Report

December 2015

Agrarian reform and the difficult road to

peace in the Philippine countryside
By Danilo T. Carranza

Executive summary
Agrarian reform and conflict in the rural areas of the Philippines are closely intertwined. The weak
government implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, inherent loopholes in the
law, strong landowner resistance, weak farmers’ organisations, and the continuing espousal by the New
People’s Army of its own agrarian revolution combine to make the government’s agrarian reform
programme only partially successful in breaking up land monopolies. This is why poverty is still
pronounced in many rural areas. The rise of an agrarian reform movement has significantly contributed to
the partial success of the government’s agrarian reform programme. But the government has not been
able to tap the full potential of this movement to push for faster and more meaningful agrarian reform.

The agrarian reform dynamics between pro- and anti-agrarian reform actors create social tensions that
often lead to violence, of which land-rights claimants are often the victims. This is exacerbated and in
many ways encouraged by the government’s failure to fulfil its obligation to protect the basic human rights
of land-rights claimants. This report outlines the pace and direction of agrarian reform in the Philippines
and its role in fighting poverty and promoting peace in rural areas. It emphasises the importance of
reform-oriented peasant movements and more effective government implementation to the success of
agrarian reform. The report also asserts the need for the government and the armed left to respect human
rights and international humanitarian law in promoting the full participation of land-rights claimants in
shaping and crafting public policy around land rights.

The causes of rural inequality, poverty From the 1950s onward the land reform laws that were
and conflict implemented, such as the Agricultural Tenancy Reform Act
The Philippine agricultural sector is characterised by and the Agricultural Leasehold Act, among others, tended
unequal and highly skewed landownership. When the to be mere concessions to tenants and were insufficient to
Spanish colonialists introduced the encomienda and bring about fundamental changes in the structure of land
hacienda system, control over vast tracts of land fell into ownership. These policies did not transfer ownership to
the hands of a very small landowning class, dispossessing peasants and merely focused on regulating production
a mass of peasants of the land that they and their ances- relations between landowners and tenants. In 1972
tors had been tilling for generations. With this process of Presidential Decree no. 27 under former president Ferdi-
dispossession colonial rule resulted in the peasantry nand Marcos offered a limited land redistribution window
experiencing poverty, exploitation and oppression. Inequal- by covering only rice and corn lands. It was implemented
ities in landownership resulted in armed agrarian unrest mainly in Central Luzon, a hotbed of peasant insurgency
and saw the birth of rural social movements that demand- and the birthplace of the New People’s Army (NPA) (Borras
ed the breaking of the land monopoly. At various times in et al., 2009: 5; Reyes, 2002: 8ff.)
the country’s history various land reform laws were passed
purportedly to promote agrarian justice by reforming a land After Marcos was ousted through the People Power
property rights regime that favours only the few. revolution in 1986, organised farmers and their supporters
 NOREF Report – December 2015

demanded the immediate passage of a law on agrarian Cultural Rights, to which the Philippines is a state party
reform. A broad alliance called the Congress for a People’s (see FIAN Philippines, 2006). The Philippines itself en-
Agrarian Reform proposed what was called the People’s shrined the right of farmers to own the land they till in the
Agrarian Reform Code in an attempt to pressure the new 1987 Philippine constitution, enunciating that the right to
government of President Corazon Aquino to implement land is integral to the attainment of equity and social
agrarian reform. On January 22nd 1987 the Kilusang justice in Philippine society.
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Peasant Movement of the
Philippines), then the largest peasant movement in the Likewise, secure land tenure reduces the vulnerability of
country, organised a huge march of peasants to demand disaster survivors. Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as
the immediate implementation of genuine agrarian reform. Yolanda) exposed the vulnerabilities of farmers without
The marchers clashed with the police, leading to the secure land tenure when some international humanitarian
infamous “Mendiola Massacre”, which caused the death of agencies refused to provide humanitarian aid to farmers
13 farmers and injuries to more than a hundred protesters and informal settlers who were unable to show secure land
(see Gavilan, 2015). In response to the sustained pressure property rights. The right to humanitarian assistance
from various peasant groups Congress finally enacted the therefore requires that the land-dependent rural poor have
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in 1988. secure land property rights.
CARP was supposed to be the watershed in the Philippine
peasants’ struggle for land (Franco, 2008: 995) and de-
mands for social justice from below. Twenty-seven years Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Pro-
later, however, demands for agrarian reform continue. gramme
Agrarian reform was considered an essential component of
the post-Marcos rural democratisation process. And the
Why land reform? passage of CARP – in theory at least – took the initial step
More than half of the Philippine population lives in rural toward such a democratisation process. In general the
areas. Forty per cent of land is attributed to the agricul- programme mandated the distribution of all agricultural
tural sector, employing about one-third of all Filipinos. This lands to landless farmers, farmworkers or tenants under
sector, however, contributes only 11.3% of GDP (World the land-to-the-tiller principle of the 1987 constitution.
Bank, n.d.). Yet for a long time vast tracts of the country’s CARP set a five-hectare landowner retention limit with an
best agricultural lands had been in the hands of a very few additional three hectares for every legitimate heir as
landowners. This contributed directly to widespread preferred beneficiaries. The goal is clear: to promote equity
poverty in rural areas. A comprehensive land reform and social justice.
programme was deemed necessary to address rural
poverty, with landless farmers and tenants among the Yet CARP is neither clearly revolutionary, because it does
most affected groups (ADB, 2009: 3). not call for the expropriation of private land without
compensating landlords or transferring land to farmers
Agrarian reform is important to rural democratisation and without charge, nor is it conservative, since it does not
the land-dependent rural poor’s enjoyment of basic human merely target resettlements, but large, private landhold-
rights. Philippine society is shaped by a land-based power ings. CARP is thus a liberal type of land reform that
structure and regional rural elites’ control of vast tracts of constitutes a compromise between progressive reform
land serves as their ticket to elective office. They are able advocates and reform opponents where state-led mecha-
to perpetuate themselves in power through patron-client nisms such as compulsory acquisition coexist with market-
relationships. Tenants and ordinary people living on oriented options such as voluntary land transfer (VLT)
haciendas are normally beholden to hacienda owners options (Borras & Franco, 2005: 336ff.).
through strict social regulation. Most often, these hacien-
da-bounded rural citizens are unable to exercise their basic There is no question, however, that CARP is more progres-
rights to association and to vote. These regional elites sive than earlier land reform programmes. Its scope is
undermine traditional and indigenous concepts of land- comprehensive, covering private and public lands regard-
ownership and restrict poor peoples’ political ability to less of crops (unlike under Presidential Decree no. 27’s
claim land rights (Franco, 2008: 994). The 1988 land reform focus on only rice and corn) or tenure arrangement.
law was therefore a crucial measure to break up these Millions of hectares of previously excluded lands that were
undemocratic structures by targeting the redistribution of planted with coconut, sugarcane, rubber, banana, pineap-
land to landless farmers, farmworkers and tenants. ple and others were covered under CARP. The government,
through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and
Secure tenure rights to and control of land also mean Department of Environment and Natural Resources
access to the fundamental human rights to livelihood and (DENR), initially aimed to distribute 10.2 million hectares of
food. Thus, agrarian reform also emphasises land owner- private and public land to 4-5 million tenants, landless
ship as a human right as enshrined in international treaties farmers, farmworkers and occupants of public land. This
and policies, such as the UN Declaration on Human Rights was adjusted to 8.1 million hectares and eventually to 7.9
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and million. The initial target of 10.2 million hectares was

