CRS Venezuela

Venezuela: Background and U.S.
Policy
Clare Ribando Seelke

Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Rebecca M. Nelson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
December 11, 2017
Congressional Research Service

7-5700
www.crs.gov
R44841
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy
Summary
Venezuela is in a deep political crisis under the authoritarian rule of President Nicolás Maduro of
the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Narrowly elected to a six-year term in 2013
following the death of populist President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), Maduro is unpopular.
Nevertheless, he has used the courts, security forces, and electoral council to repress and divide
the opposition, grouped in the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) coalition.
From March through July 2017, protesters called for President Maduro to release political
prisoners, respect the MUD-led National Assembly, and schedule elections. Security forces
quashed protests, with more than 130 killed and thousands injured. Maduro then orchestrated the
controversial July election of a National Constituent Assembly (ANC) to rewrite the constitution.
President Maduro and the ANC have since consolidated power over the opposition. After the
PSUV won 18 of 23 gubernatorial elections in October, the opposition emerged divided and
disillusioned. Although most opposition parties did not participate in municipal elections held on
December 10 in which the PSUV dominated, some fielded candidates. The MUD has initiated
dialogue with the government to try to secure humanitarian aid and establish parameters for 2018
presidential elections; some opposition figures oppose that process.
President Maduro has blamed U.S. sanctions and corruption for the country’s economic crisis.
Venezuela is experiencing a rapid contraction of the economy, high inflation, shortages of
consumer goods and medicines, and a humanitarian crisis. Maduro has arrested former executives
at state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) for alleged corruption and replaced
them with military officers. He announced that Venezuela will seek to restructure and refinance
its debts. With the government and PdVSA technically declared in default on some bond
payments in November, it is unclear whether restructuring is possible.
U.S. Policy
The United States has spoken out about setbacks to democracy and human rights in Venezuela,
called for the release of political prisoners, expressed concern about the humanitarian situation,
and supported dialogue. The U.S. government has employed targeted sanctions against
Venezuelans responsible for human rights violations, undermining democracy, and public
corruption, as well as those accused of drug trafficking and terrorism. On August 25, 2017,
President Trump imposed economic sanctions that restrict the ability of the Venezuelan
government and PdVSA to access U.S. financial markets. Broader sanctions have been
considered, but could have negative humanitarian impacts. The United States has supported
efforts at the Organization of American States (OAS) to help resolve the situation in Venezuela,
but those efforts have stalled.
Congressional Action
The 115th Congress has taken actions in response to the situation in Venezuela. In February 2017,
the Senate approved S.Res. 35 (Cardin), which, among its provisions, called for the release of
political prisoners and support for dialogue and OAS efforts. On December 5, 2017, the House
passed two measures: H.R. 2658 (Engel), the Venezuela Humanitarian Assistance and Defense of
Democratic Governance Act, which would authorize humanitarian assistance for Venezuela (a
similar but not identical bill, S. 1018 [Cardin], was introduced in the Senate in May 2017); and
H.Res. 259 (DeSantis), which would urge the Venezuelan government to suspend the ANC, hold
open elections, release political prisoners, and accept humanitarian aid. Some Members of
Congress have called for temporary protected status for Venezuelans in the United States (H.R.
2161 [Curbelo]).

Congress has appropriated funding for democracy and human rights in Venezuela ($7 million in
FY2017). The Trump Administration did not request FY2018 assistance. The House
Appropriations Committee’s FY2018 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations
bill, H.R. 3362 (H.Rept. 115-253), incorporated into the House-passed full-year FY2018
Omnibus Appropriations Measure, H.R. 3354, recommends $8 million. The Senate
Appropriations Committee’s version of the bill, S. 1780 (S.Rept. 115-152), recommends
$15 million.
Further Reading
CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political and Economic Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Clare
Ribando Seelke and Mark P. Sullivan
CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Mark P. Sullivan
CRS Insight IN10766, New Financial Sanctions on Venezuela: Key Issues, by Rebecca M. Nelson

Contents
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Political Situation ............................................................................................................................ 4
Legacy of Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) ....................................................................................... 4
Maduro Administration ............................................................................................................. 6
Canceled Recall Referendum and Failed Dialogue Efforts in 2016 ................................... 6
Repression of Dissent amid Protests ................................................................................... 7
Despite Opposition, Constituent Assembly Elected ........................................................... 8
Maduro Reconsolidating Power After Regional and Municipal Elections ....................... 10
Foreign Relations .............................................................................................................. 10
Economic Crisis ............................................................................................................................ 14
Economic Mismanagement During the Oil Boom .................................................................. 14
Oil Price Crash and Subsequent Economic Crisis................................................................... 15
Default and Debt Restructuring .............................................................................................. 17
Social Conditions .......................................................................................................................... 18
Humanitarian Concerns ........................................................................................................... 18
Crime and Violence ................................................................................................................. 20
Migration ................................................................................................................................. 21
U.S. Policy..................................................................................................................................... 22
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic Actions, Human Rights Violations, and
Corruption ............................................................................................................................ 23
Sanctions Restricting Venezuela’s Access to U.S. Financial Markets..................................... 25
Counternarcotics and Money-Laundering Issues .................................................................... 26
Terrorism ................................................................................................................................. 28
Energy Sector Concerns .......................................................................................................... 29
U.S. Foreign Assistance .......................................................................................................... 32
U.S. Support for Organization of American States (OAS) Efforts on Venezuela ................... 33
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 35
Figures
Figure 1. Political Map of Venezuela .............................................................................................. 3
Figure 2. Venezuela: Economic Contraction and Inflation ............................................................ 16
Figure 3. U.S. Imports of Venezuelan Oil ..................................................................................... 31
Tables
Table C-1. Online Human Rights Reporting on Venezuela ........................................................... 42

Appendixes
Appendix A. Legislative Initiatives ............................................................................................... 37
Appendix B. OAS Action on Venezuela: 2016-2017 .................................................................... 39
Appendix C. Online Human Rights Reporting on Venezuela ....................................................... 42
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 42

Recent Developments
On December 10, 2017, Venezuela convened municipal elections. With the three largest
opposition parties boycotting and allegations of fraud, preliminary results showed the government
winning at least 300 of the 335 municipal elections held and the governorship of Zulia. (See
“Maduro Reconsolidating Power After Regional and Municipal Elections” below.)
On December 6, 2017, it is reported that a U.S. subsidiary of Sinopec, one of China’s biggest
state-owned oil companies, sued PdVSA in a U.S. court for late payments. (See “Default and
Debt Restructuring” below.)
On December 5, 2017, the House passed H.R. 2658 (Engel), the Venezuela Humanitarian
Assistance and Defense of Democratic Governance Act, which would, among other measures,
authorize humanitarian aid for Venezuela. The House also approved a resolution, H.Res. 259
(DeSantis), expressing concern and condemnation of the political, economic, social, and
humanitarian crisis that President Maduro has wrought in Venezuela. (See Appendix A below for
more legislative initiatives.)
On December 2, 2017, Maduro government officials and the opposition MUD failed to reach an
agreement at a dialogue held in the Dominican Republic to allow humanitarian aid to enter the
country. (See “Humanitarian Concerns” below.)
On November 26, 2017, President Maduro appointed a general with no experience in the energy
sector as head of the state-owned oil company, PdVSA, and as oil minister after his attorney
general arrested the executives formerly in those positions on charges of corruption. His
appointment followed the arrest of six top executives of CITGO (a PdVSA subsidiary), including
five U.S. citizens, who were detained in Caracas and also accused of corruption. (See “Energy
Sector Concerns” below.)
On November 20, 2017, exiled former Venezuelan Attorney General Luisa Ortega presented
evidence of thousands of extrajudicial killings by Venezuelan soldiers and police committed since
2015 to the International Criminal Court. Her findings are similar to other reports by human
rights organizations. (See “Repression of Dissent amid Protests” below.)
On November 13, 2017, Standard and Poor’s found Venezuela to be officially in default on its
sovereign debts, after it missed interest payments on two government bonds. On the same day, the
government held a meeting with private bondholders to discuss debt restructuring. The meeting,
which was short and sparsely attended, provided little information about the government’s plans
to restructure its debt. (See “Default and Debt Restructuring” below.)
On November 9, 2017, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on 10 Venezuelan
government officials, including several National Electoral Council and National Constituent
Assembly members. (See “Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic Actions, Human Rights
Violations, and Corruption” below.)
On November 2, 2017, the National Constituent Assembly enacted a “hate crimes” law that
established harsh penalties against those who organize or attend protests against the government
and/or publish media reports or messages on social media that are critical of the government. (See
“Maduro Reconsolidating Power After Regional and Municipal Elections” below.)
On November 2, 2017, President Maduro announced in a televised address that the country would
seek to restructure and refinance its debts, highlighting the increasingly dire fiscal position of the
government. (See “Default and Debt Restructuring” below.)
Congressional Research Service 1

Introduction
Venezuela, long one of the most prosperous countries in South America with the world’s largest
proven oil reserves, continues to be in the throes of a deep economic and political crisis. Whereas
populist President Hugo Chávez (1998-2013) governed during a period of generally high oil
prices, his successor, Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), has
exacerbated an economic downturn caused by low global oil prices with mismanagement and
corruption. According to Freedom House, Venezuela has fallen from “partly free” under Chávez
to “not free” under Maduro, an unpopular leader who has violently quashed dissent and
undermined the National Assembly, and then illegally replaced it with a National Constituent
Assembly (ANC) elected under controversial circumstances on July 30, 2017.1
Tasked with writing a new constitution, the ANC has also given itself the power to legislate,
usurping the power of the National Assembly. From March through July 2017, more than 130
people died and thousands were injured and/or
Venezuela at a Glance detained during clashes between protesters
Population: 31.0 million (2016, IMF) and security forces (backed by armed civilian
Area: 912,050 square kilometers (slightly more than militias).2 Protests died down after the ANC’s
twice the size of California) installment in August, but the humanitarian
GDP: $287 billion (2016, current prices, IMF est.) situation is worsening, and the country is in
GDP Growth (%): -3.9% (2014); -6.2% (2015); -18% default on some bond payments. The
(2016) (IMF) opposition is in disarray after the PSUV won
GDP Per Capita: $9,258 (2016, current prices, IMF 18 of 23 gubernatorial elections held on
est.) October 15, 2017. Although fraud occurred,
Key Trading Partners: Exports—U.S. 38%, India the MUD was unable to prove that it was on a
19.6%, China 16.7%. Imports—U.S. 29%, China, 18.5%,
Brazil, 12% (2015, EIU)
massive scale. Four of five winning opposition
Unemployment: 21.2% (2015, IMF)
governors then broke with the MUD by taking
their oaths of office in front of the ANC.3
Life Expectancy: 74.4 years (2015, UNDP)
Literacy: 95.4% (2015, UNDP) U.S. relations with Venezuela, a major oil
supplier, deteriorated during the 14 years of
Legislature: National Assembly (unicameral), with 167
members Chávez’s rule, which undermined human
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); rights, the separation of powers, and freedom
International Monetary Fund (IMF); United Nations of expression in the country. U.S. and regional
Development Programme (UNDP). concerns have deepened as the Maduro
government has manipulated democratic
institutions; cracked down on the opposition, media, and civil society; failed to convene elections;
engaged in drug trafficking and corruption; and refused humanitarian aid.4 Regional efforts to
hasten a return to democracy in Venezuela have occurred through the Organization of American
States (OAS) and, more recently, ad-hoc efforts held in the Dominican Republic; they have yet to
1
Freedom House, Freedom in the World: 2017, at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-
2017; Jennifer McCoy, “Credibility of Venezuela’s Electoral Process on the Line,” August 3, 2017, Venezuelan
Politics and Human Rights, blog hosted by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), at
https://venezuelablog.org/credibility-venezuelas-electoral-process-line/ (hereinafter McCoy, August 2017).
2
Foro Penal Venezolano, Reporte Sobre la Represión del Estado en Venezuela, August 2017.
3
This decision appeared to give legitimacy to the election results and to the ANC (rather than the National Assembly).
“Venezuela Opposition Governors Take Oath Before Assembly,” AP, October 24, 2017.
4
CRS Report R43239, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, 2013-2016, by Mark P. Sullivan.

advance.5 Maduro’s convening of the National Constituent Assembly has triggered international
condemnation and broader U.S. sanctions (see “Sanctions Restricting Venezuela’s Access to U.S.
Financial Markets”).
The 115th Congress likely will continue to weigh in on what type of aid, sanctions policies, and
other bilateral and multilateral policy responses could be employed to facilitate a return to
electoral democracy in Venezuela and to protect U.S. interests in the region.6 This report provides
an overview of the political, economic, and social challenges Venezuela faces. It analyzes U.S.
policy concerns and actions regarding democracy and human rights, drug trafficking and money
laundering, terrorism, and energy issues in Venezuela.
Figure 1. Political Map of Venezuela
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS).
5
“Venezuela Dialogue Produces No Humanitarian Agreement,” Latin News Daily, December 4, 2017.
6
See also CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS Insight IN10766,
New Financial Sanctions on Venezuela: Key Issues, by Rebecca M. Nelson.

Political Situation
Legacy of Hugo Chávez (1999-2013)7
In December 1998, Hugo Chávez, a leftist populist representing a coalition of small parties,
received 56% of the presidential vote (16% more than his closest rival). Chávez’s commanding
victory illustrated Venezuelans’ rejection of the country’s two traditional parties, Democratic
Action (AD) and the Social Christian party (COPEI), which had dominated Venezuelan politics
for the previous 40 years. Most observers attribute Chávez’s rise to power to popular
disillusionment with politicians whom they then judged to have squandered the country’s oil
wealth through poor management and corruption. Chavez’s campaign promised constitutional
reform; he asserted that the system in place allowed a small elite class to dominate Congress and
waste revenues from the state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA).
Venezuela had one of the most stable political systems in Latin America from 1958 until 1989.
After that period, however, numerous economic and political challenges plagued the country. In
1989, then-President Carlos Andres Perez (AD) initiated an austerity program that fueled riots
and street violence in which several hundred people were killed. In 1992, two attempted military
coups threatened the Perez presidency, one led by Chávez himself, who at the time was a
lieutenant colonel railing against corruption and poverty. Chávez served two years in prison for
that failed coup attempt. Ultimately, the legislature dismissed President Perez from office in May
1993 for misusing public funds. The election of elder statesman and former President Rafael
Caldera (1969-1974) as president in December 1993 brought a measure of political stability, but
the government faced a severe banking crisis. A rapid decline in the price of oil then caused a
recession beginning in 1998, which contributed to Chávez’s landslide election.
Under Chávez, Venezuela adopted a new constitution (ratified by a plebiscite in 1999), a new
unicameral legislature, and even a new name for the country—the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, named after the 19th century South American liberator Simón Bolívar. Buoyed by
windfall profits from increases in the price of oil, the Chávez government expanded the state’s
role in the economy by asserting majority state control over foreign investments in the oil sector
and nationalizing numerous private enterprises. Chávez’s charisma, his use of oil revenue to
support domestic social programs and provide subsidized oil to Cuba and other Central American
and Caribbean countries through a program known as PetroCaribe, and his willingness to oppose
the United States and other global powers captured international attention.8
After Chávez’s death, his legacy has been debated. President Chávez established an array of
social programs and services known as missions that helped to reduce poverty by some 20% and
improve literacy and access to health care.9 Some maintain that Chávez also empowered the poor
7
This section draws from CRS Report R42989, Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations,
by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS Report R43239, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, 2013-2016, by Mark P. Sullivan.
8
Chávez envisioned himself as a leader of an integrated Latin America struggling against an external power (the
United States), similar to how Simón Bolívar had led the struggle against Spain by the countries that had formed Gran
Colombia in the 19th century. Carlos A. Romero and Víctor M. Mijares, “From Chávez to Maduro: Continuity and
Change in Venezuelan Foreign Policy,” Contexto Internacional, vol.38, no.1 (2016), pp. 178-188. Since 2005,
PetroCaribe has provided subsidized oil to many Caribbean and Central American countries; however, the volume of
shipments has declined since 2012. David L. Goldwyn and Cory R. Gill, The Waning of PetroCaribe? Central
American and Caribbean Energy in Transition, Atlantic Council, 2016 (hereinafter Goldwyn and Gill, 2016).
9
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2008, Briefing
Paper, November 2008, p. 11; Daniel Hellinger and Anthony Petros Spanakos, “The Legacy of Hugo Chávez,” Latin
(continued...)

