G.R. Nos.

168992-93 May 21, 2009 petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband.
The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
the Family Code.

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the
motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the
exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s
argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements,
such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner. husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.

DECISION As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and
joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the
trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of
CARPIO, J.: exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires
certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and
The Case responsibilities.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim Hence, the present petition.
(petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated 15 September
2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial Issue
court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed
without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P.
Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of
whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Facts
The Court’s Ruling
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by
profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the
entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner
to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to
to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not
children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed,
Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was
the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. 3 Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary
11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
birth is 1 August 1983.4
We deny the petition.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their
own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents.
Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December
2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself,
without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for
amnesty5 given under Republic Act No. 85526(RA 8552) to those
adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, RA 8552 reads:
petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258
and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil
capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for
consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee,
Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of and who is in a position to support and care for his/her
Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age
of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of
Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned
the adoptee’s parent;
child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. 10 The
DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael. 11
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above
stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country
The Ruling of the Trial Court
has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines,
that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application
the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
 decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved
agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her during the trial.
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to
enter his/her country as his/her adopted
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7.
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
in his/her country may be waived for the following:
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the
adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
Effects of Adoption
consanguinity or affinity; or

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
the age of majority. This is untenable.

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral,
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
mental and physical character and well-being.13 The father and the
consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court
termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of
financial accountabilities. the children.15

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is,
following cases: when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 —
emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and
property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the
son/daughter of the other; or
effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects
of adoption, thus:
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That
ARTICLE V
the other spouse has signified his/her consent
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
thereto; or

SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each
parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological
other.
parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be
vested on the adopter(s).
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the
illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such
is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this
joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child with the means of the family.
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12
adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession
without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary
remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly succession shall govern.
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties
in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to
children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the
petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other. adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each
other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority,
the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his the rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the
Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3)
that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely,
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all
prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the the benefits to which biological parents are entitled20 such as
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least
support21 and successional rights.22
three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption;
(3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is
entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5)
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them
the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless
couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which

is the promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law
should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than
defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s
decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and
it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against
judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’
petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We
cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would

show that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario
has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los
Angeles Superior Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage

between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a
decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial
decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above
that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner
was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated

15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City,
Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006 Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and
notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent. 16
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,
vs. On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with
the following recommendation:
DECISION
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma &
Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
following reasons:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

1. Minors’ surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily
Rules of Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata
No. 77826 which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the
(RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the
parental care, guidance and support they need. An Affidavit
Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein.
of Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto
attached.
The Antecedents
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United expressed their willingness to be adopted and joins the
States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of
Guam, USA, filed a petition3 for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon consent is hereto attached. The minors developed close
Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as
was born on September 7, 1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was second parent.
born on August 5, 1989.6 The minors are the natural children of Manuel
Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary
guardian who has also family to look after. As young
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance
on May 19, 1990,7 the children were left to their paternal grandmother, and support to ensure their protection and well being.
Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-
married there and now has two children by her second marriage and
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that
no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with
minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be
her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption;
adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is
the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her
hereby further recommended to be dispensed with considering that
children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November
they are close relatives and that close attachments was already
23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have
developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.17
given their written consent8 to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as
shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her
own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:
respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA,
where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She
The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario,
came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her
this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear for
children gave their written consent9 to the adoption of the minors.
the personal interview concerning the adoption of her children.
Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income,
signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in
petitioner’s custody. The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata
Landingin was conceived after the death of their paternal grandmother
and guardian. The paternal relatives including the petitioner who
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her
attended the wake of their mother were very much concerned about
favor, as follows:
the well-being of the three minors. While preparing for their adoption,
they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court as their temporary guardian.
that after publication and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the
adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after
Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that
weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
the minor children’s name follow the family name of petitioner.
consented. She realized that her children need parental love, guidance
and support which she could not provide as she already has a second
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her
premises.10 children have been supporting her children up to the present and truly
care for them, she believes her children will be in good hands. She
also finds petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare
bright future to her children.18
and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by
Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit
a report thereon not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in
hearing of the petition.11 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption;
entered its appearance12 but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to
appear in its behalf.13 Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.
allowed to present her evidence ex parte.14
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition. The dispositive
Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent portion reads:
executed by her and her siblings.15 The petitioner marked in evidence
the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann,
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE
Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed CHILDREN.27
from all legal obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural
parents and that they be declared for all legal intents and purposes the
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a)
children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with
whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written
considering that parent-children relationship has long been established
consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not
between the children and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of
the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s
the children be changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."
children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not
petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding changes/amendment
The Court’s Ruling
in the birth certificates of the above-mentioned minors.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.19

It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as
The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of Appeals on
stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,28 that adoption statutes, being humane
December 2, 2002. In its brief21 for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG
and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of
raised the following arguments:
paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental
care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and
I give them the protection of society and family in the person of the
adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience
the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE
Every reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to promote and
PROPOSED ADOPTEES’ BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.29

II
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court also ruled that the
liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure
ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever
THE PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW. mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and
interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context
and perspective. The Court’s position should not be misconstrued or
III misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of
law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child
ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over
THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED the child.31
ADOPTEES.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22 reversing the ruling of Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the children’s natural mother.
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being
Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioner’s children could not properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold
also be admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to
and was not authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine
the adoption is hereby required:
consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was not stable
enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads: (a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated (b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal
November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which
in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. has legal custody of the child;

SO ORDERED.23 (c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10)

years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 on May 21, 2004, which
the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.25 (d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latter’s
souse, if any;
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari26 on
September 7, 2004, assigning the following errors:
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted.
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS
OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE. interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard
the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.32
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable
for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a
parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another
his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in man.
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Q From whom did you learn that?

We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son,
John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines
and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second
would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the marriage?
adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to
present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37

Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the

biological mother is no longer necessary because when Amelia’s Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The
children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal Q Where is your mother now?
grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who
provided for the children’s financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the
biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner A In Italy, sir.
further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12 years, when
the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her Q When did your mother left for Italy?
child by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines.
Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during
the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she conformed A After my father died, sir.
to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner.
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?
Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition
with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 A Two years old, sir.
thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the
minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother
mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus communicate with you?
have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
A No, sir.38
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child
without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also
forego all parental duties.33 The term means neglect and refusal to stated the following:
perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent
withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection,
and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, IV. Background of the Case:
abandons the child.34
xxxx
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care
of others is not such an abandonment.35 To dispense with the Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care
requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have and custody of their maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov.
existed at the time of adoption.36 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves as their
guardian. The petitioner, together with her children and other relatives
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine abroad have been supporting the minor children financially, even
Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her during the time that they were still living with their natural parents.
children. Petitioner’s testimony on that matter follows: Their mother also sends financial support but very minimal.39

Q Where is the mother of these three children now? xxxx

A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir. V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for
Adoption:

Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance
where she communicated with the family? xxxx

A None, sir. As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger
siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works and has fun with them.
She also encourages openness on their problems and concerns and
Q How about with her children? provides petty counseling. In serious problems she already consult
(sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt.40
A None, sir.
xxxx
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors,
A I do not know, sir. Amelia recalled that they had a happy and comfortable life. After the
death of her husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had
continued providing support for them. However being ashamed of just
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos? depending on the support of her husband’s relatives, she decided to
work abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they are authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.
land which she used in going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children the person acknowledging the instrument or document is
to the care & custody of her mother-in-law who returned home for known to him, and that he is the same person who executed
good, however she died on November 2000. it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed.
The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac.
state. In case the acknowledgment is made before a notary
They became live-in partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario
public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the
who is now 2 years old. The three of them are considered Italian
preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or
residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an
the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated
annulment of his marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is
by an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé de
providing his legitimate family regular support.
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a to which he is accredited. The officer making the
month through her parents who share minimal amount of P3,000- authentication shall certify under his official seal that the
P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal person who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly
relatives are continuously providing support for most of the needs & authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly
education of minors up to present.41 exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he
assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the
law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her the place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that
children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She his signature and seal, if any, are genuine.
was merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet,
even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her
motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not
mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the
mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either
continues to send financial support to the children, though in minimal by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence
amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide. of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.47

Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner
herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties between the to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, the same
biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall is inadmissible in evidence.
then be vested on the adopter.42 It would thus be against the spirit of
the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not
consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental
stable enough to support the children and is only relying on the
authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that
financial backing, support and commitment of her children and her
Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will
siblings.48 Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially
not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting
capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a
parent.43 Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence
house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than
in adoption.
$1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed
themselves to provide financial backing should the need arise. The
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall OSG, again in its comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The Report that "petitioner has limited income." Accordingly, it appears that
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer she will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings in
of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its order to support the minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it is
findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in keeping
offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in with the means of the family.
evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is
offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the
weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as
child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should
exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless
also
formally offered.44
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should
be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint keeping with the means of the family.
Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the
authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written
According to the Adoption Home Study Report49 forwarded by the
consent of petitioner’s children45 was notarized on January 16, 2002 in
Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government of
Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way
Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate
as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section
children, as the latter are already adults, have individual lives and
2 of Act No. 2103,46 which states:
families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years
old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main intention in
authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered authentic if the adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a
acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still
following requirements: being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income
might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé d Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of
to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and
backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as
adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioner’s
ASTORGA GARCIA
allegation that her siblings and her children are financially able and that
they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore,
again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue. HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of DECISION
intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that
militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein
minors.
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
issue raised in the instant case.

SO ORDERED.
The facts are undisputed.

On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a

petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate childStephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on
June 26, 1994;2that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname;
and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent.
He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to
"Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be
changed to "Catindig," his surname.

On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
granting the adoption, thus:

"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the

petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this
Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and
that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child
to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best
interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The
Court further holds that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child
since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough
compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree
No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same

is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby
freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect
to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the
petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as
STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for
record purposes.

SO ORDERED."4

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or

reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing
an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate xxx
child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable
marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a
middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case
there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino
to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's
name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the surname, or
benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a
proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use
the middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle
name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families. (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is
his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty
her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following party, she shall resume her maiden name andsurname. If she is the
reasons: innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname.
However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with surname, unless:
her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she
remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any (1) The court decrees otherwise, or
confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof
of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the

surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall
not prohibit, it allows. continue using her name and surname employed before the legal
separation.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is

ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as
recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Committees agreed that"the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger
name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother."7 person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will
avoid confusion.
We find merit in the petition.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law – ascendants and descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a
son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation
by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives (1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by
which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the (2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at
large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. 8 It is both
of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a x x x"
name.
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper
name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper Middle Name –
name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is
that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the use of a middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as
parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act
fixed by law.9 Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is
silent as to what middle name a child may use.

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive
rules which regulate the use of surname10 of an individual whatever The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article
may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames
illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle
woman, or a widow, thus: name or the mother’s surname shall be added.

"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an
the surname of the father. adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that
"an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article
189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted
a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the shall bear the surname of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of
and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the
the adopters; adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14

x x x" The Underlying Intent of

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Adoption Is In Favor of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the
Adopted Child –
child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint
Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members
approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related
should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a
legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the
legitimate paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider
use by the wife of the surname and that of the child because the
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity
father’s surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for
and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate
which reason he would insist on the use of the father’s surname
status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when
by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the
the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of
surname of the mother.
the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle
that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility,
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted
surname of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic
replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for the
mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and adopted.20
permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
present Article 364, which reads: Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA
8552.23
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of
the father. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
of the person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He
discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members
then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct
of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In
surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody
fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother
calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is
should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is David but they all call him
Justice David.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use
of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family
modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to
Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide
use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the
that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from
that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of
her natural mother in the future.
Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating
the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in
the appropriate chapter. Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living
together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San
Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs.
xxx
Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls
them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family.
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle
suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her
always be last because there are so many traditions like the American mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin
tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even
Liberal Construction of
include the Clan name.

Adoption Statutes In Favor Of

xxx

Adoption –
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the
Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
Filipino way. The Committee approved the primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable
suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied) intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is HERBERT CANG, petitioner,
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to vs.
prevail." COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and
MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so
that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is
doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to
avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law."28
ROMERO, J.:

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted

Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a
by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her
natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? The
mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to
answer to this interesting query, certainly not one of first impression,
do so.
would have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law and
jurisprudence, but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is case.
partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use
her mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be decree of adoption issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
entered in the decree of adoption. Branch 14,2 in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, "In the Matter of
the Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph
Anthony, all surnamed Cang, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
SO ORDERED.
Clara Diago Clavano, petitioners."

Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on
January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3,
1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony,
born on January 3, 1981.

During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship
was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of
her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family
friend of the Clavanos.

Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a
petition for legal separation with alimonypendente lite 3 with the then
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu 4 which rendered a
decision5 approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses
providing that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed
and board." They further agreed:

(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly

support of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) effective from the
date of the filing of the complaint. This shall constitute a first lien on the
net proceeds of the house and lot jointly owned by the parties situated
at Cinco Village, Mandaue City;

(d) That the plaintiff shall beentitled to enter into any contract or
agreement with any person or persons, natural or juridical without the
written consent of the husband; or any undertaking or acts that
ordinarily requires husband's consent as the parties are by this
agreement legally separated; 6

Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce
from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State
of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole
custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of
visitation at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner. 7

Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a

naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife
and never remarried.

While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic

earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month8a portion of which was
remitted to the Philippines for his children's expenses and another,
deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. In so ruling, the lower court was "impelled" by these reasons:
Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and
sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB
(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed "close filial ties with
for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional
the Clavano family, especially their maternal uncle," petitioner Ronald
Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-
Clavano.
old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed
an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal
obligation to support" his children; that her brothers and sisters (2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with their
including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of printing press, real estate business, export business and gasoline
the children; that because she would be going to the United States to station and mini-mart in Rosemead, California, U.S.A., had substantial
attend to a family business, "leaving the children would be a problem assets and income.
and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and
that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the
3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie, nicknamed
children for the following reasons:
"Menchu," approved of the adoption because of her heart ailment,
near-fatal accident in 1981, and the fact that she could not provide
1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed them a secure and happy future as she "travels a lot."
her to enter into any contract without the written
consent of her husband;
(4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual
direction as they would go to church together and had sent the children
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an to Catholic schools.
illegal alien in the United States and had been
transferring from one place to another to avoid
(5) The children themselves manifested their desire to be adopted by
detection by Immigration authorities, and
the Clavanos — Keith had testified and expressed the wish to be
adopted by the Clavanos while the two younger ones were observed
3. Her husband had divorced her. by the court to have "snuggled" close to Ronald even though their
natural mother was around.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately
returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of
that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano petitioner to rest on "a very shaky foundation" because of its findings
were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances that:
were "too meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience,
allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved
children." (1) Petitioner was "morally unfit to be the father of his children" on
account of his being "an improvident father of his family" and an
"undisguised Lothario." This conclusion is based on the testimony of
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to his alleged paramour, mother of his two sons and close friend of Anna
reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had Marie, Wilma Soco, who said that she and petitioner lived as husband
transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their and wife in the very house of the Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City.
children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna
(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of "comparatively
Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and,
therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court recent dates" were "attempts at verisimilitude" as these were joint
then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to deposits the authenticity of which could not be verified.
petitioner.
(3) Contrary to petitioner's claim, the possibility of his reconciliation
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, with Anna Marie was "dim if not nil" because it was petitioner who
"devised, engineered and executed the divorce proceedings at the
issued a decree of adoption with a dispositive portion reading as
follows: Nevada Washoe County court."

