LLanzon v. Alzona, G.R. No.

150730, January 31, 2005

Facts:
Bernardo Sales and Maria Sales were husband and wife. They have
twelve children, eleven of whom are the present petitioners while the
remaining child, Estela Sales Pelongco, is one of herein respondents.
Maria was the registered owner of a certain parcel of land with an area
of 202 square meters and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. P-3225 which she acquired under a free patent. The property is
located at Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna. Until they died, Maria and Bernardo,
together with some of their children, lived on said land and in the house
which they constructed thereon. Maria died on August 27, 1986 while
Bernardo died on January 1, 1997

On January 29, 1990, a real estate mortgage contract was purportedly

executed by Maria, who was already deceased at that time, and
Bernardo in favor of herein respondent Dominador Alzona. Respondent
Estela Sales Pelongco signed as an instrumental witness to the mortgage
contract. Respondent Ernesto Alzona admitted that while he was a co-
mortgagee of his brother, Dominador, his name does not appear in the
mortgage contract. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed for
alleged failure of Bernardo and Maria to settle their obligation secured
by the said mortgage. The property was thereafter sold in a mortgage
sale conducted on December 20, 1990 wherein Ernesto Alzona was the
highest bidder. Consequently, a certificate of sale was awarded to
Ernesto on December 20, 1990, and on January 22, 1992, he executed a
Consolidation of Ownership over the property. Accordingly, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-261853 was issued in his name while OCT No.
P-3225 in the name of Maria Sales was cancelled.

On December 17, 1992, herein petitioners caused the inscription of an

adverse claim on the title to the property.

On October 15, 1993, herein petitioners filed before the RTC of San
Pedro, Laguna a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage and of Auction
Sale, with Reconveyance of Title and Damages. Respondents Ernesto
and Dominador Alzona and the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna
filed their answers, respectively. However, respondent Estela Sales
Pelongco failed to file her answer; as a consequence of which, she was
declared in default.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favour of the defendants
Dominador Alzona and Ernesto Alzona and against Estela Sales
dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint.
Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, petitioners filed an appeal with
the CA.

The CA rendered a decision affirming the judgment of the RTC but

deleting the attorney’s fees awarded to petitioners.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution issued

by the Court of Appeals 

Hence, herein petitioners filed the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not Ernesto and Dominador are mortgagees in good
faith.
Held: YES
The principle of "innocent purchasers for value" is applicable to the
present case.

Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, one of the essential requisites of
the contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor should be the absolute
owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is
considered null and void. However, an exception to this rule is the
doctrine of "mortgagee in good faith." Under this doctrine, even if the
mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage
contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by
reason of public policy.

 This principle is based on the rule that all persons dealing with property
covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are
not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. This is
the same rule that underlies the principle of "innocent purchasers for
value" cited by the CA in its decision. The prevailing jurisprudence is that
a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of
the mortgagor to the property given as security and in the absence of
any sign that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake
further investigation. Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful
owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged property, the
mortgagee in good faith is, nonetheless, entitled to protection.

For persons, more particularly those who are engaged in real estate or
financing business like herein respondents Ernesto and Dominador
Alzona, to be considered as mortgagees in good faith, jurisprudence
requires that they should take the necessary precaution expected of a
prudent man to ascertain the status and condition of the properties
offered as collateral and to verify the identity of the persons they
transact business with, particularly those who claim to be the registered
property owners.

In the instant case, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court that
Ernesto and Dominador are mortgagees in good faith. The trial court
gave credence to Ernesto’s testimony that he conducted a credit
investigation before he approved the loan sought and the property
mortgaged.
It is well settled in our jurisdiction that the determination of credibility of
witnesses is properly within the domain of the trial court as it is in the
best position to observe their demeanor and bodily movements. Further,
findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to great respect, and even finality, unless
said findings are arbitrary, or facts and circumstances of weight and
influence have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied by the
trial judge which, if considered, would have affected the case. These
findings are binding on this Court especially when affirmed by the
appellate court. After a re-examination of the evidence presented, we
find no cogent reason to depart from this rule.

People v. Umali, G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991.