by involving them directly in community councils and workers’ cooperatives.10 Nevertheless, his
presidency was “characterized by a dramatic concentration of power and open disregard for basic
human rights guarantees,” especially after his temporary ouster in 2002.11 Declining oil
production by PdVSA, combined with massive debt and rampant inflation, have laid bare the
costs involved in Chávez’s failure to save or invest past oil windfalls and his tendency to take on
debt and print money.12 Some analysts maintain that it is increasingly unclear how chavismo can
continue under Maduro without the cult of personality surrounding Chávez and the high oil prices
that sustained his popularity.13
Venezuela’s 1999 constitution, engineered by Chávez, centralized power in the presidency and
established five branches of government rather than the traditional three branches.14 Those
branches include the presidency, a unicameral National Assembly, a Supreme Court, a National
Electoral Council (CNE), and a “Citizen Power” branch (three entities that ensure that
government officials at all levels adhere to the rule of law and that can investigate administrative
corruption). The president is elected for six-year terms and can be reelected indefinitely; however,
he or she also may be made subject to a recall referendum (a process that Chávez submitted to in
2004 and survived but Maduro cancelled in 2016). Throughout his presidency, Chávez exerted
influence over all the branches of government, particularly after an outgoing legislature
dominated by chavistas appointed pro-Chávez justices to dominate the Supreme Court in 2004 (a
move that Maduro’s allies would repeat in 2015).15
In addition to voters having the power to remove a president through a recall referendum process,
the National Assembly has the constitutional authority to act as a check on presidential power,
even when the courts have failed to do so. The National Assembly consists of a unicameral
Chamber of Deputies with 167 seats whose members serve for 5 years and may be reelected once.
Under the constitution, with a simple majority the legislature can approve or reject the budget and
the issuing of debt, remove ministers and the vice president from office, overturn enabling laws
that give the president decree powers, and appoint the 5 members of the CNE (for 7-year terms)
and the 32 members of the Supreme Court (for one 12-year term). With a two-thirds majority, the
assembly can remove judges, submit laws directly to a popular referendum, and convene a
constitutional assembly to revise the constitution.16
(...continued)
American Perspectives, vol. 44, no. 1, January 2017, pp. 4-15.
10
Eva Golinger, “Opinion: Chávez was a Maker of Dreams,” CNN, March 7, 2013.
11
Although President Chávez remained widely popular until mid-2001, his standing eroded after that amid growing
concerns by some sectors that he was imposing a leftist agenda on the country and that his government was ineffective
in improving living conditions in Venezuela. In April 2002, massive opposition protests and pressure by the military
led to the ouster of Chávez from power for less than three days. He ultimately was restored to power by the military
after an interim president alienated the military and public by taking hardline measures, including the suspension of the
constitution. Human Rights Watch, “Venezuela: Chávez’s Authoritarian Legacy,” March 5, 2013.
12
Francisco Monaldi, The Impact of the Decline in Oil Prices on the Economics, Politics, and Oil Industry in
Venezuela, Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy, September 2015, pp. 9-13.
13
David Smilde, “The End of Chavismo?” Current History, February 2015; Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold,
Dragon in the Tropics: Venezuela and the Legacy of Hugo Chavez (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2015);
William Finnegan, “Venezuela: a Failing State,” New Yorker, November 14, 2016.
14
Antonio Ramirez, “An Introduction to Venezuelan Governmental Institutions and Primary Legal Sources,” New
York University Law School Library, May 2016. Hereinafter Ramirez, May 2016.
15
Human Rights Watch, “Venezuela: Chávez Allies Pack Supreme Court,” December 13, 2004.
16
Ramirez, May 2016; CRS Report R43239, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, 2013-2016, by Mark P. Sullivan.

Maduro Administration17
After the death of President Hugo Chávez in Nicolás Maduro
March 2013, Venezuela held presidential A former trade unionist who served in Venezuela’s
elections the following month in which acting legislature from 1998 until 2006, Nicolás Maduro held
President Nicolás Maduro defeated Henrique the position of National Assembly president from 2005
Capriles of the Democratic Unity Roundtable to 2006, when he was selected by President Chávez to
serve as foreign minister. Maduro retained that position
(MUD) by just 1.5%. The opposition alleged
until mid-January 2013, concurrently serving as vice
significant irregularities and protested the president beginning in October 2012, when President
outcome. Chávez tapped him to serve in that position following his
reelection. Maduro often was described as a staunch
Given his razor-thin victory and the rise of the Chávez loyalist. Maduro’s partner since 1992 is well-
opposition, Maduro sought to consolidate his known Chávez supporter Cilia Flores, who served as the
authority. Under Maduro, the security forces president of the National Assembly from 2006 to 2011;
and allied civilian groups have violently the two were married in July 2013.
suppressed protests and restricted freedom of
speech and assembly. In 2014, 43 people died and 800 were injured in clashes between
progovernment forces and student-led protesters concerned about rising crime and violence.
President Maduro also has imprisoned opposition figures, including Leopoldo López, head of the
Popular Will party. López and other political opponents remain in prison. The Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR) initiated a government-opposition dialogue in April 2014, but
talks broke down by May of that year.18 In February 2015, the Maduro government again cracked
down on the opposition.
In December 2015 legislative elections, the MUD captured a two-thirds majority in Venezuela’s
National Assembly—a major setback for Maduro. Nevertheless, the Maduro government took
actions aimed at thwarting the power of the legislature. The PSUV-aligned Supreme Court
subsequently blocked three MUD representatives from taking office, which deprived the
opposition of the two-thirds majority needed to submit bills directly to referendum and remove
Supreme Court justices. From January 2016 through August 2017 (when the National Constituent
Assembly voted to give itself legislative powers), the Supreme Court blocked numerous laws
approved by the legislature and assumed many of its functions.
Canceled Recall Referendum and Failed Dialogue Efforts in 2016

For much of 2016, opposition efforts focused on attempts to recall President Maduro in a national
referendum. The government used delaying tactics that slowed the process considerably, and on
October 20, 2016, Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) indefinitely suspended the
recall effort after five state-level courts issued rulings alleging fraud in a signature collection
drive held in June that had amassed millions of signatures.
In October 2016, after an appeal by Pope Francis, most of the opposition (with the exception of
the Popular Will party) and the Venezuelan government agreed to talks mediated by the Vatican,
along with the former leaders of the Dominican Republic, Spain, and Panama and the head of
UNASUR. By December 2016, the opposition had left the talks due to what it viewed as a lack of
17
See also CRS Report R43239, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, 2013-2016, by Mark P. Sullivan.
18
Some analysts have criticized the Union of South American Nations’ (UNASUR’s) mediation efforts in Venezuela as
favoring regime stability over respect for democracy (i.e., Maduro’s concerns over those of the opposition). Carlos
Closa and Stefano Palestini, Between Democratic Protection and Self-Defense: the Case of UNASUR and Venezuela,
European University Institute, 2015.

progress on the part of the government in meeting its commitments. Those commitments included
(1) releasing political prisoners; (2) announcing an electoral calendar; (3) respecting the National
Assembly’s decisions; and (4) addressing humanitarian needs.
Repression of Dissent amid Protests

Far from meeting the commitments it made during the Vatican-led talks, the Maduro government
has continued to harass and arbitrarily detain opponents, including the summary arrest of five
opposition mayors in mid-2017.19 In addition, President Maduro appointed a hard-line vice
president, Tareck el Aissami, former governor of the state of Aragua and a sanctioned U.S. drug
kingpin, in January 2017. El Aissami has been given vast national security authorities.
In early 2017, the opposition in Venezuela was divided and disillusioned. MUD leaders faced an
environment in which popular protests, which were frequent between 2014 and the fall of 2016,
had dissipated.20 In addition to restricting freedom of assembly, the government had cracked
down on media outlets and journalists, including foreign media.21
Despite these obstacles, the MUD became reenergized in response to the Supreme Court’s March
29, 2017, rulings to dissolve the legislature and assume all legislative functions.22 After domestic
protests, a rebuke by then-Attorney General Luisa Ortega (a Chávez appointee), and an outcry
from the international community, President Maduro urged the court to revise those rulings, and it
complied. In April 2017, the government banned opposition leader and two-time presidential
candidate Henrique Capriles from seeking office for 15 years, which fueled more protests.
From April through early August 2017, the opposition conducted large and sustained protests
against the government, calling for President Maduro to release political prisoners, respect the
separation of powers, and hold an early presidential election (instead of waiting until the end of
2018). Clashes between security forces (backed by armed civilian militias) and protesters left
more than 130 dead and hundreds injured.
Former Attorney General Luisa Ortega has presented a dossier of evidence to the International
Criminal Court that the police and military may have committed more than 1,800 extrajudicial
killings as of June 2017. In the dossier, Ortega reportedly accused security forces of “murder,
torture, imprisonment as well as a systematic and generalized attack on the civilian population”
and urged the ICC to charge Maduro and several top officials in his cabinet with serious human
rights abuses.23 An exiled judge appointed by the National Assembly to serve on the “parallel”
supreme court of justice also accused senior Maduro officials of systemic human rights abuses
before the ICC.24
19
Amnesty International, Silenced By Force: Politically-Motivated Arbitrary Detentions in Venezuela, April 26, 2017,
at http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/silenced-by-force-politically-motivated-arbitrary-detentions-in-
venezuela-0; Human Rights Watch, Venezuela’s Slide into Dictatorship, December 7, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2017/12/07/venezuelas-slide-dictatorship.
20
Hannah Dreier and Joshua Goodman, “AP Analysis: In Venezuela, Short on Food, Short of Hope,” AP, February 23,
2017.
21
In February 2017, the government suspended CNN en Español from cable after it aired an investigation into
fraudulent Venezuelan passports being sold in Iraq. The government also deported two Brazilian reporters investigating
corruption. “Venezuela Shuts Off CNN en Español After Criticizing Channel’s Passport-Selling Report,” AP, February
15, 2017; Reporters Without Borders, “Foreign Journalists Not Welcome in Venezuela,” March 22, 2017.
22
Javier Corrales, “Can’t We Give Venezuela’s Opposition a Little Credit?” Americas Quarterly, April 25, 2017.
23
“Venezuela’s Ex-prosecutor Urges ICC to Probe Maduro,” AFP, November 16, 2017.
24
Antonio Maria Delgado, “Venezuelan Officials Accused of Crimes Against Humanity in The Hague,” Miami Herald,
(continued...)

The Venezuelan human rights group Foro Penal maintains that more than 5,300 Venezuelans
were detained during the protests.25 In partnership with Human Rights Watch, Foro Penal has
documented inhumane treatment of more than 300 detainees that occurred between April and
September 2017.26 Amnesty International published a report describing how security forces also
conducted illegal nighttime raids on private homes to intimidate the population.27 As of
November 29, the government still held around 299 political prisoners, according to Foro
Penal.28 These include some who have yet to be brought before a judge and others who have been
granted a judicial order to be released, but remain imprisoned because of delays in processing.
Among Venezuela’s political prisoners are Daniel Ceballos, former mayor of San Cristóbal in
Táchira state, and two opposition prisoners under house arrest. Leopoldo López, head of the
Popular Will party, was imprisoned for several days in early August. In mid-November, Antonio
Ledezma, the former metropolitan mayor of Caracas, escaped house arrest and then traveled by
way of Colombia to Spain. He is seeking to galvanize international pressure on the Maduro
regime, but opposes those in the MUD who are attempting dialogue with the government.29
In August 2017, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(UNOCHR) issued a report on human rights violations perpetrated by the Venezuela security
forces against the protestors. According to the report, credible and consistent accounts indicated
that “security forces systematically used excessive force to deter demonstrations, crush dissent,
and instill fear.” The U.N. report maintained that many of those detained were subject to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment and that in several documented cases, the ill treatment amounted
to torture. The practices included the use of electric shocks, severe beatings, stress positions,
suffocation, and threats of sexual violence and death intended to punish and terrorize the
detainees and to extract confessions and information about opposition activities. UNOCHR called
for an international investigation of those abuses.30
Despite Opposition, Constituent Assembly Elected

In May 2017, President Maduro announced that he would convene a constituent assembly to
revise the country’s 1999 constitution. Maduro scheduled July 30 elections to select delegates to
that constituent assembly. The Supreme Court ruled that Maduro could convoke the assembly
without first holding a popular referendum (as the 1999 constitution requires). The opposition
boycotted, arguing that the elections were illegitimate and unconstitutional; a position shared by
(...continued)
November 21, 2017.
25
Foro Penal Venezolano, “Joint Statement by the Venezuelan Penal Forum and Human Rights Watch,” August 26,
2017, at https://foropenal.com/content/joint-statement-venezuelan-penal-forum-and-human-rights-watch.
26
Human Rights Watch, Foro Penal Venezolano, Crackdown on Dissent: Brutality, Torture, and Political Persecution
in Venezuela, November 2017, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/11/29/crackdown-dissent/brutality-torture-and-
political-persecution-venezuela.
27
Amnesty International, Nights of Terror: Attacks and Illegal Raids on Homes in Venezuela, October 30, 2017,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr53/7285/2017/en/.
28
For more information on political prisoners, see https://foropenal.com/presos-politicos.
29
Ledezma and former legislator Maria Corina Machado are leading an opposition movement that has split from the
MUD. It opposes the MUD’s decision to dialogue with the Maduro government. Andrew Cawthorne and Luis Jaime
Acosta, “Venezuela Opposition Leader Ledezma Flees to Spain,” Reuters, November 17, 2017.
30
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human Rights Violations and Abuses in the
Context of Protests in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela from 1 April to 31 July 2017,” August 30, 2017, at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/VE/HCReportVenezuela_1April-31July2017_EN.pdf.

then-Attorney General Luisa Ortega and international observers (including the United States,
Canada, the European Union, and many Latin American countries). In an unofficial plebiscite
convened on July 16 by the MUD, 98% of some 7.6 million Venezuelans cast votes rejecting the
establishment of the ANC.31
Despite an opposition boycott and protests, the government orchestrated the July 30, 2017,
election of a 545-member National Constituent Assembly (ANC) to draft a new constitution.
Venezuela’s CNE reported that almost 8.1 million people voted, but a company involved in
setting up the voting system alleged that the tally was inflated by at least 1 million votes.32
Credible reports also allege that the government used coercion to compel government workers to
vote in the assembly elections.33
Many observers view the establishment of the ANC as an attempt by the ruling PSUV to ensure
its continued control of the government even though many countries have refused to recognize its
legitimacy or decisions. Among its first acts, the ANC dismissed Attorney General Ortega, who
had been strongly critical of the government; voted to approve its own mandate for two years; and
passed a measure declaring itself superior to other branches of government.
Ortega subsequently fled Venezuela on August 18, 2017, and is actively speaking out against the
abuses of the Maduro government. She maintains that the Venezuelan government hired contract
killers to murder her.34 She has released a video of the former head of the Brazilian construction
firm Odebrecht’s Venezuelan operations testifying that the company had paid President Maduro
$35 million in bribes in 2013. Another video alleges that Maduro’s close ally, Diosdado Cabello,
also received campaign funds from the company.35 Ortega has reportedly provided further
evidence against other top officials to the U.S. government and, as previously discussed,
presented evidence of government human rights abuses to the International Criminal Court.36
On August 19, 2017, the ANC approved a decree allowing it to pass legislation dealing with the
economy and national security, essentially replacing the role of the opposition-dominated
National Assembly.37 The ANC initially called for trials of the political opposition, including
members of the National Assembly, on charges of treason and alleged involvement in Venezuela’s
economic crisis.38 After the ANC’s installation, which triggered broader U.S. economic sanctions
that are unpopular with a majority of Venezuelans, Maduro’s popularity rose slightly (from 17%
in July to 23% in September 2017).39
31
Andrew Cawthorne, Eyanir Chinea, “Venezuela Opposition Turns Heat up on Maduro with Strike Call,” Reuters,
July 17, 2017.
32
McCoy, August 2017.
33
Ibid.
34
Andres Schipani, Gideon Long, and Eric Platt, “Rebel Prosecutor Launches Scathing Attack on Maduro,” Financial
Times, August 23, 2017; “Venezuela Ex-Attorney General Says Contract Killers Set After Her,” Agence France Presse,
August 28, 2017.
35
Nicholas Casey, “Maduro is Accused in Bribery,” New York Times, October 13, 2017; Kirk Semple and Ana Vanessa
Herrero, “Key Maduro Ally in Venezuela is Linked to Illegal Campaign Gifts,” New York Times, October 14, 2017.
36
“Venezuela Ex-Prosecutor Gives U.S. Evidence on Maduro Officials,” Reuters, October 13, 2017.
37
Nicholas Casey, “Assembly Created by Venezuela’s President Takes Over Legislature’s Duties,” New York Times,
August 19, 2017.
38
U.S. Department of State, “Western Hemisphere: Criminalizing Dissent in Venezuela,” press statement, August 30,
2017, at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273726.htm.
39
“Venezuela’s Maduro Approval Rises to 23% After Trump Sanctions,” Reuters, October 2, 2017.

