EN BANC

September 5, 2017

A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC

Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City.,

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This administrative matter refers to the report on the preliminary results of the spot audit conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City.

The Factual Antecedents

On April 26, 2016, the OCA sent a team to conduct a spot audit of search warrant applications raffled to Branch 170, due to persistent reports pertaining to the
alleged irregular issuance of search warants by Presiding Judge Zaldy B. Docena (Judge Docena).

The Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit

On May 26, 2016, the OCA submitted to the Court its Report 1 dated May 23, 2016 on the preliminary results of the spot audit. In the Report, the OCA made the
following observations:

First, a total of 938 applications for search warrants were filed before the RTC of Malabon City from January 2015 up to April 13, 2016. These applications were
distributed among the following judges: Judge Docena, Branch 170, with 761 applications; then Executive Judge Celso Raymundo L. Magsino, Jr. (Judge Magsino),
Branch 74, with 175 applications; and Judge Jimmy Edmund G. Batara (Judge Batara), Branch 172, with two applications. 2

Second. the RTC of Malabon City exceeded the number of search warrants issued by the RTC of Manila (with 56 branches) and the RTC of Quezon City (with 48
branches), notwithstanding the fact that the latter courts are allowed to issue search warrants which are enforceable nationwide. 3
The data provided by the Statistical Reports Division of the Court Management Office show the number of search warrants issued by selected RTCs in the National
Capital Judicial Region from January 2015 up to March 2016: 4

NUMBER OF SEARCH
ISSUING COURT
WARRANTS ISSUED

RTC of Malabon City 763

RTC of Manila 675

RTC of Makati City 75

RTC of Quezon City 68

RTC of Pasig City 9

Third, out of the 761 applications assigned to Branch 170, Judge Docena issued 113 search warrants which are enforceable outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
RTC of Malabon City, viz:5

PLACE WHERE SEARCH JUDICIAL REGION SEARCH

WARRANTS WERE WARRANTS
ENFORCED ISSUED

National Capital 46
Manila
Judicial Region

National Capital
Makati City 16
Judicial Region
 National Capital
Pasig City 14
Judicial Region

National Capital
Quezon City 8
Judicial Region

National Capital
Taguig City 7
Judicial Region

National Capital
Mandaluyong City 6
Judicial Region

National Capital
Pasay City 4
Judicial Region

National Capital
Caloocan City 3
Judicial Region

National Capital
Valenzuela City 2
Judicial Region

National Capital
Parañaque City 2
Judicial Region

National Capital
Muntinlupa City 1
Judicial Region

Laguna 4th Judicial Region 1

TOTAL 113
The OCA found this to be in violation of Section 2(a) of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides that an application for a search warrant shall be filed with
"[a]ny court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed." 6

Fourth, Judge Docena issued 418 search warrants which are also enforceable outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City, but this time the
applicants specifically invoked Section 2(b) of Rule 126 which allows, for compelling reasons, the filing of the application with any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed or where the warrant shall be enforced. 7

The OCA, however, pointed out that said search warrant applications merely cited the bare allegations of possible leakage of information and/or that the person
subject of the application is influential in the area, or has friends working in the local government offices and the courts.8

Fifth, Branch 170 has admitted returns on search warrants where the seizing officer did not proceed with the operation because of new developments and/or
information that the subject has already moved out, when the proper procedure is for the applicant to file a motion to set aside the search warrant.9

There are also several cases where the returns have yet to be submitted to the court despite the lapse of the 10-day period within which to do so. The OCA
considered this to be a failure on the part of Branch 170 "to ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, [to] summon the person to whom the warrant was
issued and require him to explain why no return was made."10

And sixth, the OCA noted that Branch 170:

a) x x x issues search warrants even [though] the application is not accompanied with pertinent papers to establish that the applicant [had] conducted a surveillance
prior to the filing of said application x x x;

b) x x x issues search warrants even when the authority of the head of the agency to file the application is a mere photocopy;

c) [admits] mere photocopies of the inventory of the seized items and inventories that are not under oath; and,

d) x x x always grants custody of the seized items to the applicant and/or his agency for forensic examination or due to lack of space in the court premises. 11

Upon the OCA's recommendation, the Court issued a Resolution 12 dated May 31, 2016 placing Judge Docena under immediate preventive suspension for a period
of six months. Thus:

x x x The Court resolved, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), to:

(a) PREVENTIVELY SUSPEND, effective immediately, effective immediately, Judge Zaldy B. Docena, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 170, Malabon City, for six (6)
months pending the completion of a more comprehensive and detailed investigation on the issuance of search warrants;

(b) RELIEVE Judge Celso Raymundo L. Magsino, Jr., Branch 74, same court, from his duties as Executive Judge of RTC, Malabon City, and INCLUDE him IN THE
INVESTIGATION in view of the apparent irregularity in the raffle of applications for search warrants;
(c) DESIGNATE Judge Jimmy Edmund G. Batara, Branch 72, same court, and Judge Emmanuel D. Laurea, Branch 169, same court, as Executive Judge and Vice-
Executive Judge, respectively, of RTC, Malabon City; and

(d) DIRECT the OCA to IMMEDIATELY SEAL/SECURE all records/folders pertaining to applications for search warrant received by Judge Docena.

Let this resolutiion be personally and immediately served on the parties concerned. x x x 13

In compliance with the May 31, 2016 Resolution of the Court, the OCA's Audit Team conducted an investigation on the raffle of applications for and issuance of
search warrants in the R TC of Malabon City. The investigation was thereafter concluded on June 17, 2016.

The Result of the Investigation

In a Memorandum14 dated August 4, 2016, the Audit Team submitted the result of the investigation to Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez.

On the Distribution/Raffle of Search Warrant Applications

The Audit Team noted that only two out of the five branches15 in the RTC of Malabon City, specifically, Branches 74 and 170, took cognizance of search warrant
applications, as Branches 72 (Drugs Court), 73 (Family Court), and 169 (Family Court and Agrarian Court) which exclusively handle drugs and family court cases,
respectively, are not included in the raffle of said applications.16

The distribution of applications for search warrants in the RTC of Malabon City from January 2015 up to May 10, 2016 is as follows:17

BRANCH/JUDGE APPLICATIONS RECEIVED

Branch 170 (Judge Docena) 795

Branch 74 (Judge Magsino) 185

- Involving ordinary criminal cases (152)
(received by raffle)
(33)
- Involving special criminal cases
(received in his s,apacity as
Executive Judge)

Branch 72 (Judge Batara) 4 4

- Involving special criminal cases
(received in his capacity as the Vice
 Executive Judge)

TOTAL 984

According to Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon (Atty. Dizon), Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), this distribution system is in accordance with their internal
policies on the raffle of cases.18 The pertinent portions of said internal policies are quoted as follows:

INTERNAL OFFICE MEMO

TO: CLERK IN CHARGE OF RAFFLE (Millet/Pam, Mark, Paul)

RE: SW/TRO/TPO
DATE: MAY 2014

Per executive session with the Executive Judge, the following are the innovations with respect to raflling:

xxx

3. Raffle of TRO/TPO/SW shall be special and shall reqmre notices/Returns/complete documentation and presence of witness/applicant in case of SW;

4. Due to its confidentiality, only the Clerk of Court and the Clerk In Charge sha11 receive any application for SW. Raffle of this nature shall be held at the
chambers/office of the EJNice EJ and only the ordinary courts (170 and 74) are eligible for raffle unless the nature subject of application falls exclusively under the
powers of EJ or in his absence, the Vice EJ;

5. Ratio of cases between the EJ and Branch 170 shall be in accordance with the Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of EJs (A.M. 03-8- 02-SC) which is 2 :3;

6. SW shall be raffled on 1:2 daily basis and counted per applicant. Since Br. 74 is also the EJ, then, SW shall be raffled exclusively to the remaining ordinary court
when the EJ is on official leave, official business, official meeting.

xxx

(Sgd.)
ATTY. ESMERALDA G. DIZON
Clerk of Court VI19
After a thorough examination of the records of the OCC, the Audit Team concluded that the RTC ofMalabon City failed to observe the existing rules in the
distribution of search warrant applications involving ordinary criminal cases as provided in Chapter V of the Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of
Executive Judges.20

The Audit Team cited three instances where the raffle of search warrant applications was clearly inequitable:

a) in January 2016, Branch 170 received all 16 search warrant applications filed in the RTC ofMalabon City;21

b) in February 2016, 44 search warrant applications were assigned to Branch 170, while only five ordinary criminal cases were given to Branch 74·22 and ' '

c) in March 2016, 87 search warrant applications went to Branch 170, while only three ordinary criminal cases were raffled to Branch 74.23

In addition, the Audit Team also made the following observations:

First, the application docketed as SW16-183 was raffled to Branch 170, when it should have been directly assigned to the Executive Judge as it involved violations
of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, or the law on the illegal possession
of firearms.24

Second, it could not be ascertained whether a special raffle for applications for search warrant was actually conducted in the RTC of Malabon City because the OCC
did not prepare the minutes of the raffle.25

Third, there are discrepancies between the date of receipt of some search. warrant applications appearing in the OCC's logbook and the date stamped on the face
of said applications as received by Branch 170.26

For instance, SW15-120-MN appears to have been received by the OCC on May 6, 2015 at 9:00 a.m. and thereafter raffled to Branch 170 on the same ,day, based
on the date stamped on the face of the application.27 However,1 the case was recorded in the OCC's logbook only on May 7, 2015.28 The corresponding search
warrant was also issued on May 7, 2015.29

The same observation is true for the following applications: SW15- 427 to SW15-432 - logged as filed with the OCC on September 9, 2015,30 but the applications
were all stamped received on September 8, 2015 at 10:30 a.m.; 31and SW15-592 to SW15-596 - logged as filed with the OCC on November 27, 2015,32 but the
applications were stamped received on November 26, 2015, at 1 :00 p.m.33

And fourth, there are cases where the caption of search warrant applications already indicates that it is being filed with Branch 170, and typewritten at the bottom
of the applications is the name of Judge Docena to whom the application would be subscribed and sworn to. 34

On the Issuance of Search Warrants by Branch 170

The Audit Team noted that Judge Docena granted all 790 search warrant applications raffled to Branch 170 from January 2015 up to May 10, 2016, and 19235 of
which are John/Jane Doe search warrants. Out of the 790 search warrants issued, 442 or 55.95% thereof have yielded negative results, remained unserved, or were
otherwise never returned to the court.36

The Audit Team also found that Judge Docena granted 758 search warrant applications even though the places of commission of the crimes involved therein were
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City. Out of 758 applications, 37 130 had completely failed to cite compelling reasons to warrant their filing
in the RTC of Malabon City.38 Thus:

PLACES WHERE NO WITH TOTAL

SEARCH COMPELLING COMPELLING
WARRANTS REASON REASON
ENFORCEBLE

Laguna 1 - 1

Caloocan City 7 8 15

Las Piñas City - 6 6

Makati City 18 170 188

Mandaluyong City 6 13 19

Manila 54 116 170

Muntinlupa City 1 15 16

Parañaque City 2 65 67

Pasay City 6 75 81

Pasig City 15 68 83
 Quezon City 11 50 61

Taguig City 7 33 40

Valenzuela City 2 9 11

TOTAL 130 62839 758

The Audit Team likewise observed that there are instances where the compelling reasons cited by the applicant appear to be without merit, and Judge Docena
failed to ask the required probing and exhaustive inquiry on the veracity of the compelling reason invoked. 40

In addition to its preliminary findings, the Audit Team pointed out the following irregularities pertaining to Judge Docena's issuance of search warrants:

a) There are search warrants that were issued ahead of the date of filing of the application. 41

b) Judge Docena is the signatory of the jurat of all the applications for search warrants before Branch 170. In some cases, the signature appearing thereon is not his
customary signature.42

c) There are some applications that are not under oath although the affidavits were signed by Judge Docena. 43

d) Page 3 of the application in SWl 5-588 is missing, but Judge Docena signed on another page containing the sketch of the place to be searched. 44

e) Judge Docena signed the jurat of some affidavits of witnesses, despite the lack of signature of the affiant. 45

f) Some affidavits of witnesses are replicated, where only the dates and the addresses relating to the supposed surveillance are changed.46

g) Judge Docena has admitted as proof of surveillance the attachment of a map and pictures of the door of the unit to be searched, as well as the screen of a
computer.47

The Audit Team also noted several lapses in the management of case records in Branch 170:

a) Case records have no minutes of the proceedings.48

b) There were two sets of stenographic notes found in 16 search warrant applications. 49

c) In most applications, there are no searching questions and answers in writing and under oath, in violation of Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 50
d) The search warrant case folders of Branch 170 are not paginated.51

e) In cases where an applicant filed several search warrant applications, some of the documents attached are not original copies.52

f) Case folders are not properly stitched, and some folders loose pages. Other folders, too, are merely attached using fasteners.53

g) Stenographic notes are not attached to the records. 54

h) Transcripts of stenographic notes are similarly not attached to the records. 55

i) Branch 170 does not maintain a logbook where entries shall be made within 24 hours after the issuance of the search warrant.56

Issuance of Search Warrants by Branch 74

The Audit Team noted that Judge Magsino also granted a considerable number of search warrant applications from January 2015 up to May 10, 2016, where the
offenses involved were committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC ofMalabon City. 57 Thus:58

PLACES WHERE
NO WITH
SEARCH
COMPELLING COMPELLING TOTAL
WARRANTS
REASON REASON
ENFORCEBLE

Rizal 1 - 1

Caloocan City 1 1 2

Makati City - 35 35

Mandaluyong City 13 2 15

Manila 1 18 19

Marikina City - 2 2
 Muntinlupa City - 2 2

Parañaque City 7 10 17

Pasay City - 16 16

Pasig City 4 10 14

Quezon City 3 3 6

Taguig City 3 7 10

TOTAL 33 106 139

Nevertheless, the Audit Team found no patent irregularities in Judge Magsino's issuance of search warrants assigned to Branch 74,59 considering that:

1. There is no instance where the date of receipt by the OCC and the date ofraftle of the search warrant application to Branch 74, as stamp the face of the
application, are ahead of the date recorded in the logbook of the OCC. 60

2. There is also no instance where the date of the search warrant issued is ahead of the date of filing of the application in court.61

3. The minutes of the proceedings are attached to the case records, but the contents are not complete. 62

4. Aside from the issuance of search warrants, Judge Magsino also issues an order stating, among others, that the court conducted a hearing and examined the
applicant and his witness/informant.63

5. The stenographic notes are all attached to the records, although some have yet to be transcribed. 64

6. Branch 74 observes the guidelines on the custody of computer data under Sections 15 and 16, Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 10175, or the Cybercrime
Prevention Act. 65

For these reasons, the Audit Team no longer discussed the details of the rest of the acts and omissions of Branch 74.
In its 1st Indorsement66 dated September 27, 2016, the OCA directed Judge Docena and Judge Magsino, as well as the concerned court personnel, to submit their
comments on the final report of the Audit Team.

Judge Docena's Comment

In his Comment67 dated October 28, 2016, Judge Docena submits that he granted the search warrant applications before him "in the good faith belief that there
was probable cause for their issuance and in compliance with law and procedure." 68

Judge Docena clarifies that he had no control over which search warrant applications will be filed in the RTC of Malabon City, much less those that will be raffled to
Branch 170. Neither does he or the court personnel under him have any hand in the implementation of the search warrants issued by him or the outcome or results
thereof. 70

Judge Docena likewise contends that there is nothing irregular in his issuance of 192 John/Jane Doe search warrants, considering that the crimes involved therein
are mostly violations of the Cybercrime Prevention Act and the £-Commerce Act, where there is indeed difficulty in obtaining the identities of the alleged
perpetrators. 71

As for his issuance of search warrants involving crimes committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City, Judge Docena denies having
violated Section 2(a) of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02, given that the issuance of search warrants is inherent in all
courts and venue in search warrant applications is merely procedural and not jurisdictional. 72

Judge Docena further argues that he "cannot consider the issues of absence of compelling reasons in the [search warrant] application[s], and improper venue mo
tu proprio to deny [said] applications outright," as "these have to be raised by the respondent/accused in a motion to quash."73 And as for those respondents in
the search warrants who did not question the venue of the pertinent search warrant applications, they should be deemed to have waived said defense and
considered to have acquiesced to the venue of said applications.74

In addition, Judge Docena maintains that "he granted the search warrant applications in the good faith belief that there is merit to the compelling reasons provided
by the applicants." He insists that "this determination should be respected unless it is shown that [he] is guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction."75

Judge Docena also explains that "the rule requiring judges to conduct a probing and exhaustive inquiry is applicable only to the determination of probable cause"
and not to the compelling reasons cited by an applicant in a search warrant application, 76 as the existence of compelling reasons does not relate to the existence
of probable cause which is the basis for the issuance of the search warrant. 77

While Judge Docena admits that there are search warrants that appear to have been issued ahead of the date of filing of their respective applications, he argues
that the incorrect dates on said warrants are typographical errors which are attributable to honest mistake and inadvertence.78 He claims that Branch 170 uses
previous documents as templates in order to save time and effort,79 and he surmises that the dates in the orders pertaining to some search warrant applications
were unfortunately not properly edited to reflect the correct date. 80

Finally, Judge Docena begs the Court for understanding and leniency for his failure to properly monitor the submission of returns of the search warrants he issued
and to summon those applicants who have yet to file their respective returns, given the extraordinarily high number of search warrants raffled to Branch 170. 81
Recommendations of the OCA

In a Memorandum82 dated February 20, 2017, the OCA made the following recommendations:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:

1. Hon. CELSO R. L. MAGSINO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 74, Malabon City, and then Executive Judge, RTC, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of (a) violation
of Supreme Court rules and circulars concerning the raffle of search warrant applications, and Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and Section 12, Chapter V of
the Guidelines in the Selection and Designation of 1'.,xecutive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties on the issuance of search warrants, and
Section 12(b ), Rule 126, Rules of Court on, among others, the filing of the returns; and (b) inefficiency in the performance of his duties as Presiding Judge of Branch
74, same court, and FINED in the amount of ₱20,000.00;

2. Atty. ESMERALDA G. DIZON, Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and SUSPENDED from
the service for six (6) months, effective immediately;

3. Hon. ZALDY B. DOCENA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 170, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law, gross negligence, and gross
misconduct and DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from re-employment in
any government institution;

4. Atty. JESUS S. HERNANDEZ, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 170, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and SUSPENDED from the
service for six (6) months, effective immediately;

5. MS. OLIVIA M. LABAGNAO, MS. DEBHEM E. FARDO, MS. ROSARIO [M. SAN PEDRO], and MS. GIGI M. MENDOZA, Court Stenographers, and MS.
ZENAIDA Z. SALONGA, Clerk-in-Charge, all of RTC, Branch 170, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and ADMONISHED to be more diligent
and circumspect in the performance of their duties; and

6. Atty. EVELYN M. LOZANO-AGUILAR, Branch Clerk of Court, MA. ALICIA C. MALUBAY, Court Interpreter, and DALISAY C. CASUGA, MYRA D. SANTOS,
SHERREE ANN R. RUZGAL, MA. THERESA P. REYES, Court Stenographers, all of RTC, Branch 74, Malabon City, be REMINDED to henceforth strictly comply with
existing court issuances on search warrants without necessarily giving up their endeavor to preserve the confidentiality of the information in the records.

