04 - Tan
04 - Tan
04 - Tan
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Carag, Caballes, Jamora & Zomera Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. 109446.
VITUG, J.:
These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No.
109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as
the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending certain provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code and, in
G.R. No. 109446, the validity of Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93,
promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law.
Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
The Court has given due course to both petitions. The parties, in compliance with
the Court's directive, have filed their respective memoranda.
Petitioner contends that the title of House Bill No. 34314, progenitor of Republic
Act No. 7496, is a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely entitled,
"Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed
and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R.
No. 109289).
An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The
Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their
Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as Amended.
The pertinent provisions of Sections 21 and 29, so referred to, of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as now amended, provide:
(e) Depreciation;
For individuals whose cost of goods sold and direct costs are difficult
to determine, a maximum of forty per cent (40%) of their gross
receipts shall be allowed as deductions to answer for business or
professional expenses as the case may be.
On the basis of the above language of the law, it would be difficult to accept
petitioner's view that the amendatory law should be considered as having now
adopted a gross income, instead of as having still retained the net income, taxation
scheme. The allowance for deductible items, it is true, may have significantly been
reduced by the questioned law in comparison with that which has prevailed prior
to the amendment; limiting, however, allowable deductions from gross income is
neither discordant with, nor opposed to, the net income tax concept. The fact of
the matter is still that various deductions, which are by no means inconsequential,
continue to be well provided under the new law.
Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to
prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who
favor any one of unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to avoid
surprises or even fraud upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people,
through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects
of legislation.1 The above objectives of the fundamental law appear to us to have
been sufficiently met. Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium of
the law which could not have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate.
Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional
requirement that taxation "shall be uniform and equitable" in that the law would
now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the
manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. The contention clearly
forgets, however, that such a system of income taxation has long been the
prevailing rule even prior to Republic Act No. 7496.
Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires
that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike
both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil.
371). Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that
are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is
germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being
equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies
equally well to all those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan,
24 SCRA 3; Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52).
What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the
legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular
approach2 in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and
large, the present global treatment3 on taxable corporations. We certainly do not
view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.
Petitioner gives a fairly extensive discussion on the merits of the law, illustrating,
in the process, what he believes to be an imbalance between the tax liabilities of
those covered by the amendatory law and those who are not. With the legislature
primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent
(rate), coverage (subjects) and situs (place) of taxation. This court cannot freely
delve into those matters which, by constitutional fiat, rightly rest on legislative
judgment. Of course, where a tax measure becomes so unconscionable and unjust
as to amount to confiscation of property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down,
for, despite all its plenitude, the power to tax cannot override constitutional
proscriptions. This stage, however, has not been demonstrated to have been
reached within any appreciable distance in this controversy before us.
Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law declared
unconstitutional for being violative of due process must perforce fail. The due
process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention
of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such
transgression is so evident to us.
The Court, first of all, should like to correct the apparent misconception that general
professional partnerships are subject to the payment of income tax or that there is
a difference in the tax treatment between individuals engaged in business or in the
practice of their respective professions and partners in general professional
partnerships. The fact of the matter is that a general professional partnership,
unlike an ordinary business partnership (which is treated as a corporation for
income tax purposes and so subject to the corporate income tax), is not itself an
income taxpayer. The income tax is imposed not on the professional partnership,
which is tax exempt, but on the partners themselves in their individual capacity
computed on their distributive shares of partnership profits. Section 23 of the Tax
Code, which has not been amended at all by Republic Act 7496, is explicit:
There is, then and now, no distinction in income tax liability between a person who
practices his profession alone or individually and one who does it through
partnership (whether registered or not) with others in the exercise of a common
profession. Indeed, outside of the gross compensation income tax and the final tax
on passive investment income, under the present income tax system all individuals
deriving income from any source whatsoever are treated in almost invariably the
same manner and under a common set of rules.
Section 6 of Revenue Regulation No. 2-93 did not alter, but merely confirmed, the
above standing rule as now so modified by Republic Act
No. 7496 on basically the extent of allowable deductions applicable to all individual
income taxpayers on their non-compensation income. There is no evident intention
of the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal
footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who
practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it through a
general professional partnership.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
3 A system where the tax treatment views indifferently the tax base
and generally treats in common all categories of taxable income of
the taxpayer.