Ethnicity and the Revolution in Panay*

JOSE MANUEL VELMONTE

In the war for independence, Filipinos fought the Spaniards, Americans and their
fellow Filipinos with almost equal difficulty. When revolutionary president Emilio
Aguinaldo sent two expeditionary forces from Luzon to liberate strategic provinces
in the Visayas the objective could not be achieved without local resistance. The
expeditionary forces met lukewarm, if not hostile, reception from the locals. It did
not help that the first of two expedition leaders was inclined to burn down
uncooperative communities and that the Visayan elite had other plans for the
territory. Having fought the Spaniards without aid from the Luzon government, they
found the expeditions intrusive and reacted to them as they would an invasion. They
even established a system of government not unlike that of the United States' for
the following reasons: one, they wanted to be autonomous from the control of
Malolos and two, they wanted freedom to define relations with the United States.
The joint revolutionary forces' bungled defense of Iloilo and the fingerpointing that
followed hinted the obvious flaws of ethnicity which allow Filipinos to see each other
not as countrymen but clansmen. In a war against foreigners, the greater threat lies
within the Filipinos themselves.

The project started with a view of forming a biographical sketch of

General Ananias Diocno who was the head of the expeditionary forces to
Capiz in 1898. After poring over documents in the Philippine Insurgent
or Revolutionary Records, it became apparent that very little material
survived about Diocno. Save for a few letters he wrote, his appointment
papers from the central government, the complaints lodged against him,
and a couple of sketchy biographies, not much else is known of him.

Of the material that did exist about him, most were complaints about
the conduct of the Tagalog forces in Capiz and in Iloilo. The great majority
of these were penned by local leaders of Iloilo although Diocno did write
a couple of letters refuting the charges. This was a surprising and,
admittedly, interesting development. We decided to focus on the
revolutionary movement in Panay, with special attention on the developing
tension between Diocno and the Visayan revolutionaries.

The history of the revolution in the Visayas is rife with political

controversies and machinations that would have been fodder for the
sensationalist press. There was a struggle for political control over the

*Printed with permission of the U.P. Center for Integrative andDevelopment Studies (CIDS)-
Education Research Program, which funded the research of this paper.
75
 76 JOSE MANUEL VELMONTE

government of the region and this led to the formation of a unique system
of government within the set- up of the Philippine revolutionary government.

In this power struggle, the expeditionary forces under Diocno, the

regional forces under General Martin Delgado, and the federal government
clashed in order to gain ascendancy in the Visayas. But underlying it all,
there was a realization that the troubles in Iloilo had the unmistakable
markings of regionalism.

In this time of pride in our nationhood it would seem sorely ill-timed

to discuss matters of such a divisive nature. But at the same time, it would
not be appropriate to ignore the divisions within the revolutionary
movement in Panay, merely to keeping up in the spirit of the centennial
celebration. The problem existed and still exists today and the challenge
is to address such problems, not pretend that all is well.

This study attempts to give a running background of the conflict

between Tagalogs and Visayans. This would include the motivation for
sending the expeditionary force, the status of the revolution in Panay, the
establishment of a regional government and the attempts to suppress
this government. It would then try to sift through the various conflicts and
gain a more focused definition of ethnicity or group identification. This
study is very preliminary and it is suggested that a more thorough
consideration of various concepts of ethnicity, particularly those that
relate to group identification and differentiation, be done.

It may be proper to begin with a background of the revolutionary

movement in the island. The island Panay felt the stirrings of revolution
shortly after the outbreak in Luzon. In 1896, the Katipunan was
established in the Aclan region of Capiz by Francisco del Castillo and
Candido Iban. On March 17, 1897, the katipuneros led by del Castillo
marched on Calivo but dispersed after the death of del Castillo and the
capture and eventual execution of Iban.1 However, the movement spread
into the interior.2

The revolution in Panay was different from that which grew out of
Cavite, Laguna and Bulacan. The motivations to rebel against the
Spanish regime were markedly different. Unlike the Tagalog provinces, no
large friar estates dominated Iloilo or Capiz. But there was a strong
disgruntled element living in the interior. The Historical Data Papers
ETHNICITY AND THE REVOLUTION IN PANAY 77

(HDP) refer to the revolutionaries in Panay as the agraviados (aggrieved)

and they were pictured as occasional troublemakers and lumped
together with bandits and religious fanatics.3 Does this indicate a certain
perception that they were nothing more than men with gripes? Early
insurgents were ill-armed and lacked both logistical support and tactical
know-how. With little or no support from the revolutionary movement in
Luzon, the engagements with the Spaniards were sporadic.

