G.R. No.

237428

MAY 11 2018

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE

C. CALIDA, Petitioner
vs.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Respondent

R E S O L U T I O N

TIJAM, J.:

This resolution treats of the following motions:

1. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno’s (respondent) Ad Cautelam Motion for

Reconsideration of this Court's Decision 1 dated May 11, 2018, the dispositive
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED. Respondent Maria

Lourdes P. A. Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is here y adjudged
GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the
Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the application and nomination
process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the
Court.

Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10)

days from receipt hereof why she should not be sanctioned for violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing
the subjudice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED.2
2. Respondent’s Ad Cautelam Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply (to the
Show Cause Order dated 11 May 2018).

We first dispose of respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.

Respondent claims denial of due process because her case was allegedly not heard
by an impartial tribunal. She reiterates that the six (6) Justices ought to have
inhibited themselves on the grounds of actual bias, of having personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts, and of having acted as a material witness in the matter
in controversy. Respondent also argues denial of due process when the Court
supposedly took notice of extraneous matters as corroborative evidence and when
the Court based its main Decision on facts without observing the mandatory
procedure for reception of evidence.

She reiterates her arguments that the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an
impeachable officer through quo warranto; that the official acts of the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) and the President involves political questions that cannot be
annulled absent any allegation of grave abuse of discretion; that the petition
for quo warranto is time-barred; and that respondent was and is a person of proven
integrity.

By way of Comment, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeks a denial of respondent's motion for
reconsideration for being proforma. In any case, the OSG argues that
respondent's motion lacks merit as there was no denial of due process and that quo
warranto is the appropriate remedy to oust an ineligible impeachable officer. The
OSG adds that the issue of whether respondent is a person of proven integrity is
justiciable considering that the decision-making powers of the JBC are limited by
judicially discoverable standards. Undeviating from its position, the OSG maintains
that the petition is not time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court
does not apply to the State and that the peculiar circumstances of the instant
case preclude the strict application of the prescriptive period.

Disputing respondent's claims, the OSG reiterates that respondent's repeated

failure to file her Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) and her
non-submission thereof to the JBC which the latter required to prove the integrity
of an applicant affect respondent's integrity. The OSG concludes that respondent,
not having possessed of proven integrity, failed to meet the constitutional
requirement for appointment to the Judiciary.
Carefully weighing the arguments advanced by both parties, this Court finds no
reason to reverse its earlier Decision.

Respondent is seriously in error for claiming denial of due process. Respondent

refuses to recognize the Court's jurisdiction over the subject matter and over her
person on the ground that respondent, as a purported impeachable official, can only
be removed exclusively by impeachment. Reiterating this argument, respondent
filed her Comment to the Petition, moved that her case be heard on Oral
Argument, filed her Memorandum, filed her Reply/Supplement to the OSG's
Memorandum and now, presently moves for reconsideration. All these
representations were made ad cautelam which, stripped of its legal parlance, simply
means that she asks to be heard by the Court which jurisdiction she does not
acknowledge. She asked relief from the Court and was in fact heard by the Court,
and yet she claims to have been denied of due process. She repeatedly discussed
the supposed merits of her opposition to the present quo warranto petition in
various social and traditional media, and yet she claims denial of due process. The
preposterousness of her claim deserves scant consideration.

Respondent also harps on the alleged bias on the part of the six (6) Justices and
that supposedly, their failure to inhibit themselves from deciding the instant
petition amounts to a denial of due process.

Respondent's contentions were merely a rehash of the issues already taken into
consideration and properly resolved by the Court. To reiterate, mere imputation of
bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is
without basis. Acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice has
to be shown.3 Verily, for bias and prejudice to be considered sufficient
justification for the inhibition of a Member of this Court, mere suspicion is not
enough.

Moreover, as discussed in the main Decision, respondent's allegations on the

grounds for inhibition were merely based on speculations, or on distortions of the
language, context and meaning of the answers given by the concerned Justices as
resource persons in the proceedings of the Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives. These matters were squarely resolved by the Court in its main
Decision, as well as in the respective separate opinions of the Justices involved.
Indeed, the Members of the Court's right to inhibit are weighed against their duty
to adjudicate the case without fear of repression. Respondent's motion to require
the inhibition of Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin,
Diosdado M. Peralta, Francis H. Jardeleza, Samuel R. Martires, and Noel Gimenez
Tijam, who all concurred to the main Decision, would open the floodgates to the
worst kind of forum shopping, and on its face, would allow respondent to shop for a
Member of the Court who she perceives to be more compassionate and friendly to
her cause, and is clearly antithetical to the fair administration of justice.

Bordering on the absurd, respondent alleges prejudice based on the footnotes of

the main Decision which show that the draft thereof was being prepared as early
as March 15, 2018 when respondent has yet to file her Comment. Respondent
forgets to mention that the Petition itself was filed on March 5, 2018 where the
propriety of the remedy of quo warranto was specifically raised. Certainly, there is
nothing irregular nor suspicious for the Member-in-Charge, nor for any of the
Justices for that matter, to have made a requisite initial determination on the
matter of jurisdiction. In professing such argument, respondent imputes fault on
the part of the Justices for having been diligent in the performance of their work.

Respondent also considers as irregular the query made by the Member-in-Charge

with the JBC Office of the Executive Officer (OEO) headed by Atty. Annaliza S.
Ty-Capacite (Atty. Capacite ). Respondent points out that the same is not allowed
and shows prejudice on the part of the Court.

For respondent's information, the data were gathered pursuant to the Court En
Bane’s Resolution dated March 20, 2018 wherein the Clerk of Court En Banc and
the JBC, as custodian and repositories of the documents submitted by respondent,
were directed to provide the Court with documents pertinent to respondent's
application and appointment as an Associate Justice in 2010 and as Chief Justice of
the Court in 2012 for the purpose of arriving at a judicious, complete, and efficient
resolution of the instant case. In the same manner, the "corroborative evidence"
referred to by respondent simply refers to respondent's acts and representations
ascertainable through an examination of the documentary evidence appended by
both parties to their respective pleadings as well as their representations during
the Oral Argument. Reference to respondent's subsequent acts committed during
her incumbency as Chief Justice, on the other hand, are plainly matters of public
record and already determined by the House of Representatives as constituting
probable cause for impeachment.
 II

The Court reaffirms its authority to decide the instant quo warranto action. This
authority is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court by the Constitution under
Section 5, Article VIII which states that:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,  quo  warranto, and habeas corpus.

x x x x (Emphasis ours)

Section 5 of Article VIII does not limit the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction only
to certain public officials or that excludes impeachable officials therefrom.
In Sarmiento v. Mison, 4 the Court ruled:

The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear
provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek
Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, that:

The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the

intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The
intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed
in the constitutional provisions themselves. 5 (Emphasis ours)

The Constitution defines judicial power as a "duty" to be performed by the courts

of justice.6 Thus, for the Court to repudiate its own jurisdiction over this case
would be to abdicate a constitutionally imposed responsibility.

