RULE 76-Rule 79

1 Specpro Rule 76 to 79
RULE 76 – Allowance or Disallowance of Will specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA
pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does
G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011 not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE country of its execution, before it can be probated in the
THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from
THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or
GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners, procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and
vs. Benjamin came to this Court.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent. The Issue Presented
DECISION The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will
ABAD, J.: executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will Philippines although it has not been previously probated and
executed abroad by a foreigner although it has not been allowed in the country where it was executed.
probated in its place of execution. The Court’s Ruling
The Facts and the Case Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a by foreigners abroad must first be probated and allowed in the
Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, country of its execution before it can be probated here. This,
died single and childless. In the last will and testament she they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities
executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. of the country of its execution. They insist that local courts can
Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a)
properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under
another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign
Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the
of her estate.1 On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.
Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been
petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article
it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in
for having been executed under duress and without the accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act. place where he resides, or according to the formalities
Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as observed in his country.6
administrator of the estate. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a
Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions in the foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an
Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor,
granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person
submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the
Ruperta’s U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
in the Philippines. allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to lost or destroyed.
probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a
as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.- will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the
based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the
Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c)
Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and the probable value and character of the property of the estate;
Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),3arguing that (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e)
an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the
cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, 4 affirming the of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death
assailed order of the RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto’s inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
submission of the authenticated copies of the documents province.7 The rules do not require proof that the foreign will
has already been allowed and probated in the country of its will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could
execution. be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to
and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but
Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.3
reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re- In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the
authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a allegations in the complaint and posited that the same be
foreign country is different from that probate where the will is dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of
presented for the first time before a competent court. cause of action, and for non-compliance with a condition
Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was
Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of
applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of
the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a
as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its matter of fact, respondent was able to introduce, as an exhibit,
jurisdiction over the matter can be established. a copy of the will in Civil Case No. 224-V-00 before the RTC of
Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that respondent
impractically.1âwphi1 If the instituted heirs do not have the should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the
means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as controversy with her before he filed the suit.4
depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal
requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred,
unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her
court.8 custody the original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing that the pieces of documentary evidence presented, aside from
more than an initial ruling that the court can take cognizance of being hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue
the petition for probate of Ruperta’s will and that, in the involved in the petition—they did not prove or disprove that she
meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law
of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
due execution of the will, i.e. the testator’s state of mind at the station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus.5
time of the execution and compliance with the formalities The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. 6 In its
required of wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial February 4, 2005 Order,7 however, it granted the same on
court’s directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s motion
copy of Ruperta’s will and the certified copies of the Laws of for reconsideration of this latter order was denied on
Succession and Probate of Will of California. September 20, 2005.8 Hence, the petition was dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court.
the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July On April 26, 2006, the CA initially denied the appeal for lack of
29, 2005. merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus would issue only in
SO ORDERED. instances when no other remedy would be available and
sufficient to afford redress. Under Rule 76, in an action for the
settlement of the estate of his deceased father, respondent
could ask for the presentation or production and for the
G.R. No. 176831 January 15, 2010 approval or probate of the holographic will. The CA further
UY KIAO ENG, Petitioner, ruled that respondent, in the proceedings before the trial court,
vs. failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that his mother
NIXON LEE, Respondent. had in her custody the original copy of the will.91avvphi1
DECISION Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in
NACHURA, J.: the assailed August 23, 2006 Amended Decision, 10 granted the
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 23, 2006 the production of the will and the payment of attorney’s fees. It
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial
SP No. 91725 and the February 23, 2007 Resolution, 2 denying evidence that his mother had in her possession the
the motion for reconsideration thereof. holographic will.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for
Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion in the
Manila and left a holographic will, which is now in the custody further assailed February 23, 2007 Resolution.11
of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter
filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages, before this Court, contending in the main that the petition for
docketed as Civil Case No. 01100939, before the Regional mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the
evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an
inadmissible.12 individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or
The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ. quasi-public duty is imposed.23 The writ is not appropriate to
The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of enforce a private right against an individual. 24 The writ of
Court pertinently provides that— mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when,
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the only in cases relating to the public and to the government;
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a hence, it is called a prerogative writ.25 To preserve its
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.26
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying mandamus being invoked.27 In other words, mandamus can be
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief.28 Although
to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable
by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.13 principles.29 Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of the sound discretion of the court.
competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or ascertaining whether the obligation involved here—the
to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a
particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus
official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies
operation of law.14 This definition recognizes the public another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy
may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
performance of duties in which the public has no interest. 15 The purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not
writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the
public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or
most especially when the public right involved is mandated by not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:
the Constitution.16 As the quoted provision instructs, Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.—Any
mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the
law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.17 death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is or not, or is lost or destroyed.
his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2
he is not entitled by law.18 Nor will mandamus issue to enforce to 5, for the production of the original holographic will. Thus—
a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.—The person who has
substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere custody of a will shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows
technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having
the case is meritorious.19 As a rule, mandamus will not lie in jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.—A
officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken person named as executor in a will shall within twenty (20)
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if
station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has he obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator,
unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. 20 On the has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within
part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the
mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing trust or his refusal to accept it.
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.—A
perform the act required.21 person who neglects any of the duties required in the two last
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the court
mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
obligations.22 Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.—A person the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary
having custody of a will after the death of the testator who capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed
neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when by force and under duress and improper pressure; (5) the
ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing
committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the will. 30 of her signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the disposed of, having included in the will properties which no
ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters
remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the
that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate
Thus, the Court grants the demurrer. succession. [9]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on
certiorari is GRANTED. The August 23, 2006 Amended On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order [10] denying
Decision and the February 23, 2007 Resolution of the Court of petitioners' motion for being unmeritorious. Resolving the issue
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 are REVERSED and SET of jurisdiction, the RTC held that petitioners were deemed
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 01100939 before the Regional Trial notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiency in
Court of Manila is DISMISSED. the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright
SO ORDERED. dismissal of the petition. It merely required respondent to pay
the deficiency.[11] Moreover, the RTC's Decision was already
final and executory even before petitioners' filing of the motion
to reopen. [12]
Alaban Petitioners, Petitioners thereafter filed a petition [13] with an application for
September 23, 2005 - versus' - COURT OF APPEALS preliminary injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of
andFRANCISCO H. PROVIDO, the RTC's Decision dated 30 May 2001 and Order dated 11
Respondents. January 2002. They claimed that after the death of the
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x decedent, petitioners, together with respondent, held several
DECISION conferences to discuss the matter of dividing the estate of the
TINGA, J.: decedent, with respondent agreeing to a one-sixth (1/6) portion
as his share. Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise
This is a petition for review of the Resolutions [1] of the agreement to implement the division of the estate. Despite
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. receipt of the agreement, respondent refused to sign and
69221, [2] dismissing petitioners' petition for annulment of return the same. Petitioners opined that respondent feigned
judgment. interest in participating in the compromise agreement so that
they would not suspect his intention to secure the probate of
On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido the will. [14] They claimed that they learnt of the probate
(respondent) filed a petition, docketed as SP Proc. No. 00-135, proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result of which they filed
for the probate of the Last Will and Testament [3] of the late their motion to reopen the proceedings and admit their
Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent'), who died on 26 opposition to the probate of the will only on 4 October 2001.
October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo. [4] Respondent alleged that he They argued that the RTC Decision should be annulled and set
was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. On aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on
30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in the part of the RTC. [15]
P.D. Monfort North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered
its Decision, [5] allowing the probate of the will of the decedent In its Resolution [16] promulgated on 28 February 2002, the
and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing
respondent. [6] that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment,
More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their
petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate own. [17]Moreover, the CA declared as baseless petitioners'
proceedings. [7] Likewise, they filed an opposition to the claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by
allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any showing that they
of letters testamentary to respondent, [8] claiming that they are availed of this ground in a motion for new trial or petition for
the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the relief from judgment in the RTC, the CA added. [18] Petitioners
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non- sought reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was
payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and denied by the CA for lack of merit. [19]
lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the
will could not have been probated because: (1) the signature of Petitioners now come to this Court, asserting that the CA
the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition for the alleged
failure to show that they have not availed of or resorted to the The petition is devoid of merit.
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment
or other remedies through no fault of their own, and held that Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to
petitioners were not denied their day in court during the file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, accident,
proceedings before the RTC. [20] In addition, they assert that mistake, or excusable negligence. The same Rule permits the
this Court has yet to decide a case involving Rule 47 of the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds' of
Rules of Court and, therefore, the instant petition should be excessive award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to
given due course for the guidance of the bench and bar. [21] justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final
order is contrary to law. [32] Both motions should be filed
For his part, respondent claims that petitioners were in a within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from
position to avail of the remedies provided in Rules 37 and 38, notice of the judgment or final order.
as they in fact did when they filed a motion for new
trial. [22] Moreover, they could have resorted to a petition for Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3
relief from judgment since they learned of the RTC's judgment of Rule 38 is resorted to when a judgment or final order is
only three and a half months after its entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a
promulgation. [23] Respondent likewise maintains that no party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
extrinsic fraud exists to warrant the annulment of the excusable negligence. Said party may file a petition in the
RTC's Decision, since there was no showing that they were same court and in the same case to set aside the judgment,
denied their day in court. Petitioners were not made parties to order or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after
the probate proceedings because the decedent did not institute the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6) months
them as her heirs. [24] Besides, assuming arguendo that after entry thereof. [33]
petitioners are heirs of the decedent, lack of notice to them is
not a fatal defect since personal notice upon the heirs is a A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief
matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional from judgment are remedies available only to parties' in the
requisite. [25] Finally, respondent charges petitioners of proceedings' where the assailed judgment is rendered. [34] In
forumshopping, since the latter have a pending suit involving fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to
the same issues as those in SP No. 00-135, that is' SP No. the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of
1181 [26] filed before Branch 23, RTC of General Santos City a petition for relief from judgment. [35]
and subsequently pending on appeal before the CA in CA-G.R.
No.74924. [27] However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that
they are not or have not become parties to the probate
It appears that one of the petitioners herein, Dolores M. Flores proceedings.
(Flores'), who is a niece of the decedent, filed a petition for
letters of administration with the RTC of General Santos City, Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee
claiming that the decedent died intestate without any issue, named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate
survived by five groups of collateral heirs. Flores, armed with a may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
Special Power of Attorney from most of the other petitioners, court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. [36]Notice of
prayed for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the time and place for proving the will must be published for
the decedent. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general
lack of jurisdiction, stating that the probate court in Janiuay, circulation in the province, [37] as well as furnished to the
Iloilo has jurisdiction since the venue for a petition for the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent is the place where the testator. [38] Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the
decedent died. This is also in accordance with the rule that the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding
first court acquiring jurisdiction shall continue hearing the case publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all
to the exclusion of other courts, the RTC added. [28] On 9 persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate
January 2002, Flores filed a Notice of Appeal [29] and on 28 of the decedent. [39]
January 2002, the case was ordered forwarded to the CA. [30]
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has
Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to
case in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. They jurisdiction to hear and decide it. [40] Thus, even though
aver that respondent's offer of a false compromise and his petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they
failure to notify them of the probate of the will constitute eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the
extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTC's publication of the notice of hearing.
judgment. [31]
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have of the petition prevented them from appearing and opposing
validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or the petition for probate.
reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact,
petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a The Court is not convinced.
motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening
of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However,
the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally
after the Decision became final and executory. given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after testator. [48] A perusal of the will shows that respondent was
it had become final, they could have still filed a petition for instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as
relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen. nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory
Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decisiononly on 4 nor testate heirs[49] who are entitled to be notified of the
October 2001, or almost four (4) months from the time probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no
the Decisionhad attained finality. But they failed to avail of the legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for
remedy. probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the

said remedies available to them, petitioners could no longer Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be
resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of
would benefit from their own inaction or negligence. [41] the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter
of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional
Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for requisite. [50]
annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to comply with The non-inclusion of petitioners' names in the petition and the
the substantive requisites, as the appellate court ruled. alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do
not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate
annulled was rendered. [42] The purpose of such action is to court.
have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there
will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where One other vital point is the issue of forum-shopping against
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief petitioners. Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits in
from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer different courts, either simultaneously or successively,
available through no fault of the petitioner,[43] and is based on involving the same parties, to ask the courts to rule on the
only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or same or related causes and/or to grant the same or
denial of due process. [44] A person need not be a party to the substantially same reliefs,[51] on the supposition that one or
judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he the other court would make a favorable
can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the disposition. [52] Obviously, the parties in the instant case, as
use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected well as in the appealed case before the CA, are the same.
thereby. [45] Both cases deal with the existence and validity of the alleged
will of the decedent, with petitioners anchoring their cause on
the state of intestacy. In the probate proceedings, petitioners'
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies position has always been that the decedent left no will and if
only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. [46] Fraud she did, the will does not comply with the requisites of a valid
is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a will. Indeed, that position is the bedrock of their present
trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it petition. Of course, respondent maintains the contrary stance.
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but On the other hand, in the petition for letters of administration,
to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding petitioner Flores prayed for her appointment as' administratrix
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the of the estate on the theory that the decedent died intestate.