The insurgents were led by men such as Esteban Contreras, Juan

Arce and Juan Maraingan. Aside from Contreras, little is known about the
other men but they succeeded in establishing revolutionary movements
not only in Aklan but also in the Ilaya district of Capiz and some interior
towns of Iloilo. Their deeds and exploits, however, are recorded in folk
recollections of the people in towns of Capiz and Aklan. Were they nothing
more than peasants who were easily supplanted by the savvier principalia?

To a certain degree, other groups on the periphery of society aided

the insurrectos. The religious movement Alapaap, led by a certain
Macario Lucso or Papa Ambi, attacked the towns of Aclan.4 Teniente
Cosme Barbasa, who was identified with the religious cult called Ostiam
Poram, led the defenders of the town of Pan-ay. The unsettled conditions
also encouraged the members of various tulisan (bandit) groups, known
locally as boyongs, to stage attacks on unprotected villages and towns.
Many of these attacks were credited to the insurrectos.

The revolutionaries welcomed cooperation with these groups but

would later make a clear distinction between the two movements. The
relationship of the principalia-led revolutionaries and the agraviados was
one marked by distrust and conflict. In the eyes of revolutionaries like
Martin Delgado, Ananias Diocno and Leandro Fullon, these agraviados
were outcasts, religious fanatics and other “aggrieved” parties who took
advantage of the unsettled times to come down and attack the Spanish
forces and unprotected towns and villages. The HDP covering the period
of the Revolution is full of accounts about boyongs, pulahanes and
tulisanes who would come down from the mountains and threaten the
settlements. Pulahanes or Dios-Dios, as some of the aggrieved were
called, were not welcomed into the towns under revolutionary control and
there were frequent expeditions sent by Delgado and Diocno to free the
roads linking their areas of agraviado activities. Although they participated
 78 JOSE MANUEL VELMONTE

in harassing the Spaniards, once the revolutionaries gained the upper

hand, they were no longer welcome.

From 1897 to 1898, the Spaniards held the upper hand in Panay.
The revolutionaries, who relied almost exclusively on talibongs, bolos and
seized firearms, could not mount any serious threat to the garrisoned
towns. Cazadores, or Spanish soldiers, were deployed to the towns of
Capiz because of the unsettled situation in the area. But while small
guerrilla bands predominated in the first phase, larger regular formations
quickly formed in 1898.

On April17, 1898, the rebels fought a battle for the control of the
town of Pan-ay. The accounts are sketchy but it seems that the rebels
defeated the Spaniards. On May 4, the rebels thwarted a Spanish
attempt to take the town of Pan-ay. A few days later, a reinforced Spanish
force drove out the revolutionaries towards the swamps of Pontevedra
and Pilar and burned the town of Pan-ay. Later still, in a more decisive
battle, the revolutionaries routed the Spanish forces in Pilar (July 18,
1898) but had to flee. Effectively, this reduced Spanish presence in the
province of Capiz to the garrisoned towns of Capiz and Calivo. Punitive
forays continued to haunt the towns surrounding Capiz, resulting in the
burning of several towns by both Spanish and revolutionary forces until
the Spaniards were finally dislodged from Capiz towards the end of
1898.5

In Iloilo, the progress of the revolution started with the organization

of secret conspiratorial committees in the towns surrounding the city in
the first few months of 1898. There were also sporadic clashes between
agraviados and the Spanish forces in areas near the border with Capiz.6
By October, there were uprisings in various parts of the province of Iloilo,
especially the areas adjacent to the province of Capiz. The principalia was
still not in open rebellion. Leaders met to form a secret provisional
revolutionary government in Santa Barbara in August 1898. It was only
towards the end of October that the voluntary militia under Martin
Delgado turned against the Spaniards and declared an open revolt. The
move quickly gained adherence. By the middle of November, Iloilo City
was under siege on the landward side. The Spanish lines lay at the
outskirts of La Paz and Jaro, Mandurriao and Molo. General Delgado
became the leader of the locally organized forces called the Regional
ETHNICITY AND THE REVOLUTION IN PANAY 79

Forces of the Visayas. By November 17, a Provisional Territorial Council

was proclaimed in Santa Barbara.7

If the Revolution was progressing in Panay, why did General Emilio

Aguinaldo decide to send an expeditionary force to the Visayas? A plea
for aid came in August 1898 requesting assistance from the revolutionaries
in Luzon8 and Aguinaldo took the opportunity to install trusted men in the
Visayas. The Visayas was too important to lose. There were rumors that
the Spaniards would sell the Visayas and Mindanao to other powers,
possibly Germany, Japan, or Great Britain, or the Spaniards might
evacuate the islands in favor of the Americans. An immediate revolutionary
presence in the Visayas would make it difficult for the Spaniards to
dispose of the islands.

