Case title// same ruling with other What was asked by Atty.

y. Pague What was cited in the Book Relevant Rulings

cases (GCF)

G.R. No. 102998 July 5, 1996 Nature of replevin: Replevin, broadly understood, is the court cannot render any judgment
both a form of principal remedy binding on the defendants spouses
Replevin, broadly understood, is and of a provisional relief. It may for having allegedly violated the terms
BA FINANCE both a form of principal remedy refer either to the action itself, and conditions of the promissory note
CORPORATION, petitioner, and the contract of chattel mortgage
and of a provisional relief. It may i.e., to regain the possession of
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and on the ground that the court has no
refer either to the action itself, personal chattels being jurisdiction over their persons, no
ROBERTO M. REYES, respondents.
i.e., to regain the possession of wrongfully detained from the summons having been served on
personal chattels being plaintiff by another, or to the them. Consequently, because the
wrongfully detained from the provisional remedy that would principal debtors were not brought
plaintiff by another, or to the allow the plaintiff to retain the before the jurisdiction of the court for
provisional remedy that would thing during the pendency of the failure to serve summons, there can
allow the plaintiff to retain the action and hold it pendente lite. be no cause of action against Reyes
thing during the pendency of the The action is primarily who is merely an ancillary debtor.
action and hold it pendente lite. possessory in nature and
AN ADVERSE POSSESSOR, WHO IS
The action is primarily possessory generally determines nothing
NOT THE MORTGAGOR, CANNOT
in nature and generally more than the right of JUST BE DEPRIVED OF HIS
determines nothing more than possession. POSSESSION, LET ALONE BE
the right of possession. BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THE
The applicant need not be the CHATTEL MORTGAGE CONTRACT,
owner of the property. It is SIMPLY BECAUSE THE MORTGAGEE
enough that he has right to its BRINGS UP AN ACTION FOR
possession. REPLEVIN.

GENERAL RULE: The person in

possession of the property sought
to be replevied is ordinarily the
proper and only necessary party
defendant, and the plaintiff is not
required to so join as defendants
other persons claiming a right on
the property but not in possession
thereof. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court
allows an application for the
immediate possession of the property
but the plaintiff must show that he has
 a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title
thereto, for seeking
such interim possession.

XPN: In case the right of possession

on the part of the plaintiff, or his
authority to claim such possession or
that of his principal, is put to great
doubt (a contending party might
contest the legal bases for plaintiff's
cause of action or an adverse and
independent claim of ownership or
right of possession is raised by that
party), it could become essential to
have other persons involved and
accordingly impleaded for a complete
determination and resolution of the
controversy

G.R. No. 79021 May 17, 1993 Will replevin lie in a property in Replevin is not available when 1. It is a basic tenet of civil
custodial legis? NO. the the property is under procedure that replevin will
custodia legis, under attachment not lie for property
ROMEO S. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE It is a basic tenet of civil or seized pursuant to law. The in custodia legis. A thing is
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DENNIS in custodia legis when it is
procedure that replevin will not reason posited for this principle
CANOY AND ALEX DE shown that it has been and is
lie for property in custodia legis. is that if it were otherwise, there
LEON, respondents. subjected to the official
A thing is in custodia legis when it would be interference with the
custody of a judicial executive
is shown that it has been and is possession before the function of
officer in pursuance of his
subjected to the official custody the law had been performed as
execution of a legal writ. The
of a judicial executive officer in to the process under which the reason posited for this
pursuance of his execution of a property was taken principle is that if it was
legal writ. The reason posited for otherwise, there would be
this principle is that if it was we rule that where personal interference with the
otherwise, there would be property is seized under a search possession before the
interference with the possession warrant and there is reason to function of the law had been
before the function of the law believe that the seizure will not performed as to the process
anymore be followed by the filing under which the property was
had been performed as to the
of a criminal and there are taken. Thus, a defendant in an
process under which the conflicting claims over the seized execution or attachment cannot
property was taken. property, the proper remedy is the replevy goods in the possession
 filing of an action for replevin, or of an officer under a valid
an interpleader filed by the process, although after the levy
Government in the proper court, is discharged, an action to
not necessarily the same one which recover possession will lie.
issued the search warrant;
however, where there is still a
probability that the seizure will be
followed by the filing of a criminal
action, as in the case at bar where
the case for carnapping was
"dismissed provisionally, without
prejudice to its reopening once the
issue of ownership is resolved in
favor of complainant" (emphasis
supplied), or the criminal information
has actually been commenced, or
filed, and actually prosecuted, and
there are conflicting claims over the
property seized, the proper remedy is
to question the validity of the search
warrant in the same court which
issued it and not in any other branch
of the said court.