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party The petition was dismissed on the ground of lack of
from having his day in court. [47] jurisdiction, and it is this order of dismissal which is the subject
of review in CA-G.R. No. 74924. Clearly, therefore, there is
To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert forum-shopping.
that as a result of respondent's deliberate omission or
concealment of their names, ages and residences as the other Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the Court of the said
heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will, pending case in their certification against forum- shopping.
they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus they were Neither have they done so at any time thereafter. The Court
denied their day in court. In addition, they claim that notes that even in the petition for annulment of judgment,
respondent's offer of a false compromise even before the filing petitioners failed to inform the CA of the pendency of their
appeal in CA-G.R. No. 74924, even though the notice of Rule 77 – Allowance of Will proved outside of the
appeal was filed way before the petition for annulment of Philippines and Administration of of Estate thereunder
judgment was instituted.
G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,
petitioners. vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.
SO ORDERED. DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey
(Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the
Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle
Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a
will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who
was also designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to
probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland,
U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to
Richard’s renunciation of his appointment.2 The court also
named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary
administrator.3
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon
(respondent) with whom he has two children, namely, Kimberly
and Kevin.
On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to
probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25,
Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No.
9625.4 As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines,
petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following
properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with
improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati,
Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a
current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance
of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors,
Inc. worth P64,444.00.5
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights
and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left
to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s
Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips
was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated
Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla
Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary
administrator.
Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as
Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed
as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.8
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No.
9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of
Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of
partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the
¾ undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in
A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current
account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati
property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in
cash.10
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and
by the trial court in its Order dated February 12, 1988. 11 The April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a
trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the new one is entered ordering:
Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the (a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill
name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of Guersey in favor of the estate of W. Richard Guersey; and
the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and (b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of
Kyle (¼ undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G the Makati City Registry and the issuance of a new title in the
Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.
Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the SO ORDERED.18\
Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary
administrator for distribution to the heirs.12 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27, 1999. 19
23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the Estate of W. Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule
Richard Guersey and Kyle.13 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely erred in
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding not holding that:
No. M-888 also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5of A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL
Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 "IN THE
allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL
Richard’s three children. This was opposed by respondent on OF THE DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q.
the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND
legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE
in the property subject of the legacy." 14 Since Richard left his BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN
entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.
over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN
interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent. GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER
The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the project of DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY
partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court O’NEIL GUERSEY’S ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND
also adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS
Makati property to respondent.15 EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the
Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can no
trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is
issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.16Respondent "conclusive upon the administration as to all matters involved
contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in
when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are
distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will. concerned, all matters therein determined," and the same has
Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire already been executed.21
estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in
adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and since performing his duties as an ancillary administrator. He
Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition,
over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland,
Makati property should now pertain to respondent. such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of
Petitioner contended that he acted in good faith in submitting respondent with regard to the terms of Aubrey’s will, stating
the project of partition before the trial court in Special that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the
Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of contents of the will and how the estate will be divided.22
Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty
alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s estate amounted to
surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-
receive their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the bound to follow the express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his
orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand
and cannot be set aside. because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.
annulling the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and Respondent also states that she was not able to file any
April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 17 The opposition to the project of partition because she was not a
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides: party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will
bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty.
Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of
M-888 for the settlement of Richard’s estate. Richard’s estate, the opposition thereto, and the order of the
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special
vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in 1991.32Respondent
which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into
it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888
rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of that she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioner’s
distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the
jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action
ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet
a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of prescribed.
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber
inadvertence not imputable to negligence.26 Corporation v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court stated that "man in
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new
20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil schemes to fool the unwary."
Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of
129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which prevents a
annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all
the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not
that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it
to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the
extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four years controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any
from the discovery of the fraud.29 fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his
1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
cause and found that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has
Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of good faith, been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or
amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him
of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where
applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept
estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney
found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey’s fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these
estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally and similar cases which show that there has never been a real
benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which
Guersey Hill. a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former
Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.34
already prescribed because as early as 1984, respondent was The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is
already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will, 30 and the that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a
complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other party from having his day in court.35
hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As
had no opportunity to question petitioner’s acts since she was such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and
not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence
after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust.
Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the
of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree
protect her interest.31 of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of
annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be
run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. judged.36
Respondent’s knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will is Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of
immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as
Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated
or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen
be counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof. domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will
in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others,
that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a
Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff
and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and and a large library."39 He had all the legal resources to
probated before the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to
U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with
Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on
Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan’s him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his
Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was fiduciary duties.
authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact
Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy. remains that the trial court failed to consider said law when it
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and
especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs,
her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as and distributing Audrey’s estate according to the project of
provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit: partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to
the law of the country where it is situated. the Makati property.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of that when the rule that the negligence or mistake of counsel
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a
the nature of the property and regardless of the country miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a
wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied) particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to purposes of justice require it.
succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent." The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate.
Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by
Administration of Estate Thereunder, states: petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati
allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts,
administration with the will annexed, and such letters thus:
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and
of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same
disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may as the foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the
operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade
is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions
belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that
country. (Emphasis supplied) the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the
and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O’Neill
them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16
Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship
pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38 and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the
law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.
relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to
Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court prove the national law of Audrey O’Neill Guersey during the
peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of
terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was good faith in distributing the subject estate in accordance with
no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his
judicious appreciation of the evidence presented. actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was direct examination, to wit:
made in good faith. The Court cannot accept petitioner’s xxx
protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the
Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey was prompted by defendant
Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was already Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty equally
brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the benefit the plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625.
Ancheta’s action appears to have breached his duties and Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view
responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took
estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the
considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the same. The Court held, viz.:
fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the
resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to court below and we have found that during the hearing on
create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for
Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission to prove the national withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially
laws of the decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in sum, Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in
resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See
submission of the real issues involved in the case.41 (Emphasis pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First
supplied) Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for the
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the
of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result of hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael
petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
does not rest upon petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not
be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of
clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are
to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially
own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond her control. She was Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be
in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having
omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of
justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and the
duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took
rights.42 note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that petitioner or
Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the State of Maryland any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute
on Estates and Trusts, as follows: the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey’s and
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their
Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland on Estates and respective wills, and not according to the project of partition
Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati
of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the property belongs to respondent.
personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in
administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote:
provides that "unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have
the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as
testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy". if the testator stood before the court in full life making the
Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That
that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the
"under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to
decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that
estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be
sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances". 43 resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just what he
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, said.
consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in the Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably
Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over Audrey’s and
64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46
All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey’s x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific
have then passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes provisions must prevail over general ones.47
the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and
allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the Richard Guersey were American citizens who owned real
testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was
property in the Philippines, although records do not show when the respondent).1 On March 2, 1998, the RTC affirmed the
and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property. order dated May 3, 1995.2 The petitioners filed a notice of
Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, appeal and, later on, a record on appeal, but the respondents
the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of the public domain, moved to dismiss their appeal on June 15, 2000 on the ground
and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate of tardiness of the record on appeal. The RTC granted the
public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or motion to dismiss on February 1, 2002. On March 13, 2002,
controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court clarified the petitioners moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, 3 but
that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on May 21,
American citizens and business enterprises the right in the 2004.4 Thus, on June 23, 2004, the petitioners directly
acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition, appealed to the Court, assailing the orders of February 1, 2002
exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of and May 21, 2004.
the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation Antecedents
of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition In January 1985, the petitioners relayed their offer to the
of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 administrator of the Estate of L.J. Hodges to purchase for
Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception ₱22,560.00 Lot 18, Block 7 of 971 (Lot 18), an asset of the
of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when Estate situated on D.B. Ledesma Interior, Jaro, Iloilo City. They
the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as made a deposit of ₱4,512.00, the equivalent of 20% of the
provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article offer.5 On August 1, 1985, the administrator sought judicial
XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly approval of the offer,6 stating to the RTC that petitioner Erlinda
prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private Lebin was the actual occupant of Lot 18.7 The RTC
lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of commissioned one Atty. Tabares to conduct an ocular
legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former inspection of Lot 18 to ascertain if Erlinda Lebin was really the
natural-born citizen. occupant. In his report, Atty. Tabares confirmed that Erlinda
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly Lebin was the only occupant of Lot 18.8 Accordingly, on August
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or 28, 1985, the RTC granted the administrator’s motion for
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is approval of the offer.9
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered In the meanwhile, respondent Vilma S. Mirasol (Mirasol) also
valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already offered to purchase the lot containing an area of 188 square
passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, meters where her house stood. The lot was initially identified
if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the as Lot No. 4, Block 7 of 971 (Lot 4), but a later survey revealed
Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the that her house was actually standing on Lot 18, not Lot
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has 4.10 Learning on November 11, 1985 of the approval of the
been achieved. petitioners’ offer to purchase Lot 18, therefore, Mirasol filed on
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated December 6, 1985 a petition for relief from the order dated
March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of August 28, 1985.11
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. On December 17, 1987, pending resolution of the petition for
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the relief, the petitioners paid the last installment for Lot 18, and
performance of his duties as an official of the court. moved for the execution of the deed of sale. 12 Apparently, the
No pronouncement as to costs. motion was not acted upon by the RTC.
SO ORDERED. At last, on May 3, 1995, the RTC resolved the petition for relief,
viz:
WHEREFORE, the Court, under the auspices of equity and
justice tempered with humanitarian reasons, hereby declare
G.R. No. 164255 September 7, 2011 each of the offeror-claimants after complying with their
SPOUSES ELBE LEBIN and ERLINDA LEBIN, Petitioners, respective obligation with the estate, should there be any, to be
vs. the owner where their respective houses stand, and therefore,
VILMA S. MIRASOL, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF DIRECTS and ENJOINS for the following matters to be
ILOILO, BRANCH XXVII, Respondents. undertaken:
DECISION For the Administrator of the L.J. Hodges Estate:
BERSAMIN, J.: 1) To assist both offeror-claimants in effecting a Relocation
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the Survey Plan and cause the equal partition of the subject lot
period laid down by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. herein between the said offeror-claimant;
The Case 2) To execute the corresponding deed of sale over the
In Special Proceedings No. 1307 involving the settlement of aforecited subject lot in favor of the herein offeror-claimants ---
the estate of the late L.J. Hodges, the Regional Trial Court Erlinda Lebin and Vilma S. Mirasol purposely to expedite the
(RTC), Branch 27, in Iloilo City, issued an order dated May 3, issuance of respective title; and ---
1995 (ruling that a property of the estate sold to the petitioners 3) To exact payment from either or both offeror-claimants
be divided in two equal portions between the petitioners and should there be any deficiency, and/or to refund payment
should there be any excess payment from either or both appealed to the Supreme Court except by petition for review
offeror-claimants. on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
SO ORDERED.13 in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
On May 23, 1995, the petitioners moved for reconsideration amended. The proposition is clearly stated in the Interim Rules:
and/or new trial.14 On March 2, 1998, the RTC denied the "Appeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial of the certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of
petitioners.15 Thus, on March 27, 1998, the petitioners filed a Court.
notice of appeal in the RTC.16 Allegedly, on May 5, 1998, they On the other hand, it is not possible to take an appeal by
also filed a record on appeal.17On January 25, 1999, they certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Appeals to that Court from
presented an ex parte motion to approve the record on the Regional Trial Courts are perfected in two (2) ways, both of
appeal.18 On June 15, 2000, Mirasol filed a motion to dismiss which are entirely distinct from an appeal by certiorari to the
the appeal, insisting that the record on appeal had been filed Supreme Court. They are:
late.19 The RTC granted the motion to dismiss the appeal on a) by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error - where
February 1, 2002.20 The petitioners moved for reconsideration judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC
on March 13, 2002,21 but the RTC denied their motion for in the exercise of original jurisdiction; and
reconsideration on May 21, 2004.22 b) by petition for review - where judgment was rendered by the
Hence, the petitioners appealed via petition for review on RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
certiorari filed on June 23, 2004, to seek the review and The petition for review must be filed with the Court of Appeals
reversal of the orders of the RTC dated February 1, 2002 and within 15 days from notice of the judgment, and as already
May 21, 2004. stated, shall point out the error of fact or law that will warrant a
Issues reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to
1. Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioners’ be reviewed. An ordinary appeal is taken by merely filing a
appeal for their failure to timely file a record on appeal; and notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the judgment,
2. Whether or not the RTC committed reversible error in except in special proceedings or cases where multiple appeals
adjudging that Lot 18 be sold to both the petitioners and are allowed in which event the period of appeal is 30 days and
Mirasol in equal portions. a record on appeal is necessary.