As the Court pointed out in its Decision, this is not the first time the Court took
cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer. In the
consolidated cases of Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo7 and Estrada v. Desierto, 8 the
Court assumed jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition that challenged Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo's title to the presidency.

Arguing that the aforesaid cases cannot serve as precedent for the Court to take
cognizance of this case, respondent makes it appear that they involved a totally
different issue, one that concerned Joseph E. Estrada's immunity from suit,
specifically: "Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition
precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and
on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from
criminal prosecution."9

Respondent's allegation is utterly false and misleading. A cursory reading of the

cases will reveal that Estrada's immunity from suit was just one of the issues
raised therein. Estrada in fact sought a quo warranto inquiry into Macapagal-
Arroyo's right to assume the presidency, claiming he was simply a President on
leave.

Respondent also asserts that Estrada cannot serve as precedent for the Court to

decide this case because it was dismissed, and unlike the instant petition, it was
filed within the prescribed one (1)-year period under Section 11, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court. 10

The argument fails to persuade. Estrada was dismissed not because the Court had
no jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition but because Estrada's challenge to
Macapagal-Arroyo's presidency had no merit. In ruling upon the merits of
Estrada's quo warranto petition, the Court has undeniably exercised its
jurisdiction under Section 5(1) of Article VIII. Thus, Estrada clearly demonstrates
that the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction extends to impeachable officers.

Furthermore, as will be discussed elsewhere in this Resolution, the filing of the

instant petition was not time-barred. The issue of prescription must be addressed
in light of the public interest that quo warranto is meant to protect.

Accordingly, the Court could, as it did in Estrada, assume jurisdiction over the

instant quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer.

Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct proceedings, although both may
result in the ouster of a public officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the
relief of "ouster", while impeachment affords "removal."

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's

right or title to a public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. 11 It is
the proper action to inquire into a public officer's eligibility 12 or the validity of his
appointment. 13 Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto proceeding
involves a judicial determination of the right to the use or exercise of the office.

Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process undertaken by the

legislature to determine whether the public officer committed any of the
impeachable offenses, namely, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. 14 It
does not ascertain the officer's eligibility for appointment or election, or challenge
the legality of his assumption of office. Conviction for any of the impeachable
offenses shall result in the removal of the impeachable official from office. 15

The OSG 's quo warranto petition challenged respondent's right and title to the
position of Chief Justice. He averred that in failing to regularly disclose her
assets, liabilities and net worth as a member of the career service prior to her
appointment as an Associate Justice of the Court, respondent could not be said to
possess the requirement of proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member
of the Judiciary. The OSG thus prayed that respondent's appointment as Chief
Justice be declared void.

Clearly, the OSG questioned the respondent's eligibility for appointment as Chief
Justice and sought to invalidate such appointment. The OSG's petition, therefore,
is one for quo warranto over which the Court exercises original jurisdiction.

As the Court previously held, "where the dispute is on the eligibility to perform
the duties by the person sought to be ousted or disqualified a quo warranto is the
proper action." 16

Respondent harps on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution for
impeachable officers to be removed only through impeachment. 17 However, a
circumspect examination of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission will reveal that the framers presumed that the impeachable officers
had duly qualified for the position. Indeed, the deliberations which respondent
herself cited 18 showed that the framers did not contemplate a situation where the
impeachable officer was unqualified for appointment or election.

Accordingly, respondent's continued reliance on the Court's pronouncement

in Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 19 Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan,20 Jn Re
Gonzales,21 Jarque v. Desierto22 and Marcoleta v. Borra23 (Lecaroz etc.) is
misplaced. Not one of these cases concerned the validity of an impeachable
officer's appointment. To repeat, Lecaroz involved a criminal charge against a
mayor before the Sandiganbayan, while the rest were disbarment cases filed
against impeachable officers principally for acts done during their tenure in public
office. The officers' eligibility or the validity of their appointment was not raised
before the Court. The principle laid down in said cases is to the effect that during
their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an
offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be
members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be
charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the
public officer's title or right to the office he or she occupies. The ruling
therefore cannot serve as authority to hold that a quo warranto action can never
be filed against an impeachable officer.

The Court's quo warranto jurisdiction over impeachable officers also finds basis in

paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which designates it as the
sole judge of the qualifications of the President and Vice-President, both of whom
are impeachable officers. With this authority, the remedy of quo warranto was
provided in the rules of the Court sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET).

Respondent, however, argues that quo warranto petitions may be filed against the

President and Vice-President under the PET Rules "only because the Constitution
specifically permits" them under Section 4, Article VII. According to respondent,
no counterpart provision exists in the Constitution giving the same authority to the
Court over the Chief Justice, the members of the Constitutional Commissions and
the Ombudsman. Respondent, thus, asserts that the Constitution made a
distinction between elected and appointive impeachable officials, and limited quo
warranto to elected impeachable officials. For these reasons, respondent concludes
that by constitutional design, the Court is denied power to remove any of its
members.24

The Court is not convinced. The argument, to begin with, acknowledges that the
Constitution in fact allows quo warranto actions against impeachable officers,
albeit respondent limits them to the President and Vice-President. This admission
refutes the very position taken by respondent that all impeachable officials cannot
be sued through quo warranto because they belong to a "privileged class" of
officers who can be removed only through impeachment.25 To be sure, Lecaroz, etc.
did not distinguish between elected and appointed impeachable officers.
Furthermore, that the Constitution does not show a counterpart provision to
paragraph 7 of Section 4, Article VII for members of this Court or the
Constitutional Commissions does not mean that quo warranto cannot extend to non-
elected impeachable officers. The authority to hear quo warranto petitions against
appointive impeachable officers emanates from Section 5(1) of Article VIII which
grants quo warranto jurisdiction to this Court without qualification as to the class
of public officers over whom the same may be exercised.

