Agency, Business, or Imaginary Transactions, or When The Accused Commits Other Similar Deceits
Agency, Business, or Imaginary Transactions, or When The Accused Commits Other Similar Deceits
Agency, Business, or Imaginary Transactions, or When The Accused Commits Other Similar Deceits
315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xx xx
(2) By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
xxx
From the provision above, the elements for the crime of Estafa through
False Pretense are as follows:
(1) The accused used fictitious name or false pretense that he
possesses (a) power, (b) influence, (c) qualifications, (d) property, (e)
credit, (f) agency, (g) business or (h) imaginary transaction, or other
similar deceits;
(2) The accused used such deceitful means prior to or
simultaneous with the execution of the fraud;
(3) The offended party relied on such deceitful means to part with
his money or property; and
(4) The offended party suffered damage.
[Osorio v People ;JULY 2, 2018, G.R. No. 207711]
“The false pretense or fraudulent representation referred to under
the first element exists when the accused uses a fictitious name,
pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business, or imaginary transactions, or when the accused commits
other similar deceits. ”
[Lopez v People; G.R. No. 199294, July 31, 2013]
“Without need of passing upon the question whether Ragonjan’s
(Accused) representations to Sy (Private Complainant) on 10 October
1996 bind petitioner(Accused), we resolve the threshold question whether
her alleged statement that the Club will be finished by July 1998 was in
the first place false. The Court of Appeals grounded its affirmative answer
on the fact that the Club remained unfinished even after the lapse of its
target completion date in July 1998. Section 2(a) of Article 315,
however, requires that the false pretense be used "prior to or
simultaneous with the execution of the fraud," that is, on 10 October
1996. The crux of this issue then, is whether before or at that time,
Primelink possessed no power (capability) to develop the Club, rendering
Ragonjan’s statement false.
A review of the records compels a negative answer. When Sy
reserved to buy a Club share on 10 October 1996, barely three months
had passed after Primelink, a duly incorporated real estate developer,
signed the Agreement with Pamana, another real estate developer, to
develop the Club. Four months after Sy bought a Club share, Primelink
promoted the Club here and abroad and continued selling Club shares.
All the while, Primelink released funds to finance the project’s initial
expenses, a portion of which Pamana was ordered to repay by a Makati
court after the project was aborted.
These facts negate the conclusion that on or before 10 October
1996, petitioner and Ragonjan knew that the Club was a bogus project.
At that time, the Project was on-course as far as Primelink was
concerned. It was only after 10 October 1996 that Primelink encountered
problems with Pamana, rendering impossible the Club’s completion.”
xx xx
There is no merit in the argument that Ragonjan’s assurance to Sy
of Primelink’s status as a licensed securities dealer amounts to a
warranty, and thus required, under the warranty clause of the
reservation agreement, to be reduced in writing. The warranty clause,
which provides –
Any representation or warranty made by the agent who handled
this sale not embodied herein shall not bind the company, unless reduced
in writing and confirmed by the President or the Chairman of the Board.
refers to warranties on the terms of the share sold, not to the capacity of
Primelink to sell Club shares. Indeed, the fact that "the seller has the right
to sell the thing at the time when ownership is to pass," is implied in sales,
dispensing with the need to expressly state such in the contract. Further,
the clause operates to shield Primelink from claims of violation of
unwritten warranties, not its officers from criminal liability for making
fraudulent representation on Primelink’s authority to sell Club shares.
xx xx
“Unlike estafa under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Code,
estafa under paragraph 2( a) of that provision does not require as an
element of the crime proof that the accused misappropriated or converted
the swindled money or property. All that is required is proof of
pecuniary damage sustained by the complainant arising from his
reliance on the fraudulent representation. “
[People v Estrada; G.R. No. 225730, February 28, 2018]
“In this case, testimonial evidence established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that Estrada falsely represented herself as
possessing power to deploy persons for overseas placement. By these
pretenses, Estrada deceived the private complainants into believing that
she would provide them their desired jobs in Dubai. This active
representation of having the capacity to deploy the private complainants
abroad despite not having the authority or license to do so from the
POEA constituted deceit - the first element of estafa. Moreover,
because of her assurances, the private complainants parted with their
money in order to pay Estrada the various fees which they thought were
necessary for their deployment abroad resulting in damage to each of the
private complainants - the second element of estafa.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the elements of estafa as
charged have been established. Thus, the Court affirms Estrada's
conviction for three (3) counts of estafa under Article 315(2)(a).”
[Galvez v CA; G.R. No. 187919 , February 20, 2013]
‘’We noted there and we now reiterate that it was neither the
petitioners’ act of borrowing money and not paying it, nor their
denial thereof, but their very act of deceiving AUB in order for the
latter to part with its money that is sought to be penalized. Thus:
x x x As early as the Penal Code of Spain, which was
enforced in the Philippines as early as 1887 until it was replaced
by the Revised Penal Code in 1932, the act of fraud through false
pretenses or similar deceit was already being punished. Article 335
of the Penal code of Spain punished a person who defrauded
another ‘by falsely pretending to possess any power, influence,
qualification, property, credit, agency or business, or by means of
similar deceit.
Under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, estafa is
committed by any person who shall defraud another by, among others,
false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneous with
the commission of fraud, i.e., b y using a fictitious name, falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar
deceits.