Ruling There is therefore no longer any common method of appeal in
The petition for review lacks merit. civil cases to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
I The present procedures for appealing to either court – and, it
RTC did not err in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal may be added, the process of ventilation of the appeal – are
for their failure to timely file a record on appeal distinct from each other. To repeat, appeals to this court
Among the innovations introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. cannot now be made by petition for review or by notice of
12923 is the elimination of the record on appeal in most cases, appeals (and, in certain instances, by record on appeal), but
retaining the record on appeal only for appeals in special only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As was
proceedings and in other cases in which the Rules of Court stressed by this Court as early as 1980, in Buenbrazo v.
allows multiple appeals. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. Marave, 101 SCRA 848, all "the members of the bench and
129 has incorporated this innovation, to wit: bar" are charged with knowledge, not only that "since the
Section 39. Appeals. - The period for appeal from final orders, enactment of Republic Act No. 8031 in 1969," the review of the
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all decision of the Court of First Instance in a case exclusively
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the cognizable by the inferior court xxx cannot be made in an
final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed ordinary appeal or by record on appeal," but also that appeal
from: Provided however, That in habeas corpus cases, the by record on appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 42 of
period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice the Rules of Court was abolished by Republic Act No. 5440
of the judgment appealed from. which, as already stated, took effect on September 9, 1968.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu Similarly, in Santos, Jr., v. C.A., 152 SCRA 378, this Court
thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages declared that "Republic Act No. 5440 had long superseded
prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of Rule 41 and Section 1, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court on direct
the contents thereof. appeals from the court of first instance to the Supreme Court in
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings civil and criminal cases, x x and that "direct appeals to this
and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under Court from the trial court on questions of law had to be through
applicable provisions of the Rules of Court. (emphasis the filing of a petition for review on certiorari, wherein this Court
supplied) could either give due course to the proposed appeal or deny it
In early 1990, the Supreme Court issued its resolution in outright to prevent the clogging of its docket with unmeritorious
Murillo v. Consul24 to clarify and fortify a judicial policy against and dilatory appeals."
misdirected or erroneous appeals, stating: In fine, if an appeal is essayed to either court by the wrong
At present then, except in criminal cases where the penalty procedure, the only course of action open is to dismiss the
imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, there is no appeal. In other words, if an appeal is attempted from a
way by which judgments of regional trial courts may be judgment of a Regional Trial Court by notice of appeal, that
appeal can and should never go to this Court, regardless of disposes of a particular matter in the proceeding, unless
any statement in the notice that the court of choice is the otherwise declared by the Rules of Court.26The ostensible
Supreme Court; and more than once has this Court reason for requiring a record on appeal instead of only a notice
admonished a Trial Judge and/or his Clerk of Court, as well as of appeal is the multi-part nature of nearly all special
the attorney taking the appeal, for causing the records to be proceedings, with each part susceptible of being finally
sent up to this Court in such a case. Again, if an appeal by determined and terminated independently of the other parts.
notice of appeal is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the An appeal by notice of appeal is a mode that envisions the
Court of Appeals and in the latter Court, the appellant raises elevation of the original records to the appellate court as to
naught but issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for thereby obstruct the trial court in its further proceedings
lack of jurisdiction. And finally, it may be stressed once more, it regarding the other parts of the case. In contrast, the record on
is only through petitions for review on certiorari that the appeal enables the trial court to continue with the rest of the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may properly be case because the original records remain with the trial court
invoked. even as it affords to the appellate court the full opportunity to
There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of review and decide the appealed matter.
erroneous appeals from one court to the other, much less for Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court underscores the
tolerating continued ignorance of the law on appeals. It thus multi-part nature of special proceedings by enumerating the
behooves every attorney seeking review and reversal of a particular judgments and final orders already subject of appeal
judgment or order promulgated against his client, to determine by any interested party despite other parts of the proceedings
clearly the errors he believes may be ascribed to the judgment being still untried or unresolved, to wit:
or order, whether of fact or of law; then to ascertain which court Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be
properly has appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to observe taken. - An interested person may appeal in special
scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, with proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of
keen awareness that any error or imprecision in compliance First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
therewith may well be fatal to his client's cause. 25 (emphasis where such order or judgment:
supplied) (a) Allows or disallows a will;
An offshoot of Murillo v. Consul is the inclusion in the 1997 (b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person,
revision of the rules of civil procedure, effective July 1, 1997, of or the distributive share of the estate to which such person is
a provision that forthrightly delineated the modes of appealing entitled;
an adverse judgment or final order. The provision is Section 2 (c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against
of Rule 41, viz: the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on
Section 2. Modes of appeal.— behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(a) Ordinary appeal.— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in (d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its guardian;
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal (e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the
with the court which rendered the judgment or final order estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the
party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and
where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it
(b) Petition for review.— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its reconsideration.
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in The petitioners’ appeal comes under item (e) of Section 1,
accordance with Rule 42. supra, due to the final order of May 3, 1995 issued in the
(c) Appeal by certiorari.— In all cases where only questions of settlement of the estate of L.J. Hodges being "a final
law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with appealing." In order to elevate a part of the records sufficient
Rule 45. (n) (emphasis supplied) for appellate review without the RTC being deprived of the
The changes and clarifications recognize that appeal is neither original records, the remedy was to file a record on appeal to
a natural nor a constitutional right, but merely statutory, and be approved by the RTC.
the implication of its statutory character is that the party who The elimination of the record on appeal under Batas
intends to appeal must always comply with the procedures and Pambansa Blg. 129 made feasible the shortening of the period
rules governing appeals, or else the right of appeal may be lost of appeal from the original 30 days to only 15 days from notice
or squandered. of the judgment or final order. Section 3,27Rule 41 of the Rules
As the foregoing rules further indicate, a judgment or final of Court, retains the original 30 days as the period for
order in special proceedings is appealed by record on appeal. perfecting the appeal by record on appeal to take into
A judgment or final order determining and terminating a consideration the need for the trial court to approve the record
particular part is usually appealable, because it completely on appeal. Within that 30-day period a party aggrieved by a
judgment or final order issued in special proceedings should appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-payment of
perfect an appeal by filing both a notice of appeal and a record the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
on appeal in the trial court, serving a copy of the notice of period.32 For that reason, the RTC rightly granted Mirasol’s
appeal and a record on appeal upon the adverse party within motion to dismiss the record on appeal.
the period;28 in addition, the appealing party shall pay within Nonetheless, the petitioners propose to be excused from the
the period for taking an appeal to the clerk of the court that requirement of filing a record on appeal, arguing that "(t)o
rendered the appealed judgment or final order the full amount require a (r)ecord on (a)ppeal here is to reproduce the more
of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. 29 A violation than eighteen (18) volumes of records here which is quite
of these requirements for the timely perfection of an appeal by impossible to do" and that "most of these records, (sic) have
record on appeal,30 or the non-payment of the full amount of nothing to do with the present controversy."33 Also, they state
the appellate court docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of that their counsel was "of the honest belief and impression"
the trial court31 may be a ground for the dismissal of the that "the same was not really necessary because the nature of
appeal. the controversy xxx is civil and not an intestate one." 34
Did the petitioners comply with the requirements for perfecting The petitioners’ submissions are frail and facetious.
their appeal? In order to come up with the record on appeal, the petitioners
The petitioners received the assailed May 3, 1995 order of the were not expected to reproduce over 18 volumes of the
RTC on May 15, 1995. They filed a motion for reconsideration records, for their record on appeal would have included only
and/or new trial on May 24, 1995. On March 23, 1998, they the records of the trial court which the appellate court would be
were served with the order dated March 2, 1998 (denying their asked to pass upon.35 Section 6, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial). Although they filed Civil Procedure, which meanwhile became applicable to them,
a notice of appeal on March 27, 1998, they submitted the specified what the record on appeal should contain, thusly:
record on appeal only on May 5, 1998. Undoubtedly, they filed Section 6. Record on appeal; form and contents thereof. - The
the record on appeal 43 days from March 23, 1998, the date full names of all the parties to the proceedings shall be stated
they received the denial of their motion for reconsideration in the caption of the record on appeal and it shall include the
and/or new trial. They should have filed the record on appeal judgment or final order from which the appeal is taken and, in
within 30 days from their notice of the judgment. Their appeal chronological order, copies of only such pleadings, petitions,
was not perfected, therefore, because their filing of the record motions and all interlocutory orders as are related to the
on appeal happened beyond the end of their period for the appealed judgment or final order for the proper understanding
perfection of their appeal. of the issue involved, together with such data as will show that
The petitioners’ filing of the motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the appeal was perfected on time. If an issue of fact is to be
the order of May 3, 1995 interrupted the running of the period raised on appeal, the record on appeal shall include by
of 30 days; hence, their period to appeal started to run from reference all the evidence, testimonial and documentary, taken
May 15, 1995, the date they received the order of May 3, 1995. upon the issue involved. The reference shall specify the
They filed their motion for reconsideration on May 24, 1995. By documentary evidence by the exhibit numbers or letters by
then, nine days out of their 30-day period to appeal already which it was identified when admitted or offered at the hearing,
elapsed. They received a copy of the order dated March 2, and the testimonial evidence by the names of the
1998 on March 23, 1998. Thus, the period to appeal resumed corresponding witnesses. If the whole testimonial and
from March 23, 1998 and ended 21 days later, or on April 13, documentary evidence in the case is to be included, a
1998. Yet, they filed their record on appeal only on May 5, statement to that effect will be sufficient without mentioning the
1998, or 22 days beyond the end of their reglementary period. names of the witnesses or the numbers or letters of exhibits.
Although, by that time, the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure had Every record on appeal exceeding twenty (20) pages must
meanwhile taken effect (July 1, 1997), their period of appeal contain a subject index. (6a)
remained 30 days. It is stressed that under the 1997 revisions, The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, and should be
the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration interrupted the exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. 36The statutory
running of the period of appeal, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 nature of the right to appeal requires the one who avails
of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, viz: himself of it to strictly comply with the statutes or rules that are
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. In the
final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is absence of highly exceptional circumstances warranting their
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record relaxation, like when the loftier demands of substantial justice
on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or and equity require the relaxation,37 or when there are other
final order. special and meritorious circumstances and issues,38 such
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for statutes or rules should remain inviolable.39
new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to In like manner, the perfection of an appeal within the period
file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. laid down by law is mandatory and jurisdictional, because the
(n) (emphasis supplied) failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the
Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court empowers the RTC Rules of Court causes the judgment or final order to become
as the trial court, motu proprio or on motion, to dismiss the final as to preclude the appellate court from acquiring the
jurisdiction to review the judgment or final order. 40 The failure invalidation or modification derived from the falsity of the
of the petitioners and their counsel to file their record on appeal factual basis of the disposition, or from any other factual
on time rendered the orders of the RTC final and mistake, or from the concealment of a material fact by a party.
unappealable. Thereby, the appellate court lost the jurisdiction Consequently, the probate court’s modification of its approval
to review the challenged orders, and the petitioners were of the petitioners’ offer to purchase was well within the power
precluded from assailing the orders. of the RTC to nullify or modify after it was found to be contrary
II to the condition for the approval. Thereby, the RTC’s ruling,
RTC committed no reversible error in allocating being sound and judicious, constituted neither abuse of
Lot 18 in equal portions to both petitioners and respondent discretion nor excess of jurisdiction.
The non-perfection of the appeal by the petitioners WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review, and AFFIRM
notwithstanding, the Court declares that the RTC did not err in the final orders dated May 3, 1995 and March 2, 1998.
allocating the parcel of land equally to the parties if only to The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
serve and enforce a standing policy in the settlement of the SO ORDERED.
large estate of the late L.J. Hodges to prefer actual occupants
in the disposition of estate assets. The policy was entirely
within the power of the RTC to adopt and enforce as the
probate court. G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978
As stated in the administrator’s motion for approval of the offer, Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and
the approval of the offer to purchase would be conditioned Teresa Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA, Administrator, vs.
upon whether the petitioners were the only actual occupants. CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA.
The condition was designed to avoid the dislocation of actual DE PANGILINAN and her Children,
occupants, and was the reason why the RTC dispatched Atty.
Tabares to determine who actually occupied the property AQUINO, J.:
before approving the motion. It turned out that the report of These two cases involve the question of whether the
Atty. Tabares about the petitioners being the only occupants ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the
was mistaken, because the house of Mirasol, who had deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the
meanwhile also offered to purchase the portion where her intestate proceeding or in a separate action. Also in issue in
house stood, happened to be within the same lot subject of the these two cases is the liability of the decedents' estate for the
petitioners’ offer to purchase. The confusion arose from the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in a case regarding that
misdescription of Mirasol’s portion as Lot 4, instead of Lot same land.
18.411âwphi1 Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was
Under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may authorize allowed in this Court's resolution of August 13, 1969.
the sale, mortgage, or encumbrance of assets of the The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in
estate.1avvphi1 The approval of the sale in question, and the 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possession a homestead,
modification of the disposition of property of the Estate of L.J. consisting of two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or
Hodges were made pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 89, to wit: Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental.
Section 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as One parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1927. It has an area of
beneficial to interested persons; Disposal of proceeds. - When 3.9791 hectares. It was covered by Original Certificate of Title
it appears that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or (OCT) No. 10 of the registry of deeds of Oriental Misamis in
personal estate will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees, the name of Juan Pangilinan issued in 1927. It is now covered
legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86 (T-10) of the registry of
application of the executor or administrator and on written deeds of Misamis Occidental (p. 7, Appellees' brief in L-
notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees who are interested in 27082).
the estate to be sold, authorize the executor or administrator to The other parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1112. It has an area of
sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary 18.0291 hectares. It is covered by OCT No. P-8419 issued on
to pay debts, legacies, or expenses of administration; but such November 21, 1961 in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pan ,
authority shall not be granted if inconsistent with the provisions represented by Concepcion Pan de Yamuta (p. 73, Record on
of a will. In case of such sale, the proceeds shall be assigned Appeal in
to the persons entitled to the estate in the proper proportions. L-27082).