Respondent argues that Section 5(1) of Article VIII is not a blanket authority,
otherwise paragraph 7 of Section 4, Article VII would be "superfluous."
Superfluity, however, is not the same as inconsistency. Section 4, Article VII is
not repugnant to, and clearly confirms, the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction under
Section 5(1) of Article VIII. Respondent herself has not alleged any
irreconcilability in these provisions.

Indeed, contrary to respondent's claim, Section 4 of Article VII is not meant to

limit the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction under Article VIII of the Constitution.
In fact, We held that "[t]he power wielded by PET is "a derivative of the plenary
judicial power allocated to the courts of law, expressly provided in the
Constitution."26 Thus, the authority under Section 4 of Article VII to hear quo
warranto petitions assailing the qualifications of the President and Vice-President
is simply a component of the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction under Article VIII.
This finds support in the nature of quo warranto as a remedy to determine a
person's right or title to a public office, 27 which is not confined to claims of
ineligibility but extends to other instances or claims of usurpation or unlawful
holding of public office as in the cases of Lota v. CA and Sangalang,28 Moro v. Del
Castillo, Jr.,29 Mendoza v. Allas,30 Sen. Defensor Santiago v. Sen. Guingona,
Jr. 31 and Estrada. It will be recalled that in Estrada, the Court took cognizance of,
and ruled upon, a quo warranto challenge to a vice-president's assumption of the
presidency; the challenge was based, not on ineligibility, but on therein petitioner's
claim that he had not resigned and was simply a president on leave. To sustain
respondent's argument, therefore, is to unduly curtail the Court's judicial power
and to dilute the efficacy of quo warranto as a remedy against the "unauthorized
arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is
not entitled by law thereto."32 It bears to reiterate that:

While an appointment is an essentially discretionary executive power, it is subject

to the limitation that the appointee should possess none of the disqualifications
but all the qualifications required by law. Where the law prescribes certain
qualifications for a given office or position, courts may determine whether the
appointee has the requisite qualifications, absent which, his right or title
thereto may be declared void. 33 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

This Court has the constitutional mandate to exercise jurisdiction over quo

warranto petitions. And as Estrada and the PET Rules show, impeachable officers
are not immune to quo warranto actions. Thus, a refusal by the Court to take
cognizance of this case would not only be a breach of its duty under the
Constitution, it would also accord respondent an exemption not given to other
impeachable officers. Such privilege finds no justification either in law, as
impeachable officers are treated without distinction under the impeachment
provisions34 of the Constitution, or in reason, as the qualifications of the Chief
Justice are no less important than the President's or the Vice-President's.

Respondent's insistence that she could not be removed from office except through
impeachment is predicated on Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution. It reads:

Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Emphasis ours)

By its plain language, however, Section 2 of Article XI does not preclude a quo
warranto action questioning an impeachable officer's qualifications to assume
office. These qualifications include age, citizenship and professional experience -
matters which are manifestly outside the purview of impeachment under the
above-cited provision.

Furthermore, Section 2 of Article XI cannot be read in isolation from Section 5(1)

of Article VIII of the Constitution which gives this Court its quo
warranto jurisdiction, or from Section 4, paragraph 7 of Article VII of the
Constitution which designates the Court as the sole judge of the qualifications of
the President and Vice-President.

In Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary,  35 the Court held:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of
the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can
be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
which may make the words idle and nugatory. 36 (Citations omitted)

Section 2 of Article XI provides that the impeachable officers may be removed

from office on impeachment for and conviction of culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal
of public trust. Lack of qualifications for appointment or election is evidently not
among the stated grounds for impeachment. It is, however, a ground for a quo
warranto action over which this Court was given original jurisdiction under Section
5(1) of Article VIII. The grant of jurisdiction was not confined to unimpeachable
officers. In fact, under Section 4, paragraph 7 of Article VII, this Court was
expressly authorized to pass upon the qualifications of the President and Vice-
President. Thus, the proscription against the removal of public officers other than
by impeachment does not apply to quo warranto actions assailing the impeachable
officer's eligibility for appointment or election.

This construction allows all three provisions to stand together and to give effect
to the clear intent of the Constitution to address not only the impeachable
offenses but also the issue of qualifications of public officers, including
impeachable officers.

As this Court intoned in its Decision, to take appointments of impeachable officers

beyond the reach of judicial review is to cleanse them of any possible defect
pertaining to the constitutionally prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise
be raised in an impeachment proceeding.

To illustrate this, the Court cited the requirement that the impeachable officer
must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. We explained that if it turns out
that the impeachable officer is in fact of foreign nationality, respondent's
argument will prevent this Court from inquiring into this important qualification
that directly affects the officer's ability to protect the interests of the State.
Unless convicted of an impeachable offense, the officer will continue in office
despite being clearly disqualified from holding it. We stressed that this could not
have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution.

Respondent, however, contends that the above-cited defect will actually constitute
a ground for impeachment because the appointee's continued exercise of public
functions despite knowledge of his foreign nationality amounts to a culpable
violation of the Constitution.

The argument is untenable. Citizenship is a qualification issue which this Court has
the authority to resolve. Thus, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Exec. Sec.
Ermita,37 where the appointment of Sandiganbayan Justice Gregory S. Ong (Ong)
to this Court was sought to be annulled for the latter's supposed failure to comply
with the citizenship requirement under the Constitution, We stated that:

Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ong's
qualification for membership of this Court. This case is a matter of primordial
importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body
tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the
Constitution, the Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as
the JBC has the initial competence to do so.38 (Citation omitted and emphasis
ours)

In the subsequent case of Topacio v. Assoc. Justice Gregory Santos Ong, et

al.,39 Ong's citizenship was raised anew, this time to prevent him from further
exercising the office of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The Court held that
the challenge was one against Ong's title to the office which must be raised in
a quo warranto proceeding, thus:

While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition

partakes of the nature of a quo warranto proceeding with respect to Ong, for
it effectively seeks to declare null and void his appointment as an Associate
Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional. While the petition
professes to be one for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a quo
warranto aspect of the petition.
Being a collateral attack on a public officer's title, the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed.

