENNER OSMEÑA , respondents.
Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.
DECISION
PARAS , J : p
Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on

Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for the
disquali cation of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate for Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province. cdll
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña led his certi cate of
candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in
the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short),
as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial
Chairman, led with the COMELEC a petition for the disquali cation of private respondent
on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States
of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner led a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certi cate
issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago
certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certi cate of
Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certi cate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911,
issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
The petitioner also led a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of
Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and
proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue
canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following
exhibits tending to show that private respondent is an American citizen: Application for
Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent
dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certi cate of Registration No. 015356 in the
name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the
Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certi cate of Clearance
dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo).
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that
he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President
Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No.
0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the
Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and
that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim
the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent
was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for
disquali cation for not having been timely led and for lack of suf cient proof that private
respondent is not a Filipino citizen. cdrep
Hence, the present petition.

The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the quali cations of a registered
candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised
under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
"(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certi cate of
candidacy. — A veri ed petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certi cate of candidacy may be led by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be led at any time not later than twenty ve days from
the time of the ling of the certi cate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
and
"(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of
any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city of cer on the
ground of inelligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall le a
sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election."
The records show that private respondent led his certi cate of candidacy on November
19, 1987 and that the petitioner led its petition for disquali cation of said private
respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disquali cation was led beyond
the twenty ve-day period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear
that said petition was filed out of time.
The petition for the disquali cation of private respondent cannot also be treated as a
petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably
premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of
Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's
citizenship and quali cation to hold the public of ce to which he has been proclaimed
elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the
COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore,
disquali ed from running for and being elected to the of ce of Provincial Governor of
Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that
private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under
C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that
private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three
mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States
of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued
alien certi cate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the
Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that
because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private
respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S.
Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not.
Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States
does not concern Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent
is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent
had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to
positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al. , (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989)
and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al. (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable
to the case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United
States in 1983 per certi cation from the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but
claimed that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the
persecution of the Marcos government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of
involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the
United States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not nd it necessary to abandon their
status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen
and that he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, per certi cation from the
Australian Government through its Consul in the Philippines. This was later af rmed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of
sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia. LexLib
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore, disquali ed
from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City,
respectively, the Court considered the fact that by their own admissions, they are
indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since
they have sworn their total allegiance to a foreign state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of
allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this
country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108,
Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship
cannot be presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because
Osmeña obtained Certi cates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the rst in 1958
when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as
having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non
sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a
Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certi cate stating he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has
two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certi es that he has a brother named Jose,
this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled
as student simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University Y,
presents a Certi cation that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean
that he is not still a student of University Y. In the case of Osmeña, the Certi cation that he
is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it
stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no
renunciation, either "express" or "implied ".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no
retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country
had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it
actually existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such
dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been
enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the
COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part
Gutierrez, Jr., J., My stand in the cases of Willie Yu v. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R.
No. 83882, January 24, 1989) and Ramon Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections (G.R.
86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I cannot participate in this case
because one of the principal counsels is my relative by af nity within the fourth civil
degree.
Gancayco, J., is on official leave.
Cortes, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA , J ., dissenting :
I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.
While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a choice will
have to be made by the individual concerned at some point in time in his life, involving as it
does the priceless heritage of citizenship.
That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979,
at 45, he obtained Alien Certi cates of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear and
unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was
merely compelled to so register because of the "uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he
could have, under the new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien
Certificates and abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.
The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That
statement is but a reaf rmation of an innate conviction shared by every Filipino. The law
referred to need not be awaited for one to consider giving up the legal convenience of dual
citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.
CRUZ , J ., dissenting :
I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.

It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect af rming
that he is not a citizen. The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive from the
viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really matters in the case at bar. Under this
discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or he is not; and the question is resolved
on the basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by "express
renunciation" thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193,
June 23, 1989, there was such renunciation when the petitioner took an oath as a
naturalized citizen of the United States in which he renounced all allegiance to all other
states. In the case of Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989,
the petitioner not only took a similar oath after his naturalization in Australia but also
executed other documents in which he stated that he was not a Filipino.
The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his disavowal of
Philippine citizenship. "Express renunciation" is a separate mode of losing Philippine
citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on "naturalization in a foreign country," which
is another and different mode.
When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say
he still loves her despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left her for
another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly transferred his truth. It does him no
credit when he protests he married a second time simply for material convenience and
that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his
sordid and deceitful character.
By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after renouncing it
because of its meager resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons, is to me a
paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated state and a slight to the adopted
state. No matter how noble this attitude may appear to others, it is to me nothing less than
plain and simple hypocrisy that we should not condone, let alone extol.
Coming now to the case at bar, I note rst of all that no naturalization is involved here as
the private respondent claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the United
States. The question I think we must answer is: Was there an express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship by the private respondent when he knowingly and voluntarily
registered as an alien with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in
1979?.
In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989, I
made the following observations in a separate opinion:
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the nding that the petitioner has expressly
renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view
rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing citizenship
under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of
its signi cance and consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he
signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the Philippine
government to register him as an alien. Gov. Osmeña did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had con ned himself to simply seeking and using an
American passport, these acts could not have by themselves alone constituted a
repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is that he did more than enjoy
this legal convenience. What he actually did was register with the Philippine government as
an alien within its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it
exercises over its nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was
not required to register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By
this decision, he categorically asked the Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an
American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that was willing to consider
him its own.