G.R. No. 86792 March 21, 1990 PURPOSE OF REPLEVIN BOND "the damages awarded by the trial
Same same same
court were based on Articles 19 and
A replevin bond is simply 20 of the New Civil Code and not on
SPOUSES MARINO AND LINA JOEL intended to indemnify the the deprivation of personal
SAPUGAY, petitioners, properties subject of the replevin
defendant against any loss that
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MOBIL bond. Moreover, no judgment was
he may suffer by being compelled entered for the return of the
PHILIPPINES, INC. AND RICARDO
CARDENAS, respondents.
to surrender the possession of properties subject of the replevin
the disputed property pending bond to the defendant, the latter
the trial of the action. He cannot never having raised the issue of
recover on the bond as for a rightful possession to the said
reconversion when he has failed properties."
to have the judgment entered for
the return of the property. Nor is A replevin bond is simply intended
to indemnify the defendant
 the surety liable for payment of against any loss that he may suffer
the judgment for damages by being compelled to surrender
rendered against the plaintiff on the possession of the disputed
a counterclaim or punitive property pending the trial of the
action. He cannot recover on the
damages for fraudulent or
bond as for a reconversion when
wrongful acts committed by the he has failed to have the judgment
plaintiffs and unconnected with entered for the return of the
the defendant's deprivation of property. Nor is the surety liable
possession by the plaintiff. for payment of the judgment for
Indeed, even where the damages rendered against the
judgment was that the defendant plaintiff on a counterclaim or
was entitled to the property, but punitive damages for fraudulent or
no order was made requiring the wrongful acts committed by the
plaintiff to return it or assessing plaintiffs and unconnected with
the defendant's deprivation of
damages in default of a return, it
possession by the plaintiff. Indeed,
was declared that until judgment even where the judgment was that
was entered that the property the defendant was entitled to the
should be restored, there could property, but no order was made
be no liability on the part of the requiring the plaintiff to return it
sureties. or assessing damages in default of
a return, it was declared that until
judgment was entered that the
property should be restored, there
could be no liability on the part of
the sureties.

A.M. NO. P-07-2384 June 18, 2008 WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE 5 Being an officer of the court, Andres
DAY LEEWAY? must be aware that there are well-
KENNETH HAO v. ABE ANDRES, defined steps provided in the Rules of
SHREFIFF IV, RTC 16, DAVAO CITY To give chance to the defendant Court regarding the proper
implementation of a writ
to object to the sufficiency of the
QUISUMBING: of replevin and/or an order of
bond or the surety or sureties seizure. The Rules, likewise, is explicit
thereon or require the return of on the duty of the sheriff in its
the property by filing a implementation. To recapitulate what
counterbond. should be common knowledge to
sheriffs, the pertinent provisions of
Rule 60, of the Rules of Court are
quoted hereunder:
SEC. 4. Duty of the sheriff.Upon
receiving such order, the sheriff must
serve a copy thereof on the adverse
party, together with a copy of the
application, affidavit and bond,
and must forthwith take the
property, if it be in the possession
of the adverse party, or his agent,
and retain it in his custody. If the
property or any part thereof be
concealed in a building or enclosure,
the sheriff must demand its delivery,
and if it be not delivered, he must
cause the building or enclosure to be
broken open and take the property
into his possession. After the sheriff
has taken possession of the
property as herein provided, he
must keep it in a secure place and
shall be responsible for its delivery
to the party entitled thereto upon
receiving his fees and necessary
expenses for taking and keeping
the same.(Emphasis supplied.)

SEC. 6. Disposition of property by

sheriff.If within five (5) days after the
taking of the property by the sheriff,
the adverse party does not object to
the sufficiency of the bond, or of the
surety or sureties thereon; or if the
adverse party so objects and the court
affirms its approval of the applicants
bond or approves a new bond, or if the
adverse party requires the return of the
property but his bond is objected to
and found insufficient and he does not
forthwith file an approved bond, the
 property shall be delivered to the
applicant. If for any reason the property
is not delivered to the applicant, the
sheriff must return it to the adverse
party. (Emphasis supplied.)