Iloilo City was the second largest settlement in the country at the
close of the 19th century, and after the Spaniards surrendered Manila
to the Americans on August 13, 1898, the Spanish administrative center
was transferred to Iloilo. The Revolutionary Government, seeing Iloilo as
the center from which all other Visayan provinces would be won over to
the revolution, intended that the city be taken by Filipinos. Commissioners
were appointed to establish the local government in that province and
from thence establish similar governments in the towns and villages of
the Visayas.9 An established revolutionary government in Iloilo would go
a long way in facilitating the revolution in the Visayas as well as in
Mindanao.

However, to secure Iloilo, Aguinaldo had to deploy men of his trust

and confidence. Aguinaldo had no sufficient men in Capiz, Iloilo or
anywhere else in the Visayas. Most of the revolutionary leaders in Panay,
for example, were either katipuneros instructed by Andres Bonifacio or
were militia leaders with little or no dealings with Luzon. The immediate
organization of an expeditionary force was then necessary to establish a
presence in the region as well as provide direction to the revolution there.
Even if there were some form of indigenous force in Panay, it would still
be necessary to send trusted lieutenants as well as material aid from
Luzon.10

On August 31, 1898, Aguinaldo sent the Batangas expeditionary

force to liberate the province of Capiz. Led by Ananias Diocno, the 200-
man expedition was composed mainly of Tagalog volunteers but also
 80 JOSE MANUEL VELMONTE

included some from Bicol, Masbate and Romblon.11 Sources are scant
on the expeditionary forces but they proceeded to liberate the two
remaining garrison towns in the province: Capiz and Calivo. Diocno took
hold of the forces then surrounding the town of Capiz and reduced several
other settlements that refused to cooperate with the expeditionary
forces. The town of Ivisan and several other towns surrounding Capiz were
allegedly burned upon the orders of General Diocno. The expeditionary
forces, together with other revolutionary groups, succeeded in capturing
Calivo sometime in November or December 1898.12

But the Tagalogs were refused allegiance by several insurgent towns,

among them Dumalag, Ibajay, etc., all of which had been viably
functioning as insurgent settlements outside the official sphere of the
Philippine revolutionary government. And again, in reprisal for the refusal
to accede to the government in Luzon, Diocno burned the intransigent
towns. The memories of this policy survive in the folk histories of towns
in Capiz and Aklan.13 While the policy ensured that Diocno was to be
recognized as supreme military commander in Capiz, it also bred a fear
among the revolutionaries in neighboring Iloilo that he would similarly
reduce them.

In September, another expeditionary force was sent from Luzon to

liberate Antique and was headed by Leandro Fullon, a native of that
province. On September 21, Fullon’s party disembarked at Pandan, near
the northern end of Antique, to begin the liberation of the province from
the Spanish government. Despite some routs, Fullon’s forces were able
to take San Jose de Buenavista on November 25.14 In December, Fullon’s
forces were deployed, together with other revolutionary forces, to Iloilo.

With the military engagements in Panay as a backdrop, the government

for Panay was slowly taking shape. It must be stated that although there
were urgent pleas for assistance, by and large the revolution in Panay was
home-grown and self-sufficient. They had organized the conspiratorial
committees without the assistance or the intervention of Luzon-based
revolutionaries and had won skirmishes with the Spaniards with what little
arms they got. It surprises no one that the government of Panay was, from
the very beginning, autonomous of the main body of the revolution.

