The court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the insured was entitled to the full indemnity amount from the fire damage. The insurance policy was an "open policy" where the actual loss determined represents the total indemnity, not to exceed the policy face value. There was no evidence the building was worth more than insured. The insurer's arguments that it was not liable for elevator damage or that the insured was partially self-insured were rejected.
The court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the insured was entitled to the full indemnity amount from the fire damage. The insurance policy was an "open policy" where the actual loss determined represents the total indemnity, not to exceed the policy face value. There was no evidence the building was worth more than insured. The insurer's arguments that it was not liable for elevator damage or that the insured was partially self-insured were rejected.
The court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the insured was entitled to the full indemnity amount from the fire damage. The insurance policy was an "open policy" where the actual loss determined represents the total indemnity, not to exceed the policy face value. There was no evidence the building was worth more than insured. The insurer's arguments that it was not liable for elevator damage or that the insured was partially self-insured were rejected.
The court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the insured was entitled to the full indemnity amount from the fire damage. The insurance policy was an "open policy" where the actual loss determined represents the total indemnity, not to exceed the policy face value. There was no evidence the building was worth more than insured. The insurer's arguments that it was not liable for elevator damage or that the insured was partially self-insured were rejected.
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Tirol It then went to the respondent court, which
affirmed the decision of the trial court in
2. Development Insurance Corporation vs. toto. Hence, this petition. Intermediate Appellate Court & Philippine Union Realty Development Corporation The petitioner insurance company argues that since at the time of the fire the building Insurer: Development Insurance Corp. insured was worth P5,800,000.00, the Insured: Philippine Union Realty private respondent should be considered its Development Corp. own insurer for the difference between that Beneficiary: N/A amount and the face value of the policy and Other significant parties: N/A should share pro rata in the loss sustained. Accordingly, the private respondent is Doctrine: As defined in the aforestated entitled to an indemnity of only P67,629.31, provision, which is now Section 60 of the the rest of the loss to be shouldered by it Insurance Code, "an open policy is one in alone. In support of this contention, the which the value of the thing insured is not petitioner cites Condition 17 of the policy, agreed upon but is left to be ascertained which provides: in case of loss. " This means that the actual loss, as determined, will represent the If the property hereby insured shall, total indemnity due the insured from the at the breaking out of any fire, be insurer except only that the total collectively of greater value than the indemnity shall not exceed the face value sum insured thereon then the of the policy. insured shall be considered as being his own insurer for the difference, Facts: A fire occurred in the building of and shall bear a ratable proportion Private Respondent (Philippine Union Realty of the loss accordingly. Every item, if Development Corp.), and it sued for recovery more than one, of the policy shall be of damages from the Petitioner separately subject to this condition. (Development Insurance Corp.) on the basis of an insurance contract between them. Issue: Whether the private respondent should be considered its own insurer for the The petitioner allegedly failed to answer on difference between that amount and the time and was declared in default by the trial face value of the policy and should share pro court. A judgment of default was rata in the loss sustained subsequently rendered on the strength of the evidence submitted ex parte by the Ruling: NO. The only remaining question to private respondent, which was allowed full be settled is the amount of the indemnity recovery of its claimed damages. due to the private respondent under its insurance contract with the petitioner. This On learning of this decision, the petitioner will require an examination of this contract, moved to lift the order of default, invoking Policy No. RY/F-082, as renewed, by virtue of excusable neglect, and to vacate the which the petitioner insured the private judgment by default. Its motion was denied. respondent's building against fire for P2,500,000.00. This means that the actual loss, as Contrary to petitioner’s argument, there is determined, will represent the total no evidence on record that the building was indemnity due the insured from the insurer worth P5,800,000.00 at the time of the loss. except only that the total indemnity shall not Only the petitioner says so and it does not exceed the face value of the policy. back up its self-serving estimate with any independent corroboration. The actual loss has been ascertained in this case and, to repeat, this Court will respect On the contrary, the building was insured at such factual determination in the absence of P2,500,000.00, and this must be considered, proof that it was arrived at arbitrarily. There by agreement of the insurer and the insured, is no such showing. the actual value of the property insured on the day the fire occurred. This valuation Hence, applying the open policy clause as becomes even more believable if it is expressly agreed upon by the parties in remembered that at the time the building their contract, we hold that the private was burned it was still under construction respondent is entitled to the payment of and not yet completed. indemnity under the said contract in the total amount of P508,867.00. The Court notes that Policy RY/F-082 is an open policy and is subject to the express The refusal of its vice-president to receive condition that: the private respondent's complaint, as reported in the sheriff's return, was the first Open Policy indication of the petitioner's intention to prolong this case and postpone the This is an open policy as defined in discharge of its obligation to the private Section 57 of the Insurance Act. In respondent under this agreement. That the event of loss, whether total or intention was revealed further in its partial, it is understood that the subsequent acts-or inaction-which indeed amount of the loss shall be subject to enabled it to avoid payment for more than appraisal and the liability of the five years from the filing of the claim against company, if established, shall be it in 1980. The petitioner has temporized limited to the actual loss, subject to long enough to avoid its legitimate the applicable terms, conditions, responsibility; the delay must and does end warranties and clauses of this Policy, now. and in no case shall exceed the amount of the policy. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed in full, with costs against As defined in the aforestated provision, the petitioner. which is now Section 60 of the Insurance Code, "an open policy is one in which the NOTE: On the question of default, the record value of the thing insured is not agreed argues mightily against it. It is indisputable upon but is left to be ascertained in case of that summons was served on it, through its loss." senior vice-president, 10 days after the expiration of the original 15-day period to answer, its counsel filed an ex parte motion for an extension of five days within which to file its answer. Onthe last day of the requested extension -which at the time had not yet been granted- the same counsel filed a second motion for another 5-day extension, 14 days after the expiry of the original period to file its answer. The trial court nevertheless gave it five days within which to file its answer. But it did not. It did so onlyafter the expiry of the original and extended periods, or 21 days after the July 5, deadline. As a consequence, the trial court, on motion of the private respondent declared the petitioner in default.
The petitioner's claim that the insurance
covered only the building and not the elevators is absurd, to say the least. This Court has little patience with puerile arguments that affront common sense, let alone basic legal principles with which even law students are familiar. The circumstance that the building insured is seven stories high and so had to be provided with elevators-a legal requirement known to the petitioner as an insurance company-makes its contention all the more ridiculous. No less preposterous is the petitioner's claim that the elevators were insured after the occurrence of the fire, a case of shutting the barn door after the horse had escaped, so to speak.4 This pretense merits scant attention. Equally undeserving of serious consideration is its submission that the elevators were not damaged by the fire, against the report of The arson investigators of the INP and, indeed, its own expressed admission in its answer where it affirmed that the fire "damaged or destroyed a portion of the 7th floor of the insured building and more particularly a Hitachi elevator control panel."