Here, Andres did not wait for 5

days.
G.R. No. 182963 June 3, 2013 Is prior demand a condition
prior demand is not a condition
precedent to an action for a writ
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON precedent to an action for a writ of
AGNER of replevin? NO. replevin, since there is nothing in
vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of
PERALTA prior demand is not a condition Court that requires the applicant to
precedent to an action for a writ make a demand on the possessor of
of replevin, since there is the property before an action for a
nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of writ of replevin could be filed.
the Rules of Court that requires
the applicant to make a demand
The remedies provided for in Art.
on the possessor of the property
1484 are alternative, not
before an action for a writ of
cumulative. The exercise of one
replevin could be filed. bars the exercise of the others. At
the same time, it prayed for the
issuance of a writ of replevin or the
delivery to it of the motor vehicle .

The trial court, therefore, rightfully

granted the alternative prayer for sum
of money, which is equivalent to the
remedy of "exacting fulfillment of the
obligation." Certainly, there is no
double recovery or unjust enrichment
to speak of.

. G.R. No. 195450 February 1, 2017 REQUISITIES FOR RECOVERY ON

Replevin case was properly
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE THE REPLEVIN BOND dismissed in this case
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
 vs. to recover damages on a
HON. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO, in his replevin bond (or on a bond for to recover damages on a replevin
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional preliminary attachment, bond (or on a bond for preliminary
Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City, injunction or receivership), it is attachment, injunction or
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE receivership), it is necessary
necessary
CORPORATION, DABAY ABAD, HATAB
ABAD, OMAR ABAS, HANAPI
(1) that the defendant-claimant
(1) that the defendant-claimant has
ABDULLAH, ROJEA AB ABDULLAH, has secured a favorable secured a favorable judgment in the
ABDULLAH ABEDIN, ALEX ABEDIN, et judgment in the main action, main action, meaning that the plaintiff
al., represented by their Attorney-in- meaning that the plaintiff has no has no cause of action and was not,
Fact, MR. MANUEL L. TE, Respondents cause of action and was not, therefore, entitled to the provisional
therefore, entitled to the remedy of replevin;
provisional remedy of replevin; (2) that the application for damages,
(2) that the application for showing claimant's right thereto and
damages, showing claimant's the amount thereof, be filed in the
right thereto and the amount same action before trial or before
appeal is perfected or before the
thereof, be filed in the same
judgment becomes executory;
action before trial or before (3) that due notice be given to the
appeal is perfected or before the other party and his surety or sureties,
judgment becomes executory; notice to the principal not being
(3) that due notice be given to sufficient; and
the other party and his surety or (4) that there should be a proper
sureties, notice to the principal hearing and the award for damages
not being sufficient; and should be included in the final
(4) that there should be a proper judgment.
hearing and the award for
damages should be included in
the final judgment.
G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018 WHAT HAPPENS IF THE MAIN Of all the provisional remedies
CASE IS DISMISSED? provided in the Rules of Court, only
MILAGROS P. ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner, v. Rule 60, Section 2 requires that the
THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE CO., Upon the dismissal of the replevin case amount of the bond be double the
INC., Respondent. for failure to prosecute, the writ of value of the property.
seizure, which is merely ancillary in There is a rationale to the
nature, became functus officio and
should have been lifted. There was no requirement that the bond for a writ
adjudication on the merits, which of seizure in a replevin be double the
means that there was no value of the property. The bond
determination of the issue who has the
better right to possess the subject car.
functions not only to indemnify the
 Advent ca mot therefore retain defendant in case the property is lost,
possession of the subject car
but also to answer for any damages
considering that it was not adjudged as
the prevailing party entitled to the that may be awarded by the court if
remedy of replevin. the judgment is rendered in
defendant's favor.
Contrary to Advent's view, Olympia
International Inc. v. Court of
Appeals applies to this case. The
dismissal of the replevin case for
failure to prosecute results in the
restoration of the parties' status prior
to litigation, as if no complaint was
filed at all. To let the writ of seizure
stand after the dismissal of the
complaint would be adjudging Advent
as the prevailing party, when precisely
no decision on the merits had been
rendered. Accordingly, the parties
must be reverted to their status quo
ante. Since Young possessed the
subject car before the filing of the
replevin case, the same must be
returned to him, as if no complaint was
filed at all.51

