Constitutional Law Memory Aid PULIDO

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – MEMORY AID
Compiled by: Rolirey H. Flores

Class of: Atty. Roberto Rafael Pulido
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Definition, Nature and Concepts
 Political Law Defined. That branch of public law which deals with the organization ,and operations of the
governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory
[People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887; Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77].
Scope:
1. Political law.
2. Constitutional law
The study of the maintenance of the proper balance between authority as represented by the
three inherent powers of the State and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights [Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., p. 1].
3. Administrative law
That branch of public law which fixes the organization of government, determines the competence
of the administrative authorities who execute the law, and indicates to the individual remedies for
the violation of his rights
4. Law on municipal corporations
5. Law on public officers
6. Election laws
7. Public international law
Fields:
1. The law of public administration -organization and management of the different branches of the
government
2. Constitutional law - guaranties of the constitution to individual rights and the limitations on
governmental action
3. Administrative law - exercise of executive power in the making of rules and the decision of
questions affecting private rights
4. The law of public corporations -governmental agencies for local government or for other special
purposes [SINCO1]
 Types of Constitutional law

o English type - characterized by the absence of a written constitution (Sinco 67). An unwritten
constitution, and the power of judicial review by the courts. Thus, the courts cannot invalidate the
acts of the parliament as being unconstitutional because of "parliamentary supremacy." (Mirasol
notes.)
o European continental type - where there is a written constitution w/c gives the courts no power to
declare ineffective statutes contrary to it (Sinco 67.) A written constitution but no power of judicial
review by the courts. The so-called Constitutional Courts of France do not exercise real judicial
review but only render advisory opinions on constitutional questions upon the request of the
government, not of parties in actual litigation. (Mirasol notes.)
o American type - where the legal provisions of the written constitution are given effect through the
power of the courts to declare ineffective or void ordinary statutes repugnant to it. (Sinco 67.)
 Constitutionalism refers to the position or practice that government be limited by a constitution. The doctrine
or system of government in which the governing power is limited by enforceable rules of law, and
concentration of power is limited by various checks and balances so that the basic rights of individuals and
groups are protected
 The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of
public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited
period only, after which they are replaced or retained at the option of their principal. (More discussion of
Republicanism under Article II)
B. Nature of the Constitution
 A constitution is that body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are
habitually exercised.5 (Cooley). A constitution is that written instrument enacted by direct action of the
people by which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, and by
which those powers are distributed among several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the
benefit of the body politic. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 6) In other words: It is the supreme
written law of the land. A constitution is a municipal law. As such, it is binding only within the territorial
limits of the sovereignty promulgating the constitution
Page 1 of 140
 Its nature and purpose is: (a) serves as the supreme or fundamental law, (b) establishes basic framework and
underlying principles of government and (c) To prescribe the permanent framework of a system of
government, to assign to the several departments their respective powers and duties, and to establish certain
first principles on which the government is founded. (11 Am. Jur. 606 cited in Cruz)
 The 1987 Constitution is classified as written, enacted and rigid. (Art. XVII, 1987 Constitution). It took effect
on February 2, 1987, which was the date of the plebiscite. (De Leon v. Esguerra, G.R. No. L‐78059, Aug. 31,
1987.
o Written v. unwritten. A written constitution is one whose precepts are embodied in one document or
set of documents. An unwritten constitution consist of rules which have not been integrated into a
single, concrete form but are scattered in various sources, such as statutes of fundamental character,
judicial decisions, commentaries of publicists, customs and traditions. [CRUZ, Constitutional Law
4-5; NACHURA, Outline Reviewer in Political Law 2]
o Enacted (conventional) v. evolved (cumulative). A conventional constitution is enacted, formally
struck off at a definite time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a
constituent body or ruler. A cumulative body is the result of political evolution, not inaugurated at
any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method. [CRUZ, id, at 5]
o Rigid v. flexible. A constitution is classified as rigid when it may not be amended except through a
special process distinct from and more involved than the method of changing ordinary laws. It is
supposed that by such a special procedure, the constitution is rendered difficult to change and
thereby acquires a greater degree of stability. A constitution is classified as flexible when it may be
changed in the same manner and through the same body that enacts ordinary legislation. The British
Constitution is flexible.
 Qualities of a good written Constitution

o Broad. Not just because it provides for the organization of the entiregovernment and covers all
persons and things within the territory of the State but because it must be comprehensive enough to
provide for every contingency.
o Brief. It must confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with legislative details more
adjustable to change and easier to amend.
o Definite. To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which could result in confusion and divisiveness
among the people [Cruz, ibid,, pp. 5-6],
 Parts of the Constitution

o Constitution of Sovereignty – this refers to the provisions pointing out the modes or procedure in
accordance with which formal changes in the Constitution may be made (Art. XVII, Amendments or
Revisions)
o Constitution of Liberty – the series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political
rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the power of the government as a means of
securing the enjoyment of those rights (Art. III, Bill of Rights)
o Constitution of Government – provides for a structure and system of government; refers to the
provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down
certain rules relative to its administration and defining the electorate (Art. VI, Legislative Dep’t, Art.
VII, Exec. Dep’t, Art. VIII, Judicial Dep’t, Art. IX, Consti. Commissions)
 Self-Executing Provision vs Non-Self-Executing Provision
Self-executing provision One which is complete in itself and becomes

operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies a
sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants
may be enjoyed or protected.
Non-Self-Executing Provision One which lays down a general principle
C. Changing the Constitution
 Lambino vs. Comelec, GR. 174153 (2006)

o On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and
Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The Lambino Group
alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per
Page 2 of 140
centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three
per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC
election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
o Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a
people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The essence of amendments
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on
its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First,
the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied
in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete
proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
 Amendment vs Revision
o This distinction is significant because the 1987 Constitution allows people’s initiative only for
the purpose of amending, not revising, the Constitution.[See Lambino, supra]
o Determination whether a proposed change is an amendment or a revision
 Quantitative test – asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as
to change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the Constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions. One examines only the number of
provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
 Qualitative test – whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the
nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. (Lambino v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006)
AMENDMENTS REVISIONS
An addition or change within A change that alters a basic
the lines of the original principle in the constitution,
constitution as will effect an like altering the principle of
improvement, or better carry separation of powers or the
out the purpose for which it was system of checks-and-balances;
framed; a change that adds, alters the substantial entirety of
reduces or deletes without the constitution, as when the
altering the basic principles change affects substantial
involved; affects only the provisions of the constitution.
specific provision being [Id.]
amended. [Lambino v.
COMELEC (2006)]
Generally affects only the Generally affects several
specific provision being provisions of the constitution,
amended
Isolated or piecemeal change A revamp or rewriting of the
merely by adding, deleting, or whole instrument altering the
reducing without altering the substantial entirety of the
basic principle involved Constitution
Allows people’s initiative only
for the purpose of amending
 Doctrine of Proper Submission defined. Plebiscite may be held on the same day as regular election
(Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L‐28196, Nov. 9, 1967), provided the people are sufficiently informed
of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a
genuine manner. Submission of piece‐meal amendments is unconstitutional. All amendments must be
submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. The people have to be given a proper frame of reference in
arriving at their decision. (Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L‐34150, Oct. 16, 1971
 Steps in Amendatory Process
Page 3 of 140
1. Proposal – The adoption of the suggested change in the Constitution.

a. Congress (as a Constituent Assembly) – a vote of ¾ of ALL its members.
Note: While the substance of the proposals made by each type of ConAss is not subject to judicial review, the
manner the proposals are made is subject to judicial review. Since ConAss owes their existence to the
Constitution, the courts may determine whether the assembly has acted in accordance with the Constitution.
See Occena v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 1, which is authority for the principle that the choice of method of
proposal, i.e., whether made directly by Congress or through a Constitutional Convention, is within the full
discretion of the legislature
b. Constitutional Convention – Called into existence by (i) 2/3 of all members of Congress OR (ii) the
electorate, in a referendum called for by a majority of all members of Congress [CONST., art. XVII, sec. 3]
Three Theories on the position of a Constitutional Convention vis-a-vis the regular departments of
government: (1) Theory of Conventional Sovereignty [Loomis v. Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613]; (2) Convention is
inferior to the other departments [Wood’s Appeal, 79 Pa. 59]; (3) Independent of and co-equal to the other
departments [Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1],
If Congress, acting as a ConAss, calls for a ConCon but does not provide details for the calling of such
ConCon, Congress by exercising its ordinary legislative power may supply such details. But in so doing, the
Congress (as legislature) should not transgress the resolution of Congress acting as a ConAss.
Note: The manner of calling a ConCon is subject to judicial review because the Constitution has provided for
voting requirements.
Note: Choice of which ConAss or ConCon should initiate amendments and revisions is left to the discretion
of Congress. In other words, it is a political question.
Congress, as a ConAss and the ConCon has no power to appropriate money for their expenses. Money may
be spent from the treasury only pursuant to an appropriation made by law.
c. People (through a People’s Initiative)- petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters;
every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein
i. Limitation on Initiative: No amendment in this manner shall be authorized (1) within 5 years
following the ratification of the 1987 Const. nor (2) more often than once every 5 years thereafter.
ii. Enabling Law: Constitutional provision on amendments via People’s Initiative not selfexecutory
[Santiago v. COMELEC (1997)]
Under Republic Act No. 6735 [An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum], approved on August
4, 1989, initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislation through an election called for the purpose. There are three systems of initiative, namely: initiative on
the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; initiative on statutes which
refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and initiative on local legislation which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal or bararigay law, resolution or ordinance [Sec.
2(a), R.A. 6735]. Indirect Initiative is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or
the local legislative body for action [Sec. 2(b) R.A. 6735]. In the Resolution (on the Motion for Reconsideration) in
Lambino v. Comelec, the Court noted that the majority of the justices had voted to declare RA 6735 sufficient and
adequate for a people’s intitiative. Lambino thus effectively abandoned the ruling in Defensor-Santiago v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, where the Supreme Court declared R.A. 6735 inadequate to cover the
system of initiative to amend the Constitution
Page 4 of 140
2. Ratification [Sec. 4, Art. XVII] the proposed amendment shall be submitted to the people and shall be deemed ratified by
the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite, held not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days
a. After approval of the proposal by Congress or Concon
a. After certification by the COMELEC of sufficiency of petition of the people
II. INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
A. Role of Judiciary as interpreter of laws
 Constitution, Articles VIII, Sections 1 and 5

o Section 1, Articles VIII, 1987 Constitution.
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
o Section 5, Articles VIII, 1987 Constitution.
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
 Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.
 Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
 All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
 All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
 All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
 All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
 All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
 Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
 Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
 Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
 Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law.
 Marbury vs. Madusion, 5 US 137

o On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen
new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was
an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took
office. The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State
John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion),
but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson
refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been
delivered by the end of Adams’s term. William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an
appointment as justice of the peace.
o The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of
appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from
the person possessing the power has been performed. The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an
injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. Where a specific duty is
assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual
who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. It is emphatically the
duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases
must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court
must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is
Page 5 of 140
superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must
govern the case to which they both apply.
 Angara vs. Electoral Commision, 63 Phil 139 (1936)

o Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution. On December 8, 1935, however, private
respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral
Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that
was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
o The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner
toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The
grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired
as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
o The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief
Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is
required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may
become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or
three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission
on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a
majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction
and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to
a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. But in the main, the Constitution has blocked
out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties
between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases
of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof.
Constitutional bodies, concept of independence, judicial question definition of
 Gonzales vs. Office of the President

o Office of the President's (OP 's) motion for reconsideration of our September 4, 2012
Decision1which ruled on the petitions filed by Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III and Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. Their petitions challenged the constitutionality of Section 8(2)
of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770. n the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i) found
Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public
trust; and (ii) imposed on him the penalty of dismissal. Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and
who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary proceedings against her, solely questioned the
jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to disciplinary proceedings. The Court affirmed the
continuation of the proceedings against her after upholding the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of
RA No. 6770
Page 6 of 140
o The issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable – not a
political – question. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided
on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed
limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government. Under
Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be
the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function
essentially as a complaints and action bureau. The Ombudsman’s broad investigative and
disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public
officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure.
o Under the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have been expressly labeled as
"independent."41The extent of the independence enjoyed by these constitutional bodies however
varies and is to be interpreted with two significant considerations in mind: first, the functions
performed or the powers involved in a given case; and second, consistency of any allowable
interference to these powers and functions, with the principle of checks and balances. Notably, the
independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions
shares certain characteristics – they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are
created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the
framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies be insulated from political
pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would result in the impairment of their
core functions.
o The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence
and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions
and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only the express
mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
o The constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions’ need for independence. In
the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by
providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created by law,
on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of
politics.43 In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on
Audit highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the
Commission on Audit from political pressure.44 Notably, the Constitution also created an
"independent" Commission on Human Rights, although it enjoys a lesser degree of independence
since it is not granted fiscal autonomy in the manner fiscal autonomy is granted to the constitutional
commissions. The lack of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
clearly expressed their desire to keep the Commission independent from the executive branch and
other political leaders
o The authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and cause of
removal of all other public officers and employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the
basic principles and precepts established by the Constitution.
B. Rules of Interpretation
 Concepts
o In Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, the Supreme
Court made reference to the use of well- settled principles of constitutional construction, namely:
 Verbal legis– whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical term are employed;
 Ratio legis est anima– words of the Cnstitution should be interpreted in accordance with
the intent of the framers;
 Ut magis valeat quam pereat– the Constitution should be interpreted as a whole
o If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available.
Again in Civil Liberties Union, supra., it was held that while it is permissible to consult the debates
and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. We think it safer to
construe the Constitution from what “appears upon its face”. The proper interpretation, therefore,
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’
understanding thereof
o In case of doubt, the provisions should be considered self-executing; mandatory rather than
directory; and prospective rather than retroactive
o Self-executing provisions. A provision which lays down a general principle is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
Page 7 of 140
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies a sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
o Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and
the liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action [Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 03,
1997].
o Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows a right nor elevates the privilege to the
level of an enforceable right. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision
does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action. The disregard of this provision does not give rise to any cause of
action before the courts [Pamatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004].
o In the case of Francisco v. HR, (2003) The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Carpio Morales
opined: “American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia
vs. COMELEC, "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by
foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by
different constitutional settings and needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace
its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the
colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."”
 Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR 160261 (November 10, 2003)

o On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee
on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed and was
referred to the House Committee in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint
was “sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of
the House of Representatives.
o The Court cannot make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of
the legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise
definition.
o Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term “initiate” a meaning different from
“filing.”
o The second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint
and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first
impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed
was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period
C. Requisites of Judicial Review
 Judicial Review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of their
conformity with the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority by the courts over the other
departments, but merely an expression of the supremacy of the Constitution [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139]. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld
[Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183]. The power is inherent in the Judicial Department, by virtue of the doctrine
of separation of power. Judicial review refers to the power of the courts to test the validity of governmental
acts in light of their conformity with a higher norm (e.g. the constitution). The judiciary has the power to
determine the nature, scope and extent of powers of each branch of the government. All courts can exercise
judicial review
Page 8 of 140
 Judicial review is not an assertion of superiority by the courts over the other departments, but merely an
expression of the supremacy of the Constitution. Constitutional supremacy produced judicial review, which in
turn led to the accepted role of the Court as “the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”
 Functions of Judicial Review
o Checking - - invalidating a law or an executive act that is found to be contrary to the Constitution.
o Legitimating (legitimizing) - upholding the validity of the law which results from a mere dismissal
of a case challenging the validity of that law. When the Court exercises this function, it uses the
double negative by declaring that the law is "not unconstitutional". This is no mere semantics. The
Court cannot declare the law constitutional for it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, so that
a declaration to that effect by the court would not make it more constitutional. On the other hand,
anyone who challenges the validity of a law has the burden of proof to show its invalidity.
Declaring that the law is not unconstitutional is tantamount to saying that the challenger has not met
the burden required
o Symbolic - to educate the bench and bar as to the controlling principles and concepts on matters of
great public importance [See: Salonga v. Pano, 134 SCRA 438]
 Requisites of Judicial Review

1. The existence of an actual and appropriate case;
2. A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
3. The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
4. The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case
 Judicial Power vs Judicial Review
 Actual case or controversy
o In John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim, G.R. No. 119775, October 24, 2003, it was held
that the controversy must be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of parties who
are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests. It is not enough that the controversy
exists at the outset; to qualify for adjudication, it is necessary that the actual controversy be extant
at all stages of the review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed [Davis v. Federal Election
Commission, 128 S. Ct.2759 (2008)].
 Advisory Opinion. A case becomes an advisory opinion when there is no actual case and
controversy that demands constitutional construction for its resolution. This may take the
form of declaratory relief. It is not wise for the court to engage in an advisory opinion
Page 9 of 140
because: (a) This only leads to dialectics, to abstract legal arguments and sterile
conclusions (Laurel quoting Frankfurter) and (b) The judicial function is impoverished
since it thrives on facts that draw out the meaning of the law. A request for an advisory
opinion is not an actual case or controversy. But an action for declaratory relief is
proper for judicial determination.
 Ripeness. A constitutional question may come to the court either too early or
prematurely, so that it is still abstract (advisory opinion), or too late, so that the court's
decision would no longer affect the parties (mootness). The court must resolve
constitutional issues only when they come to it at the right time (ripeness).
o Mariano vs. COMELEC, GR 118577

 Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers,
assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). Another
petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John
H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen
 Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of
Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the
Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction
bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on
the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest,
by the City of Manila. Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as
a municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant
merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.
 Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a
new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than
two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution. This challenge on the controversy
cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent
events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
 Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be
comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by
law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.
 The petition to declare RA 7854 (converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City) as unconstitutional was dismissed, because it was premised on many
contingent events the happening of which was uncertain; petitioner, thus, posed a
hypothetical issue which had not yet ripened into an actual case or controversy
o Monstesclaros vs. COMELEC, GR 152295 (2002)

 Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date
since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age
limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed
since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections
simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of age for
membership in the SK.
 The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the
exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the
May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK
elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections
to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law, Congress merely
restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed
the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners
do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of
the Local Government Code of 1991.
 It was held that a proposed bill is not subject to judicial review, because it creates no
rights and imposes no duties enforceable by the courts.
o Facial Challenge
 Concepts
Page 10 of 140
 The established rule is that a party can question the validity of a statute only if,
as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. The exception is the so-called ‘facial
challenge”. But the only time a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when
it operates in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the
“overbreadth doctrine” permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute
even though, as applied to him, it is not unconstitutional, but it might be if
applied to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. Invalidation of the statute “on its face”, rather than “as applied”, is
permitted in the interest of preventing a “chilling effect” on freedom of
expression
 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech
 Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine - a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law. Overbreadth Doctrine - - a governmental
purpose may NOT be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. The overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases

 Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

 An information is filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a.
'Asiong Salonga' and 'Jose Velarde,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada,
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John
Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas and John Does & Jane Does of the crime of Plunder under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). Estrada questions the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him: (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness, (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions and (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code
 Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent (mens rea).
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently
immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that
such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder
the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se
o Political Question
 Judicial Question vs Political Question
Judicial Question Political Question

It calls upon the duty of the courts to is one which under the Constitution “is
settle actual controversies wherein there to be decided by the people in their
are rights (property or personal rights) sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
involved which are legally demandable full discretionary authority has been
and enforceable. delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government.”
It is one which is proper to be examined It is concerned with issues dependent
or decided in courts of justice because its upon the wisdom, not the validity or
determination would not involve an legality, of a particular measure or a
encroachment upon the legislative or contested act.
executive power
 A ‘political question’ is one the resolution of which has been vested by the Constitution
exclusively in either the people, in the exercise of their sovereign capacity, or in which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to a co-equal branch of the Government
 Thus, while courts can determine questions of legality with respect to governmental
action, they cannot review government policy and the wisdom thereof, for these questions
have been vested by the Constitution in the Executive and Legislative Departments. When
the question deals with the necessity, expediency and wisdom of a particuar act, the same
is political and not justiciable (ALMARIO VS. ALBA, 127 SCRA 69)
o Moot and Academic

Page 11 of 140
 Concepts
 A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy
by virtue of supervening events [Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No.
152774, May 27, 2004] so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value [Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Tuazon, Jr., G.R.
No. 132795, March 10, 2004]
 The issues raised in the case must not be moot and academic, or because of
subsequent developments, have become moot and academic. Generally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case [Royal Cargo Corporation v. Civil
Aeronautics Board, G.R. No. 10305556, January 26, 2004] or dismiss it on
ground of mootness [Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001].
 Gonzales vs Narvasa, GR 140835 (2000)

 Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a
petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission
on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission
on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on
November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive OrderNo. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order
“to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987
Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.” Petitioner disputes
the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office
which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
 The Court dismissed the petition
 Lacson vs. Perez, GR 147780 (2001)

 On 01 May 2001, Gloria Arroyo, faced by an angry and violent mob armed
with deadly weapons assaulting and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued
Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National
Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the
rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged
leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. On 06 May
2001 she ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro
Manila. Petitioners, Panfilo Lacson, Cezar Mancao and Michael Rey Aquino
filed with an urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction and Miriam Santiago filed
mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary restraining order. The
petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by Gloria Arroyo and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both
in fact an in law.
 Petitions are dismissed. The instant petitions have been rendered moot and
academic as Gloria Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of
rebellion on 06 May 2001
 Defunis vs. Odegard, 416 US 312 (1974)

 Marco DeFunis, Jr. applied for admission as a first-year student at the
University of Washington Law School, a state-operated institution. When he
was denied admission, he brought suit in a Washington trial court claiming that
the admissions committee procedures were racially discriminatory. However,
DeFunis was allowed to attend the law school during the case and was in his
third year when the case was heard by the Court. Further, the University has
agreed to let him graduate upon completion of his last year
 The Court ordered the parties to address the issue of mootness before they
proceeded to any other claims in the petition. Article III of the Constitution,
under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case
or controversy. No amount of public interest would be sufficient to create an
actual case or controversy, and the case was rendered moot because DeFunis
was going to graduate from the law school regardless of the Court’s ruling.
Thus, the case was rendered moot. A case is considered “moot” if a justiciable
controversy existed when a case was filed, but circumstances after filing
indicate the litigant no longer has a stake in the controversy. In such a situation,
Page 12 of 140
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is not invoked, and the Court will not even
hear the other issues presented
 Exceptions to the Moot and Academic Rule
 David vs. Arroyo

 On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017
declaring a state of emergency. On the same day, PGMA issued G.O.
No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and
PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence." David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition
of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct
injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search”
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. During the
hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and
GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the
Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces
 The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important
provisions, thus:
a. First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by
Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion”
b. Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
c. Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of
the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.”
 First Provision: Calling Out Power. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of
the Philippines v. Zamora). President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state
of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4,
Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration,
in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and
deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only
rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling
on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on
the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public
utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017
calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless. To clarify, PP 1017 is not a
declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President
Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in
preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
 Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power . This Court rules that
the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article
VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a
state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Page 13 of 140
 Third Provision: The Power to Take Over. Distinction must be

drawn between the President’s authority to declare“a state of national
emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section
18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold
constitutional issues arise.
 Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. . Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed
upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not
be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow
Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to
certain conditions, thus:
a. There must be a war or other emergency.
b. The delegation must be for a limited period only.
c. The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe.
d. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.
 The President alone can declare a state of national emergency
 The Court held that a facial review of PP 1017 using the overbreadth
doctrine is uncalled for. First, the overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing on their face statutes in free
speech cases, not for testing the validity of a law that reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless
violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered “harmful” and
“unconstitutionally protected conduct”. The incontrovertible fact
remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Second, facial
invalidation of laws is considered as manifestly strong medicine, to be
used sparingly and only as a last resort, thus, is generally disfavored.
A facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish
that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid.
Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation
exists
 A case becomes moot when there are facts, injuries and heated arguments but
for some reason the legal problem has become stale. When a case is moot and
academic, it ceases to be a case and controversy. Any decision reached by the
court would not be conclusive on the parties.
Exceptions to mootness:
a. If the question is capable of repetition and evasive of review
b. If there exists a mere possibility of collateral legal consequences if the
court does not act.
c. Voluntary cessation from the wrongful act by the defendant, if he is
free to return to his old ways.
 Standing
o Concepts
 A party has a standing in a case if his interest is such that he stands to be benefited if the
case is resolved in his favor, and he stand to be really injured if it is decided against him.
Standing is established by two nexuses: the party's status and the type of legislative act
being questioned, or his status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement.
The test of standing is whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure such concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions (Baker v Carr, supra.)
 A person has standing to challenge the governmental act only if he has a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result ot its enforcement. (People v. Vera, infra.)
 Petitioners may be accorded standing to sue provided that the following requirements are
met:
Page 14 of 140
 The case involves constitutional issues

 For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or
that the tax measure is unconstitutional (the prevailing doctrine is that taxpayers
may question contracts entered into by the national government or by
government-owned or -controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of
law [Abaya v. Ebdane, 515 SCRA 720];
 For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question
 For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early: and
 For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes their prerogatives as legislators
o KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, (G.R. No. 115381, December 23, 1994)
 LTFRB Chairman Fernando issued DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 allowing
provincial bus operators to charge passengers within a range of 15% and above and below
the LTFRB official rate of one year. PBOAP filed an application for rate increase of eight
and a half centavos (P0.085) per kilometer for all types of provincial buses. PBOAP
reduced its proposed fare to of eight and a half centavos (P0.085) per kilometer for all
types of provincial buses. LTFRB granted the fare rate increase. DOTC Secretary Prado
issued Department Order No. 92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of
transport services. [The control in pricing shall be liberalized to introduce price
competition complementary with the quality of service, subject to prior notice and public
hearing. Fares shall not be provisionally authorized without public hearing.] PBOAP
availed DOTC deregulation policy in which PBOAP announced a 20% fare increase
effective on March 16, 1994. KMU filed a petition before LTFRB opposing the increase
in bus fares. LTFRB dismissed KMU’s petition for lack of merit. PBOAP, DOTC
Secretary Garcia, and LTFRB assert that KMU don’t have the standing to maintain the
instant suit and claimed that it is within LTFRB and DOTC’s authority to set fare range
schemes and to establish a presumption of public needs in applications for certificates of
public convenience.
 The court declared that KMU has legal standing since according to the court “the parties
have suffered and continue to suffer, members of the KMU have been affected by the fare
hikes upon the avail of public transportation every day” DOTC Department Order No. 92-
587 and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 both violates of the Public Service
Act and the Rules of Court. DOTC deregulation policy [allowed provincial bus operators
to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a
petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing]
o IBP vs. Zamora, G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

 Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other
for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing
or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of
the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP
filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void
and unconstitutional.
 When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is
no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a
different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said
powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest
discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more
benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating
safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
Page 15 of 140
 The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian
task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. Moreover, the deployment of
the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the
PNP, and not with the military.
o Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
 Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish
and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition
 Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of
this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat.
It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared
that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no
force and effect.
 The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
in any other date, without its previous publication. “Laws” should refer to all laws and not
only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to
inform the public of the content of the law.
o Ople vs. Torres, 293N SCRA 141 (1998)

 Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December
1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right
to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds,
(1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s
right to privacy
 Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner
is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of
Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s concern that the
Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable.
The blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to make laws and the
power of executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be
allowed.
o Standing as a Technicality
 A party’s standing in court is a procedural technicality, which mav be set aside bv the
Court in view of the importance of the issues involved. Thus, where the issues raised by
Page 16 of 140
the petitioners are of paramount public interest, the Court may, in the exercise of its
discretion, brush aside the procedural barrier [Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110].
 Information Technology Foundation vs. COMELEC, GR 159139 (2004)

 On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized
Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election
system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996
elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). On May
29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its
president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to
Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the
Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in
which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein the
noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements
(many of which have been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a re-
bidding.
 It was held that the subject matter of the case is “a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest”; in other words, it is of “paramount public interest”
and of “transcendental importance”. The nation”s political and economic future
virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections;
accordingly, the award for the automation of the electoral process was a matter
of public concern, imbued with the public interest. This fact alone would justify
relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court
whenever a case involves “an issue of overarching significance to our society”.
 Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, 1994

 Petitioners contend that denial by the Office of the President of its protest and
the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court
injunction can stop Malacañang," and the imminent implementation of the
Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners,
filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.
 Petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged Contract of Lease executed
on 17 December 1993 by respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) and respondent Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC)is hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid. No interpretation
of the said provision to relax or circumvent the prohibition can be allowed since
the privilege to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, or other
similar activities is a franchise granted by the legislature to the PCSO. It is a
settled rule that "in all grants by the government to individuals or corporations
of rights, privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly
against the grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation of
the common rights of the public must prove his title thereto by a grant which is
clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot enlarge it by equivocal or
doubtful provisions or by probable inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally
granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication.
 Earliest opportunity
o Need to notify Solicitor General

 Mirasol vs CA, GR 128448 (2001)
 The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. PhilippineNational
Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975
under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed CreditAgreements,
a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real EstateMortgage in favor of
PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's
sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine
Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and
authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that
whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government.
Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations,
petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceedswhich it ignored.
Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded
withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle
their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB
Page 17 of 140
real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB
proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a
deficiency claim. Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds,
insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding
obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there
was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales
of sugar pertained to the National Government
 The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the
Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action
assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor
General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court.
We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice
requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar
remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action"
and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in
the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions
assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or
proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
o Symbolic Decisions
 Salonga vs. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438
 A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August,
September and October of 1980. On September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely,
Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost
killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the
explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila.
arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons,
including Salonga, who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the
series of bombings in Metro Manila. Elements of the military went to the
hospital room of Salonga at the Manila Medical Center where he was confined
due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him
under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga the ASSO form which
however did not specify the charge or charges against him.
 The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State
authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as
constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of
Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts,doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. In
dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a
P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and,therefore, constitutionally void,
escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The fact that
the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise of
its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decision
sever printed in the Reports. Herein, the prosecution evidence miserably fails to
establish a prima facie case against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a
destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of
any subversive organization. The respondents have taken the initiative of
dropping the charges against Salonga. The Court reiterates the rule, however,
that the Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of
evidence against Salonga found in the records.
 Lis Mota of the Case

o The decision on the constitutional question must be determinative of the case itself. Because of the
doctrine of separation of powers which demands that proper respect be accorded the other
departments, courts are loathe to decide constitutional questions as long as there is some other basis
that can be used for a decision. The constitutional issue must be the lismota of the case. See:
Zandueta v. de la Costs, supra.; De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294.
D. Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality
 Concepts
o What is the effect of an act subsequently declared unconstitutional?
Page 18 of 140
 Orthodox view - An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no

duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative, as if it had not been
passed at all. See Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines
 Modern view - Courts simply refuse to recognize the law and determine the rights of the
parties as if the statute had no existence. See: Manila Motors v. Flores, 99 Phil. 738;
Serrano de Agbayani v. PNB, 35 SCRA 429; Republic v. Henda, 119 SCRA 411. Certain
legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be
recognized. See: Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569. Thus, a public officer who
implemented an unconstitutional law prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality cannot
be held liable [Ynot v. IAC, supra]
o Partial Unconstitutionality. Requisites
 The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usuallyshown by the
presence of a separability clause in the law; and
 The valid portion can stand independently as law. See: In Re:Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534;
Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
 The effect of a declaration that a law is unconstitutional is to make the law either void or
voidable. It is void if on its face, it does not enjoy any presumption of validity. As such, it
produces no effect whatsoever, creates no right or office, it imposes no duty. Whatever
penalty was paid during the period of its operation must be remitted. But a law declared
unconstitutional is only voidable if, on its face, it enjoys the presumption of validity. In
this case, it becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity. And
even so, the invalidation produces no retroactive effect, since it would be unjust to hold
that the law did not produce any effect at all prior to its nullification. From the time the
law was promulgated to the time it was declared invalid, people would have entered into
various transactions and relations, expecting and in fact compelled to presume that the
law is valid. Thus, to now hold that the law never produced any effect would penalize
those who in faith believed the laws passed by their representatives to be in accordance
with their solemn duty under the Constitution.
 Serrano de Agbayani vs. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1972)

o Plaintiff Francisco Serrano de Agbayani, now appellee, was able to obtain a favorable judgment in
her suit against defendant, now appellant Philippine National Bank, permanently enjoining the other
defendant, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan, from proceeding with an extra-judicial foreclosure
sale of land belonging to plaintiff mortgaged to appellant Bank to secure a loan declared no longer
enforceable, the prescriptive period having lapsed.
o The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter
an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the
source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy
to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a
mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws of the Constitution. 3 It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution
being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
o In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with
respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official."
 Salazar vs. Achacoso 183 SCRA 145

o Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with
illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing
him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing
that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator
Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will
a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has— (1) No valid license or
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers
for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the
New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement
the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to
petitioner’s residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The
team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of
the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order
Page 19 of 140
violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties
were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.
o Under the new Constitution, “. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized”. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot
issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closureand Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the
Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, “We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge,
may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial
process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional
and of no force and effect… The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation
is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases,
like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.” Furthermore, the
search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is
null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be seized.
III. THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
A. Elements of a State
 A state is a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of
territory, independent of external control, and possessing a government to which a great body of inhabitants
render habitual obedience. See: Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23.
 Elements of the State
o People - A community of persons, more or less numerous
o Territory - Permanently occupying a definite portion of territory
o Sovereignty - Independent of external control
o Government - Possessing an organized government to which the great body of inhabitants render
habitual obedience
B. The Philippines as a State
 Territory
o Territory is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the state.
Territory as an element of a state means an area over which a state has effective control. (Read
Province of Cotabato v. GRP. October 14, 2008)
o Territory includes land, maritime areas, airspace and outer space
 Airspace
 Each state has exclusive jurisdiction over the air above its territory.
 The consent for transit must be obtained from the subject nation.
 Aircrafts not engaged in international air service, shall have the right to make
flights into or in transit non-stop across its territory and to make steps for non-
traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permission and subject
to the right of the State flown over to require landing. (Chicago Convention on
International Civil Action)
 Outerspace
 Sovereignty over airspace extends only until where outerspace begins. (50-100
miles from earth)
o UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [April 30,1982; ratified bythe Philippines in August, 1983]
provides
Territorial sea 12 nautical miles (n.m.)
Contiguous zone 12 n.m. from the edge of the
territorial sea
Exclusive economic zone 200 n.m. from the baseline [includes
(1) and (2)]
NOTE: There can be a Continental Shelf without an EEZ, but not an EEZ without a Continental
Shelf
o Control over territory is of the essence of a state (Las Palmas case). Certain rights and authority are
exercised within the state’s territory.
 State’s sovereignty is over its:
 Land territory (and airspace above it)
 Internal Waters (and airspace above it and seabed under it)
 Archipelagic Waters( and airspace above it and seabed under it)
 Territorial Sea (and airspace above it and seabed under it)
 The coastal state has a right against innocent passage in its internal waters.
Page 20 of 140
 The coastal state exercises authority over the area (contiguous zone) to the extent
necessary to prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitation authority
over its territorial waters or territory and to punish such infringement.
 The coastal state has rights over the economic resources of the sea, seabed and subsoil.
o The belt of the sea located between the coast and internal waters of the coastal state on the one
hand, and the high seas on the other, extending up to 12 nautical miles from the low water mar is
called territorial sea
o The contiguous zone xxtends up to 12 nautical miles from the territorial sea. Although not part of
the territory, the coastal State may exercise jurisdiction to prevent infringement of customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws
o The exclusive economic zone is Body of water extending up to 200 nautical miles, within which
the state may exercise sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural
resources. The state in the EEZ exercises jurisdiction with regard to:
 the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations, and structures;
 marine scientific research;
 the protection and preservation of marine environment;
o Archipelagic Doctrine. A body of water studded with islands, or the islands surrounded with
water, is viewed as a unity of islands and waters together forming one integrated unit. [N.B.
Embodied in Art. II, specifically by the mention of the “Philippine archipelago” and the
specification on “internal waters.”]. This articulates the archipelagic doctrine of national
territory,based on the principle that an archipelago, which consists of a number of islands separated
by bodies of water, should be treated as one integral unit. It is the principle whereby the body of
water studded with islands, or the islands surrounded with water, is viewed as a unity of islands
and waters together forming one integrated unit.
Two elements:
1. The definition of internal waters – waters around, between, and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of breadth and dimension
2. The straight baseline method of delineating the territorial sea – consists of drawing
straight lines connecting appropriate points on the coast without departing to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast
o Straight baseline method. Consists of drawing straight lines connecting appropriate points on the
coast without departing to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, in order to
delineate the internal waters from the territorial waters of an archipelago
See R.A. No. 9522–amended R.A. No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the
Territorial Sea of the Philippines;" specified that baselines of Kalayaan Group of Islands and
Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) shall be determined as “Regime of Islands” under the
Republic of the Philippines, consistent with the UNCLOS. R.A. No. 9522 is not
unconstitutional: it is a statutory tool to demarcate the maritime zone and continental shelf of
the Philippines under UNCLOS III, and does not alter the national territory. While UNCLOS
III does not bind the Philippines to pass a baselines law, Congress may do so. The law also
does not abandon the country’s claim to Sabah, as it does not expressly repeal the entirety of
R.A. No. 5446. [Magallona v. Ermita (2011)]
o The Philippine archipelago is that body of water studded with islands which is delineated in the
Treaty of Paris, modified by the Treaty of Washington and the Treaty of Great Britain
o Differentiate archipelagic waters, territorial sea and internal waters.

