G.R. No. L-16290 - Tabuena v. Court of Appeals

10/29/2019 G.R. No. L-16290 | Tabuena v.
Court of Appeals
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-16290. October 31, 1961.]
SANTOS TABUENA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HON.

COURT OF APPEALS, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioners.

Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. APPEALS; PURPOSE OF APPEAL BOND; EXEMPTION FROM

FILING OF APPEAL BOND. — The general rule is that an appeal bond is
required for the purpose of paying for costs which the appellate court may
award against the appellant. As an exception, an appeal bond is not required
of the Government when it is the unsuccessful party, because no costs are
supposed to accrue against the Republic of the Philippines unless otherwise
provided by law. But exemption from the filing of bonds applies only where the
action is brought by or against public officers impleaded merely as nominal
representatives of the Government, and sued purely in their official capacity
(Tolentino, vs. Carlos, 66 Phil., 140; Chan vs. Villanueva, et al., L-5420, April,
1952; Araneta, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, et al., 101 Phil., 328; Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corp. vs. Rafferty, 39 Phil., 145; Gov't. of PI vs. Judge of
the Court of First Instance, 34 Phil., 157).
2. PUBLIC OFFICERS; SUIT FOR DAMAGES IN A PERSONAL
CAPACITY. — At least on principle, a public officer, by virtue of his office
alone, is not immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from
illegal acts done in bad faith (Art. 27, N.C.C.; 43 Am. Jur., 86, 89-90). A
different rule would sanction the use of public office as a tool of oppression.
3. JUDGMENTS; EXECUTION BEFORE EXPIRATION OF TIME TO
APPEAL; REASONS FOR IMMEDIATE EXECUTION IN CASE AT BAR. —
Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution may issue before
the expiration of the time to appeal, in the discretion of the court, "Upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order." In the instant case, among its reason
for ordering the immediate appointment of petitioner, the trial court took into
account his length of service in the government, the delay that might be
entailed in the final disposition of the case, and the consequent prejudice to
him and his family. These circumstances may call for sympathy, but hardly
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10/29/2019 G.R. No. L-16290 | Tabuena v. Court of Appeals
warrant the immediate execution ordered. As a solemn trust, occupancy of a

public office cannot accommodate the vagaries of personal fortunes.
Execution pending appeal must be for weighty reason in all cases. Said
principle is underscored in case public office is involved.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J : p
In Civil Case No. B-152 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,

which was an action for mandamus with damages, judgment was rendered
for petitioner Tabuena. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) The defendant Eugenio de la Cruz, in his official capacity as
Director of the Forest Research Institute, is hereby commanded to
appoint the plaintiff, Santos Tabuena, to the position of Administrative
Assistant II in the Forest Products Research Institute with
compensation at the rate of P2,760 per annum within five (5) days
from notice of this decision;
(2) The defendant, in his personal capacity, is hereby sentenced
to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P230 a month commencing from
June 16, 1958 until he shall have been appointed and assumed office
as Administrative Assistant II in the Forest Products Research
Institute, plus the sum of P3,000 for moral damages and P1,000 for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, aside from the costs of the
suit."
Notice of appeal was filed by respondent De la Cruz, who therein manifested
that no appeal bond was required to perfect his appeal. Thereupon, Tabuena
filed two motions, both dated April 27, 1959, one, asking the trial court to
require respondent De la Cruz to file an appeal bond; and the other, praying
that, pending appeal, the trial court order execution of its judgment in so far as
it commands the appointment of Tabuena to the position of Administrative
Assistant II. After hearing further argument for and against the motions, the
trial court issued two orders, both dated July 8, 1959, requiring respondent de
la Cruz to file an appeal bond, and pending appeal directing respondent to
comply with that portion of the judgment ordering the appointment of Tabuena
to the position mentioned. A motion for reconsideration of the above orders
was denied (Annex "Q").
De la Cruz then instituted certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals to
annul the twin orders of July 8, 1959 and that of July 31, 1959 denying his
motion for reconsideration. In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision dated October 29, 1959, annulling both orders complained of and
making permanent the preliminary injunction it had issued. Upon denial of his
motion for reconsideration, Tabuena brought to this Court the instant petition
for review by certiorari.
The Court of Appeals sustained the contention of De la Cruz that he was
exempted from filing an appeal bond, as a public officer sued in his official
capacity; and that consequently, with the filing of the notice of appeal, the trial
court lost jurisdiction to order the immediate execution of its judgment.
We find this conclusion untenable. The general rule is that an appeal bond is
required for the purpose of paying for costs which the appellate court may
award against the appellant (Sec 5, Rule 41). As an exception, an appeal
bond is not required of the Government when it is the unsuccessful party,
because no costs are supposed to accrue against the Republic of the
Philippines unless otherwise provided by law (Sec. 1, Rule 131). But
exemption from the filing of bonds applies only where the action is brought by
or against public officers impleaded merely as nominal representatives of the
Government, and sued purely in their official capacity (Tolentino v. Carlos, 66
Phil. 140; Chan v. Villanueva, et al., L-5420, April, 1952; Araneta, et al. vs.
Gatmaitan, et al., L-8895 & L-9191, April 30, 1957; Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corp. v. Rafferty, 39 Phil. 145; Gov't. of PI v. Judge of the Court of
First Instance, 34 Phil., 157).
It appears exceedingly clear in this case that respondent De la Cruz was sued
not only in his official capacity as director of the Forest Product Research
Institute, but also in his personal capacity for having acted allegedly in
manifest bad faith, "with the purpose of persecuting, discriminating against or
committing injustice to the petitioner" (par. 13, Ann. "F"); and accordingly, the
judgment of the court of origin made him personally liable for damages in
varying concepts. Whether or not the trial court committed error in awarding
damages against De la Cruz in his personal capacity is immaterial here, this
being more properly cognizable in an appeal from the main case. For our
purpose, what is decisive is the dual character in which he was sued and the
judgment rendered by the trial court. At least on principle, a public officer, by
virtue of his office alone, is not immune from damages in his personal capacity
arising from illegal acts done in bad faith (Art. 27, N.C.C.; 43 Am. Jur., 86, 89-
90). A different rule would sanction the use of public office as a tool of
oppression.
Whether the trial court had sufficient reasons for executing its decision is quite
another matter. Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution
may issue before the expiration of the time to appeal, in the discretion of the
court, "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order". Among its reasons
for ordering the immediate appointment of Tabuena, the trial court took into
account his length of service in the government, the delay that might be
entailed in the final disposition of the case, and the consequent prejudice to
Tabuena and his family in the meantime. These circumstances may call for
sympathy, but hardly warrant the immediate execution ordered. As a solemn
trust, occupancy of a public office cannot accommodate the vagaries of