Considering the herein recommendation of the OCA that Judge Docena be dismissed from the service, and considering further that the preventive suspension of
Judge Docena will in the meantime expire on 1 March 2017, it is likewise hereby recommended that the PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of Judge Docena expiring on 1
March 2017 BE INDEFINITELY EXTENDED until such time the Court has resolved this administrative matter.

In a Resolution83 dated February 28, 2017, the Court extended the preventive suspension of Judge Docena for another three (3) months reckoned from March 1,
2017. Finally, on June 20, 2017, the Court resolved to extend Judge Docena's suspension until such time that this administrative matter would have been resolved. 84

The Court's Ruling

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides for the proper venue where applications for search warrant should be filed:

SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime
is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.85

It is settled that the inclusion of a statement of compelling reasons in a search warrant application that is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction
over the place of commission of the alleged crime is a mandatory requirement, and the absence of such statement renders the application defective.86

The absence of a statement of compelling reasons, however, is not a ground for the outright denial of a search warrant application, since it is not one of the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant. Section 4 of Rule 126 is clear on this point:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.87

In other words, the statement of compelling reasons is only a mandatory requirement in so far as the proper venue for the filing of search warrant application is
concerned. It cannot be viewed as an additional requisite for the issuance of a search warrant.

It is also important to stress that an application for a search warrant merely constitutes a criminal process and is not in itself a criminal action.88 The rule, therefore,
that venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases does not apply thereto.89 Simply stated, venue is only procedural, and not jurisdictional, in applications for the
issuance of a search warrant.

In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Romars International Gases Corporation,90 the Court ruled that the issue on the absence of a statement of compelling
reasons in an application for a search warrant does not involve a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter, as the power to issue search warrants
is inherent in all courts.91 Thus, the trial court may only take cognizance of such issue if it is raised in a timely motion to quash the search warrant.
Otherwise, the objection shall be deemed waived, pursuant to the Omnibus Motion Rule. 92

Consequently, the Court in Pilipinas Shell upheld the validity of the questioned search warrants despite the lack of a statement of compelling reasons in their
respective applications,93 as the objection was not properly raised in a motion to quash.94

Note, too, that the determination of the existence of compelling reasons under Section 2(b) of Rule 126 is a matter squarely addressed to the sound discretion of
the court where such application is filed, subject to review by an appellate court in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. 95
Clearly, this administrative proceeding is not the proper forum to review the search warrants issued by Judge Docena and Judge Magsino in order to determine
whether the compelling reasons cited in their respective applications are indeed meritorious.

Given these circumstances, we cannot agree with the OCA's findings that Judge Docena and Judge Magsino violated Section 2 of Rule 126 by simply issuing search
warrants involving crimes committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City where: a) there is no compelling reason to take cognizance of
the applications; and b) the compelling reasons alleged in the applications appear to be unmeritorious. 96

It is obvious that Judge Docena and Judge Magsino simply exercised the trial court's ancillary jurisdiction over a special criminal process97 when they took
cognizance of the applications and issued said search warrants. And as previously discussed, the propriety of the issuance of these warrants is a matter that should
have been raised in a motion to quash or in a certiorari petition, if there are allegations of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the issuing judge.

The Administrative Liabilities

To hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, it
must be shown that his acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice.98 Absent such
proof, the judge is fresumed to have acted in good faith in exercising his judicial functions.99

In this case, the OCA found Judge Docena's issuance of the subject search warrants to have been motivated by bad faith, 100
as evidenced by the following
attendant circumstances:

First, the high incidence of search warrant operations that yielded negative results, remained unserved, or otherwise were never returned to the court;101

Second, Judge Docena appears to have thrown leading questions during the examination of the applicant and the witness in SW16-257 and SW14-134;102

Third, four search warrants issued by Judge Docena, i.e. Search Warrant Nos. 13-160-MN, 13-161-MN, MN-13-162, and MN-13-163, have been nullified by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132860 for insufficiency of the compelling reasons alleged in the search warrant applications; 103

And fourth, there were search warrants that appear to have been issued ahead of the dates of filing of their respective applications; search warrants that were
released to the witness instead of the applicant; and search warrants which were issued on the date of filing of the application, but appear to have been received by
the applicant a day in advance.104

We are not convinced. These circumstances alone are clearly insufficient to overturn the presumption that Judge Docena acted in good faith in issuing the subject
search warrants.

For one thing, it is unfair to hold the low rate of success of search warrant operations against Judge Docena, given that the courts have absolutely no participation
in the implementation of the search warrants that they issue.1âwphi1

For another, it is a grave error to consider the CA's nullification of four search warrants issued by Judge Docena as an indication that all warrants issued by him
suffer from the same infirmity. After all, not every mistake or error of judgment of a judge in the performance of his official duties makes him liable therefor. 105
Nevertheless, we find sufficient evidence to hold Judge Docena administratively liable for gross neglect of duty for the serious mismanagement of search warrant
applications in Branch 170.

Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. -

a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to
whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether Section 11
of this Rule has been complied with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been
complied with.

c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the
result, and other actions of the judge.106

The records show that Judge Docena has failed to properly monitor the submission of returns as required under Section 12 (b) and (c) of Rule 126, considering
that:

1. the returns on 172 search warrants107 have yet to be submitted, and Judge Docena failed to summon each of the 39 applicants thereof to court to explain why no
return was made.108

2. 350 returns109 were filed by applicants well beyond the 10-day period to do so, with the delay ranging from 11 days up to six months and five days (in SW 15-
477).110

3. 43 returns111 were not immediately acted upon, with the delay ranging from one month and 22 days up to five months and 12 days (in SW 15-435).112

4. 29 returns 113 have yet to be acted upon.

Judge Docena likewise committed several lapses in ascertaining whether Section 12(a) of Rule 126 was complied with by the applicants in: a) SW 15-503-MN,
where mere photocopies of the inventory of the seized items were submitted; 114 b) in SW 16-286-MN, where the inventories are not under oath and the signatures
of the witnesses are unidentifiable because their printed names are not indicated in the inventory; 115 and c) in SW 16- 273-MN, where only one witness signed the
inventory sheet.116

We also find that Judge Docena failed to comply with his administrative responsibilities under Rules 3.08 and 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provide:

RULE 3.08 - A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the
performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
RULE 3.09 - A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.117

as it appears that the concerned court personnel in Branch 170, namely Atty. Jesus S. Hernandez (Atty. Hernandez), the Branch Clerk of Court, Ms. Zenaida Z.
Salonga, the Clerk-in-Charge, together with Ms. Olivia M. Labagnao, Ms. Rosario M. San Pedro, Ms. Debhem N. Fajardo, and Ms. Gigi M. Mendoza, all court
stenographers, too, are all guilty of simple neglect of duty for failure to diligently perform their respective administrative duties.

Atty. Hernandez, as the administrative officer in Branch 170, fell short of the diligence and care required of him in the following instances:

a. Case records have no minutes of the proceedings.118

b. Some search warrants are incorrectly dated, thus making it appear that they were issued ahead of the date of filing of their respective applications. 119

c. Some search warrants were handed over to the witnesses instead of the applicants.120

d. There is no date and time of receipt of the case folder by Branch 170 on the face of the search warrant applications.121 e. The search warrant case folders in
Branch 170 are not paginated.122

f. In several applications, some documents attached thereto are not original copies. 123

g. Case folders are not property stitched, and some folders have loose pages. Other folders, too, are merely attached using fasteners.124

The court stenographers were likewise remiss in the performance of their duties under Section 17, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, given that they failed to produce
a total of 34 stenographic notes or seven sets of consolidated notes, and to properly label their stenographic notes.125 It also appears that they only prepared
transcripts of stenographic notes upon request of the applicants.126

As for the Clerk-in-Charge, she clearly violated Section 12(c) of Rule 126,127 when she unjustifiably failed to maintain the required log book for search warrant
applications in Branch 170.

It is settled that "[a] judge presiding over a branch of a court is, in legal contemplation, the head thereof having effective control and authority to discipline all
employees within the branch."128 Consequently, Judge Docena shares accountability for the administrative lapses of his staff that contributed to the clearly
disorganized and inefficient dispatch of business in Branch 170.

Finally, we hold Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon administratively liable for simple misconduct, in their capacities as the Executive Judge and the Clerk of Court of
the RTC of Malabon, respectively, for imposing their own internal policies and practices129 in lieu of the existing rules in the raffle of applications involving ordinary
cases covered by Chapter V of the Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties
(Guidelines).
To be specific, Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon failed to observe the pertinent portion of Section 6 of the Guidelines which requires the search warrant applications
assigned to a branch during the special raffle to be deducted from the number of cases allotted to on the next scheduled regular raffle. This, however, was not
implemented in the RTC of Malabon City.130

Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon also failed to observe the proper ratio of the raffling of cases prescribed under par. 1, Chapter V of Administrative Order No. 6
dated June 30, 1975,131 which states:

V. CASELOAD AND HONORARIUM

1. The caseload of the Executive Judge shall be as follows:

xxxx

c. In case of multiple branches (salas) of more than five (5), the distribution of cases shall be in the proportion of one (1) case for the Executive Judge and two
(2) for each of the other judges.132

Their use of an improvised system of counting the applicants (instead of the applications) 133 in the special raffle is simply unacceptable, as the Executive Judge,
much less the Clerk of Court, has absolutely no discretion to deviate from the prescribed ratio for the raffling of cases without prior approval from this Court.

This resulted in an inequitable distribution of search warrant applications between Branches 170 and 74 at a ratio of almost 6:1, or a six out of seven chance that an
application will be raffled to Branch 170, thereby removing the unpredictability of the raffling process, so much so that some applicants already indicate that their
applications are being filed with Branch 170.134

The Penalties

On the one hand, gross neglect of duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, in so far as other persons
may be affected. x x x In case involving public officials, [there is gross negligence] when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable."135

It is important to stress, however, that the term "gross neglect of duty" does not necessarily include willful neglect or intentional wrongdoing. It can also arise from
situations where "such neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character" that it ends up endangering or
threatening the public welfare.136

In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or
indifference.137

Under Section 46(A), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave
offense punishable by dismissal from the service (even for the first offense), while simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense, punishable by suspension without
pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense.
In this case, we find the gravity of Judge Docena's neglect in the performance of his duties to be so serious in character that the Court may unquestionably impose
against him the penalty of dismissal from the service.

Nevertheless, we take into consideration his length of service of thirty (30) years in various sectors of the government, with eight (8) years spent rendering service
in the Judiciary as a Technical Assistant in the Supreme Court from 1985 to 1987 and as an RTC Judge from 2010 up to present, 138 his candid admission of his lapses
and his commitment to undertake stringent steps to address the matters brought to his attention by the OCA 139 as mitigating factors that serve to temper the penalty
to be imposed upon him.140 We also note that this is Judge Docena's first time to be administratively sanctioned by this Court. Thus, instead of imposing the
penalty of dismissal, we deem it proper to impose against Judge Docena the penalty of suspension for two (2) years without pay.

As for Atty. Hernandez, we agree with the OCA's conclusion that he undoubtedly failed to meet the standards required of him as an effective and competent clerk
of court.141 The OCA recommended that Atty. Hernandez be suspended without pay for six (6) months. 142 We, however, modify this recommendation and reduce
the penalty to suspension without pay for one (1) month and (1) day, considering the fact that this is his first offense, 143 and the errors he committed are purely
administrative in nature and are not gross or patent.

We likewise agree with the OCA's finding that Ms. Salonga (the Clerk-in-Charge) and Ms. Labagnao, Ms. Fardo, Ms. San Pedro, and Ms. Mendoza (the court
stenographers) also failed to diligently perform their respective duties.144 Since this, too, is their first offense, we adopt the OCA's recommendation 145 and impose
the penalty of admonition that they be more circumspect in the performance of their respective duties.

On the other hand, "[m]isconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules,
which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple." 146

In this case, there is no substantial evidence to show that Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon's actions involved the elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the
law or to disregard established rules to qualify their misconduct as grave. Absent such malicious intent or bad faith on their part, they may only be held
administratively liable for simple misconduct.

Although the penalty for simple misconduct is suspension without pay of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months, 147 the RRACCS allows the payment of a
fine in place of suspension if the offense is committed without abusing the powers of one's position or office.148 Considering that this is also the first offense for
both Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon, we find the imposition of a fine of ₱20,000.00 to be proper and commensurate for their transgressions.

Four of the Justices voted for the dismissal of Judge Docena from the service.

WHEREFORE, the Court:

1. FINDS Hon. Celso R. L. Magsino, Jr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, Malabon City, and then Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Malabon
City, GUILTY of simple misconduct, and hereby orders him to pay a FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely;
2. FINDS Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,. Malabon City, GUILTY of simple misconduct, and hereby orders
her to pay a FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely;

3. FINDS Hon. Zaldy B. Docena, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, and hereby SUSPENDS him from
office for a period of two (2) years without pay, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely;

4. FINDS Atty. Jesus S. Hernandez, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, GUILTY of simple neglect of duty, and
hereby SUSPENDS him from office for a period of one (1) month without pay, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

5. FINDS Ms. Zenaida Z. Salonga, Clerk-in-Charge, and Ms. Olivia M. Labagnao, Ms. Debhem E. Fardo, Ms. Rosario M. San Pedro, and Ms. Gigi M. Mendoza, Court
Stenographers, Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, GUILTY of simple neglect of duty, and are ADMONISHED to be more diligent and circumspect in
the performance of their duties.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 161106 January 13, 2014

WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 161266

PLANET INTERNET CORP., Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision 1 dated 20 August 2003 and the Resolution2 dated 27 November
2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing the quashal of the search warrants previously issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for
warrants3 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC) 4 located at the 11th floor, IBM
Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet)5 located at UN
2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass
operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT).6

On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali
(Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.
According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should pass through the local exchange or public switch telephone network (PSTN) on to the toll
center of one of the international gateway facilities (IGFs)7 in the Philippines.8 The call is then transmitted to the other country through voice circuits, either via fiber
optic submarine cable or microwave radio using satellite facilities, and passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the destination country. The toll center would
then meter the call, which will pass through the PSTN of the called number to complete the circuit. In contrast, petitioners were able to provide international long
distance call services to any part of the world by using PLDT’s telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF. This scheme constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and
completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency which connects directly to the local or domestic exchange
facilities of the originating country or the country where the call is originated." 9

On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and registered to WWC was used to provide a service called GlobalTalk, "an internet-based
international call service, which can be availed of via prepaid or billed/post-paid accounts."10 During a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed the local PLDT
telephone number 6891135, the given access line. After a voice prompt required him to enter the user code and personal identification number (PIN) provided
under a GlobalTalk pre-paid account, he was then requested to enter the destination number, which included the country code, phone number and a pound (#)
sign. The call was completed to a phone number in Taiwan. However, when he checked the records, it showed that the call was only directed to the local number
6891135. This indicated that the international test call using GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF.

Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to WWC with address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay
San Antonio, Pasig City.11 However, upon an ocular inspection conducted by Rivera at this address, it was found that the occupant of the unit is Planet Internet,
which also uses the telephone lines registered to WWC. 12 These telephone lines are interconnected to a server and used as dial-up access lines/numbers of WWC.

Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally connected by petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed the international calls
and bypassed PLDT’s IGF, they violated Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401 as amended,13 on unauthorized installation of telephone connections. Petitioners also
committed theft, because through their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and equipment and with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole business and
revenues that rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and intent of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT,
they evaded the payment of access and bypass charges in its favor while "piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities and infrastructure, thus stealing its
business revenues from international long distance calls. Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment (CPE) without first securing type approval license from the latter.

Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of petitioners, PLDT computed a monthly revenue loss of ₱764,718.09. PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners
deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes, license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government.

During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of
particular computers and servers that would be taken. 14

On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for search warrants.15 Accordingly, the following warrants were issued against the office premises of
petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize various items:

1. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3856,16 issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
against WWC, Adriel S. Mirto, Kevin L. Tan, Cherryll L. Yu, Carmelo J. Canto, III, Ferdinand B. Masi, Message One International Corporation, Adriel S. Mirto,
Nova Christine L. Dela Cruz, Robertson S. Chiang, and Nolan B. Sison with business address at 11/F IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Cyberpark
Libis, Quezon City:
 a) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information, applying the process of the information and supplying the results of
this process;

b) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information; and c) Manuals, application forms, access codes,
billing statements, receipts, contracts, communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.

2. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3857,17 issued for violation of P.D. 401 against Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang,
Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San
Antonio, Pasig City:

a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such as computers to communicate with other data
terminal equipment via a telephone line;

b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the prescribed process of the information and supplying the
results of this process;

c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and
equipment;

d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from different sources to pass through a common cable or
transmission line;

e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of connecting telephone lines;

f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information; and

g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks, orders, communications and documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or contracts, communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.

3. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3858,18 issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
against Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with
business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:

a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such as computers to communicate with other data
terminal equipment via a telephone line;

b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the prescribed process of the information and supplying the
results of this process;
 c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and
equipment;

d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from different sources to pass through a common cable or
transmission line;

e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of connecting telephone lines;

f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information; and

g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks, orders, communications and documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or contracts, communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.

The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the National Capital Region Police Office.

Over a hundred items were seized,19 including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop
computer.20 Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls,
such as the President’s Office and the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized. Petitioners
WWC and Cherryll Yu,21 and Planet Internet22 filed their respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically the same grounds: (1) the search warrants
were issued without probable cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search
warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree."

PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition23 to the motions to quash.

In the hearing of the motions to quash on 19 October 2001, the test calls alluded to by Gali in his Affidavit were shown to have passed the IGF of Eastern
Telecommunications (Philippines) Inc. (Eastern) and of Capital Wireless (Capwire). 24 Planet Internet explained that Eastern and Capwire both provided international
direct dialing services, which Planet Internet marketed by virtue of a "Reseller Agreement." Planet Internet used PLDT lines for the first phase of the call; but for the
second phase, it used the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire. Planet Internet religiously paid PLDT for its domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its IGF
usage. None of these contentions were refuted by PLDT.

The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of general warrants. 25 Thus, the properties seized under the said
warrants were ordered released to petitioners.

PLDT moved for reconsideration,26 but its motion was denied27 on the ground that it had failed to get the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the
motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

THE CA RULING
PLDT appealed to the CA, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 26190. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the search
warrants valid and effective.28

Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling. 29 Among the points raised was that PLDT should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than an
appeal when it questioned the RTC Resolution before the CA. The appellate court denied the Motions for Reconsideration. 30

Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, 31 and Planet Internet32 to assail the CA Decision and Resolution. The Court consolidated
the two Petitions.33

ISSUES

I. Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal despite the following procedural infirmities:

1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no personality to question the quashal of the search warrants;

2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

II. Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause, considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not constitute theft.

III. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search warrants were not general warrants.

OUR RULING

I.

1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal

action; conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to
give the aggrieved party personality to question an order
quashing search warrants.

Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal of the search warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor. They argue that it
violated Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of the prosecutor.

The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of "(a)ll criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information." However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor.34
Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,35 an application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action:

The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a
criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a
criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the
issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.

For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature,
and made necessary because of a public necessity.

In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a
process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.36 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. Meanwhile, we have consistently recognized the right of parties to question orders
quashing those warrants.37 Accordingly, we sustain the CA’s ruling that the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves
for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants.

2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued

independently prior to the filing of a criminal action, partakes
of a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.

Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling on the motions to quash was interlocutory, it cannot be appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. PLDT should
have filed a Rule 65 petition instead. Petitioners cite, as authority for their position, Marcelo v. de Guzman.38 The Court held therein as follows:

But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying the motion to quash the search warrant and to return the properties seized thereunder final in character, or is it
merely interlocutory? In Cruz vs. Dinglasan, this Court, citing American jurisprudence, resolved this issue thus:

Where accused in criminal proceeding has petitioned for the return of goods seized, the order of restoration by an inferior court is interlocutory and hence, not
appealable; likewise, a denial, by the US District Court, of defendant's petition for the return of the articles seized under a warrant is such an interlocutory order. (56
C.J. 1253).

A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined; on the other hand an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more
to be done upon its merits. Tested against this criterion, the search warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is indisputably of interlocutory character because it
leaves something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein. 39

Petitioners’ reliance upon Marcelo is misplaced.

An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to
be filed.40 Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose of
determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.

Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is
still "something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein."41

In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion
for reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.

Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the applications for search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as
incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court.
Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.

II.

Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their

judicial functions. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by
reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.

Petitioners claim that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrants.

The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)

In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched." 42

There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause43 in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in
the process of exercising their judicial function.44 They determine probable cause based on "evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed" by the offender.45

When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts:
x x x. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that
the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. 46

The transcript of stenographic notes during the hearing for the application for search warrants on 25 September 2001 shows that Judge Percival Mandap Lopez
asked searching questions to the witnesses and particularly sought clarification on the alleged illegal toll bypass operations of petitioners, as well as the pieces of
evidence presented. Thus, the Court will no longer disturb the finding of probable cause by the trial judge during the hearing for the application for the search
warrants.

However, petitioners insist that the determination of the existence of probable cause necessitates the prior determination of whether a crime or an offense was
committed in the first place. In support of their contention that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants, petitioners put forward the
adage nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege – there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. Petitioners argue that there is no law punishing toll bypass, the
act complained of by PLDT. Thus, no offense was committed that would justify the issuance of the search warrants.

According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local calls and not overseas calls, thus effectively evading payment to the PLDT of access,
termination or bypass charges, and accounting rates; payment to the government of taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory requirements. PLDT concludes that
toll bypass is prohibited, because it deprives "legitimate telephone operators, like PLDT… of the compensation which it is entitled to had the call been properly
routed through its network."47 As such, toll bypass operations constitute theft, because all of the elements of the crime are present therein.

On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu argue that there is no theft to speak of, because the properties allegedly taken from PLDT partake of the
nature of "future earnings and lost business opportunities" and, as such, are uncertain, anticipative, speculative, contingent, and conditional. PLDT cannot be
deprived of such unrealized earnings and opportunities because these do not belong to it in the first place.

Upon a review of the records of the case, we understand that the Affidavits of Rivera and Gali that accompanied the applications for the search warrants charge
petitioners with the crime, not of toll bypass perse, but of theft of PLDT’s international long distance call business committed by means of the alleged toll bypass
operations.

For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown to exist: (1) the taking by petitioners (2) of PLDT’s personal property (3) with intent to
gain (4) without the consent of PLDT (5) accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or the use of force upon things.48

Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue with categorizing the earnings and business as personal properties of PLDT. However, in Laurel v. Abrogar,49 we
have already held that the use of PLDT’s communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and business:

x x x "[I]nternational long distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such
international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely
encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said
telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent.
It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone
services and business.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act
of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information describes the thing taken as, "international long
distance calls," and only later mentions "stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was derived by the accused. In order to correct this
inaccuracy of description, this case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that the
property subject of the theft are the services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in charging the
proper offense, which would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and sufficiently
apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

In Laurel, we reviewed the existing laws and jurisprudence on the generally accepted concept of personal property in civil law as "anything susceptible of
appropriation."50 It includes ownership of telephone services, which are protected by the penal provisions on theft. We therein upheld the Amended Information
charging the petitioner with the crime of theft against PLDT inasmuch as the allegation was that the former was engaged in international simple resale (ISR) or "the
unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls
directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined."51 We reasoned that since PLDT encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and
transmits telephone calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities, the use of these communications facilities without its consent constitutes
theft, which is the unlawful taking of telephone services and business. We then concluded that the business of providing telecommunications and telephone
services is personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and that the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article.

Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished without the installation of telecommunications equipment to the PLDT telephone lines.
Thus, petitioners may also be held liable for violation of P.D. 401, to wit:

Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped gas connection without previous authority from the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System, the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company , or the Manila Gas Corporation, as the case may be, tampers
and/or uses tampered water, electrical or gas meters, jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas is stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or
piped gas meters, or water, electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical or gas meters as
well as stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon conviction, be punished with prision correccional in
its minimum period or a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both . (Emphasis supplied)

The peculiar circumstances attending the situation compel us to rule further on the matter of probable cause. During the hearing of the motions to quash the
search warrants, the test calls conducted by witnesses for PLDT were shown to have connected to the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire to complete the international
calls.

A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed if the person against whom
the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or
reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause.52 In that case, the finding of probable cause is a nullity,
because the trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses.53
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search warrant.54 In this case, the
testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test calls they conducted did not pass through PLDT’s IGF are true. They neglected, however, to look into the possibility that
the test calls may have passed through other IGFs in the Philippines, which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a deliberate
falsehood. Even Planet Internet stated that the conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in the country was made "carelessly and haphazardly." 55

On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must be noted that the trial judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack of
probable cause. Instead, the issue before us is whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC, which ruled that the search warrants are general warrants.

III.

The requirement of particularity in the description of things to

be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search
warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is sought.

Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants were in the nature of general warrants because the descriptions therein of the objects to be seized are so broad
and all-encompassing as to give the implementing officers wide discretion over which articles to seize. In fact, the CA observed that the targets of the search
warrants were not illegal per se, and that they were "innocuous goods." Thus, the police officers were given blanket authority to determine whether the objects
were legal or not, as in fact even pieces of computer equipment not involved in telecommunications or Internet service were confiscated.

On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search warrant already fulfills the requirement of particularity of description when it is as specific as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow.56 Furthermore, it cites Kho v. Makalintal,57 in which the Court allowed leeway in the description of things to be seized, taking into consideration the
effort and the time element involved in the prosecution of criminal cases.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment58 filed with the CA, likewise prayed for the reversal of the quashal of the search warrants in view of the
OSG’s position that the scheme was a case of electronic theft, and that the items sought to be seized could not be described with calibrated precision. According to
the OSG, assuming that the seized items could also be used for other legitimate businesses, the fact remains that the items were used in the commission of an
offense.

A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized." 59 It is one that allows
the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.60

Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses.1âwphi1 Our Constitution guarantees our right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the most
compelling and lawful reasons.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no such search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.In furtherance of this constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, amplify the rules regarding the following
places and items to be searched under a search warrant:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:

a) Subject of the offense;

b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search warrants, the Court has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law enforcement officers in
describing the items to be searched, especially when these items are technical in nature, and when the extent of the illegal operation is largely unknown to them.
Vallejo v. Court of Appeals61 ruled as follows:

The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable
particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the
law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look
for. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is
sufficient. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule that the particularity of the description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized is required
"wherever and whenever it is feasible."62 A search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail. 63 The warrant is valid when it
enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized.64

In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were being used to pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement
officers would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent precision. In

People v. Veloso, we pronounced that "[t]he police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the
best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far-fetched judicial interference."65

A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.66
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone
services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners a d was then able to
confirm that they had utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or
switching equipment, a d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass
operations."67

In HPS Software and Communication Corp. v. PLDT,68 we upheld a s milady worded69 description of items to be seized by virtue of the search warrants, because
these items had been sufficiently identified physically and s own to bear a relation to the offenses charged. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Court of
Appeals decision dated 20 August 2003 and Resolution dated 27 November 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26190 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-97-1390 August 5, 1998

CESAR B. MERIS, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-98-1411 August 5, 1998

FRANCISCO R. HERNANDEZ, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan, was charged with various administrative offenses contained in
two (2) separate complaints, in addition to several others previously filed against him, as will be discussed hereunder.

A.M. No. RTJ-97-1390

On 16 May 1996 respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 against a certain Thomas Jay of Lalakhan, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, for illegal
possession of 3,000 board feet of narra lumber valued more or less at P360,000.00 in violation of Sec. 68, PD 705, as amended by EO 277, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The warrant was served immediately the following day. On 20 May 1996 EIIB Operation Officer
Baltazar B. Dulalia filed a Return, Compliance and Inventory (re search warrant).

On 21 May 1996 Thomas Jay filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense and
that the warrant contained averments which if true would make up legal excuses or justifications. Appended to the motion were photocopies of the
following documents: (a) Certificate of Transport Agreement issued by CENRO, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, dated 22 January 1996, re conveyance of
the narra lumber (Annex "4"); 1 (b) Certificate of Lumber Origin issued by CENRO, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in favor of Remitans Enterprises, 12
Agueda St., Project 8, Q.C., for 11,754 bd. ft. = 27.71 cu. m. under Auxiliary Invoice No. 180795 and Official Receipt No. 4529171 dated 22 January 1996
issued by DENR-CENRO, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (Annexes "5" and "5-1"); 2 (c) Certificate of Registration of Business Name No. 0298450 issued by
the Department of Trade and Industry, NCR, on 26 September 1955, for TJ Furniture owned by Thomas Jay (Annex "1"); 3 (d) Mayor's Permit No. 16840
issued by the Office of the City Mayor of Manila on 18 January 1996 (Annex "2"); 4 (e) Delivery Receipt for narra lumber dated 21 March 1996 issued by
Remitans Enterprises to TJ Furniture (Annex "3"); 5 and, (f) Tally Sheets of narra lumber (Annexes "7", "7-1", "7-21" and "7-3"). 6

The motion to quash was set for hearing on 31 May 1996 at 8:30 in the morning. However, on 21 May 1996 Jay, through his counsel, Atty. Romeo Y. De
Jesus, moved to have the hearing advanced to 28 May 1996 on the ground that, according to him, he was informed that "the calendar of the Court is not
available; consequently, he requested for 28 May 1996 at 8:30 in the morning, undertaking at the same time to "notify the parties concerned." But counsel
for the respondent, despite his undertaking, failed to notify complainant Cesar B. Meris, Regional Director, EIIB, who as a result failed to appear on 28 May
1996.

On 27 May 1996 Atty. Salome T. Cansino, Special Counsel of the Department of Justice, filed an opposition to the motion to quash the search warrant
contending that (a) the pieces of narra lumber seized were not covered by any legal documents required by the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines;
(b) the documents submitted by Jay did not cover the lumber seized; and, (c) a criminal complaint had already been filed against Jay by the DENR for
Illegal Possession of Forest Products in violation of Sec. 68, PD 705, as amended by EO 277.

On 28 May 1996, despite the opposition of the special counsel of the Department of Justice, respondent Judge granted the motion to quash and ordered
the immediate release of the narra lumber seized from Thomas Jay. The explanation of respondent was that the pieces of lumber seized were owned by a
legitimate enterprise and covered by proper documents, emphasizing that he took into consideration not only the opposition of the Department of Justice
but also the deteriorating condition of the pieces of lumber which were already long exposed to the elements.

On 5 June 1996 complainant, in his capacity as Regional Director for Region III of EIIB, wrote a letter to Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa which is textually
quoted hereunder —

THE HONORABLE ANDRES R. NARVASA

Chief Justice

Supreme Court

S i r:

I wish to report to HIS HONOR about the actuation of Honorable Judge Carlos Ofilada, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan
which is prejudicial to the interest of the government by issuing an Order of Release of Seized/Confiscated Narra Lumber with a
commercial value of P150,000.00 by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 for violation of Section 68, PD 705 as amended by Executive
Order No. 277 without hearing of the case on the merits.

Records show that respondent/owner of seized narra lumber thru Counsel filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant before the Court and set
the case for hearing on May 31, 1996 at 8:30 in the morning.

It is sad to note, however, Honorable Judge Carlos Ofilada quashed the Search Warrant on May 28, 1996 motu propio and ordered the
release of seized narra lumber to the respondent herein, which is two (2) days prior to the scheduled hearing, May 31, 1996.
 That Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) Region III represented by the Regional Director ATTY. CESAR B. MERIS as
Counsel attended the scheduled hearing of the Motion to Quash on May 31, 1996 but sad to note Judge Ofilada already quashed the
Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 on May 28, 1996 without affording a day in Court on the part of the Government. Attached hereto are xerox
copies of Search Warrant No. 20-M-96, application for Search Warrant, marked as ANNEX "A" and "B," Motion to Quash filed by
respondent thru counsel marked as ANNEX "C," Court Order Quashing Search Warrant No. 2-M-96 dated May 28, 1996 marked as
ANNEX "D," Motion for Reconsideration marked as ANNEX "E."

May I request your Honor to look into the matter with the aim in view to enhance the good image of the Judiciary. Likewise, to encourage
the public to report erring Judges to the Supreme Court and not to the media. . . .

Very respectfully yours,

ATTY. CESAR B. MERIS

Regional Director, Counsel for EIIB3

Cabanatuan City

On 3 July 1996 Regional Director Cesar B. Meris, who was also acting as counsel for EIIB, filed an Answer (actually an opposition to the motion to quash
search warrant). On 10 July 1996 he filed his motion for reconsideration (of the order quashing the search warrant) where he claimed that he attended the
hearing on the motion to quash previously scheduled on 31 May 1996 only to be informed that respondent Judge had already quashed the search warrant
on 28 May 1996 even without the presence of either the complainant EIIB Regional Director or the Special Counsel representing the Government. His
motion for reconsideration and that of Special Counsel Salome T. Cansino, who protested the hearing of the motion without proper service and notice,
were denied by respondent Judge.

