Tactics

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POSTGRADUATE SCHOQt

A Soviet View
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SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT.

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 Tactics

A Soviet View-

Editor:
V V. G. Reznichenko
Moscow (1984
'(!!-V?r
PUBLISHED
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF
THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Translated by the
CIS Multilingual Section
l£. Translation Bureau,
Secretary of State Department
Ottawa.. Canada »

Published with the approval

of the All-Union Copyright
Agency of the U.S.S.R.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Tajctika. English. ' ^"■;

Tactics.

(Soviet military thought ; no. 21)

Translation of: Taktika.
Supt. of Docs, no.: D 301.79:21.
1. Tactics. I. Reznichenko, V. G. (Vasilii
Gerasimovich) II. Title. III. Series.
U165.T2313 1987 355.4'2 87-600132
Table of Contents

Page

Abstract viii

Foreword 1

Chapter 1. The Principles of Modern Combined Arms Combat 3

1. Tactics: The Theory and Practice of Combat 3
2. The Weaponry Employed in Modern Combined Arms Combat 9
3. The Nature and Forms of Modern Combined Arms Combat 32
4. The Characteristic Features of Modern Combined Arms Combat 36
5. The Basic Principles of Conducting Modern Combined Arms Combat 41

Chapter 2. The Offensive Engagement 60

1. The Essence and Features of an Offensive Engagement 60
2. Methods of Going Over to the Offensive 67
3. Combat Missions 73
4. The Battle Formation 80
5. The Fire Strike 88
6. Defeating the Enemy in the Tactical Zone of Defense and Developing
the Offensive in Depth 97
7. Pursuit 104
8. Crossing Water Obstacles 108
9. The Night Offensive 113
10. The Offensive Under Special Conditions 119

Chapter 3. The Meeting Engagement 128

1. The Characteristic Features of a Meeting Engagement 128
2. The Conditions Necessary for Success in a Meeting Engagement 132
3. Routing an Enemy in a Meeting Engagement 138

Chapter 4. The Defensive Engagement 147

1. The Essence of the Defensive Engagement 147
2. The Characteristic Features of the Modern Defensive Engagement and
Demands Made on the Defense 150
3. The Battle Formation 155
4. The Configuration and Engineer Preparation of Defensive Positions 158
5. The Fire Plan 162
6. Hitting the Enemy on the Approaches to the Defense 167
7. Repelling Enemy Attacks 172
 Page

8. Counterattacking 176
9. Night Defense 180
10. Defense in Mountains 184

Chapter 5. Troop Movement Igg

1. The March 188
2. Movement on Heavy Tractor-Trailer Units 207
3. Movement by Rail 211
4. Movement by Water Transport 217
5. Movement by Air Transport 222
6. Combined Movement 225

List of Recommended Readings 228

Tactical Maps 230

yi
 The translation and publication of Tactics does not constitute ap-
proval by any U.S. Government organization of the inferences, findings
and conclusions contained therein. Publication is solely for the exchange
and stimulation of ideas.

Vn*
 Abstract

This work on military theory examines the subject of tactics, its role
in the art of war, the material basis of modern combined arms combat, its
nature, and the most important principles for conducting it. Principal
attention is given to the tactics of offensive, meeting, and defensive en-
gagements, as well as to troop movement.

The book is intended for officers of the Soviet Army and students at
higher military educational institutions.

m
 Foreword

The Communist Party and the Soviet government are consistent and
persistent in conducting a Leninist peace-loving foreign policy, directed
toward relaxing international tension, universal and complete disarma-
ment, and ensuring peace and the security of all nations.

However, reactionary imperialist circles are striving to wreck detente,

to prevent disarmament and to provoke a world war. The Communist
Party and the Soviet government have therefore devoted unremitting atten-
tion to strengthening the defensive capability of the country, improving the
Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and maintaining their combat readiness
at a high level, thus ensuring the decisive and utter defeat of any aggressor.
Accomplishing this task presupposes implementing a large system of mea-
sures for equipping the army and navy with materiel, for training com-
manders, staffs and troops, and for constantly improving the Soviet art of
war.

The rapid development of materiel and armaments, essentially new

precision weapon systems, and effective methods for employing them are
bringing about substantial changes in the essence of modern combined
arms combat, in automated troop control systems, in methods of effective
fire, in troop actions, and in organizing and implementing comprehensive
support—in other words, in tactics. And tactics is a paramount component
in the Soviet art of war.

This book brings to light for the reader all the new developments in
the material basis and essence of combined arms combat, in the prepara-
tion and principles of the conduct of offensive, defensive, and meeting
engagements, and in troop movements. New methods for solving problems
of modern tactics are presented in such areas as troop control in combined
arms combat, comprehensive support of troop combat actions, and the
training and indoctrination of personnel.

The theory and practice of combined arms combat is examined in its

development and in comparison with earlier views on preparing for and
conducting combat; this allows one to trace particular principles and trends
in the evolution of tactics.

Modern tactical theory is reflected first of all in the field manuals of

the Soviet Armed Forces, which have drawn general principles from the
troops' extremely rich combat experience, from the practice of postwar
tactical and command post exercises, and from theoretical research. How-
ever, the specific character of the manuals does not allow one to substanti-
ate the situations laid out in them, to support them with examples, proofs
and calculations, or to point out preconditions and establish principles for
developing methods of combat actions. Meanwhile, knowing the manuals
is an important condition for a thorough understanding of modern tactical
theory and the nature of combined arms combat. The authors of this book
saw one of their tasks to be helping officers to master the art of tactics as
they worked on their own.

Today and in the future, the deciding role in combat will belong to
the human element—to the soldier with great moral-political, psychologi-
cal, and fighting abilities who has mastered modern materiel and the art of
preparing for and conducting combat in the complex conditions of modern
warfare. This raises still further the requirements for training and indoctri-
nating personnel.

Soviet Armed Forces personnel, including the officer cadres, must be

educated in the spirit of boundless devotion to the Motherland and to the
Communist Party; they must have a deep understanding of the just aims
of war and be ready to perform their duty as soldiers, laying down their
lives if necessary.

An officer should be highly educated in terms of mihtary technology;

he should know and skillfully apply, in combat, the new methods of action
developed by modern tactics; he should be actively involved in the creative
pursuit of ways to more fully exploit the growing capabilities of forma-
tions, units and subunits of all combat arms; he should participate in
developing scientifically based tactical principles and methods of combat
actions in line with the possibilities of combat resource development. It is
the aim of this book—7ac//c5—to help him in this. And although this
work does not claim to be a comprehensive and exhaustive exposition of
all questions of tactics, the authors hope that it will serve to improve the
tactical training of command personnel and help to broaden their outlook
on the operational and tactical level and to systematize progressive training
practice; the aim of this is to maintain formations, units, and subunits at a
high level of combat readiness and to preserve their ability to begin
carrying out a combat mission immediately, should the situation require it.
Chapter 1. The Principles of Modern Combined
Arms Combat

1. Tactics: The Theory and Practice of Combat

The Soviet art of war includes three components: strategy, operational
art, and tactics, each of which has its distinctive specific features for the
conduct of armed combat on various scales.

Strategy is the highest domain of the art of war and covers the
theoretical and practical aspects of preparing the country and the Armed
Forces for war and the planning and conduct of war and strategic opera-
tions.

Operational art includes the theoretical and practical aspects of prepa-

ration for the conduct of operations (combat actions) by large formations
of the Armed Forces. Guided by the demands of strategy, operational art
studies the nature of modern operations and the laws, principles, and
methods of preparing and conducting them; the organization, capabilities,
and principles for the employment of large operational formations; prob-
lems of operational support; and the principles of troop control in opera-
tions and the logistic support of these operations.

Tactics is the theoretical and practical aspects of preparation for the

conduct of combat by the subunits, units, and formations of the various
services of the Armed Forces, the combat arms, and the combat service
support troops. It is subdivided into general tactics and the respective
tactics of the services of the Armed Forces, the combat arms, and the
combat service support troops.

General tactics studies the laws of combined arms combat and devises
recommendations for its planning and conduct by the combined efforts of
the subunits, units, and formations of the various services of the Armed
Forces, the combat arms, and the combat service support troops. Ground
Forces tactics constitutes the basis for general tactics. The respective tactics
of the services of the Armed Forces, the combat arms, and the combat
service support troops each address specific problems relating to the com-
bat employment of the subunits, units, and formations of the combat arm
 or combat service support troops in question, in both combined arms
combat and independent actions.

General tactics is closely interrelated with the tactics of the services of

the Armed Forces, the combat arms, and the combat service support
troops. General tactics determines the missions to be performed by the
subunits, units, and formations of the services of the Armed Forces, the
combat arms, and the combat service support troops in combined arms
combat, and the procedures and methods for their joint employment, and
thus influences the development of their tactics. In turn, changes in the
tactics of the services of the Armed Forces, the combat arms, and the
combat service support troops exert an influence on the development of
general tactics and make it necessary to define the latter's recommenda-
tions more closely and to improve them.

Tactics has two aspects: the theoretical and the practical. The theory
of tactics investigates the essence and nature of modern combat and
discovers laws and principles for conducting armed combat with tactical
resources; it studies the combat capabilities of troop units and devises
methods of preparing for and conducting combat. The theoretical princi-
ples of tactics are reflected in regulations, manuals, textbooks, training
aids, and works on military theory. The practical aspect of tactics covers
the activities of commanders, staffs, and troops in preparing for and
conducting combat. This aspect includes the collection and study of data
relating to the situation, decisionmaking and the dissemination of missions
to subordinates, planning, the preparation of troops and terrain for com-
bat, the conduct of combat actions, troop control of subunits, units, and
formations, and comprehensive combat support.

As the experience of local wars confirms, tactics plays a great role

today. This results from the fact that combined arms combat continues to
be very important in achieving victory over an enemy, and also from the
extensive capabilities at the disposal of the tactical command echelon for
carrying out combat missions. Therefore, tactics (tactical training) is a
most important component in the combat training of troops and a leading
study discipline in military educational institutions.

Tactics is inseparably linked with the other components of the art of

war; its theoretical and practical aspects are subordinated to the interests
of strategy and operational art and are guided by their demands. In turn,
tactics exerts a considerable influence on operational art, and through it on
strategy as well, under the influence of the rapid development of weaponry
and materiel.

Tactics is the most dynamic domain of the art of war. Moreover,

changes in tactics occur at an ever-increasing rate, commensurately with
the acceleration of technical progress and the improvement of weaponry
and the morale and fighting efficiency of military personnel. Tactics most
closely approximates the practical activities of troops; the level to which it
is developed and the quality of the tactical training of officers, staffs, and
troops in many respects predetermine the conditions for achieving victory
in combat.

The Soviet Army's tactics developed during the Civil War. At that
time, its features were crucially dependent on the class nature of the new
army and the revolutionary spirit of the personnel. Having assimilated all
the best features acquired by the Russian Army, with the firm foundation
of Marxism-Leninism as a basis, and verifying the vaUdity of its theory
and practice by testing them in the fire of battle, Soviet Army tactics
developed continuously in pace with improvements in weapons, in the
morale and fighting efficiency of army personnel, and in the organizational
structure of forces, also giving due regard to changes in enemy weaponry,
equipment, and tactics.

A decisive factor that has shaped the development of tactics and of

the art of war as a whole has been the leadership provided by the Commu-
nist Party for the Soviet Armed Forces and Lenin's legacy in military
theory.

In supervising the defense of the fledgUng socialist state, V. I. Lenin

was most concerned with problems of strategy. However, reality and the
practical aspects of combat compelled him to deal with problems relating
to operational art and tactics as well.

V. L Lenin's pronouncements on the means, methods, and forms of

armed conflict, on the dependence of their employment on the specific
circumstances, and on the need to master all forms of combat and com-
bine them judiciously in order to achieve victory are of enormous scientific
value. V. L Lenin developed and gave concrete expression to F. Engels'
principle concerning the dependence of tactics on the level of war materiel,
and more than once emphasized the hopelessness of conducting armed
conflict "in the absence of personnel capable of making skillful use of the
latest improvements in war materiel."'

V.I. Lenin considered it necessary to employ various types of combat

actions, but he assigned the decisive role here to the offensive. He pointed
out more than once that victory could only be achieved by means of
determined offensive actions, and considered that the main objective was
not to repel the enemy, but to encircle and completely rout him. V. I.
Lenin regarded defense as temporary forced actions subordinated to the
overall interests of routing the enemy; he demanded that the maximum
tenacity, persistence, and self-sacrifice be displayed in defense.
 If the situation for the defense was particularly unfavorable, V. I.
Lenin admitted the possibility of organized withdrawal. V. I. Lenin at-
tached great importance to material and moral factors, the correct selec-
tion of the axis of the main attack, careful study of the enemy, the ability
to establish superiority over the enemy in resources in a decisive place at
the decisive moment, the achievement of surprise, and a high level of
aggressiveness, determination, and boldness in actions. He demanded care-
ful and comprehensive preparation for combat actions and paid much
attention to the equipping, training, and indoctrination of the army. Even
now, V. L Lenin's ideas are the basis of our tactics, and of all the Soviet
art of war.

During the Civil War, material resources for combat were extremely
limited, troops were poorly equipped and trained, and many commanders
lacked knowledge and experience, but the revolutionary spirit and initiative
of the commanders, commissars, and fighting men and their utter devotion
to Soviet power contributed to the appearance of new tactical methods.
The development of combat actions over large areas in the absence of
continuous front lines led to the extensive employment of mobile forms of
combat, troop actions along axes, and maneuver of resources. In these
conditions, Soviet forces' tactics were characterized by a variety of meth-
ods for conducting combat, the troops' high level of aggressiveness, deter-
mination, and swiftness in action, and the judicious initiative and dedica-
tion of personnel.

A major contribution to the dissemination of the combat experience

acquired in the Civil War and the development of tactics in the postwar
period was made by M. V. Frunze, who considered that our army's tactics
"have been and will continue to be saturated with aggressiveness in the
spirit of bold and energetically executed offensive operations."^

M. V. Frunze considered tactical problems in close connection with

the nature of a future war and the means by which it would be waged; he
expressed the idea of an increased role for aviation, tanks, and artillery in
combined arms combat and examined the influence of materiel on the
nature of combat, taking into account not just its immediate effect in
combat, but also its effect on morale. His works define the correlation and
interconnection between the offensive and defense and between positional
and maneuvering forms of combat, and the role of fire, strike, and
maneuver in battle; they examine the principles for the employment of
various types of combat actions, depending on the situation. M. V. Frunze
opposed the even distribution of forces in battle and pointed out the
advantages of actions by assault groupings; he resolutely propounded the
idea of the need to achieve victory in battle by the joint efforts of all
combat arms.
 Great contributions to the development of tactics were made by
M. N. Tukhachevskiy, S. S. Kamenev, A. I. Yegorov, I. P. Uborevich,
and other prominent Soviet military leaders. Their views were reflected in
regulations, manuals, and other guidance documents, in which the combat
experience of forces in World War I and the Civil War was disseminated,
new methods for conducting combat were revealed, and possible courses
for the further development of these methods were substantiated. Here the
principal attention was given to the study of actions in maneuvering war-
fare.

In the 1930s, when the technological updating and reorganization of

the Army had been put into effect, methods were devised for preparing for
and conducting combat with the new technical and material resources. The
theory of engagement in depth, which in practice made it possible to go
over from overcoming enemy defensive positions slowly and gradually to a
more effective maneuvering form of combat actions, was developed by the
efforts of many military leaders and theoreticians and tested by troops
during exercises, maneuvers, and the battles at Halhin-Gol. This was a
qualitative leap in the development of the art of war, which revealed a
fundamentally new method for the conduct of an offensive engagement by
technically equipped troops.

The essence of offensive engagement in depth consisted in the simulta-

neous and massive employment of weaponry throughout the depth of the
enemy's tactical zone of defense, with the aim of encircUng and eliminating
him. This was achieved by inflicting severe fire damage on enemy battle
formations by means of artillery, by exerting continuous pressure on en-
emy reserves and rear areas by means of aviation, by the nonstop advance
of infantry and close-support tanks following fire strikes, by the deter-
mined advance of long-range tanks, and by the swift actions of mecha-
nized and cavalry formations (the exploitation echelon) and airborne as-
sault forces behind enemy lines. Success was achieved in an offensive
engagement in depth by surprise and the resolute actions of the troops, by
a skillful combination of movement, fire of all types, and wide maneuver,
by continuous and close cooperation between all combat arms and combat
service support troops, and by firm troop control.

The theory of engagement in depth, developed by Soviet military

science, was exceptionally important to the Soviet Army. Its basic princi-
ples were not only used with success during the Great Patriotic War, but
were also subjected to further development, as brought about by the
equipping of troops with increasingly improved materiel, changes in orga-
nizational structure, combat experience, and consideration of the nature of
enemy actions. The tactical skill of the troops and the theory of tactics
rose to a new and higher level.
 During the Great Patriotic War there was an increase in the aggres-
siveness and determination of actions, and flexibility and creativity in the
employment of materiel and weaponry were fully in evidence. Tactics was
enriched by new methods of preparing for and conducting combat in the
diverse conditions of a tactical situation. Effective methods for breaking
through deeply echeloned enemy defenses, overcoming intermediate defen-
sive positions from the line of march, conducting meeting engagements,
and pursuing a withdrawing enemy were developed. Extensive use was
made of night actions, and methods for crossing water obstacles, encircling
the enemy and eliminating him once this was accomplished, conducting an
aggressive defense, moving by march, etc., were developed. The principles
embodied in the regulations were applied in combat not in a stereotyped
fashion, but in conformity with the specific situation. The selection of
methods of action was based on strict consideration of the capabilities of
friendly forces and thorough knowledge of the enemy and his strong and
weak points. Covert maneuver was skillfully executed and surprise attacks
were made.

During the Great Patriotic War, the troops' combat experience was
continuously synthesized on the theoretical level. Methods of preparation
for and conduct of combat by subunits, units, and formations that had
been devised in practice were synthesized and developed in a timely fash-
ion. New tactical principles were reflected in orders and directives, in
regulations, manuals, instructions, and other official documents. The va-
lidity of the theoretical principles and conclusions was tested in the practice
of preparing for and conducting combat in the diverse conditions of a
tactical situation.

In the first decade after the Great Patriotic War, tactics developed on
the basis of the very rich experience gained during the war, improvements
in weaponry and the organizational structure of forces, their complete
motorization and mechanization, and also on the basis of due regard for
changes in the materiel, force structure, and tactics of probable enemies.
The principal attention was given to in-depth investigation and synthesis of
combat experience gained by subunits, units, and formations and to im-
proving the methods of preparing for and conducting combat that were
employed during the war.

The postwar period was a qualitatively new stage in the development

of tactics. Radical changes occurred in the material resources for combat.
Fundamentally new weaponry appeared, nuclear weapons began to come
into service, available types of materiel were considerably improved, the
political, general educational, and military technical level of personnel
training rose, and the organizational structure of forces changed substan-
tially; great changes occurred in enemy weaponry, force structure, and
tactics. Under the influence of these factors, the firepower, striking power,

8
maneuverability, and armor protection of forces increased, which led to a
radical change in views on the preparation and conduct of combined arms
combat by subunits, units, and formations. Troops acquired the capability
to simultaneously exert pressure on the entire depth of an enemy battle
formation by means of powerful fire weapons, break through the enemy
defenses with great momentum, and swiftly exploit successes.

At present, the principal attention is given to theoretical development

of new procedures and methods for the combat employment of resources
in a nuclear weapon environment and the practical testing of these proce-
dures in combined arms exercises; the nuclear strike has become a new
element in combined arms combat. At the same time, work is continuing
on improving methods for preparing and conducting combined arms com-
bat with conventional weapons alone, which have also undergone qualita-
tive changes.

Modern tactics is the theoretical and practical aspects of preparing for

and conducting combat with all types of weaponry, including the newest
types. If an aggressor should succeed in unleashing a war despite the
efforts of the USSR and other peace-loving states, tactics will, as before,
play a great role in achieving victory. Consequently, the theoretical and
practical aspects of combined arms combat must constantly be improved,
with due regard for the demands of strategy, operational art, and changes
in the material resources for combat; and the level of tactical skill of
commanders, staffs, and troops must be raised continuously.

2. The Weaponry Employed in Modern Combined Arms

Combat
Weaponry exerts the greatest revolutionizing influence on the nature
of combined arms combat and the methods for conducting it, and on the
development of tactics as a whole. F. Engels and V. I. Lenin repeatedly
emphasized that military tactics is directly dependent on the level of devel-
opment of military equipment.

Modern combined arms combat may be conducted with nuclear weap-

onry and other weapons or with conventional weaponry alone, which
includes all fire and strike resources that make use of artillery, antiaircraft,
aircraft, small-arms, and engineer ammunition, as well as conventionally
armed missiles and incendiary ammunition and mixtures.^

Nuclear weapons are the most powerful means of destroying an en-

emy. They make it possible to destroy the enemy's nuclear and chemical
strike weapons with a high degree of effectiveness and in short periods of
time, to inflict great losses on him in men and equipment, to drastically
 change the correlation of forces, and to create the conditions for decisively
routing him. They are capable of quickly demolishing fieldworks and other
targets, of creating zones of mass destruction and radioactive contamina-
tion, barriers, and areas of fire and flooding, and also of exerting strong
moral and psychological pressure on personnel.

Nuclear weapons are employed with the element of surprise, and

usually in combination with other weapons, on the main axis to destroy
enemy force groupings and the most important targets.

Nuclear weaponry includes all types of nuclear warheads and delivery

systems. There are nuclear warheads of various yields in service with the
armies of a number of states. For example, the US armed forces have
nuclear warheads with TNT equivalent yields ranging from 0.01 kiloton to
several megatons.

The destruction of enemy targets by means of nuclear weapons in

combined arms combat may be accomplished by airbursts (high and low),
surface bursts, and underground bursts. Nuclear weapons may be used in
combined arms combat to make single, group, or massed nuclear strikes.

The most tactically and economically expedient variation of nuclear

strike with regard to means of delivery, yield of the nuclear warhead, and
type of burst is selected on the basis of the importance of the target to be
destroyed, the extent to which it must be destroyed, the nature of the
action and the extent of cover, range, size, mobility, the effectiveness of
the enemy air defenses, the missions of friendly forces and their safety, the
permissible degree of radioactive contamination on the terrain, physical
geographical features, and meteorological conditions.

The factors causing destruction are the shock wave, thermal radiation,
immediate nuclear radiation, and radioactive contamination of terrain.
Apart from this, nuclear weapons have enormous capabilities for com-
bined destruction.
According to foreign press data, an airburst of a nuclear warhead with a 1-kiloton yield
would put personnel in open protective structures and armored personnel carriers, as well as
in tanks lacking radiation protection, out of action in a radius of 700-900 meters. The
effective radius of a nuclear warhead with a 100-kiloton yield for personnel in open protec-
tive structures would be as great as 2700 meters, i.e., one nuclear warhead of this yield could
put a battalion out of action in any type of combat. A warhead with a 0.01-kiloton yield
would destroy personnel in a radius of 300 meters; consequently, such warheads are expected
to be employed to destroy targets in direct proximity with friendly forces.

The enormous destructive force of nuclear weapons makes it possible

to drastically reduce the artillery density and number of aircraft for the
neutralization (destruction) of a defending enemy. During World War II
about a hundred guns and mortars would have to conduct fire for 15-20

10
minutes and expend several thousand shells and projectiles in order to
neutralize the enemy in a company defense area equipped with trenches,
but today this mission could be accomplished by one medium-yield nuclear
warhead in a few seconds.

The influence of nuclear weapons on the nature of combined arms

combat is becoming increasingly significant because of the increase in the
number of them in service in a number of armies and the continuous
improvement of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. It is noted in the
foreign press that over the past 10 years the number of nuclear warheads
in formations has increased by a factor of 2, while delivery accuracy of
missiles has risen by a factor of 3 to 4. This means that the depth at which
simultaneous pressure can be exerted on the enemy and the effectiveness
with which he can be destroyed have increased.

At the same time, continuous development and improvement is taking

place in the system for combating enemy nuclear weapons, as well as
measures for protecting troops against them, and for maintaining and
quickly restoring their fighting efficiency.

The creation of neutron weapons is considered a new trend in the

development of nuclear weaponry in the US armed forces. The characteris-
tic feature of this weaponry is that when a neutron warhead detonates, an
enormous number of neutrons is released. Neutrons have great penetrative
capabilities, even through protective materials, and a high level of biologi-
cal activity. Thus, steel armor with a thickness of 100-125 millimeters
absorbs about 90 percent of gamma radiation, but only 20-30 percent of
fast neutrons. Furthermore, the interaction of the neutrons with the pro-
tective materials leads to the formation of strong secondary gamma radia-
tion and induced radioactivity.

A stream of neutrons is also absorbed by elements that are in the soil,

and consequently the soil becomes radioactive and may represent a danger
to personnel for several hours, or even days. As a result, the effective radii
for personnel, including personnel in combat equipment and protective
structures, increase significantly.
As has been reported in the foreign press, the detonation of a neutron warhead with a
1-kiIoton yield is equivalent in terms of the destructive effect of penetrating radiation to the
explosion of a modern nuclear warhead with a yield of 10-12 kilotons, or that of a nuclear
warhead of the previous generation with yield of 30 kilotons. In this case, personnel situated
in the open would be put out of action in a radius of 1300-1400 meters, while personnel
situated in tanks would be put out of action in a radius of approximately 1000 meters.

It should be noted, however, that the energy of neutron radiation decreases rapidly as it
moves away from ground zero. At a distance of 1600 meters the neutron stream would have
become some tens of thousands of times weaker, regardless of the yield of the warhead; for
this reason, the yield of neutron warheads does not exceed 1-2 kilotons. ,

11
 Moist earth and concrete have effective protective properties against
neutron radiation. A concrete cover 25 centimeters thick or a layer of
moist earth 35 centimeters thick could weaken a neutron stream by a
factor of 10, while a cover double this thickness would weaken it by a
factor of 100.

The effect of the shock wave and thermal radiation of a neutron

weapon is very limited. The radius of destruction and removal from action
for combat equipment, e.g., tanks, amounts to a few dozen meters. This
factor is used by the leaders of the US Defense Department for propa-
ganda portraying neutron weapons as humane, concealing from the public
the genuine consequences of their combat employment. Meanwhile, the
penetrating radiation of a neutron burst has a destructive effect not only
on humans and animals, but on plants as well. According to foreign press
data, the airburst of a neutron bomb at an altitude of a few hundred
meters would destroy approximately 310 hectares of coniferous trees, 140
hectares of meadows, or 110 hectares of jungle (the burst of an ordinary
nuclear bomb of equivalent yield would destroy 50 hectares). Many dec-
ades would be needed to restore ecological systems affected by neutron
radiation.

The US is intensively implementing a program that envisages fitting

the nuclear shells for 155 and 203.2 mm howitzers, the warheads of Lance
missiles, and, in the long term, Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles with
initial radiation enhancement components. Consequently, neutron weapons
may see extensive battlefield use in the event of a nuclear war breaking out
with the NATO bloc.

The survivability of the main tactical subunits (battalions) in condi-

tions where neutron weapons are employed is to a great extent determined
by their dispersion and the setup of their march, prebattle, and battle
formations. A motorized rifle (tank) battalion following company columns
in the prebattle formation may be completely destroyed by one neutron
warhead with a yield of one kiloton, but if formed up in an arrowhead or
reversed arrowhead formation, with slightly increased intervals and dis-
tances between the companies, it would sustain losses not exceeding 30
percent.
The likelihood of significantly increased personnel losses in units and formations as a
result of the employment of neutron weapons makes it necessary for officers to organize the
timely discovery and destruction of enemy neutron weapons; to improve the methods for
troop dispersion, movement, deployment, and conduct of combat actions; and to make
skillful use of the protective properties of equipment and terrain.

The intensive improvement of nuclear weapons and delivery systems

and the drastic rise in the number of nuclear warheads that may be
employed on the battlefield, permit the conclusion that nuclear weapons

12
are still the principal and most powerful means for striking the enemy in a
nuclear war and will exert a decisive influence on the nature of combined
arms combat and the methods by which it is conducted.
This confronts commanders with sevei^l tasl<s of paramount importance: to learn how to
skillfully employ nuclear weapons on the battlefield if the enemy should unleash a nuclear
war; to exploit the results of friendly nuclear strikes effectively and in good time; to improve
methods for conducting troop actions when the enemy makes large-scale use of nuclear
weapons and methods of combating his tactical and operational-tactical nuclear weapons; to
raise the survivability and steadiness of friendly forces in the face of nuclear weapon effects;
and to learn how to quickly restore the fighting efficiency of subunits, units, and formations
after enemy nuclear strikes, and to conduct combat actions with a limited complement of
personnel and equipment.

Chemical weapons. In 1925, the Soviet government became signatory

to the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical warfare
agents in war. However, a number of states in the NATO bloc are
continuing to develop and accumulate chemical weaponry. This makes it
imperative for the personnel of our Armed Forces to study the combat
characteristics of chemical weaponry and to know how to conduct combat
actions when the enemy employs such weaponry.

According to the classification adopted in the armies of the NATO

countries, chemical warfare agents are divided into four groups: lethal
agents, incapacitating agents, harassing agents, and training agents.

The lethal agents include yperite, sarin, and VX. In the American
military, the group of incapacitating agents includes the psychoactive agent
BZ.

The harassing agents are represented in the US armed forces by

chloracetophenone, adamsite, and agent CS. The last of these is considered
the most effective, while chloracetophenone and adamsite have been trans-
ferred to the category of reserve TOE or training agents.

While engaged in aggressive actions in Southeast Asia, the US became

the first state in the world to employ chemical substances—herbicides and
defoliants—which were sprayed in combat zones to destroy vegetation
along roads, canals, and electric power lines, and also to destroy rice
paddies and industrial crop plantations in densely populated areas under
the patriots' control. These measures made it simpler to observe troop
movements, aided in the discovery of troop dispositions, and made it
easier to conduct reconnaissance, terrain photography, and aimed fire.

In recent years, the US Defense Department has given particular

attention to the development of so-called binary chemical ammunition.

13
 Binary chemical ammunition has a filling that consists of two initial
components, each of which in isolation is a nontoxic or marginally toxic
chemical substance. During the warhead's time of flight to target, the
initial components of the filling mix, and a nerve agent is formed as the
result of a chemical reaction.

According to the assessment of foreign military experts, the combat

effectiveness of binary chemical ammunition is lower than that of chemical
ammunition filled with ready-made agents, since the chemical warfare
agent formed when the components mix is less in terms of mass than the
total mass of the initial components because of incomplete reaction.

The means employed to deliver chemical warfare agents may be most

diverse. It has been noted in the foreign press that in the American armed
forces the Air Force has the greatest capability for employing chemical
weaponry, being equipped with chemical bombs, cluster munitions, and
aircraft-mounted spraying devices. For the employment of chemical war-
fare agents in the US ground forces, there are chemical warheads for
missiles, chemical artillery and rocket projectiles, chemical hand grenades,
aerosol generators, chemical mines, and toxic smoke generators.
The US command puts a high value on the effectiveness of employing chemical weap-
onry. By employing chemical warfare agents, an artillery battalion can strike enemy personnel
in an area 10 times larger than when employing conventional ammunition; one fighter-
bomber employing chemical weapons could strike personnel in an area of about 8-10 square
kilometers.

In the view of the NATO command, employment of chemical weap-

onry is contemplated in both offensive and defensive actions. In an offen-
sive, the nonpersistent agent sarin would see the most extensive use. The
persistent agents VX and yperite may be employed primarily over areas
that the enemy does not intend to capture in the short term, on advancing
reserves and logistics units, and also in defense. Sarin would be employed
on counterattack axes.
The effectiveness of chemical weaponry can be significantly reduced by warning troops
of surprise chemical strikes in time, by making use of protective equipment, and by imple-
menting other measures for the protection of troops against chemical warfare.

The employment of bacteriological (biological) weapons, as is the case

with chemical weapons, is condemned by the Soviet government, which is
a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Convention on the
prohibition of the development, manufacture, and stockpiling of bacterio-
logical (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. However,
some imperialist states are secretly developing such weaponry, and envisage
its employment for strategic, operational, and tactical purposes.

The casualty effect of bacteriological (biological) weaponry stems

from the properties of the bacteriological agents, which include pathogenic
14
microbes and the toxins (poisons) produced by tliem. According to foreign
press data, the characteristic features of this weaponry are as follows: the
capability to cause mass infectious diseases, prolonged action, difficulty of
detection in the external environment, and the existence of a period of
latent action (incubation).

In the opinion of foreign military experts, bacteriological agents may

be employed by aircraft, missiles, and groups of saboteurs, by means of
contaminating water sources, food supplies, and buildings, as well as by
spreading infected vectors—insects, mites, and rodents.

The employment of bacteriological (biological) weapons would repre-

sent a severe threat both to troops and the population of the rear areas. In
some respects, they are even more dangerous than chemical or nuclear
weapnos. UN experts, in a comparative assessment of the casualty effects
of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological (biological) weaponry, have con-
cluded that one strategic bomber can strike an unprotected population in
an area of 30 square kilometers with nuclear weapons, in an area of 60
square kilometers with chemical weapons, and in an area of several thou-
sand square kilometers with bacteriological (biological) weapons."*
Timely protection against this weaponry will drastically reduce troop losses. Therefore,
when implementing a system of measures for the protection of troops against nuclear-
biological-chemical [hereafter NBC—U.S. Ed.] weapons, commanders at all levels must pay
particular attention to the timely discovery of enemy bacteriological (biological) weapons, to
warning troops of the immediate threat and beginning of their employment, to providing
notification of bacteriological (biological) contamination, to medical and veterinary measures,
and to discovering and eliminating the effects of the employment of such weapons.

Tactical and operational-tactical missiles are employed in combined

arms combat primarily as a delivery system for nuclear warheads. How-
ever, they may be used to deliver conventional warheads. For example, in
the US Army not only have nuclear and chemical warheads been devel-
oped for the Lance missile system, but also high-explosive fragmentation
(463kg) and cluster warheads (850 fragmentation bombs), and warheads
with hollow-charge elements and homing heads. The development of such
a complex of warheads and the employment of homing systems make it
possible to employ conventionally armed missiles not only against area
targets, but point targets as well, and to assign missile battalions missions
to destroy tactical nuclear weapons, artillery, and control posts, and to
neutralize personnel situated in the open and nonarmored equipment.

Tactical and operational-tactical missiles in the armies of the NATO

countries are becoming an important weapon in the reconnaissance-strike
and reconnaissance-fire complexes that are under development.

15
 Aircraft and helicopters participate in combined arms combat as a
part of front and army aviation, and sometimes as a part of military
transport aviation as well.

Front aviation is employed to strike enemy troops and aviation, to

support the combat actions of friendly forces by destroying nuclear weap-
ons, reserves, and control posts, to destroy important ground targets in the
operational and tactical depth, to destroy enemy aircraft and helicopters
on the ground and in the air, and also to land and support airborne assault
forces, to conduct reconnaissance, and to cover troops and other targets
against enemy air strikes.

Army aviation is employed to conduct air support of forces by de-

stroying ground targets, for the most part mobile ones, on the forward
edge and in the tactical depth, by landing airborne assault forces, by laying
minefields from the air, by conducting aerial reconnaissance, and by carry-
ing out other missions.

Military transport aviation is the main airlift resource. It is employed

to land airborne assault forces, to airlift troops, weaponry, ammunition,
and other material resources over long distances, and for casualty evacua-
tion.

In terms of the missions that may be performed by aviation and the

performance and combat characteristics of the aircraft, aviation is subdi-
vided into bomber, fighter-bomber, fighter, reconnaissance, and special
purpose aviation, and in foreign armies into ground attack aviation as
well.

Bomber aviation has a significant operating range and the capability

of striking with great destructive force; it is assigned to destroy (strike)
enemy groupings and to destroy important enemy ground (sea) targets,
primarily in the deep rear and operational depth.

Bomber aviation is equipped with subsonic and supersonic aircraft

capable of significant flying altitudes and with a large load-carrying capac-
ity.

Modern bomber aviation is now capable of striking more accurately

than formerly targets situated out of visual observation—from behind
cloud cover and while flying in clouds, and in inclement weather day and
night; when aircraft are equipped with air-to-surface missiles, such strikes
can be delivered without a run over the air defense zone of the target
under attack.

16
 Fighter-bomber aviation, equipped with various types of fighter-
bomber aircraft that have high speed and altitude capability and powerful
weaponry, is a multipurpose asset of front aviation. It is employed to
destroy (strike) enemy troops and ground (sea) targets in the tactical and
operational depth, and also to destroy enemy aircraft, helicopters, and
remotely piloted vehicles in the air, and to conduct reconnaissance.

Ground attack aviation is equipped with ground attack aircraft and

combat helicopters. In the view of foreign military experts, it is the princi-
pal means for close air support of combined arms formations and units
and for interdicting the approach of reserves. Ground attack aviation is
assigned to strike mainly small and mobile targets close to the forward
edge and in the tactical and immediate operational depth. It may also be
used to combat enemy helicopters, to conduct reconnaissance actions, and
to lay minefields from the air.
The American A-lOA ground attack aircraft can carry up to 7260 l^ilograms of diverse
weaponry on external pylons—higli-explosive, incendiary, and illumination bombs, cluster
ammunition and dispensers, and air-to-surface and air-to-air guided missiles. The aircraft also
has a built-in seven barreled 30mm cannon. Its maximum flight speed is 720 km/h, and its
radius of action while performing close support missions is 480 kilometers (loiter time 2
hours).'

Combat helicopters are an effective means of combating enemy tanks

and striking other ground targets. The combat helicopter fleet is made up
of fire support helicopters and troop carrier helicopters.''

Ground forces gain a high level of tactical mobility from the large-
scale employment of fire support helicopters, as well as of troop carrier
helicopters, assigned to land tactical airborne assault forces, to supply
troops with materiel, and to evacuate the wounded. For this reason, the
quantity of army aviation is constantly increasing. For example, a US
division already has more than 140 helicopters, of which 42 are equipped
with antitank guided missiles [hereafter ATGM—U.S. Ed.].
The main fire support helicopter in the US Army at present is the AH-IS Cobra/TOW,
which is armed with 8 TOW ATGMs. It has a maximum flight speed of 315 km/h, a service
ceiling of 3720 meters, a transport load capacity of up to 1520 kilograms, and a range of 500
kilometers. In 1983 a new fire support helicopter, the AH-64A, began to come into service; it
is armed with 16 laser-guided Hellfire ATGMs.'

Besides antitank combat, fire support helicopters can also be em-

ployed for close support of friendly forces by striking enemy personnel and
fire positions, by escorting troop carrier helicopters and securing the land-
ing of assault forces or the unloading of weapons and materiel, by con-
ducting reconnaissance to discover important enemy targets on the battle-
field in the interests of the ground forces, by ascertaining the effects of
strikes against enemy strongpoints in the tactical depth, by destroying

17
enemy helicopters in the air, by engaging in electronic jamming, and by
performing other combat missions.

Fighter aviation is one of the principal means for destroying enemy

aircraft, helicopters, and remotely piloted vehicles in the air. Apart from
carrying out missions to cover troops and rear installations, fighter avia-
tion can be employed to strike various ground targets situated in the open
(nuclear missiles, aircraft, personnel, combat equipment, and radar equip-
ment), and to conduct reconnaissance as well.

Modern fighters are capable of supersonic speeds and high flying

altitudes. They are generally armed with guided missiles and automatic
cannon and are capable of employing aerial bombs of various designa-
tions. Specialized guidance equipment installed in the guided missiles auto-
matically corrects aiming errors, takes account of changes in the position
of an airborne target, and ensures a high degree of hit accuracy.
The American F-16A fighter has a maximum flight speed of 2100 km/h at an altitude of
11,000 meters, a service ceiling of 16,000 meters, a maximum range of 3700 kilometers (with
external fuel tanks), and an 800-kilometer radius of action. Depending on the missions to be
performed, the following armaments may be suspended from external pylons: air-to-air
missiles, conventional aerial bombs, bombs with laser homing heads, launcher pods for 70mm
unguided rockets, pods containing laser guidance system apparatus and surveillance equip-
ment, and auxiliary fuel tanks. The aircraft is armed with a six-barrelled 20mm aircraft
cannon, guided missiles, and aircraft rocket projectiles.*

The reconnaissance aviation of foreign armies is for the most part

equipped with various modifications of the same types of aircraft that are
in service in the other categories of aviation, which are, however, equipped
with specialized equipment. It is also equipped with remotely piloted recon-
naissance vehicles.

In the opinion of foreign military experts, the integrated navigation

systems of reconnaissance aircraft, which include a computer, an inertial
system, and a forward-looking radar, ensure accurate air navigation day
and night and in visual flight rule and instrument flight rule weather
conditions.

The surveillance equipment of reconnaissance aircraft consists of

aerial photographic, infrared, and radar equipment, whose integrated em-
ployment provides for carrying out reconnaissance missions in various
weather conditions, at night, and when visibility is poor.

Reconnaissance aviation's role is continuously growing. With the de-

velopment in the armies of the NATO countries of reconnaissance-fire and
reconnaissance-strike complexes, reconnaissance and control aircraft are
becoming one of the most important elements providing for the acquisition

18
of reconnaissance data (in real time) and the precision guidance of weap-
ons to enemy targets discovered.

Transport aviation, which is equipped with transport aircraft and

heHcopters, lands airborne assault forces, transports troops and cargoes,
and provides for the maneuver by air and combat actions of troops. It can
also be employed to carry out special missions.
The American C-130 tactical transport aircraft (payload 20.4 tons) is capable of trans-
porting 92 soldiers witli equipment or 74 wounded and 6 medical orderlies, or one 155mm
howitzer.

Strategic transport aircraft have considerably greater capabilities. The American C-5A
(payload 120 t) can transport 345 soldiers with equipment, two M60 tanks, or 10 Pershing
missiles, as well as other types of weaponry and equipment.

The American CH-47B Chinook troop carrier helicopter (payload 10 t) can transport 44
soldiers with equipment.

The presence of large quantities of air transport resources in modern

armies has led to an increase in the depth of modern combined arms
combat and to the emergence of new elements in the battle formation-
tactical airborne assault forces and antiassault landing reserves. The com-
bat actions of tactical airborne assault forces, which carry out a vast range
of combat missions, have become an important component of modern
combined arms combat, and have led to considerable changes in its essence
and scope and the methods of conducting it.

Thus, aircraft, combat helicopters, and troop carrier helicopters con-

siderably increase troop firepower and mobility and also, as noted by
foreign military experts, make it possible to employ various methods of
hitting the enemy with fire strikes and to employ new methods of conduct-
ing combat using a third dimension—air space—to envelop the enemy by
air.

At the same time, the complex problem of combating enemy army

aviation and airmobile troops has also arisen. This problem is becoming an
integral element in the commander's decision in offensive and defensive
engagements and an important part of his work in organizing cooperation.

The mission of artillery is to destroy (neutralize) enemy nuclear weap-

ons, artillery, tanks, antitank and other fire weapons, personnel, control
posts, air defense weapons, and electronic equipment and to demolish
enemy defensive installations.

Artillery continues to be an important asset for delivering fire strikes

on the enemy, having, as it does, great firepower and accuracy, a great
capacity for quick preparation for action, and a capability for wide ma-

19
neuver and rapid concentration of fire on the most important targets.
Artillery forms tiie basis of tiie firepower of formations and units in the
ground forces of the NATO armies and includes tube artillery (self-
propelled and towed), multiple rocket launcher systems, and mortars.

In recent years, self-propelled artillery has seen the most development

in the ground forces of the armies of many countries. It has excellent
all-terrain performance, maneuverability, and survivability in a nuclear
weapon environment, and the crews have a high degree of protection from
bullets and shell fragments.
The most widely used self-propelled gun in the NATO forces is the American-
manufactured M109A1 155mm self-propelled howitzer, which has a range of 18 kilometers. A
modernized version of the howitzer, the M109A2, has a range of 22 kilometers;' the unit of
fire that it can carry includes two Copperhead laser-guided shells, apart from 22 standard and
12 rocket-assisted rounds.

Another type of 155mm self-propelled howitzer, the SP70, has been developed by West
Germany, the UK, and Italy and will enter service in the mid-1980s. It has a range of 24
kilometers, and about 30 kilometers when using rocket-assisted shells.'" The howitzer's
all-terrain performance and running speed correspond with the analogous characteristics of
the Leopard tank.

Together with armored self-propelled artillery, armies are also

equipped with a considerable quantity of towed artillery. In the armies of
the NATO countries, this consists for the most part of American towed
guns from World War II and the 1950s and 1960s, with calibers of 105,
155, and 203.2 millimeters and ranges of 12-15 kilometers." In recent
years, a number of new towed artillery systems have been developed or are
in the developmental stage.
The new Anglo-Italian-West German FH70 155mm howitzer and the American M198
155mm howitzer have ranges of 22 and 24 kilometers respectively with high-explosive frag-
mentation shells and about 30 kilometers with rocket-assisted shells. They can engage in
antitank combat not only by direct fire, but also from indirect fire positions, using cluster
ammunition. These howitzers can be transported by C-130 aircraft and by CH-47C helicop-
ters (suspended externally).'^

Multiple rocket launcher systems are becoming increasingly wide-

spread in the armies of the NATO countries. In the opinion of foreign
experts, they may be effectively employed in area fire to strike personnel,
armored vehicles, command posts, and other targets. For example, one
battery of eight Lars 36-tube 110mm rocket launchers of the West Ger-
many army can strike targets in an area of about 100 hectares within 18
seconds (the time taken to fire one salvo).'^

The improvement of multiple rocket launcher systems is proceeding

by way of extending the sphere of their employment, as is attested by the
development for such systems of cluster ammunition for antitank combat

20
 and the remote mining of terrain and of fuel-air explosive munitions for
striking personnel and fire weapons, and for clearing minefields.

The capabilities of multiple rocket launcher systems for remote mining

are quite considerable. For example, two batteries of Lars multiple rocket
launchers of the West German army are capable of laying a minefield on a
front of 4-5 kilometers. Multiple rocket launcher systems have even greater
capabilities for striking personnel and fire weapons situated in the open.
According to the estimates of foreign experts, one battalion of the new MLRS multiple
launch rocket system of the American military has a firepower 10 times greater than that of a
battalion of 203.2mm howitzers. The range of the MLRS is about 32 kilometers. The rocket
has a shaped charge fragmentation warhead. Besides this, a cluster warhead with terminally
guided submunitions is being developed. In the opinion of American experts, the firepower of
this system will be equivalent to that of 27 203.2mm howitzers.

Mortars are an important type of artillery equipment in modern

armies. They are considered the most effective infantry close support
weapon.

Mortars have a number of advantages as compared with other artil-

lery systems. They are simple in construction, have a steep trajectory and a
relatively light weight, and make it possible to employ high-explosive
projectiles with a high relative mass of high-explosive filling (important for
demolishing solidly constructed fieldworks). They also ensure a large area
of destruction when fragmentation and high-explosive fragmentation pro-
jectiles are fired. However, they also have some inherent shortcomings:
limited range, large dispersion, etc. Work is in progress to eliminate them.

For the most part, modern mortars use high-explosive fragmentation,

smoke, and illumination projectiles. The maximum range of mortars
ranges from 3.5 to 7.5 kilometers.

Artillery ammunition has undergone significant development in the

armies of the NATO countries in the past 10-15 years. Rocket assisted
shells and projectiles have been developed that have made it possible to
increase ranges by 17-33 percent. An increase in the power of certain shells
has been achieved. As a result, the degree of damage to targets has been
increased by 10-15 percent compared with conventional shells. The devel-
opment of shells with lethal arrow-shaped elements has raised the effective-
ness of strikes against enemy personnel situated in the open by a factor of
2-3.

A fundamentally new type of munition has been developed in the US

and certain other countries: the fuel-air explosive munitions. Their
casualty-producing elements are a blast wave that is propagated with a
velocity of about 2200 m/s and creates an excess pressure of the order of
50-60 kgf/cm^, a heat pulse of 1000-2000°C, a carbon monoxide excess of

21
more than 1.5 percent and a carbon dioxide excess of more than 12
percent, as well as an oxygen deficiency of less than 6 percent.

According to the results of investigations by American researchers, the

blast wave formed by detonation of a first-generation fuel-air explosive
device exceeds that formed by detonation of the TNT equivalent by a
factor of 2.7-5. Since 1973 the Americans have been working on develop-
ment of second-generation fuel-air explosive munitions in an attempt to
raise the excess pressure index to 100 kgf/cm^ or more, thereby exceeding
the TNT equivalent by a factor of 10. At the same time, third-generation
fuel-air explosive munitions are being developed for employment against
surface vessels.

The degree of destructive effect on a target and the severity of the

casualty effect on personnel resulting from the detonation of a fuel-air
explosive munition are determined by the mass of fuel, the height of the
burst, the distance of the target from the center of the burst, the resistance
of the target to the casualty producing factors, with allowance made for its
terrain layout, as well as weather conditions.
In Vietnam, the American aggressors would completely devastate an area about 30
meters in diameter in dense jungle with a CBU-55B 277-kilogram bomb, containing three
canisters with 36.6 kilograms of aerosol-forming liquid each. Later they were able to increase
the blast wave and employ fuel-air explosive munitions for mine clearing.

Tests are now being conducted on a 30-tube launcher for mine clear-
ing with fuel-air explosive munitions. In the assessment of American re-
searchers, such a launcher is capable of creating a minefield gap 8 meters
wide and 100 meters deep with one salvo.

Hence, fuel-air explosive munitions are capable of striking enemy

personnel and combat equipment, knocking out important targets in forti-
fied areas, and bridges, clearing areas in forests, and making minefield
gaps in shorter periods of time and more reliably.

Recently, active developmental work has been conducted on Copper-

head laser-guided shells, which are employed to engage armored targets.

As has been noted in the foreign military press, the employment of a

laser-guided shell would ensure a direct hit on moving tanks from the first
round at maximum range. In the opinion of foreign experts, such a shell
would convert a howitzer into a sniper's weapon that fires hollow-charge
shells. This would undoubtedly exert enormous pressure on enemy morale.

Laser-guided munitions are still being improved. For example, devel-

opment is taking place in the US on munitions with mid-course guidance
and terminal homing in inclement weather conditions; research is also

22
being conducted on homing systems, with particular attention given to
their resistance to jamming.

It has been reported that the employment of laser-guided shells in-

creases the accuracy of artillery fire from indirect fire positions and re-
duces shell consumption in striking individual targets, the number of guns
committed, and the time taken to accomplish missions.

Thus, the increased firepower of modern artillery, which is equipped

with qualitatively new artillery, mortar, and multiple rocket launcher sys-
tems, makes it possible to carry out fire missions in modern combined
arms combat within shorter periods of time and at greater depth. This
makes combined arms combat increasingly more dynamic and fast-moving,
increases the depth to which the enemy can be hit with simultaneous fire
strikes, and increases the importance of long-range firefights.

In the opinion of foreign military experts, antitank guided missiles—

ATGMs, with which tanks, infantry combat vehicles, armored personnel
carriers, and helicopters are equipped—are the most promising of the
antitank weapons for engaging armored targets on the battlefield. Some
subunit ATGMs are portable.

In developing ATGMs, foreign military experts are attempting to

reduce their minimum range of engagement and increase their maximum
range of engagement and also to improve the guidance systems. An opera-
tor firing a first-generation ATGM (range 400-1000 meters) had to track
the projectile and the target continuously, while an operator firing a
second-generation ATGM (range 25-6000 meters) tracks the target only.
The hit probability of modern ATGMs is close to 90 percent.
The TOW (US) and the HOT (France, West Germany) are considered the most sophisti-
cated ATGMs abroad. The TOW ATGM strikes targets at ranges of 65-3750 meters, or
about 4000 meters when fired from a helicopter (the Cobra/TOW). The HOT ATGM has a
range of 75-4000 meters. The TOW and the HOT have semiautomatic wire guidance systems
and an armor penetration capability of 500-800 millimeters.'"'

The influence of ATGMs on the nature of modern combat is increas-

ing not only because of their high level of effectiveness, but also on
account of the drastic rise in the number of them in service. For example,
the number of ATGM launchers in the US Army has recently risen by a
factor of four.'^ There are long-term plans for US divisions to be equipped
with 730 ATGM launchers, of which 380 will be ground-based Dragons
and TOWs and 350 will be helicopter-launched. Here, each mechanized
infantry battalion will have 71 ATGM launchers.

One sees a process of intensive qualitative improvement in ATGMs

and the development of new systems. An improved warhead and a jam-

m
resistant guidance system have been developed for the TOW ATGM. In
1981 the US began production of the heliborne Hellfire ATGM, which has
a semiactive laser guidance system and considerably surpasses the TOW
ATGM in flight speed, range (about 7000 meters), and armor penetration
(over 600 millimeters).

At the same time, the US military is conducting experimental tests on

the Assault Breaker antitank system, which is based on the integrated
employment of homing projectiles and missiles and includes the Lance
missile, ground-launched cruise missiles, tactical aviation aircraft, multiple
rocket launcher systems, and the Patriot surface-to-air missile system. The
specialized T-22 (for the Lance 2) and T-16 (for Patriot) terminal-homing
missiles provide for armored target kills at ranges of about 150 and 200
kilometers respectively.

There is continuing improvement of antitank artillery in the sense of

increasing flat-trajectory range, developing more powerful antitank shells,
and improving accuracy.

Because of the large concentration not only of tanks, but of other

armored targets as well, in the battle formations of modern forces, the role
of close-combat antitank weapons is increasing. Their development in the
armies of NATO countries is proceeding along the lines of producing an
antitank weapon for every soldier—antitank grenade attachments for per-
sonal small arms—and increasing the range to which these grenades can be
projected. Subunits are being equipped with new and lighter portable
antitank rocket launchers with great accuracy and increased range and
armor penetration.
The new American Viper antitank rocket launcher has an effective range of about 300
meters (prospectively about 500 meters) and a hit probabihty of 0.9 at a range of 250 meters.
The rocket has a flight speed of 257 m/s. It can penetrate the armor of a modern tank.'*

The great number of antitank weapons—and tanks—in the divisions

of the NATO armies makes it possible to create high average densities of
them—about 50 units per kilometer of front and 1.5-2 times more on the
axis where the main efforts are being concentrated.

This means that combat against enemy antitank weapons is acquiring

decisive significance for success in combined arms combat today. The
destruction of these weapons can only be achieved by the combined efforts
of all weapon systems, including artillery, aviation, and the fire weapons
of the attacking troops. Overall, in the opinion of foreign military experts,
the solution to the problem of overcoming a modern antitank defense is to
be sought in ensuring closer cooperation between tanks and mechanized
infantry, artillery, combat helicopters, and subunits of other combat arms
that participate in combined arms combat.

24
 Tanks as a combat resource are assigned to carry out a wide range of
missions encountered in modern combat. With powerful weaponry, reli-
able protection, and great mobility, they are capable by means of fire on
the move, fire from the short halt, and stationary fire of destroying enemy
tanks, other armored targets, and personnel, of demolishing enemy defen-
sive installations, of engaging low-flying targets, and of performing other
missions.

In modern armies, tank forces constitute the main striking power of

the ground forces. They are capable of exploiting the effects of nuclear
and fire strikes to the fullest and of achieving the final objectives of an
engagement or operation in short periods of time. The combat capabilities
of tank formations, units, and subunits make it possible for them to
conduct aggressive offensive actions day and night when considerably
separated from other forces, to defeat the enemy in meeting engagements,
and to negotiate extensive zones of radioactive contamination and water
obstacles from the line of march. Tank forces are also capable of swiftly
setting up a solid defense and of successfully withstanding an offensive by
superior enemy forces.

The increase in the tank's role in modern combat has led to a consid-
erable increase in the number of them in service. For example, a US Army
mechanized division has 270-306 main battle tanks and an armor division
324-360, while a West German motorized infantry division has 245 and a
tank division 305.

Modern tanks are developed with due regard for the latest scientific
and technical achievements and on the basis of modern technology; their
improvement proceeds along the lines of increasing their firepower, protec-
tion, and mobility and of improving their operating characteristics.

Tank firepower is increased by installing large-caliber guns (about

152mm) that provide high muzzle velocities, by producing ammunition
with great target kill capabilities, by equipping tanks with instruments and
mechanisms that raise hit probability, rate of fire, and the speed at which
fire can be adjusted and shorten the time required to prepare initial firing
data and open fire and by improving crew habitability conditions.'^
The majority of tanks in foreign armies (the American M60A1 and Ml, the West
German Leopard 1, the French AMX-30, the Japanese 74, etc.) have a 105mm rifled gun as
the main armament. The British Chieftan tank is armed with a 120mm rifled gun. The
American M60A2 and Sheridan light tank are equipped with a 152mm rifled gun/launcher,
which fires conventional high-explosive fragmentation shells and launches ATGMs through
the barrel. There are prospects that tanks can be fitted with both rifled and smoothbore guns
with calibers of 120 millimeters and higher.

Foreign military experts note that the first-round hit and kill probabil-
ity in tank gunnery is drastically increased by high muzzle velocities (and

25
consequently long flat-trajectory ranges), the employment of stabilization
systems, the use of various rangefinders to determine ranges to target, and
the fitting of ballistic computers that automatically prepare the initial fire
settings.

Full-caliber tank rounds are capable of penetrating armor with a

thickness 1.2-1.3 times greater than their caliber at ranges of about 1000
meters, while armor-piercing discarding sabot rounds are capable of pene-
trating armor with a thickness 2-3 times greater than their caliber. The
employment of armor-piercing discarding sabot rounds from tanks against
armored targets is effective at longer ranges as well—about 1500-2000
meters. Hollow-charge rounds penetrate armor with a thickness 3.5-4
times greater than their caliber, irrespective of range.'^ Armor-piercing
high-explosive rounds are highly effective against both armored and soft
targets.

Work is in progress in some capitalist countries on the development of

combined missile and gun tank weapon systems.'^ In the opinion of a
number of foreign experts, the scientific and technical prerequisites for the
employment of tank-launched guided missiles as the main armament have
already been met. The availability of such weaponry increases still further
the range at which enemy armored targets can be destroyed.

Antiaircraft machine guns, with which the majority of modern tanks

are equipped, are employed to engage low-flying targets, including helicop-
ters.

The employment of night vision devices and other equipment to a

great extent ensures surprise and concealment of nighttime actions for
tanks.

Armor protection and the presence of collective NBC defense systems

drastically increase the tank's resistance to weapon effects and ensure its
survivability in combat actions.

The presence in tanks of systems that protect the crew and internal
equipment from the blast wave of a nuclear burst, ventilation filters that
prevent radioactive dust and chemical and biological agents from penetrat-
ing into the tank, and a system for protecting the crew against penetrating
radiation makes tanks most suitable for employment in a nuclear weapon
environment. A tank provides its crew with complete protection against
thermal radiation and significantly reduces the effect of the blast wave and
penetrating radiation.

Fitting tanks with smoke generating equipment contributes to their

individual and collective defense against many weapons.

26
 Tank firefighting equipment is called on to prevent the tank from
being damaged beyond repair after the outbreak of fire caused by hits
from antitank weapons.

With the rise in the number and effectiveness of antitank weapons,

armor protection is being increased not just on recently developed tanks,
but also on some modernized ones. In the armies of the NATO bloc,
armor protection is increased by using a differentiated distribution of
armor thickness based on the probability of the tank being fired on from
various directions; by increasing the thickness and angles of slope of the
front portions of the hull and turret; by using spaced armor, i.e., succes-
sive placing of armor plates at a certain distance from one another; by
employing composite or laminated armor consisting of various materials;
and by armor pladng battle stowage areas and fuel compartments.-^"

Foreign experts consider that, along with design solutions, active and
passive tactical methods can be used to protect tanks against antitank
weapons in modern combat conditions.

Active methods for the defense of tanks include neutralizing (destroy-

ing) antitank weapons, primarily ATGMs, at their fire positions by means
of nuclear weapons, air strikes, and artillery and tank fire; by active
jamming of ATGM guidance systems, and by destroying ATGMs in flight
with the tank's auxiliary or main armament. Also effective are tactical
methods that make it difficult for the enemy to employ ATGMs, and the
use by tank subunits of terrain that makes it impossible or difficult for the
enemy to employ antitank weapons. Foreign experts consider it possible to
fit tanks with systems that detect and destroy ATGMs in flight.^'

The following are possible passive methods for the defense of tanks:
employment of smoke screens for screening or blanketing, deployment of
decoy targets as a countermeasure against projectiles fitted with homing
heads, and reduction of heat signature against the background of the
surrounding terrain.

The great mobility of tanks has a considerable influence on the march

capabilities of troops and increases the significance of the struggle to gain
time when units are deploying in their battle formation and of the struggle
to forestall the enemy in opening fire. The maximum road speed of
individual tanks is as high as 50-70 km/h, while the average cross-country
speed is 30-45 km/h. The mobility of tanks makes it possible to execute
swift maneuvers that surprise the enemy, essentially on any terrain and at
any time of day or night.

The mobility of modern tanks is achieved through the large power-to-

weight ratio of the engines, the employment of sophisticated transmission

27
systems, control drives, and hull suspension systems, and the improvement
of visibility. Tanks are also provided mobility by their capability to negoti-
ate various natural and manmade obstructions, including water obstacles.

The high dynamic characteristics of tanks are determined by the large

power-to-weight ratio of their engines and the sophistication of their trans-
mission systems. It has been reported in the foreign press that the Ml tank
can attain a speed of 32 km/h in 6.1 seconds. The high acceleration and
braking characteristics demand speed in detecting an enemy tank, prepar-
ing the firing data, and opening fire, especially in the case of a tank
operating on broken terrain.