Maduro Reconsolidating Power After Regional and Municipal Elections

Although the situation remains fluid, President Maduro appears to be consolidating power within
the PSUV regime and also appears to have gained the upper hand over the opposition despite
international condemnation of his actions.40 On October 15, the PSUV won 18 of 23
gubernatorial elections, and although fraud likely took place, the opposition could not prove that
it occurred on a massive scale. The MUD coalition initially rejected the election results, but four
victorious MUD governors subsequently took their oaths of office in front of the ANC (rather
than the National Assembly), a decision that has fractured the coalition.
Although most opposition parties did not participate in municipal elections held on December 10,
a few, including A New Time (UNT), led by Manuel Rosales, and Progressive Advance (AP), led
by Henri Falcon, fielded candidates. Early results show that the PSUV won at least 300 of 335
mayoralties and the governorship of Zulia.41 It is as yet unclear whether the Maduro government
will allow parties that did not participate in the municipal elections to run in the 2018 presidential
contest.42 The date for that contest has not been set.
With one prominent opposition figure still under house arrest (Leopoldo López), another barred
from seeking office (Henrique Capriles), and another having recently escaped house arrest into
exile (Antonio Ledezma), the future of the opposition is uncertain. Although past efforts at
opposition-government dialogue have failed due to the government’s failure to fulfill its
commitments, some MUD leaders are negotiating with the government to try to obtain
humanitarian aid for the Venezuelan people. Prospects for the opposition gaining major
concessions from the government appear unlikely given the PSUV’s electoral victories and the
opposition’s relative weakness and disarray.
With the opposition in disarray, President Maduro and the ANC have moved to consolidate power
within the PSUV and have blamed U.S. sanctions, which were opposed by some 61% of
Venezuelans surveyed in October 2017, for the country’s economic problems.43 President Maduro
has fired and arrested the head of PdVSA and the oil minister, who were close to Rafael Ramirez
(former head of PdVSA and a potential rival to Maduro within the PSUV), for corruption.44 He
appointed a general with no experience in the sector as oil minister and head of the company,
further consolidating military control over the economy. Maduro then ousted Ramirez from his
position as Venezuela’s U.N. ambassador.45 The ANC has approved new price controls and a
“hate crimes” law that will severely restrict freedom of expression and assembly.
Foreign Relations
The Maduro government has maintained Venezuela’s foreign policy alliance with Cuba and other
leftist governments from the Chávez era, but the country’s ailing economy has diminished its
40
Andrew Cawthorne, “Venezuela’s Maduro Keeps Eye on Prize: 2018 Presidential Vote,” Reuters, November 24,
2017; Jon Lee Anderson, “Nicolas Maduro’s Accelerating Revolution,” The New Yorker, December 11, 2017.
41
“Buoyed by Mayoral Votes, Venezuela ‘s Socialists Eye 2018 Presidency Race,” Reuters, December 11, 2017.
42
Laignee Barron, “Venezuela’s Maduro Has Disqualified His Opposition From the Next Presidential Election,” Time,
December 11, 2017.
43
Marc Weisbrot, “Trump Doubles Down on Sanctions and Regime Change for Venezuela,” Huffington Post,
November 13, 2017.
44
Some 65 other executives have thus far been fired. Alexandra Ulmer and Deisy Buitrago, “Venezuela Maduro Gains
Control Over Oil Contracts Amid Purge,” Reuters, December 3, 2017.
45
Alexandra Ulmer and Marianna Parraga, “Venezuela’s U.N. Envoy Says He Was Pushed Out by Maduro,” Reuters,
December 5, 2017.

formerly activist foreign policy, which depended on its ability to provide subsidized oil. Unlike
during the Chávez era, an increasing number of countries, including within the OAS, have
criticized authoritarian actions taken by the Maduro government (see “U.S. Support for
Organization of American States (OAS) Efforts on Venezuela”). On August 8, 2017, 12 Western
Hemisphere countries signed the “Lima Accord” rejecting the installation of Venezuela’s
Constituent Assembly in the gubernatorial elections; it has since called for an audit of the October
elections.46 Canada has implemented sanctions against corrupt Venezuelan officials.47 The
European Union refused to recognize the Constituent Assembly and established a legal
framework for targeted sanctions and also adopted an arms embargo against Venezuela to include
related material that could be used for internal repression. Japan and South Korea have expressed
similar concerns. In September 2017, several countries urged the U.N. Human Rights Council to
support the High Commissioner’s call for an international investigation into the abuses described
in its August report on Venezuela.48 These dynamics, as well as U.S. sanctions, have increased
Venezuela’s dependence on China and Russia.49
Cuba, PetroCaribe, and the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA)

Venezuela signed an agreement with Cuba in 2000 to provide the island nation with at least
90,000 barrels of oil per day (b/d). In exchange, Cuba has provided extensive services to
Venezuela. Estimates of the number of Cuban personnel in Venezuela vary, but a 2014 Brookings
study reported that “by most accounts there are 40,000 Cuban professionals in Venezuela,” with
75% of whom are health care workers.50 Sources estimate that the number of Cuban military and
intelligence advisors in Venezuela range from hundreds to thousands, coordinated by Cuba’s
military attaché in Venezuela.51 Some observers maintain that Cuba has exported its model of
political suppression to Venezuela.52
In recent years, Cuba has become increasingly concerned about the future of Venezuelan oil
supplies. Cuba’s oil imports from Venezuela have reportedly declined from 100,000 b/d in 2012
to roughly 55,000 b/d in 2016.53 In addition to their ideological affinities, the fact that a cutoff of
Venezuelan oil exports would have severe consequences for Cuba means that the Maduro regime
can count on Cuba’s continued strong support.54
Since 2005, Venezuela has provided oil and other energy-related products to other Caribbean
Basin nations with preferential financing terms in a program known as PetroCaribe. Most
Caribbean nations are members of PetroCaribe, with the exception of Barbados and Trinidad and
46
The signatories included Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. See https://www.mrecic.gov.ar/en/lima-declaration.
47
“Canada to Impose Sanctions on Venezuela’s Maduro and Top Officials,” Reuters, September 22, 2017.
48
Tamara Taraciuk Broner, “U.N. Human Rights Council Confronts Venezuela,” Human Rights Watch, October 2,
2017.
49
Kent Moors, “Russia, China to Benefit from U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela,” Oil Price.com, October 2, 2017.
50
Ted Piccone and Harold Trinkunas, “The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: The Beginning of the End?” Latin America
Initiative Policy Brief, Brookings, June 2014, p. 3.
51
Ibid.
52
See, for example, Carlos Alberto Montaner, “Venezuela on the Edge of the Abyss, and Leopoldo López,”
Interamerican Institute for Democracy, July 10, 2017; and Mary Anastasia O’Grady, “How Cuba Runs Venezuela,”
Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2017.
53
Marianna Parraga and Marc Frank, “Exclusive: Venezuela oil Exports to Cuba Drop, Energy Shortages Worsen,”
Reuters, July 13, 2017; Stratfor, Mexico Sees an Opportunity in Venezuela’s Struggles, August 29, 2017.
54
CRS Report R44822, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.

Tobago, as are several Central American countries.55 A recent report estimates that PdVSA
shipments to PetroCaribe beneficiaries averaged only 39,000 b/d in 2016 (down from 120,000 b/d
in 2012).56 Deliveries have likely declined further this year.
The Maduro government has continued to count on political support from Cuba, Bolivia, and
Nicaragua, which, together with Venezuela, are key members of the Bolivarian Alliance of the
Americas (ALBA), a group of leftist governments launched by President Chávez in 2004. Lenín
Moreno, the new president of Ecuador, another ALBA member, recently has been critical of the
human rights situation in Venezuela and called on President Maduro to engage in talks with the
opposition.57 Several Caribbean members of ALBA—Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada,
St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—appear to remain reluctant to take action
that could be viewed as interfering in Venezuela’s domestic affairs.
South America and the Lima Declaration

With the rise of conservative governments in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, and Maduro’s
increasingly authoritarian actions, ties between Venezuela and South America have frayed. In
December 2016, the South American Common Market (Mercosur) trade bloc suspended
Venezuela over concerns that the Maduro government had violated the requirement that
Mercosur’s members have “fully functioning democratic institutions.”58 Six UNASUR
members—Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Paraguay—issued a joint statement
opposing the Venezuelan Supreme Court’s attempted power grab in March 2017. Concerned
about potential spillover effects from turmoil in Venezuela, Colombia has supported OAS actions,
provided assistance to Venezuelan economic migrants and asylum seekers, and closely monitored
the situation on the Venezuelan-Colombian border.
This year, Mexico abandoned its traditional noninterventionist stance to take a lead in OAS
efforts to resolve the crisis in Venezuela, including during the OAS General Assembly meeting it
hosted in June 2017. It has also reportedly begun to explore the possibility of replacing Venezuela
as a source of oil for Cuba and PetroCaribe countries.59
As noted above, on August 8, 2017, 12 Western Hemisphere countries signed the “Lima Accord,”
a document rejecting the rupture of democracy and systemic human rights violations in
Venezuela, refusing to recognize the ANC, and criticizing the government’s refusal to accept
humanitarian aid.60 The signatory countries include Mexico; Canada; four Central American
countries (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama); and six South American countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru).
The accord calls for an arms embargo of Venezuela, rejecting Venezuelan candidates at
international organizations, and supporting any OAS efforts. The signatory countries pledge to
keep discussing Venezuela at the Foreign Minister level and supporting any credible efforts at
55
In 2015, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica reached agreements to pay back their PetroCaribe debt to Venezuela
at a steep discount. Venezuela provided the debt relief because it was facing declining international reserves and
needed the cash. Goldwyn and Gill, 2016.
56
Stratfor, Mexico Sees an Opportunity in Venezuela’s Struggles, August 29, 2017.
57
Gretel Johnston and Juan Garff, “Maduro Losing Regional Support as Pence Tours Latin America,” Deutsche Press-
Agentur, August 15, 2017.
58
Mercosur includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Mac Margolis, “Mercosur Turns Its Back on a
Diminished Venezuela,” Bloomberg View, December 9, 2016.
59
Stratfor, Mexico Sees an Opportunity in Venezuela’s Struggles, August 29, 2017.
60
See https://www.mrecic.gov.ar/en/lima-declaration.

dialogue between the government and the opposition. In September, several leaders from the
“Lima 12” countries met with President Trump during the U.N. General Assembly and spoke out
about human rights abuses in Venezuela during the U.N. Human Rights Council meetings. While
they appear to support targeted U.S. economic sanctions, many reject broader economic sanctions
and any discussion of military intervention.61 On October 5, the Lima group called for free and
fair regional elections. It has since called for an independent audit of the results.
China and Russia

As Venezuela’s economic situation has deteriorated, maintaining close relations with China and
Russia, the country’s largest sources of financing and investment, has become a top priority.62
From 2007 through 2016, China provided some $62.2 billion in financing to Venezuela.63 The
money typically has been for funding infrastructure and other economic development projects,
but has also included some lending for military equipment.64 It is being repaid through oil
deliveries. Although the Chinese government has been patient when Venezuela has fallen behind
on its oil deliveries, it reportedly stopped providing new loans to Venezuela in the fall of 2016.65
Some observers have criticized China for its continued support to the Venezuelan government and
questioned whether a new Venezuelan government might refuse to honor the obligations incurred
under Maduro.66 China refrained from any negative commentary after Venezuela’s Constituent
Assembly elections. It maintained that the Venezuelan government and people have the ability to
properly handle their internal affairs through dialogue.67 China responded to U.S. sanctions by
stating that “the experience of history shows that outside interference or unilateral sanctions will
make the situation even more complicated.”68 It has expressed confidence that Venezuela can
“appropriately handle their affairs, including the debt issue.”69
Russia has also remained a strong political and economic ally of the Maduro government. It has
called for the political crisis in Venezuela to be resolved peacefully, with dialogue, and without
outside interference.70 Russia’s trade relations with Venezuela currently are not significant, with
just $336 million in total trade in 2016, with almost all of that, $334 million, consisting of
61
Geoff Ramsey, “U.S. and Latin American Allies Discuss Venezuela in and Around UN General Assembly,”
Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights, WOLA, September 23, 2017.
62
R. Evan Ellis, Testimony to the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, The Influence of Extra-Hemispheric Actors on the Crisis in Venezuela”, 115th Cong., 1st sess., September
13, 2017. Hereinafter, Ellis, September 2017.
63
Kevin P. Gallagher and Margaret Myers, “China-Latin America Finance Database,” Washington, D.C. Inter-
American Dialogue, 2016, at http://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/.
64
Ellis, September 2017.
65
Marianna Parraga and Brian Ellsworth, “Venezuela Falls Behind on Oil-for-Loan Deals with China, Russia,”
Reuters, February 10, 2017; David Dollar, Chinese Investment in Latin America, Brookings Institution, January 2017.
66
Daniel Lansberg-Rodríguez, “Exit the Dragon,” New York Times, February 16, 2017; and Christopher Balding,
“Venezuela’s Road to Disaster Is Littered with Chinese Cash,” Foreign Policy, June 6, 2017.
67
“China Backs Ally Venezuela, Says Constituent Assembly Vote “Generally Smooth,” Reuters News, August 3,
2017.
68
“China Says Sanctions Won’t Help as Trump Targets Venezuela,” Reuters News, August 28, 2017.
69
“China Says Venezuela Can ‘Appropriately’ Handle Debt Load,” Reuters, November 15, 2017.
70
“Russia Calls U.S. Threat Against Venezuela Unacceptable,” Agence France Presse, August 16, 2017; “Russia Says
Venezuelan Crisis Must Be Resolved Peacefully ‘Without Outside Pressure,’” Radio Free Europe Documents and
Publications, August 16, 2017.