Complainant claims that by ordering the release of the confiscated narra lumber without hearing the case on the merits and without affording the
prosecution a day in court, respondent Judge committed grave abuse of authority prejudicial to the interest of the Government. Section 5, Rule 15, of the
Rules of Court states —

Sec. 5. Contents of notice. — The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the
motion. 7

A perusal of the request for advanced resetting of the motion to quash search warrant would show that although it stated the time and date of hearing, it
failed to comply with Sec. 5 of Rule 15 as the notice was addressed only to the clerk of court and not to the parties concerned is required. 8 Neither was
there proof of service of the motion on the adverse party despite the undertaking of counsel for movant to notify the public prosecutor of the request as
required by Sec. 6 of Rule 15 —

Sec. 6. Proof of service, to be filed with motion. — No motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof,
except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected. 9

In Manakil v. Revilla 10 we held that the court will not act on the motion if there is no proper notice and/or proof of service of the notice on the adverse party.
It is nothing but a useless piece of paper filed with the court. It is not a motion. It presents no question which the court could decide. The court has no
reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it without that compliance with the rules. Harsh as they may seem, these rules were introduced to
avoid a capricious change of mind in order to provide due process to both parties and ensure impartiality in the trial.

Due process demands proper obedience to procedural rules, especially when the subject matter of the motion to quash is a search warrant. Since
searches are in derogation of the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 11 it necessarily follows that the
applicant should rely on the strength of his evidence to support the application or the subsequent legal custody of the seized articles. Otherwise,
upon prima facie proof that the movant for the quashal of the warrant was the owner of the seized lumber and that he lawfully acquired them, he is entitled
to the quashal of the search warrant and the restoration to him of the seized articles. 12 It is clear therefore that the exception in Sec. 6, Rule 15, of the
Rules of Court cannot apply in a motion to quash search warrant. For without the proper notice of hearing and proof of service thereof, the rights of either
party will be adversely affected. Moreover, the ground invoked by movant was that the warrant charged no offense. The fundamental test in considering a
motion to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by the
law. 13

A cursory examination of the search warrant will disclose that the essential elements of the offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not right, therefore,
to resolve the charges at the very outset without any notice of hearing, or to hear the motion ex parte. The issues require a fuller examination especially
since a criminal complaint had already been filed in court. The prosecution, too, must be given its day in court — the burden of proof thereof being placed
squarely on its shoulders. A prudent judge would, in the absence of the opposing party in the hearing of a motion as pivotal as a motion to quash, inquire
from the other party or verify from the records the proof of service of notice rather than proceed with the hearing. This is but an elementary notion of fair
play. He should not rely on a party's undertaking to notify the adverse party of a scheduled hearing. The judge must demand what the rule requires, i.e.,
proof of such notice on the adverse party, otherwise, a contentious motion, as the motion to quash in the case before respondent Judge, should be
considered a mere scrap of paper which should not have even been received for filing.

Respondent's culpability is further compounded by his misrepresentation in the order the issued on 14 August 1996 (denying the motion of the public
prosecutor for reconsideration) that he was on extended leave of absence from 29 May 1996 to 22 July 1996 when the records show that he actually
applied for leave only from 29 May 1996 to 3 July 1996 (not up to 22 July 1996).

A. M. No. RTJ-981411

On 18 April 1994 an Information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan against four (4) accused, namely, Rolando Garcia, Lopito
Gumasing, Eric Gumasing and Eduardo Gumasing. The Information stated that all the accused were at large. No bail was recommended. On 22 April 1994
warrants of arrest were issued against the four (4) accused.

On 7 June 1995, or more than one (1) year that the accused remained at large, Atty. Eufrocio Marquez appeared before the trial court as counsel for the
accused and submitted a "Motion to Voluntarily Surrender the Accused with Motion to Bail" praying that the accused be allowed to post bail in the amount
of P10,000.00 each in cash. At the bottom of page 2 of the motion, the public prosecutor manifested in writing that he was submitting the matter to the
sound discretion of the court provided that the bail be increased to P15,000 in cash for each accused.

On 16 June 1995 respondent Judge granted the motion and allowed the four (4) accused to post bail in the amount of P10,000.00 each. After the accused
had posted bail, respondent Judge lifted the warrant of arrest and set the arraignment on 16 August 1995.

At the hearing of 17 July 1995, which does not appear on record to have been previously scheduled, respondent Judge issued an order citing as grounds
for the grant of bail (a) voluntary surrender of the accused; (b) no evidence was presented by the public prosecutor that the evidence of guilt was strong;
(c) the public prosecutor did not object to the granting of bail; and, (d) the complainant, wife of the victim, had submitted an affidavit of desistance. The four
(4) accused were later arraigned, and the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant was marked during the pre-trial.

After the prosecution rested, the defense manifested its intention to file demurrer to evidence. In an order dated 20 January 1997, respondent Judge gave
the accused five (5) days within which to file the intended demurrer and the prosecution the same period to comment thereon.

In an order dated 30 January 1997 respondent Judge admitted the demurrer filed by the accused and submitted the same for resolution there being no
comment from the public prosecutor.

On 20 February 1997 respondent Judge granted the demurrer to evidence and acquitted all four (4) accused for failure of the prosecution to establish their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, on 19 March 1997 respondent Judge ordered the release of the cash bond posted by the accused for their
provisional liberty.

Francisco R. Hernandez, uncle of the deceased victim, filed a complaint-affidavit before this Court charging respondent Judge with knowingly rendering
unjust orders and for improperly granting bail, manifest bias and partiality in favor of the accused in the conduct of the proceedings. After respondent Judge
filed his comment to the complaint, we referred the case to Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin Jr. of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.

In his Report dated 1 June 1998 Justice Martin found respondent Judge guilty of gross incompetence and recommended that he be meted the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months with stern warning that commission of a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.

The actuations of respondent Judge in Crim. Case No. 1441-M-94 showed his utter disregard of the rules and settled jurisprudence thus constituting gross
ignorance of the law. In granting the motion for application of bail which did not contain a notice of hearing directed to the parties and where the accused
had never been placed under the custody of the court, respondent Judge again demonstrated his lack of knowledge and understanding of the basic
principles of law and procedures. A perusal of the "Motion to Voluntarily Surrender the Accused with Motion to Bail" shows that the notice of hearing was
directed solely to the clerk of court and did not contain a place and time of hearing. A motion that does not meet the requirements of Secs. 4 and 5 of Rule
15 of the Rules of Court, particularly that the notice be directed to the parties concerned and stating the time and place for the hearing of the motion, is a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and the court has no authority to act upon. 14

The records show that respondent Judge had not been as zealous as he should have been in observing the standard and fundamental procedure
mandated by the Rules of Court in criminal cases. In granting bail to the four (4) accused who were at large, respondent Judge violated the rule that bail is
unavailing to the accused who has not voluntarily surrendered or to one who has yet to be placed under legal custody. 15

The refusal of the prosecution to adduce evidence that the guilt of the accused was strong or its failure to interpose an objection to the motion for bail was
not a justifiable reason for respondent Judge to grant bail. It is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing and ask searching and clarificatory
questions 16 for the purpose of determining the existence of a strong evidence against the accused. 17 On the face of his orders dated 16 June 1995 18 and
17 July 1995 19 which granted bail to the accused, respondent Judge did not make any finding that the evidence against the accused was not strong as to
warrant the grant of bail. Hence, the orders should not be sustained or given any semblance of validity. 20

Conclusion

The unseemly haste with which respondent Judge granted the motions filed by the accused (a) to quash search warrant ex parte in A.M. No. RTJ-97-1390
and (b) for bail in A.M. No. RTJ-981411 is indicative of his patent injustice, partiality, nay, his gross ignorance of the law bordering on incompetence. It
should be mentioned that respondent Judge was previously charged with eight (8) other administrative cases ranging from gross ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of authority and discretion, incompetence, dishonesty, dereliction of duty, misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a judge, oppression and direct
bribery. Although seven (7) of the eight (8) cases were dismissed without hearing for various reasons, in Santos v. Ofilada, 21 the Court through Senior
Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado found the same respondent Judge to have whimsically and arbitrarily granted bail in Crim. Case No. 1433-M-94 for
murder and in Crim. Case No. 1434-M-94 for illegal possession of firearm without notice to the prosecution in both cases, for which he was fined
P20,000.00 and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would definitely warrant a more severe sanction. Those
administrative cases are also enumerated in the Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator dated 15 July 1996 thus —

It is also worthy to inform the Honorable Court that there are at least eight (8) administrative complaints filed against herein respondent
Judge charging him with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and discretion, incompetence, dishonesty, dereliction of duty,
misconduct, conduct unbecoming (of a Judge), oppression and direct bribery (RTJ-90-588, RTJ-91-639, RTJ-92-882, RTJ-93-1040, RTJ-
94-1219, RTJ-94-1250, RTJ-94-1267 and RTJ-94-1281). However, these complaints were subsequently dismissed by this Court. But in
RTJ-94-1217, respondent Judge was charged with incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, oppression and grave misconduct relative to
criminal cases filed before this Court wherein he granted bail to the accused without hearing. In the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated
June 16, 1995, the Court imposed on Judge Carlos C. Ofilada a FINE of P20,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more seriously.

It may also be worth to mention that on 17 March 1998 another sworn administrative complaint was filed before this Court against respondent Judge for
gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming of a member of the bench. 22 Thereafter, in an indorsement dated 14 April 1998 by Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus P. Guerrero, another complaint which was filed with the Ombudsman against respondent Judge for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code was referred to this Court for appropriate action. 23 Respondent has yet to submit his
comments on both charges against him.

Be that as it may, this Court finds that respondent Judge has failed to conduct himself in a manner that will justify his continued stay in the judiciary. The
Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to perform his official duties competently, honestly, with diligence and impartiality. Regretfully, respondent Judge
is found miserably short of the standards set for appropriate judicial conduct, which leaves the Court no choice but to cut short his membership in and
terminate his official relations with the judiciary.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan, GUILTY in A. M. No.
RTJ-97-1390 for grave abuse of authority and evident partiality, and in A. M. No. RTJ-98-1411, for gross incompetence, ignorance of the law and evident
partiality, all prejudicial to the interest of the Government and the judicial service. These being his second and third offenses, respondent is ordered
DISMISSED immediately from the service with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and leave credits with prejudice to his reemployment in any public
office including any government owned or controlled corporation.

JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA is directed to immediately cease and desist from performing the functions of the Office of Regional Trial Court Judge of
Malolos, Bulacan, and to turn over all records and property responsibilities to the Clerk of Court of that court who shall issue the corresponding receipt
therefor.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ.,
concur.
 SECOND DIVISION

September 2, 2015

G.R. No. 188794

HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated March 31, 2009, and the Resolution3 dated July 10, 2009, of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 31154. The appealed decision affirmed the joint judgment 4 dated September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao City,
Albay, which convicted petitioner Honesto Ogayon of violating Sections 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. 5

The Antecedent Facts

On December 1, 2003, two Informations were filed against Ogayon for the crimes allegedly committed as follows:

I. Criminal Case No. 4738:

That at about 5:20 o’clock (sic) in the morning of October 2, 2003 at Barangay Iraya, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
four (4) pcs. of small aluminum foil, four (4) pcs. Of disposable lighter in different colors, one (1) blade trademark "Dorco," and one (1) roll aluminum foil,
instruments used or intended to be used for smoking or consuming shabu, without authority of law, to the damage and prejudice of the public interest and
welfare.6

II. Criminal Case No. 4739:

That at about 5:20 o’clock (sic) in the morning of October 2, 2003 at Barangay Iraya, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to violate the law, and without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing 0.040 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), with full knowledge that in his possession and control is a dangerous drug, to the damage and prejudice of the public interest and welfare.7

During his arraignment in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and 4739 on January 21, 2004, and March 17, 2004, respectively, Ogayon denied both charges and pleaded "not
guilty." The joint pre-trial held on May 5, 2004 yielded only one factual admission on the identity of the accused. 8 A joint trial on the merits ensued.

The Prosecution Version

On October 2, 2003, at around 5:20 a.m., Police Chief Inspector Elmer Ferrera, together with the other members of the Albay Provincial Police Office, proceeded to
Ogayon’s house in Barangay Iraya, Guinobatan, Albay, to enforce Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003.9The warrant was for the seizure of shabu and drug
paraphernalia allegedly kept and concealed in the premises of Ogayon’s house. Barangay Tanod Jose Lagana (Tanod Lagana) and Kagawad Lauro Tampocao
assisted the police team in conducting the search.10

Upon reaching Ogayon’s house, the police team noticed several persons inside a nipa hut located nearby. Suspecting that a pot session was about to be held, the
police team restrained two of the five persons and immediately proceeded to Ogayon’s house. After introducing themselves as police officers, Senior Police Officer
Herminigildo Caritos (SPO4 Caritos) informed Ogayon that they had a warrant to search his place. SPO4 Caritos handed a copy of the warrant to Ogayon, who
allowed the police team to conduct the search.11

Led by SPO4 Caritos, some members of the police team went to the comfort room located about five meters away from Ogayon’s house. When they searched the
area, they found an object (wrapped in a piece of paper with blue prints) that fell from the wooden braces of the roof. Upon SPO4 Caritos’ inspection, the paper
contained two (2) small, heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that the police team suspected to contain shabu.

The search of the comfort room also uncovered four (4) disposable lighters, one (1) knife measuring six inches long, used aluminum foil, one (1) roll of aluminum
foil, and a "Dorco" blade.12 SPO4 Caritos then placed his initials on the two (2) plastic sachets before joining the rest of the police officers who were conducting a
search in Ogayon’s house. The police officers who searched Ogayon’s house found live ammunition for an M-16 rifle.

After conducting the search, the police team prepared a Receipt of Property Seized. 13 The receipt was signed by the seizing officers, representatives from the
Department of Justice and the media, and two (2) barangay officials who were present during the entire operation. 14

The police team thereafter arrested Ogayon and the two (2) other persons who had earlier been restrained, and brought them to Camp Simeon Ola for booking.
The seized items were likewise brought to the camp for laboratory examination. In his Chemistry Report,1 5 Police Superintendent Lorlie Arroyo (forensic chemist of
the Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory) reported that the two (2) plastic sachets seized from Ogayon’s place tested positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 16

The Defense Version

The defense presented a different version of the events.

Testifying for himself, Ogayon disavowed any knowledge of the prohibited drugs and claimed that he saw the seized items for the first time only when they were
being inventoried. His statements were corroborated by the testimony of his wife, Zenaida Ogayon.

Ogayon asserted that prior to the search, he was asleep in his house. His wife Zenaida woke him up because several policemen and barangay officials came to his
house. He claimed that the police team did not present any search warrant before conducting the search, and it was only during trial that he saw a copy of the
warrant.

He recounted that the police officers, splitting into two groups, conducted a simultaneous search of his house and the comfort room located nearby. He noticed
that SPO4 Caritos, who was part of the group that searched the comfort room, came out and went to the Barangay Hall. Shortly after, SPO4 Caritos returned,
accompanied by Tanod Lagana. SPO4 Caritos again went inside the comfort room, leaving Tanod Lagana waiting outside. SPO4 Caritos thereafter came out from
the comfort room and ran towards Ogayon’s house while shouting "positive, positive." 17

The RTC Ruling

On September 5, 2007, the RTC rendered a joint judgment convicting Ogayon of the two criminal charges against him. Relying on the presumption of regularity,
the RTC rejected Ogayon’s frame-up defense. The dispositive portion of the joint judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, under the above considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

a. In Criminal Case No. 4738, accused, Honesto Ogayon y Diaz is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 12, Art. II, Republic Act No.
9165, known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for his unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, namely: four (4) pcs. small
aluminum foil, one (1) roll aluminum foil, four (4) pcs. disposable lighters, and one (1) pc. blade; thereby sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay a FINE of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00);

b. In Criminal Case No. 4739, accused, Honesto Ogayon y Diaz is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 11, Art. II, Republic Act
No. 9165, known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for his unlawful possession of two (2) pcs. Small heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," with total net weight of 0.0400 gram; thereby, sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and to pay a FINE of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00).18

Ogayon appealed to the CA. This time, he questioned the validity of the search warrant, claiming it was improperly issued. He argued that the search warrant was
defective for lack of transcript showing that the issuing judge conducted an examination of the applicant for search warrant and his witnesses.

The CA Ruling

In accordance with Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a judge must examine under oath and in writing an applicant for search warrant and his witnesses.
Although the CA found no evidence in the records showing compliance with this requirement, it nevertheless upheld the search warrant’s validity due to Ogayon’s
failure to make a timely objection against the warrant during the trial.

That Ogayon objected to the prosecution’s formal offer of exhibits, which included the search warrant, was not sufficient for the CA. Ogayon merely claimed that
the chemistry report was not executed under oath, the items were not illegal per se, and that he did not sign the Receipt of Property Seized since he was not
present when the seized items were confiscated. The CA noted that the objections were not based on constitutional grounds, and for this reason, concluded that
Ogayon is deemed to have waived the right to question the legality of the search warrant. 19

Based on the search warrant’s validity, the CA affirmed Ogayon’s conviction for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Although the comfort room was
located outside Ogayon’s house, the CA declared that he exercised exclusive control over it and should rightly be held responsible for the prohibited drugs and
paraphernalia found there.