 Archipelagic waters. According to UNCLOS, Archipelagic waters refers to areas
enclosed as internal waters by using the baseline method which had not been previously
considered as internal waters. (See Article 53 of UNCLOS)
 Territorial sea is an adjacent belt of sea with a breadth of 12 nautical miles measured from
the baselines of a state and over which the state has sovereignty. (Article 2, 3 of
UNCLOS)
 Internal waters refer to “all waters landwards from the baseline of the territory.” Is from
which the breadth of territorial sea is calculated. (Brownlie, Principles of PIL) No right of
innocent passage for foreign vessels exist in the case of internal waters. (Harris, Cases
and Material on International Law, 5th ed., 1998, p.407)
o Article 1 National Territory: The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all
the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its
territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
Page 21 of 140
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
Comprises:
1. Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein.
Internal waters – waters around, between, and connecting the islands of

the archipelago, regardless of breadth and dimension
2. All other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction
Consists of:
a. Territorial sea, seabed, subsoil, insular shelves, and other submarine
areas
b. Terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains
o Definition of “all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction”
It includes any territory that presently belongs or might in the future belong to the Philippines
through any of the internationally accepted modes of acquiring territory. This includes any territory
which presently belongs or might in the future belong to the Philippines through any of the
internationally modes of acquiring territory. (a) Batanes islands and (b) Those belonging to the
Philippines by historic right or legal title (Sabah, the Marianas, Freedomland)
o Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968 (1969)

 William Reagan imported a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car withaccessories valued at US $
6,443.83, including freight, insurance and other charges. After acquiring a permit to sell
the car from the base commander of Clark Air Base, Reagan sold the car to a certain
Willie Johnson Jr. of the US Marine Corps stationed in Sangley Point, Cavite for US$
6,600. Johnson sold the same, on the same day to Fred Meneses, a Filipino. As a result of
the transaction, theCommissioner rendered Reagan liable for income tax in the sum of
P2,970. Reagan claimed that he was exempt as the transaction occurred in Clark Air Base,
which as he contends is “a base outside the Philippines.”
 The court ruled in the negative. The Philippines, as an independent and sovereign
country, exercises its authority over its entire domain. Any state may, however, by
its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. It may allow
another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of
its territory. By doing so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with
an alien character. The areas retain their status as native soil. Clark Air Base is within
Philippine territorial jurisdiction to tax, and thus, Reagan was liable for the income
tax arising from the sale of his automobile in Clark. The law does not look with favor on
tax exemptions and that he who would seek to be thus privileged must justify it by words
too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted. Reagan has not done so,
and cannot do so.
o People vs. Gozo, 53 SCRA 476

 Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit
from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any
modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity on the
pretext that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American
armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to
be Philippine territory, she in effect seek to emasculate the State's sovereign rights by the
assertion that the latter cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction
 The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or
preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government
retains not only jurisdictional lights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the
United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The
first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the
second from the express provisions of the treaty." There was a reiteration of such a view
in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent
and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion
thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its
Page 22 of 140
terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily,
likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of it sovereignty.
 The principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent,
express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a
curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of
sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the property
of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and
self-restriction.' A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what
otherwise is illimitable competence." 16 The opinion was at pains to point out though that
even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not it appearance. The
words employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no
longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another
power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its
territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an
alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its
authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the
bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement
of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory."
 People
o As an element of a state, “people” means a community of persons adequate in number for self-
sufficiency and defense, and also capable of maintaining the continued existence of the community
and held together by a common bond of law. (BERNAS). The term assumes three different
meanings, depending on the context in which it is used: (NACHURA): (i) Inhabitants [Sec 2, Art
III; Sec 3, Art II), (ii) Electors [Sec 4, Art VII] and (iii) Citizens [Preamble; Sec 1, Art II; Sec 4, Art
II; Sec 7, Art III]
o Article II, Sections 1, 4, 15, and 16

 Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them
 Under this principle, the Philippines is a democratic state that is, a government
for, of, and by the people. But it is not a pure democracy. Thus, while it is true
that the people are the possessors of sovereign power, it is equally the case that
they cannot exercise the powers of government directly, but only through the
medium of their duly elected representatives.
 Republic is a representative government run by the people and for the people
 Republican State is one wherein all government authority emanates from the
people and is exercised by representatives chosen by the people. Democratic
State merely emphasizes that the Philippines has some aspects of direct
democracy such as initiative and referendum
 The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation. The citizenry
selects a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people
and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are
replaced or retained at the option of their principal

 Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof,
all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military
or civil service.
 Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them
 Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
o Article III, Sections 1, 2, and 7

 Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws
 Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
 Section 7. he right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
Page 23 of 140
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
o Article VII, Section 4

 Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the
people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified
for election to the same office at any time. No Vice-President shall serve for more than
two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for
which he was elected. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May. The returns of
every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers
of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of
the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall,
not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all certificates in the presence
of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress,
upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided
by law, canvass the votes. The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of
votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members
of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. The Congress shall promulgate its
rules for the canvassing of the certificates. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
o Article XVI, Section 2

 Section 2. The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national
anthem, or a national seal, which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals,
history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratification
by the people in a national referendum.
o Article XVIII, Section 25

 Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
 Government
o Section 2, Administrative Code. Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the
corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout
the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through
which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous
regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local
government.
o People vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 145951 (2003)

 Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia
were all charged with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents before the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25741. The Information alleged that Ramiscal, et. al.
misappropriated and converted for their personal use the amount of P250,318,200.00
from the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). On 12 November 1999, Ramiscal filed with the
Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest." He argued, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the case because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent
Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent Motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on 6 January 2000. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued on 12 May 2000, the Sandiganbayan
sustained Ramiscal, et. al.'s contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it
reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case 25741.
Page 24 of 140
Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the present special
civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
 The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree 361. Its purpose and functions are
akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the
retirement and pension funds of those in the military service. Members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are expressly excluded from
the coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997. Therefore, soldiers and military personnel, who
are incidentally employees of the Government, rely on the administration of the AFP-
RSBS for their retirement, pension and separation benefits. For this purpose, the law
provides that the contribution by military officers and enlisted personnel to the System
shall be compulsory. Its enabling law further mandates that the System shall be
administered by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines through an
agency, group, committee or board, which may be created and organized by him and
subject to such rules and regulations governing the same as he may, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to time. Moreover,
the investment of funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense. The
funds of the AFP-RSBS, except for the initial seed money, come entirely from
contributions and that no part thereof come from appropriations. While it may be true that
there have been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the
Government is not precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide
additional benefits to the men in uniform. The above considerations indicate that the
character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, we
hold that the same is a government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds.
o MIAA vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 155650 (2006)

 The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903
(MIAA Charter), as amended. As such operator, it administers the land, improvements
and equipment within the NAIA Complex. In March 1997, the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to
MIAA under Section 21 of its Charter. Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax
already due. In June 2001, it received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from
the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer
subsequently issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the airport lands and
buildings. At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying
Opinion No. 061, pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires persons exempt from
real estate tax to show proof of exemption. According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA
Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax.
 The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax imposed by
local governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from real estate tax any real property
owned by the Republic of the Philippines. This exemption should be read in relation with
Sec. 133(o) of the LGC, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of local
governments shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. These provisions recognize the
basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, which
historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. The rule is that a tax
is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. This rule
applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national government
instrumentalities. Moreover, a tax exemption is construed liberally in favor of national
government instrumentalities. MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the
government. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the properties. MIAA itself is
owned solely by the Republic
 Constituent vs Ministrant Functions

 Traditionally, the functions of government have been classified into constituent,
which are mandatory for the Government to perform because they constitute the
very bonds of society, such as the maintenance of peace and order, regulation of
property and property rights, the administration of justice, etc; and ministrant,
those intended to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people,
and which are merely optional for Government to perform.
 It is interesting to note the nature of the functions that the government may
exercise to accomplish its objectives. These functions are two-fold, constituent
and ministrant: the former constitutes the very bonds of society and are
Page 25 of 140
compulsory in nature; the latter the those that are undertaken only by way of
advancing the general interest of society, and are merely optional.
 Are the two-fold function of government as enumerated by the Supreme Court
in BACANI VS. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468 (Ministrant [merely directory] and
Constituent [Mandatory] Functions) still applicable today? No more as held
in ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649. This is due to complexities of the
changing society, the two-fold function of the government as classified by
President Wilson is no longer relevant as a result of the changing society
wherein what are considered merely ministrant functions of the State before are
now considered constituent , or vice versa
 Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256

 This case involves a request by petitioners from the General Manager
of the Government Service Insurance System to furnish them a list of
names of legislators who were able to secure loans upon the guaranty
of then First Lady Imelda Marcos, as well as certified true copies of
documents evidencing the loans
 In granting the petition for mandamus, the Court said that the public
nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by
the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of
public interest and concern. However, the right to access such records
does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information or matters of public concern.
 The Concept of Parens Patriae

 Cabanas vs. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94
 Deceased Florentino Pilapil, the husband of Melchora Cabanas and
the father of Millian Pilapil, left an insurance having his child as the
beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as
trustee during his daughter’s minority. The lower court decided to
give the mother of the child the right to act as trustee while her child
is a minor citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code. The
welfare of the child is the paramount consideration here, and the
mother resides with the child so she is the rightful trustee. The
judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the State parens patriae,
called for the mother to take responsibility. The defendant appealed
for the case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by
invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee
of the insurance policy.
 The provisions of Article 320 and 321 of the Civil Code became the
basis of the decision. The former provides that “the father, or in his
absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is
worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a
bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." The latter
provides that "The property which the unemancipated child has
acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative
title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or
mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose
company he lives; ...
 It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an
agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a
pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority
to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal
person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary
powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the
great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties."
What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this
concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic
social institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is
the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of
doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still
deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court
Page 26 of 140
to decide as it did. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above

quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void.
 Sovereignty
o Concepts
 Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that
State is governed.
Kinds
1. Legal, which is the power to issue final commands; orPolitical, which is the
sum total of all the influences which lie behind the law.
2. Internal, or the supreme power over everything within itsterritory; or External,
also known as independence, which is freedom from external control.
Characteristics: Permanence, exclusiveness, comprehensive-ness, absoluteness,

indivisibility, inalienability, and imprescriptibility. See Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856
 Effects of change in sovereignty. Political laws are abrogated[People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil.
887; Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77]; municipal laws remain in force [Vilas v. City
of Manila, 229 US 345].
 Effects of belligerent occupation. No change in sovereignty. See:Peralta v. Director of
Prisons, 75 Phil. 285; Alcantara v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 749;Ruffyv. Chief of
Staff, 75 Phil. 875. However, political laws, except the law on treason, aresuspended
[Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856]; municipal laws remain in force unless repealed by the
belligerent occupant. At the end of the belligerent occupation, when the occupant is
ousted from the territory, the political laws which had been suspended during the
occupation shall automatically become effective again, under the doctrine of jus
postliminium.
 Dominium refers to the capacity to ownor acquire property, including lands held by the
State in its proprietary capacity; while Imperium is the authority possessed by the State
embraced in the concept of sovereignty.
 Postliminy theory or jus postliminium. When a foreign power occupies a state and
exercises the powers of government, the political laws of the said state are deemed
automatically suspended but the former government automatically comes to life and will
be in force and in effect again upon the re-establishment of the former government.
(Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)
 Doctrine of sovereignty as “auto limitation” In the succinct language of Jellinek, it “is
the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-
determination and self-restriction.” A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the
exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.” The opinion was at pains to point
out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its
disappearance. (Cited in Reagan vs. Commissioner, PEOPLE VS. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476
and COMMISSIONER VS. ROBERTSON, 143 SCRA 397)
 “Incorporation theory” or the “Incorporation Clause” of the Constitution. It is the
principle embodied in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which states that “The
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land”. (MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 90 Phil. 70, KURODA VS.
JALANDONI, 83 Phil 171, and AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195).
o Macariola vs. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77

 In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their inheritance
involving parcels of land located in Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola, after
determining the legibility of the parties to inherit rendered a decision in the civil case.
Thereafter, the counsels of the parties submitted a project partition reflecting the
preference of the parties. The project partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But
her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly authorized by Macariola as counsel. The
judge then approved the project partition. The decision became final in 1963 as well.
Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold the property to
judge Asuncion in 1965.
 The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the
property in 1965 – 2 years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy
the property directly from any of the parties since the property was directly bought by
Galapon, who then sold the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that Galapon
acted as a “dummy” of Asuncion. Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a
gross inequality in the partition; or that what she got were insignificant portions of the
land.
Page 27 of 140
o Harvey vs. Commissioner, 162 SCRA 840

 This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52
and 72 years, respectively, are both American nationals residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna,
while Adriaa Van Den Elshout, 58 years old, is a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan,
Laguna. The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from
their respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
(CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago of the CID. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center.
 There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons,
including aliens, whether accused of crime or not ]. One of the constitutional
requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon
probable cause. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its
territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public
interest . The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the
authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose
continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the
domestic tranquility of the people . Particularly so in this case where the State has
expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners,
acted in the interests of the State.
C. Philippine Citizenship
 Article IV, Citizenship

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
SECTION 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
SECTION 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
SECTION 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law.
 There are only two categories of Philippine citizens: the natural born and the naturalized. On the one hand, a
natural born citizen is someone who is already a Filipino at the time of his birth and does not have to do
anything to acquire or perfect his citizenship (Sec. 2, Art. II). In other words, he is a Filipino by birth. On the
other hand, a naturalized citizen is someone who was once a foreigner then later on became a Filipino by
legal fiction. Paragraph 2 (Either father or mother is a Filipino) and paragraph 3 (Elect Philippine Citizenship)
of the above provision are natural born citizens, while paragraph 4 (naturalized under the law) refers to the
naturalized citizen. Paragraph 1 (citizen at the time of the adoption of the Constitution) may refer to either a
natural born or naturalized citizen depending on the kind of citizenship he has at the time of the adoption of
the 1987 Constitution.
 Modes of Acquiring Citizenship

o By birth
 Jus sanguinis – acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood relationship
 Jus soli – acquisition of citizenship on the basis of the place of birth.
o By naturalization
o By marriage
Note: Jus sanguinis and naturalization are the modes followed in the Philippines
 Naturalization
o The government, through its three branches, can confer citizenship by naturalization. Hence, a
foreigner can be naturalized in either of three ways: (a) Judicial naturalization refers to
naturalization by means of court judgment pursuant to the “Revised Naturalization Act.”
Page 28 of 140
Applications are filed with the proper Regional Trial Court which will render the decree of
naturalization; (b) Legislative naturalization refers to naturalization by means of a direct act of
Congress, that is, by the enactment of a law by the Congress declaring therein that a foreigner is
conferred citizenship and admitted into the political community; and
(c) Administrative naturalization is naturalization by means of administrative proceedings before
the Special Committee on Naturalization pursuant to the “Administrative Naturalization Law of
2000.” Applicants must be aliens born and residing in the Philippines with all of the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided by law
o Special note must be given to Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as “Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act of 2003,”which amended Commonwealth Act No. 63. It provides that natural
born citizens of the Philippines who lost their citizenship because of naturalization in a foreign
country shall be deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. After the effectivity of RA 9225, those who are
naturalized in a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship also upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Thus, under the present law, it is the taking of the
necessary oath of allegiance and registration of the same that retains and reacquires Philippine
citizenship.
o Dual Allegiance vs Dual Citizenship. The Philippines cannot prohibit dual citizenship because its
laws cannot control the laws of other states. It is dual allegiance that is prohibited because it is
intentional while dual citizenship is generally unintentional, in that it is only accidentally cause by
birth in a foreign state or marriage with a foreigner
Dual Citizenship Dual Citizenship

Dual Allegiance as Provided in Dual citizenship happens when
the Constitution. Section 5, an individual is a citizen of two
Article IV states, “Dual countries because the laws of
allegiance of citizens is inimical both countries confer upon him
to the national interest and shall membership to their State.
be dealt with by law.” Dual
allegiance happens when a
naturalized citizen of the
Philippines maintains his
allegiance to his country of
origin.
 Lee vs Directors of Lands, GR 128195 (2001)

o Sometime in March 1936, the Dinglasans sold to Lee Liong (Chinese citizen) a parcel of land
situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City. In 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-
Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the RTC of Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of the
lot. (Alleging that the transfer certificate of title issued to Lee Liong was lost or destroyed during
World War II.) Petitioners Elizabeth and Pacita alleged that they were the widows of the deceased
Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the lot. The
Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of
title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he was a
Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land. CA declared the
reconstitution void. Hence this petition
o Lee Liong was not qualified but the ownership of the lot was already acquired by Filipino
citizens Lee Liong was disqualified to acquire the land under the 1935 Constitution. The sale of
the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands,
save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to
acquire the land in question. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the
public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In
this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of
Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land.
 Republic of the Philippines v Chule Y Lim, GR No. 153883

o The respondent, Chule Y. Lim, is an illegitimate daughter of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother,
who never got married due to a prior subsisting marriage of her father. The espondent petitioned
that there were few mistakes as to her citizenship and identity, to wit: (a) That her surname “Yu”
was misspelled as “Yo”. She has been using “Yu” in all of her school records and in her marriage
certificate, (b) That her father’s name in her birth record was written as “Yo Diu To (Co Tian)”
when it should have been “Yu Dio To (Co Tian).”, (c) That her nationality was entered as Chinese
when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother got married and (d) That
she was entered as a legitimate child on her birth certificate when in fact, it should have been
illegitimate. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals granted the respondent’s petition
Page 29 of 140
o The Court of Appeals did not err in ordering the correction of the citizenship of respondent Chule
Y. Lim from “Chinese” to “Filipino” despite the fact that respondent never demonstrated any
compliance with the legal requirements for election of citizenship. By being an illegitimate child of
a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth, and as such, there was no
more need for her to validly elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Also, she
registered as a voter inside the country when she reached 18 years old. The exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.
o The Court of Appeals did not err in allowing respondent to continue using her father’s surname
despite its finding that respondent is an illegitimate child. The Court of Appeals did not allow
respondent to use her father’s surname. What it did allow was the correction of her father’s
misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can remember. The court held that
prohibiting the respondent to use her father’s surname would only sow confusion. Also, Sec. 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 142 which regulates the use of aliases as well as the jurisprudence state
that it is allowed for a person to use a name “by which he has been known since childhood”. Even
legitimate children cannot enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from using his surname.
While judicial authority is required for a chance of name or surname, there is no such requirement
for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since childhood.
 Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR 160869

o Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing RA 9225,
or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other
Purposes. Petitioner avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the
1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law."
o Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and is not self-executing
provision. What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. In
its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance
 Republic v. Sagun, G.R. No. 187567 : February 15, 2012

o Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a
Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to
Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document
was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leungon but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City. Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine
passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no
annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she
sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship averring that she was raised as
a Filipino and she is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in
Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification. She
asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and
such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a
Philippine passport.
o Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship
of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a
given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a
remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the
adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino
citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the court's competence. Under Article IV,
Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in
the 1973 Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines.
Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which
states that [t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however,
that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not
be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for
those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under
the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge
had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
Page 30 of 140
 In Re: Vicente Ching, Bar Matter 914 (1999)

o In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He
eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen
before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his
mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935
Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of
the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is
a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor
in a municipality in La Union. The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a
legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of
majority” is construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old
because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place). Ching did elect Filipino
citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching
the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended that the rule be relaxed due
to the special circumstance of Ching.
o Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree with the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had lapsed and it’s way beyond the
allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally 3 years but it
was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special circumstances
can’t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a
professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place.
Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but
I guess it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
 Co vs. Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991

o On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the candidate is
herein respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of
the second district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship of respondent Ong
since Ong’s father was only a naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned Ong’s residence
qualificationsince Ong does not own any property in Samar
o The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. In the case at bar, the Court finds
no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will
necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court. On April 28, 1955,
Jose OngChuan, respondent’s father, an immigrant from China was declared a Filipino citizen by
the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose OngChuan took his oath, the private respondent then is a minor
of nine years, was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. Hence, there is no
ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a
natural-born Filipino mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial. The framers of the
Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word residence which regarded it as
having the same meaning as domicile. The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was
the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose
Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the
residency of respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.
 BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001
o The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement
that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen.” Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent
of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost
his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine
Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country.” Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S.
Marine Corps. In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA
2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United
States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in
Page 31 of 140
the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born
citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. HRET rendered its decision
dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the
said election.
o Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of
Congress. Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces; 2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, 4. marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien; and 5. political economic necessity. Repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored
to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen,
a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
 Frivaldo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 120295 (June 28, 1996)

o Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988,
and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity,
filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo‘s election and proclamation on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20
January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded
the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself
against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was ―merely forced upon himself as a means
of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator‘s agents abroad.‖ He
also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto
petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with
Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code.
o The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and
elective provincial and city officials. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No.
725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial
governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted.
The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibilityQualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer‘s entire tenure. Once any of
the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified
from serving as governor of Sorsogon.
 Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006

o Petitions for certiorari and mandamus for exercising their rights to suffrage under the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act or RA No. 9189. Petitioners are dual citizens who retained or reacquired
Philippine Citizenship under RA No. 9225, or Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
COMELEC denied their petitions on the ground that they fail to meet the qualification of 1-year
residency required by the Section 1, Article V of the Constitution
o There is no provision in the RA 9225 requiring duals to actually establish residence and physically
stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Congress enacted RA 9189
pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, identifying in its Section 4 of the said
Act who can vote under it, among others, are Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in
another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule under the Section 5(d) of
the same Act. By applying the doctrine of necessary implication, Constitutional Commission
provided for an exception to actual residency requirement of Section 1, Article 5 of 1987
Constitution, with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. Filipino immigrants and permanent
residents in another country may be allowed to vote even though they do not fulfill the residency
requirement of said Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution.
Page 32 of 140
 Aznar vs .COMELEC, GR No. 83820 (1990)

o Aznar filed a petition for certiorari to review COMELEC resolution proclaiming Osmena as the
Cebu Governor. He alleged that Osmena is an American thus disqualified to run in the 1988
election. He presented evidence. Osmena claimed that he is a Filipino
o No substantial & convincing evidence presented to prove Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen &
disqualified from running. Filipino citizenship is lost by naturalization in a foreign country or by
express renunciation of citizenship or by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support another
country’s constitution or laws (CA No. 63). No proof Osmena did any of those. Aznar assumed that
the ACR & permit to re-enter were proof of such. However, only RP courts are allowed to
determine whether one is a Filipino citizen or not, regardless of whether that person is considered
an American under US laws. His father is Filipino thus, without proof to the contrary, the
presumption that he is a Filipino remains
 Valles vs. COMELEC, GR No. 137000 (2000)

o Respondent was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. Australia follows
jus soli. She ran for governor. Opponent filed petition to disqualify her on the ground of dual
citizenship
o Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. The fact that she has
dual citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for public office. Filing a
certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship because in the certificate, the
candidate declares himself to be a Filipino citizen and that he will support the Philippine
Constitution. Such declaration operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship
D. The Doctrine of State Immunity
 Suits vs the Philippine State
o Concepts
 The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “[t]he State may not be sued
without its consent,” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of
the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. As has been aptly
observed by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. True,
the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called “the royal prerogative of
dishonesty” because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim
against it by simply invoking its non-suability. We have had occasion to explain in its
defense, however, that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be
deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of
its multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may
be caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the
availability of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. (Department of
Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993 [Vitug]) The rule, in any case, is not
really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances.
On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, “the state may not be
sued without its consent;” its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. The
State's consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made
through a general law (i.e., Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1445 [Sections 49-50], which requires that all money claims against the
government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit which must act upon it
within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to elevate the matter
to the Supreme Court on certiorari and, in effect, sue the State thereby) or a special law.
In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in
Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon
any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which
could serve as a basis of civil action between the private parties.” Implied consent, on the
other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to
a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested
itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule x x x is not, however, without qualification.
Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
Page 33 of 140
distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its
sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.
 A suit against the State is proper: (1) When the Republic is sued by name, (2) When the
suit is against an unincorporated government agency and (3) When the suit is on its face
against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to
the officer but to the government
 One State cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem
non habet imperium. To do so would “unduly vex the peace of nations.” (Cruz.)
Immunity is enjoyed by other States, consonant with the public international law principle
of par in parem non habet imperium. The Head of State, who is deemed the
personification of the State, is inviolable, and thus, enjoys immunity from suit
 A suit is against the State regardless of who is named the defendant if: (1) It produces
adverse consequences to the public treasury in terms of disbursement of public funds and
loss of government property and (2) Cannot prosper unless the State has given its consent.
When not against the state. It was held that the suit is not against the State: (1) When the
purpose of the suit is to compel an officer charged with the duty of making payments
pursuant to an appropriation made by law in favor of the plaintiff to make such payment,
since the suit is intended to compel performance of a ministerial duty. [Begoso v. PVA
(1970)], (2) When from the allegations in the complaint, it is clear that the respondent is a
public officer sued in a private capacity; and (3) When the action is not in personam
with the government as the named defendant, but an action in rem that does not name the
government in particular.
 Suits against Government Agencies
Type Function Rule

Incorporated Governmental CAN be sued IF
or proprietary charter allows
Unincorporated Governmental CANNOT be sued
unless consent is
given
Proprietary CAN be sued
 Suits against Public Officers. The doctrine of state immunity also applies to complaints
filed against officials of the State for acts performed by them in the discharge of their
duties within the scope of their authority. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not
apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his (1) private
and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen, for (2) acts without authority or in excess of
the powers vested in him. (Lansang vs CA [2000]).
 Consent to be sued is not concession of liability: Suability depends on the consent of the
state to be sued, and liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable, but it can
never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove that it is liable.
[United States of America v. Guinto (1990)] Such execution will require another waiver,
because the power of the court ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment, unless
such disbursement is covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law
[Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84; Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693].
But funds belonging to government corporations (whose charters provide that they can
sue and be sued) that are deposited with a bank are not exempt from garnishment
[Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595; Rizal Commercial Bank v. De
Castro, 168 SCRA 49].
o Article XVI, Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
o Republic vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424 (1987)

 Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The trial court rendered a decision
declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the property
reverted to the public domain. Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate
Court but it was denied. The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action
cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano
Page 34 of 140
 A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has
consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory
language too plain to be misinterpreted. The complaint involves land not owned by the
state but private land belonging to Feliciano, hence the government is not being divested
of any of its properties
o Phil Agila Satellite v. Lichauco, GR No. 134887 (2006)

 On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding1 (MOU) was entered into by a
consortium of private telecommunications carriers and the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), they formed a corporation and adopted the corporate name
Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI). They requested the then DOTC Secretary Amado
S. Lagdameo, Jr. for official government confirmation of the assignment of Philippine
orbital slots 161ºE and 153ºE to PASI for its AGILA satellites by a letter dated June 28,
1996. When it was confirmed, PASI undertook preparations for the launching, operation
and management of its satellites by, among other things, obtaining loans, increasing its
capital, conducting negotiations with its business partners, and making an initial payment.
PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge and that it subsequently came to
learn that another company whose identity had not been disclosed had submitted a bid
and won the award for orbital slot 153ºE, filed on January 23, 1998 a complaint 7 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City against Lichauco and the
"Unknown Awardee," for injunction to enjoin the award of orbital slot 153ºE, declare its
nullity, and for damages.
 There exists a prejudicial question because if the award to the undisclosed bidder of the
orbital lot 153°E is, in the civil case declared valid for being within Lichauco’s scope of
authority to thus free her from liability for damages, there would be no prohibited act to
speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by
petitioner. When a public officer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any injury
caused by him is his own personal liability and cannot be imputed to the State. (p.34,
Political Law, Isagani Cruz)
o Sayson vs. Singson, 54 SCRA 282

 In January 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare
parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District Engineer,
Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan.
It was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V.
Raquiza. What is more, charges for malversation were filed against the district engineer
and the civil engineer involved. It was the failure of the Highways Auditor, one of the
petitioners before us, that led to the filing of the mandamus suit below, with now
respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, being adjudged as
entitled to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the contract in question having been upheld.
Hence this appeal by certiorari
 The claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public
policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the
State but a ordinary action for specific performance. the suit disguised as one for
mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against
the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of
the State ... . In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General
Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions
under which money claim against the government may be filed: "In all cases involving
the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor
General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and
holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other
persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted
from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him."
Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final
decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within
thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of
the United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the
Philippines, or (b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the
Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity." Once consent is secured, an
action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory
grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also,
the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would
be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even
had there been such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is this
Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter.
Page 35 of 140
o People vs. Purisima, No. L -47757-61, January 28, 1980

 Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar, individually and
separately, before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar for illegal possession
of deadly weapon or violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No.
1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973. On the motion to quash by the accused, the three
respondent judges: Judge Purisima and Judge Macaren, both of CFI of Manila; and Judge
Polo of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed before them an order to quash
or dismiss the informations on a common ground – Lack of essential elements to
constitute an offense penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent judges stated that to
constitute the said offense, two elements must be present; (1) possession of any bladed,
blunt or pointed weapon outside of residence as stated in par 3; (2) and intended to use it
to commit or abet subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of the said PD. The
People, as petitioners, thru the Solicitor General, contended that the prohibited acts need
not be related to subversive activities and the intent of the accused are irrelevant since its
is a statutory offense and punishing the possession of such deadly weapon is not only to
eradicate subversive acts but also criminality in general. The petitioners also argued that
the preamble is not an essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text of the law
itself.
 The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which
are those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7
which are to suppress those who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts
and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9 also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble
is not a part of the statute, it is the key to determine what is the intent and spirit of the
decree and determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal statute.
o Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 81 SCRA 314 (1978)
 A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously
been issued. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the
appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the
writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the garnishment
"may be public in character."
 An order of the now defunct respondent Court of Industrial Relations denying for lack of
merit petitioner's motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized as a grave
abuse of discretion and assertion that the funds "could be public" in character, thus giving
rise to the applicability of the fundamental concept of non-suability valid. The petition
for certiorari is dismissed. No costs. The premise that the funds could be spoken of as
public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation was a government-owned entity It does not follow though that they were
exempt from garnishment. as a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a
personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. By engaging in
a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests
itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the
rules of law governing private corporations
 From the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As was pointed out
by him: "It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in
any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company,
of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to
the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with
whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to
the business which is to be transacted. The office or entity is "possessed of a separate and
distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be
levied upon or garnished.
o SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

o The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for
damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an
illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the
application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging
the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court
made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies
on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor
dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil
Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by
the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Page 36 of 140
 The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides
guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted
activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service
shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring
to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states
that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by
government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government
officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and
other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike
they are prohibited from doing so
o GAUDENCIO RAYO vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN G.R. No. L-55273-
83 December 19, 1981
 At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent opened simultaneously
all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden, precipitate and
simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns in Bulacan were inundated. The
petitioners filed for damages against the respondent corporation. Petitioners opposed the
prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case and contended that the respondent
corporation is merely performing a propriety functions and that under its own organic act,
it can sue and be sued in court
 The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to
sue and be sued in any court under its charter. As a government owned and controlled
corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
government. Moreover, the charter provision that it can sue and be sued in any court
o Farolan vs CTA
 S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port of
Manila carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Baging Buhay Trading
(Baging Buhay). The import was classified under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B of the Tariff
and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the
amount of P11,350.00. The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination
of the shipment upon hearing the information that the shipment consisted of mosquito net
made of nylon under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Upon re-
examination, it turns out that the shipment was undervalued in quantity and value as
previously declared. Thus the Collector of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the
government
 Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent
sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim
to prosper would violate the doctrine o f sovereign immunity. Since it demands
that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for
which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been
converted technically into a suit against the state. On this point, the political doctrine that
“state may not be sued without its consent,” categorically applies. As an unincorporated
government agency without any separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of
Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is
invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely taxation. As an agency, the
Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is
defined not a proprietary function. Thus private respondents claim for damages against
the Commissioner of Customs must fails
o Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 85384 (1990)

 On 29 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, as Plaintiff, through its governmental
instrumentality the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed with the
respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint against Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al. for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages, docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 0025 (PCGG No. 26).
 Intervention is not an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing
litigation. Now, considering that respondent Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction not only over
Civil Case No. 0025 but also over the private respondents' action for intervention, any
error or irregularity that it may have committed in rendering its questioned resolutions, in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, amounts to an error of judgment, which is not correctable
in the present petition for certiorari but by appeal. The private respondents intervened in
Civil Case No. 0025 merely to unite with the defendants therein in resisting the claims of
petitioner, as plaintiff, and for that reason asked for no affirmative relief against any party
Page 37 of 140
in their answer in intervention. In other words, this is not a case where the private
respondents take the initiative in an action against petitioner by filing a complaint in
intervention or a complaint. Private respondents' action for intervention in Civil Case No.
0025 is not, therefore, a suit or counter-suit against petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
o Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping, 95 Phil 905 (1954)

 The plaintiff therein Fernando A. Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant, Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. The Republic of the Philippines intervened by filing a complaint in
intervention. Thereafter, the defendant filed its answer to the complaint in intervention,
and set up a counterclaim against the Republic of the Philippines. The trial court
dismissed the defendants counterclaim against the Republic on the ground, among others,
that the state is immune from suit. On appeal, this Court held that the dismissal of the
counterclaim was untenable, because by filing its complaint in intervention the
Government in effect waived its right to non-suability.
o Lim vs. Brownell, 107 Phil 344 (1960)

 The plaintiff Benito E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez,
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Alien Property
Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney General of the United States) for the
recovery of four (4) parcels of land (which were subsequently transferred to the Republic
of the Philippines) with a prayer for the payment of back rentals. The Republic of the
Philippines intervened in the case. The defendant Attorney General of the United States
and the defendant- intervenor Republic of the Philippines each filed an answer, alleging
by way of affirmative defense, among others, that the lower court had no jurisdiction over
the claim for rentals since the action in that regard constituted a suit against the Republic
to which it had not given its consent.
o Santiago vs. Republic, 87 SCRA 294 (1978)

 In January 1971, Ildefonso Santiago gratuitously donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of
Plant Industry. The terms of the donation are; that the Bureau should construct a building
on the said lot and that the building should be finished by December 7, 1974, that the
Bureau should install lighting facilities on the said lot. However, come 1976 there were
still no improvements on the lot. This prompted Santiago to file a case pleading for the
revocation of such contract of donation. The trial court dismissed the petition claiming
that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper without the consent of the
government.
 The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there is
consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be implied. In this case
it must be emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the Republic or any
of its agency being a Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the
conditions of such donation
o Amigable vs. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360 (1972)

 Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her
Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of
any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines,
requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor
General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint
against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the
lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at
the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery
of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to
be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
 In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when
the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without
going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party
may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no
annotation in favour of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and
plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the
government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to
recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been
Page 38 of 140
used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due
compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking.
o Torio vs. Fintanilla, 85 SCRA 99 (1978)

 The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 “to manage
the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration…” The “1959 Malasiqui ‘Town Fiesta
Executive Committee” was created, which, in turn, organized a sub-committee on
entertainment and stage. A “zarzuela” troupe, of which Vicente Fontanilla was a member,
arrived for their performance on January 22. During the “zarzuela”, the stage collapsed
and Fontanilla was pinned underneath. He was immediately hospitalized, but died the
following day.
Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint to recover damages against the Municipality of
Malasiqui, its Municipal Council and all the Council’s individual members. The
municipality invoked inter alia the defense that as a legally and duly organized public
corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an
exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the
negligence of any of its agents. The councilors maintained that they merely acted as the
municipality’s agents in carrying out the municipal ordinance and as such they are
likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore,
they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance.
 Under Philippine laws, municipalities are political bodies endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal
governments in conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter
alia sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. The powers of a municipality
are two-fold in character: public, governmental or political on the one hand; and
corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised
by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public
welfare. These include the legislative, judicial public, and political. Municipal powers, on
the other hand, are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community.
These include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. This distinction of
powers are necessary in determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its
agents which result in injury to third persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function/duty,
no recovery can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the
matter, nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good
faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. With respect to proprietary
functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third
persons ex contract or ex delicto. They may also be subject to suit upon contracts and its
tort.
 Suits vs Foreign States
o The Holy See vs. Rosario (December 17, 1994)

 This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square
meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was contiguous with two other
lots. These lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In view of the refusal of the squatters to
vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of
evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was
the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana
 As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the
generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such
principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a
condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. In the present case,
if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business,
surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However,
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for
profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines. The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the
lot of concern is non-proprietary in nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a
donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial
purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of
the Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal
thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot
for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living
thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation
Page 39 of 140
 The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and
institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged,
entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the
country's foreign relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever
necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine
government before the international community. When international agreements are
concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of
seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this task falls
principally on the DFA as being the highest executive department with the competence
and authority to so act in this aspect of the international arena. "In Public International
Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic
immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to
convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.”
o USA vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985)

 The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of
those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US.
Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US fro the construction of
wharves in said base that was wrongly awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit
for specific performance was filed by him against the US
 he traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of
another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law
are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities
of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign
and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary acts. The result is that
state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts. The restrictive
application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the exercise of its sovereign
function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted
to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes
o Minucher vs. CA, GR No. 76609 (1990)

 Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in
Tokyo, Japan and Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as
head of the Iranian National Resistance Movement. In May 1986, Minucher was charged
with an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. The criminal charge followed a “buy-bust operation” conducted by the Philippine
police narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been
seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who
became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. In August 1988, Minucher
filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the ‘trumped-up’
charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
 Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission
involve, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly
relations with the receiving state. Only “diplomatic agents,” are vested with blanket
diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of
whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzo’s main
function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective
fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the
home government. He is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission.
On the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note,
divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic immunity is
contentious. Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a
State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary
international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done
by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his
official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign
from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect,
suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but
Page 40 of 140
for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim – par in parem, non habet imperium
– that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The
implication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being
against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. A foreign agent,
operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it
can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent
of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two
sovereigns.
o Rep. of Indonesia vs. Vinzon, GR 154705 (2003)

 Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The
maintenance agreement includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning
units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. The
agreement shall be effective for 4 years. The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found
respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards
set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent. The
latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign immunity from
suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.
 The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis.
Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a
diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with private
entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The
Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a
contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the
Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed
to have waived its immunity from suit.
o WHO vs. Aquino, GR. No. l-35131 (1972)

 Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting
Assistant Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve
(12) crates, were allowed free entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action
Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates “contain large quantities of highly dutiable
goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC officers,
Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects
of Verstuyft. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that
Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as
accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and
requested that the search warrant be suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly
joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless
summarily denied the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.
 The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA
formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The
Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed
said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search
warrant. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of
separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and
courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed
by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting
under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention
of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign
relations.
o DFA vs. BLRC, GR No. 113191 (1997)

 On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against
Asian Development Bank. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB
and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified
respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were
Page 41 of 140
covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale
of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the
Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the
Agreement Between The Bank and The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The
Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement"). The Labor Arbiter took cognizance
of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity
from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor Magnayi. The ADB did not appeal the
decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its
referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to
obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.
 Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal
process of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee
operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Bank’s
officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their
official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities
and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government which must be respected. Being an international organization that
has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal
law. "One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or
even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such
subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."
 The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction,
which should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service
contracts with different private companies. “There are two conflicting concepts of
sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical
or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the
Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of
the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state,
but not with regard toprivate act or acts jure gestionis. “Certainly, the mere entering into
a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act
can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is
engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an
act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.”
 Suits against Public Officers
o Animas vs PVAO, 174 SCRA 214

 The case originated from a suit for mandamus commenced by the petitioners against the
respondent, the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, to compel payment by the said
respondent of full pension benefits, retroactive to 1947, under Republic Act No. 65 as
amended. Isidro Animos is a veteran of World War II, having been a member of the
USAFFE and later of the guerilla forces during the war. The denial of the petitioner's
claim was predicated on the finding that his disabilities were, based on the respondent's
"Rules on Disability Ratings", partial rather than total, a condition that precludes payment
of maximum pension benefits. The petitioner submits that the very rating system adopted
by the respondent veterans' office is null and void.
 "x x x it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on
the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public
official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of
non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the
suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with
the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or
petitioner. x x x. The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the
doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public
official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak
of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment
they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public
official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
Page 42 of 140
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction
 The Court strongly stresses that Republic Act No. 65, the veterans' Bill of Rights, was not
meant to compensate alone veterans for the wounds of war. It is, above all, a gesture of
gratitude on the part of the State and a tribute to their gallantry and selfless love of
country. Though valor cannot be measured in terms of money, money is the best we can
offer for the moment. And if we cannot do more, let us do no less. This case should not
have indeed reached this Court had not insensitivity gotten the better of Government
functionaries.
o USA vs. Reyes, GR No. 79233 (1993)

 Private respondent [Montoya] is an American citizen was employed as an identification
(I.D.) checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military
Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Petitioner [Bradford] also
worked at NEX JUSMAG as an “activity manager”. There was an incident on 22 January
1987 whereby Bradford had Montoya’s person and belongings searched in front of many
curious onlookers. This caused Montoya to feel aggrieved and to file a suit for damages.
 While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against
such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them,
the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally
impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be
applicable under all circumstances. It is a different matter where the public official is
made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights
of plaintiff. In the present case, it appears that Bradford was sued for acts done beyond
the scope and beyond her place of official functions. Thus she may not avail of
immunity.
o Shauf vs. CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990)

 Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a
member of the United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance
Counselor, GS17109, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is
eminently qualified. As found by the trial court, she received a Master of Arts degree
from the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours
in psychology-guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science; she has also
completed all course work in human behavior and counseling psychology for a doctoral
degree; she is a civil service eligible; and, more importantly, she had functioned as a
Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four
years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. By reason of her non-selection
to the position, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity
complaint against private respondents, for alleged discrimination against the former by
reason of her nationality and sex. Plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf twice applied for the position
of Guidance Counselor sometime in 1975 and in October 1978. Although she was
qualified for the postision, her appointment was rejected ny the defendant Detwiler. The
two who were appointed, a certain Petrucci and Edward B. Isakson, were ordered
removed by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. Instead of replacing Petrucci with the
plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, the defendant Detwiler had the position vacated by Petrucci
abolished. And in the case of Edward Isakson, the defendant Detwiler ignored the order
of the U.S. Civil Service Commission to have him removed according to the testimony of
plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf.
 Elementary is the rule that the conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and
cogent reasons. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This
situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the
powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act
done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are
no exception to this rule.
 Execution vs the State
o Nessia vs. Fermin, 220 SCRA 615 (1993)
Page 43 of 140
 Article 27 of the Civil Code accords judicial relief to "[a]ny person suffering material or
moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to
perform his official duty." This originated from the complaint filed against respondents
Jesus M. Fermin and the Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, by petitioner Jose
V. Nessia for recovery of damages and reimbursement of expenses incurred in the
performance of his official duties as the then Deputy Municipal Assessor of Victorias.
The complaint theorized that Fermin deliberately ignored and caused the non-payment of
the vouchers in question because Nessia defied the former's request to all municipal
officials to register and vote in Victorias in the 1980 local elections.
 On the defense of lack of appropriation, while it is true that Fermin may not be compelled
by mandamus to approve vouchers because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations,
he may, nevertheless, be held liable for damages under Art. 27 for malicious inaction
because he did not act on the vouchers. This provision against official inaction finds its
ally in Sec. 3, par. (f), of R.A. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act," which criminalizes "[n]eglecting or refusing, after due demand or
request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter
pending before him for the purpose of . . . discriminating against any interested party." It
is apparent that public officials are called upon to act expeditiously on matters pending
before them. For only in acting thereon either by signifying approval or disapproval may
the plaintiff continue on to the next step of the bureaucratic process. On the other hand,
official inaction brings to a standstill the administrative process and the plaintiff is left in
the darkness of uncertainty. In this regard, official "inaction" cannot be equated with
"disapproval."
o Caloocan City vs. Allarde, GR No. 107721 (2003)

 In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City
Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees
assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFI in 1973 declared abolition illegal and
ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back-
wages and other emoluments. The City Government appealed the decision but such was
dismissed. In 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back-
wages. The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid
back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to
Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On
July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles
of the City Government for P100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The City
Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle; properties of the municipality
were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to
levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the City Council
of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14
claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the
City Treasurer to release the check but the City Treasurer can’t do so because the Mayor
refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to
immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the
claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City
Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would
hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of
the city.
 Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to
subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money
owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been
that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the
Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or
special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy,
in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule
as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the
judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained,
the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and
execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a
seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication
that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the
satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined
exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In such
a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the
City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of
1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for Santiago’s back-wages plus interest. This
Page 44 of 140
case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgment of the trial court could then
be validly enforced against such funds.
IV. PHILIPPINE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
A. Preamble
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop
our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
B. Principles and Policies (Article II, Philippine Constitution
 Concepts
o Principles are binding rules which must be observed in the conduct of the government. Policies are
guidelines for the orientation of the state. Note: The distinction between principles and polices is of
little significance because not all of the six “principles” are self-executory and some of the
“policies” already anchor justiciable rights.
o Legislative power is given to the Legislature whose members hold office for a fixed term; executive
power is given to a separate Executive who holds office for a fixed term; and judicial power is held
by an independent Judiciary. The principle of separation of powers is based on the conception that
if the totality of governmental powers were concentrated in one person or group of persons, the
possibility of establishing a despotic and tyrannical regime capable of suppressing and suffocating
the rights of the people becomes a tempting reality
o Checks and Balances is one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify
mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments, e.g. veto power of the President as check on
improvident legislation.
o Delegation of Powers. Potestas delegata non potest delegare. Premised on the ethical principle that
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. Exceptions:
Tariff powers of the President, Emergency powers of President, Delegation to the people,
Delegation to Local Government units and Delegation to administrative bodies
 Pable Ocampo vs HRET, GR No. 158466 (2004)

o The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser
because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who
obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected
o On May 23, 2001, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent Mario B.
Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez, the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila pursuant
to the May 14, 2001 elections. He was credited with 32,097 votes or a margin of 768 votes over
petitioner who obtained 31,329 votes.
o the settled jurisprudence that the subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes to be declared the winner. This principle has been reiterated in a number our decisions, such
as Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, Abella vs. COMELEC, Benito vs. COMELEC15 and Domino vs.
COMELEC.As a matter of fact, even as early as 1912, it was held that the candidate who lost in an
election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is found to be
ineligible for the office for which he was elected. In Geronimo vs. Ramos, if the winning candidate
is not qualified and cannot qualify for the office to which he was elected, a permanent vacancy is
thus created. The second placer is just that, a second placer – he lost in the elections, he was
repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters. He could not be proclaimed winner as he
could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates. To rule otherwise is to
misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the sociological and psychological
underpinnings behind voters’ preferences
 Maquiling vs COMELEC (2013)

o Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On
28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Page 45 of 140
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. Respondent
Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as “USA-American.” The COMELEC First Division ruled that
the petition for disqualification be granted because he is still using his US passport after his
renunciation of his US citizenship which negates his Affidavit of Renunciation. Arnado filed a
Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling
(Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest
number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En
Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. The COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Arnado on
the ground that the use of a US passport……. does not operate to revert back his status as a dual
citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US
passport does not operate to “unrenounce” what he has earlier on renounced. Maquiling files a
petition before the Supreme Court to assail the decision of the COMELEC En Banc.
o Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the
date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit
of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and
voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities
of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by
the United States of America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can
simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights
granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign
passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation
and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position. We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of
using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and
effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took
place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This
act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for
public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not
just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which
violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack. We therefore hold that
Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same
Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation.
He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in
the May 2010 elections.
o Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates. With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the
election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. We have
ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC[ and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC
cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
 Villavencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phl 778 (1919)

o Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took
custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge
and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers.
Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of
Sampaloc. hat when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case
saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city
of Davao instead.
o Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly
and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and
then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the
person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other
municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the
wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is
addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no
reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority
of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the
Page 46 of 140
reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to
change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost
her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily
evaded.
 Agustin v Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979)

o Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction 229
and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already had
warning lights and did not want to use this. The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an
early warning device installed on a vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked
cars. The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a
regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.
o Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power? Yes on both. Petition
dismissed. Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing
more or less than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty. The case also says that
police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property to promote the general welfare.
 Ichong v Hernandez, 101 Phil 115 (1957)

o Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes
the retail trade business. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of theRepublic of the Philippines;
(4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to
entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and
Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
o We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by aliendominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country
from dominance and control. Such enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of
the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future.
Furthermore, the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for thedistinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly
evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any
case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion
the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. Moreover, the provisions of the law
are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicityand has not misled the legislators
or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict
with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police
power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
 In RE Garcia, 2 SCRA 984

o Arturo E. Garcia, a Filipino citizen, studied law, became a lawyer and practiced law in Spain. Later,
he applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without taking the Philippine bar
examinations. He cited the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of
Professions between the Philippines and Spain and argued that he is entitled to practice the law
profession in the Philippines even without submitting to the required bar examinations.
o The petitioner CANNOT validly invoke the subject treaty to justify his petition to be admitted to
the practice law in the Philippines without taking the Philippine bar examinations. Applicant is a
Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to
the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals
desiring to practice in the Philippines.
 Lagman v Zosa, 66 Phil 13 (1938)

o The accused were charged with and convicted of refusal to register for military training as required
by the National Defense Act. On appeal, Sosa argued that he was fatherless, had a mother and eight
(8) brothers to support, while Lagman alleged that he had a father to support, had no military
training and never wished to be killed. Both claimed that the statute was unconstitutional.
o The Supreme Court affirmed its conviction holding that the law in question was based on Sec. 4,
Art. XVI of the Constitution. It added that the National Defense Act, insofar as it established
compulsory military services, does not go against any provisions of the Constitution, but is in
faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the government to defend the state cannot be performed
except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the people would be to
Page 47 of 140
make this duty of the government excusable should there be no sufficient men to volunteer to enlist
therein.
 Estrada v Escritor AM No. P-02-1651 (2006)

o Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada,
the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas
City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio
Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived
with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio
is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is
not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows
such act. Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in
conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28,
1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation. Such
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a
presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing
the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon
and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
o A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court states that our
Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests. In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within
the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where
the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondent’s
claim of religious freedom but must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.
 Bayan v Exec Secretary, GR No. 138570 (2000)

o The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine
government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the
total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further
defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by
the other contracting State.”
o NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it
must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum;
and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. here is no dispute as to the presence
of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in
§25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum
being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. This Court is of the firm view that the
phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this
case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is
to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States
treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
 Pamatong v Comelec GR No. 161872 (2004)

o Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
Page 48 of 140
registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of
Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to “equal access
to opportunities for public service” under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting
the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him
since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the
constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a
national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has
the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he
has a platform of government.
o What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of
an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a
thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of
Article II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions
under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for
according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the
provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. The privilege of equal access
to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically
on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on
“Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as
the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the
limitations or the burdens which they create. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance
candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run
for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises
are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater
the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and
resources in preparation for the election. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance
candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this
Court.
 Maquera v Borja, GR No L-24761 (1965)

o Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the National Police Commission when Republic Act.
No. 8851, otherwise known as the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998, took effect.
Section 8 of Republic Act. No. 8851 provided that the terms of office of the incumbent
commissioners were deemed expired. Petitioners claimed that this violated their security of tenure.
o Petitioners are members of the civil service. Republic Act No. 8551 did not expressly abolish the
positions of petitioners. Under RA No. 6975, the National Police Commission was under the
Department of Interior and Local Government, while under Republic Act. No. 8551 it is made an
agency attached to the Department of Interior and Local Government. The organizational structure
and the composition of the National Police Commission remain essentially the same except for the
addition of the Chief of PNP as ex-officio member. The powers and duties of the National Police
Commission remain basically unchanged. No bona fide reorganization of the NPC having been
mandated by Congress and insofar as RA 8851 declares the office of the petitioner as expired
resulting in their separation from office, it is tantamount to removing civil service employees from
office without legal cause therefore, it must be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.
 Calalang v Williams 70 Phil 726 (1940)

o The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate
and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
o The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national
roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the
Page 49 of 140
bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving. Social justice
is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of
the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
 APCD v PCA, GR No. 110526

o PCA was created by PD 232 as independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated
development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure
that coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and
growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law. PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses
to would-be coconut plant operators. On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution
No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for
licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free
enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this
caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling,
smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The APCD then filed a petition for
mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93.
o Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic
principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless
reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of “protective regulations” for the
benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the
government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and
when the public interest so requires.
 Simon v CHR, GR No. 100150 (1994)

o On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution
of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear
before the CHR. On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's
jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that
Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of
violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not
civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business". On March 1, 1991, the CHR
issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991. The Petitioner filed a
a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also
prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled
"Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".
o No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR.
Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own
or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political
rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it
does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or
need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an
restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ,
for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the
action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC. The writ prayed for the petition is granted.
The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.
 PASEI v Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)

Page 50 of 140
o Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity
of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only
to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it
also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of
the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on
behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power
of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some
states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing
for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
o SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female
domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their
class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but
it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality
before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and
women. It admits of classification, provided that: 1. Such classification rests on substantial
distinctions, 2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law, 3. They are not confined to existing
conditions and 4. They apply equally to al members of the same class. In the case at bar, the
classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to
travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right,
as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may
be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power.
Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the
labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.
 UP BOR v CA, GR No. 134629 (1999)

o Private respondent Arokiasamy William was enrolled in a Doctoral Program in Anthropology of the
UP Diliman College of Social Sciences and Philosophy. An oral defense by the PR was held on
February 5, 1993. After going over the dissertations, the panel pointed out after it has been looked
into that some portion of it were lifted from other sources without proper acknowledgement, hence
requesting her to revise the dissertation which PR failed to do so resulting to her not obtaining
approval from 2 of the panels of the Oral Defense.
o The court held that academic freedom is guaranteed to institutions of higher learning by Art XIV of
the 1987 Constitution. This freedom includes deciding whom a university will confer degrees on. If
the degree is procured by error or fraud then the Board of Regents, subject to due process being
followed, may cancel that degree. Art. XIV, Section 5 par. 2 of the Constitution provides that
“academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.” It is a freedom granted to
“institutions of higher learning” which is thus given “a wide sphere of authority certainly extending
to the choice of students.” If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot
study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being
its graduates.
 Camacho v Coresis, GR No. 134372 (2002)

o Subject of the present petition for certiorari is the Resolution dated June 3, 1997 of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, hereafter simply the Office, which dismissed the administrative and
criminal complaints against respondents Sixto O. Daleon, Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba, Norma
Tecson and the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines (USP), Davao City,
for violation of Section 3 [a], [e] and [j] of Republic Act 3019 also known as the “Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.”[1] Also sought to be nullified is the Order of the Office dated September 10,
1997, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts as culled from the records
are as follows: Petitioner is the Dean of the College of Education of said university, since January
1994 to the present. He has served the university as faculty member and as administrator for almost
13 years.
o As held by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the Resolution of the Board of Regents is
clearly an exercise of its sound discretion as the final arbiter of issues affecting the internal
operations of the university and as interpreter of the policies of the school. Academic freedom is
two-tiered – that of the academic institution and the
teacher’s. Institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for
itself, its aims and objectives and the methods on how best to attain them, free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint.[22] It encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” The right of
Page 51 of 140
the school to confirm and validate the teaching method of Dr. Daleon is at once apparent in the
third freedom, i.e., “how it shall be taught.” Academic freedom also accords a faculty member the
right to pursue his studies in his particular specialty. It is defined as a right claimed by the
accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his
conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalty because these
conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution. s
applied to the case at bar, academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the widest latitude to innovate
and experiment on the method of teaching which is most fitting to his students (graduate students at
that), subject only to the rules and policies of the university. Considering that the Board of Regents,
whose task is to lay down school rules and policies of the University of Southeastern Philippines,
has validated his teaching style, we see no reason for petitioner to complain before us simply
because he holds a contrary opinion on the matter.
 SSS Employees Assn. vs CA, 175 SCRA 686

o The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary
restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject
matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the
case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the
Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the
NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
o The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes.
On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any
legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of
the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable
laws concerning strike by government employeesenjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-
outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are
prohibited from doing so. In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are
denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are
part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.
 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113

o Roe (P), a pregnant single woman, brought a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of
the Texas abortion laws. These laws made it a crime to obtain or attempt an abortion except on
medical advice to save the life of the mother. Other plaintiffs in the lawsuit included Hallford, a
doctor who faced criminal prosecution for violating the state abortion laws; and the Does, a married
couple with no children, who sought an injunction against enforcement of the laws on the grounds
that they were unconstitutional. The defendant was county District Attorney Wade (D). A three-
judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held that Roe and Hallford had standing to
sue and presented justiciable controversies, and that declaratory relief was warranted. The court also
ruled however that injunctive relief was not warranted and that the Does’ complaint was not
justiciable. Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. The district court held that the Texas
abortion statutes were void as vague and for overbroadly infringing the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The Does lost, however, because the district court ruled that
injunctive relief against enforcement of the laws was not warranted. The Does appealed directly to
the Supreme Court of the United States and Wade cross-appealed the district court’s judgment in
favor of Roe and Hallford.
o State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only life-saving procedures on the
mother’s behalf, and that do not take into consideration the stage of pregnancy and other interests,
are unconstitutional for violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due
Process Clause protects the right to privacy, including a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy,
against state action. Though a state cannot completely deny a woman the right to terminate her
pregnancy, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman’s health and the
potentiality of human life at various stages of pregnancy.
 Pierce v Society of Sisters, 262 US 510

o Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain academies or
schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary,
Page 52 of 140
college preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders
prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all
parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants
appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.
o The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and has
no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state. The Appellees have
standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the appellees’ schools. The
state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to
choose the appropriate preparation for their children.
 Tanada v Angara, GR 118295 (1997)

o On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of
Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its
respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek
approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate
to ratify the WTO Agreement. This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO
agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant and
independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino
first” policy.
o The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist
policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy”
does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The Senate, after
deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the
law of the land”. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal department in government. It
presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and
persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or
restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfilment of the obligations undertaken
V. THE EXERCISE OF GOVERNMENT POWER
A. Concepts
 There are three branches of the government — legislative, executive and judicial. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that
the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution
has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government.
B. In RE Laureta and Maravilla 148 SCRA 382

 Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and
Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division. Ilustre using contemptuous language claimed that
members of the court rendered unjust decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself
from participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27
October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and found no reason to take action, stating
that Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case and was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14
July 1986 after the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to
Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing the case to another forum of justice, to which
she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber 1986. Atty.
Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioner’s
Complaint
 va Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave
professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further Orders. Resolutions of the
Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full
faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of
enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the Supreme Court’s judicial power is a restatement of the
fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of
government such that the three co-equal branches of government are each supreme and independent within
the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.
Page 53 of 140
C. INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983)

 Plaintiff, Mr. Chadha, challenged a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“Act”) that allowed
one house of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate and thus, veto the decision of the Executive branch to
allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. The Act authorized the Attorney General to
suspend deportation if the alien met certain conditions, deportation would result in “extreme hardship,” and
the Attorney General reported to Congress. The Attorney General suspended Plaintiff’s deportation pursuant
to the Act and notified Congress. A year and a half later, the House of Representatives passed a resolution
stating that Plaintiff’s deportation should not be suspended. The House resolution was not submitted to the
Senate or presented to the President. The Court of Appeals held that the House action was unconstitutional as
a violation of the separation of powers.
 Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Since explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution’s
Article I prescribe and define the respective functions of Congress and the Executive branch in the legislative
process, those provisions must be applied to resolve the issue here. The decision to provide the Presentment
Clause wherein the President has a limited power to veto proposed legislation was based on the framers’
conviction that the powers of Congress must be constrained. Therefore, lawmaking was a power to be shared
by both houses and the President. The bicameral requirement of Article I, by requiring a law’s approval by a
majority in both houses of Congress, represents the framers’ decision that the legislative power of the federal
government be exercised in accordance with a systematic procedure. Here, Congress made a deliberate choice
to delegate to the Executive branch the authority to suspend the deportation of deportable aliens. Congress
must abide by
its delegation of authority until delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.
D. Arnault v Balagtas, 97 Phil 358 (1955)

 The controversy arose out of the Government's purchase of 2 estates, the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates.
Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase which was effected.
The price paid for both estates was P5, 000,000. Thereafter, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a
Special Committee to determine the validity of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just.
During the said Senate investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440, 000,
was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for
contumacious acts and ordered his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines
Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the Special Committee the
name of the person who received the P440, 000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto. Petitioner filed
a habeas corpus proceeding. CFI ruled that the continued detention and confinement of petitioner pursuant to
a Senate Resolution No. 114, is illegal, and that the Senate committed a clear abuse of discretion in not
considering his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000
was made. Further, on the ground that that petitioner, by his answer has purged himself of contempt and is
consequently entitled to be released and discharged.
 The Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This is implied or incidental
or necessary to the exercise of legislative power. The 1987 Constitution adopted the principle of separation of
powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority; it must have intended each
department's authority to be full and complete, independent of the other's authority and power. Provided that
contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the course of the legislative
process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme, and
unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming
within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial
interference. The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature in order to enable it
to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from the judicial process wherein
offenders are brought to the courts of justice for punishment that criminal law imposes upon them. The
former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because the
former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter has to do with the
enforcement and application of the criminal law.
E. Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996

 President Carter terminated a treaty with Taiwan, and a few Congressional members felt that this deprived
them of their Constitutional function. However, no Congressional action was ever taken. The Senate
considered a resolution that would require the President to get Senate approval before any mutual defense
treaty could be terminated, but there was no final vote on the resolution.
 Is this issue of whether a President can terminate a treaty without Congressional approval a non-justiciable
political question? Yes. Whether or not a President can terminate a treaty closely involves his foreing
relations authority and therefore is not reviewable by the Supreme Court
F. Garcia v Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219

 On 27 November 1990, Cory issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges
imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This
additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil
products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same
year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products
Page 54 of 140
continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: " All appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments." He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress,
the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the
nature of revenue-generating measures.
 Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like
all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It
does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be
characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: "(2) The
Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government." There is
thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or
imposts . . . ."
G. US v Tang Ho 43 Phil 1
 The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section 1, authorizing the
governor-General “fro any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue
and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act”. Thus, on
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General signed EO 53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang Tang
Ho was caught selling a ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher than that fixed by EO 53.
Defendant was found guilty and now assails the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of
legislative powers.
 Act 2868 is unconstitutional. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act
authorized the Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect the law.
The said Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify what conditions the Governor-
General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states “for any cause”. It also failed to define
“extraordinary rise” that such proclamation by the Governor-General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said Act
authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor-General
H. Conference v POEA, 243 SCRA 666

 Petitioner, Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., is
a n i n c o r p o r a t e d association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-
petitioners, all licensed manning agenci es who
hire and recruit Filipino sea men for and in behalf of the irrespective foreign ship-owner-
principals, seek to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the POEA and
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05. The petitioners contended that POEA does not have the power
and authority to fix
and promulgate rate s a ffe cti ng death and workmen 's co mpens ation of Filipino seamen work
ing in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can. Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing
Board resolves to amend and increase the compensation and other benefits as specified under Part
II, Section C, para graph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the P OEA Standard
Emplo yment Contract for Seafarers
 The constitutional challenge of the rule- ma king power of the P OEA based on impermissible
delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented by thepublic respondents, brushed aside by
this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA. The governing Board of the Administration
(POEA) shall promulgate the necessaryrules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of theAdministration (POEA). While the ma king of la w s is a non-
delegable power that pertai ns exclusivel y to
Congress, neve rtheless, the latter ma y constitutionally delegate the authority topromulgat
e rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason
that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in
carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards
prescribed by the law.
I. Pelaez v Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569

 In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was
purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. The then Vice President, Emmanuel
Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be
appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that
Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may
“not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez
Page 55 of 140
argues: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?” The Auditor General
countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the President.
Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He
further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create
municipalities to the President.
 here was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power
to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Further, although Sec.
68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would mean that the President
may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the
standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare
may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the
President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality. The Supreme Court declared that the power to create
municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive).
J. People v Judge Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90

 On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria,
public school officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for violating
Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is
unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment is unfixed and may run toreclusion perpetua; and (2)
it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being
solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government.
 Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional. Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative power by vesting in the court the responsibility of imposing a duration on the
punishment of imprisonment, as if the courts were the legislative department of the government. The decision
and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge Dacuycuy) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal
Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial
Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
VI. STRUCTURE AND POWER OF GOVERNMENT
A. Concepts
 The Constitution is the fundamental law of the land. The present political structure of the Philippines was
defined by the 1987 Constitution, duly ratified in a plebiscite held on February 2, 1987 and proclaimed
ratified on February 11, 1987.
 The Philippines is a republic with a presidential form of government wherein power is equally divided among
its three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. One basic corollary in a presidential system of
government is the principle of separation of powers wherein legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the
Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. The Legislative branch is authorized to make
laws, alter, and repeal them through the power vested in the Philippine Congress. This institution is divided
into the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Executive branch is composed of the President and the
Vice President who are elected by direct popular vote and serve a term of six years. The Constitution grants
the President authority to appoint his Cabinet. These departments form a large portion of the country’s
bureaucracy. The Judicial branch holds the power to settle controversies involving rights that are legally
demandable and enforceable. This branch determines whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part and instrumentality of the government. It is
made up of a Supreme Court and lower courts. The Constitution expressly grants the Supreme Court the
power of Judicial Review as the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation unconstitutional.
B. The Legislative Branch
 Article VI, Philippine Constitution [See Constitution]
 Doctrine of Shifting Majority– For each House of Congress to pass a bill, only the votes of the majority of
those present in the session, there being a quorum, is required.
Exceptions:
Page 56 of 140
 Composition
Senate House of Representatives

Composition 24 Senators elected at large Not more than two hundred and fifty
members
Qualifications 1. Natural-born citizen of the 1. Natural-born citizen of the
Philippines Philippines
2. At 35 years of age on the day 2. At least 25 years of age on the
of the election day of the election
3. Able to read and write 3. Able to read and write
4. A registered voter 4. Except the party-list
5. Resident of the Philippines for representatives, a registered voter
not less than two years in the district in which he shall
Page 57 of 140
immediately preceding the day be elected

of the election 5. Resident thereof for a period of
not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of
the election
Term of 6 years 3 years
Office
Limitations No Senator shall serve for more No Member of the House of
than two consecutive terms Representatives shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms.
Composition [Sec. 5(1) and (2), Art. VI]: Not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by
law, consisting of:
 District representatives, elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities and the Metropolitan Manila area.
 Party-list representatives, who shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives, elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
 Sectoral representatives. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
 The Legislative Power

o Defined: The power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws.
o Where vested. In the Congress, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.
Classification of legislative power

Original Possessed by the people in their sovereign capacity
Delegated Possessed by Congress and other legislative bodies by virtue of the
Constitution
Constituent The power to amend or revise the Constitution
Ordinary The power to pass ordinary laws
Note: The original legislative power of the people is exercised via initiative and referendum. In this
manner, people can directly propose and enact laws, or approve or reject any act or law passed by Congress or
a local government unit.
 Other Concepts
Elections
1. Regular Elections.
2nd Monday of may, every 3 years, starting 1992 (unless otherwise provided by law).
The term of office begins on the following June 30. For the transitory period, the first election was
held on the 2nd Monday of May, 1987
2. Special Elections
In case of vacancy in the Senate or the House, a special election may be called to fill up such vacancy
"in the manner prescribed by law." The law that governs and lays down the details concerning the
special congressional elections is Rep. Act No. 6645 (December 28, 1987). Under the law, no special
election will be called if the vacancy occurs (i) less than 18 months before the next regular election in
the case of the Senate, or (ii) less than 1 year before the next regular election in the case of the House;
in these cases, we will just have to wait for the next regular election, for practical reasons. When the
vacancy occurs during the period when special elections are allowed to be conducted (18 or 12 months
or more before the next regular election), the particular House of Congress must pass either a
resolution by the House concerned, if Congress is in session, or a certification by the Senate President
or the Speaker of the House, if Congress is not in session, (a) declaring the existence of the vacancy
and (b) calling for a special election to be held within 45 to 90 days from the date of calling of the
special election (that is, from the date of the resolution or certification). But the Senator or Member of
the House thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term.
Page 58 of 140
Funds certified by the COMELEC as necessary to defray the expenses for holding regular and special elections,
plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in the regular or special appropriations and, once
approved, shall be released automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the COMELEC.
Q: Can appropriation of money through a law be compelled by mandamus?

A: No.
Q: Is the rule absolute?

A: No. There are exceptions (see Pasay case). LGUs may be compelled by mandamus to appropriate money for
obligations already incurred or (when there is already) a right to w/c a private party is entitled.
Initiative and Referendum

In compliance with the constitutional mandate, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6735 [approved by
President Aquino on August 4, 1989], known as an Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum.
Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislation through an election called for the purpose. There are three systems of initiative,
namely: Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution; Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation;
and Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. Indirect initiative is the exercise of initiative
by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or local legislative body for action [Sec. 2, R. A.
6735],
Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called
for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to
approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and Referendum on local laws
which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional
assemblies and local legislative bodies [Sec. 2(c), R. A. 6735].
Prohibited measures.
The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition: No petition
embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and statutes involving
emergency measures, the enactment of which is specifically vested in Congress by the
Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after their effectivity
[Sec. 10, R. A. 6735].
Local Initiative. Not less than 2,000 registered voters in case of autonomous regions, 1,000
in case of provinces and cities, 100 in case of municipalities, and 50 in case of barangays,
may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively,
proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or
resolution [Sec. 13, R. A. 6735].
Limitations on Local Initiative: (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised
more than once a year; (b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are
within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact; and (c) If at any time before
the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented,
the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire,
apply for initiative.
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the
respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation [Sec. 7, Art. XVIII, 1987].
These appointments shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
[Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on
Appointments, 177 SCRA 259].
Apportionment of legislative districts [Sec. 5(3) and (4), Art. VI]

The question of the validity of an apportionment law is a justiciable question [Macias v. Comelec, 3 SCRA
1].
 Apportionment shall be made in accordance with the number of respective inhabitants [among
provinces, cities and Metro Manila area], on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. But: (i) each
city with not less than 250,000 inhabitants shall be entitled to at least one representative; and (ii) Each
province, irrespective of number of inhabitants, is entitled to at least one representative.
 Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory. This is intended to prevent gerrymandering.
Page 59 of 140
 Congress to make reapportionment of legislative districts within three years following the return of
every census.
The Party-List System [R.A. 7941 (The Party-List System Act)].

