KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.

Facts:

Khosrow Minucher filed a Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court for claiming that he have
been trumped-up with charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC
detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
That on June 14, 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that he is a special agent of the United States
Drug Enforcement Administration and is entitled to diplomatic immunity to which the RTC
denied.
On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with the SC asking that the
Civil Case complaint be ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals which
sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against
him. Minucher filed a petition for review with the SC appealing the judgment of the Court of
Appeals which the SC reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to the
lower court for trial. RTC continued with its hearings on the case Adjudging defendant liable to
plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10
million; exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney’s fees in the sum of
P200,000.00 plus costs.The trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence
presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he,
nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained of committed outside his
official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during
his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the “Receiving
State” pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.

Issue:

Whether Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

Ruling:

Yes, Arthur Scalzo entitled to diplomatic immunity. The Court has recognized that, in such
matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and
incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it
should behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be
most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam
issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the
law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction. But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus
remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities
within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur
Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the
complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State
Immunity from Suit.
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. “It is a different matter where the public
official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the
rights of the plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts,
for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the
State from suit.
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:

On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information
against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Rowena P. Geraldino for the crime of Bigamy.
Witness Jesusa Pinat Nollora testified that she and accused Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while
she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Nollora, Jr.
courted her and on April 6, 1999, they got married in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and
because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the
latter's workplace and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between complainant and
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this
knowledge she still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and because
they were neighbors and childhood friends

As a defense Nollora claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even
before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant.
He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran.
However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that the consent of
the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to
secure her consent.

Issue:

Whether the second marriage contracted is bigamous.

Ruling:

Yes. The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is
legally married to Pinat; (2) Nollora and Pinat's marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to
the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to
Geraldino; and (4) Nollora and Geraldino's marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.
Article 13 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that “in case of a marriage between a
Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the
Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the
Philippines shall apply." Nollora's religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim
that Nollora's marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Accused Atilano Nollora,
Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the
above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a Muslim
convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent.
The appellate court rejected Nollora's defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in
lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Qur'an.
Nollora's two marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines should apply. Nollora's claim of religious
freedom will not immobilize theState and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally
Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora,
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES,
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG
and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
----------------------------------------
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

Facts:

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the House of
Representatives and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings begun in the Senate during
which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only
stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in
suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown
into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned
after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office.

Issue:

Whether the President enjoys immunity from suit.

Ruling:

The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft
and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel by the name of Steamship Standard engaged in the
transport of animals such as carabaos and cattles from a foreign port to the Philippines
commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel
from Ampieng, Formosa carried 677 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and
proper suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt
and others to have died while in transit.

This negligence and cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the
Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it
said that the court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it
say about ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships involved.

Issue:
Whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while
inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

Ruling:

The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the
objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by
the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its
territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a
friendly power without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition
such ports are considered as open to the public ships of all friendly powers.
No court of the Philippines has jurisdiction over any crimes committed in a foreign ship on the
high seas, but the moment it entered into territorial waters, it automatically would be subject to
the jurisdiction of the country. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its
territorial waters. The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that merchant vessels
of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade would subject themselves to
the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.

Facts:

In August 19, 1909 between the hours of 11 and 12 midnight, the Port of Cebu and internal
revenue agent of Cebu among them were Messrs. Jacks and Milliron went aboard the steamship
Erroll to inspect and search its cargo. In doing so, they found two sacks containing opium (49
cans). The defendant stated freely and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of opium in
Hong Kong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as
his hold had already been searched several times for opium he ordered two other chinamen to
keep the sack. All the evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti. It was established that
the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hong Kong, and that it was
bound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and Cebu. The defense moved for a dismissal of
the case, on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned
therein did not constitute a crime.

Issue:

Whether courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign vessels stationed in its
port.