Russian exports to Venezuela.71 However, Venezuela had been a major market for Russian arms
sales between 2001 and 2013, with over $11 billion in sales. Press reports in May 2017 asserted
that Venezuela had more than 5,000 Russian-made surface-to-air missiles, raising concern by
some about the potential for them being stolen or sold to criminal or terrorist groups.72 Russia’s
recent decision to allow Venezuela to restructure $3.15 billion in debt provided a much-needed
boost to the Maduro government.73
Russian state oil companies Rosneft and Gazprom have large investments in Venezuela. Both are
seeking to expand other investments in Venezuela’s oil and gas markets74 (see “Energy Sector
Concerns” below).
Iran
There is some debate about the extent and significance of Iran’s relations with Venezuela. The
personal relationship between Hugo Chávez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-
2013) drove the strengthening of bilateral ties over that period. Since Ahmadinejad left office and
Chávez passed away in 2013, many analysts contend that Iranian relations with the region have
diminished. Current Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who took office in August 2013, has not
prioritized relations with Latin America. Nevertheless, there are two Iranian companies operating
in Venezuela that are subject to U.S. sanctions.75
Economic Crisis
For decades, Venezuela was one of South America’s most prosperous countries. Venezuela has the
world’s largest proven resources of oil, and its economy is built on oil.76 Oil accounts for more
than 90% of Venezuelan exports, and oil sales fund the government budget. After years of
economic mismanagement under President Hugo Chávez, Venezuela was not well-equipped to
withstand the dramatic fall in oil prices in 2014. Economic conditions have deteriorated rapidly
under President Maduro, as the country struggles with an acute economic crisis. The crisis is
marked by rapid contraction of the economy, high inflation, shortages of consumer goods, default
on the government’s debt obligations, and deteriorating living conditions, with devastating
humanitarian consequences.
Economic Mismanagement During the Oil Boom

Venezuela benefited from the boom in oil prices during the 2000s. When Hugo Chávez took
office in 1999, the price of Brent crude oil (a common benchmark oil price) was $10 a barrel. Oil
71
Federal Customs Service of Russia, as presented by Global Trade Atlas.
72
Girish Gupta, “Exclusive: Venezuela Holds 5,000 Russian Surface-to-air MANPADS Missiles,” Reuters, May 22,
2017.
73
Rachel Ansley, “Debt Default Pushes Venezuela Further into Russian Orbit,” Atlantic Council, November 22, 2017.
74
“Special Report: Vladimir’s Venezuela – Leveraging Loans to Caracas, Moscow Snaps Up Oil Assets,” Reuters,
August 11, 2017; Michael Place, “Russia’s Gazprom Eyeing Venezuela Gas Projects,” BN Americas, October 3, 2017.
75
The Iranian state oil company Petropars, which invests in Venezuela’s oil sector, is subject to sanctions pursuant to
E.O. 13599, which expanded sanctions against the Iranian government and Iranian financial institutions. The Iran
Maritime Industrial Company, deemed an affiliate of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is subject to sanctions
pursuant to E.O. 13382, targeting the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters. See
CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Mark P. Sullivan.
76
“How Chávez and Maduro Have Impoverished Venezuela,” Economist, April 6, 2017.

prices steadily rose over the following several years, reaching a peak of $133 a barrel in July
2008.77 Between 1999 and 2015, the Venezuelan government earned nearly $900 billion from
petroleum exports, with about half ($450 billion) earned between 2007 and 2012, during
Chávez’s second term.78
President Chávez used the oil windfall to spend heavily on social programs and expand subsidies
for food and energy. Social spending as a share of GDP rose from 28% to 40% between 2000 and
2013, a much bigger rise than in Latin America’s other large economies.79 Chávez also borrowed
against future oil exports, with the government running budget deficits in nine of the years
between 1999 and 2013, when Chávez was in office.80 Venezuela’s public debt more than doubled
as a share of GDP between 2000 and 2012, from 28% of GDP to 58% of GDP.81 Additionally,
Chávez used oil to expand influence abroad, for example through Petrocaribe, a program that
allowed Caribbean countries to purchase oil at below-market prices. The Chávez government
engaged in widespread expropriations and nationalizations, and adopted currency and price
controls.
Although substantial government outlays on social programs helped Chávez curry political favor,
widespread economic mismanagement had long-term consequences. Government spending was
not directed toward investment that could have helped increase economic productivity or
diversify the economy from its reliance on oil. Expropriations and nationalizations discouraged
foreign investment that would have provided the country with needed expertise and capital. Price
controls created market distortions and stifled the private sector. Economic growth and poverty
reduction in Venezuela lagged behind the rest of South America.82
Oil Price Crash and Subsequent Economic Crisis

When Nicolás Maduro was elected president in April 2013, he inherited economic policies that
were broadly viewed as unsustainable and reliant on proceeds from oil exports. When oil prices
crashed by nearly 50% in 2014, the Maduro government was ill-equipped to soften the blow to
the Venezuelan economy. Whereas many other major commodity producers used the boom years
to build foreign exchange reserves or sovereign wealth funds to mitigate risks from big swings in
commodity prices, the Chávez government created no such stabilization fund to guard against a
potential future fall in oil prices.83 Instead, Chávez had run up government debt on the
expectation that oil prices would remain high.84
The crash in oil prices led to a sharp decline in government revenue and, combined with poor
policy choices, triggered a broad economic crisis. Venezuela’s economy is estimated to have
contracted by nearly 35% between 2012 and 2017, a more severe contraction than experienced by
the United States during the Great Depression in the 1930s.85 The fall in oil prices strained public
77
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Europe Brent Spot Price FOB, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/
LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=rbrte&f=m.
78
Michael M. McCarthy, “Venezuela’s Manmade Disaster,” Current History, February 2017, pp. 61-67.
79
80
IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2017.
81
Ibid.
82
Michael M. McCarthy, “Venezuela’s Manmade Disaster,” Current History, February 2017, pp. 61-67.
83
84
85
IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2017; Ricardo Hausmann, “Venezuela’s Unprecedented
Collapse,” Project Syndicate, July 31, 2017.

finances, and instead of adjusting fiscal policies through tax increases and spending cuts, the
Maduro government tried to address its growing budget deficit by printing money, which quickly
gave way to hyperinflation. Inflation, about 20% in 2012, is projected to exceed 1,100% by the
end of 2017.86 The government has tried to curb inflation through price controls, although these
controls were largely ineffective in restricting prices, as supplies have dried up and transactions
have moved to the black market.87 Unemployment in Venezuela is forecast to reach 26% in 2017,
more than triple the level of unemployment in 2012.88
Figure 2.Venezuela: Economic Contraction and Inflation
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2017.

Note: Includes estimated and forecasted data.
Despite tight resources, the Maduro government has, until recently, remained committed to
repaying its debts, fearing the legal challenges from creditors that plagued Argentina for more
than a decade after its default in 2001. Such legal challenges against the Venezuelan government
could result in the seizure of Venezuela’s overseas assets, such as PdVSA subsidiary CITGO, oil
shipments, and cash payments for oil exports. However, Maduro’s commitment to debt service
came at a high cost: to meet its international payments, the government tightened restrictions on
access to foreign currency, imposed price controls, and cut imports. Venezuela relies heavily on
imports for most consumer goods, and cuts to imports led to severe shortages of food and
medicine, creating a serious humanitarian crisis, as discussed below.
The Venezuelan government pursued a variety of policies to fill its funding gaps and avoid
default. The government approached allies China and Russia for financing, securing loans to be
repaid through future oil exports (“oil-for-loan” deals), although it has fallen behind on these
deals. In May 2017, the Venezuelan central bank raised funds through the sale of $2.8 billion in
PdVSA bonds to Goldman Sachs Asset Management at a steep discount (Goldman paid $865
86
87
88

million).89 The deal was controversial, and the government had trouble finding buyers for a
similar transaction in subsequent months.90 In August 2017, the government’s precarious fiscal
situation was exacerbated by new sanctions imposed by the Trump Administration, which
restricted Venezuela’s ability to borrow from U.S. investors or access U.S. financial markets.
Default and Debt Restructuring

After months of speculation about if and when Venezuela would default, on November 2, Maduro
announced in a televised address that the country would seek to restructure and refinance its debt.
The announcement signaled a significant shift in policy, but came with few details about how the
restructuring would proceed. Maduro stressed his promise to continue debt service during
negotiations with creditors, likely to evade legal challenges from bondholders, but the
government missed some bond interest payments, leading credit rating agencies and a New York-
based derivatives group (the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, ISDA) to issue
default notices for the Venezuelan government.91 PdVSA was also late on payments, leading
ISDA to issue a default notice for PdVSA as well.92
Although it is difficult to find reliable data on the composition of Venezuelan debt, it is estimated
that Venezuela owes about $64 billion to bondholders, $20 billion to China and Russia, $5 billion
to multilateral lenders (such as the Inter-American Development Bank), and tens of billions to
importers and service companies in the oil industry.93 Any comprehensive restructuring of
Venezuelan debt is expected to be a long and complex process, due to (1) the number of parties
involved, including thousands of bondholders that are in the early stages of organizing, as well as
China and Russia, whose lending to Venezuela is driven at least in part by geopolitical
considerations;94 (2) legal challenges likely to be initiated by bondholders, which could take years
to resolve and could result in the seizure of Venezuelan assets in the United States, including
CITGO (owned by PdVSA), oil shipments, and cash payments for oil; (3) differences in legal
provisions attached to different bonds, including differences between the sovereign and PdVSA
bonds; (4) U.S. sanctions, which prohibit U.S. investors from accepting any new debt issued in a
debt restructuring or from engaging with Vice President Tareck El Aissami, who is leading the
debt negotiations and subject to U.S. sanctions for drug-trafficking charges; and (5) lack of any
economic reform agenda in Venezuela to accompany the restructuring.
The Venezuelan government organized a bondholders meeting in Caracas on November 13 that,
although touted by the government as a sign of good faith in negotiations with creditors, provided
little insight into how negotiations would proceed.95 In mid-November, Russia agreed to
89
Kejal Vyas, Anatoly Kurmanaev, and Julie Wernau, “Goldman Sachs Under Fire for Venezuela Bond Deal,” Wall
Street Journal, May 30, 2017; Kejal Vyas and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Goldman Sachs Bought Venezuela’s State Oil
Company’s Bonds Last Week,” Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2017.
90
Matt Wirz, and Carolyn Cui, “Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis Tests Wall Street Ethics,” Wall Street Journal, June
19, 2017.
91
John Paul Rathbone and Robin Wigglesworth, “Venezuela Debt: US, Russia, and China Play for High Stakes,”
Financial Times, November 22, 2017.
92
Corina Pons, “Venezuela Ruled in Default by Trade Group after Bond Payment Delays,” Reuters, November 16,
2017.
93
John Paul Rathbone and Robin Wigglesworth, “Venezuela Debt: US, Russia, and China Play for High Stakes,”
Financial Times, November 22, 2017.
94
Robin Wigglesworth, “Debt Restructuring Battle is Brewing over Venezuela,” Financial Times, November 20, 2017.
95
Ben Bartenstein, Katia Porzecanski, and Patricia Laya, “Venezuela’s Bondholder Meeting Is a Bust as S&P Declares
Default,” Bloomberg, November 13, 2017.

restructure $3.15 billion in debt owed by Venezuela on favorable terms, despite Russia’s own
fiscal pressures, easing the fiscal pressures facing the Venezuelan government, although serious
challenges remain. In November 27, a U.S. subsidiary of Sinopec, one of China’s biggest state-
owned oil companies, sued PdVSA in a U.S. court for $23.7 million plus punitive damages over
late payments on a May 2012 contract for steel rebar, a sign that China may not be willing to
extend forbearance to Venezuela.96
Whereas most countries that seek debt restructuring have committed to an International Monetary
Fund (IMF) program, which provides creditors reassurance that government policies are on track,
Venezuela has no such program. Moreover, the government has not permitted the IMF to engage
in routine surveillance of the economy for more than a decade. In November 2017, the IMF
formally found Venezuela to be in violation of its commitments to provide key economic data, a
process that could eventually lead to Venezuela being expelled from the institution.97
To date, Maduro’s stated goal of restructuring and subsequent default notices have driven down
the value of Venezuelan debt trading in secondary markets, with limited spillover effects in
regional and global financial markets. It is unclear how restructuring and/or default could affect
Venezuela’s finances, in part because it is not clear whether the government intends to, or will be
able to, continue repaying debts during the negotiations.98 If the government does suspend debt
service, it could in the short term redirect funds to domestic objectives, which could help bolster
domestic political support for the Maduro regime. Over the longer term, however, suspending
payments to creditors could result in a substantial loss of government revenue, if creditors are
able to seize oil exports or funds tied to oil exports.
Social Conditions
Humanitarian Concerns99
Venezuela faces a dire social situation fueled by shortages in food, medicine, and other basic
consumer goods; people’s declining purchasing power; and bottlenecks and corruption in the food
importation and distribution system.100 In 2016, the shortages led to riots, protests, and looting
around the country and resulted in the deaths of several people shot by security officials. In
August 2016, Venezuela agreed to open pedestrian crossings at six border checkpoints with
Colombia, which has allowed Venezuelans to travel to Colombia for food and other basic goods.
The opening of the Colombian-Venezuelan border has helped to relieve shortages in border areas
to some extent.
Nevertheless, according to a 2016 national survey released in February 2017, 27% of people
across the country eat only once a day, and 9 out of 10 households lack enough income to
purchase food. Basic food items reportedly are largely out of reach for the majority of the
population because of rampant inflation. The same survey showed that almost three-quarters of
96
Jonathan Wheatley, “Sinopac Sues as China Loses Patience with Venezuela,” Financial Times, December 6, 2017.
97
IMF, Statement by the IMF Executive Board on Venezuela, November 3, 2017.
98
Jonathan Wheatley and Robin Wigglesworth, “Venezuela Bond Repayments: Dead and Alive,” Financial Times,
November 28, 2017.
99
Edward Y. Gracia, CRS Research Assistant, contributed to this section.
100
Hannah Dreier and Joshua Goodman, “Venezuela Military Trafficking Food as Country Goes Hungry,” AP,
December 28, 2016.

Venezuelans have lost about 19 pounds over the past year.101 Between 2014 and 2016, Venezuela
recorded the greatest increase in malnourishment in Latin America and the Caribbean, a region in
which only eight countries have recorded increases in hunger in recent years.102 According to
Caritas Venezuela (an organization affiliated with the Catholic Church), child mortality increased
by 30% in 2016, with areas around Caracas showing rates of malnutrition high enough to meet
World Health Organization (WHO) standards describing a humanitarian crisis.103
Venezuela’s health system has been affected severely by budget cuts, with shortages of medicines
and basic supplies. Some hospitals face critical shortages of antibiotics, intravenous solutions,
and even food, and 50% of operating rooms in public hospitals are not in use.104 According to
Médicos por la Salud, a Venezuelan nongovernmental health organization, only 38% of drugs
listed as essential by the WHO are available in the country, and only 30% of drugs for basic
infectious diseases are available in public hospitals.105
In February 2017, Venezuela captured international attention following the unexpected
publication of data from the country’s Ministry of Health (the country had not been regularly
releasing such data since 2015). The report revealed alarming spikes in infant and maternal
mortality rates and the return of previously eradicated infectious diseases like diphtheria and
measles.106 An estimated 1 million unvaccinated children may be at risk of contracting measles
this year, and malaria, once under control, is spreading rapidly, with 240,000 cases recorded in
2016 (a 76% increase over 2015).107 People are also reportedly dying at a faster rate from
HIV/AIDS in Venezuela than in many African countries due to the collapse of the country’s once
well-regarded HIV treatment program and the scarcity of drugs needed to treat the disease.108 HIV
advocates are pushing for the Global Fund, a public-private entity that focuses on HIV,
tuberculosis, and malaria, to do more to address the situation in Venezuela.109 Observers are
101
Maritza Landaeta-Jiménez, Marianella Herrera Cuenca, Guillermo Ramírez, Maura Vázquez, Encuesta Condiciones
de Vida Venezuela 2016, February 27, 2017. The complete survey is available in Spanish at
http://www.fundacionbengoa.org/noticias/2017/encovi-2016.asp; “Venezuela: Poverty Increases Dramatically,” Latin
News Regional Monitor: Andean Group, March 3, 2017. Also see Juan Forero, “Venezuela in Starving,” Wall Street
Journal, May 6, 2017; and Emma Graham-Harrision, “Hunger Eats Away at Venezuela’s Soul as Its People Struggle to
Survive,” The Guardian, August 26, 2017.
102
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), Pan American Health
Organization (PAHO), Panorama of Food and Nutritional Security in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2017,
http://www.fao.org/americas/recursos/panorama/en/.
103
“Venezuela’s Child Malnutrition Crisis Grows,” BBC, June 15, 2017.
104
“Venezuela: Approximately 50% of Operating Theaters in Venezuelan Public Hospitals Are Not Functional,”
Global Health Intelligence, March 27, 2017.
105
Caritas, “Caritas on Venezuela,” August 16, 2017, at http://www.caritas.org/2017/08/caritas-on-venezuela/.
106
“Boletín Epidemiológico, Semana Epidemiológica No 52, 25 al 31 de Diciembre de 2016 Año de edición LX,”
Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela; Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Salud, February 2017. The government
reported more than 120 cases to the WHO from January-June 2017. “Suspected Diptheria Cases up in Crisis-Stricken
Venezuela, Data Suggests,” Reuters, July 29, 2017.
107
“One Million Unvaccinated Venezuelan Kids Vulnerable in Measles Outbreak: Doctors,” Reuters, September 29,
2017; “Why Malaria Is Spreading in Venezuela,” The Economist, October 12, 2017.
108
Stephanie Nolen, “In Venezuela, a Once-Leading AIDS Program Lies in Ruins,” The Globe and Mail, June 21,
2017.
109
ICASO and Acción Ciudadana contra el SIDA (ACCSI), Triple Threat: Resurging Epidemics, a Broken Health
System, and Global Indifference to Venezuela’s Crisis, October 2, 2017, http://www.icaso.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/
2017/10/Triple_Threat.pdf.