Underscoring the aforesaid discussion, we found that:
First, G ilbert Guy, Philip Leung, Katherine Guy, Rafael Galvez and
Eugene Galvez, Jr., interlocking directors of RMSI and SPI, represented
to AUB in their transactions that Smartnet Philippines and SPI were one
and the same entity. While Eugene Galvez, Jr. was not a director of SPI,
he actively dealt with AUB in his capacity as RMSI’s Chief Financial
Officer/Comptroller by falsely representing that SPI and RMSI were the
same entity. Gilbert Guy, Philip Leung, Katherine Guy, Rafael Galvez,
and Eugene Galvez, Jr. used the business names Smartnet Philippines,
RMSI, and SPI interchangeably and without any distinction. They
successfully did this by using the confusing similarity of RMSI’s business
name, i.e., Smartnet Philippines – its division, and, Smartnet Philippines,
Inc. – the subsidiary corporation. Further, they were able to hide the
identity of SPI, by having almost the same directors as that of RMSI. In
order to let it appear that SPI is the same as that of Smartnet
Philippines, they submitted in their application documents of RMSI,
including its Amended Articles of Incorporation, third-party real estate
mortgage of Goodland Company in favor of Smartnet Philippines, and
audited annual financial statement of SGV & Co. Gilbert Guy, et al. a lso
used RMSI letterhead in their official communications with the bank and
the contents of these official communications conclusively pointed to
RMSI as the one which transacted with the bank.
These circumstances are all indicia o f deceit. Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false
or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that
he shall act upon it to his legal injury.”
[People v Menil; G.R. No. 115054-66, September 12, 2000]
“In convicting accused-appellant of the crimes of Large Scale
Swindling punishable under P.D. 1689 in Criminal Case No. 2948 and
estafa in the thirteen other criminal cases filed against
accused-appellant, the trial court made reference to Article 315, par. 2
(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Under this provision, swindling or estafa
by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud is committed by "using fictitious name,
or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions, or by other similar
deceits." The elements of estafa under this penal provision are: (1) the
accused defrauded another by means of deceit and (2) damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party
or third party.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that the accused-appellant
failed to pay the expected returns of the investments and/or
solicitations of the private complainants. Accused-appellant himself
admits that he was not able to pay the returns on the investments due
August 29, 1989 onwards. Neither did he return the amount of their
investments.
xx xx
In other words, accused-appellant merely paid the returns of
maturing investments from the remittances of succeeding investors.
What accused-appellant actually offered to the public was a "Ponzi
Scheme," an unsustainable investment program that offers extravagantly
high returns and pays these returns to early investors out of the capital
contributed by later investors.
xx xx
The prosecution having proved the two elements of damage and
deceit in all the cases filed against accused-appellant, the trial court thus
committed no error in finding accused-appellant guilty of one count of
large scale swindling and thirteen (13) counts of estafa.’’
[People v Mateo et al; OCTOBER 9, 2017, G.R. No. 210612]
“In addition, fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise
anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and
concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or
confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which
an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a
generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity
can devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an
advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth
and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way
by which another is cheated. On the other hand, deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false
or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that
he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
Thus, in the present case, it is clear that all the elements of
syndicated estafa, are present, considering that: (a) the
incorporators/directors of MMG comprising more than five (5) people,
including herein accused-appellant, made false. pretenses and
representations to the investing public - in this case, the private
complainants - regarding a supposed lucrative investment
opportunity with MMG in order to solicit money from them; (b) the
said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same,
private complainants invested their hard-earned money into MMG; and
(d) the incorporators/directors of MMG ended up running away with the
private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.
Accused-appellant insists that the prosecution failed· to prove the
element of defraudation because no sufficient evidence was presented to
prove that he "personally, physically and actually performed any 'false
pretenses' and/or 'fraudulent representations' against the private
complainants." The Court does not agree. Accused-appellant should be
reminded that he is being accused of syndicated estafa in conspiracy
with the other co-accused. In this regard, the Court finds no error in the
finding of the CA that herein appellant and his co-accused are guilty of
conspiracy, to wit:
x x x x
The evidence adduced by the prosecution established the
existence of conspiracy among the accused in committing the
crime charged. They started by forming the partnership. All of
them had access to MMG Holding's bank accounts. They
composed the Members of the Board of Directors that manage
and control the business transactions of MMG Holdings.
Without the participation of each of the accused, MMG
Holdings could not have solicited funds from the general public
and succeeded to perpetrate their fraudulent scheme. Hence,
each of them is a co-conspirator by virtue of indispensable
cooperation in the fraudulent acts of the partnership.
x x x
In the instant case, it was not necessary for the prosecution to
still prove .that accused-appellant himself "personally, physically and
actually performed any 'false pretenses' and/or 'fraudulent
representations' against the private complainants," g iven the findings
of both the RTC and the CA of the existence of conspiracy among
appellant and his co-accused.’’
[People v Ortega; G.R. No. 177944, December 24, 2008]
‘’From the foregoing, swindling or estafa by false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud is committed by "using fictitious name, or falsely pretending
to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by other similar deceits.’’
In order to sustain a charge and conviction under paragraph 2(a)
of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must be able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the concurrence of the following
elements:
(1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit; and
(2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
caused to the offended party or third person.
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment
involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another. On the other hand,
deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that
which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.
From the preceding facts, it is evident that accused-appellant
employed deceitful tactics to make Adorable part with her money in
order to purchase the lot purportedly offered for sale by Ortega to
the former. Ortega’s act of misrepresenting herself as having the
requisite authority to sell the alleged property belonging to Manuel
Cabingatan set in motion a chain of events that led to the eventual
parting of Adorable with her hard-earned money. Without the
representation from petitioner that she was authorized to sell the
property, Adorable would not have parted with her money to make
advances for the payment of notarial documents, titling and other
documentary fees necessary for the transfer of title of the said property
from Manuel Cabingatan to her. Ortega could have simply returned the
money wrongfully taken from Adorable after her failure to transfer the
property, but instead denied receiving a single centavo from Adorable.’’