(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner "is now an alien

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
for adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and from the standpoint of Philippine laws" and therefore, how his "new
Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the attachments and loyalties would sit with his (Filipino) children is an
open question."
petitioner-spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted and
approved. These children shall henceforth be Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC
known and called as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine Social Worker in her Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as
D. Clavano and Joseph Anthony D. Clavano follows:
respectively. Moreover, this Decree of Adoption
shall:
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children.
And abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified
(1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and duties as by statute as a ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic)
though they were in fact the legitimate children of the petitioners; adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]).
Indeed, in such case, adoption will be allowed not only without the
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of the consent of the parent, but even against his opposition (Re McKeag,
141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Re Camp. 131 Gal.
children; and,
469,63 P. 736, 82 Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83 Colo. 346,
265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners. R.C.L.; Steams v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349; 97 Am. St. Rep.
441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep. 564;
Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo, 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a copy
Rep. 17.) 9
of this Decree of Adoption for registration purposes.

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court
SO ORDERED.
erred in holding that it would be in the best interest of the three children
if they were adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara 2) 73-166-8 March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan
Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally National Bank
defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a)
he did not have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never
Oct. 26, 1987 of Williamson, West
abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give
their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not
present as witness the representative of the Department of Social Virginia, U.S.A.
Welfare and Development who made the case study report required by
law.
3) 564-146883 December 31, 1986 2,622.19
Security Pacific National
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Oct. 29, 1987 Bank, Daly City, Cal.,
Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the written
consent of the natural parents of the child to be
adopted. It has been held however that the U.S.A.
consent of the parent who has abandoned the
child is not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. The first and third accounts were opened however
729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The in oppositor's name as trustee for Charmaine
question therefore is whether or not oppositor may Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively. In
be considered as having abandoned the children. other words, the accounts are operated and the
In adoption cases, abandonment connotes any amounts withdrawable by oppositor himself and it
conduct on the part of the parent to forego cannot be said that they belong to the minors. The
parental duties and relinquish parental claims to second is an "or" account, in the names of Herbert
the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the Cang or Keith Cang. Since Keith is a minor and in
natural and legal obligations which parents owe the Philippines, said account is operable only by
their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or oppositor and the funds withdrawable by him
the withholding of the parent's presence, his care alone.
and the opportunity to display voluntary affection.
The issue of abandonment is amply covered by
the discussion of the first error. The bank accounts do not really serve what
oppositor claimed in his offer of evidence "the aim
and purpose of providing for a better future and
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar security of his family."10
remittances to the children and has in fact even
maintained bank accounts in their names. His duty
to provide support comes from two judicial Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals.
pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707 He emphasized that the decree of legal separation was not based on
CEB, supra, obliges him to pay the children the merits of the case as it was based on a manifestation amounting to
P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by a compromise agreement between him and Anna Marie. That he and
the divorce decree of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal his wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the United States
Court which orders him to pay monthly support of was borne out by the fact that prior to his departure to the United
US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor has not States, the family lived with petitioner's parents. Moreover, he alone
submitted any evidence to show compliance with did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he and his wife initiated
the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has submitted the "joint complaint" for divorce.
22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45) drawn
in the children's names totalling $2,126.98. The Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for
last remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). his children was belied by the award to him of custody over the
His obligation to provide support commenced children in Civil Case No. JD-707. He took exception to the appellate
under the divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that court's findings that as an American citizen he could no longer lay
as of October 6, 1987, oppositor should have claim to custody over his children because his citizenship would not
made 53 remittances of $150.00, or a total of take away the fact that he "is still a father to his children." As regards
$7,950.00. No other remittances were shown to his alleged illicit relationship with another woman, he had always
have been made after October 6, 1987, so that as denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the instant
of this date, oppositor was woefully in arrears adoption case. Neither was it true that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and
under the terms of the divorce decree. And since family friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in Mandaue City
he was totally in default of the judgment in JD-707 seven (7) kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of
CEB, the inevitable conclusion is oppositor had Cebu City. Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco should
not really been performing his duties as a father, not have been given weight for it was only during the hearing of the
contrary to his protestations. petition for adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother of Ronald, came to
know her and went to her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be
True, it has been shown that oppositor had a witness for monetary considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it
opened three accounts in different banks, as would be hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim that they could love the
follows — children much more than he could. 11

Acct. No. Date Opened His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now
Balance Name of Bank before this Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally
defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as
required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and
———— —————— —— Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
—— ——————
Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides —
1) 118-606437-4 July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great
Western Savings,
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The
written consent of the following to the adoption
Oct. 29, 1987 Daly City, Cal., U.S.A. shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or, over; Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be
filed with the petition a written consent to the
adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of
2) The natural parents of thechild or his legal guardian of the
age or over and not incompetent, and by the
Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed child placement
child's spouse, if any, and by each of its known
agency under whose care the child may be;
living parents who is not insane or hopelessly
intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or if
(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum,
parents. (Emphasis supplied) children's home, or benevolent society or person,
by the proper officer or officers of such asylum,
home, or society, or by such persons; but if the
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued child is illegitimate and has not been recognized,
Executive Order No. 91 amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the consent of its father to the adoption shall not
the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As thus amended, Article 31 read:
be required. (Emphasis supplied)

Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written
written consent of the following to the adoption
consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the
shall be necessary: decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent
can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child 13 or that
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over; such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may
acquire jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of
the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after receiving alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance
counselling and appropriate social services from the Ministry of Social therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court
Services and Development or from a duly licensed child-placement treats the procedural aspect of adoption. Thus, the Court declared:
agency;

. . . . The technical rules of pleading should not be

(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it
licensed child-placement agency under whose care and legal custody is deemed more important that the petition should
the child may be; contain facts relating to the child and its parents,
which may give information to those interested,
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting than that it should be formally correct as a
parents. (Emphasis supplied) pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a
petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially
complies with the adoption statute, alleging all
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. 14
that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
determines the jurisdiction of the court. 12 As such, when private
respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother
applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by was attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the
Executive Order No. 91. natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged
the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural
father as follows:
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988,
the Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code
took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity 3. That the children's mother, sister of petitioner
"insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in RONALD V. CLAVANO, has given her express
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the consent to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of
Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now Consent, Annex "A". Likewise, the written consent
reads: of Keith Cang, now 14 years of age appears on
page 2 of this petition; However, the father of the
children, Herbert Cang, had already left his wife
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to and children and had already divorced the former,
the adoption shall be necessary: as evidenced by the xerox copy of the DECREE
OF DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe,
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over; State of Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex "B") which was
filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long after he
abandoned his family to live in the United States
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper as an illegal immigrant. 15
government instrumentality;

The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even

(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of absent the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower
the adopting parent or parents; court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural
parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting jurisprudence 16 dispense with the requirement of written consent to the
parents, if living with said parent and the latter's spouse, if any; and adoption of their minor children.