A tank must negotiate water obstacles. In the Soviet Union, underwa-

ter driving tests were conducted even before World War II began, and
during the Great Patriotic War tanks would negotiate water obstacles by
deep fording. Modern tanks fitted with special equipment can negotiate
water obstacles 4-5 meters deep.

Another important quality of modern tanks is a long road range—

400-600 kilometers.^^

The majority of modern tanks have multifuel engines. For example,

our Soviet T-72 tank has an engine that runs on both diesel fuel and
kerosene or gasoline. The multifuel capability of tank engines increases
their autonomy of action when separated from supply subunits and makes
it simpler to organize fuel supply during combat actions.

An analysis of tank combat characteristics shows that, in close coop-

eration with other assets that engage in combined arms combat and given
fire support and reliable cover against air strikes, they can achieve victory
on the battlefield. Tanks are still an important means for increasing the
dynamic and maneuvering nature of modern combat and for improving
the methods of conducting it.

Infantry combat vehicles have considerably increased the maneuver-

ability, striking power, firepower, and protection of motorized infantry.
Modern infantry combat vehicles have reliable armor protection against
small-arms fire and shell fragments, excellent cross-country performance
(they can negotiate 30° slopes), and running speeds (about 60-75 km/h).
They are air-portable and can negotiate water obstacles at speeds of 6-7
km/h (except the West German Marder infantry combat vehicle). Infantry
combat vehicles have 264-600 h.p. diesel engines and a fairly high power-
to-weight ratio (approximately 20 h.p./t).^"*
The main armament of foreign infantry combat vehicles is made up of 20-25mm
automatic cannon with cyclic rates of fire of 570-1000 rounds per minute and muzzle
velocities of over 1000 m/s. As auxiliary armament, infantry combat vehicles have 1-2

28
machine guns and smoke grenade launchers. Equipped with armor-piercing discarding sabots
and fragmentation rounds for their automatic cannon, infantry combat vehicles can success-
fully engage armored targets (armor penetration over 20 millimeters at a range of 1000
meters, and 40 millimeters at 600 meters), as well as enemy artillery, ATGM launcher crews,
and infantry and provide effective fire support for tanks.

According to foreign press data, the process by which the infantry

combat vehicle is being upgraded is aimed at raising its firepower and
increasing its protection. The first of these taslcs is accomplished by in-
creasing the caliber of the main armament, raising the power of the
ammunition, stabilizing the armament and vision devices in two or even
three planes, and by arming infantry combat vehicles with ATGMs. In
order to increase the protection of infantry combat vehicles, more exten-
sive use of new materials, special armor plate designs (composite and
spaced armor), and layout solutions that increase the vehicle's survivability
are anticipated.^"*

The excellent combat characteristics of infantry combat vehicles and

their large-scale introduction into service make it possible for motorized
rifle subunits to rapidly exploit the effects of nuclear and fire strikes, to
engage in combat independently or in close cooperation with tanks, pro-
viding them with effective assistance in combating enemy antitank weap-
ons, artillery, and infantry combat vehicles, to make extensive use of
maneuver on the battlefield, and to negotiate water obstacles and contami-
nated sectors of terrain from the line of march.

Troop air defense weapons with which surface-to-air missile [hereafter

SAM—U.S. Ed.] and antiaircraft artillery units and subunits are equipped
are capable of decisively striking the enemy in the air, covering troops and
important rear installations, and creating favorable conditions for achiev-
ing success in combat.

SAM systems of various ranges constitute the main troop air defense
resource. SAM systems are highly effective against airborne targets and,
depending on the type, are capable of destroying airborne targets at low,
medium, and high altitudes and in the stratosphere.

Man-portable SAM systems constitute an effective subunit air defense

resource.
The American Stinger SAM system, which came into service in 1980, is designed to hit
targets flying at speeds of about 1200 km/h at ranges of 300-5000 meters and heights of
30-3000 meters on head-on and dog courses, with a 0.3-0.5 kill probability. Each motorized
infantry, tank, and reconnaissance battalion has a section that includes five such systems and
30 missiles for them.

The short-range Roland self-propelled SAM system (West Germany, France) has a range
of 500-6200 meters, a maximum height of 20-3000 meters, and a 0.5-0.6 kill probability.^'

29
 The Patriot SAM system, now in service with the American military, is capable of
striking airborne targets at ranges of between 4-5 and 50 kilometers at heights of 60-24,000
meters, with a kill probability of 0.8.

Antiaircraft artillery systems are designed to destroy airborne targets

at low and medium altitudes. They include self-propelled antiaircraft guns
and antiaircraft gun systems of small (20-60 millimeters) and medium
(60-100 millimeters) caliber. Antiaircraft artillery can also be called on to
engage enemy ground forces, including tanks.
In the opinion of the foreign press, the most sophisticated representative of antiaircraft
artillery abroad is the Gepard self-propelled antiaircraft gun (West Germany). This twin-
barreled 35mm system was developed from the Leopard tank. It is an autonomous all-
weather antiaircraft gun system designed to hit aircraft and helicopters at heights of up to 3
kilometers and at ranges of about 4 kilometers, with a kill probability of 0.3-0.4. Onboard
equipment provides for stationary fire and fire on the move.^"^ In the US, the DIVAD
self-propelled antiaircraft gun was put into service in 1981; it has approximately the same
combat characteristics.

Radar equipment is employed for the timely detection of enemy air-

craft and warning of air defense resources and troops about them, and
also for supporting the combat actions of fighter aviation, antiaircraft
artillery, and SAM systems. Existing radars make it possible to detect
aircraft at great distances and determine their coordinates and movement
characteristics at any time of day or night in the most inclement weather
and in a complex electronic situation.

Judging from foreign press reports, the improvement of air defense

weaponry is proceeding along the lines of further increasing their effective-
ness in destroying manned aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles, helicop-
ters, and operational-tactical, tactical, and cruise missiles. During World
War II medium caliber antiaircraft artillery would expend 400-500 rounds
to destroy one aircraft, and small-caliber artillery 700-800 rounds, while
today one to three SAMs may be enough to destroy an aircraft. The
number of target and missile channels in each firing element and the
dimensions of their impact zones and coverages, especially in the case of
low-flying targets and targets with small reflecting surfaces, are being
increased; air defense weapons are also being upgraded in terms of their
jam resistance, all-weather capability, autonomy of operation, survivabil-
ity, and operational reliability.

Small arms remain, as before, the mass weapon of personnel in

motorized rifle subunits, and are widely used in close combat.

The small arms of modern armies are fully automatic, have a rela-
tively high level of standardization (one cartridge for various types of
weapon), excellent maneuver characteristics, relatively simple design; they
are simple and easy to use, reliable and trouble-free in operation, conve-

30
nient for firing on the move and from infantry combat vehicles (armored
personnel carriers), and multipurpose.

The development of small arms is proceeding along the lines of

improving existing types, developing new automatic weapon systems and
ammunition for them, and improving antitank rocket launchers.

The main trends in the development of small arms abroad are as

follows: reduction in the external dimensions and mass of the weapon at
the expense of a reduction in caliber; development of caseless cartridges;
increase in firepower and weight of fire by increasing rate of fire and using
two-, three-, and multiple-ball cartridges; increase in accuracy and group-
ing; increase in the lethal effect of ammunition (small caliber and arrow-
shaped bullets that lose their stability on impact with body tissue and cause
severe lacerated wounds); and reduction in the variety of types of small
arms used.

The NATO countries are putting special efforts into finding the opti-
mum calibers for rifles, machine guns, and pistols.
The standard caliber for small arms in the NATO forces is still 7.62 millimeters.
However, small-arms types with a caliber of 5.56 millimeters have been developed abroad in
recent years. In the US, for example, a 5.56mm automatic rifle and light machine gun are
being produced; a new rifle grenade launcher has been taken into service; the development of
aluminum cases for rifle cartridges with arrow-shaped lethal elements and cartridges with
flechettes is in progress; and a new flamethrower is being tested. In West Germany, a 4.7mm
rifle with a range of about 300 meters has been developed; it fires caseless cartridges made up
of a pressed nitrocellulose casing into which the ball is fixed.^^

Motorized rifle subunits equipped with modern small arms can con-
duct combat in any situational conditions, whether nuclear weapons are
employed or not, and have great firepower and maneuverabiUty.

In the opinion of NATO, electronic warfare exerts a significant influ-

ence on the development of tactics; specialized electronic suppression assets
engage in electronic warfare. They are equipped with jammers that sup-
press ground forces radio and radio relay communications, the radio
communications and short-range radio navigation of tactical aviation, and
the onboard radars of aircraft, with jammers for disrupting radio fuzes,
and with optoelectronic jammers.

By suppressing electronic intelligence and communications systems,

modern electronic suppression assets afford secrecy in preparing and sur-
prise in beginning combat actions, reduce the effectiveness of enemy weap-
ons, and make it difficult for the enemy to maneuver his resources and
adjust his fire. Electronic suppression assets contribute to a significant
reduction in personnel and equipment losses by blinding enemy ATGW
operators and by suppressing SAM guidance systems, aircraft and artillery

31
radars, aircraft and missile instruments, laser reconnaissance and missile
(bomb) guidance equipment, television, and other control and guidance
equipment. Foreign military experts note that during the aggressive war in
Vietnam, the US was able to achieve a 50-percent reduction in Air Force
losses by implementing comprehensive electronic warfare measures.

In the NATO armies, electronic warfare is considered an integral part

of combat operations, since the disruption of troop and weapons control
systems is considered a guarantee of victory.
The helicopter-mounted Quick Fix II system and the ground-based TACJAM system are
considered the most promising electronic warfare equipment abroad. A reconnaissance and
electronic warfare battalion equipped with powerful shortwave and ultrashortwave communi-
cations jammers has been introduced in the US division.

All of this means (hat a sort of "electronic battle" will be conducted in a tactical combat
zone. The commander must take timely measures for successful suppression of enemy elec-
tronic equipment and protection of friendly equipment from suppression by the enemy. The
effective employment of weaponry, and the success of troop actions as a whole, will in many
respects depend on the outcome of this "battle."

The weaponry that may be employed in combined arms combat has

become qualitatively different: its destructive power, striking power, and
maneuver capabilities have increased drastically. The development of con-
ventional weapons is proceeding along the lines of developing highly accu-
rate homing and automated systems that drastically increase fire capabili-
ties for hitting important enemy targets with the first round and approach
NBC weapons in terms of their effectiveness. All this changes the essence
and nature of combined arms combat and gives rise t^ a need to improve
existing methods of preparing for and conducting such combat, and to
seek new ones.

3. The Nature and Forms of Modern Combined Arms Com-

bat
Combat is organizec] armed conflict between the subunits, units, and
formations of belligerents and is the main form of tactical actions on land,
in the air, and at sea; it manifests itself in strikes coordinated in terms of
objective, place, and time, fire, and maneuver aimed at routing (destroy-
ing) the enemy or taking him prisoner and of taking or holding important
areas (lines, objectives). Combat is the only means of achieving victory.

The objective of an engagement is achieved by powerful strikes made

by weapons of all types, by aggressive and resolute actions on the part of
the troops participating in it, by the complete exertion of the moral and
physical forces of personnel, and by their cohesion in action and inflexible
will to win.

32
 Modern Ground Forces combat is combined arms combat, since
subunits, units, and formations of ail combat arms and combat service
support troops, aviation, and—in the case of actions on coastal axes-
Navy ships as well, participate in it.

The nature of combat is determined primarily by the level of develop-

ment of weaponry and military equipment. The basic substance of modern
combined arms combat is made up of nuclear strikes, if combat actions
are conducted with nuclear weapons; fire from conventional weapons; and
strikes and maneuver on the part of troops. The electronic suppression of
enemy troop and weapons control systems is becoming an integral part of
combat.

A nuclear strike is made up of one or several nuclear bursts produced

within a short time in the interests of carrying out a tactical mission. The
capability of nuclear weapons to inflict full defeat on the enemy within a
given radius makes them a most important element in modern combined
arms combat.

But however powerful nuclear weapons are, it is not possible to

accomplish all missions in combat by means of them alone. In fact, this
would be inexpedient. Fire by conventional weapons, whose power has
increased drastically, is an important means of completing the enemy's
rout in a nuclear war, and the main means of defeating him while conduct-
ing combat actions without the use of nuclear weapons.

The role of fire in modern combined arms combat has increased

appreciably. Fire is used to prepare for and support strikes carried out by
troops, thus constituting an integral part of such strikes, affords swift
exploitation, and creates the necessary conditions for carrying out maneu-
vers. The growing capabilities of fire weapons make it possible to carry out
long-range firefights, and this may exert a substantial influence on the
nature of combined arms combat and the methods by which it is con-
ducted.

A troop strike is a combination of fire and movement by tank and

motorized rifle subunits and units aimed at completing the enemy's rout
and taking an assigned area (line, objective). The force of a strike by
attacking (counterattacking) subunits and units is primarily determined by
the firepower of their weapons.

Maneuver is the organized movement of forces or the shifting of the

fire of weapons in the interests of creating favorable conditions for con-
ducting combat actions. In modern combined arms combat, "maneuver"
would also refer to those ground and air actions that make it possible to

33
 swiftly rout the enemy with coordinated strikes from various directions,
including the rear.

Electronic suppression is considered by foreign military experts to be a

system of measures and troop actions implemented to disrupt enemy con-
trol of units (subunits) and of weapons and to reduce the effectiveness with
which the enemy can employ his electronic systems and equipment by
means of affecting their electromagnetic radiation. This is achieved by
electronic jamming, by employing dummy targets and decoys, by reducing
the radar, optical, heat, and acoustic contrast of materiel and installations,
and by means of radio deception.

By acting on receivers, electronic jamming distorts signals or images,

hinders or disrupts radio voice communications and the detection of tar-
gets by electronic equipment, and reduces the operating range of surveil-
lance equipment and the accuracy with which automatic weapon guidance
systems function.^^

Combined arms combat usually forms part of an operation or battle

and only sometimes is conducted in order to achieve a special objective
outside their framework. It is still one of the most important ways of
achieving operational and strategic successes, for, as a rule, the implemen-
tation of the plans devised by operational art and strategy is initiated,
executed, and completed by means of combat conducted by combined
arms formations, units, and subunits. This determmes the significance of
combined arms combat as one of the most important ways to achieve final
victory in modern war.

In order to achieve victory over the enemy, formations, units, and

subunits use various methods of action and procedures and every possible
combination of them. However, despite the diversity of combat actions, it
is possible to classify them by type, taking their most essential features into
account. Such features include the objective that may be pursued in com-
bat, the methods by which it is achieved, and the nature of the actions by
troops of the opposing sides, taken as a whole. Depending on this, two
types of combat are distinguished in tactics: the offensive and defense.

The offensive is the main type of combat. It is of decisive importance

for victory over the enemy. Only a determined offensive, carried out at
high momentum and in great depth, ensures the complete rout of the
enemy. A rapid offensive makes it possible to frustrate the enemy's con-
cept and to exploit the effects of friendly nuclear and fire strikes to the
fullest.

The objective of an offensive is the complete rout of an opposing

enemy force in a short period of time and the capture of important terrain

34
areas (lines, objectives). The objective of an offensive is achieved by
destroying the enemy's offensive nuclear and chemical weapons and major
groupings by means of strikes by missile troops, aviation, and artillery fire,
and also by the swift advance of tank and motorized rifle subunits, units,
and formations to a great depth in cooperation with aviation and airborne
assault forces, and by these elements boldly breaking out to the enemy's
flanks and rear, encircling and dispersing him, and defeating him in detail.

Depending on the situation and the missions assigned, an offensive

may be conducted against a defending, advancing, or withdrawing enemy
force.

The offensive against a defending enemy is the main type of offensive

engagement. It includes the following: nuclear and fire strikes against the
enemy, the employment of airborne assault forces, going over to the
offensive from close contact with the enemy or by advancing from the
depth, breaking through the defensive positions, exploitation in depth or in
the direction of a flank, encircling the enemy, dispersing his battle forma-
tion, and defeating him in detail.

The offensive against an advancing enemy force is conducted by

means of a meeting engagement. A meeting engagement occurs when both
sides strive to carry out assigned missions by attacking and is characterized
by its own methods of defeating the enemy and completing his rout by
means of attack by tank and motorized rifle subunits and units.

An offensive against a withdrawing enemy force is for the most part

carried out by pursuing it, which consists of a combination of some of the
forces routing the enemy covering subunits and the main body carrying out
rapid actions along routes parallel with the enemy's withdrawal. A defend-
ing enemy usually conducts delaying actions with the aim of covering the
withdrawal of the main body.

Defense is a type of combat that has the objective of brealcing up or

repelling an offensive (strike) by superior enemy forces, inflicting signifi-
cant losses on them, and holding important areas (lines, objectives), and
thereby of creating favorable conditions for going over to a determined
offensive. This is achieved by means of nuclear strikes and fire from
conventional weapons, by wide maneuver of resources and of fire, and by
counterattacking while stubbornly holding the main areas (lines).

Defense may be forced or intentional. It is employed in those cases

where an offensive is impossible or inexpedient and also when it is neces-
sary to economize on resources on some axes in order to provide condi-
tions for an offensive on other more important axes. Defense can be

35
 prepared ahead of time or organized while combat is in progress, either in
or out of close contact with the enemy.

The radical changes in the essence of combined arms combat that

have resulted from the new level of development of weaponry and materiel
are reflected in the employment of nuclear weapons and qualitatively new
conventional weapons. This increases the combat capabilities of subunits
and units and exerts a substantial influence on the nature of modern
combined arms combat and the principles by which it is conducted.

4. The Characteristic Features of Modern Combined Arms

Combat
Modern combined arms combat is characterized by resoluteness, great
maneuverability, intensity and fast evolution, rapid and drastic changes in
situation and a diversity of methods by which it can be conducted, and the
development of high-momentum combat actions on the ground and in the
air, on a broad front and in great depth.

The resoluteness of combat actions is predetermined by the resolute-

ness of political objectives, the acute class nature of a future war, the
special features of the Soviet Army as an army of a new type that defends
the state interests of the socialist Motherland, the excellent political and
moral qualities of Soviet soldiers, and the employment of powerful mod-
ern weaponry.

Resoluteness manifests itself in the objectives of combat and the

methods by which they are achieved, in the selfless actions of troops, and
in their unyielding drive to accomplish their mission in any situation.
It is vitally important to indoctrinate officers in a spirit of resoluteness, boldness, and
perseverance, the ability to implement decisions without hesitation, the willingness to assume
responsibility for initiative displayed and to use every means to accomplish a combat mission.
Indecisiveness and passivity in combat lead to defeat.

The great maneuverability of modern combat results from the em-

ployment of powerful weaponry, the increased mobility of combined arms
units and formations because of their complete motorization and high
degree of mechanization, and the absence of a continuous front line in
defense and attack.

Modern weaponry makes it possible to inflict heavy losses on the

enemy in a short time, and the great mobility of combined arms units and
formations makes it possible to swiftly exploit the effects of nuclear and
fire strikes, to attack the enemy from the line of march, and to advance
rapidly to the depth while extensively maneuvering resources, including by
air.

36
 In the past, the maneuver of troops was usually limited to movement
with the aim of taking up a more advantageous position with respect to
the enemy in order to make strikes against him. Now it is also used for the
timely exploitation by troops of the effects of nuclear and fire strikes; for
the swift transfer of efforts into the depth or onto a new axis; for the
negotiation of zones of radioactive contamination, barriers, demolished
areas, and areas affected by fires and flood; for the withdrawal of troops
in the face of enemy nuclear strikes; and for the replacement of units and
subunits that have sustained heavy losses and lost their fighting efficiency.

Favorable conditions for maneuver were limited in the past because of

the presence of continuous defensive zones. The first-echelon formations
and units, operating in narrow zones, were initially forced to carry out a
frontal attack and to break through continuous enemy defenses, i.e., to
create a breach in his formation for carrying out a close or deep envelop-
ment.

Now the defense is formed up with considerable gaps between de-

fended areas and strongpoints. Besides, employment of nuclear weapons,
or even of powerful conventional weapons alone, makes it possible to
inflict heavy losses on the enemy and create breaches in his battle forma-
tion in the shortest periods of time. At the same time, the great mobility of
troops makes it possible to swiftly exploit the effects of nuclear and fire
strikes and to quickly switch efforts and intensify them on the axis where
the most success is being achieved. Thus, the capability for wide maneuver
appears from the very beginning of combat actions, and not just when
fighting in the depth of the defense, as was previously the case.

Maneuver in combat is carried out with respect to fire and resources.

A qualitatively new component is the shifting of nuclear strikes by
retargeting delivery systems (shift of trajectory) or by moving them into
given areas to strike the most important enemy targets simultaneously or
consecutively. The role of maneuver by air has also increased as a result of
the development of army aviation, as has that of trajectory shifts as a
result of the increased range of artillery fire.
During combat training, units and formations must learn to swiftly execute any type of
maneuver, to deploy within short periods of time from march formation to prebattle and
battle formation, to strike rapidly with their fire weapons, and to attack the enemy quickly
and, after routing him, to close up rapidly in columns and advance, using their maneuver
capabilities to the maximum. This is an important condition for routing the enemy, even if he
has considerable superiority in personnel and equipment.

The intensity of combat actions depends on the inner drive and

capabilities of the opposing sides to conduct aggressive combat actions
with decisive objectives. \

37
 In these conditions, high combat training standards, moral-political indoctrination, psy-
chological stability, and the maximum exertion of physical powers and moral fibre are
required from troops in order to achieve victory in combat.

The fast evolution of modern combat is determined by the power and

high rate of operation of the weapons employed and the capability of
troops to hit the enemy with decisive strikes in short periods of time, to
attacic quickly from the line of march and complete the enemy's rout
following nuclear and fire strikes, and to exploit successes in depth with
high momentum.
In the conditions arising in quickly evolving combat actions, the problem of the struggle
to gain time arises more acutely than ever before. Officers must be able to quickly assess the
situation, make a decision, and assign missions for subunits, which demands a high level of
tactical training and sound skills in troop control.

Rapid and drastic clianges in situation constitute a new characteristic

feature of modern combined arms combat. The rate at which a situation
changes is determined by the time within which substantial changes occur
in the position, status, and nature of the actions of the belligerent forces,
and depends on the capability of weaponry to neutralize or destroy given
enemy targets in the minimum time and on the speed of troop movements.

Drastic changes in situations result from qualitative changes in the

composition of friendly and enemy groupings of forces, the correlation of
forces, the radiation and chemical situation, the speed with which reserves
are moved up, the execution of paradrops, powerful surprise strikes by
combat helicopters, and the resulting drastic changes in the methods of
operating and switching from one type of combat to another.

In the past, when front lines were continuous and contacts between
subunits, units, and formations close, combat actions developed evenly
from one line to another, especially in breakthroughs of enemy defenses.
During World War I, the rate at which the situation on the battlefield
changed was determined for the most part by the speed at which the
infantry moved and its capabilities to exploit the results of fire effect on
the enemy, while at the end of World War II it was determined by the
movement speed and striking power of armored forces and motorized
infantry.

In modern combat, the main factor determining the rate at which the
situation changes is nuclear weaponry. The employment of such weapons
by both sides in combination with conventional weapons, the great mobil-
ity of troops, and their great firepower and striking power may lead to
radical changes in the situation not merely within a few hours, but within a
few minutes.

38
 This gives rise to the need to train troops to carry out their combat missions in
conditions where the situation changes extremely rapidly and drastically and to train com-
manders and staffs to react appropriately to these changes within the shortest periods of time,
displaying resolve, initiative, creativity, and independence.

The diversity of methods by which combined arms combat may be

conducted is also a new feature. As we know, by methods of conducting
combat is meant the procedure for employing resources in carrying out
assigned combat missions. As historical experience shows, the methods for
conducting combat are continuously changing and improving as material
resources develop. They also depend on the missions assigned to the
troops, the conditions under which these missions are carried out, the
combat capabilities of units and formations, the composition of the enemy
force and the nature of its actions, and terrain features.

In past wars, a relative degree of persistence was observed in the

methods by which units and formations conducted combat. They could
spend hours, and even days, breaking through enemy defenses or crossing
a water obstacle.

The employment of various weapons in modern combat, the highly

dynamic and quickly evolving nature of combat actions, rapid and drastic
changes in situations, and the rapid interchanging of types of combat
necessitate the use of various methods for conducting it. In such condi-
tions, subunits and units must be prepared to conduct, in the course of a
day, both aggressive offensive actions—breaking through defenses, cross-
ing water obstacles, defeating the enemy in a meeting engagement, and
pursuing him—and defensive actions, and sometimes to execute maneuvers
with the aim of disengaging and withdrawing as well.

Every type of combat and its varieties are characterized by their own
methods for conducting combat actions, and their own tactical procedures,
which will also change depending on the specific circumstances. Therefore,
in order to achieve victory over an enemy today it is necessary to master
the art of employing the various tactical procedures and to persist in
finding, developing, and mastering new and more effective ones.
This feature of modern combined arms combat makes great demands on the level of
training of commanders and staff officers. Now it is more necessary than ever to think
creatively and fast and to act boldly, resolutely, and with initiative.

It has become possible to develop combat actions on the ground and

in the air, on a broad front and in great depth, and to conduct them at
high momentum because of the drastic increase in the combat capabilities
of troops and the increased ranges and effectiveness of weapon systems.

The increase in the combat capabilities of modern subunits, units, and

formations, the change in the nature of defense and the methods of attack,

39
 and the need to disperse forces have led to an increase in the spatial
boundaries within which and the momentum with which modern combat is
conducted.

During the Great Patriotic War a rifle division would advance on a

front of 1-2 kilometers and defend a zone with a frontage of 8-10
kilometers and a depth of 6-8 kilometers, but a modern division, accord-
ing to the experience of NATO exercises, may advance in a zone of 20-30
kilometers and defend a zone with a frontage of 20-35 kilometers and over
20 kilometers in depth. The momentum of advance of one of our divisions
in operations during 1944-45 did not exceed 12-18 kilometers per day. The
infantry divisions of the capitalist countries advanced almost twice as
slowly during the last war. Today a NATO division can advance at a rate
of 20-40 kilometers per day and more.^'

In the last war the enemy could be neutralized by division fire weap-
ons to a depth of 10-15 kilometers, achieving the most reliable effect only
to the depth of the first position (2-3 kilometers). Today enemy targets can
be destroyed to a depth many times greater by tactical missiles and artil-
lery. Combat helicopters, tactical airborne assault forces, and forward
detachments are capable of operating in the entire tactical depth of the
enemy defenses and beyond its boundaries. Combat actions in all types of
combat can simultaneously encompass practically the entire depth of the
dispositions of formations, including second echelons and reserves, and not
just the line of contact between the opposing sides and the immediate
depth, as was once the case.

With the introduction of new and more sophisticated weaponry, the

tendency for the spatial scope of combat to increase will develop even
further.
The increase in the spatial boundaries within which and the momentum with which
combined arms combat is conducted places greater demands on commanders and staffs in
terms of their ability to organize combat, particularly fire strikes, cooperation, and troop
control.

Analysis of the characteristic features of modern combined arms com-

bat shows that high levels of training in tactics and military technology and
of moral-political and psychological indoctrination in troop units and high
levels of combat training, discipline, and physical conditioning in individ-
ual soldiers are necessary in order to conduct it.
Modem combined arms combat demands the following from all officer personnel:
profound knowledge of military theory, a broad outlook in general science, creativity and
initiative, skill in operational-tactical foresight, and the ability to predict the possible course
of combat actions and to develop and master new and more effective methods for conducting
combat actions.

40
5. The Basic Principles of Conducting Modern Combined
Arms Combat
The principles of conducting combined arms combat are the main
guiding regulations and the most important recommendations on the orga-
nization and conduct of combat actions by subunits, units, and forma-
tions; they are developed on the basis of the scientific synthesis of combat
experience and troop exercises and are set forth in regulations and manu-
als.

Skill in organizing and conducting combat depends on many factors:

the commander's military knowledge, morale and fighting spirit, experi-
ence, organizing abilities, intellect, willpower, and military talent, and his
creative application of the principles of the art of war in the complex
conditions of a situation.

As the German military theoretician K. Clausewitz aptly put it, the

principles of the art of war are "a real fulcrum and lodestar for one
responsible for the action."^" In other words, the correct application of the
principles for conducting combat, with due regard for the specific situa-
tion, assists commanders and staff officers in their practical activities, is
conducive to the display of rational initiative, and to the greatest extent
ensures the achievement of success in combat.

The basic principles for conducting modern combined arms combat

include the following: a constantly high level of combat readiness in
formations, units, and subunits; a high level of aggressiveness, resolve, and
continuity in conducting combat; surprise in actions; coordinated and joint
employment of the combat arms and combat service support troops in
combat and the maintenance of continuous cooperation; decisive concen-
tration of main troop efforts on the main axis at the necessary time;
maneuver of nuclear strikes, resources, and fire; due regard for and use of
moral-political and psychological factors in the interests of accomplishing
the assigned mission; comprehensive support; maintenance and timely res-
toration of the fighting efficiency of troops; and firm and continuous
troop control and determination to achieve the planned objectives, and to
implement decisions made and missions assigned.

A constantly high level of combat readiness in formations, units, and

subunits. This principle of the art of war indicates that the successful
accomplishment of combat missions depends directly on a constantly high
level of combat readiness in formations, units, and subunits both in peace-
time and during military actions, regardless of their position in the combat
(march) formation and the nature of the missions to be performed. It is
only on this condition that one can count on timely deployment and
engagement of formations, units, and subunits, repelling the enemy's at-

41
tack and hitting him with powerful strikes, and the successful accomplish-
ment of assigned combat missions.

Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of De-

fense, notes that a high state of combat readiness "is determined primarily
by the quality of personnel training in the field, at sea, and in the air, the
degree to which they have mastered weaponry and combat equipment, the
level of moral-political conditioning, discipline, and organization of the
troops and naval forces and skill in troop control."^'

A constantly high level of combat readiness in formations, units, and

subunits is achieved by the following: correct understanding by command-
ers, staffs, and political organs of their missions; high moral-political state
of the troops, with personnel, weapons, combat equipment, and other
technical stores at authorized levels; clear-cut organization and vigilant
performance of alert duty; the maintenance of weapons and combat equip-
ment in working order and ready for immediate use; a high level of
combat mastery among commanders, staffs, and troops; physical fitness,
high morale, fighting, and psychological qualities, and discipline of person-
nel; firm and continuous troop control; constant reconnaissance and im-
plementation of all other types of support; and the availability of reserves
of material resources and the timely replenishment of them.

All these components of combat readiness are considered as a whole

and are achieved by persistent daily work and the intensive training of all
personnel in conditions as close as possible to those of a combat situation.
The more intensively the combat training of subunits and units is con-
ducted and the higher the quality and the more purposefully party-political
work directed at improving the moral-political and psychological qualities
of troops is conducted, the greater the combat readiness of the troops.

Great aggressiveness, resolve, and continuity in the conduct of com-

bat. In order to achieve victory in combat, formations, units, and subunits
must operate boldly, bravely, and with initiative and the utmost persistence
and stubbornness day and night in any weather. They must restore their
fighting efficiency quickly, forestall the enemy's actions, frustrate his
plans, and seize the initiative and firmly retain it.

The experience of past wars shows that, all other things being equal,
success in combat is achieved by the side that operates more aggressively
and resolutely, struggles persistently for the initiative, and imposes its will
on the enemy. It is possible to have well-trained and equipped troops in
sufficient numbers and to plan combat brilliantly, but still fail to achieve
success, in the absence of the requisite persistence and energy and the
inflexible will to achieve the objectives set. V. I. Lenin emphasized that

42
"the upper hand in war belongs to the side that fights the most energeti-
cally of all and makes use of every occasion to strike the enemy."^^

A high level of aggressiveness and resolve is expressed in the objec-

tives of combat and the methods by which they are achieved, in the
exertion of constant pressure on the enemy in any situation, in the timely
exploitation of favorable conditions in the situation and friendly combat
capabilities, i.e., the power of friendly weaponry, subunit mobility, superi-
ority in terms of the morale and fighting qualities of personnel, etc., and
in depriving the enemy of the opportunity to choose the methods, direc-
tion, nature, time, and place of the actions and paralyzing his will and
initiative.
This principle demands tliat commanders at all levels constantly strive for the complete
rout of the enemy. The decision to defeat the enemy must be sound and must be carried
through without hesitation. It is the commander's duty to inspire this resolve in his subordi-
nates and to constantly prepare them for the successful accomplishment of combat missions.
He must always be ready to assume responsibility for the decision made and to make use of
all forces, assets, and capabilities, as well as the enemy's mistakes and blunders, in order to
achieve success and the complete rout of even a numerically superior enemy force.

The principle of aggressiveness and resolve in actions predetermines

the offensive as the main type of combat for our forces, since only an
offensive that is conducted resolutely, at high momentum, and in great
depth ensures the complete rout of the enemy. V. I. Lenin repeatedly
pointed out that victory could only be achieved by means of resolute
offensive actions. He wrote: "Resolve and drive are three-quarters of
success."^^

Aggressiveness and resolve in an offensive manifest themselves prima-

rily in striking the enemy with nuclear weapons, if they are used, or with
heavy fire, and in the swift advance of forces in combination with wide
maneuver of resources on land and in the air.

The manifestation of aggressiveness and resolve in a meeting engage-

ment lies in forestalling enemy actions such as fire strikes, execution of an
expedient maneuver—particularly on the flanks and in the rear of the
enemy—deployment of troops, and the making of strikes by them. Great
aggressiveness in a meeting engagement presupposes resolve and quick
reactions to a continuously changing situation. Insufficient intelligence
about the enemy cannot serve as grounds for refusing to operate boldly.
Beginning with the initial stages of the engagement between advance
guards and forward detachments and the nuclear and fire strikes made
against the advancing enemy grouping, and right up to the point where the
enemy goes over to the defensive or withdraws, it is necessary to attempt
to display the maximum aggressiveness in order to seize the initiative and
rout the advancing enemy by means of forward-moving head-on actions.

43
 In defense, this principle is expressed in hitting the main enemy targets
with nuclear and fire strikes while he is advancing and deploying, wide
maneuver of resources, and making decisive counterattacks in order to
eliminate the enemy once he has broken through, to restore the situation,
and, given favorable conditions, to renew the offensive.

In every type of combat, subunit actions must be conducted with the

utmost intensity in the employment of forces until the enemy is completely
routed, continuously, and, as a rule, by hitting him with increasingly
powerful strikes throughout the depth of his formation.

Continuity in the conduct of combat makes it difficult for the enemy

to restore the fighting efficiency of forces that have sustained losses, to
maneuver, and to organize resistance on new lines; it contributes to his
defeat in detail within short periods of time. Continuity is achieved by the
following: conducting combat day and night and in any weather; immedi-
ate destruction of offensive nuclear and chemical weapons and other im-
portant enemy targets; availability of reserves, skillful maneuver of nuclear
strikes, fire, and resources and timely intensification of efforts on selected
axes; timely relief of troops in the first and second echelons (reserve);
restoration of the fighting efficiency of forces that have sustained enemy
nuclear and chemical strikes; switching from one type of combat to an-
other without delay; timely replenishment of expended reserves of missiles,
ammunition, fuel, and other materiel, and conducting technical mainte-
nance and repair of weapons, combat and other equipment and returning
them to service; maintenance of high morale and fighting spirit in the
troops; and skillful planning of combat by staffs and operational-tactical
foresight on the part of commanders.

Surprise in combat actions and the employment of methods for carry-

ing out combat missions unanticipated by the enemy create favorable
conditions for routing the enemy within a short period of time and even
with fewer resources.

Surprise has long been the most important principle of the art of war.
The enormous importance of surprise in armed conflict was repeatedly
emphasized by V. I. Lenin. He required that the enemy should be hit by
strikes "where and when he least of all anticipates an attack."^'* V. I.
Lenin repeatedly emphasized: "We must try to catch the enemy by sur-
prise, to capture the moment when his forces are dispersed."^^

The employment in modern combat of nuclear weapons, highly effec-

tive conventional weapons, and highly mobile forces has drastically in-
creased the role and significance of surprise strikes.

44
 Surprise makes it possible to take the enemy unawares, to cause panic
in his ranks, to paralyze his will to resist, to drastically reduce his fighting
efficiency, to contain his actions, to disrupt his troop control, and to deny
him the opportunity to take effective countermeasures quickly. As a result,
this makes it possible to successfully rout even superior enemy forces with
the least possible losses to friendly forces.

Surprise is achieved by the following: application by commanders and

staffs of methods for organizing and conducting combat that are new or
unanticipated by the enemy; covert concentration and unanticipated large-
scale use of new types of weapons and combat equipment unknown to the
enemy and novel employment of combat equipment already in service;
maintenance of secrecy concerning the concept of the coming engagement
and the preparations for it; misleading the enemy as to one's intentions;
bringing troops to a state of combat readiness covertly and cutting to the
minimum the time required to prepare for combat; hitting the enemy
where he does not expect it and forestalling his actions; rapid accomplish-
ment of missions assigned; skillful use of camouflage and implementation
of measures to counteract enemy reconnaissance; strict adherence to re-
quirements for secure troop control, communications security, and security
procedures; skillful maneuver of fire and resources; extensive employment
of aviation, forward detachments, and airborne and amphibious assault
forces; and maximum exploitation of the capabilities of weapons and
combat equipment and the morale and fighting qualities of personnel.

The conduct of combat at night is conducive to achieving surprise.

However, as the experience of modern local wars has shown, combat
actions at night demand a high level of specialized training in subunits and
units, thorough preparation for combat, careful organization of coopera-
tion, skillful use of reconnaissance, surveillance, and troop control assets,
and the timely destruction of enemy illumination equipment and night
vision devices.
Surprise is achieved by intensive and creative activity on the part of commanders and
staffs and skillful actions on the part of troops. Achieving surprise involves misleading the
enemy, exploiting his unpreparedness, displaying the maximum in terms of battlecraft, strata-
gems, and resourcefulness, and surpassing the enemy in the art of war.

Achievement of surprise and the use of methods of action and procedures unanticipated
by the enemy depend on a high level of tactical training in command personnel; on their
constant knowledge of the enemy, his tactics, and his strong and weak points; and on their
ability to quickly assess and exploit a situation and enemy mistakes and blunders, and to
display creativity in finding ways to ensure surprise in the diverse conditions of a situation.

Surprise must form the basis for all troop combat activities. Surprise
achieved at the beginning of an engagement may become exhausted after a
while. Its effect is limited to the time that the enemy needs to eliminate the
unequal conditions caused by unanticipated actions on the part of the

45
opposing side. This is why it is necessary during an engagement to strive
both to make the maximum use of surprise already achieved and to
achieve a new surprise in the actions of all troop elements.

While striving to achieve surprise, it is at the same time necessary to

take all possible measures to prevent this on the part of the enemy. This is
achieved by conducting reconnaissance aggressively and continuously, by
forseeing the enemy's intentions and possible actions, by great vigilance on
the part of all personnel, and by constant combat readiness of forces to
quickly counteract the enemy and to frustrate and repel his surprise ac-
tions.

Coordinated joint employment of the combat arms and combat ser-

vice support troops in combat, and the maintenance of continuous cooper-
ation. Success in modern combined arms combat can only be achieved by
the joint efforts of all participating resources on the basis of their close
and continuous cooperation and the fullest utilization by each of their
combat capabilities.

On the basis of this principle, combined arms commanders must have

the skill to coordinate the actions of units and subunits of the combat
arms and combat service support troops, both with one another and with
nuclear strikes and strikes by aviation and other fire weapons, in terms of
missions, axes, lines, time, and the methods by which the assigned missions
are carried out.

Cooperation is organized and implemented in the interests of those

motorized rifle and tank units and subunits operating on the most impor-
tant axes and carrying out the main missions.

Cooperation procedure is determined by the commander as he makes

his decision; he gives instructions in this regard when assigning missions.
Subsequently, the cooperation procedure is specified with more detailed
consideration of problems—at the depth of the immediate objective in the
case of an offensive, and along the enemy's probable Unes of action and
the counterattack axes of friendly subunits in the case of defense. Besides
the commander, the following participate in organizing cooperation: staff
officers, the chiefs of the combat arms, combat service support troops,
and support services, the commanders of attached and support elements,
and representatives from adjacent elements and aviation.

Cooperation is a most important condition for success in modern

combined arms combat. Where various types of highly maneuverable and
quick-operating weapon systems are employed, their coordinated use is the
most important condition for achieving victory in combat.

46
 Subunits, units, and formations of all combat arms must be prepared
for the joint performance of missions. The main efforts in officer training
must be directed at developing in officers practical skills in organizing
cooperation and combat as a whole—in the field and, when the situation
forbids, on terrain mockups or a map. Skillful organization and constant
maintenance of cooperation constitute a commander and staff's most
important duty while preparing for and conducting combat. It is exactly
here—in the ability to organize cooperation precisely and maintain it con-
stantly—that the commander's art of war, organizing abilities, tactical
maturity, and ability to exercise troop control in combat are focused.

Cooperation must be continuous throughout the engagement. Even a

short break in cooperation gives rise to disorganization in troop actions,
reduces the force of a strike against the enemy, and leads to unjustified
losses.

Continuity of cooperation ensures effective and decisive defeat of the

enemy, intensification of efforts at the requisite place and time, skillful
combination of nuclear strikes, fire from conventional weapons, and
strikes and maneuvers by the troops, and, in the final analysis, successful
accomplishment of the assigned combat missions by combined efforts.

The initiative of subordinate commanders is becoming especially im-

portant for maintaining continuous cooperation. In all cases where there is
a break in cooperation, they must themselves strive to establish communi-
cations with adjacent elements and the senior commander and coordinate
their actions without waiting for special instructions from the senior com-
mander (chief).
The skillful coordination of the actions of all combat assets, combat arms, and combat
service support troops engaging in combat demands thorough knowledge of their combat
capabilities and the methods for their employment under various circumstances, as well as
quick and accurate calculations. Cooperation will be effective only if the commander of each
subunit engaging in combat has a sound knowledge and correct understanding of the objec-
tive of the engagement, his individual and the overall combat missions, and the methods for
carrying them out; knows with whom, when, how, and for what purpose he is cooperating;
gives the senior commander (chief) timely information about the situation; and displays
creative initiative aimed at maintaining unbroken communications and continuous coopera-
tion.

The decisive concentration of the main troop efforts on the main axis
at the necessary time is essential in order to achieve victory in combat.
Decisively concentrating one's main efforts to perform the principal mis-
sions on the most important axis or in the most important area at the
necessary time, rather than dispersing resources evenly along the entire
front, implies achieving the requisite superiority over the enemy in re-
sources, creating unfavorable conditions for him, and, in the final analysis,
winning a victory over him.

47
 F. Engels referred to the concentration of efforts as a great principle
of tactics.^'' V. I. Lenin repeatedly pointed out the necessity of utilizing it:
"Having an overwhelming superiority of forces at the decisive moment
and at the decisive point—this 'law' of military success is also the law of
pohtical success. . . ."^^

Application of this principle played a decisive role in the outcome of

most engagements and encounters in the past. During the Great Patriotic
War, concentration of efforts was utilized on the strategic, operational,
and tactical scales. This testifies to a high level of skill in our generals and
officers, to their profound insight into the enemy's concepts, and to their
creativity and skill in determining the enemy's groupings whose rout would
lead to a loss of stability in his defense or the breaking up of his offensive.

This principle is put into practice by skillful allocation of resources in

terms of missions, axes, areas, and targets for strikes; by employing most
resources, the most battleworthy units and subunits, and the most power-
ful and effective weaponry on the main axis or in the main area; by
large-scale employment of nuclear weapons and other weaponry; and by
boldly maneuvering resources and fire during the engagement.

In an offensive engagement where nuclear weapons are employed,

decisive superiority over the enemy in resources will be achieved on se-
lected axes by means of nuclear strikes, strikes by front and army aviation,
and swift actions by the main body—primarily from the line of march and
in a sufficiently broad zone—with the simultaneous landing of tactical
airborne assault forces. If nuclear weapons are not employed, the main
efforts are concentrated by building up a considerable quantity of re-
sources in a limited sector, by hitting the enemy with artillery, tank, and
ATGM fire and front and army aviation strikes, by intensifying efforts on
the main axis by committing second echelons and reserves and landing
tactical airborne assault forces.

The principal methods for concentrating efforts in defense are as

follows: hitting the enemy with nuclear, fire, and air strikes as he advances
or deploys; preparation and occupation by units and subunits of areas on
whose retention the stability of the defense depends; making counterat-
tacks during the engagement by second echelons on previously prepared
(new) axes or occupation by these second echelons of defensive positions in
the depth; and the maneuvering of reserves and of resources withdrawn
from quiet sectors of the front.

When following this principle, one should bear in mind that in mod-
ern combat there is the constant threat of enemy employment of nuclear
weapons. This gives rise to the need to disperse troops and adopt measures
to reduce losses when the enemy makes nuclear strikes. This is why the

48
need to disperse resources should be taken into consideration when mass-
ing them.

The degree of dispersion depends on the mission to be performed, the

distance separating friendly forces from the enemy, the protective features
of the terrain, and the capabilities of troop control assets. It must provide
for timely concentration of efforts and rapid dispersal of resources along
the front line and in depth after the combat mission has been performed.

Maneuver of resources, nuclear strikes, and fire contributes to success

in modern combat. Units and subunits must carry out bold, resolute, and
timely maneuvers of resources. Skillful application of this principle makes
it possible to seize and retain the initiative, to disrupt the enemy's concept,
to conduct combat successfully in a situation that has changed, to achieve
the objectives of an engagement in a shorter time and with fewer losses,
and to defeat superior enemy forces in detail.

Maneuver of resources is conducted with the aim of creating a favor-

able grouping of forces and ensuring their most expedient employment in
performing assigned missions or missions that have arisen; and to hit the
enemy flanks and rear with decisive surprise strikes and withdraw friendly
forces from enemy strikes. Maneuver of resources must be based on the
timely and fullest possible exploitation of the effects of nuclear and fire
strikes on the enemy.

The types of maneuver are close envelopment, deep envelopment, a

combination of the two, and withdrawal. A close envelopment is a maneu-
ver that is executed to strike the enemy flank. It is carried out in close
tactical cooperation and mutual fire support with subunits and units at-
tacking frontally. A deep envelopment is a deeper maneuver executed by
troops to strike the enemy rear. It is carried out in tactical cooperation
with subunits and units operating from the front and with tactical airborne
assault forces. Withdrawal is a maneuver that may be used to remove
friendly forces in the face of an enemy strike, to gain time, and to occupy
a more favorable line (position). It is carried out only with the permission
of the senior commander (chief).

The maneuver of nuclear strikes and fire consists in concentrating

strikes and fire on the most important enemy groupings, installations, and
targets, in distributing the strikes and fire to hit (destroy) several group-
ings, installations, or targets simultaneously or consecutively, and in
switching strikes and fire onto new targets.

A maneuver must be simple in concept and must be executed swiftly

and covertly and come as a surprise to the enemy. Swiftness of maneuver
is achieved by organizing it in short periods of time, by high rates of

49
advance on the part of units and subunits, by negotiating various obstacles
and enemy centers of resistance from the line of march, by the employ-
ment of helicopters and transport aircraft to airlift subunits, combat equip-
ment, and materiel, and by timely and comprehensive support.

The availability of reserves is vitally important for the timely execu-

tion of a maneuver and for achieving continuity in combat actions. Re-
serves make it possible to intensify efforts on a selected axis, to replace
units and subunits that have sustained great losses, to rapidly restore the
fighting efficiency of forces, to transfer efforts to new axes, and to per-
form missions that arise unexpectedly. Expended reserves must be reestab-
lished as quickly as possible.

The decisiveness, rapid evolution, and intensity of modern combined

arms combat, the great mobility of units and subunits, and the employ-
ment of quick-operating electronic troop control equipment make demands
on troops, not only with regard to bold maneuver, but also with regard to
quick reaction to any change in the situation, flexibility in the employment
of firepower, and the accomplishment of combat missions in the minimum
time and with the maximum effectiveness, high momentum, and minimum
losses. V. I. Lenin required that strikes should be carried out swiftly and
decisively. It is necessary to "pull up sluggishness by the roots."^^

In past wars skillful maneuver, mobility, and high momentum in

combat actions led to the rout even of superior enemy forces.

Today, thanks to the fact that our personnel are equipped with highly
effective materiel, and have a good level of combat training and high
morale and fighting qualities, our forces have a mobility that enables them
to maneuver resolutely and boldly, to react immediately to any—even the
most drastic—changes in the situation, to employ firepower flexibly, to
rapidly detect and destroy important enemy targets and installations, and
to act at the requisite time and place more rapidly than the enemy and
unanticipated by him, either with or without the employment of nuclear
weapons.
Putting our forces' mobility characteristics to use depends on the theoretical development
and practical mastery of the methods for conducting combat actions that provide for the
effective employment of all resources for the purpose of routing the enemy and achieving the
planned objectives in the shortest possible time, and also on the skill and creativity of
commanders and staffs.

The following may be classified among the most important methods

for achieving great maneuverability: effective neutralization of the enemy
throughout the depth of his battle formation by means of nuclear weap-
onry and conventional fire weapons, and the timely and effective exploita-
tion of their effects; extensive employment of aviation, tactical airborne

50
assault forces, and forward detachments; swift advance in prebattle forma-
tion and in columns without dismounting; the conduct of maneuvering
combat actions along axes; swift negotiation of zones of radioactive con-
tamination, barriers, demolished areas, fires, and floods; crossing water
obstacles from the line of march, etc.

Due regard for the use of moral-political and psychological factors in

the interests of performing assigned missions exerts a profound effect on
all aspects of troop combat activities, commanders' decisions, and the
nature, course, and outcome of combat actions carried out by subunits,
units, and formations. The human being always was and still is the main
force in combat.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that "in any war, victory in the final analysis
depends on the morale of those masses who shed their blood on the
battlefield."'^ High morale in personnel increases the combat capabilities
of forces many times over, and provides a certain qualitative superiority
over the enemy. As experience shows, a high level of consciousness and
moral-political solidarity and boundless dedication to the Communist
Party and Soviet government raise the fighting efficiency of troops, give
rise to gallantry, courage, and endurance and lead to victory in the name
of the socialist Motherland.

In modern combat, personnel have to withstand great psychological

and physical stresses. For this reason, moral-political indoctrination con-
ducted during training periods and exercises must be directed toward
developing a firm will, stable mentality, self-control, restraint, persistence,
and aggressiveness in soldiers.

The maintenance and operation of weaponry and combat equipment

now requires skillful and coordinated collective actions and interoper-
ability. This is why moral-political and psychological indoctrination of
troops is directed toward creating military collectives in crews, detach-
ments, subunits, and units that achieve cohesiveness on the basis of friend-
ship, comradeship, mutual assistance, and a high level of military disci-
pline and efficiency.
In order to gain victory in combat, commanders and political workers must have a
thorough knowledge of and due regard for the moral-political state of their troops, conduct
aggressive political work to reinforce this state, systematically study the moral-political quali-
ties of the enemy, discover his strong and weak points, aggressively counteract his ideological
diversions and propaganda, and purposefully exert an ideological and psychological influence
on enemy troops.

Comprehensive support consists in organizing and implementing mea-

sures for maintaining a high state of combat readiness in troops, preserv-

51
ing their fighting efficiency, and creating favorable conditions for the
successful and timely accomplishment of assigned missions.

Success in combat in many respects depends on comprehensive sup-

port. It is conducted continuously, both while preparing for and during
combat. Support is organized on the basis of the commander's decision
and implemented by all combat arms, and by combat service support
troops and logistics units and subunits in the case of more complex mea-
sures requiring specialized training of personnel and the employment of
specialized equipment.
The organization of compreliensive support is one of the principal duties of command-
ers, staffs, and the chiefs of combat arms, combat service support troops, and support
services. The measures they implement must correspond to the concept of the engagement
and provide for concentrating the main efforts of the supporting forces and equipment on the
decisive axis (in the decisive area); they must also allow for flexible maneuver of these
resources, depending on the situation that develops.

Comprehensive support of subunits and units includes combat, techni-

cal, and logistic support.

Combat support consists in organizing and implementing measures to

prevent surprise attacks by the enemy, reducing the effectiveness of his
strikes, and creating favorable conditions for friendly forces to enter com-
bat in a timely and organized fashion and to conduct it successfully.

The types of combat support are reconnaissance, NBC defense, elec-

tronic warfare, camouflage, engineer, chemical, topogeodesic, and
hydrometeorological (meteorological) support, and security. The main or-
ganizers of combat support are the formation (unit) commander, chief of
staff, and the chiefs of the appropriate arms and services.

Reconnaissance is especially important in modern combat. It is the

most important type of combat support, since without reliable intelligence
on the enemy, the terrain, and the radiological and chemical situation it is
impossible to employ friendly resources correctly, to perceive the enemy's
intention, and to forestall his actions. Because of the large volume of
intelligence missions, reconnaissance is conducted constantly and aggres-
sively via the integrated employment of friendly resources to determine the
coordinates and location of enemy targets with the greatest possible accu-
racy and provide them to the troops in a timely manner, and to provide
the commander with the timely intelligence data needed for decisionmaking
and troop control in combat.

Electronic warfare is considered by foreign military experts to be an

important type of combat support. Its role is constantly increasing, since
electronic equipment exerts a decisive influence on the stability of troop
and weapons control.

52
 Electronic warfare is considered to be a system of measures taken
with the aim of disrupting the enemy's troop control, reducing the effec-
tiveness of his reconnaissance, weapons, and combat equipment, and en-
suring the stable operation of friendly troop and weapons control equip-
ment. It includes electronic intelligence via radio interception and
direction-finding, electronic suppression by jamming, and electronic pro-
tection of friendly electronic equipment against enemy jamming and
radiation-homing weapons, and against cross-interference in friendly elec-
tronic equipment.

Electronic warfare measures must be implemented concurrently with

the destruction of the most important enemy electronic targets. Such tar-
gets may be enemy command posts, intelligence and electronic warfare
assets, and forward air controllers and radars.

The NATO armies are contemplating setting up radio jamming

groups in subunits equipped with organic radios in order to conduct
electronic suppression of radio communications, and using smoke, search-
lights with infrared filters, and other equipment to suppress enemy
optoelectronic equipment and ATGMs.

In order to provide for the electronic protection of his own electronic

equipment, the enemy envisages organizing communications between con-
trol posts via several interchangeable radio nets that operate in different
frequency bands, establishing secure radio nets, making use of short-
duration signals for subunit troop control, and training radio operators
and subunit commanders for operation when there is powerful enemy
jamming.

For purposes of eletronic security, it is necessary to exploit the protec-

tive properties of terrain, to adhere strictly to the rules of secure troop
control, to make use of directional antennas for the operation of radios,
and to operate at reduced outputs.

Camouflage is an important type of combat support. Its significance

has grown drastically in modern combat. This is associated primarily with
the increased role of enemy technical reconnaissance assets in obtaining
intelligence data and the introduction of precision homing and automated
weapons and weapon systems.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to conceal the position of friendly

forces and mislead the enemy as to the objective of an engagement.
However, these missions may be successfully carried out if the weak points
of enemy reconnaissance assets and weapon systems are known, skillful
use is made of camouflaging assets, and the requirements of camouflage
discipline are strictly adhered to. For example, the Assault Breaker

53
reconnaissance-strike complex detects moving targets on open terrain but
not targets moving along planted areas, high-tension power lines, in for-
ests, and over broken terrain. This must also be taken into account in the
disposition of subunits and units on the ground and while they are advanc-
ing.

Technical support consists in organizing and implementing measures

for the maintenance (storage) of combat and other equipment, ammuni-
tion of all types, and military technical stores, for keeping them in a
constant state of readiness for combat employment, and also for recover-
ing and repairing them when damaged and for returning them to service.

Logistic support is organized and implemented for the purposes of

maintaining troops in a battleworthy state, of providing them with the
appropriate types of materiel, and of establishing conditions for carrying
out assigned missions.

Logistic support includes supply, medical support, veterinary support,

trade and consumer suppport, billeting, and financial support. The deputy
commander for logistics of a formation (unit) is the principal organizer of
logistic support.

The maintenance and timely restoration of troop fighting efficiency.

The fighting efficiency of subunits, units, and formations must be main-
tained and quickly restored to a level that ensures successful accomplish-
ment of combat missions.

Great attention has always been given to the problem of maintaining a

constantly high level of troop fighting efficiency. At the same time, on
analyzing the experience of past wars, it is possible to speak of a relatively
slow increase in losses sustained by units and formations as an engagement
developed and a relatively predictable distribution of losses throughout the
elements of a troop battle formation. Losses were sustained primarily by
first-echelon units, mainly infantry and tanks, but the organizational integ-
rity of the units and formations was not usually compromised in the
process.

The possibility of extensive enemy employment of NBC weapons,

precision homing and automated systems, army aviation, multiple rocket
launcher systems, and laser-guided munitions establishes the prerequisites
for simultaneously inflicting heavy losses on troops throughout the depth
of their battle formation and for abrupt increases in losses within ex-
tremely limited periods of time.

A high level of losses may lead to compromise of the organizational

integrity of formations and units and of troop control and support systems

54
 and to a reduction in troop fighting efficiency; it may also have an
appreciable effect on the successful performance of combat missions. This
is why maintenance and quick restoration of troop fighting efficiency has
become one of the main principles of the art of war.

The fighting efficiency of formations, units, and subunits, is depen-

dent on the numerical strength of personnel and their morale, fighting
spirit, and psychological and physical state; the level of combat equipment
and weaponry and their technical condition, the level of training, team-
work in action, and combat experience in subunits, units, and formations,
the supply situation, and the level of training of officers and staffs.

The maintenance of troop fighting efficiency implies preserving it

during an engagement at a level that ensures the successful accomplishment
of assigned missions. To do this, it is necessary to perform combat mis-
sions skillfully, with the minimum losses in personnel, weapons, and com-
bat equipment; to provide troops with reliable protection against enemy
NBC weapons; and to quickly restore the fighting efficiency of subunits,
units, and formations, and recover and repair combat hardware that has
temporarily gone out of action as the result of enemy strikes.

Nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological (biological) weapons and preci-

sion homing and automated conventional weapon systems are the most
powerful troop weaponry. The timely destruction of these weapons is the
principal and most reliable method of reducing the effectiveness with
which the enemy can employ them.

Thorough preparation and implementation of measures for protecting

troops from enemy NBC and precision weapons, particularly his
reconnaissance-strike complexes, is vitally important in maintaining fight-
ing efficiency. The main measures are as follows: timely detection of
enemy preparations to employ nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapons and precision conventional weapon systems; dispersal of
troops and periodic changes of their disposition areas; engineer preparation
of areas (positions) occupied by troops and preparation of routes for
maneuver; exploitation of the protection and camouflaging features of
equipment and terrain; warning troops of the immediate threat and onset
of enemy employment of NBC weapons; notifying troops of radioactive,
chemical, and bacteriological (biological) contamination; medical and vet-
erinary measures; ensuring the safety and protection of personnel when
operating in contaminated zones, demolished areas, and areas affected by
fires and floods; and detecting enemy employment of NBC weapons and
carrying out damage control.

Restoring troop fighting efficiency is an important task for command-

ers and staffs. This takes in a large system of measures, the main ones

55
being: restoring compromised troop control; updating the combat missions
of subunits tiiat have retained their fighting efficiency; withdrawing
subunits that have sustained nuclear and fire strikes to areas where their
fighting efficiency can be restored; and replacing personnel in the subunits
to be reconstituted, replenishing them with weaponry, equipment, and
materiel, and strengthening the political-moral state and psychological en-
durance of personnel.

The restoration of the fighting efficiency of subunits and units is

usually conducted within the previous organizational structure, but some-
times by establishing combined newly activated units as well. It must be
conducted within periods of time that make it possible to forestall the
enemy in the transition to aggressive actions.

Firm and continuous troop control and determination to achieve tlie

planned objectives and to implement decisions made and missions as-
signed. The experience of past wars shows that success in an engagement
has always depended on the quality of troop control. Skillful troop control
contributes to routing the enemy with minimum losses and to achieving a
victory within short periods of time. Conversely, a low level of troop
control or its loss for a certain time may result in defeat, even if sufficient
resources are available and the situation is favorable.

Troop control must be firm and continuous. This is achieved mainly

by being constantly aware of the situation and foreseeing the most signifi-
cant changes in it; by making timely decisions, preparing thoroughly for
their implementation, and implementing them persistently; by ensuring the
skillful organization, precise functioning, and survivability of control
posts; by the availability of stable communications with the troops; by the
precise functioning of automated troop control systems; and by skillful
combination of centralized troop control with initiative allowed to subordi-
nates.

The decision constitutes the basis for troop control. It must clearly
define the objective of the engagement and the methods by which it is to
be achieved. The objective of the engagement is derived from the essence
of the combat mission assigned by the senior commander (chief), while the
methods for achieving the objectives are derived from an estimate of the
conditions in which this mission is to be performed. For this reason, the
decision usually includes an analysis of the mission assigned and an esti-
mate of the situation.

The objective of an engagement must be in keeping with a force's

combat capabilities and the conditions of the actual combat situation, and
it must be proportionate to the resources to be employed, with regard to
their correlation with the enemy's resources.

56
 The objective of an engagement is the end result that must be
achieved in a specific combat situation. In an offensive, the objective of an
engagement is to rout the opposing enemy force and to seize certain areas
(lines, objectives) on the ground that provide for the further development
of the offensive. In defense, the objective of an engagement is to break up
or repel an enemy offensive, to hold occupied areas (lines, objectives), and
to establish conditions for subsequently going over to the offensive.