[emphasis supplied] According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third
Without doubt, the disposal of estate property required judicial parcel, Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares which was
approval before it could be executed. 42 Implicit in the surveyed in the name of Concepcion Pan and which adjoins
requirement for judicial approval was that the probate court Lots Nos. 1927 and 1112, also forms part of the estate of the
could rescind or nullify the disposition of a property under deceased Pangilinan spouses (pp. 61-64, Record on Appeal).
administration that was effected without its authority. 43 This The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs:
power included the authority to nullify or modify its approval of (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar all
the sale of the property of the estate to conform to the law or to surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan
the standing policies set and fixed for the purpose, where the Yamuta who died in 1961, and (3) Francis, A Benjamin Perla
and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the children of Francisco with an area of eight hectares, which lot was surveyed at
Pan who died in 1948 and who was also survived by his should be included in the project of partition.
widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is not clear whether Roseller, On August 31, 1966 the lower court, apparently acting on its
Demosthenes and Eliza, all surnamed Japay, were the children own volition, tackled once more the project of partition. After
of the deceased Helen Pangilinan, presumably a daughter of noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the
Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. See pages 81-82, ownership of the twelve hectares, it issued an order approving
Record on Appeal). the project of partition but excluding the twelve hectares
Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan.
Misamis Occidental was instituted on September 5, 1963 for That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. excluding the twelve hectares, the lower court did not bother to
Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. decide how the remainder should be partitioned and whether
On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project Prima Pangilinan had a share in that remainder.
of partition wherein the combined areas of Lots Nos. 1112 and That is the order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca
1927, or 22.0082 hectares, were partitioned as follows: as administrator, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion
(a) To Crispin Borromeo as payment of his attorney's fees in Pangilinan. However, the said appellants in their brief also
Civil Case No. 560 or CA-G.R. No. 6721-R, February 27, 1952, assail the lower court's order of December 6, 1963, excluding
Crispin Labaria vs. Juan C. Pangilinan, in accordance with the eighteen hectares from the inventory, which order was
lower court's decision dated July 19, 1965 in Civil Case No. sustained by the Court of Appeals in its decision in Atay vs.
2440. Borromeo vs. Coca (p. 11, Appellees' brief in L- Catolico, CA-G.R. Nos. 33165-R, and 3426-R, May 14,1964, 5
27082), three hectares which should be taken from Lot No. CAR 1200. This Court refused to review that decision in its
1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-A; resolution of July 29, 1964, in
(b) To the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Mrs. Pizarras and L-23088-89, Atay vs. Court of Appeals.
children), 5.3361 hectares taken from Lot No. 1112 and The other incident involves the lower court's order of May 11,
designated as Lot No. 1112-B; 1968 which directed that the claim of the heirs of Francisco
(c) To Prima Pangilinan, 6.3361 hectares, taken from Lot No. Pangilinan for reimbursement of litigation expenses (apart from
1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-C, and presumably a the sum of P1,459.49, as the value of the produce of the
daughter of Francisco Pan 81-82, Record on Appeal). twelve hectares already mentioned, which was appropriated by
(d) To the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, 7.3360 hectares, the special administrator), be referred to the clerk of court for
consisting of Lot No. 1927 and the remainder of Lot No. 1112, reception of the evidence.
which remainder is designated as Lot No. 1112-D. In another order, also dated May 11, 1968, the lower court
It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum of reiterated its order of October 2, 1965 that the administrator
P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the estate to Concepcion should pay the heirs of Concepcion Pan the. amount to be
Pan should be divided equally among the three sets of heirs, or reimbursed to her estate. The court further directed the
P1,696.16 for each set of heirs, and that Prima Pangilinan and administrator to account for the income of the estate, to
the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should pay that amount to the recover any amount due from the special administrator, and to
heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and the amount due to the
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan as directed in its order of
opposed that project of partition. They contended that the August 31, 1966 and in its approval of the accounting of the
proposed partition contravened the lower court's order of special administrator.
December 6, 1963 which recognized the right of the heirs of The administrator, Filomeno Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the
Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that heirs of Concepcion Pan also appealed from those two orders
Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan should dated May 11, 1968 (L-29545).
be excluded from the partition; that the total share of the heirs The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court,
of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the twelve-
while that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the
hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion appellees" or the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the
Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not been properly allowed. lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve hectares
The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the when it ordered their exclusion from the project of partition. So,
administrator to pay the debt of the estate to the heirs of the problem is how the title to the twelve hectares should be
Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of decided, whether in a separate action or in the intestate.
partition until the ownership of the twelve hectares, which were proceeding.
claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and the six hectares, It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be
which were claimed by Crispen Borromeo (eighteen hectares resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its
in all which were excluded from the inventory in the court's general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in
order of December 6, 1963) is determined in an ordinary reality not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a
action. procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may
On may 14,1966 the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan filed a be waived" (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232. Cf. Reyes
supplemental opposition wherein they asked that Lot No. 1920, vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re jurisdiction over the issue).
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable
be passed upon in the estate or intestate proceeding. That settlement has been reached, the probate court should receive
question should be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal evidence or, as indicated by the Court of Appeals in Atay vs.
vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That Catolico, supra a full-dress hearing should be held.
general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three
expediency and convenience. hectares but only for the purpose of deciding what portion of
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an the estate should be given to him in satisfaction of his share.
intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or His claim for the sum of P416 had already been adjudicated by
exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without the lower court in its order of August 31, 1966 (pp. 26- 27,
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action Record on Appeal in L-29545). No appeal was interposed from
Lachenal vs. Salas, supra). that adjudication.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question After trial the lower court's decision on the issues as to what
of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs or constitutes the estate of the Pangilinan spouses should include
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties the partition thereof and should indicate what portion of the
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court estate should be allocated to Crispen Borromeo. If necessary,
and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the the validity of the donation or partition of Lot No. 1112, made
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership by Juan C. Pangilinan during his lifetime, should be passed
(Pascual vs. Pascual 73 Phil. 561; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L- upon.
18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892; Cunanan vs. Considering that the respective claims of the heirs of Francisco
Amparo, supra; 3 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, Pangilinan . and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for
1970 Ed., p. 4731). reimbursement of the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception Civil Case No. 560 will be included in the trial, the two orders of
to the general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in the trial court dated May 11, 1968 regarding those matters (L-
a separate action. 29545) should not be enforced. They should be set aside.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's amended order of August
ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of 31, 1966, excluding twelve hectares from the partition of the
the motion for its exclusion from title inventory The only estate of the deceased Pan spouses (L-27082) and (2) the two
interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the orders dated May 11, 1968, regarding the claim of Guadalupe
intestate proceeding. Pizarras and her children and the debt of the estate to
As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor Concepcion Pangilinan (L-29545) are reversed and set aside.
stratum of society. They should not be forced to incur A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of
additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate the proper pleadings and in case no amicable settlement is
action to determine the ownership of the twelve-hectare reached. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should file their
portion. motion within thirty days from notice of the entry of judgment in
The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the this case.
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to the in the intestate, The case is remanded to the lower court for further
proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 568, a motion in the form proceedings in accordance with the guidelines already set
of a complaint wherein they should set forth their claim for the forth. No costs.
twelve hectares in question, stating the ultimate facts in SO ORDERED.
support of their claim, such as the partition made by Juan C.
Pangilinan, their acquisition of the share of Prima Pangilinan
and the usufructuary rights of their parents, their long
possession of the said portion, their claim for the produce of
the land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No.
560, Labaria vs. Pangilinan, and their contention that Lot No.
1920 forms part of the estate of the Pangilinan spouses.
Copies of that motion should be serves upon the administrator
and upon Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan (who are all represented by the same lawyers).
They should answer the motion within fifteen days from
service. In their answer the appellants should set forth the
ultimate facts and the defenses (such as the violation of
section 118 of the Public Land Law) to support their theory that
Lot No. 1112 still forms part of the estate of the spouses Juan
C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba and that the heirs of
Francisco Pangilinan should bear one-third of the expenses
incurred by Concepcion Pan in Civil Case No. 560.
Rule 78 – Letters Testamentary and of Administration and averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be
when and to whom Issued appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013 issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the
MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners, petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting
vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence
LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent. was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC
DECISION decision reads:
PEREZ, J.: Having attained legal age at this time and there being no
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as
45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the
November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner,
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of
portion of which states: a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her. 9
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in
DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of
the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of
Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2 the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to
The Facts prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting
the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to
respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the
The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia- venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals
Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent
joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer). Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), The Issues
represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of
a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF
Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR
parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED
the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO
Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth 4 signed by Eliseo as THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST
her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties The Court’s Ruling
worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo We find the petition bereft of merit.
and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate. letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, the time of his death:
opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the
an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province
Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now
addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally.
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of
(Emphasis supplied). the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code,
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog 23 applicable four-square
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms,
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration
of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from
domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses voidable marriages, to wit:
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after
not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
"inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual interested party may attack a void marriage.24
stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage
special proceedings have one and the same meaning. 18 As has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that
thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
consistency.19 Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s
cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage
laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the
his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city. spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of
petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be extinguish such cause of action.
considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s
death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or
courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being
Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as bigamous.
husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence
1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was
Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of
Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the
ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. 20 That officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in
Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent
before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position evidence of marriage and the certification from the National
that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists
and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We
submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, record of marriage can no longer be found in the National
must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court. 21 Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote.
Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law,
marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that satisfied.29Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s
the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27 estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED
for Letters of Administration. for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc
preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of AFFIRMED in toto.
administration, thus: SO ORDERED.
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. —
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors G.R. No. 183053 June 16, 2010
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or III,Petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-
next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such SUNTAY, Respondent.
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, DECISION
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; NACHURA, J.:
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or Unlike Pope Alexander VI1 who, faced with the impasse
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects between Spain and Portugal, deftly and literally divided the
for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for exploration, or more appropriately, the riches of the New World
administration or to request that administration be granted to by issuing the Inter Caetera,2 we are confronted with the
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family imbroglio
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; over the estate of a decedent.3
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
may be granted to such other person as the court may select. Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949,4 reversing the decision of the
petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in
interested person, thus: Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.5
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
interested person and must show, so far as known to the (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died
petitioner: intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
(a) The jurisdictional facts; (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico,
names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent; and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-
estate; Suntay.
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco,
are prayed. and they begot three children, namely: herein respondent,
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-
letters of administration. Suntay. Emilio I’s marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children
be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Tañedo (Nenita),
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel
proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose Santos, respectively.
relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever
share in the estate as distributees.28 since he was a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child
be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I
be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and
record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the Cristina.
petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and
administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate Isabel was annulled.6 Consequently, respondent and her
attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother on
of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is paternal grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a Emilio III averred his own qualifications that: "[he] is presently
petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was trained by the
Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and decedent to work in his early age by involving him in the
Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City granted the petition activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was
and allowed Federico one hour of visitation monthly, initially established in 1979 in memory of her grandmother’s father; the
reduced to thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of significant work experiences outside the family group are
a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her included in his curriculum vitae; he was employed by the
sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents. oppositor [Federico] after his graduation in college with
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy
or on September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate Rural Bank; x x x."10
grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.71avvphi1 In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000,
On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the Federico died.
issuance of letters of administration in her favor, containing the After the testimonies of both parties’ witnesses were heard and
following allegations: evidence on their respective allegations were adduced, the trial
[A]t the time of [the decedent’s] death, [she] was a resident of court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing
the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent
[decedent] left an estate of real and personal properties, with a Cristina’s intestate estate, to wit:
probable gross value of ₱29,000,000.00; that the names, ages WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is
and residences of the surviving heirs of the [decedent] are: (1) DENIED and the Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.
Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and a Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby
resident of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old, appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina
legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; (3) Margarita Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his
Cojuangco-Suntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱200,000.00,
a resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years conditioned as follows:
old, legitimate grandson and a resident of x x x; and that as far (1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and
as [respondent] knew, the decedent left no debts or obligation complete inventory;
at the time of her death.8 (2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends
respondent Isabel, Federico filed his opposition on December thereon;
21, 1995, alleging, among others, that: (3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of at any other time when required by the court, and
administering her estate and he should be the one appointed (4) To perform all orders of the Court.
as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of
properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal Administration be issued in his favor.
preference in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her SO ORDERED.11
family had been alienated from their grandparents for more Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which
than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in the reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed
of his son[,] namely: Emilio III and Nenita S. Tañedo; that he is respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the
better situated to protect the integrity of the estate of Cristina decedent, Cristina, to wit:
as even before the death of his wife[,] he was already the one WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed
who managed their conjugal properties; that the probable value decision dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial
of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is
(sic); and that Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration
are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.9 issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is
proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of
March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be
administrator of the decedent’s estate on his behalf, in the issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of
event he would be adjudged as the one with a better right to Two Hundred Thousand (₱200,000.00) Pesos.
the letters of administration. No pronouncement as to costs.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio III’s Motion for SO ORDERED.12
Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been
the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which denied, he appeals by certiorari to this Court, raising the
essentially echoed the allegations in his grandfather’s following issues:
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
was better equipped than respondent to administer and ESTATE UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES
manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. Additionally,
OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE be appointed as the administrator of the decedent’s estate for
APPLIES; and the following reasons:15
B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN 1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a
PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER suspensive condition, i.e., Federico’s appointment as
SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF administrator of the estate, he being the surviving
THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM spouse of Cristina, the decedent. The death of
BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE Federico before his appointment as administrator of
DECEDENT’S ESTATE.13 Cristina’s estate rendered his nomination of Emilio III
In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC inoperative;
ratiocinated, thus: 2. ,
Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both 2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and
testimonial and documentary, the court opines that it is to the illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of decedent’s son, Emilio I,
best interest of the estate of the decedent and all claimants respondent is preferred, being the "next of kin" referred to by
thereto, that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and entitled to share
appointed administrator of the estate in the above-entitled in the distribution of Cristina’s estate as an heir;
special proceedings. 3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 16 of the
Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court, Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato
[respondent’s immediate] family and that of the decedent are from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
apparently estranged. The root cause of which, is not for this mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting from his
court to ascertain nor is this the right time and the proper forum grandmother, cannot be preferred over respondent in the
to dwell upon. What matters most at this time is the welfare of administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent;
the estate of the decedent in the light of such unfortunate and and
bitter estrangement. 4. Contrary to the RTC’s finding, respondent is as much
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would competent as Emilio III to administer and manage the subject
go against the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] estate for she possesses none of the disqualifications specified
from infancy in her home in Baguio City as her own child. in Section 1,17 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the surviving The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio
spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as III and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of
administrator. the decedent’s estate.
