Imbong v. Ochoa Jr., G.R. No.

204819, April 8, 2014

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the
said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
grounds:

Substantial Issue/s:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the
Constitution

Procedural:

Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
 3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

Substantial Issues:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for

violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

Procedural:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1. Actual Case or Controversy
2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule
Discussions:

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota
of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or

controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,
lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real,
tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature,
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement
of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege
the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is
one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech,
but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom
of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the
right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing
is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress
to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index
or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule
“so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the
principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading
it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office;
it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern
view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not
annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to
recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no
existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The
Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence
of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as
law.

Ruling/s:

Substantial:

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper
hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their
own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that
life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins
at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment
of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition,
they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill
or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent
the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was
to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot
interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits
abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that
induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH
Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded
duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only
those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s
womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives
that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be
struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are
made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the
DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall
be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription
of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory”
only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the
FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient
and effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation
in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right
or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or
restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and
thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control
program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the
religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes
into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution
mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the
right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family. The exclusion
of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent
or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section
23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal
guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be
required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.” However, a minor
may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services.
Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before
it. Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education
has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in
the development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents
in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State. The provisions of Section 14 of
the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant)
the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children. By
incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest
groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the
program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section
4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health
care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health
care service provider. The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to
include providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals
operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures. The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used
together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a
sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and
effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not
a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII
of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the
underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers. The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to
reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the
RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not
impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor. The exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize
the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health
care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to
involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably
imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only
encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro
bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do
otherwise. However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their
religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
Procedural:

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out
the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also
a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the
case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike
its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of
the Constitution. Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously
alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the
RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple
expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a
reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional
issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a
procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set
aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the
social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs,
the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual
analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to
control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human
rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights,
the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. Considering the close
intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive
the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except
with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5
.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow
a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of
the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit
the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or
one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5
.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive
health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive
health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of
pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily”
in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null
and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II
of the Constitution.