As with the RTC, the CA relied on the presumption of regularity of the police team’s operation and found Ogayon’s claim of frame-up to be unsupported. The CA
thus ruled that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Ogayon was liable for the crimes charged.

The Issues

In the present petition, Ogayon raises the following assignment of errors:

I.

The CA erred in finding that Ogayon had waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant.

II.

Even granting without admitting that Ogayon had already waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant, the search conducted was still highly
irregular, thereby rendering the seized articles as inadmissible in evidence.

Ogayon primarily argues that there was a violation of his constitutional right to be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. He denies waiving the right through his supposed failure to assail the search warrant’s validity during the trial. On the contrary, he claims to have
objected to the prosecution’s formal offer of the search warrant.

Even assuming that he questioned the search warrant’s validity only during appeal, Ogayon contends that this should not be interpreted as a waiver of his right.
Since an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, any objection made on appeal, though not raised before the trial court, should still be
considered.

Ogayon next argues that the search conducted by the police team on his premises, pursuant to an already defective search warrant, was highly irregular. He and his
spouse were in their house when SPO4 Caritos allegedly discovered the shabu in the comfort room located outside their house, so they were not able to witness
the search. Moreover, he claimed that there were other persons near the premises of his house (and the comfort room) when the search was conducted. Hence, it
could not indubitably be concluded that the seized items were under his actual and effective control and possession.

The Court’s Ruling

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the fundamental constitutional rights. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, reads:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. [emphasis ours]

This right has been included in our Constitution since 1899 through the Malolos Constitution 20 and has been incorporated in the various organic laws governing
the Philippines during the American colonization,21 the 1935 Constitution,22 and the 1973 Constitution.23

The protection afforded by the right is reinforced by its recognition as a fundamental human right under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,24 to both of which the Philippines is a signatory.25 Both the Covenant and the Declaration recognize a person’s right
against arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy and property.26

Given the significance of this right, the courts must be vigilant in preventing its stealthy encroachment or gradual depreciation and ensure that the safeguards put
in place for its protection are observed.

Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is central to the right, and its existence largely depends
on the finding of the judge conducting the examination.27 To substantiate a finding of probable cause, the Rules of Court specifically require that –

Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statem gether with the affidavits submitted. [emphasis ours]

Ogayon’s appeal of his conviction essentially rests on his claim that the search warrant was defective because "there was no transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings in which the issuing judge had allegedly propounded the required searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable
cause."28 We find that the failure to attach to the records the depositions of the complainant and his witnesses and/or the transcript of the judge’s examination,
though contrary to the Rules, does not by itself nullify the warrant. The requirement to attach is merely a procedural rule and not a component of the right. Rules
of procedure or statutory requirements, however salutary they may be, cannot provide new constitutional requirements.29

Instead, what the Constitution requires is for the judge to conduct an "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce," after which he determines the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The examination requirement was originally a procedural rule
found in Section 98 of General Order No. 58,30 but was elevated as part of the guarantee of the right under the 1935 Constitution. 31 The intent was to ensure that a
warrant is issued not merely on the basis of the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, but only after examination by the judge of the complainant and his
witnesses. As the same examination requirement was adopted in the present Constitution, we declared that affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are
insufficient to establish the factual basis for probable cause.32 Personal examination by the judge of the applicant and his witnesses is indispensable, and the
examination should be probing and exhaustive, notmerely routinary or a rehash of the affidavits.33

The Solicitor General argues that the lack of depositions and transcript does not necessarily indicate that no examination was made by the judge who issued the
warrant in compliance with the constitutional requirement.

True, since in People v. Tee,34 we declared that –

[T]he purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to the existence of probable cause.1âwphi1 The Bill of
Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that depositions be attached to the records of an application for a search warrant. Hence, said omission is not
necessarily fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the record showing what testimony was presented.35

Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is shown by the depositions and the transcript. In their absence, however, a warrant may still be upheld if
there is evidence in the records that the requisite examination was made and probable cause was based thereon. There must be, in the records, particular facts and
circumstances that were considered by the judge as sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the
search warrant.36

The Solicitor General claims that, notwithstanding the absence of depositions and transcripts, the records indicate an examination was conducted. In fact, a
statement in the search warrant itself attests to this:

Search Warrant

xxxx

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examination under oath of the applicant and his witnesses that there is probable cause to believe that
respondent, without authority of law, has under his possession and control the following articles to wit:

---Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "Shabu" and paraphernalia which are kept and concealed in the premises of his house particularly in the kitchen and in the CR
outside his house both encircled with a red ballpen, as described in the sketch attached to the Application for Search Warrant, located at Bgy. Iraya, Guinobatan,
Albay.37 (emphasis and underscore ours)

Generally, a judge’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded great deference by a reviewing court, so long as there was
substantial basis for that determination.38 "Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are
in the place sought to be searched."39

Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find nothing in the records of this case indicating that the issuing judge personally and
thoroughly examined the applicant and his witnesses. The absence of depositions and transcripts of the examination was already admitted; the application for
the search warrant and the affidavits, although acknowledged by Ogayon himself, 40 could not be found in the records. Unlike in Tee, where the testimony given
during trial revealed that an extensive examination of the applicant’s witness was made by the judge issuing the warrant, the testimonies given during Ogayon’s
trial made no reference to the application for the search warrant. SPO4 Caritos testified that he was among those who conducted the surveillance before the
application for a search warrant was made. However, he was not the one who applied for the warrant; in fact, he testified that he did not know who applied for it.41

The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer that the requisite examination was made, and from which the factual basis for
probable cause to issue the search warrant was derived. A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional requirements for its issuance; otherwise, it
is void. Based on the lack of substantial evidence that the search warrant was issued after the requisite examination of the complainant and his witnesses was
made, the Court declares Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003 a nullity.

The nullity of the search warrant prevents the Court from considering Ogayon’s belated objections thereto.

The CA declared that Ogayon had waived the protection of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures due to his failure to make a timely objection
against the search warrant’s validity before the trial court. It based its ruling on the procedural rule that any objections to the legality of the search warrant should
be made during the trial of the case. Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides the manner to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence obtained
thereby:

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. — A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained
thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in
and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another
court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. [emphasis ours]

We find the CA’s casual treatment of a fundamental right distressing. It prioritized compliance with a procedural rule over compliance with the safeguards for a
constitutional right. Procedural rules can neither diminish nor modify substantial rights; 42 their non-compliance should therefore not serve to validate a warrant that
was issued in disregard of the constitutional requirements. As mentioned, the existence of probable cause determined after examination by the judge of the
complainant and his witnesses is central to the guarantee of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The ends of justice are better served if the supremacy of the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is preserved over technical rules of procedure.

Moreover, the courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; we should not presume acquiescence in
the loss of fundamental rights.43 In People v. Decierdo,44 the Court declared that "[w]henever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled
to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver." The relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid out convincingly.

In this case, the only evidence that Ogayon waived his constitutional right was his failure to make a timely motion during the trial to quash the warrant and to
suppress the presentation of the seized items as evidence. This failure alone, to our mind, is not a sufficient indication that Ogayon clearly, categorically, knowingly,
and intelligently made a waiver.45 He cannot reasonably be expected to know the warrant’s defect for lack of data in the records suggesting that defect existed. It
would thus be unfair to construe Ogayon’s failure to object as a waiver of his constitutional right. In People v. Bodoso, 46 the Court noted that "[i]n criminal cases
where life, liberty and property are all at stake… The standard of waiver requires that it ‘not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’"

At this point, we note the purpose for the enactment of Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court – a relatively new provision incorporated in A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC
or the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000). The provision was derived from the policy guidelines laid down by the Court in Malaloan
v. Court of Appeals47 to resolve the main issue of where motions to quash search warrants should be filed. In other words, the provision was "intended to resolve
what is perceived as conflicting decisions on where to file a motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence seized by virtue thereof…."48 It was certainly
not intended to preclude belated objections against the search warrant’s validity, especially if the grounds therefor are not immediately apparent. Thus, Malaloan
instructs that "all grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant,
otherwise they shall be deemed waived," and that "a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that
objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress."
A closer reading of the cases where the Court supposedly brushed aside belated objections would reveal that the objections were disregarded because they had
been cured or addressed based on the records.

In Demaisip v. Court of Appeals,49 the accused asserted that the search warrant was never produced in court, thus suggesting its absence. The Court, however,
noted that "there were supposed testimonies of its existence."

In People v. Tee,50 the accused claimed that the issuing judge failed to exhaustively examine the complainant and his witnesses, and that the complainant’s witness
(a National Bureau of Intelligence operative) had no personal knowledge of the facts comprising probable cause, but the Court brushed these claims aside. It found
that the witness’ knowledge of the facts supporting probable case was not based on hearsay as he himself assisted the accused in handling the contraband, and
that the issuing judge extensively questioned this witness. In People v. Torres,51 the accused assailed the validity of the search conducted pursuant to a search
warrant as it was supposedly made without the presence of at least two witnesses, but the Court found otherwise, citing the testimonies taken during the trial
contradicting this claim. A similar objection was made by the accused in People v. Nuñez, 52 but the Court noted the testimony of the officer conducting the search
who stated that it was made in the presence of the accused himself and two barangay officials.

The rulings in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,53 People v. Court of Appeals,54 and People v. Correa55 are without significance to the present case. As mentioned,
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals involved the question of where motions to quash search warrants should be filed, and the guidelines set therein was applied in
People v. Court of Appeals. People v. Correa, on the other hand, involved a warrantless search of a moving vehicle.

We reiterate that the requirement to raise objections against search warrants during trial is a procedural rule established by jurisprudence. Compliance or
noncompliance with this requirement cannot in any way diminish the constitutional guarantee that a search warrant should be issued upon a finding of probable
cause.1âwphi1 Ogayon’s failure to make a timely objection cannot serve to cure the inherent defect of the warrant. To uphold the validity of the void warrant
would be to disregard one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution.

In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003, the search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void. Under the Constitution, any evidence
obtained in violation of a person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.56 With the
inadmissibility of the drugs seized from Ogayon' s home, there is no more evidence to support his conviction. Thus, we see no reason to further discuss the other
issues raised in this petition.

WHEREFORE, under these premises, the Decision dated March 31, 2009, and the Resolution dated July 10, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31154
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction, as stated in the joint judgment dated September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Lig ity, Albay, in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and 4739, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ is ACQUITTED of the
criminal charges against him for violation of Republic Act No. 9165.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

APRIL 18, 2018

G.R. No. 216922

JAYLORD DIMAL and ALLAN CASTILLO, Petitioners

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated
August 27, 2014 and Resolution2 dated February 4, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 128355. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing
the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87, which denied the Omnibus Motion (Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 10-11, to
Declare the Seized Items as Inadmissible in Evidence) in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-12-175369 to Q-12-175371.

The Facts

At around 6:00 p.m. of September 6, 2010, Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio were scheduled to visit the compound of petitioner Jaylord A.
Dimal in Echague, Isabela, to negotiate for the sale of palay. At around 7:30 p.m., Lucio's nephew, Edison Pua, went to Dimal's compound, asking for
information as to the whereabouts of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. Dimal informed Edison that they had left an hour ago. Unable to locate his relatives,
Edison went to the police station in Alicia, Isabela, to report that they were missing, then proceeded to seek assistance from the police station in Echague.

Thereafter, Edison was escorted by two policemen to Dimal's compound, where they allegedly stayed and observed the premises in the absence of Dimal
until September 7, 2010. On even date at around 5:30 a.m., Edison and the two policemen supposedly searched without a warrant Dimal's compound, but
found no evidence linking him to the disappearances.

On September 24, 2010, petitioner Allan Castillo was accosted by the Echague Police, and allegedly tortured to implicate Dimal in the killing of Lucio,
Rosemarie and Gemma. On September 25, 2010, a certain Eduardo Sapipi was arrested due to the supposed statement made by Castillo. Sapipi
purportedly made an uncounseled confession that Dimal shot the three victims, and ordered him, Castillo and one Michael Miranda to cover up the crime
by throwing the bodies in a river.

On September 26, 2010, Dimal was arrested by the Echague Police. On September 27, 2010, the Echague Police filed with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela, a criminal complaint for Kidnapping for Ransom and Multiple Murder against Dimal, Castillo, Sapipi, Miranda, Marvin Guiao
and Robert Baccay.

On October 8, 2010, Police Inspector (P/lnsp.) Roy Michael S. Malixi, a commissioned officer of the Philippine National Police assigned with the Police
Anti-Crime and Emergency Response in Camp Crame Quezon City, filed an Application for the Issuance of a Search Warrant4 before the R TC Ilagan,
Isabela, Branch 17, in connection with the kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma.

In his application for search warrant, P/Insp. Malixi stated that "he was informed, and verily believed that JA YLORD ARIZABAL DIMAL @ JAY, 28 years
old, a resident of Felix Gumpal Compound, Ipil Junction, Isabela and CMJ Building Dubinan East, Santiago City, has in control of the following items" in the
said address, to wit:

a. Personal belongings such as:

1. Driver's License of Lucio Pua;

2. Alien Certificate of Registration Identification cards of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua;

3. ATM Cards such as BDO under Lucio Pua's accounts;

4. Deposit Slips in BDO accounts of Lucio Pua;

5. Receipts of the palay delivered;

6. Blood-stained clothes of the victims:

6.1 Rosemarie Pua's green inner garment with black blazer and brownish pedal pants;

6.2 Lucio Pua's black short and pink polo shirt;

6.3 Gemma Eugenio y Estrada's maong pants, faded pink long sleeves jacket, black striped t-shirt and a shoulder bag;

6.4 Polo t-shirt and faded pink jacket seen beside the comfort room inside the compound of the warehouse of Jayson Dimal.

7. Picture of Shaira Mae Eugenio's youngest sister (Queen Sean Eugenio) seen inside the shoulder bag of the victim, Gemma Eugenio.

b. 1,600 sacks of palay inside a warehouse found in the Felix Gumpal Compound, Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela;

c. Long bolo approximately 16 inches in length; and

d. Glock 9mm caliber pistol. 5

P/Insp. Malixi stressed that he has personally verified and ascertained the veracity of the information and found the same to be true and correct, as
narrated and sworn to by Ernesto Villador, a long-time employee of Dimal, Edison Uy Pua, the nephew of the victims Lucio and Rosemarie Pua, and
Shaira Mae Eugenio, daughter of the victim Gemma Eugenio. P/Insp. Malixi claimed that the application was founded on his personal knowledge and that
of his witnesses, acquired after conducting surveillance and investigation. P/Insp. Malixi attached to the application as Annexes "A", "B", "C" and "D" the
Vicinity/Location and Floor Map.

After the hearing of the application on October 8, 2010, Judge Bonifacio T. Ong of the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17, issued a Search Warrant, which
reads:

The undersigned Presiding Judge personally examined in the form of questions and answers in writing and [under oath], the applicant Police Senior
Inspector Roy Michael S. Malixi and the witnesses, namely: Edison Pua, Shaira Mae Eugenio, and Ernesto Villador, who all collaborated to the fact of
death of Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio in Echague, Isabela. That witness Edison Pua went to the house of Jaylord Dimal after the
commission of the crime and was able to see the blood-stained clothes of the victims:

1) Lucio Pua's clothes; and

2) [Rosemarie] Pua's clothes;

On the part of Shaira Mae Eugenio, she testified that before her mother Gemma Eugenio left her house, she wore faded pink long sleeves jacket and black
T-shirt, and brought with her a shoulder bag and two (2) cellphones which probably are in the house of Jaylord Dimal. In the case of Ernesto Villador, he
testified that he saw Jay lord Dimal holding a 9mm caliber pistol and testified that he usually keep said firearm under the computer table or drawers. He
likewise testify (sic) that there were 1,600 sacks of palay sold by the victims and brought to the Felix Gumpal Compound.

With the testimony of said witnesses and their Sinumpaang Salaysay and deposition of witness, it would readily show that there is probable cause to
believe that in the house, particularly the Felix Gumpal Compound of Jay lord Dimal located at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela, said items, to wit: blood-
stained clothes of the victims, 1,600 sacks of palay inside the warehouse in the Felix Gumpal Compound and 9mm cal. pistol are found.

The said Application for Search Warrant was filed before this Court due to compelling reasons for security and confidentiality purposes, considering that
possibility of leakages of information once the application for search warrant is filed with the court within the area having territorial jurisdiction over it.