As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the We cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling excluding
latter is accorded preference as the surviving spouse under Emilio III in the administration of the decedent’s undivided
Sec 6(a), Rule 78, Rules of Court. On the basis of such estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several undisputed
preference, he vigorously opposed the appointment of the facts and circumstances:
petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and 1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate
adopted child. Such nomination, absent any valid and succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumed
justifiable reason, should not be imperiously set aside and will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will;
insouciantly ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has 2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the
passed away, in order to give effect to the order of preference iron curtain bar rule,18 is quite the opposite scenario in the facts
mandated by law. Moreover, from the viewpoint of the estate, obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico
the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically meritorious. and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was
For the benefit of the estate and its claimants, creditors, as well akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives;
as heirs, the administrator should be one who is prepared, 3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina,
academically and by experience, for the demands and and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as
responsibilities of the position. While [respondent], a practicing their grandchild;
physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the court that when it 4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate
comes to management of real estate and the processing and of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal
payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
established track record as a manager has a decided edge and 5. Cristina’s properties forming part of her estate are still
therefore, is in a position to better handle the preservation of commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her
the estate.14 share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her
In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s status as death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from 6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to
representing his deceased father in the estate of the latter’s share in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir,
legitimate mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA one degree from Federico, not simply representing his
pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely nominated by deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the latter’s From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in
appointment as administrator of the decedent’s estate, cannot excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedent’s
estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the
estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one
interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.
declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that
spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the
the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not
the conjugal partnership." Thus, we are puzzled why the CA apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the
resorted to a strained legal reasoning – Emilio III’s nomination contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent,
was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their
inoperative by reason of Federico’s death – wholly inapplicable own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their
to the case at bar. businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedent’s
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of husband, the original oppositor to respondent’s petition for
preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate: letters of administration.
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors and a lacuna in the law concerning the bone of contention that
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with the eminent
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation
next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992,
for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995
administration or to request that administration be granted to and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in
may be granted to such other person as the court may select. the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
on the attendant facts and circumstances of each indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil
case.19 Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. 20 In the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and
respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an
estate. enlightened attitude vis-à-vis illegitimate children.23
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,21 we upheld the Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate
appointment by the trial court of a co-administration between succession:
the decedent’s son and the decedent’s brother, who was The law [of intestacy] is founded… on the presumed will of the
likewise a creditor of the decedent’s estate. In the same vein, deceased… Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and,
we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the
Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian22 that: descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals,
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal always preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have
appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the done so had he manifested his last will… Lastly, in default of
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be of blood or affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will
represented in the management of the estates, a situation that his property be given to charitable or educational
which obtains here. institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity. 24
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect
other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for
Cristina and Federico, Nenita Tañedo, but who was likewise the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her
adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her
Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of
claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate
partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly
pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist 3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’
animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate motion for reconsideration.
descendants of a deceased. The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
on who will administer the properties of the long deceased six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
couple has yet to be settled. Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata 25 on the same issue Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
remains good law: Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
premature, although the evidence sufficiently shows who are Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First
entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
the inheritance is liquidated. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William
the foregoing admonition: Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. – x x x. Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the 1992.
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch
obligations within such time as the court directs. 146 thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San
SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal
petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be
make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
costs. administration should have been filed in the Province of
SO ORDERED. Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior
to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007 personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
vs. legally married to Merry Lee.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and
LUIS, Respondent. joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal10 of the
DECISION petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent
February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted
CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M- home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the denied. 28
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of
the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. which states:
Romillo, Jr. 14 WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the
Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given the trial court for further proceedings. 29
retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the
with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent,
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code. for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate,
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from
Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case. legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the administration was properly filed in Makati City.
petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal
motion for disqualification was deemed moot and capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage
resolution of said motion. between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under
for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
on which it was based. With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2,
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines
Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re- in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the
raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel. enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge
submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any
May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the
respectively. Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the
for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the bigamous marriage.
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner
in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant
was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it granted. 36
would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist
children. that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to
claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given which when absent, one has the intention of
time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the
for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal,
Laguna. actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. consistency.43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively residence in one place and domicile in another.
applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo
void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he
considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration. up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing
and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also
subject petition for letters of administration. presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart
The petition lacks merit. Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100
for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also
be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club,
Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
determining the residence – as contradistinguished from deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the
domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of deceased’s calling cards 49stating that his home/city address is
the settlement of his estate: at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term Laguna."
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17,
the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of file the petition for letters of administration, we must first
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
though; however, the residence must be more than jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
temporary.41 (Emphasis supplied) The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by
Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under
and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the
they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected.
The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus: abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to
45 L. Ed. 794, 799: Article 26. 61
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical
of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus Brief Historical Background
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into
without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the states:
other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
marriage." with the laws in force in the country where they were
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before now provides:
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
property. 53 accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
her marital duties and obligations. It held: Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
petitioner has to be considered still married to private abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and x x x x
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter Legislative Intent
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
served. 54 (Emphasis added) Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay- Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case
his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained
from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
or cast obloquy on the other." 56 consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a
the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect. paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering
denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive
marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and of no possible good to the community, relief in some way
should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It
productive of any good to the society where one is considered held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution
to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a
a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this writing or document may be proven as a public or official
case. record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
Court, 68 the Court stated: his office. 71
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
legislature, is to render justice. further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has
that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
done even as the law is obeyed. decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not part:
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A
the literal command without regard to its cause and petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to interested person and must show, as far as known to the
the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes petitioner: x x x.
again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be
them." benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
xxxx claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested
That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by
the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce
when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her
render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
justice. 69 Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce property relations between parties who live together as
decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
with the legal personality to file the present petition as property acquired by either or both of them through their work
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent necessary that the property be acquired through their joint
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through

their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-
owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the
divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be
Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
property relations of couples living together as husband and
wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property
regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the
union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each
other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will
only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party
who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength
of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or
as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article
148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28,
1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Rule 79 – Opposing Issuance of Letters, Testamentary, Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"),
Petition and Contest for Letter of Administration Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10",
& "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II,, Petitioner, v. COURT OF 13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of
APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his the testator and in the presence of each and all of the
Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, witnesses signed the said Last Will and Testament and duly
Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh.
of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de "A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and
Santos, Respondents. Testament, pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").
DECISION Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos
MENDOZA, J.: Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole
the Thirteenth and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of legatee and devisee of petitioners properties, real and
Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in personal, approximately valued at not less than P2 million, Ms.
the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and
were consolidated considering that they involve the same to serve as such without a bond.
parties and some of the issues raised are the same. From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has
The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows: substantially established the material allegations contained in
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident his petition. The Last Will and Testament having been
of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will1 in the executed and attested as required by law; that testator at the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. time of the execution of the will was of sane mind and/or not
No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had mentally incapable to make a Will; nor was it executed under
no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole duress or under the influence of fear or threats; that it was in
legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; writing and executed in the language known and understood
that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate by the testator duly subscribed thereof and attested and
value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in the presence of
will were in the custody of the named executrix, private the testator and of another; that the testator and all the
respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the attesting witnesses signed the Last Will and Testament freely
will2 was annexed to the petition for probate. and voluntarily and that the testator has intended that the
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of instrument should be his Will at the time of affixing his
RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition signature thereto.
and allowing the will. The order reads: WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator
On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the himself) the petition for the allowance of the Last Will and
hearing of the petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30 oclock in Testament of Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED and
the morning, copies of which were served to Arturo de Santos ALLOWED.
Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips (Officers Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on
Return, dated 04 September 1995 attached to the records). February 26, 1996.
When the case was called for hearing on the date set, no On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion
oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever filed for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de
and on motion of petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his Santos (testators sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was
evidence in support of the petition. the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the
placed on the witness stand and was directly examined by the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the
Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers to give order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of
this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the administration in his name.
petitioner when he executed the subject will. After the On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes
examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of sound Phillips, the designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for
and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later,
undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion.
Will and Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a
he was neither forced nor influenced by any other person in memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said
signing it. court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence intervention.3cräläwvirtualibräry
adduced that petitioner in his lifetime, executed his Last Will Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13,
and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his 1996. On the other hand, private respondent, who earlier
residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in
Park, Makati City; said Last Will and Testament was signed in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with the
the presence of his three (3) witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr.
Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation
No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65. of cases must be approved by the Presiding Judges of the
Upon private respondents motion, Judge Salvador Abad affected Branches.
Santos of Branch 65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996, 5 Judge
appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De Santoss Abad Santos appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would be
estate. improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the petition (Sp.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate proceedings
No. M-4343 and to set aside the appointment of private were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer
respondent as special administrator. He reiterated that he was of the records back to the latter branch. However, he later
the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case "to
testator; that he came to know of the existence of Sp. Proc. expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October
No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings in 21, 1996, he stated:
Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.
still pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true of Branch 61 to continue hearing this case notwithstanding the
worth of the testators estate; that private respondent was not fit fact that said branch began the probate proceedings of the
to be the special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise
should be given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the entire
De Santos. estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed as
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional
of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if
is related to the case before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 only to expedite the proceedings, and under the concept that
. . ." the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is but one court.
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice
Gorospe had denied on August 26, 1996 petitioners motion for and the Office of the Court Administrator, of the Supreme
intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los
Appeals which, in a decision4 promulgated on February 13, Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos Maloles,
1998, upheld the denial of petitioners motion for intervention. Intervenor.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners
4, 1996, returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to motion for intervention. Private respondent moved for a
Branch 65 on the ground that there was a pending case reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court.
involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
before said court. The order reads: which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision 6 setting
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this aside the trial courts order on the ground that petitioner had not
Court, transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the ground shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-
that this case is related with a case before this Court, let this 4343.
case be returned to Branch 65 with the information that there is Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:
no related case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT 1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court - Makati,
ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before this Branch. Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate
There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of
petitioner under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the Dr. Arturo de Santos
Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP. PROC. 2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court - Makati,
NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16 February 1996 Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance
and has become final. of letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent.
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became 3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr.
final, herein Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the
MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the
TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after respondent.
this Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the motion 4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum
could not be admitted as the subject matter involves a shopping in filing her petition for issuance of letters
separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and testamentary with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65
movant withdrew her motion and filed this case (No. 4343). knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving the
Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR same testate estate of the decedent is still pending with the
INTERVENTION before Case No. M-4223 and this motion was Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61.
already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26 August 1996 First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in
likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a separate Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance
case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases
be included in this case filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban7 and Tagle v. Manalo,8 he
Court. argues that the proceedings must continue until the estate is
fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of after the testators death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the
the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court. testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course, that even
Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he
lawfully act upon private respondents petition for issuance of may be acting under duress or undue influence, but these are
letters testamentary. rare cases.