Facts:

Francisco Manalo was investigated by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon

Police Department for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act which was
filed against him in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City.
Aside from said case, accused Francisco Manalo was likewise facing
other charges such as concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes
against property. Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong Municipal Jail,
and sought the help of Francisco Manalo and told him the social and
pernicious effect of prohibited drugs like marijuana being peddled to
minors of Tiaong, Quezon. Manalo although a detention prisoner was
touched by the appeal made to him by the policeman and agreed to
help in the identification of the source of the marijuana. In return he
asked the policeman to help him in some cases pending against him. He
did not negotiate his case for violating the dangerous drug act, as he
has entered a plea of guilty to the charged ( sic) before the sala of Judge
Eriberto Rosario.

With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the

Investigation Division gave him four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buy
marijuana from sources known to him. The serial numbers of the money
was entered in the police blotter. The instruction was for Manalo to
bring back the prohibited drug purchased by him to the police
headquarters. Few minutes there after , Manalo returned with two (2)
foils of dried marijuana which lie allegedly bought from the accused
Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to
give a statement on the manner and circumstances of how he was able
to purchase two (2) marijuana foils from accused Gloria Umali. With the
affidavit of Francisco Manalo, supported by the two (2) foils of
marijuana.

Gloria and Suzeth Umali y Amado, defendants-appellants, were charged

for violation of Sec. 4, Art. 1 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The
defendants-appellants were accused of selling marijuana as witnessed
by Francisco Manalo, who was given 4 marked P5 bills which he used to
buy 2 foils of marijuana. The Chief of the Investigation Division
petititoned for the issuance of a search warrant as a justification for
them to search the house of Gloria Umali. The warrant was served and
the 4 P5 bills were confiscated from the person of Gloria Umali as well
as a can of milo containing 16 foils of dried marijuana leaves.
Appellant alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its
face value. Furthermore, he stressed that said witness has several
charges in court and because of his desire to have some of his cases
dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.

However, the plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General said that

even if Francisco Manalo was then facing several criminal charges when
he testified, such fact did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.
"His testimony is not only reasonable and probable but more so, it was
also corroborated in its material respect by the other prosecution
witnesses, especially the police officers."

The appellant also claimed that the marked money as well as the
marijuana were confiscated for no other purpose than using them as
evidence against the accused in the proceeding for violation of
Dangerous Drugs Act and therefore the search warrant issued is illegal
from the very beginning. She stressed that there can be no other
plausible explanation other than that she was a victim of a frame-up.

In relation to this contention, the Solicitor General noted that it is not

true that the evidences submitted by the prosecution were obtained in
violation of her constitutional right against illegal search and seizure.

Furthermore, the appellant contended that the essential elements of the

crime of which she was charged were never established by clear and
convincing evidence to warrant the findings of the court a quo. She also
stressed that the court's verdict of conviction is merely based on
surmises and conjectures.

However, the Solicitor General noted that the positive and categorical
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who had personal knowledge
of the happening together with the physical evidence submitted clearly
prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused-appellant for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the witness Francisco Manalo is

credible to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
Held: YES

Time and again, it is stressed that this Court is enjoined from casually
modifying or rejecting the trial court's factual findings. Such factual
findings, particularly the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the
testimony of the witnesses are accorded with great respect on appeal
for the trial judge enjoys the advantage of directly and at first hand
observing and examining the testimonial and other proofs as they are
presented at the trial and is therefore better situated to form accurate
impressions and conclusions on the basis thereof ( See People v. Bravo,
G.R. No. 68422, 29 December, 1989,180 SCRA 694,699).

Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who

can perceive, and perceiving can make known their perception to
others may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or

conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not
be a ground for disqualification.

The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law"

takes into account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons
convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony" are
disqualified from being witnesses to a will." (Paras, RULES OF COURT
ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p. 44)

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-
mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this case does not
involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said witness is
facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way
disqualify him as a witness.

The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the
absence of evidence that he was actuated by improper motive (People v.
Melgar, G.R. No. 75268,29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 718). Hence, in the
absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by
improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.

Conviction cannot be predicated on a presumption or speculation. A

conviction for a criminal offense must be based on clear and positive
evidence and not on mere presumptions (Gaerlan v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 57876, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA 20). The prosecution's
evidence consisted of the testimony of witness Manalo and the law
enforcers as well as the physical evidence consisting of the seized
marked peso bills, the two (2) foils of marijuana purchased and the can
containing sixteen (16) aluminum foils of dried marijuana.

Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence more so as it

consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are
presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof
to the contrary (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, 21 February 1989,
170 SCRA 497). Hence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, full
credence should be accorded to the prosecution's evidence. The
evidence on record sufficiently established that Umali gave two (2) foils
of marijuana to witness Manalo for which she was given and received
four (4) marked five peso (P5.00) bills, and fully supports conviction for
drug pushing in violation of Section 4 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.

Northwest Airlines V. Chiong, G.R. No. 155550, January 31,

2008.
Facts:
Respondent Steven Chiong was supposed to depart for San Diego,
California for an employment as an engineer of TransOcean’s vessel M/V
Elbia. Thus, on April 1, 1989, Chiong arrived at the Manila International
Airport. Marilyn Calvo, the Liaison Officer of Philimare (Philippine agent
of TransOcean), met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two
proceeded to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Counter to present
Chiong’s seaman service record book for clearance. Thereafter, Chiong’s
passport was duly stamped, after complying with government
requirements for departing seafarers. Chiong proceeded to queue at the
Northwest (the airline) check-in counter. When it was Chiong’s turn, the
Northwest personnel informed him that his name did not appear in the
computer’s list of confirmed departing passengers. Chiong was then
directed to speak to a "man in barong" standing outside Northwest’s
counters from whom Chiong could allegedly obtain a boarding pass.
Posthaste, Chiong approached the "man in barong" who demanded
US$100.00 in exchange therefor. Without the said amount, and anxious
to board the plane, Chiong queued a number of times at Northwest’s
Check-in Counter and presented his ticket. Ultimately, he was not able
to depart for San Diego.

Thus, Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of contract of carriage before

the RTC. Northwest contradicted, reiterating that Chiong had no cause
of action against it because per its records, Chiong was a "no-show"
passenger.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chiong was able to prove by preponderance of

evidence his claim for breach of contract.
Held: YES.
In this regard, the Court notes that, in addition to his testimony,
Chiong’s evidence consisted of a Northwest ticket for the April 1, 1989
Flight No. 24, Chiong’s passport and seaman service record book duly
stamped at the PCG counter, and the testimonies of Calvo, Florencio
Gomez, and Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration (POEA)
personnel who all identified the signature and stamp of the PCG on
Chiong’s passport.

It is of no moment that Chiong’s witnesses – who all corroborated his

testimony on his presence at the airport on, and flight details for, April
1, 1989, and that he was subsequently bumped-off – are, likewise,
employees of Philimare which may have an interest in the outcome of
this case. We intoned in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, thus:

This Court has repeatedly held that a witness’ relationship

to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of
his or her testimony. While this principle is often applied in
criminal cases, we deem that the same principle may apply in this
case, albeit civil in nature. If a witness’ relationship with a
party does not ipso facto render him a biased witness in
criminal cases where the quantum of evidence required is
proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no reason why
the same principle should not apply in civil cases where
 the quantum of evidence is only preponderance of
evidence.

The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence, taken together,

amply establish the fact that Chiong was present at MIA on April 1,
1989, passed through the PCG counter without delay, proceeded to the
Northwest check-in counter, but when he presented his confirmed ticket
thereat, he was not issued a boarding pass, and ultimately barred from
boarding Northwest Flight No. 24 on that day.

Northwest likewise insists – now that there is a pending criminal case for
False Testimony against Chiong – that a falsified part of Chiong’s
testimony would indicate the falsity of his entire testimony, consistent
with the "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus " doctrine. Following
Northwest’s flawed logic, this would invariably lead to the conclusion
that the corroborating testimonies of Chiong’s witnesses are also false.

The legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, cited by Northwest, is

not a positive rule of law and is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction.
Before this maxim can be applied, the witness must be shown to have
willfully falsified the truth on one or more material points. The principle
presupposes the existence of a positive testimony on a material point
contrary to subsequent declarations in the testimony. However, the
records show that Chiong’s testimony did not contain inconsistencies on
what occurred on April 1, 1989. Yet, Northwest never even attempted to
explain or impugn the evidence that Chiong passed through the PCG
counter on April 1, 1989, and that his passport was accordingly
stamped, obviously for purposes of his departure on that day.