The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo
warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally, even
through mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside order. In Nacionalista Party v.
De Vera, the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of
the appointment of a public officer.

x x x [T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as

judges or other judicial officers, cannot be treated as a substitute for quo
warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the functions of the
writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de facto, the title to the office and the
right to act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an intruder takes possession of
a judicial office, the person dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of
prohibition commanding the alleged intruder to cease from performing judicial
acts, since in its very nature prohibition is an improper remedy by which to
determine the title to an office.40 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Determining title to the office on the basis of a public officer's qualifications is

the function of quo warranto. For this reason, impeachment cannot be treated as a
substitute for quo warranto.

Furthermore, impeachment was designed as a mechanism "to check abuse of

power."41 The grounds for impeachment, including culpable violation of the
Constitution, have been described as referring to "serious crimes or
misconduct"42 of the "vicious and malevolent" kind.43 Citizenship issues are hardly
within the ambit of this constitutional standard.

The Constitution must be construed in light of the object sought to be

accomplished and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied. 44 An interpretation
that would cause absurdity is not favored.45

It thus bears to reiterate that even the PET Rules expressly provide for the
remedy of election protest. Following respondent's theory that an impeachable
officer can be removed only through impeachment means that a President or Vice-
President against whom an election protest has been filed can demand for the
dismissal of the protest on the ground that it can potentially cause his/her removal
from office through a mode other than by impeachment. To sustain respondent's
position is to render election protests under the PET Rules nugatory. The
Constitution could not have intended such absurdity since fraud and irregularities
in elections cannot be countenanced, and the will of the people as reflected in their
votes must be determined and respected.

The preposterousness of allowing unqualified public officials to continue occupying

their positions by making impeachment the sole mode of removing them was
likewise aptly discussed by Our esteemed colleague Justice Estela M. Perlas-
Bernabe when she stated that qualification should precede authority, viz:

Owing to both the "political" and "offense-based" nature of these grounds, I am

thus inclined to believe that impeachment is not the sole mode of "removing"
impeachable officials as it be clearly absurd for any of them to remain in office
despite their failure to meet the minimum eligibility requirements, which failure
does not constitute a ground for impeachment. Sensibly, there should be a remedy
to oust all our public officials, no matter how high-ranking they are or criticial
their functions may be, upon a determination that they have not actually qualified
for election or appointment. While I do recognize the wisdom of insulating
impeachable officials from suits that may impede the performance of vital public
functions, ultimately, this concern cannot override the basic qualification
requirements of public office. There is no doubt that qualification should
precede authority. Every public office is created and conferred by law.xx
x. 46 (Emphasis in the original)

Underlying all constitutional provisions on government service is the principle that

public office is a public trust.47 The people, therefore, have the right to have only
qualified individuals appointed to public office. To construe Section 2, Article XI
of the Constitution as proscribing a quo warranto petition is to deprive the State
of a remedy to correct a public wrong arising from defective or void appointments.
Equity, however, will not suffer a wrong to be without remedy. 48 It stands to
reason, therefore, that quo warranto should be available to question the validity of
appointments especially of impeachable officers since they occupy the upper
echelons of government and are capable of wielding vast power and influence on
matters of law and policy.

III

 
Much noise and hysteria have been made that a sitting Chief Justice can only be
removed by impeachment and that quo warranto is an improper remedy not
sanctioned by the Constitution. The wind of disinformation was further fanned by
respondent who claimed that her ouster was orchestrated by the President. This
campaign of misinformation attempted to conceal and obfuscate the fact that the
main issue in the petition which the Court is tasked to resolve is the qualification
of respondent.

In the instant motion, respondent made mention of Senate Resolution No.

738,49 which urges this Court to review Our May 11, 2018 Decision as it sets a
"dangerous precedent that transgresses the exclusive powers of the legislative
branch to initiate, try and decide all cases of impeachment." This Resolution was
supposedly aimed to express "the sense of the Senate to uphold the Constitution
on the matter of removing a Chief Justice from office." We have to remind the
respondent, however, that while a majority of the Senators - 14 out of the 23
members - signed the said Resolution, the same has not yet been adopted by the
Senate to date. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice that on May 31, 2018, the
Senate adjourned its interpellation without any conclusion as to whether the
Resolution is adopted. 50 Without such approval, the Senate Resolution amounts to
nothing but a mere scrap of paper at present.

The Senate Resolution also appears to have been drafted, signed by some
Senators, and interpellated on while respondent's motion for reconsideration is
still pending consideration by the Court. While the concerned Members of the
Senate insist on non-encroachment of powers, the Senate Resolution itself tends
to influence, if not exert undue pressure on, the Court on how it should resolve the
pending motion for reconsideration. The importance and high regard for the
institution that is the Senate is undisputed. But the Court, in the discharge of its
Constitutional duty, is also entitled to the same degree of respect and deference.

At any rate, and with due regard to the Members of the Senate, We emphasize
that the judicial determination of actual controversies presented before the
courts is within the exclusive domain of the Judiciary. "The separation of powers
doctrine is the backbone of our tripartite system of government. It is implicit in
the manner that our Constitution lays out in separate and distinct Articles the
powers and prerogatives of each co-equal branch of government." 51 Thus, the act of
some of the Senators questioning the Court's judicial action is clearly an
unwarranted intrusion to the Court's powers and mandate.
To disabuse wandering minds, there is nothing violative or intrusive of the Senate's
power to remove impeachable officials in the main Decision. In fact, in the said
assailed Decision, We recognized that the Senate has the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. We have extensively discussed therein that the
Court merely exercised its Constitutional duty to resolve a legal question referring
to respondent's qualification as a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. We also
emphasized that this Court's action never intends to deprive the Congress of its
mandate to make a determination on impeachable officials' culpability for acts
committed while in office. We even explained that impeachment and quo
warranto may proceed independently and simultaneously, albeit a ruling of removal
or ouster of the respondent in one case will preclude the same ruling in the other
due to legal impossibility and mootness.

Quo warranto is not a figment of imagination or invention of this Court. It is a

mandate boldly enshrined in the Constitution52 where the judiciary is conferred
original jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other branches of the
government. Quo warranto, not impeachment, is the constitutional remedy
prescribed to adjudicate and resolve questions relating to qualifications, eligibility
and entitlement to public office. Those who chose to ignore this fact are
Constitutionally blind. US Supreme Court Justice Scalia once said: "If it is in the
Constitution, it is there. If it is not in the Constitution, it is not there." 53 There is
nothing in Our Constitution that says that impeachable officers are immuned,
exempted, or excluded from quo warranto proceedings when the very issue to be
determined therein is the status of an officer as such. No amount of public
indignation can rewrite or deface the Constitution.