(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily
(Emphasis supplied) because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he
had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination.
The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon,
amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be
requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as considered on its merits.
follows:
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon with her angkong and how pretty she was in white
this Court. 17 This Court is not expected nor required to examine or dress when she won among the candidates in
contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the the Flores de Mayo after she had prayed so hard
parties. 18 However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the for it. She informed him, however, that she was
authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts worried because Charmaine was vain and wont to
if it that these do not conform to the evidence on record. 19 extravagance as she loved clothes. About Joeton
(Joseph Anthony), she told petitioner that the boy
was smart for his age and "quite spoiled" being the
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court has held that the exceptions
youngest of the children in Lahug. Joeton was
to the rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive
mischievous but Keith was his idol with whom he
and may not be reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the
would sleep anytime. She admitted having said so
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
much about the children-because they might not
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded
have informed petitioner of "some happenings and
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the
spices of life" about themselves. She said that it
judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of
was "just very exciting to know how they've grown
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
up and very pleasant, too, that each of them have
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
(sic) different characters." She ended the letter
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
with the hope that petitioner was "at the best of
appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
health." After extending her regards "to all," she
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
signed her name after the word "Love." This letter
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
was mailed on July 9, 1986 from Cebu to
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
petitioner whose address was P.O. Box 2445,
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify
Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
a different conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record. 2. Exh. 2 — letter dated 11/13/84 on a green
stationery with golden print of "a note from
Menchu" on the left upper corner. Anna Marie
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals
stated that "we" wrote to petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984
failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a
and that Keith and Joeton were very excited when
different conclusion 21 on the issue of whether petitioner has so
petitioner "called up last time." She told him how
abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption
Joeton would grab the phone from Keith just so
unnecessary.
petitioner would know what he wanted to order.
Charmaine, who was asleep, was so disappointed
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to that she missed petitioner's call because she also
forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root wanted something that petitioner should buy.
idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and Menchu told petitioner that Charmaine wanted a
publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, pencil sharpener, light-colored T-shirts for her
hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to walking shorts and a (k)nap sack. Anna Marie
resume or claim one's rights or interests. 22 In reference to informed petitioner that the kids were growing up
abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports and so were their needs. She told petitioner to be
"any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego "very fatherly" about the children's needs because
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It those were expensive here. For herself, Anna
means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations Marie asked for a subscription of Glamour and
of care and support which parents owe their children." 23 Vogue magazines and that whatever expenses he
would incur, she would "replace" these. As a
postscript, she told petitioner that Keith wanted a
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not size 6 khaki-colored "Sperry topsider shoes."
manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish
all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is 3. Exh. 3 — an undated note on a yellow small
not tantamount to abandonment. 24 While admittedly, petitioner was piece of paper that reads:
physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not
remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for
Dear Herbert,
his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and
children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by
mail and catered to their whims. Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you
had a wonderful one.
Petitioner's testimony on the matter is supported by documentary
evidence consisting of the following handwritten letters to him of both By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one.
his wife and children: It's nice to be thought of at X'mas. Thanks again.

1. Exh. 1 — a 4-page updated letter of Menchu

(Anna Marie) addressed to "Dear Bert" on a C.
Westates Carbon Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu
stated therein that it had been "a long time since
the last time you've heard from me excluding that
of the phone conversation we've had." She
discussed petitioner's intention to buy a motorbike
for Keith, expressing apprehension over risks that
could be engendered by Keith's use of it. She said
that in the "last phone conversation" she had with
petitioner on the birthday of "Ma," she forgot to tell
petitioner that Keith's voice had changed; he had
become a "bagito" or a teen-ager with many "fans"
who sent him Valentine's cards. She told him how
Charmaine had become quite a talkative
"almost dalaga" who could carry on a conversation
 and dollars that he could save. He told petitioner h
that he was saving the money he had been u
sending them. He said he missed petitioner and
wished him the best. He added that petitioner
4. Exh. 4 — a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose
should call them on Sundays.
Clavano, Inc. addressed to "Dear Dad." Keith told his father that they
tried to tell their mother "to stay for a little while, just a few weeks after
classes start(s)" on June 16. He informed petitioner that Joeton would 8. Exh. 8 — a letter from Joeton and Charmaine
be in Kinder I and that, about the motorbike, he had told his mother to but apparently written by the latter. She asked for
write petitioner about it and "we'll see what you're (sic) decision will money from petitioner to buy something for the
be." He asked for chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt and shorts, rubber school and "something else." She, promised not to
shoes, socks, headband, some clothes for outing and perfume. He told spend so much and to save some. She said she
petitioner that they had been going to Labug with their mother picking loved petitioner and missed him. Joeton said "hi!"
them up after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or dinner. From her to petitioner. After ending the letter with "Love,
aerobics, his mother would go for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00 Joeton and Charmaine," she asked for her prize
o'clock in the evening. He wished his father "luck and the best of for her grades as she got seventh place.
health" and that they prayed for him and their other relatives. The letter
was ended with "Love Keith."
9. Exh. 9 — undated letter of Keith. He assured
petitioner that he had been writing him; that he
5. Exh. 5 — another undated long letter of Keith. would like to have some money but he would save
He thanked his father for the Christmas card "with them; that he learned that petitioner had called
$40.00, $30.00 and $30.00" and the "card of them up but he was not around; that he would be
Joeton with $5.00 inside." He told petitioner the going to Manila but would be back home May 3;
amounts following his father's instructions and that his Mommy had just arrived Thursday
promise to send money through the mail. He afternoon, and that he would be the "official altar
asked his father to address his letter directly to boy." He asked petitioner to write them soon.
him because he wanted to open his own letters.
He informed petitioner of activities during the
10. Exh. 10 — Keith thanked petitioner for the
Christmas season — that they enjoyed eating,
money he sent. He told petitioner that he was
playing and giving surprises to their mother. He
saving some in the bank and he was proud
apprised him of his daily schedule and that their
because he was the only one in his group who
mother had been closely supervising them,
saved in the bank. He told him that Joeton had
instructing them to fold their blankets and pile up
become naughty and would claim as his own the
their pillows. He informed petitioner that Joeton
shirts sent to Keith by petitioner. He advised
had become very smart while Charmaine, who
petitioner to send pants and shirts to Joeton, too,
was also smart, was very demanding of their
and asked for a pair of topsider shoes and
mother. Because their mother was leaving for the
candies. He informed petitioner that he was a
United States on February 5, they would be
member of the basketball team and that his mom
missing her like they were missing petitioner. He
would drive for his group. He asked him to call
asked for his "things" and $200.00. He told
them often like the father of Ana Christie and to
petitioner more anecdotes about Joeton like he
write them when he would call so that they could
would make the sign of the cross even when they
wait for it. He informed petitioner that they had all
would pass by the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his
grown bigger and heavier. He hoped petitioner
insistence that Aquino was not dead because he
would be happy with the letter that had taken him
had seen him on the betamax machine. For Keith,
so long to write because he did not want to commit
Charmaine had become "very maldita" who was
any mistakes. He asked petitioner to buy him
not always satisfied with her dolls and things but
perfume (Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner,
Joeton was full of surprises. He ended the letter
added that the latter should buy something for
with "Love your son, Keith." The letter was mailed
Mommy.
on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).