In view thereof, you are hereby commanded to search at any time of the day or night the premises of Felix Gumpal Compound located at Ipil Junction,
Echague, Isabela, and forthwith seize and take possession of the following properties: blood-stained clothes of Rosemarie Pua, Lucio Pua, and Gemma
Eugenio, either to take the 1,600 sacks of palay or just to photograph the same, and the 9mm caliber pistol, and to bring the said articles to the custody of
the Provincial Director of Isabela at the Provincial Police Office of Isabela under custodia legis, to be dealt with according to law.6

In the Return on the Search Warrant, P/Insp. Gary Halay-ay Macadangdang, Deputy Chief of Police, Echague Police Station, Echague, Isabela,"
manifested that (1) Search Warrant No. 10-11 was served at the premises of Dimal at Barangay Ipil, Echague, Isabela, on October 9, 2010 at about 9:00
a.m., and (2) the search was conducted in an orderly manner and in the presence of owner/custodian Carlos Dimal, Barangay Captain Florencio
Miguel, Barangay Kagawads Rodolfo Vergara and Mariano Seriban, and BOMBO Radyo reporter Romy Santos. P/Insp. Macadangdang enumerated the
items recovered:
The following articles, subject of the warrant, were found by the said Office during the search:

a. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-24 with JAM markings)

b. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-25 with JAM markings)

c. One (1) Black T-Shirt with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-26 with JAM markings)

d. One (1) Black T-Shirt with red lining with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-15 with JAM markings)

e. One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Mark as E-14 with JAM markings)

f. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-16 with JAM markings)

g. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-17 with JAM markings)

h. Palay husk with suspected blood stain (mark as E-28 with JAM markings)

i. Suspected blood stain (mark as E-25-A with JAM markings)

The articles recovered/seized in plain view during the conduct of search are the following:

a. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-1 with JAM markings)

b. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-2 with JAM markings)

c. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-3 with JAM markings)

d. One (1) pc spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-4 with JAM markings)

e. One (1) bag pack color black (Mark as E-5 with JAM markings)

f. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-6 with JAM markings)

g. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-7 with JAM markings)

h. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-8 with JAM markings)

i. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-9 with JAM markings)

j. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-10 with JAM markings)

 k. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-11 with JAM markings)

1. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-12 with JAM markings)

m. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-13 with JAM markings)

n. Two (2) Alien Certificate of Registration of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua, and One (1) BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio Pua (mark as E-15
with JAM markings)

o. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-18 with JAM markings)

p. One (1) piece gold-plated earring (mark as E-19 with JAM markings)

q. Suspected human hair (mark as E-20 with JAM markings)

r. A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (mark as E-22 with JAM markings)

s. Three (3) burned Tire wires (mark as E-23 with JAM markings)

t. One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid (mark as E- 27 with JAM markings)

u. One (1) live ammo of caliber 22 (mark as E-29 with JAM markings)

v. One (1) color white t-shirt (mark as E-30 with JAM markings).7

On February 20, 2012, petitioners Dimal and Castillo, together with Michael Miranda, filed an Omnibus Motion8 to quash Search Warrant No. 10-11 and to
declare the seized items as inadmissible in evidence. They argued that the search warrant is invalid because it was issued in connection with, not just one
single offense, but two crimes, i.e., kidnapping and multiple murder. They also contended that except for witness Ernesto Villador, applicant P/Insp. Malixi
and witnesses Edison and Shaira Mae have no personal knowledge surrounding the two crimes committed; hence, their statements did not provide basis
for a finding of probable cause, much less for the issuance of a search warrant. With respect to Villador, petitioners assert that his sworn statement is
incredible because he is just an ordinary laborer, who is unfamiliar with the English language, and there is no showing that the contents of his statement
were fully explained to him by the Judge who issued the search warrant. Petitioners further posit that the search warrant was invalidly implemented
because the raiding team failed to comply with Section 8, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court on the requisite presence of two witnesses during a search of
premises, and with Section 10, Rule 126 on the issuance of a receipt of seized properties. Finally, petitioners sought that the items seized which are not
covered by the search warrant, should be declared inadmissible in evidence and be ordered returned to the accused.

Meanwhile, on November 22, 2010, three (3) criminal Informations for Kidnapping for Ransom, as defined and penalized under Article 267, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, were filed against petitioners before the RTC of Echague, Isabela, Branch 24, and later re-raffled
to the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17. The accusatory portion of the Informations similarly read, save for the names of the 3 victims, as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of September 2010, and for sometime thereafter, in the Municipality of Echague, Province of Isabela, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Jaylord Arizabal Dimas (sic) and Allan Castillo y Marquez, being the principals therein, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, kidnap and detain one Lucio Uy Pua (Chinese
name: Xinyi Pan)9 for the purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of Fifty (50) million pesos, from him and from his relatives.

That during his[/her] detention, the said accused, in pursuance of conspiracy, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and
shot with a caliber 9mm pistol the said Lucio Uy Pua10 which had directly caused his death and, thereafter, chopped his body into several pieces and
placed them into big plastic containers and ice box, and burned his head and placed the same into a plastic bag, and threw the same on separate rivers
located at Santiago City and at the Province of Quirino.

That the accused Michael Miranda Genova alias Mike Miranda being an accessory, took part in the subsequent commission of the crime by providing the
vehicle and a container drum used to dispose the chopped body of said Lucio Uy Pua11 and threw the same on the river, in order to conceal the body of
the crime, to prevent its discovery.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 12

Pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 12-1-18-RTC, the criminal cases were re-raffled to Judge Aurora A. Hernandez-Calledo of the RTC of Quezon City,
and re-docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-12-175369, Q-12- 175370 to Q-12-175371.

In an Order13 dated September 28, 2012, the RTC of Quezon City denied the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 10-11 for lack of merit. The RTC ruled
that a perusal of the application for search warrant reveals that it was issued by the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, after conducting searching and probing
questions upon the persons of the applicant P/Insp. Malixi, and his witnesses Edison, Shaira Mae and more particularly Villador, and finding probable
cause based on their personal knowledge. In rejecting the claim of unreasonableness of the implementation of the search warrant, the RTC noted that the
records show that the owner/custodian of the property subject of the warrant by the name of Carlos Dimal, was present, together with the Barangay
Captain, two Barangay Kagawads, and a reporter from Bomba Radyo.

Considering that no complaint was filed regarding the implementation of the search warrant, and that a Certification of Orderly Search was issued by
the barangay officials, the RTC declared that the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duty was not sufficiently contradicted. Anent the
claim that the search warrant was not issued in connection with a single offense but with the crimes of Kidnapping and Murder, the RTC said that the
nature of the case and the circumstances at the time the search warrant was applied for, justify the issuance of such warrant as the two offenses are allied
or closely related to each other because it was reported to the applicant that the victims were kidnapped for ransom and murdered. Finally, the RTC
stressed that the claim that no return on the search warrant was submitted must fail because such a return was issued by the executing officer, and was
marked as Exhibit "4" for the prosecution during the preliminary conference .

With the RTC's denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

In a Decision 14 dated August 27, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the subject search warrant was validly issued, thus:

A perusal of the records show that Judge Ong, through searching and probing questions, personally examined the (sic) P/lnsp. Malixi and the witnesses,
Edison Uy, Ernesto Villador and Shaira Mae Eugenio, on 8 October 2010. The questions that Judge Ong propounded were sufficiently probing, not at all
superficial and perfunctory. The facts narrated by the witnesses while under oath, when they were asked by the examining judge, were sufficient
justification for the issuance of the subject search warrant.

Furthermore, the subject search warrant specifically designated or described Felix Gumpal Compound, located at lpil Junction, Echague, Isabela as the
place to be searched and enumerated the articles to be seized.
Petitioners['] contention that the subject search warrant which was issued in connection with two (2) separate offenses, Kidnapping and Murder, as
indicated therein, cannot stand. However, as aptly pointed out by the People through the Office of the Solicitor General, the crimes of kidnapping and
murder are interrelated and points to the commission of a single complex crime known as kidnapping with murder. They cannot be treated as separate
crimes.15

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated February 4, 2015. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issues

Petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in failing to pass upon petitioners' allegations (1) that the search warrant is void and its quashal imperative; and
(2) that the items seized on the basis of the void search warrant are inadmissible in evidence. They contend that the search warrant was null and void
because it was issued in connection with two unrelated offenses, without a finding of probable cause, and without specifying the place to be searched and
the items to be seized.

Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious. Search Warrant No. 10-11 was validly issued, but most of the items seized pursuant thereto are inadmissible in evidence,
as they were neither particularly described in the warrant nor seized under the "plain view doctrine".

At the outset, there is no merit to petitioners' contention that the search warrant was applied for in connection with two unrelated offenses, i.e., kidnapping
and murder, in violation of Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which requires that such warrant must be issued in relation to one offense.

Suffice it to state that where a person kidnapped is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, there is only one special complex crime for which the
last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides the maximum penalty that shall be imposed, i.e., death. 16 In People v. Larranaga, 17 the
Court explained that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime:

This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of "special complex crime" of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated
the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where
the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is
killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

xxxx

x x x Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the
special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries,
(4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the
component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No.
7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special
complex crime." 18
There is no dispute that Search Warrant No. 10-11 was applied for and issued in connection with the crime of kidnapping with murder. Asked by Judge
Ong during the hearing as to what particular offense was committed, search warrant applicant P/Insp. Malixi testified that Dimal "allegedly committed the
crime of kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio and Rosemarie Pua and one Gemma Eugenio on September 6, 2010."19 It is not amiss to add that a
search warrant that covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.20

Neither can petitioners validly claim that the examining judge failed to ask searching questions, and to consider that the testimonies of the applicant and his
witnesses were based entirely on hearsay, as they have no personal knowledge of the circumstances relating to the supposed disappearance or murder of
the 3 victims.

The Court explained in Del Castillo v. People21 the concept of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant:

x x x Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable
cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible totality of the
circumstances standard. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court,
therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the
place sought to be searched.

Corollarily, the Court said in Oebanda v. People22 that in an application for search warrant, the mandate of the judge is for him to conduct a full and
searching examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. "The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses
must depend on a large extent upon the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule as to how a judge may conduct his examination, it
is axiomatic that the said examination must be probing and exhaustive and not merely routinary, general, peripheral or perfunctory. He must make his own
inquiry on the intent and factual and legal justifications for a search warrant. The questions should not merely be repetitious of the averments stated in the
affidavits/deposition of the applicant and the witnesses."23

Having in mind the foregoing principles, the Court agrees with the RTC and the CA in both ruling that Judge Ong found probable cause to issue a search
warrant after a searching and probing personal examination of applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses, Edison, Shaira Mae and Villador. Their
testimonies jointly and collectively show a reasonable ground to believe that the 3 victims went to Dimal's compound to sell palay, but were probably killed
by Dimal, and that they may have left personal belongings within its premises.

During the hearing of his application for search warrant, Judge Ong was able to elicit from P/Insp. Malixi the specific crime allegedly committed by Dimal,
the particular place to be searched and items to be seized:

[COURT:]

Q: And in your application for Search Warrant, what particular place are you going to search in this Search Warrant if ever it will be granted?

[P/INSP. MALIXI:]
A: According to the Opponent we are applying to search the Palay Buying Station of Jaylord Dimal located at Felix Gumpal Compound, lpil,
Echague, Isabela, and also to search the back portion of a vacant lot within the Felix Gumpal Compound, Your Honor.

Q: The particular place is Felix Gumpal Compound, in Echague, Isabela, no more?

A: No more, Your Honor.

Q: And what particular offense have this Jaylord Dimal committed, if any?

A: He allegedly committed the crime of kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio and Rosemarie Pua and one Gemma Eugenio on September 6,
2010, Your Honor.

Q: And what particular items are you going to search in that compound of Felix Gumpal?

A: Subject of the offense, the personal belongings of the victims when they went to the Felix Gumpal Compound, where they were reportedly murdered,
Your Honor. 1âw phi 1

Q: What specific items are you going to search from that place?

A: Personal belongings such as Driver's License of Lucio Pua, Alien Certificate of Registration ID of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua, A TM Cards
such as BDO under Lucio Pua's account, Deposit slips of BDO accounts of Lucio Pua, receipts of the palay delivered, blood-stained clothes of
the victims, such as Rosemarie Pua's green inner garment with black blazer and brownish pedal pants, Lucio Pua's black short and pink polo
shirt, Gemma Eugenio's maong pants, faded pink long sleeves jacket, black stripe T-shirt and a shoulder bag of the victim Gemma Eugenio
color white, the 1,600 sacks of palay inside the Warehouse of Felix Gumpal Compound, long bolo [which] is approximately 16 inches long, and
the 9mm caliber black pistol, your Honor.

Q: Where did you get this information regarding the articles found in the Felix Gumpal Compound?

A: This information was given to me by the Opponents, Your Honor.

Q: And who are they?

A: They are Edison Uy Pua, Ernesto Villador y Yakapin and Shaira Eugenio y Estrada, Your Honor.

Q: How sure are you that these people were able to see these items in Felix Gumpal Compound? A: Edison Uy Pua and Shaira Mae Eugenio are the
relatives of the victims who personally saw the victim's clothes they were wearing right before they went to Jaylord's compound and the victims were seen
by Ernesto Villador sprawled lifeless on the floor in the palay buying station of Jaylord Dimal, Your Honor.

Q: You said that there is a gun 9mm pistol, how did they come to know that there was a gun in that place?

A: It was reported to me by Ernesto Villador, Your Honor.24

Judge Ong was also able to draw corroborative testimonies from P/lnsp. Malixi's witnesses. Edison testified on the circumstances prior to the
disappearance of his uncle Lucio and his aunties Rosemarie and Gemma, while Shaira Mae described the clothes and personal belongings of her mother
before the latter disappeared, thus:

[COURT]

Q: On September 6, 2010, where were you?

[EDISON]

A: I was at home, Your Honor.

Q: Where?

A: At Antonino, Alicia, Isabela, Your Honor?

Q: Where is Lucio and Rosemarie Pua on that day?

A: They went to Jaylord to collect the payment of the palay, Your Honor.

Q: And you were left in your house in Alicia when your Uncle Lucio and Auntie Rosemarie when they went to Jaylord to collect payment of palay?

A: Yes, Your Honor, I was.

Q: And do you know what happened to your Uncle Lucio and Auntie Rosemarie when they went to Jaylord's place?

A: I know because when they went to collect payments they did not come back anymore, Your Honor.

Q: And what did you do when you learned that they did not come back anymore?

A: They were already dead and their bodies were chopped into pieces, your Honor.

Q: And what did you do when you learned that they were already dead and chopped into pieces?

A: We went to look for the pieces of the bodies because they said it was thrown to the river, Your Honor.

Q: And what did you do after that?

A: We went to the house of Jaylord, Your Honor.

Q: And what did you do in the house of Jaylord?

A: We saw the T-shirt of my Uncle Lucio Pua and Ate Gemma, Your Honor.

Q: Who is that Gemma?

A: My aunt, the one who canvass palay, your Honor.

Q: What did you see in the house of Jaylord?

A: Polo shirt and Jacket of Auntie Gemma, Your Honor.

Q: What else aside from the Polo shirt and jacket did you see?

A: No more your Honor, we went back to Alicia.

Q: Who were with you when you went to the house of Jaylord?

A: My cousin, Your Honor .

Q: What is the name of your cousin?

A: Harison, Your Honor.

Q: When was that when you went to the house of Dimal?

A: October 5, 2010, Your Honor.25

xx xx

[COURT]

Q: On September 6, 2010, in the afternoon, at about 4:00 o'clock, do you know where was (sic) your mother then? [SHAIRA MAE]

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?

A: She [Gemma] went to Jaylord Dimal, Your Honor.

Q: Do you remember what was (sic) the clothes of your mother and what did she brought (sic) with her when she went to Jaylord Dimal?
A: Yes, Your Honor, the long sleeves is faded pink, the inner shirt is black, and bag is pink, inside it are two (2) cellphones, the picture of my
sister and her Driver's License. 26

While it may be noted that applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses Shaira Mae and Edison have no personal knowledge how the crimes of kidnapping
and multiple murder were committed, their testimonies corroborated that of Villador, who petitioners admitted to have known about the incidents
surrounding the commission of such crimes. 27

Significantly, Judge Ong's inquiry underscored that Villador has a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed at the Felix Gumpal
Compound on September 6, 2010. In reply to the queries of Judge Ong, Villador revealed that (1) when Dimal called him inside the house to receive his
payment as classifier of palay, he saw them [Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma] talking to each other; and (2) later in the day, Dimal called him to ask for help,
but he backed out upon seeing that Dimal was holding a black 0.9 mm pistol amidst people lying bloody on the ground. Thus:

[COURT:]

Q: You said you are a classifier, what is the work of a classifier?

[VILLADOR]

A: We classify the kinds of palay, Your Honor.

Q: Where are you working as a classifier?

A: Jaylord Dimal, Your Honor.

Q: And where is the place of the business of Jaylord Dimal?

A: Junction Ipil at the former compound of Felix Gumpal, Your Honor.

Q: How long have you been a classifier of Jaylord Dimal?

A: It is already two (2) years that every cropping he calls for me to classify, Your Honor.

Q: On September 6, 2010, are (sic) you still a classifier in the business of Jaylord Dimal.

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Where were you on that date?

A: In the compound of Jaylord, Your Honor.

Q: In the afternoon of that date, do you know of any person who went to the place of businessman Dimal?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Who are they?

A: Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q: Do you know their purpose of going to the place of Jaylord Dimal?

A: They were supposed to collect payment of the palay that Jay lord asked me to gather, Your Honor?

Q: And where are those palay that Jaylord asked you to gather?

A: I was the one discarding the sacks of palay in the bodega of Jaylord, Your Honor.

Q: Who owns these palay that you are discarding?

A: Owned by Lucio and Rosemarie Pua, Your Honor.

Q: And why were they taken to the place of Jaylord Dimal?

A: They asked me to classify those palay and by agreement of Jaylord and the Pua's I discarded the palay in the bodega of Jaylord, Your Honor.

Q: Do you know how many cavans?

xxxx

A: 1,600 sacks, Your Honor.

Q: And where are they now those sacks of palay?

A: They are in the bodega or warehouse, Your Honor.