IV

The plain issue in the instant case is whether respondent is eligible to occupy the
position of Chief Justice. To determine whether or not respondent is eligible, the
primordial consideration is whether respondent met the requisite Constitutional
requirements for the position. Questions on eligibility therefore present a
justiciable issue, which can be resolved by juxtaposing the facts with the
Constitution, as well as pertinent laws and jurisprudence. In Kilosbayan
Foundation,54 the Court affirmed its jurisdiction to resolve the issue on the
qualification for membership of this Court as the body tasked with the
determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution, even when
the JBC has the initial competence to do so. 55
True enough, constitutionally committed to the JBC is the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. The function to recommend appointees
carries with it the concomitant duty to screen applicants therefor. The JBC's
exercise of its recommendatory function must nevertheless conform with the basic
premise that the appointee possesses the non-negotiable qualifications prescribed
by the Constitution. While the JBC enjoys a certain leeway in screening aspiring
magistrates, such remains to be tightly circumscribed by the Constitutional
qualifications for aspiring members of the Judiciary. 56 These Constitutional
prerequisites are therefore deemed written into the rules and standards which the
JBC may prescribe in the discharge of its primary function. The JBC cannot go
beyond or less than what the Constitution prescribes.

The surrender to the JBC of the details as to how these qualifications are to be
determined is rendered necessary and in keeping with its recommendatory function
which is nevertheless made expressly subject to the Court's exercise of
supervision.

As an incident of its power of supervision over the JBC, the Court has the
authority to insure that the JBC performs its duties under the Constitution and
complies with its own rules and standards. Indeed, supervision is an active power
and implies the authority to inquire into facts and conditions that renders the
power of supervision real and effective. 57 Under its power of supervision, the
Court has ample authority to look into the processes leading to respondent's
nomination for the position of Chief Justice on the face of the Republic's
contention that respondent was ineligible to be a candidate to the position to begin
with.

Arguments were raised against the Court's assumption over the quo

warranto petition on the premise that the determination of the integrity
requirement lies solely on the JBC's discretion and thus, a prior nullification of the
JBC's act on the ground of grave abuse of discretion through a certiorari petition
is the proper legal route.

The question of whether or not a nominee possesses the reqms1te qualifications is

determined based on facts and as such, generates no exercise of discretion on the
part of the nominating body. Thus, whether a nominee is of the requisite age, is a
natural-born citizen, has met the years of law practice, and is of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence are to be determined based on
facts and cannot be made dependent on inference or discretion, much less
concessions, which the recommending authority may make or extend. To say that
the determination of whether a nominee is of "proven integrity" is a task
absolutely contingent upon the discretion of the JBC is to place the integrity
requirement on a plateau different from the rest of the Constitutional
requirements, when no such distinction is assigned by the Constitution. As well, to
treat as discretionary on the part of the JBC the question of whether a nominee is
of "proven integrity" is to render the Court impotent to nullify an otherwise
unconstitutional nomination unless the Court's jurisdiction is invoked on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion. Such severely limiting course of action would
effectively diminish the Court's collegial power of supervision over the JBC.

To re-align the issue in this petition, the Republic charges respondent of unlawfully
holding or exercising the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The
contents of the petition pose an attack to respondent's authority to hold or
exercise the position. Unmoving is the rule that title to a public office may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. 58 As it cannot be assailed
collaterally, certiorari is an infirm remedy for this purpose. It is for this reason
that the Court previously denied a certiorari and prohibition petition which sought
to annul appointment to the Judiciary of an alleged naturalized citizen. 59

Aguinaldo, et al. v. Aquino, et al.,  60 settles that when it is the qualification for the

position that is in issue, the proper remedy is quo warranto pursuant
to Topacio. 61 But when it is the act of the appointing power that is placed under
scrutiny and not any disqualification on the part of the appointee, a petition
for certiorari challenging the appointment for being unconstitutional or for having
been done in grave abuse of discretion is the apt legal course. In Aguinaldo, the
Court elucidated:

The Court recognized in Jardeleza v. Sereno that a petition for certiorari is a

proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the
government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

In opposing the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the OSG cites

Topacio in which the Court declares that title to a public office may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed
collaterally, such as by certiorari and prohibition.
However, Topacio is not on all fours with the instant case. In Topacio, the writs
of certiorari and prohibition were sought against Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong on the ground that he lacked the qualification of Filipino
citizenship for said position. In contrast, the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition puts under scrutiny, not any disqualification on the part of respondents
Musngi and Econg, but the act of President Aquino in appointing respondents
Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices without regard for the
clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists by the JBC, which allegedly
violated the Constitution and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. This would not be the first time that the Court, in
the exercise of its expanded power of judicial review, takes cognizance of a
petition for certiorari that challenges a presidential appointment for being
unconstitutional or for having been done in grave abuse of discretion.xx
x.62 (Italics and citations omitted.)

A certiorari petition also lacks the safeguards installed in a quo warranto action

specifically designed to promote stability in public office and remove perpetual
uncertainty in the title of the person holding the office. For one,
a certiorari petition thrives on allegation and proof of grave abuse of discretion. In
a quo warranto action, it is imperative to demonstrate that the respondent have
usurped, intruded into or unlawfully held or exercised a public office, position or
franchise.

For another, certiorari may be filed by any person alleging to have been aggrieved

by an act done with grave abuse of discretion. In a quo warranto action, it is the
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President or when
upon complaint or when he has good reason to believe that the grounds for quo
warranto can be established by proof, who must commence the action. The only
instance when an individual is allowed to commence such action is when he or she
claims to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another. In such case, it is incumbent upon the private person to
present proof of a clear and indubitable right to the office. If certiorari is
accepted as the proper legal vehicle to assail eligibility to public office then any
person, although unable to demonstrate clear and indubitable right to the office,
and merely upon claim of grave abuse of discretion, can place title to public office
in uncertainty.

Tellingly also, the rules on quo warranto do not require that the recommending or
appointing authority be impleaded as a necessary party, much less makes the
nullification of the act of the recommending authority a condition precedent
before the remedy of quo warranto can be availed of. The JBC itself did not
bother to intervene in the instant petition.