The requirement that the decision be scientifically sound is most fully

met by keeping the objective of an engagement in conformity with avail-
able capabilities. This presupposes a comprehensive and thorough estimate
of the situation that has developed, with thorough consideration of troop
combat capabilities and the quantitative and qualitative correlation of
forces of the opposing sides, adoption of a well-founded decision and the
assigning of demanding and aggressive, but practically realizable missions
to subordinates, and precise organization of comprehensive support and
troop control.

Two extremes are possible in a situation estimate: overestimating

friendly forces and underestimating the enemy or, conversely, underesti-
mating one's own capabilities and overestimating the enemy. The first
extreme manifests itself in troops being assigned impossible missions,
which may result in the objective of the engagement not being fully
achieved, or even in defeat. The second extreme usually results in the loss
of a realistic opportunity to rout the enemy.

For planning to be reahstic and scientific, it is not enough just to

consider the quantitative correlation of forces between the opposing sides
and to assess their fire and maneuver capabilities in merely quantitative
terms. It is just as important to make a thorough assessment of the
qualitative state of resources: the level of combat training of troops, the
state of training of commanders and staffs of all levels, whether the units
and subunits have combat experience, and how physically and morally fit
personnel are to carry out combat missions. It is troop quality that makes
it possible to wage war by skill rather than by weight of numbers.

The qualitative characteristics of troops constitute the main indicator

of the level of their combat capabilities. Only on the basis of a thorough
analysis of troop quality can one plan an engagement correctly, define
combat missions soundly, and select the most expedient methods to con-
duct the engagement. But in order to exercise troop control in a scientific
fashion, one must have a sound knowledge of military theory and a high
level of training in military technology, and he must perfectly master the
art of leading troops in the complex conditions of modern war. The words
of V. I. Lenin sound particularly relevant today: ". . . In order to exercise
control, one must be competent, one must have a full and precise knowl-

57
edge of all conditions of production, and one must know the technology
of this production at its modern level. . . . "■*°
Thus, the improvement of weaponry has substantially changed the
essence and nature of modern combined arms combat and predetermined
the development and application of new principles for organizing it, and
also of new methods for conducting combat actions. A mastery of these
new principles and methods, and of the art of applying them in practice, is
the most important condition for achieving success in combat.

Notes
1. V. I. Lenin, Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy [Complete Collected Works], IX, 156. [Here-
after cited as Lenin.]
2. M. V. Frunze, Izbrannyyeproizvedeniya [Selected Works], Moscow, 1977, p. 71.
3. Numerical data and factual material on enemy nuclear and other NBC weapons are cited
from Zashchita ot oruzhiya massovogo porazheniya. Spravochnik [Protection from NBC
Weapons: A Reference Book], Moscow, 1984.
4. See Razoruzheniye. Spravochnik [Disarmament: A Reference Book], Moscow, 1979,
p. 60.
5. See Vooruzheniye i tekhnika. Spravochnik (Inostrannyye armii) [Weaponry and Equip-
ment: A Reference Book (Foreign Armies)], Moscow, 1984, p. 269. [Hereafter cited in
English.]
6. See Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], 1976, II, 108.
[Hereafter cited in English.]
7. See Weaponry and Equipment, p. 159.
8. Ibid., p. 279.
9. Ibid., p. 65.
10. Ibid., p. 70.
11. See N. K. Glazunov and P. Ye. Maslennikov, Sukhoputnyye voyska kapitalisticheskikh
gosudarstv [The Ground Forces of the Capitalist States], Moscow, 1980, p. 345.
12. See Weaponry and Equipment, pp. 66, 71.
13. See Glazunov and Maslennikov, op. cit., p. 297.
14. See Weaponry and Equipment, pp. 50, 53.
15. See N. K. Glazunov and N. S. Nikitin, Operatsiya i boy [Operation and Engagement],
Moscow, 1983, p. 71.
16. See Weaponry and Equipment, 1982, p. 35.
17. See Soviet Military Encyclopedia, 1979, VII, 657.
18. See Tanki i tankovyye voyska [Tanks and Tank Forces], Moscow, 1980, p. 13. [Hereaf-
ter cited in English.]
19. See ibid., p. 17.
20. See Soviet Military Encyclopedia, VII, 657.
21. See Tanks and Tank Forces, p. 249.
22. See ibid., p. 15.
23. See Weaponry and Equipment, p. 175.
24. See ibid., pp. 167-69.
25. See Weaponry and Equipment, p. 124.
26. See ibid., pp. 129-30.
27. See ibid., p. 14.
28. See A. I. Paliy, Radioelektronnaya bor'ba [Electronic Warfare], Moscow, 1981, p. 4.
29. See N. K. Glazunov and P. Ye. Maslennikov, op. cit., pp. 176, 261, 265.
30. K. Clausewitz, O voyne [On War], 4th ed., Moscow, 1937, I, 146.

58
31. D. F. Ustinov, Sluzhim Rodine, delu kommunizma [We Serve the Motherland and the
Cause of Communism], Moscow, 1982, p. 83.
32. Lenin, IX, 186.
33. Lenin, XI, 340.
34. Lenin, VI, 176.
35. Lenin, XXXIV, 383.
36. See Marx, K., and F. Engels, Sochineniya [Works], 2nd ed., XIV, 198.
37. Lenin, XL, 6.
38. Lenin, L, 306.
39. Lenin, XLI, 121.
40. Lenin, XL, 215.

59
Chapter 2. The Offensive Engagement

1. The Essence and Features of an Offensive Engagement

Throughout the centuries of military history, the tactics of offensive
actions have been continuously changing, mainly because of improvements
in the forces and means of armed combat.

At an early stage in the development of military affairs, when the

destruction of the enemy was achieved solely by the direct physical effect
of soldiers using "cold steel," an offensive would be carried out in com-
pact and closed formations and would not develop in great depth. At that
time, an offensive was essentially composed of only one element—a strike
by troops.

Subsequently, when combat actions became more complex, other ele-

ments also emerged in the offensive engagement. Thus, with the invention
of gunpowder and firearms, fire became an important component of
combat. At the same time, maneuver of forces was becoming increasingly
important. Maneuver was applied particularly well in combat by such
Russian military leaders as Peter the Great, P. A. Rumyantsev, A. V.
Suvorov, M. I. Kutuzov, and others.

As weaponry developed, the relationship between fire, strike, and

maneuver became deeper and more comprehensive, and the way they
interacted in an offensive engagement also changed. In the period when
the attacking force's fire effect on the enemy was relatively weak, its role
was limited to supporting their actions in preparation for the decisive
moment of the attack, i.e., a bayonet or saber assault. As the power of
firearms increased, and particularly after the appearance of rifled weapons,
the significance of firepower in combat grew steadily. Since the second half
of the nineteenth century, losses to the enemy in combat have been caused
mainly by fire. During the Napoleonic Wars 40 percent of all casualties
were inflicted by rifle and artillery fire and 60 percent by "cold steel,"
while the number of casualties inflicted by fire weapons in the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 reached 90 percent."

60
 The role played by firepower in an offensive engagement gained
furtiier importance with the appearance of quick-firing and long-range
artillery and machine guns. For example, during World War I, the fire-
power of infantry divisions became 2.5-3 times greater because of their
having a full complement of automatic weapons and artillery.^ As a result,
hand-to-hand combat (the infantry bayonet attack or the cavalry saber
assault) gradually gave way to close combat employing firearms.

A grouped battle formation was built up around powerful offensive

fire weapons, i.e., close support guns and, later, tanks as well, which led
to increased troop maneuverability and permitted the most rapid penetra-
tion by forces into the depth of the enemy defense.

The offensive engagement assumed a combined arms character. Suc-

cess was achieved through the joint efforts of all combat arms and assets
participating in combat. For this reason, the role of cooperation increased.
At the same time, under the influence of new weaponry, the aggressiveness
and intensity of combat actions increased and the spatial scope of opera-
tions (engagements) widened.

The establishment of positional front lines during World War I pre-

sented a new challenge to attacking troops: the need to penetrate strong
and deeply echeloned enemy defenses. This was achieved by breakthrough,
i.e., by creating a breach in the enemy defenses, first in a narrow sector
and then developing it in depth and extending it toward the flanks.

The breakthrough as a method of offensive actions was first used in

the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. However, because of lack of experi-
ence, neither of the opposing armies was able to achieve any substantial
successes in breaking through enemy defenses. This problem was not fully
solved even during World War 1. Finally, toward the end of the war, it
became possible for forces to penetrate the tactical depth of an enemy
defense with massed infantry, tank, air, and artillery strikes. However, the
problem of exploitation and turning a tactical breakthrough into an opera-
tional one remained unsolved, since the combat equipment's radius of
action did not exceed the boundaries of a tactical zone of defense.

During the Civil War, the Red Army applied basically the same
offensive methods as those established by the Russian Army in World War
I. However, because of the maneuvering character of the Civil War, the
most resolute combat methods were used in all types of combat, including
wide maneuver and bold initiative. An extended line of riflemen was the
most widely used configuration for battle formations, which were as a rule
quite shallow. By skillfully massing resources on selected axes and using
large cavalry formations for exploitation, the Red Army command strove

61
to achieve deep enveloping strikes, quick breaching of enemy defenses, and
rapid exploitation in great depth.

Using the experience of World War I and the Civil War and giving
due regard to qualitative changes in the state of technical equipment in
armies (i.e., the rapid development of tank forces, aviation, artillery, air
defense assets, and airborne troops), Soviet miUtary thought in the 1930s
devised an essentially new theory of offensive actions—the theory of the
offensive engagement in depth. Its essence consisted in simultaneously
neutralizing the enemy defense by fire throughout the depth of his forma-
tion, breaking through the tactical zone on selected axes by using powerful
offensive groupings of rifle troops reinforced with tanks and artillery and
supported by aviation, and then carrying out swift exploitation by moving
up mobile tank, motorized infantry, and cavalry formations in cooperation
with airborne assault forces dropped behind enemy lines.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War testified to the practicality

of the theory of offensive engagement and operation in depth. It was
brilliantly put into practice by the Soviet command and proved to be very
effective in routing the enemy. New methods of preparing and conducting
an offensive were also developed on the basis of practical experience,
particularly with regard to organizing fire strikes on the enemy, massing
resources on decisive axes, carrying out tactical and operational break-
throughs, and exploitation.
In the Belorussian, lasi-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, Berlin, Manchurian, and other offensive
operations, Soviet troops demonstrated unsurpassed skills in carrying out highly maneuver-
able offensive actions and quickly evolving meeting engagements and battles. They aimed at
quick encirclement and rout of large enemy groupings, rapid crossing of wide water obstacles,
and relentless pursuit of the enemy at high momentum and in great depth.

Objective reasons for further development of offensive tactics

emerged after the war. They resulted from the radical modernization of
combined arms equipment, the increased proportion of tanks and other
armored vehicles within forces, the improved effectiveness of artillery,
aviation, helicopters, and organic troop air defense weapons, the acquisi-
tion by enemy forces of precision homing weapons, improved engineer
equipment and combat, technical, and logistic support equipment, and the
extensive introduction of electronics and automation in the field of troop
control.

Nuclear weapons are now especially important in the offensive en-

gagement. Their employment increases the decisiveness of an offensive,
making it possible to achieve quick and reliable destruction of the enemy.
The main method of conducting offensive actions using nuclear weapons is
to carry out simultaneous nuclear and conventional strikes throughout the

62
depth of the enemy defense and then to complete his rout by means of
motorized rifle and tank subunits and aviation.

In order to succeed in a modern offensive engagement, the following

factors are acquiring paramount importance: skillful organization and con-
tinuous conduct of reconnaissance, effective nuclear (fire) strikes against
the enemy, decisive exploitation by subunits of the effects of the nuclear
and fire strikes to advance swiftly into the depth of the enemy's disposi-
tions, constant and precise cooperation, effective protection against NBC
weapons, quick intensification of efforts and exploitation in depth, the
ability to conduct combat with limited resources, and timely restoration of
subunit fighting efficiency after enemy nuclear strikes and the organization
of subsequent actions by elements thus affected.

In an offensive engagement using conventional weapons alone, the

enemy is routed by sequentially defeating the defending subunits of his
first and second echelons and reserves, subjecting him to artillery strikes,
and resolutely moving up motorized rifle and tank subunits into the depth
of his defense to seize tactically advantageous areas and lines.

The employment of new weaponry increases the decisiveness of an

offensive engagement. This feature was also inherent in the offensive
engagements of past wars. It is brought about by the continuous increase
in troop combat capabilities and by their ability to rout the enemy, some-
times without having overall superiority over him in resources, to carry out
swift strikes at considerable depth, to maneuver quickly, to conduct day
and night combat in summer and winter, to make bold raids behind enemy
lines while separated from the main body, and to relentlessly pursue the
enemy.

The decisiveness of offensive actions is even more pronounced today.

Motorized rifle and tank subunits with highly effective combat equipment
and weapons are capable of quickly breaching a deeply echeloned enemy
defense, in spite of its large concentrations of antitank weapons and
minefields; of combating enemy offensive nuclear weapons, armored vehi-
cles, self-propelled artillery, various types of fire weapons, fast aircraft and
helicopters, reconnaissance-strike complexes, airborne and amphibious as-
sault forces, and airmobile subunits; of negotiating radioactive contamina-
tion zones, demolished areas, and areas affected by fires and floods; of
crossing large water obstacles; and of conducting aggressive combat actions
in any season, at any time of day or night, and on any terrain, be it
mountains, desert, forest, or the arctic regions. Aggressive and resolute
actions make it possible for the attacking forces to frustrate the enemy's
plans, impose their will on him, seize and keep the initiative, and act with
the utmost determination.

63
 The ever-increasing involvement of airspace in active combat is an
indicator of tlie great decisiveness of a contemporary offensive engage-
ment. Even during World War II, a most important role in carrying out
combat missions was played by aviation and airborne assault forces, as a
result of which an offensive would often consist of a kind of envelopment
of the enemy from the air. i

Today, this tendency has been further developed. An offensive has a

pronounced air-land character. This means that in order to achieve success
in combat, it is of paramount importance to ensure firm troop control of
various types of forces, thorough organization of cooperation between
troops and aviation, tactical airborne assault forces, and helicopter
subunits and to establish a flexible air defense system and reliable antiair-
craft cover for subunits.

In a contemporary offensive engagement, maneuver plays an every-

increasing role. It is used to create the most advantageous grouping of
forces, to ensure swift exploitation of the effects of nuclear and fire strikes
on the enemy, to advance swiftly into the depth of his defense, to make
surprise strikes against weak spots in his battle formation, especially on the
flanks and in the rear, and also to quickly withdraw friendly subunits in
the face of enemy strikes and transfer efforts onto a new axis.

Motorized rifle subunits may carry out long-distance maneuvers by

air. This is done to land airborne assault forces, to create pockets of
aggressive combat behind enemy lines, and to quickly negotiate large
natural obstacles, wide radioactive contamination zones, barriers, demol-
ished areas, and areas subjected to fires and floods. The main advantage
of maneuver by air lies in the speed and surprise with which it can be
carried out, and in its independence of the condition of land routes.

In order to achieve a quick and decisive success in an offensive, it is

important to skillfully apply new, tactical procedures not anticipated by
the enemy. This was clearly demonstrated by the experience of the Great
Patriotic War. Actual combat was in many respects conducive to the
improvement of offensive tactics. Accordingly, new tactical procedures
such as a nonstop infantry and tank attack following a rolling barrage,
swift surprise tank strikes on enemy strongpoints, and daring raids when
the offensive was developing in the depth of enemy defense, were widely
used during breakthroughs. Frontal strikes were often combined with close
and deep envelopments of a defending enemy force. The capture of pri-
mary enemy defensive installations by attacking forces was sometimes
achieved in cooperation with airborne assault forces, particularly during
the combat actions in the Far East.

Nevertheless, offensives during World War II often assumed a me-

64
thodical character. During the breakthrough, the attacking troops had to
gradually wear down the enemy defense, while systematically exploiting in
depth and widening the breach toward the flanks. The immediate rout of a
defending grouping was accomplished by gradually grinding down the
enemy resources. This made it possible for the enemy to regroup, some-
times unimpeded, and, by moving up troops to the breakthrough area
from sectors of the front that had not been attacked and from behind the
lines, to strengthen the defense and mount counterattacks.

An offensive engagement today is more dynamic than in the last war.

Fully motorized and having a full complement of tanks, forces can attack
with smaller densities of resources than before and yet in considerably
greater depth and with greater momentum. Formations and units go over
to the offensive primarily by attacking the open flanks and rear of the
enemy's main groupings in order to rout them quickly with strikes from
several directions. Such troop actions make it possible to exploit the effects
of all fire assets to the fullest.

When it is impossible to envelop or turn the enemy, the offensive

begins with a breakthrough into the enemy defense. Here, forces dispense
with direct frontal attacks by making extensive use of gaps in the enemy's
battle formation to penetrate into the depth of his defense. A break-
through may be carried out on a wider front than in the last war. Exploit-
ing the effects of nuclear and fire strikes, motorized rifle and tank subunits
in cooperation with tactical airborne assault forces operating in the rear
envelop the enemy defense by aggressive combat actions, break up the
enemy grouping to as great a depth as possible, and defeat it in detail.

In past wars, breaching a prepared enemy defense was the most

complex and difficult stage of an offensive, the one that would decide the
success of the entire operation. The fact that troops are now equipped with
exceptionally powerful weapons does not make a breakthrough easier in a
modern offensive engagement, but, on the contrary, makes it more diffi-
cult. This is because a defending enemy also has an increased capability to
take measures against an offensive by setting up a stable and deeply
echeloned defense, by intensifying resistance, by employing nuclear and
fire strikes, by transferring troops, weapons, and equipment by air to the
threatened axis, and by creating large-scale demolition and obstacles, in-
cluding remotely laid minefields, in order to contain the maneuver of the
attacking troops.
NATO exercises indicate the extent to wliich the armored vehicles and mobile antitank
weapons at the disposal of defense have increased. The battle formations of defending forces
are being increasingly dispersed along the front line and in depth. During World War II an
infantry division would usually occupy a defensive zone 8-10 kilometers wide and 5-8
kilometers deep, but today the dimensions of a defensive zone have increased to 30-40
kilometers in frontage and 20-25 kilometers in depth.'

65
 According to the US Army's air-land battle concept, the objectives of
defensive actions will be achieved by carrying out an effective deep fire
strike, not only on the first echelon of the attacking troops, but also the
second echelon and the reserves, by making wide maneuvers on the ground
and in the air using forces, equipment, and engineer obstacles, by laying
ambushes, and by conducting determined counterattacks.'* When organiz-
ing a breakthrough into such a defense, it is important to disrupt or
impede the enemy's maneuver as much as possible, to take advantage of
vulnerable points in his battle formation, to decisively concentrate efforts
on a selected axis, and to ensure surprise in attacking, forestalling the
defending forces in capturing key objectives. It is particularly important to
organize thorough reconnaissance of the enemy in order to discover his
defensive system in time, to achieve quick and effective destruction of his
offensive nuclear weapons and precision weapon systems, and to disrupt
enemy troop control.

The experience of local wars, particularly the 1982 armed conflict in

Lebanon, shows that the modem offensive engagement is characterized by
the great complexity of the electronic situation. Much attention is given in
NATO armies to the organization of electronic warfare. For example, the
US Army is taking steps to increase its electronic warfare capability on the
tactical level in order to achieve electronic superiority, to put the enemy's
troop control systems out of action or disrupt them, to lower the effective-
ness of enemy electronic troop and weapons control systems, to take
integrated countermeasures against enemy surveillance equipment, and to
protect friendly systems and troop control assets. Although electronic
countermeasure assets are not counted as offensive weapons, their influ-
ence on the course of any battle is very important. The opportunities of
the attacking forces will increase if, besides achieving fire superiority and
air supremacy, they are able to disorganize the enemy's troop and weapons
control system. Conversely, attacking troops that are superior in both
quality and quantity of resources will be practically unable to achieve
victory without ensuring firm troop control and effectively protecting their
systems and weaponry against the effects of enemy electronic countermea-
sures.

Consequently, when organizing combat, attacking troops must con-

stantly monitor the electronic situation, take measures for the protection of
their own electronic systems, and at the same time strive to disrupt the
enemy's troop and weapons control system.

The overall tendency in the development of the modern offensive

engagement is toward a further increase in its decisiveness, maneuverabil-
ity, and spatial scope. It is characterized by the application of various
tactical procedures and intense electronic warfare, which result in more
complex troop control, and increased demands for the organization of

66
combat and cooperation and for improvement of political indoctrination.
It is extremely important today to ensure that commanders, staff officers, and political
workers display extensive initiative and creativity, skill in maneuver, and the ability to select
the most effective methods of routing the enemy.

2. Methods of Going Over to the Offensive

An offensive may be carried out from the line of march or from a
position of close contact with the enemy.

When making his decision, the commander assesses the nature of the
enemy's defense, his system of fortifications, fire plan, and obstacle sys-
tem, the status of his own forces and the actions of adjacent elements,
terrain conditions, the radiological and chemical situation, weather and
seasonal conditions, the time of day, as well as the other factors making
up the situation and, taking all this into consideration, formulates his
concept: the axis where the main efforts are to be concentrated; which
enemy force should be routed, how to go about routing it, and in what
sequence it should be routed; the sequence for fire strikes against the
enemy; and the configuration of the battle formation.

The experience of past wars shows that in determining the method of

going over to the offensive, an important role is played by the extent to
which the enemy's defense has been neutralized by fire. Before the appear-
ance of automatic weapons, when troops' firepower was relatively weak,
troops went over to the offensive after advancing to contact with the
enemy.
For example, during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the opposing sides advanced to
contact in an artillery fire zone 5-6 kilometers deep in dispersed formations, and in a rifle fire
zone 1-1.5 kilometers deep in extended lines. Going over to the offensive would take place
after building up forces on the line of attack.'

With the appearance of more powerful weapons with longer ranges,

i.e., quick-firing artillery and machine guns, troops would go over to the
offensive after occupying a prepared departure area located in the immedi-
ate vicinity of the forward edge of the battle area [hereafter FEBA—U.S.
Ed.] of the enemy. This method was widely used in World War I, and
particularly in the Great Patriotic War.

The essence of this method was that forces assigned to the offensive
moved up from the rear in advance (usually on three or four consecutive
nights), occupied the departure area replacing the defending units, and
then, after powerful artillery and air preparation, went over to the offen-
sive. Preparation for the offensive was carried out in the departure area,
i.e., in the immediate vicinity of the enemy. When organizing combat,

67
 commanders and staffs carried out reconnaissance, assigned the subunits'
combat missions on the spot, and organized cooperation and combat,
technical, and logistic support. Simultaneously, the troops in the departure
area were fitted out for the offensive.*'

It was necessary to go over to the offensive from close contact with

the enemy because rifle formations and units had limited mobility (they
usually moved on foot) and were unable to attack from the line of march
immediately after moving up from the rear. They had to approach the
enemy FEBA as closely as possible and needed a certain period of time to
prepare for the offensive in order to ensure swiftness in the strike. More-
over, they were unable to make a powerful strike without previously
establishing a high density of resources in the breakthrough sectors (200 or
more guns and 30 to 40 tanks per kilometer of front) and accumulating the
necessary reserves of ammunition, fuel, and other resources.

The concentration of large numbers of personnel and combat equip-

ment in a departure area located close to the enemy was achieved by the
ability of commanders, staffs, and troops to conceal the preparations for
the offensive. The success of the actions was ensured only when this
condition was met.
During World War I, especially in its initial stage, the British and the French frequently
neglected the element of surprise when preparing for an offensive and executed moves and
assembled assault groupings in breakthrough sectors openly and in the enemy's view. Artillery
preparation preceding the attack was lengthy, often lasting many hours and sometimes even
several days. Hence, the defending enemy force was able to detect preparations for an
offensive quite easily, determine the axes of the attacks, and take preventive measures.
Obviously, such an offensive would usually fail, despite huge casualties and tremendous
expenditure of materiel.

Success was achieved in those engagements and operations where commanders and staffs
displayed creativity in selecting the method of going over to the offensive and ensured
surprise in the attack. During a Southwestern Front operation carried out in 1916 under the
command of General A. A. Brusilov, the Russian command misled the enemy by using many
novel tactical procedures in occupying departure areas and in selection of methods for going
over to the offensive and in choosing effective methods of fire neutralization of the enemy's
defense. Thus, artillery preparation for the attack was relatively short in duration. Artillery
support was carried out using a new method, the rolling barrage. Moreover, artillery fire was
to be switched to the depth "so gradually and imperceptibly as to ensure that neither friendly
infantry nor the enemy should perceive it at once.'" Skillful selection of the method for going
over to the offensive, determination, and surprise in attacking the enemy greatly contributed
to the success of the Russian troops' actions.

The Soviet command demonstrated great skill in preparing for and conducting offensive
engagements during the Great Patriotic War. In spite of the fact that enemy reconnaissance
capabilities had grown significantly, the Soviet command, thanks to its skillful organization
of combat, was able to covertly concentrate offensive groupings in breatkthrough sectors and
suddenly go over to the offensive. To this end, various methods of camouflaging troop
concentration areas were used and regrouping was often done at night. In order to conceal
the axes of the main attack, departure areas for the offensive were usually set up on an

68
extended front. This was done under the guise of strengthening the defense. To mislead the
enemy, troop concentrations were simulated in secondary sectors and other feint actions were
carried out. Troops often went over to the offensive at night. During artillery preparation for
the attack, fire would be suddenly switched into the depth of the enemy's defense.*

Today, methods of going over to the offensive have been developed

further. Because of the radically increased firepower, accuracy, range, and
rate of fire of weapons and the greater mobility of units and subunits,
there is no longer a need to concentrate troops close to the enemy FEBA
before the offensive. Such troop concentrations can even be risky, since
there is the danger of their being subjected to enemy nuclear and conven-
tional strikes. Since forces are highly maneuverable, they may now move
up quickly from the rear and attack from the line of march. This new
method of going over to the offensive is used today by many armies.

Attacks from the line of march have also been undertaken in the past.
For example, breakthrough directly following approach was envisaged as
early as the Red Army Temporary Field Regulations of 1936. During the
Great Patriotic War, Soviet troops carried out offensives directly after
moving up from the rear fairly often and successfully. However, such
attacks were carried out using mainly tank and mechanized formations. As
a rule, they were conducted during rapid exploitation, most often when
crossing hastily organized intermediate defense lines with little engineer
preparation.
In the Vistula-Oder Operation of 1945, the 11th Tank Corps was committed from the
second echelon of its army on the first day of the operation with the mission of breaking
through the enemy's tactical zone of defense. This attack was carried out from the line of
march, which enabled it to win time.'

Today, troops may go over to the offensive from the line of march
not only while the engagement is developing in the tactical or operational
depth of the enemy's defense, but also at the very beginning of the
operation, even when breaking through a prepared and well-fortified de-
fense, since the attacking forces are able to destroy or reliably neutralize
the defense with nuclear and fire strikes and, exploiting their effects,
rapidly attack the enemy while exploiting in depth.

In order to prepare for such an offensive, troops usually occupy and

prepare departure areas in the depth of their defense at a distance from the
line of contact sufficient to ensure that the troops will be out of range of
most enemy tactical nuclear weapons and artillery and that the enemy's
ground reconnaissance equipment cannot be used to its fullest potential.

When conditions are favorable (usually during development of com-

bat actions in the depth of the enemy's defense), subunits may attack from
the line of march, by deploying in battle formation from columns of
route, i.e., directly from the line of march. Such a method of attack makes

69
 it impossible for the enemy to maneuver and ensures that surprise will be
achieved in the strike. In such cases, the commander usually organizes
combat, i.e., makes his decision, assigns subunits combat missions, and
organizes cooperation on the move or during short halts. Subunits go over
to the attack as they approach the enemy FEBA.

Preparation for an offensive from the line of march is aided by the

fact that it is performed out of direct contact with the enemy. However,
since the attack is carried out immediately after a march, personnel will be
subjected to greater physical stresses, and expenditures of fuel and other
resources will be higher. It is possible that the move will have to be carried
out across areas of mass destruction, zones of radioactive contamination,
and areas affected by fires and floods. As a result of enemy nuclear and
fire strikes, some elements in the battle formations of units may be put out
of action even before the attack begins.
An offensive from the line of marcli requires that commanders and troops possess great
mobUity in action, carry out nuclear damage control quicldy, and, when necessary, be able to
bypass contaminated zones, demolished areas, and areas affected by fires and floods.
Subunits must be able to carry out a march at the highest possible speed, promptly deploy
into battle (prebatUe) formation, and carry out a swift attack. In order to provide fire cover
for the advancing subunits against enemy strikes, it is important to destroy the enemy's
long-range fire weapons and neutralize (blind) his reconnaissance systems in time.

To ensure that subunits move up and deploy in an organized manner

and go over to the attack at the same time, they are usually informed of
the movement route, the departure line (point), the hnes (points) for
deployment into battalion and company (platoon) columns (sometimes also
report lines), the line for going over to the attack, and the troop safety line
(figure 1). [These maps are all found at the end of the book—U.S. Ed.]

Subunit deployment lines are established so as to ensure the subunits a

high momentum of advance and minimize the probability of their being
subjected to enemy nuclear and fire strikes, particularly from precision
weapon systems. For example, the line for deployment into battalion
columns is selected out of range of the main enemy artillery grouping.
Preparatory fire for the attack usually begins when the subunits reach this
line. The main criterion for selecting the line for deployment into company
columns is the range of enemy ATGM launchers, tanks, and guns assigned
for direct fire. Subunits should deploy into prebattle formation before
entering the kill zone of these weapons.

The troop safety line is selected so as to protect the advancing

subunits against friendly nuclear strikes on strongpoints in the first hne of
the enemy's defense.

Experience in tactical exercises shows how important it is to correctly

select the line for going over to the attack. It is necessary here to take iiito

70
consideration the nature of the enemy's defense, the extent of fire strikes
carried out against it, terrain conditions, and whether the attack is to be
conducted with troops mounted on infantry combat vehicles (armored
personnel carriers) or on foot.

If the attack is carried out on foot, the line for going over to the
attack is selected as close as possible to the enemy FEBA. This makes it
possible to reduce to a minimum the time between the fire strike against
the enemy and the beginning of the attack. The dismount line is usually set
in places screened from enemy fire, especially from that of his short-range
antitank weapons.

The line for going over to the attack with troops mounted on infantry
combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers) is set so as to ensure that the
subunits can move up to it covertly and at a distance that permits effective
fire from the main types of weapons and makes it possible for the subunits
to attack the enemy nonstop, quickly, and at the predetermined time
(H-hour).

In organizing an offensive from the line of march, it is necessary to

precisely coordinate the efforts of all resources performing combat mis-
sions. It is particularly necessary to determine the order in which the
subunits will move up to the line for going over to the attack; the proce-
dure for allowing tanks to pass through the battle formations of friendly
subunits and for making lanes through the obstacles; and the procedure
and methods for attacking the enemy FEBA with motorized rifle and tank
subunits, for their conducting fire and negotiating obstacles and obstruc-
tions, and for ensuring their cooperation with artillery and aviation in
defeating the enemy in his strongpoints on the FEBA, in combat in the
depth of the defense, especially that aimed at destroying his nuclear,
chemical, precision, and antitank weapons, and in repelling his counterat-
tacks.
In preparing an offensive from the line of marcli, the commander must talie into
account the fact that the greatest success is achieved when missions are assigned to subunits in
the field or on a three-dimensional terrain mock-up. Cooperation is organized by the battal-
ion (company) commander giving instructions and the commanders of subordinate and
attached subunits reporting on their subunits' sequence of actions while performing the
assigned missions and by outlining the main tactical phases. It is particularly important to
work out the subunits' actions while advancing, during the attack, when capturing enemy
strongpoints in the depth of the defense, when committing the second echelon, etc.

When time is extremely limited, subunit commanders usually organize cooperation by

issuing instructions.

When an attack following advance from the depth is judged inexpedi-

ent for whatever reason, troops go over to the offensive from a position of
direct contact with the enemy (figure 2).

71
 In such a case, subunits have the opportunity to thoroughly study the
terrain both in the friendly dispositions and in the enemy dispositions and
defense system. However, since the troops are located within range of all
enemy fire weapons while preparations are being made for the engage-
ment, there is greater danger of their being subjected to enemy nuclear and
fire strikes. Moreover, it is easier for the defenders to discover the group-
ing of the attacking forces. This makes it even more necessary to keep
subunits' actions covert and achieve surprise in the attack. This is why it is
particularly important to skillfully select the departure area for the offen-
sive and carry out thorough engineer preparation. The regrouping and
replacement of forces should, whenever possible, be done at night or in
other times of limited visibility.

The battle formation to be adopted by subunits for an offensive

carried out in this manner is established in advance. Motorized rifle com-
panies of the first echelon assume a departure area in the first trench and
adjoining communication trenches. Before the attack begins, they must be
constantly ready to repel a possible enemy attack.

Tank subunits move up from the depth, reach the departure area, and
occupy their assembly areas. During the Great Patriotic War, these areas
were usually set at a distance of about 8 kilometers or more from the
enemy FEBA.'° Tanks advance to the line for going over to the attack
during the preparatory fire period. The tanks located in company
strongpoints go over to the attack after the necessary regrouping.

When going over to the offensive in direct contact with the enemy,
subunit commanders carry out all preparatory measures for combat right
in the field. A motorized rifle battalion (company) is assigned a departure
area for the offensive, instructed as to the sequence for occupying it, and
told by whom, where, and when lanes are to be opened for the tanks, how
they will be marked, the schedule for crossing them, and the fire plan
during the advance.

Motorized rifle subunits advance to their departure areas for the

offensive at night using concealed routes and communication trenches.
Infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers) take advantage of
broken terrain and natural cover to assume fire positions that are usually
situated behind their subunits and get ready to give them fire support and
advance behind them during the offensive. In this case, motorized rifle
subunits usually attack on foot.

There are better opportunities to apply various methods of going over

to the offensive now than there were during the last war. This is conducive
to achieving surprise in an attack and successful accomplishment of the
combat mission.

72
3. Combat Missions
One of the most important factors in the organization of an engage-
ment lies in assigning combat missions to units and subunits and configur-
ing the battle formation so as to ensure that these missions will be carried
out. The combat mission governs the actions of units and subunits and
constitutes the basis on which commanders and staffs organize coopera-
tion, troop control, and comprehensive support. The timely and precise
accomplishment of the combat mission is the main measure of success in
an engagement.

The combat mission of troops in an offensive consists essentially in

routing the enemy grouping and capturing a designated line (area) within a
fixed time limit.

Without question, the enemy constitutes the main objective of the

attacking forces' actions. Conditions for achieving the objective of an
engagement are met only when his personnel have been eliminated (taken
prisoner) and his weapons destroyed (captured). However, the enemy must
also be considered in terms of space. His strongpoints, fire resources,
fortifications, and obstacles are located on the ground in a specific area.
Therefore, when routing the enemy, the attacking subunits capture terri-
tory as they advance. In other words, routing the enemy and capturing
territory go hand in hand.

As an element in the combat situation, terrain plays a neutral role

with respect to the opposing sides. The extent to which its tactical features
affect the subunits' accomplishment of a combat mission is proportional to
the troops' ability (or lack thereof) to take advantage of them.

In an offensive, it is necessary to capture key objectives on the ground

under enemy control, such as road junctions, built-up areas, commanding
heights, mountain passes, water obstacles crossings, etc., in order to estab-
lish favorable conditions for routing the enemy grouping. The loss of these
objectives denies a defending enemy force many important advantages,
hinders the maneuver of his resources, and disrupts his fire plan, coopera-
tion, and troop control. At the same time, the attacking forces are better
able to impose their will on the enemy and exploit successes.
One indicator of combat sliill in subunits is sl<illful use of terrain for maneuvering in
order to quidily advance to tlie enemy's flanks and rear, strilce iiim decisively, break up his
battle formations, and defeat him in detail.

In addition to the most important elements of the combat situation

such as the enemy and the terrain, accomplishment of a combat mission
also depends on the amount of time available. Today, the time factor is of
prime importance in an offensive. A subunit may capture its designated

73
 line (area), advance to a great depth, or carry out a successful maneuver,
but the combat mission may not be successfully performed if these actions
are carried out too late.
When organizing an offensive, the commander must calculate time and plan the engage-
ment precisely, and strive for the timely destruction of enemy nuclear and chemical weapons,
elements of his precision weapon systems and antitank weapons, and the disruption of the
enemy's troop control system.

The time permitted for accomplishing a combat mission in an offen-

sive must be such as to ensure the rout of the enemy in the minimum time,
a high momentum of advance, and continuity in exploitation. The defend-
ing enemy force must be forestalled in maneuvering, opening fire, counter-
attacking, etc. A. V. Suvorov taught that "forestalling means winning."

Correct timing and coordination of efforts in terms of missions, lines,

times, and methods of action are the most important conditions for suc-
cess in an offensive. Experience acquired in combat and on tactical exer-
cises shows that the better the engagement is planned and the keener the
commander's foresight with respect to the development of events during
the engagement, the less changes will have to be introduced into the
decision and cooperation procedure during the offensive. However, in
order to ensure realistic timing, one must have reliable intelligence concern-
ing the enemy's status and actions, discover his concept in a timely fash-
ion, and constantly know the status of friendly forces, their combat capa-
bilities, and the standard time allotted for accomplishment of tactical,
technical, and fire missions.

The nature of the combat missions assigned to forces in an offensive

reflects the level attained in the development of armament and combat
equipment, training standards of personnel, and their morale and fighting
qualities. The nature of combat missions changes as weaponry is im-
proved, the firepower, striking power, and maneuverability of units and
subunits increases, and combat skills of personnel improve. Here one
should also note the trend toward increasing the depth of combat missions.
For example, during the Great Patriotic War, the depth of a division's
combat missions, measured in kilometers from the enemy FEBA, were as
follows:
Immediate Subsequent Objective of
Objective Objective the Day
1941 1.5-2.5 3-4 _
1942 2-3 4-6 _
1943 2-4 5-7 _
1944 3-4 5-7 10-13
1945 3-5 6-8 15-48

74
 On the basis of these data one may conclude that in the initial period
of the war (1941-42), when the combat capabilities of Soviet formations
and units were limited because of various objective factors and the troops
did not have sufficient combat experience, the depth of their combat
missions was relatively small. During the Soviet Army's 1944-45 offensive
operations, the firepower and striking power of rifle divisions, as well as
attached and supporting forces (artillery, tanks, aviation), increased sub-
stantially, and forces gained much combat experience. All this resulted in
an increase in the depth of combat missions assigned to rifle and tank
formations.

Changes in the nature of enemy defenses also greatly influence the

nature of combat missions assigned to formations and units. During the
Great Patriotic War, the attacking and defending forces were engaged in a
continuous struggle. In response to the increased firepower and striking
power of the Soviet forces, the enemy strengthened his defense by echelon-
ing it in depth and by adding increasing numbers of fire weapons and
engineer obstacles. In 1943 the Nazi forces abandoned the shallow and
locally centralized defensive system that they had been using on the
Soviet-German front at the beginning of the war and went on to establish
a continuous multizone entrenched defensive system. This, in turn, made it
necessary for the offense to establish powerful battle groups in order to
break through. Attacking forces were deployed in deep battle formations
to ensure uninterrupted buildup of efforts in the breakthrough sector.

Several factors were taken into consideration when troop combat

missions in an offensive were being established: the necessity to establish
overwhelming superiority over the enemy in resources on the axis of the
main attack; provision for effective fire strikes on the enemy throughout
the depth envisaged in the combat mission; ensuring a swift and nonstop
attack and continuous intensification of efforts when exploiting in depth
and toward the flanks; and defeating the enemy grouping in detail before
the arrival of his reserves.

The immediate and subsequent objectives of a division, as well as its

objective of the day, took into consideration the need to rout that element
of the enemy's battle formation whose loss would create favorable condi-
tions for undermining the stability of his defense and be conducive to the
success of subsequent actions of the attacking forces. Moreover, the imme-
diate and subsequent objectives were planned to be carried out in the same
battle formation whenever possible. This would eliminate the need for an
operational pause during the engagement in order to reconfigure the battle
formation when the second echelon (reserve) was committed and when the
cooperation procedure and the organization of fire strikes and combat,
technical, and logistic support were being updated.

75
 The main objective of the first operational echelon in an offensive
operation during the last war was to break through the enemy's tactical
zone of defense. As a rule, operational expediency demanded that this
mission be accomplished in the first 24 hours of the operation. In other
words, it was necessary to ensure that the attacking forces break as quickly
as possible through the strongest and densest enemy defenses in order to
deprive him of the opportunity to take measures directed at eliminating the
breakthrough, to ensure continuity in the development of the operation, to
create conditions for quickly turning a tactical success into an operational
success, and to commit mobile army and front groups through the gap.
Here, successful accomplishment of the combat mission depended to a
crucial extent on how fast the enemy's anti-infantry, antitank, and artillery
fire system in the main defensive zone was disrupted, particularly in the
first defensive position. Usually this was the immediate objective of regi-
ments belonging to a division's first echelon.

The general principles according to which troop combat missions in

an offensive were determined during the Great Patriotic War are as perti-
nent now as they were then. However, consideration should also be given
to the major changes that occurred after the war in the combat capabilities
of advancing forces and the tactics of defensive actions. Modern defenses
tend to be increasingly echeloned.
According to the experience of NATO exercises, a NATO tactical zone of defense is
40-50 l<ilometers or more deep. Tliis is three or four times the tactical depth of defenses
during World War II. Therefore, in order to break through such a defense in the first 24
hours of an operation, troops will be required to advance with greater momentum than in the
past. Being highly mobile, formations are able to meet these requirements in an offensive, as
was clearly demonstrated in the "Zapad-81" exercise.

The employment of nuclear weapons, and conventional weapons more

powerful than those of the past, exerts a particularly strong influence on
the nature of combat missions in an offensive. Nuclear and fire strikes on
the enemy defenses may create breaches that the attacking forces can use
to rapidly advance to the depth.

However, the defending side has extensive capabilities for countering

a breakthrough. The experience of NATO exercises shows that in order to
break up an offensive, fire strikes are delivered on the entire depth of the
enemy's battle formations, fire barriers are set up on the endangered axes,
and combined strikes are carried out from several directions against attack-
ing troops that have penetrated the depth of the defense. In these condi-
tions, extreme efforts will be required from the troops in order to achieve
high momentum and continuity in the advance.

Effective measures must be taken against the enemy's offensive nu-

clear weapons, reconnaissance-strike complexes, tanks, infantry combat

76
vehicles, self-propelled artillery, antiaircraft weapons, fixed-wing aircraft,
helicopters, and airborne assault forces. Since these and other targets
crucial to the integrity of the defense are mainly located deep behind
enemy lines, the attacking forces should try wherever possible to pressure
the entire battle formation of a defending enemy by means of simulta-
neous aggressive actions. For this purpose, the offensive must be organized
in such a way as to destroy the enemy rather than to dislodge him; i.e.,
frontal strikes must be combined with maneuvers aimed at the enemy flank
and rear, while a quick breakthrough to the depth by mobile forces must
be combined with the landing of tactical airborne assault forces.

The specific content of combat missions assigned to subunits in an

offensive depends on the given situation. By and large, the increased
combat capabilities of subunits, units, and formations make it possible to
increase the momentum of overall advance in an offensive.

Consequently, combat missions are now determined in a manner

different from the past. During the last war only an immediate objective
was assigned to a battalion operating in the first echelon, but now, in an
offensive against a deliberate enemy defense, a battalion is assigned its
immediate and subsequent objectives, as well as the subsequent direction
of attack [napravleniye dal'neyshego nastupleniya—U.S. Ed.].

The immediate objective of a first-echelon battalion may be to defeat

the enemy in a first-echelon battalion defense area and to capture the first
position. Its subsequent objective consists in developing the offensive,
routing the enemy brigade (regimental) reserves in cooperation with its
adjacent battalions, and capturing the line they occupied. A battalion's
subsequent direction of attack is determined in such a way as to guarantee
accomplishment of its regiment's mission (figure 3).

The immediate objective of a first-echelon company usually consists in

cooperating with adjacent subunits to destroy the enemy in a first-echelon
company strongpoint and capture it. A company's subsequent direction of
attack is determined so as to ensure the enemy's rout in the depth of a
first-echelon battalion defense area. The immediate objective of a tank
company attached to a motorized rifle battalion usually consists in cooper-
ating with motorized rifle companies to rout the enemy in a first-echelon
company strongpoint and capture it. The subsequent direction of attack is
determined so as to ensure accomplishment of the motorized rifle
battalion's immediate objective.

As a rule, a second-echelon company is instructed as to the direction

and schedule of movements during the engagement, possible second eche-
lon lines of commitment, the immediate objective, and the subsequent
direction of attack.

77
 Organic and attached fire resources (artillery and mortars) are nor-
mally instructed as to which targets should be destroyed or neutralized
during the preparatory fire phase and, when the attack begins, whom to
support and by what method, missions in connection with supporting the
commitment of the second echelon and repelling enemy counterattacks,
fire positions, route and schedule of advance, the time by which to be
ready to open fire, and the schedule of moves during the engagement.

Mortar and antitank platoons are instructed as to targets to be de-

stroyed during the preparatory fire phase, fire positions and the schedule
for assuming them, the time by which to be ready to open fire, and
missions to support subunit actions during the engagement. An antiaircraft
subunit is instructed as to which subunits should be covered against air
strikes while advancing, deploying, attacking the enemy FEBA, and during
engagement in depth, the schedule of moves during the engagement, and
times and levels of readiness.

Attached combat engineer subunits are instructed as to places and

times for clearing lanes and constructing routes through obstacles in front
of the enemy FEBA and other missions that they may have to perform
during the engagement.

The width of the zone (front) of advance is an important component

of the combat mission. The experience of the Great Patriotic War has
shown that a formation's (unit's) zone of advance must, above all, make it
possible to estabUsh in it the requisite superiority over the enemy in
resources.
In operations during the first period of the war, for example in the Battle of Moscow,
the zone of advance for rifle divisions operating in breakthrough sectors was often too wide,
reaching 10 kilometers. This violated the principle of massing resources and led to dispersal of
force efforts. Therefore, in subsequent operations, for example, in the Battle of Stalingrad,
the division's zone of advance was narrowed down to 4-5 kilometers. In the operations of
1944-45 it was 2-3 kilometers wide, and sometimes as narrow as 1-1.5 kilometers. This made
it possible to create overwhelming superiority over the enemy in resources in the breakthrough
sector.

However, if an overly narrow zone of advance was assigned to a

formation (unit), this often severely Umited troop maneuver. During the
Great Patriotic War, when advancing on a continuous front, troops en-
gaged in a breakthrough were forced to carry out frontal attacks against
enemy strongpoints. This hindered their actions. For this reason, when
fighting in the depth of the enemy defenses, forces tried to broaden their
zone of advance at the first opportunity in order to obtain more space to
make close and deep envelopments of the enemy flanks and to hit him
with surprise strikes from various directions.

78
 In modern engagements, where the threat of the enemy employing
nuclear weapons is constant, the width of the zone of advance should
ensure, on one hand, decisive superiority in resources and, on the other,
the requisite dispersal of troops to minimize casualties in case the enemy
makes nuclear strikes. This means that the zone of advance should be
neither too narrow nor too wide. Dangerous overcrowding of resources is
inevitable in a narrow zone, while an overly wide zone may lead to
dispersal of efforts and a weaker strike.

The battalion serves as the unit of calculation for determining the

width of a zone of advance on the tactical level. The width of a zone of
advance depends on the situation, particularly on whether the senior com-
mander (chief) decides to employ nuclear weapons on the battalion's axis
of actions, whether the attack is carried out mounted on infantry combat
vehicles (armored personnel carriers) or on foot, and on other factors.

The experience of wars and postwar exercises shows that one of the
most important conditions for successful accomplishment of a combat
mission in an offensive is the decisive concentration of efforts on tiie main
axis at the decisive moment. Today, the significant dispersal of troop
actions in time and space and the fragmented nature of engagements create
the danger of dispersing combat efforts.
Commanders and staffs must organize combat skillfully and, above all, correctly assign
the axis of the main attack for the offensive. To do that, it is necessary to thoroughly
consider all the factors of a given situation that may affect performance of the combat
mission. The axis of the main attack must ensure surprise and create favorable conditions for
concentrating and deploying subunits, the execution of maneuver, rapid advance to areas
whose capture will disrupt the stability of the enemy's defenses, and timely accomplishment
of the combat mission.

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet forces usually made the main
attack against a weak point in the enemy's battle formation. Such vulnera-
ble spots in the defense were open flanks and gaps between strongpoints
and sectors defended by troops less steady in action or where the defenses
had little engineer preparation and were insufficiently developed in depth.
Skillful exploitation of such vulnerable spots in the defense made it possi-
ble to speed up the breakthrough.
The actions of the 65th Army's formations in the Belorussian offensive may serve as an
example of skillful selection of the axis of the main attack. It was decided to direct the main
attack across a swampy section of the terrain, since the enemy considered it impassable for
the attacking forces and had allotted meager forces to cover it. Using the element of surprise,
the Soviet forces were able to negotiate the swamp quickly and approach the enemy flank,
thus contributing to the overall success of the offensive. Even in the first six hours of combat
actions, the formations succeeded in advancing 5-6 kilometers into the enemy dispositions
and capturing several of his major strongpoints."

The Soviet command tried to achieve decisive superiority over the

79
enemy in resources on the axis of the main attack, often even in cases
when the relative overall strengths of resources were equal or unfavorable
for friendly forces. This happened, for example, during the Battles of
Moscow and Stalingrad and in some other operations. The density and
correlation of forces on the axis of the main attack during the Great
Patriotic War were as follows:
First Second Third
period period period
Density of forces:
Artillery (guns and mortars per 20-60 120-200 200-250
km of front)
Tanks (per km of front) 8-15 15-20 20-30
Infantry (rifle battalions per km 1.5-2 3-4 5-7
of front)
Correlation of forces:
Artillery 1.5-2 : 1 4-6 : 1 6-10:
Tanks 0.6-1.5 : 1 2-3 : 1 4-5 : 1
Infantry 1.5-2: 1 3-4 : 1 3-5 : 1

Today, when the threat of the enemy employing nuclear weapons is

constant, it would hardly be possible to assemble the same density of
resources in breakthrough sectors as during the Great Patriotic War, al-
though the need to secure decisive superiority in resources on the main
axis, especially in the course of a conventional engagement, undoubtedly
remains. Therefore, emphasis should be put on creating not so much
quantitative as quahtative superiority over the enemy in resources by tak-
ing full advantage of the troops' increased striking power, firepower,
maneuverability, the greater accuracy of strikes against enemy targets (in-
stallations), the use of more powerful ammunition, and skillful joint em-
ployment of ground and air actions. On the whole, the present growth in
the combat capabilities of combined arms formations, units, and subunits
creates objective conditions for increasing the scope and depth of their
missions and achieving a high momentum of advance.
How tliese possibilities will be put into practice depends on the organizing abilities of
commanders, staff officers, and political workers, on their ability to select the most effective
methods of routing the enemy, to concentrate efforts on the decisive axis, to organize
continuous cooperation, to apply flexible maneuver in combat, and to skillfully configure
battle formations.

4. The Battle Formation

A force's battle formation is closely related to its combat missions. It
should correspond to the objective of the engagement and the prevailing
conditions. A battle formation is arranged so as to make it possible to rout
the enemy successfully, concentrate efforts on the chosen axes, combine
fire, movement, and maneuver during an attack, and provide means for
timely buildup of efforts and reliable troop control.

80
 The forms and methods used to set up battle formations comprised of
formations, units, and subunits in offensive engagements have undergone a
complex evolution in the course of many wars. Changes in battlefield
equipment acted as the major factor in their development. Thus, as weap-
ons improved and firepower increased, the linear formation, which had
dominated the battlefield for many years, made way for the extended
order at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century.
Then, when tanks appeared on the battlefields in World War I, and
especially in World War II, the infantry formation was replaced by the
infantry and tank formation. Subsequently, the development of the battle
formation was associated with the improvement of other combat resources
such as aircraft, antitank and air defense weapons, and combat, technical,
and logistic support. The large-scale adoption of more effective combat
equipment by combined arms formations and units led to an increase in
their offensive capabilities and, consequently, to the creation of new ele-
ments in the battle formation and qualitative changes in the composition
of these elements.

Changes in the nature of enemy defenses greatly influenced the forms

and methods used for configuring battle formations in offensives. Until
World War I, the defense was shallow and largely fragmented, and the
battle formation of infantry formations and units was, as a rule, arranged
in a single echelon, to which a general reserve was allocated. However,
when the defense became solid and positional and increased in depth, it
became evident that a single effort by the attacking troops would not be
sufficient to quickly overcome strong enemy defenses made up of several
positions and zones with good engineer preparation, and to ensure that
attacks were exploited relentlessly to great depth and that breakthroughs
were enlarged toward the flanks. As a result, during World War I, when
both sides went over to positional warfare, a new element, the second
echelon, appeared in the battle formation of infantry divisions (regiments).
It was intended for use in building up the efforts of first-echelon units and
for exploitation.

During World War II, the two-echelon battle formation of combined

arms formations became the prevalent method of forming up for breaking
through prepared enemy defenses. Admittedly, in some Soviet operations
in 1944-45, divisions were organized into three-echelon battle formations,
which gave them greater opportunities for building up their efforts during
engagements. However, it became obvious during actual combat that, with
such an arrangement, troops were often forced to operate in over-
compacted formations, especially when fresh forces were committed to
action from the rear. This hindered their maneuver, cooperation, and
troop control.

81
 In Soviet operations in the second and third period of the war,
single-echelon formations were also used for rifle divisions, especially when
the enemy defenses were shallow.
In the Belorussian Operation, 28 of 44 first-echelon divisions, i.e., more than half, had a
single-echelon battle formation. Admittedly, in those cases, rifle regiments were usually
arranged in two- or even three-echelon formations, which provided for sequential buildup of
efforts from the rear.''^

In addition to its one or two (sometimes three) echelons, the battle

formation of a rifle division during the Great Patriotic War included
artillery groups, tank groups for close support of infantry, an air defense
grouping, reserves assigned to various functions, a mobile obstacle detach-
ment, and often a forward detachment as well.'^

The need to create artillery groups within formations had already

arisen during World War I, when forces began to receive full complements
of artillery. But this way of employing artillery in combat became particu-
larly widespread in the Soviet Army during the last war. From 1943
first-echelon divisions and regiments breaking through the enemy's de-
fenses had sufficiently powerful division and regimental artillery groups at
their disposal to ensure flexibility in the use of artillery in combat and its
close cooperation with infantry and tanks, and to increase the units'
autonomy of fire and striking power.

During the Great Patriotic War, combat employment of tanks im-

proved as their numbers increased in the battle formations of combined
arms formations. Since rifle divisions did not have any organic tanks, they
were reinforced with tanks from the assets under the senior commander's
(chief's) direct control when operating on the main axis while breaching
enemy defenses. The attached tanks were used for close support of infan-
try (CSI). At first, CSI tanks were subordinate to the division commander,
but from 1944, because of the ever-increasing numbers of tanks in service,
they began to be allocated to regiments as well.

In the final stage of the war, the number of tanks allocated to

formations and units (subunits) increased substantially.
Over 30 percent of the divisions operating on the axis of their army's main attack in the
Vistula-Oder Operation were equipped with 80-90 tanks each. In view of this, tanks were
allocated not just to regiments but also to battalions. This increased the striking power of the
subunits and ensured flexible and continuous cooperation between infantry and tanks. In
attacks, tanks acted as the main striking forces. The tanks usually advanced 200-400 meters
in front of the infantry, enabling rifle subunits to exploit their success and advance. In turn,
the infantry provided fire cover for the maneuver of the tanks.

In addition to reinforcing first-echelon units with CSI tanks, divisions

often created tank reserves. Their mission was to reinforce the second-

82
echelon regiments when they were committed and to carry out other
suddenly occurring missions.

Air defense groupings became integral parts of battle formations when

aviation appeared on the battlefield. The grouping's mission was to pro-
vide the main body of an advancing formation with reliable cover against
enemy air attacks.

During the war, defending enemy battle formations were also pro-
vided with great numbers of tanks. To counter enemy tanks, antitank
artillery reserves and mobile obstacle detachments began to be set up in
first-echelon rifle formations and units. Antitank artillery subunits consti-
tuted the basis of the antitank artillery reserve. Mobile obstacle detach-
ments included engineer subunits equipped with mine-laying equipment.
These elements of the battle formation acted in close cooperation, carrying
out common missions: repelling, in cooperation with the infantry, counter-
attacks by enemy tank subunits and destroying tanks that had broken
through to the flanks and rear of advancing units.

The need to employ forward detachments had already arisen during

the Soviet forces' first offensive operations. But, in fact, they became an
integral part of the battle formations of attacking divisions only in the
final stage of the war. Usually the most maneuverable units and subunits,
capable of quickly breaking away from the main body of troops and
carrying out independent missions in the enemy's rear, were assigned to
forward detachments. The tactics that they used in action were based on
flexible maneuver, surprise attacks against the enemy, and daring raids
behind his lines.

Today, because of the entry of new weaponry, such as nuclear weap-

ons, missile systems, infantry combat vehicles, and antitank guided mis-
siles, into service in the ground forces and because of the substantially
increased number of tanks and the greater effectiveness, accuracy, range,
and rate of fire of conventional weapons, the demands placed on troop
battle formations have increased.

The battle formation must make it possible to fight successfully with

or without nuclear weapons; strike the enemy resolutely throughout the
depth of the combat missions and repel air strikes; exploit the results of
nuclear or fire strikes quickly and completely; minimize the vulnerability of
subunits to enemy nuclear strikes and strikes with precision-guided weap-
ons; and provide stable and continuous cooperation and command and
control under the most complex conditions.

According to the experience of tactical exercises, on breakthroughs of

enemy defenses, a unit's (subunit's) battle formation should be arranged in

83
one or two echelons. The first echelon is usually the most powerful and is
employed to rout the opposing enemy grouping, carry out its assigned
mission and develop the attack. The second echelon has the function of
building up efforts and exploiting the success achieved by the first echelon,
relieving first-echelon troops that have suffered casualties, repelling enemy
counterattacks, and conducting an offensive on a new axis. When the
battle formation is configured in a single echelon, a combined arms reserve
is created to perform unexpected missions that crop up during the offen-
sive.

Motorized rifle subunits are used in the first and second echelons and
in the combined arms reserve. They may operate as advance guards,
forward or outflanking detachments, or tactical airborne or amphibious
assault forces. Motorized rifle subunits perform their mission of destroying
the enemy in close cooperation with tanks, artillery, and subunits of other
combat arms. Skillfully combining fire and movement, they swiftly attack
the enemy, destroy his personnel, tanks, infantry combat vehicles, artillery,
antitank and other fire resources, nuclear and chemical weapons, fixed-
wing aircraft, helicopters and other air targets, capture his positions, and
quickly exploit the advance.

Tank subunits play an important role in defeating a defending enemy.

With their great striking power and maneuverability, they are able to reach
the enemy's rear suddenly through breaches in his defense, destroy remain-
ing pockets of resistance, smash his approaching reserves, neutralize offen-
sive nuclear weapons, capture important objectives and thereby ensure the
swift destruction of defensive groupings. In an offensive, tank subunits are
used either to reinforce motorized rifle subunits or to act independently,
especially in sectors where the enemy defenses have been subjected to
nuclear strikes. In such cases, they normally operate on the axis of the
main attack.

One of the current trends is to improve the battle formations of

motorized rifle and tank units and subunits engaged in offensives by
further increasing their tactical independence and autonomy of fire. This is
because attacking forces will now often operate on independent axes,
sometimes far from the main body.

As in the last war, the need arises to create artillery groups in first-
echelon formations and units when they are breaking through enemy
defenses. They must be powerful enough to provide continuous fire sup-
port for the attacking troops throughout the engagement; destroy the
enemy's identified fire resources, especially offensive nuclear weapons,
artillery, tanks, infantry combat vehicles and air defense weapons; strike
personnel in strongpoints; and demolish, blind, and lay smoke screens on
his fortifications.

84
 Greater demands are now placed on air defenses. They must be
employed throughout the engagement and provide reliable cover for at-
tacking units and subunits as they perform their missions. An air defense
grouping must be capable of destroying enemy aviation appearing from
any direction and at all altitudes, particularly low and very low altitudes.
For this purpose, troop air defense subunits deploy and operate right in
the battle formations of the motorized rifle and tank subunits that they are
covering.

Tactical airborne assault forces now play an important part in the

offensive. Their use makes it possible to quickly exploit the effects of
nuclear and fire strikes, increase the force and depth of simultaneous
attacks against the enemy, and break up his maneuvers aimed at restoring
breached defenses. A tactical airborne assault force may be used to capture
and destroy the most important enemy targets, including offensive nuclear
weapons, control posts and communications centers in the enemy's tactical
and immediate operational depth; capture and hold areas (lines) and such
ground objectives as road junctions, bridges, mountain passes, gaps, and
water obstacle crossings, and help the attacking troops to cross natural
obstacles quickly and maintain a high momentum of advance; and destroy
bases, stores, pipelines and other installations in the enemy's rear.

The depth and time at which airborne assault forces are landed and
the methods used may vary. According to experience gained on exercises,
tactical airborne assault forces operating as part of a reinforced battalion
land deep behind enemy Unes.

The increased decisiveness and dynamism of modern offensive engage-

ments present the greatest possibilities for employing forward detachments.
In addition to capturing individual ground objectives (road junctions,
built-up areas, mountain passes, etc.), forward detachments may carry out
such complex missions as destroying enemy offensive nuclear weapons, air
defense weapons, control posts, and some enemy logistics installations and
countering airborne (amphibious) assault forces and airmobile subunits.
When combat missions are assigned, the forward detachments are usually
instructed as to their composition and axis of actions, which Unes are to be
captured and when, and the procedure by which their actions will be
supported by artillery fire and air strikes.