The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
Party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
Political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office. It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over
the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
Sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the following sectors: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers and professionals, whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector.
Sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share
similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. ’
Coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or

organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Registration: Manifestation to Participate in the Partv-List System Any organized group of persons
may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with
the Comelec not later than 90 days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations. Any party, organization or coalition
already registered with the Comelec need not register anew, but shall file with the Comelec not later
than 90 days before the election a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.
Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The Comelec may, motu propio or upon a verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (i) it is a
religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (ii) it
advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (iii) it is a foreign party or organization; (iv) it
is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members, or indirectly through third parties, for
partisan election purposes; (v) it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections; (vi) it declares untruthful statements in its petition; (vii) it has ceased to exist for at least one
year; and (viii) it fails to participate in the last two preceding elections or fails to obtain at least 2% of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which
it has registered.
Nomination of party-list representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit
to the Comelec not later than 45 days before the election a list of names, not less than five, from which
party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. A person may
be nominated in one list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in
the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid
for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change shall be allowed after the list
shall have been submitted to the Comelec except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in
writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall
be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are
nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
Qualifications of Partv-List nominees: Natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a

resident of the Philippines for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
90 days preceding the day of the election, and is at least 25 years of age on the day of the election. For
the youth sector, he must be at least 25 years of age but not more than 30 years of age on the day of
the election. Any youth representative who attains the age of 30 during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Page 60 of 140
Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two votes: the first is a vote for the candidate for
member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party,
organization or coalition he wants represented in the House of Representatives; provided that a vote
cast for a party, sectoral organization or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted.
In Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Comelec, G.R. No. 171271, May4,2007, the Supreme Court
held that the Commission on Elections has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups, citing Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern as complemented by the policy of full disclosure
and transparency in Government.
Number. The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of the members of the
House of Representatives including those under the party-list. For purposes of the May, 1998,
elections, the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
representation in the party-list system. In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the
following procedure shall be observed: (i) the parties, organizations and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections; and
(ii) the parties, organizations and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one-seat each; provided, that those garnering more than 2% of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; provided, finally, that
each party, organization or coalitions shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. •
In Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000, the Supreme Court
reversed the Comelec ruling that the 38 respondent parties, coalitions and organizations were each
entitled to a party- list seat despite their failure to obtain at least 2% each of the national vote in the
1998 party-list election. The Court said that the Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least four
inviolable parameters: [a] the 20% allocation- the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives; [b] the 2% threshold- only
those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
qualified to have a seat in the House; [c] the three-seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and
two additional; an<^ M proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes”.
In Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Butil Farmers Party (Butil) v. Comelec, G.R. No. 164702,
March 15, 2006 petitioners party-list groups sought the immediate proclamation by the Comelec of
their respective second nominee, claiming that they were entitled to one (1) additional seat in the
House of Representatives based on the number of votes they obtained and on the formula used by the
Supreme Court in Ang Bagong Bayani. The Court held that the formula used in the landmark case of
Veterans Federation Party, which is:
Votes cast for
Additional seats Qualified Party x Alloted seats for
Party = Votes cast for First First Party
Party
shall be followed. Ang Bagong Bayani merely reiterated this formula for computing the additional
seats which a party-list group shall be entitled to.
In Ang Bagong Bayani - OFW Labor Party v. Comelec, G.R. No.147589, June 26, 2001, the Supreme
Court said that even if major political parties are allowed by the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
under-represented.. The following guidelines should be followed in order that a political party
registered under the party-list system may be entitled to a seat in the House of Representatives: [a]
must represent marginalized and under-represented sectors; [b] major political parties must comply
with this statutory policy; [c] Ang Bagong Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (as a party) must be subject to
the express constitutional prohibition against religious sects; [d] the party must not be disqualified
under RA 7941; [e] the party must not be an adjunct of an entity or project funded by the government;
[f] the party and its nominees must comply with the requirements of the law; [g] the nominee must
also represent a marginalized or under-represented sector; and [h] the nominee must be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation.
Choosing Partv-List Representatives. Party-list representatives areproclaimed by the Comelec based

on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations or coalitions to the Comelec
according to their ranking in the list.
Page 61 of 140
Effect of change of affiliation. Any elected party-list representativewho changes his political party or
sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat; provided that if he changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation within 6 months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party- listrepresentatives, the vacancy shall be
automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the
Comelec by the same party, organization or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the
list is exhausted, the party, organization or coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.
Term of office: rights. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years, and shall
be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives
Privileges
1. Salaries
The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law.
While it is Congress, through a salary law, that determines the salary to be received by its members,
the Constitution mandates that no increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the two houses approving such increase.
Illustration: If a salary law is passed in 1983 increasing the salary of members of Congress, the same
law can only take effect for the term that begins at noon of 30 June 1992; but if a salary is passed in
1988 decreasing the salary of members of Congress, the law can take effect right away, since the
Constitution prohibits only the increase. If another salary law is passed in 1993 to increase the salary,
the same can take effect not in the term beginning at noon of 30 June 1995; the top twelve senators
elected on the 2nd Monday of May, 1992 would still be holding office then. It can only take effect in
1998. Effectively, therefore, such law can take effect only after the expiration of the longest term of a
Senator, which is six years, even if the term of the Representative who voted for the law is only 3
years.
2. Freedom from arrest
This is reinforced by Art. 145, Revised Penal Code, which provides: “The penalty of prision mayor
shall be imposed upon any person who shall use force, intimidation, threats or fraud to prevent any
member of the National Assembly from attending the meetings of the Assembly or of any of its
committees or subcommittees or divisions thereof, from expressing his opinions or casting his vote;
and the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who
shall, while the Assembly is in regular or special session, arrest or search any member thereof, except
in case such member has committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than
prision mayor. ”.
Elements of the privilege

 Congress must be in session, whether regular (sec. 15) or special (supra). It does not
matter where the member of Congress may be found (attending the session, socializing
in a private party, or sleeping at home); so long as Congress is in session, freedom
from arrest holds;
 The crime for which the member is to be arrested is punishable by 6 years of
imprisonment or less. "Punishable" refers to the maximum possible penalty which a
penal statute attaches to the offense. It follows too that if the crime is punishable by 6
years and 1 day of prision mayor or more, the member can be arrested, even if he is
session in the halls of Congress.
In People v. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875, February 3, 2000, the Supreme Court denied the
motion of Congressman Jalosjos that he be allowed to fully discharged the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee hearings despite
his having been convicted by the trial court of a non-bailable offense. The denial was
premised on the following: [i] membership in Congress does not exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons; [ii] one rationale behind
confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense, i.e., it
is the injury to the public, not the injury to the complainant, which state action in criminal
law seeks to redress; [iii] it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without
justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune from arrest during their attendance in Congress and in going to and
returning from the same; and [iv] accused-appellant is provided with an office at the House
of Representatives with a full complement of staff, as well as an office at the Administration
Page 62 of 140
Building, New Bilibid Prison, where he attends to his constituents; he has, therefore, been
discharging his mandate as member of the House of Representatives, and being a detainee,
he should not even be allowed by the prison authorities to perform these acts.
A similar ruling was made in Trillanes IV v. Judge Pimentel, G.R. No. 179817, June 27,
2008. In this case, petitioner Antonio Trillanes sought from the Makati RTC leave to attend
Senate sessions and to convene his staff, resource persons and guests and to attend to his
official functions as Senator. He anchored his motion on his right to be presumed innocent,
and claims that the Jalosjos ruling should not be applied to him, because he is a mere
detention prisoner and is not charged with a crime involving moral turpitude. The Makati
RTC denied the motion. Elevating the matter, the Supreme Court denied Trillanes’ petition
on the ground that Sec. 13, Art. Ill of the Constitution, explicitly provides that crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua are nonbailable. The Court further said that the
presumption of innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and
political rights.
3. Privilege of speech and of debate
This privilege protects the member concerned from any libel suit that may be filed against him for a
speech made "in" the halls of Congress or in any of its committees. Speech is not confined to
traditional speech but even to the casting of votes, the making of reports, a debate or discussion, even
communicative actions, and any other form of expression.
The speech, however, must be made "in" Congress in the discharge of legislative duty. Note that the
member of Congress may be held to account for such speech or debate by the House to which he
belongs.
The provision protects the Member of Congress only from being held liable outside of Congress ("in
any other place"); it does not protect him from liability "inside" Congress, i.e., from possible
disciplinary measures that his peers may impose upon him. For as mentioned above, his speech may
constitute disorderly behavior as in Osmena v Pendatun (109 Phil 863), and this may be penalized
with censure, suspension for 60 days, or expulsion, the latter two upon concurrence of 2/3 of the
membership.
It is important to note that this privilege is not absolute. The rule provides that the legislator may not
be questioned "in any other place," which means that he may be called to account for his remarks by
his own colleagues in Congress itself, and when warranted, punished for disorderly behavior.
Disqualifications
1. Incompatible office
An incompatible office is a post which a member cannot accept unless he waives or forfeits his seat in
Congress. A sensu contrario, if he waives or forfeits his seat, he may accept the other post, since the
incompatibility arises only because of his simultaneous membership in both.
Forfeiture of the seat in Congress shall be automatic upon the member’s assumption of such other
office deemed incompatible with his seat in Congress. See Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431.
However, no forfeiture shall take place if the member of Congress holds the other government office
in an ex officio capacity, e.g., membership in the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines
of the Chairman, Committee on Education, in the Senate.
2. Forbidden office
A forbidden office is one to which a member cannot be appointed even if he is willing to give up his
seat in Congress. The effect of his resignation from the Congress is the loss of his seat therein but his
disqualification for the forbidden office nevertheless remains. The prohibition lies in the "fiduciary"
nature of the relationship involved
The ban against appointment to the office created or the emoluments thereof increased shall, however,
last only for the duration of the term for which the member of Congress was elected.
Such a member cannot resign in anticipation of the passage of the law creating such office or
increasing its emolument as a way of circumventing the prohibition. However, the prohibition is not
forever (as in the Jones Law); it is for the term for which he was elected.
3. Other inhibitions
Page 63 of 140
a. Personally appearing as counsel before any court of justice, the Electoral Tribunal,
quasi-judicial bodies, and other administrative bodies
What the Constitution prohibits in the case of members of Congress who are also members
of the bar is their personal appearance before any of these bodies. This is not a prohibition
against, the practice of law in any court. Thus, a member may still sign and file his
pleadings, give legal advice, continue as partner, and have a partner or associate appear for
him in court.
b. Being interested financially in any (a) contract with, or (b) franchise or special
privilege granted by, the Government, its subdivision, agency or instrumentality, a
government owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary. The prohibition is for
the duration of his term of office.
c. Intervening in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary
benefit
d. Intervening in any matter where he may be called upon to act on account of his office
It may be noted that the last 3 prohibitions are themselves punishable acts under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
Duty to Disclose
Upon assumption of office, must make a full disclosure of financial and business interests. Shall notify
House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed
legislation of which they are authors [Sec. 12, Art. VI],
In general, a public officer or employee shall, upon assuming office and as often thereafter as may be,
required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth. But in the case
of members of Congress and other high government officials (as enumerated), the disclosure must be
made public (Art. XI, Sec. 17). Furthermore, all members of Congress shall, upon assumption of
office make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests (Art. VI, Sec. 12).
Commission on Audit, which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses
incurred for each Member (Art. VI, Sec. 20.) The purpose of public disclosure of a member's financial
status and official expenses is to make him visible to the rest, and thus give him a deterrent from
committing graft and corruption. The public has a right to know how much it is spending for its
government
The law governing this financial disclosure by public officers and employees is RA 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Every public officer shall submit to (a) the Office
of the Department Head, or (b) the Office of the President in case of a head of department or chief of
an independent office, the following:
1. A true, detailed, and sworn statement of assets and liability;
2. A statement of the amounts and sources of his income;
3. The amount of personal and family expenses, and
4. The amount of income taxes paid the previous year, on the following occasions:
(a) within 30 years after assuming office
(b) on or before April 15 after the close of the calendar
year, and
(c) upon the expiration of their term of office, or upon
resignation or separation from office.
When a member of Congress authors a proposed legislation, he must notify the House concerned of any
"potential conflict of interest" that may arise from his filing of such bill (Art. VI, Sec. 12.). Furthermore, the
records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with
law, and such books shall be audited by the
Internal Government of Congress

 Election of officers
First order of business - election by each house of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House, and such other officers that the rules of each house may provide.
A majority vote of all the respective members is required to elect these two officers.
Page 64 of 140
Upon the election of the President and the Speaker, the Constitution deems the Houses "organized."
(VI, 19)
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
 Quorum
The quorum required to conduct business is a majority (1/2 + 1) of all the members. But to pass a law,
only the votes of the majority of those present in the session, there being a quorum, are required. This
is known as the "shifting majority".
To illustrate: 13 members of the Senate are sufficient to constitute a quorum. If only 13 members are
present, a vote by 7 in favor of a bill is sufficient to pass it. But as the number of those present
increases, the number of votes needed to pass a bill would correspondingly increase, i.e., shift.
When a quorum cannot be had, a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the
attendance of the absent (recalcitrant) members by the means of arrest or such other measures and
penalties as the House may provide in its rules.
“Majority” refers to the number of members within the “jurisdiction” of the Congress (those it can
order arrested for the purpose of questioning). In this case, one Senator was out of the Philippines
which is not within the “jurisdiction” of the Senate, so that the working majority was 23 Senators.
There is a difference between a majority of "all members of the House" and a majority of "the House",
the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore, an absolute majority (12) of all members of
the Senate less one (23) constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of the
quorum. [Avelino v. Cuenco (1949)]
 Rules of proceedings
Each House or its committees may determine the rules of its proceedings. These rules include the
procedure to be followed in "inquiries in aid of legislation." The House may set aside the rules it
adopted as it sees fit, because these rules are only of a temporary nature
 Discipline of members
Each house may punish it members for "disorderly behavior." What constitutes "disorderly behavior"
is solely within the discretion of the house concerned.
House may punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of 2/3 of all its
members, suspend (for not more than sixty days) or expel a member. See Osmena v. Pendatun, 109
Phil 863, where the Supreme Court said that the determination of the acts which constitute disorderly
behavior is within the full discretionary authority of the House concerned, and the Court will not
review such determination, the same being a political question.
The penalty may consist of (i) censure; or upon a 2/3 vote of all the members of the house, (ii)
suspension, not exceeding 60 days, or (iii) expulsion. Others are: (iv) deletion of unparliamentary
remarks from the record, (v) imprisonment and (vi) fine
The suspension contemplated in the Constitution is different from the suspension prescribed in the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act [RA 3019]. The latter is not a penalty but a preliminary
preventive measure and is not imposed upon the petitioner for misbehavior as a member of Congress
[Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118364, August 10, 1995]. The Supreme Court clarified this
ruling in Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001, saying that
Sec. 13, RA 3019 (where it appears to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue the order of
suspension upon a determination of the validity of the criminal information filed before it) does not
state that the public officer should be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts charged. Furthermore, the order of suspension provided in RA 3019 is distinct
from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks. Neither does the order of suspension encroach
upon the power of Congress.
 The doctrine of separation of powers, by itself, is not deemed to have effectively excluded the
members of Congress from RA 3019 or its sanctions
Adjournment.
A majority of each House, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may determine.
See Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17, which is authority for the principle that the basis in determining the
existence of a quorum in the Senate shall be the total number of Senators who are in the country and
Page 65 of 140
within the coercive jurisdiction of the Senate. In its Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in
Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998, the Supreme Court declared that the question
of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly, especially when a quorum is obviously present, for the purpose
of delaying the business of the House.
.
Records and books of accounts
Preserved and open to the public in accordance with law; books shall be audited by COA which shall
publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each member
Legislative Journal and the Congressional Record.

It is the first time that the Constitution requires a "record" in addition to a "journal". Up to the 1973
Constitution, only a journal was required to be kept, although in practice, the legislature has always
kept a record.
The journal is only a resume of minutes of what transpired during a legislative session. In addition,
the journal contains the summary of the proceedings.
The record is the word-for-word transcript of the proceedings taken during the session. The
Constitution is silent as to what the record must contain.
However, in Art. XI, Sec. 3(3), the Constitution speaks of the vote of each member of the House
either affirming a favorable or overriding its contrary resolution of the impeachment complaint to be
"recorded."
Matters which, under the Constitution, are to be entered in the journal:

a. Yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill;
b. Veto message of the President;
c. Yeas and nays on the repassing of a bill vetoed by the President; and
d. Yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of members present.
Enrolled Bill Theory.

An enrolled bill is one duly introduced and finally passed by both Houses, authenticated by the proper
officers of each, and approved by the President. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. Court is bound
under the doctrine of separation of powers by the contents of a duly authenticated measure of the
legislature [Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1; Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14,
1997], If a mistake was made in the printing of the bill before it was certified by Congress and
approved by the President, the remedy is amendment or corrective legislation, not a judicial decree
[Casco (Phil) Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347]
Journal Entry vs. Enrolled Bill

Enrolled bill prevails, except as to matters which, under the Constitution, must be entered in the
Journal. See Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714; Morales v. Subido, 26 SCRA 150
The Congressional Record.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
Probative Value of the Journal

The journal is conclusive on the courts as to its contents, so the SC ruled in US V Pons, 34 Phil. 729
(1916). Pons, in this case was prosecuted under a criminal statute. He contended, however, that the
statute was passed past the midnight after February 28, 1914, the last day of session of the legislative
body, but that the members stopped the clock at mid-night, to pass the law. The SC rejected this claim,
ruling that the probative value of the journal could not be questioned, otherwise proof of legislative
action would be uncertain and would now have to depend on the imperfect memory of men.
Electoral Tribunals
Composition: Three Supreme Court justices designated by the Chief Justice, and six members of the
house concerned chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
registered under the party- list system represented therein. The Senior Justice shall be its Chairman.
The HRET was created as a non-partisan court. It must be independent of Congress and devoid of
partisan influence and consideration. “Disloyalty to the party” and “breach of party discipline” are not
valid grounds for the expulsion of a member. HRET members enjoy security of tenure; their
membership may not be terminated except for a just cause such as the expiration of congressional
term, death, resignation from the political party, formal affiliation with another political party, or
removal for other valid causes [Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792]. See also Tanada v. Cuenco, 100
Phil 1101
Page 66 of 140
On the disqualification of the senator-members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, because an election
contest is filed against them, see Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651, where the
Supreme Court held that it cannot order the disqualification of the Senators-members of the Electoral
Tribunal simply because they were themselves respondents in the electoral protest, considering the
specific mandate of the Constitution and inasmuch as all the elected Senators were actually named as
respondents.
In Pimentel v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002, the
Supreme Court said that even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number
and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and Commission on Appointments,
their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with the Court. Only if
the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of
political parties in the HRET and Commissiion on Appointments can the party-list representatives
seek recourse from this Court through judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before the petitioners may bring the case to
Court.
Power. The Electoral Tribunals of the Houses of Congress shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. a) In Sampayan v.
Daza, 213 SCRA 807, involving a petition filed directly with the Supreme Court to disqualify
Congressman Raul Daza for being allegedly a green card holder and a permanent resident of the
United States, the Court held that it is without jurisdiction, as it is the HRET which is the sole judge of
all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of its members. Furthermore, the case is
moot and academic, because Daza’s term of office as member of Congress expired on June 30, 1992.
The proper remedy should have been a petition filed with the Commission on Elections to cancel
Daza’s certificate of candidacy, or a quo warranto case filed with the HRET within ten days from
Daza’s proclamation.
But the HRET may assume jurisdiction only after the winning candidate (who is a party to the election
controversy) shall have been duly proclaimed, has taken his oath of office and has assumed the
functions of the office, because it is only then that he is said to be a member of the House [Aquino v.
Comelec, 248 SCRA 400]. Thus, in Vinzons-Chato v. Comelec, G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007 the
Court said that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed officed as
a Member of the House of Representatives, the Comelec’s jurisdiction over the election contest
relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdicition begins. See
also Guerrero v. Comelec, G.R. No. 137004, July 20, 2000. b) The Electoral Tribunal is independent
of the Houses of Congress
[Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139; Morrero v. Bocar, 66 Phil 429], and its decisions may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion in a petition for
certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court [Pena v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal G R No 123037, March 21, 1997].
Sessions
a) Regular Session
The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session,
unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it
may determine, until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays and legal holidays. Xxx
"[P]lace" as here used refers not to the building but to the political unit where the two Houses may be
sitting.
b) Special Session
Special sessions are held in the following instances:

o When the President calls for a special session at any time (Art. VI, Sec. 15)
o To call a special election due to a vacancy in the offices of President and Vice-President
(Art. VII, Sec. 10) in w/c Congress shall convene at 10 a.m. of the third day after the
vacancy, without need of a call.
o To decide on the disability of the President because the Cabinet (majority) has "disputed"
his assertion that he is able to dispose his duties and powers. (This takes place not when the
Cabinet first sends a written declaration about the inability of the President, but after the
President has disputed this initial declaration.) (Art. VII, Sec. 11.) Congress shall convene, if
it is not in session, within 48 hours, without need of call.
Page 67 of 140
o To revoke or extend the Presidential Proclamation of Martial Law or suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus (Art. VII, Sec. 18). Congress, if not in session, shall, within 24 hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene, without need of a call.
In the last three cases, Congress convenes without need of a call. These are exceptions to the
general rule in the 1st case that when Congress is not in session, it can only meet in special
session call by the President.
c) Joint Session
When both houses meet jointly, they generally vote separately. The reason is obvious:there
are only 24 senators, while there are 250 representatives. It would be bad policy to give one
vote to a Senator, who was elected "at large", and the same weight of vote to a
representative, who is either elected only by one legislative district or a party-list.
 Voting separately:
o Choosing the President [Sec. 4, Art. VII].
o Determine President’s disability [Sec. 11, Art. VII].
o Confirming nomination of the Vice President [Sec. 9, Art. VII].
o Declaring the existence of a state of war [Sec. 23, Art. VI],
o Proposing constitutional amendments [Sec. 1, Art. XVII],
 Voting jointly: To revoke or extend proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or placing the Philippines under martial law [Sec. 18, Art. VII].
Commission on Appointments
Composition: The Senate President, as ex officio Chairman, 12 Senatorsand 12 Members of the House
of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman shall not vote
except in case of a tie. See Daza v. Singzon, 180 SCRA 496; Coseteng v. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377;
Cunanan v. Tan, 5 SCRA 1.
In Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789, the Supreme Court heldthat a political party must have at
least two elected senators for every seat in the Commission on Appointments. Thus, where there are
two or more political parties represented in the Senate, a political party/coalition with a single senator
in the Senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission on Appointments. It is not
mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission; what the Constitution requires is that there must be
at least a majority of the entire membership.
Powers. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of its members. The
Commission shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of
all its members. See Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549; Deles v. Committee on Constitutional
Commissions, Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259; Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 169.
The Commission shall confirm or approve nominations made by the President of certain public
officers named by the Constitution or by law:
 heads of the executive departments
 ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls
 officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain
 other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution
o Chairman and members of 3 Constitutional Commissions
o regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council
o members of the Regional Consultative council
The Commission on Appointments is independent of the two Houses of Congress; its employees are
not, technically, employees of Congress. It has the power to promulgate its own rules of proceedings.
But see: Pacete v. Secretary, Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58.
The Commission on Appointments shall meet to discharge its powers and functions only while the
Congress is in session. The meeting may be called by (a) the Chairman, or (b) a majority of all its
members.
The Chairman of the Commission does not vote, except to break a tie. The Commission shall act on
all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission rules by a majority vote of all its members.
Regular appointment
Page 68 of 140
Regular appointment takes place when the President appoints an officer whose appoinment requires
confirmation by the Commission, while Congress is in session. The officer so appointed cannot
assume office at once. The President must first nominate him to the Commission. Then, the
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress from
their submission (VI, 18). Failure to act within the period is tantamount to disapproval of the
nomination, since the Constitution requires positive action by the Commission (VV). If the Congress
or the Commission itself adjourns without taking any action on the nomination, again it is deemed
disapproved (or bypassed). If the Commission approves the nomination, the Office of the President
makes an "issuance of commission." Only then can the appointee assume office.
Recess appointment
On the other hand, recess appointment takes when Congress is not in session. (This is also known as
ad-interim appointment, but the latter term is equivocal because it can be used in 2 senses: (i)
midnight appointment, which happens when the President makes an appointment before his term
expires, whether or not this is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and (ii) recess
appointment, which happens when the President makes appointment while Congress is in recess,
whether or not his term is about to expire.) Unlike regular appointment, the ad-interim appointment
made by the President is complete in itself, and thus effective at once, even without confirmation. But
this appointment has only temporary effect. When Congress convenes, the Commission would have to
act on the ad interim appointment by confirming it (in which case the appointment becomes
permanent) or disapproving it by means of a positive failure to act on the appointment (in which case
the appointment is immediately terminated). According to the Constitution, the President shall have
the power to make appointment during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
(which can only be done when Congress is in session (Art. VI, Sec. 19) or until the next adjournment
of the Congress (if the Commission fails to act earlier). (Art. VII, Sec. 16, par. 2).
Legislative Power and Process of Congress

1. General [plenary] legislative power [Sec. 1,Art. Vi], Legislative power is the power to propose,
enact, amend and repeal laws.
Limitations:
Substantive:
 Express: (ia1) Bill of rights [Art. Ill]; (ia2) On appropriations[Secs. 25 and 29 (1) & (2),
Art. VI]; (ia3) On taxation [Secs. 28 and 29 (3), Art. VI; Sec. 4 (3), Art. XIV]; (ia4) On
constitutional appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [Sec.30, Art. VI]; (ia5) No law
granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be passed [Sec. 31, Art. VI]
 Implied: (ib1) Non-delegation of powers; and (ib2) Prohibition against the passage of
irrepealable laws.
Procedural:
 Only one subject, to be expressed in the title thereof [Sec. 26, Art. VI]. See Tio v. Videogram
Regulatory Commission, 151 SCRA 208; Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479; Lidasan v.
Comelec, 21 SCRA 496. In Chiongbian v. Orbos, supra., it was held that the title is not
required to be an index of the contents of the bill. It is sufficient compliance if the title
expresses the general subject, and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that
subject. In Mariano v. Comelec, supra., it was declared that the creation of an additional
legislative district need not be expressly stated in the title of the bill. In Tatad v. Secretary of
Energy, supra., it was held that a law having a single, general subject indicated in its title
may contain any number of provisions, no matter how adverse they may be, so long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, R.A. 8249 which “defines” the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but allegedly “expands” said jurisdiction, does not violate the one-title-one-
subject requirement. The expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be
considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such
is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must have
one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this
case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. In
Farinas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003, the Supreme Court
said that Sec. 14 of R.A. 9006, which repealed Sec. 67, but left intact Sec. 68, of the
Omnibus Election Code, is not a rider, because a rider is a provision not germane to the
subject matter of the bill, and the title and objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. It need not be
expressed in the title, because the title is not required to be a complete index of its contents.
o Three readings on separate davs: printed copies of bill in its final form distributed
to Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to
its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency; upon last
Page 69 of 140
reading, no amendment allowed, and vote thereon taken immediately and yeas and
nays entered in the Journal [Sec. 26, Art. VI]. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
supra., it was held that the presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
The “unless” clause must be read in relation to the “except” clause, because the
two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the “except”
clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the “unless” clause
would not only violate the rules of grammar, it would also negate the very premise
of the “except” clause, i.e., the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a
bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. This
interpretation is also supported by the weight of legislative practice
Legislative Process.
 Requirements as to bills:
o Only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof.
o Appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives [Sec. 24, Art. VI]. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra., it was held
that RA 7716 (Expanded VAT Law) did not violate this provision. It is important to
emphasize that it is not the law, but the bill, which is required to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, because the bill may undergo such extensive changes in the
Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. As a result of the Senate action, a
distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute, not just the bill, must be
substantially the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only “to
concur with amendments” but also to “propose amendments”. It would violate the
coequality of legislative power of the Senate. The Constitution does not prohibit the filing
irr the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so
long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. This
was reiterated in the Supreme Court Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, October
30, 1995. In Alvarez v. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695, R.A. 7720, converting the Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela, into an independent, component city, was declared valid, even if it was
Senate Bill No. 1243 which was passed by the Senate, because H.B. 8817 was filed in the
House of Representatives first. Furthermore, H.B. 8817 was already approved on third
reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted its public hearing on S.B. 1243. The filing of a substitute bill in the
Senate in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House does not contravene the
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of
Representatives as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
 Procedure: “No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three
days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency” [Sec 26 (2) Art. VI]. ’
o In Arroyo, et a!., v. De Venecia, et at., G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, the Supreme
Court noted that the challenge to the validity of the enactment of R.A. 8240 (amending
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes”)
was premised on alleged violations of internal rules of procedure of the House of
Representatives rather than of constitutional requirements. Decided cases, both here and
abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules,
in the absence of showing that there was a violation of constitutional requirements or the
rights of private individuals. In its Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in the same
case [June 26, 1998], the Supreme Court ruled that it is well settled that a legislative act will
not be declared invalid for non-compliance with the internal rules of the House. In Osmena
v. Pendatun, supra., it was held that rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Furthermore,
parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
o In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra., the Supreme Court declared that the
Presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing and
distribution but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
o It is within the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee to include in its report an
entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. And if
the Committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no
reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as “an amendment
in the nature of a substitute”, so long as the amendment is germane to the subject of the bills
before the Committee [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.]. In the Resolution on the
Motion for Reconsideration, October 30, 1995, the Court adverted to its opinion in
Page 70 of 140
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, that the jurisdiction of the
Conference Committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the
House versions of the bill. It may propose an entirely new provision.
Approval of bills.
The bill becomes a law in any of the following cases:
 When the President approves the same and signs it.
 When Congress overrides the Presidential veto. If the President disapproves the bill, he shall return the
same, with his objections thereto contained in his Veto Message, to the House of origin [which shall
enter the objections at large in its Journal]. The Veto is overridden upon a vote of two-thirds of all
members of the House of origin and the other House. [Yeas and nays entered in the Journal of each
House.]
o No pocket veto.
o Partial veto. As a rule, a partial veto is invalid. It is allowed only for particular items in an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill [Sec. 27 (2), Art. VI]. See Bolinao Electronics
Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486. See also Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452, on
“item veto”. In Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133, the Supreme Court declared as
unconstitutional the veto made by President Aquino of appropriations intended for the
adjustment of pensions of retired justices [pursuant to A.M. 91-8-225-CA] under R.A. 910,
as amended by R.A. 1797, as this is not an item veto. The President cannot veto part of an
item in an appropriation bill while approving the remaining portion of the item.
Furthermore, the President cannot set aside a judgment of the Supreme Court; neither can
the veto power be exercised as a means of repealing R.A. 1797. The veto also impairs the
fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, and deprives retired justices of the right to a pension
vested under R.A. 1797.
o Legislative veto. A congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature can block or
modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a form of legislative control in the
implementation of particular executive action. The form may either be negative, i.e.,
subjecting the executive action to disapproval by Congress, or affirmative, i.e., requiring
approval of the executive action by Congress. A congressional veto is subject to serious
questions involving the principle of separation of powers. In Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506, on the issue of whether Special Provision No. 2 on
the “Use of Funds” in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP, General
Appropriations Act of 1994, which requires prior approval of Congress for the release of the
corresponding modernization funds, is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court did not resolve
the issue of legislative veto, but instead, ruled that any provision blocking an administrative
action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval for executive acts
 When the President fails to act upon the bill for thirty riaY«; from receipt thereof, the bill shall
become a law as if he had signed it [Sec. 27(1), Art. VI]. ’
Effectivity of laws [Art. 2, Civil Code]. See Tanada v. Tuvera, supra., and Executive Order No. 200, June
18,1987.
2. Power of Appropriation. In Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra., on the issue of

whether the power given to members of Congress (under the 1994 GM) to propose and identify the
projects to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund was an encroachment by the legislature
on executive power, the Supreme Court stated: The spending power, called the “power of the purse”,
belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. While it is the President who
proposes the budget, still, the final say on the matter of appropriation is lodged in Congress. The
power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under
the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
Need for appropriation. [Sec. 29 (1), Art. VI: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.”] In Comelec v. Judge Quijano-Padilla and Photokina Marketing, G.R. No.
151992, September 18, 2002, the Supreme Court said that the existence of appropriations and the availability of
funds are indispensable requisites to, or conditions sine qua non for, the execution of government contracts. The
import of the constitutional requirement for an appropriation is to require the various agencies to limit their
expenditure within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal year. In this case, since the bid of Phokokina
(P6.588B) was way beyond the amount appropriated by law (P1B) or funds certified to tbe available (P1.2B),
there is no way the Comelec should enter into the contract. The Bids and Awards Committee of the Comelec
should have rejected the bid of Photokina for being excessive.
Appropriation law, defined. A statute the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of
public funds from the Treasury.
Classification:
Page 71 of 140
General appropriation law: passed annually, intended to provide for the financial operations of the
entire government during one fiscal period. must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
Thus, since Special Provision No. 2 is an “inappropriate” provision, the President properly vetoed the
same.
Special appropriation law: designed for a specific purpose.
Implied [extra-constitutional] limitations on appropriation measures:

 Appropriation must be devoted to a public purpose. See Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, 110 Phil 331.
 The sum authorized to be released must be determinate, or at least determinable. See Guingona v.
Carague, 196 SCRA 221, where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service under the 1990 General Appropriations Act. According to the Court, the
legislative intent in R.A. 4860, Sec. 31, P.D. 1177, and P.D. 1967, is that the amount needed should be
automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest,
taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credit, indebtedness x x x when they become due
without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises, x x x
Although the decrees do not state the specific amounts to be paid x x x the amounts nevertheless are
made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees x x x The mandate is to pay only
the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges x x x when they shall become due. No
uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the
books in the Treasury.
Constitutional limitations on special appropriation measures:

 Must specify the public purpose for which the sum is intended.
 Must be supported by funds actually available as certified to by the National Treasurer, or to be raised
by a corresponding revenue proposal included therein [Sec. 25(4), Art. VI].
Constitutional rules on general appropriations law [Sec. 25, Art. VI]:

 Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget.
 The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
 No provision or enactment shall be embraced unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates. This is intended to prevent riders, or irrelevant provisions included
in the bill to ensure its approval. See Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 520.
Procedure for approving appropriations for Congress shallstnctly follow the procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments and agencies. This is intended to prevent sub rosa appropriation by
Congress.
Prohibition against transfer of appropriations. [Sec. 25 (5)-

No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations- however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriation law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations. ”] See Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 209, on the unconstitutionality of
certain provisions of P.D. 1177.
On the constitutionality of a Special Provision in the 1994 GAA which allows a member of Congress to realign
his allocation for operation expenses to any other expense category, the Supreme Court, in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra., said that the members of Congress only determine the necessity of
the realignment of savings in the allotments for their operational expenses, because they are in the best position
to do so, being knowledgeable of the savings available in some items of the operational expenses, and which
items need augmentation However it is the Senate President or the Speaker of the House of Representatives,’ as
the case may be, who shall approve the realignment. Hence, the special provision adverted to is not
unconstitutional.
ln the same case, the Supreme Court upheld the Presidential veto of a provision (in the appropriation for the
AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, 1994 GAA) which authorized the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension fund, on the ground that under Sec. 25 (5), Art VI such right must and can be exercised only by the
President of the Philippines
Prohibition against appropriations for sectarian benefit [Sec 29(2), Art. VI: No public money or property
shall be appropriated, applied paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion or of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher, or dignitary, as such except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
Page 72 of 140
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanaqe or leprosarium”]. See
Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 SCRA 201; Garces v Estenzo 104 SCRA 510. In Manosca v. Court of Appeals, supra., the
expropriation of the birthplace of Felix Manalo, founder of Iglesia ni Cristo, was deemed not violative of the
provision. The Supreme Court said that the attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little
consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might
follow from, the exercise of the power. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true, but such peculiar advantage still remains to be
merely incidental and secondary in nature.
Automatic reappropriation [Sec. 25 (7), Art. VI: “If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed
to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the
preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress’]..
Impoundment. The refusal by the President for whatever reason to spend funds made available by Congress. It is
the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type [Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra.]. This power of the
President is derived from Sec. 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987 on suspension.
Appropriation reserves. Sec. 37 of the Administrative Code authorizes the Budget Secretary to establish
reserves against appropriations to provide for contingencies and emergencies which may arise during the year.
This is merely expenditure deferral, not suspension, since the agencies concerned can still draw on the reserves
if the fiscal outlook improves.
3. Power of Taxation.
Uniformity in taxation means that persons or things belonging to the same class shall be taxed at the same rate.
It is distinguished from equality in taxation in that the latter requires the tax imposed to be determined on the
basis of the value of the property. The present Consti. Adds that the rule of taxation shall also be equitable, w/c
means that the tax burden must be imposed according to the taxpayer's capacity to pay.
Limitations:
 Rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
 Charitable institutions, etc., and all lands, building and improvements actually, directly and
exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation [Sec.
28(3), Art. VI]. See Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292; Province of Abra v.
Hernando, 107 SCRA 104.
 All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes
4. Power of Legislative Investigation [Sec. 21, Art. VI: The Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected”]. .
 Sec. 4 (b) of Executive Order No. 1, issued by President Aquino on February 28, 1986, which
provides that “no member or staff of the Commission (PCGG) shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceedings concerning matters within its
official cognizance” is repugnant to Sec. 21, Art. VII, of the Constitution, and is deemed repealed.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation encompasses everything that concerns
the administration of existing laws, as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or abolish. Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the
broad power of Congress in the absence of any constitutional basis. Furthermore, Sec. 4 (b) of E.O.
No. 1, being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with Art. XI, Sec. 1, of the Constitution
which states that “public office is a public trust”, as it goes against the grain of public accountability
and places PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of the courts, Congress and other
administrative bodies [Miguel v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006].
 Limitations:
o In aid of legislation.
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767, the inquiry was held not to be in aid of
legislation. The Supreme Court declared that the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into possible violation of Sec. 5,
RA 3019. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. Further, the issue to be investigated is
one over which jurisdiction has been acquired by the Sandiganbayan; the issue had thus been
preempted by that Court. To allow the Committee to investigate would only pose the shall be exempt
from taxes and duties [Sec. 4(3), Art. XIV]. See Abra Valley College v. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106.
Page 73 of 140
Law granting tax exemption shall be passed only with the concurrence of the majority of all the
members of Congress [Sec. 29(4), Art. VI].
Rights of persons appearing in, or affected by such, inquiry shall be respected.

In Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, supra., it was held that the legislative
inquiry does not violate the petitioners’ right to privacy. In Miguel v. Gordon, supra., the Court said
that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over
the right to the privacy of ordinary financial transactions. Employing the rational basis relationship
test laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, the Court said that there is no infringement of the individual’s right
to privacy as the requirement to disclose information is for a valid purpose; in this case, to ensure that
the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public
who invest in foreign securities.
Neither does the inquiry violate the petitioners’ right against self-incrimination, because the officers of
Standard Chartered Bank are not being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding; they are merely
summoned as resource persons, or as witnesses. Likewise, they will not be possibility of conflicting
judgments, but if the Committee’s judgment is reached before the Sandiganbayan’s, the possibility
that its influence may be made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan cannot be
discounted. The SBRC’s probe and inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.
However, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-
judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be
extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting
a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of
which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a
criminal or an administrative investigation [Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,
G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007].
In accordance with duly published rules of procedure.