G.R. No. L-59906 October 23, 1982 IS THE ORDER FIXING THE The amount fixed in the order is only The order of fixing the amount of
AMOUNT OF SUPPORT FINAL? provisional. It is not final in character support pendente lite is not final in
BUENAVENTURA SAN NO. in the sense that it can be the subject character in the sense that it can
JUAN, petitioner, of modification, depending on the be the subject of modification,
vs. HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, changing conditions affecting the depending on the changing
Judge of the Court of First Instance of ability of the obligor to pay the conditions affecting the ability of
Rizal and DOROTEA amount fixed for support. the obligor to pay the amount
MEJIA, respondents. fixed for support.

April 24, 2012. WHAT IS WRIT OF AMPARO? In amparo actions, petitioners

G.R. Nos. 184379-80. must establish their claims by
The writ of amparo is an substantial evidence, and they cannot
Case # 1. RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, independent and summary remedy merely rely on the supposed failure of
JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO that provides rapid judicial relief to respondents to prove either their
LOZADA, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA protect the people’s right to life, defenses or their exercise of
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, EDUARDO liberty and security.62 Having been extraordinary diligence. In the present
ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL originally intended as a response case, the totality of the evidence
to the alarming cases of
adduced by petitioners failed to meet
extrajudicial killings and enforced
 ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER disappearances in the country, it the threshold of substantial evidence.
VALEROSO serves both preventive and Sifting through all the evidence and
SERENO, J: curative roles to address the said allegations presented, the crux of the
human rights violations. It is case boils down to assessing the
preventive in that it breaks the
veracity and credibility of the parties’
expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses, and diverging claims as to what actually
it is curative in that it facilitates the transpired on 5-6 February 2008.
subsequent punishment of Lozada was not illegally deprived of
perpetrators by inevitably leading his liberty from the point when he
to subsequent investigation and disembarked from the aircraft up to
action. the time he was led to the departure
area of the airport, as he voluntarily
submitted himself to the custody of
respondents.

The writ of amparo is confined only to

cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, or to
threats thereof. Considering that this
remedy is aimed at addressing these
serious violations of or threats to the
right to life, liberty and security, it
cannot be issued on amorphous and
uncertain grounds, or in cases where
the alleged threat has ceased and is
no longer imminent or continuing.
Instead, it must be granted judiciously
so as not to dilute the extraordinary
and remedial character of the writ,
thus: The privilege of the writ of
amparo is envisioned basically to
protect and guarantee the rights to
life, liberty, and security of persons,
free from fears and threats that vitiate
the quality of this life. It is an
extraordinary writ conceptualized and
adopted in light of and in response to
the prevalence of extra-legal killings
and enforced disappearances.
Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
 resorted to and granted judiciously,
lest the ideal sought by the Amparo
Rule be diluted and undermined by
the indiscriminate filing ofamparo
petitions for purposes less than the
desire to secure amparo reliefs and
protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations.

The writ of amparo is an independent

and summary remedy that provides
rapid judicial relief to protect the
people’s right to life, liberty and
security; It is preventive in that it
breaks the expectation of impunity in
the commission of these offenses, and
it is curative in that it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of
perpetrators by inevitably leading to
subsequent investigation and action.

G.R. No. 230324 ELEMENTS OF ENFORCED [ Nature of Writ of Amparo]