The contention has no merit. After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or
authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will,
validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities before he has had a chance to present such petition, the
prescribed by law.9cräläwvirtualibräry ordinary probate proceeding after the testators death would be
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the in order.11cräläwvirtualibräry
death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on
allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do
testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to
cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis
jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-
the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory Makati that -Nex old
nature of wills.10cräläwvirtualibräry Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased, it
petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the
provides: exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate
Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the of a will but continues up to such time that the entire estate of
Rules of Court. the testator had been partitioned and distributed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the
having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, testator meant merely that the partition and distribution of the
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance estate was to be suspended until the latters death. In other
of wills after the testators death shall govern. words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a
Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on manifestation for the same purpose in the probate
petition of the testator. court.12cräläwvirtualibräry
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to
during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be intervene, cites Rule 73, 1 which states:
conclusive as to its due execution. Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is
Rule 76, 1 likewise provides: an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of will. - Any whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
or not, or is lost or destroyed. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
court for the allowance of his will. other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
of testator has been explained by the Code Commission thus: location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
testamentary capacity of the testator or the formalities adopted case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
in the execution of wills. There are relatively few cases The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of
concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It actions for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
is far easier for the courts to determine the mental condition of In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was
a testator during his lifetime than after his death. Fraud, held:13cräläwvirtualibräry
intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section
a will does not comply with the requirements prescribed by law, 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of
the same may be corrected at once. The probate during the residence of the decedent, or of the location of the state," is in
testators life, therefore, will lessen the number of contest upon reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:
wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the testator, "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and
the only questions that may remain for the courts to decide Processes." It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of
provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely Appeals held:
with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under
over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a
the court over the subject matter "existed was fixed before compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral
procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in
not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly already been probated and disposes of all his properties the
exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled.
exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural His interest in the decedents estate is, therefore, not direct or
law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power immediate.
to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one,
of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the
court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records
judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of show, not supported by evidence.
something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this . . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest
provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong in the estate or the will, and the private respondent has none.
presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the Moreover, the ground cited in the private respondents
court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the
of method, of convenience to the parties. truth worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to the
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and question of her competency to act as executor. Section 2, Rule
settlement of estates with approximate value of over 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of the
P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro probable value and character of the property of the estate. The
Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, true value can be determined later on in the course of the
as amended. The different branches comprising each court in settlement of the estate.16cräläwvirtualibräry
one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of Rule 79, 1 provides:
and incompatible with each other.14cräläwvirtualibräry Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the petition for administration. - Any person interested in a will may
venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not
concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of
from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon
testator after his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same
v. Ramolote:15cräläwvirtualibräry time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested
under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and co- person" is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as
equal courts, and the totality of which is only one Court of First an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely
judges. And when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction incidental or contingent.17cräläwvirtualibräry
over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he
the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a
proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has
is for this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate
grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
power to apportion the cases among the different branches, One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his
both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to
of the work by the different branches of the same court. The succeed.
apportionment and distribution of cases does not involve a One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate
grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code
continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -
the court. (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City legitimate parents and ascendants;
has jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343. (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private descendants;
respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and (3) The widow or widower;
creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Assailed before us in this Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45 of
Civil Code.18cräläwvirtualibräry the Rules of Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir CA-GR Sp. No. 33101, promulgated on 19 April 1994 affirming
who may have been preterited in the testators will. the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement Cotabato City in Special Procedure Case No. 331.
proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the As culled from the records, the following facts have been
deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor established by evidence:
in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with
of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out
Pecson:19cräläwvirtualibräry of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children,
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a namely, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.
testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator On 2 July 1992, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial
should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be Court of Cotabato City a Petition1 which is reproduced
trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The hereunder:
curtailment of this right may be considered a curtailment of the IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION
right to dispose. OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF
trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons MINORS ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO SP. PROC. NO/ 331
to administer the estate.20 None of these circumstances is and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO, all
present in this case. surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
forum shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate Petitioner
proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. PETITION
According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights COMES NOW the petitioner assisted by counsel and unto this
asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are Honorable Court most respectfully states:
founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result 1. That she is of legal age, Filipino, married but separated from
in res judicata in the other. her husband and residing at Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City,
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for Philippines;
probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the 2. That sometime from 1970 up to and until late 1981 your
purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his petitioner lived with Roberto Lim Chua as husband and wife
will, the proceedings were terminated. and out of said union they begot two (2) children, namely,
On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua who was born in General Santos
testamentary was filed by private respondent, as executor of City on April 28, 1977 and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua who
the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing was born in Davao City on August 30, 1978. A xerox copy of
authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into the birth certificate of each child is hereto attached as annex
effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement "A" and "B", respectively.
proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition terminates 3. That the aforementioned children who are still minors today
upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises are both staying with herein petitioner at her address at
to the persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City;
between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed during the 4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above-mentioned
pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum minors, died intestate on May 28, 1992 in Davao City.
shopping. 5. That the aforementioned deceased left properties both real
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the and personal worth P5,000,000.00 consisting of the following:
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. a) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT
SO ORDERED. No. T-12835 with an area of 290 sq. m. estimated at
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998 P50,000.00
b) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT
ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, petitioner, No. T-12834 with an area of 323 sq. m. 50,000.00
vs. c) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Eight Division), HON. No. T-126583 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00
JAPAL M. GUIANI, RTC, Branch 14, 12th Judicial Region, d) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT
Cotabato City, and FLORITA A. VALLEJO, as No. T-126584 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00
Administratrix of the Estate of the late Roberto L. e) Residential house in Cotabato City valued at 30,000.00
Chua, respondents. f) Residential house in Davao City valued at 600,000.00
g) Car, Colt Lancer with Motor No. 4G33-3 AF6393 210,000.00
KAPUNAN, J.:
h) Colt, Galant Super Saloon with Motor to the provisions of Article 988 of the New Civil Code of the
No. 4G37-GB0165 545,000.00 Philippines.
i) Car, Colt Galant with Motor No. 4G52-52D75248 110,000.00 5. And for such other reliefs and remedies this Honorable
j) Reo Isuzu Dump Truck with Motor Court may consider fit and proper in the premises.
No. DA640-838635 350,000.00 Cotabato City, Philippines, June 29, 1992.
k) Hino Dump Truck with Motor No. ED100-T47148 350,000.00 (Sgd.) FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO
l) Stockholdings in various corporations with par value (Petitioner)
estimated at 3,335,000.00 The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the
Total P5,000,000.00 petition on 14 August 1992 and directed that notice thereof be
6. That deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and without published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province
legitimate descendants or ascendants, hence, the above of Maguindanao and Cotabato City and or Davao City.
named minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride On 21 July 1992, herein petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de
Alonzo Chua, his children with herein petitioner shall succeed Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto
to the entire estate of the deceased. (Article 988 of the Civil Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss2 on the ground of improper
Code of the Philippines). venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent's
7. That the names, ages and residences of the relatives of said death Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial
minors are the following, to wit: Court of Davao City is the proper forum.
Names Relationship Ages Residence Private respondent filed an opposition to the Motion to
1. Carlos Chua Uncle 60 Quezon Avenue, Dismiss3 dated July 20, 1992 based on the following grounds:
Cotabato City (1) That this petition is for the guardianship of the minor
2. Aida Chua Auntie 55 Rosary Heights, children of the petitioner who are heirs to the estate of the late
Cotabato City Roberto L. Chua and under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of
3. Romulo Uy Uncle 40 c/o Overseas Court the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides;
Fishing Exporation (2) That the above-named minors are residents of Cotabato
Co. Inc., Matina, City:
Davao City (3) That the movant in this case has no personality to intervene
6. That considering the fact that the aforementioned minors by nor oppose in the granting of this petition for the reason that
operation of law are to succeed to the entire estate of Roberto she is a total stranger to the minors Robert Rafson Alonzo and
Lim Chua under the provisions of Article 988 of the New Civil Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua.
Code of the Philippines, it is necessary that for the protection (4) That deceased Roberto L. Chua died a bachelor. He is the
of the rights and interest of Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and father of the above-named minors with the petitioner in this
Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, both minors and heirs of case;
deceased Roberto Lim Chua, a guardian over the persons and (5) That movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving
properties of said minors be appointed by this Honorable spouse of the late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the
Court. estate of the latter since the deceased never contracted
7. That herein petitioner being the mother and natural guardian marriage with any woman until he died.
of said minors is also competent and willing to act as the On 6 August 1992, private respondent Vallejo filed a Motion for
guardian of minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Admission of an Amended Petition4 "in order that the
Pride Alonzo Chua both staying and living with her; that designation of the case title can properly and appropriately
petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the capture or capsulize in clear terms the material averments in
disqualifications of a guardian. the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any confusion or
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this
prayed: petition." The amended petition5contained identical material
1. That, upon proper notice and hearing, an order be issued allegations but differed in its title, thus:.
declaring minors ROBERTO RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and IN RE: PETITION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE
RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO CHUA as heirs to the intestate INTESTATE ESTATE OF ROBERTO L. CHUA,
estate of deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA; DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petitioner PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT AND
for the administration of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO RUDYARD, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF
LIM CHUA; LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
3. That the petitioner be also appointed the guardian of the FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
persons and estate of minors ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO Petitioner.
CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO CHUA; Paragraph 4 of the original petition was also amended to read
4. That after all the property of deceased Roberto Lim Chua as follows:
have been inventoried and expenses and just debts, have 4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned
been paid, the intestate estate of Roberto Lim Chua be minors is a resident of Cotabato City and died intestate on May
distributed to its rightful heirs, the minors in this case, pursuant 28, 1992 at Davao City.
The petition contained exactly the same prayers as the original It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish
petition. the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the
Petitioner opposed the motion to amend petition alleging that decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which
at the hearing of said motion on 24 July 1992, private the movant failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title,
respondent's counsel allegedly admitted that the sole intention Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents
of the original petition was to secure guardianship over the cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has
persons and property of the minors.6 submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
On 21 August 1992, the trial court issued an Order 7 denying concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a
the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. The court ruled that letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage
Antonietta Garcia had no personality to file the motion to that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.
dismiss not having proven her status as wife of the decedent. Consequently, she has no personality to file the subject motion
Further, the court found that the actual residence of the to dismiss.
deceased was Cotabato City, and even assuming that there On the issue of the residence of the decedent at the time of his
was concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts where death, the decedent as a businessman has many business
the decedent had resided, the R.T.C. of Cotabato had already residences from different parts of the country where he usually
taken cognizance of the settlement of the decedent's estate to stays to supervise and pursue his business ventures. Davao
the exclusion of all others. The pertinent portions of the order City is one of them. It cannot be denied that Cotabato City is
read: his actual residence where his alleged illegitimate children also
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19, 1992, reside.
counsel for movant Antonietta G. Chua presented 18 Exhibits The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of
in support of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of
decedent and that the latter resides in Davao City at the time of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction
his death. Exh. "1" was the xerox copy of the alleged marriage over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue (Fule
contract between the movant and the petitioner. This cannot be vs. CA, L-40502, November 29, 1976). Even assuming that
admitted in evidence on the ground of the timely objection of there is concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts of
the counsels for petitioner that the best evidence is the original the places where the decedent has residences, the Regional
copy or authenticated copy which the movant cannot produce. Trial Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the estate of the decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
following: a certification from the Local Civil Registrar exclusion of all other courts (Section 1, Rule 73). It was this
concerned that no such marriage contract was ever registered Court which first took cognizance of the case when the petition
with them; a letter from Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged was filed on July 2, 1992, docketed as Special Proceeding No.
person to have solemnized the alleged marriage that he has 331 and an order of publication issued by this Court on July 13,
not solemnized such alleged marriage. Exhibit "2" through "18" 1992.
consist among others of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss
the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and is hereby denied for lack of merit.
a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and On 31 August 1992, upon motion of private respondent, the
1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and trial court issued an order appointing Romulo Lim Uy, a first
was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the
1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was decedent's estate.8
stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he On the same day, the trial court, likewise, issued an Order
was married and his residence was Davao City. Petitioner appointing Florita Vallejo as guardian over the persons and
through counsels, objected to the admission in evidence of properties of the two minor children.9
Exhibits "2" through "18" if the purpose is to establish the truth Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion dated 25 October
of the alleged marriage between the decedent and Antonietta 199310 praying that the letters of administration issued to
Garcia. The best evidence they said is the marriage contract. Vallejo be recalled and that new letters of administration be
They do not object to the admission of said exhibit if the issued to her. She, likewise, filed a Motion dated 5 November
purpose is to show that Davao City was the business 199311 to declare the proceedings a mistrial. Both motions
residence of the decedent. were denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22 November
Petitioner through counsels, presented Exhibit "A" through "K" 1993. 12 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order
to support her allegation that the decedent was a resident of was denied by the trial court in an Order dated 13 December
Cotabato City; that he died a bachelor; that he begot two 1993.13
illegitimate children with the petitioner as mother. Among these Assailing the last two orders of the trial court, petitioner filed a
exhibits are Income Tax Returns filed in Cotabato City from petition for certiorari and prohibition (Rule 65) with the
1968 through 1979 indicating therein that he was single; birth respondent Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. No. Sp.
certificates of the alleged two illegitimate children of the 33101, alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
decedent; Resident Certificates of the decedent issued in discretion in:
Cotabato City; Registration Certificate of Vehicle of the (1) unilaterally and summarily converting, if not treating, the
decedent showing that his residence is Cotabato City. guardianship proceedings into an intestate proceeding;
(2) summarily hearing the intestate proceedings without THE RULES OF COURT AND THE RULINGS OF THE
jurisdiction and without any notice to herein petitioner SUPREME COURT.
whatsoever; and III
(3) issuing the questioned order (sic) on the alleged pretension THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
that herein petitioner has no personality to intervene in SPL SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT NULLIFYING THE ORDERS
Proc. No. 331 questioning the highly anomalous orders (Annex "P" to "T") PRECIPITATELY ISSUED EX-PARTE BY
precipitately issued ex-parte by the public respondent R.T.C. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN
without notice to the petitioners. THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT PRIOR
Petitioner in the main argued that private respondent herself HEARING OR NOTICE TO HEREIN PETITIONER THEREBY
admitted in her opposition to petitioner's motion to dismiss filed DEPRIVING THE LATTER (ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE
in the trial court and in open court that the original petition she CHUA ) OF DUE PROCESS AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE
filed is one for guardianship; hence, the trial court acted HEARD.
beyond its jurisdiction when it issued letters of administration IV
over the estate of Roberto L. Chua, thereby converting the THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
petition into an intestate proceeding, without the amended GRAVELY ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY HOLDING THAT
petition being published in a newspaper of general circulation PETITIONER'S REMEDY IS APPEAL.15
as required by Section 3, Rule 79. In support of her first assignment of error, petitioner submits
The Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on 19 April that the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the original petition
1994,14 denied the petition ratiocinating that the original petition was one for guardianship and administration of the intestate
filed was one for guardianship of the illegitimate children of the estate is contradicted by the evidence on hand, asserting that
deceased as well as for administration of his intestate estate. the original petition failed to allege and state the jurisdictional
While private respondent may have alleged in her opposition to facts required by the Rules of Court in petitions for
the motion to dismiss that petition was for guardianship, the administration of a decedent's estate, such as: (a) the last
fact remains that the very allegations of the original petition actual residence of the decedent at the time of his death; (b)
unmistakably showed a twin purpose: (1) guardianship; and (2) names, ages and residences of the heirs; and (c) the names
issuance of letters of administration. As such, it was and residences of the creditors of the decedent. Petitioner also
unnecessary for her to republish the notice of hearing through reiterates her argument regarding private respondent's alleged
a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The admission that the original petition was one for guardianship
amended petition was filed for the only reason stated in the and not for issuance of letters of administration, pointing to the
motion for leave: so that the "case title can properly and Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 20 July 1992, where
appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the material the private respondent alleged.