Ruling:

Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter. The mere possession of a thing of
prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not,
as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such
vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality. However, the same rule does not
apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippines, in the present case, a can
of opium, is landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation
of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime. Only the court established
in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel which arrived in the port of
Cebu from Saigon. He bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board and had them
in his possession during the said trip. The 8 cans of opium were found in the ashes below the
boiler of the steamer's engine by authorities who made a search upon anchoring on the port of
Cebu. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had purchased it
in Saigon. He dis not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say
that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands is criminally
liable in the Philippines.

Ruling:

Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person who unlawfully imports or
brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under
this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the
jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, unless
contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
Two Dutch boats sailed for Peta in the Dutch East Indies (present day Indonesia). The second
boat, which carried several passengers, arrived between the islands of Buang and Bukid. Six
vintas with 24 armed men surrounded the vessel. The armed men initially asked for food.
However, once they were on the Dutch boat, the armed men attacked the passengers, raped two
women, and stole all the cargo. They drilled holes into the boat to make it sink. They also took
the two women and repeatedly raped them. The two women escaped at Maruro, where the armed
men landed. Left with no provision, the passengers were rescued after 11 days. Lol-lo and Saraw,
two of the armed men, later went back to their home in Sulu. Subsequently, they were arrested
and charged with piracy. After trial, both were found guilty of the crime.
On appeal, defendants argued that Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over their case since
the crime was committed in the high seas.

Issue/s:

1. Whether a crime of piracy was commited

2. Whether Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:

1. The accused are guilty of priracy.

Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. All of the elements of
the crime of piracy are present.

2. Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case.

Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but
against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all
other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it
matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, “for
those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Facts:

The appellee was accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa
of English Nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from
the shores of the city. The lower court held and dismissed the case on lack of jurisdiction, hence
the Attorney-General representing the appellant prayed for the revocation of the order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila sustaining the demurrer.

Issue:

Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in jurisdiction waters of the Philippines.

RULING:

Yes. The court held that mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit is not triable
by courts of the Philippines but to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard
a foreign vessel is a breach of the public order because it causes such drug to produce pernicious
effects within our territory. Wherefore, the order appealed is revoked and the cause ordered
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with the law, without
special findings as to cost.

JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED STATES
ARMY, respondents.
Facts:

Jesus Miquiabas is a Filipino citizen and civilian employee of the US army in the Philippines
who had been charged of disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the US
army in violation of the 94th article of War of the US. He was arrested followed by a General
Court-Martial was appointed which he was found guilty and was sentenced for 15 years in
prison. As a rule, the Philippines being a sovereign nation has jurisdiction over all offenses
committed within its territory but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the US shall
exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within said portions of territory.

Issue/s:

1. Whether the offense has been committed within a US base thus giving the US jurisdiction over
the case.

2. Whether the offender is a member of the US armed forces

Ruling:

No. The Port of Manila Area where the offense was committed is not within a US base for it is
not names in Annex A or B of Article XXVI of the Military Base Agreement (MBA) and is
merely part of the temporary quarters located within presented limits of the city of Manila.
Moreover,
extended installations and temporary quarters are not considered to have the same jurisdictional
capacity as permanent bases and are governed by Article XIII paragraphs 2 and 4. The offence at
bar, therefore is in the beyond the jurisdiction of military courts.

No. Under the MBA, a civilian employee is not considered as a member of the US armed forces.
Even under the articles of war, the mere fact that a civilian employee is in the service of the US
Army does not make him a member of the armed forces.

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
Facts:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years old. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time their son was only
eighteen months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in
the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene. However, since the arrival of petitioner and
her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. Then respondent
came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in
Cebu City.

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent which respondent initially refused to receive. Petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit
with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City. Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-
Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent. Consequently, respondent was arrested
and, subsequently, posted bail. Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent
Protection Order On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,
dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent. Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion
for Reconsideration On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration

Issue/s:

1. Whether a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law
2. Whether a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child

Ruling:

We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner's contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative
that the legal obligation to support exists.
We agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that
he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner's son
under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner's son
altogether.
Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is not liable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states
that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still not find applicability. Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy
and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.