DISAPPEARANCE The protective writ of amparo is a
LORIE MARIE TOMAS CALLO vs. judicial remedy to expeditiously
COMMISSIONER JAIME H. MORENTE, Elements constituting enforced provide relief to violations of a
BUREAUS OF IMMIGRATION, OIC disappearance as defined under RA person's constitutional right to life,
ASSOCIATES COMMISSIONERS No. 9851 were clearly laid down by liberty, and security, and more
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and this Court: specifically, to address the problem
BRIAN ALAS, BUREAU OF a) that there be an arrest, of extralegal killings and enforced
IMMIGRATION disappearances or threats thereof.
detention, abduction or any
The writ shall cover extralegal
form of deprivation of liberty;
CARPIO, Acting C.J.: killings and enforced
b) that it be carried out by, or
disappearances or threats thereof.
with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, Elements constituting enforced
the State or a political disappearance as defined under RA
organization; No. 9851 were clearly laid down by
c) that it be followed by the this Court:
State or political
organization's refusal to
 acknowledge or give e) that there be an arrest,
information on the fate or detention, abduction or any
whereabouts of the person form of deprivation of liberty;
subject of the amparo f) that it be carried out by, or
petition; and with the authorization,
d) that the intention for such support or acquiescence of,
refusal is to remove subject the State or a political
person from the protection of organization;
the law for a prolonged g) that it be followed by the
period of time. State or political
organization's refusal to
acknowledge or give
information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo
petition; and
h) that the intention for such
refusal is to remove subject
person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged
period of time.

It is clear that the elements of

enforced disappearance are not
attendant in this case. There is also no
threat of such enforced
disappearance. While there is indeed
a detention carried out by the State
through the Bureau of Immigration,
the third and fourth elements are not
present. There is no refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of
freedom or refusal to give information
on the whereabouts of Parker because
as Callo admits, Parker is detained in
the Immigration Detention Facility of
the Bureau of Immigration.
 In Boac v. Cadapan, we emphasized
the importance of the exclusive and
successive order of who can file a
petition for a writ of amparo. Thus,
while "any person" may file a petition
for the writ of habeas corpus, in a
petition for the writ of amparo, the
order of priority on who can file the
petition should be strictly followed.

G.R. No. 140189. February 28, 2005]

In view of the retroactive
application of procedural laws,
GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
SERVICES CORPORATION (GSMSC),
of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
FERRY CASINOS LIMITED and PIONEER
No. 00-2-03 which took effect on
INSURANCE AND SURETY
September 1, 2000, is the governing
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
provision. It provides that when a
JENNIFER ANNE B. ACUA, HAYDEE
motion for reconsideration is
ANNE B. ACUA, MARITES T. CLARION,
timely filed, the 60-day period for
MARISSA C. ENRIQUEZ, GRACIELA M.
filing a petition for certiorari shall
TORRALBA and MARY PAMELA A.
be counted from notice of the
SANTIAGO, respondents.
denial of said motion. While
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: respondents motion for
reconsideration was filed 16 days
late, the NLRC nonetheless acted
thereon and denied it on the basis of
lack of merit. In resolving the merits of
the motion despite being filed out of
time, the NLRC undoubtedly
recognized that it is not strictly
bound by the technicalities of law
and procedure. Thus, the 60-day
period for filing of a petition
for certiorari should be reckoned
from the date of the receipt of the
resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, i.e., May 30, 1997,
and thus, the filing made on July
 18, 1997 was well within the 60-day
reglementary period.

As regards the verification signed

only by respondents counsel, this
procedural lapse could have
warranted the outright dismissal of
respondents petition
for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. However, it must be
remembered that the rules on
forum shopping, which were
precisely designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration
of justice, should not be interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective which is the
goal of all rules of procedure - that
is, to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.

Under normal
CRISOLOGO v JEWM AGRO-
circumstances, JEWM would be
INDUSTRIAL
correct in their averment that the
GR No 196894 lack of legal standing on the part of
March 3, 2013 Spouses Crisologo in the case
prevents the latter’s recourse via
Rule 65. However, is an exception.
In many instances, the Court has ruled
that technical rules of procedures
should be used to promote, not
frustrate the cause of justice. Rules of
procedure are tools designed not to
thwart but to facilitate the attainment
of justice; thus, their strict and rigid
application may, for good and
deserving reasons, have to give way
to, and be subordinated by, the need
 to aptly dispense substantial justice in
the normal cause.