averments in the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any 1. That this petition is for guardianship of the minor children of
confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and the petitioner who are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L.
purpose of this petition," which was for guardianship over the Chua and under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court the
persons and properties of her minor children and for the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides. 16
settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent who was as well as to the statements made by counsel for the private
their father. In other words, there being no change in the respondent during the 24 July 1992 hearing on the motion to
material allegations between the original and amended dismiss:
petitions, the publication of the first in a newspaper of general ATTY. RENDON:
circulation sufficed for purposes of compliance with the legal We filed our opposition to the motion to dismiss the petition
requirements of notice. because this is a petition for guardianship of minors, not for
Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the petitioner's remedy intestate proceedings. So this is a case where the mother
is appeal from the orders complained of under Section 1(f), wanted to be appointed as guardian because she is also the
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, not certiorari and prohibition. litigant here. Because whenever there is an intestate
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, proceedings, she has to represent the minors, and under the
petitioner comes to this Court contending that the appellate Rules of Court in any guardianship proceedings, the venue is
court committed the following errors: at the place where the minor is actually residing.17
I The petition is devoid of merit.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the
GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT petition is one which includes the issuance of letters of
THE ORIGINAL PETITION (Annex F, Petition) WAS FOR A administration. The title of said petition reads:
TWIN PURPOSE, TO WIT: FOR GUARDIANSHIP AND FOR IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIPS,
INTESTATE ESTATE PROCEEDINGS; GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSON AND PROPERTIES
II OF MINORS ROBERTO ALONZO AND RUDYARD ALONZO,
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT APPEALS SERIOUSLY all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO ADMINISTRATION.18
PUBLISH THE AMENDED PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATION Likewise, the prayer of the petition states:
OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE THEREBY CONTRAVENING
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petition for Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife
the administration of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO of the decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and
LIM CHUA. wife is a marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to
The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat
required in a petition for the issuance of letters of copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being
administration. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court reads: a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration — A worthless pieces of evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an its 21 August 1992 Order that:
interested person and must show, so far as known to the . . . Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates,
petitioner: passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage
(a) jurisdictional facts; especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and the from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged
names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent' marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged
(c) The probative value and character of the property of the to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized
estate;. said alleged marriage. . . .22
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration Under her third assignment of error, petitioner claims that the
are prayed; trial court issued its orders, Annexes "P" to "T" without prior
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of hearing or notice to her, thus, depriving her of due process.
letters of administration. (emphasis ours). The orders referred to by petitioner are: Order dated 31 August
The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for issuance of 1992 appointing Romulo Lim Uy, first cousin of the deceased,
letters of administration are: (1) the death of the testator; (2) as special administrator of the estate; Order dated 31 August
residence at the time of death in the province where the 1992 appointing private respondent as guardian over the
probate court is located; and (3) if the decedent was a non- person and property of the minors; Order dated 5 August 1993,
resident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign country and directing the transfer of the remains of the deceased from
that the decedent has left an estate in the province where the Davao City to Cotabato City; Order dated 6 September 1993
court is sitting.19 directing petitioner to turn over a Mitsubishi Gallant car owned
While paragraph 4 of the original petition stating: by the estate of the deceased to the special administrator; and
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above mentioned Order dated 28 September 1993, authorizing the sheriff to
minors, died intestate on May 28, 1992 in Davao City. break open the deceased's house for the purpose of
failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of conducting an inventory of the properties found therein, after
his death, the omission was cured by the amended petitions the sheriff was refused entry to the house by the driver and
wherein the same paragraph now reads: maid of petitioner.
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned Apart from the fact that petitioner was not entitled to notice of
minors is a resident of Cotabato City and died intestate on May the proceedings of the trial court, not being able to establish
28, 1992 at Davao City.20 (Emphasis in the original.) proof of her alleged marriage to the deceased, or of her
All told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts interest in the estate as creditor or otherwise, petitioner
required to be stated in the petition for letters of administration. categorically stated in the instant petition that on 25 October
Consequently, there was no need to publish the amended 1993 she filed a motion praying for the recall of the letters of
petition as petitioner would insist in her second assignment of administration issued by the trial court and another motion
errors. dated 5 August 1993 praying that the proceedings conducted
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the by the trial court be declared as a mistrial and the court orders
motion to dismiss as she is not related to the deceased, nor relative thereto be set aside and nullified. Petitioner further
does she have any interest in his estate as creditor or stated that her motions were denied by the trial court in its
otherwise. The Rules are explicit on who may do so: Order dated 22 November 21, 1993 and that on 30 November
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration — Any 1993 she filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
interested person, may by filing a written opposition, contest denial which in turn was denied by the trial court on 13
the petition on the ground of incompetency of the person for December 1993.
whom letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard,
ground of the contestant's own right to the administration, and not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be
may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any competent held.23 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
person or persons named in the opposition.. be heard.24 Here, even granting that the petitioner was not
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for notified of the orders of the trial court marked as Exhibits "P" to
issuance of letters of administration. An interested person is "T," inclusive, nonetheless, she was duly heard in her motions
one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or to recall letters of administration and to declare the
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his proceedings of the court as a "mistrial," which motions were
interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect denied in the Order dated 22 November 1993. 25 A motion for
or contingent.21 the reconsideration of this order of denial was also duly heard
by the trial court but was denied in its Order of 13 December On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo,
1993.26 petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings, entitled
Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a "In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente
party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M.
for reconsideration.27 Ocampo," in the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, docketed as
As to the last assignment of errors, we agree with the Court of Spec. Proc. No. B-3089.5 The petition alleged that, upon the
Appeals that the proper remedy of the petitioner in said court death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother
was an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the
for certiorari; which can be availed of if a party has no plain, estate of their parents. Under such circumstance, Leonardo
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the
Except for her bare allegation that an ordinary appeal would be total income generated from the properties of the estate.
inadequate, nothing on record would indicate that extraordinary However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession,
remedy of certiorari or prohibition is warranted. control and management of the properties to the exclusion of
Finally, petitioner further argues as supplement to her petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate
memorandum that the ruling of the Court of Appeals treating of Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise,
the Special Proceeding No. 331 as one for both guardianship prayed for the appointment of an administrator to apportion,
and settlement of estate is in contravention of our ruling divide, and award the two estates among the lawful heirs of the
in Gomez vs. Imperial,28 which the petitioner quotes: decedents.
The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is Respondents filed their Opposition and Counter-Petition dated
a function pertaining property not to the guardianship October 7, 2004,6 contending that the petition was defective as
proceedings, but to another proceeding which the heirs are at it sought the judicial settlement of two estates in a single
liberty to initiate. proceeding. They argued that the settlement of the estate of
Petitioner's reliance on said case is misplaced. In Leonardo was premature, the same being dependent only
the Gomez case, the action before the lower court was merely upon the determination of his hereditary rights in the settlement
one for guardianship. Therefore said court did not have the of his parents’ estate. In their counter-petition, respondents
jurisdiction to distribute the estate of the deceased. While in prayed that they be appointed as special joint administrators of
the case at bar, the petition filed before the court was both for the estate of Vicente and Maxima.
guardianship and settlement of estate. In an Order dated March 4, 2005,7 the RTC denied
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition of petitioner respondents’ opposition to the settlement proceedings but
Antonietta Chua is hereby denied. admitted their counter-petition. The trial court also clarified that
SO ORDERED. the judicial settlement referred only to the properties of Vicente
and Maxima.
G.R. No. 187879 July 5, 2010 Through a Motion for Appointment of Joint Special
DALISAY E. OCAMPO Administrators dated October 11, 2005,8 respondents
vs. RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. reiterated their prayer for appointment as special joint
OCAMPO, Respondents. administrators of the estate, and to serve as such without
DECISION posting a bond.
NACHURA, J.: In their Comment dated November 3, 2005,9 petitioners argued
This petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the that, since April 2002, they had been deprived of their fair
Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set aside the share of the income of the estate, and that the appointment of
Decision2 dated December 16, 2008 and the Resolution 3 dated respondents as special joint administrators would further cause
April 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. injustice to them. Thus, they prayed that, in order to avoid
104683. The Decision annulled and set aside the Order dated further delay, letters of administration to serve as joint
March 13, 20084 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, administrators of the subject estate be issued to respondents
Biñan, Laguna, in Sp. Proc. No. B-3089; while the Resolution and Dalisay.
denied the motion for reconsideration of the Decision. In another Motion for Appointment of a Special Administrator
The Antecedents dated December 5, 2005,10 petitioners nominated the Biñan
Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo Rural Bank to serve as special administrator pending
(Vince), Melinda Carla E. Ocampo (Melinda), and Leonardo E. resolution of the motion for the issuance of the letters of
Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife and the administration.
children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died on In its June 15, 2006 Order,11 the RTC appointed Dalisay and
January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato as special joint administrators of the estate of the
Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) deceased spouses, and required them to post a bond of
are the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses ₱200,000.00 each.12
Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August
December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively. 1, 200613 of the Order, insisting that Dalisay was incompetent
Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in and unfit to be appointed as administrator of the estate,
Biñan, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts. considering that she even failed to take care of her husband
Leonardo when he was paralyzed in 1997. They also for Inventory and to Render Account. They asserted that the
contended that petitioners’ prayer for Dalisay’s appointment as RTC should, in the meantime, hold in abeyance the resolution
special administrator was already deemed abandoned upon of this Motion, pending the resolution of their Motion for
their nomination of the Biñan Rural Bank to act as special Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond.
administrator of the estate. On October 15, 2007, or eight (8) months after the February
In their Supplement to the Motion for 16, 2007 Order appointing respondents as special joint
Reconsideration,14 respondents asserted their priority in right administrators, petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or
to be appointed as administrators being the next of kin of Revoke the Special Administration and to Proceed to Judicial
Vicente and Maxima, whereas Dalisay was a mere daughter- Partition or Appointment of Regular Administrator.21 Petitioners
in-law of the decedents and not even a legal heir by right of contended that the special administration was not necessary
representation from her late husband Leonardo. as the estate is neither vast nor complex, the properties of the
Pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, estate being identified and undisputed, and not involved in any
petitioners filed a Motion to Submit Inventory and Accounting litigation necessitating the representation of special
dated November 20, 2006,15 praying that the RTC issue an administrators. Petitioners, likewise, contended that
order directing respondents to submit a true inventory of the respondents had been resorting to the mode of special
estate of the decedent spouses and to render an accounting administration merely to delay and prolong their deprivation of
thereof from the time they took over the collection of the what was due them. Petitioners cited an alleged fraudulent
income of the estate. sale by respondents of a real property for ₱2,700,000.00,
Respondents filed their Comment and Manifestation dated which the latter represented to petitioners to have been sold
January 15, 2007,16 claiming that they could not yet be only for ₱1,500,000.00, and respondents’ alleged
compelled to submit an inventory and render an accounting of misrepresentation that petitioners owed the estate for the
the income and assets of the estate inasmuch as there was advances to cover the hospital expenses of Leonardo, but, in
still a pending motion for reconsideration of the June 15, 2006 fact, were not yet paid.