By the beginning of November, the form of government of the Visayas

was already a serious question. Should it maintain its autonomy from the
ETHNICITY AND THE REVOLUTION IN PANAY 81

central government? The Territorial Council of the Visayas was formed at

the instigation of various prominent men of Iloilo and Negros. This
council, together with the provisional revolutionary forces under Martin
Delgado, was formed in Santa Barbara in November 1898. Allegedly,
prior to the open defiance of the revolutionaries, the council had already
been meeting as a shadow government since July.15 However, some form
of contact had already been established between the revolutionary
government in Cavite and the regional government in Sta. Barbara.
Commissioners from Luzon, for example, had been appointed to supervise
the establishment of local governments throughout the Visayas. The Cry
of Sta. Barbara also featured the raising of a Filipino flag.

At the onset, despite the declared adhesion of the regional government

to the central government, Malolos had nominal control over Iloilo. The
regional government was autonomous in essence and in fact. The
ambiguous nature of the regional government as well as its relationship
with Luzon was a breeding place of secessionist sentiments later on.

The set-up for a federal system was not incorporated into the draft
of the Malolos constitution. It was a unilateral decision of the Visayans
to establish such a government.16 The inspiration to establish an
autonomous regional government may have come from the Cantonal
Republic of Negros, which was organized on November 26, 1898. The
Negros government was organized following the Swiss cantonal system,
which incorporated the western and eastern halves of the island. The
Negros Cantonal Republic declared its adhesion to the Visayan regional
territorial government as well as to the national Philippine government in
Malolos.

On December 12, the Federal State of the Visayas was inaugurated.

In the state’s declaration, they cited their imitation of the system of
government of the United States of America. They called for equal status
among the three component groups, Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.
Despite avowed adherence and subordination to the government in
Luzon, the definitions of the relationship with Malolos remained vague.
In a series of decrees after the establishment of the federal state, the
president of the state still continued to define the relationship with Luzon.

To a certain extent, the ambiguous nature of the relationship

between Luzon and Panay was also due to the hesitance of Malolos to
 82 JOSE MANUEL VELMONTE

define the relationship. In November 1898, Mabini wrote to Aguinaldo

about the situation in the Visayas but it was remarkably devoid of any
opinion on the matter of an autonomous regional government. He merely
endorsed the undertakings of the commissioner for the Visayas, Francisco
Villanueva.17 President Aguinaldo was, himself, silent over the question,
and it was not until he came out with his decree abolishing the federal
government in April 1899 that he wrote at length about the problem.

Why would the Visayans want to establish a separate system of

government? Two things come to mind. One, they wanted autonomy
because they resented the control of Malolos and two, they wanted
freedom to define relations with the United States. It must continually be
stressed that the Panaynons had been conducting their fight against the
Spaniards free of Luzon’s control before the advent of Diocno’s forces.
Thus Diocno’s expedition was viewed more as some sort of invasion
rather than liberation. Diocno actually demanded that the revolutionary
forces in Capiz adhere to his military command. Those who refused were
forcibly disarmed or attacked, causing a great deal of ill-feeling.

The Visayans were not at all comfortable with the prevailing set-up
within the Revolutionary government where the Tagalogs, in general, and
the Caviteños in particular, were getting more than their fair share of the
positions in government. Diocno, for example, was sent on an expeditionary
mission to liberate Capiz. He was a Tagalog from Taal and had no links
with the Visayas. Iloilo, as a second city at that time, may have resented
the impositions or dictates of Cavite and may have wanted to have control
over their choice of leaders. The conflict between the expeditionary forces
and the regional army is rife with ethnic antagonisms.

In the second case, it may be important to note that the Philippine

government had already declared its independence and established its
structure through a constitution. Neither of these endeavors were
recognized by the United States. It was also apparent that the United
States intended to stay in the Philippines following a series of military
deployments in August. Even clearer was that after the signing of the
Treaty of Paris ending the Spanish-American War, the United States
gained the right to govern the Philippines, subject to the concurrence of
the American Senate.
ETHNICITY AND THE REVOLUTION IN PANAY 83

The Federal State of the Visayas was inaugurated several days after
the Treaty of Paris was signed. It was patterned after the federal system
of the United States where states had considerable power of policy
making. In the aftermath of the revolution, and with the relations of the
federal state vis-à-vis the central government still unclear, the policy-
making potentials of a federal state were enormous; the federal state, for
instance, could even contemplate secession. This potential was not lost
on the Americans. In a series of consultations with Visayan leaders based
in Manila, the Military Governor, General Elwell Otis, sounded them about
the American intentions to occupy major Visayan ports. It was also made
clear that the Americans wanted to deal with Visayans directly. Again,
after the Americans took Iloilo, the peace commissioners wanted to
conduct peace negotiations with the Visayans in March 1899. However,
the talks bogged down after General Delgado insisted that the Americans
agree to two conditions: one, that Filipino independence be recognized,
and two, that negotiations be cleared with Luzon.