Antitank reserves are an important part of modern battle formations

in an offensive. Their mission is to fight counterattacking enemy tanks and
with the mobile obstacle detachments provide cover for threatened ajjes
and open flanks and for the second echelon (general reserve) as it is
deployed and committed.

In order to speed up the maneuver toward threatened axes, some

85
reserves, such as the general and engineer reserves, may operate in helicop-
ters.

Motorized rifle and tank subunit battle formations have undergone

major changes. During the Great Patriotic War, the battle formation of a
rifle (tank) battalion was usually arranged in a single echelon with a reserve
allocated. This was because the battalion had a relatively small number of
organic and attached subunits of other combat arms at its disposal, with
the result that it did not have great fire and striking power.

The modern motorized rifle or tank battaUon, equipped with effective

weapons and combat equipment, has great fire and striking power and is
highly maneuverable, well protected by armor, and resistant to NBC weap-
ons. Moreover, considerable reinforcements may be attached to a battal-
ion, including an artillery battalion or battery, antitank weapons, an anti-
aircraft battery (platoon), and engineer and chemical warfare subunits. A
motorized rifle battalion may be reinforced with tank subunits, while a
tank battalion may be reinforced with motorized rifle subunits. All this
significantly increases a battalion's combat capabilities in an offensive.

Consequently, the number of elements in the motorized rifle (tank)

battalion's battle formation increases and its possible configurations be-
come more diverse than before. Currently a battalion battle formation
consists of first-echelon companies with their reinforcements, a second-
echelon or reserve company, air defense and fire resources directly subordi-
nated to the battalion commander, and battalion logistics (figure 4).

However, the issue lies not just in increasing the number of elements
in a battalion's battle formation, but also in making qualitative changes in
the composition and combat capabilities of these elements. In the last war
the battle formation of a rifle battalion was based on infantry that at-
tacked the enemy on foot and was supported by tanks and artillery, but
today the motorized rifle subunit's battle formation includes infantry com-
bat vehicles, armored personnel carriers and tanks capable of quickly
breaching enemy defenses and advancing at high momentum.

Organic ATGM launcher and rocket launcher subunits and attached

artillery play an important role in supporting a battahon's actions. These
resources are used to neutralize or destroy targets, particularly armored
targets, that hinder the forward movement of attacking subunits.

Antiaircraft subunits, which are found in a battalion's battle,

prebattle, and march formations, are capable of destroying fixed-wing
aircraft, heUcopters, remotely piloted vehicles (cruise missiles), and enemy
airborne assault forces at low and medium altitudes.

86
 Engineer subunits attached to a battalion conduct engineer reconnais-
sance of the enemy and the terrain, inflict casualties on the enemy with
mines and other weapons, neutralize enemy nuclear mines, clear passages
through obstacles and areas of destruction, construct crossings over ob-
structions, maintain crossings and traffic routes, use machines to dig fox-
holes, fire trenches, and communication trenches, and carry out engineer
operations relating to camouflage and the preparation and maintenance of
water supply points.

Chemical warfare subunits perform important missions in an offen-

sive. They carry out radiological, chemical, and general bacteriological
(biological) reconnaissance, dosimetric and chemical monitoring, and de-
contaminate subunits.

The main mission of flamethrower subunits in an offensive is to

inflict casualties and damage on enemy personnel, weapons, and combat
and other equipment and to set fires. They are normally attached to
motorized rifle subunits and operate as a part of their battle formations.

A battalion communications subunit maintains reliable communica-

tions with subordinate (attached) subunits and adjacent forces.

A modern battalion is quite autonomous in terms of equipment and

logistics. It has all the men and equipment required to conduct repairs and
technical maintenance of weapons, to maintain the necessary reserves of
material resources and supply them to the subunits, to refuel vehicles, to
provide personnel with hot meals, to search for, assemble, and evacuate
the wounded and sick and provide them with medical assistance.

Thus, the battle formation of a motorized rifle (tank) battalion, which

is the principal tactical combined arms subunit, supports the successful
accomplishment of complex missions in offensives conducted either in
nuclear or strictly conventional environments. It is important to know how
to use the subunits' fighting and maneuvering capabilities and how to
arrange their battle formation skillfully.

Depending on the situation, a battalion or company may operate in

prebattle or march formation. The prebattle formation is used to move
subunits in columns that are separated laterally and in depth (figure 5). It
must ensure that the subunits are minimally vulnerable to NBC weapons,
artillery fire, and air strikes and that they can deploy rapidly into battle
formation, achieve a high momentum of advance, and swiftly negotiate
obstacles, radioactive contamination zones, demolished areas, fires, and
floods.

87
 When developing an attack in the tactical and operational depth of
the enemy defenses and when pursuing the enemy, subunits may assume
march formation, i.e., they may move in columns. This will ensure a high
rate of movement, quick deployment into prebattle and battle formations,
minimum vulnerability to NBC weapons and air strikes, and the mainte-
nance of firm troop control.

As training experience shows, subunits should operate in battle forma-

tion primarily when attacking strongpoints and stubbornly defended posi-
tions. After capturing them and breaking up organized enemy opposition,
the subunits quickly re-form into prebattle formation and advance rapidly
into the depth of the defense. On approaching new defensive lines or
positions, they attempt to penetrate in depth from the line of march, in
prebattle formation, by using breaches and gaps in the enemy formation,
and then strike his main forces from the flanks and rear. They deploy into
battle formation for an attack only when they cannot operate in prebattle
formation. In the event that enemy opposition is broken and he is forced
to begin withdrawing, the first-echelon subunits swiftly form into marching
columns and move into the depth of the defense as rapidly as possible.
A commander's art lies in being able to make competent use of battle, prebattle, and
march formations in the heat of an engagement, skillfully re-form the troops in a timely
fashion, and always be aware of the status of an engagement while stepping up the pace of
the attack.

The appearance of precision weapons in the NATO armies, the elabo-

ration of methods for conducting deep fire strikes, and the development of
tactics for air-land actions give rise to the need to further improve the
battle formations of units and subunits. In order to mislead the enemy,
they should be set up differently every time. It is particularly important to
take effective protective measures and increase the tactical and fire auton-
omy of subunits (companies and platoons), their ability to operate for long
periods of time while separated from the main body of forces, and their
ability to accomplish diverse missions during an offensive.

5. The Fire Strike

Historical experience reveals that fire exerts an ever-increasing influ-

ence on the development of offensive tactics. As early as the 1920s, M. V.
Frunze wrote: "Fire constitutes the decisive factor and main force in
modern combat. Superiority over the enemy may be achieved only by
fire."'^

The Great Patriotic War confirmed the validity of this statement.

Combat experience introduced many innovations into methods for the
combat employment of artillery and aviation. In engagements and opera-

88
tions, the Soviet command elaborated and applied effective methods of
achieving fire superiority over the enemy and providing fire support to the
troops, particularly in the form of artillery and air offensives.'^

Since World War II, methods of making fire strikes against the enemy
have developed further as a result of the introduction of nuclear weapons
and the increased power, accuracy, and range of conventional weapons. As
the foreign press states, the latest artillery, tank, antitank, and aviation
armament surpasses the previous generation several times in range, dozens
of times in power, and hundreds of times in accuracy.

The introduction of new weapons exerts considerable influence on the

essence and nature of fire strikes against the enemy in offensives. The
essence of these changes is that fire effect is achieved by exerting coordi-
nated and comprehensive pressure on the enemy with various types of
weapons, including tanks, small arms, and air defense weapons, as well as
artillery fire and aviation and combat helicopter strikes.

During World War II, great numbers of various weapons were in-
volved in fire fights, but the main fire missions were assigned to artillery
and aviation. Today, essentially all services of the armed forces and com-
bat arms and some combat service support troops participate in fire
strikes. As a result, the effect of fire on the enemy has become more
intense and comprehensive and is applied for the entire duration of the
offensive practically without interruption and in the most varied forms,
usually by combining concentrated and massed fire.

As new weapons appeared, the depth to which simultaneous fire

effect could be achieved increased drastically and the roles played by
various types of weapons in carrying out fire missions were redistributed.
While ardllery was the main antitank weapon during the Great Patriotic
War, now this role is also filled by ATGMs and tanks themselves.
In the 1973 war in the Middle East, more than half of the tank Icills were carried out by
ATGMs, about 22 percent by tank fire, and about 28 percent by air strikes, antitank mines,
and other weapons.

There has been a particular increase in the role played in fire strikes
by combat helicopters, whose actions are characterized by their great
mobility and surprise. In the 1973 and 1982 Middle East wars, helicopters
usually made fire strikes from ambush, maneuvering quickly and covertly
on the battlefield.

The part played by mines in inflicting casualties on troops has also

increased. Foreign armies have adopted a new method of laying mine
fields: remote mining using multiple rocket launcher systems and aviation.

89
This restricts maneuver of troops considerably, wears them out, reduces
their momentum of advance, and disrupts the normal operation of control
posts and logistics elements.

The main objective of a fire strike in an offensive engagement is to

inflict as much damage on the enemy as is necessary to prevent him from
putting up organized resistance, thereby creating the necessary conditions
for successfully carrying out combat missions.

Planning fire strikes, i.e., determining the number of phases in them,

their nature, composition, and duration, and methods of firing, depends
on the situation that develops and the nature of the enemy defenses. But in
all cases, the greatest possible numbers of organic, attached, and support-
ing fire weapons and aircraft, and sometimes even weapons controlled
directly by senior commanders (chiefs), are assembled to participate in fire
strikes.

When offensives are undertaken while in direct contact with the en-
emy, fire strikes achieve their greatest effect when made in three stages:
preparatory fire for the attack, supporting fire for the attack, and support-
ing fire for troops attacking in depth. If troops go over to the offensive
from the Une of march, fire strikes are carried out while the troops are
moving up, using missiles, aircraft, and artillery.

Since essentially all unit and subunit fire weapons take part in fire
strikes, they are planned by the combined arms commander. Taking into
consideration the objective and concept of the engagement, the combined
arms commander determines the degree to which the enemy is to be
subjected to fire, the number and nature of targets to be neutraUzed
(destroyed) before going over to the attack and during the engagement, the
resources needed to accomplish fire missions, the sequence followed in
coordinating their efforts, and the required density of fire on the main
axes. Depending on how the situation develops, the commander decides on
the method for carrying out a given fire mission, i.e., determines the
procedure and sequence for making fire strikes, so as to attain a sufficient
degree (effectiveness) of fire effect on the enemy.

On the basis of the combined arms commander's decision and instruc-

tions, commanders of artillery, air, and other fire subunits organize the
combat employment of their assets, work out aspects of the fire strike in
detail, specify which targets (installations) to hit with which resources and
in what sequence, determine ammunition requirements, methods of carry-
ing out fire missions, sequence of movement and deployment of fire
resources, and work out matters in the field (or on a map) pertaining to
cooperation, subunit support, and fire control to the last detail.

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 The experience of wars and tactical exercises reveals that in order to
achieve success in an offensive it is essential to attain and maintain fire
superiority over the enemy. To achieve this, one must forestall the enemy
in opening fire, seize the initiative in firing as quickly as possible and
firmly maintain it, ensure the effective employment of one's fire resources,
and prevent the enemy from making full use of his weapons. The struggle
for fire superiority in an engagement is closely linked with achieving air
supremacy. Unless the subunits are provided with reliable cover against
enemy air strikes, it is impossible to ensure that they will be able to
perform their combat missions successfully and seize and maintain the
initiative in firing.

In modern combat, methods used to achieve fire superiority over the

enemy differ substantially from those of the Great Patriotic War. Then, in
fact, this mission was assigned exclusively to ardllery. Fire superiority was
achieved mainly by disrupting the enemy's fire plan, above all by neutraUz-
ing (destroying) his artillery resources. Today, successful counterbattery
bombardment does not ensure that fire superiority will be achieved. First,
enemy offensive nuclear weapons, such as tactical missiles, long-range
artillery guns (especially those firing nuclear shells), and reconnaissance-
strike complexes, must be detected and destroyed. It is also important to
disrupt the enemy's antitank, anti-infantry, and andaircraft fire plans and
his troop and weapons control systems. In other words, the mission con-
sists in undermining the stability of fire in the enemy defenses as quickly as
possible, thereby maintaining a high momentum of advance and protecting
friendly troops against enemy nuclear and fire strikes.

The increased power, accuracy, range, and rate of fire of modern fire
weapons, and the improvement in the stability and aggressiveness of the
defense that occurred at the same time have considerable influence on the
methods used to carry out fire missions in offensives. During the Great
Patriotic War, subunits destroyed the enemy for the most part in close
combat, that is by concentrating their fire mainly on targets and installa-
tions that were obstructing the attacker's advance. This enabled the
subunits to exploit the effects of fire immediately, since the enemy could
not manage to restore his disrupted fire plan in time, and this predeter-
mined the success of the attack.

However, close-range fire fights, in which the defending enemy's

resources were destroyed (neutralized) sequentially as the troops advanced,
also had their disadvantages. The enemy's weapons and reserves located in
the depth of his defenses were largely out of range of the attacking forces'
fire. As a result, the enemy often maneuvered with impunity laterally and
from the depth toward the threatened axes and counterattacked. In order
to prevent this, the Soviet command took every possible measure to in-

91
crease the part played by long-range fire in offensives, i.e., to increase the
depth to which the enemy defenses could be neutralized by fire simulta-
neously.
In 1941-42 massed artillery fire was used in operations by Soviet forces to neutralize the
enemy defenses to depths of 2.5-5 kilometers, while in operations in 1943, this reached 3-4
kilometers, in 1944 and 1945 the depth to which the enemy defenses were neutralized
increased to 6-8 kilometers, and in the final operations of the war it often reached 15
kilometers.'*

In modern combat, simultaneous effect in depth against the defenses

has become an objective necessity, since the major portion of the enemy's
long-range fire resources are now concentrated in the depth of his disposi-
tions. Moreover, the range of fire weapons has increased considerably. As
a result, long-range fire fights have become typical of modern offensives.
This was demonstrated by the 1973 war in the Middle East.
Combat actions by the opposing sides created a situation where counterbattery exchanges
took place within mutual artillery range, i.e., about 8-10 kilometers from the line of contact;
where ATOM launchers engaged tanks at ranges of 3-4 kilometers; combat helicopters
equipped with ATGMs engaged tanks at ranges of 2-3 kilometers; and, finally, tanks engaged
targets within their flat trajectory range.

As demonstrated in the war, fire strikes in depth make it possible for

forces to make preventive fire strikes against enemy targets and installa-
tions as they are detected and create favorable conditions for neutralizing
the defenses to a considerable depth, for destroying not only the first
echelons, but the second echelons and reserves as well, and for containing
their maneuver and disrupting troop and weapons control systems and
logistics operations. All this undermines the stability of the enemy's de-
fense.
For this reason it Is important that personnel master the skills needed to conduct
long-range fire fights and know how, in an exchange of fire with the enemy, to hit targets
(installations) with the first round, from the initial contact, and in the first attack at
maximum ranges.

However, the increased importance of long-range fire fights naturally

does not mean that close combat is no longer important. Most of the fire
resources belonging to a defending enemy, particularly his antitank weap-
ons, have rather short ranges of fire.
For example, the hollow charge antitank rifle grenades with which NATO armies are
equipped can be fired at a range of about 100 meters, the range of antitank rocket launchers
is 100-150 meters, the range of recoilless guns is 1000-1500 meters, and the range of tank and
antitank guns is about 2000 meters.

Therefore, many antitank weapons are located in direct proximity to

the FEBA at depths of about 1.5 kilometers. Consequently, unless they are
effectively destroyed, either by direct or indirect fire, there can be no
assurance that attacks by tank and motorized rifle subunits will succeed.

92
 The nature of fire strikes is greatly affected by the methods used by
subunits in going over to the offensive. In the last war, if offensives were
carried out by troops moved up from the depth, fire cover had to be
provided for them as soon as they began moving up. Artillery cover
provided to the troops as they were moving up in fact constituted a
separate phase of the artillery offensive. Enemy weapons whose fire could
reach the advancing troops while they were still on the distant approaches
to the enemy defenses were first to be hit. At the same time, artillery and
aviation neutralized enemy control posts, radar and reconnaissance sys-
tems. This made it possible to "blind" the defending enemy and disrupt
his troop control and combat support systems. As the troops approached
the line of contact, fire strikes in the depth of the enemy's defenses were
gradually shifted toward the front line, thus supporting the subunits'
attack.

In an offensive carried out while in direct contact with the enemy, the
advancing troops sought primarily to effectively neutralize enemy
strongpoints in the immediate depth of his defenses, since otherwise it
would be impossible to carry out a breakthrough successfully. Massed
artillery and air strikes against targets in the depth of the enemy defenses
were normally carried out during the engagement.

Obviously, both of the aforementioned methods of exerting pressure

by firing on enemy defenses will be employed today. The best results here
may be achieved by combining consecutive and simultaneous fire strikes.

As combat experience has revealed, one of the most important phases

in a fire strike is the fire preparation for an attack, which includes artillery
and air preparation. Its aim is to ensure the strongest possible initial strike
against the enemy. Although its duration and the methods used in organiz-
ing it may vary, the greatest effect is achieved by firing as deep into the
enemy defenses as possible. The principal weight of fire here must be
concentrated on neutralizing the enemy's first defensive positions.
In Soviet operations during the Great Patriotic War, usually about half the ammunition
allotted to artillery preparation was spent on neutralizing strongpoints on the first line of
enemy defenses, while 25-30 percent was used to neutralize the second position and 15-20
percent to neutralize the third position. As a result of this distribution of efforts, enemy
casualties reached approximately 60-70 percent in the first position, about 10 percent in the
second, and about 5 percent in the third. This ensured a successful attack by the troops.'''

It should be noted that during the war, artillery preparation for an

attack tended to be somewhat shorter in duration, so as to increase the
intensity of fire effect on the enemy. For this purpose, the time allocated
to fire strikes was increased. Fire strikes made up 40-60 percent of the
artillery preparation for attacks in operations during the third period of the
war.

93
 Today the duration of artillery preparation for an attack depends on
the nature of the enemy defenses and on the quantity and quality of
weapons used. Artillery preparation may consist of several fire strikes
against predetermined targets (installations), in combination with direct fire
by guns, tanks, and antitank weapons, which destroy observed fire weap-
ons, armored targets, and fortifications in the enemy FEBA and in the
immediate depth during the whole period of artillery preparation. Artillery
fire must achieve its greatest density at the beginning of the attack. Air
preparation for an attack may precede or coincide with artillery prepara-
tion. As motorized rifle and tank subunits move up to the attack line, on
signals given by commanders, fire is shifted into the depth without pausing
or reducing the density and in such a way as to be unnoticed by the
enemy.

Fire support, which includes artillery and air support, begins as the
subunits go over to the attack. In providing fire support, the advancing
forces strive to prevent the enemy from conducting aimed fire against the
attacking subunits using short- and long-range weapons. For this purpose,
during the last war, dense curtains of fire were laid ahead of the attacking
subunits in the form of single or double rolling barrages, while in attacks
against hastily erected enemy defenses, sequential concentrated fire was
employed. This type of fire was intended to reach depths of 2-5 kilome-
ters. When strongly reinforced enemy defenses were being breached and
when the advancing forces had sufficient quantities of artillery weapons, a
more powerful and deeper effect of fire on the enemy defenses was
achieved.
When the Leningrad blockade was broken in January 1944, fire was employed simulta-
neously against three lines—a triple rolling barrage. In the Crimean Operation of 1944, a
quadruple rolling barrage was actually laid in the sector where the 51st Rifle Corps broke
through. Wartime experience revealed that the denser and deeper the effect of fire on the
defenses, the more successful the attack.

The method used to provide fire support depends on the nature of

enemy defenses and the extent of the damage inflicted on them during
preparatory fire for the attack. In sectors where the defensive system has
been completely disrupted by nuclear weapons or powerful fire strikes and
the enemy subunits are demoralized, fire support is provided using concen-
trated fire and fire on point targets; in other sectors, single or double
rolling barrages may be used. In this case, the first line of the rolling
barrage is, in most instances, designated for the enemy FEBA. Fire is
shifted from this and subsequent lines on signal from regimental com-
manders as the attacking subunits approach the troop safety Une.

While artillery support is being provided for an attack, particular

consideration is given to neutralizing and destroying enemy nuclear and
artillery resources and repelling enemy counterattacks. Air support for an

94
attack is provided in the form of powerful air strikes against enemy
control posts, radar, advancing reserves, newly discovered targets and
offensive nuclear weapons.

During the last war, Soviet commanders demonstrated great skill by

organizing effective close fire (artillery and air) support for subunit of-
fensives in depth. It was normally carried out throughout the depth to
which missions had been assigned and consisted of continuous powerful
artillery fire and air strikes against the enemy force's first echelon, re-
serves, and other targets.

A commander's skillful use of battle-tested principles for making fire

strikes is vitally important in achieving success in an offensive. The most
important of these are concentrating fire efforts on the main axes, quick
fire maneuver, providing precise and continuous mutual fire support be-
tween attacking subunits and fire assets, making surprise fire strikes, exert-
ing continuous fire effect on the enemy, and exercising flexible fire control.

Today these principles have undergone many essential changes. Thus,

in the past, concentration of fire was achieved mainly by increasing the
numbers of weapons in breakthrough sectors.
During the Great Patriotic War, the density of artillery on the axis of the main attack
increased from 70-80 to 250-300 or more guns per kilometer of front, i.e., by 3-4 times.'**
The concentration of great masses of artillery and other fire resources on the main axes was
necessary to ensure effective neutralization of enemy defenses.

Since the effectiveness of modern fire weapons has increased consider-

ably, concentration of fire is achieved mainly by employing weapons with
greater fire capabilities and more powerful ammunition. Foreign military
experts consider the use of fuel-air explosive munitions very promising.
Their effectiveness, according to the foreign press, is 10 times greater than
that of high-explosive fragmentation shells.

The mobility of aviation is exploited to concentrate fire on the main

axes. For example, when providing air support for an attack, the NATO
armies propose to increase the number of aircraft in groups used to make
air strikes from 4-12 to 30-50 aircraft, i.e., by a factor of four.'^

An important principle to be observed during fire strikes is the quick

maneuver of fire. This is particularly critical during the decisive stages of
an engagement: when repelling enemy counterattacks, committing the sec-
ond echelon, and redirecting efforts onto a new axis; i.e., when quick
concentration of subunit fire makes it possible to destroy primary enemy
targets (installations). In local wars, maneuvers by combat helicopters have
been widely used for these purposes. They have made surprise air-to-
surface strikes against the enemy. Air-to-ground maneuvers are quick.

95
taking literally minutes, which is particularly important for countering
enemy offensive nuclear weapons, reconnaissance-strike complexes, tanks,
and tactical airborne assault forces.

In the future, the tactics used by artillery and aviation in maneuver by

fire and strikes will change because of the influence of new weapons
introduced. The use of various types of shells, aerial bombs, and missiles
that ensure the effective destruction of well-defended point targets enables
the artillery to switch over to using fire platoons and even individual guns
to accomplish missions, while continuing to use the traditional methods of
firing by battalions and batteries. It also enables aviation to strike in
groups and with individual aircraft, while continuing to make large-scale
and concentrated strikes.

In modern offensive engagements, mutual fire support between the

subunits on the offensive and fire resources increases in importance be-
cause of the drastic increase in the resources making fire strikes, the
increased scope of offensive engagements, and their dynamism and maneu-
verability. In order to defeat the enemy, it is necessary to precisely coordi-
nate the fire of the attacking subunits and attached and supporting re-
sources in terms of target, place, and time.

Experience gained in combat and on tactical exercises reveals that the

effect of fire on an enemy depends in many respects on the degree of
surprise achieved in fire strikes. It is achieved by forestalling the enemy in
deploying his fire resources and in opening fire, by using varied and novel
methods in the organization of fire strikes, concentrating fire quickly at
decisive moments on the main axis, maneuvering by fire unexpectedly, and
employing new weapon systems and ammunition.
Since the enemy will also strive to achieve surprise in opening fire, it is important to
reconnoiter thoroughly; to constantly maintain fire resources at high levels of combat readi-
ness; to take timely protective measures against NBC weapons and fire resources, especially
precision automated weapon systems; to be able to carry out nuclear and fire strike damage
control quickly; and to be able to quickly restore the fighting efficiency of friendly fire
resources.

The effectiveness of fire support for subunits on the offensive also

depends largely on continuous fire effect on the enemy during an engage-
ment. The importance of this principle has been confirmed in many wars.
Thus one of the reasons for the low momentum of advance of Soviet
troops in the offensive operations of the first period of the Great Patriotic
War was that fire and troop movements were not always closely coordi-
nated. Fire strikes against the enemy were sporadic and isolated, and, as a
result, the subunits were often left without fire support during the offen-
sive. This situation was soon rectified. Artillery and air offensive actions
became an effective means of maintaining continuous fire support for the

96
troops. Their skillful organization and conduct enabled the troops to
advance literally "to the thundering music of artillery and aviation."

As the dynamism of offensive engagements and the depth of troop

advance increases, so does the importance of providing the subunits with
continuous fire support. Exercise "Zapad-81" demonstrated that to main-
tain continuous fire support, commanders must make detailed fire plans,
determine ammunition expenditures in terms of missions, plan timely
movements of fire resources during engagements, and organize flexible fire
control.

6. Defeating the Enemy in tlie Tactical Zone of Defense and

Developing the Offensive in Depth

An offensive against a defending enemy normally begins with a break-

through. In a number of offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War,
breakthroughs were brilliantly prepared and carried out by Soviet troops.
The actions of the Soviet command in breaking through enemy defenses
were marked by all-round assessment of the situation, application of bold
and original solutions, skillful concentration of resources on main axes,
well-organized cooperation, comprehensive support, and flexible troop
control.

Today, as in the past, success in a breakthrough will depend on

thoroughness of preparation and aggressiveness and determination of
troop actions. Methods of breaking through may vary according to the
situation. In some cases, nuclear strikes on primary targets in the enemy
defenses may precede the troops' transition to the attack; in others, the
defenses will be breached by artillery fire and air strikes, followed by a
determined advance by motorized rifle and tank subunits into the depth
and widening of the breach toward the flanks.

Achieving a quick breakthrough depends largely on the good organi-

zation and resoluteness of an attack. It consists in the swift and continuous
movement of tank and motorized rifle subunits deployed in battle forma-
tion, combined with dense fire from tanks and infantry combat vehicles
(armored personnel carriers) and, as the attackers close with the enemy,
fire from other types of weapons to destroy (defeat) the enemy. The main
factors ensuring success in an attack are vigor, audacity of the attackers'
actions, surprise of the strike, speed of maneuver, and continuous fire and
movement.

The methods used in an attack depend to a crucial extent on the

intensity of the fire effect achieved on the defense and the striking power
and mobility of the subunits. During World War I, strikes were carried out

97
essentially by infantry with relatively weak fire support, while during
World War II, because of the considerable concentration of tanks and
artillery in infantry battle formations, the resoluteness of attacks increased
and the part played by fire strikes grew.

In the 1944-45 operations, attacking forces often reached depths of

3-4 kilometers in continuous advances behind rolling barrages, while the
momentum of attack reached 1-1.5 km/h. However, in many cases the
infantry was unable to withstand enemy retaliatory fire and the attack was
aborted. The main reason for this was insufficiently effective neutralization
of the defenses by fire, as a result of which the enemy was able to quickly
restore his fire plan, which had been disrupted in the course of artillery
and air preparation for the attack, and to put up organized resistance to
the attackers.

In modern engagements, tank and motorized rifle subunits cooperate

closely during attacks. Tanks play the leading role. Neutralizing and de-
stroying enemy weapons in cooperation with the artillery, the tanks create
the conditions needed for a swift advance by attacking troops. Tank
subunits attack in an extended line.

Attacks by motorized rifle subunits may be carried out in various

ways, depending on the situation. On those axes where the enemy de-
fenses, especially his antitank resources, have been effectively neutralized
by nuclear or conventional weapons, motorized rifle subunit attacks are
carried out with personnel remaining mounted on infantry combat vehicles
(armored personnel carriers). When breaking through deliberate enemy
defenses, thoroughly prepared beforehand and well developed in an engi-
neering sense, or through fortified areas, without employing nuclear weap-
ons, attacks by motorized rifle subunits are carried out on foot, behind the
tanks. This method is also used when subunits are advancing through
adverse terrain or when visibility is limited.

When attacking on foot, motorized rifle subunits deploy in an ex-

tended line and advance behind the tanks at a distance that ensures their
safety from friendly artillery shells and enables them to support the tanks
with small-arms fire. Infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers)
hit targets that block the advance of the attacking subunits. They move in
bounds, from line to line and from cover to cover, and, as soon as the
situation allows, motorized rifle subunit personnel remount and move
forward swiftly.

During the attack, the main efforts of artillery and aviation support-
ing the motorized rifle and tank subunit actions are concentrated on
destroying the enemy's strongpoints, especially in his first line of defense,
and exposed fire weapons and on neutralizing advancing enemy reserves.

98
Guns and tanks allocated for direct fire and ATGM launchers destroy
observed weapons and defensive works in the FEBA and the immediate
depth of the defenses. Combat helicopters operate from ambush and make
strikes, primarily against enemy tanks and other armored targets. Under
the cover of artillery fire, combat engineer subunits clear passages through
the enemy's engineer obstacles in front of his FEBA.

In order to mislead the enemy, feint shifts of artillery fire into the
depth of the defense may be made during fire preparation for attacks.
Soviet troops made skillful use of this tactic during the Great Patriotic
War.
The schedule of artillery preparation for the attack by the 3rd Guards Rifle Division's
units on Perekop Isthmus in April 1944 provided for two feint shifts of fire, during which the
infantry pretended to begin attacking. This contributed substantially to the achievement of
surprise in the fire strikes. The Nazis took the feint shifts of fire for the beginning of an
attack by our troops, left cover, and, as a result, suffered heavy casualties.^"

When one switches from preparatory fire to fire support, it is impor-

tant not to allow any lapse in time between the moment when artillery fire
is switched into the depth of the defense and that when the motorized rifle
subunits and tanks begin their attack, in order to prevent the enemy from
preparing to repel the attack. In cases where this could not be done in the
last war the attacks failed.
When formations of the 11th Guards Army were breaking through the Nazi defenses in
August 1943 (Battle of Kursk), the infantry began attacking on several sectors of the front as
late as 10-12 minutes after artillery preparation had ceased. As a result, artillery support for
the attack had to be delayed. A pause occurred in the troops' actions, which was exploited by
the enemy to restore his fire plan in the FEBA and inflict heavy casualties on the attacking
subunits.

Combat against enemy antitank weapons is continuous during an

attack. In essence, the antitank defensive system now constitutes the basis
of the defense. The density of antitank weapons has increased drastically.
In the Great Patriotic War, antitank weapon density on the main axes
came to about 20-25 weapons per kilometer of front, while now, accord-
ing to the experience of NATO exercises, this has doubled or tripled.
Moreover, the combat capabilities of antitank weapons, i.e., their firing
range and accuracy, and the power of their projectiles (missiles), have
increased substantially.
According to the foreign press, the firing range of some antitank systems is 4-5 kilome-
ters or more, compared with their range of 950 meters at the end of World War 11. In the
battalion defense area of the West German Army, there are 15 antitank weapons capable of
firing at ranges of about 3 kilometers, 30-35 weapons firing at ranges of about 2 kilometers,
and 45-50 weapons firing at ranges of about 500 meters. Moreover, their fire may be
reinforced and intensified by unit and formation antitank weapons.

99
 To disrupt modern enemy antitank defense systems, it is necessary to
destroy or neutralize a considerable portion of the antitank weapons
(70-80 percent of their total, according to the experience of local wars)
while still conducting fire preparation for the attack. Also, the attacking
subunits must immediately exploit the effects of the fire strike. The swifter
and more unexpected the attack, the fewer casualties the attacking troops
will suffer and the quicker they will be able to cross the zone of dense,
overlapping enemy antitank fire. Experience gained on tactical exercises
shows that when the momentum of attack is 1.5 times greater, casualties
suffered by the attacking subunits because of enemy fire decrease by a
factor of two or three.

Tank and motorized rifle subunits, attached and supporting artillery,

tanks and armored personnel carriers, and antitank weapons are very
effective against enemy antitank weapons. The antitank weapons normally
advance behind first-echelon company battle formations, ready to destroy
enemy tanks and other armored targets that hinder the subunits' attack.

The advancing subunits are assigned the important mission of com-

bating enemy combat helicopters. In order to succeed in this undertaking,
it is necessary to detect these helicopters in good time; warn the subunits
about the possibility of helicopter attacks; organize measures to destroy
them in the air, thereby preventing them from attacking; and break up the
actions of enemy heliborne assault forces. Missile, air, and fire strikes may
be made against helicopters situated on airfields, while helicopters in the
air are destroyed with machine gun, cannon, and antiaircraft weapon fire
and by the combat helicopters of the attacking forces.

Engagements in the depth of enemy defenses are characterized by

their complexity and the speed and abruptness with which the situation
changes. During this phase, the attacking subunits may carry out combat
missions that vary in essence and nature, such as routing advancing enemy
reserves; repelling counterattacks; destroying offensive nuclear weapons;
negotiating radioactive contamination zones, engineer obstacles, barriers,
and demolished areas; and fighting enemy airborne assault forces,
airmobile subunits, isolated groupings, etc.

To succeed in these and other missions, attacking subunits must ma-

neuver fire and resources. Every breach and vulnerable spot in the enemy's
battle formation must be exploited to break through to the flank and rear
of enemy strongpoints, advance swiftly into the depth, and make a sur-
prise strike. Enemy groupings should not be dislodged from one position
to another but should be split up, encircled, and defeated in detail. "To
dislodge the enemy means failure, but to cut off, encircle, and disperse the
enemy means success," A.V. Suvorov taught.

100
 In the course of an offensive, the commander keeps constant track of
how the situation is developing; organizes reconnaissance; makes timely
mission assignments to the subunits; updates cooperation plans, organizes
combat, technical, and logistic support; and sees to it that assigned mis-
sions are carried out unswervingly, whatever the difficulties.

Reconnaissance must determine the degree of damage inflicted by fire

strikes against the enemy's strongpoints, what measures he is taking to
restore his disrupted fire plan and obstacle system, which firing positions
hinder the subunits' advance, the nature of the obstacles and destruction
and how they may be bypassed, and the composition of the enemy reserves
and their axis of advance.

The success of actions by advancing forces depends largely on main-

taining precise and continuous cooperation throughout the engagement. To
this end, the battalion (company) commander periodically updates the
missions assigned to motorized rifle and tank subunits and coordinates
their actions with artillery fire, air strikes, and the actions of the rocket
launcher, antitank and machine gun subunits, and adjacent forces that are
aimed at destroying enemy strongpoints and fire resources, especially of-
fensive nuclear and chemical weapons and precision weapons; assigns addi-
tional missions to the artillery and other fire resources in order to provide
continuous fire support for the attacking subunits as they repel enemy
counterattacks and negotiate obstacles and obstructions; updates the proce-
dure for changing the positions of the second echelon (reserve), artillery
and other organic and attached resources during the engagement; and,
when necessary, he updates the missions of the antiaircraft subunit cover-
ing the battalion against enemy air strikes during the engagement.

During offensives, subunits have to negotiate various types of engi-

neer obstacles. Today, when the enemy is able to use remote minelaying to
rapidly set up obstacles both in front and to the rear of advancing forces,
it is essential to increase the mobility of subunit actions where mined
locales abound. Various means are used to negotiate obstacles. Whenever
possible, minefields are bypassed. But when this is impossible, lanes are
created in them by obstacle clearing groups comprised of combat engineer
subunits and mine clearing tanks.

As the advancing forces penetrate the defenses, the enemy will in-
crease his resistance and do whatever possible to localize the breakthrough.
Thus, in the course of an engagement, both sides will be involved in an
intense competition to build up their efforts. Under these conditions, it is
important to forestall the enemy in making fire strikes and disrupt his
concept. He should not be permitted to restore his disrupted fire plan and
obstacle system and systematically regroup his resources along the front
and from the depth. To this end, the subunits must move faster than the

101
enemy can maneuver. The commanders of the attacking subunits must
retain the initiative in action and hold the reins of troop control securely.

The timely commitment of the second echelon (reserve), which is used

to intensify efforts, to exploit, and to maintain the necessary superiority in
resources on the main axis, plays an important part in exploiting gains
made. In Soviet offensive operations during the Great Patriotic War,
battalion and regimental reserves (second echelons) often had to be com-
mitted even as the enemy's first defensive position was being breached;
division and corps second echelons were committed as the second and third
positions were being breached. As a result, the mobile group of an army
(front) had to be brought into action prematurely, which had a negative
effect on the development of an operation.

Today, because of the dynamism of offensive combat, second-echelon

(reserve) units and subunits may be committed deeper inside the enemy
defenses. For example, a battalion's second echelon may be committed
after the battalion has accomplished its immediate objective, i.e., after it
has taken the enemy's first defensive position.

It is very important to correctly determine the time for committing the

second echelon (reserve). The buildup of efforts must occur when the first
echelon is still advancing but with the real danger that its momentum of
advance will be reduced.
The commander must follow the situation attentively and sense the pulse of the engage-
ment in order to determine, correctly and in good time, the moment when additional forces
have to be committed from the depth to ensure a decisive superiority in resources over the
enemy on the main axis and swiftly exploit in depth or toward a flank.

The way that a second echelon of a motorized rifle battalion was committed in the
"Zapad-81" exercise may serve as an example. A situation had developed where the "South-
ern" forces, having lost their first defensive position, had hastily begun to move up their
reserves to counterattack and reinforce their defenses in depth. This was discovered in time by
"Northern" force reconnaissance. After evaluating the situation, the commander of the
"Northern" battalion decided to commit his second echelon. The subsequent course of the
engagement revealed the good timing of the action. The attacking subunits succeeded in
disrupting the defenders' concept and in maintaining their momentum of advance. The
"Southern" forces did not have time to deploy for a counterattack and were unable to put up
stout resistance. The "Northern" forces successfully breached the defense.

Gaps between the enemy's strongpoints and breaches created in his

battle formations by nuclear and fire strikes are exploited to commit the
second echelon (reserve). This enables the subunits to advance swiftly into
the depth of the defense, make surprise strikes, quickly destroy enemy
offensive nuclear weapons, fire resources, and control posts, and capture
important objectives in the enemy rear.

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 When the second echelon (reserve) is being committed, its commander
is usually given information concerning the enemy; the position of the
first-echelon subunits; the hne of commitment and the time to reach it; the
immediate objective and subsequent direction of attack; resources for
reinforcement and the places and times of their arrival; and the procedure
for providing fire support to the commitment and for cooperating with
first-echelon subunits.

The second-echelon (reserve) subunits may carry out their mission of

routing the enemy in cooperation with tactical airborne assault forces and
subunits of the forward detachment. When this is the case, their actions
are coordinated in terms of target, place, and time.

The enemy may seek to prevent the attacking subunits from advanc-
ing into the depth of his defenses by counterattacking on the main axis. In
the last war, the attacking forces did not have the required striking force
and firepower, and so when threatened by counterattacks from defending
enemy forces, especially those made with large forces, they normally
stopped on the line they had reached, consoUdated on it, and, exploiting
favorable terrain features and a well-organized fire and obstacle system,
repelled the counterattacks. This method was effective but inevitably re-
duced the momentum of advance.

Today, attacking subunits are equipped with more powerful and

longer-range fire weapons and therefore, when repelling counterattacks,
they seek to cause as much damage as possible to the enemy reserves as
they are discovered in concentration areas and while they are moving
forward. For this purpose, nuclear and fire strikes are made against the
enemy with resources under the direct control of the senior commander
(chief), while the attacking subunits, when conditions are right, make
encounter attacks from the line of march against the reserves moving up
from the rear. This makes it possible to repel enemy counterattacks with-
out substantially reducing the momentum of advance.

If the counterattacking enemy is nonetheless able to obtain decisive

superiority in resources on the axis of attack, some of the attacking troops
will have to consolidate on the line reached in order to repel the counterat-
tack.

The antitank reserve and mobile obstacle detachment move up to the

threatened axis and, in cooperation with the first-echelon subunits, attempt
to inflict damage on the enemy with fire and obstacles, hold up his
advance, and create favorable conditions for developing the offensive.
Tanks and infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers) operating
in the first echelon assume fire positions behind the nearest cover, while
personnel from the motorized rifle subunits advancing in infantry combat

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vehicles (armored personnel carriers) dismount and assume positions from
which they can cooperate with tanks in destroying the counterattacking
enemy forces.

Subunits use the concentrated fire of all fire resources to make fire
strikes against the enemy at maximum range. As the enemy approaches,
fire is gradually increased to its maximum intensity. At the same time, the
main body of the attacking troops continues to develop the offensive in the
depth of the defense. When necessary, it attacks the flanks and rear of the
counterattacking enemy and, in cooperation with adjacent forces, destroys
the enemy with a decisive attack and goes over to pursuit.
In the course of an offensive, the battalion commander must always ensure that the
subunits are supplied with ammunition, fuel, food, and other stores; organize technical
maintenance, recovery, and repair of armament and combat equipment; and provide for
casualty collection, medical treatment, and evacuation.

7. Pursuit

Pursuit is an integral part of an offensive. F. Engels wrote: "The

fruits of victory are usually reaped during pursuit. The more energetic the
pursuit, the more decisive the victory."^' War experience shows that as the
spatial scope, decisiveness, and maneuverability of an offensive grow, the
role, scale, and importance of pursuit increases. In the positional battles of
World War I, pursuit of the enemy was relatively rare, but in most
offensive operations during the Great Patriotic War, especially during its
dynamic second and third phases, pursuit comprised from 60 to 80 percent
of the overall duration of operations.

The conditions for going over to pursuit, the organization of pursuit,

and the methods used in conducting it changed in line with the develop-
ment of means of transport, support, and troop control. In wars during
the preimperialist period, pursuit was conducted on a narrow front and
not to great depths. The rate of pursuit was determined by the speed at
which the infantry or cavalry moved. As armies became better equipped,
especially as a result of their mechanization and motorization, pursuit
actions became more decisive. In several Soviet offensive operations of the
Great Patriotic War, the rate of pursuit was 10-40 kilometers per 24 hours
for rifle formations and 25-80 kilometers for tank formations.^^

Methods of pursuit also improved. In addition to frontal pursuit,

pursuit on axes parallel to the direction of enemy withdrawal and com-
bined pursuit, that is, when some of the forces conducted frontal pursuit
and the remainder engaged in pursuit on axes parallel to the direction of
enemy withdrawal, were used during the war. The various methods of
pursuit were used more effectively, making it possible to intercept the

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enemy's line of withdrawal, move swiftly against the flanks and rear of
enemy groupings, divide and encircle them, and defeat them in detail.
Tank and mechanized formations and units played the main role in pursuit
in the last war. With more mobility and striking power than the rifle
troops, they could bypass the infantry, carry out raids deep behind enemy
lines, forestall retreating enemy units in seizing important objectives (road
junctions, crossings, passes, ravines, built-up areas), and thereby cause
disarray and panic among the enemy forces.

The effectiveness of pursuit depended largely on artillery and aviation,

which struck the withdrawing enemy's columns, obstructed his occupation
of advantageous defensive lines, and disrupted his movement on roads,
creating pileups of enemy troops in ravines, on mountain passes, at water
obstacle crossings, etc.

Forward detachments played an important role in pursuit. Boldly and

resolutely penetrating the depth of the enemy dispositions, they destroyed
his rear guard by surprise attacks and intercepted the lines of his columns'
withdrawal, seizing key objectives on movement routes and holding them
until the main body approached.
The forward detachment of the 9th Guards Tank Corps, consisting of the 47th Guards
Tanl< Brigade, began pursuing the enemy in the Vistula-Oder Operation at 1800 hours on 15
January 1945, crossed the Pilica River, swiftly overtook the infantry and, bypassing the
strong centers of enemy resistance, reached the town of Sochaczew at 2300 hours on 16
January. In 29 hours of combat actions, it passed through approximately 100 kilometers of
the enemy's rear dispositions, cut off his communications, and provided for successful actions
by the corps' main forces.^' Forward detachments of tank forces normally operated 10-30
kilometers from the main body, forward detachments of rifle forces 5-12 kilometers from the
main body.

The procedure followed in preparing for and methods used in con-

ducting pursuit in the Great Patriotic War have largely retained their
significance even today. However, when they are followed today, consider-
ation must be given to the qualitative changes that weapons have under-
gone. The availability of nuclear weapons and improved conventional
weapons, increased troop mobility, and the possibility of landing large-
scale airborne assault forces behind enemy lines makes it possible to attain
more decisive objectives during pursuit and to enlarge its scope. It is now
possible to defeat the retreating enemy quickly and accelerate the rate and
maintain the continuity of pursuit to great depths. On the other hand, the
enemy has increased capabilities for resisting the pursuing forces. He may
set up large-scale barriers and areas of demolition and radioactive contami-
nation on their routes of advance, make strikes with helicopters, carry out
remote minelaying, etc. Hence, pursuit must be thoroughly organized and
subunit actions must be provided with comprehensive support.

105
 Advancing forces may go over to pursuit at various periods in an
engagement: at the beginning of the offensive or, usually, during the
exploitation stage. Normally, pursuit is undertaken when the enemy has
been forced to withdraw from favorable defensive positions or after an
unsuccessful meeting engagement. During the last war, pursuit sometimes
began when the enemy was deliberately withdrawing to improve his opera-
tional position. Most often, troops went over to pursuit after breaking
through the enemy defenses, when he was forced to pull his troops back to
the depth.

As combat experience has revealed, pursuit is a complex and dynamic

form of offensive engagement, characterized by great determination of
actions, quicli and drastic clianges in tlie situation, an intense struggle to
win time, and complexity in troop control. Pursuit aims to destroy the
withdrawing enemy, preventing him from organizing to go over to the
defense in favorable positions in depth or from linking up with approach-
ing reserves.

Today, it is particularly important to detect the enemy's withdrawal in

good time because, being highly mobile, he may quickly break away from
the attacking subunits. To prevent this, reconnaissance is stepped up when
an enemy withdrawal is anticipated. The mission of reconnaissance is to
reveal the enemy's concept of actions, the beginning and direction of his
withdrawal, his routes and speed of movement, the composition of the
column, and the nature of the actions of the covering subunits; to discover
where the enemy is preparing intermediate defensive positions and what
forces may be occupying them; and to determine the presence of obstacles
and obstructions on routes of pursuit and the direction of movement of
the enemy reserves.

Discovering the enemy's withdrawal, the subunits begin pursuit inde-

pendently, as a rule, without waiting for orders from the senior com-
mander (chief). Here, the battalion commander organizes additional recon-
naissance and updates the pursuit missions for the subunits. He reports to
the regimental commander and informs adjacent forces that he has
switched to pursuit.

It is important to prevent the enemy from breaking away and to

disrupt his orderly withdrawal. For this purpose, motorized rifle and tank
subunits bypass the withdrawing enemy forces along parallel routes, ex-
ploiting the great cross-country capability of tanks and infantry combat
vehicles (armored personnel carriers), emerge on the enemy lines of march,
and, in cooperation with adjacent forces, defeat him with a decisive attack
in his flank and rear. When it is impossible to pursue the enemy on axes
parallel to his withdrawal, subunits undertake a frontal pursuit, defeat the
covering subunits, break through to the main body, and, in cooperation

106
with adjacent forces, as well as tactical airborne assault forces and forward
detachments (advance guards) where indicated, attack the enemy from the
line of march.

Strongpoints and ambushes encountered on the line of march are, as

a rule, bypassed and destroyed with attacks from the flanks and rear. The
main thing is to ensure speed and momentum in pursuit and to gain time.
A. V. Suvorov taught: "The enemy must be pursued day and night, for a
forest that is not totally uprooted will grow back."

With a view to providing reliable fire support for subunit pursuit

actions, the major portion of the artillery is moved with the advance guard
or at the head of the column of the main body, ready to fire when the
withdrawing enemy's covering force and main body are engaged, to de-
stroy and neutralize his fire resources, and to prevent him from assuming
defenses in intermediate positions.

Fixed-wing aircraft and combat helicopters conduct continuous recon-

naissance, strike the withdrawing enemy columns, interdict the approach
of enemy reserves from the depth, and support the landing and actions of
tactical airborne assault forces and the actions of the advance guards and
forward detachments. The main efforts of the air defense resources are
concentrated on covering subunits operating in the main body, especially
while crossing ravines, water obstacles, built-up areas and mountain
passes, and as they are deploying for combat with the withdrawing enemy.

The main missions of engineer subunits are carrying out engineer

reconnaissance of obstacles and demolished areas, opening gaps in them,
and supporting the subunits in pursuit as they deploy and maneuver
toward the enemy's flank and rear. When necessary, engineer subunits lay
minefields, carry out demolition on the routes of enemy withdrawal, and
prepare and maintain crossings over water obstacles.

Experience in combat and in tactical exercises reveals that, in order to

achieve great momentum and continuity in pursuit, it is important to
skillfully alternate the actions of the first and second echelons and reserves,
intensify efforts in good time when routing enemy reserves moving up
from the depth, quickly restore the fighting efficiency of subunits that
have suffered losses because of enemy nuclear and fire strikes, skillfully
switch fire and maneuver resources, and operate with daring, drive, and
vigor.

In pursuit, tactical airborne assault forces are tasked with capturing

road junctions, crossings, passes, and other important objectives on the
enemy's withdrawal routes, slowing down the advance of his reserves,
breaking up their maneuvers, and creating conditions for defeating the

107
 enemy in detail. The tactical airborne assault force assists the pursuing
troops in quickly overcoming the enemy's defensive lines and negotiating
natural obstructions, obstacles and demolished, burnt, and flooded areas.

In order to ensure swift and skillful actions while pursuing the enemy,
it is important to maintain high levels of combat aggressiveness in person-
nel in the main body, reconnaissance subunits, forward detachments, and
advance guards.

8. Crossing Water Obstacles

When developing an offensive in essentially any theatre of military

operations, troops will be required to cross various water obstacles: rivers,
lakes, canals, estuaries, reservoirs, flooded areas, etc. For example, rivers
about 100 meters wide may be encountered every 35-60 kilometers; rivers
100-300 meters wide, every 100-150 kilometers; and rivers more than 300
meters wide, every 250-300 kilometers. In other words, during an offen-
sive, a formation (unit) will have to cross an average of one medium-width
and several narrow water obstacles every day.
Crossing water obstacles is a complex combat mission that requires great skill in the
organization of combat actions and troop control on the part of commanders and staffs, high
moral-political, psychological and combat training standards on the part of personnel, and
determination and persistence in attaining the assigned objectives.

In the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet troops crossed water obstacles
such as the Dnepr, Desna, Sozh, Dnestr, Neman, Bug, Vistula, Danube,
Oder, and other rivers with great skill. They were as a rule crossed quickly,
by surprise, and on a broad front. However, not all water obstacles could
be crossed from the line of march, because of the inadequacy of the water
crossing equipment available at the time, the poor mobility of rifle troops,
and their limited capabilities with respect to engineer, technical, and logis-
tic support. Therefore, long and bitter battles were fought for water
obstacles, even over relatively small ones.

Today, when the depth of the combat missions of attacking forma-

tions and units and their momentum of advance has increased, they will
have to cross water obstacles much more often than in the last war. And
although their water obstacle crossing capabilities have increased substan-
tially because of their being supplied with fast amphibious fighting equip-
ment, water obstacles still constitute serious natural obstructions to the
movement of attacking troops. It may be expected that, as in the past,
defending enemy forces will make extensive use of water obstacles to
strengthen their defenses.
On tactical exercises carried out in recent years by the NATO armies, defensive lines, fire
barriers, flooded areas, and nuclear mine strips were set up, as a rule, along rivers, canals,

108
and lakes. Nuclear and fire strikes against tlie enemy as he approaches a water obstacle are
calculated to create large areas of demolition, barriers, and highly radioactive zones and
drastically change the conditions of the river, its course, and the nature of the terrain on the
riverside. It may be concluded from the experience of these exercises that fighting for water
obstacles will demand great efforts from attacking forces.

Depending on the situation, water obstacles may be crossed from the

line of march, either by preparing for crossing before the subunits ap-
proach the water obstacle or by deploying the main body at the water
obstacle and crossing it after quick supplementary preparations.

The essence of crossing a water obstacle from the line of march

consists in the subunits rapidly approaching the water obstacle on a broad
front, crossing it quickly after brief preparatory fire, making a resolute
attack against the enemy, and developing the offensive on the opposite
shore without stopping (figure 6). The advantage of this type of crossing
lies in the fact that it makes it possible to gain time and make a surprise
attack against the enemy and ensures speed and great momentum of
advance.
In April 1944, the 226th Rifle Regiment of the 93rd Rifle Division made an assault
crossing of the Dnestr River. While approaching the river, reconnaissance determined that the
opposite shore was defended only by enemy security subunits. Evaluating the situation, the
regimental commander decided to gain time by sending forward a reinforced rifle company,
which was assigned the mission of crossing the river in boats, destroying the combat security
outposts, and seizing a bridgehead, thereby enabling the main body of the regiment to cross.
The mission was successfully accomplished and the regiment crossed the Dnestr in short
order.

The conditions necessary for crossing from the line of march are
usually created as the offensive develops. It is important to pursue the
enemy closely so as to prevent him from breaking away, quickly capture
existing crossing sites, and cross water obstacles literally "on the heels" of
the withdrawing subunits. The forward detachments and advance guards
play an important part in carrying this out. When approaching the water
obstacle, the commander of a battalion allocated to the forward detach-
ment organizes reconnaissance of the obstacle. For this purpose, a battle
reconnaissance element or patrol sections (tanks) are dispatched to the
designated crossing sites with the mission of determining the availability
and condition of bridges and fords, the best sites for setting up assault and
ferry crossings, and places for tanks to cross by fording or snorkeling.

The commander must make his decision for crossing the obstacle as
early as possible so as to make timely assignments of combat missions to
the subunits, organize cooperation, and, when already advancing toward
the water obstacle, make the necessary preparations for crossing the obsta-
cle. Usually the decision for crossing a water obstacle considers the follow-
ing factors: methods of defeating the enemy on the approaches to the
water obstacle and on the opposite bank; locations and types of main and

109
alternate crossing sites; distribution of water crossing equipment; routes
and sciiedule for the subunits' approach to the water obstacle and proce-
dure for preparing equipment for crossing the obstacle; and the sequence
in which the subunits are to cross.

The nature of motorized rifle (tank) subunit missions during a cross-

ing depends on the nature of the enemy defenses on the opposite bank, the
extent of damage to them from fire strikes, the availability of water
crossing equipment, the width of the water obstacle, and other factors.

It is advisable to assign missions to the subunits and organize coopera-

tion in the field. The first-echelon subunits are given instructions concern-
ing the sequence to follow in approaching the water obstacle, missions
while crossing it and fighting on the opposite bank, the locations of the
main and alternate crossing sites, the tank sealing area, the area for
loading men and combat equipment onto self-propelled assault crossing
equipment, as well as the line of departure and the crossing time.

The artillery is instructed as to the location of fire positions, when it

should be ready to open fire, missions to provide support for the subunits
during the crossing and subsequent engagement on the opposite bank, and
the sequence of crossing. The air defense subunit is instructed as to the
schedule for approaching the river, its missions in protecting the first-
echelon subunits against enemy air strikes as they approach the river,
during the crossing, and while fighting on the opposite bank, when it
should be prepared to open fire, and the sequence of crossing.

The line of departure for crossing an obstacle should run, whenever

possible, behind folds in the terrain and beyond the flat-trajectory range of
enemy guns and tanks. When an underwater crossing by tanks is envis-
aged, the sealing area is situated in places screened from short-range enemy
weapons.

The subunit battle formations are set up in accordance with the

concept of crossing actions and the assigned combat missions. The forma-
tion must ensure that the water obstacle is crossed quickly and the buildup
of combat effort is maintained without interruption during the engagement
on the opposite bank. Subunits normally cross the water obstacle from the
line of march in the same formation used when pursuing the enemy.

Engineer subunits play an important role in ensuring the success of

the crossing. They carry out engineer reconnaissance of the subunits' lines
of movement, the water obstacle, and the enemy defenses; prepare routes
and provide support for the advance of the attacking subunits and the
movement of the assauh crossing equipment to the obstacle; clear lanes in

110
engineer obstacles; perform traffic control and rescue and recovery service
at the crossing sites; and support the actions of the attacking subunits on
the opposite bank.

The subunits approach the water obstacle at maximum speed. If a

battalion is operating in the forward detachment, its mission is to reach the
water obstacle as soon as possible, bypassing isolated enemy strongpoints,
and to capture intact crossing sites and sectors suitable for crossing the
obstacle. The battalion crosses the water obstacle with available bridges,
amphibious combat vehicles, and assault crossing equipment, seizes a fa-
vorable line on the opposite bank, and holds it until the main body arrives.
Smoke screens are used extensively to camouflage crossings.

When an obstacle is crossed from the line of march, fire strikes

against the enemy begin while the subunits are approaching the water
obstacle. The strikes are made against enemy offensive nuclear weapons,
artillery, strongpoints, reserves, control posts, and radar. On approaching
the water obstacle, the artillery supporting the subunits and some of the
tank resources, ATGM launchers, and antitank rocket launchers assume
fire positions, hit the enemy fire resources that are impeding the crossing,
and provide support for the actions of subunits on the opposite bank.

Exploiting the effects of friendly nuclear and fire strikes and of the
actions of the forward detachment (advance guard) and tactical airborne
assault force (if one is employed), the first-echelon motorized rifle subunits
cross the water obstacle in amphibious combat vehicles and assault cross-
ing equipment under cover of a smoke or aerosol screen, fire on the enemy
from all weapons while afloat, seize a bridgehead on the opposite bank
and, without stopping, develop the offensive in depth.

Tank subunits operating in the main body cross the obstacle over
captured bridges and fords or in assault crossing equipment at the same
time as the first echelon. After the opposite bank has been taken, some of
the tanks may cross under water. After crossing the water obstacle, the
tank subunits head for their axes without stopping, and carry out their
assigned missions.

Artillery attached to battalions and air defense subunits usually cross

in amphibious vehicles and assault crossing equipment so as to ensure that
the attacking subunits on the opposite bank receive continuous fire support
and air defense cover.

A battalion's technical support and logistics subunits cross behind the

artillery subunits in assault crossing equipment or on ferries.

Ill
 The engagement on the opposite bank may become stubborn and
intense. The enemy will seek to destroy the subunits that have crossed the
water obstacle with fire and counterattacks and to eliminate the bridgehead
at any price. Under such conditions, the attacking forces may execute
concealed maneuvers to build up their efforts, quickly capture a favorable
line under cover of smoke or aerosol screens, repel enemy counterattacks,
and, without stopping, develop the offensive in depth.

Winning time is crucial to success in crossing a water obstacle. The

availability of a great deal of water crossing and amphibious equipment
for the troops ensures high momentum while crossing the obstacle and
enables the subunits to make the crossing as quickly as possible. Thus,
according to the experience of NATO exercises, the total time allotted to
crossing a medium-width obstacle is 1-1.5 hours for battalions operating in
forward detachments, 2-3 hours for first-echelon regiments, and 5-6 hours
for divisions.

In those cases when a forced crossing is made by deploying the main

body at the water obstacle (figure 7), the subunits are in direct contact with
the enemy at the water line before the start of the offensive. This creates
conditions for carrying out more thorough and systematic preparations for
the crossing.

The battalion commander makes a thorough study of the nature of

the water obstacle and the terrain on its approaches and on the opposite
bank, organizes preparations for the crossing, covertly concentrates water
crossing equipment in the crossing sector, and assigns the subunits missions
for preparation of a departure area for the crossing and the crossing sites.

When the main body is deployed at the water obstacle, it is crucial

that this be kept covert if the crossing is to succeed. Therefore, under these
conditions, forced crossings are usually carried out at night. In order to
prevent the enemy from learning the location of crossing sites beforehand
and to avoid concentrating resources at the sites, the subunits in the first
echelon of the main body should be loaded into infantry combat vehicles
(armored personnel carriers) and assault crossing equipment during the fire
preparation phase in concealed areas far enough from the water obstacle
to protect them against most enemy long-range antitank weapons.

At the assigned time, the subunits move quickly toward the water
obstacle. The beginning of the crossing (H-hour) is the moment when the
first-echelon subunits cast off from the near bank. As is the case when
making a forced crossing from the line of march, after landing on the
opposite bank, the subunits, by exploiting the effects of artillery fire and
air strikes, quickly destroy the enemy first-echelon company strongpoints
and develop the offensive in depth without stopping.

112
 When forced crossings are being prepared and carried out, it is impor-
tant to keep up a higli level of aggressive spirit in tiie soldiers and maintain
their urge to effectively defeat the enemy defending the water obstacle and
quickly develop the offensive on the opposite bank. This applies particu-
larly to soldiers serving in subunits assigned to the forward detachment
(advance guard) and tactical airborne assault force, which will operate
detached from the main body for long periods of time and perform
complex missions aimed at ensuring a successful crossing.

9. The Night Offensive

In past wars, particularly the Great Patriotic War, night combat
actions played an important part. They are even more important today.
This results from the decisiveness of an offensive engagement and the drive
to conduct it continuously, at high momentum, and in great depth until
the enemy is completely routed.

Aggressive actions at night provide subunits with many tactical advan-

tages. The main advantage lies in the possibility of making fuller use of the
element of surprise. During darkness, attacking forces are able to covertly
regroup their resources, move up to the line for going over to the attack,
deploy in battle (prebattle) formation, carry out a surprise attack, make a
close or deep envelopment of the enemy's flanks, and, when necessary,
withdraw their subunits in the face of an enemy strike.

