G.R. No.

175991 August 31, 2011

JOSE R. CATACUTAN, Petitioner,

FACTS:

Private complainant Georgito Posesano was an Instructor II with Salary Grade 13 while private
complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was an Education Program Specialist II with Salary Grade 16,
both at the Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT).3

On June 2, 1997, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Caraga Administrative Region,
appointed and promoted private complainants as Vocational Instruction Supervisor III with Salary
Grade 18 at SNSAT.4 These promotional appointments were duly approved and attested as
permanent by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on June 3, 1997.5 Being then the Officer-In-
Charge of SNSAT, the approved appointments were formally transmitted to the petitioner on June 6,
1997,6 copy furnished the concerned appointees. Despite receipt of the appointment letter, the
private complainants were not able to assume their new position since petitioner made known that
he strongly opposed their appointments and that he would not implement them despite written
orders from CHED7 and the CSC, Caraga Regional Office.8 Thus, on August 2, 1997, private
complainants lodged a formal complaint against petitioner for grave abuse of authority and
disrespect of lawful orders before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao.9

In an Information dated February 27, 1998, petitioner was charged before the RTC of Surigao City
with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as amended.

During arraignment on September 22, 1998, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." For his defense,
petitioner admitted that he did not implement the promotional appointments of the private
complainants because of some procedural lapses or infirmities attending the preparation of the
appointment papers. According to him, the appointment papers were prepared by SNSAT
Administrative Officer, Crispin Noguera, using blank forms bearing the letterhead of SNSAT and not
of the CHED Regional Office who made the appointments. He also averred that the appointment
papers cited the entire plantilla11 (1996 Plantilla-OSEC-DECSB-VOCIS3-19, Pages 1-16) instead of
only the particular page on which the vacant item occurs. He likewise claimed that he received only
the duplicate copies of the appointments contrary to the usual procedure where the original
appointment papers and other supporting documents are returned to his office. Finally, he asserted
that the transmittal letter from the CHED did not specify the date of effectivity of the appointments.
These alleged infirmities, he contended, were formally brought to the attention of the CHED
Regional Director on June 20, 199712 who, however, informed him that the subject appointments
were regular and valid and directed him to implement the same. Still not satisfied, petitioner sought
the intercession of CHED Chairman Angel C. Alcala in the settlement of this administrative
problem13 but the latter did not respond. Petitioner alleged that his refusal to implement the
appointments of the private complainants was not motivated by bad faith but he just wanted to
protect the interest of the government by following strict compliance in the preparation of
appointment papers.

RTC: holding that the act of the petitioner in defying the orders of the CHED and the CSC to implement
the subject promotional appointments despite the rejection of his opposition, demonstrates his
palpable and patent fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing
for some perverse motive or ill will. The trial court ruled that petitioner’s refusal to implement the
appointments of the private complainants had caused undue injury to them. Thus, it held petitioner
guilty of the crime charged and accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six
(6) years and one (1) month and perpetual disqualification from public office.

SANDIGANBAYAN: On appeal, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto by the

Hence, this petition.

In the Court’s Resolution19 dated February 26, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was
required to file its Comment. The OSG filed its Comment20 on June 5, 2007 while the Office of the
Special Prosecutor filed the Comment21 for respondent People of the Philippines on February 22,
2008.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s constitutional right[s] to due process and equal protection of the law
were violated when he was denied the opportunity to present [in] evidence the Court of Appeals.

HELD: No.

Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process.

"Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard."24 "Due process is satisfied when the
parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy."25 "Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process."26

Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim denial of
his fundamental right to due process. Records show that petitioner was able to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him, argue his case vigorously, and explain the merits of his defense.
To reiterate, as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law for the opportunity to be heard is the better
accepted norm of procedural due process.

There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to introduce as
evidence the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795. It is well within the court’s discretion to reject
the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the
proceeding on hand. This is specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal
proceeding as in this case, concerns an administrative matter. As the Sandiganbayan aptly
remarked:

The RTC committed no error in judgment when it did not allow the Accused-appellant to present the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 (Jose R. Catacutan vs. Office of the
Ombudsman). The findings in administrative cases are not binding upon the court trying a criminal
case, even if the criminal proceedings are based on the same facts and incidents which gave rise to
the administrative matter. The dismissal of a criminal case does not foreclose administrative action
or necessarily gives the accused a clean bill of health in all respects. In the same way, the dismissal
of an administrative case does not operate to terminate a criminal proceeding with the same subject
matter.

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and
the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one
should not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative
case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases.

On the basis of the afore-mentioned precedents, the Court has no option but to declare that the courts
below correctly disallowed the introduction in evidence of the CA Decision. "Due process of law is not
denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an
incompetent witness. It is not an error to refuse evidence which although admissible for certain
purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it."

At any rate, even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence of
the CA Decision, petitioner is not left without legal recourse. Petitioner could have availed of the
remedy provided in Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. – If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded
by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence
excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of
the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.

As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on having the RTC admit the CA’s
Decision for whatever it may be worth, he could have included the same in his offer of exhibits. If an
exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is rejected, the party producing it should ask the court’s
permission to have the exhibit attached to the record.

As things stand, the CA Decision does not form part of the records of the case, thus it has no
probative weight. Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must
be formally offered by him otherwise it is excluded and rejected and cannot even be taken
cognizance of on appeal. The rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of
evidentiary value to evidence which was not formally offered.

First, petitioner could not have committed the acts imputed against him during the time material to
this case were it not for his being a public officer, that is, as the Officer-In-Charge (Principal) of
SNSAT. As such public officer, he exercised official duties and functions, which include the exercise
of administrative supervision over the school such as taking charge of personnel management and
finances, as well as implementing instruction as far as appointment of teachers.32

Second, petitioner acted with evident bad faith in refusing to implement the appointments of private
complainants. While petitioner may have laudable objectives in refusing the implementation of
private complainants’ valid appointments, the Court fails to see how he can still claim good faith
when no less than the higher authorities have already sustained the validity of the subject
appointments and have ordered him to proceed with the implementation. "It is well to remember that
good intentions do not win cases, evidence does."
Third, undue injury to the private complainants was duly proven to the point of moral certainty. Here,
the private complainants suffered undue injury when they were not able to assume their official
duties as Vocational Supervisors III despite the issuance of their valid appointments. As borne out by
the records, they were able to assume their new positions only on November 19, 1997. So in the
interregnum from June to November 1997, private complainants failed to enjoy the benefits of an
increased salary corresponding to their newly appointed positions. Likewise established is that as a
result of petitioner’s unjustified and inordinate refusal to implement their valid appointments
notwithstanding clear and mandatory directives from his superiors, the private complainants suffered
mental anguish, sleepless nights, serious anxiety warranting the award of moral damages under
Article 2217 of the New Civil Code.

At this point, the Court just needs to stress that the foregoing are factual matters that were threshed
out and decided upon by the trial court which were subsequently affirmed by the Sandiganbayan.
Where the factual findings of both the trial court and the appellate court coincide, the same are
binding on this Court. In any event, apart from these factual findings of the lower courts, this Court in
its own assessment and review of the records considers the findings in order.