Q: Are those sacks of palay still there up to now?

A: Yes, Your Honor, they are still there.

Q: What happened in the afternoon of September 6, 2010 when Lucio and Rosemarie and Gemma was (sic) there in the house or place of
Jaylord Dimal?

A: Jaylord Dimal went out from his house and he called for the three and went inside the house, Your Honor.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: Jaylord called me up but I was already in our house and I was busy giving wages to my laborers, when he summoned me to go to his house,
"Kuya punta ka sandali dito," meaning "Kuya, please come here for a while."

Q: And did you go to the place of Jaylord?

A: Yes, Your Honor, I rode my motorcycle and went to the place.

Q: And what happened next?

A: When I arrived at the gate he asked me to enter the compound with my motorcycle, Your Honor.

Q: What happened next?

A: I asked him, "Bakit Boss?" meaning, "Why, Boss?"

Q: What happened next?

A: He answered, "Kuya yung mga tao patay na baka pwedeng patulong." Meaning "Kuya the people are already dead please help?

Q: What did you see from Jaylord [Dimal] when he told you the people were already dead? A: I saw him holding a black .9mm pistol and when I
saw the people lying bloody on the ground, I told him "Sir, hindi ko kaya", meaning "I cannot do it.

Q: How many times have you seen that gun which he was holding on that day September 6, 2010?

A: That night when he called for me, Your Honor.

Q: After the September 6, 2010 incident, have you went (sic) back to the place of Dimal.

A: No more, Your Honor.

Q: What are the things did you see (sic) when Dimal called for you and told you that these persons were already dead?

A: I saw these people lying on the ground bloody and they are already dead and I said, "hindi ko kaya", meaning "I cannot do it" and he replied,
"Sige sibat ka na," meaning "okay, just go."
Q: So, it is (sic) still possible that the gun held by Dimal is still in his house?

A: I think so that is still in his house because he keep (sic) it in one place, Your Honor.

Q: And you said he keep (sic) it in one place are you familiar where he is keeping it?

A: What I usually see, he placed it under the table where the laptop is and there drawers in it, Your Honor. 28

Records clearly show that Judge Ong personally examined under oath applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses, Edwin, Shaira Mae and Villador, whose
collective testimonies would prompt a reasonably discreet person to believe that the crime of kidnapping with murder was committed at the Felix GumpaL
Compound on September 6, 2010, and that specific personal properti'es sought in connection with the crime could be found in the said place sought to be
searched.

As to petitioners' claim that the judge did not ask anymore searching questions after statements were made by Villador, 29 the Court finds that searching
and probing questions were indeed propounded by Judge Ong, and that there is no more necessity to ask Villador to describe the position and state of the
lifeless bodies, and the specific place in the compound where the bodies were lying. Villador could not have been expected to take a closer look into the
bloody bodies on the ground because Dimal was then holding a pistol, and told him to leave if he cannot help. Petitioners would do well to bear in mind
that, absent a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed.30 The judge has the prerogative to give his own
judgment on the application of the search warrant by his own evaluation of the evidence presented before him.31 The Court cannot substitute its own
judgment to that of the judge, unless the latter disregarded facts before him/her or ignored the clear dictates of reason.32

Petitioners submit that the search warrant is also void for failing to identify with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized. They·
assert that Felix Gumpal Compound consists of a very large area, consisting of two houses, one nipa hut, two external bathrooms, one garage, one
warehouse utilized as a palay depot, and one warehouse utilized to store a palay drying machinery. They likewise claim that all the items actually seized
were either not among those listed in the warrant or were seized in violation of the "plain view doctrine". Insisting that the search warrant was procured in
violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, petitioners posit that all the items seized in Dimal's compound are "fruits of the poisonous tree" and
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Contrary to petitioners' submission, the search warrant issued by Judge Ong identified with particularity the place to be searched, namely; (1) the house of
Jaylord Dimal and (2) the palay warehouse in the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela. This is evident from the
Search Warrant issued by the judge, which reads:

The undersigned Presiding Judge personally examined in the form of questions and answers in writing and under oath, the applicant Police Senior
Inspector Roy Michael S. Malixi and the witnesses, namely: Edison Pua, Shaira Mae Eugenio, and Ernesto Villador, who all collaborated to the fact of
death of Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio in Echague, Isabela. That witness Edison Pua went to the house of Jaylord Dimal after the
commission of the crime and was able to see the blood-stained clothes of the victims:

1) Lucio Pua's clothes; and

2) [Rosemarie] Pua's clothes;

On the part of Shaira Mae Eugenio, she testified that before her mother Gemma Eugenio left her house, she wore faded pink long sleeves jacket and black
T-shirt, and brought with her a shoulder bag and two (2) cellphones which are probably in the house of Jaylord Dimal. In the case of Ernesto Villador, he
testified that he saw Jay lord Dimal holding a 9mm caliber pistol and testified that he usually keep said firearm under the computer table or drawers. He
likewise testify (sic) that there were 1600 sacks of palay sold by the victims and brought to the Felix Gum pal Compound.

With the testimony of said witnesses and their Sinumpaang Salaysay and deposition of witness, it would readily show that there is probable cause to
believe that in the house, particularly the Felix Gumpal Compound of Jaylord Dimal located at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela, said items, to wit:
blood-stained clothes of the victims, 1600 sacks of palay inside the warehouse in the Felix Gumpal Compound and 9mm cal. pistol are found.

The said Application for Search Warrant was filed before this Court due to compelling reasons for security and confidentiality purposes, considering that
possibility of leakages of information once the application for search warrant is filed with the court within the area having territorial jurisdiction over it.

In view thereof, you are hereby commanded to search at any time of the day or night the premises of Felix Gum pal Compound located at
lpil Junction, Echague, Isabela, and forthwith seize and take possession of thefollowing properties: blood-stained clothes of Rosemarie Pua, Lucio Pua,
and Gemma Eugenio, either to take the 1,600 sacks of palay or just photograph the same, and the 9mm caliber pistol, and to bring the said articles to the
custody of the Provincial Director of Isabela at the Provincial Police Office of Isabela under custodia legis, to be dealt with according to law.33

A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the place intended, and
distinguish it from other places in the community. 34 A designation that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.35 To the Court's view, the above-quoted search warrant
sufficiently describes the place to be searched with manifest intention that the search be confined strictly to the place described. At any rate, petitioners
cannot be heard to decry irregularity in the conduct of the search of the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound because, as aptly ruled by the RTC, a
Certification of Orderly Search was issued by the barangay officials, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duty was not sufficiently
contradicted by petitioners.

Moreover, the objection as to the particularity of the place to be searched was belatedly raised in petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Order
denying their Omnibus Motion to quash. The Court has consistently ruled that the omnibus motion rule under Section 8, Rule 1536 is applicable to motion to
quash search warrants. 37 In Abuan v. People, 38 it was held that "the motion to quash the search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed by
the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be
raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress." Accordingly, the trial court could only take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in a motion to quash
if (1) said issue was not available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the
subject matter.39 Because petitioners' objection as to the particularity of the place to be searched was available when they filed their omnibus motion to
quash, and there being no jurisdictional issue raised, their objection is deemed waived.

Meanwhile, a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized (1) when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow; or (2) when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in
making the search and seizure; (3) and when the things to be described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offenses for which the warrant
is being issued.40 The purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant in order to
leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what items they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures will be
committed.41

In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, 42 the Court clarified that technical precision of description is not required. "It is only necessary that there be reasonable
particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission.
Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of
things to look for."43

Under American jurisprudence which has persuasive effect in this jurisdiction, the degree of specificity required in a search warrant's description of the
items to be searched for and seized is flexible and will vary depending on the crime involved and the types of items sought.44 A description is said to be
valid if it is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation will permit. But if the circumstances make an exact description
of the property to be seized a virtual impossibility, the searching officer can only be expected to describe the generic class of the items sought. The
practical guide to determine whether a specific search warrant meets the particularity requirement is for the court to inquire if the officer reading the
description in the warrant would reasonably know what items to be seized. 45

In Search Warrant No. 10-11, only two things were particularly described and sought to be seized in connection with the special complex crime of
kidnapping with murder, namely: (1) blood-stained clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of a faded pink long sleeves jacket and a black tshirt, and (2) a
0.9mm caliber pistol. Having no direct relation to the said crime, the 1,600 sacks of palay that were supposedly sold by the victims to Dimal and found in
his warehouse, cannot be a proper subject of a search warrant because they do not fall under the personal properties stated under Section 3 of Rule 126,
to wit: (a) subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c) those used or intended to be used as the means
of committing an offense, can be the proper subject of a search warrant.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in upholding the denial of the Omnibus Motion to quash because all the Constitutional46 and
procedural47 requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are still present, namely: (1) probable cause; (2) such probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and
the things to be seized.48

Despite the fact that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 10-11 is valid, petitioners are correct that most items listed in the Return on the Search Warrant
are inadmissible in evidence. Since only 2 items were particularly described on the face of the search warrant, namely: (1) the blood-stained clothes of
Gemma Eugenio consisting of faded pink long sleeves jacket and black t-shirt; and (2) the 0.9 mm caliber pistol, the Court declares that only two articles
under the Return on the Search Warrant are admissible in evidence as they could be the blood-stained clothes of Gemma subject of the warrant:

c. One (1) Black T-Shirt with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-26 with JAM markings)

d. One (1) Black T-Shirt with red lining with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-15 with JAM markings)

It bears stressing that the application for search warrant particularly described the victims' blood-stained clothes as follows: (1) Rosemarie Pua's green
inner garment with black blazer and brownish pedal pants; (2) Lucio Pua's black shorts and pink polo shirt; and (3) Gemma Eugenio's maong pants, faded
pink long sleeves jacket, and black striped t-shirt. Considering that only Gemma's clothes were described in Search Warrant No. 10-11 as specific as the
circumstances will allow, the Court is constrained to hold as inadequately described the blood-stained clothes of Lucio and Rosemarie. Without the aid of
the applicant's witnesses who are familiar with the victims' personal belongings, any other warrant officer, like P/Insp. Macadangdang who served the
search warrant, will surely be unable to identify the blood-stained clothes of Lucio and Rosemarie by sheer reliance on the face of such warrant.

The Court could have rendered a favorable ruling if the application for search warrant and supporting affidavits were incorporated by reference in Search
Warrant No. 10-11, so as to enable the warrant officer to identify the specific clothes sought to be searched. This is because under American
jurisprudence, an otherwise overbroad warrant will comply with the particularity requirement when the affidavit filed in support of the warrant is physically
attached to it, and the warrant expressly refers to the affidavit and incorporates it with suitable words of reference. Conversely, a warrant which lacks any
description of the items to be seized is defective and is not cured by a description in the warrant application which is not referenced in the warrant and not
provided to the subject of the search.49

The Court further declares that the following items are inadmissible as they do not bear any direct relation to the 3 items particularly described in Search
Warrant No. 10-11:

a. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-24 with JAM markings)

b. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-25 with JAM markings)

xxxx

e. One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Mark as E-14 with JAM markings)

f. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-16 with JAM markings)

g. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-17 with JAM markings)

h. Palay husk with suspected blood stain (mark as E-28 with JAM markings)

i. Suspected blood stain (mark as E-25-A with JAM markings)

With respect to the items under Return on the Search Warrant indicated as "articles recovered/seized in plain view during the conduct of the search," it is
well settled that objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search
warrant and may be introduced in evidence.50

For the "plain view doctrine" to apply, it is required that the following requisites are present: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.51 As
explained in People v. Salanguit: 52

What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification-whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to a lawful-arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused-and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another
until something incriminating at last emerges.

The first requisite of the "plain view doctrine" is present in this case because the seizing officer, P/Insp. Macadangdang, has a prior justification for an
intrusion into the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound, for he had to conduct the search pursuant to a valid warrant. However, the second and third
requisites are absent, as there is nothing in the records to prove that the other items not particularly described in the search warrant were open to eye and
hand, and that their discovery was unintentional.

In fact, out of the 2 items particularly described in the search warrant, only the 2 black t-shirts with suspected blood stain possibly belonging to Gemma
were retrieved, but the 9mm caliber pistol was not found. It is also not clear in this case at what instance were the items supposedly seized in plain view
were confiscated in relation to the seizure of Gemma's bloodstained clothes - whether prior to, contemporaneous with or subsequent to such seizure.
Bearing in mind that once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for admitting
the other items subsequently found,53 the Court rules that the recovery of the items seized in plain view, which could have been made after the seizure of
Gemma's clothes, are invalid.

It is also not immediately apparent to the officer that, except for the Alien Certificates of Registration of Lucio and Rosemarie, the BDO Passbook in the
name of Lucio, and the live ammo of caliber 22 (marked as E-29 with JAM markings), the following items may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure:

a. One (1) pc torn cloth (Mark as E-1 with JAM markings)

b. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-2 with JAM markings)

c. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-3 with JAM markings)

d. One (1) pc spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-4 with JAM markings)

e. One (1) bag pack color black (Mark as E-5 with JAM markings)

f. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-6 with JAM markings)

g. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-7 with JAM markings)

h. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-8 with JAM markings)

i. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-9 with JAM markings)

j. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-10 with JAM markings)

k. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-11 with JAM markings)

l. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-12 with JAM markings)

m. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-13 with JAM markings)

xxxx
o. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-18 with JAM markings)

p. One (1) piece gold-plated earring (mark as E-19 with JAM markings)

q. Suspected human hair (mark as E-20 with JAM markings)

r. A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (mark as E-22 with JAM markings)

s. Three (3) burned Tire wires (mark as E-23 with JAM markings)

t. One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid (mark as E-27 with JAM markings)

xxxx

v. One (1) color white t-shirt (mark as E-30 with JAM markings)

It bears emphasis that the "immediately apparent" test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of the
evidence, but only that the seizure be presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is a probable cause to associate the property with a criminal
activity. 54 In view thereof, the 10 pieces of spent shell of calibre 0.22 ammo cannot be admitted in evidence because they can hardly be used in a 9mm
caliber pistol specified in the search warrant, and possession of such spent shells are not illegal per se. Likewise, the following items supposedly seized
under plain view cannot be admitted because possession thereof is not inherently unlawful: (a) 3 tom cloths; (b) black bag pack; (c) a piece of goldplated
earing; (d) a suspected human hair; (e) a piece of embroidered cloth; (f) 3 burned tire wires; (g) empty plastic of muriatic acid; and (h) white t-shirt.

Notwithstanding the inadmissibility in evidence of the items listed above, the Court sustains the validity of Search Warrant No. 10-11 and the admissibility
of the items seized which were particularly described in the warrant. This is in line with the principles under American jurisprudence: (1) that the seizure of
goods not described in the warrant does not render the whole seizure illegal, and the seizure is illegal only as to those things which was unlawful to seize;
and (2) the fact that the officers, after making a legal search and seizure under the warrant, illegally made a search and seizure of other property not within
the warrant does not invalidate the first search and seizure.55 To be sure, a search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to
undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. 56 Objects taken which were not specified in the
search warrant should be restored57 to the person from whom they were unlawfully seized.