When visibility is limited, it is more difficult for a defending enemy to

detect preparations for an offensive, repel an attack, and maneuver fire
and resources. By exploiting the advantages of conducting combat actions
at night, the attacking forces can achieve the objective of the engagement
with minimum losses, exert constant pressure on the enemy, impose their
will on him, and maintain the initiative.

On the other hand, the night substantially hinders an offensive. The

rising technical level of troop equipment and the availability of effective
night vision devices, illuminants, radar, and other equipment diminish the
adverse effect of darkness on combat actions, but do not completely
eliminate the difficulties experienced by personnel at night. Even if exten-
sive use is made of technical support equipment, observation of friendly
and enemy actions, position-finding, and maintenance of cooperation and
continuous troop control become more difficult at night. Operating at
night requires more physical and psychological effort and promotes fatigue
in personnel.

113
 Consequently, the success of night actions depends to a great extent on whether the
commander has organized the engagement skillfully and precisely, particularly with respect to
illumination, NBC defense, and thorough camouflage. It also depends on effective political
work.

A night offensive may begin with breaking through a deliberate en-

emy defense, or it may be a continuation of daytime combat actions.
Moreover, in the last war nighttime actions were often conducted with the
purpose of improving positions held, i.e., capturing an objective of tactical
importance, such as a built-up area, commanding height, pass, etc.

When operating at night, the attacking forces normally try to avoid

complex maneuvers.

The success of a night engagement depends on how thoroughly it has

been organized. Subunit axes of advance are selected so as to lead by the
shortest possible route to the objective to be attacked and to run through
open, relatively smooth terrain with a minimum of natural obstacles and
with reference points easily visible in darkness.

When missions are set for subunits, consideration is given to their

level of readiness for night actions, to how long the darkness will last, to
the nature of the enemy's defense, and to terrain conditions, available
illumination equipment, etc. Today, subunit combat capabilities are such
as to enable them to conduct an offensive at night wdth the same high
momentum and to approximately the same depth as in daylight.

A tendency to assign deep combat missions to units and subunits

operating at night was clearly apparent even during the Great Patriotic
War.
In the lasi-Kishinev Operation, while breaking through the enemy's defense at night in
August 1944, the 229th Guards Rifle Regiment was assigned an immediate objective at a
depth of 3 kilometers and a subsequent objective at a depth of 5 kilometers. In actuality, the
subunits advanced at a rate of 800 meters per hour.-^'' The depth of combat missions carried
out by the regiment in daylight was similar to the depth of its night missions. Combat
experience has demonstrated that, besides the immediate and subsequent objective, subunits
may also be assigned a line that they must capture before dawn.

The configuration of subunit battle formations in a night engagement

depends on the nature of the enemy's defense and how long the darkness
will last. If a battalion is to break through a deliberate enemy defense,
then its battle formation should be configured in two echelons. Here the
first echelon must normally be able to accomplish its combat mission
without the need to build up efforts, i.e., without having to commit the
second echelon in darkness, since that is a very difficult task. Another
important requirement in configuring a battle formation for night actions

114
lies in ensuring the subunits' tactical autonomy. For this purpose, not only
battalions, but also companies, were reinforced with tanks, artillery, and
engineer subunits in the last war.
In the Gomel' Operation, during a night offensive on 21 November 1943, the tanks
attached to the 828th Rifle Regiment were resubordinated to rifle companies. This ensured
closer cooperation with the infantry and resulted in the subunits successfully breaking through
the enemy's defense and advancing 12 kilometers during the night, losing only one tank.^'
When tank units and subunits operated independently, they, in turn, were reinforced with
artillery and with rifle and engineer subunits.

The specific nature of organizing a night engagement may be exam-

ined using the example of a subunit commander's actions in preparing a
night offensive on a certain tactical exercise. The motorized rifle
battalion's mission was to break through the "enemy's" defense by attack-
ing him at night, to seize strongpoints in his first defensive position, and to
exploit in depth.

The battalion commander completed the preparations for the offen-

sive for the most part in daylight, so that at the onset of darkness he only
had to update certain matters. When organizing the offensive, he indicated
reference points visible at night to the companies and, moreover, in order
to ensure that the axis of advance was maintained, he determined the
compass bearing for movement and assigned a guide company. During
terrain reconnaissance and when assigning combat missions to the
subunits, he established the procedure for using night vision devices and
attached radar during the attack and in the course of the offensive; he
indicated in the field the procedure for illuminating the terrain and objec-
tives for attack and by whom, when, and how to place the marker lights
(alignment lights) indicating the axis of advance; and he estabhshed the
procedure for marking the lines reached by the subunits in the course of
the engagement and for marking their flanks.

When organizing cooperation, the battalion commander decided by

whom, when, and how the subunits would be supplied with illumination
and signaling equipment and tracer shells and bullets, and he outlined
measures for protecting personnel against the thermal radiation of nuclear
bursts.

As a result of such thorough preparation for the night engagement,

the battalion successfully accomplished its combat mission in the exercise.

The special missions assigned to aviation and artillery for supporting

night actions are illuminating the ground and targets in the enemy de-
fenses, destroying (neutralizing) enemy illumination, bUnding his observa-
tion posts and fire resources, and placing light (alignment) markers.

115
 As a rule, iliumination support is centralized, organized according to a
single plan, and takes in the whole combat mission in terms of lines,
objectives, and time. Its purpose is to enable the friendly subunits to
operate and to hinder enemy actions. As demonstrated in exercises, illumi-
nation support planning usually includes: the procedure for illuminating
targets (objectives) for the benefit of motorized rifle and tank subunits,
artillery, aviation, and other combat resources; the procedure for placing
light (ahgnment) markers; methods of using light markers to mark pas-
sages through obstacles, subunit deployment lines, and the line for going
over to the offensive; the procedure for using light signals for mutual
identification, target designation, and cooperation; and measures for com-
bating enemy night vision devices and illumination equipment. Steps are
taken to ensure that the employment of illumination equipment has no
adverse effect on the use of night vision devices.

In order to conceal preparations for night actions and to achieve

surprise in the attack, troops must maintain the prescribed system of
illumination and the procedure for using night vision devices.

One of the most important aspects of preparing for night engage-

ments is organizing cooperation. To ensure precise coordination of subunit
efforts during an engagement, common reference points, easily visible in
darkness, are established. The actions of resources participating in battles
for strongpoints in the enemy's FEBA and in the depth of his defenses are
coordinated in terms of target, position, and time. The following are thus
established: the method of exploiting masking features of the terrain,
techniques for subunit actions when repelling enemy dawn counterattacks,
and the procedure for consolidating on captured lines and ensuring conti-
nuity in the advance when switching from night to day actions. The lines
on which cooperation is planned are determined by orientation with fea-
tures of the terrain that are easily distinguishable in darkness, such as the
crests of heights, roads, the edges of forests or woods, rivers, built-up
areas, etc.

To protect personnel against the thermal radiation of nuclear bursts,

the protective features of combat equipment are used primarily. Optical
instruments, night vision devices, and glassed cab windows are prepared so
as to reduce the effect of thermal radiation intensity. Personnel operate
wearing special protective goggles.

To succeed in a night engagement, it is necessary to be well aware of

the tactics of enemy actions and to reveal his strengths and weaknesses.
For this purpose, reconnaissance before an offensive establishes the follow-
ing: the enemy's system of illumination and method of using night vision
devices; measures he is taking to strengthen his defenses during the night;
and how the disposition of his fire resources and reserves changes with the

116
onset of darkness. Taking into consideration that tlie enemy will also seek
to intensify reconnaissance with the onset of darkness, it is essential to
carefully observe camouflage measures and skillfully conceal signs that will
give away preparations for the offensive. At the same time, active mea-
sures should be taken to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance
radar and laser range finding systems.

Depending on the objective of the engagement, the attack may be

carried out right after dusk, in the middle of the night, or before dawn.
An attack that is a continuation of daytime actions prevents the enemy
from completing measures to reinforce his defenses for the night. When
the subunits are assigned missions that are limited in depth, the transition
to the offensive may be made in the latter half of the night or before
dawn. Combat experience reveals that this allows the factor of surprise to
be exploited more fully. Moreover, it enables subunit commanders to
organize more thoroughly for the night attack: to move up to the depar-
ture area under cover of darkness; to carry out "final" reconnaissance; to
regroup resources when necessary; and to update subunit missions and
procedures for cooperation, combat support, and troop control on the
spot.

Night attacks by motorized rifle subunits are usually carried out on

foot. Before or during preparatory fire for the attack, nuclear or fire
strikes are made against the targets in the enemy's defense whose locations
have already been established. In this case, the necessary measures are
taken to protect friendly subunits against the thermal radiation of nuclear
bursts. Artillery neutralizes the enemy's radar surveillance systems, blinds
his observation posts, and destroys his fire resources engaged in illuminat-
ing the terrain and placing light markers. Air defense subunits are also
enlisted to counter enemy illumination equipment.
Night actions encourage commanders to demonstrate extensive creativity and initiative in
choosing various methods of attack. The least expected tactics can be employed to defeat the
enemy at night.

The night attack by units of the 37th Guards Rifle Division on 12 August 1943 was
preceded by a salvo from 50 guns that had been moved up for direct fire. The enemy was
stunned and unable to withstand such a fire strike and was routed.^'*

In order to achieve the greatest possible surprise, an attack may be

carried out without preparatory fire and without using illumination equip-
ment.
In the early hours of 14 January 1944, during a heavy blizzard, the 299th Rifle Regiment
quickly broke through the enemy defenses without artillery preparation and seized an impor-
tant bridgehead on the north shore of 11'men' Lake." The "silent" night attack carried out
by units of the 6th Guards Tank Army and 17th Guards Army on 6 January 1945 in
Hungary was also successful.^*

117
 It is important that subunits keep closely to the indicated axes when
attacking the enemy FEBA. To this end, light (alignment) markers are put
down at regular intervals during the engagement. Depending on the rug-
gedness of the terrain, the nature of the enemy defenses, and the illumina-
tion conditions, tanks operate either directly in the extended line of the
motorized rifle subunits or at a distance of 100-150 meters. As the attack
begins, some artillery and engineer subunits are resubordinated to battal-
ions, and sometimes even to companies. Attacks are usually supported by
concentrated artillery fire, fire on point targets, and air strikes. Signals to
switch and cease artillery fire are given by the subunit commanders.

Combat helicopters play an important role in destroying enemy ar-

mored targets and supporting the attacking subunits, particularly those
operating separately from the main body. Darkness provides surprise in
striking the enemy.

Having destroyed the strongpoints in the enemy FEBA, the subunits

quickly exploit the advance. Night engagements in the depth of the enemy
defenses are extremely complex and require firm and continuous troop
control, skillful maneuver of fire and resources. For precise orientation,
the subunits mark their positions with light markers when they reach their
designated Unes. In the course of the engagement, commanders take the
measures necessary to ensure the safety of subunits when negotiating
difficult terrain. Making skillful use of night vision devices and means of
illumination, personnel defeat the enemy decisively.

During an offensive, it is very important to discover enemy prepara-

tions for a counterattack in good time. Reconnaissance is tasked with
locating the enemy reserves. To this end, the ground is illuminated in the
area of their dispositions. To repel counterattacks, the second echelon
(reserve) maneuvers toward the threatened axis. In addition, the senior
commander may decide to move up the antitank reserve and the mobile
obstacle detachment to this axis. Preparations are made for artillery fire on
the enemy's probable line of deployment and, when necessary, this Une is
illuminated.

Experience gained on tactical exercises reveals that when effective use

is made of night conditions and when surprise is achieved in the offensive,
subunits are capable of advancing to great depths rapidly and without
stopping. On axes where this cannot be achieved, the momentum of
advance may be lost. In order to prevent this, timely measures must be
taken for a decisive buildup of combat efforts, i.e., the second echelon
(reserve) must be committed. Particularly thorough illumination is needed
for the actions of the second echelon (reserve) at night. Its route of
advance, line of deployment, and line for going over to the attack are

118
clearly designated with marker lights, and cooperation, comprehensive
support, and traffic control services are organized.

Even the slightest pause in exploiting the advance should be avoided

when making the transition from night to day actions. To this end, the
following measures are taken well before dawn: reconnaissance is stepped
up; the subunits' combat missions and cooperation procedure are updated;
stores of ammunition, fuel, and other material resources are replenished;
and steps are taken to intensify combat efforts and break up any possible
enemy counterattack at dawn.

Since night actions are distinguished by their great complexity and

numerous specific features, subunits should be thoroughly prepared for
them beforehand. On tactical exercises, personnel acquire the skills needed
for night actions and learn to find their bearings on the ground, to fire
accurately at illuminated targets and muzzle flashes, to use illumination
equipment in combat, and to execute aimed fire using night vision devices.

The highly aggressive spirit, determination, and fearlessness of Soviet

soldiers, their unsurpassed fighting efficiency, morale, and psychological
qualities, their ability to perform boldly and demonstrate initiative in
combat and to defeat the enemy decisively provide the basis for success in
offensive engagements both day and night, in any season and on any
terrain.

10. The Offensive Under Special Conditions

The environmental conditions of various geographic areas, e.g.,
mountain, desert, or arctic regions, have a fundamental effect on the
nature of offensives. Although the fundamentals of organizing and con-
ducting offensive engagements remain the same, specific environmental
and climatic factors give rise to many special features in troop actions.

Extremely rugged mountainous terrain is characterized by many al-

most impassable natural obstructions, a limited number of roads, and the
singular nature of the weather. Mountains greatly hinder maneuver of
troops and make cooperation, support, and troop control more difficult.
Personnel must receive special training for successful actions in mountains.
However, combat experience reveals that no mountain is insurmountable.
This has been confirmed by successful offensive operations carried out by
Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War in the mountains of the
North Caucasus, the Carpathian Mountains, and the mountainous regions
of Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the Far East.

119
 Offensives on terrain that is difficult of access are usually carried out
from the line of contact, while in valleys and on mountain plateaus they
are carried out from the line of march. The most stubborn battles are
those conducted for key objectives, such as mountain passes, gaps, com-
manding heights, road junctions, and built-up areas. Movement by attack-
ing subunits along roads and valleys and on mountain slopes is combined
with close and deep envelopments of the enemy in sectors that are difficult
of access. During the last war, the employment of flexible maneuver, i.e.,
conducting simultaneous strikes from several directions against a defending
enemy's strongpoints, ensured the success of division- and regimental-scale
offensive actions in mountains.

When organizing offensive engagements in mountains, the com-

mander must keep in mind that extremely rugged terrain lends itself to the
establishment of a stable defense, and the presence of great numbers of
natural obstacles, such as rocky sectors, sudden precipices, deep canyons,
and ravines, enables the enemy to quickly organize a stubborn defense on
a broad front with relatively small forces.

However, defenses in mountains also have their vulnerable spots.

Their localized nature and the large gaps between strongpoints enable the
attacking subunits to infiltrate to the rear of the defending enemy.

In assessing the enemy's defenses, it is important to discover his

strengths and weaknesses, and his fire plan and obstacle system, especially
on the approaches to mountain passes; to find gaps left unoccupied by
enemy subunits that may be used for close and deep envelopments and for
setting ambushes and barriers; and to determine lines from which strikes
by enemy combat helicopters may be expected.

In addition to general questions, the decision for an offensive in

mountains establishes the following: procedure for capturing strongpoints,
passes, and other primary objectives; composition and missions of the
outflanking detachment and its procedures for cooperating with the
subunits making a frontal assault or the tactical airborne assault force;
measures for negotiating sectors that are difficult of access, for position
finding, and for maintaining the axis of advance; steps for covering the
flanks and rear and stepping up the security of control posts; protective
measures against landslides, avalanches, mudslides, and floods; and mea-
sures to equip the subunits with mountain-climbing gear.

Because of the increased difficulty of movement on rugged terrain,

subunit combat missions may be assigned that are not as deep as under
normal conditions.

120
 The average daily distance covered in tiie offensive by Transcaucasus Front troops when
negotiating the northern spurs of the Greater Caucasus Range in the 1943 Krasnodar Opera-
tion and by troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front during the 1944 Carpathian Operation was 2
kilometers.^'

When the battle formations of motorized rifle and tank subunits are
being configured, great stress is placed on ensuring their tactical auton-
omy. Battalions and companies are reinforced with more than the usual
numbers of artillery, air defense, and engineer assets. Motorized rifle
subunits are given additional tanks and vice versa.-'*'

Reconnaissance in mountains is usually organized on a broader front

and to greater depths. It must determine the nature of the enemy defenses
on commanding heights, in passes, and at road junctions, the presence of
obstacles and demolished areas in valleys, ravines, and mountain passes;
and find concealed approaches to the enemy flanks and rear. Helicopters
are used to reconnoiter terrain that is difficult of access, reverse slopes,
and ravines.

Since actions in mountains are carried out for most part along accessi-
ble axes, they are more vulnerable to enemy air strikes. Therefore, in-
creased demands are made of air defense. It is set up on subunit axes of
actions. Air defense positions are usually located along roads and valleys.

The enemy is hit with fire strikes so as to ensure that fire resources in
strongpoints set up on commanding heights, especially on slopes adjacent
to roads and valleys, are neutralized as effectively as possible. When the
enemy defenses are configured so as to overlap, the fire resources in all
components are neutralized simultaneously. Direct fire from guns, tanks,
ATGM launchers, antitank rocket launchers and air defense systems, and
helicopter strikes against enemy fire resources and personnel located on
reverse slopes and in gorges and ravines are assigned a major role in fire
strikes.

Attacks by motorized rifle subunits over difficult terrain are carried

out on foot. Tanks operate directly in the extended line of the attacking
subunits, while infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers) ad-
vance behind the tanks, destroying targets standing in the way of the
attacking troops.

When moving through narrow valleys or ravines, subunits usually

assume an inverted wedge formation. Valleys (ravines) are entered only
after the subunits have captured the adjacent heights. Strikes against en-
emy forces putting up resistance in valleys (ravines) are carried out by fire
support helicopters, artillery, and mortars. Maneuvers toward the flanks
and rear of strongpoints play an important part in defeating defending
enemy forces in valleys (ravines). To do this, the outflanking subunits take

121
advantage of natural terrain features and move up along the crests of
heights to indicated Unes where, together with the subunits attacking from
the front, they attack from several directions.

One of the crucial missions in an offensive in the mountains is

capturing a mountain pass, which usually provides the key to the entire
defense of such as area. There are various methods of capturing mountain
passes. The attacking subunits must try to forestall the enemy in reaching a
pass.

When approaching a pass, subunit commanders organize reconnais-

sance so as to learn the defense system in detail and the nature of the
obstacles and obstructions on the approaches to it and to find routes on
which to bypass or negotiate sectors that are difficult of access.

The nature of subunit actions in taking a mountain pass may be

looked at in the light of a certain tactical exercise. A motorized rifle
battalion operating on a separate axis was assigned the mission of captur-
ing a mountain pass from the line of march in cooperation with a tactical
airborne assault force, thus enabling the main body to advance. After
evaluating the situation, the commander decided to concentrate the
battalion's efforts on seizing the commanding height adjacent to the pass.
Since the terrain made it possible to move up covertly to the flank of the
enemy defending the pass, it was decided to capture the pass with simulta-
neous frontal and flanking attacks.

The subunits, thoroughly camouflaged, moved up to their objective

along a ravine. The attack on the height was begun simultaneously by the
outflanking detachment, the subunits operating from the front, and the
tactical airborne assault force. Artillery and mortars, cooperating with
combat helicopters, effectively neutralized enemy fire resources both on the
slopes of the height under attack and on the adjacent heights, from which
the defenders could execute flanking fire.

While approaching their objective, the subunits encountered a mined

barrier of stones. The battalion commander arranged reconnaissance of the
barrier, surveillance, and security. Since it was impossible to bypass the
barrier, it was decided to negotiate it with mine-clearing tanks. Particular
consideration was given here to providing fire cover for the resources that
were clearing away the barrier.

The battle for the pass was stubborn. Success was assured by a
skillfully executed maneuver that resulted in a simultaneous attack on the
"enemy" defending the pass, carried out from the front, flank, and rear.

122
 Experience in wars and tactical exercises reveals that outflanking de-
tachments play an important role in offensives in mountains. As a rule,
outflanking detachments maneuver across sectors of terrain that are diffi-
cult of access. They usually cross the front line at night or at other times
of limited visibility (fog, snowfall, rain). The subunits move as quietly as
possible, observing sound damping measures. When approaching their
attack objective, detachments bypass enemy security subunits without en-
gaging them, so as not to reveal their presence too soon. If the security
subunits cannot be bypassed, the detachment makes a fire strike against
the enemy and a portion of the men and equipment defeats him, while the
main body rushes into the depth of the enemy defenses toward the objec-
tive.

In the course of an offensive, particularly when moving into valleys or

onto mountain plateaus, subunits must be prepared to repel enemy coun-
terattacks. To this end, it is necessary to ascertain the movements and
deployment of the enemy reserves in good time and consolidate on favor-
able lines. In the case of a counterattack down slopes from above, the
battalion consolidates on the slope with a portion of its forces, while the
main body moves around the height using concealed approaches, captures
the summit, and strikes down against the counterattacking enemy forces.

Open flanks are protected by conducting continuous reconnaissance

on threatened axes, configuring the subunits in echelon formation, and
conducting sweeps of ground where the enemy may have set up ambushes.

Combat experience, including that gained during recent local wars,

demonstrates that success in offensives in mountains is vitally dependent
on the timely preparation of subunits and the ability of personnel to
operate boldly and with initiative.

Offensives in the desert are usually conducted from the line of march.
Here, as in the mountains, maneuvers aimed at making deep and close
envelopments of the open enemy flanks and striking at his rear are often
employed. The distinctly fragmented enemy defenses and the level ground
that makes it possible to employ all combat arms on virtually every axis
lend themselves to these maneuvers. However, it is more difficult to con-
ceal maneuvers from the enemy on open desert terrain, and for this reason
protection must be particularly effective.

Because of the considerable dispersal of important installations and

forces in the enemy defenses, subunit combat missions may be assigned at
greater depths behind enemy lines and attacks may be carried out on
broader fronts.

123
 The battle formation is configured with due regard for the possibility
that subunits will operate away from the main body, meaning that provi-
sion must be made for autonomous actions by them.

When organizing an offensive in the desert, commanders indicate

compass bearing for movement, the procedure for marking the locations
of subunits, reliable methods of negotiating sand dunes, wet saline soil,
and other difficult sectors; measures to protect control posts, flanks and
rear and to maintain adequate sanitary and hygienic conditions in troop
dispositions; procedures for preparing weapons and combat equipment for
operation in dusty conditions; and priorities for water and fuel expendi-
tures in the course of the engagement.

Fire strikes against the enemy are organized and carried out with due
regard for the open and flat nature of the terrain. Direct fire is used
extensively by guns and tanks. Preparatory fire for an attack is usually
directed against individual centers of resistance and strongpoints. Here the
destruction (neutralization) of enemy antitank resources is stressed.

It is important for advancing forces to capture oases, road junctions,

and water sources. Exercise experience reveals that success is achieved here
when attacks are made simultaneously from the front by attacking
subunits, from the flanks by outflanking detachments, and from the rear
by a tactical airborne assault force. Attacks must be sudden and swift.

In the course of an offensive in the desert, particular attention is paid

to ensuring that reconnaissance discovers enemy centers of resistance for-
ward of the front line and on the flanks in good time, determines the
passability of terrain on the axes of subunit actions, and discovers the
locations of enemy ambushes.

Engineer support for advancing forces' actions in the desert consists in

well-timed discovery of water sources, protection of open flanks with
obstacles, and construction and maintenance of water supply points.

When chemical warfare support is organized, particular attention is

given to radiological and chemical reconnaissance of oases and to
dosimetric and chemical monitoring of water sources.

In arctic regions and during winter, offensives are usually conducted

along roads, as a rule from a position of direct contact with the enemy. A
motorized rifle (tank) battalion attacks as a part of the main body of its
regiment or independently on a separate axis. In many cases, motorized
rifle subunits may function as outflanking detachments assigned to cooper-
ate with subunits advancing from the front in the capture of key terrain
objectives.

124
 During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet troops carried out successful
offensive actions under the difficult conditions of the Arctic. The main
method used to overcome enemy defenses was frontal attack combined
with off-road deep and close envelopment of strongpoints.^'

When preparing for offensives in arctic regions, in addition to general

matters, the battalion commander also indicates the sequence of subunit
actions in capturing defiles, road junctions, and commanding heights. In
winter actions, provisions are made for crossing deep snow, organizing
warm-up points, protecting personnel against frostbite, preparing weapons
and combat equipment for use in low temperatures, and camouflage.

Preparatory fire for an attack on various axes may vary in duration

and begin at different times. The densest fire is directed against enemy
targets located on mountain slopes adjacent to roads and in defiles.

When the snow is deep, motorized rifle subunits usually attack on

skis. In this case, the tanks advance directly in the extended line with the
subunits or immediately behind this line, providing covering fire for the
attacking subunits. Infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers)
operate behind the tanks and use their armament to destroy enemy targets
hindering the advance of the subunits. In areas covered with ice, it is
possible to attack in these vehicles without dismounting.

When offensives are conducted during the arctic night or in snow-

storms or blizzards, it is important to provide reliable orientation for the
subunits. Marker (alignment) lights are placed for this purpose. The com-
pass bearing of the axis of advance is given to the subunits.

In the course of an engagement, the subunits exploit gaps in the

enemy's battle formation and open flanks to infiltrate into the depth of his
defenses and, by making surprise attacks, to capture enemy strongpoints,
primarily those that cover roads, defiles, passes, and built-up areas.

Troops must be given special training in order to succeed in actions in

arctic regions, while personnel must develop skill in quick orientation,
correctly calculating distances and target ranges, and firing in poor weather
conditions, and subunits must train in operating resolutely and be able to
seize the initiative from the enemy and employ unexpected tactical
procedures.

The principles of conducting modern offensive engagements are being

intensively refined. The nature of the modern offensive engagement and
the methods used in preparing for and conducting it will be influenced by
the increasingly extensive introduction of modern armaments, electronic
and other resources, and automated troop control systems, in addition to

125
nuclear weapons. This may lead to further extension of the spatial limits of
engagements, especially with regard to depth, and also to greater use of
airspace, a significant increase in the intensity of offensive actions, and to
their being conducted with exceptional determination, dynamism, and ma-
neuverability.

Under such conditions, commanders and staffs will be required, as

never before, to demonstrate creativity and initiative, and to employ new,
more effective procedures for defeating the enemy, conducting fire strikes
against him, configuring battle formations, and defining subunit combat
missions and methods of organizing cooperation, troop control, and com-
bat, technical, and logistic support. The moral-political and psychological
training of troops becomes particularly important.

Notes
1. D. S. Kaminskiy and S. A. Novosel'skiy, Poteri v proshtykh voynakh [Casualties in Past
Wars], Moscow, 1947, pp. 127-50.
2. A. A. Strokov, Vooruzhennyye sily i voyennoye iskusstvo v pervoy mirovoy voyne [The
Armed Forces and the Art of War in World War I), Moscow, 1974, p. 590.
3. Taktika po inostrannym vzglyadam [Foreign Views on Tactics], Moscow, 1972, p. 216.
4. Field Manual 100-5.
5. Sovelskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], 1978. V, 520.
6. Taktika v boyevykh primerakh. Polk [Tactics in Combat Examples: The Regiment],
Moscow, 1974, p. 56.
7. A. Kirey, Artilleriya ataki i oborony [Artillery on the Attack and the Defense], Moscow,
1936, p. 69.
8. Tactics in Combat Examples: The Regiment, pp. 32, 88.
9. Armeyskiye operatsii [Army Operations], Moscow, 1977, pp. 67-68.
10. Tankovyy batal'on v boyu [The Tank Battalion in Combat], Moscow, 1972, p. 197.
11. Army Operations, pp. 22-23.
12. Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva [The History of the Art of War], Moscow, 1961, Book 3,
p. 487.
13. Soviet Military Encyclopedia, 1976, I, 532.
14. M. V. Frunze, Sobr. soch. [Collected Works], Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, I, 237.
15. Boyevoy ustav pekhoty Krasnoy Armii [Red Army Infantry Field Regulations], Moscow,
1942, part 2, p. 423.
16. Soviet Military Encyclopedia, I, 266.
17. Taktika v boyevykh primerakh. Diviziya. [Tactics in Combat Examples: The Division],
1976, p. 62.
18. Soviet Military Encyclopedia, I, 266.
19. N. K. Glazunov and N. Ye Maslennikov, Sukhoputnyye voyska kapitalisticheskikh
gosudarstv [The Ground Forces of the Capitalist States], p. 175.
20. Nastupatel'nyy boy strelkovoy divizii [The Rifle Division in Offensive Engagements],
Moscow, 1949, p. 71.
21. F. Engels, Izbrannyye voyennyye proizvedeniya [Selected Military Works], Moscow,
1937, II, 303.
22. Army Operations, p. 84.
23. Tactics in Combat Examples: The Division, p. 33.
24. Ibid., p. 111.
25. Ibid.

126
26. Ibid., p. 112.
27. Ibid.
28. Boyevyye deystviya noch'yu [Night Combat Actions], Moscow, 1970, p. 85.
29. Army Operations, p. 124.
30. Boyevyye deystviya v osobykh usloviyakh [Combat Actions in Special Conditions],
Moscow, 1967, p. 68.
31. Tactics in Combat Examples: The Regiment, p. 133.

127
Chapter 3. The Meeting Engagement

1. The Characteristic Features of a Meeting Engagement

A meeting engagement occurs when both sides try to accompUsh
assigned missions by attacking. Troops in a meeting engagement aim to
rout the attacking enemy quickly, seize the initiative, and create favorable
conditions for subsequent aggressive actions. A meeting engagement can
take place on the march, in an offensive when repelling counterattacks and
counterstrikes or when exploiting successes and engaging enemy troops,
and in defense when making counterattacks and counterstrikes or destroy-
ing enemy airborne or amphibious assault forces.'

The increased firepower, striking power and mobility of formations,

units, and subunits resulting from the equipping of troops with nuclear
weapons, missiles, tanks, self-propelled artillery systems, as well as other
combat equipment and weapons, has significantly increased the offensive
capabilities of the opposing sides. Today, therefore, the probability of a
meeting engagement taking place and its importance in the scheme of
combat actions are especially great.

The meeting engagement is now taking on new characteristics that

make it significantly different not only from the meeting engagements of
the Great Patriotic War, but from those of comparatively recent local wars
as well.

The characteristic features of modern meeting engagements are limited

time for organization; swift approach by the opposing sides and engage-
ment from the line of march; intense struggle to gain time and to seize and
hold the initiative; drastic and frequent changes in situation; the develop-
ment of actions on a broad front and in great depth and the rapidity with
which they evolve; and the existence of open flanks and gaps that allow
freedom of maneuver.

The limited time available to organize meeting engagements is ex-

plained by the conditions under which they occur. In preparing to attack a
defending enemy, the initiative in choosing the moment to go over to the
attack belongs to the attacking side, which results mainly from the need

128
for comprehensive preparation for battle in order to guarantee success, but
the basic work of organizing a meeting engagement is carried out on the
appearance of a specific opponent, who is also striving to achieve his aims
by attacking—during a march, while the opponents are approaching one
another, or while combat actions are already in progress. Only some of the
measures necessary to prepare for a meeting engagement may be carried
out beforehand.

The extremely limited time available for organizing meeting engage-

ments makes it difficult to make decisions, assign missions to the subunits,
and organize cooperation; it requires great efficiency and coordination on
the part of commanders and staffs, speed and efficiency of action, and
immediate execution of commands and instructions on the part of the
troops. Taking this into account, experienced commanders take a number
of measures beforehand, while still anticipating a meeting engagement, that
are conducive to organizing for battle in a short time and to achieving
success. They determine the lines of probable enemy contact and the
concept of action on them; they set up the appropriate grouping of
resources on the march, if engagement from the line of march is envis-
aged; they organize combat and logistic support; and they conduct political
work.

The swift approach of the opposing sides and their engagement from
the Hne of march are the results of great troop mobility. The swiftness of
approach is equal to the sum of the average speeds of the troops closing
with one another. The higher these speeds, the higher the rate of approach.
At average speeds of 25-30 km/h, opposing subunits located 50-60 kilo-
meters apart can enter into a meeting engagement in about an hour.

The engagement of troops from the line of march immediately after

approaching is a result of the decisiveness of their objectives and missions,
the drive to forestall the enemy's actions, and the dynamism of the engage-
ment itself. Subunits are deployed in battle formation chiefly from col-
umns of route. In some cases, particularly when a meeting engagement
occurs while an enemy's tactical zone of defense is being negotiated, troops
of both sides or one may be deployed in battle formation beforehand.
Here too, however, they will engage from the line of march.

When troops enter into a meeting engagement, intelligence on the

enemy is usually far from complete, while the time for final reconnoitering
and clarifying the situation is extremely limited. Moreover, the opposing
forces, with their great mobility and maneuverability, can quickly alter
their grouping of men and equipment and axes of actions. This makes
reconnaissance difficult and at the same time demands that it be highly
efficient and complete, and that information be highly reliable.

129
 The intense struggle to gain time and to seize and liold the initiative
results from the very essence of the meeting engagement. When attacking a
defending or withdrawing enemy, the attaclcing side has the initiative from
the very beginning of combat actions, but in a meeting engagement, when
each side considers itself capable of routing the other with aggressive
offensive actions, each having gained time, endeavors first of all to seize
the initiative, so that it can secure freedom of action, dictate its will to the
enemy, and force him to operate under unfavorable conditions.

The struggle to seize and hold the initiative is intense and continues
throughout the engagement. Today, this struggle is assuming increasing
scope in terms of time and space. It starts with nuclear strikes and the use
of aviation, combat helicopters, long-range missiles and tube artillery, and
airborne assault forces while the opposing sides are quite distant from one
another.

As the opposing forces approach one another, the struggle to seize the
initiative intensifies. In addition to making powerful nuclear and fire
strikes, it becomes extremely important to forestall the enemy in deploying
and going over to the attack, and in occupying favorable lines and areas
that will provide for the successful development of subsequent combat
actions. Simultaneously, it is necessary to take measures to reduce the
enemy's momentum of advance and break up the organized deployment of
his units and subunits. This is achieved by strikes by aviation and missile
subunits and artillery fire against enemy columns, particularly near cross-
ings, defiles, road junctions, and passes, by setting up obstacles on the
enemy's movement routes, and by seizing important installations in his
rear with tactical airborne assault forces.

The nuclear weapons in the arsenals of modern armies, if used, can

quickly alter the correlation of forces of the opposing sides, while great
troop mobility enables new units and subunits to be brought up quickly.
Therefore, the side that loses the initiative will make every attempt to
regain it during a meeting engagement, because the outcome of the strug-
gle for initiative determines the result of the engagement. Once one side
has lost the initiative and goes over to the defensive or begins to retreat,
the meeting engagement loses its specific character, because the other side
will attack the defending enemy or go over to pursuit.

Drastic and frequent changes in situation are characteristic of every

type of modern combined arms combat, but become especially important
in a meeting engagement. This is mainly the result of the continuous and
intense struggle for the initiative. Both sides display great aggressiveness
and resolve in combat. Combat actions develop dynamically. The absence
of a continuous front line creates conditions favorable for making power-

130
ful strikes on the flanks and rear. Therefore, drastic and frequent changes
take place in the status and position of the opposing forces, as well as in
the nature and methods of their actions.

A meeting engagement usually takes place on terrain with no engineer

preparation, where the troops on both sides are in the open. Because of
this, the effectiveness and radius of destruction of nuclear weapons, artil-
lery, and other fire weapons on targets situated in the open are increased.
This creates conditions favorable for a higher momentum of advance,
maneuver, and decisive penetration of the enemy's battle formation and
leads to drastic and rapid changes in the situation.

The development of actions on a broad front and in great depth and

the rapidity of their development are the result of each side endeavoring to
achieve the advantage through maneuver so as to attack the enemy's flank
or rear. In the initial stages of a meeting engagement both sides endeavor
to deploy the maximum resources in the first echelon as quickly as possible
in order to make a strong initial attack, carry out a deep enveloping
maneuver, make a close envelopment of the enemy's open flanks, and at
the same time safeguard their own flanks. Because of this, combat actions
develop on a broad front. During the Great Patriotic War, the front on
which units and subunits were deployed in a meeting engagement was
about two or three times larger than that in an attack on a defending
enemy. ^ Roughly the same ratio may also exist today.

In meeting engagements, the use of modern weaponry with its great

destructive power, the great mobility and striking power of the troops, and
the decisiveness of actions are responsible for the rapid development of
meeting engagements. Rapid development is particularly characteristic of
meeting engagements between subunits. If one side forestalls the other in
making powerful fire strikes and going over to the attack and is able, after
skillful maneuver, to make a strong attack on his flank and rear, the
outcome of the meeting engagement will be decided quite quickly. The
other side, if not totally defeated, will, with the losses it has suffered, be
obliged to go over to the defensive or begin to withdraw.

The existence of open flanks and gaps gives both sides freedom of
maneuver. The meeting engagement begins, as a rule, at the moment when
the flanks of the opposing forces advancing toward one another are open,
which provides conditions favorable for maneuver. This is facilitated as
well by the absence of a continuous front line and the existence of consid-
erable gaps between the subunits deployed to contain the enemy from the
front and the main body making the strike.

131
 Thus, modern meeting engagements have a number of characteristic
features that must be taken into account if they are to be carried through
with success.

2. The Conditions Necessary for Success in a Meeting Engage-

ment
In order to achieve victory in a meeting engagement, it is necessary to
creatively employ the general principles of modern combined arms combat
and to skillfully use the great maneuverability, mobility, firepower and
striking power of the forces involved. In addition, experience in combat
reveals that the course and outcome of a meeting engagement are greatly
influenced by factors arising from the nature of this type of combat. They
must be considered in their entirety in organizing and conducting a meeting
engagement.

In a meeting engagement, both sides endeavor to carry out their

missions by attacking and engage from the line of march. Therefore, one
of the main conditions for success is constant and aggressive reconnais-
sance of the enemy, with a view to obtaining reliable information on him.
Forces that remain unaware of enemy positions, forces, and intentions are
liable to attack from any direction, while their actions become random and
disorganized, they lose the initiative, and, as a result, suffer defeat.

Today, under the constant threat of enemy employment of nuclear

weapons and where troops are highly mobile, possess great firepower, and
are dispersed both laterally and in depth, change positions rapidly and are
capable of making sudden changes in their direction of movement, the role
of reconnaissance is becoming ever more important.

Reconnaissance must locate the advancing enemy in good time, detect

his grouping and concept, and constantly monitor all his actions. Timely
location of the enemy and establishing uninterrupted surveillance over him
enables a commander to assess a situation correctly and make well-
founded decisions, as well as to foresee probable changes in the situation
while combat actions arc in progress.

The conditions for organizing a meeting engagement, the timeliness of

a commander's updating or making of a decision, the assignment of
missions to subunits, the coordination of their efforts, rapidity of deploy-
ment, and, in the final analysis, the successful rout of the enemy, depend
on the distance at which the advancing enemy is spotted and the complete-
ness, reliability, and accuracy of intelligence information.

132
 A commander receives intelligence on the enemy from his own recon-
naissance and from his senior commander's (chief's) forward operational
intelligence elements, the security subunits and forward detachment, as
well as directly from reconnaissance and combat aircraft and helicopters,
from airborne assault forces, adjacent elements, and his senior commander
(chief). A commander's personal observation of the enemy is also ex-
tremely important, particularly when the march security elements are en-
gaged in combat.

Reconnaissance detachments and reconnaissance (combat reconnais-

sance) patrols play an important role in obtaining intelligence information.

A reconnaissance detachment may consist of a motorized rifle com-

pany, to which engineer and chemical warfare subunits are usually at-
tached. While at a great distance from the enemy, when the probability of
contact is low, a reconnaissance detachment usually advances by road at
maximum speed. On approaching the line of probable contact with the
enemy, it as a rule moves covertly, off the roads, from one advantageous
observation point to another, carefully observing the roads and other
possible lines of enemy approach.

A reconnaissance (combat reconnaissance) patrol may be as much as a

reinforced platoon in strength. The distance separating it from the main
body of the battalion (company) depends on the mission to be accom-
plished, the enemy's actions, the nature of the terrain, and communica-
tions support capability.

IntelUgence information must be transmitted to the commander with-

out delay, since it is quickly outdated in meeting engagements.

Units and subunits enter meeting engagements from the line of march.
After an engagement begins, there is no time for re-forming and reallocat-
ing support weapons and reinforcements. Therefore, to succeed in a meet-
ing engagement, the commander must set up his grouping of resources
beforehand, based on his concept of the forthcoming engagement.

While on the march in anticipation of a meeting engagement, it is

important to decide on the composition of the forward security element,
the advance guard, and the forward detachment and their distance from
the main body, as well as the placement of artillery and antiaircraft
subunits within the column of the main body. It is advisable to bring the
artillery of the advance guard and main body up to the head of the
column so that it will be able to deploy and open fire quickly; and to keep
the antiaircraft subunits attached to the battalion closer to the head of the
column of the main body, while keeping the organic antiaircraft platoon in
the point of the vanguard or the column of the main body.

133
 One of the main conditions for success in a meeting engagement is
timeliness in making tiie decision and disseminating missions to subordi-
nate subunits, since the time factor is of prime importance in a meeting
engagement. The slightest delays in making decisions and disseminating
missions to the troops will lead to delays in launching fire strikes, deploy-
ing subunits, and going over to the attack, to loss of initiative, and, in the
end, to defeat. At the same time, swiftness must not result in decisionmak-
ing that is less expedient in a tactical sense.

Timeliness of decisionmaking for a meeting engagement presupposes

not only that decisions will correspond to a situation, but also that they
will enable troops to maneuver and form groupings that conform to the
concept of the engagement and to forestall the enemy in making fire
strikes, seizing advantageous lines, and deploying his main forces. If the
troops do not succeed in the above, even the best decisions may prove
unacceptable. Therefore, accurate timing, swiftness, and efficiency on the
part of commanders and staffs, and precision and good organization in
actions by troops are indispensable.
An insufficiently clear situation and fragmentary, sometimes even contradictory, infor-
mation on the enemy do not relieve a commander of his responsibility for making sound and
bold decisions, in good time and on the basis of the combat mission assigned and available
information on the situation, and implementing them with persistence. Putting off a decision
until the situation has become clearer, until new and more complete information on the
enemy has been received, is tantamount to inertness and indecision and enables the enemy to
reconnoiter the friendly grouping, make nuclear and fire strikes against it, and forestall it in
deploying.

A battalion commander usually makes the decision to attack an ad-

vancing enemy in a meeting engagement while on the move, formulating it
on the map, either when the point of the vanguard engages the enemy or
when he receives the combat mission. In so doing, he decides on the
following: the concept of the engagement, combat missions for the
subunits, basic questions of cooperation and procedure for comprehensive
support, and the organization of troop control.

Concepts for meeting engagements establish: the axis on which the

main efforts will be concentrated, the type of maneuver and sequence to
be used in routing the advancing enemy force, the procedure for firing on
the enemy while he is advancing and deploying, the battle formation and
the order of employment of organic and attached resources.

In a meeting engagement, only the immediate objective and the subse-

quent direction of attack are given to the battalion, while subsequent
objectives are not assigned.

The substance of the immediate objective depends on the battalion's

place in the battle formation (march formation). The immediate objective

134
of a battalion in the forward detachment consists in seizing and holding a
particular line, employing all its fire resources against the leading enemy
subunits, and supporting the advance of its own main body.

The immediate objective of a battalion in the advance guard is to

eliminate the enemy's security subunits, to contain the aggressive actions of
the enemy's main body, and support its own main body in deploying and
engaging the enemy.

The immediate objective of a battalion operating in the main body

may be to rout, on its axis, the main body battalion of the enemy's first
echelon, destroy or capture enemy artillery, and seize a line that will be
advantageous for subsequent actions.

When combat missions are assigned to the subunits, the following are
usually indicated:

—for the forward security element—composition, movement route,

and the line to be seized and held, and by what time, in order to support
the main body as it deploys, as well as the sequence of actions with which
to begin their attack;

—for organic and attached artillery subunits—missions to support the

forward security element and the main body as they engage, areas for fire
positions and the time by which to be prepared to open fire, signals for
opening, switching, and ceasing fire, and sequence of position changes
during the engagement;

—for the motorized rifle (tank) companies—combat missions, the line

for going over to the attack, time and direction of attack, procedures for
cooperation, and routes to be taken to the line for going over to the
attack;

—and for the reserve—composition, axis, and order of position

changes during the engagement.

As a rule, a commander assigns combat missions to the subunits by

radio and later updates them on the spot. Artillery and subunits that will
be engaging the enemy and operating on the main axis are the first to be
assigned their missions. Basic questions of troop control and comprehen-
sive support are pointed out at the same time.

The battle formations of subunits in meeting engagements must make

it possible to make strong initial strikes. Therefore, it is formed up, as a
rule, in a single echelon, with a reserve allocated.

135
 Success in a meeting engagement also depends on maneuvering
quickly to seize a favorable line; forestalling the enemy's nuclear and fire
strikes, deploying and going over to the attack; and hitting the enemy with
strong surprise attacks, as a rule on his flank and rear.

A favorable line for deploying forces might be one that commands

terrain to the front, provides for the effective employment of all combat
arms and types of combat equipment, particularly tanks, infantry combat
vehicles (armored personnel carriers), ATGMs, and artillery, and has hid-
den approaches and routes for the advance and rapid deployment of
troops and for hitting the enemy's flank and rear.

Forestalling the enemy in occupying a favorable line makes it possible

to better exploit terrain features so that the main body can deploy and
engage the enemy and helps in planning and organizing maneuvers for the
purpose of making strong surprise attacks on the enemy's flank and rear.

Forward detachments, advance guards, and tactical airborne assault

forces play an important role in seizing favorable lines that will ensure
conditions advantageous to the main body when it deploys and engages the
enemy. So that they can perform their assigned missions successfully,
forward detachments and advance guards receive allocations primarily of
tank subunits.

Today the importance of forestalling enemy fire strikes has drastically

increased. As noted in the foreign press, field artillery, multiple rocket-
launcher systems, missiles, and ammunition in the armies of a number of
capitalist countries have undergone extensive development in recent years;
remote mining of the terrain on troop advance and maneuver routes is
employed extensively. In the US Army, for example, increasing efforts are
going into the development of highly accurate reconnaissance-fire com-
plexes, capable of locating and engaging tanks, infantry combat vehicles,
and other armored targets.^

The initiative can be seized and major tactical advantages gained by

forestalling enemy fire strikes and, when nuclear weapons are used in
combat actions, also by making nuclear strikes; major losses can be in-
flicted, troop control compromised, advances disrupted, and deployment
and organized engagement delayed by opening fire on the enemy's forces
by surprise, thereby creating favorable conditions for completely routing
him with fewer resources and in a shorter time.

In addition to forestalling the enemy in making nuclear and fire

strikes, it is also very important to forestall him in deploying his main
body and going over to the attack. The significance of this condition in

136
achieving success in a meeting engagement has been confirmed in many
meeting engagements in past wars and is emphasized in the manuals of
many modern armies.

Prior deployment makes it possible to gain time, hit the enemy force
with powerful initial strikes when it is as yet unprepared for offensive
actions, seize the initiative, and defeat the main enemy forces in detail,
without giving them a chance to deploy completely. Prior deployment also
enables one to maneuver freely, engage the enemy in an organized manner,
and exploit the effects of fire strikes most effectively.

The enemy can be forestalled in deploying by making timely decisions;

by creating groupings of resources in keeping with the concept of the
forthcoming engagement before the line of probable contact with the
enemy is approached; and by organizing the march formation in a suitable
manner, reducing the depth of the columns and deploying troops quickly.
It is also very important to prevent the organized advance of enemy
groupings. This can be done by making powerful surprise nuclear, fire,
and air strikes on advancing enemy columns, major crossings, defiles, road
junctions, and other important targets on the enemy's movement routes
whose destruction may cause extended delays in the enemy's advance and
prevent his organized deployment; by capturing and holding key points of
the terrain with airborne assault forces; and by setting up obstacles on the
enemy's movement routes. Enemy deployment can be broken up by mak-
ing powerful nuclear and fire strikes against his main grouping at the
deployment line, when troops assume a more compact battle formation
laterally and in depth.

Success cannot be achieved in a meeting engagement unless the initia-

tive is seized and held during the engagement. This is achieved by highly
aggressive and resolute actions and mobility on the part of the troops, by
efficiency on the part of commanders and staffs, and by demonstrating
creativity and forestalling enemy actions.

The open flanks and gaps between units and subunits in a meeting
engagement enable the enemy to carry out wide maneuver aimed at mak-
ing powerful surprise attacks on the flanks and rear. For this reason, it is
particularly important to protect them if one is to achieve success in a
meeting engagement. This is done by conducting constant reconnaissance
on the flanks, detecting enemy preparations for strikes on the flank in
good time, and taking measures to prevent such attacks; and by placing
reserves and antitank weapons closer to the flanks and organizing resis-
tance to the enemy quickly if he attacks. Experienced commanders employ
echeloned formations on the flanks, which makes it possible to cover them
in depth and successfully repel attacks by enemy units and subunits de-
ployed for deep or close enveloping maneuvers.

137
 A most important condition for achieving success in a meeting en-
gagement is firm and continuous troop control and the maintenance of
constant cooperation among subunits. Combat actions develop when there
is active resistance from the enemy and in quickly and drastically changing
situations. Often communications with the senior commander (chief) be-
come difficult or are broken for a time, while the situation demands
immediate action. In these situations, commanders must make decisions
and implement them quickly, demonstrating creativity and initiative.

"Even with adequately equipped and well-trained personnel," states

Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense,
"the combat capabilities of subunits, units, ships, and formations will
remain unexploited and missions will be threatened with ruin if troop
control is not effective.'"'
A commander's initiative is grounded in a correct understanding of the combat mission
and the situation. It consists in endeavoring to find the most effective ways and means of
carrying out combat missions, exploiting situations that are developing in his favor quickly
and in good time, and taking measures to immediately eliminate threats as they occur.

The conditions that determine success in a meeting engagement are

closely interrelated, but in specific situations certain of them may be
decisive. Therefore, subunit commanders must be able not only to make
provision for them in combat, but also to exploit them with skill in order
to rout the enemy decisively and quickly.

3. Routing an Enemy in a Meeting Engagement

A meeting engagement may be conducted with both nuclear and
conventional weapons or conventional weapons alone. In selecting a
method of routing the enemy, the specific conditions in which the meeting
engagement develops, the combat capabilities of the troops, the profes-
sional training of commanders and staffs and their skill in troop control,
and the field training of the subunits are taken into account.

When nuclear weapons are employed in combat actions, direct contact

with enemy subunits in meeting engagements will be preceded, as a rule,
by nuclear strikes on advancing enemy groupings using weapons under the
control of a senior commander (chief). These strikes will be made as the
enemy groupings move up, and their effects will have a decisive influence
on the nature of subsequent combat actions.

Nuclear strikes against enemy columns as they pass road junctions,

crossings, defiles, and other choke points may be particularly effective.
Such strikes make it possible to inflict damage on the enemy's advancing

138
force, hold up its advance, or create favorable conditions for forestalling
him in deploying and carrying out synchronized attacks by motorized rifle
and tank subunits.

The use of nuclear weapons puts the advancing enemy forces against
which they are employed at a disadvantage even before they engage, makes
it possible to seize the initiative, and sets up conditions that will lead to
success in a meeting engagement.

In turn, the enemy will constantly endeavor to make nuclear strikes as

well. Thus, it is imperative to anticipate this eventuality and take measures
to reduce troop vulnerability to a minimum and prevent delays in their
advance.

Reconnaissance subunits, once they have made contact with enemy

reconnaissance and security subunits, usually bypass them and infiltrate to
the main body, determine its composition, grouping, direction of move-
ment, times for passing major lines, gaps, flanks, possible lines of deploy-
ment and the times when deployment will begin, artillery fire positions,
and control post sites. The special mission of reconnaissance subunits is to
establish the locations of enemy nuclear and chemical weapons. If neces-
sary, the reconnaissance subunits attack individual enemy foward subunits,
take prisoners, and disrupt movements. They quickly report information
on the enemy to the commander who sent them.

Meeting engagements usually open when the forward detachment and

march security element come into contact with the enemy's security ele-
ments and forward detachments.

The forward detachment, advancing at maximum speed, endeavors to

beat the enemy to its indicated line. The chief mission of the foward
detachment is to forestall the enemy in occupying a favorable line and to
delay him until the main body approaches. Advancing to a designated line,
the forward detachment eliminates the small groups it encounters by means
of resolute actions, inflicts losses on the opposing enemy force using all of
its fire resources, seizes its line from the line of march, and holds it until
the main body draws near. If the enemy forestalls the forward detachment
in reaching the indicated line, the detachment quickly moves against the
enemy's flank and attacks it from the line of march. As a rule, motorized
rifle battalions attack in their infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel
carriers) without dismounting.

If the forward detachment engages a superior enemy force, it will

hold the enemy on other favorable lines using all of its fire resources and
by aggressive actions, providing favorable conditions for the main body to
deploy and engage the enemy and to strike his flank and rear.

139
 The actions of the march security elements (forward security element,
advance guard) must be aggressive and resolute. They play a major role in
seizing the initiative. The commander of a battalion (company) allocated to
the march security element must be aware that success in the engagement
hinges on his resolute actions.

On encountering enemy reconnaissance and security subunits, the for-

ward security element eliminates them by deploying from the line of march
and continues to carry out its assigned mission. On coming into contact
with a superior enemy force, it takes up a favorable line and, holding it
stubbornly, inflicts losses on the enemy with all its fire resources, enabling
the column thus covered to deploy and engage the enemy. When the
forward security element engages the enemy, the advance guard quickens
its advance in order to provide timely support to the former.

The artillery usually takes up fire positions along the route of advance
from the line of march and immediately opens fire on the advancing
enemy columns. It neutralizes enemy artillery and antitank weapons and
supports the forward security element, as well as the advance guard as it
advances, deploys, and engages. The guns allocated for direct fire and the
ATOM launchers advance to their fire positions. In order to hinder the
enemy's deployment and restrict his maneuvers, they first hit the vehicles
at the head and tail of a column.

The tank and motorized rifle subunits of the advance guard, in infan-
try combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers), exploit natural terrain
features and move up to their axis, deploy for battle from the line of
march, swiftly attack enemy covering subunits and eliminate them, pene-
trate to the main enemy force, make a decisive attack on it, and contain it,
enabling their own main force to maneuver, deploy, and engage the en-
emy.

On encountering a superior enemy force, the advance guard quickly

deploys on a favorable line (one already reached) and, using tank, artillery,
antitank, infantry combat vehicle (armored personnel carrier), and small-
arms fire, contains the enemy on a broad front, holds up further enemy
advances, and enables the main body to engage under advantageous condi-
tions. Strong antitank defenses are set up on axes accessible to tanks using
all the antitank resources allotted to the advance guard. Combat engineer
subunits construct antitank obstacles in front and on the flanks of the line
occupied.

If the leading enemy subunits succeed in forestalling the advance

guard in taking a favorable line, then actions are taken to seize this line
from the line of march. The enemy is neutralized with artillery and tank
fire and air and combat helicopter strikes, after which a hasty attack is

140
carried out. After taking the designated line, the subunits of the advance
guard consolidate on it and with aggressive actions enable the main body
to deploy and engage.
The actions of subunits in the forward detachment and march security elements provide
advantageous conditions for the main body to deploy and engage the enemy. For this reason
the senior commander (chief) must devote as much attention as possible to their actions,
provide timely support mainly with his own fire resources, and take all possible measures to
exploit their success using the main body, to hold up the deployment of the enemy's main
body, and eliminate his leading subunits before their actions receive support from forces
advancing from the depth.

Combat experience reveals that striking the enemy's flank and rear
with the main body is an effective way of routing an enemy in a meeting
engagement. The flanks and, even more so, the rear are the most vulnera-
ble spots in an enemy battle formation. Attacks on the flank and rear
create advantageous conditions for hitting the enemy with all fire resources
on a broad front. When maneuvers are made covertly and these attacks
made quickly, the enemy is unable to prepare to repel them, which in a
meeting engagement may result in the defeat of his stronger, as yet
undeployed grouping (figure 8).

During the Great Patriotic War, tank and mechanized units had great
capabilities for maneuvering on the enemy's flanks and rear in meeting
engagements. With their excellent cross-country performance and speed of
movement and their ability to brush aside enemy screening forces from the
line of march, they carried out deep and close envelopments and attacked
where they were least expected.
On 8 November 1943, during the Kiev-Fastov Operation, the 55th Tank Brigade of the
7th Guards Tanl< Corps carried out a deep envelopment and made a surprise strike on the
right flank of the units of the enemy's 25th Tank Division as they were deploying for a
meeting engagement. The surprise achieved and the force of this strike largely determined the
success of the engagement.'

Depending on the situation, attacks may be made on one or both

flanks and the rear simultaneously.

At the same time, it may not always prove possible or advisable to

attack a flank because of unfavorable terrain features, lack of time for
maneuver, or the need for aggressive actions on the shortest axis that are
aimed at swiftly exploiting the effects of a nuclear strike, or because one is
in contact with the enemy's outflanking force.

In a meeting engagement, the enemy will also try to make extensive

use of flank and rear attacks. For this reason, the axes of deep or close
envelopments by friendly and enemy forces may coincide. In such cases,
frontal attacks are made in order to split the enemy grouping and defeat it
in detail. The subunits attack following nuclear and intense fire strikes.

141
making extensive use of breaches and gaps in the enemy's battle forma-
tion. The axis of attack is selected on terrain that is most advantageous to
actions by tanks and infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers).

In order to maneuver and strike the enemy's flank and rear with the
main body, it is often necessary to contain him from the front. A small
portion of the subunits, motorized rifle subunits as a rule, are allotted for
this mission. They also operate aggressively and resolutely, so as not to
give the enemy a chance to maneuver against the friendly grouping as it
carries out a deep or close envelopment.

The order of deployment for the main body and the time needed to
deploy depend on the composition of the main body, its configuration, the
distance from the line of probable enemy contact, the actions of the march
security elements, the enemy's composition and the nature of his actions,
and also the terrain features. In all cases, it is advisable to advance and
deploy as rapidly as possible in order to forestall the enemy's deployment
and make a strong coordinated strike against him. Therefore, when de-
ploying the main body, one should avoid complicated regroupings that will
lead to delays.

Depending on the enemy's axis of actions, terrain features, and the

concept of the meeting engagement, the main body may be deployed by
re-forming into battalion, company, and platoon columns in sequence, and
subsequently deploying for combat, or by having the subunits turn simul-
taneously in the direction of attack (figure 9).

Moreover, if prevailing circumstances permit and the terrain provides

good masking features, the main body can move in march formation
directly to the deployment line and, after simultaneously re-forming into
battle formation, can immediately go over to the attack.

The main body's deployment line is selected so as to enable the main

body to advance to it covertly and deploy rapidly to make a strong
coordinated strike. The advance to the deployment line follows the shortest
axes possible.

In order to approach the enemy swiftly, and also to protect friendly

forces against NBC weapons, it is advisable for the main body, increasing
the distances and gaps between subunits, to continue to advance in battal-
ion columns to the range limit of enemy direct artillery and ATGM fire.

The main body's artillery is deployed as soon as possible, so that it

will be able to provide support for the subunits as they deploy and go over

142
to the attack. In this case, the artillery occupies fire positions at a distance
from the deployment line that will enable it to strike the enemy to a depth
no less than half the range of the guns.

In a meeting engagement, it is often necessary to deploy toward one

or both flanks. This is because of the presence of large gaps and breaches
in the battle formation, the great maneuverability and mobility of the
opposing forces, and their mutual drive to strike the flanks and rear.

If the main body is deployed toward a flank, the flank guard detach-
ment acts as the forward security element. It eliminates the enemy march
security elements, penetrates to his main body, and, with resolute actions,
inflicts losses on him or deploys on a favorable line, whereupon, with fire
and aggressive actions, it contains the enemy and provides the main body
with advantageous conditions for engaging the enemy. A part of the main
body deploys to contain the enemy from the front and create favorable
conditions for striking the enemy flank and rear.

If the enemy is conducting simultaneous actions on the front and

flank, the main efforts will be directed at routing the most threatening
enemy grouping while simultaneously covering friendly forces against his
other grouping.

The enemy will attempt to strike the main grouping with nuclear
weapons, combat helicopters, and aviation the moment it deploys. Particu-
lar attention must therefore be given to air defense and troop NBC de-
fense. The bulk of antiaircraft resources will be used to cover the main
grouping and other major targets. Fighter cover for troops will be in-
creased at the same time.
In order to counter enemy combat helicopters effectively, a commander must constantly
keep in mind the possibility that they may appear suddenly and remain in engagement zones
only briefly; determine possible lines from which enemy helicopters can attack; and conduct
constant air observation and be constantly ready for action against helicopters.

Troop NBC defense is provided when deploying by carrying out

continuous radiological and chemical warfare reconnaissance, by setting up
an early-warning system for the subunits, and by dispersing troops and
exploiting terrain protective and masking features as much as possible. If
the enemy employs nuclear and chemical weapons during deployment,
strong measures are taken to restore the fighting efficiency of the subunits
exposed to attack and to restore disrupted cooperation and troop control.

The most important reconnaissance missions in the deployment stage

are location of enemy nuclear and chemical weapons, identification of

143
targets for nuclear strikes, timely discovery of enemy intentions to launch
flank attacks, and identification of breaches, gaps, and other vulnerable
spots in the enemy battle formation.