As to the criminal case, it is well to note that there is no final

determination, as yet, of Chiong’s guilt by the courts. But even if Chiong
is adjudged guilty, it will have little effect on the outcome of this case.
As we held in Leyson v. Lawa:

The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety

instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a
testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a
conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts
established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross
and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered.
 It must be stressed that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in
answer to one question may be supplied or explained as qualified
by his answer to other question. The principle falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. The
doctrine deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a
positive rule of law, and the same is not an inflexible one of
universal application. The testimony of a witness can be believed
as to some facts and disbelieved as to others.

From the foregoing disquisition, the ineluctable conclusion is that

Northwest breached its contract of carriage with Chiong.

Time and again, we have declared that a contract of carriage, in this

case, air transport, is primarily intended to serve the traveling public and
thus, imbued with public interest. The law governing common carriers
consequently imposes an exacting standard of conduct. As the aggrieved
party, Chiong only had to prove the existence of the contract and the
fact of its non-performance by Northwest, as carrier, in order to be
awarded compensatory and actual damages.

Mancol, Jr. v. DBP, G.R. No. 204289, November 22, 2017

Facts:

respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), scheduled an

Invitation to Bid for Negotiated Sale over a residential lot with a two-
storey building (subject property) covered by TCT and with Tax
Declaration  with a purchase price of P1,326,000.

In line with this, Fernando Mancol, Jr. (petitioner) executed a Special

Power of Attorney (SPA) appointing his father, Fernando Mancol, Sr.
(Mancol, Sr.), to represent and negotiate, on his behalf, the sale of the
subject property. Pursuant to the SPA, Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated
Offer to Purchase and Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition
of Assets on a First-Come First Served Basis. DBP then issued an Official
Receipt (O.R.) No. 3440018 dated October 13, 2004, in the name of
Fernando R. Mancol, Jr., paid by Fernando M. Mancol, Sr., in the amount
of P265,200, as initial payment for the purchase price of the subject
property. During the negotiations, DBP officials allegedly agreed, albeit
verbally, to: (1) arrange and effect the transfer of title of the lot in
petitioner's name, including the payment of capital gains tax (CGT); and
(2) to get rid of the occupants of the subject property.

Petitioner paid the balance in the amount of P1,060,800, Thereafter,

DBP, through its executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, in petitioner's favor.
Petitioner made a deposit with DBP for the payment of the CGT and
documentary stamp tax (DST) in the amount of P99,450. DBP
acknowledged the deposit and issued O.R. No. 3440537.
Years later, DBP reneged on its undertaking based on the oral
agreement, returned to the petitioner all the pertinent documents of the
sale and issued a Manager's Check. Petitioner filed a Complaint for
damages for breach of contract against DBP before the RTC of Calbayog
City.

DBP answered that the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale stated no
condition that DBP will work on the document of transfer and to eject
the occupants thereon.

During trial, testified that he was the one ordered by the DBP to bring
the necessary documents to BIR-Catbalogan. Mancol, Sr. testified that
after the execution and delivery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, DBP
verbally agreed to facilitate the transfer of the title, the payment of
the CGT, and to cause the vacation of the occupants of the house and
lot.

The RTC Decision ruled in favor of the petitioner,

Thereafter, DBP moved for the reconsideration of the RTC's Decision.

DBP alleged, among others, that the testimonies of Villanueva and
Mancol, Sr. were hearsay because their statements were based on facts
relayed to them by other people and not based on their personal
knowledge.
The RTC Order granted DBP's motion and dismissed petitioner's
complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, Villanueva and
Mancol, Sr., should be given probative value to establish the alleged
contemporaneous verbal agreement in the sale contract.

Held: NO
This notwithstanding, We stress that the admissibility of the testimonial
evidence as an exception to the parol evidence rule does not necessarily
mean that it has weight. Admissibility of evidence should not be
confounded with its probative value.

"The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and

competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade." The admissibility
of a particular item of evidence has to do with whether it meets various
tests by which its reliability is to be determined, so as to be considered
with other evidence admitted in the case in arriving at a decision as to
the truth. The weight of evidence is not determined mathematically by
the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact, but
depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief on the part of the
judge trying the case. "Admissibility refers to the question of whether
certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative
value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an
issue." "Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided by the rules of evidence."

It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts
that he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., those which are
derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify on what he
merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of
what he has learned, read or heard. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not
of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from
others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise
applies to written statements.
The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed
fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot
be called upon for that purpose because his testimony derives its value
not from the credit accorded to him as a witness presently testifying but
from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of his
information.