Under Section 6, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, when the action is against a person
for usurping a public office, position or franchise, it is only required that, if there
be a person who claims to be entitled thereto, his or her name should be set forth
in the petition with an averment of his or her right to the office, position or
franchise and that the respondent is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons
claiming to be entitled to the public office, position or franchise may be made
parties and their respective rights may be determined in the same quo
warranto action. The appointing authority, or in this case the recommending
authority which is the JBC, is therefore not a necessary party in a quo
warranto action.

Peculiar also to the instant petition is the surrounding circumstance that an

administrative matter directly pertaining to the nomination of respondent is
pending before the Court. While the administrative matter aims to determine
whether there is culpability or lapses on the part of the JBC members, the factual
narrative offered by the latter are all extant on record which the Court can take
judicial notice of. Thus, considerations regarding the lack of due process on the
part of the JBC present only a superficial resistance to the Court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the instant quo warranto petition.

In any case, the rules on quo warranto vests upon the Court ancillary jurisdiction to
render such further judgment as "justice requires." 63 Indeed, the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction implies the grant of necessary and usual incidental powers
essential to effectuate its jurisdiction and subject to existing laws and
constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all
things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the
scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and
mandates. 64 Accordingly, "demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to,
or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be
taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid
of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be
called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would
not be within its cognizance."65

V
This Court had likewise amply laid down the legal and factual bases for its ruling
against the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground of prescription. Our
ruling on this matter is anchored upon the very purpose of such prescriptive period
as consistently held by this Court for decades and also upon consideration of the
unique underlying circumstances in this case which cannot be ignored.

In addition to the catena of cases cited in the assailed Decision, the Court,
in Madrigal v. Prov. Gov. Lecaroz, 66 exhaustively explained the rationale behind the
prescriptive period:

The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition

for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed
within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position. xx x
The reason behind this being was expounded in the case of Unabia v. City Mayor,
etc., x x x where We said:

"x x x[W]e note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the
action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in
the island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in Section 216 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression
of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an
office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps
to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one
year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that
demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in
the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public business
may [not] be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to
positions in the service must be discouraged. The following considerations as to
public officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be applicable to employees in the
civil service:

'Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of

the officer for one year could be validly considered as waiver, i.e., a renunciation
which no principle of justice may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position
anytime he pleases.

And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the
title to public office should be subjected to continued uncertain[t]y, and
the peoples' interest require that such right should be determined as speedily
as practicable.'

"Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any

person claims to be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as
against another actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced
with the predicament of having to pay the salaries, one, for the person
actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually
rendering service although entitled to do so.xx x."67 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)

The long line of cases decided by this Court since the l 900's, which specifically
explained the spirit behind the rule providing a prescriptive period for the filing of
an action for quo warranto, reveals that such limitation can be applied only against
private individuals claiming rights to a public office, not against the State.

Indeed, there is no proprietary right over a public office. Hence, a claimed right
over a public office may be waived. In fact, even Constitutionally-protected rights
may be waived. Thus, We have consistently held that the inaction of a person
claiming right over a public office to assert the same within the prescriptive period
provided by the rules, may be considered a waiver of such right. This is where the
difference between a quo warranto filed by a private individual as opposed to one
filed by the State through the Solicitor General lies. There is no claim of right
over a public office where it is the State itself, through the Solicitor General,
which files a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the person
holding the public office. As We have emphasized in the assailed Decision, unlike
Constitutionally-protected rights, Constitutionally-required qualifications for a
public office can never be waived either deliberately or by mere passage of time.
While a private individual may, in proper instances, be deemed to have waived his or
her right over title to public office and/or to have acquiesced or consented to the
loss of such right, no organized society would allow, much more a prudent court
would consider, the State to have waived by mere lapse of time, its right to uphold
and ensure compliance with the requirements for such office, fixed by no less than
the Constitution, the fundamental law upon which the foundations of a State stand,
especially so when the government cannot be faulted for such lapse.

On another point, the one-year prescriptive period was necessary for the
government to be immediately informed if any person claims title to an office so
that the government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two
salaries, one for the person actually holding it albeit illegally, and another to the
person not rendering service although entitled to do so. It would thus be absurd to
require the filing of a petition for quo warranto within the one-year period for
such purpose when it is the State itself which files the same not for the purpose
of determining who among two private individuals are entitled to the office. Stated
in a different manner, the purpose of the instant petition is not to inform the
government that it is facing a predicament of having to pay two salaries; rather,
the government, having learned of the predicament that it might be paying an
unqualified person, is acting upon it head-on.

Most importantly, urgency to resolve the controversy on the title to a public office
to prevent a hiatus or disruption in the delivery of public service is the ultimate
consideration in prescribing a limitation on when an action for quo warranto may be
instituted. However, it is this very same concern that precludes the application of
the prescriptive period when it is the State which questions the eligibility of the
person holding a public office and not merely the personal interest of a private
individual claiming title thereto. Again, as We have stated in the assailed Decision,
when the government is the real party in interest and asserts its rights, there can
be no defense on the ground of laches or limitation, 68 otherwise, it would be
injurious to public interest if this Court will not act upon the case presented
before it by the Republic and merely allow the uncertainty and controversy
surrounding the Chief Justice position to continue.

Worthy to mention is the fact that this is not the first time that this Court
precluded the application of the prescriptive period in filing a petition for quo
warranto. In Cristobal v. Melchor,69 the Court considered certain exceptional
circumstances attending the case, which took it out of the rule on the one-year
prescriptive period. Also, in Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 70 the Court considered, among
others, therein petitioner's good faith and the injustice that he suffered due to
his forcible ouster from office in ruling that he is not bound by the provision on
the prescriptive period in filing his action for quo warranto to assert his right to
the public office. When the Court in several cases exercised liberality in the
application of the statute of limitations in favor of private individuals so as not to
defeat their personal interests on a public position, is it not but proper, just,
reasonable, and more in accord with the spirit of the rule for this Court to decide
against the application of the prescriptive period considering the public interest
involved? Certainly, it is every citizen's interest to have qualified individuals to
hold public office, especially which of the highest position in the Judiciary.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that this Court's ruling on the issue of
prescription is not grounded upon provisions of the Civil Code, specifically Article
1108(4)71 thereof. Instead, the mention thereof was intended merely to convey
that if the principle that "prescription does not lie against the State" can be
applied with regard to property disputes, what more if the underlying
consideration is public interest.