C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of Philippine
citizenship be made in connection with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a
foreign country. Renunciation may be made independently of naturalization proceedings.
Moreover, no sacramental words are prescribed by the statute for the express
renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and
the preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine
citizenship is lost.
The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be allowed
where Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be retained.
The Philippines for all her modest resources compared to those of other states, is a
jealous and possessive mother demanding total love and loyalty from her children. It is
bad enough that the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what is worse is
where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its own territory at that, and offers his total
devotion to the other state.
I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmeña to improve the province of Cebu,
and also, I should add, of the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the
administration of their respective jurisdictions. But that is not the point. The point is that it
is not lawful to maintain in public of ce any person who, although supported by the
electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.
Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.
PADILLA , J ., dissenting :
I am constrained to dissent.
I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña enjoyed
at one time dual citizenship, i.e., Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born in the
Philippines of a Filipino father and an American (U.S.) mother. However, his sworn
applicationfor alien registration dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B) led with the Philippine
immigration authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano, 1 express
renunciation means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left
to inference or implication.
Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder — like the
private respondent of age, and with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath
applies with the Philippine Government for registration as an alien, insofar as his intention
not to remain a Filipino citizen is concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit
manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine
immigration authorities issued to private respondent Alien Certi cate of Registration No.
015356 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re-enter the Philippines No. 122018
dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration Certi cate of Clearance No. D-146483
dated 3 January 1980 (Exh. E) 2
All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to the private
respondent at his request are predicated on the proposition that private respondent is an
alien under Philippine laws. It should also be mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in
the case at bar, private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City Native Born Certificate
of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as veri ed from Immigration records).
This document, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the
proposition that private respondent is a duly-registered alien (American) residing in the
Philippines.
Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry Permit
executed and signed by private respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath, and
veri ed from the records at the CID, wherein private respondent expressly stated that he is
a U.S. national. The importance of this document cannot be underestimated. For, if private
respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said
Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his
country (the Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent executed said sworn
Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex B, is again an
abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he continuous to be, a
resident alien (American) in the Philippines.
It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already registered as
an alien with the Bureau of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 (RA 562).
Section 1 of said Act provides:
"SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after
the approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those residing in the
City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those residing in
other localities at the of ce of the city or municipal treasurers, or at any other
office designated by the President. . . . ." 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, per certi cation of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Miriam
Defensor-Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had been
issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27 and 28 March 1958 respectively. He,
therefore, registered himself in the Philippines as an alien twice; rst, in the year 1958,
when he was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice
registering under oath as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration, private respondent
thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was an alien (and,
therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and under its laws.
At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clari cation should be
made. In his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that
he (private respondent) was born in
1934 — hence, our mathematical conclusion that when he rst registered as an alien in
1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years
old. However, private respondent's immigration records disclose that he was born in 1938
(not in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth of private
respondent (and that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is
erroneous), then in 1958, when he rst registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in
1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 41 years old.
Still, his rst registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an express
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was almost 21 years
old — the age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration
Act (RA 562), an alien 14 years or over has to register in person (and not through his
parents or guardian). It provides:
"The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of age,
shall have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That whenever any such
alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines he shall, within fteen days
thereafter, apply in person for registration." (Sec. 1, par. 2)
I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder on whether
to remain a Filipino citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14, and private respondent
(although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age 20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been made or
led by private respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could
perhaps be some room for contention that vis-a-vis the Philippine Government, private
respondent had not renounced his Philippine citizenship. But said acts of express
renunciation were led with the Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines. In
turn, the Philippine Government, through the immigration authorities, accepted and acted
on private respondent's aforesaid representations, and registered and documented him
TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.
The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual citizenship,
because this condition or status assumes as a necessary complement thereof dual
allegiance at the same time to two (2) different countries. As early as 16 September 1947,
a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the celebrated
case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative
of Philippine citizenship, for the following reason, among others:
". . . . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be
taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented. But the
application of the principle of jus soli to persons born in this country of alien
parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long run would be
detrimental to both countries of which such persons might claim to be citizens." 4
This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides —
"Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law." (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the "best of
two (2) worlds" may be the result of birth or other factors accidentally brought about, the
"dual citizen" has to make a choice at one time or another. Having two (2) citizenships is,
as I see it, similar in many ways to having two (2) legal spouses, when as a matter of
principle and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and
certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:
"Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undersirable phenomenon. It
inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to international con icts. . . .
Dual nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a badge of
convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the singleness of
commitment which is the hallmark of citizenship and allegiance. A person should
have a right to choose his own nationality, and this choice should be honored by
all countries. However, he should not be entitled to claim more than one
nationality." 5 (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the Philippine
Government — which, like many other countries, considers dual allegiance as against
national or public interest — to register him at least twice (and, therefore, unmistakably) as
an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. The choice must be respected as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a
discerning, distinguished and respected person who must be presumed to have known the
full import of his acts.
Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is inconsistent in its
rulings. In the light of its recent decision in G.R No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The
Commission on Elections, et al.), I see no valid justi cation for holding Mr. Labo an alien
under Philippine law while holding private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the
majority states: "In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that
he was a citizen of Australia" (p. 7, Decision). And that is exactly what private respondent
did. In a number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the United
States.
To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private respondent,
despite such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never mind those
sworn statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce
for the gander. The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions should be built on the merits,
not on distinctions that really make no difference.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private respondent not a
Filipino citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of such citizenship.
SARMIENTO , J ., concurring :
The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American citizenship,
only that he did not necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The important question,
however, inheres in how he obtained American citizenship. I nd that there is a dearth of
facts here.
For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has lost Filipino
citizenship (Com. Act No. 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989; Labo v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he, however, became one by the application
of the principle of jus soli, it is by force of circumstances rather than choice. But he does
not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.
In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a citizen of the
Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time, a citizen of the United States. There
must be a clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the means
enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had obtained an alien
certificate of registration, standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."
Feliciano, J., concurs.
Footnotes

1. G.R. No. L-24530, October 31, 1968, 25 SCRA 890.
2. Rollo, pp. 117-118.
3. 46 OG 11, 5367.
4. 79 Phil. 257.
5. Volume 4, Nationality, 1989 ed., p. 11-12.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000.]
CIRILO R. VALLES , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ , respondents.
Ifurung & Marquinez for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the COMELEC, dismissing
the petition for disquali cation led by petitioner against private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental. EHTCAa
Petitioner maintained that private respondent is an Australian citizen, not qualified to

run for elective o ce, because: she is a holder of an Australian passport; and she
expressly renounced her Filipino citizenship when she declared under oath in her
application for alien certi cate of registration and immigrant certi cate of residence that
she was a citizen or subject of Australia.
In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that private
respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certi cate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of Filipino citizenship.
Renunciation must be express, to effectively result in the loss of Filipino citizenship. At
most, private respondent had dual citizenship — she was an Australian and a Filipino, as
well. Dual citizenship as a disquali cation refers to citizens with dual allegiance. Her ling
of a certi cate of candidacy, where she declared that she is a Filipino citizen and that she
will support and defend the Philippine Constitution and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto, su ced to renounce her foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; RENUNCIATION MUST BE EXPRESS;