In Neriv. Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180843, March 25, 2008, by a majority vote, the Supreme
Court declared that the conduct of the investigations by the Senate Committees did not comply with
the Constitution, for failure to publish the rules of procedure on logislative inquiries.
Question hour. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before
and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three
days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session. [Sec. 22, Art. VI],
A distinction has to be made between the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of
which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, and the power to conduct a question
hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function
[Senate v. Ermita, supra.]. . i)
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom,
as Chief Executive, the deparment heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty.
In such instances, Art. VI, Sec. 22, in keeping with the doctrine of separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request the appearance of department heads, who may appear with subjected to
any penalty by reason of their testimony [Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,
supra.].
Legislative Question Hour

Inquiries
Constitutional Art. VI, Sec. 21 Art. VI, Sec. 22
Provision
Topic In aid of legislation On any matter
pertaining
to the subject’s
department
Persons Subjected Any person upon Heads of
subpoena departments
Only
Page 74 of 140
Appearance of Appearance of Appearance of

Exec. Officials executive executive
officials generally officials via request
mandatory
5. Power to punish contempt. Punishment of contumacious witness may include imprisonment, for the
duration of the session. The Senate, being a continuing body, may order imprisonment for an
indefinite period, but principles of due process and equal protection will have to be considered. See
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil 29; Arnault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil 358.
In Miguel v. Gordon, supra., the Supreme Court underscored the indispensability and usefulness of
the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry. Sec. 21, Art. VI, grants the power of inquiry not only to
the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to their respective committees. Clearly, there is
a direct conferral of the power to the committees. A reasonable conclusion is that the conferral of the
legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry with it all powers necessary
and proper for its effective discharge.
In the exercise of this power, Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee,
composed of members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate. The creation of the Joint
Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and the
other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under
attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint
session of Congress, the two Houses voting separately [Ruy Elias Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004],
Even after Congress has adjourned its regular session, it may continue to perform this constitutional
duty of canvassing the presidential and vice-presidential election results without need of any call for a
special session by the President. The joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by
express directive of Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the
newly-elected President and Vice President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has
accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers
However, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation”
under Sec. 21, the appearance is mandatory. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only
way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of executive privilege.
They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may
be exempted from this power — the President — on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond
the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment.
Thus, the requirement for Cabinet Members to secure Presidential consent under Sec. 1 of E.O. 464,
which is limited only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. It cannot, however, be
applied to appearances of deparment heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in
such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid
claim of privilege is subsequently made either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary,
acting for the President. [Senate v. Ermita, supra.]
6. War powers. By a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, declare the
existence of a state of war [Sec. 23(1), Art. VI]..
7. Power to act as Board of Canvassers in election of President [Sec. 4, Art. VII]. has completed its
functions is it rendered functus officio [Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress, G.R. No. 163783,
June 22, 2004],
8. Power to call a special election for President and Vice President [Sec. 10, Art. VII].
9. Power to judge President’s physical fitness to discharge the functions of the Presidency [Sec. 11,
Art. VII],
10. Power to revoke or extend suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law [Sec. 18, Art. VII].
11. Power to concur in Presidential amnesties. Concurrence of majority of all the members of
Congress [Sec. 19, Art. VII],
12. Power to concur in treaties or international agreements. Concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate [Sec. 21, Art. VII]. See Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3
SCR A 351.
Page 75 of 140
13. Power to confirm certain appointments/nominations made by the President.

Nomination made by the President in the event of a vacancy in the Office of Vice President, from
among the members of Congress, confirmed by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of
Congress, voting separately [Sec. 9, Art. VII],
Nominations made by the President under Sec. 16, Art. VII, confirmed by Commission on
Appointments.
14. Power of impeachment [Sec. 2, Art. XI].
public officers and employees Grounds

President Culpable violation of the
Constitution
Vice-President Treason (RPC)
Justices of the Supreme Court Bribery (RA 3019)
Members of the Constitutional Graft and corruption (RA 3019)
Commissions
Ombudsman Other high crimes
Betrayal of public trust
15. Power relative to natural resources [Sec. 2, Art. XII].
16. Power to propose amendments to the Constitution [Secs. 1 and 2, Art XVII].
 Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486

o During the 89th Congress, it was found that Plaintiff had engaged in deceptive and possibly illegal
actions surrounding his service as chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor. After his
reelection to the 90th Congress, he was asked to step aside while the other representatives were
sworn in. Also, he was later asked to inform the Governor of New York that his seat was vacant.
Plaintiff sued, alleging the House did not have the constitutional authority to deny his seat when he
met the qualifications expressly set forth for Representatives in Article I of the United States
Constitution (Constitution).
o Does the House have a textual commitment in the constitution to determine the qualifications of its
members? Yes. Case reversed and remanded. The Defendants-Respondents, members of Congress
including the Speaker of the House John W. McCormack (Defendants), argued that the House has
broad powers under Article I, Section: 5 of the Constitution to determine the qualifications of its
membership. Plaintiff argued and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) agreed,
the ratification debates and historical context of the framers limit the qualifications to those set forth
in the Constitution. The Supreme Court also notes that to hold otherwise would nullify the framers’
decision to require two-thirds vote for expulsion.
 Macias v Comelec. 3 SCRA 1

o Petitioner Emilio Macias II and private respondent Herminio G. Teves both ran for the position of
Governor of Negros Oriental during the elections held on January 18, 1988. Petitioner was
proclaimed Governor by the Provincial Board of Canvassers. The proclamation was actually held,
as found by respondent COMELEC, on January 25, 1988 (p. 82, rollo), although the "Certificate of
Canvass and Proclamation" evidencing said proclamation was dated January 24, 1988. (Annex "B-
11," p. 30, Rollo). Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental,
Misamis Oriental and Bulacan and the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. They are requesting
that the respondent officials be prevented to implement RA 3040, an act that apportions
representative districts in the country. They alleged that their respective provinces were
discriminated because they were given less representation. Furthermore, they allege that RA 3040 is
unconstitutional and void because: (a) It was passed without printed final copies which must be
furnished to the members of the HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to passage, (b) It was approved
more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the population and (c) It apportioned districts
without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.
o The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House of Representatives
“shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the member of
their respective inhabitants.” A law giving provinces with less number of inhabitants more
representative districts than those with bigger population is invalid because it violates the principle
of proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution. Inequality of apportionment law is
“arbitrary and capricious and against the vital principle of equality.” as held in Houghton County v.
Blacker.
 Tan v COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727 (1986)
Page 76 of 140
o This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3,
1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante,
Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto. Pursuant to and in
implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners
opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in
complete accord with the Local Government Code because: (1) The voters of the parent province of
Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del
Norte, were not included in the plebiscite and (2) The area which would comprise the new provinc
of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area
prescribed by the governing statute
o Under Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Consititution, which states that "Sec. 3. No province, city,
municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." In
interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whenever a province is created,
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, "the approval of a majority
of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" must first be obtained. The creation of the
proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of
the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental.
 Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)

o Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal
group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was
approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list
will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said
resolution of the COMELEC.
o Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-
list representatives found in theConstitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left
the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The
20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be
more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. We rule that, in computing the
allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achievethe maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list
seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the
two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives.” either the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly
intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.
However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
 Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010)

o Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-
genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since
their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201. In its Comment, the
COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda
to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for
the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA
7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
o Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that
only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
Page 77 of 140
explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with
the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section
5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality
in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with
this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it
noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
 Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010)

o Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List(AGPP) filed with the Commission on Elections its Manifestation of
Intent to Participate in theMay 10, 2010elections. Subsequently, onMarch 23, 2010, AGPP filed its
Certificate of Nomination together with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees. OnMarch
25, 2010, petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, and Bayan Muna Party-List, represented
by TeodoroCasi, (collectively referred to ascertiorari petitioners) filed with the COMELEC a
petition for disqualification against Arroyo, pursuant to Resolution No. 8696, in relation with
Sections 2 and 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 (the Party- List System Act).
The certiorari petitioners argued that not only must the party-list organization factually and truly
represent the marginalized and the underrepresented; the nominee must as well be a Filipino citizen
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, citing in this
regard the case ofAng Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC. On this basis,
thecertioraripetitioners concluded that Arroyo cannot be considered a member of the marginalized
and underrepresented sector, particularly, the sector which the AGPP represents tricycle drivers and
security guards because he is not only a member of the First Family, but is also (a) an incumbent
member of the House of Representatives; (b) the Chairman of the Houses Energy Committee; and,
(c) a member of key committees in the House, namely: Natural Resources, Aquaculture, Fisheries
Resources, Ethics and Privileges, Justice, National Defense and Security, Public Works and
Highways, Transportation and Ways and Means.
o The court finds that the second issue has been mooted by the supervening participation, election and
proclamation of AGPP after it secured the required percentage of votes in the May 10, 2010
elections.The prohibition issue has been rendered moot since there is nothing now to prohibit in
light of the supervening events.A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy
by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon (in this case, the prevention of the
specified acts) can no longer be done. The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has
jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and
assumption of office; they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of
Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their party. In the present case, it is not
disputed that Arroyo, AGPPs first nominee, has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of
office as a Member of the House of Representatives.The court takes judicial notice, too, of the filing
of two (2) petitions forquo warrantoagainst Arroyo, now pending before the HRET.The court holds
that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has the
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyos qualifications as a Member of the
House of Representatives.
o What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of
the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected
members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET
has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and
the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins.
 Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766

o 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court
(SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions
issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list
groups and organizations failed to represent a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” their
nominees do not come from a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” and/or some of the
organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in
Congress.
o In a Decision promulgated on April 2, 2013, the high court, through Carpio’s ponencia, ruled in
favor of the 54 petitions and remanded these petitions to the Comelec. The party-list groups and
organizations covered by the 41 petitions that obtained mandatory injunction orders from the high
Page 78 of 140
court still stand a chance to make it to the 2013 party-list race as the high court ordered the poll
body to determine “whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections” under the new parameters set forth in the
Decision. The rest, meaning, the 13 other petitions, were remanded to the poll body merely for
purposes of determining whether they may be granted accreditation under the new parameters but
may not participate in the May 2013 elections.
o New parameters set forth in the Decision on who may participate in the May 2013 party-list
race and subsequent party-list elections. The Decision identified three groups that may
participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. On the part of national parties or
organizations and regional parties or organizations which intend to participate in the party-list race,
the new guidelines state that these parties “do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not
need to represent any ‘marginalized or underrepresented sector.'” As for political parties, they may
participate in the party-list race by registering under the party-list system and no longer field
congressional candidates. These parties, if they field congressional candidates, however, are not
barred from participating in the party-list elections; what they need to do is register their sectoral
wing or party under the party-list system. This sectoral wing shall be considered an “independent
sectoral party” linked to a political party through a coalition.
o The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may either represent “marginalized
and underrepresented” constituencies or those “lacking well-defined political constituencies.” The
high court went on to enumerate “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, as follows: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
 Aquino v Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995)

o On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of
Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10
months. Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that
the latter lacked the residence qualification as acandidate for congressman which under Section 6,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the
(May 8, 1995) day of the election. Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the
entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on
Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the
election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910
votes. Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the
latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the
issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the
elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence. Aquino then filed a Petition of
Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.
o The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under
the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied. Aquino has not established
domicile of choice in the district he was running in. The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention
that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the
elections in the district in which he seeks election to.
 Santiago v Guingona, G.R. 134577, (1998)

o During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both
nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the
duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen.
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority
leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only
those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen
Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.
o While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members
who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the
minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become
the minority leader. Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than
Senate President and House Speaker. Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature.
The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain
Page 79 of 140
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half
of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean
that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any
construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the
said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the
usual meanings of these terms.
 Avelino v Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)

o Senator Cuenco was elected Senate President after the seat being declared vacant resulting to the
other senators including the Senate President Avelino's walk-out.
o By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the
Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken
over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding
officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers,
change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of
the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that twelve is a majority of 24 enough to conduct business
taking into consideration the absence of Senator Confessor being out of the country and jurisdiction,
and Senator Sotto who's in the hospital.
 Alejandrino v Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924)

o Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the
privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de Vera. He was
deprived of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of being a senator. He filed mandamus and
injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel Quezon from executing the said resolution
and to declare the said resolution null and void.
o Petition dismissed. Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly
controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the petition.
 De Venecia vs. SB, G.R. No. 130240 (2002)

o On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del
Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a “Motion To Suspend The
Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the
motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on
12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18
August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.
Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on
separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body
pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of
court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice. Jose de Venecia,
Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity
as Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier, House
of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of Representatives, filed the
petition for certiorari.
o s held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8 August 1995), the suspension
provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and purpose. It is
imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of
valid Information. As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of
separation of powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The
order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Its purpose is to prevent
the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or tampering
with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. It is
thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand, the suspension or
expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its members. It is,
therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings,
or vindicate its honor and integrity.
 Casco Chemical v Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963)
Page 80 of 140
o Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding
lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the
importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of the
said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960.
Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon Resolution
No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro
Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the said refund on the ground that the exemption
granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of section 2 of RA 2609.
o Urea and formaldehyde are not exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee. Urea
formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The
petitioner’s contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction “and” between
the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of “urea
formaldehyde” and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of
the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the
bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
 Philconsa v Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)

o Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the
Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or
passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. The 1965-1966 Budget
implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set
by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementationis
violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the
term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have
expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated
in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
o In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks
of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure,
using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider
both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the
word “term” in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the
Senate and the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10),
the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that
enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become
operative. The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134
is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and
House that approved it will have expired.
 Ligot v Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)

o Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for
three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to
December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 “fixing the salaries of
constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government” was enacted into law
and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress
(senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per
annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.” Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for
retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided
for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least
twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided
“in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates
of pay as provided by law.” HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor
refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The
thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him
during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs.
Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve
therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of
his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic
Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
Page 81 of 140
o To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be
a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly
what he could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members
of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for
the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview
of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other emoluments” to their salary
as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on
December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which
they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were
permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-
General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner’s colleague, ex-Congressman Singson,
“(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result
by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”
 People v Jalosjos, G.R. NO. 132875

o While his appeal from a conviction of rape is pending, the accused, a Congressman was confined at
the national penitentiary. Since he was reelected to his position, he argued that he should be
allowed to attend the legislative sessions and committee hearings, because his confinement was
depriving his constituents of their voice in Congress.
o Election to high government office does free accused from the common restraints of general
law. Under Section II, Article VI of the Constitution, a member of the House of Rep is privileged
from arrest only if offense is punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment. Confinement of a
congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years has constitutional
foundations. If allowed to attend the congressional sessions, the accused would be virtually made a
free man. When he was elected into office, the voters were aware of his limitations on his freedom
of action. Congress can continue to function even without all its members being present. Election
to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
 Adaza v Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985)

o Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30,
1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor
on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same
elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March
27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner
Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first
among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa
on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984,
Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started
to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the
governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he
was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province
until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the
parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can
hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of
Parliament.
o The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law
practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his
holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for
the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private
citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP. This
is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the
BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors, mayors,
members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of
candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.” Indubitably, respondent falls
within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided
in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code.
 Puyat v De Guzman 113 SCRA 31 (1982)

o After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held,
one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings,
questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat
group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could “appear as counsel before
any administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not
Page 82 of 140
continue his appearance for respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent
Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a motion for
intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in
litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of the said 10
shares.
o Commissioner’s order granting Fernandez to leave to intervene in SEC was reversed and set aside.
He had signified his intention to appear as counsel for Acero which was objected to by petitioners.
He decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. the
Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an
administrative body. That is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11,
Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear
actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.
 Abbas v SET, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)

o On October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May
11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC. With the exemption of Senator Estrada, the
senators filed for motion for disqualification or inhibition from the hearing and resolution on the
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case
o Petition dismissed. The Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual
situations of for the substitution of senators designated to the Tribunal. Litigants must simply place
their trust and hopes for the vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Tribunal.
 Bondoc v Pineda, 201 SCRA 732

o In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP
were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was
proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6
are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from
the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman
Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim
Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision,
Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP
for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly
inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation
of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of
the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and
rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.
o The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must
discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach
of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the
votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman
Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of
the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of
tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore,
membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of
the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the
political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal
for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party
disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.
 Codilla v De Venecia, G.R. 150605 (2002)

o Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of
the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the City
Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga
and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so
Page 83 of 140
Codilla’s name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest
number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec.
After hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered disqualified. Codilla’s
votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and
subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with
the Comelec and also sought the annulment of Locsin’s proclamation.
o If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, the proclamation of
the candidate cannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to review its validity. Ministerial
duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidate. In Puzon vs. Cua, even the
HRET ruled that the “doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect
has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving
members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the
issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves.” This is because
the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued
by a division or en banc.
 Cunanan v Tan 5 SCRA 1 (1962)

o Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as acting Deputy
Administrator of the Reforestation Administration. Cunanan was formerly appointed in the same
position but was later on rejected by the Commision of Appointment prompting the President to
replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent. Filing the quo warranto proceeding
to the Supreme Court, Cunanan questions the validity of the convened Commission of
Appointments citing irregularities as to the numbers of members comprising the same.
o With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was ruled that such is a power vested
in the Congress as they deem it proper taking into consideration the proportionate numbers of the
members of the Commission of Appointment members as to their political affiliations. However,
with their reorganization, this affected a third party's right which they rejected as its result. To
correct this, the Supreme Court declared the reinstatement of the petitioner and ordered respondent
to vacate and turn over the office in contention.
 Tio v Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208

o Petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely
affected assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The Decree
promulgated on October 5, 1985, took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion
of its publication in the Official Gazette. PD 1994 issued a month thereafter reinforced PD 1987 and
in effect amended the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Petitioner contended among
others that the tax provision of the decree is a rider.
o The title of the decree, which calls for the creation of the VRB is comprehensive enough to include
the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covered in all its provisions. It is
unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of
the decree. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry
through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with nor foreign to
the general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the decree. The express purpose of PD 1987 to include taxation of
the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videos is evident from Preambles 2 and 5. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in
presenting the measure.
 Araullo v Abad, G.R. 209287 (2014)

o Araullo vs Aquino (July 1, 2014, penned by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin) declared unconstitutional
four “acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular
No. 541 and related issuances.” It did not declare the DAP unconstitutional, only the “acts and
practices under” it, unlike Belgica vs Ochoa (Nov. 13, 2013) which plainly declared the Priority
Development Assistance Fund unconstitutional. The four are worded in deep legalese and need to
be explained for lay readers. Backgrounder. Annually, Congress approves the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) or budget. In general, it contains an estimate of revenues and funding
sources, which are usually (1) taxes, (2) capital revenues (like proceeds from the sales of assets), (3)
grants, (4) extraordinary income (like dividends of government corporations) and (5) borrowings.
o The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by
the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government
spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for
by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP. there is no executive impoundment in the
DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to
Page 84 of 140
retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the
GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not
happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds. he transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true
that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the
Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be
made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies. Further,
transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these
projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to
them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent
under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects
is unconstitutional and is without legal basis. These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to
what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings
only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once
it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as
funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was
not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should
only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being
withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by
the Executive particularly by the DBM. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as
money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the
revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped
stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all
actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be
undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so
that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
 Belgica v Ochoa, G.R. 208566 (2013)

o In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly
referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork
Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional
Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local
Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas
Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino
presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund under the Joseph Estrada administration,
as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.
The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the
Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8,
Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created
under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social
Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential
Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and
projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
o At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the
projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the
2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be
construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4.
Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund
release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4,
paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article). Thus, legislators have been, in one form or
another, authorized to participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including
“the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release
of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition
covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must
Page 85 of 140
therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents have failed to
substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory
import. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled
in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power
of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor,
involves (a) setting apart by law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified
purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum
fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators
have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
egarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits
of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may
be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds
for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public
funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the
principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include
– or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and
hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase
“for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive
department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the
subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”
 ABAKADA Guro v Ermita, G.R. No. 168207 (2005)

o Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition
for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No.
9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10%
VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or
lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%,
effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the
law is unconstitutional.
o ince there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to
the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income
taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes. The powers which Congress is prohibited from
delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative
power which can never be delegated is theauthority to make a complete law- complete as to the
time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency
of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its
exercise which determines the validity of its delegation. For the delegation to be valid, it must be
complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. There is no
undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere
implementation of the law.
o Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are
conclusive of its due enactment.
 Fabian v Desierto, G.R. No. 129742 (1998)

o Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business with a certain Nestor
Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering
District (FMED). Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and
Page 86 of 140
Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts
to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman but the
Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later referred to the deputy
Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero. Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
o Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First
Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment
of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
 Gonzales v Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636, (1990)

o December 16, 1988 Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal Year 1989) which
eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the president.
President signed bill into law (RA 6688) but vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec 55, a general
provision. SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several department to augment any item in
the GAB thereby violation CONSTI ART VI SEC 25 (5) (page 459) SEC 16 of the GAB of 1990
provides for the same and the reason for veto remains the same with the additional legal basis of
violation of PD 1177 SEC 44 and 45 as amended by RA 6670 that authorizes the president and the
heads of depts. To use saving to augment any item of appropriations in the exec branch of
government (page 460)
o The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. Although the petitioners contend that the veto exceeded the
mandate of the line-veto power of the president because SEC 55 and SEC 16 are provisions the
court held that inappropriate provisions can be treated as items (Henry v. Edwards) and therefore
can be vetoed validly by the president. Furthermore inappropriate provisions must be struck down
because they contravene the constitution because it limits the power of the executive to augment
appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR 5.) The ‘provisions’ are inappropriate because (1) They
do not relate to particular or distinctive appropriations, (2) Disapproved or reduces items are
nowhere to be found on the face of the bill and (3) It is more of an expression of policy than an
appropriation
 Tanada v Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) [See previous]
 Tan v Del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324 (2000)

o Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation
Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law. Petitioners contended that
public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional
partnerships.
o Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or
objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.
Uniformity does not violate classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are
substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3)
the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the
classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class.
 Lung Center v QC, G.R. No. 144104 (2004)

o Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No.
1823. It is the registered owner of the land on which the Lung Center of the Philippines Hospital is
erected. A big space in the ground floor of the hospital is being leased to private parties, for canteen
and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their
private clinics. Also, a big portion on the right side of the hospital is being leased for
commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden
Center. the Lung Center of the Philippines filed a claim for exemption on its averment that it is a
charitable institution with a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds exclusively used for charity
patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity patients. The claim
forexemption was denied, prompting a petition for the reversal of the resolution of the City
Assessor with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City, which denied the same.
Page 87 of 140
o The Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution. To determine whether an enterprise is
a charitable institution or not, the elements which should be considered include the statute creating
the enterprise, its corporate purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods of administration,
the nature of the actual work performed, that character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness
of the beneficiaries and the use and occupation of the properties. However, under the Constitution,
in order to be entitled to exemption from real property tax, there must be clear and unequivocal
proof that (1) it is a charitable institution and (2)its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY
and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for
treatment of patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-
paying, other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals and enterprises. Exclusive is
defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others, debarred from participation or
enjoyment. If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used
for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation.
 First Lepanto Ceramics v CA, 237 SCRA 519 (1994)

o The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended provided that appeals from decisions of the
Board of Investments(BOI) shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a few months after the
1987 Constitution took effect (July 17, 1987), the OmnibusInvestments Code of 1987 (EO 226) was
promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof that such appeals be directly filed with the SC. The
SC later promulgated, under its rule-making power, Circular No. 1-91 which confirmed that
jurisdiction of the CA over appealsfrom the decisions of the BOI. SC’s Second Division, relying on
said Circular, accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in this present case. They
contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) cannot be deemed to have superseded Art 82
of EO 226 (a legislation).
o EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitution took effect February 2, 1987. Thus, Art 82
of EO 226, which provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is invalid and
therefore never became effective for the concurrence of the Court was no sought in its enactment.
Thus, the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended still stands. The exclusive jurisdiction
on appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.
 Tolentino v Secretary of Finance, G.R. 115455 (1994)

o RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of
RA 7716 on various grounds. Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from
the House of Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it
did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and
26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
o The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is
sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo
extensive changes in the Senate. SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President
need not meet the requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
 Bengzon v Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767

o Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group
of the properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG. Senator
Enrile citing probable violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Section 5. The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed away prior the decision of the
court issued this petition for prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order and/or
injuctive relief enjoin the Blue Ribbon committee of compelling them to appear before them
o The Supreme court granted the petition. The committee investigation wanted by Senator Enrile is
not in aid of a legislation, therefore is violative of the separation of powers between the Senate or
Congress and that Judiciary. The pending civil case of the petitioners under Civil Case No. 0035
before the Sandiganbayan is where these issues by the Senate should be discussed. Saying further
that the power of the Senate and Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation is not
absolute or without limitation.
 Senate v Ermita, G.R. 169777 (2006)

o Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by the President.
Petitioners contend that the President abused its power and prayed that said law be declared null
and void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments obtain the consent of the President before they
can validly appear before investigations including the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants
executive privilege on all classified or confidential information between the President and the
public officers covered by the EO.
o The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the Constitution.
This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry – with process to enforce
it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
Page 88 of 140
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and when it does not possess the required information,
recourse must be had on others who possess it. This power is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch. The operation of the government is a proper subject for investigation, as held in
Arnault case. Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to
the power of inquiry, which fall under the rubric of ‘executive privilege’. It is defined by Schwartz
as “the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts and the
Congress.” (e.g. state secret privilege, informer’s privilege, generic privilege). Executive privilege,
whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain
types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a
claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in
which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the
duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary
character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
o A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid
of legislation. These are two distinct functions of the legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while closely
related does not pertain to the same power of the Congress. One specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation with the aim of eliciting information that may be used in
legislation while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which
is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Hence, the oversight function of
Congress may only be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power – the president on whom the executive power is vested, hence beyond the reach of the
Congress except by the power of impeachment. Members of SC are likewise exempt from this
power of inquiry. This is on the basis of separation of powers and fiscal autonomy, as well as the
constitutional independence of the judiciary.
 Belgica (G.R. 208566, 2013)

 Araullo v Abad (G.R. 209287)
 Arnault v Balagtas, 97 Phil 358

o This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of Prisons,
Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding Arnault in
contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted business in relation
to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The circumstances of
Arnault's incarceration are described in the companion case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which
affirmed the Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for defying or refusing to comply
with an order in a legislative inquiry.Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one
Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate,
obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114.
o The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner incarcerated. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have
the right to review the findings of the Senate. In the above quoted resolution, the Senate in stating
that petitioner “has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to
whom he gave the amount of P440,000” and that the situation of petitioner “has not materially
charged since he was committed to prison”, clearly shows that the Senate believes that Arnault was
still trying to deceive them. The CFI on the other hand arrogated unto itself to review such finding
and held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the questions of the Senate in its investigation of the
Buenavista and Tambobong deal. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be
invoke are when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has
been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion. The legislature has the power to punish
recalcitrant witnesses. This power is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be
considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said
power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base
intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and
information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? The legislative
department should not be constrained to look to the courts whenever for every act of refusal, every
act of defiance, every act of contumacy with which it is faced.
 Article VII, Philippine Constitution
 Republic v Sandiganbayan, GR 152154 (2003)

o Republic (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the
Page 89 of 140
Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA 1379. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement
and the Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children
and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the
Marcos family
o RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to
forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful
income of the public officer who owns it. The following facts must be established in order that
forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected: (1) ownership by the public officer of
money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and
(2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly
disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer. (3) that the said amount is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property.
o The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine
National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002,
plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines
 Estrada v Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738 (2001)

o It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7,
impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft
and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11
senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against
Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution
panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada. On
January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term
as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
o Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of people power of freedom of speech
exercise of the people power of and freedom of assemblyto petition the
revolution which overthrew the whole government for redress of grievances which
government. only affected the office of the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the intra constitutional and the resignation of the
new government that resulted from it cannot be sitting President that it caused and the
the subject of judicial review succession of the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
prejudicial publicity.
o Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President
Estrada left the Palace. Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing
material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.
C. The Executive Department
Page 90 of 140
 Concepts
Qualifications of a President Natural-born citizen of the

Philippines
Registered voter
Able to read and write
40 years of age on the day of

election
Resident of the Philippines for

at least 10 years immediately
preceding the election
Term of Office Six [6] years
Limitation No re-election: and no person
who has succeeded as President
and has served as such for more
than four years shall be
qualified for election to the
same office at any time
The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election
is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, extended to noon of June 30, 1992 [Sec. 5, Art. XVIII],
See Osmena v. Comelec, 199 SCRA 750.
Congress as canvassing board.

Returns of every election forPresident and Vice President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to Congress, directed to the Senate
President who, upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, shall, not later than 30 days after the day
of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity
and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. Congress shall
promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. In case two or more candidates shall have
an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall be chosen by a majority vote of all the
members of Congress.
 Sec. 18.5 of R.A. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003),insofar as it grants sweeping
authority to the Comelec to proclaim all winning candidates, is unconstitutional as it is
repugnant to Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution vesting in Congress the authority to proclaim
the winning candidates for the positions of President and Vice-President [Makalintal v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003].
 In the exercise of this power, Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional
Committee, composed of members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate. The
creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have
deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives,
because under the very Rules under attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee
shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of both Houses of Congress, voting
separately [Ruy Elias Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004]
 Even after Congress has adjourned its regular session, it may continue to perform this
constitutional duty of canvassing the presidential and vice-presidential election results without
need of any call for a special session by the President. The joint public session of both Houses
of Congress convened by express directive of Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution to canvass
the votes for and to proclaim the newly-elected President and Vice-President has not, and
cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only
when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio [Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the votes cast for President and Vice
President, G R No 163783 June 22, 2004],
 There is no constitutional or statutory basis for Comelec to undertake a separate and an
“unofficial” tabulation of, results, whether manually or electronically. By conducting such
“unofficial” tabulation, the Comelec descends to the level of a private organization, spending
public funds for the purpose. This not only violates the exclusive prerogative of NAMFREL to
conduct an “unofficial” count, but also taints the integrity of the envelopes containing the
election returns and the election returns themselves. Thus, if the Comelec is proscribed from
Page 91 of 140
conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the
Comelec is, with more reason, prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes
[Brillantes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004].
Oath of Office
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as
President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate to myself to the service
of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
Supreme Court as Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose
Privileges
1. Official residence.
2. Salary. Determined by law; shall not be decreased during tenure. No increase shall take effect
until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was
approved.
3. Immunity from suit. In Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393, it was held that while the
President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting suit. See also In Re:
Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160. In Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil 534, the Supreme Court said
that the President is immune from civil liability. After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot
invoke immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was
President which were not performed in the exercise of official duties [Estrada v. Desierto,
G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 02, 2001].
Executive Privilege.
It has been defined as “the right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately, the public”. Thus, presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings, like the
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions
of either House of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot
be pried open by a co-equal branch of government [Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April
20, 2006], The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
the inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as
in the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers
may enjoy greater confidentiality than others [Neri v. Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180843,
March 25, 2008],
However, the privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information (in this case to Congress), the necessity for withholding the information must be of
such a high degree as the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. In
light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the
President (and to the Executive Secretary, by order of the President) the power to invoke the
privilege [Senate v. Ermita, supra.].
In Neri, a majority of the members of the Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the petitioner to
answer the three questions asked during the Senate inquiry because the information sought by
the three questions are properly covered by the presidential communications privilege, and
executive privilege w,as validly claimed by the President, through the Executive Secretary.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” (the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other countries) of the President; second, the
communications were received by a close advisor of the President, Secretary Neri being a
member of the Cabinet and by virtue of the “proximity test”, he is covered by executive
privilege; and third, there was no adequate showing by the respondents of the compelling need
for the information as to justify the limitation of the privilege, nor was there a showing of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall not hold any other office or employment
 The President
o The President can assume a Cabinet post, (because the departments are mere
extensions of his personality, according to the Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency, so no objection can be validly raised based on Art. VII, Sec. 13.).
Page 92 of 140
o The President is the Chairman of NEDA. (Art. XII, Sec. 9)

 The Vice President
o The Vice President may be appointed to the Cabinet, without need of confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments; and the Secretary of Justice is an ex officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council
 The Cabinet
o The Secretary of Justice shall be an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council. (Art. VIII, Sec. 8[1])
o The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as member of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is prohibited from
receiving any compensation for this additional office, because his services are
already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It
follows that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA Board merely as representative of
the Secretary of Labor, is likewise prohibited from receiving any compensation
therefor. Otherwise, the representative would have a better right than his principal,
and the fact that the petitioner’s position as Director IV of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) is not covered by the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union
case is of no moment. After all, the petitioner attended the PEZA Board meetings by
authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor; without such designation or
authority, petitioner would not have been in the Board at all [Bitonio v. Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 147392, March 12, 2004].
o Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position,
appointive officials shall not hold any other office or employment in the Government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government- owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Art. IX, B, 7, par. 2)
In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, the Supreme Court declared as
unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 which allowed Cabinet members to hold two other
offices in government, in direct contravention of Sec. 13, Art. VII. The prohibition on the
President and his official family is all-embracing and covers both public and private office
employment, not being qualified by the phrase “in the Government” x x x This is proof of the
intent of the Constitution to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter
prohibitions.
This prohibition must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity, as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of the said officials’ office. The reason is that
these posts do not comprise “any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition, but properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. To
illustrate, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of
the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority and the Light Rail Transit Authority. The ex-officio
position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that
the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in said
position.
The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached
to the principal office [National Amnesty Commission v. CO A, G.R. No. 156982, September 8,
2004].
Rules on Succession
1. Vacancy at the beginning of the term.
 Death or permanent disability of the President-elect: Vice President-elect shall
become President.
 President-elect fails to qualify: Vice President-elect shall act as President until the
President-elect'shall have qualified.
 President shall not have been chosen: Vice President-elect shall act as President until
a President shall have been chosen and qualified.
 No President and Vice President chosen nor shall have qualified, or both shall have
died or become permanently disabled: The President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as President until a
President or a Vice President shall have been chosen and qualified. In the event of
inability of the officials mentioned, Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner
in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice
President shall have qualified.
2. Vacancy during the term:

Page 93 of 140
 Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the

President: Vice President shall become the President.
In Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G. R. No.

146738, March 2, 2001, the Supreme Court declared that the resignation of
President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, [i] he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President; [ii] he
emphasized he was leaving the palace for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any
kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon
as the disability disappears); [iii] he expressed his gratitude to the people
for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to
the past opportunity); [iv] he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come in the same service of the country; and [v] he
called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. The Court declared that the
elements of a valid resignation are: [1] intent to resign; and [2] act of
relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
 Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of President and
Vice President: Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or Vice President shall be
elected and qualified. Congress, by law, shall provide for the manner in which one is
to act as President in the event of inability of the officials mentioned above.
 Temporary Disability.
1. When President transmits to the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to
the contrary: such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.
2. When a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the Senate
President and the Speaker their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President
shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President, x x x Thereafter, when the President transmits to the Senate
President and Speaker his written declaration that no inability exists, he
shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a
majority of the Members of the Cabinet transmit within 5 days to the
Senate President and Speaker their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, Congress shall
decide the issue. For this purpose, Congress shall convene, if not in
session, within 48 hours. And if, within 10 days from receipt of the last
written declaration or, if not in session, within 12 days after it is required
to assemble, Congress determines by a 2/3 vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice President shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
3. Constitutional duty of Congress in case of vacancy in the offices of President and Vice
President: At 10 o’clock in the morning of the 3rd day after the vacancy occurs, Congress shall
convene without need of a call, and within 7 days enact a law calling for a special election to
elect a President and a Vice President to be held not earlier than 45 nor later than 60 days from
the time of such call. The bill shall be deemed certified and shall become law upon its approval
on third reading by Congress, x x x The convening of Congress cannot be suspended nor the
special election postponed, x x x No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs
within 18 months before the date of the next presidential election.
The Vice President

Vacancy in the office of the Vice President [Sec. 9, Art. VII]: The Presidentshall nominate a
Vice president from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who
shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of
Congress voting separately.
Powers of the President

1. The Executive Power
The executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws.In National
Electrification Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143481, February 15,
Page 94 of 140
2002, the Supreme Court said that as the administrative head of the government, the
President is vested with the power to execute, administer and carry out laws into
practical operation. Executive power, then, is the power of carrying out the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance
Authority to reorganize the Officeofthe President. TheAdministrative Code of 1987

(EO 292) expressly grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office
of the President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the
recurring need of every President to reorganize his office “to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency”. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the
Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must
be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit
to carry out his directives and policies. But the power to reorganize the Office of the
President under Sec. 31 (2) and (3) of the Administrative Code should be
distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under
Sec. 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions
from one unit to another. In contrast, under Sec. 31 (2) and (3), the President’s power
to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper is limited to merely
transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or
Agencies, and vice versa [Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003].
In Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil 451, and in Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil 62,
the Supreme Court declared that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of
the Government of the Philippines and no other, and that all executive authority is
thus vested in him. [This is in keeping with the rule announced in Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, that the specific grant of executive powers is not inclusive but is
merely a limitation upon the general grant of executive power.] However, in Lacson
v. Roque, 92 Phil 456, and in Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil 143, the Supreme Court
opted for a stricter interpretation of executive power, e.g., the President’s power of
general supervision over local governments could be exercised by him only as may
be provided by law. See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, on certain “residual
powers” of the President of the Philippines.
In Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc.(MEWAP) v.

Romulo, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007, it was held that the President has the
authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the
Constitution and statutes. This authority is an adjunct of the President’s power of
control under Art. VII, Secs. 1 and 17, and it is also an exercise of his “residual
powers”. However, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the
reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive department.
It is not for the President to determine the validity of a law since this is a question
addressed to the judiciary. Thus, until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional,
the President has a duty to execute it regardless of his doubts on its validity. A
contrary opinion would allow him to negate the will of the legislature and to
encroach upon the prerogatives of the Judiciary.
2. The Power of Appointment

Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. It is distinguished from
designation in that the latter simply means the imposition of additional duties,
usually by law, on a person already in the public service. It is also different from the
commission in that the latter is the written evidence of the appointment.
Appointments, classified.
Permanent or temporary. Permanent appointments are those extended to persons
possessing the qualifications and the requisite eligibility and are thus protected by
the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Temporary appointments are given
to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and without the necessity of just
cause or a valid investigation; made on the understanding that the appointing power
has not yet decided on a permanent appointee and that the temporary appointee may
be replaced at any time a permanent choice is made.
A temporary appointment and a designation are not subject to confirmation by the

Commission on Appointments. Such confirmation, if given erroneously, will not
make the incumbent a permanent appointee [Valencia v. Peralta, 8 SCRA 692].
Page 95 of 140
In Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, it was held that where a person
is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall
hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by
the appointing authority. In this sense, a designation is considered only an
acting or temporary appointment which does not confer security of tenure
on the person named.
Regular or ad interm. A regular appointment is one made by the President while

Congress is in session, takes effect only after confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, and once approved, continues until the end of the term of the
appointee. An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress
is not in session, takes effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments or upon the next adjournment of Congress. In the
latter case, the ad interim appointment is deemed “by-passed” through inaction. The
ad interim appointment is intended to prevent interruptions in vital government
services that would otherwise result from prolonged vacancies in government
offices.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment [Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng

Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22]. It is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by
the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character [Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002].
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the

Constitution: disapproval of the appointment by the Commission on Appointments,
or adjournment by Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on the
appointment. There is no dispute that when the Commission on Appointments
disapproves an ad interim appointment, the appointee can no longer be extended a
new appointment, inasmuch as the disapproval is a final decision of the Commission
in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President.
Such disapproval is final and binding on both the appointee and the appointing
power. But when an ad interim appointment is by-passed because of lack of time or
failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize, there is no final decision by
the Commission to give or withhold its consent to the appointment. Absent such
decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment [Matibag v.
Benipayo, supra.].
Officials who are to be appointed bv the President.