The commander and staff, while directing the deployment of the main
body, take measures to move the subunits forward rapidly and switch
them over immediately to the attack. In accordance with the commander's
decision, staff officers are dispatched with communications equipment to
the most important axes, from whence they report on the progress of
deployment. If the enemy strikes the columns as they deploy, the staff
determines the condition of the subunits, assesses the situation, and, in
accordance with the commander's decision, takes measures to restore their
fighting efficiency. Subunits that have lost their fighting efficiency are
replaced by reserves. If losses are significant, the commander and staff
quickly form up combined subunits, which continue to carry out the
combat mission.

The main body goes over to the attack from the line of march.
Preparatory fire for the attack may consist of one or several artillery
strikes. It is important here that the first artillery strike eliminate the fire
resources on which the fire superiority and stability of the enemy's battle
formation depend, including tactical nuclear weapons, ATOM launchers,
guns, tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and air defense weapons.

The main body may engage the enemy simultaneously or sequentially.

Experience reveals that going over to the attack simultaneously enables the
main body to make a strong initial strike that is difficult for the enemy to
repel. The strike is carried out on a broad front, and hence the enemy is
deprived of the ability to maneuver troops that are not under attack. This
sort of strike requires better preparatory fire. However, preparations for a
strong initial attack take a certain amount of time, which may not be
available in many cases.

Sequential engagement of the main body as the subunits approach

and deploy inevitably results in some dispersal of resources and reduces the
force of the initial attack. The enemy may defeat individual subunits or
repel their attacks. For this reason, the main body usually engages sequen-
tially when it is necessary to exploit the effects of a nuclear strike immedi-
ately, when the enemy has not had time to deploy his forces and has thus
created conditions favoring an attack on his flank and rear, or when,
under pressure from a superior enemy force, the march security subunits
are forced to withdraw and the enemy must be stopped immediately in
order to deny him the chance to exploit his success.

Motorized rifle subunits in infantry combat vehicles (armored person-

nel carriers) may attack in conjunction with tanks. Firing on the move.

144
they eliminate enemy resources, striving to penetrate enemy positions to
the greatest depth possible. The attack will be most effective if carried out
while the enemy is deploying when his forces are on the move.

The attacking subunits are supported by artillery fire concentrated

against targets that obstruct the advance, as well as by fire on the most
important enemy targets, whose destruction and neutralization make it
possible to develop the attack rapidly. Enemy nuclear weapons are de-
stroyed as soon as they are discovered. The artillery changes position,
following the attacking subunits, in order to provide continuous fire sup-
port to the entire depth of actions.

When the subunits go over to the attack, they penetrate the gaps
between enemy columns, and the enemy grouping is split and defeated in
detail. Exploiting their success, the subunits prevent the organized deploy-
ment of advancing enemy reserves and deny the enemy any opportunity to
go over to the defensive and regroup his forces.

In meeting engagements, the enemy will usually engage as the subunits

approach. Hence, the attacking force must operate in an exceptionally
aggressive and resolute manner in order to defeat the enemy in detail.

Moreover, in order to rout the enemy's first echelon quickly, it is vital

to seal the battlefield off from advancing enemy reserves. This can be
accomplished by making nuclear, air, and combat helicopter strikes on the
orders of the senior commander (chief) and artillery strikes aimed at
hitting enemy reserves, preventing or hindering their advance, demolishing
bridges, crossings, and roads, and setting up obstacles. Ambushes on the
movement routes of enemy columns and minelaying may also play an
important role.

If the enemy attempts to make a deep or close envelopment of the

flanks of friendly forces, fire strikes are made against the forces carrying
out this maneuver, and the necessary forces are allocated to cover the
flanks with engineer obstacles and antitank weapons. Subunits, primarily
tanks and artillery, are quickly regrouped toward the threatened flank, and
the outflanking or enveloping grouping is eliminated by a decisive strike
against its flank and rear.

Timely exploitation on one axis can have a positive effect on the

entire front and lead to total defeat of the enemy. At the same time, the
slightest delay will inevitably lead to increasing enemy resistance. Conse-
quently, it is advisable to commit the reserve as soon as possible.

Meeting engagements must end in the total rout of the enemy. How-
ever, in many cases the enemy may attempt to withdraw or go over to the

145
defensive. Therefore, it is very important not to give him the opportunity
to consolidate on favorable lines or begin an organized withdrawal.

When enemy attempts to go over to the defensive are detected, they

should be broken up by resolute strikes on his flanks and front. If the
enemy attempts to withdraw in order to escape total rout, pursuit is
organized from the front and along routes paralleling his direction of
withdrawal.

Thus, equipping forces with modern weapons and combat equipment

and increasing the firepower, striking power, and mobility of subunits and
units have greatly influenced the nature and essence of meeting engage-
ments. The circumstances under which they occur have become more
diverse. The depth and power of the opposing sides' fire effect have
increased. Meeting engagements have become more dynamic, maneuvering,
intense, and quickly evolving. The importance of the time factor in a
meeting engagement and of forestalling enemy actions, particularly fire
strikes, has increased dramatically. All this demands great professional
skills on the part of commanders, political workers, staffs, and troops and
requires that they demonstrate creativity and initiative in order to achieve
victory.

The weapons in service make it possible to hit considerable numbers

of tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and other types of combat equipment
effectively over large areas and in a short time and to put whole elements
of troop battle formations out of action long before they engage. Thus,
problems of improving the survivability of troops and troop control sys-
tems and of forestalling enemy actions will become even more acute.
Different ways will have to be found of advancing, deploying forces, and
routing the enemy in a meeting engagement. Manuever, camouflage, air
defense, electronic warfare, and reliable troop control in combat will
increase in importance. All this demands that subunit commanders have a
profound understanding of the modern meeting engagement and that they
be creative in their search for ways of conducting it and achieving success.

Notes
1. See Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], II, 407.
2. See Razvitiye taktiki Sukhoputnykh voysk v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne [The Evolu-
tion of Ground Forces Tactics in the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, 1981, pp. 315-24.
3. See Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye [Foreign Military Review], No. 4, 1978, pp.
11-12; No. 5, 1978, p. 31; No. 4, 1983, p. 16.
4. D. F. Ustinov, Sluzhim Rodine, delu kommunizma [We Serve the Motherland and the
Cause of Communism], p. 95.
5. See Taktika v boyevykh primerakh. Polk [Tactics in Combat Examples: The Regiment],
p. 181.

146
Chapter 4. The Defensive Engagement

1. The Essence of the Defensive Engagement

Defense developed simultaneously with the offensive, inasmuch as
combat actions are a two-sided process. If one side attacks, that is, carries
out an offensive, the other side repels the attacks, or defends.

When the art of war was still in its early formative stages, inequality
in resources and the fact that the attacking force had the initiative and the
ability to choose the axis and time for carrying out strikes determined the
aim and methods of defense.

The aim of the defending forces was to repel offensives by superior

enemy forces, inflict significant losses on them, and hold specific points or
areas on the ground. Here, the defending forces would occupy an advanta-
geous position that enabled them to halt the enemy offensive. If they were
unable to do this in one position, they would hit the enemy at several
positions occupied in succession. After the attackers had suffered losses
and lost their superiority in resources, the defending forces would attempt
to exploit the situation created to go over to the offensive.

When mass armies of many millions made their appearance and

combat actions developed on fronts extending for hundreds or thousands
of kilometers, the way in which defense was employed was determined not
only by the need to combat an attacking enemy, but also by the need to
combine offensive actions on some axes with defensive actions on others.
In other words, defense began to be used to economize on resources on
secondary axes and gain superiority over the enemy for attacking on the
most important axes; to hold lines seized in the course of an offensive and
repel enemy counterstrikes or counterattacks; to cover the flanks and rear
of advancing groupings; and to consolidate lines taken and gain time to
prepare for a renewed offensive. Thus, the way in which defense was
employed was largely subordinated to the interests of the offensive.

The methods by which the defense could achieve its aims were deter-
mined primarily by the state of development of available military equip-
ment. When firearms appeared, strikes against attacking enemy forces

147
were mainly made with infantry and artillery fire, while during World War
I, and particularly during World War II, tank fire and aerial bombing
attacks were used as well.

Inasmuch as the defending forces were, as a rule, inferior to the

attacking enemy in resources and were forced to respond to his actions, the
defenders had to search for ways to improve the effectiveness of their
strikes against the enemy. Factors such as terrain and time were the
primary ones exploited to deprive the enemy of his superiority in resources.

Insofar as possible, defensive positions were selected behind natural

obstructions and on commanding heights and crests that provided good
fields of view and fire over the terrain to the front. Natural obstructions
hindered the actions of both advancing enemy infantry and tanks. Engi-
neer preparation of positions became very important, as did the use of
various obstacles by the troops.

The defenders attempted to occupy positions selected beforehand in

order to gain time for carrying out engineer preparation and other prepara-
tory defensive measures. In addition, positions were as a rule selected at a
distance from the attacking enemy that would force him to expend a
certain amount of time approaching and then preparing his troops for the
attack. The defending forces used this time to set up stronger defenses.

Flexibility in maneuvering fire and resources in order to reinforce

troops that had suffered losses, to counter enemy breakthroughs in depth
and toward the flanks, to alter the correlation of forces, and to gain fire
superiority over the enemy on the main axes became more important when
the defense lacked sufficient resources.

The experience of combat actions revealed that the defender would

succeed if, in addition to making fire strikes against the enemy from
prepared positions and maneuvering resources, he also carried out
counterstrikes against the enemy.'

The principal methods by which the defense achieved its objectives

were striking the enemy with planned fire from all types of weapons in
combination with obstacles; stubbornly holding positions that were well
selected and had good engineering preparation; flexibility in maneuvering
fire and resources; and counterattacking. Of course, these methods of
action were used most effectively by forces that demonstrated firmness and
determination in defense, had been trained for extended defensive engage-
ments under difficult conditions, and made skillful use of all their fire-
power and combat equipment.

148
 Consequently, until nuclear weapons appeared, defense was a type of
engagement whose objectives—repelling attacks by superior enemy forces,
inflicting significant losses on them, holding occupied positions, and creat-
ing advantageous conditions for going over to the offensive—were
achieved by striking the enemy with planned fire from all types of weapons
in combination with obstacles, by taking advantage of favorable terrain
features and engineer-prepared positions, and by the firmness and determi-
nation of the defending force and their use of varied maneuvers and
counterattacks.

The essence of defense is wholly retained today as well, if combat

actions are conducted with conventional weapons alone.

When combat actions are conducted with nuclear weapons, resolute

strikes will be made against an attacking enemy with nuclear weapons.
Thanks to the defending force's having missiles and aviation, preemptive
nuclear strikes may be made against major enemy targets while the enemy
is in the concentration area preparing to attack, as battle groupings ap-
proach the defenses, and while they deploy to attack from the line of
march.

At the same time, the occupation of lines advantageous for defense

and the exploitation of protective features of the terrain and engineer
preparation give the defending force a number of fire and tactical advan-
tages even when nuclear weapons are used and provide protection against
the casualty-producing elements of nuclear and conventional weapons.

A major advantage of the defense continues to lie in its ability to

make more extensive use of obstacles, especially mixed minefields, on the
enemy axes of advance. When nuclear weapons are employed, obstacles
make it possible to hold up or reduce the momentum of advance, deploy-
ment, and attack of enemy tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and armored
personnel carriers and so increase the effects of both conventional and
nuclear weapons on the enemy.

The defending force has greater opportunities to use camouflage ef-

fectively. By concealing his real positions and exposing dummy positions,
the defender forces the enemy to expend nuclear and conventional war-
heads by striking unmanned positions and secondary targets. Therefore,
through skilled and timely exploitation of its advantages, the defense can
withstand attacks by superior enemy forces even when nuclear weapons are
used.

Forces going over to the defense set themselves various objectives.

Nuclear strikes are the primary means of achieving defense objectives. The
most crucial of them, i.e., disrupting prepared enemy offensives, may be

149
achieved through large-scale use of nuclear weapons. At the same time,
planned fire with conventional weapons in combination with obstacles is
used extensively, since it is impossible to carry out all missions relating to
defensive actions with nuclear weapons. This also applies to flexibility in
maneuvering fire and resources and counterattacking and also to firmly
holding advantageous positions with good engineer preparation.

When nuclear weapons are employed, one cannot count on being able
to hold continuous positions where resources are disposed in close deploy-
ment. The attacking force can then use nuclear weapons to create sizable
breaches in the defenses and rush to the depth. For this reason, the
defending force must base its defense on holding principal (key) lines
(areas) that intersect probable enemy axes of advance and provide the
necessary conditions for carrying out effective nuclear and fire strikes and
counterattacking from the depth. The struggle for these lines (areas) will be
aggressive in nature and will demand determination and firmness on the
part of the troops and extensive maneuver of fire and resources.

Thus, when nuclear weapons are employed, the essence of defense

consists in breaking up or repelling attacks by superior enemy forces,
hitting him with nuclear and fire strikes in combination with extensive
maneuver of fire and resources, counterattacks, the use of obstacles, and
stubbornly holding principal (key) areas and positions that intersect proba-
ble enemy axes of advance and thereby create advantageous conditions for
going over to offensive actions.

2. The Characteristic Features of the Modern Defensive En-

gagement and Demands Made on the Defense
Defense develops mainly as a result of improvements in armament
and combat equipment. The nature and methods of conducting defensive
actions are affected not only directly by new weapons, but also by changes
in the methods of attack used by the enemy. Specifically, the use of new
weapons increases a defending force's combat capabilities, imparts new
features to the defense, and makes it more stable and aggressive. At the
same time, the use of new types of weapons and combat equipment by an
attacking enemy increases the firepower and force of his assault, which in
turn heightens the demands on such qualities and characteristics as the
defense must have if it is to withstand the attacker.

The current stage in weapons development is characterized by im-

provement in enemy nuclear weapons, their extensive introduction in for-
mations and units of all services, combat arms, and combat service sup-
port troops, and a buildup of nuclear warheads. The US and other NATO

150
armies consider that nuclear weapons must be used by surprise, on a large
scale, and throughout the depth of the opposing force's combat formation.

Under these circumstances, the defense will be able to achieve its

objectives if it is stable in the sense of being prepared for nuclear defense.
Stability of the defense in this sense means primarily its capability to detect
and destroy the attacking enemy's nuclear weapons before he uses them
and to protect the maximum numbers of men and equipment against
enemy nuclear strikes so as to repel attacks by enemy forces in the wake of
nuclear strikes.

The defending force is made less vulnerable to NBC weapons by

dispersing unit and subunit combat formations and periodically changing
the areas where they are located; by using the armor of fighting vehicles to
protect personnel; by digging in personnel unprotected by fighting vehicle
armor; by using camouflage to impede discovery of defense systems by
enemy reconnaissance; and by using deception to mislead the enemy with
respect to the defensive configuration and concept of defensive actions.

When nuclear weapons are used on a broad scale, armored forces

become increasingly important. NATO bloc armies devote a great deal of
attention to improving tanks and designing armored personnel carriers and
infantry combat vehicles that will enable infantry to fight directly from the
fighting vehicles. They continue to equip their combined arms formations
with large numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry
combat vehicles. For this reason, the requirement that the defense be
configured for antitank actions, that is, be capable of repelling massed
attacks by advancing enemy tanks and other armored vehicles, will become
at least as important as its stability in the face of nuclear attack.

The armed forces of the US and its NATO partners consider tactical
aviation to be an important combat asset. It is capable of making strikes
with conventional and nuclear weapons against the most important enemy
targets, particularly small mobile targets. Much attention has been focused
lately on establishing so-called airmobile forces. Combat helicopters are
coming into service in NATO ground forces formations.

Tactical aviation, combat helicopters, airborne assault forces and

airmobile forces are employed increasingly by attacking forces, thus drasti-
cally increasing demands on the defense in terms of being prepared to
defend against air and airborne attack.

The enemy's offensives may be broken up or his advances halted only

by fighting with determination using all available weapons, primarily nu-
clear weapons, and if the defense is highly stable and aggressive.

151
 Stability of defense may be understood as its ability to withstand
enemy strikes using all kinds of weapons, to repel offensives by superior
enemy forces, to prevent the landing of and actions by enemy airborne
assault forces, to hold important areas, and to eliminate enemy groupings
should they penetrate.

Necessary conditions for a stable defense include the ability to give the
friendly troop grouping maximum protection against nuclear strikes by the
attacking enemy force, as well as firm and skilled troop control, timely
organization and continuous maintenance of cooperation, rapid restoration
of disrupted defense systems and comprehensive support for combat ac-
tions, and endurance, steadiness, and determination on the part of the
defending forces. The defending units and subunits are not authorized to
abandon their positions and withdraw without orders from the senior
commander (chief). They must be prepared to operate when there is no
tactical liaison with adjacent elements and when they are encircled.

Nuclear weapons are capable of striking troops over a large area. The
battle formation of a defending force is normally dispersed laterally and in
depth so as to reduce its vulnerability. Dispersal of defending forces results
in the absence of a continuous front line. Dispersal in depth enables the
defending force to withstand the growing force and depth of enemy strikes
and to put up increasing resistance to the enemy, makes it more difficult
for him to discover the system of defenses, and provides for extensive
maneuver of fire and resources.

Aggressiveness in defense consists in hitting the attacking forces con-

tinuously with all resources, imposing one's will on the enemy, creating
unfavorable conditions for him to fight under, and carrying out wide
maneuvers and counterattacks.

Great aggressiveness cannot be attained by a defense that lacks stabil-

ity, while the stability of the defense will grow as defensive actions are
conducted more aggressively.

In wars conducted with nuclear weapons, defensive actions will be

more decisive than was the case in the last war, since primary importance
will attach to nuclear and fire strikes against the enemy on the distant
approaches in order to disrupt his employment of NBC weapons and
break up his offensive before he goes over to the attack. When fighting an
enemy force that has gone over to the attack, the defending force will
make nuclear and air strikes against it, hit it with fire from all resources,
and employ varied maneuvers and decisive counterattacks.

With the increase in firepower, striking power, and momentum of

advance of attacking enemy forces, it has become particularly important to

152
increase the rates at which the defense's resources can be maneuvered.
Rates of maneuver must enable the defender to forestall the enemy's
advance to designated positions or lines (areas).

Surprise is a most important factor in the defending force's actions if

they are to employ nuclear and conventional weapons to make powerful
surprise attacks on attacking enemy forces in order to break up their
advance with the fewest resources. Surprise in defense is manifested when
the enemy is misled regarding the actual disposition of friendly resources in
an effort to force him to make nuclear and fire strikes against unmanned
positions or secondary targets and thereby reduce his ability to affect the
defending force's main grouping. This is achieved by concealing troop
dispositions, by camouflage, by using methods of configuring the defense
that are unknown to the enemy, by setting up forward positions and
dummy positions and installations, and by maneuvering to counter nuclear
attack. This maneuver consists in forces changing their areas of disposition
and defended areas and positions before the attacking enemy force makes
its anticipated grouped or massed nuclear strikes.

Defensive actions will be characterized by the formation of barriers,

demolished areas, areas affected by fires and floods, and zones of radioac-
tive contamination resulting from mutual nuclear exchanges, in which it
will be difficult or even impossible to conduct aggressive combat actions.
Troops will normally be airlifted across such areas and zones.

In sum, defensive actions will develop unevenly along the front and in
depth. Characteristically, they will be conducted on the enemy groupings'
axes of advance and simultaneously in the depth of the defense and in
areas where enemy airborne assault and airmobile forces have been
dropped (landed).

The tactical autonomy of units and subunits, their ability to conduct

an all-round defense, and the state of the troops' preparation for aggres-
sive defensive actions in zones of radioactive contamination will become
especially important under these circumstances.

The resoluteness of the objectives pursued by both the attackers and

the defenders, their use of nuclear weapons, the deep penetrations made by
the attacking force when it advances on the defending force's flanks and
rear, and the dropping (landing) of airborne assault forces will impart
great ferocity and intensity to defensive actions and give rise to swift and
sudden changes in ground and air situations. Success in such actions
demands that battle formations be configured in depth, that groupings of
fire resources, particularly nuclear weapons, be created, that various re-
serves be allocated, and that the troops be provided with effective cover
against air strikes.

153
 The employment of nuclear weapons by the opposing sides and the
growing mobility of attacking and defending forces increase the dynamism
of defensive actions and make them increasingly rapid in their develop-
ment. The great losses caused by enemy nuclear strikes reduce the duration
of subunit, unit, and formation defensive actions. Large-scale employment
of nuclear weapons enables the defending force to achieve its objectives
and switch more quickly from defense to offense.

Since each side endeavors to conduct combat actions without interrup-

tion, defensive engagements are often conducted at night and at other
times when visibility is limited.

When nuclear weapons are employed in combat actions, the problem

of initiative in defense is dealt with in a new way. Initiative was once
considered the prerogative of the attacker, but now, thanks to the avail-
ability of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, the defender can seize the
initiative and impose his will on the attacking force. All that is needed is
skillful and timely use of this capability.

Success in modern-day defensive actions depends largely on the fight-

ing efficiency and morale and the level of combat training and psychologi-
cal indoctrination of personnel. They must be able to undergo the most
severe trials and bear the greatest psychological and physical stresses in
combat. Otherwise, the extent of the effect of the new weapons on morale
will exceed the extent of their physical effects. This means that, in addition
to those forces that have been hit with a nuclear strike, forces quite distant
from the strike may also be put out of action.

Only great political awareness among soldiers, good organization and

iron discipline, unshakable firmness and determination, great aggressive-
ness, and the will to perform the mission assigned, whatever the cost or
effort, even Ufe itself, can guard the defending force against confusion,
panic, and defeat.

Thus, modern defense must be aggressive and stable, particularly as

regards its ability to defend itself against attacks by nuclear weapons,
tanks, aviation, and airborne assault forces. Modern defensive engage-
ments are characterized by greater resoluteness of combat actions; great
maneuverability; increased importance of the surprise factor; uneven devel-
opment of defensive actions; the fact that they are conducted on axes;
their ferocity, intensity, and highly dynamic nature; swift and drastic
changes in the ground and air situations; and the growing importance of
morale and psychological factors.

154
3. The Battle Formation
The battle formation is always set up in accord with the commander's
decision for conducting the forthcoming engagement. It depends on the
mission to be performed, enemy actions, the availability of resources, and
the nature of the terrain.

The battle formation must ensure the defense's stability and aggres-
siveness; enable it to fight successfully with both nuclear and conventional
weapons; provide for the most effective use of available resources for
striking the enemy as he approaches the defense, in front of the FEBA,
and when the defense is penetrated; reduce to a minimum the defending
force's vulnerability to nuclear and fire strikes by the attacking enemy;
enable it to carry out wide maneuvers of resources during an engagement,
put up increasing resistance to the enemy, and quickly eliminate enemy
forces that penetrate to the depth of the defense; enable it to effectively
counter enemy aviation and airborne assault forces (airmobile forces);
provide for ease of troop control and the ability to maintain continuous
cooperation; and ensure the greatest possible use of advantageous terrain
features and the ability to quickly carry out engineer preparation of the
ground.

The complexity of these missions is caused primarily by the fact that

the defending force must have its resources in the field disposed in certain
areas, in certain positions, or on certain lines before the enemy offensive
begins. This makes it easier for the attacking enemy to discover the
groupings of resources in the defense and to hit them with nuclear strikes.
As nuclear weapons develop, nuclear warheads are stockpiled, and delivery
systems improve, the effectiveness of nuclear strikes against the defending
force increases. This is affected as well by ever-increasing enemy offensive
use of airspace in combination with ground strikes.

World War II experience revealed that in-depth, as a rule two-

echelon, configuration of the troop battle formation is essential in defense.
In addition to echelons, artillery and antiaircraft artillery groups, tank-
kiUing areas, artillery and antitank reserves, and mobile obstacle detach-
ments (and tank reserves in the case of divisions) were set up in the combat
deployments of formations and units.^

However, when nuclear weapons appeared, the intervals and distances

between battalions, which had been clearly defined in terms of defended
areas and zones in the last war, proved inadequate. This was because
defending units and formations may sustain great losses from nuclear
strikes with medium-yield warheads (20 kilotons and over). For this rea-
son, it was necessary first of all to increase the distance in depth between
battalions located in two positions, so that it would be impossible to hit

155
both with a single nuclear warhead. Lateral gaps between battalions also
had to be created. Naturally, in each specific case the size of the intervals
and gaps depends on the nature of the terrain, maneuver conditions, and
possibilities for maintaining tactical liaison and mutual fire support be-
tween battalions, on condition that the lateral and in-depth dispersal of the
battle formation does not compromise the integrity of the defense.

When low-yield nuclear warheads (a few kilotons) appeared, the battle

formation of the battalion also had to be dispersed, so that a strike by one
such warhead could not eliminate more than a single company. The gaps
between company strongpoints, laterally and in depth, were set up with
due regard for the destructive properties of low-yield nuclear warheads, the
direct-fire ranges of the antitank weapons and tanks in the company
strongpoints, and the nature of the ground and of its engineer preparation.
Because of this, each company's responsibility for holding its strongpoint
and protecting the gaps between adjacent strongpoints increased consider-
ably, which made it essential that companies be provided with a full
complement of more effective organic and attached antitank weapons.

Further dispersal of defending subunits' battle formations resulted

from the US development of, and the possibility of attacking NATO
forces using super-low-yield nuclear warheads (less than 1 kiloton). The
blast from such a warhead could cause considerable destruction to a
company strongpoint. In order to reduce the extent of its destructive
effect, the battle formation of the company also had to be dispersed to the
point that one super-low-yield warhead would be unable to put more than
a single platoon out of action. Now the gaps between platoon strongpoints
are several hundred meters.

The two-echelon configuration battle formation that came out of the

experience of the last war has proven the most suitable for offering
increasing resistance to an attacking enemy when nuclear weapons are
employed. Therefore, it is advisable that a battalion in tlie defense, partic-
ularly on the main axes, be deployed for combat in two echelons. Usually
a single company is allocated to the second echelon.

On adverse terrain, when resources are in short supply, and also when
occupying positions in the depth of the defense, a battalion's battle forma-
tion may consist of a single echelon. In this case, so as not to greatly
reduce the depth of the battalion's defenses and to provide conditions for
organizing flanking and crossfire, one of the companies may be moved
forward or back and disposed as an echelon on the open flank. Depth in a
battalion's battle formation is also created by allocating a reserve consist-
ing of a reinforced platoon, as well as by using the fire assets (tanks,
ATGMs, rocket launchers, and mortars) and air defense assets remaining
at the battalion commander's disposal.

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 When necessary, a battalion's defenses are broadened frontally on
adverse terrain by increasing tlie gaps between companies, although not by
dispersing the battle formations of the component subunits.

The battalions that make up the second echelons (combined arms

reserves) occupy defense areas in positions in depth and prepare to carry
out wide maneuvers for counterattacking and performing missions to cover
areas subjected to nuclear strikes and for moving up to axes where enemy
tanks have broken through. They may also be used to eliminate enemy
airborne assault forces (airmobile forces) that have landed.

The defense's need to acquire greater mobility and maneuverability

has affected other elements of the battle formation as well. In particular, a
tendency has arisen to increase the personnel and firepower of the antitank
reserves, while mining has become more important for closing breaches in
the defenses, laying minefields on axes where tanks have broken through,
and covering flanks and gaps. For this reason, mobile obstacle detach-
ments are used more extensively, and their equipment is being improved.

Considerable changes have taken place in the combat deployment of

formations and units in the US and other NATO armies because of the
inclusion of more powerful artillery weapons and battlefield nuclear deliv-
ery systems in their establishment. For example, artillery groupings of
203.2mm and 155mm howitzers capable of firing nuclear shells are part of
the battle formation of US Army divisions at the present time.

In addition to such missions as striking enemy personnel, fire re-

sources, and tanks, artillery in the defense now performs a number of new
missions. It destroys and neutralizes tactical nuclear weapons, destroys
radar equipment, and provides fire to cover breaches created in battle
formations as the result of enemy nuclear strikes.

An important means of increasing the stability of the defense is to

deceive the enemy with respect to the configuration of the battle forma-
tion. This is achieved by declining, no matter what, to follow stereotyped
patterns in configuring battle formations and by employing methods of
utilizing resources that are new and unanticipated by the enemy.

One way to increase the stability of the defense is to make skillful use
of advantageous terrain features. In this case, it is particularly important
to take advantage of the terrain to protect troops against the casualty-
producing elements of enemy nuclear weapons and fire; to camouflage the
battle formation against observation and all types of enemy reconnais-
sance; and to provide for the effective employment of fire resources to
strike the attacking enemy.

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 The growing capabilities of reconnaissance equipment must be talcen
into account when organizing modern defenses. For this reason, it is
inadvisable to leave even those elements of the battle formation that are
concealed by terrain features in the same areas for a long time. The
locations of elements of the battle formation that are situated in the depth
of the defense must be changed in order to deceive the attacking enemy
and make it more difficult for him to reconnoiter and fix the coordinates
of targets for nuclear strikes.

The actual dispositions of the defender's main body may also be

concealed by skillful construction of the forward position and forward
defense area security zone. For example, the US Army may employ con-
siderable numbers of covering forces and general and combat security
outposts for actions in the forward defense area security zone in order to
deceive the enemy as to the position of the FEBA.

However, measures to conceal the actual configuration of the defend-

ing force's battle formation will be effective only if determined counterac-
tion is taken against enemy reconnaissance and if the defending force also
conducts aggressive reconnaissance.

4. The Configuration and Engineer Preparation of Defensive

Positions
The dispersal of battalion battle formations and the increased auton-
omy of company and platoon strongpoints have resulted in changes in the
configuration of defensive positions. They have begun to be based on
company strongpoints that have been prepared for all-round defense and
connected in battalion defense areas by a fire plan and obstacles (figure
10). Here, because of the employment of tank subunits in the second
echelon, tank company strongpoints have become increasingly important in
defensive positions situated in the depth.

Defending subunits use mainly conventional weapons to strike the

enemy. For this reason, the skillful use of advantageous terrain features,
the outline of the positions, and the disposition of subunits and fire
resources on the ground must enable subunits to strike the enemy at
maximum range and to intensify fire on the enemy as he approaches the
FEBA.

It is well known that the approaches to the defense can be best

observed and covered by fire in great depth when defenses are set up on
commanding heights, particularly on slopes that face the enemy. Today,
however, the advantages and disadvantages of setting up defenses on
commanding heights must be evaluated thoroughly in every case. In many

158
cases, it is more advantageous to iiold adjacent heights after the ap-
proaches to the commanding heights have been covered with fire. Reverse
slopes of heights are also used to put subunits into position covertly and
enable them to make surprise attacks on the enemy.

Skillful exploitation of natural obstructions and obstacles has always

contributed to a successful defense. They slow the enemy's momentum of
advance and make it possible to strike him more effectively. It becomes
even more important to exploit this factor in defense when nuclear weap-
ons are employed. It is good practice to choose lines of defense that lie
beyond water obstacles, swamps, ravines, various types of defiles, and
other obstructions, so that these obstacles are under constant observation
and fire from the defending force.

The great mobility and maneuverability of the defending force has led
to the establishment, along with defensive positions, of firing lines allo-
cated to second-echelon (combined arms reserve) tank and infantry combat
vehicle subunits. Firing lines are prepared on probable axes of nuclear
strikes and massed attacks by advancing enemy tanks on the defending
force's positions, between positions, and on the flanks. Emplacements for
tanks and infantry combat vehicles are prepared on the firing lines, as well
as access routes to them.

There may be a great deal of variation in the outline of the firing

lines. However, it must tie in with the outline of the defensive positions,
making it possible to create pockets of fire that will prevent the enemy
from developing attacks in depth and toward the flanks and create condi-
tions for effectively striking enemy groupings that have penetrated the
defense with nuclear strikes and fire from all types of weapons.

Counterattack deployment lines are designated on axes of probable

enemy penetration to the defenses of the second-echelon (combined arms
reserve) subunits. If time permits, emplacements for fire resources are
prepared on these lines, as well as routes for moving up and deploying the
subunits in battle formation.

If it proves impossible or inadvisable to counterattack, the deploy-

ment lines may also be used as firing lines. In turn, prepared firing lines
may serve as counterattack deployment lines for second-echelon (combined
arms reserve) subunits.

If time permits, alternative positions may be prepared in the defenses.

They are usually laid out at an angle to the front line in order to prevent
the enemy from widening breakthroughs toward the flanks and to enable

159
the defenders to create fire pockets in order to wipe out the enemy with
fire and counterattacks. The alternative positions may be used as firing
lines or counterattack deployment lines.

Antitank reserve deployment lines are prepared on axes of probable

enemy tank attack and on the flanks.

Minefield lines, on which mobile obstacle detachments deploy, tie in

with the firing lines of the second-echelon subunits and the antitank re-
serve deployment lines.

When missile subunits are placed, particular attention is given to

ensuring their survivability and concealing their dispositions.

Artillery subunit fire positions are usually located on probable lines of

tank approach and are echeloned in depth so that the artillery will be able
to strike the enemy at maximum range as he approaches the defenses,
deploys, and attacks and when he penetrates the defenses. The antiaircraft
weapon positions must provide for effective cover of the defending force's
battle formations, particularly on axes of probable enemy air attack.

In order to provide for surprise in their actions, defending forces

devote special attention to setting up reserve and dummy defensive posi-
tions, defense areas, fire positions, and disposition areas for second-
echelon and reserve subunits.

Engineer preparation of defensive positions must ensure protection for

the greatest possible numbers of men and equipment when the enemy
employs nuclear weapons and make it possible to restore the defenses
quickly after a nuclear strike, as well as to repel enemy attacks and quickly
maneuver resources along the front and up from the depth of the defense
as needed.

As before, the greatest difficulties in engineer preparation of positions

occur in going over to the defense while in direct contact with the enemy,
inasmuch as it is not always possible then to use mechanized engineer
equipment for this purpose on the FEBA and in the immediate depth.
Under these conditions, the skillful exploitation of protective and masking
features of the terrain to protect subunits, fire resources, and combat
equipment becomes particularly important. Large and small ditches, ra-
vines, and pits, even with minimal preparation, may replace trenches or
fire trenches and thus provide the necessary degree of protection from both
conventional and nuclear weapons.

As a rule, in transitions to the defense while in direct contact with the

enemy, engineer preparation of company and platoon strongpoints is car-

160
ried out manually under enemy fire. For this reason, it is primarily the
night hours that must be used for engineer work.

First, one-man (two-man) fire trenches are dug and the main fire
positions for tanks, ATGMs, infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel
carriers), guns, and rocket launchers are prepared for use. Then the one-
man fire trenches are joined to form section-size trenches, and these are
joined in turn to form sections of the main trenches, communications
trenches are dug, and reserve fire positions for the tanks, ATGMs, and
other fire resources are prepared for use.

Because of the difficulties of using engineer equipment on the FEBA,

it is considered essential to go over to the defense while covered by
forward or security subunits, which prepare forward positions or combat
security outposts. The combat security outpost position is set up at a
distance from the FEBA that will prevent enemy ground observation,
machine gun fire, and direct fire from guns, tanks, and ATGMs on
strongpoints in the FEBA. The forward position is set up at a greater
distance in order to reduce the effect of enemy artillery and mortar fire on
the FEBA and to mislead the enemy with respect to the true outline of the
forward edge. One must make skilled use of terrain and local features in
order to quickly prepare the positions occupied by the covering subunits.

Subunits making up the second echelon and reserve have more advan-
tageous conditions for carrying out engineer preparation of company
strongpoints and battalion defense areas. They can use various types of
mechanized engineer equipment and prefabricated protective field works,
which enables better fieldworks to be constructed in a short time. Thus, a
single tank fitted with a bulldozer attachment can prepare dugouts for a
tank company in 5-6 hours.

Engineer preparation of company and platoon strongpoints and bat-

talion defense areas usually begins after subunit positions, fire positions,
and the fire plan have been decided on.

The areas for artillery, mortar, and antiaircraft weapons fire posi-
tions, missile subunit deployment areas, and reserve locations are prepared
at the same time as engineer preparation of motorized rifle and tank
company strongpoints. Fire trenches are also dug on firing lines and, if
time permits, on counterattack deployment lines, and fieldworks are con-
structed at control posts; reserve and dummy strongpoints, defense areas
and positions, and maneuver routes are prepared; and camouflaging mea-
sures are taken.

The times for performing engineer work have now been reduced
considerably in comparison with those of the last war. This is mainly the

161
result of using excavating equipment to dig trenches, communications
trenches, and tank and artillery emplacements, the mechanization of other
types of work, the employment of explosives, and the extensive use of
prefabricated components and assemblies in protective fieldworks.

However, in the opinion of foreign military experts, neither the time

needed for engineer preparation of defensive positions nor the protective
features of fortifications can be considered adequate. For this reason,
many armies are working to produce new engineer equipment, to improve
the protective features of defensive works, and to find ways to reduce the
time needed for setting them up.

The lateral and in-depth dispersal of battle formations increases the

importance of obstacles. The large-scale use of tanks, infantry combat
vehicles, and armored personnel carriers by the attacking enemy have
made it necessary for the defender to make extensive use primarily of
antitank obstacles.

Before the engagement begins, engineer obstacles are set up in front

of the FEBA, in the gaps between strongpoints, and on the defending
force's flanks. Then obstacles are set up in depth. The greatest density of
antitank obstacles here is set up on probable enemy axes of advance.

Minefields are laid beforehand in the depth of the defense on the

most important lines of probable tank approach. During defensive engage-
ments, mine obstacles are laid primarily by mobile obstacle detachments
and other engineer subunits. Moreover, it is thought to be necessary to
train personnel from subunits of other combat arms in minelaying, as well
as personnel from engineer subunits.

As the experience of local wars reveals, helicopters are used more and
more to move up to the minefield lines in order to lay mines more quickly.
What is more, foreign armies have equipment for remote minelaying.

Demolition work as well as minelaying is extremely important in

defense. Thus, it is considered necessary to demolish road sections, defiles,
bridges, road junctions, hydroelectric works, railroad stations, and airfields
in the defensive zones of US Army divisions during engagements.
The American military plans to use napalm (incendiary) mines against attacking infantry.
In recent years, training has been intensified in the use of nuclear landmines as obstacles,
which, on exploding, as well as destroying personnel by means of the shock wave, thermal
radiation, and penetrating radiation, create deep craters, and contaminate the ground.

An important mission in engineer preparation of the ground is prepa-

ration of maneuver routes, which contributes to increased maneuverability
in defensive actions, since development of road and rail networks has

162
made it possible to move reserves up quickly to the required axes. As a
rule, existing roads are used in preparing maneuver routes. However, they
do not always lie on the required axes. Moreover, many sections of road
may be destroyed by the attacking enemy. In transitions to the defense,
therefore, it becomes necessary to construct supplementary lateral and
frontal lines of communication. Engineer road construction and combat
engineer subunits outfitted with road-building and other equipment are
employed for this purpose.

When the enemy employs NBC weapons, problems of troop water

supply become vitally important, since a real threat exists that open water
sources will be contaminated. The water supply points best protected
against contamination are those supplied by underground water extracted
through boreholes with special pumps. Therefore, at present all armies
devote a great deal of attention to reconnoitering for and obtaining water
with the equipment of engineer subunits.

Various camouflaging techniques are used in an effort to stabilize the

defense. Their basic aim is to conceal the defense's actual configuration
and intentions from enemy ground and air observation. Camouflaging
measures must be varied and convincing to achieve the necessary effect.
Inventiveness is required if they are to be used successfully.
During a defensive engagement, the commander must direct tlie engineer support's main
efforts toward effective employment of engineer obstacles against attacl^ing enemy tanks,
infantry combat vehicles, and armored personnel carriers; carrying out engineer operations
for NBC damage control, primarily by repairing roads and bridges and constructing new
cross-country routes that will enable troops to move away from fires caused by nuclear and
various other incendiary weapons; and consolidating the lines taken in successful counterat-
tacks.

5. The Fire Plan

The fire plan comprises the skillful deployment and use of fire re-
sources in accordance with the concept of a defensive engagement in order
to strike the enemy on the approaches to the defense, in front of the
forward edge, on the flanks, and when he penetrates the defenses.

During the Great Patriotic War, the organization of a fire plan con-
sisted in preparing for fire strikes on the approaches to the defense,
creating zones of massed fire from all weapons in front of the forward
edge and positions in the depth of the defense, and preparing to maneuver
fire so as to concentrate it quickly on any threatened axis or sector. The
fire plan was built around cooperation of artillery, mortars, antitank and
small-arms fire in combination with obstacles. It was based on artillery,
mortar, tank, self-propelled gun, and machine gun fire.

163
 Antitank defense systems were devised in an effort to employ, in an
organized manner, all the fire resources of the subunits, units, and forma-
tions capable of countering tanks. Antitank defense constituted the basis
of the defense and was organized throughout the tactical depth of the
defense. By the end of the Great Patriotic War, the following elements of
an antitank defense system had been established: company antitank
strongpoints, combined into battalion antitank strongpoints; tank-killing
areas; artillery, tanks and self-propelled guns, deployed on likely axes of
tank approach, artillery and antitank reserves; and antitank obstacles.

When nuclear weapons appeared and armored vehicles underwent

further development, in addition to such missions as striking the enemy on
the approaches to the defenses, in front of the forward edge, and when he
had penetrated the defenses, conducting counterbattery fire and so on, new
missions arose: countering an attacking enemy's nuclear weapons and
providing fire to cover breaches created in battle formations as the result
of enemy employment of nuclear weapons. All this has made organizing a
fire plan and the methods for performing fire missions more complex. It
also demands integrated employment of various fire resources for carrying
out fire strikes.

Countering the attacking enemy's nuclear weapons is considered the

chief mission of artillery fire in defense. This must be done continuously.
Certain distinctive features have now emerged in the organization of artil-
lery and mortar strikes against enemy forces when they are on distant
approaches to the defenses, advancing, and deploying for the attack.
Troops are moved up from the depth in tanks, infantry combat vehicles
(armored personnel carriers), and trucks to attack from the line of march.
As a result, the time available for the defending force to carry out strikes
against the enemy as he advances to the FEBA has been drastically re-
duced.

The defending force tries to hit the enemy with artillery and mortar
strikes at maximum range in order to ensure the greatest possible fire
effect. Particular consideration is given here to hitting the enemy at choke
points, i.e., in defiles and at crossings, where an advantage can be ob-
tained by holding up the enemy in order to carry out nuclear strikes
against him.

Artillery fire on the approaches to the defense and in front of the

forward edge is concentrated on axes of probable attack by the enemy's
main force, so as to hit him with decisive combined artillery and nuclear
strikes.

Gaps between subunits and flanks are covered primarily by organizing

enfilade and cross antitank and small-arms fire in combination with obsta-

164
cles. Moreover, this mission is performed, especially on the main axes, by
artillery and mortars, and target areas for concentrated fire and defensive
fire lines are set up, particularly in front of gaps and in the gaps them-
selves.

Wide fire maneuver by artillery firepower and artillery subunits, per-

forming fire missions both in front of the forces they support and in front
of adjacent forces, is organized to provide fire cover in breaches created in
the battle formation after enemy nuclear strikes and to restore disrupted
fire plans. Artillery fire is supplemented by flanking and cross-antitank fire
organized by adjacent subunits situated in a single position, as well as by
the maneuver of antitank resources laterally and from the depth.

Fire effect on an enemy force that has gone over to the attack is
achieved by massed and concentrated fire on the main axes, as well as
defensive fire directly in front of the forward edge.

Artillery and mortars employ mainly defensive and concentrated fire

to eliminate enemy forces that have penetrated the defenses and to support
counterattacks. The greatest concentration of fire is planned for axes of
probable enemy penetration of the defenses. Artillery and mortar fire are
carefully coordinated with the actions of counterattacking subunits.

Artillery fire is coordinated with fighter-bomber strikes in order to

increase its destructive effect on the enemy. Because of its great radius of
action, aviation is assigned primarily to targets located beyond the maxi-
mum artillery range, such as large concentrations of troops and combat
equipment, forces on the move, artillery, and control posts. Aviation is
also employed to destroy nuclear weapons, to strike small mobile targets in
the artillery fire zone, and to engage advancing enemy tanks.

Besides searching for new methods of hitting the enemy with decisive
strikes while he is advancing and deploying, much attention is given in all
modern armies to improving available fire resources and designing new
ones to destroy tanks and other armored targets, as well as personnel, in
close combat. Here, particular importance is attached to improving the
accuracy, range, and effectiveness of fire of antitank weapons. Foreign
military experts consider it impossible to engage modern armored targets
effectively in close combat using a single standardized weapon. It is essen-
tial to have antitank weaponry, including antitank tube artillery, that is
varied in its combat characteristics. Rocket launchers can also be used to
destroy attacking armored vehicles at close quarters.

In recent years, combat helicopters armed with ATGMs and other fire
resources have been used more and more extensively to engage tanks and

165
other armored targets. Combat helicopters with ATGMs achieve great
effectiveness in actions by being able to appear suddenly and remain only
briefly over the battlefield.

Tanks still constitute an effective antitank resource in the fire plan.

This is because of their great fighting efficiency, which enables them not
only to destroy attacking enemy tanks by fire, but also to maneuver
quickly to cover breaches created in the battle formations by nuclear
strikes, to replace subunits that have lost their fighting efficiency, and to
counterattack. Tanks are also an effective means of eliminating enemy
airborne assault forces that have landed in the depth of the defense.

Antitank fire plays a decisive role in the fire plan. When antitank fire
is organized in company and platoon strongpoints and battalion defense
areas, tanks, ATGMs, guns, and other fire resources are concealed and
concentrated so that they will be able to fire at maximum range, to hit the
enemy with very dense enfilade fire, crossfire, and surprise short-range
concentrated fire, to fire in coordination, and to create pockets of fire.
Linear disposition of fire resources in strongpoints is unacceptable.

Platoons are assigned supplementary arcs of fire to provide all-round

defense for company strongpoints, and reserve fire positions are prepared
for fire resources to be used on the flanks and rear. Some of the fire
resources are positioned in the depth of the strongpoint.

The experience of the last war testifies to the great effectiveness of fire
pockets set up in the defenses for use in countering large tank groupings.
In 1943, in the area held by the 307th Rifle Division in the vicinity of Ponyri, on the
Kursk salient, the forces of the 3rd Tank Destroyer Brigade, three tank destroyer regiments of
the 13th Tank Destroyer Brigade, and three light artillery regiments set up a fire pocket.
Between 6 and 10 July, 82 tanks, including 25 Tigers, were destroyed by the 3rd Tank
Destroyer Brigade alone.

Today, because of the increased ranges of antitank weapons and

tanks, fire pockets may also be set up in battalion defense areas.

Ambushes by tanks, ATOM subunits, and other antitank resources

have come to play an increasingly important role in fire plans. Subunits
that are small in terms of establishment can, when allocated to an ambush,
change location quickly and, firing by surprise, in a short time inflict
considerable losses on attacking enemy tanks that have broken through
into the depth of the defense.

Roving batteries, tanks, guns, and infantry combat vehicles play an

important role in misleading the enemy with respect to the dispositions of

166
fire resources and in achieving surprise when opening fire on tanks. Their
fire is coordinated with the maneuver of antitank reserves on the deploy-
ment line and strikes by combat helicopters.

Small-arms fire aimed at destroying enemy personnel in close combat

is organized according to principles similar to those used in organizing
antitank fire. The enemy is destroyed most effectively by crossfire and
enfilade fire, which are the most lethal and have a strong effect on enemy
morale. Machine guns mounted on armored personnel carriers are used to
reinforce small-arms fire. The armored personnel carriers are situated in
emplacements in the depth of platoon and company strongpoints and on
the flanks to cover gaps and provide all-round defense.

Artillery, antitank, and small-arms fire in front of the forward edge is

planned in such a way that even when strongpoints are dispersed laterally,
mutual fire support between them will be guaranteed and a zone of
concentrated fire of all types will be created. Here, fire must be made as
intense and concentrated as possible on axes of probable enemy attack.

The fire plan in modern defense incorporates organized artillery and

mortar fire from indirect fire positions, antitank fire zones, and zones of
concentrated overlapping fire by all weapons. Preparations are also made
for fire maneuver in order to quickly concentrate on any threatened axis
(sector). The fire plan must be coordinated with planned nuclear strikes
and combined with the use of engineer obstacles.

6. Hitting the Enemy on the Approaches to the Defense

The aim of the defense is to break up enemy offensives in the most
effective way possible before he goes over to the attack. For this reason,
the defender always endeavors to employ weaponry and methods of action
that enable him to inflict the maximum destruction on the main enemy
grouping on the approaches to the defense, thereby reducing the force of
his initial strike and breaking up his attack when he approaches the
forward edge.

Before nuclear weapons appeared, artillery and aviation were the

primary means of achieving this aim. During World War I, attempts were
made to use chemical weapons to break up enemy offensives. Preplanned
brief, but powerful surprise strikes were made beforehand against the main
enemy grouping poised for the offensive and against its main fire re-
sources. Fire strikes of this sort were called counterpreparation fire.

In World War I, the defender was unable to completely break up

enemy offensives with artillery counterpreparation fire because of the lim-

167
ited capabilities of artillery. At Ypres, in the early hours of 13 July 1917, it
was only by making surprise use of a new weapon (50,000 chemical shells)
that the Germans were able to inflict heavy losses on the Anglo-French
forces with counterpreparation fire and to break up their offensive.

During World War II, counterpreparation fire was extensively em-

ployed, particularly in Soviet Army defensive actions. Soviet forces em-
ployed it in the defensive engagements on the Moscow axis in September
1941 (the 16th, 19th and 20th Armies of the Western Front), at Stalingrad
in September-October 1942 (the 62nd and 64th Armies), and at Kursk in
July 1943 (the forces of the Central and Voronezh Fronts).

Aviation as well as artillery took part in counterpreparation. The

principal targets of attack were enemy infantry, tanks, and artillery. Con-
stant increases were observed in the scope of counterpreparation fire and
the numbers of forces involved in conducting it.
An average density of 30 guns and mortars per kilometer of front, and of about 60-80
guns and mortars on thie main axes, was used in counterpreparation fire in the defensive
battle at Kursk by the 13th Army of the Central Front and the 6th Guards Army of the
Voronezh Front. On the other hand, approximately 100 guns and mortars per kilometer were
used in counterpreparation fire in the defense conducted by forces of the 69th Army on the
Pulawy beachhead on the Vistula in September 1944.

As a result of counterpreparation fire, enemy forces concentrated for

an offensive sustained considerable losses in men and combat equipment,
which led to delays in starting the offensive and reduced the force of the
initial strike. In a number of cases, successful counterpreparation fire
prevented the enemy from carrying out an offensive in a given area. That
is how an enemy offensive against the 34th Rifle Corps of the 46th Army
of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, holding a beachhead on the west bank of the
Dnestr, was broken up on 1 June 1944.

Sometimes, following counterpreparation fire, the defending forces

made limited-objective counterstrikes with a portion of their forces.
At Stalingrad on 27 September 1942, the 62nd Army carried out 15 minues of
counterpreparation fire against enemy forces that had deployed on a start line to attack in the
area of hill 102.0 Exploiting the results of the counterpreparation fire, the 95th Rifle Division
went over to the counterattack and took the southwestern slopes of hill 102.0, thereby
considerably improving their position. As a result of the counterpreparation fire and counter-
attack, the enemy was obliged to refrain from attacking on this axis for several days.

However, it was rare for the defending force to make limited-

objective counterattacks against the enemy after counterpreparation fire.
Usually the defender did not have sufficient forces for such a strike.

Nuclear weapons have brought about a dramatic improvement in the

defending force's capability to break up enemy offensives. Counter-

168
preparation fire and counterstrikes (counterattacks) against enemy group-
ings prepared for an offensive continue to be the principal rnetliods used to
break up enemy offensives or weaken enemy strikes. But, while prepara-
tions for an offensive used to be complete when the troops occupied a
departure area in direct proximity to the defending force's forward edge,
today the main enemy grouping is situated in the depth, and offensives
may be undertaken from the line of march, with an advance from concen-
tration areas or from the line of march. As a result, the planning and
conduct of counterpreparation fire have become much more complex.

Establishing the level of enemy readiness for an offensive and the

probable axes of enemy attacks has now become more difficult. The
employment of nuclear weapons permits the enemy to avoid having to
create large artillery groupings on the main axis of advance, which once
took several days. Moreover, with nuclear strikes, the enemy can create
conditions that will enable him to advance on any axis that will permit the
use of tanks and other armored vehicles.

The defending force will not always have the resources to carry out
short-duration large-scale nuclear strikes and counterpreparation fire
against the main enemy grouping by means of powerful fire strikes with
conventional weapons. When going over to the defense during an enemy
offensive or as a result of an unsuccessful meeting engagement, a defender
may have expended his nuclear and conventional warheads in preceding
combat actions and then, most likely, will make individual strikes in an
effort to weaken the enemy grouping and break up its attack on individual
axes. In this case, the enemy's most important targets, particularly his
nuclear weapons, must be struck as soon as they are discovered.

In addition to taking measures to break up the enemy's offensive, the

defending forces also use other means to weaken his initial strike. In past
wars, the configuration of the forward edge was often concealed by mak-
ing skillful use of the masking features of the terrain and employing
various methods of camouflage. Forward positions or combat security
outposts were set up in order to deceive the enemy with respect to the
outline of the forward edge and reduce the effectiveness of strikes on the
defending force. Often minimal resources were left in the zones liable to be
attacked most heavily, and the defending force's grouping and the loca-
tions of control posts were changed periodically in order to reduce losses
from artillery fire and air strikes. In some operations, troops were with-
drawn from the FEBA to the depth on certain axes before enemy artillery
preparation. What is more, even before World War II some armies set up
forward defense area security zones (forward defense areas) in front of the
main defensive zones.

169
 During the Great Patriotic War, forward defense area security zones
were in many cases set up when our troops went over to the defense while
out of contact with the enemy. The forward detachments operating in such
zones held up the enemy's advance, inflicted losses on him, and forced
him to deploy his main body prematurely, thereby gaining time for
friendly forces to reinforce the defenses and revealing the enemy's group-
ing and intentions.
At Stalingrad in July 1942, forward detachments, each consisting of a reinforced rifle
regiment, were moved up from three divisions of the 62nd Array to a distance of 40-60
kilometers from the FEBA. Conducting combat actions on several lines in succession, the
forward detachments delayed the enemy's approach by five or six days. This enabled the
defending force to reinforce its positions and determine the enemy's grouping and the axis of
his main attack in more detail.'

When nuclear weapons are employed, measures to weaken the

enemy's strike and wear him out on the approaches to the defense become
even more important. Where there is a forward defense area security zone,
the subunits defending it can, by using fire from all types of weapons,
supporting artillery, and air strikes, repel the enemy's leading subunits,
inflict significant losses on them, and force the enemy to deploy his main
body prematurely as it moves up to the FEBA.

Skillfully maneuvering fire and resources, withdrawing from one posi-

tion to another, and employing obstacles and demolition, the subunits in
the forward defense area security zone hold up the enemy in areas desig-
nated for inflicting nuclear strikes on him in order to weaken his main
grouping and gain the time necessary for the defense's main body to
occupy an advantageous line.

If a forward position is set up, the fight to hold it will be conducted

with great stubbornness. The subunits allocated to defend the forward
position open fire on the approaching enemy at maximum range. Their
actions are supported by artillery fire from the depth and by air strikes. It
is important here that the nature of the enemy's actions be judged cor-
rectly so that enemy reconnaissance or attacks by limited forces will not be
mistaken for an offensive by the main body.

The time for subunits to withdraw from the forward position is

determined by the situation. If the enemy makes nuclear strikes against the
forward position, it may be assumed that he has mistaken it for the
FEBA. Support for the withdrawal of subunits from the forward position
is provided by artillery and mortar fire and tank fire from ambush. Gaps,
covered by fire from the depth, are left in obstacles so that the subunits
can pass through the FEBA.

170
 The Great Patriotic War provides many examples of aggressively
conducted combat actions to hold the forward position, as a result of
which the enemy committed large forces prematurely, sustained great
losses, and was held up for a considerable time in his advance to the main
defensive zone.
On 4 July 1943 at Kursk, the enemy, after mistaking the reinforced combat security
outposts of a rifle battalion of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division of the 6th Guards Army for
the main body, committed about a regiment of infantry and 50 tanks, supported by artillery
and 100 aircraft. The Nazi troops fought for 17 hours to take the forward position. In that
time, the division's main body was able to reinforce its defenses and determine the enemy's
grouping and intentions in more detail."

Actions by subunits in combat security outposts are based on the

same principles as those on which the actions of subunits defending the
forward position are based. However, it must be noted that the former are
weaker in terms of combat capabilities, and it may therefore prove neces-
sary to withdraw them from their positions after they have performed their
mission of preventing a surprise enemy attack on the FEBA.

When the enemy employs nuclear weapons, the main aim is to pre-
serve the maximum resources in the defending force. Resources situated in
the depth of the defense may be moved to reserve areas or positions, as
was the practice also in the last war, in order to reduce the effects of
enemy nuclear strikes. Subunits can also be removed from areas threatened
by nuclear strikes by withdrawing them from the FEBA. In an effort to
deceive the enemy, combat security outposts with the necessary numbers of
tanks and antitank weapons may be left to maintain the previous level of
fire at the FEBA.

The objective of maneuvering to reserve areas and positions can be

achieved only if the maneuver is kept concealed from enemy reconnais-
sance. For this reason, the maneuver must be carried out under the
strictest camouflage discipline. It should be timed to coincide as nearly as
possible with the beginning of the enemy's advance, so that he will have
less time to discover the true dispositions of the defender's resources. In
order to conceal the maneuver, it is advisable to move subunits to new
areas at night or under other conditions of limited visibility.

In taking measures to break up the enemy offensive or weaken his

strike and to wear him out on the approaches to the defenses, the defend-
ing forces take actions to reinforce the defenses on identified axes of
enemy advance. To this end, the missions of subunits may be updated, the
density of fire and obstacles increased, resources maneuvered, and addi-
tional engineer preparation of positions carried out.
However, a commander must bear in mind that, regardless of tlie increased firepower of
defending units and subunits, their capabilities for striking enemy fire resources, particularly

171
nuclear weapons, will often be greatly limited as a result of losses sustained. On his part, the
enemy will take every possible measure to prepare his offensive covertly and initiate it by
surprise. For this reason, the defending force must be in a state of constant readiness to repel
strikes by an attacking enemy.

7. Repelling Enemy Attacks

At the present time, enemy attacks are preceded, as a rule, by prepa-
ratory fire using nuclear and conventional warheads. A defending force's
most important mission, on which success in the defensive engagement
depends entirely, is to withstand powerful nuclear and fire strikes and
maintain a high degree of fighting efficiency.

While under preparatory fire preceding an enemy attack, the defend-

ing force attempts to get personnel under cover in good time in dugouts,
trenches, and other cover and takes measures to protect weapons and
equipment against, or diminish the extent of their damage by, enemy
nuclear and fire strikes. In order to enable subunits to assume their
positions quickly to repel an enemy attack, commanders and observers
remain in their positions and continue to observe the enemy. When the
enemy goes over to the attack, subunit commanders signal personnel to
take up their positions.

Measures to minimize the effects of the enemy's nuclear and fire

strikes and interfere with his attack preparations are extremely important
to the defending forces for reducing losses. Therefore, when the enemy
starts preparatory fire for an attack, defending units and subunits make
fire strikes against known enemy nuclear weapons, on his artillery, antiair-.
craft, and electronic resources, as well as on tanks, combat vehicles,
armored personnel carriers, and infantry that are advancing or preparing
to attack. Commanders of subunits, particularly those defending the for-
ward edge, maintain continuous observation of enemy actions in an at-
tempt to detect targets in time to hit them with all weapons.

Maintaining the fighting efficiency of defending subunits depends

more than ever on successfully countering enemy aviation. For this reason,
all antiaircraft assets will be used to hit enemy aircraft and helicopters
within firing range.

While the enemy is conducting preparatory fire for an attack, it is

important to maintain high morale in personnel so that they will not
become confused or panic as a result of enemy NBC strikes. Commanders
and political workers must, by personal example, sustain the coolness,
courage, and self-control of personnel.

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 As a result of enemy nuclear strikes, some of the defending subunits'
personnel and fire resources will be destroyed, the fire plan and troop
control system will be disrupted, and fieldworks will be demolished. There-
fore, at the same time that the enemy is being struck in front of the
forward edge with all resources, measures are taken to clarify the situation
in areas subjected to nuclear strikes, to quickly close breaches created in
the battle formations of first-echelon subunits, to restore troop control and
the fire plan, and to carry out NBC damage control.

Breaches can be closed by concentrating artillery and mortar fire on

areas that have been subjected to enemy nuclear strikes and by maneuver-
ing reserves, particularly antitank reserves, and mobile obstacle detach-
ments. If necessary, second-echelon subunits (combined arms reserves),
which consist for the most part of tanks, are maneuvered (figure 11).

The methods of action used by subunits being moved to cover

breaches depend on the distance from the enemy, availability of time,
radiation conditions and the nature of the terrain. If the advancing
subunits forestall the enemy in advancing to the nuclear blast area and
terrain and defensive works are not significantly contaminated, they may
hold a defensive line in front of or in the blast area, using intact defensive
works. If the enemy cannot be forestalled, the subunits allocated to cover
the breaches will occupy lines behind or on the flanks of the area subjected
to the nuclear strike. If subunits in the nuclear blast area lose their fighting
efficiency, the commanders of the arriving subunits will assume command
and proceed to carry out nuclear damage control.