In fact, the separatist tendencies of the Federal State of the Visayas

were recognized by many revolutionary leaders. Julio Ynfante, who was
in Iloilo in November 1898, spoke of the dangerous tendencies of the
Visayans in favor of annexation and warned of the severe consequences
arising from the loss of the Visayas to the young republic. General Arcadio
Maxilom, police chief of Cebu, wrote to Malolos concerning the suspicions
he had about the government in Iloilo, which he termed as annexationist.18

To understand the motivations of the annexationist leaders of the

Federal government, one must see who they were. Most were landed
hacenderos of Iloilo and Negros. One clear motive was the search for a
market for sugar. Another was the search for a reliable security cover. The
United States represented the biggest single market of Philippine sugar
and that fact was not lost on many hacenderos. Annexation to the U.S.
would facilitate the entry of sugar into the American market. The
Americans were also in the best position to provide security for the
Philippines, compared to either the Spaniards or the Filipino revolutionaries.
As astute businessmen, the annexationist leaders also recognized that
a war with the US would be devastating economically. Not only would the
sugar fields be destroyed, the American market would also be lost. The
choice then became clear.19 As it turned out, this decision fueled the
animosity between Diocno, who stood unwaveringly for independence,
and the Visayan annexationists.
 84 JOSE MANUEL VELMONTE

On other hand, it cannot be denied that the national government was

concerned about the conditions in the Visayas despite the seeming lack
of a defined policy towards the Visayas. But the national government
admitted that it was beyond its power to impose a political solution to the
problem in Iloilo. When Mabini received the recommendations of the
commissioner, it was an act of resignation to an act already done—a fait
accompli. To challenge or to revise the autonomous government of the
Visayas was to participate in counter-productive talk, and the prime goal
in December 1898 was to capture the city of Iloilo.

What the national government did was to limit the spread of the
power base of the Visayan government. The Visayan federal government
was strongest in Iloilo and Negros. Capiz and Antique adhered to it
because of proximity and because of the continuing indecision of Luzon.
However, outside the Ilonggo-dominated provinces, there was clearly
little support for the Federal government,20 a point I will return to in this
paper. From the original concept of revolution emanating from Iloilo and
radiating to the other Visayan provinces, the national government began
communicating directly with local revolutionary movements or sending
forces and leaders from Luzon to these provinces. They were markedly
successful in the case of Samar and Cebu, both valuable components of
the Visayan group. Two military generals became loyal lieutenants of
Aguinaldo, Arcadio Maxilom in Cebu and Vicente Lucban in Samar.

In Iloilo, which could be described as the center of the Federal

government, the national government did try to undermine the
effectiveness of the Federal government. In a letter to General Delgado,
dated February 2, 1899, Apolinario Mabini explained that all structures
set up under the Federal government had to be considered provisional
until the national government was able to fulfill the mandate of the
constitution. Mabini stressed that the true repository of sovereignty was
the Filipino people as represented by the Congress.

It appears that the national government looked upon Delgado as a

rival leader. Diocno, despite his ascerbic complaints against the Visayan
Federal leaders, chose to view Delgado as being misled by his companions.
Mabini appealed to Delgado to recognize the national government when
he wrote directly to the Chief of the Regional Army in February 1899.
Hence, it was no surprise that despite Aguinaldo's close ties with Fullon
(he was operations chief for the Visayas) and Diocno (the chief of the
ETHNICITY AND THE REVOLUTION IN PANAY 85

expeditionary forces), it was Delgado who was hailed the general in chief
of the forces on Panay island by virtue of the decree of April 27. It may
also be noted that appended to the appointment of Delgado as general
in chief was a letter from Apolinario Mabini, in which he pledged the
support and cooperation of General Diocno in the move to dissolve the
Federal Government.

Delgado, however, would not cooperate in the move to dissolve the

Federal government. His career thus far as the head of military force, he
had not exercised any political office. He continued to consult with the
Federal government, which was fast being decimated by defections to the
American side,21 and hesitated to take direct orders from Luzon. His
hesitation, in part, was due to the conflict between Tagalogs and
Visayans. While staunchly committed to independence, he was also very
loyal to his own regional government.