concerned that the widespread lack of access to reliable contraception may hasten the spread of
sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies, and dangerous clandestine abortions.110
During the Vatican-mediated talks in November 2016, the Maduro government reportedly agreed
to improve the processes for importing food and medicines and promote monitoring of
distribution chains. Discussions reportedly also broached the idea of establishing a channel for
allowing humanitarian aid to reach Venezuela, possibly through Caritas Venezuela. In December
2016, Venezuela’s foreign minister announced that the government would increase collaboration
with U.N. agencies such as the WHO to acquire medications. The WHO is reportedly helping the
government purchase and deliver millions of vaccines against measles, mumps, and rubella.111
Nevertheless, a group of doctors and health associations recently protested outside the WHO’s
office in Caracas to urge the entity to provide more assistance and exert more pressure on the
government to address the health crisis.112 In December 2017, President Maduro rejected the need
for international assistance, and government-MUD dialogue efforts in the Dominican Republic
failed to agree upon how to open a channel to get food and medical assistance into the country.
He reportedly said that “Venezuela is not a country of beggars … we have our problems … [but]
we will overcome them with our own formulas.”113
Crime and Violence

In addition to the aforementioned political violence, Venezuela has among the highest crime
victimization and homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean, the region with the highest
homicide rates in the world.114 Moreover, unlike El Salvador and Honduras, two other extremely
violent countries where homicides trended downward in 2016, violence in Venezuela escalated in
that year. According to data from the attorney general’s office, the homicide rate in Venezuela
stood at 70.1 per 100,000 in 2016, up from 58 per 100,000 in 2015, with 21,700 homicides
recorded.115 The independent Venezuelan Violence Observatory estimated 28,479 homicides in
2016, or a rate of 91.8 per 100,000 people.116 Among the homicides recorded by the government
in 2016, some 254 minors were killed, up from 177 in 2015. According to a 2014 study by the
U.N. Children’s Fund, homicide has been the leading cause of death for youth under the age of 20
in Venezuela, with a homicide rate for adolescent boys of 74 per 100,000.117 The impunity rate for
homicide in Venezuela is roughly 92%.118
In addition to violence committed by criminal groups and fueled by drug trafficking and other
illicit markets, Venezuela reportedly has a high rate of extrajudicial killings by security forces and
110
Abortion is illegal in Venezuela unless the life of the mother is at risk. Mariana Zuñiga and Anthony Faiola, “Even
Sex Is in Crisis in Venezuela, Where Contraceptives Are Growing Scarce,” Washington Post, November 28, 2017.
111
“One Million Unvaccinated Venezuelan Kids Vulnerable in Measles Outbreak: Doctors,” Reuters, September 29,
2017.
112
“Venezuela Doctors in Protest Urge Stronger WHO Stance on Health Crisis,” Reuters, September 25, 2017.
113
Sofia Nederr, “Maduro Rechaza Ayuda Humanitaria para el País,” El Nacional, December 4, 2017; “Venezuela
Dialogue Produces No Humanitarian Agreement,” Latin News Daily, December 4, 2017.
114
Laura Jaitman, ed., The Costs of Crime and Violence in Latin America: New Evidence and Insights from Latin
America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank, 2017.
115
Christopher Woody, “Venezuela Admits Homicides Soared to 60 a Day in 2016, Making It One of the Most Violent
Countries in the World,” Business Insider, April 3, 2017. Hereinafter, Woody, April 2017.
116
“Venezuela Set for Murderous 2017,” Insight Crime, January 8, 2017.
117
U.N. Children’s Fund, Ocultas a Plena Luz: Un Análisis Estadístico de la Violencia Contra los Niños, 2014, at
https://www.unicef.org/ecuador/ocultos-a-plena-luz.pdf.
118
Woody, April 2017.

allied armed civilian militias (collectivos).119 According to an April 2016 report by Human Rights
Watch and the Venezuelan Human Rights Education-Action Program, some 245 such killings
occurred after the government launched an anticrime initiative in mid-2015 called the Operation
to Liberate and Protect the People.120 The report also alleged that security forces committed
arbitrary detentions, forced evictions, the destruction of homes, and the arbitrary deportation of
Colombian nationals during raids in low-income neighborhoods. The State Department’s human
rights report covering 2016 cites a nongovernmental organization estimate of 1,396 extrajudicial
killings committed by security forces in 2015 (the latest year for which data are available), up
37% from the year before.121
Migration
The ongoing political and economic turmoil in Venezuela has prompted many Venezuelans to
leave the country. Thousands of Venezuelans in areas bordering Brazil and Colombia who in the
past entered those countries on a temporary basis to obtain food and medicine have chosen to
remain outside Venezuela. As of October 2017, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) reported that there were an estimated 300,000 Venezuelans living in Colombia, 81,000
in Peru, and 20,000-30,000 in Brazil.122 Of those in Colombia, over 67,000 Venezuelans had
applied for a Special Stay Permit being offered by the Colombian government that would allow
them to stay and to work for up to two years. This measure reportedly could benefit 210,000
Venezuelans. In addition, another 1,000,000 Venezuelans had registered for a Border Mobility
Card that allows them to enter Colombia temporarily to access basic goods and services.
UNHCR reports that Caribbean countries close to Venezuela have also seen increasing numbers
of Venezuelans migrating to their countries. This includes 40,000 in Trinidad and Tobago, 20,000
in Aruba, and 5,000 in Curacao (both Aruba and Curacao are Dutch territories, known as
autonomous countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands).123
In May 2017, UNHCR some of its reserve funding (including $1.7 million of U.S. funds provided
by the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration) to deploy missions to
help serve the needs of current and future Venezuelan arrivals in those countries and others in
Latin America. Services provided vary by country, but include support for reception centers and
shelters, emergency relief items, legal assistance with asylum applications and other matters, and
the creation of temporary work programs. UNHCR estimates that it will need an additional $1.6
million to support these efforts, as well as efforts in Venezuela and across the region through the
end of this year.124
Should the situation in Venezuela deteriorate further, there could be large-scale emigration
(including of those seeking asylum) to neighboring countries, particularly to Colombia. There are
reportedly some 5 million Venezuelans of Colombian origin who could seek to relocate to
119
David Smilde, “Crime and Revolution in Venezuela,” NACLA Report on the Americas, 2017, vol. 49, no. 3.
120
Human Rights Watch and the Venezuelan Program of Action-Education in Human Rights, “Unchecked Power,
Police and Military Raids in Low-Income Immigrant Communities in Venezuela,” April 2016, at https://www.hrw.org/
node/288189/.
121
State Department Human Rights, 2017.
122
UNHCR, “Venezuela Situation: Venezuela Situation: Update on Response and Funding Requirements,” October
2017. Hereinafter, UNHCR, October 2017.
123
UNHCR, “Venezuela Situation,” Situation Update, August 2017.
124
UNHCR, “Venezuela Situation Funding Update,” November 28, 2017.

Colombia. These individuals likely would need social services, which would put an added burden
on the Colombian government at a time when it is trying to implement a peace process.125
U.S. Policy
The United States historically has had close relations with Venezuela, a major U.S. foreign oil
supplier, but friction in relations increased under the Chávez government and has intensified
under the Maduro regime. For more than a decade, U.S. policymakers have had concerns about
the deterioration of human rights and democratic conditions in Venezuela and the lack of bilateral
cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts. The United States has employed
various sanctions in response to concerns about the activities of the Venezuelan government or
Venezuelan individuals.126 These have included sanctions related to terrorism, drug trafficking,
trafficking in persons, and, since 2015, sanctions related to undermining democracy, human rights
violations, and public corruption. U.S. funding and political support has also bolstered democratic
civil society in Venezuela, OAS efforts to address the crisis in Venezuela, and UNHCR’s capacity
to assist Venezuelan emigrants (including asylum seekers).
President Trump and top Administration officials have generally backed multilateral approaches
to resolving the crisis in Venezuela, while issuing statements on issues of concern to the United
States and continuing to ratchet up sanctions. Before the Constituent Assembly election, President
Trump said that the United States would “not stand by as Venezuela crumbles” and asserted that
the United States would “take strong and swift economic actions” if the Maduro regime imposed
the ANC.127 The State Department has said that the United States will not recognize the ANC,
which it considers “the illegitimate product of a flawed process designed by the Maduro
dictatorship to further its assault on democracy.”128 On July 31, the Administration imposed
sanctions on President Maduro, one of only four heads of state subject to U.S. sanctions.129 U.S.
State Department officials have continued to call for the release of Josh Holt, a U.S. citizen who
has been imprisoned in Venezuela since June 2016 and whose health has declined.130
On August 11, 2017, President Trump stated in a press conference that “we have many options for
Venezuela, including a possible military option if necessary.”131 Although other U.S. officials,
including Vice President Mike Pence, subsequently emphasized U.S. economic and diplomatic
policy tools, analysts contend that the President’s remarks have not helped efforts to forge a
united regional front on the Venezuela crisis. Several Latin American nations have spoken out
against military action.132 The Maduro regime has used the remarks to rally public support against
what it terms a potential “imperialist” invasion.
125
Prepared statement by Dr. Shannon K. O’Neil, Council on Foreign Relations, before the U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Venezuela: Options for U.S. Policy, 115th Cong., 1st sess., March 2, 2017.
126
See CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Mark P. Sullivan.
127
White House, “Statement from President Donald J. Trump,” July 17, 2017.
128
U.S. Department of State, “Venezuela’s Illegitimate National Constituent Assembly,” August 3, 2017.
129
U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions the President of Venezuela,” July 31, 2017.
130
U.S. Department of State, Heather Nauert, Spokesperson, Department Press Briefing, November 30, 2017.
131
Jenna Johnson and John Wagner, “Trump Won’t ‘Rule Out a Military Option’ in Venezuela,” Washington Post,
August 11, 2017.
132
Brian Ellsworth and Mitra Taj, “Latin America Rejects Trump’s Military Threat Against Venezuela,” Reuters,
August 11, 2017.

The Trump Administration has been analyzing additional policy options on Venezuela. On
September 24, 2017, President Trump banned U.S. travel by certain Venezuelan officials and their
families. Some observers expected that more sanctions would come after controversial regional
elections held in October 2017, which the Administration has condemned as having been neither
free nor fair.133 The Treasury Department levied targeted sanctions on 10 officials, including
several members of the National Electoral Council and the ANC on November 9, 2017.134
Other potential measures run the gamut from additional sanctions against government officials to
broader sanctions aimed at Venezuela’s economy, especially its oil sector, the government’s main
revenue source.135 The Administration has limited PdVSA’s access to external financing (through
sanctions imposed on August 25 as discussed below). It may also consider prohibiting certain
U.S. exports to and/or imports from Venezuela, and/or prohibiting all financial transactions with
PdVSA.
Stronger economic sanctions could cause divisions within the Venezuelan government and hasten
the end of its repressive policies, but could have negative effects and unintended consequences.
Analysts are concerned that such sanctions could exacerbate Venezuela’s already difficult
humanitarian situation. Another broad concern is the potential effect that stronger sanctions could
have on the U.S. economy. U.S. oil refiners that depend on the importation of Venezuelan crude
oil oppose sanctions that could increase costs for their operations and for U.S. consumers.136 A
complicating factor in implementing sanctions is that PdVSA owns CITGO, which operates three
crude oil refineries, three pipelines, and several petroleum product terminals in the United States.
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic Actions, Human

Rights Violations, and Corruption137
In Venezuela, as in other countries, the U.S. government has used targeted sanctions to signal
disapproval of officials who have violated U.S. laws or international human rights norms and to
attempt to deter others from doing so. Targeted sanctions can punish officials or their associates
who travel internationally and hold some of their assets in the United States without causing harm
to the population as a whole. In July 2014, the Obama Administration imposed visa restrictions
on some Venezuelan officials responsible for human rights violations. Some argue that
sanctioning additional Venezuelan officials might help to increase pressure on the Maduro
government to cede power or at least stop violating human rights, whereas others argue that
increased sanctions would only encourage Maduro and his allies to harden their positions.
In December 2014, the 113th Congress enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278). Among its provisions, the law required (until December 31,
2016) the President to impose sanctions (asset blocking and visa restrictions) against those whom
the President determined were responsible for significant acts of violence or serious human rights
133
U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, Heather Nauert, Department Spokesperson, “Gubernatorial Elections in
Venezuela,” October 16, 2017.
134
U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Ten Venezuelan Government Officials,” November 9, 2017.
135
David Mortlock and Francisco Monaldi, Venezuela: What are the Most Effective US Sanctions?, Atlantic Council,
August 9, 2017.
136
CRS Insight IN10741, U.S. Petroleum Trade with Venezuela: Financial and Economic Considerations Associated
with Possible Sanctions, by Phillip Brown and Clare Ribando Seelke.
137
Portions of this section are drawn from CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Mark P.
Sullivan.

abuses associated with the 2014 protests or, more broadly, against anyone who had directed or
ordered the arrest or prosecution of a person primarily because of the person’s legitimate exercise
of freedom of expression or assembly. The act included presidential waiver authority for the
application of sanctions if the President determined it was in the national security interest of the
United States. In July 2016, Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 114-194) extending the
termination date of the requirement to impose targeted sanctions until December 31, 2019.
In March 2015, President Obama issued

Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, which Corruption
implemented P.L. 113-278 and went beyond Venezuela ranked 166 out of 176 countries included in
Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption
the requirements of the law. The E.O. Perceptions Index (CPI), the lowest ranking of any
authorized targeted sanctions (asset blocking country in Latin America and the Caribbean. In a 2017
and visa restrictions) against (1) those survey, more than 75% of Venezuelans said that
involved in actions or policies that undermine corruption was rising. Corruption in PdVSA, as well as in
democratic processes or institutions; (2) those ports, border crossings, and food importing and
distribution systems now controlled by the military, has
involved in significant acts of violence or cost the country hundreds of millions of dollars in lost
conduct constituting a serious abuse or income.138 Some officials, allegedly including Vice
violation of human rights, including against President El Aissami, Interior Minister Nestor Reverol,
persons involved in antigovernment protests in and many members of the military, have received illicit
income from drug trafficking. Corruption in the criminal
Venezuela during or since February 2014; (3)
justice system is tied to widespread human rights abuses
those involved in actions that prohibit, limit, and impunity. According to Transparency Venezuela, the
or penalize the exercise of freedom of full extent of this corruption is difficult to gauge given the
expression or peaceful assembly; or (4) those government’s lack of transparency and weak institutions.
senior Venezuelan officials involved in public Sources: Transparency International, CPI,
corruption. It also authorized targeted https://www.transparency.org/country/VEN,
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/
sanctions against any person determined to be
corruption_on_the_rise_in_latin_america_and_the_cari
a current or former Venezuelan government bbean.
official or a current or former leader of any
entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in any activity described above.
To date, the Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on 37 Venezuelans pursuant to E.O.
13692. In March 2015, the Treasury Department froze the assets of six members of Venezuela’s
security forces and a prosecutor involved in repressing antigovernment protesters. Under the
Trump Administration, the Treasury Department has imposed sanctions against an additional 30
Venezuelans pursuant to E.O. 13692, including the following in 2017:
 On May 18, 8 members of Venezuela’s Supreme Court for usurping the power of
the National Assembly;
 On July 26, 13 current and former officials, with 4 for undermining democracy or
human rights, including Minister of Education Elias Jaua, National Electoral
Council (CNE) President Tibisay Lucena, and then-Human Rights Ombudsman
and now Attorney General Tarek Saab; 5 for violence and repression, including
Minister of Interior, Justice, and Peace Nestor Reverol and the leaders of
Venezuela’s army, national guard, and national police; and 4 for public
corruption, including the vice president of finance for PdVSA;
 On July 31, President Nicolás Maduro; and
138
Hannah Dreier and Joshua Goodman, “Venezuela Military Trafficking Food as Country Goes Hungry,” AP,
December 28, 2016.

 On August 9, 8 high-ranking Venezuelan officials.

