“[D]eceit is obvious not only from the fact that respondents have represented a fictitious car rental

business to complainants but also from the deliberate concealment of their business’ lack of
sufficient assets or paid-up capital… no shred of evidence has been presented by the respondents to
prove financial capability from the onset to fully comply with their supposed guaranteed returns for
the investments.”

In the case of ROSITA SY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183879, April 14, 2010 discussed
the ways of committing the felony of estafa, thus:

"X x x.

The sole issue for resolution is whether Sy should be held liable for estafa, penalized under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Swindling or estafa is punishable under Article 315 of the RPC. There are three ways of committing
estafa, viz.: (1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means. The three ways of committing estafa may be
reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of deceit.

The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an accused defrauded another by abuse
of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused the offended party or third person.

The act complained of in the instant case is penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC,
wherein estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud another by false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. It is
committed by using fictitious name, or by pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that there must be a false
pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation
was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the
offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to
part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.

Thus, the Court held that the president used false pretenses when it sold membership shares to the
public when it was not duly authorized to do so for failure to secure a license and registration from
SEC. It also clarified that unlike estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), estafa under paragraph 2(a)
“does not require as an element of the crime proof that the accused misappropriated or converted
the swindled money or property. All that is required is proof of pecuniary damage sustained by the
complainant arising from his reliance on the fraudulent representation.”

The Court also added that the “registration requirement under BP 178 applies to all sales of securities
‘includ[ing] every contract of sale or disposition of a security,’ regardless of the stage of
development of the project on which the securities are based. No amount of ‘ industry practice’
works to amend these provisions on presale registration”

The gravamen of the offenses charged in all the afore-mentioned cases is the employment of fraud
or deceit to the damage or prejudice of another. As defined in Balasa:

Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is
taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can
device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false
suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any
unfair way by which another is cheated. On the other hand, deceit is the false representation of a
matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of
that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he
shall act upon it to his legal Injury.34

The elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315 (2 )(a) of the RPC are the following: (a)
that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false
pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage.22

In addition, fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive,
including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or
confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another.23 It is a generic term embracing all multifarious
means which human ingenuity can devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an
advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise,
trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated.24 On the other hand,
deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives
or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.25
Estafa by Means of Deceit

Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code penalizes fraud or deceit when committed as follows:

xxxx

2. by means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud:

(a) by using fictitious name, or actions, falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualification,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

"The elements of the crime of estafa under the foregoing provision are: (1) there must be a false
pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3)
the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means and
was thus induced to part with his money or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage."13

Petitioners presented themselves to Lourdes as persons possessing the authority and capacity to
engage in the financing of used vehicles in behalf of Final Access Marketing. This was a clear
misrepresentation considering their previous knowledge not only of Erlinda’s complaint but also of
several others as regards the failure of Final Access Marketing to deliver the motor vehicles bought.
Lourdes relied on their misrepresentations and parted with her money. Almost a week passed by,
but petitioners and Rule did not deliver the said motor vehicle. They also did not fulfill their
subsequent promise to provide a replacement or to refund her payment. When Lourdes visited the
office of Final Access Marketing to demand the return of her money, it was already closed. She could
not locate any of them except for Franco who denied any wrongdoing. Consequently, she suffered
damage.

If indeed they were innocent as they claimed to be, Erlinda’s complaint to petitioners and the 12
other similar complaints with "Hoy Gising" regarding undelivered vehicles should have dissuaded
petitioners from further soliciting customers. The fact that they continued to offer for sale a second-
hand car to Lourdes is indicative of deceit and their complicity in the conspiracy to commit estafa.
The manner in which petitioners transacted business with Erlinda and Lourdes as well as their
awareness of 12 other similar complaints with "Hoy Gising" were sufficient to establish the existence
of a modus operandi.

G.R. No. 159280 May 18, 2004

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a
Decision1 by the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 21, 2003 affirming with modification the Decision2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 34, finding petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. and co-
accused Elison Villaflor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of
the Revised Penal Code, instead of Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) thereof, as well as its Resolution3
dated August 1, 2003 denying appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner and co-accused
Elison Villaflor were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal, as maximum,
and to indemnify the private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan the sum of P480,000.00 representing the
amount paid for the purchase of the car that was impounded by the authorities.