APPLYING FOR AN ALIEN CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION AND HOLDING A FOREIGN
PASSPORT, NOT A CASE OF; CASE AT BAR. — In order that citizenship may be lost by
renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner's contention that the
application of private respondent for an alien certi cate of registration, and her Australian
passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC
and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC. In the case of Aznar,
the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certi cate
stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certi cate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the
fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997,
only a year before he led a certi cate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just
assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an
Australian passport and had an alien certi cate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must
be express. EDATSI
2. ID.; ID.; DUAL CITIZENSHIP; AS A DISQUALIFICATION FROM RUNNING FOR

PUBLIC OFFICE REFERS TO CITIZENS WITH DUAL ALLEGIANCE; CASE AT BAR. —
Petitioner maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual
citizenship, still, she is disquali ed to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40
of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, . . . In the
aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clari ed "dual citizenship" as used in
the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may,
without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the con icting laws of
different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual
citizenship as a disquali cation must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. . . Thus, the fact
that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from
running for a public office.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP EFFECTIVELY
REMOVES ANY DISQUALIFICATION AS A DUAL CITIZEN; CASE AT BAR. — It was ruled that
for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon
the ling of their certi cate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship. The ling of a certi cate of candidacy su ced to renounce foreign citizenship,
effectively removing any disquali cation as a dual citizen. This is so because in the
certi cate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent led her
certi cate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is signi cant to note that on January 15, 1992, private respondent executed a
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February
11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certi ed to by
Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly
appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the
alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; PRINCIPLE THEREOF
GENERALLY DOES NOT APPLY IN CASES OF CITIZENSHIP; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. —
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res
judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in
the case of Burca vs. Republic, an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court
ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of
citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship be raised as a material
issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3) the nding on
citizenship is a rmed by this Court. Although the general rule was set forth in the case of
Moy Ya Lim Yao , the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It
elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent o cial ndings,
though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. Indeed, there appears
su cient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-
066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private
respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence
presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or
supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. TCaEAD
DECISION
PURISIMA , J : p
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15,
1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the
petition for disquali cation led by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet,
Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fteen, she
left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the
Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the
electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial
Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for
and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent,
Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground
therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, nding no su cient proof that
respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en
banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned
resolution shows that respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the
Filipino citizenship of her late father . . . and consequently, prove her own
citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations
of the petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding. ETIDaH
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . .
no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to con rm the allegations of
petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express
renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth
Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its
signi cance and consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are
inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of
her Filipino citizenship". 1
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, led a petition for
disquali cation, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division,
contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the
COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she
ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her
candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC's First Division came out with a Resolution
dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to
dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table de nitely
shows that petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the
Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely
restates the same matters and incidents already passed upon by this
Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No.
92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature,
persuasive in character or su ciently provocative to compel reversal of such
Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of course.
xxx xxx xxx
"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and
issues tendered, We nd no convincing reason or impressive explanation to
disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-
54 and SPA 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to
DISMISS the present petition.
SO ORDERED." 2
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but

to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15,
1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition;
questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
is a Filipino citizen and therefore, quali ed to run for a public o ce because (1) her father,
Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she
was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a
Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January
15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her
Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certi ed to by the Australian Embassy in
Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA
Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly quali ed to run for the elective
position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian
citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certi cate
of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988; SCEDaT
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certi cate
of Residence (ICR); and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private
respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for
alien certi cate of registration and immigrant certi cate of residence, private respondent
expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said
declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for
elective office.
As regards the COMELEC's nding that private respondent had renounced her
Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992,
as certi ed to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said
acts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen.
According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she
must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171;
and the election of private respondent to public o ce did not mean the restoration of her
Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with
her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively
become a stateless person and as such, is disquali ed to run for a public o ce in the
Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the
principle of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim
Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 3 that:
". . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand. . . . "
The petition is unmeritorious.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the
place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality
or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier
Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen
and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this
was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as
the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United
States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws de ned who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine
islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4. . . . all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred
and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto; shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
(italics supplied) HSIADc
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:

SEC. 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other
country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized
to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States if residing therein. (italics supplied)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine
citizens. Private respondent's father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in
Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certi ed true copy of an entry in the
Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo
Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo's daughter, herein private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public o ce in
the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 4 and 1987 5 Constitutions. Thus,
the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born
to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing
her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is
a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this
contention, petitioner cited private respondent's application for an Alien Certi cate of
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certi cate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988,
and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or
laws of a foreign county upon attaining twenty-one years of age or
more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a
foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; SEHTIc
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the

Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary
pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of
the laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. Petitioner's contention that the application of private respondent for an alien
certi cate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was
put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC 6 and in the more recent case of Mercado vs.
Manzano and COMELEC. 7
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was
a holder of a certi cate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a
Filipino, and that an application for an alien certi cate of registration was not tantamount
to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that
respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year
before he led a certi cate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of
his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of
an Australian passport and had an alien certi cate of registration are not acts constituting
an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must
be express. 8 As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an
alien certi cate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation
of one's citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certi cate
of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs.
Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively
renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship — she was
an Australian and a Filipino, as well. ISHCcT
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was
born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one's Philippine
citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship,
petitioner's claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not
hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent
had dual citizenship, still, she is disquali ed to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing
Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
which states:
"SEC. 40. Disquali cations. — The following persons are disquali ed
from running for any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx xxx xxx
Again, petitioner's contention is untenable.

In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clari ed "dual citizenship"
as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5
of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. 9 Recognizing situations in which a Filipino
citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the
con icting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court
explained that dual citizenship as a disquali cation must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
". . . the phrase 'dual citizenship' in R.A. No. 7160, ... 40 (d) and in R.A. No.
7854, . . . 20 must be understood as referring to 'dual allegiance'. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification."
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically
disqualify her from running for a public o ce. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates
with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the ling of
their certi cate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. 1 0
The ling of a certi cate of candidacy su ced to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
removing any disquali cation as a dual citizen. 1 1 This is so because in the certi cate of
candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent led her certi cate of
candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is signi cant to note that on January 15, 1992, private respondent
executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a
result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled,
as certi ed to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila.
As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue
of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was
effective, petitioner's claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of
repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or
administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered
res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya
Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration . 1 2 He insists that the same issue of citizenship
may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res
judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in
the case of Burca vs. Republic, 1 3 an exception to this general rule was recognized. The
Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in
cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person's citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part
in the resolution thereof; and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did
not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may
somehow be placed on these antecedent o cial ndings, though not really binding, to
make the effort easier or simpler. 1 4 Indeed, there appears su cient basis to rely on the
prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which
resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence
adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior
cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a
reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding,
considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions,
dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED. ATHCac
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged quali ed to run for
governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is abroad, on official business.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 31.
2. Rollo, pp. 57-58.
3. 141 SCRA 292, 367.
4. Article III, Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

3. Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.