Detachments made up of motorized rifle subunits reinforced with

combat engineers, chemical warfare troops, and evacuation, repair, and
medical subunits are employed for nuclear damage control. Their mission
is to search for casualties, to remove them from combat vehicles, defensive
works, and shelters, and to recover weapons and combat equipment, to
clear barriers, and to extinguish fires.

Subunits that have been subjected to nuclear strikes, but have not lost
their fighting efficiency, use their resources for NBC damage control by
providing first aid to the wounded, removing them from the attack area
and evacuating them to medical aid posts; decontaminating personnel,
weapons, combat equipment, and occupiable fieldworks; clearing barriers
that hinder the movement of personnel and the recovery of equipment
from damaged shelters; and extinguishing fires.

The complexity of these measures results from the extremely limited

time available and the effect of enemy fire. Enemy tanks and motorized
infantry may undertake attacks against the FEBA 20-30 minutes after the
nuclear strikes. For this reason, it becomes most important to gain time to

173
maneuver resources to restore the defenses and to take nuclear damage
control measures. This is done by using massed artillery and mortar fire,
by making strikes with aviation and combat helicopters against advancing
and deploying enemy forces and by making use of various obstacles.
Particular attention is given to hitting the enemy as he approaches and
negotiates the obstacles in front of the FEBA. It may be possible to gain
time to close breaches and carry out nuclear damage control, primarily in
the battle formations of the subunits defending the forward edge, by
fighting determinedly to hold the forward position.

When the preparatory fire ceases and the enemy goes over to the
attack, the subunits, at their commanders' signal, quickly leave cover,
assume their positions, and open fire.

The switching of artillery and mortar fire to the depth usually signals
the beginning of an attack. However, the enemy may use feinting actions
(a feint switch of fire) in an attempt to force the defending subunits to
leave cover to repel an attack. If the enemy succeeds in doing so, he may
make repeated artillery and aviation strikes to inflict additional losses on
the defenders.
Preservation of a subunit's fighting efficiency depends largely on the commander's
ability to correctly determine the moment at which the subunits can leave cover. At the same
time, a subunit's readiness to repel enemy attacks depends largely on whether the command
to assume positions has been given in time. A commander must have a good knowldge of
enemy tactics and an ability to foresee the course of events in order to correctly determine the
moment at which to bring the troops out of cover. He may be aided by a well-organized
observation and reconnaissance system, reliable communications, and continuous information
on enemy actions. Prior training of suhunit personnel in leaving cover is also very important.

During the Great Patriotic War, defending forces always tried to repel
enemy attacks before they reached the FEBA, since holding up the enemy,
particularly when the defenses were not configured in depth, meant the
breakup of the enemy offensive. Having expended a considerable portion
of its ammunition and sustained great losses, the attacking force would no
longer be able to bring high densities of fire and personnel to bear for
repeated attacks. In this case, it was always taken into consideration that
the morale of the attacking force would fall after their attack was repelled,
while the defenders' morale would improve.

Battles for the FEBA were stubborn and fierce. During such actions,
repeated enemy attacks were repelled, and the enemy suffered losses in
personnel, tanks, and other combat equipment, forcing the attacking
forces to refrain from subsequent attacks on some axes. If the enemy was
able to overcome the FEBA anyway, the time gained enabled the defenders
to determine his concept of action and grouping with greater accuracy and

174
to take measures to reinforce threatened axes by maneuvering fire and
resources from the depth positions and from axes that had not been
attacked.
In the Balaton Defensive Operation, at 0600 on 6 March 1945, the enemy attacked units
of the 233rd and 74th Rifle Divisions of the 135th Rifle Corps with two motorized regiments
and one cavalry regiment, supported by 60-65 tanks. The density of artillery, mortar,
antitank, and small-arms fire increased as the enemy approached the FEBA, the attack was
repelled, and the enemy, suffering great losses, was forced to withdraw to his departure areas.
Nazi forces were able to penetrate the FEBA only after 15 hours of repeated attacks. In all,
the enemy spent about 9 hours overcoming the FEBA.

Fighting to hold strongpoints on the FEBA is no less important today.

However, holding them for long periods of time has become considerably
more difficult. After the enemy has carried out nuclear strikes against the
FEBA, breaches are created in the battle formations of the subunits de-
fending it. On some axes, the breaches will be covered by resources moved
up from the depth by the time the attacking enemy tanks, infantry combat
vehicles, and armored personnel carriers approach, while on other axes,
because of the great losses sustained, the breaches will be covered only by
artillery and mortar fire and obstacles.

Under these circumstances, the missions of subunits that have retained

their fighting efficiency or moved up from the depth will consist in inflict-
ing losses on the attacking enemy with available fire resources, preventing
him from penetrating to the depth of the defense, breaking up his battle
formation in order to gain time for nuclear damage control in the depth of
the defense, maneuvering resources, and preparing and carrying out nu-
clear and fire strikes against the enemy. Successful performance of these
missions is ensured by organized fire from all weapons and by the firmness
and determination of the subunits defending strongpoints in the forward
edge and moving up to the areas subjected to enemy nuclear strikes.

As the attacking forces approach the FEBA, artillery, mortar, tank,

antitank, and small-arms fire achieves maximum intensity. The artillery
and mortars conducting concentrated defensive fire on tanks and other
armored targets create conditions under which they can be destroyed by
antitank fire. Simultaneously, newly discovered enemy nuclear weapons
and other important targets are destroyed. Antitank weapons and tanks
open fire on the attacking tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and armored
targets at maximum range.

As the enemy approaches the FEBA, the defending subunits separate

the attacking infantry from the tanks and eliminate it with fire from all
weapons. Tanks and other armored targets that break through the FEBA
are destroyed by fire from antitank weapons positioned in the depth.

175
 Commanders of first-echelon battalions move up their reserves or
some of the subunits and fire resources from unattacked sectors to threat-
ened axes, seeking to inflict the maximum losses in personnel, tanks, and
infantry combat vehicles on the enemy. If the situation permits, they use
available forces to carry out counterattacks against the flanks of enemy
forces that have broken through the FEBA.

While the enemy attack is being repelled on the ground, aviation and
antiaircraft weapons aggressively combat enemy aircraft. Defending
subunits destroy low-flying enemy aircraft and helicopters and enemy air-
borne assault and airmobile groups in flight, using antiaircraft and small-
arms fire.

The antiairborne reserve, second-echelon subunits, and other special

subunits, near to whose dispositions the enemy has landed, move up to the
landing areas of airborne assault or airmobile groups. Artillery and mortar
fire is concentrated on the landing areas in an effort to inflict casualties on
the enemy and support the subunits involved in eliminating the enemy.

If the enemy lands in several areas simultaneously, measures are taken

to prevent him from consolidating his efforts and to defeat the airborne
assault or airmobile groups in detail. If sufficient forces are not available
to eliminate the enemy groups landed, the landing areas must be sealed
off, and the airborne assault or airmobile groups can be eliminated once
the reserves arrive.

In sectors where the enemy attack has been repelled, measures are
taken to quickly restore the fire plan, particularly the antitank fire plan,
obstacles, and demolished defensive works, to evacuate the wounded, and
to replenish stores. The subunits that have stopped the enemy prepare to
repel repeated attacks.

8. Counterattacking
The advancing forces, having seized the initiative and established
considerable superiority in resources on a selected axis, may in some cases
penetrate the defenses. Under these circumstances, the defending force
may alter a situation that is developing to its disadvantage by counterat-
tacking and may often even succeed in defeating the enemy force that has
broken through to the depth of the defense.

Counterattacks were carried out extensively in defensive engagements

during the Great Patriotic War. When they were conducted in combination
with stubborn holding of defensive lines, they wore down the attacking

176
enemy, inflicted great losses on him in men and fighting equipment,
delayed further development of the offensive, and helped friendly forces
gain time to maneuver resources.
In defensive engagements conducted on the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943, a
powerful grouping of Nazi forces attacking in the region of the Voronezh Front was able to
advance only 35 kilometers in 10 days because of the stubborn and aggressive defense and
counterattacks carried out by our forces. During this time, the Soviet command was able to
transfer seven tank and mechanized corps and great numbers of artillery to the axis of the
enemy's main attack, which radically altered the correlation of forces and in the final analysis
led to the enemy's defeat.

In the last war, counterattacks were conducted, as a rule, on division

and corps scale. In a division, a second-echelon rifle regiment and some of
the troops of the first-echelon regiments were employed for this purpose,
while in a rifle corps, a second-echelon division, and some of the troops of
the first-echelon divisions were used.

Today, the defending force's employment of nuclear weapons to de-

feat enemy forces that have penetrated the defenses and also to defeat his
approaching reserves makes it possible to alter the correlation of forces in
one's favor far more quickly, and thereby increase the effectiveness of
counterattacks. As a result, the aim of counterattacks may not be limited
to regaining lost positions, as was the case in the past, but may also
include defeating enemy forces that have penetrated and seizing lines that
will be advantageous for subsequent aggressive actions.

One condition for a successful counterattack is the firm holding of

Unes and areas in front of which the attacking enemy will be halted and
forced to move up additional resources to develop the offensive. The
resulting compaction of the battle formations of the penetrating groupings
and advancing reserves creates conditions favorable for making nuclear
strikes against the enemy, while stabilizing the line of contact for a time
enables defending forces to move up, deploy, and go over to the counter-
attack.

If the enemy is not stopped, then the counterattacking subunits will be

forced into a meeting engagement with an enemy grouping that is superior
in resources, deployed in battle formation, and advancing into the depth of
the defense.

A situation may even develop where, using large-scale nuclear and fire
strikes, the attacking enemy succeeds in disrupting the stability of the
defense and establishing overwhelming superiority in resources or where
the second echelon (reserve) of the defending force sustains considerable
losses or is employed to perform other missions. Then the defending
subunits must take every possible action to hold the positions they have
retained, prevent the enemy from developing his offensive toward the

177
depth and flanks, and create conditions in which a counterattaclc can be
made with resources under the control of the senior commander (chief).

However complex the situation, the defending forces exert the maxi-
mum effort and show determination, firmness, and good organization in
order to halt the enemy advance and prevent their own battle formation
from being broken up. Particular attention is given here to holding lines
on the flanks of a breach so that the enemy grouping that has broken
through will be boxed in and the defending subunits will be occupying
close envelopment positions in relation to this grouping.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War revealed that usually coun-
terattacks will not succeed against an enemy who has not been neutralized
by fire and who has retained superiority in resources. For this reason, if a
counterattack is to succeed, it is important for the enemy grouping that
has penetrated to be hit with nuclear, fire, aviation, and combat helicopter
strikes in an effort to weaken this grouping, break up its battle formation,
and thereby make it easier to destroy it with a counterattack.

For a counterattack to succeed, in addition to hitting the enemy with

nuclear and fire strikes, it is essential to cut off his approaching reserves.

Enemy reserves may be cut off by nuclear strikes, concentrated and

massed artillery fire, air strikes, and minefields and other obstacles. This
will result in fragmentation of the efforts of the reserves and the penetrat-
ing grouping, make it more difficult for the attacking forces to intensify
their strike, and create conditions for defeating in detail the enemy that has
penetrated. Thus, the moment when the enemy troops that have penetrated
have been stopped as a result of losses and the reserves approaching from
the depth have been held up or have sustained considerable losses is viewed
as advantageous for a counterattack.

As the experience of the last war confirms, it is essential to gain

superiority in resources on the axis selected for a counterattack in order for
it to succeed. This can be attained primarily by nuclear, artillery, and air
strikes against the enemy that has penetrated. Nuclear strikes against the
penetrating enemy are carried out so as not to hit the defending subunits
or restrict their maneuver.

As formerly, it is considered most advisable to make counterattacks

against the flank and rear of the enemy that has penetrated. The flanks are
still the most vulnerable spots in the attacking force's battle formation. If
the enemy sustains great losses or it is impossible to move second-echelon
subunits to his flank because of terrain features, a counterattack may also
be carried out from the front.

178
 It is also important to achieve surprise in order for a counterattack to
succeed. As the experience of the Great Patriotic War reveals, surprise
counterattacks stun the enemy. Today, however, the great effectiveness of
enemy reconnaissance equipment makes it far more difficult to achieve
surprise in actions. It has now become especially important to achieve
speed in actions, i.e., counterattacking from the line of march without
halting on a deployment line. This is made possible because counterattack-
ing subunits have tanks and infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel
carriers) that increase their mobility and striking power.

Counterattacks are usually organized while the defenses are being

prepared. When the decision to counterattack is made during an engage-
ment, aspects of organization are updated with reference to the specific
situation that has developed. The commander of a second-echelon battal-
ion must always be aware of the situation on the forward edge. On
receiving the order to counterattack, he dispatches his reconnaissance,
assigns (updates) combat missions for the subunits and fire resources, and
gives the signal to move up to the deployment line.

The second-echelon subunits are moved up to the deployment line as

rapidly as possible in small columns, along previously designated routes,
and they are covered by artillery fire and fire from all the weapons of the
first-echelon subunits operating on the counterattack axis, as well as by
minefields laid on the flanks of the advancing subunits. Preparatory fire is
usually employed so as to enable the counterattacking subunits to deploy
and defeat the enemy force that has penetrated.

Tanks usually comprise the principal element of a counterattack

grouping. Motorized rifle subunits attack in infantry combat vehicles (ar-
mored personnel carriers) or dismounted behind the tanks.

The counterattack proceeds rapidly until the enemy force that has
penetrated the defenses is completely eliminated or until a designated line is
reached (figure 12). The first-echelon subunits support the second echelon's
counterattack with fire or, on the orders of the senior commander (chieO,
counterattack with it and eliminate the enemy force that has penetrated the
defenses.

While moving up to the deployment line and during the counterat-

tack, the counterattacking subunits are protected from enemy air strikes by
antiaircraft fire.

After successfully counterattacking and defeating the enemy force that

has penetrated, the defending subunits take measures for restoration of
disrupted defenses and for nuclear damage control as quickly as possible
and prepare to repel repeated attacks.

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9. Night Defense

The defense must withstand enemy strikes both day and night. Night
defensive actions may be continuations of engagements begun in daytime
or may arise from the need to repel enemy night offensives. In addition,
subunits may be forced to go over to the defense at night.

The principles of conducting night defensive engagements are basically

the same as those of defense in daytime. At the same time, night has a
certain effect on the methods used to conduct defensive engagements.
Night gives the defenders advantages that, if skillfully exploited, can enable
them to perform defensive missions more effectively.

Night helps the defending force to achieve greater surprise in its

actions and to conceal the configuration of its battle formation and fire
plan. As a result, it may be possible to stun the enemy while repelling an
attack by opening up on him with sudden concentrated fire and by making
unanticipated counterattacks. By deceiving the enemy, one may hold up
his advance with a small force and thereby gain time to prepare the main
body for daytime combat actions or for maneuvering to more important
axes.

Under cover of darkness, one may withdraw subunits from threatened

areas before the enemy begins preparatory fire and thereby not only
conserve resources, but also force the enemy to make nuclear and fire
strikes on lightly held or unmanned positions. Moreover, engineer work is
carried out, obstacles are set up, stores are replenished, the wounded are
evacuated, and restoration work is carried out covertly at night.

The main factors that make planning and conducting night defense
more complicated are the limited visibility, the difficulty of orienting on
and maintaining assigned axes when maneuvering and counterattacking,
and the vagueness of the situation on the battlefield.

Today the difficulties created by darkness have been reduced some-

what by means of various illumination and night vision devices. However,
limited visibility makes it easier for the attacking enemy to approach the
defenses covertly and to mount surprise attacks.

Night makes it difficult for the defending force to select targets

against which to carry out nuclear strikes and air actions, and to conduct
aimed artillery, antitank, and small-arms fire. Troop control, maintenance
of communications, and nuclear damage control are made more compU-
cated by poor visibility on the battlefield.

180
 At night, personnel fatigue increases and people are more susceptible
to fear and panic.
Thus, it is essential to train subunits for niglit actions beforehand, and commanders at
all levels must maintain great troop stability in night engagements and demonstrate self-
control, coolness, and firmness in troop control. The commander's personal example plays a
great role in repelling enemy attacks.

In organization of defense at night, provision is made for measures to

reduce the effect on the defenders' actions of negative factors caused by
nighttime conditions. Subunit commanders strive during the day to orga-
nize defenses to repel enemy night offensives. This makes it possible to
better study the terrain, organize fire plans, maneuver resources for night
engagements, and carry out engineer preparation of positions, thus gaining
a number of advantages over the attacking enemy.

If subunits go over to the defense at night, commanders make deci-

sions and assign missions to the subunits, usually on maps. The subunits
move covertly up to their assigned defense areas and strongpoints and
consolidate on the indicated lines. At dawn, subunit missions, arrange-
ments for cooperation, and the fire plan are updated, and necessary
changes are made in the disposition of resources on the spot.

Combat security outposts are reinforced, observation of the enemy

and the obstacles in front of the forward edge is intensified, and sound
monitoring is initiated in order to prevent an enemy surprise attack and
detect in good time his movement up to the forward edge and transition to
the attack.

Illumination of the ground in front of the FEBA and of enemy

installations and targets during an engagement is set up to improve condi-
tions for observing the enemy and using fire resources when repelling his
attack. Moreover, countermeasures are taken against the enemy's illumina-
tion and night vision devices, thereby reducing the effectiveness of his fire
and making his troop control more difficult. Artillery, mortar, and anti-
tank fire, air strikes, and small-arms fire are used for this purpose; smoke
is used to blind enemy observers.

In order to increase the effectiveness of the defending subunits' fire at

night, it is important to have prepared weapons for aimed fire, including
those using night vision devices.

Because the enemy conducts night offensives along roads as a rule,

fire resources are used primarily on these axes.

Primary emphasis is placed on reinforcing antitank fire. For this

purpose, the number of antitank weapons on call is increased, and when

181
darkness falls, some of the guns, ATGMs, and rocket launchers are moved
up to temporary positions closer to the FEBA. The numbers of fire
resources moved up and their disposition for night actions are determined
by the subunit commanders.

Some of the artillery battalions (batteries) are readied for defensive

fire on possible axes of enemy attack. Antitank reserves may be moved up
to the main axes.

In order to improve conditions for orienting and controlling fire,

reference points are designated that are easily visible both day and night. If
necessary, means of illuminating them are prepared. Recognition signals
for friendly forces are also established.

In night engagements, the attacking enemy will most likely carry out
nuclear strikes against targets quite distant from the FEBA. However, it is
essential to take measures to guarantee the safety of subunits holding the
forward edge, particularly against thermal radiation from nuclear bursts,
since in darkness it may put personnel out of action at distances 3-4 times
greater than in daytime.

Subunit night maneuvers must be simple in conception and not de-

mand complex regroupings. They are organized so as to avoid having the
subunits' lines of movement intersect, and to prevent large concentrations
of troops on roads. Routes of maneuver are marked with signs that are
illuminated or easily visible in darkness. Routes and deployment lines are
studied during daylight hours by the commanders of all the subunits that
are to be maneuvered. Speed of maneuver of resources is less at night than
during the day. For this reason, the second-echelon subunits and reserves
must be situated as close as possible to the sites where they will be
employed.

Although night itself serves to mask the troops, it is nonetheless

essential to institute camouflage measures at night. In such a case, the
distance from the enemy and his possession of surveillance equipment are
taken into consideration. In areas within range of radar equipment and
night vision devices, camouflage must be just as thorough at night as
during the day.

In order to maintain a state of heightened combat readiness, at least

50 percent of subunit personnel remain in their positions at night, ready to
quickly open fire and repel enemy attacks.

If enemy movement is detected on the approaches to the defense,

specially detailed artillery and mortars illuminate the ground in front of the
forward edge with illumination shells and bombs. Illumination of the

182
 attacker's first echelon, the areas of the enemy's missile launcher and
artillery fire positions, and his approaching reserves receives primary con-
sideration , .

Aviation, artillery and mortars, exploiting the ground illumination,

destroy the enemy's tactical nuclear weapons, artillery, and also his ad-
vancing tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and armored personnel carriers.

When threatened by enemy nuclear strikes, personnel take cover in

dugouts, shelters, at the bottom of foxholes and trenches, and in tanks.

Enemy attacks are repelled by opening fire by surprise. Extensive use

is made of fire resources equipped with night vision devices and antitank
rocket launchers to destroy enemy tanks, other armored targets, and infan-
try.

At night it is even more important to repel an enemy before he

reaches the forward edge than it is during the day, because if even a small
enemy force penetrates the defenses, the fire plan will be disrupted, and it
will be difficult to restore it in the dark. The subunits defending the
forward edge must take every measure possible to repel enemy attacks and
hold their positions. Their actions are supported by artillery fire from the
depth and the fire resources under the direct control of the senior com-
mander (chieO-

If the enemy penetrates the defenses, the subunits will fire on him
with all weapons, holding their lines and positions stubbornly.

Surprise counterattacks are more effective at night than during the

day. They make it possible to make substantive changes in the situation in
favor of the defending forces. Counterattacks may even be carried out by
small forces at any time of night, with the provision that by dawn they will
have defeated the enemy that has penetrated.

The experience of the last war provided many examples of successful

night counterattacks.
On 17 January 1943, about a battalion of enemy infantry penetrated the boundary
between two rifle companies of the 147th Independent Rifle Brigade following an artillery
strike. Further enemy advance was halted. The brigade commander decided to use the reserve
to make a night counterattack against the flanks of the battalion that had penetrated in order
to encircle and eliminate it. By 2200, the counterattack groupings had assumed a departure
area at the base of the penetration. To mislead the enemy, the brigade reconnaissance group
fired continuously on him from the front. The counterattack was preceded by a 10-minute
artillery strike, during which members of the reconnaissance group, feinting a frontal counter-
attack, intensified their fire. In response, the enemy opened up with a hail of fire in this
sector and began to illuminate the ground. At that time, the enemy was hit by a surprise

183
counterattack on the flanks. The counterattacking subunits successfully advanced toward one
another. The enemy, perceiving the threat of encirclement, quickly withdrew. By morning the
defenses were restored.

Organizing counterattacks is more complicated at night than during

the day. For this reason, counterattacks are planned to be simple in
conception and are carried out on open ground well provided with visible
night reference points. Special attention is given to supporting the move-
ment of the counterattacking subunits to the deployment lines. For this
purpose, in addition to marking the routes of advance, guides may be
assigned and reconnaissance and local security stepped up. When the
counterattacking subunits reach the deployment line, the enemy and the
terrain ahead will be illuminated. The enemy force that has penetrated is
defeated by decisive surprise actions on the part of the counterattacking
subunits.

At dawn, the attacking enemy usually operates more aggressively. At

night, he does his best to bring up the second echelon (reserves) in order to
carry out more powerful strikes against the defending forces at dawn and
achieve success on a decisive axis. For this reason, the defenders must try
to covertly concentrate their reserves on the most important axis during the
night, then at dawn make a preventive strike against the enemy grouping
that has penetrated and seize the initiative.

When enemy airborne assault forces are engaged at night, surprise is

particularly important. It is achieved by covertly moving up the resources
assigned to eliminate the assault force and attacking its flank and rear. In
transitions to the attack, the ground held by the assault force is given
increased illumination to make it easier to find one's position and to
maintain cooperation among the subunits eliminating the assault force.

10. Defense in Mountains

Mountainous terrain has a twofold effect on the actions of defending
forces. The harsh ruggedness of the terrain and the presence of obstruc-
tions forces the attacking enemy to conduct his combat actions mainly
along valleys, roads, and mountain ridges. The enemy's momentum of
advance in mountains is reduced in comparison with that on regular
terrain, and maintenance of cooperation between groupings advancing on
separate axes separated by obstacles is made more difficult. For these
reasons, forces going over to the defense in mountains can set up stable
defenses with fewer resources than on moderately rugged terrain. The
strongest, most deeply echeloned defenses will be set up on sectors of
terrain that intersect axes of likely enemy advance, i.e., at road junctions,
on commanding heights, and in passes. Sectors that are difficult of access
will be covered by company and independent platoon strongpoints.

184
 The negative effect of mountains on organizing defenses is apparent
in the great areas of dead ground and numerous deep and hidden ap-
proaches that hinder observation and malce it possible for the enemy to
approach the forward edge unnoticed and attaclc it by surprise. The large
gaps between strongpoints make it easier for attacking enemy forces make
deep or close envelopments.

The limited numbers of roads, the possibility of landshdes, and the

creation of barriers on roads after nuclear bursts make it more difficult for
attackers and defenders alike to maneuver resources from one axis to
another.

The effects of the casualty-producing elements of nuclear bursts vary

in mountainous terrain. On slopes facing bursts, the lethality of the blast is
greater than on reverse slopes. Levels of radioactive contamination will be
greater in valleys and gorges than on slopes or watersheds.

Stony and craggy terrain makes engineer work more difficult. When
fortifications are constructed, sudden weather changes are taken into con-
sideration and measures are taken to warn subunits about and protect
them from rock falls, avalanches, and flooding by rivers.

Mountains have a screening effect on the functioning of radios, which

necessitates measures to improve the stability and range of communica-
tions (setting up relay stations and so on).

In the mountains, battalions as a rule set up their defenses on broader

fronts than on regular terrain, intersecting the most easily accessible axes
of enemy actions, while defenses on plateaus and in wide valleys are set up
in the same way as under regular conditions. Defenses are set up so as to
create company and independent platoon strongpoints with the aim of
holding commanding heights, passes, road junctions, and other important
terrain sectors. Strongpoints are set up so as to provide for all-round
defense and mutual fire support between them. In sectors that are difficult
of access and hard to cover by observation and fire, and in the gaps
between strongpoints, ambushes and obstacles are set up and reconnais-
sance and patrols are organized.

Forward edges are chosen that lie on the slopes of mountain ridges,
heights, and spurs, providing good fields of view and fire over their
approaches and on the reverse slopes of hills.

When a fire plan is organized, preparations are made for overlapping

enfilade fire, crossfire and surprise short-range concentrated fire in front
of the forward edge, in the depth of the defense area, in the gaps between
strongpoints, and on the flanks. Fire resources are disposed in stepped

185
formation on the slopes facing the enemy and on the reverse slopes of
heights in order to make it possible to hit the enemy in the valleys and
eliminate dead zones and hidden approaches to the forward edge.

Tanks attached to motorized rifle battalions, antitank guns, and

ATGMs are usually employed in company strongpoints that are defending
road junctions, exits from valleys, defiles, the edges of forests, and moun-
tain river crossings. Their fire positions are selected to enable them to hit
the enemy at maximum range.

If a battalion is defending a narrow mountain valley (ravine), fire

resources are positioned on adjoining mountain slopes, from which the
valley is covered by crossfire.

The main efforts in defending a pass are concentrated on holding

heights situated on the approaches to it. A portion of the battalion's forces
assumes defensive positions directly in the pass. Obstacles are set up on the
roads leading to the pass from both directions; the approaches to them are
covered by crossfire from the adjacent heights.

In the engineer preparation of strongpoints, fortifications built in

rocky soil consist primarily of banked semi-dugouts made of stones and
covered with a layer of soil and sandbags filled with earth. Demolition
charges are used extensively in engineer preparation. Foxholes, shelters,
and other fieldworks are prepared so as to prevent incendiary mixtures and
water from leaking into them. Mine workings, caves, and other types of
natural cover are adpated to protect personnel against NBC weapons.

When obstacles are prepared, extensive use is made of natural ob-

structions, some set up with stones, while in mountainous woodland, tree
barriers are constructed, sections of roads (trails) and man-made structures
are prepared for demolition, and minefields are laid on roads.

The attacking enemy is hit by fire from the time he reaches the distant
approaches. His attack is repelled using all fire resources. Tanks and other
armored targets are destroyed as they negotiate gradients, particularly on
hairpin bends where their speed is reduced.

The defending subunits hit enemy outflanking groups with concen-

trated fire. Artificial landslides are used extensively to counter their pene-
tration into the depth of the defense.

When the enemy penetrates the defenses, subunits stubbornly hold

their strongpoints, maintain all-round defense, and inflict the maximum
losses on the enemy. If conditions are favorable, a battalion will counterat-
tack to eliminate an enemy force that has penetrated.

186
 In order to move up covertly to the counterattack deployment line,
tank subunits making up the second echelon (reserve) take advantage of
hollows, the reverse slops of heights, mountain roads reconnoitered before-
hand, and the beds of shallow rivers. As a rule, counterattacks are carried
out from above, along the slopes of mountains, valleys, and ridges, with
artillery support.

Today's motorized rifle and tank units and subunits possess consider-
able capabilities for setting up stable defenses quickly and successfully
repelling an offensive by superior enemy forces. Still, it is essential to bear
in mind that there are great difficulties involved in conducting defensive
engagements when the enemy is employing powerful weapons and tactical
airborne assault forces. For this reason, commanders must, under condi-
tions that approximate actual combat as nearly as possible, foster in their
subordinates a confidence in their capabiUty to repel enemy attacks with
available weapons and combat equipment and to create conditions for
going over to a decisive offensive.

Notes
1. See Taktika v boyevykh primerakh. Polk [Tactics in Combat Examples: The Regiment],
p. 195.
2. See ibid., p. 189.
3. See Armeyskiye operatsii [Army Operations], p. 176.
4. See Tactics in Combat Examples: The Division, p. 269.

187
Chapter 5. Troop Movement

Troop movement is the organized relocation of troops by marching or

by means of motor, rail, water, or air transport or any combination
thereof, the aim being to bring them to a designated area or line within a
specified time, fully prepared to accomplish any combat mission.

The troops' timely arrival at the designated area (or line) in battle-
ready condition is achieved by choosing skillful methods of movement, by
advance preparation of troops, roads, and transportation, by meticulous
organization, and by ensuring comprehensive movement support, reliable
air defense cover for the troops, thorough subunit training, and capable
action on the part of commanders and staffs.

Troop movement is executed while regrouping and maneuvering re-

sources.

1. The March
The basic method of troop movement is the march. The march is the
organized movement of troops in columns, using their own resources—on
foot (skis in winter) or in organic vehicles, using roads and cross-country
routes, with march security and observing intercolumn spacing and speed
of movement regulations. Tanks and other vehicles with low speeds and
range can be transported on heavy tractor-trailer units included in the
columns.

The march is always combined either with combat or the regrouping

of subunits in the field. Alternatively, it may take the form of troop
deployment for an offensive, meeting engagement, or defense, for taking a
designated line situated out of enemy contact, or for concentrating in a
designated area.

The march has always played an important role in achieving victory,

and therefore military leaders of the past have given much attention to the
art of its execution. Today, with the exceptional maneuverability, dyna-
mism, and broad spatial scope inherent in troop actions, the march has
become an integral part of preparation for and conducting of combat.

188
 The fact that the march can be used in a great variety of circum-
stances, both well to the rear of friendly forces and in the combat zone,
makes it the most common form of movement. Marches may be made
toward, along, or away from the front line. In terms of the conditions
under which they are carried out, it is customary to distinguish between
marches made in anticipation of engagement and those with no threat of
encountering the enemy.

A inarch in anticipation of engagement refers to the possibility of

combat with enemy ground forces during the march or to a move up to an
indicated line (area); it is executed close to the line of contact and is
usually limited to a day's march. It may include one or, more rarely, two
halts or none at all if the march is not long. After the march, the troops
may concentrate in the designated area or else deploy on the indicated line
in order to go over to the offensive, a meeting engagement, or a defensive
position.

The Great Patriotic War provided a great many examples of marches

in anticipation of engagement. The formation of offensive groupings, the
transfer of efforts to new axes, advancing to defensive positions, and the
execution of regroupings and troop maneuvers for other reasons all in-
volved marches.
In January 1942, units of the 93rd and 338th Rifle Divisions were committed from the
second echelon of the 33rd Army to develop the offensive in the direction of Vyaz'ma. The
march covered 80-100 kilometers. In August 1944, during the liberation of the Baltic states,
the 145th Rifle Division made a 50-kilometer march to cover the flank of the attacking troops
against attacks by enemy reserves.'

During a inarch without threat of enemy encounter, combat with

enemy ground forces is ruled out; however, troops must be constantly
prepared for intense combat with enemy air attack weapons. Such marches
usually take place deep in the rear of friendly troops and generally last
several days, although they may sometimes by limited to a single day. At
the end of the march, the troops concentrate in the assigned area or deploy
on the indicated line for advance preparation for combat.

A troop movement using organic resources over a distance greater

than a day's march is considered a long-distance march.

The extent of a long-distance march may amount to several hundred

or even several thousand kilometers. The march will have 2-3 halts every
day, with a day- or nighttime rest period at the end of each day's march
and, if need be, a day's rest every few days. When moving from deep
within home territory into a combat zone, troops can move without threat
of enemy encounter for most of the time, but on the last day's march they

189
must anticipate engagement. If a march is carried out parallel to the front
at a negligible distance from the line of contact, it is executed in anticipa-
tion of engagement.

Today, long-distance marches with various objectives are practiced

extensively, especially given increased enemy capability for disrupting the
movement of troops by rail.

The great maneuvering quality of modern combat actions and the

increased range and power of weapons significantly complicates conditions
for executing marches, especially in the daytime and when close to the line
of contact.

Troops may be hit by enemy nuclear or chemical strikes and sustain

losses in personnel, weapons, and equipment; they may be required to
negotiate (or skirt) radioactively contaminated zones, chemically contami-
nated sectors and areas affected by demolition, fire, or floods. Heavy
losses in personnel or combat equipment, significant destruction of roads,
bridges and tunnels, or the creation of extensive areas of radioactive
contamination may force troops to halt temporarily in order to restore
fighting efficiency, prepare passages through obstacles and demolished
areas, or await a drop in high radiation levels. All this requires that the
troops be constantly ready to restore their fighting efficiency, to take
chemical and nuclear damage control measures, and to ensure continued
advance. When the march is being organized, it is necessary to choose and
prepare alternate and lateral routes in addition to the principal routes; they
can be used in the course of the march to skirt contaminated zones and
demolished areas.

During a march, troops may be subject to the action of tactical

aviation and, as they approach the front, that of army aviation. Enemy
fighter-bombers are, even in adverse weather, capable of making bomb
strikes and employing rockets, cannons, and incendiary weapons. Combat
helicopters using ATGMs and unguided rockets, incendiary mixtures, and
mines are capable of striking columns, mining the terrain, and landing
reconnaissance and combat subunits on troop movement routes.

This calls for effective cover for troops from enemy air strikes and
strict observance of camouflage rules and march discipline. The probability
of action by airlifted diversionary reconnaissance groups and airborne
assault forces increases when troops are moving through close or broken
country, built-up areas, defiles, and bridges, especially at night. These
enemy troops may destroy roadworks along the routes and water develop-
ment works at water obstacles, create road blocks on mountain or forest
roads, capture crossings and passes, and attack control posts and missile
and logistics subunits. Under these conditions, it becomes particularly

190
important to maintain great vigilance, to guard movement routes, col-
umns, control posts, missile and logistics subunits, and to organize traffic
control meticulously. Movement routes should not pass through densely
populated areas, near railway stations, or through road junctions and
defiles.

As the troops near the front line, the chances of coming under the
effects of guided and unguided missiles are increased, and, as they ap-
proach the designated deployment line, long-range tube artillery and multi-
ple rocket launchers may be employed against them. The enemy may not
only carry out reconnaissance and make effective hits on troops with
precision weapon systems, but may also carry out surprise remote mining
of the terrain, resulting in increased losses to troops on the move and the
necessity of using organic resources to negotiate the obstacles thus created.
Such enemy actions are more likely when troops are negotiating barely
passable sectors of terrain—mountain passes, for instance—and when
moving through areas where the enemy cannot make effective use of
aviation. The possibility of enemy use of precision weaponry requires that
commanders at all levels constantly carry out reconnaissance, observe
spacing regulations and camouflage measures, and provide the columns
with air defense cover during both movement and halts.

Troops may stage marches with various levels of strength in person-

nel, armament, combat and other equipment and material resources. On
marches conducted when an engagement is anticipated, they may be rein-
forced with artillery, antitank and antiaircraft weapons, engineer subunits,
and other resources, which may join the troops in the area of their
dispositions before movement begins or else may be incorporated into the
columns during halts or as they approach the designated line of deploy-
ment.

Marches usually take place under concealment, whether at night or

under other conditions of limited visibility, but movement during combat
actions or well to the rear of friendly forces may also take place during the
day. Circumstances may call for troop movement by march at any time of
year, in any kind of weather, and over varied terrain. In the course of a
march, troops will have to negotiate large rivers and mountainous regions
and frequently travel cross-country, laying down cross-country routes and
fully exploiting the excellent off-road capabilities of fighting vehicles and
transport. There may be a variety of economic conditions, sociopolitical
makeup, and attitudes among the population in the regions in which the
troops are moving.

Difficult marching conditions may have an adverse effect on the

troops' fighting efficiency and momentum of advance, especially if there
has been insufficient preparation for the march, the subunits have been

191
poorly march-trained, and the commanders and staffs are inept in direct-
ing them during the march. In order to eliminate undesirable conse-
quences, it is necessary to thoroughly prepare personnel, armament and
combat and other equipment for the march, to organize it capably, and to
ensure comprehensive support, together with a high level of subunit march
training.

The march capabilities of a subunit are indicators of its ability to

cover a given distance within the time limit, neither overtaxing personnel
nor overusing vehicles, while maintaining constant readiness to engage the
enemy. The march capability of troops is judged by their average speed of
movement and the distance covered in a day's march.

During the Great Patriotic War, troops usually staged marches at

night; they lasted from 6 to 8 hours, although they would sometimes run
between 10 and 12 hours. Average speeds in motor transport on paved
roads were 15-20 km/h at night and 20-25 and sometimes 30 km/h in the
daytime; a day's march would cover 150-200 kilometers, and sometimes
even 250-300 kilometers.
The 133rd Rifle Division, moving by motor transport from Kutalino to Dmitrov in
November 1941, covered 240 kilometers a day; their average speed was 25 Icm/h. The troops
of the 2nd Ukrainian Front covered 170-190 kilometers a day in May 1944.

Today troops are fully motorized and mechanized and equipped with
better developed armored vehicles and motor transport equipment. The
mechanical reliability of the vehicles is also significantly greater; speed and
cross-country performance have improved, as has range between
refuelings. They are capable of negotiating water obstacles, radioactively
contaminated zones and mixed minefields; they have effective night driving
instruments and reliable blackout devices. All this, combined with better
troop march training, makes possible increased subunit march capabilities,
allows movement at night to be approximately as rapid as it is in the
daytime, and renders obsolete the earlier categorizing of marches into
normal and forced. Troops can move under their own power over consid-
erable distances, under any conditions of terrain or weather, and at any
time of day, yet remain constantly battle-ready.

The average speed of troop movement depends on the effectiveness of

enemy action, commanders' skill in column control, drivers' level of train-
ing, mechanical condition of the vehicles, column composition, march
route conditions, weather, and other factors. When a subunit is perform-
ing an independent mission, its rate of movement will be higher than it
would be as part of a unit. In the event of nuclear or chemical attack or
air strikes or when the march routes pass through demolished areas, barely
negotiable sectors and crossings, or under unfavorable road and weather

192
conditions, the rate of troop movement will be reduced, sometimes fairly
significantly. Columns of wheeled vehicles move more rapidly than tank or
mixed columns.

Troops must in all cases execute marches with the maximum possible
speed under the given conditions, negotiating observable sectors especially
quickly with a view to protecting themselves from enemy precision weap-
ons. Average speeds of 25-30 km/h or more are now attainable not only
by motor transport columns on paved roads, as was the case in the last
war, but also by tank and mixed columns, even when moving along dirt
roads; motor transport columns may attain an average speed of 40 km/h
or greater.^ In mountains, deserts, arctic regions, wooded and swampy
areas, and other unfavorable conditions, the average speed is reduced to 20
km/h. If a march is made on foot, a subunit's average speed of movement
may be 4-5 km/h, or 5-7 km/h on skis.

Average speed is calculated without regard for the time of march (day
or night) or for time elapsed during halts. When a march is planned,
average speed is defined as the ratio of the distance of a day's march to
the time taken for the move. Since troops will move at various speeds
through different sectors, subunit commanders and traffic control service
personnel should know the boundaries of each sector within which a given
speed is to be maintained.

The term "day's march" signifies the distance that troops can cover
in a 24-hour period. This figure depends on the mission being performed,
the average speed and the length of time the column will be moving during
the 24-hour period. The period of actual movement is governed largely by
the drivers' physical and mental capabilities, their ability to endure the
high stress levels of a march and still maintain fighting efficiency. Indeed,
in the course of a day's march, the driver has to move the gearshift and
steering mechanism alone at least 6,000 times; the total equivalent mass
moved by a driver in a day is 150-200 metric tons.^

Although during the Great Patriotic War it was exceptional for a

driver to work for 10-12 hours without a break, with today's vehicles this
is the norm. The remaining 12-14 hours are spent in servicing armament
and combat and other equipment, providing personnel with rest and food,
moving columns out of disposition areas, and dispersing and camouflaging
the vehicles in the rest area (whether it be a daytime, nighttime or a day's
rest) or in the designated concentration area.

Day's marches of as much as several hundred kilometers were ex-

tremely rare during the Great Patriotic War; today such a day's march
may be considered the norm when traveling in average road and weather
conditions and for motor transport columns traveling for 10-12 hours a

193
day at average speeds of 30-40 km/h, the distance of a day's march may
be even greater. On marches in unfavorable road and weather conditions
(in mountains, deserts, arctic regions, wooded or swampy areas, etc.), the
extent of a day's march will be less.

On the map, the extent of a day's march is measured in kilometers

along the march routes from the line of departure to the furthest boundary
of the designated concentration (rest) area or to the troop deployment line.
Depending on the map scale, the local terrain, and how crooked the roads
or cross-country routes are, the calculated overall distance of the march
must be revised upward by 5 to 15 or 20 percent. This ensures greater
accuracy in determining the distance of the troops' daily march and makes
any derived calculations more realistic. When the routes are broken down
into segments of 5-10 kilometers on the map, the necessary correction is
made to each segment.

Troops execute marches in march formation, a configuration of re-

sources created especially for moving in columns and determined by the
mission assigned, the objectives of the upcoming actions, the number of
march routes, and other prevailing conditions.

In the case of a march where the possibility of engagement is fore-

seen, the troop march formation must ensure that the march is completed
by deadline; it must also ensure combat readiness in the event of an enemy
nuclear strike or attack by chemical or conventional (including precision)
weapons, and rapid deployment of troops into battle formation.

A troop march formation consists of columns, whose number de-

pends mainly on the number of march routes. A subunit will march in a
single column. A battalion assigned to the forward detachment (advance
guard) or following a different route advances with a main body column
and march security. As Great Patriotic War experience has shown, the
march formation for units (formations) may include a forward detach-
ment, march security, a movement support detachment, main body col-
umns, and technical and logistic support subunit (unit) columns (figure
13).^*

The forward detachment is dispatched to forestall the enemy in cap-

turing an advantageous line and holding it until the main body arrives; it is
also responsible for reconnaissance. The forward detachment is dispatched
a few hours before the main body begins to move in order to ensure that
the dispatching commander has time to organize combat and maneuver
resources; consideration is given here to the ability of the forward detach-
ment to independently engage numerically superior enemy forces without
support from the main body. During the last war the following groups
would be sent out as forward detachments: from a division—a reinforced

194
regiment, and when moving in a broad march zone—several reinforced
battalions, one from each of the leading regiments; a regiment would send
out a reinforced battalion.

March security is organized at the front, on threatened flanks, and at

the rear in order to ensure unhindered movement by the main body and to
prevent sudden enemy attacks or penetration by enemy reconnaissance,
and also to ensure the troops advantageous conditions for engaging. In
front, the troops are protected by advance guards, forward security ele-
ments, forward patrols of the advance guard, and patrol sections (tanks).

During the war a reinforced regiment would sometimes be sent out as

part of an advance guard. Today, anything up to a reinforced battalion is
sent out on each march route to a considerable distance, which gives the
dispatching commander time to make decisions and task the troops and
gives the main body time to maneuver and deploy for combat. The
forward security element may consist of anything up to a reinforced
company, and the forward patrol of an advance guard—a platoon; patrol
sections (tanks) are not sent beyond visual communication range.

To protect the main body from threats to its flanks, flank parties of
about the strength of a reinforced company are sent out; in especially
dangerous sectors, stationary flank security elements are put out, holding
advantageous lines until the protected columns have passed. Protection
from the rear is provided by rear parties. The flank and rear protection
proceed at distances of about 5 kilometers in order to protect the troops
from sudden enemy attack from a threatened flank or the rear.

Movement support detachments consisting of engineer subunits are

dispatched on each march route to provide close support for the movement
of the main body along roads and column routes. In order to have more
time to prepare march routes, the detachment usually begins to move out
of the troop disposition areas behind the forward security element. Their
grouping also includes motorized rifle or tank subunits.

The main body forms one or several columns, dispersed laterally and
in depth. The distance between adjacent columns following parallel routes
must be sufficient to prevent them from being hit simultaneously by a
nuclear strike. The distance maintained between battalion columns follow-
ing each other must be sufficient to prevent a medium-yield nuclear war-
head from putting them out of action simultaneously.

In establishing intercolumn spacing, one must proceed from the actual

conditions of troop movement, the various yields of the nuclear warheads
in use by the enemy, the features of the local terrain, weather, and the
degree to which organic vehicles reduce the destructive effects of nuclear

195
strikes on personnel. The distance between vehicles is set at 25-50 meters,
as it was in the last war. However, while the overall depth, for example, of
a motor transport battalion column in the last war was 2 kilometers and
that of a motor transport regiment column was 10-15 kilometers, today
the increased complement of resources in subunits, units, and formations
and the need to observe requirements for defending against nuclear and
precision weapons have resulted in a significant increase in column
lengths.^

Columns are grouped so as to allow any one of them to engage the

enemy independently. Tanks and infantry combat vehicles usually move at
the head of a column, artillery a little further back, and antiaircraft
weapons are distributed throughout the column's depth. Antitank weapons
and some artillery may be located between the main body and the march
security. Depending on the prevailing circumstances, logistics and technical
support subunits may march right behind the combat subunits or further
back—as much as several kilometers—in independent columns. Some of
the medical and repair subunits, and also those vehicles carrying fuel and
ammunition, may move in the main body columns.

When there is no threat of enemy contact, the troop march formation

is organized with due regard for ease of movement, attaining high march
speed with minimum strain to personnel, and maintaining the condition of
armament and of combat and other equipment. It therefore differs from
the march formation in cases where engagement is anticipated, namely: no
advance detachment is sent out; march security at the front of a column
may have a smaller complement and not be sent as far ahead; if conditions
are favorable, flank and rear march security may not be sent out at all.
The main body is reorganized into fewer but consequently longer columns.
Subunits in tracked vehicles may be combined into joint columns and
either follow different routes or follow the subunits on wheeled vehicles.
Movement support detachments move out ahead of time, and some of the
personnel of the logistics subunits are sent ahead to the halt and daytime
(nighttime, day's) rest areas.

If troop movement is to be successful, it is extremely important that

inarch discipline be observed.
In the Vistula-Oder Operation during the Great Patriotic War, for example, a formation
consisting of three rifle corps of the 21st Army was able to move 210 kilometers under its
own power between 13 and 18 January 1945 without being hit by enemy air strikes, largely
because of excellent march discipline. They moved mainly at night, stopping at dawn, and
during halts and rests they would disperse in areas with good natural camouflage.

Today, with increased enemy capabilities for reconnaissance and in-

flicting casualties, even on troops marching at a great distance from the
line of contact, the importance of march discipline continues to grow.

196
 March discipline must be observed from tlie moment movement be-
gins. Subunit columns are formed up in the disposition area and calculate
their move out to the starting point so that the head of each column will
pass it at the specified time, while maintaining the assigned speed; each
succeeding subunit column passes the starting point when the tail of the
preceding column has reached the requisite distance. If troops are moving
along several routes, the lead vehicles of all leading subunits (units) must
cross the line of departure precisely at their assigned time, maintaining the
required speed of movement. The correct timing for beginning a march is
controlled by the senior commander (chief) and staff officers (figure 15).

During the march, speed of movement, spacing, safety measures,

camouflage, and the set times for crossing report lines are all strictly
observed. With the onset of darkness, special attention is paid to observing
blackout procedures. It is forbidden for vehicles to move without blackout
headlamps, or for fires to be lit during halts or disposition for nighttime
rest periods. Vehicles in columns move with the help of night vision
devices or blackout apparatus, but if it is a bright night, neither will be
used at all.

Moving columns use only the right side of the road; the left side is left
free for oncoming traffic or for overtaking the column, which may be
done only with the permission of the senior commander (chieO. When the
vehicles are moving at high speed, along dusty or icy roads, or roads with
steep up- and downgrades and sharp turns, the distance between them is
increased. The troops pass through built-up areas, crossings, passes and
defiles without stopping and at maximum possible speed. If troops are
held up at choke points or barely negotiable spots, the columns following
will halt in open terrain in good time; immediate measures are taken to
eliminate the congestion. During a long march, drivers (driver-mechanics)
will be periodically replaced.

Every 3-4 hours of movement, troops halt for about an hour; there is
also one halt of about 2 hours that takes place in the second half of a
day's march. The leading vehicles of all battalion columns must stop for
the halt simultaneously and not disrupt the configuration of the column.
The vehicles stop on the right shoulder of the road at set distances from
one another, but the minimum intervehicular distance is 10 meters. Person-
nel leave the vehicles and disperse for rest to the right of the road.
Observers, antiaircraft alert crews, and radio operators remain in the
vehicles. In the interests of protection against nuclear and precision weap-
ons, the protective and camouflaging features of the terrain are fully
exploited; if there is no natural cover near the route, it is advisable for
personnel to dig themselves slit trenches and, if time permits, to prepare
very simple shelters for weapons and combat equipment. During the halts,
general inspection and technical maintenance of weapons and combat and

197
other equipment are carried out. During halts of about 2 hours' duration,
hot food is distributed to personnel. At the end of the halt, all vehicles
resume movement simultaneously, gradually increasing speed and spacing.

At the end of a day's march, at the designated time, the troops stop
for a rest (day- or nighttime) and, after several such marches, for a day's
rest (if necessary). The duration of the rest depends on actual conditions.
At the rest area, the troops leave the road and disperse to concealed
positions, giving due regard to requirements for protection against preci-
sion and NBC weapons; the dispositions adopted also provide for main-
taining battle-readiness and for rapid resumption of convoy formation in
order to continue movement. Rest and food for personnel and technical
maintenance and repair of damaged vehicles are organized; any necessary
column reconfiguration is carried out, and basic shelters are prepared for
personnel and combat equipment. Antiaircraft weapons are deployed in
their positions. Local security is organized in each subunit; the march
security becomes a bivouac guard or is replaced by a newly appointed
bivouac guard.

The traffic control service plays an important role in maintaining

good march discipline. The experience of the last war reveals that when it
is well organized, troops strictly observe the prescribed order of movement
and camouflage measures, carry out the move more systematically, and
arrive at the designated area or line at the right time.
The traffic control service was well organized for the regrouping of the First Baltic Front
formations onto the Memel axis in the autumn of 1944. Rigid control of troop movement
over all routes and situation reports from report lines to headquarters along existing and
specially laid communications lines contributed greatly to the success of the troop regrouping.
On the other hand, the traffic control service was absent for a regrouping in the operation
conducted by the Northwestern Front to destroy the enemy's Demyan grouping at the
beginning of 1942; this was one of the reasons that the troops did not arrive at the line of
commitment into the breakthrough on time.

Traffic control service on movement routes and in halt and rest areas
is organized ahead of time by the staff. To control movement on the line
of departure, the report lines, crossings and road junctions—in other
words, wherever troop movements become more complex, it is more diffi-
cult for them to orient themselves, and a column could leave the proper
route—traffic officer posts and traffic control points are set up. In order
to cut down on the number of posts, road and traffic signs are used that
are easily seen by troops moving in darkness or other conditions of limited
visibility, but that are inconspicuous to the enemy. Helicopters may be
widely used for aerial monitoring of troop observation of march discipline,
to lead back to the route columns that have lost their way, to show the
troops detours around areas affected by demolition, flooding and fires,
and to give them new axes in response to changes in the mission.

198
 In the set of measures for comprehensive march support, especially
marches conducted when an engagement is anticipated, an extremely im-
portant one is combat support, aimed at preventing enemy surprise attacks
and reducing the effectiveness of enemy strikes. Among the most impor-
tant aspects of combat support are reconnaissance, troop NBC defense,
and engineer support.

Reconnaissance is carried out constantly throughout the full extent of

the day's march, on the axis of movement, and along the flanks. Recon-
naissance of march routes and halt and rest areas is conducted under all
march conditions, and if a move is made in anticipation of engagement,
reconnaissance of the enemy is continuous.

The main missions of reconnaissance are timely detection of the en-

emy and determination of his fighting strength and intentions; it is espe-
cially important to determine whether he has nuclear or chemical weapons
or precision weapons system components, where they are located, and their
state of readiness. Reconnaissance also determines the condition of march
routes, the passability of off-road terrain and its nature at lines of possible
contact with enemy ground forces. It is very important to clarify the
radiological, chemical, and bacteriological situations in the march zone, to
detect contaminated zones in good time, and to reconnoiter detour routes.
Reconnaissance missions are carried out by surveillance, investigation of
the terrain, and other methods involving extensive use of new technical
equipment.

For reconnaissance purposes during the Great Patriotic War, observ-

ers were assigned and reconnaissance forces, reconnaissance parties, inde-
pendent reconnaissance patrols, engineer and chemical warfare reconnais-
sance patrols, scout vehicles and foot patrols were dispatched from
formations, units, and subunits on the march. In addition to organic
reconnaissance subunits, tank, motorized rifle, and rifle subunits on horse-
back or on motor transport were also included in the reconnaissance
elements; they were reinforced with antitank artillery, combat engineers,
and sometimes with tanks and self-propelled guns, which allowed them to
carry out reconnaissance along a broad front and in great depth.
On 28 January 1945, while on a march during the development of an offensive on the
Lodz axis, horse- and motor-transported reconnaissance subunits of the 47th and 57th Rifle
Divisions conducted reconnaissance to a distance of 30-35 kilometers from the main body; on
14 January 1945, reconnaissance subunits of the 88th Guards Rifle Division, using tanks,
penetrated the enemy's rear to a depth of 20 kilometers in the course of a pursuit.''

Today reconnaissance forces, reconnaissance, independent reconnais-

sance and battle reconnaissance patrols and reconnaissance detachments
(tanks) can also be dispatched and observers assigned from reconnaissance,
motorized rifle, and tank subunits and engineer and chemical warfare

199
reconnaissance patrols, artillery reconnaissance subunits, etc., may be dis-
patched from subunits of various combat arms and the combat service
support troops. If need be, reconnaissance parties for actions in the
enemy's rear and officers' reconnaissance patrols may be dispatched.

The fact that troops today are fully mechanized and motorized and
equipped with improved reconnaissance hardware allows them to obtain
information about the enemy and terrain during marches that is more
accurate and reliable and over a significantly greater range than was the
case during the last war; the extensive use of helicopters for reconnaissance
purposes makes it possible to quickly discover the condition of march
routes, identify contaminated zones, barriers, areas affected by demolition,
fires and flooding, and search out detours to negotiate or skirt them.

Protection against NBC weapons is provided by timely detection of

them, by warning troops of the immediate threat and onset of their
employment by the enemy, and by quickly notifying personnel about NBC
contamination. An important role in NBC protection is played by regular
lateral and in-depth dispersion of the march formation; skillful use of
protective and masking features of the terrain while on the move, on halts
and during dispositions for daytime (nighttime) or day's rests; engineer
preparation of rest areas; timely use of personal and collective protective
equipment; and skillful use of the protective features of fighting equipment
and motor transport.^

It is very important to be strict about camouflage, and to prevent

troops from massing in front of the line of departure, at report lines, at
halt and daytime (nighttime) or day's rest areas, at crossings and passes, in
defiles, and in built-up areas. Troops must always be ready to negotiate
extensive contamination zones or areas affected by demolition, fires or
flooding, all from the line of march.

NBC damage control should be carried out quickly and should not
delay troop movement. Personnel, armament, and combat and other
equipment undergo partial decontamination on leaving contaminated
zones, but when contamination is by chemical warfare agents, this must be
done immediately; full decontamination usually takes place in the daytime
(nighttime) or day's rest area or on arrival in the designated area.

As the experience of the Great Patriotic War testifies, engineer march

support is an important factor in ensuring successful troop movement,
especially if they are forced to negotiate water obstacles or other obstruc-
tions. In order to ensure that the troops arrived in the designated area or
at the deployment line in time, subunits, units and formations had to
perform great volumes of work in engineer march support.

200
 On 6 and 7 July 1943, on the march from the Korocha region near Belgorod, advance
reconnaissance was conducted in the 280th Guards Rifle Regiment concerning the nature and
condition of difficult sectors and choke points along their march routes; the order in which
the subunits would negotiate them was determined, combat engineer alert subunits with
engineer equipment and recovery and repair facilities were detailed, detour routes were
assigned, and the order in which the subunits would negotiate crossings, bridges, defiles and
large built-up areas was established. The regiment passed through choke points without
stopping. If it encountered demolished sectors on the route, it strove to bypass them; if this
proved impossible, it had the movement support detachment or specially detailed combat
engineer and rifle subunits carry out repair work. This ensured the accomplishment of their

Today, when troops are equipped with large numbers of combat and
other equipment, and especially with march conditions having grown con-
siderably more difficult, engineer support missions are becoming increas-
ingly varied, while the times for carrying them out are constantly reduced.

A successful march is impossible without continuous engineer recon-

naissance, the timely removal of obstacles and damage on march routes
and in troop rest areas, the maintenance of route passability, road and
bridge repair, the preparation of cross-country routes, and the preparation
and maintenance of crossings at water obstacles. The major engineer
support measures include creating passages across obstructions, and
breaches in obstacles created by enemy remote mining of an area; prepar-
ing routes around or through obstructions, zones with high NBC contami-
nation levels, barriers, and areas affected by demolition, fires and flood-
ing; enabling troops to travel barely passable sectors of roads; preparing
shelters in rest areas; and setting up and maintaining water supply points.

Great importance attaches to camouflage measures, to the skillful use

of organic and local materials to camouflage vehicles and combat equip-
ment during movement, on halts or in rest areas, setting up various types
of screening using engineer subunit resources on open sectors of the route,
and using camouflaging smoke screens when negotiating crossings and
defiles.

In the course of a march, troops may be subject to enemy aviation

and nuclear strikes and the effects of precision and incendiary weapons,
and remote mining. It may become necessary for columns, before they
reach their designated area or line, to counter enemy reconnaissance and
sabotage groups and airborne assault forces (airmobile forces) or to em-
ploy part of their resources to defeat enemy ground groupings breaking
through from the flank or approaching from the depth. This makes it
necessary not only to take combat support measures, but also to preserve
troop fighting efficiency and to skillfully repel enemy strikes (figure 14).

Troop air defense on the march is conducted with due regard for
measures envisaged by the senior commander (chief). All-round air obser-

201
vation is conducted from every vehicle in all subunits. In the event of
enemy air attack, troops are alerted immediately by a set signal. As a rule,
the columns continue to move at a higher speed and with greater
intervehicular spacing. If road structures are heavily damaged and it is
impossible to skirt the demolished sectors, some columns will halt until the
obstruction is removed.

Antiaircraft weapons destroy the enemy by firing on the move or

from the short halt. Small arms fire by subunits so detailed may also be
directed against aerial targets. Road sectors destroyed by air strikes are
bypassed on reserve or newly reconnoitered routes.

Subunits and units that have retained their fighting efficiency after
enemy nuclear strikes continue their move. Columns suffering direct hits
take steps to restore troop control and the fighting efficiency of personnel,
to carry out nuclear damage control, and to clear the roads or reconnoiter
detour routes. Areas hit by nuclear strikes are bypassed; if the resulting
areas of barriers, high levels of radiation, demolition, flooding and fires
prove impossible to bypass, they are negotiated at maximum speed and
with increased spacing along axes assuring the least damage to and con-
tamination of personnel and combat equipment. Under these circum-
stances both individual and collective protective equipment is used; vehicle
hatches, doors, ports, and louvers are all closed.

If, on the orders of the senior commander (chief), the column must
wait for high radiation levels to drop, troops disperse, take shelter, and
camouflage themselves. Contaminated personnel are evacuated to the near-
est medical facilities, while damaged weapons and combat and other equip-
ment that cannot be repaired in the unit are sent to the recovery and repair
facilities under the direct control of the senior commander (chief).

If the enemy deploys incendiary weapons against troops on the march

or if these troops have to negotiate an area of fires from the line of march,
measures are taken to ensure the safety of personnel, to safeguard the
weapons and combat and other equipment, and to fully exploit the protec-
tive features of this equipment and personal protective equipment. The
columns are quickly led out, either straight ahead or to the windward side
of the burning area, where they stop. Armament and vehicle fires are put
out, and personnel are evacuated and given first aid. After this, the
columns resume movement, while the wounded and sick are either evacu-
ated to the nearest medical facilities or else proceed with their subunits.

In the event the enemy conducts surprise remote mining of an area in

the troop movement zone, reconnaissance of the mined sectors is organized
immediately and, if it is impossible to bypass them and continue to move

202
in the assigned direction, the necessary resources are detailed to clear
passages in the obstacles thus created through which personnel and mate-
riel can pass.

Gaps in minefields on march routes are made by movement support

detachments, breaching teams, tanks with mine clearing attachments, or
manually. Each of these tanks clears two tracks, along which dismounted
motorized rifle subunits, following the tanks, negotiate the minefield.
Tanks not so equipped, infantry combat vehicles, prime movers, and
trucks negotiate minefields along lanes at least 5-6 meters wide that have
been cleared throughout their width either manually, by detonating the
mines with specially prepared explosive charges, or through offset
minefield clearing by tanks with the appropriate mine clearing attachments.