Order appointing Dalisay as co-special administratrix with Respondents filed their Opposition and Comment22 on March
Renato. 10, 2008, to which, in turn, petitioners filed their Reply to
In its Order dated February 16, 2007, the RTC revoked the Opposition/Comment23 on March 17, 2008.
appointment of Dalisay as co-special administratrix, In its Order dated March 13, 2008,24 the RTC granted
substituting her with Erlinda. The RTC took into consideration petitioners’ Motion, revoking and terminating the appointment
the fact that respondents were the nearest of kin of Vicente of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators, on
and Maxima. Petitioners did not contest this Order and even account of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the
manifested in open court their desire for the speedy settlement posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and
of the estate. responsibilities as special administrators, i.e., the submission
On April 23, 2007, or two (2) months after respondents’ of an inventory of the properties and of an income statement of
appointment as joint special administrators, petitioners filed a the estate. The RTC also appointed Melinda as regular
Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the administratrix, subject to the posting of a bond in the amount of
Estate,17 reiterating their stance that respondents, as joint ₱200,000.00, and directed her to submit an inventory of the
special administrators, should be directed to submit a true properties and an income statement of the subject estate. The
inventory of the income and assets of the estate. RTC likewise found that judicial partition may proceed after
Respondents then filed a Motion for Exemption to File Melinda had assumed her duties and responsibilities as regular
Administrators’ Bond18 on May 22, 2007, praying that they be administratrix.
allowed to enter their duties as special administrators without Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari 25 under
the need to file an administrators’ bond due to their difficulty in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, ascribing grave
raising the necessary amount. They alleged that, since abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in (a) declaring them
petitioners manifested in open court that they no longer object to have failed to enter the office of special administration
to the appointment of respondents as special co- despite lapse of reasonable time, when in truth they had not
administrators, it would be to the best interest of all the heirs entered the office because they were waiting for the resolution
that the estate be spared from incurring unnecessary expenses of their motion for exemption from bond; (b) appointing Melinda
in paying for the bond premiums. They also assured the RTC as regular administratrix, a mere granddaughter of Vicente and
that they would faithfully exercise their duties as special Maxima, instead of them who, being the surviving children of
administrators under pain of contempt should they violate any the deceased spouses, were the next of kin; and (c) declaring
undertaking in the performance of the trust of their office. them to have been unsuitable for the trust, despite lack of
In an Order dated June 29, 2007,19 the RTC directed the hearing and evidence against them.
parties to submit their respective comments or oppositions to Petitioners filed their Comment to the Petition and Opposition
the pending incidents, i.e., petitioners’ Motion for Inventory and to Application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
to Render Account, and respondents’ Motion for Exemption to preliminary injunction,26 reiterating their arguments in their
File Administrators’ Bond. Motion for the revocation of respondents’ appointment as joint
Respondents filed their Comment and/or Opposition, 20 stating special administrators. Respondents filed their Reply.27
that they have already filed a comment on petitioners’ Motion
On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered its assailed Decision such sum as the court directs, conditioned that he will make
granting the petition based on the finding that the RTC gravely and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights,
abused its discretion in revoking respondents’ appointment as credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his
joint special administrators without first ruling on their motion possession or knowledge, and that he will truly account for
for exemption from bond, and for appointing Melinda as regular such as are received by him when required by the court, and
administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine will deliver the same to the person appointed executor or
her competency to assume as such. According to the CA, the administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to
posting of the bond is a prerequisite before respondents could receive them.32
enter their duties and responsibilities as joint special Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be
administrators, particularly their submission of an inventory of appointed as administrator of the estate of Vicente and
the properties of the estate and an income statement thereon. Maxima, the RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise to
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appoint joint special administrators pending the determination
Decision.28 The CA, however, denied it. Hence, this petition, of the person or persons to whom letters of administration may
ascribing to the CA errors of law and grave abuse of discretion be issued. The RTC was justified in doing so considering that
for annulling and setting aside the RTC Order dated March 13, such disagreement caused undue delay in the issuance of
2008. letters of administration, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 80 of the
Our Ruling Rules of Court. Initially, the RTC, on June 15, 2006, appointed
The pertinent provisions relative to the special administration of Renato and Dalisay as joint special administrators, imposing
the decedents’ estate under the Rules of Court provide— upon each of them the obligation to post an administrator’s
Sec. 1. Appointment of special administrator. – When there is bond of ₱200,000.00. However, taking into account the
delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by arguments of respondents that Dalisay was incompetent and
any cause including an appeal from the allowance or unfit to assume the office of a special administratrix and that
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special Dalisay, in effect, waived her appointment when petitioners
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of nominated Biñan Rural Bank as special administrator, the
the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided RTC, on February 16, 2007, revoked Dalisay’s appointment
and executors or administrators appointed.29 and substituted her with Erlinda.
Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. – Such A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject
special administrator shall take possession and charge of to its supervision and control, expected to work for the best
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth
preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards administration and speedy settlement.33 When appointed, he or
appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the parties
suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and suggesting the appointment.34The principal object of the
other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the
shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized
ordered by the court.30 to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant
Sec. 1. Bond to be given before issuance of letters; Amount; to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.35
Conditions. – Before an executor or administrator enters upon While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest
the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint
administration issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as the special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for
court directs, conditioned as follows: the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or
(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules
true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, regarding the selection or removal of regular
credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his administrators.36 The probate court may appoint or remove
possession or knowledge or to the possession of any other special administrators based on grounds other than those
person for him; enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to
(b) To administer according to these rules, and, if an executor, first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or
according to the will of the testator, all goods, chattels, rights, unfitness37 and the application of the order of preference under
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to his Section 6 of Rule 78,38 as would be proper in the case of a
possession or to the possession of any other person for him, regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is
and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity,
legacies, and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is
as shall be decreed by the court; unwarranted.39 The appointment or removal
(c) To render a true and just account of his administration to of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus
the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for
required by the court; certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.40
(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.31 Granting the certiorari petition, the CA found that the RTC
Sec. 4. Bond of special administrator. – A special administrator gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents’
before entering upon the duties of his trust shall give a bond, in appointment as joint special administrators, and for failing to
first resolve the pending Motion for Exemption to File expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included
Administrators’ Bond, ratiocinating that the posting of the among the acts constituting the care, management, and
administrators’ bond is a pre-requisite to respondents’ entering settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond
into the duties and responsibilities of their designated office. is in the nature of a qualification for the office of
This Court disagrees. administration.41
It is worthy of mention that, as early as October 11, 2005, in Hence, the RTC revoked respondents’ designation as joint
their Motion for Appointment as Joint Special Administrators, special administrators, especially considering that respondents
respondents already prayed for their exemption to post bond never denied that they have been in possession, charge, and
should they be assigned as joint special administrators. actual administration of the estate of Vicente and Maxima
However, the RTC effectively denied this prayer when it issued since 2002 up to the present, despite the assumption of
its June 15, 2006 Order, designating Renato and Dalisay as Melinda as regular administratrix. In fact, respondents also
special administrators and enjoining them to post bond in the admitted that, allegedly out of good faith and sincerity to
amount of ₱200,000.00 each. This denial was, in effect, observe transparency, they had submitted a Statement of
reiterated when the RTC rendered its February 16, 2007 Order Cash Distribution42 for the period covering April 2002 to June
substituting Dalisay with Erlinda as special administratrix. 2006,43 where they indicated that Renato had received
Undeterred by the RTC’s resolve to require them to post their ₱4,241,676.00, Erlinda ₱4,164,526.96, and petitioners
respective administrators’ bonds, respondents filed anew a ₱2,486,656.60, and that the estate had advanced
Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond on May 22, ₱2,700,000.00 for the hospital and funeral expenses of
2007, positing that it would be to the best interest of the estate Leonardo.44 The latter cash advance was questioned by
of their deceased parents and all the heirs to spare the estate petitioners in their motion for revocation of special
from incurring the unnecessary expense of paying for their administration on account of the demand letter 45 dated June
bond premiums since they could not raise the money 20, 2007 of Asian Hospital and Medical Center addressed to
themselves. To note, this Motion was filed only after petitioners Dalisay, stating that there still remained unpaid hospital bills in
filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the the amount of ₱2,087,380.49 since January 2004. Undeniably,
Estate on April 23, 2007. Respondents then argued that they respondents had already been distributing the incomes or fruits
could not enter into their duties and responsibilities as special generated from the properties of the decedents’ estate, yet
administrators in light of the pendency of their motion for they still failed to post their respective administrators’ bonds
exemption. In other words, they could not yet submit an despite collection of the advances from their supposed shares.
inventory and render an account of the income of the estate This state of affairs continued even after a considerable lapse
since they had not yet posted their bonds. of time from the appointment of Renato as a special
Consequently, the RTC revoked respondents’ appointment as administrator of the estate on June 15, 2006 and from
special administrators for failing to post their administrators’ February 16, 2007 when the RTC substituted Erlinda, for
bond and to submit an inventory and accounting as required of Dalisay, as special administratrix.
them, tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful orders. What is more, respondents’ insincerity in administering the
Inarguably, this was, again, a denial of respondents’ plea to estate was betrayed by the Deed of Conditional Sale dated
assume their office sans a bond. The RTC rightly did so. January 12, 200446 discovered by petitioners. This Deed was
Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the executed between respondents, as the only heirs of Maxima,
performance of the duties and obligations of an administrator as vendors, thus excluding the representing heirs of Leonardo,
namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2) to and Spouses Marcus Jose B. Brillantes and Amelita Catalan-
perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year Brillantes, incumbent lessors, as vendees, over a real property
and at any other time when required by the probate court; and situated in Biñan, Laguna, and covered by Transfer Certificate
(4) to make an inventory within three (3) months. More of Title No. T-332305 of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna, for a
specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is total purchase price of ₱2,700,000.00. The Deed stipulated for
conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of a payment of ₱1,500,000.00 upon the signing of the contract,
the decedent’s estate requiring the special administrator to (1) and the balance of ₱1,200,000.00 to be paid within one (1)
make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, month from the receipt of title of the vendees. The contract
credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his also stated that the previous contract of lease between the
possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as vendors and the vendees shall no longer be effective; hence,
received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the the vendees were no longer obligated to pay the monthly
same to the person appointed as executor or regular rentals on the property. And yet there is a purported Deed of
administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to Absolute Sale47 over the same realty between respondents,
receive them. and including Leonardo as represented by Dalisay, as vendors,
Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the same spouses, as vendees, for a purchase price of
and the heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether regular only ₱1,500,000.00. Notably, this Deed of Absolute Sale
or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the already had the signatures of respondents and vendee-
obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to spouses. Petitioners claimed that respondents were coaxing
safeguard the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the Dalisay into signing the same, while respondents said that
bond should not be considered as part of the necessary Dalisay already got a share from this transaction in the amount
of ₱500,000.00. It may also be observed that the time of the (c) The probable value and character of the property of the
execution of this Deed of Absolute Sale, although not notarized estate;
as the Deed of Conditional Sale, might not have been distant (d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration
from the execution of the latter Deed, considering the similar are prayed.
Community Tax Certificate Numbers of the parties appearing in But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of
both contracts. letters of administration.
Given these circumstances, this Court finds no grave abuse of Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. – When a
discretion on the part of the RTC when it revoked the petition for letters of administration is filed in the court having
appointment of respondents as joint special administrators, the jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the
removal being grounded on reason, equity, justice, and legal petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the
principle. Indeed, even if special administrators had already known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other
been appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the
no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing manner provided in Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.48 Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration. – Any
On the other hand, the Court finds the RTC’s designation of interested person may, by filing a written opposition, contest
Melinda as regular administratrix improper and abusive of its the petition on the ground of the incompetency of the person
discretion. for whom letters are prayed therein, or on the ground of the
In the determination of the person to be appointed as regular contestant’s own right to the administration, and may pray that
administrator, the following provisions of Rule 78 of the Rules letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons
of Court, state – named in the opposition.
Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or Sec. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. – At the hearing
administrators. – No person is competent to serve as executor of the petition, it must first be shown that notice has been given
or administrator who: as herein-above required, and thereafter the court shall hear
(a) Is a minor; the proofs of the parties in support of their respective
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and allegations, and if satisfied that the decedent left no will, or that
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of there is no competent and willing executor, it shall order the
the trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of issuance of letters of administration to the party best entitled
understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an thereto.1avvphi1
offense involving moral turpitude. Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of administration
xxxx with respect to Melinda, as the prayer for her appointment as
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – co-administrator was embodied in the motion for the
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors termination of the special administration. Although there was a
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a hearing set for the motion on November 5, 2007, the same was
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: canceled and reset to February 8, 2008 due to the absence of
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or the parties’ counsels. The February 8, 2008 hearing was again
next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such deferred to March 10, 2008 on account of the ongoing
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, renovation of the Hall of Justice. Despite the resetting,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; petitioners filed a Manifestation/Motion dated February 29,
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or 2008,49 reiterating their prayer for partition or for the
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or appointment of Melinda as regular administrator and for the
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects revocation of the special administration. It may be mentioned
for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for that, despite the filing by respondents of their Opposition and
administration or to request that administration be granted to Comment to the motion to revoke the special administration,
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the the prayer for the appointment of Melinda as regular
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; administratrix of the estate was not specifically traversed in the
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it said pleading. Thus, the capacity, competency, and legality of
may be granted to such other person as the court may select. Melinda’s appointment as such was not properly objected to by
Further, on the matter of contest for the issuance of letters of respondents despite being the next of kin to the decedent
administration, the following provisions of Rule 79 are pertinent spouses, and was not threshed out by the RTC acting as a
– probate court in accordance with the above mentioned Rules.
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima, with a view to
interested person and must show, so far as known to the putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs, we take into
petitioner: account the fact that Melinda, pursuant to the RTC Order dated
(a) The jurisdictional facts; March 13, 2008, already posted the required bond of
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the ₱200,000.00 on March 26, 2008, by virtue of which, Letters of
names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent; Administration were issued to her the following day, and that
she filed an Inventory of the Properties of the Estate dated
April 15, 2008.50 These acts clearly manifested her intention to

serve willingly as administratrix of the decedents’ estate, but
her appointment should be converted into one of special
administration, pending the proceedings for regular
administration. Furthermore, since it appears that the only
unpaid obligation is the hospital bill due from Leonardo’s
estate, which is not subject of this case, judicial partition may
then proceed with dispatch.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated December 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated
April 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
104683 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
Order dated March 13, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, with respect to the revocation of the
special administration in favor of Renato M. Ocampo and
Erlinda M. Ocampo, is REINSTATED. The appointment of
Melinda Carla E. Ocampo as regular administratrix is SET
ASIDE. Melinda is designated instead as special administratrix
of the estate under the same administrator’s bond she had
posted. The trial court is directed to conduct with dispatch the
proceedings for the appointment of the regular administrator
and, thereafter, to proceed with judicial partition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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RULE 76-Rule 79

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1 Specpro Rule 76 to 79

For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the

union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through

April 15, 2008.50 These acts clearly manifested her intention to

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