5. Article IV, Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
2. Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
6. 185 SCRA 703.
7. G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999.

8. Commonwealth Act 63, Section 1.
9. "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."
10. Mercado vs. Manzano, supra.
11. Ibid.
12. 41 SCRA 292, supra.
13. 51 SCRA 248.

14. Moy Ya Lim Yao, supra, pp. 366-367.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016.]
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES , petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO ,
respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 221698-700. March 8, 2016.]
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES , petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P.
CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ , respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ , J : p
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of
temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division; and (4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for
having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar
(Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed
on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after,
6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the
O ce of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certi cate and
Certi cate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was ve (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) led a petition
for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974,
the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed
from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."
Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling
certi cate re ecting the court decreed adoption, 2 the petitioner's adoptive mother
discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled
petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certi cate of Live Birth
indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay,
petitioner's mother executed an a davit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she
submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certi cate of Live
Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a
voter with the local COMELEC O ce in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she
received her COMELEC Voter's Identi cation Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila. 5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No.
F927287 6 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993
and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured
Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616. 7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at
the University of the Philippines 8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left
for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from
Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts
degree in Political Studies. 9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose
Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in
the U.S., the couple ew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29
July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian)
on 16 April 1992. 12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika
(Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004,
respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She
obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna
to support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during
this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S.
with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, speci cally on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to
the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her
father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country
until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to
assist in the settlement of his estate. 18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow
to her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner
and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime
in the rst quarter of 2005. 19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement
including noti cation of their children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine schools for the next semester; 20 coordination with property movers for the
relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;
21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in
bringing their pet dog into the country. 22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit
her job in the U.S. 23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 24 and without
delay, secured a Tax Identi cation Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her
three (3) children immediately followed 25 while her husband was forced to stay in the
U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home
there. 26
The petitioner and her children brie y stayed at her mother's place until she and
her husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005. 27 The corresponding
Condominium Certi cates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the
Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.
28 Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the
disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings. 29 She travelled back
to the Philippines on 11 March 2006. 30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband o cially informed the U.S. Postal
Service of the family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. 31 The
family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006. 32 Petitioner's husband resigned
from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started
working for a major Philippine company in July 2006. 33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home 34 and to this day, is
where the couple and their children have been residing. 35 A Transfer Certi cate of Title
covering said property was issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City on 1 June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003. 36 Under the same Act, she led with the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with
petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July
2006. 37 As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on
petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines. 38
Consequently, the BI issued Identi cation Certi cates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in
the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on
31 August 2006. 40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing
the No. XX4731999. 41 This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was
issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA. 42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classi cation Board (MTRCB). 43
Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "A davit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship"
before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, 44 in satisfaction of the legal
requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. 45 The following day, 21 October 2010
petitioner submitted the said a davit to the BI 46 and took her oath of o ce as
Chairperson of the MTRCB. 47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her American
passport. 48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S.
Embassy in Manila an "Oath/A rmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United
States." 49 On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice
Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21
October 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship.
50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the
U.S., speci cally in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from
May 2005 to present. 51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certi cate of
Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010. 52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner led with the COMELEC her Certi cate of
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and
6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."
53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16
May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No.
DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner led her COC for the Presidency for the May
2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen
and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. 57 The petitioner
attached to her COC an "A davit A rming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship"
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's ling of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered
the ling of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these
consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner led her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo)
led a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No.
15-001 (DC) and ra ed to the COMELEC Second Division. 59 She is convinced that the
COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition. 60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is
that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016
Elections. 61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be
considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling. 62
Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born status and
Filipino citizenship on foundlings. 63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not
quali ed to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is
not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with. 64 Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she
became a naturalized American citizen. 65 According to Elamparo, natural-born
citizenship must be continuous from birth. 66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was
bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she
indicated that she had resided in the country for only six (6) years and six (6) months as
of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that
petitioner is quali ed to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell
short of the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could
only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine
citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is quali ed to
reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to
reestablish her domicile in the Philippines. 67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was
actually a petition for quo warranto which could only be led if Grace Poe
wins in the Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice
(DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain
allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the
statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was
there any allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to
misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show
that foundlings were considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have
been born of citizens of the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship prior to the ling of her COC for President in the May 9,
2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and
has not been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not
possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she
reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24,
2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she
reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012
COC for Senator was an honest mistake, not binding and should
give way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the
sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide a purely political
question, that is, should she serve as the country's next leader. 68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was
deemed submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution
nding that petitioner's COC, led for the purpose of running for the President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained
material representations which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE , in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certi cate of Candidacy is hereby
GRANTED . Accordingly, the Certi cate of Candidacy for President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections led
by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby
CANCELLED . 69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was led by
petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution
by denying the same. 70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions led by Francisco S. Tatad
(Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against
petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated and ra ed to its First
Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, 71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the
requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency. 72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered
natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born
status. 73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is
excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the
categories of citizens in the 1935 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to
exclude them. 74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-
born citizen. 75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to
support her claim that foundlings have a nationality. 76 According to Tatad, international
conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary
in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. 77 He also
stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-
born status to foundlings. 78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the
option to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to
former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling. 79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not
comply with the ten (10)-year residency requirement. 80 Tatad opined that petitioner
acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American
citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011. 81 Additionally, Tatad questioned
petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her
husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S. 82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner,
docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No.
9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen. 83 He advanced the
view that former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires
only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born
citizens. 84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she
had only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months
prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's
claim that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to
her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did
not meet the ten (10)-year residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases led against petitioner, Contreras' petition,
85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He
claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground
that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy
and that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of
the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016. 86 Contreras
contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the
Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI. 87 He asserted that petitioner's physical
presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of
reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American
citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws. 88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:

First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of
action. His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disquali cation case as
enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. 89 Instead, Tatad
completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner
which are not among the recognized grounds for the disquali cation of a candidate to
an elective office. 90
Second, the petitions led against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as
they focus on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency. 91 A petition for quo
warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) and not the COMELEC. 92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents. 93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a
natural-born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a
nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found. 94
Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be
repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status. 96
Moreover, the o cial acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of
regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as
natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of
adoption of San Juan RTC. 97 She believed that all these acts reinforced her position
that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the rst quarter of 2005, she started
reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her
children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in
San Juan City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills. 99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in
the Philippines even before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three
determinants for a change of domicile are complied with. 100 She reasoned out that
there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for
the acquisition of a new domicile of choice. 101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her
COC for Senator was a mistake made in good faith. 102
In a Resolution 103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First
Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the
ten (10)-year residency requirement, and that she committed material
misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident of
the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of
the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not
quali ed for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The
dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certi cate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES
for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner led a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC
First Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present
petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28
December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the
COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the
consolidation of the two petitions led by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January
2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and
to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in
SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent;
SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-
139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding
the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding
the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions
emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National
Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be
denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the
certi cate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in
the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the
quali cations of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet
undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the
same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, rst of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions
in Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and quali cations of all elective regional,
provincial, and city o cials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay o cials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, nal orders, or rulings of the Commission on elections contests
involving elective municipal and barangay o ces shall be nal,
executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of
polling places, appointment of election o cials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after su cient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present
their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms
of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects
shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere
to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to
political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to
elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their
registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that
may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a veri ed complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court
for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses,
and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda
materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of
election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any o cer or employee it
has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or
decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on
the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or
recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the
provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and quali cations of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and quali cations of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the quali cations of the
President, the Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such provision for
candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission
on Elections, 104 which was a rmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v.
COMELEC 105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring
the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15,
1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 §1, the following:
Grounds for disquali cation. — Any candidate who does
not possess all the quali cations of a candidate as provided for
by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
declared by law to be grounds for disquali cation may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the
creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC,
in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution,
cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC
even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially
involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship
of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disquali cation is contrary to the evident intention
of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disquali cation" different from those for a declaration of
"ineligibility." "Disquali cation" proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds speci ed in §12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of
the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual
from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public o ce.
In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the
start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of
the quali cations prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding
public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is
to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the quali cations for a public
o ce does not imply that he is not disquali ed from becoming a candidate or
continuing as a candidate for a public o ce and vice versa. We have this sort
of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
quali cations prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he does not
suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of
the respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the
lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be
supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected,
there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the o ce. In contrast,
whether an individual should be disquali ed as a candidate for acts
constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of
prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he
wins because of the very acts for which his disquali cation is being sought.
That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disquali cation are established,
a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor
will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has
won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g.,
his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make,
extending beyond the beginning of the term of the o ce. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v.
COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in
the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the
summary character proceedings relating to certi cates of candidacy. That is
why the law makes the receipt of certi cates of candidacy a ministerial duty of
the COMELEC and its o cers. The law is satis ed if candidates state in their
certi cates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek
to ll, leaving the determination of their quali cations to be made after the
election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges
of false representations made in certi cates of candidacy is the COMELEC
given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation
cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the
House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the
prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other
Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice President, as
the case may be. 106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as
reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on
25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February 1993 version of Rule 25, which
states that:
Grounds for disquali cation. — Any candidate who does not possess all the
quali cations of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disquali cation
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate. 107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. — Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is
declared by nal decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disquali cation provided by law or the
Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to
or Cancel a Certi cate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a
Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence
of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the quali cations of
candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a
declaration by a nal judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be
disquali ed "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the quali cation of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are
ipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment
of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts
of quali cation must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an
authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of quali cation may
be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disquali ed without a prior nding that he or she is
suffering from a disquali cation "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the
certi cate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her quali cations, without a prior authoritative nding
that he or she is not quali ed, such prior authority being the necessary measure by
which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception that can be
conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial
confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the
falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate nding or nal pronouncement in a proceeding under
Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding the
candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that
since foundlings 108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935
Constitution, 109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral
arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders
on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule
that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is
certain that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has
the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is
DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither
unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a
whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. 110 That said, there is more than su cient
evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner
is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the
burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that
her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are
unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sec. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters — Evidence must have such a
relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in
issue.
The Solicitor General offered o cial statistics from the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA) 111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was
10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that
decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83% . For her part, petitioner presented census
statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were
962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were
Filipinos. In 1970, the gures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55% .
Also presented were gures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were
230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68% . In the same
year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58% . In 1970, there
were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1,190 female aliens, or 99.56% . That same year,
there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53% .
COMELEC did not dispute these gures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted,
during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of
the population in Iloilo was Filipino. 112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the
fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She
also has typical Filipino features: height, at nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond
shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 113 All of the foregoing
evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in
a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such
that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a
Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that
petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based
are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as
the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come
to the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies
behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is such that every
foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of
being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the
chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners?
Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a
yearly average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino
parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents.
Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born
Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines
is 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is
15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This
means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on
that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the
numbers for us, but I am con dent that the statistical probability that a child
born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by
whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling
would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos
abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine
foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those
infants would have better economic opportunities or believing that this country
is a tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt
whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is
best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them
stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the
thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two,
foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make
any sense. Given the statistical certainty — 99.9% — that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such
status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this
Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacri ce the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor,
constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate
disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the
1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would de nitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and
ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the
intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 114 this Court held
that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary
task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of
the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be
covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols:
For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted:
"The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not
recognized by the father.
xxx xxx xxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clari cation from the proponent of the amendment.
The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate
children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown
parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clari cation. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes
consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all
children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered
Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage
is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a
child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be
Filipino, and there is no need. . . .

Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be
Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for
amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus: "Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and
a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown
parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown
parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the
child, is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the
children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child.
Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino
mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be
considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman
from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands
of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between,
that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the
principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are
citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a
provision on the subject exhaustively. 116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was
any objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but
only because their number was not enough to merit speci c mention. Such was the
account, 117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego
who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an

amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign
father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but
this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that
the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation.
Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already clear to
the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and
that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were found,
thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed
amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16
February 2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what
was declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of
foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is
by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that
there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were
legally correct. Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on
assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing
rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to
convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to
expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so
recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of
linguistic e ciency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to
recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the
1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was
paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it
is silently vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create
a just and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be
unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that,
given the grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born
Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
"for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on
those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that
the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and in ict this across
the board marginalization."
We nd no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings.
On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of
the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are
several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the
"State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities . . ." and Article XV, Section 3
which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these
provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the
adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the rst place to be adopted. The
most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding
on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status,
and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In
Ellis and Ellis v. Republic, 119 a child left by an unidenti ed mother was sought to be
adopted by aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem,
which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject
matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the
personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code
(Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural
person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have
jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines,
but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. 120 (Underlining
supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the
Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other Purposes"
(otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled
"An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For
Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this
Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino
children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling
leading to the issuance of a foundling certi cate under these laws and the issuance of
said certi cate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the
foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2
"Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the rst
place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the
citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child
but by the authorities. 121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of
the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship,
or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother
under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is
a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certi cate issued in her favor. 122 The Decree
of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa
Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife,
Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively a rming petitioner's status
as a foundling. 123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. 124 On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations. 125 International customary rules are accepted as
binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread,
and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as
the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence
of a rule of law requiring it. 126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized
nations" are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based
on principles which are "basic to legal systems generally," 127 such as "general
principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general
principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation." 128 These are the same
core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights. 129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this
Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on
the State. 130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
The Philippines has also rati ed the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance
with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international
instruments in this eld, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.
In 1986, the country also rati ed the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire
a nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to
such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on
the part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This
grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the
application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen
(18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unrati ed by the Philippines,
are generally accepted principles of international law. The rst is Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Con ict of Nationality Laws
under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to
wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be
determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born
on the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the
territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are
not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a
signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15 (1) of which 131
effectively a rms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961
"United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to
Article 15 (1) of the UDHR. 132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the
Philippines had not signed or rati ed the "International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against
enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a
"generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable
for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the
convention had been rati ed by only sixteen states and had not even come into force
and which needed the rati cation of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as
petitioner points out, the Court was content with the practice of international and
regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the
United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is
Mijares v. Rañada, 134 where only four countries had "either rati ed or acceded to" 135
the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also
pointed out that that nine member countries of the European Common Market had
acceded to the Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and
jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen
countries were considered and yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of
foreign judgments was widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that
"generally accepted principles of international law" are based not only on international
custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the
phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness,
equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles
underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to legal systems generally," 136
support the notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the recognition
of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of
international law" under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence 137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and
South America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its
citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty,
only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six
(26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February
2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or
87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the
practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country
in which the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally
accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and
this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them,
foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been
pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only
to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA,
considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus
sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of
foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at
more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of
nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class
which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to
their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the
community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is
relevant:
. . . the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that
those treaties and conventions were drafted because the world community is
concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It
would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the
international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to
deny them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship. 138
The COMELEC also ruled 139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born
citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what
is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the
matter of repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson III v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as
follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to
his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several
cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC 141 where we described it as an
"abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship . . . ." Also
included is Parreño v. Commission on Audit, 142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,
143 where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover
his natural-born citizenship. Parreño v. Commission on Audit 141 is categorical that "if
petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will . . . recover his
natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the de nition of natural
citizens as implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain
uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line
with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or
reacquired. Congress saw it t to decree that natural-born citizenship may be
reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the
Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be

continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET 145 where the phrase "from
birth" was clari ed to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is
a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation"
an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court
pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution:
natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated
citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen
who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category
for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it.
The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship
and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary quali cations to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives. 146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court.
And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine
cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S.
Binay, Jr., 147 where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it
"should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately
uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior
to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be
respected." 148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner
committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the
BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data
required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact — petitioner was legally adopted.
One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents
and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee." 149
Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certi cate
"attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which
certi cate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue." 150 That law also
requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the les
of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency
or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential." 151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents
were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certi cate anyway.
And given the policy of strict con dentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not
obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the quali cations of petitioner, which it cannot
make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is,
moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave
abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not
petitioner committed false material representation when she stated in her COC that she
has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years'
residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming
elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the
Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested
information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in these cases
corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the
U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile,
which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1.
Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an
intention to abandon the old domicile. 152 To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona de
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
de nite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at
the domicile of choice must be for an inde nite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual. 153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These
evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005
and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail
correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to
arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to
the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to
ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in
Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identi cation card
for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in
February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts
dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of
items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service con rming
request for change of address; nal statement from the First American Title Insurance
Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 lled-up
questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had
been a Philippine resident since May 2005; a davit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting
to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with
a ant until the condominium was purchased); and A davit from petitioner's husband
(con rming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and
that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the
COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been
timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner
Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the rst two requisites, namely, physical presence
a n d animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-revertendi. 154 The
COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the
basis of the position that the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence
in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was
approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC, 155 Japzon
v. COMELEC 156 and Caballero v. COMELEC . 157 During the oral arguments, the private
respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC. 158 Respondents contend that these
cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she
obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry
under a balikbayan stamp being insu cient. Since petitioner was still an American
(without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her
stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different
from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC, 159 the only evidence presented was a
community tax certi cate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would
be running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC 160 did not involve a candidate who
wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the
Court decreeing that residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether
the candidate's acts after reacquisition su ced to establish residence. In Caballero v.
COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he
only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC, 162 the candidate was
found to be an American citizen who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disquali ed on the
citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as
provincial o cer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such
fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases
cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be
counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken
together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her
U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes
from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post O ce of the abandonment of their
address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning
from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to
the Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005
(securing T.I.N., enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here,
constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her
husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to
reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it
was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had
entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as
amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows
that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must
leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized
abroad and "comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan
program "providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the
balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to
the country" 164 in line with the government's "reintegration program." 165 Obviously,
balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him
reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms
that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted
him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community
before he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And
that is exactly what petitioner did — she reestablished life here by enrolling her children
and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for
repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in
domicile is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court.
Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that
comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v.
COMELEC, 166 and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to
have its rulings there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue
of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of
petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six (6)
years and six (6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC
for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident
only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the
statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her veri ed pleadings, she misunderstood the date
required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that
COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the
period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In
that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted
from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of
residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she
submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in
the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before
May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not
acknowledge that the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of
her U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she
had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and
the school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a
binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence
against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a
candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by
evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 167 the candidate mistakenly put seven
(7) months as her period of residence where the required period was a minimum of one
year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certi cate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satis ed the constitution's residency quali cation requirement." The COMELEC ought
to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that
she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would
have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent
period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner
actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only
because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established only from
petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take
away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay
permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything.
As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been led against her with the SET as
early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement
of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an
established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the
2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was rst brought up in the media on 2 June
2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to
have answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed
petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco
discussed it in the media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the
circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of public record
and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET
petition for quo warranto. Her Veri ed Answer, which was led on 1 September 2015,
admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six (6) years and six
(6) months as she misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a
longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore,
when petitioner accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could
not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC
for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an
intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation.
Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disquali cation to run for public o ce does
not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground
for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already
discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a
material fact (eligibility and quali cations for elective o ce), but should evince
a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the
electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office. 168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a
good number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the
Philippines and animus non revertendi to the United States of America. The veracity of
the events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential,
the focus having been xed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for
Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an
admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in November
2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency
requirement for President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing
jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that
determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement
of residency for election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that
cases on questions of residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the
basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance than that
presented by petitioner. 169 It ignores, above all else, what we consider as a primary
reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which
declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for
Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been
a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May
2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election
as Senator which was satis ed by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested
during the oral arguments before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was
made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and
that the general public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she
would run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence
different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other than
that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have
never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. [petitioner's]

husband however stayed in the USA to nish pending projects and arrange the
sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan
City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and
Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in
Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to
go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F
of One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived
in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was
completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered
that her former lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to
secure from the O ce of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certi cate of Live
Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald
Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled brie y to the US in order to
supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings.
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States
Postal Service of the family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole n on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He
returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine
company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in
Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their family home. 170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let
the case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other
date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for
her candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the
COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of
discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in
SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certi cate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in
the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections led by respondent Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certi cate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the
elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection
with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Veri ed Motion for Reconsideration of
SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The
Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is
AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11
December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE . Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the
National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonen, Jardeleza and Caguioa, JJ., see Concurring
Opinion.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., please see Separate Dissenting Opinion.
Peralta, J., I join J. Caguioa's opinion.

Reyes, J., I concur with the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Perlas-Bernabe.
Footnotes
1. Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700, pp. 15-16; COMELEC First Division
Resolution dated 11 December 2015 in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
and SPA No. 15-139 (DC), p. 2.
2. Petition for Certiorari, id. at 16-17.
3. COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 4.

4. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 22.
5. Id. at 17; Comment (on the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697) led by respondent
COMELEC dated 11 January 2016, p. 6.
6. Petition for Certiorari, id.; id. at 7.

7. Id. at 18.
8. Supra note 6.
9. Id.
12. Id. at 18.
13. Id.
14. COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 10.
15. Id.
16. Supra note 1 at 17-18.

17. COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 10.
18. Id.
19. Id.
21. Id.
22. Supra note 3.
23. Supra note 20.

24. Supra note 3.
25. Supra note 20.
26. Supra note 3.

27. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 4.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 23; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 3.
30. Id.; id.
31. Id.; id.
32. Id.; id.

33. Id. at 23-24; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 5.
34. Id. at 24; id.
35. Id.
36. Supra note 34.
37. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 25; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1
at 5.
38. Id. at 25-26; id.

39. Id. at 26; id.
40. Id.; id.
41. Id.; id.
42. Id. at 32; id. at 6.

43. Supra note 39.
44. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 26-27; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra
note 1 at 5.
45. Section 5, R.A. No. 9225 states:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Those appointed to any public o ce shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of o ce: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the
country where they took that oath;
xxx xxx xxx

47. Id. at 29.
48. Supra note 46; supra note 1 at 6.
49. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 30; id.

50. Id.
51. Supra note 48.
52. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 31; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1
at 6.
53. Comment, supra note 5 at 9.

55. Id. at 32; Comment, supra note 53 at 10.
56. Id.; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 6.
57. Id.; id. at 7.

58. Id.; id.
59. Comment (on the Petition in G.R. No. 221697) led by respondent Elamparo, dated
January 6, 2016, p. 7.
60. COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated December 1, 2015 in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), p.
7.
61. Id. at 7-8.

62. Supra note 60.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id.
66. Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697, p. 7.
67. Supra note 64.
68. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 65 at 8; COMELEC Second Division Resolution, supra
note 60 at 8-11.
69. COMELEC Second Division Resolution, supra note 60 at 34.
70. Comment, supra note 59 at 10.
71. Section 1 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, states:

Rule 25 — Disqualification of Candidates
Section 1. Grounds. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party, is
declared by nal decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disquali cation provided by law or the
Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a
Certi cate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate,
or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
72. Petition to Disqualify dated 19 October 2015 filed by Tatad in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), p. 9.
73. Id., at 9 and 14.

74. Id. at 10.
75. Id. at 12.
76. Id. at 11.

78. Id.
79. Petition to Disqualify, supra note 72 at 11.
80. Id. at 21.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Supra note 1 at 8.
84. Id.
85. Contreras' petition is a petition for cancellation of Grace Poe's COC under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code which states that:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certi cate of candidacy. — A veri ed
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certi cate of candidacy may be
led by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
led at any time not later than twenty- ve days from the time of the ling of the
certi cate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
86. Petition for Cancellation of Grace Poe's COC dated 17 October 2015 led by Contreras in
SPA No. 15-007 (DC), pp. 2-4.
87. Id. at 3; Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 13.
88. Id. at 3-4.

89. Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code provide:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by nal judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
be disquali ed to be a candidate and to hold any o ce, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
This disquali cations to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of ve years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party
i s declared by nal decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to in uence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public o cials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disquali ed from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the o ce. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be quali ed to run for any elective o ce
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws.

91. Id. at 10.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 9.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 9-10.
100. Id. at 10.

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division was concurred in by
Commissioners Louie Tito F. Guia and Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon. Presiding
Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim issued a Separate Dissenting Opinion.
104. 318 Phil. 329 (1995).

105. 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
106. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, supra note 104 at 396-397.
107. Id. at 397-398; Fermin v. COMELEC, supra note 105 at 471-472.