During the Great Patriotic War, troops on the march always took
measures to counter enemy diversionary reconnaissance groups or airborne
assault forces. When information was received about an area in which
diversionary reconnaissance groups were active or where enemy airborne
assault forces had landed, units and formations would step up reconnais-
sance, the protection of dangerous sectors on the march route, especially
bridges and defiles, and local security for the main body; in each column,
alert subunits would be assigned to move at the head of the column.
Sometimes when, in the commander's estimation, there was a likely area
for an airborne assault landing on the axis of advance of the troops, the
necessary resources were dispatched in advance to guard the area until the
arrival of the main body.

Troops usually went over to aggressive action against enemy diver-

sionary reconnaissance groups and airborne assault forces only when en-
emy subunits attacked columns or seized sectors of the movement route.
However, only the minimum necessary forces were called on for this, while
the other subunits and units continued the march.^

Today, the enemy has increased capabilities for employing diversion-

ary reconnaissance groups, airborne assault forces, and airmobile forces.
Therefore, it is necessary to resort to aggressive action against diversionary
reconnaissance groups and airborne assault forces more often than in the
last war, and more resources must be enlisted to counter them.

Enemy diversionary reconnaissance groups and airborne assault forces

encountered on movement routes are destroyed by reconnaissance, march
security and traffic control service subunits, and by specially detailed
subunits from the main body. If there are large groups of airborne assault
or airmobile forces to be destroyed, the first to be called on are the

203
following that are located closest to the area where they landed: the
combined arms subunits, antiaircraft weapons, artillery, and, on the orders
of the senior commander (chief), aviation.

Enemy airborne assault forces are defeated by air strikes against

them, by resolute tank and motorized rifle subunit attacks, and by splitting
them up and defeating them in detail. If the circumstances call for uninter-
rupted movement, troops seal off the assault forces with part of their
forces, while the main body bypasses the enemy-held area and continues
the march. In this case, the assault forces are defeated by subunits detailed
by the senior commander (chief)- If there is any threat of continued
aggressive action from the remainder of the defeated enemy assault forces,
local and march security of the column is stepped up, especially on the
flanks and rear; if necessary, stationary flank security elements are posted
on threatened march route sectors.

During the march, troops may encounter enemy groupings that have
broken through from the flank or advanced from the depth. To defeat
them, only the minimum necessary resources should be committed: the
forward detachment, the advance guard, the forward artillery and, if need
be, some of the main body's motorized rifle or tank units. The remaining
resources bypass the combat area, dispatch a new forward detachment and
march security, and continue their move to the designated area or indi-
cated line.

The actions of the subunits detailed to defeat the enemy must be

directed toward the quickest possible accomplishment of the assigned mis-
sion, attacking from the line of march. Hitting the enemy with damaging
fire, they use part of their forces to contain the enemy from the front,
while the main forces execute a maneuver and carry out a resolute strike
against him, primarily in the flank and rear. If insufficient resources have
been detailed to defeat the enemy and circumstances do not permit the
detailing of additional resources, these subunits may temporarily go over
to the defensive on an advantageous line. After the enemy has been
defeated, the subunits advance at higher speed to rejoin the main body.

Whatever the conditions, reliable cover against air strikes must be

provided for both the main body and the subunits detailed to defeat enemy
forces on the ground.

Technical and logistic support of troops on the march has become

considerably more complex in both nature and scope of missions than it
was in the Great Patriotic War. This is explained by the fact that today's
troop movement takes place under different conditions, troops are better
equipped, organizational structure is greatly improved, and troop require-
ments for materiel, recovery and repair, and medical aid for the wounded

204
and sick, have increased drastically, especially when troops are moved in
situations where nuclear weapons are employed.

On long-distance marches, consumption of food and of petroleum,

oil, and lubricants has increased drastically, while on marches where an
engagement is anticipated, the consumption of ammunition for antiaircraft
weapons and sometimes for antitank weapons, tanks, and artillery has also
dramatically increased; the same applies to recovery and repair of equip-
ment, medical aid for the wounded and sick, and the need to evacuate
them.

The purpose of technical support for troops on the march is to

maintain armament, combat and other equipment, ammunition, and mili-
tary technical stores in good condition and constant readiness for use in
combat and, if necessary, to meet the needs of the troops for weapons,
ammunition, and miUtary technical stores on a continuous basis. Technical
maintenance of vehicles is performed at halts, and during daytime (night-
time) and day's rests and is extensive enough to ensure that they function
reliably for the entire move and arrive in the designated area or on the
indicated line in good mechanical working order; the servicing is done by
crews (details), driver-mechanics (drivers), and also by the personnel of
technical support subunits. Vehicles that break down during the march are
taken off to the right of the road and usually repaired on the spot; should
such repair prove to be impossible or impractical, the vehicle is recovered
and transferred to the repair facilities under the direct control of the senior
commander (chief)-

Logistic support of troops on the march is carried out with a view to

uninterruptedly meeting troop requirements for fuel, provisions, kit and
medical stores, and other material resources, delivering these resources to
the troops, replenishing petroleum, oil, and lubricant supplies, feeding
personnel, giving medical assistance to the wounded and sick, and evacuat-
ing them. Reserves of material resources are usually replenished in the
daytime (nighttime) or day's rest areas, while vehicles with limited range
are also refueled during halts, primarily during the halts of about 2 hours'
duration in the latter half of a day's march. Hot meals are prepared and
distributed to personnel three times a day, as a rule: before the march
begins, during the halt in the latter half of a day's march, and in the
daytime (nighttime) rest area. Medical assistance is provided for the
wounded and sick on the spot, after which they either proceed with their
own subunits or are evacuated to the nearest medical facilities; if circum-
stances do not permit evacuation, they proceed with the medical subunits
of their units.

During the Great Patriotic War, troop control on the march was
conducted from mobile control posts. Subunit commanders moved at the

205
heads of columns on foot, on horseback, or in a tank or transport vehicle
and maintained the established march order. Regiments were controlled
from command posts that traveled at the head of the main body column
or behind the advance guard. In cases where the command post moved
with the main body, the regimental commander traveled with the advance
guard.'° Divisions were controlled from command posts that moved at the
head of the main body column.

As a rule, radio communication during a march was forbidden. In the

interests of troop control, only mobile communications facilities and the
traffic control service radio nets were used, as well as commands and
signals.

Today, as in the past war, subunit commanders move at the head of a

column, usually in a tank, infantry combat vehicle (armored personnel
carrier) or transport vehicle. Checking the march route against the map
and using signals and mobile communications facilities for troop control,
they strictly maintain the established march order. Subunit and unit troop
control is carried out from mobile control posts equipped with modern
means of transport, communication, and surveillance.

The constant threat of enemy use of NBC weapons makes it necessary

to disperse officers and means of communication and transport to several
control posts operating simultaneously and to move them via various
routes during the march at the head of the main body columns and of the
technical and logistic support subunits. If necessary, the commander, with
a small group of officers and communication equipment, can move for-
ward and travel with the forward detachment or the advance guard.

Communications on the march are provided mainly by mobile com-

munications facilities and signaling equipment. Helicopters can be used to
perform these and other missions: monitoring the movement of troops;
passing the necessary orders on to them; and supplying more detailed data
about the situation in areas hit by the enemy with nuclear strikes and on
routes bypassing zones with high radioactive and chemical contamination
levels, as well as areas affected by fires, floods, and demolition. Radios are
set to receive only. On the instructions of the superior staff, ultrahigh-
frequency radio, radio relay, and line communications can be used on the
march routes for warning the troops and for fire control and directing the
traffic control service.
High levels of morale, psychological stability, and combat skills of personnel are crucial
to the success of a march. In combat conditions a great many situations arise, and skill in
turning them to advantage may contribute to improving the morale, psychological stability,
and combat skills of personnel.

The 280th Guards Rifle Regiment was marching from the Korocha region near Belgorod
on 6 and 7 July 1943, when they came across eight Nazi tanks, knocked out and burnt, at the

206
village of Maruskevichi. A halt was called by the tanks, during which the regimental com-
mander, the commander of artillery, and the battalion commanders recounted to personnel
how the Nazi Tigers had been knocked out; they pointed out the tanks' vulnerable spots,
reminded the men of methods used by infantry to counter them, and cited examples of
successful action against tanks by courageous soldiers. This activity had a positive influence
on the subsequent actions of regimental personnel."

On marches, especially those during which an engagement is anticipated, the rapport of

commanders and political workers with their subordinates and their personal example in
resolute actions, bravery, combat skills, and self-denial take on great significance.

If, while on a march, troops receive a new mission that involves

changing their axis of movement, the decision must be made and subordi-
nates given the missions for the march on the new axis in the shortest time
possible. Missions are immediately updated for those subunits that have
already proceeded on the old axis. Reconnaissance, march security, a
march support detachment, a subunit to provide traffic control service,
and, if necessary, a forward detachment are all dispatched along the new
axis. The main body is moved onto the new route by the shortest way
possible, if possible without stopping and with minimal reconfiguration of
march columns.

If troops receive a combat mission during a march, all planning for

the enemy's defeat is done on the move, while closing with the enemy.

The march ends when the troops arrive in the designated area or reach
the indicated line.

2. Movement on Heavy Tractor-Trailer Units

At the current level of troop motorization and mechanization, for all
practical purposes each subunit of any combat arm, the combat service
support troops and logistics, and all combined arms subunits, can move in
organic tanks, infantry combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers and
other means of transport. However, marches, particularly over long dis-
tances, make great demands on personnel, primarily on driver-mechanics
and drivers of combat and transport vehicles, increase the wear and tear
on armament and combat equipment, and lead to rapid expenditure of
motor transport assets, particularly in terms of the fuel consumption of
heavy armored vehicles and engineer and other equipment. This is why
subunits with such equipment are more and more often moved on large
trailers. These are heavy tractor-trailer units consisting of tractors pulling
trailers carrying loads of about 50 tons.'^

Heavy tractor-trailer units are a new means of moving subunits and

their equipment. Motor transport units equipped with trailers can move at
a rather high speed and are not as tied to communication routes as rail or

207
water transport. The use of heavy tractor-trailer units makes it possible to
conserve motor transport assets, reduce wear and tear on equipment, save
the energies of crews, and reduce consumption of petroleum, oil, and
lubricants. Moreover, subunits thus transported maintain a high degree of
combat readiness since, when necessary, after quickly unloading from the
trailers, they can engage the enemy from the line of march or after brief
preparation. Therefore, troops are moved with heavy tractor-trailer units
both when marches are conducted where there is no threat of enemy
contact and when engagements are anticipated, especially if the purpose of
the march is to move forces to areas far from the line of contact.

It is mainly tanks that are moved on heavy tractor-trailer units. When

sufficient numbers of tractor-trailer units are available, they can be used to
move engineer and other equipment that is limited in range and speed. As
a rule, tanks and other equipment are moved on trailers in single columns,
which are either included in the main body of the unit carrying out the
march or proceed independently to the appointed area. The latter mode of
column movement occurs only when equipment is moved deep in the rear
of the friendly forces.

If a column of heavy tractor-trailer units carrying tanks and other

combat equipment is traveling within the grouping of a unit on the march,
the conditions under which the column moves equipment and operates
while preparing for and executing the move will be similar to the move-
ment conditions and actions of the main body's column on the march.
They may differ somewhat when the tractor-trailer column carrying the
heavy equipment is moving independently at a considerable distance from
the line of contact.

Loading areas for heavy tractor-trailer units are assigned to tank

subunits and subunits with heavy equipment. Loading areas are chosen so
as to provide good masking against air observation, ease of approach, and
natural cover. In addition to the main loading areas, reserve loading areas
are planned in case it proves impossible to use the main areas as a result of
enemy air actions and nuclear or chemical strikes.

Tanks and other equipment are loaded onto the trailers precisely at
the designated time and covertly, while safety measures are observed in
order to avoid accidents and damage to combat and transport equipment.
Loading sequence and times depend on specific conditions: whether all
vehicles are loaded simultaneously or in succession, one vehicle after an-
other; the nature of enemy action; meteorological conditions, weather,
time of year and day; and level of crew training and skills in loading
combat vehicles onto trailers quickly and correctly under difficult condi-
tions. A trained crew can load and secure a tank in 10-15 minutes. A tank

208
company can complete a simultaneous loading in 15-20 minutes, and a
tank battalion can finish in 30-40 minutes; loading in succession takes a
tank company about an hour.'^

The tank and motor transport subunit commanders supervise the

loading of tanks onto the trailers together. Loading is carried out on level
horizontal surfaces. Tractor-trailer units are arranged so that they face in
the direction in which they will be departing on their movement route.

The tank commander personally supervises the loading and securing

of his fighting vehicle. The driver-mechanic drives the tank onto the trailer
platform under its own power, while the tractor driver-mechanic is in his
cabin ready for immediate action. The tank, turret locked in travel posi-
tion, must drive smoothly onto the trailer platform, in low gear and at
minimum speed. Once loaded, the tank is fastened down securely onto the
trailer with guy wires; wooden wedges are hammered between the road
wheels to prevent the tank from shifting; the engine is shut off, and the
tank is put in low gear with the brake on.

To reduce loading time, equipment may be secured after the tractor-

trailer unit has been driven out of the loading area. Depending on the type
of tractor, the tank crew travels in the tractor cabin or body. When the
column's air defenses need to be reinforced with tank weapons, one crew
member may be placed in each tank.

The trailer column's route is chosen with due regard for the load
capacity of bridges on routes skirting large built-up areas, for road junc-
tions and other likely targets of enemy nuclear strikes, and for defiles and
other choke points where the column might be exposed to enemy air
strikes. In the interests of defense against precision weapons, the route
selected must run along folds in the ground and through wooded areas,
and must be protected against enemy radar reconnaissance by screens and
smoke screens. Insofar as possible, the route must not have steep upgrades
or inclines, sharp turns that would require the vehicles to drastically reduce
speed, or extended sections of sandy or other soft surfaces that would
cause them to skid.

On routes that are in good condition, trailer columns can develop

speeds of 45-50 km/h."* However, because of the difficulty of controlling
trailers carrying heavy loads (a trailer carrying a heavy load drifts when
traveling fast), it is not advisable for the column to move at more than 30
km/h. On inclines, the speed should not exceed 40 km/h; level crossings
are negotiated at no more than 15 km/h. The distance between trailers
may reach 50 meters; this is increased on upgrades or inclines.

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 During a move, bridges with insufficient load capacity to carry the
entire heavy tractor-trailer unit at once are crossed first by the tractor, and
then by the trailer, which is pulled over to the tractor with a winch. In
order to get over sections of road that are difficult for the trailers to
negotiate, the tanks may be unloaded and used to tow their tractor-trailer
units, then reloaded onto their transport to continue the move. If there is
damage on the route, if fires or floods occur, or if it is necessary to cross a
bridge with a low load capacity, then the tanks may also be unloaded from
the trailers, proceed under their own power around the obstruction con-
fronting them, and then be reloaded onto the trailers.

Insofar as possible, tractor-trailer units should unload on level sec-

tions of the road, halting before the approaches to an obstruction, either
maintaining the distance between vehicles that was established for the
move or reducing it to 20-25 meters. Depending on the specific conditions,
mainly on the skills of commanders and tank and tractor driver-mechanics,
the weather, and time of year and day, a tank company may take about 30
minutes to unload and a tank battalion about 45 minutes. The tanks are
reloaded after they reach a road with a firm surface.

A trailer column carrying tanks may consist of dozens of moving

tractor-trailer units and be several kilometers in depth. When a column of
this sort is moving at a considerable distance from the front lines, enemy
aviation is likely to exert pressure on it with any type of weapon. This is
why great emphasis must be placed on providing the column cover against
enemy air strikes while loading, moving, and unloading. Cover is provided
mainly according to the plan of, and using resources controlled directly by,
the senior commander (chief). Antiaircraft weapons assigned to provide
direct cover travel at the head and tail of the column.

As a rule, columns continue moving during air attacks, increasing

their speed and the distance between vehicles, while the antiaircraft weap-
ons repel the enemy attack by firing on the move or from short halts.
Tank crew members in their tanks use antiaircraft machine guns to fire on
the aircraft as they descend. When continued movement is impossible, the
column halts and personnel take cover in folds in the ground and fire on
low-flying enemy aircraft.

In addition to conventional weapons, including precision weapons,

enemy aviation may also employ NBC weapons against subunits being
transported on heavy tractor-trailer units. When passing near important
large installations, the column may be exposed to the destructive effects of
enemy strikes against these installations using high- and super-high-yield
nuclear warheads and as a result may suffer casualties. Some tractor-trailer

210
 units and the combat equipment they carry may be damaged, and contami-
nated zones, barriers, and areas of destruction, fire and flood may be
encountered on the route.

After an enemy nuclear strike, subunits that have retained their fight-
ing efficiency continue moving. Measures are taken to restore the fighting
efficiency of subunits that have been exposed to the direct effects of NBC
weapons and to control the damage. The fighting efficiency of subunits
may be restored with resources from the subunits themselves or by drawing
on resources from other subunits in the column on the orders of the senior
commander (chief).

Tanks and other combat equipment are reloaded from damaged

tractor-trailer units onto reserve units taken from the column's technical
maintenance echelon. After receiving first aid, the wounded and sick are
evacuated to the nearest medical facilities or proceed with their subunits
when immediate evacuation is impossible. Damaged combat equipment
and transport that can not be repaired with resources in the column is
transferred to repair facilities under the control of the senior commander
(chief).

Areas with high radiation levels, barriers, and areas of destruction,

fire, and flood are skirted or negotiated on routes that will ensure mini-
mum damage to and contamination of personnel and combat equipment.
In so doing, personnel employ personal protective equipment; tractor cab-
ins, infantry combat vehicle hatches and firing ports, and tank louvers are
closed tight. Partial decontamination is carried out after leaving the zone
of radioactive contamination or, in cases of contamination by chemical
warfare agents, immediately. Complete decontamination is carried out in
the rest area or after the move has been completed.

A subunit's move on heavy tractor-trailer units is completed when the

column has arrived in the assigned area and the tanks and other combat
equipment carried on the trailers have been unloaded. After the subunits
have been unloaded and assigned a new mission by the senior commander
(chief), they proceed to carry it out, while the transport departs as as-
signed.

3. Movement by Rail

In modern warfare, as during the Great Patriotic War, rail transporta-

tion is used extensively in moving troops over long distances. This method
of troop movement makes it possible to conserve the strength of person-
nel, to protect weapons and combat and other equipment from wear and
tear, and to conserve motor transport resources. It ensures rapid move-

211
ment of troops regardless of the season and of the physical condition of
personnel at the time of the move. The rate of movement is practically
independent of weather conditions.

However, troops use rail transportation less often than marches, be-
cause of the great complexity involved in preparing for and ensuring the
safety of the move. As a rule, the locations of stations, bridges, and other
structures on rail lines are known to the enemy, who has a large arsenal of
long-range weapons at his disposal and can inflict significant losses on
troops and disrupt their movement by making surprise strikes with aviation
or nuclear, chemical, or precision weapons.

In order to ensure that troops being transported arrive at the desig-

nated area on time and fully battle-ready, what is needed primarily are
thorough preparation for transporting armament, equipment, and person-
nel; able organization of and comprehensive support for the move; secrecy
in carrying it out; and high levels of vigilance and discipline among the
troops.

Before entraining, troops are usually stationed in waiting areas, where

they go through final preparations for the move. In each such area are
stationed the subunits that comprise a single troop train and are assigned
to entrain at one railway station. Waiting areas are selected about 3-5
kilometers from the entraining station, i.e., at a distance that precludes the
troops' being affected in the event of a nuclear strike on the station. It is
chosen with due regard for the nature of the terrain, the presence of
natural cover, convenient approach routes, and possibilities for camou-
flage, especially against aerial observation. In addition to the main waiting
area, a reserve area is chosen, in case circumstances make it impractical to
get to the main area or if serious contamination, destruction, or fires
should force the troops to leave (figure 16).

In the waiting area, troops disperse, prepare cover for personnel and
combat equipment, and carefully camouflage themselves. Preparations for
the move are carried out under concealment. The subunits organize obser-
vation, local security, radiological and chemical reconnaissance, and warn-
ing of air attacks or NBC contamination. Alert fire weapons are detailed,
which, along with the antiaircraft weapons, are constantly ready to repel
enemy aircraft. Fire fighting measures are implemented, as well as mea-
sures to protect personnel and materiel. Traffic control is organized along
the routes the troops will take to their loading sites.

During the preparation period, medical precautions are taken; supplies

of personal protection equipment for personnel are checked. Weapons and
equipment undergo technical inspection and repair and vehicles are fully
refueled. The order in which the subunits are to move out and the loading

212
sequence and times are established. Personnel, weapons, equipment, and
stores are allocated to boxcars and flatcars. A movement support estimate
is compiled that keeps in mind the need to preserve the organizational
integrity of the subunits during the move and ensure their readiness to join
combat after detraining.

Personnel, rations, and kitchens in operation during the move are

slated for allocation to boxcars, while weapons and combat equipment are
placed on flatcars and gondolas, and stores in transport vehicles and
boxcars. Fuel and other hazardous cargo may be transported in boxcars,
gondolas, or flatcars if it is in fuel cans or other special containers; if it is
in bulk, it is transported in railway tank cars, tanker or refueling trucks,
and also on specialized rail cars.

A troop train with its complement is configured so as to locate the

cars with personnel and operating kitchens in its middle section, while the
flatcars and gondolas with combat equipment are at either end. In order to
permit ease of fire for the antiaircraft weapons, the flatcars carrying them
must be separated from the locomotive and from boxcars and gondolas by
at least one flatcar with a low-profile load. Cars with hazardous cargo are
separated from the locomotive, the end of the train, passenger cars, and
those with operating kitchens—and, if need be, from each other—by
special means: empty cars or cars carrying nonhazardous cargo.

Armament, stores, and combat and other equipment are loaded and
personnel entrained under concealment, observing safety measures with a
view to preventing accidents and damage to equipment, stores, and means
of transportation.

Loading equipment and stores takes the most time. It is therefore

done first. Immediately before loading, combat equipment is prepared for
transport by rail. At precisely the set loading time, the subunits move out
to the loading sites in the set sequence and, on the order of the troop train
commander, begin to load the weapons, equipment, and stores onto the
rail cars; this is usually done simultaneously along a good portion of the
train's length, using all available cargo handling equipment.

Combat equipment is loaded either with cranes or under its own

power. The subunit commander directs each combat vehicle as it drives
onto the train, while the vehicle commander directs its subsequent move-
ment on the flat or open car and its final placement. The vehicles must
move only on the commander's signals, without jerks or sharp turns and
in low gear. The arrangement of weapons and combat and other equip-
ment on the rail cars takes into account the sequence in which they will be

213
unloaded and brought into action; they are arranged as densely as possible,
in order to make full use of the car's load capacity, and also so as not to
endanger trains moving on adjacent tracks.

After the combat equipment and stores have been arranged on the rail
cars, they are firmly secured to prevent both lateral and longitudinal
shifting. Fastening materials (wires, wooden beams, inserts, struts, stakes,
chocks, shackles and pins) and securing equipment (sturdy metal chocks,
cable and chain stays, and wood beams, found in every vehicle) are used
for this. The vehicles are parked in low gear with the brake on; turret
traverse mechanisms are locked and sealed. The flatcars' side boards are
raised and secured with catches, although if the vehicles' dimensions make
this impossible, they are secured firmly in the dropped position. The
weapons, combat equipment, and stores on flatcars and gondolas are
carefully camouflaged.

After the combat equipment and stores have been loaded, the person-
nel board the troop cars; this operation must be completed at least 10
minutes before the train departs. Small arms are placed on bunks, beneath
them, on specially equipped racks, or on the floor of the car. After
boarding is complete, the troop cars are camouflaged.

Depending on the type of equipment transported and the condition of

the loading sites, loading may take from three to five hours; if loading
takes place at night under blackout conditions or if personnel have to work
in gas masks, these time norms may increase by as much as 20 percent.

If an air raid warning is given while a troop train is being loaded, all
work ceases immediately, and personnel and combat equipment are dis-
persed and concealed. If loading and boarding have already been com-
pleted, either the train leaves the station or personnel detrain and withdraw
to cover, while a guard detail is left to protect the combat equipment and
stores. If there is an enemy nuclear or chemical strike, the troops withdraw
from the contaminated zone, restore their fighting efficiency, and take
NBC damage control measures. Depending on the situation, the troops
may be brought to a new waiting area, continue loading at the original
station, or begin loading at a new one.

During the move by rail, all personnel must maintain great vigilance
and discipline.

Observation of move regulations by personnel is monitored by subunit

commanders, who implement their control function using runners and
sound and Ught signals and also by personal contact with subordinates

214
 during halts. The troop train commander also uses line communications.
Radio communication is forbidden on the train for the duration of the
move.

Troop movement by rail may take several days. If the enemy discov-
ers the troop train, he may hit it with aviation or nuclear, chemical, or
precision weapons, especially when the train is passing through large sta-
tions, mountain passes, or over bridges spanning water obstacles. As the
train approaches the front line, airborne assault force landings, diversion-
ary reconnaissance group action, and even breakouts to the movement
route by mobile enemy groupings may be anticipated.

In order to rule out surprise enemy attacks, to prevent strikes from

being made against the subunits, or to minimize their losses and to ensure
the timely arrival of the troop train in the designated area, subunit com-
manders must organize effective air defense and implement measures for
comprehensive support, especially combat and logistic support, during the
move.

Troop train air defense is carried out by subunit antiaircraft weapons

as well as those under the direct control of the senior commander (chieQ
organizing the move. If enemy aircraft appear, a warning signal is given,
either one established by the troop train commander or else the one
generally used in transport (a series of short sounds). At the signal, the
doors, windows, and hatches of the troop cars are closed and protective
equipment is put into the ready position. Antiaircraft weapons and other
guns detailed to repel enemy aircraft open fire from the moving train on
the order of the troop train commander; if it is a surprise attack, they may
fire at will.

Observation and local security of the troop train are provided by

observation posts (at the head, middle, and end of the train), alert weapon
crews, patrols and alert subunits, and a guard detail assigned to protect the
combat equipment and stores.

To repel enemy ground forces, guns and tanks are enlisted; they are
detailed in advance and prepared to fire on the move right from the
flatcars. Troop train antiaircraft weapons not engaged in repelling enemy
air raids are also used.

Warning of NBC contamination is given either by a signal established

by the troop train commander or the one used in transport (a series of
long and short sounds or, in a station, repeated striking of a rail). Person-
nel don gas masks and, if necessary, other personal protection equipment
and, as far as possible, take up places on the middle and upper berths of
the troop cars. Doors, windows, and hatches are closed tight and cracks

215
stopped up with rags, paper, and other materials at hand. Food prepara-
tion in kitchens is forbidden; reserves of drinking water, provisions, and
the kitchens themselves are carefully covered; combat equipment is also
covered as well as possible.

If a sector of the rail line is radioactively contaminated, it may be

crossed on condition that the radiation dose received by personnel does not
exceed permissible norms. The train will negotiate such sectors at maxi-
mum speed and without stopping. Personnel use their personal protection
equipment; tank and other armored vehicle crews may take their places in
the vehicles. After the contaminated sector has been negotiated, the
subunits undergo partial decontamination without delaying the train; full
decontamination is carried out only after detraining.

Hot meals from the operating kitchens are distributed to troop train
personnel at least twice a day, as a rule, during halts. The wounded and
sick are given necessary and timely medical assistance. Those unable to
proceed with their subunits are sent to the nearest medical facilities. Those
with communicable diseases are put into the isolation car or transferred to
special medical facilities. If 2-5 percent of the personnel are found to have
a communicable disease or if even one case of an especially dangerous
infection is found, the troops detrain and go to an observation point.

Circumstances may arise in which troops are forced to interrupt their

move, whether to engage enemy ground forces or to bypass a demolished
or heavily contaminated area under their own power, and then continue
the move by train or by march to their destination. Troops being moved
must therefore be constantly ready to detrain suddenly and quickly at
unprepared sites, to march either to their destination or around demolished
and heavily contaminated areas, and to entrain again or engage enemy
forces on the ground.

On arriving at the detraining station, personnel leave the troop cars on

the order of the troop train commander and split up by subunit to the sites
where the combat equipment and stores will be unloaded. Those subunits
not detailed to unload equipment and cargo immediately withdraw from
the station area to the assembly area, 3-5 kilometers away from the
unloading sites. As the unloading proceeds, all personnel make their way
there with the weapons, combat and other equipment, and stores.

Unloading takes place under cover and must be completed by dead-

line. Depending on the type of equipment transported and the condition of
the unloading sites, a troop train may take 2.5-4 hours to unload; if
personnel are unloading at night under blackout conditions or if they have
to work in gas masks, these time norms increase by as much as 20 percent.

216
 If a warning signal for enemy aircraft is given between the time the
train arrives in the station and the time it unloads, either the train leaves
the station with its troop complement, or personnel detrain and withdraw
to the nearest cover, and a guard detail is left with the train to protect the
combat equipment and stores. If the enemy makes a nuclear or chemical
strike on the troop train during unloading, steps are taken to restore the
fighting efficiency of subunits, carry out damage control, and speed up
unloading. The subunits withdraw without delay to the assembly area or to
a special decontamination center within the unloading area, where either
partial or full decontamination is carried out.

Troop movement by rail ends when the train has arrived at its station
of destination and troops have all detrained. Personnel, combat equip-
ment, and stores concentrate in the designated area; troops are brought to
full combat readiness, are given their new mission, and proceed to carry it
out.

4. Movement by Water Transport

During the Great Patriotic War, water transport was used to move
troops. Sea and river transport was used when a sea or large lake lay on
the movement routes or when the courses of navigable rivers coincided
with the direction of troop movement. Water transport was also used for
actions on coastal axes, i.e., on the coasts of the Baltic, Black, or other
seas.

Troops are moved by water transport even today. True, it is not as

commonly used as marches or troop movements by rail, since it requires
the availability of equipped wharves and heavy cranes, which are needed
for more protracted loading and unloading operations, and sometimes also
for the transfer of men and equipment in the roadstead. Moreover, the
locations of ports (docks) are easily discovered by the enemy, which in-
creases their vulnerability to air, nuclear, and chemical strikes and attacks
using precision weapons and incendiary agents.

Nevertheless, movements by water transport make it possible to con-

serve the strength of personnel, protect equipment against wear, economize
on motor transport, and move troops at a minimum of 25-30 km/h, with
increased efficiency being achieved the greater the distance over which the
move is made. Therefore, if the situation permits, seagoing or river trans-
port may be used to move troops and will consume less time than marches.
It is expedient to move troops by water, especially over great distances.

Troops that have arrived for embarkation are placed in waiting areas
located 3-5 kilometers from the loading ports (docks); if it is not possible

217
to use the main waiting areas, reserve areas are employed. Botii the main
and reserve waiting areas are chosen with due regard for the protective and
masking terrain features and the availability of convenient routes for
moving to them and from them to the loading ports (docks).

In the waiting areas, subunits disperse and prepare the cover needed
for men and equipment, organize air defense, institute all types of security
measures, and set up movement control on the routes to be used for
embarkation on seagoing or river transport. Subunits are situated so that
those that load first are located close to the routes leading to the loading
sites. This eliminates the need for one subunit to pass another, prevents
congestion on the routes for moving out, and eliminates pileups of person-
nel and combat equipment at the wharves.

The time spent in the waiting area is used to prepare for loading.
Essential medical measures are taken, combat equipment undergoes main-
tenance inspection and repair, and vehicles are refueled. Finally, the load-
ing plan and the schedule for the embarkation of personnel, weaponry,
combat and other equipment, and stores are updated.

For movement by water transport, troops are distributed by echelon,

ship, and ship accommodations. A troop echelon is a military unit or
subunit organized for a move on a single ship or towed barge. Several
echelons may be transported on a large ship. The troops are formed in
echelons so that subunits are not split up, to ensure that constant combat
readiness is maintained, and, if necessary, to enable them to fight indepen-
dently after debarkation.

Self-propelled ships and towed barges that have bays and decks suit-
able for accommodating men and combat equipment and that provide safe
transport can be used to transport troop echelons. Ship bays are prepared
and equipped to accommodate personnel for long stays; available cargo
handling equipment, implements, and pumping, firefighting and emer-
gency rescue equipment are put into good working order; the ships are
fueled, stocked with fresh water, and provided with the necessary rescue
and firefighting equipment, and a sick bay and isolation ward are prepared
to provide medical services for personnel.

The troops in the waiting area remain in constant communication

with the officer in charge of the echelon. At a precisely determined time,
immediately before the echelon is to embark, they are called from the
waiting area to the embarkation site. They move by subunit, in order of
priority of loading, and in such a way that the subunits can proceed with
embarkation immediately on arriving at their embarkation sites. Since the
enemy may detect and disrupt troop embarkation, even if the port (dock)

218
is far away from the front lines, armament, equipment and stores must be
loaded and personnel embarked covertly and quickly, without allowing any
delays in loading.

Troop echelons are loaded onto seagoing or river craft in ports and at
moorings on wharves or, using collapsible transshipment ramps or tempo-
rary wharves, on unprepared river banks. When the water at a wharf in a
port is shallow, troop echelons are loaded onto seagoing vessels in the
roadstead using harbor craft.

The armament, equipment, and stores of an echelon are loaded first.

As a rule, loading is carried out on a broad front, using mechanical
equipment and cargo handling devices and implements, observing safety
measures in order to prevent accidents and damage to armament, equip-
ment, and transport. First of all, the holds are loaded as much as possible
through all hatches. If conditions permit, equipment and stores are loaded
into the holds and onto the decks simultaneously. When loading, it is
essential to try to make maximum possible use of available load capacity,
cargo capacity, useful deck space, and ship accommodations.

Combat equipment must be stowed with due regard for the strength
of the decks and bottom of the ship, where possible along its center line,
so that the ship's clearance limits are not exceeded. Ammunition, explo-
sives, petroleum, oil, and lubricants and other hazardous cargoes should be
stowed in specially designated places.

Amphibious equipment, antiaircraft weapons covering the embarka-

tion area against enemy air strikes, and tractors used to speed up the
loading of combat equipment are loaded onto the ship last, just before the
personnel embark.

Armament, combat and other equipment, and stores are loaded onto
seagoing and river vessels using wharfside and floating cranes, ship booms
and winches, under their own power, and with the aid of tractors.

Dock workers and ship crews load cargoes using cranes and ship
booms; they are assisted by echelon loading teams. Combat equipment,
moving at low speed, moves onto a wharf, is placed in the spot allocated
for it, and is prepared for slinging. Vehicle engines are turned off, tank
turrets are turned with their gun barrels to the rear, guns are put in travel
position, etc. The cargo handling teams working on the wharf and the ship
sling the equipment and set it in place on the ship. Loading implements
such as straps, nets, cargo trays, and slings are used to sling the combat
equipment.

219
 Equipment must be lifted from the wharf and transferred and lowered
to the deck or hold of the ship slowly, without jerking, observing safety
measures. This is controlled with the aid of guide ropes. Loading seagoing
ships with cranes and ship booms takes, on the average, 4-10 minutes for
a gun, 8 minutes for a truck, 10 minutes for a tractor, and 20 minutes for
a tank. The times for loading combat equipment onto river vessels are
approximately 20 percent less.

Loading of combat equipment under its own power or with winches

or tractors occurs only in the case of river vessels and low-sided seagoing
vessels, such as amphibious ships, flat barges, and so on. Tanks, infantry
combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers, tractors, trucks, and other
tracked or wheeled fighting vehicles are brought up to their assigned
loading places, aligned with the axis of the ramp, then in low gear, without
jerking or turning, they ascend the ramp under their own power to the
deck of the ship and stop on the designated spot, after which their engines
are turned off and brakes set.

The subunit commander directs every fighting vehicle as it is driven

onto the ship, and the vehicle commander controls its movement on deck
and its placement. Loading combat equipment onto river vessels under its
own power takes on the average 3-4 minutes for a truck, 4 minutes for a
tractor, 5-8 minutes for a tank, and 2-5 minutes for a towed gun.'^

After the combat equipment and stores have been stowed, they are
fastened down securely to prevent them from shifting from front to back
or from side to side as the ship rolls. When troops are moved on river
vessels along rivers, only the combat equipment that is placed athwart the
ship's fore-and-aft axis is fastened down. When troops are transported on
river vessels across large reservoirs or lakes, or on seagoing ships, all the
combat equipment is fastened down. Combat equipment is secured by the
vehicle crews under the supervision of the subunit commanders, using bars
to block the tracks and wheels, fastening equipment and stores to the
ship's frames, bollards, ribs, and beams with the aid of wires, cables, and
chains. The necessary fastening materials are wire, nails, clamps, bars,
wedges, and guys, which are provided by the loading port.

During the move, subunit commanders must constantly check to see

that combat equipment and stores are fastened securely.

After the equipment and stores have been loaded, echelon personnel
embark onto the ship. Subunits embark in a set sequence using gangplanks
and gangways with safety lines; subunit commanders supervise the embar-
kation and accommodation of personnel in the ship bays. Small arms are
stowed in specially fitted rifle racks, in the men's quarters in the passages

220
between sections, and on the decks (except the upper ones). Personnel
must finish embarking at least 10 minutes before the ships are to leave.

Special harbor vessels are used to embark troops onto ships standing
in a roadstead. In the loading port, these vessels are loaded in a set
sequence, the echelon's combat equipment and stores are fastened down
immediately, and personnel are embarked. Harbor vessels carry echelon
personnel, equipment, and stores from shore to the seagoing vessel in the
roadstead, approaching from the leeward side. There, on the echelon
commander's order, fastenings are removed and the combat equipment is
prepared for loading.

Echelon combat equipment and stores are loaded using ship booms or
floating cranes; the port workers and the ship crew are helped by the
echelon cargo handling team. Loading with ship booms takes on the
average 6-15 minutes for a gun, 10-12 minutes for a truck, 12-15 minutes
for a tractor, and 30 minutes for a tank. Personnel disembark by gang-
ways. When an echelon is loading in the dark or under other conditions of
limited visibility, the illumination necessary for loading must be provided.
In an open roadstead, when the sea is running and safety is threatened,
loading is suspended.

If an air raid warning is given while an echelon is loading in port or

being transported in a roadstead, work stops immediately and actions are
taken to disperse men and combat equipment on the wharf and get them
under cover, while the harbor vessels pull away from the ship's anchorage.
If the alarm is given after loading in the port has been finished, the ship
pulls away from the wharf or personnel debark and pull back under cover,
while a guard remains to protect the echelon's combat equipment and
stores. If the alarm is given after a troop echelon has finished loading onto
a seagoing ship standing in the roadstead, it will weigh anchor as quickly
as possible and put out to sea.

Antiaircraft and other weapons allocated to repel enemy air attacks

are readied to open fire immediately. Ship doors, portholes, and hatches
are closed and individual protective gear is placed in the ready position.
Enemy air raids are repelled using all fire resources.

While troops are being moved on water transport, commanders direct

subunits with line communications equipment, by personal contact with
subordinates, via messengers, and with light and sound signals. The re-
sources of the forces being moved take measures to provide comprehensive
support for the troop echelon.

221
 All personnel must be alert, maintain a high state of organization and
discipline, and strictly observe prescribed rules of conduct during the sea
passage or movement by river, and also during stops in ports or at
moorings en route to their destination.

When information is received about the presence of contaminated

areas of water along the ship's route, the ship's portholes and hatches are
closed tight, cracks are stopped up with rags, paper, and other materials at
hand, food preparation in the galleys ceases, and reserves of drinking
water and provisions are carefully covered; combat equipment is also
covered as well as possible.

Ships may move through areas of water contaminated by radioactive

materials if the radiation dosage to which personnel are exposed does not
exceed permissible levels. When a contaminated area is approached, an
alarm is given and personnel don gas masks or respirators and, if neces-
sary, other protective gear as well. Ships cross the contaminated areas
without stopping. The radiation dosage to which personnel are exposed is
monitored, and, after crossing the area, the level of contamination of
personnel, ship accommodations, equipment and stores is checked, and
subunits undergo partial decontamination.

When the ships approach the debarkation area, drivers (driver-

mechanics) test their engines, abiding by fire safety rules. When the ships
arrive in port or at the wharf, personnel debark onto the shore at the
echelon commander's order. Subunit commanders, drivers (driver-
mechanics), and cargo handling teams quickly begin unloading equipment
and stores from the ship onto the wharf. Personnel not engaged in unload-
ing, as well as combat equipment and stores as they are unloaded, are sent
off to the assembly area, which is 3-5 kilometers from the debarkation
area. Unloading is executed covertly and quickly.

Troop movement by water transport is completed once they have

debarked from the vessels. Personnel, armament, combat and other equip-
ment, and stores are concentrated in the designated area; troops are
brought to a state of complete combat readiness and, receiving their new
mission, proceed to carry it out.

5. Movement by Air Transport

During the offensive operation carried out by the Western Front in winter 1942 in the
area of Vyaz'ma, the 4th Airborne Corps, numbering about 10,000 men, was dropped
successively by battalion and brigade. In the Belorussian Operation of summer 1944, aviation
supplied the mechanized cavalry groups and tank armies and corps by air with 1182 tons of
fuel, 1240 tons of ammunition, and about 1000 tons of various technical supplies and spare
parts for tanks.

222
 These examples show that during the Great Patriotic War air trans-
port was employed extensively to transport various cargoes, primarily
ammunition, fuel, and other supplies, to evacuate wounded, and to drop
troops behind enemy lines.

Air transport could be used to transfer rifle subunits, and sometimes

even units, to the front lines or behind enemy lines.
In January 1942, over a period of three nights, an airborne assault force was dropped in
the area southeast of Vyaz'ma. It consisted of 1,600 men of the 250th Rifle Regiment,
dropped to support the 33rd Army in encircling the enemy's Yukhnov-Myatlevo grouping."^

However, it was rare for combined arms subunits and units or those
of other combat arms (excluding airborne) or combat service support
troops to be transported by air from deep inside the country to the front
hnes.

Air transport is used extensively today for moving troops. This type
of transport is less vulnerable to the effects of enemy NBC weapons than
rail or water transport and makes it possible to transport troops more
quickly over considerable distances, even over vast contaminated zones and
areas of destruction, fire, and flood. It does not depend on road networks
and may be employed not just to transport troops over friendly territory,
but even to fly over the line of contact to drop troops in the enemy rear.
The use of air transport makes it possible to conserve manpower, preserve
the motor transport serviceability of combat equipment, significantly re-
duce consumption of stores and, most important, surprise the enemy by
delivering troops to a specified area in a higher rate of combat readiness
than if they had moved under their own power.

Air transport is a means of moving troops that has prospects for

further development. The lifting and cargo capacity of aircraft and heli-
copters is increasing. Work is going on in the West to produce new types
of vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. Even today, air transport is capa-
ble of carrying not only subunits and units by air, but even combined arms
formations.

However, even though moving troops by air transport has many

advantages over other means of movement, it cannot be used as exten-
sively or as often as, for example, marches. This is mainly because moving
forces by air, particularly combined arms units and formations, requires
considerable numbers of aircraft and large details of combat aircraft to
provide cover for them in flight. Besides, aviation must have prepared
airbases or fields in the embarkation and debarkation areas.

223
 Depending on the situation and the size of the troop formation being
transferred by air, troops can be moved by air transport in one or several
flights. A subunit will be transferred in a single flight, and a unit or
formation in several.

Specialized aircraft from military transport aviation, passenger and

cargo aircraft, helicopters, and perhaps even transport gliders, may be used
to move troops by air; airbases or fields of embarkation and debarkation
are assigned, the number of which depends primarily on the force's mis-
sion and the type and number of aircraft used for the move. A subunit
with support weapons embarks (debarks) at a single airbase or field.
Subunit loading and embarking areas are assigned in the region of each
airbase (field) or in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft and helicopter
standing areas.

Troops usually undergo immediate preparations for movement by air

in a waiting area. They stay briefly in these areas before leaving for the
airbases or fields assigned for loading. Waiting areas are selected 5-10
kilometers from subunit loading areas and are chosen for their capability
to provide masking against air and ground observation and reliable protec-
tion against enemy nuclear strikes where possible. Troops are positioned
covertly and in dispersed deployment, observing NBC defense measures
and camouflage against observation from the air.

In the waiting areas, calculations of allocations for the troop air

movement are updated with a view to preserving, insofar as possible, the
organizational integrity of the subunits and ensuring their readiness to fight
independently after debarking. Particular consideration is given in this to
distribution of personnel, combat equipment, and stores among the air-
craft (helicopters, gliders).

At an assigned time, in set order, the subunits move up along a

prepared route from the waiting area to the loading area. There, on
prescribed signals and orders from the air subunit commanders, they first
load armament, equipment, and stores onto the aircraft (helicopters, glid-
ers), after which the personnel embark. Measures are taken to avoid
overconccntrations of personnel, equipment, and stores near the loading
and embarkation areas. Loading and embarkation are carried out quickly
and covertly, observing safety measures in an effort to avoid accidents and
damage to armament, equipment, and transport.

Armament and combat and other equipment are placed in the aircraft
(helicopters, gliders) with due regard for the sequence in which they will be
unloaded and put into action. Ammunition and fuel reserves are loaded
onto different aircraft (helicopters). Everything loaded onto air transport
must be secured with ropes, nets, and special devices securely enough to

224
prevent any sort of shifting of combat equipment and other loads on the
aircraft and to preserve the aircraft's trim. The loading of combat equip-
ment is finished in at least an hour and the embarkation of personnel at
least 20-30 minutes before the aircraft (helicopters, gliders) take off.

A subunit commander travels in the same aircraft as his subordinates.

If a subunit is moved in several aircraft or if a larger troop formation is
moved, the commander travels in one aircraft with the necessary communi-
cations equipment, his deputy travels in a second aircraft, and his staff in
a third. Resources under the direct control of the senior commander (chief)
provide comprehensive support for troops being moved by air. In flight,
troop control is exercised using brief radio signals broadcast over the
military transport aviation radio net.

Aircraft must land at the debarkation airbases or fields at set times.

Personnel debark and combat equipment and stores are unloaded immedi-
ately after aircraft have landed and taxied aside, clearing the runway for
the next aircraft, or after hehcopters or gliders have landed. In order to
reduce the length of time that aircraft remain at the airbases, aircraft crews
may be enlisted to unload combat equipment and stores. Aircraft are
unloaded without switching the engines off, and those that have been
unloaded take off immediately.

As the subunits with their armament, combat and other equipment,

and stores are unloaded, they are moved away from the debarkation
airbases and fields without delay to assembly areas, which are located at
least 10 kilometers from the debarkation areas. In the assembly areas, the
troops are made completely combat ready in order to proceed to carry out
their combat mission. Troops may be assigned a combat mission while still
unloading from the aircraft and may engage the enemy on the ground
without proceeding to the assembly areas.

6. Combined Movement
Combined troop movement means transferring forces from one area
to another or moving them to an indicated line by a combination of
various methods of movement. In some cases, forces may employ various
methods of movement simultaneously, while in others they are used alter-
nately, changing in succession. Here, all or only some modes of transport
may be used. Depending on the size of the troop formation, the distance
of the move, the nature of the lines of communication, and the availability
and type of transport to be used for the move, a combined march, a
combined move, or a combination of march and movement may be car-
ried out (figure 17).

225
 At the levels at which troops are now equipped, combined marches
may be carried out by subunits from section to platoon size, and more
rarely by companies or battalions. On such a march, various modes of
march transport are used alternately or simultaneously, including organic
tanks, infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers) and trucks, or
movement on foot or, in winter, on skis. Today, larger troop formations
do not make combined marches, since our troops do not move on foot
either in a combat zone or the rear, but rather employ organic vehicles for
movement.

As a rule, combined movement assumes the execution of sequential

and sometimes even simultaneous troop movement combinations by vari-
ous modes of transport, i.e., rail, water (seagoing, river), and air trans-
port. It may be employed to shift the positions of subunits and larger
troop formations from one area to another.

Currently a simultaneous or sequential combination of march and

movement is widely employed. It can be carried out by troop formations
of any size. In the simultaneous combination of march and movement,
one part of a force proceeds under its own power, while the other (tanks,
heavy equipment, vehicles with limited range or speed) is moved by rail or
water transport. When the sequential combination is used, a march may
precede a movement or may be made after it has finished. Both the
simultaneous and the sequential combinations of march and movement
may be used when moving large troop formations, or the combinations
can be used alternately.
The success of a combined troop movement depends largely on the ability of the
commander and staff to provide ahead of time for measures that will ensure a swift transition
from one mode of transport to another, or to the march. In a simultaneous combination of
march and movement, the skill of the commander and staff in coordinating the actions of the
subunits moving under their own power and those being transported become particularly
important.

Estimates for the movement of troops by various means are coordi-

nated so that in the event of the move being stopped, all the troops will be
able to join up and, wherever possible, arrive at the indicated concentra-
tion area simultaneously.

If sudden changes in the situation resuh in the move being stopped

while troops are moving by combined means, subunits being moved by rail
or water transport will debark from the trains or ships and proceed by
march to the new loading area to continue their move. If the situation
demands that the move be stopped altogether, the subunits debark and
proceed independently under their own power to a designated concentra-
tion area or will join up with the troops moving by march.

226
 Under the complex conditions of modern warfare, it is becoming
increasingly important that troops be capable of moving by any means
over any distance, maintaining a high state of fighting efficiency and
readiness to proceed with their combat mission from the line of march or
after brief preparation. Troop training pertaining to the march is improv-
ing constantly. In order to be able to load and unload combat, specialized,
and transport vehicles, and stores into railway cars, onto flat cars, and into
ships, aircraft, helicopters and gUders, personnel from all subunits train in
and work through in practice the problems of embarking onto and debark-
ing from rail, water, and air transport, and the rules for securing, trans-
porting and unloading weaponry, combat and other equipment, and stores
from transport, since now all troops must be trained to move by various
means and be constantly ready to carry out marches and moves by any
mode of transport.

Notes
1. See Taktika v boyevykh primerakh. Diviziya [Tactics in Combat Examples: The Divi-
sion], p. 150.
2. See Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], V, 166.
3. See Peredvizheniye podrazdeleniy na bol'shoye rasstoyaniye [Long-Distance Movement
of Subunits], Moscow, 1967, p. 11.
4. See Soviet Military Encyclopedia, V, 166.
5. See Taktika v boyevykh primerakh. Polk [Tactics in Combat Examples: The Regiment],
p. 161.
6. See Tactics in Combat Examples: The Division, p. 162.
7. See Soviet Military Encyclopedia, 1977, III, 422.
8. See Tactics in Combat Examples: The Regiment, pp. 169-72.
9. See ibid., pp. 172-73.
10. See ibid., pp. 164, 173.
11. See ibid., pp. 167-168.
12. See Voinskiye avtomobil'nyye perevozki [Troop Movements by Motor Transport], Mos-
cow, 1974, p. 173.
13. See Long-Distance Movement of Subunits, p. 56.
14. See Soviet Military Encyclopedia, 1980, VIII. 86.
15. Set Long-Distance Movement of Subunits, \). \\9.
16. See Armeyskiye operatsii [Army Operations], pp. 103-5.

227
List of Recommended Readings

Marx, K., F. Engels, and V. I. Lenin, O voyne i armii [On War and the
Army], Moscow, 1980. KPSS o vooruzhennykh silakh Sovetskogo
Soyuza. Dokumenty 1917-1981 [The CPSU on the Soviet Armed
Forces: Documents 1917-1981], Moscow, 1981.
Ustinov, D. F., Sluzhim Rodine, delu kommunizma [We Serve the Moth-
erland and the Cause of Communism], Moscow, 1982.
Tukhachevskiy, M. N., hbrannyye proizvedeniya [Selected Works], Vols.
1 and 2, Moscow, 1964.
Frunze, M. V., hbrannyye proizvedeniya [Selected Works], Moscow,
1984.
Armeyskiye operatsii [Army Operations], Moscow, 1977.
Glazunov, N. K., and P. Ye. Maslennikov, Sukhoputnyye voyska
kapitalisticheskikh gosudarstv [The Ground Forces of the Capitalist
States], Moscow, 1980.
Glazunov, N. K., and N. S. Nikitin, Operatsiya i boy [Operation and
Engagement], Moscow, 1983.
Konoplev, V. K., Nauchnoye predvideniye v voyennom dele [Scientific
Foresight in Military Affairs], Moscow, 1974.
Kulikov, V. G., Kollektivnaya zashchita sotsializma [The Collective De-
fense of Sociahsm], Moscow, 1982.
Merimskiy, V. A., Takticheskaya podgotovka motostrelkovykh i
tankovykh podrazdeleniy [The Tactical Training of Motorized Rifle and
Tank Subunits], Moscow, 1984.
Osnovy teorii upravleniya voyskami [Fundamentals of the Theory of
Troop Control], Moscow, 1984.
Pavlovskiy, I. G., Sukhoputnyye voyska SSSR [The Ground Forces of the
USSR], Moscow, 1984.
Paliy, A. L, Radioelektronnaya bor'ba [Electronic Warfare], Moscow,
1981.
Peredel'skiy, G. Ye., Artilleriyskiy divizion v boyu [The Artillery Battalion
in Combat], Moscow, 1984.
Peredel'skiy, G. Ye., et al., Artilleriya v boyu i operatsii [Artillery in the
Engagement and Operation], Moscow, 1980.
Razvitiye taktiki Sukhoputnykh voysk v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy
voyny [The Development of Ground Forces Tactics During the Great
Patriotic War], Moscow, 1981.
Rybyan, A. A., Podrazdeleniya v nochnom boyu [Subunits in Night En-
gagements], Moscow, 1984.
Simonyan, R. G., and S. V. Grishin, Razvedka v boyu [Reconnaissance in
Combat], Moscow, 1980.
Sukhoputnyye voyska [The Ground Forces], Moscow, 1981.
Sverdlov, F. D., Takticheskiy manevr [Tactical Manever], Moscow, 1982.

228
Taktika v boyevykh primerakh. Polk [Tactics in Combat Examples: Tlie
Regiment], Moscow, 1974.
Taktika v boyevykh primerakh. Diviziya [Tactics in Combat Examples:
The Division], Moscow, 1976.
Taktika po inostrannym vzglyadam [Foreign Views on Tactics], Moscow,
1972.
Vayner, A. Ya., Takticheskiye raschety [Tactical Calculations], Moscow,
1982.
Vooruzheniye i tekhnika. Spravochnik (Inostrannyye armii) [Weaponry
and Equipment: A Reference Book (Foreign Armies)], Moscow, 1984.
Yepishev, A. A., Ideologicheskaya rabota v Vooruzhennykh Silakh [Ideo-
logical Work in the Armed Forces], Moscow, 1979.
Zashchita ot oruzhiya massovogo porazheniya. Spravochnik [Protection
from NBC Weapons: A Reference Book], Moscow, 1984.

229
Tactical Maps

U.S. Editor's Key to Map Symbols and Abbreviations

(A) CC (Maps 6, 7) (assistant) crossing commander

ARTY artillery
ATOM (Maps 6, 7) antitank guided missile
AT PLT (Map 10) antitank platoon
B (Maps 4, 5, 11, 12) air burst
BN battalion
BR (Map 3) brigade
CF (Map 3) concentrated fire
00 company
(COMB) ENGR (combat) engineer
CRP (Map 6) combat reconnaissance patrol
OSP (Maps 6, 7) tracked self-propelled ferry
H (Map 14) ground burst
ICV (Maps 4, 6, 7) infantry combat vehicle
MI motorized infantry (blue)
MR motorized rifle (red)
PLT platoon
PTS (Maps 6, 7) amphibious transporter
RES (Maps 3, 11, 12) reserve
TK tank

b in triangle ammunition supply point

b in oblong figure (Map 5) mobile ammunition supply
p in triangle (Map 10) forward observation post
K in circle (Maps 6, 7, 16) commandant's control point
R in circle (Maps 6, 16) traffic control
KPP in circle (Map 6) movement control point

Figures 4, 5, 11 and 12 contain formulas for 10-kiloton air bursts

(10-B), with the date-time group given in the denominator position in the
order time-day-month.

Figure 14 contains a formula for a 10-kiloton ground burst (10—H),

with the same kind of date-time group on the bottom. Two other formulas
in figure 14 also have date-time groups. Of those two, the one just above
the remote mining section has an "av" on top, which indicates that the
mining was carried out by aviation.

230
Figure 1. Shift to Offensive Against Defending Enemy From the March. *

* [The formula in the upper left area of the map indicates a 10-kiloton air burst, with the denominator position
signifying H—hour minus 12 minutes—U.S. Ed.]
 ff /of

\. IMIPLTW

1st MR BN location

^ TC 1) defending

f\-- ^ \C 2) before advance

^^-
Figure 2. Shift to Offensive From Position of Direct Contact With Enemy.
 Jl ^1 I MR CO

PLT^
MI PLT I ♦* I
\
IMI CO,
-r^\
r I I MI PLT»- I •W^X I

il
MI PLT* *MI PLTL

MI CO
1
•^
MIPLTf
1 MR CO

PLT_
i-n
/^

Ml PLT! 1 MR CO
11—

MR BN subsequent objective MR BN immediate objective MR CO immediate objective

Figure 3. Combat Missions of Motorized Rifle Battalion (or Company) in an Advance.

 60 e-a,
00
o e

a n <Ti re j^
n
Z 2 o
s
2 E? m
3 S * m
c
^-TT<^
eo 5" o
Vi s
o
CO
n Z 3: cs
a*
'/^
@
o "o
3 TT
3
ft „ o
o
n <. s
o f. %
o
s ts i
" OS

3 3' o
o
e >« 3
s
en
m
£; o
 Shorc road

T!^Q>-^■
MR CO

MR BN (+ TK CO, ARTY BN,

COMB ENGR PLT)

JP^'RP TK CO

T^ ■*^MR CO

Jt^MH ATGM platoon direct fire line

<^r "tfN C'rossing in ICVs

J Dena
I Departure line for crossing Crossing on GSPs
^ rv_ Crossing in PTSs

Figure 6. Forced Crossing of Water Obstacle From the March.

 H 4 "■"□"* ATGM plaloon direct fire line Crossing on GSPs

Crossing in PTSs
^\j *^^^ Crossing in ICVs

Figure 7. Forced Crossing With Deployment of Main Body at Water Obstacle.

 a b c
Figure 8. Methods for Defeating Enemy in Meeting Engagement:
a) flank attacic, containing part of forces from front; b) attacking both flanks, containing part of forces from
front; c) frontal attack

f OlOaiOC31CB<3>==r=

ii^ ^ / //
Kf^4 t
/ / /
III
» \
\ \
\
\

:^£2L

Figure 9. Deployment of Subunits for Meeting Engagement:

a) sequential; b) simultaneous.
 Gun 1
a
laMR PLT .
i—' QlsJaMR "^
*^ J\ ^'^PLT y,-^\\^-^ \^/
TK BN

MR BN(+TKCO)

"Lion
^s r
^
P
^V
kGun 2
^ C '^ ^ MR PLT* /\ ^

Ml BN

/.
'MRPLT x^ ■!

Figure 10. Motorized Rifle Battalion Defense Area.

Figure 11. Maneuver of Fire and Resources to Close Breach After Enemy Nuclear Attack.
 -\J^ D>
c^^ TK BN
Z*^ X VMR CO' <.^ ""^
'-TT^'

10-6
J 5.00 117

-^

--^^^

L ^\
Figure 12. Tank battalion Counterattadc to Eliminate Enemy That Has Broken Into Defense Position.
 March in anticipation of engagement
^^^ ij. Station
Stationary
flank security
Movement
support Tech.support Rear
Reconnaissance Security detachments Main body and logistics subunits security

O Mixed columns of subunits

vO
C=3 Flank security \^ *^ J Flank security

March with no threat of encountering enemy

Tech. support
Main body and logistics subunits

Wheeled vehicle columns

Tracked vehicle columns

Zl

Figure 13. Troop March Formation.

 On encountering enemy ground forces
1. Defeat enemy with forces of forward detachment, advance
guard, and, if necessary, by calling in part of subunits from
main body.
2. Main body bypasses battle area (with reinforced security).

''i®;-
New troop
disposition area
In event of chemical attack
1. Immediate evacuation of contaminated area at maximum
speed and with increased distance between vehicles.
2. Damage control (decontamination, medical aid for
victims).
3. Main body bypasses contaminated area..

Figure 14. Troop actions during march.

* [Note: The formula in the far right center of the map indicates a river ford
with depth 0.5 meters, length 80 meters, a hard surface, and current speed
0.3 meters per second—U.S. Ed.]
New troop
disposition area

Figure 15. Lines, Locations of Halt and Rest in Course of March.

Figure 16. Troop Movement by Rail.
 COMBINED MOVEMENT

COMBINED MARCH
■" ^ ' * Movement in
Personnel -organic veliicles
dismount area

o
o

Figure 17. Combined Troop Movement.

 0230414

SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT Series

1. The Offensive
2. Marxism—Leninism on War and Army
3. Scientific-Technical Progress and the
Revolution in Military Affairs
4. The Basic Principles of Operational Art and
Tactics
5. The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and
Problems of Contemporary War
6 Concept, Algorithm, Decision
7 Military Pedagogy
8, Militaiy Psychology
9 Dictionary of Basic Military Terms
10 Civil Defense
11 Selected Soviet Military Writings: 1970-1975
12 The Armed Forces of the Soviet State
13 The Officer's Handbook
14. The People, the Army, the Commander
15. Long-Range Missile-Equipped
16. Forecasting in Military Affairs
17. The Comm.and and Staff of the Soviet Army
Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945
18. Fundamentals of Tactical Command and
Control
19. The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their
Organizational Developm.ent
20. The Initial Period of War