Time and again, the Court has

ruled that the absence of an
indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but
even to those present. Consequently
then, the proceedings were null and
void including the assailed orders. To
turn a blind eye to the said nullity and,
in turn, rule as improper the recourse
to Rule 65 by the lack of legal standing
is to prolong the denial of due process
to the persons whose interests are
indispensible to the final disposition
of the case. It will only result in a
protracted litigation as Spouses
Crisologo will be forced to rely on a
petition for the annulment of
judgment before the CA (as the last
remaining remedy), which may again
reach this Court. To prevent
multiplicity of suits and to expedite
the swift administration of justice, the
CA should have applied liberality by
striking down the assailed orders
despite the lack of legal standing on
the part of Spouses Crisologo to file
the Rule 65 petition before it. Besides,
this lacking requirement, of which
Spouses Crisologo were not even at
fault, is precisely the reason why this
controversy arose

G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014 Does CTA have the authority to Also, in accordance with the liberal The CTA has jurisdiction over a
issue Petition for certiorari? spirit pervading the Rules of Court special civil action for certiorari
and in the interest of substantial assailing an interlocutory order
THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by justice, this Court has, before, issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS. a court may issue a writ of certiorari in treated a petition for certiorari as a In order for any appellate court to
LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said petition for review on certiorari, effectively exercise its appellate
the City Treasurer of Manila, court has jurisdiction to review, by particularly (1) if the petition for jurisdiction, it must have the
Petitioners, appeal or writ of error, the final orders certiorari was filed within the authority to issue, among others, a
vs. or decisions of the lower court. reglementary period within which writ of certiorari. In transferring
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in to file a petition for review on exclusive jurisdiction over appealed
her capacity as Presiding Judge of the certiorari; (2) when errors of tax cases to the CTA, it can
Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay judgment are averred; and (3) reasonably be assumed that the law
City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME when there is sufficient reason to intended to transfer also such
HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES justify the relaxation of the rules as power as is deemed necessary, if
CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE when there is a significant issue of not indispensable, in aid of such
HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; jurisdiction appellate jurisdiction. There is no
WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES, perceivable reason why the transfer
PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., should only be considered as
CORP.; SURPLUS MARKETING partial, not total.
CORPORATION and SIGNATURE LINES,
Respondents. Consistent with the above
pronouncement, the Court has held
PERALTA, J.: as early as the case of J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118
Phil. 1022 (1963)] that “if a case
may be appealed to a particular
court or judicial tribunal or body,
then said court or judicial tribunal
or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.”
This principle was affirmed in De
Jesus v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
101630, August 24, 1992) where the
Court stated that “a court may issue
a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction if said court
has jurisdiction to review, by appeal
or writ of error, the final orders or
decisions of the lower court.
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, A petition for certiorari filed by a In this case, the Rule 65 petition
2015 for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
city mayor before the CA in order
was filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in
to nullify the preventive order to nullify the preventive
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER
CAPACITY AS THE suspension order issued by the suspension order issued by the
OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF Ombudsman is in order because Ombudsman, an interlocutory
APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND the order of suspension is an order,148 hence, unappealable.149
JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY,
JR., Respondents.
interlocutor order, hence,
In several cases decided
unappealable. after Fabian, the Court has ruled that
DECISION Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against
unappelable issuances150 of the
PERLAS-BERNABE, J Ombudsman should be filed before the
CA, and not directly before this Court:

In Office of the Ombudsman v.

Capulong151 (March 12, 2014),
wherein a preventive suspension order
issued by the Office of the Ombudsman
was - similar to this case - assailed
through a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari filed by the public officer
before the CA, the Court held that
"[t]here being a finding of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman, it was certainly
imperative for the CA to grant
incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by
Section 1 of Rule 65."152

In Dagan v. Office of the

Ombudsman153 (November 19,
2013), involving a Rule 65 petition
for certiorariassailing a final and
unappealable order of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative case,
the Court remarked that "petitioner
employed the correct mode of review
in this case, i.e., a special civil action
for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals."154 In this relation, it stated
that while "a special civil action
for Certiorari is within the concurrent
original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals, such
petition should be initially filed with the
Court of Appeals in observance of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts."
Further, the Court upheld Barata v.
 Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001), wherein
it was ruled that the remedy against
final and unappealable orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case was a Rule 65
petition to the CA. The same verdict
was reached
in Ruivivar156(September 16, 2008).