Elison Villaflor and Augusto Sim, Jr., were formally charged with the crime of Estafa in an Information
dated September 6, 1999 which reads:4

That on or about May 2, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Jay Byron Ilagan in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused by means of false manifestations which they made to said Jay Byron Ilagan to the
effect that they are selling one (1) colored green Nissan Pathfinder pick-up with motor
number PD27-555735 bearing Plate No. BCF-620 in the amount of P480,000.00 registered in
the name of Henry Austria, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in
inducing said Jay Byron Ilagan to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P480,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent, as the
said car is a stolen car and they are not the owner, and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact
they did obtain the amount of P480,000.00 which amount once in their possession, with
intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Jay
Byron Ilagan in the aforesaid amount of P350,000.00, Philippine currency.

Contrary to law.

Private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan is a tire supplier whose store, Marfi Tire Supply, is
located along the highway at San Pablo City, Laguna. He had been dealing with accused
Elison Villaflor for twenty years, as the latter is engaged in the same business of selling tires
and rims at 39 C-3 Road, Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan City.

In March 1998, private complainant talked to Elison somewhere in Tondo, Manila, and
expressed his interest in buying a vehicle. Elison told him that he knew someone who sells
vehicles at a cheap price, and that he had bought a Toyota Tamaraw FX at lower than the
market price. Private complainant then asked Elison to ask if there was an Isuzu pick-up for
sale. A month later, Elison called private complainant to inform him that he was able to find a
1997 Nissan Pathfinder. They agreed to inspect the vehicle together as private complainant
wanted to buy it before his birthday on May 31, 1998.5

On April 30, 1998, only Elison went to Dagupan City to get the Nissan Pathfinder from his friend,
petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. Petitioner told Elison that the Nissan Pathfinder was given to him by a
customer in payment of a debt and had been used only for a year.
Elison brought the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder to San Pablo City. Private complainant at first did not like
the vehicle since it was not the brand he was looking for. Elison said that his kumpadre would look at
the vehicle as the latter was also interested in it.6

Private complainant decided to buy the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder at the agreed price of P480,000.00.
The amount was paid in five checks issued by Fe Ilagan under her account at Solidbank-San Pablo
Branch. One check was dated May 6, 1998 in the sum of P350,000.00, and four checks in the sum of
P32,500.00 each was dated June 6, July 6, August 6 and September 6, all in 1998.7

Elison gave private complainant photocopies of the Certificate of Registration (C.R.) and Official
Receipt (O.R.) issued by the Land Transportation Office (LTO) showing the name of the owner as
one Henry Austria. While waiting for the processing of the papers, the vehicle was parked at private
complainant’s place. After a week, Elison brought the deed of sale which private complainant signed
without the signature of the owner, Henry Austria. After private complainant signed the deed of
sale, he gave it back to Elison to be brought back to Dagupan City for signing by the owner/vendor
and transfer of registration in the name of private complainant.8

On June 7, 1998, Elison returned and delivered to private complainant the deed of sale signed by the
owner/vendor, together with the new C.R. and O.R. issued by the LTO of Lingayen, Pangasinan in the
name of private complainant.9

The checks given by private complainant in payment of the vehicle were deposited by petitioner in
his name at Solidbank-Dagupan Branch. All five checks were debited in favor of petitioner. After
receiving the registration papers from Elison, private complainant was eventually able to use the
Nissan Pathfinder.10

On October 28, 1998, private complainant’s vehicle was apprehended by Anti-Carnapping operatives
of the Philippine National Police (ANCAR NCRTMO). The vehicle and its registration papers were
inspected and thereafter brought to Camp Crame. It turned out that the vehicle was a "hot car" as it
had been reported stolen on November 29, 1997 by its real owner, Golf Construction of the
Philippines, Inc. pursuant to the Alarm Sheet issued by the PNP Traffic Management Group.11

Private complainant accompanied the ANCAR operatives to the residence of Elison. He went with
them to Camp Crame, and named petitioner as the owner of the vehicle. However, they were not
able to locate petitioner right away. Meanwhile, the vehicle was impounded by the authorities. The
investigation revealed that its original motor and chassis numbers were replaced and/or tampered
but its Production Number remained intact. Eventually, the real description of the vehicle was fully
established and identified by no less than the manufacturer/assembler of the unit, Universal Motors
Corporation.12

Private complainant spoke with Elison about the possible recovery of the money paid by him for the
confiscated vehicle. On November 30, 1998, private complainant met petitioner for the first time.
Petitioner signed a Promissory Note with Deed of Undertaking whereby he obligated himself to pay
private complainant the amount of P480,000.00 plus attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 in scheduled
installments. Petitioner issued a check in the amount of P75,000.00 but private complainant did not
encash it, thinking that if he does, petitioner would not pay him anymore. Private complainant was
unable to recover the money paid by him to petitioner.13

Thereafter, Elison and petitioner were charged with estafa under a criminal information dated
September 6, 1999. Elison was arraigned on September 17, 1999; while petitioner was arraigned on
June 1, 2000. Both pleaded "not guilty."