11. Exh. 11 — a Christmas card "For My

6. Exh. 6 — an undated letter Charmaine. She
Wonderful Father" dated October 8, 1984 from
thanked petitioner for the bathing suit, key chain,
Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and
$50.00. She reminded him of her birthday on
January 23 when she would turn 9 years old. She 12. Exh. 12 — another Christmas card, "Our Wish
informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of For You" with the year '83 written on the upper
her feet was IM. They had fun at Christmas in right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith,
Lahug but classes would start on January 9 Charmaine and Joeton.
although Keith's classes had started on January 6.
They would feel sad again because Mommy would
13. Exh. 13 — a letter of Keith telling petitioner
be leaving soon. She hoped petitioner would keep
writing them. She signed, "Love, Charmaine." that he had written him even when their Mom "was
there" where she bought them clothes and shoes.
Keith asked petitioner for $300.00. Because his
7. Exh . 7 — an undated letter of Keith. He mother would not agree to buy him a motorbike,
explained to petitioner that they had not been he wanted a Karaoke unit that would cost
remiss in writing letters to him. He informed him of P12,000.00. He informed petitioner that he would
their trip to Manila — they went to Malacañang, go to an afternoon disco with friends but their
Tito Doy Laurel's house, the Ministry of Foreign grades were all good with Joeton receiving "stars"
Affairs, the executive house, Tagaytay for three for excellence. Keith wanted a bow and arrow
days and Baguio for one week. He informed him Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his desire
that he got "honors," Charmaine was 7th in her that petitioner would come and visit them
class and Joeton had excellent grades. Joeton someday.
would be enrolled in Sacred Heart soon and he
was glad they would be together in that school. He
asked for his "reward" from petitioner and so with 14. Exh. 14 — a letter of Keith with one of the four
pages bearing the date January 1986. Keith told
Charmaine and Joeton. He asked for a motorbike
 his father that they had received the package that poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she
the latter sent them. The clothes he sent, however, may be able to look back with pride and a sense of
fitted only Keith but not Charmaine and Joeton satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts,
who had both grown bigger. Keith asked for however humble, to make her dreams of her little
grocery items, toys and more clothes. He asked, in boy come true. We should not forget that the
behalf of his mother, for low-heeled shoes and a relationship between a foster mother and a child is
dress to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be
that would make her look sexy. He intimated to a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had
petitioner that he had grown taller and that he was done for him, said parents might yet count and
already ashamed to be asking for things to buy in appraise (sic) all that they have done and spent for
the grocery even though his mother had told him him and with regret consider all of it as a dead
not to be shy about it. loss, and even rue the day they committed the
blunder of taking the child into their hearts and
their home. Not so with a real natural mother who
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of
never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever
banks in the U.S.A. showing that even prior to the filing of the petition
treasuring memories of her associations with her
for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his
child, however unpleasant and disappointing.
children. 25 Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to
Flesh and blood count. . . . .
the children from 1985 to 1989.

In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court stated that "(I)n

These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite
ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
surprising why the courts below simply glossed over these, ignoring
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
not only evidence on financial support but also the emotional exchange
considerations." Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the father,
of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts
the Court said:
below emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his
children and the fact that, as regards the bank deposits, these were
"withdrawable by him alone." Simply put, the courts below attached a A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates
high premium to the prospective adopters' financial status but totally that Teresita, or at least, her counsel are more
brushed aside the possible repercussion of the adoption on the intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a
emotional and psychological well-being of the children. mother separated from her children and the
humiliation she suffered as a, result of her
character being made a key issue in court rather
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and
than the feelings and future, the best interests and
aunt. However, his seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by
welfare of her children. While the bonds between a
his testimony is contradicted by his feelings towards his father as
mother and her small child are special in nature,
revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that
either parent, whether father or mother, is bound
Keith's testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for
to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody.
adoption that would certainly have engendered confusion in his young
One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater
mind as to the capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had
than that of the other parent. It is not so much the
been used to.
suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent
but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
The courts below emphasized respondents' emotional attachment to consideration. (Emphasis supplied) 29
the children. This is hardly surprising for, from the very start of their
young lives, the children were used to their presence. Such attachment
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration
had persisted and certainly, the young ones' act of snuggling close to
were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive
private respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their
a person of parental authority over his children. There should be a
emotional detachment from their father. Private respondents, being the
holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the physical,
uncle and aunt of the children, could not but come to their succor when
emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the
they needed help as when Keith got sick and private respondent
child.30 The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned
Ronald spent for his hospital bills.
his family needs more evidentiary support other than his inability to
provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot could provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally
be entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and
larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he received
in David v. Court of Appeals,26 the Court awarded custody of a minor from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more important
illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market emotional tie between him and his children. The children needed him
vendor instead of to his affluent father who was a married man, not not only because he could cater to their whims but also because he
solely because the child opted to go with his mother. The Court said: was a person they could share with their daily activities, problems and
triumphs.
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life
of affluence that private respondent promises if the The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond
child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner's "meager" financial support to ferret out other indications on
petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his family. The omission of
support her children according to her means. said courts has led us to examine why the children were subjected to
the process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound
them to their father. To our consternation, the record of the case bears
In Celis v. Cafuir 27 where the Court was confronted with the issue of
out the fact that the welfare of the children was not exactly the
whether to award custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster
"paramount consideration" that impelled Anna Marie to consent to their
mother, this Court said: adoption.

This court should avert the tragedy in the years to

In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the
come of having deprived mother and son of the children in the country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a
beautiful associations and tender, imperishable problem that would naturally hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other
memories engendered by the relationship of
words, the adoption appears to be a matter of convenience for her
parent and child. We should not take away from a because Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her
mother the opportunity of bringing up her own children. 31 In his testimony, private respondent Ronald swore that
child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to
Anna Marie had been out of the country for two years and came home The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption
twice or three times, 32 thereby manifesting the fact that it was she who insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure
actually left her children to the care of her relatives. It was bad enough the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever
that their father left their children when he went abroad, but when their mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and
mother followed suit for her own reasons, the situation worsened. The interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context
Clavano family must have realized this. Hence, when the family first and perspective. The Court's position, should not be misconstrued or
discussed the adoption of the children, they decided that the misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of
prospective adopter should be Anna Marie's brother Jose. However, law and jurisprudence. 46 The discretion to approve adoption
because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child
task upon private respondents. 33 but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over
the child. 47
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the
children. A businessman, private respondent Ronald Clavano In this regard, this Court notes private respondents' reliance on the
commutes between Cebu and Manila while his wife, private manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna
respondent Maria Clara, is an international flight Marie which became the basis of the decree of legal separation.
stewardess. 34 Moreover, private respondent Ronald claimed that he According to private respondents' counsel, 48 the authority given to
could "take care of the children while their parents are Anna Marie by that decree to enter into contracts as a result of the
away," 35 thereby indicating the evanescence of his intention. He legal separation was "all embracing" 49 and, therefore, included giving
wanted to have the children's surname changed to Clavano for the her sole consent to the adoption. This conclusion is however, anchored
reason that he wanted to take them to the United States as it would be on the wrong premise that the authority given to the innocent spouse to
difficult for them to get a visa if their surname were different from enter into contracts that obviously refer to their conjugal properties,
his. 36 To be sure, he also testified that he wanted to spare the children shall include entering into agreements leading to the adoption of the
the stigma of being products of a broken home. children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis as private
respondents' apparent reliance on the decree of legal separation for
doing away with petitioner's consent to the adoption.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent
Ronald, his sister Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the
inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to keep the children away The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the
from their father. One of the overriding considerations for the adoption decree of legal separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner of
was allegedly the state of Anna Marie's health — she was a victim of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for
an almost fatal accident and suffers from a heart ailment. However, adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: ". . . in case of legal
she herself admitted that her health condition was not that serious as separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the
she could still take care of the children. 37 An eloquent evidence of her parent designated by the court." In awarding custody, the court shall
ability to physically care for them was her employment at the Philippine take into account "all relevant considerations, especially the choice of
Consulate in Los Angeles 38 — she could not have been employed if the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit."
her health were endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos' attempt
at depriving petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed from
If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent
their notion that he was an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact
spouse the "exercise" of parental authority. Having custody of the
expressed fear that her children would "never be at ease with the wife
child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of parental rights
of their father." 39
with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have
the right to the child's services and earnings, and the right to direct his
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a activities and make decisions regarding his care and control,
womanizer and father to the sons of Wilma Soco. 40 As to whether he education, health and religion. 50
was telling the truth is beside the point. Philippine society, being
comparatively conservative and traditional, aside from being Catholic
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority,
in orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the part of a
the joint exercise of which is vested by the law upon the parents, 51 as
family man, considering the baneful effects such irresponsible act visits
on his family. Neither may the Court place a premium on the inability of
a man to distinguish between siring children and parenting them. . . . a mass of rights and obligations which the law
Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a grants to parents for the purpose of the children's
paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that physical preservation and development, as well as
petitioner was necessarily an unfit father. 41 Conventional wisdom and the cultivation of their intellect and the education of
common human experience show that a "bad" husband does not their hearts and senses. As regards parental
necessarily make a "bad" father. That a husband is not exactly an authority, "there is no power, but a task; no
upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of
children. 42 Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern for his the minor."
children when he took the trouble of sending a telegram 43 to the lower
court expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately after
learning about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the case Parental authority and responsibility are
and to testify about his love for his children and his desire to unite his inalienable and may not be transferred or
family once more in the United States. 44 renounced except in cases authorized by law. The
right attached to parental authority, being purely
personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship
abide by the agreement with his wife on the support of the children. and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United States. As such, he could institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of
not have procured gainful employment. Private respondents failed to a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
refute petitioner's testimony that he did not receive his share from the even in a document, what is given is merely
sale of the conjugal home, 45 pursuant to their temporary custody and it does not constitute a
manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal separation case. renunciation of parental authority. Even if a
Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
redounded to the benefit of his family, particularly his children. The disallows the same.
proceeds may not have lasted long but there is ample evidence to
show that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by his agreement with his
wife and sent his family money, no matter how "meager." The father and mother, being the natural
guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
 bound and entitled to keep them in their custody (a) To ensure that every child
and company. 52 (Emphasis supplied) remains under the care and
custody of his/her parent(s)
and be provided with love,
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been
care, understanding and
completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of
security towards the full and
custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate, that
harmonious development of
award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement
his/her personality. 60
of the spouses.