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NOREF Report – December 2015

based on a nationwide list of landowners called the Lista commercial and corporate farms, the prioritisation of the
Saka (List of Farms), which was based on government tax distribution of public land over private landholdings, and
records. Subsequent adjustments were based on the unclear guidelines for land use conversions3 (Cruz &
so-called CARP Scope Validation,1 which supposedly Manahan, 2014: 934; Tadem, 2015: 2).
entailed ground-level initiatives to further validate the
scope of the agrarian reform programme. To what extent In particular the SDO, leaseback agreements and VLT were
these validations defined actual areas to be subjected to major constraints to land redistribution. The SDO is an
agrarian reform is unclear. But the reduction from the option for corporate land to distribute stocks to farmwork-
original target was significant and the DAR continues to ers instead of land.4 Of 13 SDO cases, Hacienda Luisita, one
entertain “new lands” for coverage, which means that the of the largest and most controversial landholdings, which
issue of how much land is to be covered under agrarian was previously owned by the Cojuangcos, who are family of
reform remains uncertain 27 years after CARP took effect. President Benigno Aquino III, is a prime example of the
circumvention of land redistribution under CARP (see FIAN
The Land Bank of the Philippines determines the value of International, n.d.). The VLT option was a much-favoured
the land using various factors that include level of produc- way to evade land redistribution. It allowed landowners to
tivity, fair market value, the market value of adjacent lots transfer land directly to “dummy” beneficiaries, which
and tax assessments, among others. Once the price is ensured that the previous landowners maintained control
established, the landowner is paid by the Land Bank. A over the land.
portion of the settlement is paid in government bonds,
while the rest is paid in cash. A 30-year amortisation period Despite its many loopholes, CARP paved the way for
allows less burdensome payments for farmer beneficiaries farmers’ land-rights claims. But with the various loopholes
and gives them plenty of time to fully develop the land. In and weak programme implementation it became necessary
cases where the value of the land is beyond farmers’ that claimants should be organised and capable of oppos-
capacity to pay, the law provides an “affordability clause”, ing and resisting the anti-reform initiatives of actors
which bases the payment on the productivity of the award- opposed to CARP. As will be discussed below, there are
ed land (i.e. 2.5% of the gross harvest in the first two years, cases where farmers were successful in thwarting these
5% in the next three years and 10% in the remaining 25 anti-reform initiatives.
years). Until today it is unclear if the affordability clause
was actually put into practice in the amortisation process. The DAR is the main agency tasked with redistributing
private lands, while the DENR is tasked with distributing
Support services are an integral component of CARP and a public lands. The political will of the officials and employ-
right of all farmer beneficiaries. This is to ensure that the ees of these agencies has directly influenced the pace of
beneficiaries will be able to make the land productive agrarian reform over the 27 years of programme imple-
through access to technology, credit and market services. mentation, and some administrations have performed
In cases of land disputes, farmers should also be provided better than others.
with legal support to defend their land rights.

In a compromise programme, however, landowning CARP Extension with Reforms

members of Congress had a significant influence on the
law, creating several loopholes that allowed landowners to “CARP remains an orphan program because it is lacking state
evade, delay or derail land redistribution. These loopholes support, resources, and plain good faith” (Bello, 2008: 3)
were reflected in anti-peasant and pro-landowner provi-
sions such as the stock distribution option (SDO) and Because the Philippine government was only able to
leaseback agreements, VLT, the exclusion of fishponds and distribute 57% of the targeted land throughout CARP’s
prawn farms, and the exemption of reclassified land (land original mandated period of ten years, the programme was
that was reclassified before CARP took effect in 1988) and extended in 1998 for another ten years. The major reasons
areas utilised for livestock production. Reclassified land is cited for the delayed implementation of CARP were budget
land that is specifically declared either by presidential constraints on the costs of land acquisition and distribu-
proclamation or local government units ordinance to be tion, including landowner compensation (Bello, 2008: 2),
reserved or used for residential, commercial and industrial lack of an accurate land registration system, and extensive
purposes, among others. The programme also suffers from corruption in the DAR (Cruz & Manahan, 2014: 937). In
vague procedures for the identification of beneficiaries2 on addition, other major reasons could have significantly

1 Undertaken in 1993 under DAR secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.

2 To be identified as a beneficiary a claimant needs to be a landless farmer. This category includes agricultural lessees, tenants, and regular, seasonal and other
farmworkers. But there are further conditions; e.g. to be qualified as a farmer-beneficiary, a person needs to be at least 15 years old, a Philippine citizen, willing
and able to till the land, and resident of the barangay (village) where the landholding is located.
3 The requirements for land-use conversions are very stringent. For instance, applications cannot be accepted more than 60 days after the issuance of notices of
coverage. The farmers are obliged to pay for the land and not transfer it within ten years. The land should be used for agricultural purposes, of course, since it is
classified as such.
4 The free stocks supposedly give the farmers dividends and profit shares, a seat on the board of the corporation, and the promise that they will continue to work on
the land.

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 NOREF Report – December 2015

slowed down the progress of land redistribution, including: privately claimed agricultural lands. Farmers and advo-
(1) the slow resolution of legal disputes arising from cates have been campaigning for the extension of the
landowners’ protests or applications for exemption or DAR’s authority to issue NOCs to ensure the coverage and
exclusion, which normally take more than a decade to distribution of the remaining balance of private lands. The
resolve; (2) the lack of petitions from strong farmers’ balance of public lands, on the other hand, needs to be
organisations in many haciendas that are tightly controlled carefully investigated: many of these so-called public lands
by landowners; and (3) quite simply, the lack of a sense of are in grey areas, because many public lands are subject to
urgency in government in terms of redistributing land. private claims and are under private control. Due to the
absence of reliable documentation the actual area that
While land redistribution brought about significant changes should be subject to agrarian reform also remains unclear.
(various studies showed decreases of poverty among Currently, the DAR is still left with the job of distributing
agrarian reform beneficiaries), the benefits to the peas- approximately one million hectares of the most difficult and
antry were limited to those benefitting from land redistri- contentious landholdings (Tadem, 2015: 3). This being the
bution, while the degree of success depended on many case, the most realistic scenario that farmers can hope for
factors, including the quality of support services received is the redistribution of lands that have been issued with
by farmers. In this sense, CARP was neither truly success- NOCs and are being processed. With the DAR’s very weak
ful nor a total failure, since the government was not able to performance, however, many of these lands will remain
fully cover and distribute targeted land nor provide the sup- undistributed during President Aquino’s term.
port services needed to increase farmers’ productivity and
income (Cruz & Manahan, 2014: 938). Contradictions, loopholes and weaknesses
of CARP/CARPER
The passage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program Extension with Reforms (CARPER) Act on August “[L]and is freedom from poverty: owning a piece of land, earning
7th 2009 gave CARP five more years to be completed. This from it, sending their children to school and putting a roof
period was deemed sufficient to complete the land acquisi- over their heads through the fruits of the land will finally allow
tion and distribution programme under CARPER. However, them to live a life of dignity and pride” (Manahan, 2013: 13)
if land distribution is not completed within this extension
period, section 30 of Rights Act no. 9700 provides for the It is clear from official data that agrarian reform is far from
continuation of the land redistribution process only with complete and is beset by major weaknesses. Towards the
respect to landholdings already issued with notices of end of the Aquino administration in 2016 land redistribution
coverage (NOCs) or landholdings with pending petitions or is expected to be in total paralysis. In fact, CARP’s perfor-
legal cases or claims. Landholdings without NOCs or mance under the present administration is one of the
pending legal claims after June 30th 2014 will remain in poorest in the country’s agrarian reform history. While
limbo, unless a bill to extend the DAR’s authority to issue there is some truth to the contention that most of the
NOCs is passed. The expiry of the issuance of NOCs does remaining balance of land redistribution is extremely
not affect the continuity of the land distribution process for contentious, the administration has clearly lacked the will
landholdings with NOCs, including the delivery of support to redistribute those lands without legal impediments,
services and legal support for potential agrarian reform such as Hacienda Matias in San Francisco, Quezon, among
beneficiaries.5 The elimination of the SDO and VLT option, others. The government also made DAR employees feel
the recognition of women as agrarian reform beneficiaries, insecure and uninspired by offering them early retirement,
the prioritisation of the distribution of large landholdings which was interpreted by employees to be consistent with
(from 25 hectares upwards), the lack of feasibility of an unofficial plan to phase out the programme. Moreover,
certificate of landownership awards (CLOAs) and the the DAR created layers of legal-procedural requirements
provision of a PHP 150 billion budget (approximately $3.2 that instead of speeding up the process, created confusion
billion), of which 40% should be allocated to the provision as to how to fulfil these requirements. Even when it was
of support services, are the most significant changes under targeting actual redistribution, the current administration
CARPER (Manahan, 2013: 10; see Manahan, 2009). seemed to be unable to establish achievable targets,
aiming instead for high targets while consistently recording
Incumbent president Benigno Aquino III committed to around a 50% shortfall in performance. According to the
complete the land distribution process under CARPER. DAR’s reports on its activities, from 2010 to 2013 the
With less than a year left in office, however, it is impossible Aquino administration distributed only 107,813.48 hectares
for him to fulfil such a promise. The remaining balance of each year on average, which is far below the Ramos
potential land distribution includes: (1) lands that are still administration’s redistribution of 316,678 hectares per year
being processed; (2) lands that have yet to be issued with (1992-98) and the Corazon Aquino administration’s 141,420
an NOC after the DAR’s authority to issue NOCs expired on hectares (1986-92) (Cruz & Manahan, 2014: 963).
June 30th 2014; and (3) public lands, including untitled

5 Meanwhile, the extension for the issuance of NOCs under CARPER has not been introduced. The programme has reached a state of limbo. Civil society organi-
sations submitted a so-called “one-liner bill” to extend the issuing of NOCs, but it has not been passed into law. It is also important to note that only 20% of all
beneficiaries received some kind of support services.

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NOREF Report – December 2015

69ff.). Land-rights claimants who are not killed by anti-

Accuracy of data reform forces have had to endure immeasurable suffering.
A major obstacle to completing land distribution is the And this situation thrives because of the government’s
absence of accurate data on the current status of land incapacity to fulfil its obligation to protect all the country’s
distribution by the DAR and DENR. It has been proved that citizens.
the DAR’s monitoring system is inconsistent and flawed,
making the data unreliable. Moreover, the DAR seems to Reversals and land conversion
present a better picture of its achievements than the actual Even reformed lands are not spared from reversals of the
situation (Tadem, 2015: 3). The DAR’s data indicates that redistribution process. Many landholdings have reverted to
the official land acquisition and distribution balance as of former landowner through anti-reform judicial decisions. A
January 2014 remained at 790,671 hectares, covering a recent case involved more than 600 hectares in the town of
total of 80,867 landholdings, of which 26,571 landholdings Sariaya, in Quezon. If these reversals continue, at least
(206,536 hectares) have no NOCs.6 DENR data, on the other 2,000 hectares of reformed land and around 1,500 farmers
hand, has been neither validated nor investigated. More­ will be affected in Sariaya alone. The number of land
over, weak coordination between the responsible authori- conversions have intensified even in landholdings that have
ties and an overlapping of jurisdiction due to the varying already been earmarked for distribution. It is claimed that
classifications under different laws resulted in duplicate these lands are inappropriate for agricultural use and
reporting or, in other cases, wrongly declared land (Bello, should instead be developed for purposes like real estate
2009: 46). development, tourism, mining, or special economic zones
by foreign and domestic land speculators. Prominent
At their face value government statistics are problematic, examples include the cases of Casiguran in Aurora, Sumalo
because they contain serious anomalies that need to be in Bataan and Sicogon Island in Iloilo. Aggressive develop-
dealt with. One example is the inclusion of reports of ers are displacing farming communities and using up
farmers who are supposed to be beneficiaries of land productive land (Tadem, 2015: 3).
distribution, but do not yet hold their CLOAs. This issue
affects more than 12,000 farmers in the province of Leyte Provision of support services
alone. Another problem is the continuing inclusion of ghost The programme also suffers from acute inadequacies in
land distribution processes in the Autonomous Region of the delivery of support services. As of December 2013 only
Muslim Mindanao, even though this anomaly was un- 44% of all agrarian reform beneficiaries had access to
earthed a decade ago. The titles of private landholdings support services packages, of which 27% were agrarian
that had been cancelled and transferred to the government reform communities that are mainly funded by foreign aid
are already reflected as finalised land distributions, even (Cruz & Manahan, 2014: 968; Tadem, 2015: 4ff.) In several
when CLOAs have yet to be awarded and farmers have yet cases the inability to deliver timely and adequate support
to occupy such lands. It is also unclear how the govern- services has prevented agrarian reform beneficiaries from
ment will proceed with the redistribution of the so-called becoming economically viable small farmer-producers
untitled privately claimed agricultural lands (UPALs) with (Cruz & Manahan, 2014: 969). In Hacienda Luisita at least
an area of 77,000 hectares, because these areas are 90% of more than 6,000 farmer beneficiaries were forced to
supposed to be public lands. The DAR has removed UPALs informally lease their lands under unjust terms to arienda-
from its list of targets. These issues are fuelling demands dors (informal lessees) due to the government’s failure to
to audit the actual status and achievements of CARP/ provide timely and comprehensive support services after
CARPER. the nullification of the SDO and the eventual land distribu-
tion in 2014 (see Ranada, 2014). Others take loans from
Violence against land-rights claimants loan sharks and traders that charge high interest rates
Violence and strong resistance by landlords continue to (Tadem, 2015: 5). This lack of support services speeds up
accompany the peasants’ struggle for land in the Philip- the reconsolidation of reformed lands into the hands of a
pines. Harassment and intimidation by hired guards, few new landowners. Most of these new landowners are
privately paid thugs or paramilitary forces; the filing of the traders or loan sharks themselves who take the land as
criminal cases; and forcible evictions are common forms of a form of payment for the loans incurred by farmers. One
violence used by landlords, real estate and mining compa- example is the 540-hectare Superior Agro Industries, in
nies, and agribusiness operators against the rural poor Barangay Pagsangahan, San Francisco, Quezon, where a
(Borras & Franco, 2007: 69ff.) The state also commits barangay official said that at least 200 hectares of reformed
violence against peasants through its police, military and land had been taken over by the local copra (coconut meat)
courts, as often occurs when the state pursues or supports trader after farmers incurred huge debts.
land investments via real estate development, mining or
commercial plantation projects (Borras & Franco, 2007:

6 The DAR only highlighted the land that had been distributed, but did not show what happened to this land after the beneficiaries received their land titles. For
instance, in Hacienda Luisita 95% of the distributed land is now in the hands of so-called “ariendadors”, i.e. middlemen/-women that the farmers had to lease their
land to through informal contracts because they had no means to make their land productive due to the lack of or delayed provision of government support services.

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 NOREF Report – December 2015

longer pushing for another extension. PARC proposed a

Ghost “achievements” and a conservative, legalis- new agrarian reform programme that takes the “land-to-
tic bureaucracy the-tiller” principle seriously and will include all cultivated
Serious doubt regarding the actual achievements of CARP and agriculturally productive lands that are exempted from
and CARPER is bolstered by “ghost” cases. In the province the current programmes. It also proposed a proper delivery
of Leyte, for example, RIGHTS, an NGO working for the of support services for all beneficiaries in order to develop
rehabilitation of Yolanda survivors, discovered that at least small-farmholder-based agriculture.
12,055 CLOAs affecting 14,000-plus beneficiaries covering
36,685 hectares were not yet distributed, although they
were reflected as part of the official list of DAR achieve- Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill
ments in 2008, in which the province of Leyte was regarded The debate about CARP/CARPER versus “genuine agrarian
as one of the best performing provinces in terms of land reform” had been ongoing even before CARP took effect in
distribution. 1988. The proposed Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill (GARB)
was filed in the previous (14th) Congress as House Bill no.
Many advocates and farmers’ organisations, however, 3059 and was refiled as House Bill no. 252 in the current
assert that the main problem attributed to CARPER’s poor Congress. This attempt by the national democratic move-
performance, even though CARPER was supposed to be a ment to turn the demand for genuine agrarian reform into
stronger version of CARP, has been the conservative and law through a legislative initiative is laudable. The bill,
“safety-first” approach adopted by the bureaucracy, however, is confronting serious legal challenges because it
particularly current DAR secretary Virgilio de los Reyes. proposes an agrarian reform framework that would extend
The unofficially declared policy for resolving or handling the limits of legal boundaries. Many of its proposals, while
agrarian issues is to make sure that the DAR and its radically pro-farmer, are deemed to be unconstitutional.
officials will not commit mistakes in the process of CARP These include the following:
implementation to protect themselves from being sued • the inclusion/distribution of timberland and mineral
during and after their terms in office. The result is the lands that are in reality cultivated;
tendency to over-analyse the situation, which creates • the inclusion/distribution of livestock areas;
layers of administrative procedures that slow the work of • the confiscation of sullied landholdings;7
the bureaucracy. A relatively good law can only go so far in • the issuing of notice of the cancellation of transnational
the hands of a conservative and legalistic bureaucracy, and corporations’ business permits and the taking of these
will lose the momentum needed to push reform in the corporations under state control from the date when
countryside. the GARB is enacted; and
• the vesting of the DAR with primary jurisdiction over the
Beyond CARPER determination of just compensation.
The dismal record of agrarian reform under the Aquino
administration brings to the fore the continuing gap As pointed out in a DAR opinion – one among many on the
between theory and practice of post-Marcos governments’ matter – timberlands or mineral lands are non-alienable
commitments to promote equity and social justice in the state domains. As such, these lands cannot be disposed of
countryside. The less-than-complete and less-than-ideal or titled for private ownership without violating the consti-
state of CARP/CARPER implementation is giving rise to tution. Similarly, commercial livestock areas are deemed
continuing demands for agrarian reform and criticism even non-agricultural in nature and are not covered by the
from supporters of CARP and CARPER. agrarian reform programme. The exemption of livestock
areas is reinforced by Supreme Court decisions that
In June 2014 around 1,000 participants from various affirmed that livestock areas lie outside CARP’s ambit
groups, including workers’ organisations, church alliances, (such as the Sutton case in Masbate and the Uy case in the
academics and advocates, organised a People’s Agrarian Bondoc Peninsula).
Reform Congress (PARC). This congress called for a new,
more radical, irreversible agrarian reform programme that The confiscation of sullied landholdings, on the other hand
would truly promote equity and social justice. The weak- is considered to be in violation of the constitutionally
nesses demonstrated by CARP and CARPER over the last guaranteed right to due process. Moreover, while the DAR
two decades (such as the very slow and cumbersome initially determines just compensation, the ultimate
process of implementation and the reversals, exemptions decision on such compensation rests with the regular
and conversions even of prime food production areas, as courts and this proposal cannot pass without impinging on
well as the failure to protect the basic human rights of land the provisions of the constitution.
rights claimants), could give this proposal a fresh impetus.
This is the reason why some peasant groups are starting to It is understandable that the proponents of the GARB
distance themselves from CARP and CARPER and are no included the proposal to include forest lands and mineral

7 Defined by the bill as “(a) those landholdings acquired by their owners through fraud, deception, intimidation or the use of force or violence; and (b) those whose
landowners maintain private armed groups which are known to have been involved in extra-judicial killings and abduction of farmers”.

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NOREF Report – December 2015

lands under agrarian reform. This is because many such programme that aims to mobilise landless peasants in
lands are actually devoted to agricultural production and support of the revolution.
have existing social and production relations, where
farmers are subjected to oppression and exploitation by The “minimum” programme of the agrarian revolution
claimant landowners. In forest areas at least an alternative promises rent reductions and the abolition of usury, while
policy exists: the government’s Community-Based Forest the “maximum” programme advocates the outright
Management Programme (CBFMP) allows forest inhabit- confiscation and free distribution of land. Central to the
ants 25 years of tenure renewable for another 25 years. CNN’s “agrarian revolution” is the participation of peas-
ants, which should form the main force of the “national
Many commercial livestock areas, on the other hand, are democratic revolution”. Land rent reduction is aimed at
normally located in coconut-growing areas. In many cases reversing the system of share tenancy in favour of peasants
the main source of income in these areas come from in tenancy areas. Called “tersyong bliktad” (reversed
agricultural activity (the cultivation of coconut trees) and sharing), under the agrarian revolutionary programme
not livestock raising. Because of this, coconut-growing two-thirds of the share of agricultural production would go
areas that are simultaneously devoted to livestock produc- to tenants and one-third to landlords. On the other hand,
tion also normally have share tenancy relations between the free distribution component of the agrarian revolution
landowners and tenants.8 At the very least, therefore, this is supposed to take place after the revolutionary victory.
share tenancy should be changed to a leasehold system as
the minimum right of tillers in such areas. But CARP does Like the government’s agrarian reform programme, the
not even allow the reform of the share tenancy system to a revolutionary programme has not performed according to
leasehold system in commercial livestock areas due to the its promise of liberating the peasants from feudal exploita-
“commercial” nature of the land. In some cases farmers tion, even in areas where the CNN is strong.
are totally divested of their rights, are ejected and are
placed in far more difficult situations, because their The case of the remote poor district of the Bondoc Penin-
attempts to change share tenancy through CARP result in sula in Quezon province in southern Luzon illustrates how
court decisions affirming the exemption of livestock areas the government’s programme and the CNN’s agrarian
from CARP coverage. revolution contended to obtain the support of landless
peasants. As will be shown, an autonomous movement of
The GARB is currently pending in the House Committee on reform-oriented peasants in the area played a key role in
Agrarian Reform. The possibility of the bill being submitted the profound changes that occurred in the agrarian
to Congress for deliberation is remote due to the serious structures in the area. The rights-based autonomous
legal-constitutional concerns about the bill’s major reform movement challenged both the government and the
proposals. And except for the six lawmakers from the armed movement by demanding respect for peasants’
left-progressive party-list Makabayan bloc, the bill is not human rights and rights under international humanitarian
receiving the support it needs for it to pass into law. law.

“Agrarian revolution” According to farmers’ accounts, the area evolved in the

“Agrarian revolution” is the programme of the revolution- 1980s as one of the NPA’s strongholds. Promising feudal
ary underground movement represented by the Commu- liberation, the agrarian revolution initially became a power-
nist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the National Demo- ful tool in organising the peasantry around the armed
cratic Front (NDF) and the New People’s Army (NPA) – struggle. The situation of the Bondoc Peninsula in the
know collectively as the CNN – which promised to change 1980s was ripe for such a programme: it was marked by a
the structure of landlessness and oppression in the highly skewed system of land ownership where 44% of the
countryside. For the CNN the revolution should be area’s most productive land was owned by only 1.1 % of the
achieved through the so-called “national democratic population,9 while tenants were condemned to poverty,
revolution”, sometimes referred to as the “people’s receiving only 30-40%, and in some instances only 20%, of
democratic revolution”, a two-step revolution that would the gross produce.
involve first removing the feudal, imperialist and bureau-
cratic-capitalistic characteristics of society and then In the Bondoc Peninsula the minimum programme of the
initiating a socialist revolution. In this context the principal agrarian revolution would supposedly take the form of
struggle is armed, guided by the Maoist dictum “wave by “tersyong baliktad”, which prior to the CARP period would
wave, surround the cities from the countryside”. A key have had a profound impact on tenants’ lives. But it was
element of this strategy is the agrarian revolution, a clear that the agrarian revolution was not making any

8 “Share tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor,
with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with the aid of labor available from mem-
bers of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions”
(Philippines, 1954: part 1).
9 A 1989 study of the poverty situation in the Bondoc Peninsula was undertaken by development experts from the Asian Institute of Management to inform the design
of the Bondoc Development Programme, a bilateral development cooperation between the government of the Philippines and Germany. The study revealed that
one of the major causes of rural poverty in the region was the widespread landlessness of farmers due to the concentration of land ownership in a very few hands.

7
 NOREF Report – December 2015

substantial progress in addressing feudal exploitation in continue paying the landowner’s share, asserting that the
the area. Towards the end of the 1990s share tenancy armed movement would implement real agrarian reform at
persisted, which was a sign of the NPA’s failure to imple- the proper time. The tenants refused this request. Then
ment its programme. Tensions began to show when the NPA started to harass the farmers’ leader, accusing
tenants started to assert their autonomy on how to address him of various “crimes against the revolution”, including
feudal exploitation by forming their own independent being a member of the state military’s intelligence net-
organisations and seriously engaging with the govern- work. The leader and his family have not lived in the area
ment’s agrarian reform programme. This assertion was for almost a decade after surviving an NPA attempt on his
inspired by the promise of reform under the government’s life in early 2004.
CARP, as well as by the failure of the armed movement to
take peasants’ demand for change in the agrarian situation In another case a group of tenants in Hacienda Villa Reyes,
more seriously. the largest hacienda in the Bondoc Peninsula, also peti-
tioned for the distribution of the lands they tilled. The initial
In early 1995 farmers in Barangay Cambuga,10 Mulanay, petition in 2001 grew and expanded to 13 subvillages in
Bondoc Peninsula, in Quezon province asked for the NPA’s 2003. Over time and after holding sustained dialogues with
support to renegotiate with the landowner for an improve- government agencies, the petitioners discovered that
ment of the sharing system in a 201-hectare property portions of the hacienda were in areas classified as timber/
which at that time was shared 80% to 20% in favour of the forest areas, i.e. lands that cannot be alienated or priva-
landowner. The NPA promised to help, but failed to attend tised, and were thus not covered by agrarian reform. It
on the date appointed for the dialogue. Without the armed therefore dawned on the farmers that the landlord’s claim
movement to back up the peasants the dialogue turned into of private ownership was bogus, or at least seriously
a “one-sided tongue lashing” as the landowner condemned questionable. This encouraged some 300 tenants to stop
the tenants for making such a demand. share payments to the claimant. As in the other areas, the
NPA dissuaded the farmers from continuing their non-
Feeling deeply insulted and betrayed, the farmers have payment of the land owner’s share. But once again the
taken a more independent path since then in resolving the farmers refused to obey the armed movement.
exploitative share tenancy system. They approached
government agencies involved in agrarian reform imple- The farmers were perplexed by the NPA’s attitude and
mentation and were surprised to learn that share tenancy could only surmise that it had formed an “unholy alliance”
was no longer allowed under the CARP. The DAR, however, with the landowners in order to stop the advance of the
revealed that it could not distribute the land because it was government’s agrarian reform programme. The landown-
in a timber/forest zone and therefore it could not be ers’ anti-reform resistance was primarily motivated by a
alienated or titled. This information pushed the tenants to possible break-up of their haciendas in favour of small
stop giving the share payment to the landowner. A little farmers. As former farmer-supporters of the armed
later the NPA approached them and convinced them to movement revealed, the landowners were paying the NPA
continue paying the landowner’s share, claiming that it was revolutionary tax, which is an imposition that is normally
not yet time for such an initiative. The tenants stood their levied in areas considered to be the armed movement’s
ground, however, and asked the armed movement to territory. The NPA needed the financial and logistical
respect their decision. They also campaigned for the support that the landowners provided to advance the cause
implementation of the CBFMP to secure their tenure over of its armed struggle. The NPA was also motivated by the
the disputed land. The CBFMP was implemented in 1997. belief that any advance of the government’s agrarian
reform would hamper the growth of the peasant-based
In another case, two tenants in Sitio Libas,11 Barangay San revolution. Things took a turn for the worse when the
Vicente, San Narciso, Quezon, were accused of estafa, a landowners and the armed movement started to use
criminal offence or fraud, for allegedly not paying the violence to stifle the tenants’ dissent.
landlord’s share in 1996. Despite their denial, the tenants
were arrested and jailed and had to sell their carabaos to These violent dynamics have had deadly consequences for
raise the amount needed for bail. Once out of prison, one of the farmers. Between 1998 and 2013 six leaders of the
the jailed farmers, who claimed to be an NPA courier, Bondoc Peninsula’s land rights claimants were killed: four
helped to organise the tenants and led the petition for the were killed by armed thugs linked to landlords and two
land to be covered under CARP. Later, the tenants discov- were killed by the NPA, with one leader barely escaping an
ered that the land was untitled and concluded that it was attempt on his life. Many farmers also faced physical injury
publicly owned. This prompted them to stop giving the and displacement, and more than 200 farmers were jailed
share payment to the landlord claimants, who were the when landlords started to criminalise the peasants’ reform
most powerful political family in the locality. After this, the initiatives.
NPA met twice with the tenants’ leader to convince them to

10 A barangay is the smallest political and administrative division in the Philippines, equivalent to a village.
11 A sitio is a territorial enclave that forms part of a barangay.

8
NOREF Report – December 2015

Nevertheless, the combined anti-reform resistance of the

landowners and the NPA failed to dampen the tenants’ Conclusion and recommendations
reform initiatives. In pursuing their land rights the farmers Land is a scarce natural resource. For the land-dependent
were ably assisted by community organisers who worked rural poor land is a basic requirement for a dignified
with an NGO whose programmes were designed to improve existence. In the Philippines, this has been a major demand
farmers’ land tenure rights. These organisers help to of the rural poor, a demand that has historical, moral, legal
increase the momentum of the government’s agrarian and political bases. This demand, unfortunately, remains
reform programme by raising tenants’ awareness of their largely unfulfilled. Thus, a rural insurgency is continuing to
legal rights, assisting in establishing tenants’ organisations grow as a result of this unkept promise. Agrarian reform,
and facilitating discussions with the relevant government therefore, remains relevant to peacebuilding in the Philip-
agencies. Initial but very significant reform successes also pines.
proved crucial in further swaying tenants’ support for the
government’s agrarian reform programme. This was In the decades prior to CARP the armed left was able to
highlighted by the dramatic reinstatement of 55 forcibly mobilise landless rural poor around the so-called “agrar-
evicted tenant families in Barangay Catulin, Buenavista, ian revolution”, which was the main option available to the
Quezon province in September 1999 through a government rural poor due to the absence of a viable government
inter-agency task force led by the DAR together with the agrarian programme. But post-Marcos changes in the
Armed Forces of the Philippine, the Philippine National policy environment brought about new political opportuni-
Police and other government agencies. ties for the rural poor to confront their poverty and exploi-
tation. The NPA failed to adjust to this changing reality,
The most recent of these reform successes was the especially when CARP and landless peasant reform
reinstatement of the agrarian reform beneficiaries of initiatives started to gain ground. Instead, it attempted to
Hacienda Matias on July 2nd 2015. This is by far the most thwart the government’s reform programme, resulting in
impressive showcase of CARP/CARPER under President many instances of abuse of the human rights of land-rights
Aquino. A steel gate and concrete wall that symbolised the claimants. This antagonism is primarily driven by the belief
landowners’ control over the land in Hacienda Matias were that any inroads by state-led agrarian reform legitimises
dismantled and removed during the DAR’s operation to the state, which in turn weakens peasant support for the
reinstate farmers and pave the way for the initial group of armed movement. Part of this antagonism had to do with
farmer beneficiaries to fully exercise their right to land. the NPA’s ability to claim effective territorial control, which
Two hundred policemen and around 60 military personnel entails the solid support of actors or groups, including
were mobilised for the project and showed that the full landlords, in such territory. For landlords and businesses
force of the law, which had been weak and inadequate for this support translates into the payment of revolutionary
some time, was needed to achieve successful agrarian taxes. The emergence of autonomous reform movements
reform in an area with known strong anti-reform resist- threatened this territorial control and undermined the
ance. This is a formula that could have made CARP/ underground movement’s agrarian revolution programme.
CARPER more effective, if only the government had learned And when social tensions between reform-oriented
from the experience of the Barangay Catulin farmers in movements and landowners arose, the NPA mediated to
1999. But even the Matias reinstatement was largely a assert its authority as a regulating mechanism and to
result of relentless social pressure in terms of which the ensure that peasants did not pursue their land-rights
farmers had to set up camp in front of the DAR in Manila claims under the government’s agrarian reform pro-
for over two months to push it to reinstate them and gramme. However, this directly benefits the landowners’
decisively address the landowner’s recalcitrance by using aim to keep their haciendas intact. Violence becomes the
the full force of the law. last recourse of both the NPA and landowners when
reform-oriented initiatives spin out of control.
Tenant farmers in the Bondoc Peninsula have been
claiming their right to land under the law since the mid-
1990s, which is reflective of a continuing strategic shift in This attitude towards agrarian reform lends credence to
peasant strategies to confront poverty and exclusion. Yet the presumption that in many isolated rural areas where
the case of the Bondoc Peninsula may be an exception. The the NPA still has an effective presence the implementation
success of the reform initiative in the peninsula was a of the government’s agrarian reform programme will be
product of: (1) a relatively strong mass movement that was even weaker, especially without powerful reform-oriented
capable of exerting sustained social pressure to make the land-rights claimants. It would be worthwhile, therefore, to
law a malleable tool for social change, and (2) the presence ask the government to what extent agrarian reform has
of NGOs working to organise tenants, and legal advocates, penetrated large haciendas in isolated areas of Masbate,
which initiated a serious national and international cam- Camarines Sur, Albay, Negros Oriental, Negros Occidental,
paign in support of the demands of the farmers and for and many of the provinces of Mindanao, among others. In
respect for human rights and international humanitarian Masbate, for example, almost 50% of land acquisition and
law. Unfortunately, these factors may not be present in distribution comprises voluntary land transfers, where
other areas of the country. dummies are suspected to have been used as beneficiaries

9
 NOREF Report – December 2015

so that the government can claim that land distribution has gramme, the resolution of agrarian reform issues that
taken place even as landowners retain effective control of triggered the conflict dragged on, taking more than ten
the land. years to be resolved. The same is true in the cases of the
reported killings of peasant leaders in Masbate in 2007 and
It is clear that the government’s agrarian reform pro- 2008, where the land issues that triggered the conflicts
gramme is delinked from its peacebuilding efforts. Even in remain unresolved to this day. This kind of treatment
conflict sites like the Bondoc Peninsula there is no clear reduces government action to a counterinsurgency
indication that agrarian reform is being implemented with response instead of a peacebuilding response that ad-
a sense of urgency to assist farmers embroiled in land dresses the root cause of the problem.
conflicts, despite the presence of such programmes as
PAMANA, which defines agrarian reform, among others, as What can be done at this point? Unfortunately, this ques-
a foundation of peacebuilding. In government agencies like tion is not easy to answer. As a part of the substantive
the DAR and DENR there is hardly any literature and plans issues in the peace talks, the agrarian reform agenda can
that link peace and agrarian reform. In some cases where easily make or break these talks due to the radically
CARP/CARPER have been successful, such success was different agrarian reform approaches of the underground
the result of the determined and unrelenting social movement and the Philippine government. As the actor in
pressure of land-rights claimants such as those in Haci- power, however, the burden of showing that the current
enda Matias. agrarian reform programme works falls squarely on the
government. It is precisely the less-than-ideal state of the
In the Bondoc Peninsula a recent $2.4 million peacebuild- government’s agrarian reform initiative that gives legiti-
ing project12 undertaken by the International Labour macy to the continuing demand of the CNN for genuine
Organisation with support from the Japanese government agrarian reform. But is it still possible for the government
and the UN Trust Fund for Human Security ironically did to strengthen the implementation of CARP/CARPER,14 a
not include support for resolving land conflicts because programme that has obviously lost momentum and its
this was considered to be “too political”. The farmers were former supporters.
left to pursue their land-rights claims on their own and
were fortunate to have NGO allies that assisted them, The future of CARPER itself is unclear. The government’s
however limited this assistance sometimes was, in their legislative efforts to pass a law to extend the mandate of
struggle for land rights. That the agrarian reform success- the DAR to issue NOCs is in limbo, especially as elections
es in the Bondoc Peninsula affected peace and promoted have become the priority of members of Congress. It is
peaceful communities is largely an afterthought – not a also more difficult to expect the measure to pass after the
conscious effort by the government. 2016 elections without any visible momentum from
pro-reform movements in the country. The attitude of the
This is despite the fact that many of the reported violations next government will determine whether agrarian reform
of the Comprehensive Agreement for the Respect of will still occupy an important part of the government’s
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law agenda after the 2016 elections. None of the presidential
(CARHRIHL) between the government and the CNN were candidates so far has outlined a clear agenda for the
land-related abuses and/or violations. In fact, the first two continuity of agrarian reform as a priority agenda for the
cases that were filed at the Joint Monitoring Committee landless rural poor or as part of the peace effort of the
(JMC)13 in 2004 were by land-rights claimants from the future government they wish to head.
Bondoc Peninsula, because these claims involved acts that
were violations of the CARHRIHL even while criminal cases
were also being filed at the regular courts. Land-rights Moving forward
claimants hoped that such submissions would prod the Notwithstanding the current government inertia, CARP/
government to give them protection from harassment. They CARPER offers significant opening for independent
also hoped that the government would speed up the initiatives around the transformation of conflict in prov-
resolution of their agrarian claims in light of its supposed inces that are considered as agrarian hotspots. These
peace efforts. independent initiatives should build from the inroads of
CARP’s land distribution activities and should demonstrate
While some of the witnesses in these cases were for a time and/or showcase agrarian reform as an important measure
covered by the government’s Witness Protection Pro- in promoting peace and development in the countryside.

12 The Inter-Agency Programme to Nurture Peace, Security and Decent Work through Local Development in Conflict Areas of the Philippines (Bondoc Peninsula) was
implemented from 2010 to 2013 to: (1) expand livelihood assets and increase the productivity of communities through the provision of decent work and livelihood
opportunities for vulnerable groups in the Bondoc Peninsula; and (2) to improve the coordination and cooperation of local government units, civil society organisa-
tions, the private sector and community organisations to achieve local socioeconomic development and peacebuilding.
13 This mechanism was supposed to be used by the government and the CNN parties to submit complaints regarding human rights violations. In the two cases that
were submitted by land-rights claimants from the Bondoc Peninsula the government never issued a statement in support of the complainants. Over the years the
JMC served more as a propaganda platform where each party used JMC statistics to accuse the other of violating human rights and international humanitarian
law.
14 CARPER, with its positive provisions, still offers the most realistic option for peasants, given the balance of forces in society. But a precondition for its success is
the involvement of an implementing agency with the political will and the necessary sense of urgency to implement the law.

10
NOREF Report – December 2015

This may take the form of comprehensive post-land Borras, S. M. & J. C. Franco. 2005. “Struggles for land and
distribution productivity and enterprise development livelihood.” Critical Asian Studies, 37(3): 331-61.
programmes in selected agrarian hotspots that could
include Hacienda Luisita, the Bondoc Peninsula, areas in Borras, S. M. & J. C. Franco. 2007. “Struggles over land
the Bicol region, Negros Island, the Leyte-Samar area and resources in the Philippines.” Peace Review: Journal of
parts of Mindanao. Social Justice, 19(1): 67-75.

Support should be given for the holding of a national Borras, S. M. et al. 2009. Anti-land Reform Land Policy? The
dialogue before and after the 2016 elections to insert the World Bank’s Development Assistance to Agrarian Reform in
question of agrarian reform into the election discussions the Philippines. Quezon City: Focus on the Global South-
and to push the newly elected government to more mean- Philippines.
ingfully implement agrarian reform. This dialogue should
include pushing for the extension of the power of the Cruz, J. P. & M. A. Manahan. 2014. “CARPER diem: a
government to issue NOCs and the need for an audit of socio-legal analysis of the state of the comprehensive
CARP/CARPER. The dialogue should also include discus- agrarian reform program in the Aquino administration.”
sions around the need for faster and fairer implementation Ateneo Law Journal, 59(3): 930-1006.
of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act.
FIAN International. n.d. “Hacienda Luisita: a decades-long
A civil-society-led independent audit of CARP/CARPER’s struggle for the right to food.” ‹http://www.fian.org/library/
status should be supported as part of the effort to deter- multimedia/hacienda-luisita-timeline/›
mine the current status of farmers and the agrarian reform
programme. Priority geographic areas for such an audit FIAN Philippines. 2006. Running Amok: Landlord Lawless-
should be the various agrarian hotspots so that remedial ness and Impunity in the Philippines. Final Report of the
measures can be recommended to improve the policy and June 2nd-15th 2006 International Fact-finding Mission on
implementation of agrarian reform. Agrarian Reform-related Violations of Human Rights in the
Philippines. Quezon City.
Support should also be given to programmes that would
promote dialogue to resolve land-based conflicts in Franco, J. C. 2008. “Making land rights accessible: social
selected areas. In these dialogues a multistakeholder movements and political-legal innovations in the rural
approach could be adopted to encourage a range of actors Philippines.” Journal of Development Studies, 44(7): 991-
to be involved in the resolution of the various issues. This 1022.
should include rights holders and rights bearers.
Gavilan, J. 2015. “28 years on: still no justice for Mendiola
As to the peace talks, a national-level, strong and respect- Massacre victims.” Rappler, January 22nd. ‹http://www.
ed third-party peace mediator should be established to rappler.com/move-ph/81659-still-no-justice-mendiola-
influence the government and the CNN to sit down and massacre›
thrash out possible initial steps toward peace talks. This
group should include influential personalities and church Manahan, M. A. 2009. “CARPER and the continuing strug-
leaders, and civil society groups working for human rights, gle for land.” ‹http://www.focusweb.org/philippines/
land rights and international humanitarian law, among content/view/307/52/›
others. Such a group should also contribute to the drawing
up of an agenda that is key to peace talks, including the Manahan, M. A. 2013. The State of Agrarian Reform under
issue of agrarian reform. President Benigno Aquino III’s Government. Beyond the
Numbers: A Struggle for Social Justice and Inclusive Rural
Development. Quezon City: Focus on the Global South-Phil-
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THE AUTHOR
Danilo T. Carranza is the national coordinator of the Rural Poor
Institute for Land and Human Rights, a network of grassroots- The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre
based NGOs with a presence in 14 Philippine provinces nationwide.
Norsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging
He has nearly three decades of experience in agrarian reform
and rural development, and has served in various capacities as
organiser, campaigner, paralegal and grassroots-based educator The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) is a
­resource centre integrating knowledge and experience to strengthen
for various NGOs. He has also assisted some farmers’ groups in
peacebuilding policy and practice. Established in 2008, it collaborates
their campaign for respect for human rights and international
and promotes collaboration with a wide network of researchers,
humanitarian law.
policymakers and practitioners in Norway and abroad.

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organisation for which he works or NOREF. NOREF does not
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