After trial, the trial court convicted both Elison and petitioner of the crime of estafa under Art. 315,
par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
judgment with the modification that appellants should be convicted of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2
(a).

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, assigning the following errors:
 I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

Two issues are presented before this Court: (1) Whether there was conspiracy between petitioner
and Elison Villaflor in defrauding private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan; and (2) Whether petitioner is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal
Code.

On the first assignment of error, petitioner argues that there is no conspiracy between him and co-
accused. He points that it was only co-accused Elison Villaflor who dealt with private complainant.
The latter had not even met him before he was allegedly forced to sign the amicable agreement.

Petitioner further alleges that contrary to the findings of the appellate court, there is no convincing
evidence to show that petitioner performed any previous or simultaneous act with Elison in
committing the offense against private complainant. The witnesses presented by the prosecution did
not show or prove that petitioner directly participated in the commission of the offense or
performed an act which would show community of purpose with Elison.

Petitioner’s argument is bereft of merit.

Even in the absence of direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime, conspiracy may be
deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before, during and after the commission of the crime,
which are indicative of a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.14
Conspiracy is deemed implied when the malefactors have a common purpose and were united in its
execution. Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the
commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility.15

In Erquiaga v. Court of Appeals,16 we ruled that conspiracy, as a rule, has to be established with the
same quantum of proof as the crime itself and shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.
However, conspiracy need not be shown by direct evidence, but may take the form of circumstances
which, if taken together, would conclusively show that the accused came to an agreement to
commit a crime and decided to carry it out with their full cooperation and participation.

As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, petitioner’s actions in relation to the fraudulent sale
of the Nissan Pathfinder to private complainant clearly established conspiracy as alleged in the
information, which acts transcend mere knowledge or friendship with co-accused Elison.17
Notwithstanding the fact that it was only Elison who dealt with or personally transacted with private
complainant until the time the sale was consummated, by his own testimony petitioner admitted all
the acts by which he actively cooperated and not merely acquiesced in perpetrating the fraud upon
private complainant.18 That petitioner is a conspirator having joint criminal design with Elison is
evident from the fact that as between them, both knew that petitioner was the person selling the
vehicle under the false pretense that a certain Henry Austria was the registered owner.19 Petitioner,
together with Elison, clearly deceived private complainant in order to defraud him in the amount of
P480,000.00, to the latter’s damage and prejudice. In addition, the acts of petitioner in deliberately
misrepresenting himself to private complainant as having the necessary authority to possess and sell
to the latter the vehicle so that he could collect from him P480,000.00 only to renege on that
promise and for failure to reimburse the said amount he collected from private complainant, despite
demand, amount to estafa punishable under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).

The Court of Appeals, in affirming the findings of fact of the trial court, aptly observed:20
 That conviction under the afore-cited provision is more proper is evident from the trial
court’s finding that appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. from the very beginning was aware that the
subject vehicle was not his nor given to him in payment of debt as he made appellant Villaflor
to believe. Nonetheless, appellant Villaflor was not absolved from liability, having actively
conspired with appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. to convince private complainant to purchase the
Pathfinder upon their false pretense and representation that said vehicle was being sold by
its real owner, Henry Austria, the name appearing in the registration papers and deed of sale
under circumstances clearly showing their knowledge that the status of said vehicle is
dubious or anomalous, as in fact it turned out to be a "hot car" or had been stolen/carnapped
from its true owner. The totality of the evidence indicates a common or joint design, purpose
and objective of the accused-appellants to defraud private complainant who parted with his
money upon the belief that there is no problem regarding the ownership of the Pathfinder
sold to him by the appellants.

The trial court rejected the argument of the defense that it was private complainant who supposedly
had the vehicle and its registration papers checked at Camp Crame before buying the same. It
pointed out that verification would have been difficult considering that the motor and chassis
numbers in the registration papers are correct but the name of the owner appearing therein is false.