 On November 9, 10 government officials, including several CNE and ANC
members.
Trafficking in Persons. Since 2014, Venezuela has received a Tier 3 ranking in the State
Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) reports. U.S. assistance to Venezuela has not
been subject to TIP-related sanctions since the democracy and human rights aid provided goes to
nongovernmental organizations and has been deemed to be in the U.S. national interest.139
According to the June 2017 TIP report, although the government arrested seven trafficking
suspects, it did not provide any data on prosecutions or convictions, victims identified, or any
other antitrafficking efforts.
Sanctions Restricting Venezuela’s Access to U.S. Financial Markets

President Trump signed E.O. 13808, effective August 25, 2017, imposing new sanctions that
restrict the Venezuelan government’s access to U.S. financial markets, which has been an
important source of capital for the government and PdVSA.140 According to the White House, the
measures “are carefully calibrated to deny the Maduro dictatorship a critical source of financing
to maintain its illegitimate rule, protect the United States financial system from complicity in
Venezuela’s corruption and in the impoverishment of the Venezuelan people, and allow for
humanitarian assistance.”141 Sanctions targeting sovereign debt are unusual, but not
unprecedented.142
The sanctions seek to cut off new funds flowing from U.S. investors or through the U.S. financial
system to the Maduro government. To this end, sanctions restrict transactions by U.S. investors or
within the United States related to new debt issued by the Venezuelan government and PdVSA.
U.S. persons are also prohibited from purchasing securities from the Venezuelan government.
Additionally, CITGO—whose parent company is PdVSA—is prohibited from distributing profits
to the Venezuelan government, though it can continue its operations in the United States.
Concurrent with the release of the Executive Order in August, Treasury issued licenses to
minimize the impact of sanctions on U.S. economic interests and on the Venezuelan people. The
licenses allow (1) a 30-day window to wind down contracts affected by the sanctions; (2) U.S.
investors to continue trading their existing holdings of Venezuelan and PdVSA bonds on
secondary markets; (3) transactions involving new debt issued by CITGO; and (4) financing for
specific humanitarian goods, including agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices.
Additionally, the sanctions specified in the Executive Order allow transactions involving new
short-term debt (less than 30 days for the Venezuelan government and less than 90 days for
PdVSA). This ensures continued access to short-term financing that facilitates U.S. trade with
Venezuela, including U.S. imports of oil from Venezuela.
139
See, for example, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential Determination on Foreign
Governments’ Efforts Regarding Trafficking in Persons,” September 30, 2018.
140
Presidential Executive Order on Imposing Sanctions with Respect to the Situation in Venezuela, August 25, 2017, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/25/presidential-executive-order-imposing-sanctions-respect-
situation.
141
Statement by the Press Secretary on New Financial Sanctions on Venezuela, August 25, 2017, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/25/statement-press-secretary-new-financial-sanctions-venezuela.
142
Congress has passed legislation to prohibit investments and transaction in Iran sovereign debt (22 U.S.C. 2723), and
the Countering Russia Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (§242 of P.L. 115-44) calls for a report studying
the effects of sanctioning Russian sovereign debt and related derivative products.

When the sanctions were announced in August, there was debate about whether they would push
Venezuela to default, or whether the government would be able to find alternative sources of
financing, for example in new oil-for-loan deals with Russia and China or taking cash from
PdVSA and other state institutions. Most economists agree that the sanctions made the fiscal
position of the government more difficult, as many international banks ceased all financial
transactions with Venezuela for fear of violating sanctions, and as sanctions accelerated the
decline in Venezuelan oil exports to the United States.143 In the November 2 address announcing
his intent to restructure Venezuela’s debt, President Maduro blamed U.S. sanctions for the
government’s fiscal problems, arguing that they made it impossible for the government to raise
additional funds.
Counternarcotics and Money-Laundering Issues

Venezuela’s pervasive corruption and extensive 1,370-mile border with Colombia have made the
country a major transit route for cocaine destined for the United States and an attractive
environment for drug traffickers and other criminals to engage in money laundering. In 2005,
Venezuela suspended its cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) after
alleging that DEA agents were spying on the government, charges U.S. officials dismissed as
baseless. Prior to that time, the governments had negotiated an antidrug cooperation agreement
(an addendum to a 1978 Bilateral Counternarcotics agreement) that would have enhanced
information-sharing and antidrug cooperation. Venezuela has yet to approve that agreement.
Since 2005, Venezuela has been designated annually as a country that has failed to adhere to its
international antidrug obligations, pursuant to international drug-control certification procedures
in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228). In September 2017, President
Trump designated Venezuela as one of two countries not adhering to its antidrug obligations.144
At the same time, President Trump waived economic sanctions that would have curtailed U.S.
assistance for democracy programs.
The State Department reported in its 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR) that Venezuela was one of the preferred trafficking routes for the transit of illicit drugs
out of South America, especially cocaine, because of the country’s porous border with Colombia,
weak judicial system, sporadic international counternarcotics cooperation, and permissive and
corrupt environment. The report notes the following:
 Cocaine is trafficked via aerial, terrestrial, and maritime routes, with most drug
flights departing from Venezuelan states bordering Colombia and maritime
trafficking that includes the use of large cargo containers, fishing vessels, and
“go-fast” boats.
 The vast majority of drugs transiting Venezuela in 2016 were destined for the
Caribbean, Central America, the United States, West Africa, and Europe.
Colombian drug-trafficking organizations—including multiple criminal bands,
the FARC, and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—facilitate drug
transshipment through Venezuela. Mexican drug-trafficking organizations also
operate in the country.
143
Ben Bartenstein and Christine Jenkins, “Venezuelan Bonds Get Harder to Trade Thanks to Sanctions,” Bloomberg,
August 31, 2017; Lucia Kassai and Sheela Tobben, “Venezuelan Oil Cargoes to U.S. Ports Plunge as Sanctions Bite,”
Bloomberg, October 24, 2017.
144
The White House, “Presidential Determination—Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for
Fiscal Year 2018,” September 13, 2017.

 Despite a near doubling in coca cultivation in Colombia from 2013 to 2015, the
report states that Venezuelan antidrug forces seized only 32 metric tons (MT) of
drugs in the first six months of 2016, compared to 66 MT in the first eight
months of 2015.
 “Venezuelan authorities do not effectively prosecute drug traffickers, in part due
to political corruption,” but Venezuelan law enforcement officers also “lack the
equipment, training, and resources required to impede the operations of major
drug trafficking organizations.”145
 Venezuela and the United States continue to use a 1991 bilateral maritime
agreement to cooperate on interdiction. In 2016, Venezuela worked with the U.S.
Coast Guard in six maritime drug interdictions cases (down from 10 in 2015).
 As noted in prior years, “the United States remains committed to cooperating
with Venezuela to counter the flow of cocaine and other illegal drugs transiting
Venezuelan territory.”146
In addition to State Department reporting, recent cases in the United States demonstrate the
involvement of high-level Venezuelan officials or their relatives in international drug trafficking.
President Maduro either has dismissed those cases or appointed the accused to Cabinet positions,
where they presumably will be protected from extradition. Some observers have maintained that
it may therefore be difficult to persuade officials to leave office through democratic means if,
once out of power, they likely would face extradition and prosecution in the United States.147
On August 1, 2016, the U.S. Federal Court for the Eastern District of New York unsealed an
indictment from January 2015 against two Venezuelans for cocaine trafficking to the United
States. The indictment alleged that General Néstor Luis Reverol Torres, former general director of
Venezuela’s National Anti-Narcotics Office (ONA) and former commander of Venezuela’s
National Guard, and Edylberto José Molina Molina, former subdirector of ONA, participated in
drug-trafficking activities from 2008 through 2010, when they were top ONA officials.148
President Maduro responded by appointing General Reverol as Minister of Interior and Justice in
charge of the country’s police forces.
In November 2016, two nephews of Venezuelan First Lady Cilia Flores—Franqui Francisco
Flores de Freitas and Efrain Antonio Campo Flores—were convicted in U.S. federal court in New
York for conspiring to transport cocaine into the United States. The two nephews had been
arrested in Haiti in November 2015 and brought to the United States to face drug-trafficking
charges. President Maduro asserted that the conviction was an attempt by the United States to
weaken his government.149 The trial and conviction reportedly shed light on the role of
Venezuelan government and military officials in drug trafficking.150
145
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2017 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), vol. 1, p. 286.
146
Ibid., p. 289.
147
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Venezuela: Options for U.S. Policy, 115th Cong., 1st sess.,
March 2, 2017.
148
U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York, “Former Top Leaders of
Venezuela’s Anti-Narcotics Agency Indicted for Trafficking Drugs to the United States,” August 1, 2016.
149
“Venezuela’s Maduro Calls Nephews’ Drug Conviction ‘U.S. Imperialism,’” Reuters News, November 25, 2016.
150
Mike LaSusa and Tristan Clavel, “Venezuela’s ‘Narco Nephews’ Case Hints at Govt Complicity in Drug Trade,”
InSight Crime, November 21, 2016; and Laura Natalia Ávila, “Game Changers 2016: Venezuela’s Cartel of the Suns
Revealed,” InSight Crime, January 3, 2017.

The Department of the Treasury has imposed sanctions on at least 20 Venezuelans for narcotics
trafficking and 10 companies in Venezuela by designating them as Specially Designated
Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act,
P.L. 106-120, Title VIII; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).151 On February 13, 2017, the Department of the
Treasury imposed drug-trafficking sanctions against Venezuelan Vice President Tareck el Aissami
and an associate, Samarck Lopez Bello.152
In addition to drug trafficking, the 2017 INCSR discusses Venezuela’s high level of vulnerability
to money laundering and other financial crimes. According to the report, money laundering is
widespread in the country and is evident in industries ranging from government currency
exchanges to banks to real estate to metal and petroleum. Venezuela’s currency-control system
requires individuals and firms to purchase hard currency from the government’s currency
commission at a fixed exchange rate of 10 bolivars per U.S. dollar, which has created incentives
for trade-based money laundering.
Venezuela revised its laws against organized crime and terrorist financing in 2014 but excluded
the government and state-owned industries from the scope of any investigations. The unit charged
with investigating financial crimes has “limited operational capabilities,” and there is a lack of
political will in the judicial system to combat money laundering and corruption.153 The 2017
INCSR concludes that Venezuela’s “status as a drug transit country, combined with weak AML
supervision and enforcement, lack of political will, limited bilateral cooperation, an unstable
economy, and endemic corruption” make the country vulnerable to money laundering.154
On September 20, 2017, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
advised U.S. financial institutions to report any suspicious financial transactions that could have a
nexus with Venezuela.155 The advisory urges U.S. institutions to exercise increased scrutiny over
transactions that may involve lesser-known state-owned enterprises connected to the government.
It also warns that recent sanctions against Venezuelan officials could “increase the likelihood that
other non-designated Venezuelan senior political figures may seek to protect their assets.”
Terrorism
The Secretary of State has determined annually, since 2006, that Venezuela has not been
“cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms
Export Control Act (AECA). Per the AECA, such a designation subjects Venezuela to a U.S. arms
embargo, which prohibits all U.S. commercial arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela. The most
recent determination was made in May 2017.
The State Department’s most recent annual terrorism report, issued in June 2017, stated that
“there were credible reports that Venezuela maintained a permissive environment that allowed for
151
See CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Mark P. Sullivan.
152
The designation stated that El Aissami, former governor of the state of Aragua and a former Interior minister, had
overseen shipments of more than 1,000 kilograms of narcotics and protected other drug traffickers. Bello laundered
drug proceeds for El Aissami. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Prominent Venezuela Drug
Trafficker Tareck el Aissami and His Primary Frontman Samark Lopez Bello,” February 13, 2017.
153
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2017 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), vol. II: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, March 2017, p. 190-
192.
154
Ibid.
155
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “Advisory on Widespread Public
Corruption in Venezuela,” September 20, 2017.

activities that benefited known terrorist groups.”156 The report stated that individuals linked to the
FARC, the ELN, and Basque Fatherland and Liberty (a Basque terrorist organization), as well as
Hezbollah supporters and sympathizers, were present in Venezuela. In 2008, the Treasury
Department imposed sanctions (asset freezing and prohibitions on transactions) on two
individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuela for providing financial support to Hezbollah,
which the Department of State has designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The action was
taken pursuant to E.O. 13224, aimed at impeding terrorist funding.
Recently, some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about allegations that Venezuelan
passports may have been sold to individuals at the Venezuelan Embassy in Iraq and that some of
those passports could be used by terrorists.157 Some observers, however, question the allegations.
They note that passport falsification is not unique to Venezuela and maintain that the difficulty of
obtaining a U.S. visa means that the possibility of a security threat to the United States is low.158
Energy Sector Concerns
Developments in Venezuela’s Energy Sector

Although Venezuela has vast proven oil reserves (301 billion barrels in 2015—the largest in the
world),159 oil production in the country has declined from an average of roughly 3.5 million
barrels per day (b/d) in 2000 to an average of 2.2 million b/d in 2016, according to the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA).160 Monthly oil production has continued to decline in
2017, with October production levels at 1.9 million b/d.
PdVSA’s performance has been affected by a number of factors. Under Chávez, government
control over PdVSA increased, and oil export revenues were not reinvested in the oil sector.
Chávez’s moves toward nationalization of oil assets created a difficult investment environment
for international oil companies. Losses in human capital that began after thousands of technocrats
were fired in the wake of a 2002-2003 oil workers’ strike have continued. Since August, some 50
executives have been arrested for alleged corruption, which dissidents within the company say is
a false pretense for replacing technocrats with military officers.161 Production also has been
challenged by aging infrastructure, bottlenecks created by PdVSA’s inability to pay service
companies and producers, and shortages of inputs (such as light crudes for blending) used to
process its heavy crude oil.162 Corruption remains a major drain on the company’s revenues and
an impediment to performance; it is likely to worsen if military officers take control of the
company from professional managers.163
156
U.S. Department of State, “Chapter 2, Western Hemisphere Overview,” in Country Reports on Terrorism 2015,
June 2016.
157
Scott Zamost et al., “Venezuela May Have Given Passports to People with Ties to Terrorism,” CNN, February 14,
2017.
158
Geoff Ramsey and David Smilde, “Fact Checking Venezuelan Passports-to-Terrorists Allegations,” Insight Crime,
February 22, 2017.
159
BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2017.
160
U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics.
161
“New Venezuela Oil Boss to Give Military More PDVSA Posts,” Reuters, November 27, 2017.
162
Igor Hernández and Francisco Monaldi, Weathering the Collapse: An Assessment of the Financial and Operational
Situation of the Venezuelan Oil Industry, CID Working Paper No. 327, November 2016. Hereinafter, Hernández and
Monaldi, 2016.
163
Kirk Semple, “General Is Given Control of Venezuelan Oil Giant,” New York Times, November 28, 2017.

Until recently, a domestic subsidy made gasoline virtually free for Venezuelans, a practice that
cost the Venezuelan government some $12 billion annually, increased consumption, and spurred
smuggling operations at the border with Colombia. In February 2016, the government raised the
price of gasoline for the first time since 1994, to approximately 15 cents a gallon (still the lowest
price in the world).164
Although a bond swap in late 2016 eased some of the company’s short-term debt burden, the
company remains heavily indebted, with total outstanding bonds estimated at $25 billion.165 In
November 2017, PdVSA was late in making bond payments, triggering a New York-based
derivatives group to issue a default notice for the state-oil company, in addition to the
government, and raising questions about PdVSA’s ability to make payments going forward.166
Observers maintain that the recent appointment of a general with no experience in the oil sector to
run PdVSA (and the oil ministry) may not bode well for the government’s willingness and ability
to make upcoming debt service payments.167 They are also concerned about reports that President
Maduro will review all oil contracts.168
Declining production by PdVSA-controlled assets stands in contrast to the performance of joint
ventures that PdVSA has with Chevron, CNPC, Gazprom, Repsol, and others. From 2010 to
2015, production declined by 27.5% in fields solely operated by PdVSA, whereas production in
fields operated by joint ventures increased by 42.3%.169 The future of these ventures is uncertain,
given that many of those companies worked closely with the recently ousted oil minister while he
headed PdVSA and in his most recent position as oil minister.170
U.S.-Venezuela Oil Trade

Traditionally, Venezuela has been a major supplier of crude oil imports into the United States, but
the amount, value, and relative share of U.S. oil imports from Venezuela declined in recent years.
In 2016, Venezuela was the third-largest foreign supplier of crude oil to the United States (behind
Canada and Saudi Arabia), providing an average of 796,000 b/d, down from 1.5 million b/d in
2015. The decline in U.S. oil imports from Venezuela has continued in 2017, to their lowest level
since 2002 (see Figure 3). In 2016, Venezuelan crude oil accounted for about 9.4% of U.S.
imports worldwide, down from 11% in 2005.
164
Mery Mogollon and Chris Kraul, “At 15 Cents a Gallon, It’s the Cheapest Gas in the World—Yet Venezuela
Worries,” Los Angeles Times, February 19, 2016.
165
Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt, July 2017.
166
Robin Wigglesworth, “Default Ruling on Venezuela Debt Postponed, Again,” Financial Times, November 13,
2017; Davide Scigliuzzo, “ISDA Panel to Reconvene on Venezuela CDS Auction,” Reuters, November 27, 2017.
167
Eurasia Group, “PDVSA Leadership Change Darkens Oil Sector Outlook and Increases Debt Service Uncertainty,”
November 27, 2017.
168
Alexandra Ulmer and Deisy Buitrago, “Venezuela Maduro Gains Control Over Oil Contracts amid Purge,” Reuters,
December 3, 2017, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil/venezuela-maduro-gains-control-over-oil-
contracts-amid-purge-idUSKBN1DX0V8.
169
Hernández and Monaldi, 2016.
170
Eurasia Group, “PDVSA Leadership Change Darkens Oil Sector Outlook and Increases Debt Service Uncertainty,”
November 27, 2017.