Thus, with the unconstitutionality of

the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770, the Court, consistent with
existing jurisprudence, concludes that
the CA has subject matter jurisdiction
over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
petition
G.R. No. 180147, January 14, 2015 2nd exception: JUDICIAL The principle of judicial courtesy, x x x [t]he principle of judicial courtesy
COURTESY. What is judicial to justify the suspension of the to justify the suspension of the
SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, courtesy? proceedings before the lower proceedings before the lower court
INC., Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. court even without an injunctive even without an injunctive writ or
MACATLANG, ET AL.,1Respondents. writ or order from the higher order from the higher court. In that
court, may still apply “if there is a case, we pronounced that [d]ue
[G.R. NO. 180148] strong probability that the issues respect for the Supreme Court and
before the higher court would be practical and ethical considerations
ARIS PHILIPPINES, rendered moot and moribund as a should have prompted the appellate
INC., Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. result of the continuation of the court to wait for the final
MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents. proceedings in the lower court” determination of the petition [for
certiorari] before taking cognizance of
[G.R. NO. 180149] the case and trying to render moot
exactly what was before this [C]ourt.
SARA LEE We subsequently reiterated the
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. EMILINDA concept of judicial courtesy in Joy
D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents. Mart Consolidated Corp. v. Court of
Appeals.
[G.R. NO. 180150]
We, however, have qualified and
CESAR C. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. EMILINDA limited the application of judicial
D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents. courtesy in Go v.
Abrogar and Republic v.
[G.R. NO. 180319] Sandiganbayan. In these cases, we
expressly delimited the application of
FASHION ACCESSORIES PHILS., judicial courtesy to maintain the
INC., Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. efficacy of Section 7, Rule 65 of the
MACATLANG, ET AL.,Respondents. Rules of Court, and held that the
principle of judicial courtesy applies
[G.R. NO. 180685] only if there is a strong probability
that the issues before the higher court
EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET would be rendered moot and
AL., Petitioners, v. NLRC, ARIS moribund as a result of the
PHILIPPINES, INC., FASHION continuation of the proceedings in the
ACCESSORIES PHILS., INC., SARA LEE lower court. Through these cases, we
CORPORATION, SARA LEE clarified that the principle of judicial
PHILIPPINES, INC., COLLIN BEAL AND courtesy remains to be the exception
ATTY. CESAR C. CRUZ, Respondents. rather than the rule.7

RESOLUTION The Corporations argument is

specious. Judicial courtesy indeed
PEREZ, J.: applies if there is a strong
probability that the issues before
the higher court would be rendered
moot as a result of the continuation
of the proceedings in the lower
court. This is the exception
contemplated in the aforesaid
ruling and it obtains in this case.
The 19 December 2006 ruling of the
NLRC would moot the appeal filed
before the higher courts because
the issue involves the appeal bond
which is an indispensable
requirement to the perfection of
the appeal before the NLRC. Unless
this issue is resolved, the NLRC
should be precluded from ruling on
the merits on the case. This is the
essence of judicial courtesy.

G.R. No. 220598 Did the SC take cognizance of the The special civil action for certiorari is
petition for certiorari? Yes. generally not proper to assail such an
Invoked expanded power. interlocutory order issued by the trial
court because of the availability of
another remedy in the ordinary course
GLORIA MACAPAGAL of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119
ARROYO, Petitioner, of the Rules of Court expressly
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND provides that “the order denying the
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (First motion for leave of court to file
Division), Respondents demurrer to evidence or the demurrer
itself shall not be reviewable by
appeal or by certiorari before
judgment.” It is not an insuperable
obstacle to this action, however, that
the denial of the demurrers to
evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not
terminate the proceedings, and the
proper recourse of the demurring
accused was to go to trial, and that in
case of their conviction they may then
appeal the conviction, and assign the
denial as among the errors to be
reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that
the situations in which the writ
of certiorari may issue should not be
limited, because to do so “x x x would
be to destroy its comprehensiveness
and usefulness. So wide is the
discretion of the court that authority
is not wanting to show
that certiorari is more discretionary
than either prohibition or mandamus.
In the exercise of our superintending
control over other courts, we are to be
guided by all the circumstances of
each particular case ‘as the ends of
justice may require.’ So it is that the
writ will be granted where necessary
to prevent a substantial wrong or to
do substantial justice.”