Elison’s false pretense in holding out that he had authorization from the owner to sell the 1997
Nissan Pathfinder was made in conjunction with petitioner’s fraudulent misrepresentation that he
was legally entitled to possess the aforesaid vehicle. The evidence shows that petitioner and Elison
acted in conspiracy to deceive private complainant into buying a stolen Nissan Pathfinder, thereby
defrauding the latter in the amount of P480,000.00, and upon their false pretense and
representation as to the real status of the vehicle, i.e., that said unit is in fact being sold by its true
owner Henry Austria and that Augusto Sim, Jr. in whose name the checks were issued had the
authority or right to sell the same. After a few months, the vehicle sold was apprehended and
impounded by police authorities for being stolen or carnapped which resulted in pecuniary damage
to private complainant who had demanded the return of his money from petitioner and Elison.21 The
evidence of the prosecution satisfactorily established the fraudulent acts and representations which
induced private complainant to part with his money for which he suffered damage and loss when the
vehicle sold to him by petitioner and Elison was recovered by its true owner through operatives of
the police anti-carnapping group.22

On the second assignment of error, petitioner contends that the evidence is not sufficient to prove
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner’s contention is untenable.

While the trial court charged and convicted petitioner and his co-accused of estafa under Art. 315,
par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the appellate court modified the lower court’s decision by
convicting them of the same crime under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).

Regardless of whether petitioner is charged or convicted under either par. 1 (b) or par. 2 (a) of Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code, he would still be guilty of estafa because damage and deceit, which
are essential elements of the crime, have been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. False
pretenses or fraudulent acts were committed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud by falsely pretending to possess property. In this case, false pretenses or fraudulent acts were
employed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud by falsely pretending to
possess the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder, where damage and deceit have been established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is
taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can
device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false
suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any
unfair way by which another is cheated. Deceit is a species of fraud.23

Swindling or estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or

The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) are:

(1) There must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;

(2) Such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;

(3) The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means,
that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means;

(4) As a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.25

These four elements are present in the instant case:

(1) False pretenses were employed by petitioner and his co-accused to deceive private complainant
into purchasing the stolen Nissan Pathfinder;

(2) False pretenses were employed prior to, and simultaneously with, the fraudulent sale of the
Nissan Pathfinder;

(3) Private complainant relied on false pretenses of petitioner and co-accused, inducing him to part
with his money due to the misrepresentation employed by the perpetrators of the fraud; and

(4) As a result of false pretenses and misrepresentations by petitioner and co-accused, private
complainant suffered damages in the amount of P480,000.00.

Furthermore, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court, which is in the best
position to make an assessment of the witnesses’ credibility and to appreciate complainants’
truthfulness, honesty and candor.26 Factual findings of trial courts, as well as their assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court more so when these
are affirmed by the Court of Appeals.27 As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the
complainant, petitioner’s mere denial cannot prevail.

The proper imposable penalty for the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) is prisión correccional in
its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years. In such cases, the penalty
shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,28 if the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law
to the sound discretion of the court and can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances
are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.

In the present case, petitioner defrauded private complainant in the amount of P480,000.00. The
fact that the amount involved in the case at bar exceeds P22,000.00 should not be considered in the
initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as
analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full
indeterminate sentence. This legal interpretation accords with the rule that penal laws should be
construed in favor of the accused.29

The maximum penalty to be imposed on petitioner should be taken from the maximum period of the
penalty under Art. 315, which is reclusión temporal, since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00,
adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total penalty which may be imposed should
not exceed twenty (20) years.

Since the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of estafa under Art. 31530 is prisión mayor in its
minimum period if the amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000.00, the minimum term should be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense, which is prisión
correccional in its maximum period. Hence, the minimum period of the penalty should be from four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The determination of the minimum penalty
is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and can be anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided.

We are convinced that the appropriate penalty in accordance with law that can best serve the ends
of justice in the case at bar should range from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prisión correccional, as minimum, to twenty years of reclusión temporal, as maximum, for the crime of
estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the May 21, 2003 Decision and August 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. is sentenced
to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisión
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal, as maximum, for the crime of
estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a). He is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant Jay Byron
Ilagan, jointly and severally with Elison Villaflor, the sum of P480,000.00 with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum until fully paid.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr.*, Panganiban**, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.