The first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, says that the President shall nominate, and with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the following: {a] Heads of executive
departments; [b] Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; [c] Officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and [dj Those other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in the Constitution.
In Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, the Supreme Court declared that the
foregoing are the only categories of appointments which require confirmation by the
Commission on Elections. In this case, it was held that the appointment of Salvador
Mison as Commissioner of Customs needs no confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, because the Commissioner of the Customs is not among the officers
mentioned in the first sentence, Sec. 16, Art. VII. On the other hand, in Quintos-
Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on Appointments,
177 SCRA 259, the appointment of a sectoral representative by the President of the
Philippines is specifically provided for in Sec. 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution.
Thus, the appointment of a sectoral representative falls under category [d] above.
In Soriano v. Lista, G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003, the Supreme Court said that
because the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is no longer part of the Philippine Navy
or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but is now under the Department of
Transporation and Communications (DOTC), a civilian agency, the promotion and
appointment of respondent officers of the PCG will not require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Obviously, the clause “officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain” refers to military officers alone.
The second sentence of Sec. 16, VII, states that he shall also appoint [a] All other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law; and [b] Those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint.
Page 96 of 140
In Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 16, the Supreme Court held that
the appointment of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not
otherwise provided for in the Constitution or in the law. Thus, there is no necessity
for such appointment to be passed upon by the Commission on Appointments. In
Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254, Article 215 of the Labor Code, as amended by
R.A. 6715, insofar as it requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of the appointment of the NLRC Chairman and commissioners, is unconstitutional,
because it violates Sec. 16,Art. VII. Infact, inManalov. Sistoza, G.R. No.
107369,August 11,1999, the Supreme Court said that Congress cannot, by law,
require the confirmation of appointments of government officials other than those
enumerated in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII.
In Tarrosa v. Singson, supra., the Court denied the petition for prohibition filed by
the petitioner as a “taxpayer” questioning the appointment of Gabriel Singson as
Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments as provided in RA 7653, calling attention to its ruling
in Calderon v. Carale. The petition was dismissed, however, primarily on the ground
that it was in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding, which can be commenced
only by the Solicitor General or by “a person claiming to be entitled to a public
office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another”.
In Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 113956, July 21, 2006, the Supreme Court declared
that a statute cannot circumvent the constitutional provisions on the power of
appointment by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the co-
workers in that office. This manner of filling vacancies in public office has no
constitutional basis. Thus, because the challenged section of the law is
unconstitutional, it is the President who shall appoint the trustees, by virtue of Sec.
16, Art. VII of the Constitution which provides that the President has the power to
appoint officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Steps in the appointing process:

 Nomination by the President;
 Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;
 Issuance of the commission;
 Acceptance by the appointee.
In Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil 740,, the Supreme Court declared that an appointment is deemed
complete only upon its acceptance. Pending such acceptance, which is optional to the
appointee, the appointment may still be validly withdrawn. Appointment to a public office
cannot be forced upon any citizen except for purposes of defense of the State under Sec. 4, Art.
II, as an exception to the rule against involuntary servitude.
Discretion of Appointing Authority. Appointment is essentially a discretionary power and must be

performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee, if issued a permanent appointment, should possess the minimum qualification
requirements, including the Civil Service eligibility prescribed by law for the position. This discretion
also includes the determination of the nature or character of the appointment, i.e., whether the
appointment is temporary or permanent. See Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327; Lapinid
v. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 106; Pobre v. Mendieta, 224 SCRA 738.
In Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, several Senators, including
members of the Commission on Appointments, questioned the constitutionality of the
appointments issued by the President to respondents as Acting Secretaries of their respective
departments, and to prohibit them from performing the duties of Department Secretaries. In
denying the petition, the Supreme Court said that the essence of an appointment in an acting
capacity is its temporary nature. In case of a vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of
the President, such as the office of Department Secretary, the President must necessarily
appoint the alter ego of her choice as Acting Secretary before the permanent appointee of her
choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego,
whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be
a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from
President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the
recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
Page 97 of 140
Special Constitutional Limitations on the President’s appointing power:

 The President may not appoint his spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, as Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or -controlled corporations [Sec. 13, Art. VII].
 Appointments extended by an acting President shall remain effective unless revoked by the
elected President within ninety days from his assumption of office [Sec. 14, Art. VII].
 Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or acting President shall not make appointments except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety [Sec. 15, Art. VII].
In De Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001, the Supreme
Court ruled that this provision applies only to presidential appointments. There is no
law that prohibits local executive officials from making appointments during the last
days of their tenure.
During this period, the President is neither required to make appointments to the
courts nor allowed to do so. Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the
President is required by law to fill up vacancies in the courts within the time frames
provided therein, unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Article VII. While the filling up of
vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in
this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during
the period of the ban [In Re: Mateo Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9,
1998].
[Note: The presidential power of appointment may also be limited by Congress through its power to
prescribe qualifications for public office; and the judiciary may annul an appointment made by the
President if the appointee is not qualified or has not been validly confirmed.]
3. The Power of Removal. As a general rule, the power of removal may be implied from the
power of appointment. However, the President cannot remove officials appointed by him
where the Constitution prescribes certain methods for separation of such officers from public
service, e.g., Chairmen and Commissioners of Constitutional Commissions who can be
removed only by impeachment, or judges who are subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. In the cases where the power of removal is lodged in the Presfdent, the same
may be exercised only for cause as may be provided by law, and in accordance with the
prescribed administrative procedure.
 Members of the career service of the Civil Service who are appointed by the
President may be directly disciplined by him [Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA
710], provided that the same is for cause and in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law.
 Members of the Cabinet and such officers whose continuity in office depends
upon the pleasure of the President may be replaced at any time, but legally
speaking, their separation is effected not by removal but by expiration of their
term. See Alajar v. Alba, 100 Phil 683; Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA
231.
4. The Power of Control

Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter [Mondano v. Silvosa, supra.]. It is
distinguished from supervision in that the latter means overseeing, or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate
The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of
Health under the Constitution and statutes. This authority is an adjunct of his power
of control under Art. VII, Sections 1 and 17, of the Constitution. While the power to
abolish an office is generally lodged in the legislature, the authority of the President
to reorganize the executive branch, which may incidentally include such abolition, is
permissible under present laws [Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the
Philippines (MEWAP) v. Romulo, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007].
The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his
residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book II, Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of the Philippines), which grants the President broad
organization powers to implement reorganization measures. Further, Presidential
Decree No. 1772, which amended P.D. 1416, grants the President the continuing
authority to reorganize the national government which includes the power to group,
Page 98 of 140
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create

and classify functions, services and activities, and to standardize salaries and
materials [MEWAP v. Romulo, supra.].
Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith incarrying out the
reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive department if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. R.A, 6656 enumerates
the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal
of civil service employees as a result of reorganization: (a) where there is a
significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are
replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the
original offices; and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation [MEWAP
v. Romulo, supra.].
The alter ego principle. Also known as the “doctrine of qualified political agency”.
Under this doctrine which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executives
and administrative organizations are adjuncts officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail
or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to
make them perform these duties. of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive [DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees. G.R.
No. 149724, August 19, 2003].
The President may exercise powers conferred by law upon Cabinet members or other
subordinate executive officers [City of lligan v. Director of Lands, 158 SCRA 158; Araneta v.
Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328], Even where the law provides that the decision of the Director of
Lands on questions of fact shall be conclusive when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, the same may, on appeal to the President, be reviewed and reversed by
the Executive Secretary [Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895]. Thus, in Gascon v.
Arroyo, 178 SCRA 582, it was held that the Executive Secretary had the authority to enter into
the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with ABS-CBN, since he was acting on behalf of the President
who had the power to negotiate such agreement.
Applying this doctrine, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may
validly be delegated to his Cabinet Members exercising control over a particular executive
department. Accordingly, in this case, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR
by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal,
South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego of the
President, is presumed to be the act of the President because the latter had not expressly
repudiated the same [DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees, supra.].
But even if he is an alter-ego of the President, the DECS Secretary cannot invoke the
President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him, inasmuch as the questioned acts are
not those of the President [Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000].
Appeal to the President from decisions of subordinate executive officers, including Cabinet
members, completes exhaustion of administrative remedies [Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125
SCRA 302], except in the instances when the doctrine of qualified political agency applies, in
which case the decision of the Cabinet Secretary carries the presumptive approval of the
President, and there is no need to appeal the decision to the President in order to complete
exhaustion of administrative remedies [Kilusang Bayan, etc., v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92],
But the power of control may be exercised by the President only over the acts, not over the
actor [Angangco v. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619].
The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) is under the control of the Office of the
President. All projects undertaken by SBMA involving P2- million or above require the
Page 99 of 140
approval of the President of the Philippines under LOI 620 [Hutchinson Ports Phils, Ltd. V.
SBMA, G.R. No. 131367, August 31, 2000] .
Power of control of Justice Secretary over prosecutors. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,

supra., it was reiterated that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the
Secretary of Justice who exercises the power of direct control and supervision over
prosecutors. Review, as an act of supervision and control by the Justice Secretary, finds basis
in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. This power may still be availed of
despite the filing of a criminal information in Court, and in his discretion, the Secretary may
affirm, modify or reverse the resolutions of his subordinates. The Crespo ruling did not
foreclose the Justice Secretary’s power of review. Thus, where the Secretary of Justice
exercises his power of review only after an information is filed, trial courts should defer or
suspend arraignment and other proceedings until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment,
however, does not mean that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice, because jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.
See also Solar Team Entertainment v. Judge How, G.R. No. 140863, August 22, 2000;
Noblejas v. Salas, 67 SCRA 47; Villegas v. Enrile, 50 SCRA 11; David v. Villegas, 81 SCRA
842.
5. The President exercises only the power of general supervision over local governments
[Sec. 4, Art. X], i)
On the President’s power of general supervision, however, the President can only interfere in
the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter had acted
contrary to law. The President or any of his alter egos, cannot interfere in local affairs as long
as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
Constitution. Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter
the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a
patent nullity, because it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well as the doctrine of
separation of powers of the executive and the legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations [Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350. December 3, 2002].
Sec. 187, R.A. 7160, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review the constitutionality
or legality of a tax ordinance — and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both grounds — is
valid, and does not confer the power of control over local government units in the Secretary of
Justice, as even if the latter can set aside a tax ordinance, he cannot substitute his own
judgment for that of the local government unit [Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135],
In Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000, the Supreme Court held that Sec. 4,
Administrative Order No. 327, which withholds 5% of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)
of local government units, is unconstitutional, because the President’s power over local
governments is only one of general supervision, and not one of control. A basic feature of local
fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of LGU shares in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution.
6. The Military Powers [Sec. 18, Art. VII]
a. The Commander-in-Chief clause.
As Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, the President has the
following powers:
 He may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.
 He may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or
 He may proclaim martial law over the entire Philippines or any part thereof.
“The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armedforces of the

Philippines...” In Gudaniv. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, the Senate
Committee on National Defense invited several senior AFP officers to testify on
matters related to the conduct of the 2004 elections. AFP Chief of Staff General
Senga wrote Senator Biazon, chairman of the Senate Committee, that “no approval
has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear” at the Senate
hearing. This notwithstanding, General Gudani and Col. Balutan attended and both
testified atthe hearing. On recommendation of the Office of the Provost Marshal
General, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were charged with violation of Articles of
War 65, on will fully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to Articles of War 97,
Page 100 of 140
on conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline. Gudani and Balutan
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, asking that the order of PGMA
preventing petitioners from testifying be declared unconstitutional, the charges for
violation of the
To call out (such) armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra., the Supreme Court said that the

petitioners failed to prove that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power,
by issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. The
Court noted the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum
showing a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the record. Thus, absent any contrary allegations,
the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017, calling for
military aid. Indeed, judging from the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo
was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what
she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid her
in suppressing lawless violence, invasion or rebellion; this involves ordinary police
action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is
considered illegal or ultra vires. For this
Articles of War be quashed, and the respondents be permanently enjoined from proceeding
against the petitioners. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent
before appearing in Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent specie
of presidential authority — the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. By
tradition and jurisprudence, these commander- in-chief powers are not encumbered
by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or
executive control.
The vitality, of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the AFP is
most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civil supremacy over the military, and
to the general stability of our representative system of government. The Court quoted
Kapunan v. De Villa: “The Court is of the view that such is justified by the
requirements of military discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of
persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be
circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual
rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its
duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline
within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules
must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier’s personal view on the
matter.”
Reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of her powers. She cannot invoke
a greater power when she wishes to act under a lesser power.
General Order No. 5, issued to implement PP 1017, is valid. It is an order issued by

the President, acting as commander- in-chief, addressed to subalterns in the AFP to
carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it provides a valid standard —
that the military and the police should take only the “necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence”. But the
words “acts of terrorism” found in the GO, had not been legally defined and made
punishable by Congress, and thus, should be deemed deleted from the GO. However,
PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the President the authority to
promulgate “decrees”, because legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
Congress. Likewise, the inclusion in PP 1017 of Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution
is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers. Sec. 17, Art. XII, must
be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause, and thus, requires a
delegation from Congress.
In Guanzort v. de Villa, 181 SCRA 623, the Supreme Court recognized, as part of the military
powers of the President, the conduct of “saturation drives” or “areal target zoning” by
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Page 101 of 140

In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, the
Supreme Court said that when the President calls out the armed forces to suppress lawless
violence, rebellion or invasion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom. The Court cannot overrule the President’s discretion or substitute its own. The
only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary”, the President may call out the armed
forces. In the exercise of the power, on-the-spot decisions may be necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the
decision to call out the armed forces must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any
effect at all.
In Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001, the Supreme Court said that the President
has discretionary authority to declare a “state of rebellion”. The Court may only look into the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of the power.
In Sanlakas v. Reyes, supra., it was held that the President’s authority to declare a “state of
rebellion” springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws
strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. However, a mere declaration of a state of
rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. There is also no basis for
the apprehensions that, because of the declaration, military and police authorities may resort to
warrantless arrests. As held in Lacson v. Perez, supra., the authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion as provided under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Be that as it may, the Court said that, in calling out the armed forces, a
declaration of a state of rebellion is an “utter superfluity”. At most, it only gives notice to the
nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.
“The Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal
intents, the declaration is deemed not written.”
It is pertinent to state that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to
declare a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of
national emergency. While the authority to declare a state of rebellion emanates from
her powers as Chief Executive (the statutory authority being Sec. 4, Chapter 2, Book
II, Administrative Code of 1997), and the declaration was deemed harmless and
without legal significance, in declaring a state of national emergency in PP1017,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, but also
on Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution, calling for the exercise of awesome powers
which cannot be deemed as harmless or without legal significance [David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.].
The power to organize courts martial for the discipline of themembers of the armed forces,
create military commissions for the punishment of war criminals. See Ruffy v. Chief of Staff,
75 Phil 875; Kuroda v. Jalandoni 42 0.G.4282.
But see Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, where it was held
that military tribunals cannot try civilians when civil courts are open and
functioning. In Quilona v. General Court Martial, 206 SCRA 821, the Supreme
Court held that pursuant to R.A. 6975, members of the Philippine National Police are
not within the jurisdiction of a military court.
This is made clear in Navales v. General Abaya, G.R. No. 162318. October 25, 2004,
where the Supreme Court said that in enacting R.A. 7055, the lawmakers merely
intended to return to the civilian courts jurisdiction over those offenses that have
been traditionally within their jurisdiction, but did not divest the military courts
jurisdiction over cases mandated by the Articles of War. Thus, the RTC cannot
divest the General Court Martial of jurisdiction over those charged with violations of
Art. 63 (Disrespect Toward the President, etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior
Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition). 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman) and 97 (General Articles) of the Articles of War, as these are
specifically included as “service-connected offenses or crimes” under Sec. 1, R.A.
7055.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing [Sec. 18,
Art. VII]. See Lartsang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448.
In Gudani v. Senga, supra., on the issue of whether the court martial could still assume
jurisdiction over General Gudani who had been compulsorily retired from the service, the
Court quoted from Abadilla v. Ramos, where it was held that an officer whose name was
Page 102 of 140
dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military
authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination
of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is
terminated.
Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

A "writ of habeas corpus" is an order from the court commanding a detaining officer to inform
the court (i) if he has the person in custody, and (ii) what his basis in detaining that person.
The "privilege of the writ" is that portion of the writ requiring the detaining officer to show
cause why he should not be tested. Note that it is the privilege that is suspended, not the writ
itself.
Requisites:
 There must be an invasion or rebellion, and
 The public safety requires the suspension.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ does not impair the right to bail [Sec. 13, Art. III].
The suspension applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he
shall be released.
Grounds: Invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it. .
Duration: Not to exceed sixty days, following which it shall belifted, unless extended by
Congress.
Duty of President to report action to Congress: within 48 hours,personally or in writing.

Congress may revoke [or extend on request of the President] theeffectivity of proclamation
byy a majority vote of all its members, voting jointly.
There are 4 ways, then, for the proclamation or suspension to be lifted:

1. Lifting by the President himself
2. Revocation by Congress
3. Nullification by the Supreme Court
4. Operation of law after 60 days
Martial Law.
“A state of martial law does not suspend the operation ofthe Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ” [Sec. 18, Art. VII]. The constitutional limitations
for the suspension of the privilege of the writ are likewise imposed on the proclamation of martial
law.
b. Emergency Powers
This grant of emergency power to the President is different from the Commander-in-
Chief clause. When the President acts under the Commander-in-Chief clause, he acts
under a constitutional grant of military power, which may include the law-making power.
But when the President acts under the emergency power, he acts under a Congressional
delegation of law-making Power
The scope of the grant is such "powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy." Under the 1935 Constitution, this was construed the power to issue rules
and regulations to carry out the declared policy. The 1987 Constitution, it is submitted,
does not change the scope. "Power necessary and proper" should mean legislative power,
because Congress is only allowed to delegate legislative power, being its only inherent
power. Its other powers are only granted to it by the Constitution, and so it cannot
delegate what has only been delegated to it.
This power is (1) for a limited period, and (2) subject to such restrictions as Congress may
provide. The power ceases (a) upon being withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, or, if
Congress fails to adopt such resolution, (b) upon the next (voluntary) adjournment of
Congress. For the fact that Congress is able to meet in session uninterruptedly and
Page 103 of 140

adjourn of its own will proves that the emergency no longer exists is to justify the
delegation.
This rule or the termination of the grant of emergency powers is based on decided cases,
which in turn became Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the 1973 Constitution.
7. The Pardoning Power [Sec. 19, Art. VII: “Except in cases of impeachment,or as otherwise
provided in the Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress”.]
i)Pardon. An act of grace which exempts the individual on whom itis bestowed from
the punishment that the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.
ii)Commutation. Reduction or mitigation of the penalty.
iii)Reprieve. Postponement of a sentence or stay of execution.
iv)Parole. Release from imprisonment, but without full restoration ofliberty, as parolee is still
in the custody of the law although not in confinement.
v)Amnesty. Act of grace, concurred in by the legislature, usuallyextended to groups of persons
who committed political offenses, which puts into oblivion the offense itself.
Exercise bv the President. Discretionary; may not be controlled by thelegislature or reversed

by the courts, unless there is a constitutional violation. Thus, it was a legal malapropism for the
trial court to interject par. 2, Art. 135, Revised Penal Code, recommending the grant of pardon
after the convict shall have served a jail term of 5 years, considering that this was a
prosecution under a special law, and that the matter of a pardon is within the President’s
exclusive prerogative [People v. de Gracia, supra.].
Limitations on exercise:
i) Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment [Sec. 19, Art. VII].
ii) Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission on Elections [Sec. 5, Art. IX-C].
iii) Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment. In People v. Salle, 250 SCRA 581,
reiterated in People v. Bacang, 260 SCRA 44, the Court declared that the 1987 Constitution
prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of
his appeal from the judgment of conviction by the trial court. Any application for a pardon
should not be acted upon, or the process toward its grant should not begin, unless the appeal is
withdrawn. The ruling in Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, which was laid down under
the 1973 Constitution, is now changed by virtue of the explicit requirement under the 1987
Constitution. In People v. Catido, G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997, it was held that while the
pardon was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal, or before
conviction by final judgment, and therefore a violation of Sec. 19, Art. VII, the grant of
amnesty, applied for by the accused-appellants under Proclamation No. 347, was valid.
iv) Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt (as it would violate separation of
powers), or civil contempt (as the State is without interest in the same) ,
v) Cannot absolve the convict of civil liability. See People v. Nacional, G.R. No. 11294,
September 7, 1995, where the Court said that the grant of conditional pardon and the
subsequent dismissal of the appeal did not relieve the accused of civil liability.
vi) Cannot restore public offices forfeited [Monsanto v. Factoran, supra.]. But see Sabello v.
DECS, 180 SCRA 623, where a pardoned elementary school principal, on considerations of
justice and equity, was deemed eligible for reinstatement to the same position of principal and
not to the lower position of classroom teacher. On executive clemency re: administrative
decisions, see Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 226 SCRA 356.
Pardon Classified.
i) Plenary or partial.
ii) Absolute or conditional.
On conditional pardon, see Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 273. The rule is reiterated
in In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong, supra., that a
conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the Chief Executive and the
convicted criminal; by the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in the contract,
the pardonee has placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his
delegate who is duty bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the
conditions of the pardon. Sec. 64 (i), Revised Administrative Code, authorizes the
President to order the arrest and re-incarceration of such person who, in his
judgment, shall fail to comply with the conditions of the pardon. And the exercise of
this Presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny.
Page 104 of 140

Amnesty.
In People v. Patriarca, G,R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000, it was held that the person
released under an amnesty proclamation stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense. Par. 3, Art. 89, Revised Penal Code, provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by amnesty; the penalty and all its effects are thus extinguished.
In Vera v. People of the Philippines, 7 SCRA 152, it was held that to avail of the benefits of an
amnesty proclamation, one must admit his guilt of the offense covered by the proclamation.
See People v. Casido, supra.. 6
Pardon, Probation and Parole
Amnesty Probation Parole

a sovereign act of A disposition under which a defendant the suspension of the sentence of a
oblivion for past acts, after conviction and sentence is convict granted by a Parole Board
granted by government released subject to conditions mposed after serving the minimum term of
generally to a class of by the court and to the supervision of a the indeterminate sentence penalty,
persons who have been probation officer. [Sec. 3 (a), PD 968.] without granting a pardon,
guilty usually of prescribing the terms upon which
political offenses the sentence shall be suspended
(treason, sedition,
rebellion), and who are
subject to trial but have
not yet been convicted,
and often conditioned
upon their return to
obedience and duty
within a prescribed
time. (Black; Brown v
Walker, 161 US 602).
Pardon distinguished from probation

Probation and Pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually distinct
and different from each other, both in origin and nature. In probation, the probationer is in no
true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not
exempt from the entire punishment w/c the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the
probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. The
probationer, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody-- subject to the control of
the probation officer and of the court, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the
conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the
sentence originally imposed upon him [People vs. Vera, 65 P 56 (1937)]
In both cases, there must be a final judgment of conviction, and the convict must be exempted
from service of sentence. But pardon is granted by the Chief Executive for any crime, while
probation is granted by the court after investigation by a probation officer only for cases where
the penalty imposed does not exceed 6 years and 1 day (prision mayor), where the crime is not
against the security of the State, where there was no previous conviction for an offense
punished by arresto mayor, and where there was no previous availment of probation.
Pardon distinguished from Parole

Pardon may be granted by the Chief Executive under the Constitution and formerly the
Administrative Code, at any time after final judgment of conviction, even before service; while
parole is granted by the Board of Pardons and Parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law
only after the convict has served the minimum term of his sentence. In pardon, the convict
becomes a free man; in parole, he is not really free because although he his released from the
custody of the law, he must submit to periodic examination by the Board of Parole.
Pardon distinguished from Amnesty

 Pardon is usually granted for common crimes; amnesty, for political crimes.
 Pardon is granted to individuals; amnesty, to a group, class, or community generally.
 Pardon can only be granted after conviction; amnesty may be granted even before trial.
 Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which
he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment; amnesty looksbackward
and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, that is, it overlooks andobliterates the
Page 105 of 140

offense with which the convict is charged that the person released stands preciselyas though he
had committed no offense. (Barrioquinto v Fernandez, infra.)
 Pardon is a private act of the President w/c must be pleaded and proved by the person bec. the
courts do not take judicial notice of it; amnesty is a public act of w/c the courts take judicial
notice. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1991 ed.)
 Pardon does not require the concurrence of the Congress; amnesty requires such concurrence.
(id.)
8. The Borrowing Power. Sec. 20, Art. VII]
Does Congress have to be consulted by the President when he contracts or guarantees foreign
loans that increase the foreign debt of the country?
The affirmative view cites Art. VI, Sec. 24 which holds that all bills authorizing increase of the
public debt must originate exclusively from the House of Representatives, although the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.
The negative, and stronger view, is that the President does not need prior approval by Congress
because the Constitution places the power to check the President's power on the Monetary
Board and not on Congress. Congress may, of course, provide guidelines for contracting or
guaranteeing foreign loans, and have these rules enforced through the Monetary Board. But
that Congress has prior approval is a totally different issue. At any rate, the present power,
which was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, was based on RA 4860 or the Foreign
Loan Act. What used to be a statutory grant of power is now a constitutional grant which
Congress cannot take away, but only regulate
9. The Diplomatic Power. Sec. 21, Art. VII]

In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351, the Supreme
Court distinguished treaties from executive agreements, thus: (i) international
agreements which involve political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements of a permanent character take the form of a
treaty; while international agreements involving adjustment of details carrying out
well established national policies and traditions and involving arrangements of a
more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements; and (ii) in
treaties, formal documents require ratification, while executive agreements become
binding through executive action.
But see Bayan v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, where the
Supreme Court said that the Philippine government had complied with the
Constitution in that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was concurred in by the
Philippine Senate, thus complying with Sec.-21, Art. VII. The Republic of the
Philippines cannot require the United States to submit the agreement to the US
Senate for concurrence, for that would be giving a strict construction to the phrase,
“recognized as a treaty”. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the
VFA as merely an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is just as binding as a treaty.
10. Budgetary Power. Sec. 22, Art. VII: “
The budget is the plan indicating the (a) expenditures of the government, (b) sources
of financing, and (c) receipts from revenue-raising measures. This budget is the
upper limit of the appropriations bill to be passed by Congress. Through the budget,
therefore, the President reveals the priorities of the government.
11. Other powers:

a. Call Congress to a special session [Sec. 15, Art. VI: “x x x The President may call a
special session at any time ],
b. Power to approve or veto bills [Sec. 27, Art. VI].
c. To consent to deputation of government personnel by the Commission on Elections
[Sec. 2(4), Art. IX-C].
d. To discipline such deputies [Sec. 2(8), Art. IX-C].
e. By delegation from Congress, emergency powers [Sec. 23(2), Art. VI], and tariff
powers [Sec. 28(2), Art. VI].
f. General supervision over local governments and autonomous regional governments
[Art. X]. ) See Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December
2, 2002.
Page 106 of 140

 CLU v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317

o Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in
83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being
resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. Executive Order No. 284, according to
the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions.
o In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution
itself. The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII
and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.
 Cruz v COA, G.R. No. 138489 (2001)

o On September 19, 1997, the COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038directing all unit
heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations which have effected payment of any form of additional compensation or
remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in
violation of the rule on multiple positions, to (a) immediately cause the disallowance of such
additional compensation or remuneration given to and received by the concerned officials, and (b)
effect the refund of the same from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision
in the consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs. Exexcutive Secretary and Anti-Graft League of
the Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al., promulgated on February 22,
1991. The COA Memorandum further stated that the said Supreme Court Decision, which became
final and executory on August 19, 1991, declared Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar
as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold other offices, in addition to their
primary offices, and to receive compensation therefor.
o It may be conceded that the directors concerned occupy positions lower than Assistant Secretary
which may exempt them from the prohibition (under) the doctrine enunciated in Civil Liberties
Union vs. Executive Secretary, supra. However, their positions are merely derivative; they derive
their authority as agents of the authority they are representing; their power and authority is sourced
from the power and authority of the cabinet members they are sitting for. Sans the cabinet members,
they are non-entities, without power and without personality to act in any manner with respect to
the official transactions of the NHA. The agent or representative can only validly act and receive
benefits for such action if the principal authority he is representing can legally do so for the agent
can only do so much as his principal can do. The agent can never be larger than the principal. If the
principal is absolutely barred from holding any position in and absolutely prohibited from receiving
any remuneration from the NHA or any government agency, for that matter, so must the agent
be. Indeed, the water cannot rise above its source
o the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held
without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the concerned officials office. The term ex-officio means from office; by virtue
of office. It refers to an authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred
upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position. Ex-officio likewise denotes
an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office. An ex-officio member of a board is one
who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or
appointment. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his
services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by
the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of
Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually
and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy
in monetary banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such
attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form
of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name
it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
 NAC v COA G.R. No. 156982 (2004)

o NAC is a government agency composed of seven members namely, a Chairperson, three regular
members appointed by the President and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior
Local Government as ex officio members. The said three ex officio members turned over their
responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994.
Page 107 of 140
However, on October 15, 1997. NAC resident auditor Elaila disallowed on audit the payment
of honoraria to these representatives for a period of December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant
to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 which tasked the COA “to immediately cause disallowance of
any payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries xxx or
their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions xxx (emphasis supplied)” and this
was upheld by NGAO in September 1, 1998. Meanwhile, on April 28, 1999, the NAC passed AO
no. 2 and was approved by President Estrada allowing ex officiomembers to designate their
representatives who shall be entitled to per diems, allowances and other benefits as may be
authorized by law. Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the
rulings of the resident auditor and the NGAO disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex
officio members’ representatives, to no avail.
o COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of
instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule
or regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-
executing prohibition imposed by the Constitution of multiple offices and receiving double
compensation of public officials.
 Laurel v Garcia, GR No. 92013 (1990)

o The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi property. The
said property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It
consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it
became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the
Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The
President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital
goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
o It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole
will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is
valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so
because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the
Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the
President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on
conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.
 Marcos v Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760

o Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to
return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to
issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to
the Philippines.
o According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested
in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by
executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President
such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19),treaty
making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power(Section
22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
 De Leon v Carpio, 178 SCRA 457

o Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister of Justice Neptali A.
Gonzales. Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the said body declined to act on their petitions
for reconsideration on the ground that it had lost its jurisdiction with the ratification of the new
Constitution. They were advised instead to seek relief from the Civil Service Commission. The
Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals were invalid and unconstitutional,
having been done in violation of their security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly,
the Board ordered their reinstatement. However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned
the orders issued by the Secretary of Justice to CSC “without action,” claiming that they were null
and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
o It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the Constitution and
honored not in the breach but in the observance, that all executive departments, bureaus and offices
are under the control of the President of the Philippines. The President’s power of control is directly
exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the
Page 108 of 140
bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The
constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not require statutory
implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature.
Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of his Cabinet and may appoint them
as he sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, and replace them in his discretion. Once in place, they are at all times under the
disposition of the President as their immediate superior. “Without minimizing the importance of the
heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the
President. Hence, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.” (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior). In the case at bar, there is no question that when
he directed the respondent to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regular
discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts should therefore have been
respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is in the Department of Justice under the
direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in this department, the respondent was (and is)
bound to obey the Secretary’s directives, which are presumptively the acts of the President of the
Philippines.
 Blaquera v Alcala, GR 109406 (1998)

o On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and employee of
the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the
employee’s one month basic salary but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO
provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991.
Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards of government-owned or
controlled corporations andfinancial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study
being undertaken by the Office of the Pres. The petitioners, who are officials and employees of
several government departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then,
on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive
benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition
under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without
priorapproval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which
authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to
immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments
oragencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or
allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
o The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and
implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive departments as provided
under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution. Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control,
review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive
departments, bureau or offices under him. When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of
incentive benefits,enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits
without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over theprescribed amount, the
Pres. was just exercising his power of control over executive departments. The Pres. issued subject
AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent,
dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited resources of
government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his
power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted
incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres.,
thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources.
 Hutchison Ports v SBMA, GR No 131367 (2000)

o The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority conducted a bidding for the development and operation of a
modern marine container terminal. It awarded the contract to petitioner. The Office of the
President set aside the award and ordered a new bidding. Petitioner filed action for specific
performance.
o The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority is under the control of the Office of the President. Therefore
the President may overturn any of awards granted by it for justifiable reasons.
 Pimentel v Aguirre, GR 132988 (2000)

o This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order
No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their
expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and to
enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their
internal revenue allotments.
Page 109 of 140
o Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out
any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and
has been issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local
governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The
AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-
reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not contain
any sanction in case of noncompliance. The Local Government Code also allows the President to
interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public
sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate
and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case
be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current one. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal
autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the
withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
 Manalo v Sistosa, GR 107369 (1999)

o RA 6975 was enacted by Corazon Aquino, creating DILG. Secs 26 and 31 pertain to the Chief of
PNP as well as PNP officers and members as having to be confirmed by the CA before assuming
their duties. Executive Secretary Drilon promoted the 15 respondent officers and appointed them to
the PNP in a permanent capacity. The petitioners assail the legality of such appointment because,
invoking said provisions of RA 6975, confirmation of CA is needed. They also assail the
disbursements made out by the DMB Secretary (Salvador Enriquez III)’s for the officers’ salaries
and emoluments.
o Secs 26 and 31 go against the Constitution because according to Sec 16, Art 7, the PNP officers do
not fall under the first group which requires the confirmation of the CA. courts have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit delineated by
the fundamental law. However, the remainder of RA 6975 remains valid because assailed
provisions are severable from the main statute. The constitution expressly provides for their
distinction (See Secs 24 and 6 of Art 16). Also, RA 6975 provides that “no element of the police
force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the
AFP.” The disbursements and emoluments disbursed for the respondents are valid.
 Soriano v Lista GR 153881 (2003)

o Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice
Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires
confirmation of the COA.
o Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or
statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in
immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and
not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even be
classified as a taxpayer’s suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not
involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.
Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred from the Department of
National Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC).
 Pimentel v Ermita, GR 164978

o This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (“President Arroyo”) through Executive Secretary Eduardo
R. Ermita (“Secretary Ermita”) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor,
Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap
(“respondents”) as acting secretaries of their respective departments.
o The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with
the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitutionexpressly
allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against
the legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is
limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint
a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither
may Congressimpose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an
office. However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress,
the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does
Page 110 of 140
not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a
stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego ofthe President, such
as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume
office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of
prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should
be. The office of a department secretary may become vacant whileCongress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even
whileCongress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical
reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
o Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of
them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess
ofCongress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover
ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or
rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a
way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
 Echegaray v Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96

o On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the
TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also
encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
o Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control
the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative
and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason
that there is no higher right than the right to life. For the public respondents therefore to contend
that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to
violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
 Constantino v Cuisa, GR No. 106064 (2005)

o During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the country’s external
debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought
to initiate the program for foreign debts – they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion
programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens,
together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do
not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution.
And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly
delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the
Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the
power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power.
They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the
Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President
“alone and personally” can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop
acting pursuant to the scheme.
o There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may contract or
guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It
makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On
the other hand, the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident
exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the
debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a
strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the
Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and
cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President were to
personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from
running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the
propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that
may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate,
obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to
Page 111 of 140
the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents.
This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and
the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the
President’s effectivity in running the government. The act of the respondents are not
unconstitutional.
o Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief
Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or
ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance,
in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him
of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy). There are certain presidential powers which arise out
of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-
equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt
of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President
of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing
that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
 Gudani v Senga, GR No 170165

o The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud
and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen.
Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential
approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been
given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the
Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered
them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of
a superior officer
o The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies
under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify
before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer.
Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to
faithfully execute. SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket
requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a
congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive
privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However,
the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn
on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-
chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. At the same time, the
refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to
judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct
of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly
interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in
this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is
aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent
from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. The duty falls on the
shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military
officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers
appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the courts.
 Gloria v CA, GR No. 119903

o Respondent was appointed School Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon
City. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the President
reassigned him as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology on the
ground that he is an expert in vocational and technical education. Respondent questioned the
validity of his reassignment on the ground that it is indefinite and it violated his security of tenure
Page 112 of 140

o There is nothing to show that the reassignment of respondent is temporary. The evidence or
intention to reassign respondent had no definite period. It is violative of his security of tenure.
D. The Judicial Department
 Concepts
o Qualifications
 Appointments
 Others
Constitutional Safeguards to insure the independence of the Judiciary

1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body; it may not be abolished by the legislature.
2. The members of the judiciary are not subject to confirmation by the CA
3. The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment.
4. The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate jurisdiction;
appellate jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice and concurrence.
Page 113 of 140

5. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and personnel.
6. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline judges/ justices of inferior courts.
7. The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure.
8. The members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial
or administrative functions.
9. Salaries of judges may not be reduced; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy.
In Re: Clarifying and Strengthening the Organizational Structure andAdministrative Set-up of

the Philippine Judicial Academy, A.M. No. 01- 1-04-SC-Philja, 481 SCRA 1, the Supreme
Court said that fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay
plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or
prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. In downgrading the
positions and salary grades of two positions in the Philippine Judicial Academy, the DBM
overstepped its authority and encroached upon the fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court and
its power of supervision over court personnel, as enshrined in the Constitution.
10. The Supreme Court, alone, may initiate and promulgate the Rules of Court.
11. The Supreme Court, alone, may order temporary detail of judges.
12. The Supreme Court can appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary
Mode of Sitting
It may sit en banc, or in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5 or 7 members (or 5, 3 or 2
divisions). [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1)] When the SC sits in divisions, it does not violate the
concept of a "one Supreme Court" because, according the United States v Limsiongco, 41
Phil 94 (1920), the divisions of the SC do not diminish its authority, because although it
sits in divisions, it remains and co-functions as one body. This "one Supreme Court"
doctrine is strengthened by the provision that "when the required number (in a division) is
not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: provided, that no doctrine or principle of
law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified
or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3)]
Procedure for Appointment.

 Appointed by the President of the Philippines from among a list of atleast three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy; the appointment shall need
no confirmation [Sec. 9, Art. VIII]..
 Any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90)days from the
occurrence thereof [Sec. 4 (1). Art. VIII],
 For lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment withinninety (90) days from
the submission by the JBC of such list [Sec. 9, Art. VIII].
JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE
See SC Resolution dated February 14, 2012, “In Re: Production of Court Records and
Documents and the Attendance of Court officials and employees as witnesses under the
subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the various letters for the Impeachment Prosecution Panel
dated January 19 and 25, 2012.”
Background: The Senate Impeachment Court (during the Impeachment Trial of Chief Justice
Corona), issued a supoena ad testificandum et duces tecum for certain documents relating to
the FASAP cases, the League of Cities cases, and Gutierrez v. House Committee on Justice, as
well as the attendance of certain court officials. The Supreme Court refused, invoking judicial
privilege.
Judicial Privilege
A form of deliberative process privilege; Court records which are pre-decisional and
deliberative in nature are thus protected and cannot be the subject of a subpoena A
document is predecisional if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision to which
it relates.
A material is deliberative on the other hand, if it reflects the giveand-take of the

consultative process. The key question is whether disclosure of the information
would discourage candid discussion within the agency. Judicial Privilegeisan
exception to the general rule of transparency as regards access to court records.
Court deliberations are traditionally considered privileged communication.
Page 114 of 140

Summary of Rules
The following are privileged documents or communications, and are not subject to disclosure:
1. Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by the Court on
each case included in the agenda of the Court’s session on acts done material to pending cases,
except where a party litigant requests information on the result of the raffle of the case,
pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC);
2. Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters
pending before the Court;
3. Court records which are “pre-decisional” and “deliberative” in nature, in particular, documents
and other communications which are part of or related to the deliberative process, i.e., notes,
drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations, and similar papers.
Additional Rules:
1. Confidential Information secured by justices, judges, court officials and employees in the
course of their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged even after
their term of office.
2. Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that cannot be
disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made available by
the court to the general public.
3. The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy demands that the highest officials of
each department be exempt from the compulsory processes of the other departments.
4. These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an institution, not to any justice or judge in
his or her individual capacity. Since the Court is higher than the individual justices or judges,
no sitting or retired justice or judge, not even the Chief Justice, may claim exception without
the consent of the Court.
Powers [Sec. 5, Art. VIII]:

 Original jurisdiction: over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
 Appellate jurisdiction: Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as
the law or Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in (i) all
cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation is
in question; (ii) all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto; (iii) all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is
in issue; (iv) all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher;
and (v) all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
Note that this power does not include the power of the Supreme Court to review
decisions of administrative bodies, but is limited to “final judgments and orders of
lower courts” [Ruffy v. Chief of Staff,
Only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death must the trial court
forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review of the
conviction [People v. Redulosa, 255 SCRA 279]. Where the penalty imposed is
merely reclusion perpetua, the accused should appeal the decision of conviction,
otherwise, the judgment of conviction will become final and executory [Garcia v.
People, G.R. No. 106531, November' 18, 1999].
Sec. 30, Art. VI, provides that no law shall be passed increasingthe appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its concurrence. Thus, in Fabian v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998, Sec. 27, R.A. 6770, which provides
that orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are
appealable to the Supreme Court through Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, was
declared unconstitutional, because it expands the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction
without its advice and concurrence. See also Namuhe v. Ombudsman, G.R. No.
124965, October 29, 1998, and Tirol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135913, November
4, 1999; Villavert v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133715, February 13, 2000.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135789, January 31,2002, it was held that
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law. A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a
certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
Page 115 of 140

probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted.
 Temporary assignment of judges of lower courts to other stations aspublic interest may
require; but the assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
 Order change of venue or place of trial, to avoid miscarriage of justice. See People v.
Gutierrez, 39 SCRA 173. e)Rule Making Power: Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged.
Limitations on the rule-making power. The rules mustprovide a simplified and

inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases; they must be uniform for
all courts of the same grade; and must not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. See Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 451,
An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as

distinguished from a bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by
which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying
out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities, x x The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official
unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial
support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court [In Re
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22].
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory
nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one’s membership in the IBP
remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is
engaged in [Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from
Payment of IBP Dues, B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005].
The enforcement of the penalty of removal does not amount to deprivation of

property without due process of law. The practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
which is authority for the principle that trial by assessors is a substantive right and may not be repealed
by the Supreme Court. Likewise, in First Lepanto Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, 1994,
it was held that Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91, which orders that appeals from decisions of
administrative bodies shall now be filed with the Court of Appeals, did not repeal E.O. 226, and did not
diminish, increase or modify the substantive right to appeal. It merely transferred the venue of appeals
from decisions of said agencies to the Court of Appeals, and provided a different period (15 days from
notice), both of which are merely procedural in character.
In Re: Request for Creation of a Special Division, A.M. No. 02-1- 09-SC, January
21, 2002, it was held that it is within the competence of the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its power to promulgate rules governing the enforcement and protection
of constitutional rights and rules governing pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, to create a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan which will hear and decide
the plunder case against former President Joseph Estrada.
The writ of amparo. The nature and time-tested role of amparohas shown that it is an effective and
inexpensive instrument for the protection of constitutional rights [Azcuna, The Writ of Amparo: A
Remedy to Enforce Fundamental Rights, 37 Ateneo L.J. 15 (1993)]. Amparo, literally “to protect”,
originated in Mexico and spread throughout the Western Hemisphere where it gradually evolved into
various forms, depending on the particular needs of each country.
By Resolution in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, and it took effect on October 24, 2007. Section 1 thereof provides: “The petition
for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity ”
Page 116 of 140
An extraordinary feature is Section 14 of the Rule which allows the grant by the court of
interim reliefs, which may either be a temporary protection order, inspection order,
production order or a witness protection order.
No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and
legal basis of the right sought to be protected. Petitioners right to their dwelling, assuming they
still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute
right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ
of amparo [Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008].
The writ of amparo shall not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari
process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes [Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R.
No. 182484, January 17, 2008].
The writ of habeas data. The writ of habeas data is anindependent remedy to protect the right to privacy,
especially the right to informational privacy. The essence of the constitutional right to informational
privacy goes to the very heart of a person’s individuality, an exclusive and personal sphere upon which
the State has no right to intrude without any legitimate public concern. The basic attribute of an effective
rightto informational privacy is the right of the individual to control the flow of information concerning
or describing them public responsibilities [In Re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, August 3, 1978],
The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office
against a judge; he must first indorse the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action [Fuentes v.
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001]. In the absence of any
administrative action taken against the RTC Judge by the Supreme Court with regard to the former’s
certificate of service, the investigation conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Supreme
Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine
of separation of powers [Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 469; Dolalas v. Office of the Ombudsman, 265
SCRA 819].
Administrative proceedings before the Supreme Court are confidential in nature in order to protect the
respondent therein who may turn out to be innocent of the charges; it can take years to build a reputation
and
By Resolution in A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data, effective February 2, 2008. Section 1 thereof provides: “The writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, honor and correspondence of the aggrieved party. ”
Congress cannot amend the Rules of Court. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601,
January 19, 1999, the Supreme Court declared: “But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away
the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.”
vii) Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court [Sec. 5 (5), Art. VIII]..
 Power of Appointment: The Supreme Court appoints all officials and employees of the
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law [Sec. 5 (6), Art. VIII].
 Power of Administrative Supervision: The Supreme Court shall have administrative

supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof [Sec. 6, Art. VIII].
But this requirement does not apply to administrative cases[Prudential Bank v. Castro, 158
SCRA 646],
When the votes are equally divided and the majority vote is not obtained, then
pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition shall be
dismissed [Cruz v. Secretary, DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000],
The decision shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law onwhich it is
based.
But this requirement does not apply to a minute resolutiondismissing a petition for
habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus, provided a legal basis is given therein
Page 117 of 140
[Mendoza v. CFI, 66 SCRA 96; Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 1].
Neither will it apply to administrative cases [Prudential Bank v. Castro, supra.].
This constitutional mandate does not preclude the validity of“memorandum

decisions”, which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law
contained in the decisions of inferiortribunals. “Memorandum decisions” are a
species of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the
provisions of Sec. 40, B.P. 129, as amended, on the grounds of expediency,
practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. But to be valid, it cannot
incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by
means of remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily
and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the
incorporation by only a single accusation, although unfounded, to destroy it
[Godinez v. Alano, A.M. RTJ-98-1409, February 18, 1999],
Annual Report
Supreme Court to submit, within 30 days from theopening of each regular session of Congress,
to the President and to Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the
Judiciary [Sec. 16, Art. VIII].
Consultations/Decisions of Supreme Court [Secs. 13 & 14, Art. VIII]

Conclusions in any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached in consultation before the
case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued. This requirement is applicable also to lower
collegiate courts.
reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being
adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words,
the memorandum decision should actually embody the findings of facts and conclusions of law
of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision
[Solid Homes v. Laserna, G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008].
A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. So long as the factual and
legal basis are clearly and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom, the
decision arrived at is valid. However, it is imperative that the decision not simply be limited to
the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with reference
to the record, and contain a statement of applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunal’s
statement and conclusions on the case. Thus, in Dizon v. Judge Lopez, AM. No. RTJ-96-1338,
September 5, 1997, the decision, which consisted only of the dispositive portion (denominated
a sin perjuicio judgment) was held invalid.
In People v. Baring, G.R. No. 137933, January 28, 2002, the Supreme Court said that the trial
court’s decision may cast doubt on the guilt of the accused, not by the lack of direct evidence
against the accused but by the trial court’s failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts,
the weight or admissibility of the evidence, the assessments made from the evidence, and the
conclusion drawn therefrom, after applying the pertinent law as basis of the decision.
Likewise, in De Vera v. Judge Dames, A.M. RTJ-99-1455, July 13, 1999, because the
respondent judge had precipitately concluded that the letter was defamatory without
sufficiently explaining why, he was deemed to have violated Sec. 14, Art. VIII, and although
there was no clear proof of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration, the Judge must
still be sanctioned.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefor.
In Fr. Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123547, May 21, 2001, the Court of Appeals
denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in this wise: “Evidently, the motion poses
nothing new. The points and arguments raised by the movants have been considered and
passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the
same.” The Supreme Court held that there was adequate compliance with the constitutional
provision.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, supra., the Supreme Court ruled that “lack of merit” is sufficient
declaration of the legal basis for denial of petition for review or motion for reconsideration. In
Komatsu Industries v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127682, April 24, 1998, it was held that
when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations,
comments or motions, decides to deny due course to a petition, and states — in a minute
resolution — that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent
Page 118 of 140
court’s decision is shown or some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement. This is reiterated in Tichangco v. Enriquez,
G.R. No. 150629 June 30, 2004.
Tenure of Judges/Justices
In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988,
the Supreme Court said that the Special Prosecutor (Tanodbayan) is without authority to
conduct an investigation on charges against a member of the Supreme Court with the end in
view of filing a criminal information against him with the Sandiganbayan. This is so, because
if convicted in the criminal case, the Justice would be removed, and such removal would
violate his security of tenure.
Periods for Decision

All cases filed after the effectivity of the Constitution must be decided orresolved, from date of
submission, within: 24 months - Supreme Court; 12 months - lower collegiate courts; and 3
months - all other lower courts; unless, in the two latter cases, the period is reduced by the
Supreme Court.
A certification to be signed by the Chief Justice or Presiding Justice shall be issued stating the
reason for delay
 Miranda v Aguirre, G.R. No 133064 (1999)

o 1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an
independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a
plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law
for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite. Respondents defended the
constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago
from an independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
“creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the
standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over
which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
o RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said
petition because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the
court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional. That when an
amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is
mandatory.
 MMDA v Jancom, GR 147465

o After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA, Jancom won a contract for the
MMDA’s San Mateo waste management project. A BOT contract for the waste to energy project
was signed on Dec 19, 1997, between Jancom and the Philippine Government, represented by the
Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management through DENR Secretary Victor Ramos,
CORD-NCR chair Dionisio dela Serna, and MMDA chair Prospero Oreta. The contract, however,
was never signed by President Ramos as it was too close to the end of his term. He endorsed it to
President Estrada, but Estrada refused to sign it, for two reasons: the passage of RA 8749, or the
Clean Air Act of 1999 and the clamor of San Mateo residents for the closure of the dumpsite. On
May 29, 2000, the lower court decided in favor of Jancom. Instead of appealing, the MMDA filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and a TRO. When the CA dismissed the petition,
the MMDA went to the Supreme Court, arguing that the contract with Jancom was not binding
because it was not signed by the President, the conditions precedent to the contract were not
complied with, and there was no valid notice of award.
o The Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence of a valid and perfected contract
between the Republic of the Philippines and Jancom. The MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the
same without the consent of the other. Although the contract is a perfected one, it is still ineffective
or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President.
 Tirol v CA, GR No. 133954 (2000)

o During petitioner's capacity as the DECS Regional Director of Region VIII, he and some officials
of the Lalawigan National High School in Eastern Samar entered into a contract with Fairchild
Marketing and Construction in the total amount of P80,000. Upon filing of complaint by the
Teachers and Employees Union, COA investigated the transaction and found that there was
malversation of public funds. Instead of a competitive public bidding, the purchase of certain
supplies and equipment was done through a negotiated contract, which resulted in an overprice of
Page 119 of 140
P35,100. Petitioner alleged that (1) his participation was limited to signing of the RIV and the check
as a matter of routine; (2) that the RIV did not involve the determination of the price of the supplies
and equipment; (3) that the signing of the check was authority vested in him as the DECS Regional
Director; and (4) that the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions by public
officers should apply in his favor.
o From the pleadings, it is clear that the questions raised by the petitioner are questions of fact rather
than of law. What petitioner wants to happen is for the Supreme Court to review the evidence and
determine whether in fact he acted in good faith and that no conspiracy existed among the accused.
The rulings in Arias and Magasuci are inapplicable to petitioner because the petitioners in the said
cases were indicted and submitted themselves to trial before the Sandiganbayan, which convicted
them for the offense charged. In Arias, the Court set aside the judgment against the petitioner
becasue there was no evidence that the Government suffered undue injury. And in Magsuci, the
reversal by the Court of the judgment of conviction was based on a finding that Magsuci acted in
good faith and that there has been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity
committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Acia. In both Arias and Magsuci, there was paucity
of evidence on conspiracy, while in this case, there is only the claim of peitioner that he acted in
good faith and that there was no conspiracy. The Ombudsman believes otherwise and the Court
does not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of the said Office.
 Cruz v DENR, GR 135385 (2000)

o Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground
that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
o No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the
State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral
domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found,
the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
large scale development and exploitation. Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by
native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from
the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral
domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
o The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition
was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural
resources – somehow against the regalian doctrine.
o The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other
classes as may be provided by law, giving the government great leeway for classification. Then the
1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks.
Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership
of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been consistently
adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.
 Martinez v CA, GR 123547 (2001)

o This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 7, 1995, and resolution, dated
January 31, 1996, of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decisions of the Regional Trial
Court, Branches 251 and 28,2Cabanatuan City, finding private respondents spouses Reynaldo and
Susan Veneracion owners of the land in dispute, subject to petitioner's rights as a builder in good
faith.
o It is apparent from the first and second assignment of errors that petitioner is assailing the findings
of fact and the appreciation of the evidence made by the trial courts and later affirmed by the
respondent court. While, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, review may nevertheless be granted under certain
exceptions, namely: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issue of the case and the same is contrary to the
Page 120 of 140
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (I) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) when the finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by
the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. In this case, the Court of Appeals based its ruling that private respondents Veneracion
are the owners of the disputed lot on their reliance on private respondent Godofredo De la Paz's
assurance that he would take care of the matter concerning petitioner's occupancy of the disputed lot
as constituting good faith. This case, however, involves double sale and, on this matter, Art. 1544 of
the Civil Code provides that where immovable property is the subject of a double sale, ownership
shall be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it to the Registry
of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in
default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title. The requirement of the law, where title to
the property is recorded in the Register of Deeds, is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and
recording in good faith. To be entitled to priority, the second purchaser must not only prove prior
recording of his title but that he acted in good faith, i.e., without knowledge or notice of a prior sale
to another. The presence of good faith should be ascertained from the circumstances surrounding
the purchase of the land.
o this Court has ruled that, in appealed cases, the failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not
automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal, the dismissal being discretionary on the part of
the appellate court. hus, private respondents Veneracions' failure to pay the appellate docket fee is
not fatal to their appeal.
 Aguirre v Rana, Bar matter No. 1036 (2003)

o Respondent is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to sign the roll of
attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who charges respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
Apparently, the respondent appeared as counsel to an election candidate before
the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Masbate before he took his oath and
signed the rolls of attorneys. In his comment, respondent alleges he only provide specific assistance
and advice not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. He contends that he did not sign the
pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate and its findings
disclosed that according to the minutes of the meeting of the MBEC, the respondent actively
participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as counsel for the candidate.
o The court held that respondent did engaged in unauthorized practice of law. It held that all the
activities he participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the fact that he is not
yet a member of the Bar. The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to those
morally upright and with the proper knowledge and skills. It involves strict regulation, one of which
is on the moral character of its members. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still
had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in
the Roll of Attorneys. Because the court finds respondent not morally fit to be admitted in the Bar,
notwithstanding the fact that he already took his oath, he was denied admission to the bar.
 In RE: IBP Elections Bar Matter No. 491 (1989)

o There were 3 candidates for the position of IBP President in 1989: Attorneys Nereo Paculdo,
Ramon Nisce, and Violeta Drilon. Drilon won the elections. However, there were allegations that
the candidates resorted to unorthodox campaigning practices that further investigation was
conducted
o The IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in
the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP
officers, national, or regional, or chapter. Elections of 1989 are null and void. All the practices,
those which pertain to the campaign of the 3 candidates proving to be overly extravagant and
unreasonable, made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole elections process. In
addition the Court amended the by-laws of the IBP. The changes included, among others, the shift
of the voter participation in the elections from all the delegates of the IBP per region to simply the
members of the Board of Governors. The Court has power to amend the by-laws as part of their
power to promulgate rules under Article 8, Section 5(5).
 De La Llana v Alba 122 SCRA 291

o De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin
the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice
from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior
courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the
Page 121 of 140
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this
character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been
ignored and disregarded.
o What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their
services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices. Well-settled is the rule
that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle
that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Removal is to be distinguished
from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent
office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict
law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
E. The Constitutional Commissions
 Concepts
General Provisions.
1. The independent constitutional commissions are the Civil ServiceCommission, the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit [Sec. 1, Art. IX-A].
2. Safeguards insuring the independence of the Commissions:
 They are constitutionally created; may not be abolished by statute.
 Each is expressly described as “independent”
 Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by statute.
 The Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by impeachment.
 The Chairmen and members are given a fairly long term of office of seven years.
 The Chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in an acting capacity
In Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358, it was held that thedesignation of Commissioner
Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections was a violation of this
provision.
In Matibag v. Benipayo, supra., the Supreme Court said thatwhen an ad interim

appointment (of the Chairman of the Commission on Elections) is not confirmed (as it
was by-passed, or that there was not ample time for the Commission on Appointments to
pass upon the same), another ad interim appointment may be extended to the appointee
without violating the Constitution.
 The salaries of the chairman and members are relatively high and may not be decreased
during continuance in office.
 The Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy.
In Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget andManagement, G.R. No. 158791,

July 22, 2005, the Supreme Court said that the “no report, no release” policy may not be
validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy, without violating Sec. 5,
Art. IX-A of the Constitution. The “automatic release” of approved annual appropriations
to petitioner, a constitutional commission vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be
construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed, x x x
However, petitioner’s claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress below the
amount appropriated for the previous year, as in the case of the Judiciary, must be
rejected. Sec. 3, Art. VIII, prohibiting the reduction in the appropriation for the Judiciary
below the amount appropriated for the previous year, does not appear in Sec. 5, Art. IX-
A. The plain implication of this omission is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing
the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for
them for the previous year.
In Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v.Commission on Human

Rights, G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004, the Supreme Court said that the
Commission on Human Rights, unlike the three Constitutional Commissions, does not
enjoy fiscal autonomy.
 Each Commission may promulgate its own procedural rules, providedthey do not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights [though subject to disapproval by the
Supreme Court], j)The Chairmen and members are subject to certain
disqualificationscalculated to strengthen their integrity.
 The Commissions may appoint their own officials and employees inaccordance with Civil
Service Law.
Inhibitions/Disqualifications
Page 122 of 140
 Shall not, during tenure, hold any other office or employment.

 Shall not engage in the practice of any profession.
 Shall not engage in the active management or control of any businesswhich in any way may be
affected by the functions of his office.
 Shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contractwith, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or -controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. 4
Rotational Scheme of Appointments.

The first appointees shall serve terms of seven, five and three years, respectively. After the
first commissioners are appointed, the rotational scheme is intended to prevent the possibility
of one President appointing all the Commissioners.
In Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 140335. December 13,2000, it was held that in
orderto preserve the periodic succession mandated by the Constitution, the rotational plan
requires two conditions: [i] The terms of the first commissioners should start on a common
date; and fii] Any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the
term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.
Decisions.
1. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its membersany case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. [Sec. 7,
Art. IX-A],
a. The provision of the Constitution is clear that what is required isthe majority vote of
all the members, not only of those who participated in the deliberations and voted
thereon in order that a valid decision may be made by the Constitutional
Commissions. Under rules of statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the
words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained [Estrella v. Comelec, G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004], This
ruling abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua v. Comelec, 156 SCRA 582.
b. In Dumayas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001,because two
Commissioners who had participated in the deliberations had retired prior to the
promulgation of the decision, the Supreme Court said that the votes of the said
Commissioners should merely be considered withdrawn, as if they had not signed
the resolution at all, and only the votes of the remaining Commissioners considered
for the purpose of deciding the controversy. Unless the withdrawal of the votes
would materially affect the result insofar as votes for or against a party is concerned,
there is no reason to declare the decision a nullity. In this case, with the withdrawal
of the votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining votes among the
four incumbent commissioners, still constituting a quorum at the time of the
promulgation of the resolution, would still be 3 to 1 (and thus, be a vote of the
majority) in favor of the respondent.
2. As to the need to expedite resolution of cases and the 60-dayperiod for decision, in Alvarez v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 142527, March 1, 2001, the Supreme Court said that the Comelec has
numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical. Considering the Commission’s
manpower and logistical limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural requirements on
deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the Commission to
resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. This is not what the
framers had intended.
3. Any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to theSupreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.
a. In Aratuc v. Comelec, 88 SCRA 251, the Supreme Court held thatwhen it reviews a
decision of the Comelec, the Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction; thus, the
proceeding is limited to issues involving grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and does not ordinarily empower the Court to review the
factual findings of the Commission. In Loong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133676, April
14, 1999, the Court reiterated that certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the appropriate remedy to invalidate disputed Comelec resolutions, i.e., final orders,
rulings and decisions of the Comelec rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers.
b. In Reyes v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999,the Court said
that under Rule 64, Sec. 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments or final orders
of the Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Rule 65. Even before the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission on Audit to
Page 123 of 140

the Supreme Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by
the Constitution. The judgments and final orders of COA are not reviewable by
ordinary writ of error or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court. Only when the
COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
c. In the case of decisions of the Civil Service Commission, however,Supreme Court
Revised Circular 1-91, as amended by Revised Administrative Circular 1 -95, which
took effect on June 1,1995, provides that final resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission shall be appealable by certiorari to the Court of Appeals within fifteen
days from receipt of a copy thereof. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
party adversely affected thereby shall file a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
d. Thus, in Mahinayv. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152457, April 30, 2008, the Supreme
Court held that the proper mode of appeal from the decision of the Civil Service
Commission is a petition for review under Rule 43 filed with the Court of Appeals.
e. In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004,
because the petitioner imputed to the Court of Appeals “grave abuse of discretion”
for ruling that he had no legal standing to contest the disapproval of his appointment,
the Supreme Court said that “grave abuse of discretion is a ground for a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court”. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
resolved to give due course to the petition and to treat it appropriately as a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The grounds alleged
shall be deemed “reversible errors", not “grave abuse of discretion”.
Enforcement of Decision.
In Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 235, it was held that final decisions of the Civil
Service Commission are enforceable by a writ of execution that the Civil Service Commission
may itself issue.
 Cayetano v Monsod, GR 100113 (1991)

o Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
o The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission
(in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200). The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such
an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).
Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment.
o Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23). Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is
in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." At this point, it might be helpful to
define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often
called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership
and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates."
 Gaminde v COA, GR No. 140335 (2000)

o The case is a special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul and set aside two decisions of the
Commission on Audit ruling that petitioners term of office as Commissioner, Civil Service
Page 124 of 140
Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as set
forth in her appointment paper. he case is a special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul and set
aside two decisions of the Commission on Audit ruling that petitioners term of office as
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired
on February 02, 1999, as set forth in her appointment paper. However, on February 24, 1998,
petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of
office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07,
1998[2] opined that petitioners term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February
02, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02,
1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote the Commission on Audit
requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff
may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02,
1999.
o The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in
the 1987 Constitution, as follows: Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for
seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment.Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity. In Republic vs. Imperial,[11] we said that the operation of the rotational plan requires two
conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3)
Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation
or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of
the term.Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the
variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the
expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of
the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditions to the
case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to
the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the
date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the
interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted
against the latter. Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members of the
Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this
Constitution under their existing appointments at the discretion of the appointing power, who may
cut short their tenure by: (1) their removal from office for cause; (2) their becoming incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office, or (3) their appointment to a new term thereunder, all of which
events may occur before the end of the one year period after the effectivity of the Constitution.
 Brillantes v Yorac, GR No. 93867 (1990)

o The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate
Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of
Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to
investigate the December 1989 coup d' etat attempt.
o Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions
as "independent." Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable
laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. The choice of a temporary chairman
in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be
exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. the designation by the
President of the Philippines of respondent Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission
on Elections is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
 CSC v DBM, GR 158791

o Before this Court is the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) praying that this Court reconsider its Decision dated July 22, 2005 (the
Decision) granting the subject petition. The DBM posits that this Court’s ruling that fiscal
autonomy means preference in terms of cash allocation is not supported by the deliberations of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, particularly the discussions on the draft article on the Judiciary
where the concept of fiscal autonomy was, by its claim, introduced.
o The Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, after considering the Court’s position, opined that one of the
principles by which the constitutional mandate on judicial fiscal autonomy can be achieved is that
"[a]fter approval by Congress, the appropriations for the judiciary shall be automatically and
regularly released subject to availability of funds" – which opinion, the DBM alleges, is the position
adopted by this Court. The phrase "subject to availability of funds" must thus be understood in
harmony with the constitutional mandate to automatically release funds as the same has been
consistently interpreted by this Court. It is not an authority for the DBM to implement a policy
Page 125 of 140
which, although labeled "cash payment schedule," actually goes beyond mere scheduling of releases
and effects a withholding and reduction of the approved appropriations, as it did in the present case
against petitioner Civil Service Commission.
 Sarmiento v COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307

o Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and
decided the appeals without first referring them to any of it Divisions.
o The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it
resolved the appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned Special Cases without first referring
them to any of its Divisions. A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to
the Divisions pursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be
in order. However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending
before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved. The terms
of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions commenced at noon of June
30 1992. These cases have thus been rendered moot and such a resolution would only be an
exercise in futility. Thus, in Sarmiento vs. COMELEC5 [212 SCRA 307, 313 (1992).] and in
subsequent cases,6 [Abad vs. COMELEC, GR-128877, December 10, 1999; Zarate vs. COMELEC,
GR-129096, November 19, 1999.]we ruled that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the
requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation controversies in the
first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the
Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void.
 Ambil v Comelec GR No. 143398

o The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to nullify the order dated June 15, 2000 of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division,[1] giving notice to the parties of the
promulgation of the resolution on the case entitled Jose T. Ramirez, Protestee, versus Ruperto A.
Ambil, Jr., Election Protest Case No. 98-29, on June 20, 2000, at 2:00 in the afternoon and to
prohibit the respondent Commission on Election from promulgating the so called Guiani ponencia.
Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and respondent Jose T. Ramirez were candidates for the position of
Governor, Eastern Samar, during the May 11, 1998 elections.[3] On May 16, 1998, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as the duly elected Governor, Eastern
Samar, having obtained 46,547 votes, the highest number of votes in the election returns.
o The case at bar is an election protest involving the position of Governor, Eastern Samar.[32] It is
within the original jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in division.[33] Admittedly,
petitioner did not ask for a reconsideration of the divisions resolution or final decision.[34] In fact,
there was really no resolution or decision to speak of [35] because there was yet no promulgation,
which was still scheduled on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon. Petitioner went directly
to the Supreme Court from an order of promulgation of the Resolution of this case by the First
Division of the Comelec. A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is
promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the
time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or
decision.[47] Much more could he be the ponente of the resolution or decision. The resolution or
decision of the Division must be signed by a majority of its members and duly promulgated.
o This is the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A motion for reconsideration then is a
pre-requisite to the viability of a special civil action for certiorari, unless the party who avails of the
latter can convincingly show that his case falls under any of the following exceptions to the rule: (1)
when the question is purely legal, (2) where judicial intervention is urgent, (3) where its application
may cause great and irreparable damage, (4) where the controverted acts violate due process, (5)
failure of a high government official from whom relief is sought to act on the matter, and seeks
when the issue for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. This
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons,
for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies.
o Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within the jurisdiction of the
Comelec in division can not dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision,
resolution or final order of the Division of the Commission on Elections because the case would not
reach the Comelec en banc without such motion for reconsideration having been filed and resolved
by the Division.
F. The CSC
 A Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least 35 years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the election immediately preceding their appointment. They shall
be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven [7]
Page 126 of 140

years without reappointment. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity. See Brillantes v. Yorac, supra..
 Camporedondo v NLRC, GR No. 129049

o At issue in this case is whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC for short) is a government
owned and controlled corporation or it has been impliedly converted to a private organization
subject to the jurisdiction of labor tribunals in a complaint filed by petitioner, a former PNRC
chapter administrator in Surigao del Norte, for illegal dismissal and damages, as he was forced to
"retire" after he was required to restitute shortages and unremitted collections in the total sum of
P135,927.78.
o All suitors must come to court with clean hands. This is especially true of paid staff of the
Philippine National Red Cross. Like its unpaid volunteers, they must be men of unquestioned
honesty and integrity serving in selfless manner to aid the sick and wounded of armed forces in time
of war, acting in voluntary relief in time of peace and war, maintaining a system of national and
international relief in meeting emergency relief needs caused by typhoons, floods, fires,
earthquakes, and other natural disasters, and promoting such service in time of peace and war to
improve the health, safety and welfare of the Filipino people.[1] Paid staff of the PNRC are
government employees who are members of the Government Service Insurance System and
covered by the Civil Service Law. Unlike government service in other agencies, Red Cross service
demands of its paid staff uberrima fides, the utmost good faith and dedication to work.
o The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government owned and controlled corporation,
with an original charter under Republic Act No. 95, as amended. The test to determine whether a
corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its
own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation
law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory
members of the Government Service Insurance System. The PNRC was not "impliedly converted to
a private corporation" simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure
loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges of all kinds on all
importations and purchases for its exclusive use, on donations for its disaster relief work and other
services and in its benefits and fund raising drives, and be alloted one lottery draw a year by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for the support of its disaster relief operation in addition to
its existing lottery draws for blood program.
 General v Roco, GR No. 143366 (2001)

o Respondent Ramon S. Roco was appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos on August 26, 1996
as Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in Region V, a position equivalent to
CES rank level V. He forthwith began to assume and discharge the duties and responsibilities of the
said office. Subsequently, then President Joseph E. Estrada re-appointed him to the same position
on February 8, 1999. At the time of respondents appointment in 1996 and 1999, he was not a CES
eligible. However, during his incumbency, or on August 13, 1999, he was conferred CES eligibility
by the Career Executive Service Board. On September 7, 1999, petitioner Luis Mario General, who
is not a CES eligible,[1] was appointed by President Estrada as Regional Director of the LTO in
Region V, the same position being occupied by respondent. Pursuant thereto, DOTC
Undersecretary Herminio B. Coloma, Jr., as Officer-in-Charge of the Department, issued a
Memorandum directing petitioner General to assume the said office immediately and for respondent
Roco to report to the Office of the Secretary for further instructions. Accordingly, petitioner
General assumed office on September 16, 1999.
o It must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except
first and second-level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to the office or
to the position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may be
transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank which follows him
wherever he is transferred or reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no diminution of salary even if
assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank
and not on the basis of the position or office he occupies. In the case at bar, there is no question that
respondent Ramon S. Roco, though a CES eligible, does not possess the appropriate CES rank,
which is - CES rank level V, for the position of Regional Director of the LTO (Region V). Falling
short of one of the qualifications that would complete his membership in the CES, respondent
cannot successfully interpose violation of security of tenure.Accordingly, he could be validly
reassigned to other positions in the career executive service.
 CSC v Salas, GR 123708

o The present petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated September 14, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 38319 which set aside Resolution No. 92-1283 of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and ordered the reinstatement of herein private respondent
Rafael M. Salas with full back wages for having been illegally dismissed by the Philippine
Page 127 of 140

Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), but without prejudice to the filing of
administrative charges against him if warranted
o On the strength of this statutory declaration, petitioner PAGCOR terminated the services of
respondent Salas for lack of confidence after it supposedly found that the latter was engaged in
proxy betting. In upholding the dismissal of respondent Salas, the CSC ruled that he is considered a
confidential employee by operation of law, hence there is no act of dismissal to speak of but a mere
expiration of a confidential employee's term of office, such that a complaint for illegal dismissal
will not prosper in this case for lack of legal basis. Prior to the passage of the aforestated Civil
Service Act of 1959, there were two recognized instances when a position may be considered
primarily confidential: Firstly, when the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of
Civil Service, has declared the position to be primarily confidential; and, secondly in the absence of
such declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office there exists "close intimacy"
between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of
state. Hence the dictum that, at least since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the
nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-
determining or highly technical.
 Office of the Ombudsman vs CSC, GR No. 159940 (2005)

o Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court
seeking to set aside and nullify Resolution No. 030919 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
dated August 28, 2003. By letter dated March 7, 1994 addressed to then Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez, the CSC approved the Qualification Standards for several positions in the Office of the
Ombudsman (petitioner) including that for Graft Investigation Officer III. The Career Executive
Service Board (CESB) subsequently advised the Ombudsman, by letter of May 29, 1996, [2] that
pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s.1994, the position of Graft Investigation Officer
III, among other positions in petitioner therein mentioned, was classified as a Career Executive
Service (CES) position, hence, governed by the rules of the CES pertaining to eligibility,
appointment to CES ranks, and performance evaluation, among other things
o To classify the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to the CES and require an
appointee thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure would be
absurd as it would result either in 1) vesting the appointing power for said position in the President,
in violation of the Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a position not occupied by a presidential
appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code. It bears emphasis that that under P.D. No 807, Sec.
9(h) which authorizes the CSC to approve appointments to positions in the civil service, except
those specified therein, its authority is limited only to [determine] whether or not the appointees
possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else. Such being the case, the
CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the request of the Ombudsman that appointment be made
permanent effective December 18, 2002. To refuse to heed the request is a clear encroachment on
the discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as appointing authority
 Vistan v Nicolas 201 SCRA 524

o These consolidated cases were brought by the same complainant, Leonila A. Vistan, against
Respondent Judge Ruben T. Nicolas, Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Pandi, Bulacan. AM No. MTJ-
87-79, filed on 16 March 1987, charged Respondent with gross ignorance of the law and grave
abuse of authority and immorality. Complainant alleged that Respondent, as the then MTC Judge of
Guiguinto, Bulacan, rendered a Decision in Criminal Case No. 3073, entitled "People v. Narciso
Paloma," for Forcible Abduction with Consent on 17 February 1987, acquitting the accused therein,
despite the fact that Respondent had not yet ruled on the accused's written offer of evidence which
was filed as early as 14 August 1984. Said Decision, Complainant contended, manifested
Respondent's gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority and discretion. Further,
Complainant stated that Respondent was maintaining an illicit relationship with a woman not his
wife and with whom he has a child. AM. No. MTJ-87-79 was initially dismissed on 21 February
1989 for having become moot and academic, upon Respondent's manifestation and after verification
with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that respondent had resigned from the service
when he became a congressional candidate in the 1987 election. However, such reconsideration
sought by Complainant and again confirmed by the OCA (p. 44, Rollo). Respondent was re-
appointed to the service on 9 February 1989 as MTC Judge, this time, of Pandi, Bulacan.
Accordingly, AM No. MTJ-87-79 was reinstated.
o For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench,
Respondent took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the stature of his
office, and must be pronounced guilty of gross misconduct. The complaint for gross ignorance of
the law and grave abuse of discretion and authority was already resolved by the Court in a
Resolution, dated 4 December 1990. A Judge's official conduct should be free from impropriety or
any appearance thereof. His personal behavior in the performance of official duty, as well as
everyday life, should be beyond reproach (Paguirigan v. Clavaria, AM No. 537-CJ, 19 December
1974, 61 SCRA 411). High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained,
Page 128 of 140
without which the faith of the people in the judiciary so indispensable in an orderly society cannot
be preserved (Candia v. Tagabucba, AM No. 528, MJ, 12 September 1977, 79 SCRA 51). There is
no place in the judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and
integrity (Felix Barja v. Judge Bonifacio B. Bercacio, AM No. 561-MJ, 29 December 1976, 74
SCRA 355). In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the Judiciary (Dy
Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar, AM No. 1720, 31 January 1981, 102 SCRA
494).
 Domingo v Zamora, GR 142283 (2003)

o This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition[1] with prayer for temporary restraining order
seeking to nullify Executive Order No. 81 and Memoranda Nos. 01592 and 01594.[2] The assailed
executive order transferred the sports development programs and activities of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS for brevity) to the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC for
brevity). The questioned memoranda (DECS Memoranda for brevity), on the other hand, reassigned
all Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports (BPESS for brevity) personnel named in the
DECS Memoranda to various offices within the DECS. On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph
E. Estrada issued Executive Order No. 81[3] (EO 81 for brevity) entitled Transferring the Sports
Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine
Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports.
o The Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO
292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under
Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferringfunctions from
one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the Presidents power to
reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice versa. This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of
tenure of employees. The abolition of an office in good faith necessarily results in the employees
cessation in office, but in such event there is no dismissal or separation because the office itself
ceases to exist.[11] On the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does not result in the
employees cessation in office because his office continues to exist although in another department,
agency or office. In the instant case, the BPESS employees who were not transferred to PSC were at
first temporarily, then later permanently reassigned to other offices of the DECS, ensuring their
continued employment. At any rate, RA 9155 now mandates that these employees shall be retained
by the Department.
 OP v Buenaobra, GR 170021 (2006)

o This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals dated May 27, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78279, which reversed and set aside petitioners
Resolutions dated April 11, 2003[2] and June 26, 2003[3] dismissing respondent Nita P. Buenaobra
from the service. The Office of the Ombudsmans Special Prosecution Officer filed an information
against respondent Nita P. Buenaobra, Chairman of the Komisyon sa Wikang Pilipino (KWP), with
the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 for allegedly
causing undue injury to the government through gross inexcusable negligence in connection with
the unauthorized reprinting of the Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 26918 (the Sandiganbayan case)
o Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7104[13] creating the Commission on the Filipino Language provides for 11
commissioners to be headed by a chairman and all appointed by the President. [14] The chairman and
two commissioners shall serve full-time for a term of seven years. Based on the foregoing,
respondent who is the Chairman of the KWP is a non-career service personnel whose tenure is
limited to seven years as provided under R.A. No. 7104.Since her tenure is fixed by law, her
removal from office is not at the pleasure of the appointing authority. We have consistently ruled
that non-career service personnel enjoy security of tenure. They may not be removed without just
cause and non-observance of due process
 Central Bank v CSC, 171 SCRA 744

o May the Civil Service Commission disapprove an appointment and require the appointment of
another person whom it believes is more qualified for the position? This is the primordial issue
addressed in this petition for certiorari brought to this Court by the petitioners Dr. Angela 0.
Jordan ** and the Central Bank of the Philippines under Section 7, Paragraph A, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution. They are questioning Resolution Nos. 87-156 1 and 87-375 2 of the Civil Service
Commission dated May 26, 1987 and October 16, 1987, respectively. The questioned resolutions
directed the immediate revocation of the appointment of Dr. Angela P. Jordan to the position of
Assistant Bank Physician of the Central Bank of the Philippines and the issuance of an appointment
in favor of herein private respondent, Dr. Basilio E. Borja to the said position.
o It is well-settled principle that the appointing authority is given ample discretion in the selection and
appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions. This is a management prerogative which is
Page 129 of 140
generally unhampered by judicial intervention. 9 Within the parameters of this principle, the right to
select and appoint employees is the prerogative of the employer which may be exercised without
being held liable therefor provided that the exercise thereof is in good faith for the advancement of
the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the
employees under special laws or under valid agreements and provided further that such prerogatives
are not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice or
spite. There is no question that the Central Bank of the Philippines is vested with the power of
appointment under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 265, as amended, otherwise known as the
Central Bank Act. Under the Civil Service Act of 1959, 11 the Commissioner of Civil Service has
the final authority on appointments. 12 But the situation has changed under the new law, Presidential
Decree No. 807, 13 otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree, wherein the Commission is not
authorized to curtail the discretion of the appointing official on the nature or kind of appointment to
be extended. 14 The authority of the Commission is limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the law governing the Civil Service.
o
G. The COMELEC
 A Chairman and six [6] Commissioners who shall be natural born Filipino citizens, at least 35 years of age,
holders of a college degree, and have not been candidates in the immediately preceding election. Majority,
including the Chairman, must be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years. [Sec. 1, Art. IX-C]. They shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven [7] years without reappointment. No member shall be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. See Brillantes v. Yorac, supra..
 Brillantes v Comelec, GR 163193 (2004)

o Before us is the petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
Atty. Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., a voter and taxpayer, seeking to nullify, for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, Resolution No. 6712 dated
April 28, 2004 approved by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banccaptioned
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION AND
CONSOLIDATION OF ADVANCED RESULTS IN THE MAY 10, 2004 ELECTIONS. [1] The
petitioner, likewise, prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and, after due
proceedings, a writ of prohibition to permanently enjoin the respondent COMELEC from enforcing
and implementing the questioned resolution. On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 8436[2] authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the
process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and
local elections. It also mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs),
computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials
o An administrative body or tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to
determine the matter before it; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed
with the power to determine the matter, oversteps its authority as determined by law.[31] There is
grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is a capricious
and whimsical exercise of his judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
o As correctly observed by the petitioner, there is a great possibility that the unofficial results
reflected in the electronic transmission under the supervision and control of the COMELEC would
significantly vary from the results reflected in the COMELEC official count. The latter follows the
procedure prescribed by the Omnibus Election Code, which is markedly different from the
procedure envisioned in the assailed resolution. Resultantly, the official and unofficial canvass, both
to be administered by the respondent COMELEC, would most likely not tally. In the past elections,
the unofficial quick count conducted by the NAMFREL had never tallied with that of the official
count of the COMELEC, giving rise to allegations of trending and confusion. With a second
unofficial count to be conducted by the official election body, the respondent COMELEC, in
addition to its official count, allegations of trending, would most certainly be aggravated. As a
consequence, the electoral process would be undermined. As it stands, the COMELEC unofficial
quick count would be but a needless duplication of the NAMFREL quick count, an illegal and
unnecessary waste of government funds and effort.
 Sandoval v Comelec, GR 133842

o The petition at bar assails the order of the Commission on Elections , (COMELEC) en banc dated
June 2, 1998 nullifying and setting aside the proclamation of petitioner Federico S. Sandoval as
congressman-elect for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district. Petitioner Federico S. Sandoval and
private respondent Canuto Senen Greta, together with Pedro Domingo, Mariano Santiago, Symaco
Benito and Warren Serna, vied for the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative
district during the election held on May 11, 1998
o As a general rule, candidates and registered political parties involved in an election are allowed to
file pre-proclamation cases before the COMELEC. Pre-proclamation cases refer to any question
Page 130 of 140
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by, any
candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or
directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation
to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns. [24] The
COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.[25] As an exception,
however, to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 [26]. prohibits candidates in the
presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation
cases. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of
Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of
canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vice- president and members of the
House of Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not
prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule
is consistent with and complements the authority of the COMELEC under the Constitution to,
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an, election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall"[29] and its power to "decide, except those involving the right to
vote, all questions affecting elections."
o COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of
the COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint
election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies
and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections,
register political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission,
prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any
other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of
its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision
over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. However , the resolution of the adverse
claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the
questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the
Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide
whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the
exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi- judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests
in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the
exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is
deemed quasi-judicial.[41] The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore
the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent
 Al Haj v Comelec, GR No. 151046

o Petitioners assail the resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc dismissing their petition to
declare a failure of elections in the Municipality of Munai, Province of Lanao del Norte. In their
petition, petitioners Tawantawan M. Caruntongan and Nasser Manalao, candidates for Municipal
Mayor and Vice Mayor, respectively, enumerated the grounds for the declaration of failure of
elections. The COMELEC dismissed the petition because the grounds relied upon are not those
which constitute grounds for a declaration of failure of election.
o Clearly, the only three instances wherein a failure of election may be validly declared are when: 1)
the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed in account of force
majeure,violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; 2) the election in any polling place
had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force
majeure,violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or 3) after the voting and during the
preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous cases.This enumeration is exclusive and restrictive.It limits the power of this
Commission to annul the results of an election only to those instances where the election is not
held, is suspended or results in a failure to elect.The latter phrase should be understood in its literal
sense, which is, nobody was elected (Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 260 SCRA 604 [1996]). Moreover,
the irregularities pointed out by petitioners such as vote-buying, fraud, and terrorism are grounds
for an election contest and may not, as a rule, be invoked to declare a failure of election and to
disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate through the misdeeds, precisely, of only a
relative few (Ututalum vs. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 335 [1990]; Depatuan vs. COMELEC, 185
SCRA 86 [1990]).
 Guevarra v Comelec, 104 Phil 269

o Under section 2, Article X of the Constitution and section 5 of the Revised Election Code, the
Commission on Elections not only has the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections but the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to
it in connection with the elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also punish for
contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the same procedure and
with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense, the Commission, although it cannot be
classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (section 13, Art. VIII) for it is
Page 131 of 140
merely an independent administrative body (The Nacionalista Party v. Vera, 85 Phil., 126), may
however exercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of the
law come under its jurisdiction. As to what questions may come within this category, neither the
Constitution nor the Revised Election Code specifies. The former merely provides that it shall come
under its jurisdiction, saving those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting
elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the
appointment of election inspectors and other election officials, while the latter is silent as to what
questions may be brought before it for determination. But it is clear that, to come under its
jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and must refer to the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
o The requisitioning and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is an
imperative ministerial duty of the Commission on Elections performed in its administrative capacity
in relation to the conduct of election ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it
only dicharges a ministerial duty; it does not exercise any judicial functions. Such being the case, it
can not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is
inherently Judicial in nature.
o "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and
mandates of Courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice" (Slade Perkins v. Director
of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U. S. v. Loo Koe, 36 Phil., 867; In re Sotto 46 Off. Gaz., 2570; In re
Kelly, 35 Phil, 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident
and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, Ibid.) Its exercise by administrative
bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People v.
Swena, 296 p. 271), and the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its
administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg v. Decker, 31 N. E. 190; In re Sims, 37
Phil., 135; Roberts v. Hacney, 58 S.W. 180).
 Jaramilla v Comelec, GR No, 155717 (2003)

o [Respondent] Antonio Suyat and [petitioner] Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the position of
Member of the Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the May 14,
2001 elections. On May 16, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, proclaimed the
winning candidates for the offices of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and eight (8) members of
the Sangguniang Bayan. The Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation shows the following
results and ranking with respect to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan. In the tabulated results
issued by the Election Officer and Chairperson of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz,
it is shown that [respondent Suyat] obtained Four thousand seven hundred seventy nine (4,779)
votes and was ranked no. 9. Upon review by [respondent Suyat], he discovered that [petitioner] was
credited with only twenty three (23) votes per Election Return from Precinct No. 34A1. However,
when the figures were forwarded to the Statement of Votes by Precinct, [petitioner] was credited
with seventy three (73) votes for Precinct No. 34A1 or fifty (50) votes more than what he actually
obtained.
o As stated in the provision, and in line with the Courts recent pronouncement in Milla v. Balmores-
Laxa,[8] election cases including pre-proclamation controversies should first be heard and decided
by a division of the COMELEC, and then by the commission en banc if a motion for
reconsideration of the division is filed. It must be noted however that this provision applies only in
cases where the COMELEC exercises its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and not when it
merely exercises purely administrative functions. This doctrine was laid out in Castromayor v.
COMELEC,[9] and reiterated in subsequent cases.[10] Accordingly, when the case demands only the
exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions, such as the correction of a manifest
mistake in the addition of votes or an erroneous tabulation in the statement of votes, the
COMELEC en banccan directly act on it in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide
questions affecting elections. The Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors in the case at bar
alleges an erroneous copying of figures from the election return to the Statement of Votes by
Precinct. Such an error in the tabulation of the results, which merely requires a clerical correction
without the necessity of opening ballot boxes or examining ballots, demands only the exercise of
the administrative power of the COMELEC. Hence, the Commission en banc properly assumed
original jurisdiction over the aforesaid petition.
o Petitioner bewails the fact that the COMELEC took cognizance of respondent Suyats petition for
correction despite its having been filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period fixed in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure and its lack of certification against forum-shopping. Petitioner
overlooks the fact that the COMELEC has the discretion to suspend its rules or any portion thereof
in the interest of justice
o Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people
in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. [20]Adherence to
technicality that would put a stamp on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of
frustrating the peoples will, can never be countenanced
Page 132 of 140

 Baytan v Comelec, GR No. 153945 (2003)

o Challenged in this petition for certiorari[1] with prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction is the Resolution dated June 3, 2002[2] of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC for brevity) en banc in E.O. Case No. 97-503. In its assailed Resolution, the
COMELEC en banc denied the motion to reconsider Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 dated
November 9, 2000[3] ordering the Law Department to file criminal cases for double registration
against petitioners Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan (petitioners for brevity).
On June 15, 1997, petitioners were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they
met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio (Ignacio for brevity), in Barangay 18,
Zone II of Cavite City. Ignacio led petitioners to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay
18. Petitioners registered in this precinct as evidenced by Voters Registration Records Nos.
41762473, 41762472 and 41762470.
o The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC of the power to investigate and prosecute election
offenses is intended to enable the COMELEC to assure the people of free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections. This grant is an adjunct to the COMELECs constitutional duty to enforce
and administer all election laws. Failure by the COMELEC to exercise this power could result in
the frustration of the true will of the people and make an idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty
of every qualified citizen to vote. A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial and is only
the means to discover who may be charged with a crime, its function being merely to determine
probable cause.[5] All that is required in the preliminary investigation is the determination of
probable cause to justify the holding of petitioners for trial. By definition, probable cause is x x x a
reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded x x x such a state of
facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean `actual
or positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge. It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the
prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELECs sound discretion. The COMELEC
exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for
violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and
malpractices.[9]Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELECs exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election
laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law
o Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both
administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELECs administrative powers are found in
Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C.[21] The 1987 Constitution does not
prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in
division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELECs administrative powers in the Commission
on Elections, while providing that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions.Clearly, the
COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this
has been the practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. On the other
hand, the COMELECs quasi-judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C
H. The COA
 A Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural born Filipino citizens, at least 35 years of age,
CPAs with not less than 10 years of auditing experience or members of the Philippine Bar with at least 10
years practice of law, and must not have been candidates in the election immediately preceding the
appointment. At no time shall all members belong to the same profession [Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-D]. They shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment [Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-D].
 DBP v COA, 231 SCRA 202

o This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the May 13, 1992 decision of respondent
Commission on Audit (COA) disallowing the amount of P246,539.25 representing payment of
customs duties and taxes for one (1) unit of KVA Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) purchased
by petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) at a public bidding conducted by DBP
itself
o DBP is no doubt a government corporation and the question of whether COA Circular 86-299 was
retroactively applied to the subject transaction is thus of no moment. To begin with, there was never
any retroactive application of post-audit. Regardless of the result of the pre-audit, it cannot be
denied that respondent COA is so empowered to conduct a post-audit.
 Bustamante v COA, 216 SCRA 164

Page 133 of 140
o In the case of Bustamante vs. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 134, decided by this Court
on November 27, 1992, COA also disallowed the claim for transportation allowance of the legal
counsel of National Power Corporation because he was already issued a government
vehicle. Involving the circular aforementioned and almost the same facts as in this case, it was
therein held that COA Circular No. 75-6 is categorical in prohibiting the use of government
vehicles by officials receiving transportation allowance and in stressing that the use of government
motor vehicle and claim for transportation allowance are mutually exclusive and incompatible
o The issue need no longer be belabored for no less than this Court ruled in the aforesaid case that a
government official, to whom a motor vehicle has been assigned, cannot, at the same time, claim
transportation allowance. (Underscoring supplied)
 DBP v COA, GR No. 88435 (2002)

o This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the letter-decision of the Chairman of the Commission
on Audit2("COA" for brevity) and the letter-decision of the COA en banc3, prohibiting the
Development Bank of the Philippines ("DBP" for brevity) from hiring a private external auditor.
This petition raises a question of first impression, whether or not the constitutional power of the
COA to examine and audit the DBP is exclusive and precludes a concurrent audit of the DBP by a
private external auditor. In 1986, the Philippine government, under the administration of then
President Corazon C. Aquino, obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery Loan ("ERL"
for brevity) in the amount of US$310 million. The ERL was intended to support the recovery of the
Philippine economy, at that time suffering severely from the financial crisis that hit the country
during the latter part of the Marcos regime.
o The resolution of the primordial issue of whether or not the COA has the sole and exclusive power
to examine and audit government banks involves an interpretation of Section 2, Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution. The COA vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of Section 2, the COA
enjoys the sole and exclusivepower to examine and audit all government agencies, including the
DBP. The qualifying word "exclusive" in the second paragraph of Section 2 cannot be applied to
the first paragraph which is another sub-section of Section 2. A qualifying word is intended to refer
only to the phrase to which it is immediately associated, and not to a phrase distantly located in
another paragraph or sub-section.26 Thus, the first paragraph of Section 2 must be read the way it
appears, without the word "exclusive", signifying that non-COA auditors can also examine and
audit government agencies. The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire
Section 2 is that the COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the
COA's authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and
disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive. Besides, the framers of the
Constitutionintentionally omitted the word "exclusive" in the first paragraph of Section 2 precisely
to allow concurrent auditby private external auditors.
I. Sandiganbayan
 PD 1606
WHEREAS, the new Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust and ordains that
public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people; WHEREAS, to attain the
highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, Section 5, Article XIII
of the New Constitution provides for the creation of a special court to be known as Sandiganbayan;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as follows:
Section 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications; tenure; removal and composition. A

special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a
court of justice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a Presiding
Justice and eight Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President.
No person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan; unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of age and for at least ten years has been
a judge of a court of record or been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held
office requiring admission to the bar as a pre-requisite for a like period.
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:

(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office.
Page 134 of 140
The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is
punishable by a penalty higher than prision correccional, or its equivalent, except as herein
provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent with the regular courts.
 Nunez v Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433

o The test as to whether the ex-post facto clause is disregarded, in the language of Chief Justice
Fernando in the case of Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (450), is: "Would the ommission
of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the
protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the negative. In the first place, his innocence or
guilt is passed upon by the three judge court of a division of respondent Court. Moreover, a
unanimous vote is required, failing which 'the Presiding Justice shall designated two other justices
from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five
justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering
judgment. Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of
law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps
excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of the facts. What
cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to give due
course to the petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence
has been overcome. ... 'The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to
a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.' This Court has repeatedly reversed convictions on
a showing that this fundamental and basic right to be presumed innocent has been disregarded."
o The issue on absence of intermediate appeal in the Sandiganbayan as a denial of due process was
earlier resolved in the leading case of Nunez v. Sandiganbayan (111 SCRA 433). The circumstances
of the instant petition do not warrant a reexamination of the doctrine. The discussions in Nunez v.
Sandiganbayan however, especially in the dissenting opinions emphasize the need for more
scrupulous attention to the basic rules of fairness in Sandiganbayan procedure. The Sandiganbayan
was created as part of the program to restore public faith and confidence in the manner public
officers perform their duties. The Constitution is unusually pre-occupied with problems of
inefficiency, graft, corruption, and irresponsibility in public office. There would be no need for the
various constitutional commissions and agencies dedicated to good government had there been no
negative image of the trustworthiness and performance of public officers. For this reason, it is,
therefore, not enough to avoid irregularities in the course of Sandiganbayan trials. The slightest
taint of unfairness should likewise be avoided.
J. Ombudsman
 Roxas v Vasquez, GR No 114944

o Manuel C. Roxas was the Chairman, while Ahmed S. Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and
Awards Committee of the Philippine Constabulary–Integrated National Police (PC-INP). The PC-
INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. After the public bidding, General
Cesar P. Nazareno created a Technical Evaluation Committee, headed by General Mario
Tanchanco, which was sent to Korea and Japan to conduct ocular inspections of the plant facilities
and equipment of the five qualified proponents. Thereafter, the Technical Evaluation Committee
recommended for procurement the Morita Isuzu and Nikki-Hino fire trucks. Meanwhile, the Bids
and Awards Committee voted to recommend to Director General Cesar Nazareno the procurement
of Ssangyong fire trucks. Instead of acting on this recommendation, Gen. Nazareno created a
Review Committee headed by Gen. Gerardo N. Flores, which found that there was a failure to bid.
Gen. Nazareno thus instructed the Bids and Awards Committee to reconsider its earlier
recommendation and to conduct further evaluation of the proponents, but this time limiting itself to
the two Japanese brands recommended by the Technical Evaluation Committee, namely, Morita
Isuzu and Nikki-Hino. The Bids and Awards Committee subsequently voted to award the contract
to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikki-Hino
o Ordinarily, we will not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there
exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probable guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts.13 However, we find that the case at bar falls under one of the recognized exceptions to this
rule, more specifically, the constitutional rights of the accused are impaired and the charges are
manifestly false.14 In cases where the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor were unable to agree
on whether or not probable cause exists, we may interfere with the findings and conclusions. Be that
as it may, we recognize that the power to investigate offenses of this nature belongs to the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor.
o Under Rule II, Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 07, i.e., the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman, motions for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or
resolution of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman must be filed within fifteen (15) days
from notice thereof. It is significant to note in this case that no motion for reconsideration was filed
from the resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the charges against petitioners. Hence,
Page 135 of 140
petitioners had a right to consider the complaint against them as closed. Indeed, every litigation
must come to an end; otherwise, it would become even more intolerable than the wrong and
injustice it is designed to correct. The finding of probable cause against petitioners in proceedings
which they had neither knowledge of nor participation in violated their right to procedural due
process. At the very least, they should have been notified that the complaint against them has not
yet been finally disposed of; or that the fight was not yet over, so to speak. They should have been
apprised of their possible implication in the criminal case to enable them to meet any new
accusations against them head-on, and to prepare for their defense.
 People v Velez, GR No. 138093

o Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution[1] of the Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated January 9, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 24307 [2] granting the Motion
to Withdraw Information filed by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Resolution [3] of the SB
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Ignacio J. Salmingo of said resolution.
o The Office of the Ombudsman is vested under the 1987 Constitution with investigatory and
prosecutorial powers. Said office, through the Special Prosecutor, has direct control over the
prosecution of the case. When it filed the Motion to Withdraw Information on its finding that there
was no probable cause against respondents, except the City Engineer, the Office of the Ombudsman
merely exercised its investigatory and prosecutorial powers. Case law holds that this Court is loathe
to interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of its powers: x x x At this point we reiterate that
x x x [t]his is an exercise of the Ombudsmans powers based upon constitutional mandate and the
courts should not interfere in such exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman
but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts
will be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or
dismiss a complaint by a private complainant
o While the Office of the Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether an Information should
be withdrawn and a criminal case should be dismissed, and to move for the withdrawal of such
Information or dismissal of a criminal case, the final disposition of the said motion and of the case
is addressed to the sound discretion of the SB subject only to thecaveat that the action of the SB
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused and of the right of the People to due process of
law.[23] In this case, the Court holds that the SB acted in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion
in granting the motion of respondents and ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 24307.
 Ledesma v CA GR No. 161629

o This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision [1] dated August 28,
2003 and the resolution[2] dated January 15, 2004 of the Court of Appeals[3]in CA-G.R. SP No.
58264 which affirmed with modification public respondents (1) Joint Resolution dated January 22,
1999, which ordered, among other things, petitioners suspension for one (1) year for conduct
prejudicial to the service; and (2) Order dated February 8, 2000, as reiterated in a Memorandum
dated March 17, 2000, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration but reduced his
suspension to nine (9) months without pay. The Court of Appeals modified the above issuances by
further reducing petitioners suspension from nine (9) months to six (6) months and one (1) day
without pay
o In Arias v. Sandiganbayan,[15] we stated that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent
on their subordinates. Practicality and efficiency in the conduct of government business dictate that
the gritty details be sifted and reviewed by the time it reaches the final approving authority. In the
case at bar, it is not unreasonable for the BOC to rely on the evaluation and recommendation of the
BSI as it cannot be expected to review every detail of each application transmitted for its approval.
Petitioner being the Chairman of the First Division of the BSI has direct supervision over its
proceedings. Thus, he cannot feign ignorance or good faith when the irregularities in the TRV
extension applications are so patently clear on its face. He is principally accountable for certifying
the regularity and propriety of the applications which he knew were defective
o The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. [17] The
Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.[18] Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate and prosecute cases
involving public officers and employees. Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law on November 17, 1989 and provided for the
structural and functional organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the
Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act promptly on complaints but also to enforce the
administrative, civil and criminal liability of government officers and employees in every case
where the evidence warrants to promote efficient service by the Government to the people. It is thus
Page 136 of 140
clear that the framers of our Constitution intended to create a stronger and more effective
Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach of political influences and vested with powers that
are not merely persuasive in character. The Constitutional Commission left to Congress to empower
the Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did when RA 6770 was enacted.
 Ombudsman v Madriaga, GR No. 164316

o The Court of Appeals having declared, by Decision of May 28, 2004, that the six-month suspension
meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman to respondent Gertrudes Madriaga (Gertrudes), school
principal of San Juan Elementary School, San Juan, Metro Manila, and her co-respondent Ana
Marie Bernardo (Ana Marie), a classroom teacher who was designated as Canteen Manager of the
same school, is merely recommendatory to the Department of Education, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
o The Office of the Ombudsman (hereafter petitioner) argues that the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770
(The Ombudsman Act of 1989) have conferred on it full disciplinary authority over public officials
and employeesincluding the power to enforce its duly-issued judgments,10 and jurisprudence has
upheld such authority; and under Section 21 of R.A. No. 6770, 11 with the exception of impeachable
officials, Members of Congress and the Judiciary, it has been given full administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over all public officials and employees who commit any kind of malfeasance,
misfeasance or non-feasance. The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in
conjunction with the phrases "ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770. In fine, petitioner's authority to impose administrative
penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory within the
bounds of the law. The implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed
through the proper officer.
K. Office of the Special Prosecutor
 Zaldiva v SB, 160 SCRA 843

o On June 30, 1988, this Court annulled the information in accordance with its decision in the
consolidated cases ofZaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and Zaldivar vs.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, April 27, 1988 (160 SCRA 843), where it ruled that: ... the incumbent
Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain
powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except
upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1 987. From that
time, he has been divested of such authority.
 Orap v Sandiganbayan, 139 SCRA 252

o Three informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor
Rodolfo B. Aquino, charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
information, duly approved by Hon. Juan A. Sison, then Chief Special Prosecutor of the
Tanodbayan, were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. SB-020, 021 and 022. Likewise charged under
Criminal Case No. 020 was Melanio B. Fernandez, petitioner's Clerk of Court. The fourth
information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-189, was filed against petitioner, also for violation
of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The gravamen of all these charges was to the effect that the
accused on different occasions unlawfully and feloniously received and took various sums of
money from several persons in connection with Criminal Case No. 2032 of the Municipal Court of
Mangatarem entitled, "People vs. Pepito F. Iglesias", for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property. Before his scheduled arraignment,
petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations on the ground that the officer who signed the
same had no authority to do so and that, corollarily, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction
over the offenses charged. After due hearing, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion to
quash. Petitioner verbally moved for the reconsideration of the order but the relief sought was
denied. Hence, the instant recourse.
o The respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that the Tanodbayan has such authority. We affirm. The
Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman, but as prosecutor as well. As ombudsman, his
investigatory powers are limited to complaints initiated against officers and personnel of
administrative agencies, as defined in Section 9(a) of the law. As prosecutor, however, the authority
of the Tanodbayan is primary and without exceptions. His powers are defined in Sections 17 and 19
of P.D. 1607. Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term, confers upon the Tanodbayan, through
the Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors, the exclusive authority to "conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations
therefor, and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein." If, as petitioner contends,
judges, and other court personnel lie outside the investigatory power of the Tanodbayan, then no
judge or court employee could ever be brought to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, for lack of proper officer or entity authorized to conduct the preliminary
Page 137 of 140
investigation on complaints of such nature against them. This absurd situation the law could never
have intended, considering that the Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to "give effect
to the constitutional right of the people to petition the government for redress of grievances and to
promote higher standards of integrity and efficiency in the government service." The informations
in question have complied with the substantial and formal requirements of the law. They carry the
certification of the investigating prosecutor as to the existence of a prima facie case. They also bear
the approval of the Chief Special Prosecutor, as required by Section 11 of
PD 1606. As petitioner is charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which are within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, the
said court validly acquired jurisdiction over the informations in question.
L. National Commissions
 Carino v CHR, GR 96681

o Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest the alleged failure
of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away
from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc.
The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face
dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay
High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41,
P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear
the charges. When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said
teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually,
Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of
Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of
violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually
elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass
actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. While the case was pending with CHR, SC
promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of
issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the
“striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not have been replaced without a
chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political
rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.”
o The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject
to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the
power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can
exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power
pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for
contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it
or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth.
It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required
by its findings. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in
the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
o "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire
into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an
official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by
the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step
by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with
Page 138 of 140
care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm
L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters." "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term
as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised:
. . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule
upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case
of controversy . . . ." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge"
means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
o Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate,"
cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if
there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question,
initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the
question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and
are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking
part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their
classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of
relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by
the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
 Canonizado v Aguirre, GR No. 133132 (2000)

o Respondents are seeking a reconsideration of the Courts 25 January 2000 decision, wherein we
declared section 8 of Republic Act No. 8551 (RA 8551) to be violative of petitioners
constitutionally mandated right to security of tenure. As a consequence of our ruling, we held that
petitioners removal as Commissioners of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and the
appointment of new Commissioners in their stead were nullities and ordered the reinstatement of
petitioners and the payment of full backwages to be computed from the date they were removed
from office.
o Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the
intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. [4] In order to constitute abandonment of
office, it must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute
relinquishment.[5] There must be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law
will infer a relinquishment.[6] Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act;[7] it springs from and is
accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice.[8] There are, therefore, two essential elements
of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and second, an overt or external act by which the
intention is carried into effect. Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon
such office by nonuser or acquiescence.[10] Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or
to exercise an office.[11] However, nonperformance of the duties of an office does not constitute
abandonment where such nonperformance results from temporary disability or from involuntary
failure to perform.[12] Abandonment may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in his
wrongful removal or discharge, for instance, after a summary removal, an unreasonable delay by an
officer illegally removed in taking steps to vindicate his rights may constitute an abandonment of
the office.[13] Where, while desiring and intending to hold the office, and with no willful desire or
intention to abandon it, the public officer vacates it in deference to the requirements of a statute
which is afterwards declared unconstitutional, such a surrender will not be deemed an abandonment
and the officer may recover the office.
o There is no question that the positions of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector General of the
IAS are incompatible with each other. As in the Tan and Gonzales cases, Canonizado was
compelled to leave his position as Commissioner, not by an erroneous decision, but by an
unconstitutional provision of law. Canonizado, like the petitioners in the above mentioned cases,
held a second office during the period that his appeal was pending. As stated in the Comment filed
by petitioners, Canonizado was impelled to accept this subsequent position by a desire to continue
serving the country, in whatever capacity.[23] Surely, this selfless and noble aspiration deserves to be
placed on at least equal footing with the worthy goal of providing for oneself and ones family,
either of which are sufficient to justify Canonizados acceptance of the position of Inspector
General. A contrary ruling would deprive petitioner of his right to live, which contemplates not only
a right to earn a living, as held in previous cases, but also a right to lead a useful and productive life.
Furthermore, prohibiting Canonizado from accepting a second position during the pendency of his
petition would be to unjustly compel him to bear the consequences of an unconstitutional act which
Page 139 of 140

under no circumstance can be attributed to him. However, before Canonizado can re-assume his
post as Commissioner, he should first resign as Inspector General of the IAS-PNP.
o An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no
protection.[28] Therefore, the unavoidable consequence of the Courts declaration that section 8 of
RA 8551 violates the fundamental law is that all acts done pursuant to such provision shall be null
and void, including the removal of petitioners and Adiong from their positions in the NAPOLCOM
and the appointment of new commissioners in their stead. When a regular government employee is
illegally dismissed, his position does not become vacant and the new appointment made in order to
replace him is null and void ab initio.[29] Rudimentary is the precept that there can be no valid
appointment to a non-vacant position.[30] Accordingly, Adiongs appointment on 11 March 1998 for
a term of two years, pursuant to section 8 of RA 8551, is null and void. However, he should now be
permitted to enjoy the remainder of his term under RA 6975. Therefore, based on our foregoing
disquisition, there should no longer be any doubt as to the proper execution of our 25 January 2000
decision all the Commissioners appointed under RA 8551 should be removed from office, in order
to give way to the reinstatement of petitioners and respondent Adiong.
Page 140 of 140

Constitutional Law Memory Aid PULIDO

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Constitutional Law Memory Aid PULIDO

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Constitutional Law Memory Aid PULIDO

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – MEMORY AID

Compiled by: Rolirey H. Flores

A. Definition, Nature and Concepts

 Types of Constitutional law

B. Nature of the Constitution

 Qualities of a good written Constitution

 Parts of the Constitution

 Self-Executing Provision vs Non-Self-Executing Provision

Self-executing provision One which is complete in itself and becomes

Non-Self-Executing Provision One which lays down a general principle

C. Changing the Constitution

 Lambino vs. Comelec, GR. 174153 (2006)

 Steps in Amendatory Process

1. Proposal – The adoption of the suggested change in the Constitution.

II. INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION

A. Role of Judiciary as interpreter of laws

 Constitution, Articles VIII, Sections 1 and 5

 Marbury vs. Madusion, 5 US 137

 Angara vs. Electoral Commision, 63 Phil 139 (1936)

Constitutional bodies, concept of independence, judicial question definition of

 Gonzales vs. Office of the President

 Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR 160261 (November 10, 2003)

C. Requisites of Judicial Review

 Requisites of Judicial Review

 Judicial Power vs Judicial Review

 Actual case or controversy

o Mariano vs. COMELEC, GR 118577

o Monstesclaros vs. COMELEC, GR 152295 (2002)

 Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

 Judicial Question vs Political Question

Judicial Question Political Question

o Moot and Academic

 Gonzales vs Narvasa, GR 140835 (2000)

 Lacson vs. Perez, GR 147780 (2001)

 Defunis vs. Odegard, 416 US 312 (1974)

 Exceptions to the Moot and Academic Rule

 David vs. Arroyo

 Third Provision: The Power to Take Over. Distinction must be

 The case involves constitutional issues

o IBP vs. Zamora, G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

o Ople vs. Torres, 293N SCRA 141 (1998)

 Information Technology Foundation vs. COMELEC, GR 159139 (2004)

 Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, 1994

o Need to notify Solicitor General

 Lis Mota of the Case

D. Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality

 Orthodox view - An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no

 Serrano de Agbayani vs. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1972)

 Salazar vs. Achacoso 183 SCRA 145

III. THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

B. The Philippines as a State

o Differentiate archipelagic waters, territorial sea and internal waters.

Internal waters – waters around, between, and connecting the islands of

o Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968 (1969)

o People vs. Gozo, 53 SCRA 476

o Article II, Sections 1, 4, 15, and 16

o Article III, Sections 1, 2, and 7

o Article VII, Section 4

o Article XVI, Section 2