To be clear, this Court is not abolishing the limitation set by the rules in instituting
a petition for quo warranto. The one-year prescriptive period under Section 11,
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court still stands. However, for reasons explained above
and in the main Decision, this Court made distinctions as to when such prescriptive
period applies, to wit: (1) when filed by the State at its own instance, through the
Solicitor General, 72 prescription shall not apply. This, of course, does not equate to
a blanket authority given to the Solicitor General to indiscriminately file
baseless quo warranto actions in disregard of the constitutionally-protected rights
of individuals; (2) when filed by the Solicitor General or public prosecutor at the
request and upon relation of another person, with leave of court, 73 prescription
shall apply except when established jurisprudential exceptions 74 are present; and
(3) when filed by an individual in his or her own name, 75 prescription shall apply,
except when established jurisprudential exceptions are present. In fine, Our
pronouncement in the assailed Decision as to this matter explained that certain
circumstances preclude the absolute and strict application of the prescriptive
period provided under the rules in filing a petition for quo warranto.

Thus, this Court finds no reason to reverse its ruling that an action for quo
warranto is imprescriptible if brought by the State at its own instance, as in the
instant case.

In any case, and as aptly discussed in the main Decision, the peculiarities of the
instant case preclude strict application of the one-year prescriptive period against
the State. As observed by Justice Perlas-Bernabe in her Separate Opinion, "x x x
if there is one thing that is glaringly apparent from these proceedings, it is
actually the lack of respondent's candor and forthrightness in the submission of
her SALNs."76 Respondent's actions prevented the State from discovering her
disqualification within the prescriptive period. Most certainly, thus the instant
case is one of those proper cases where the one-year prescriptive period set under
Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court should not apply.

VI
Respondent reiterates her argument that her case should be treated similarly as
in Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada Jr. 77

As extensively discussed in the main Decision, respondent, unlike Doblada, did not
present contrary proof to rebut the Certifications from U.P. HRDO that
respondent's SALNs for 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004,
2005 and 2006 are not in its possession and from the Ombudsman that based on
its records, there is no SALN filed by respondent except that for 1998. Being
uncontroverted, these documents suffice to support this Court's conclusion that
respondent failed to file her SALNs in accordance with law.

In Doblada, the contrary proof was in the form of the letter of the head of the

personnel of Branch 155 that the SALN for 2000 exists and was duly
transmitted and received by the Office of the Court Administrator as the
repository agency. In respondent's case, other than her bare allegations attacking
the credibility of the aforesaid certifications from U.P. HR.DO and the
Ombudsman, no supporting proof was presented. It bears to note that these
certifications from the aforesaid public agencies enjoy a presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed. These certifications suffice as proof of
respondent's failure to file her SALN until contradicted or overcome by sufficient
evidence. Consequently, absent a countervailing evidence, such disputable
presumption becomes conclusive. 78

As what this Court has stated in its May 11, 2018 Decision, while government
employees cannot be required to keep their SALNs for more than 10 years based
from the provisions of Section 8, paragraph C(4) of Republic Act No. 6713, 79 the
same cannot substitute for respondent's manifest ineligibility at the time of her
application. Verily, even her more recent SALNs, such as those in the years of
2002 to 2006, which in the ordinary course of things would have been easier to
retrieve, were not presented nor accounted for by respondent.

Respondent attempts to strike a parallelism with Doblada by claiming that she, too,
religiously filed her SALNs. The similarity however, ends there. Unlike
in Doblada, respondent failed to present contrary proof to rebut the evidence of
non-filing. If, indeed, she never missed filing her SALNs and the same were merely
lost, or missing in the records of the repository agency, this Court sees nothing
that would prevent respondent from securing a Certification which would provide a
valid or legal reason for the copies' non-production.
 VII

Respondent insists that the filing of SALNs bears no relation to the Constitutional
qualification of integrity.1âwphi1 For her, the measure of integrity should be as
what the JBC sets it to be and that in any case, the SALN laws, being malum
prohibitum, do not concern adherence to moral and ethical principles.

Respondent's argument, however, dangerously disregards that the filing of SALN

is not only a requirement under the law, but a positive duty required from every
public officer or employee, first and foremost by the Constitution. 80 The SALN
laws were passed in aid of the enforcement of the Constitutional duty to submit a
declaration under oath of one's assets, liabilities, and net worth. This positive
Constitutional duty of filing one's SALN is so sensitive and important that it even
shares the same category as the Constitutional duty imposed upon public officers
and employees to owe allegiance to the State and the Constitution. 81 As such,
offenses against the SALN laws are not ordinary offenses but violations of a duty
which every public officer and employee owes to the State and the Constitution. In
other words, the violation of SALN laws, by itself, defeats any claim of integrity
as it is inherently immoral to violate the will of the legislature and to violate the
Constitution.

Integrity, as what this Court has defined in the assailed Decision, in relation to a
judge's qualifications, should not be viewed separately from the institution he or
she represents. Integrity contemplates both adherence to the highest moral
standards and obedience to laws and legislations. Integrity, at its minimum, entails
compliance with the law.

In sum, respondent has not presented any convincing ground that would merit a
modification or reversal of Our May 11, 2018 Decision. Respondent, at the time of
her application, lacked proven integrity on account of her failure to file a
substantial number of SALNs and also, her failure to submit the required SALNs
to the JBC during her application for the position. Although deviating from the
majority opinion as to the proper remedy, Justice Antonio T. Carpio shares the
same finding:

Since respondent took her oath and assumed her posit10n as Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court on 16 August 2010, she was required to file under oath her
SALN within thirty (30) days after assumption of office, or until 15 September
2010, and the statements must be reckoned as of her first day of service,
pursuant to the relevant provisions on SALN filing.

However, respondent failed to file a SALN containing sworn statements

reckoned as of her first day of service within thirty (30) days after assuming
office. While she allegedly submitted an "entry SALN" on 16 September 2010, it
was unsubscribed and the statements of her assets, liabilities and net worth were
reckoned as of 31 December 2009, and not as of her first day of service, or as of
16 August 2010. x x x

xxxx

The Constitution, law, and rules clearly require that the sworn entry SALN "must
be reckoned as of his/her first day of service" and must be filed "within thirty
(30) days after assumption of office." Evidently, respondent failed to file under
oath a SALN reckoned as of her first day of service, or as of 16 August 2010,
within the prescribed period of thirty (30) days after her assumption of office. In
other words, respondent failed to file the required SALN upon her assumption
of office, which is a clear violation of Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution.
In light of her previous failure to file her SALNs for several years while she was a
UP College of Law Professor, her failure to file her SALN upon assuming office in
2010 as Associate Justice of this Court constitutes culpable violation of the
Constitution, a violation committed while she was already serving as an impeachable
office.82 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)

Having settled respondent's ineligibility and ouster from the position, the Court
reiterates its directive to the JBC to immediately commence the application,
nomination and recommendation process for the position of Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's Ad Cautelam Motion for

Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY for lack of merit. No further
pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made immediately.