Figure 3. U.S. Imports of Venezuelan Oil
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), as prepared by CRS Graphics.
Oil is overwhelmingly Venezuela’s major export to the United States. According to U.S. trade
statistics, Venezuela’s oil exports to the United States were valued at $10.4 billion in 2016,
accounting for 96% of Venezuela’s exports to the United States.171 This figure is down from $29
billion in 2014, reflecting the steep decline in the price of oil.
In addition to importing crude oil from Venezuela, the United States also exports light crude oil
and other product inputs to Venezuela needed to blend with and refine Venezuelan heavy crude
oil. Some 43% of U.S. exports to Venezuela consist of light crude oil and other oil product
inputs.172
The decline in U.S. imports of oil from Venezuela is driven by a number of factors. These include
Venezuela’s decreased production and increased U.S. oil imports from Canada.173 U.S. sanctions
are also making oil imports from Venezuela more difficult. Under the sanctions, U.S. partners can
extend new credit to PdVSA for up to only 90 days. PdVSA has dealt with its fiscal problems by
delaying payments and paying service providers with promissory notes, in lieu of payments.174
There are concerns that delayed payments and promissory notes would count as new credit, and if
their maturity exceeds 90 days, would violate sanctions. These payment issues have contributed
to the slowdown in oil production, although it has not halted it.175
171
Trade statistics are from Global Trade Atlas, which uses Department of Commerce statistics.
172
Ibid; Nicholas Casey and Clifford Krauss, “How Bad Off Is Oil-Rich Venezuela? It’s Buying U.S. Oil,” New York
Times, September 20, 2016.
173
Venezuelan heavy crudes compete directly with Canadian oil sands heavy crudes to supply certain refiners in the
United States (many in the Gulf Coast region) that have been optimally configured to process heavy crude oils.
174
Risa Grais-Targow, Greg Priddy, and Agata Ciesielska, “Venezuela/Oil,” Eurasia Group, November 21, 2017.
175
Ibid.

PdVSA-Rosneft Financing Deal: Implications for U.S. Energy Security

As Venezuela’s economic situation has become more precarious and PdVSA has struggled to pay its debts, some U.S.
policymakers have expressed concerns about Russian involvement in the Venezuelan oil industry. In 2016 PdVSA
secured a $1.5 billion loan from the Russian state-oil company Rosneft. PdVSA used 49.9% of its shares in CITGO as
collateral for the loan. If PdVSA defaults on the loan from Rosneft, Rosneft would gain the 49.9% stake in CITGO.
CITGO, based in Texas, owns substantial energy assets in the United States, including three oil refineries, 48 terminal
facilities, and multiple pipelines. Some policymakers are concerned that Rosneft could gain control of critical U.S.
energy infrastructure and pose a serious risk to U.S. energy security.176 There are also questions about whether the
transaction would be compliant with U.S. sanctions on Rosneft.
In a hearing before the Senate Banking Committee in May 2017, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin indicated that any such
transaction would be reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).177 At the end
of August, it was reported that the Trump Administration stands ready to block the transaction.178 Reportedly,
Rosneft is negotiating to swap its collateral in CITGO for oilfield stakes and a fuel supply deal.179
U.S. Foreign Assistance

For more than a decade, the United States has provided democracy-related assistance to
Venezuelan civil society through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and
the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).
From 2002 through 2010, USAID supported democracy small-grant and technical assistance
activities in Venezuela through its Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) to provide assistance to
monitor democratic stability and strengthen the county’s democratic institutions. At the end of
2010, USAID’s support for such activities in Venezuela was transferred from OTI to USAID’s
Latin America and Caribbean Bureau. In recent years, U.S. democracy assistance to Venezuela
amounted to $4.3 million in each of FY2014 and FY2015 and $6.5 million in FY2016, provided
through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) foreign aid funding account.
For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested $5.5 million in ESF funding to “defend
democratic practices, institutions, and values that support human rights, freedom of information,
and Venezuelan civic engagement.”180 After enacting several short-term continuing resolutions,
the 115th Congress enacted the FY2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 244/P.L. 115-31)
on May 4, 2017. The explanatory statement accompanying the law recommends providing $7
million for civil society programs in Venezuela. Instead of ESF assistance, an estimated $7
million from the Development Assistance foreign aid funding account will be provided.
The Trump Administration did not request any assistance for democracy and human rights
programs in Venezuela as part of the FY2018 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs request. Nevertheless, the House Appropriations Committee’s FY2018 State
Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3362 (H.Rept. 115-253),
176
For example, see Jeff Duncan and James Conway, “Venezuela-Russia Deal Threatens U.S. Energy Security,” The
Hill, July 11, 2017.
177
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Domestic and International Policy,
115th Cong., May 18, 2017. For more on CFIUS, see CRS In Focus IF10177, The Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States.
178
Ian Talley, “U.S. to Block Potential Russian Move into American Energy,” Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2017.
179
Alexandra Ulmer and Marianna Parraga, “Russia, Venezuela Discuss Citgo Collateral Deal to Avoid U.S.
Sanctions,” Reuters, July 20, 2017.
180
U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations FY2017, Appendix 3, February
26, 2016, p. 489.

recommends providing $8 million. H.R. 3362 was incorporated into the House-passed full-year
FY2018 Omnibus Appropriations Measure, H.R. 3354. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s
version of the bill, S. 1780 (S.Rept. 115-152), recommends $15 million.
As noted above, NED has funded democracy projects in Venezuela since 1992. U.S. funding for
NED is provided in the annual State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations measure,
but country allocations for NED are not specified in the legislation. In FY2016, NED funded 36
projects in Venezuela totaling $1.6 million.181
On December 5, 2017, the House approved legislation, H.R. 2658 (Engel), the Venezuela
Humanitarian Assistance and Defense of Democratic Governance Act of 2017. The bill would
direct the State Department to work through nongovernmental organizations to provide food and
nutritional supplements, medicine and medical supplies, and related technical assistance to
Venezuela. A similar bill, S. 1018 (Cardin) has been introduced in the Senate.
U.S. Support for Organization of American States (OAS) Efforts

on Venezuela
Over the past two years, the U.S. government has strongly supported the organization’s efforts
under Secretary General Luis Almagro to address the situation in Venezuela.182 Although the
United States’ ability to advance its policy initiatives within the OAS generally has declined as
Latin American governments have adopted more independent foreign policy positions, OAS
efforts on Venezuela have complemented U.S. policy objectives. OAS efforts have thus far
largely failed, however, due to the reluctance of some countries to intervene in Venezuela’s
domestic affairs (see Appendix B for more details on OAS efforts).
OAS Secretary General Almagro (who assumed his position in May 2015) has spoken out
strongly about the situation in Venezuela. On May 31, 2016, the Secretary-General invoked the
Inter-American Democratic Charter—a collective commitment to promote and defend
democracy—when he called (pursuant to Article 20) on the OAS Permanent Council to convene
an urgent session on Venezuela to decide whether “to undertake the necessary diplomatic efforts
to promote the normalization of the situation and restore democratic institutions.”183 Secretary
General Almagro issued an extensive report on the political and economic situation in Venezuela,
concluding that there were “serious disruptions of the democratic order” in the country.184 The
Permanent Council received the report, but has yet to achieve consensus on how to respond to the
evolving crises.
181
National Endowment for Democracy, “Venezuela 2016,” at http://www.ned.org/region/latin-america-and-caribbean/
venezuela-2016/.
182
CRS Report R42639, Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer.
183
OAS, “Secretary General Invoked Democratic Charter and Convened Permanent Council on Venezuela,” May 31,
2016.
184
OAS, Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Situation in Venezuela, May 30, 2016, at
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/OSG-243.en.pdf.

OAS Secretary General Almagro issued a new report to the Permanent Council in March 2017,
which called on the Venezuelan government to undertake a series of measures to resume the
constitutional order, including holding general elections without delay, or face a possible
suspension from the OAS.185 It concluded by calling on OAS member states to apply Article 21 of
the Inter-American Democratic Charter to suspend Venezuela from the organization if the
Venezuelan government failed to address the report recommendations positively within 30 days.
An affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
member states (23) in a special session of the Article 20 of the Inter-American
General Assembly would be necessary to Democratic Charter (IADC)
suspend Venezuela from the organization. Article 20 of the IADC reads as follows:
In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of
Although a suspension would demonstrate the constitutional regime that seriously impairs
Venezuela’s diplomatic isolation, it is unclear the democratic order in a member state, any
whether such a move would affect the Maduro member state or the Secretary General may
government’s policies. President Maduro has request the immediate convocation of the
Permanent Council to undertake a collective
instructed his foreign minister to begin the assessment of the situation and to take such
process for Venezuela to withdraw from the decisions as it deems appropriate.
OAS in protest of the organization’s recent The Permanent Council, depending on the
actions, marking the first time in the situation, may undertake the necessary diplomatic
organization’s history that a country has initiatives, including good offices, to foster the
sought to quit.186 The withdrawal process, restoration of democracy.
which takes two years, would require If such diplomatic initiatives prove unsuccessful, or
if the urgency of the situation so warrants, the
Venezuela to pay $8.8 million in back dues to Permanent Council shall immediately convene a
the OAS.187 Venezuela could lose access to special session of the General Assembly. The
other inter-American organizations such as the General Assembly will adopt the decisions it
Pan American Health Organization, the deems appropriate, including the undertaking of
regional arm of the WHO. diplomatic initiatives, in accordance with the
Charter of the Organization, international law,
Despite the deteriorating situation in and the provisions of this Democratic Charter.
Venezuela, a number of countries have been The necessary diplomatic initiatives, including
reluctant to follow Almagro’s lead in calling good offices, to foster the restoration of
democracy, will continue during the process.
for the Venezuelan government to take certain
steps to improve the human rights situation
and restore democratic institutions. During the OAS General Assembly meeting in June 2017, 20
countries voted in favor of adopting a resolution (introduced by Peru and backed by the United
States) to press the Venezuelan government to take concrete actions, but the measure failed
because it needed 23 votes. Among other countries, six voted no (Bolivia, Dominica, Nicaragua,
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela) and eight countries abstained
(Antigua and Barbuda, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Haiti, Suriname,
and Trinidad and Tobago).
In the absence of consensus within the General Assembly, Secretary General Almagro has
continued to speak out against actions taken by the Maduro government.188 He issued a report in
185
OAS, “Secretary General Presents Updated Report on Venezuela to the Permanent Council,” press release (contains
link to the full report), March 14, 2017, at http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-014/17.
186
Michael Shifter, “Venezuela’s Bad Neighbor Policy: Why It Quit the OAS,” Foreign Affairs, May 5, 2017.
187
Eurasia Group, “Venezuela- Preemptive Breakup with the OAS Will Not Diminish International Pressure,” April
27, 2017.
188
See, for example, Testimony of OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy,
(continued...)

July 2017 describing abuses committed by the government against protesters earlier this year and
another in September denouncing the consolidation of Venezuela’s “dictatorial regime” with the
formation of the Constituent Assembly.189 In addition, the Secretary General is leading a process
to analyze whether the Maduro government’s abuses against its citizens constitute crimes against
humanity and therefore merit a referral to the International Criminal Court.190 While some
observers have praised Secretary General Almagro’s outspoken activism on Venezuela, others
have asserted that he and the OAS are unlikely to be trusted by anyone in the Maduro government
as a mediator that could help resolve the current crisis.191
Outlook
For some time, analysts have debated how long President Maduro can retain his grip on power
and how best to help hasten a return to electoral democracy in the country. Despite sustained
protests, opposition from within the PSUV earlier this year, a deepening economic crisis, and
increasing international isolation, Maduro has consolidated control in Venezuela since the
establishment of the National Constituent Assembly. Gubernatorial elections held in mid-October
2017 resulted in a lopsided victory for his party that, although likely fraudulent, was eventually
accepted by part of the opposition.192
As 2017 draws to a close, the opposition appears weak and divided. Some opposition figures
criticized the MUD’s decision to participate in the October elections that were rigged in the
government’s favor. One of those critics, Maria Corina Machado, a former legislator, has split
from the MUD to form her own movement with the exiled former mayor of Caracas, Antonio
Ledezma.193 Other MUD leaders criticized the four Democratic Action (AD) governors’ decision
to take their oaths of office by swearing in front of the ANC rather than the National Assembly.
The MUD coalition also split over whether or not to participate in the December 10, 2017,
municipal elections, with two parties fielding candidates and others boycotting. At a more macro
level, the opposition cannot agree on whether to continue engaging in dialogue with the Maduro
government in order to try to secure some guarantees regarding when and how the 2018
presidential elections will be carried out. Some parties may be frozen out of the process as a result
of their decision not to participate in the municipal contests.194
(...continued)
Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues, The Collapse of the Rule of Law in Venezuela: What the United States and
the International Community Can Do to Restore Democracy, 115th Cong., 1st sess., July 19, 2017.
189
OAS, Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Situation in Venezuela, July 19, 2017, at
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/TERCER-INFORME-VENEZUELA-ENGLISH-Final-signed.pdf; and OAS,
“Denunciation of a Dictatorial Regime’s Consolidation in Venezuela: Presented by Secretary General Luis Almagro to
the Permanent Council,” September 25, 2017, at http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/OSG-445-CUARTO-
INFORME-venezuela-English.pdf.
190
OAS, “Fact Sheet: Process to Analyze Whether the Situation in Venezuela Merits Referral to the International
Criminal Court,” September 13, 2017.
191
D. Smilde et al., “Is the OAS Playing a Constructive Role on Venezuela? What Should It Be Doing Differently?—
Dialogue,” Portside, June 1, 2017.
192
Andrew Cawthorne and Andreina Aponte, “Venezuela Governors Sworn In, Showing Opposition Disunity,”
Reuters, October 23, 2017, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics/venezuela-governors-sworn-in-
showing-opposition-disunity-idUSKBN1CS2R3.
193
“Venezuela’s Opposition Divided Over Election Result,” Latin News Daily, October 18, 2017.
194
Laignee Barron, “Venezuela’s Maduro Has Disqualified His Opposition From the Next Presidential Election,” Time,
December 11, 2017.