(b) In all matters relating to

While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to
the care, custody and
a compromise, 53 there was no factual finding in the legal separation
adoption of a child, his/her
case that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should
interest shall be the
be deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds under
paramount consideration in
the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal
accordance with the tenets
separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody
set forth in the United Nations
over the children from Anna Marie back to petitioner. The order was
(UN) Convention on the
not implemented because of Anna Marie's motion for reconsideration
Rights of the Child. 61
thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer
of custody to the petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a
contempt charge against them. 54 (c) To prevent the child from
unnecessary separation from
his/her biological parent(s). 62
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the
child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the
legal separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations
whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant Convention on the Rights of the Child, the government and its officials
dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental are duty bound to comply with its mandates. Of particular relevance to
authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. 55 But there instant case are the following provisions:
cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because, as
this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities,
the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a
rights and duties of parents . . . to provide, in a
misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of
record.
the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the
exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has present Convention. 63
ruled in Tenchavez v. Escaño 56 that a divorce obtained by Filipino
citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this
States Parties shall respect the right of the child
jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an
who is separated from one or both parents to
American citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained
maintain personal relations and direct contact with
a Filipino citizen, the divorce has no legal effect.
both parents on a regular basis, except if it is
contrary to the child's best interests. 64
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out
of established customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v.
A child whose parents reside in different States
Court of Appeals, 57 a case involving the visitorial rights of an
shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis,
illegitimate parent over his child, the Court expressed the opinion that:
save in exceptional circumstances personal
relations and direct contacts with both parents . .
Parents have the natural right, as well as the . 65
moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see
to their upbringing and safeguard their best
States Parties shall respect the rights and duties
interest and welfare. This authority and
of the parents . . . to provide direction to the child
responsibility may not be unduly denied the
in the exercise of his or her right in a manner
parents; neither may it be renounced by them.
consistent with the evolving capacities of the
Even when the parents are estranged and their
child. 66
affection for each other is lost, the attachment and
feeling for their offsprings invariably remain
unchanged. Neither the law not the courts allow Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and
this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, the domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle
grave and imminent threat to the well being of the that all actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is
child. not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of
the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The
rights of parents vis-à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil
each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the
Code, there has been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in
fullest extent possible.
adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of childless couples
for a child, as on the paramount interest, of a child who needs the love
and care of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and
Code and the Family Code, the discernible trend has impelled the Charmaine are now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching
enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry, eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be endowed with the
Adoption 58 and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state
domestic adoption of Filipino children. 59 that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare
and best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of
the time that the petition for adoption was filed. 67 Said petition must be
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws,
denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who,
such as the following policies in the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998":
by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned
them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
GRANTED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,
are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith,
vs.
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S.
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is
LAHOM"), respondent.
immediately executory.

VITUG, J.:
SO ORDERED.

The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete
without children. The realization could have likely prodded the spouses
Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care
Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their
own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love
and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed,
for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin.
Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On
05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all
the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for
Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City
changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."

A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December

of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga
City. In her petition, she averred —

"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said

spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from
Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly
her husband until the latter died, and even before his death
he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's
adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's supplication,
however with his further request upon petitioner to give to
charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to
respondent in the future.

xxx xxx xxx

"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to

the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his
records with the Professional Regulation Commission
showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued
in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities
in connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose
Melvin M. Sibulo.

xxx xxx xxx

"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in

this city with only her household helps to attend to her, has
yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but
respondent remained indifferent and would only come to
Naga to see her once a year.

"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-
up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a
leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would
need most the care and support from a love one, but
respondent all the more remained callous and utterly
indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.

"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of

petitioner's nephews and nieces whenever they would find
time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only
motivated by their desire for some material benefits from
petitioner.

"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting

in a strained and uncomfortable relationship between him
and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings,
knowing that after all respondent's only motive to his
 adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the
properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly petition is ordered dismissed."4
shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for
partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of
of Court, petitioner raises the following questions; viz:
adoption, considering respondent to be the child of
petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which
reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this 1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still
petition for revocation,"1 be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 8552?
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption 2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?
Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of
adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some
insights on the subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads: adoption to assure male heirs in the family.5 The continuity of the
adopter's family was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters
relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was
"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon
hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted.6 Countries, like
petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to preserve
Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age
inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized
but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may
adoption.7 It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus
be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by
in law and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount
the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
concern.8Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone
relented and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which,
counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual
subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans
assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to
came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most
comply with parental obligations.
countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an overriding
consideration.9 In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of
"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be children invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in 1948,10followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the
Article 919 of the Civil Code." (emphasis supplied) Child,11 were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard
the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines 12 of
1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending
Code13 and then by the Family Code of the Philippines,14 gave
principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and
immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In
(b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted
1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the
provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of
Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the
opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not
principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral
retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the
responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the
adoption vested under the regime of then Article 3482 of the Civil Code
adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for
and Article 1923 of the Family Code.
the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the
adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly: The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption
decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal
ties created by adoption.
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this
Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99- Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not
11-07 SC. adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the
trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under
the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or
not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of said guaranty of due process15 that expresses apresent fixed interest which
complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state
365). action;16 it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement
of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after
the right has become vested.17 Rights are considered vested when the
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted right to enjoyment is a present interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and
the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted perfect19 or fixed and irrefutable.
under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the
petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to adopt Jason Condat
was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child
"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long
and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an
acquired under the provisions of the Family Code should be adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial
respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that court had rendered its decision and while the case was still pending on
petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent
appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been 209), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, took effect.
exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. From the Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be dismissed for
averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal
having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by the
grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is
petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement
instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if
of the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the
any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs.
Rules of Court)
Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined by her husband, G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs.
Miller,21spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to
vs.
formalize Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken into their
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME
care. At the time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed
SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on
08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. DECISION
The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In
discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court
VELASCO, JR., J.:
ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed.
Nature of the Case
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein
petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul
1975. By then, the new law,22 had already abrogated and repealed the the March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees Compensation
right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled
rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner the deceased employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442,
after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued. otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by
PD 626.2
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set
aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule The Facts
10023 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to
revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise
of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician
fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk
also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the
privileges.24 While adoption has often been referred to in the context of government's Employees' Compensation Program
a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.25 It is a the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely
privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may death the following day.4
deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. 26 Matters
relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus,
to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and,
State.27 Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits
away at anytime before it has been exercised.28 under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando
City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases
where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim
nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex because you are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN
sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based
have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while on documents you submitted to us.
barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to
an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation
law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union
will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
disposable portion of his estate. reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is
AFFIRMED. No costs. hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. SO ORDERED.6

In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled
against petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after under
PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary
beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth
were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather,
Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No.
8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4,
1985, which decree of adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as
argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary
beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner
qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that
Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:

Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that
beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the
on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still
descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the alive.
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a
primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."

Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally

The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the
legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV,
special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agenciesover
Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
matters falling under their jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case,
This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a
the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the
legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for
petitioner – Cornelio’s death certificate.13
adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption
divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive
father died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years
xxxx
since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained
finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed
parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. away.
Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as
amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is
adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant. 9 (Emphasis
contrary to law
supplied)

This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
the death benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise. The
likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code,
as amended, which reads:
The Issues
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition: indicates otherwise:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS xxxx

I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on (j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and
record. dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying
descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the
the just, due and lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a
beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who
are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion supplied)
in not giving due course/denying petitioner’s otherwise
meritorious motion for reconsideration.11
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the
ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the processing of
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed
parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on
secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as
receive the benefits under the ECP? follows:

The Court's Ruling RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES

The petition is meritorious. SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or
secondary, and determined atthe time of employee’s death.
The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on
record (b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s (1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee
claim for death benefits is that eventhough she is John’s biological at the time of the employee’s death until he
mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, remarries; and
was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried
the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age,
immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security or over 21 years of age provided that he is
benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this incapacitated and incapable of self - support due
Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as such, is the to physicalor mental defect which is congenital or
one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a
deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
beneficiary under the Social Security law, in view of her status as other considered as a primary beneficiary only when
 there are no other dependent children who are It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was
qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this
provided finally, that if there are two or more wise:
acknowledged natural children, they shall be
counted from the youngest and without
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in
substitution, but not exceeding five.
its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to
say:
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered
secondary:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not
defined by it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a general and inclusive
the employee for regular support; scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction
prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate
distinguera debemus. xxx
children who are unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over
21 years of age providedthat he is incapacitated According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992
and incapable of self - support dueto physical or in a more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted
mental defect which is congenital or acquired by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the
during minority. (Emphasis supplied) law intends to use the termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the
term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New
Civil Code.
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground
that she is no longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by
the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute
severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the
her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a
being a secondary beneficiary. more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier,
is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
We disagree.
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents"
in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to
Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the
"legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent
Labor Code, as amended
parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent
of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by
indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.
ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated
by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that
Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to
solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to
violation or non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children
or practice to the contrary. and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the
lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate
parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent
parents" was intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid parents by nature or adoption.
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.(Emphasis supplied) b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Fortune Tobacco Corporation16 that: To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is
an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate
to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as
effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be
amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not countenanced.
covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in
harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
basic law. (Emphasis supplied) rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law
on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions
a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate legitimate governmental objective.19
parents."
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal the restoration of custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent
is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not
class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."20 left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since
discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a
rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all
legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We
classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA
pressing government concern or interest that requires protection so as 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the
to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the
the rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his
better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that employees welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered
and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee
event of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted. this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be
expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s
biological one.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries
to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take
other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though
appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the
Employees’ Compensation. adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To
demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to
inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent
Code:

In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted
rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims
shall be governed by the following rules:
for and receive death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy
to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in
its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, xxx
she could have still claimed death benefits under the law.
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide
"legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants
over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed and the other half, by the adopters;
Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming
arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the
xxx
adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents,
and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental
authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary. (6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then
the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years
old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the
lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the
Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than New Civil Code, which provides:
three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at
about four (4) years of age.
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children
or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should
be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their
rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of
personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue
of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
the adopter passed away? employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the
pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the
policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way
the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too
Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of
Act, provides: parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor
offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of
a minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of
adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp.
adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological
Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off
parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the
restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal
end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’sminority
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other
resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the
shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)
adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s
dependence on John can be established from the documentary
evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner,
prior to John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in
1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she
was unable to "give a bright future to her growing children" as a
housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand
Elizabeth in 1985.

Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner

and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos
Norte" as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in John’s
Death Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal
Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel
boarded by John.26 Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the
ECC’s assailed Decision.27Similarly, this same address was used by
petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union branch and,
thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that
aside from having been restored parental authority over John,
petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived
together under one roof.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of

his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as
the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover
compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows
the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the
member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner
as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered
petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of
circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the
restoration ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing
singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner
as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to
death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a
dependent parent.

All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of
legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not
deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from
John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise
during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then
the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall
accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010

Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case
No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is
hereby directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary
of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 also stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985,
and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on August
1987, and Regina on March 1989.14 Under "Motivation for
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
Adoption," the social welfare officer
noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA
CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario
CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Petitioners, Mata, he was not able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child.
v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA However, with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will
MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents. fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to legalize their
relationship and surname. . . .15
DECISION
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed
and Regina temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The children
LEONEN, J.:
have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth's death in
July 1995.17chanrobleslaw
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony,
there must be a showing of notice and consent. This cannot On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the
be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances adoption,18 having ruled that "[n]o opposition had been
where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out received by this Court from any person including the
of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children government which was represented by the Office of the
must be personally notified through personal service of Solicitor General."19 A certificate of finality20 was issued on
summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified February 9, 2006.
through constructive service.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer,
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Atty. Rene V. Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment
decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, against Jose with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.21 In
which denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by her complaint, she alleged that Jose had been remiss in
petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to providing support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36
annul the judgment of the trial court that granted years.22 She alleged that she single-handedly raised and
respondents' decree of adoption.3chanrobleslaw provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been
showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry R.
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of adopting
Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jéd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and
(Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged Joanne's knowledge and consent.23She also alleged that Jose
husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and
Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known Regina were his illegitimate children with Larry's wife,
by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with
nickname, "Jayrose." Larry.24chanrobleslaw

Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
1962 in Laoag City. Their marriage had allegedly been Jose denies being remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne
troubled. They had a child, Rose Marie, who was born in during her minority. He alleged that he always offered help,
1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease and only but it was often declined.25 He also alleged that he adopted
lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple Jed and Regina because they are his illegitimate children. He
of months because of the incompatibilities between denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by
them.4chanrobleslaw Rosario. He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998
that left him paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario diminished because several properties had to be sold to pay
gave birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived for medical treatments.26 He then implored the Integrated Bar
as husband and wife for about a year even if she lived in of the Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice and
Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in equity."27chanrobleslaw
Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they separated
permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos
homosexual tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they Norte.28chanrobleslaw
"remained friends for fifteen (15) years despite their
separation(.)"6chanrobleslaw On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the
the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and
he alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children Regina's adoption.29chanrobleslaw
with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth),8 whom Rosario
alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.9 At the time of the In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned
filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old.10chanrobleslaw of the adoption sometime in 2005.30 They allege that
Rosario's affidavit of consent, marked by the trial court as
According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the "Exh. K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They also allege that Jed and
Social Welfare Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a Regina's birth certificates showed different sets of
prominent and respected family, being one of the three information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the
children of former Governor Mauricio Castro. time she gave birth. They argue that one set of birth
certificates states the father to be Jose and in another set of
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos National Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be
Norte.12 The report mentioned that he was once married to Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover.33 It was further alleged
Rosario, but the marriage did not produce any children.13 It that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose's illegitimate
children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who
were married at the time of their birth.34chanrobleslaw Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a
party may file an action with the Court of Appeals to annul
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be available if
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through
that there is "no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse no fault of the petitioner."49chanrobleslaw
and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be personally
notified of the hearing."35chanrobleslaw In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of
Appeals:50chanrobleslaw
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme
employed by [Jose] in obtaining an adoption decree in favor A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so
of [his illegitimate children] to the prejudice of the interests of exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when
his legitimate heirs"36 but stated that its hands were bound by other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final
the trial court decision that had already attained "finality and order or final resolution sought, to be annulled was rendered
immutability."37chanrobleslaw by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet,
the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the
information contained in the different sets of birth certificates final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus
required the determination of the identities of the persons instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the
stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by
action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud was also prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that
perpetrated during the trial and could not be classified as the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new
extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
of judgment.38chanrobleslaw are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A
petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the
When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was safeguards cannot prosper.
denied on July 10, 2009,39 they filed this petition.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals judgment, final order or final resolution is understandable, for
erred in denying the petition for annulment for failure of the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of
petitioners to (1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid
and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud. corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The
doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of
erred in its application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge
to annul a judgment.40 They argue that because of the of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial
fabricated consent obtained by Jose and the alleged false controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
information shown in the birth certificates presented as precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that
evidence before the trial court,41 they were not given the has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the
proceedings were concealed from them.42chanrobleslaw modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of
fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the
and misapplied the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of land. As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on
due process, notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public
parties.43 They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children policy and sound practice demand that the rights and
requires the consent, not only of the spouse, but also the obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an
legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such indefinite period of time.51 (Emphasis supplied)
consent was never secured from Joanne.44chanrobleslaw
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that only two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be
petitioners could not have been deprived of their day in court availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four years
since their interest was "amply protected by the participation from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be
and representation of the Solicitor General through the brought before it is barred by estoppel or
deputized public prosecutor."45chanrobleslaw laches.52chanrobleslaw

Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction
through publication for three consecutive weeks in a over the nature of the action or subject matter, or lack of
newspaper of general circulation, which constitutes not only jurisdiction over the parties.53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other
notice to them but also notice to the world of the adoption hand, is "[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or
proceedings.46 They argue that since the alleged fraud was from presenting his entire case to the court, or [that which]
perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself
fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment but to the manner in which it is procured."54chanrobleslaw
of judgment.47 They also argue that petitioners were not
indispensable parties because adoption is an action in The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as
rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the
state.48chanrobleslaw proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through
extrinsic fraud.
The petition is granted.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 vis-a-vis the law on adoption
of the Rules of Civil Procedure
 children if they are 10 years old or older. In Article III,
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by Section 9 of Republic Act No.
the trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws require their 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
consent as a requisite in the proceedings.
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After
Petitioners are correct. being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give
or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the required:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
action."55 As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1,
2000, it is Republic Act No. 855256 which applies over the (c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10)
proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only (Emphasis supplied)
the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate
children. The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it
ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It also
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will
husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks have to share their parent's love and care, as well as their
to adopt his own children born out of future legitimes, with another person.
wedlock:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate
ARTICLE III child and that she was over 10 years old at the time of the
ELIGIBILITY adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was
necessary for the adoption to be valid.
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may
adopt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to
the trial court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As
cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not
valid.
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter
of the other; or For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required
by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected.
signified, his/her consent thereto; or It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case.
Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . privileged over substantive statutory rights.
(Emphasis supplied)
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly
and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale acquired jurisdiction.
for this is stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P.
Lim:57chanrobleslaw There was extrinsic fraud

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while
means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is fraud may have been committed in this case, it was only
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic fraud. This is erroneous.
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation.
As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to Florece:59chanrobleslaw
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the
spouses.58 Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing
party in litigation committed outside of the trial of the
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from
in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or
children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by
is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must keeping him away from court, by giving him a false
first obtain the consent of his or her spouse. promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never had
the knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without
annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite authority connives at his defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)
their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed
and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be
adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's brought within four years from discovery.61Petitioners alleged
consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in that they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The
her name cannot be considered compliance of the requisites filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period
of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of allowed by the rules.
the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable
opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her The badges of fraud are present in this case.
consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's relation to any of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag
City, llocos Norte.62 Larry and Lilibeth were residents of circumstances.
Barangay 6, Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina were born in San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne were residents of The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who
Parañaque City, Manila.65 The petition for adoption, however, violate its provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic
was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Act No. 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Norte.66 The trial court gave due course to the petition on
Jose's bare allegation in his petition that he was a resident of ARTICLE VII
Batac,67 even though it is admitted in the Home Study Report VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
that he was a practicing lawyer in Laoag City.68chanrobleslaw
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. —
Second, using the process of delayed registration,69 Jose was
able to secure birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing (a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years
him to be the father and Larry as merely the and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not
informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more
certificates were procured: one showing that Jose and Lilibeth than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the
were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila,71 and another discretion of the court shall be imposed on any person
wherein the portion for the mother's name was not filled in at who shall commit any of the following acts:
all.72 The birth certificates of Jed and Regina from the (i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue
National Statistics Office, however, show that their father was influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or other
Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in clear similar acts;
contradiction to the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the (ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards
trial court in support of his petition for adoption. provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii)subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger,
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared abuse, or exploitation.
that his motivation for adoption was because he and his wife, (b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of
Rosario, were childless,74 to the prejudice of their daughter, the birth of a child under the name(s) of a person(s) who
Joanne. The consent of Rosario to the adoption was also is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of
disputed by Rosario and alleged to be simulation of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayor
fraudulent.75chanrobleslaw in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty
thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce
the trial court in approving his petition, but also to prevent Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment
Rosario and Joanne from participating in the proceedings or of any of his criminal liabilities.78 Republic Act No. 8552 also
opposing the petition. fails to provide any provision on the status of adoption
decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI, Section
by Jose as intrinsic on the basis that they were "forged 19 of Republic Act No. 855279 since rescission of adoption can
instruments or perjured testimonies"76 presented during the only be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are
trial. It failed to understand, however, that fraud is left with no other remedy in law other than the annulment of
considered intrinsic when the other party was either present the judgment.
at the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such
instrument or testimony was presented in court, The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary prejudice. There is reason to believe that Joanne has grown
up having never experienced the love and care of a father,
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that her parents having separated a year after her birth. She has
prevented a fair and just determination of the case, but the never even benefited from any monetary support from her
difference is that the acts or things, like falsification and false father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to
testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the obtain a medical degree from the University of the Philippines
trial or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud College of Medicine80 and is now working as a doctor in
does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he Canada.81 These accomplishments, however, are poor
can guard against that kind of fraud through so many means, substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to
including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross- continue.
examination, resorting to the modes of discovery, and proper
scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated
documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in October 16, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos
court testimony have been regarded as not preventing the Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is
participation of any party in the proceedings, and are not, rendered NULL and VOID.
therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud.77 (Emphasis
supplied) SO ORDERED.

When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the

participation of any other interested party, as in this case,
then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud
was committed through the use of forged documents or
perjured testimony during the trial.

Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a

reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario
and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would
have hesitated to grant Jose's petition since he failed to fulfill
the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no
other conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the trial
court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent