UY vs. CA
UY vs. CA
UY vs. CA
*
ANICETO UY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
MINDANAO STATION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,
CARMENCITA NAVAL-SAI, rep. by her Attorney-in-Fact
RODOLFO FLORENTINO, respondents.
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* THIRD DIVISION.
514
515
516
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision2
dated January 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals, Mindanao
Station,
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517
3 Id., at p. 77.
4 RTC Records, pp. 1-2.
5 Id., at p. 6.
6 It appears from the records that there is a mistake as to the number
of the lot Naval-Sai sold to Adil. Following the turn of events, this lot
could only be either Lot No. 54-B-8 or 54-B-9.
7 RTC Records, p. 2.
8 Id.
518
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9 Id., at p. 6.
10 CA Rollo, p. 47.
11 Memorandum of petitioner dated November 15, 2007, Rollo, p. 144.
12 Rollo, pp. 28-35.
13 Id., at pp. 36-43.
519
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520
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521
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522
However, the Court of Appeals emphasized that despite
its discussion on the prescriptibility of the action, it has not
made a finding that the deed of sale is indeed fictitious or
forged because it is for the RTC to rule on after evidence
has been presented and evaluated. Thus, the relevant
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
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24 Id., at p. 61.
523
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration26 on March
3, 2006, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution27 dated May 18, 2006.
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS ON CERTIFICATION FOR NON-FORUM
SHOPPING.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED AND/OR THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF INACTION, LACHES
OR ESTOPPEL.
Our Ruling
There was substantial com-
pliance with the requirements
on certification against forum
shopping.
A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and
personal responsibility of the party, an assurance given to
the
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25 Id., at p. 63.
26 CA Rollo, pp. 145-154.
27 Rollo, p. 79.
524
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525
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526
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37 Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto, G.R. No. 143016, August 30, 2000, 339
SCRA 306, 309, citing Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112547, July
18, 1994, 234 SCRA 192, 198.
527
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528
In Caro v. Court of Appeals,44 we said that this provision
should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered
a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes.
The law creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey
the property and its title in favor of the true owner.
Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of PD No. 1529 and
Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the
Civil Code,45 the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of
fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of
title.46 This ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from
the date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust,
which repudiation takes place when the adverse party
registers the land.47 An exception to this rule is when the
party seeking reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust is in actual, continuous and
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44 G.R. No. 76148, December 20, 1989, 180 SCRA 401, 407.
45 ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
46 Id.
47 Crisostomo v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 164787, January 31, 2006, 481
SCRA 402; Salvatierra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107797, August 26,
1996, 261 SCRA 45; Amerol v. Bagumbaran, No. L-33261, September 30,
1987, 154 SCRA 396.
529
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48 Vda. de Gualberto v. Go, G.R. No. 139843, July 21, 2005, 463 SCRA
671, 681.
49 Brito, Sr. v. Dianala, G.R. No. 171717, December 15, 2010, 638
SCRA 529, 538.
50 ART. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites
concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
51 Aquino, Amado D., Land Registration and Related Proceedings, p.
133, 4th ed., 2007.
52 Id., at p. 136.
530
better title than what he actually has. Being null and void,
the sale produces no legal effects whatsoever.53
Whether an action for reconveyance prescribes or not is
therefore determined by the nature of the action, that is,
whether it is founded on a claim of the existence of an
implied or constructive trust, or one based on the existence
of a void or inexistent contract. This is evident in several of
our past decisions. In Casipit v. Court of Appeals,54 we
rejected the claim of imprescriptibility and applied the 10-
year prescription where the action filed was based on
fraud:
There is no dispute that an action for reconveyance
based on a void contract is imprescriptible (Castillo, et al. v.
Madrigal, et al., G.R. No. 62650, June 27, 1991; Baranda,
et al. v. Baranda, et al., G.R. No. 73275, May 20, 1987, 150
SCRA 59). However, We simply cannot apply this principle
to the present case because the action filed by petitioner
before the trial court was 1) for reconveyance based on
fraud since the ownership of private respondents over the
questioned property was allegedly established on “false
assertions, misrepresentations and deceptive allegations”
(p. 182, Records); and 2) for rescission of the “Kasulatan ng
Pagmamana at Paghahati”
(pp. 173, 187, Records). x x x 55
On the other hand, in Daclag v. Macahilig,56 we rejected
the claim of petitioners that prescription is applicable
because the action was based on fraud. We ruled that the
action was not subject to prescription because it was, in
fact, based on a deed of sale that was null and void. Thus:
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531
In Santos v. Heirs of Dominga Lustre,58 the complaint
alleged that the deed of sale was simulated by forging the
signature of the original registered owner. We ruled in
favor of imprescribility applying the doctrine that the
action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of
title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is
virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which
does not prescribe.
Also, and more illustrative of the discussion above, in
Castillo v. Heirs of Vicente Madrigal,59 it was alleged by
the plaintiffs that they never signed any document. We
ruled as follows:
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532
533
We conclude that, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the
action for reconveyance is based neither on an implied or
constructive trust nor fraud. Naval-Sai alleged that the
purported deed of sale, which became the basis to transfer
the titles in petitioner’s name, was an absolute forgery
because she never sold the two lots to any person.61 Naval-
Sai also alleged that her signature and that of her
husband’s, in the deed of sale are forgeries.62 These
allegations make the action one based on a void or
inexistent contract for lack of consent on the part of the
alleged vendor, Naval-Sai. Based on the complaint, Naval-
Sai only consented to use the titles of the two lots as
security to a loan she obtained from Ng.63
Resolution of the issue of prescription hinges on whether
the deed of sale was indeed forged and, thus, void.
Unfortunately, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals did
not make actual findings on the alleged forgery. No full-
blown trial occurred in the RTC to prove that the deed of
sale was indeed simulated and that the signatures were
forgeries. The case was dismissed based on the pleadings of
the parties. The Court of Appeals also resolved to decide
the case on available records and pleadings, in order to
avoid further delay, due to several resettings and motions
for postponement filed by the parties one after another.
The lack of factual findings on the
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534
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535
Petition denied.
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