The Court REITERATES its order to the Judicial and Bar Council to commence the
application and nomination process for the position of the Chief Justice without
delay. The ninety-day (90) period83 for filling the vacancy shall be reckoned from
the date of the promulgation of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

I maintain my Dissent
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice

Please see my Separate Concurring

I maintain my dissent Opinion
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
Associate Justice CASTRO
Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I maintain my Separate Opinion

I maintain my dissent
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I maintain my dissent
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I maintain my dissent
Please See Concurring Opinion
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ANDRES B. REYES, JR. ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 6230-6382.

2
 Id. at 6380.

3
 Barnes v. Reyes, et al., 614 Phil. 299, 304 (2009).

4
 No. L-79974, December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA549.

5
 Id. at 552.

6
 Section I of Article VIII states:

Sec. I. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis
ours)

7
 406 Phil. I (2001).

8
 Supra.

9
 Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Rec0nsideration, pp. 68-69.
10
 Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, p. 69.

 Sen. Defensor Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr.,  359 Phil. 276, 302 (1998).
11

12
 Fortuna v. Judge Palma, 240 Phil. 656, 664 ( 1987).

 Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126, 133 (1949) and J/Sr. Supt.

13

Engano v. Court of Appeals, 526 Phil. 291, 297 (2006).

14
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 2.

15
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI. Sections 2 and 3(7).

16
 Fortuna v. Judge Palma, supra at 664.

17
 Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, p. 58.

18
 Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 58-61.

19
 213 Phil. 288 (1984).

20
 241 Phil. 162 (1988).

21
 243 Phil. 167 (1988).

22
 En Banc Resolution dated December 5, l 995 in A.C. No. 5409.

21
 601 Phil. 470 (2009).

24
 Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 67-68.

25
 Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, p. 59.

26
 Atty. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,  650 Phil. 326, 359
(2010).

27
 Sen. Dejensor Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr., supra note 11, at 302.

28
 112 Phil. 619 (1961).

29
 662 Phil. 331 (2011).
30
 362 Phil. 238 ( 1999).

 359 Phil. 276 (1998)

31

32
 Sen. Defens or Santiago v. Sen Guingona, Jr., supra note 11, at 302.

33
 J/Sr. Supt. Engano v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13, at 299.

34
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Sections 2 and 3.

35
 272 Phil. 147 (1991).

36
 Id. at 162.

37
 553 Phil. 331 (2007).

38
 Id. at 340.

39
 595 Phil. 491 (2008).

40
 Id. at 503.

 Chief Justice Corona v. Senate of the Philippines, et al.,  691 Phil. 156, 170
41

(2012).

42
 Id.

 Gonzales Ill v. Office of the President q/the Philippines, et al.,  694 Phil.
43

52, I 02 (2012).

 Atty Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, supra note 26, at

44

340; People of the Philippines v. Lacson, 448 Phil. 317, 386 (2003).

 Southern Cross Cement Corp. v. Cement Manufacturers Association of the

45

Phil., 503 Phil. 485, 524 (2005).

46
 Separate Opinion of Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe in G.R. No. 237428
dated May 11, 2018, rollo, pp. 6578-6579.

47
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 1.
  Re: Request of National Committee on legal Aid to Exempt legal Aid
48

Clients from Paying Filing, Docket and Other Fees,  A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC,
August 28, 2009.

49
 RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE TO UPHOLD
THE CONSTITUTION ON THE MATTER OF REMOVING A CHIEF
JUSTICE FROM OFFICE.

50
 <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/05/31/18/senate-fails-to-adopt-
resolution-challenging-sereno-ouster>(visited on June 1, 2018).

 Padilla, et al. v. Congress of the Phils., G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017.

51

52
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII. Section 5.

53
 Scalia and Gamer, READING THE LAW: THE INTERNATIONAL OF
LEGAL TEXTS, pp. 4-6(2012).

54
 Supra note 37.

55
 Id. at 340.

56
 Villanueva v. .Judicial and Bar Council,  757 Phil. 534 (2015).

57
 Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62, 77 (1939).

 Topacio v. Assoc. Justice Gregory Santos Ong, et al.,  supra note 39, at
58

503 citing Gonzales v. COMELEC, et al., 129 Phil 7, 29 (1967).

59
 Id.

60
 G.R. No. 224302. November 29. 2016.

 Supra note 39.
61

62
 Aguinaldo, et al. v. Aquino, et al.. supra.

63
 Section 9. Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

64
 The City of Manila, et al. v. .Judge Grecia-Cuerdo. el al.  726 Phil. 9. 27
(2014).
65
 Id. at 27-28.

66
 269 Phil. 20 (1990).

67
 Id. at 25-26.

68
 Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,  253 Phil. 698, 713 (1989)
citing Government of the U.S. v. Judge of the First Instance of
Pampanga, 49 Phil. 495, 500 (1965).

69
 168 Phil. 328 (1977).

70
 48 Phil. 676 (1929)

71
 Article 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:

xxxx

(4) Juridical persons, except the State and its subdivisions.

72
 Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

73
 Section 3, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

74
 (1) there was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of the petitioner,
amounting to the abandonment of his right to the position; (2) it was an act
of the government through its responsible officials which contributed to the
delay in the filing of the action; and (3) the petition was grounded upon the
assertion that petitioner's removal from the questioned position was
contrary to law. [Cristobal v. Melchor and Arcala, 168 Phil. 328 (l977)]

75
 Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

76
 Rollo, p. 6584.

77
 498 Phil. 395 (2005).

78
 See Alcantara v. Alcantara, 558 Phil. 192 (2007).

79
 AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL
STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD
THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC
TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY
SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on February 20, 1989.

80
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 17.

81
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 18.

82
 Dissenting Opinion of Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO in G.R. No. 237428
dated May 11, 2018, pp. 6401-6404.

83
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 4