108. In A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, Resolution Approving the Proposed Rule on Adoption (Domestic
and Inter-Country), effective 22 August 2002, "foundling" is de ned as "a deserted or
abandoned infant or child whose parents, guardian or relatives are unknown; or a
child committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar institution with unknown
facts of birth and parentage and registered in the Civil Register as a "foundling."
109. Article IV — Citizenship.
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Section 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
110. Article 163 to 182, Title VI of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family
Code of the Philippines, which took effect on 4 August 1988.
111. Statistics from the PSA or its predecessor agencies are admissible evidence. See Herrera
v. COMELEC, 376 Phil. 443 (1999) and Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, 593 Phil. 678 (2008).
In the latter case, the Court even took judicial notice of the figures.
112. Transcript of Stenographic Notes, 9 February 2016, p. 40.
113. Section 3 (y), Rule 131.
114. 236 Phil. 307 (1987).

115. Id. at 314-315.
116. English translation of the Spanish original presented in the petitioner's pleadings before
the COMELEC and this Court. The COMELEC and private respondents have not
disputed the accuracy and correctness of the translation.
117. I Jose M. Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 209 (1949).
118. TSN, 16 February 2016, pp. 20-21.

119. 117 Phil. 976 (1963).
120. Id. at 978-979.
121. See Section 5 of the RA No. 8552: "Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty
of the Department or the child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert
all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child
shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal
proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned." (Underlining supplied)
122. See Exhibit "1" in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and SPA No. 15-00 (DC).
123. See Exhibit "2" in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and SPA No. 15-00 (DC).
124. Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536, 600 (2009) citing Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Assoc. of the Philippines v. Duque III, 561 Phil. 386, 398 (2007).
125. Article 38.1, paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
126. Mijares v. Rañada, 495 Phil. 372, 395 (2005).

127. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. of the Philippines v. Duque III, 561 Phil. 386, 400
(2007).
128. International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, 388 Phil. 661, 672-673 (2000).
129. CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1.

130. Rep. of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504, 545 (2003).
131. "Everyone has the right to a nationality".
132. See Introductory Note to the United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness issued by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees.
133. Supra note 124.

135. Id. at 392; See footnote No. 55 of said case.
136. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. of the Philippines v. Duque III, supra note 127.
137. See Exhibits 38 and 39-series.

138. Opening Statement of the Solicitor General, p. 6.
139. First Division resolution dated 11 December 2015, upheld in toto by the COMELEC En
Banc.
140. 409 Phil. 633, 649 (2001).
141. 692 Phil. 407, 420 (2012).

142. 551 Phil. 368, 381 (2007).
143. 531 Phil. 407, 417 (2006).

145. Supra note 140 at 646.
146. Id. at 651.
147. G.R. Nos. 217126-27, 10 November 2015.

148. Id.
149. Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 8552, Art. VI, Sec. 33.
150. Republic Act No. 8552 (1998), Sec. 14.

151. Republic Act No. 8552 (1998), Sec. 15.
152. Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 623 Phil. 628, 660 (2009)
citing Japzon v. COMELEC, 596 Phil. 354, 370-372 (2009) further citing Papandayan,
Jr. v. COMELEC, 430 Phil. 754, 768-770 (2002) further further citing Romualdez v.
RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No. 104960, 14 September 1993, 226 SCRA 408, 415.
153. Domino v. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798, 819 (1999).
154. TSN, 16 February 2016, p. 120.

155. 434 Phil. 861 (2002).
156. 596 Phil. 354 (2009).
157. G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015.
158. G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013, 699 SCRA 522.


163. Republic Act No. 6768 (1989), as amended, Sec. 2 (a).
164. Republic Act No. 6768 (1989), as amended, Sec. 1.
165. Republic Act No. 6768 (1989), as amended, Sec. 6.

167. Supra note 104 at 326. (Emphasis supplied)
168. Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC, 575 Phil. 253, 265-266 (2008).

169. In Mitra v. COMELEC, et al. , [636 Phil. 753 (2010)], It was ruled that the residence
requirement can be complied with through an incremental process including
acquisition of business interest in the pertinent place and lease of feedmill building
as residence.
170. COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015 in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), pp. 4-5.
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the o cial copy. The term "sole" should read
as "sold".

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 128448. February 1, 2001.]

SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MIRASOL and LILIA E. MIRASOL , petitioners,

4. ID.; SUPREME COURT; REQUISITES FOR EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW. —

After trial on the merits, the trial court decided as follows:

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xxx xxx xxx

(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy,

Moral damages are explicitly authorized in breaches of contract where the

1. One picul is equivalent to 63.25 kilograms.

9. Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135, 139 (1994).

11. 3 SCRA 696, 703-704 (1961).

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18. Drilon v. Lim, supra.

22. Rollo, p. 78.

26. Id. at 86.

27. Id. at 87.

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[G.R. No. 59524. February 18, 1985.]

JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO,

Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Corpuz, and Padlan for petitioner.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; DENIAL OF A MOTION

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10. ID.; ID.; BY ADOPTING DEFENSE WITNESS AS ITS OWN, PROSECUTION IS

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On this argument, we ruled:

Inﬁnitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of

"A. To categorize former Senator Salonga if he were an organizer, he

Lovely's account of the petitioner's involvement with the former's bombing

"A. About thirty (30) minutes.

"42. Q. What happened when the man arrived?

"43. Q. Were the materials given to you?

"A. When Sen. Salonga came back, we asked to be permitted to leave

xxx xxx xxx

"A. Not to my knowledge.

"A. Raul Daza, your Honor.

"A. I am really not quite sure, your Honor.

Respondent judge further said:

"Because according to him, it was in pursuance of the plan that he

Apparently, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by

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Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is

"Actually, it was not my intention to do some kind of bombing

Such a statement wholly negates any politically motivated or subversive

"A. No, your Honor. I did not try to implicate Salonga.

It should be noted that after Lovely's testimony, the prosecution manifested to

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against

— UPO press dispatch from

The Philippine News, a San Francisco-based weekly, in its issue of December

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[G.R. No. L-23127. April 29, 1971.]

FRANCISCA SERRANO DE AGBAYANI, plaintiﬀ-appellee, vs.

Dionisio E. Moya for plaintiﬀ-appellee.

1. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL REVIEW; EFFECTS OF THE DECLARATION OF

A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the eﬀect, if any, to be

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of

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[G.R. No. 81510. March 14, 1990.]

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS D.