In recent months, President Maduro has been going after his political rivals within the regime
(such as recently ousted U.N. Ambassador Rafael Ramirez), while also increasing military control
over the economy. With many members of the military benefiting from corruption and some
leaders facing potential charges in the United States for drug trafficking and other crimes, the
costs of defying Maduro could be significant. As the military takes increasing control over
PdVSA and other sectors of the economy, its loyalty to Maduro is likely to further strengthen.
Polls are now predicting that Maduro could win reelection in 2018.195
For now, many analysts predict that economic problems, including the possibility of a messy
default, may be the most likely factor that could lead to Maduro leaving office.196 While U.S.
sanctions may hasten that process, increased support from Russia and/or China could potentially
help Maduro stay afloat, at least for the time being. Both the Venezuelan government and PdVSA
are already in technical default on some bond repayments. Restructuring those or other external
debt could be extremely complex.
In addition to concerns about democracy and human rights, the U.S. government and the
international community are increasingly concerned by the profound economic and social crises
that the Venezuelan people are experiencing. Many observers contend that the road to economic
recovery will take several years, no matter who is in power. The IMF has estimated that an
international financial assistance package for Venezuela could cost more than $30 billion a year.
However, discussion about an IMF program is still speculative.197 The Maduro regime has
essentially cut off relations with the IMF, and many analysts believe that an IMF program would
proceed only under a new government in Venezuela.
Congress faces appropriations decisions regarding the level of democracy and human rights
assistance available to civil society and opposition groups in Venezuela. Some Members of
Congress have called for that aid to be increased. Congress also may consider authorizing
humanitarian aid to Venezuela and neighboring countries, such as Colombia, where Venezuelans
have migrated as a result of hardship, violence, and/or political persecution, either bilaterally or
through multilateral or nongovernmental channels.
195
Jim Wyss, “Poll Gives Venezuela’s Maduro Clear Lead Ahead of 2018 Presidential Race,” Miami Herald,
December 5, 2017; “Buoyed by Mayoral Votes, Venezuela Socialists Eye Presidency Race,” Reuters, December 11,
2017.
196
Anthony Faiola and Rachelle Krygier, “In Venezuela, the Economy May Yet Do What the Opposition Couldn’t,”
Washington Post, August 11, 2017.
197
John Paul Rathbone and Shawn Donnan, “IMF Crunches the Numbers for Possible Venezuela Rescue,” Financial
Times, October 16, 2017.

Appendix A. Legislative Initiatives

P.L. 115-31 (H.R. 244). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017. Introduced January 4, 2017, as
the Honoring Investments in Recruiting and Employing American Military Veterans Act of 2017;
subsequently, the bill became the vehicle for the FY2017 appropriations measure known as the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017. House agreed to Senate amendments (309-118) May 3,
2017; Senate agreed to House amendment to Senate amendments (79-18) May 4, 2017. President
signed into law May 5, 2017. The explanatory statement accompanying the law recommends
providing $7 million in democracy and human rights assistance to Venezuelan civil society.
S. 1018 (Cardin)/H.R. 2658 (Engel). Venezuela Humanitarian Assistance and Defense of
Democratic Governance Act of 2017. S. 1018 was introduced May 3, 2017; referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations. H.R. 2658 was introduced May 25, 2017; amended and
reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee September 28, 2017; approved by the
House on December 5, 2017. Both bills would
 direct the State Department and USAID to deliver a strategy within 90 days of
the enactment of the act on how they will work through NGOs in Venezuela or in
neighboring countries to channel basic medical supplies and services, food and
nutritional supplements, and related technical assistance needed to assist the
Venezuelan people;
 support OAS efforts to invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter;
 secure a Presidential Statement from the United Nations urging the Government
of Venezuela to allow the delivery of humanitarian relief;
 require a report by the Secretary of State, acting through the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, on Venezuelan officials involved in grand corruption,
and encourage the imposition of sanctions on those individuals;
 amend P.L. 113-278 to broaden the activities for which Venezuelans can be
sanctioned to include engaging in undemocratic practices or public corruption,
extend the date for imposing sanctions through 2022, and urge the Administration
to encourage other countries to sanction those individuals; and
 express the sense of the Senate and House that the President should take all
necessary steps to prevent Rosneft from gaining control of U.S. energy
infrastructure.
In addition, S. 1018 would
 authorize $10 million in humanitarian assistance for Venezuela and would require
the Secretary of State to provide a strategy on how that assistance would be
provided;
 authorize $9.5 million for coordinated democracy and human rights assistance
after the Secretary of State submits a strategy on how the funds would be
implemented and would make $500,000 available to support any future OAS
electoral missions to the country; and
 prioritize continued U.S. support to Caribbean countries that have been
dependent on Venezuela for energy.
Rather than authorize funding, H.R. 2658 would

 require a strategy within 90 days on how U.S. assistance would be coordinated

with those of other donors;
 call on the United States to advocate and, if possible, support an OAS election
observation mission to Venezuela when it is appropriate; and
 require a report on other countries’ activities in Venezuela (Russia, China, Iran,
and Cuba) within 180 days of enactment.
H.R. 3354 (Calvert). Interior and Environment, Agriculture and Rural Development, Commerce,
Justice, Science, Financial Services and General Government, Homeland Security, Labor, Health
and Human Services, Education, State and Foreign Operations, Transportation, Housing and
Urban Development, Defense, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, Legislative Branch,
and Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2018. Introduced and reported out of the
House Appropriations Committee July 21, 2017. House approved September 14, 2017.
H.R. 2161 (Curbelo). Venezuelan Refugee Assistance Act. The bill would provide for the status
adjustment to permanent resident of qualifying Venezuelan nationals and the spouse, child, or
certain unmarried sons or daughters of such aliens. Introduced April 26, 2017; referred to House
Judiciary Committee.
H.R. 3362 (Rogers). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2018. H.Rept. 115-253 recommends providing $8 million in democracy and
human rights assistance to Venezuelan civil society. Introduced and reported out of the House
Appropriations Committee July 24, 2017. Incorporated into House Omnibus, H.R. 3354,
approved by the House September 14, 2017.
H.Res. 259 (DeSantis). The resolution would express concern about the multiple crises that
Venezuela is facing; urge the Venezuelan government to hold elections, release political prisoners,
and accept humanitarian aid; support OAS efforts, including a potential temporary suspension of
Venezuela from the organization if the government does not convene elections and release
political prisoners in a timely manner; and encourage President Trump to prioritize resolving the
crisis in Venezuela, including through the use of targeted sanctions. Introduced April 6, 2017;
reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee July 27, 2017, approved by the House
December 5, 2017.
S.Res. 35 (Cardin). The resolution expresses support for a dialogue that leads to respect for
Venezuela’s constitutional mechanisms and a resolution to the multiple crises the country faces,
as well as for OAS efforts to invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The resolution urges
full U.S. support for OAS efforts and calls for U.S. agencies to hold Venezuelan officials
accountable for violations of U.S. law and international human rights standards. Introduced
February 1, 2017. Agreed to in the Senate February 28, 2017.

Appendix B. OAS Action on Venezuela: 2016-2017

On May 31, 2016, Secretary General Almagro invoked the Inter-American Democratic Charter—
a collective commitment to promote and defend democracy—when he called (pursuant to Article
20) on the OAS Permanent Council to convene an urgent session on Venezuela to decide whether
“to undertake the necessary diplomatic efforts to promote the normalization of the situation and
restore democratic institutions.”198 Secretary-General Almagro issued an extensive report on the
political and economic situation in Venezuela, concluding that there are “serious disruptions of
the democratic order” in the country.199 The Permanent Council met on June 23, 2016, to receive
the report but did not take any further action.
A group of 15 OAS member states issued two statements (in June and August 2016) supporting
dialogue efforts but also urging the Venezuelan government to allow the recall referendum
process to proceed.200 On November 16, 2016, the OAS Permanent Council adopted a declaration
that encouraged the Maduro government and the MUD opposition coalition “to achieve concrete
results within a reasonable timeframe” and asserted the need for the constitutional authorities and
all actors to “act with prudence and avoid any action of violence or threats to the ongoing
process.”201 There were not enough votes in the Permanent Council to take any further action.
As dialogue efforts failed to improve the increasingly dire political or economic situation in the
country, by early 2017 many observers were contending that the Maduro government had used
such efforts as a delaying tactic. As a result, OAS Secretary General Almagro, in a new report to
the Permanent Council issued March 14, 2017, called on the Venezuelan government to undertake
a series of measures to resume the constitutional order, including holding general elections
without delay, or face a possible suspension from the OAS.202 Secretary-General Almagro also
has continued to speak out against repression in Venezuela.203
Secretary General Almagro’s March 14, 2017, report concluded that “repeated attempts at
dialogue have failed” and that “Venezuela is in violation of every article in the Inter-American
Democratic Charter.”204 The report referred to the Venezuelan government as a “dictatorial
regime” and stated that the country has “spiraled down into an unrestrained authoritarianism.” It
included four major recommendations for the Venezuelan government:
1. Convene general elections without delay that satisfy international observation
standards.
198
OAS, “Secretary General Invoked Democratic Charter and Convened Permanent Council on Venezuela,” May 31,
2016.
199
OAS, Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Situation in Venezuela, May 30, 2016, at
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/OSG-243.en.pdf.
200
Those countries included Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay. OAS, “Statement by Ministers and Heads of
Delegation on the Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,” June 15, 2016; U.S. Department of State, “Joint
Statement on Recent Developments in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,” August 11, 2016.
201
OAS, “Declaration of the Permanent Council Supporting the National Dialogue in the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela,” November 16, 2016.
202
203
OAS, “OAS Secretary General Calls on Venezuelan Regime to Immediately Halt Repression,” press release, E-
029/17, April 7, 2017.
204

2. Immediately release all political prisoners.

3. Immediately establish a channel to provide humanitarian assistance to the
Venezuelan people.
4. Return the government to constitutional order with full respect for the separation
of powers (which would require the restoration of authorities to the National
Assembly and the democratic selection of the CNE and the Supreme Court).
The report concluded by calling on OAS member states to apply Article 21 of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter to suspend Venezuela from the organization if the Venezuelan government
fails to address the report recommendations positively within 30 days. An affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the member states (23) in a special session of the General Assembly would be
necessary to suspend Venezuela from the organization.
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s March 2017 action, the Permanent Council met in a
special meeting called by 20 OAS members on April 3, 2017, and approved a resolution by
consensus expressing “grave concern regarding the unconstitutional alteration of the democratic
order” in Venezuela.205 The resolution urged the Venezuelan government “to safeguard the
separation and independence of powers and restore full constitutional authority to the National
Assembly.”206 The body also resolved to undertake additional diplomatic initiatives as needed “to
foster the restoration of the democratic institutional system.”207
On April 26, 2017, the OAS Permanent Council voted to convene a meeting of the region’s
ministers of foreign affairs to discuss the situation in Venezuela. Nineteen countries voted in favor
of convening the meeting.208 However, some countries objected to potential statements or actions
(such as a temporary suspension from the OAS) opposed by the Venezuelan government based on
the organization’s principles of nonintervention and respect for national sovereignty. 209
On May 31, 2017, the OAS convened a meeting of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs to
discuss the situation in Venezuela. After much debate, the foreign ministers failed to approve a
resolution to address the crisis.210 Some countries supported a draft resolution put forth by
Canada, Panama, Peru, Mexico, and the United States, which called upon the Venezuelan
government and the opposition to take a series of steps but also offered humanitarian assistance
and willingness to create a “group or other mechanism of facilitation to support a new process of
dialogue and negotiation.”211 That draft resolution called upon the government to stop the
205
OAS, “OAS Permanent Council Adopts Resolution on Recent Events in Venezuela,” press release, E-022/17, April
3, 2017.
206
Ibid.
207
Ibid.
208
Those countries include Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the
United States, Honduras, Jamaica, Guatemala, Guyana, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, and Uruguay.
OAS, “OAS Permanent Council Agrees to Convene a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to
Consider the Situation in Venezuela,” press release, E-035/17, April 26, 2017.
209
Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Dominica, Ecuador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname, and Venezuela voted against the resolution. Belize, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and
Trinidad and Tobago abstained. Grenada was absent from the meeting.
210
For analysis and links to the draft resolutions, see Geoff Ramsey and David Smilde, “OAS Foreign Ministers’
Meeting Reveals Persistent Differences in How to Address Venezuela’s Crisis,” blog hosted by WOLA, May 31, 2017.
211
The draft resolution by Peru et al., called on all parties to cease all violence and to respect the rule of law and human
rights. Permanent Missions of Peru, Canada, United States, Mexico, and Panama to the OAS, Draft Declaration on the
Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to be considered at the OAS, Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, May 31, 2017.

constituent assembly process as it is currently conceived, cease arbitrary detentions and the use of
military tribunals for civilians, and fulfill the commitments made during the 2016 dialogue
process (namely, respect the separation of powers, release political prisoners, and establish an
electoral calendar with international observers). Other countries supported a resolution offered by
CARICOM calling for dialogue and the creation of an external “group or other mechanism” to
support dialogue between the government and the opposition without the specific preconditions
on the government included in the other draft resolution.212 OAS member states were unable to
reach consensus on either of the draft resolutions.
Foreign ministers reconvened during the OAS General Assembly held in Mexico on June 19-21,
2017. At those meetings, 20 countries voted in favor of adopting the aforementioned resolution
put forth by Peru (and backed by the United States) on Venezuela, 6 countries voted no, and 8
abstained from voting.213 The foreign ministers could reconvene to continue that meeting at any
time. For any resolution, up to and including the sanction of the expulsion of Venezuela from the
organization, to pass the meeting of ministers, it would need 23 votes.
212
The draft resolution by CARICOM called on all parties to cease violence; develop plans to restore peace and
stability; respect human rights and the rule of law; engage in a renewed dialogue and negotiation leading to a
comprehensive political agreement with established timetables, concrete actions, and guarantees; and for the
government to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the OAS. Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Draft
Declaration on the Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to be considered at the OAS, Meeting of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, May 31, 2017.
213
Andrés Cañizález, “We Only Need Three Votes: Venezuela and the OAS,” Latin American Goes Global, June 27,
2017. Six countries voted against the U.S.-backed resolution: Venezuela (absent), Bolivia, Dominica, Nicaragua, St.
Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Eight others abstained: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominican
Republic, Haiti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Appendix C. Online Human Rights Reporting on

Venezuela
Table C-1. Online Human Rights Reporting on Venezuela
Organization Document/Link
Amnesty International Human Rights in Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,

https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/
venezuela/
Committee to Protect Journalists http://www.cpj.org/americas/venezuela/
Foro Penal Venezolano http://foropenal.com/
Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/en/americas/venezuela
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights http://www.cidh.oas.org/DefaultE.htm;

(IACHR) Annual Report of the IACHR 2016, May 2017, chapter IV
includes a section on Venezuela, http://www.oas.org/en/
iachr/docs/annual/2016/TOC.asp
Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en http://www.derechos.org.ve/
Derechos Humanos (PROVEA)
Reporters Without Borders https://rsf.org/en/venezuela
U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/
index.htm?year=2016&dlid=265622
Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights Blog hosted by the Washington Office on Latin America,
http://venezuelablog.tumblr.com/
Source: Congressional Research Service.
Author Contact Information
Clare Ribando Seelke Rebecca M. Nelson

Specialist in Latin American Affairs Specialist in International Trade and Finance
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229 rnelson@crs.loc.gov, 7-6819
Acknowledgments
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, contributed to this report.

CRS Venezuela

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CRS Venezuela

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

CRS Venezuela

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Venezuela: Background and U.S.

Clare Ribando Seelke

December 11, 2017

Congressional Research Service

Congressional Research Service

Congressional Research Service

Table C-1. Online Human Rights Reporting on Venezuela ........................................................... 42

Congressional Research Service

Congressional Research Service

Congressional Research Service 1

Congressional Research Service 2

Figure 1. Political Map of Venezuela

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS).

Congressional Research Service 3

Congressional Research Service 4

Congressional Research Service 5

Canceled Recall Referendum and Failed Dialogue Efforts in 2016

Congressional Research Service 6

Repression of Dissent amid Protests

Congressional Research Service 7

Despite Opposition, Constituent Assembly Elected

Congressional Research Service 8

Congressional Research Service 9

Maduro Reconsolidating Power After Regional and Municipal Elections

Congressional Research Service 10

Cuba, PetroCaribe, and the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA)

Congressional Research Service 11

South America and the Lima Declaration

Congressional Research Service 12

China and Russia

Congressional Research Service 13

Economic Mismanagement During the Oil Boom

Congressional Research Service 14

Oil Price Crash and Subsequent Economic Crisis

Congressional Research Service 15

Figure 2.Venezuela: Economic Contraction and Inflation

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2017.

Congressional Research Service 16

Default and Debt Restructuring

Congressional Research Service 17

Congressional Research Service 18

Congressional Research Service 19

Crime and Violence

Congressional Research Service 20

Congressional Research Service 21

Congressional Research Service 22

Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic Actions, Human

Congressional Research Service 23

In March 2015, President Obama issued

Congressional Research Service 24

 On August 9, 8 high-ranking Venezuelan officials.

Sanctions Restricting Venezuela’s Access to U.S. Financial Markets

Congressional Research Service 25

Counternarcotics and Money-Laundering Issues

Congressional Research Service 26

Congressional Research Service 27

Congressional Research Service 28

Energy Sector Concerns

Developments in Venezuela’s Energy Sector