Although the Alien Certificates of Registration of Lucio and Rosemarie and the BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio are inadmissible in evidence, for not
having been seized in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," these personal belongings should be returned to the heirs of the respective victims. Anent
the live ammo of caliber 0.22 (marked as E-29 with JAM markings), which could not have been used in a 0.9mm caliber pistol, the same shall remain
in custodia legis pending the outcome of a criminal case that may be later filed against petitioner Dimal. In Alih v. Castro, 58 it was held that even if the
search of petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution and the firearms and ammunition taken therefrom are inadmissible in evidence, pending
determination of the legality of said articles they can be ordered to remain in custodia legis subject to appropriate disposition as the corresponding court
may direct in the criminal proceedings that have been or may thereafter be filed against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 27, 2014 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 128355 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to declare that the following properties seized under Search Warrant No. 10-11 are
inadmissible in evidence for neither having been particularly described in the search warrant nor seized under the "plain view doctrine":
1. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Marked as E-24 with JAM markings)

2. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Marked as E-25 with JAM markings)

3. One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Marked as E-14 with JAM markings)

4. One (1) cell phone spare part (marked as E-16 with JAM markings)

5. One (1) cell phone spare part (marked as E-17 with JAM markings)

6. Palay husk with suspected blood stain (marked as E-28 with JAM markings)

7. Suspected blood stain (marked as E-25-A with JAM markings)

8. One (1) pc tom cloth (Marked as E-1 with JAM markings)

9. One (1) pc tom cloth (Marked as E-2 with JAM markings)

10. One (1) pc tom cloth (Marked as E-3 with JAM markings)

11. One (1) pc spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-4 with JAM markings)

12. One (1) bag pack color black (Marked as E-5 with JAM markings)

13. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-6 with JAM markings)

14. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-7 with JAM markings)

15. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-8 with JAM markings)

16. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-9 with JAM markings)

17. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-10 with JAM markings)

18. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-11 with JAM markings)

19. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-12 with JAM markings)

20. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-13 with JAM markings)
21. Two (2) Alien Certificate of Registration of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua, and One (1) BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio Pua (mark as E-15 with
JAM markings)

22. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-18 with JAM markings)

23. One (1) piece gold-plated earring (marked as E-19 with JAM markings)

24. Suspected human hair (marked as E-20 with JAM markings)

25. A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (marked as E-22 with JAM markings)

26. Three (3) burned Tire wires (marked as E-23 with JAM markings)

27. One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid (marked as E-27 with JAM markings)

28. One (1) live ammo of caliber 22 (marked as E-29 with JAM markings)

29. One (1) color white t-shirt (marked as E-30 with JAM markings)

Moreover, the two (2) Alien Certificates of Registration of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua, and One (1) BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio Pua are
directed to be returned to the respective heirs of said victims, while the live ammo of caliber 0.22 (marked as E-29 with JAM markings) shall remain
in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal case that may be filed against petitioner Jaylord Dimal.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 162489 June 17, 2015

BERNARDO U. MESINA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Under review is the decision promulgated on July 24, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120, in Caloocan City convicting the petitioner of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4
of the Revised Penal Code.2

Antecedents

On July 9, 1998, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner with qualified theft. Upon his motion, he was granted a reinvestigation. On
September 17, 1998, after the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed charging him instead with malversation of public funds, the amended
information alleging thusly:

That on or about the 6th day of July 1998, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said above-named
accused, being then an employee of [the] City Treasurer's Office, Caloocan City, and acting as Cashier of said office, and as such was accountable for the
public funds collected and received by him (sic) reason of his position, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied
and embezzled and convert to his 0~11personal use and benefit said funds in the sum of ₱167,876.90, to the damage and prejudice of the City
Government of Caloocan in the aforementioned amount of ₱167,876.90.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The CA adopted the RTC's summary of the facts, as follows:

x x x that in the afternoon of July 6, 1998 between 1 :00 and 2:00 o'clock, herein accused Bernardo Mesina then Local Treasurer Officer I of the Local
Government of Caloocan City went to the so called Mini City Hall located at Carnarin Road, District I, Caloocan City for purposes of collection. While
thereat, Ms. Rosalinda Baclit, Officer-In-Charge of collection at said onice, turned over/remitted to Mesina the weeks' collection for the period covering the
month of June 1998 representing, among others, the Market Fees' collection, Miscellaneous fees, real property taxes, Community Tax Receipts (cedula)
and the 'Patubig' (local water system) collection all amounting to ₱468,394.46 (Exhs. 'K' and 'K-2', 'L' - 'L-2', 'M', 'M-2', 'N' - 'N-2', 'O' - '0-2', 'P' - 'P-2', 'Q' -
'Q-2', 'R', 'R-2', 'S' -· 'S-2', 'T' - 'T0-2', 'U' - 'U-2', 'V' - 'V-2', 'W', 'W-2', 'X' -- 'X-2', and 'Y' - 'Y-2'). After counting the cash money, the (sic) were bundled and
placed inside separate envelopes together with their respective liquidation statements numbering about thirteen (13) pieces signed by both Ms. Irene
Manalang, OIC of the Cash Receipt Division, and herein accused Mesina acknowledging receipt and collection thereof (Exhs, 'K-1 ', 'M-3', 'N-3', 'P-3', 'Q-3',
'R-3', T-3', 'U-3', 'V-3', 'W-3 ', 'X-3 ', and 'Y-3 '). Thereafter, Bernardo Mesina together with his driver left the Mini City I-Jail and proceeded to City Hall Main.

Later that same afternoon, Ms. Baclit received several phone calls coming from the Main City Hall. At around 3:00 o'clock, Mrs. Josie Sanilla, secretary of
City Treasurer Carolo V. Santos, called up the Mini City Hall confirming the collection of the 'Patubig' by Mr. Bernardo Mesina. Thirty (30) minutes
thereafter, Mrs. Elvira Coleto, Local Treasurer Operation Officer II of the Main City Hall called up to inform Ms. Baclit that the supposed 'Patubig' collection
amounting to P.167,870.90 (Exh. 'K-2') was not remitted. Also, Bernardo Mesina phoned Ms. Baclit telling the latter that he did not receive the 'Patubig'
collection. Alarmed by these telephone calls she just received, Ms. Baclit then immediately consulted the documents/liquidation statements supposedly
signed by Mesina acknowledging receipt and collection thereof, however, all efforts to locate and retrieved (sic) these records proved futile at that moment.

Meanwhile, City Treasurer Carolo V. Santos, after having been informed by Mrs. Irene Manalang of the discrepancy in the collection, summoned both Ms.
Baclit and Bernardo Mesina to his office at the Main City Hall for an inquiry relative to the missing ₱167,870.90 'Patubig' collection. And as the two (2),
Baclit and Mesina, insisted on their respective versions during said confrontation, City Treasurer Santos, in the presence of the Chief of the Cash
Disbursement Division, Administrative Officers and Local Treasurer's Operation Officer II Mrs. Coleto, then ordered Mesina's vault scaled pending further
investigation.

The following morning July 7, 1998, Caloocan City Mayor Reynaldo O. Malonzo called for an immediate probe of the matter. Present during the
investigation at the Mayor's Office were Ms. Baclit, accused Bernardo Mesina, City Auditor Chito Ramirez, City Treasurer Santos as well as the
representative from the different offices concerned. Again, when asked by Mayor Malonzo as to whether or not [t]he 'Patubig' collection was collected
and/or remitted, Mesina stood fast in his denial of having received the same; Ms. Baclit on the other hand positively asserted the remittance and collection
thereof by Bernardo Mesina.

Thereafter, they all proceeded to the cashier's room where Mesina had his safe and thereat, in the presence of COA State Auditor III Panchito Fadera,
Cashier IV-CTO Fe. F. Sanchez, Administrative Officer IV Lourdes Jose, LTOO II Elvira M. Coleto, accused Bernardo Mesina and LTOO II Rosalinda
Baclit, Mesina's vault was opened and a cash count and/or physical count of the contents thereof was conducted. Found inside were the following, to wit: I)
coins amounting to ₱107.15; 2) coins amounting to ₱50.47; 3) coins amounting to ₱127.00; 4) coins amounting to ₱64.1 O; 5) cash with tape amounting to
₱770.00; 6) spoiled bills amounting to ₱440.00; 7) bundled bills amounting to ₱20,500.00. Also found inside were the Report of Collection by the
Liquidating Officer (RCLO) in the amount of ₱123,885.55 as well as the original and duplicate copies of the daily sum of collections of accountable form
under the name of one Racquel Ona dated March 31, 1998 amounting to ₱123,885.55 (six (6) copies of vales/chits) Exhs. 'Z', 'Z-1' and 'Z-2'). In addition
thereto, the cash amount of ₱67,900.00 then withheld by the City Cashier pending this investigation, was turned over to the said auditing team, thus, the
total cash money audited against accused Mesina amounted to ₱89,965.72 (sic) (Exhs. 'BB' and 'BB-1').

In the afternoon of July 7, 1998, at about 5:00 o'clock, Mses. Rosalinda Baclit and Maria Luisa Canas all went to the SID Caloocan City Police Station to
have their separate sworn statements taken (Exhs. 'E', 'E-1 ', 'D', 'D-1 ', 'F', and 'F-1 '). Mmes. Lorna Palomo-Cabal, Divina Dimacali-Sarile and Victoria
Salita Vda. De Puyat likewise executed a joint sworn affidavit (Exhs. 'G', 'G-1', 'G-2', and 'G-3') in preparation for the filing of appropriate criminal charge
against Bernardo Mesina.

The following day, July 8, 1998, Mamerto M. Manahan, Panchito Fadera and Carolo V. Santos also executed their respective affidavits in relation to the
incidents at bar (Exhs. 'A', 'A-1 ', 'A-2'; Exhs. 'B', and 'B-1'; Exhs. 'C', and 'C-1'). Meanwhile, the statement of collection supposedly signed by accused
Mesina was finally recovered at Rosalinda Baclit's desk hidden under a pile of other documents. (Rollo, pp. 74-75)4
The Defense presented the oral testimony of the petitioner and documentary evidence.5 He admitted collecting the total amount of ₱468,394.46 from Baclit,
including the subject patubig collection totaling to ₱167,976.90, but adamantly denied misappropriating, misapplying, and embezzling the patubig
collection, maintaining that the patubig collection was found complete in his vault during the inspection. He explained that he deliberately kept the collection
in his vault upon learning that his wife had suffered a heart attack and had been rushed to the hospital for immediate medical treatment. He believed that
he did not yet need to remit the amount to the OIC of the Cash Receipt Division because it was still to be re-counted. He claimed that when he returned to
the Main City Hall that same day his vault was already sealed.6 He said that the accusation was politically motivated. In support of his claim of innocence,
he cited his numerous awards and citations for honesty and dedicated public service.7

On November 8, 2001, the RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation, disposing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused BERNARDO MESINA Y UMALI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

The Court further imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office and a fine of ₱167,876.90 upon the accused.

SO ORDERED.8

On July 24, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC's decision, with modification as to the amount of fine imposed,9 decreeing:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated November 8, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, Caloocan City in Criminal
Case No. C-54217 is affirmed with modification in the sense that the fine is reduced from 1!167,876.98 to ₱37,876.98. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

In his appeal, the petitioner submits for consideration the following:

I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIME OF MAL VERSA TION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT:

a. it had admitted in evidence the testimony of prosecution witness ELVIRA COLITO that she saw, when accused-appellant 's vault was opened, to
have seen (sic) the bundles of the missing Patubig collections of more than Ps130,000.00 (sic), and thus, in effect, there was no misappropriation,
as one of the elements of the crime of malversation;

b. that it erred and completely misapprehended and failed to appreciate the true meaning of the testimony of the said witness of seeing inside the
vault more than Ps130, 000. 00 in bundles by treating/and/or (sic) appreciating the same as exactly Ps130, 000. 00 flat without appreciating the
words more than, thus guilty of erroneous inference surmises and conjectures; c. that it overlooked and completely disregarded that inside the vault
was the sum of Ps20,500.00 in bundles also [Exh. "BB and B-1 "j regarding contents of the vault or the total sum of Ps22, 065. 72 testified to by
Panchito Madera (sic), Head of the Audit Team;
 d. the Court of Appeals gravely erred to surmise and at least look on the lack from the lists of inventories of the vault the more than Ps130,000.00
in bundles and why it was not listed among the moneys found inside the accused-appellant 's vault;

e. doubts and inconsistencies existing therefrom shall remained (sic) favorable to the accused-appellant pursuant to applicable jurisprudence;

II. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A (SIC) QUESTIONS OF LAW, THAT THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE GROUP OF
MAYOR MALONZO, THE TREASURER, THE ADMINISTRATOR, THE CITY AUDITOR, CHIEF OF DIVISIONS AND THE AUDIT PROCEEDINGS ARE
NULL AND VOID DUE:

A. Accused-appellant was not informed of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel as mandated by the Constitution;

B. The audit proceedings did not comply strictly with the Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors and other Guidelines, thus null and
void,'

C. Thus, the presumption of juris tantum in Art. 127 of the Revised Penal Code is overcome firmly supported by the discovery of the missing money
and further the conclusions of the Court of Appeals was against established jurisprudence enunciated in the case of TINGA vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, No. L-57650, [160 SCRA 483};

III. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS FATALLY WRONG IN NOT APPL YING EVIDENCE OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER TO ACQUIT AND
EXONERATE PETITIONER ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 130, SEC. 46, OF THE RULES OF COURT. A. Notwithstanding, not only
are the evidence weak, but its findings or discovery of "more than Ps130,000.00 inside the vault is subject to double interpretations, and/or double
alternative or probabilities, thus the presumption of innocence will be adopted.10

Ruling of the Court

The appeal has no merit.

The crime of malversation of public funds charged herein is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as follows:

Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property. - Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property shall suffer:

xxxx

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than
twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by R.A. No. 1060)

The crime of malversation of public funds has the following elements, to wit: (a) that the offender is a public officer; (b) that he had the custody or control of
funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) that the funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d)
that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.11

The elements of the crime charged were duly established against the petitioner.

The Prosecution proved, firstly, that the petitioner was a public officer with the position of Local Treasurer Officer I of Caloocan City; secondly, that by
reason of his position, he was tasked to collect fees and taxes regularly levied by the Mini City Hall, including market fees, miscellaneous fees, real
property taxes, and the subject patubig collection; and, thirdly, that all of the fees and taxes collected were unquestionably public funds for which he was
accountable.

As to the fourth element of misappropriation, the petitioner did not rebut the presumption that he had misappropriated the patubig collection to his personal
use. He had earlier feigned ignorance of having received the patubig collection when he phoned Ms. Baclit to tell her that he did not receive the collection.
He still insisted that he had not received the sum from Ms. Baclit when the City Treasurer summoned them both. His denial continued until the next day
when City Mayor Malonzo himself asked them both about the matter. Only after the petitioner's vault was finally opened did he declare that the collection
was intact inside his vault. Even then, the actual amount found therein was short by 1!37,876.98. Conformably with Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code,
supra, the failure of the petitioner to have the patubig collection duly forthcoming upon demand by the duly authorized officer was prima facie evidence that
he had put such missing fund to personal use. Although the showing was merely prima facie, and, therefore, rebuttable, he did not rebut it, considering that
he not only did not account for the collection upon demand but even steadfastly denied having received it up to the time of the inspection of the sealed
vault. Under the circumstances, he was guilty of the misappropriation of the collection.

Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode
charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is still committed; hence, a conviction is proper.12 All that is necessary for a
conviction is sufficient proof that the accused accountable officer had received public funds or property, and did not have them in his possession when
demand therefor was made without any satisfactory explanation of his failure to have them upon demand. For this purpose, direct evidence of the personal
misappropriation by the accused is unnecessary as long as he cannot satisfactorily explain the inability to produce or any shortage in his
accounts.13 Accordingly, with the evidence adduced by the State being entirely incompatible with the petitioner's claim of innocence, we uphold the CA's
affirmance of the conviction, for, indeed, the proof of his guilt was beyond reasonable doubt.

The petitioner bewails the deprivation of his constitutionally guaranteed rights during the investigation. He posits that a custodial investigation was what
really transpired, and insists that the failure to inform him of his Miranda rights rendered the whole investigation null and void. We disagree with the
petitioner's position.

According to People v. Marra,14 custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The safeguards during custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into a still unsolved crime, and the interrogation is then focused on a particular suspect who has been taken
into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions that tend to elicit incriminating statements. The situation contemplated is
more precisely described as one where -After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at best may be
termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding, and every person he meets he
considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study
has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional
rights.

And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence x x x.15

Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the fact that he was one of those being investigated did not by itself define the nature of the investigation as custodial.
For him, the investigation was still a general inquiry to ascertain the whereabouts of the missing patubig collection. By its nature, the inquiry had to involve
persons who had direct supervision over the issue, including the City Treasurer, the City Auditor, the representative from different concerned offices, and
even the City Mayor. What was conducted was not an investigation that already focused on the petitioner as the culprit but an administrative inquiry into
the missing city funds. Besides, he was not as of then in the custody of the police or other law enforcement office.

Even as we affirm the CA, we have to clarify the penalty imposed in terms of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 1âw phi1

Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law states that an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a
minimum term.16 The maximum term is the penalty properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code after considering any attending circumstance; while
the minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense committed. Conformably
with the instructions on the proper application of the Indeterminate Sentence law in malversation reiterated in Zafra v. People:17 (a) the penalties provided
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees; and ( b) considering that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code arc not composed of three periods, the time included in the prescribed penalty should be divided into three equal portions, each portion forming a
period, pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code.18 With the amount of ₱37,876.98 ultimately found and declared by the CA to have been
misappropriated exceeding the ₱22,000.00 threshold, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua (that is, 17
years, four months and one day to reclusion perpetua), the minimum period of which is 17 years, four months and one to 18 years and eight months, the
medium period of which is 18 years, eight months and one day to 20 years, and the maximum period is reclusion perpetua.

Accordingly, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence of the petitioner is the medium period in view of the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, while the minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken from the penalty next lower, which is reclusion temporal in its minimum
and medium periods (i.e., from 12 years and one day to 17 years and four months). Hence, the indeterminate sentence for the petitioner is modified to 12
years and one day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 18 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

In addition, the Court notes that both lower courts did not require the petitioner to pay the amount of ₱37,876.98 subject of the malversation. That omission
was plain error that we should now likewise correct as a matter of course, for there is no denying that pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The omission, if unchecked and unrevised, would permanently deprive the City of Caloocan
of the misappropriated amount. Such prejudice to the public coffers should be avoided.

The Court has justifiably bewailed the omissions by the lower courts in this respect, and has seen fit to point out in Zafra v. People:

One more omission by the CA and the R TC concerned a matter of law. This refers to their failure to decree in favor of the Government the return of the
amounts criminally misappropriated by the accused. That he was already sentenced to pay the fine in each count was an element of the penalties imposed
under the Revised Penal Code, and was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution, which the RTC and the CA should have included in
the judgment. Indeed, as the Court emphasized in Bacolod v. People, it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the
accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver
of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the R TC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the
judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from
the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their
disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves
seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority
but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.

We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the
established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be
otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all.
Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is
what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done
without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto
of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.19

Under the law, the civil liability of the petitioner may involve restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential
damages.20 Given that his obligation requires the payment of the amount misappropriated to the City of Caloocan, the indemnification for damages is
through legal interest of 6% per annum on the amount malversed, reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.21

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 24, 2003 finding petitioner BERNARDO U. MESINA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of malversation of public funds subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and one day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to 18 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and pay a fine of ₱37,876.98; and (b) he shall further
pay to the City of Caloocan the amount of ₱37,876.98, plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum, reckoned from the finality of this decision until the
amount is fully paid.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.