personal fortunes. Execution pending appeal must be for weighty reasons in
all cases. Said principle is underscored in case public office is involved.
Moreover, the following considerations are pertinent —
"If the judgment is executed and, on appeal, the same is reversed,
although there are provisions for restitution, oftentimes, damages
may arise which cannot be fully compensated. Accordingly, execution
should be granted only when these considerations are clearly
outweighed by superior circumstances demanding urgency . . ."
(Aguilos v. Barrios, 72 Phil. 285; Ledesma, et al. vs. Teodoro, et. al.,
L-9174, January 25, 1956, (Italics supplied).
"Lastly, if the respondents are reinstated and paid their back salaries
from city funds, and then the appeal in the main case is decided
against them, the city stands to suffer irreparable injury because it is
hardly to be expected that the said policemen shall be able to make
restitution." (City of Bacolod, et al. vs. Hon. Enriquez, et al., L-9775,
May 29, 1957.)
That respondent De la Cruz might retire before the case is finally disposed of
cannot render the judgment ineffective because then, his successor in office
may be substituted as respondent (Section 18, Rule 3). On the other hand,
unless the appeal is unquestionably dilatory, the allusion made by the trial
court that the appeal being taken by respondent is only for the purpose of
delay (Annex "Q") cannot be a valid reason. This assumption prematurely
judges the merits of the appeal (City of Bacolod vs. Enriquez, et al., supra.).
Whether or not Tabuena is entitled to the office to which he was ordered
appointed by the trial court is precisely the very core of the main case.
At any rate, the continued vacancy of the position of Administrative Assistant
II in the Forest Products Research Institute does not appear so disruptive of
public functions as to impel a provisional appointment of one whose rights to
said office have yet to be finally resolved.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals setting aside the trial
court's execution of its judgment pending appeal is affirmed; the orders of the
trial court dated July 8, 1959 and July 31, 1959, in so far only as they require
respondent to file an appeal bond in Civil Case No. B-152, are reinstated; and
respondent De la Cruz is hereby given a period of ten (10) days from entry of
our judgment within which to file his appeal bond in said Civil Case B-152.
The records of this case are hereby ordered remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. No costs.
Bengzon, C . J ., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes,
and De Leon, JJ ., concur.
Barrera, J ., took no part.

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10/29/2019 G.R. No. L-16290 | Tabuena v.

[G.R. No. L-16290. October 31, 1961.]

SANTOS TABUENA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HON.

David G. Nitafan for petitioners.

1. APPEALS; PURPOSE OF APPEAL BOND; EXEMPTION FROM

warrant the immediate execution ordered. As a solemn trust, occupancy of a

In Civil Case No. B-152 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

trust, occupancy of a public office cannot accommodate the vagaries of

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