The exercise of this power to

correct grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
 jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government
cannot be thwarted by rules of
procedure to the contrary or for the
sake of the convenience of one side.
This is because the Court has the
bounden constitutional duty to strike
down grave abuse of discretion
whenever and wherever it is
committed. Thus, notwithstanding
the interlocutory character and
effect of the denial of the
demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could
avail themselves of the remedy
of certiorari when the denial was
tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

G.R. No. 231658 July 4, 2017 What is any appropriate During the oral argument, the
proceeding petitioners theorized that the
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, jurisdiction of this Court under the
et al., Petitioners To conclude that the "appropriate third paragraph of Section 18, Article
vs. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, et proceeding" refers to a Petition for VII is sui generis. 87 It is a special and
al, Respondents Certiorari filed under the expanded specific jurisdiction of the Supreme
jurisdiction of this Court would, Court different from those
DEL CASTILLO, J.: therefore, contradict the clear enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of
intention of the framers of the Article VIII.
Constitution to place additional It is settled that jurisdiction over the
safeguards against possible martial subject matter is conferred only by the
law abuse for, invariably, the third Constitution or by the law. 89 Unless
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII jurisdiction has been specifically
would be subsumed under Section 1 of conferred by the Constitution or by
Article VIII. In other words, the framers some legislative act, no body or
of the Constitution added the tribunal has the power to act or pass
safeguard under the third paragraph upon a matter brought before it for
of Section 18, Article VII on top of the resolution. It is likewise settled that in
expanded jurisdiction of this Court. the absence of a clear legislative
The jurisdiction of this Court is not intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied
restricted to those enumerated in from the language of the Constitution
Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. For or a statute.90 It must appear clearly
instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole from the law or it will not be held to
judge of all contests relating to the exist.91
election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President can A plain reading of the afore-quoted
be found in the last paragraph of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it
Section 4, Article VII.102 The power of specifically grants authority to the
the Court to review on certiorari the Court to determine the sufficiency of
decision, order, or ruling of the the factual basis of the proclamation
Commission on Elections and of martial law or suspension of the
Commission on Audit can be found in privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Section 7, Article IX(A).
The standard of review in a petition for
The unique features of the third certiorari is whether the respondent
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII has committed any grave abuse of
clearly indicate that it should be discretion amounting to lack or excess
treated as sui generis separate and of jurisdiction in the performance of his
different from those enumerated in or her functions. Thus, it is not the
Article VIII. Under the third paragraph proper tool to review the sufficiency of
of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed the factual basis of the proclamation or
pursuant therewith will follow a suspension.
different rule on standing as any
citizen may file it. Said provision of the Section 18, Article VII is meant to
Constitution also limits the issue to the provide additional safeguard against
sufficiency of the factual basis of the possible abuse by the President in the
exercise by the Chief Executive of his exercise of his power to declare
emergency powers. The usual period martial law or suspend the privilege of
for filing pleadings in Petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling
Certiorari is likewise not applicable from the aftermath of the Marcos
under the third paragraph of Section martial law, the framers of the
18, Article VII considering the limited Constitution deemed it wise to insert
period within which this Court has to the now third paragraph of Section 18
promulgate its decision. of Article VII.
In fine, the phrase "in an
appropriate proceeding" appearing To give more teeth to this additional
on the third paragraph of Section safeguard, the framers of the 1987
18, Article VII refers to any action Constitution not only placed the
initiated by a citizen for the President's proclamation of martial
purpose of questioning the law or suspension of the privilege of
sufficiency of the factual basis of the writ of habeas corpus within the
the exercise of the Chief Executive's ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed
emergency powers, as in these the rule on standing by allowing any
cases. It could be denominated as a citizen to question before this Court
complaint, a petition, or a matter to the sufficiency of the factual basis of
be resolved by the Court. such proclamation or suspension.
Moreover, the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII veritably
conferred upon any citizen a
demandable right to challenge the
sufficiency of the factual basis of said
proclamation or suspension. It further
designated this Court as the reviewing
tribunal to examine, in an appropriate
proceeding, the sufficiency of the
factual basis , and to render its
decision thereon within a limited
period of 30 days from date of filing
The most important objective,
however, of Section 18, Article VII is
the curtailment of the extent of the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
This is the primary reason why the
provision was not placed in Article VIII
or the Judicial Department but
remained under Article VII or the
Executive Department.

While traditional powers

inherent in the office of the
President are granted,
nonetheless for the first time,
there are specific provisions
which curtail the extent of
such powers. Most significant
is the power of the Chief
Executive to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or proclaim martial
law.