Delgado’s dilemma was shared by many of Iloilo’s military leaders like

Juan Jalandoni, Quintin Salas and Ambrosio Mondejar. It seems that the
military elite in general was not particularly ambitious and contented
themselves with playing a secondary role in the formation of policy within
the Federal State of the Visayas. Roque Lopez, the first president and a
military general, for example, resigned as president of the Federal
government in favor of Raymundo Melliza. But with the neutralization of
the political elite, the military took up the role of leading the revolution
and led the resistance movement against the Americans.

It was on the occasion of the American threat to the city of Iloilo that
the regional and expeditionary forces came into close contact. All forces
were concentrated in the city of Iloilo in anticipation of a naval landing.
The Capiz-based expeditionary forces of General Diocno, the Antique
expeditionary force of General Fullon, the Regional forces under General
Delgado, and the forces of General Pablo Araneta were in close enough
proximity in the city to try to prevent the landing of American troops. But
the problems of harmonizing the chains of command soon became
evident. The expeditionary forces took their commands directly from the
Revolutionary Government in Cavite, while the regional forces took their
direction from the Territorial Council of the Visayas. The existence of two
forces under two directions clearly marked the beginning of a struggle for
supremacy.
 86 JOSE MANUEL VELMONTE

On February 11, the Americans began the naval bombardment of the

city. The revolutionaries held their positions until the troops under
General Araneta retreated, setting the town on fire. Seeing that their
comrades were in retreat, Fullon’s forces, which held the important
station of Fuerza San Pedro, also fell back. Diocno’s forces likewise
retreated to Jaro. The Americans took Iloilo, which was nothing more than
ashes.22

The Americans advanced on Jaro, La Paz and Molo. The insurgents

quickly quit these positions after minor skirmishes and after setting
several villages on fire. After establishing the fronts, the Americans were
unable to push out of the vicinity of the city. The revolutionaries dug
trenches to fortify their positions. The American knew they did not have
the troops to hold on to any new conquests and kept Iloilo only through
superior arms. The Federal government retired to the town of Sta.
Barbara, while most of the troops manned the fronts surrounding Iloilo
and its environs. The forces of Fullon retreated to Antique. The Americans
made no further advances, and save for the failed Balantang advance in
March, the fronts were unmoved until November 1899.

The failed defense of Iloilo exposed the divisions within the revolutionary
forces in Panay that had been simmering since December. The military
leaders blamed each other for the failure to defend the city from the
Americans. Each leader sent word to Malolos of the other's failures. The
Visayans accused Diocno and the Tagalogs of setting fire to the city and
of indulging in looting.23 Diocno, on the other hand, was particularly
critical of the conduct of the Visayans in trying to exclude Tagalog
participation in the defense of Iloilo. Although he faulted Fullon’s forces
for initiating the retreat, he attributed this action to the atrocious
conditions the Tagalogs were forced to endure during the long expectation
of the American bombardment. He intimated that the Visayans had no
intention to fight the Americans and they wanted the Tagalogs out of Iloilo
so that they could deliver the city to the foreigners. 24 His criticisms were
not left unanswered.25

The division came to a dangerous juncture in April when the local

government of Cabatuan accused members of the expeditionary forces
based in that town of abducting several women and of stealing food from
the people. Relations between the Tagalogs and the Visayans grew so
bad that members of a demoralized Tagalog force could not attempt to
ETHNICITY AND THE REVOLUTION IN PANAY 87

move out of their camps for fear of being ambushed by disgruntled

Visayans. In truth, a number of Tagalogs were killed when they ventured
outside their camp. Nor were they allowed to carry arms for fear that they
might shoot upon civilians. The Tagalogs complained about the relative
speed with which the case was brought to the attention of the government
in Luzon. The complaints of harassment and the reluctance of local
leaders to provide food and provisions for the expeditionary forces were,
however, ignored. In contrast, the Consejo de Tagalos noted that equally
or even more brutal incidents done by Visayans were ignored. In a note
concerning a document in which local leaders denied that their towns
were burned by Visayan troops, James Taylor issued an opinion that the
incident may have been true because the Federal government was so
bent on disproving it. The leader of the troops was the famed Visayan
colonel, Quintin Salas.26

In March 1899, the state government asked General Diocno to

surrender his arms to representatives of the Regional forces. Rather than
accept the demands made by the state government, Diocno retired to
Capiz where he remained incommunicado as far as the state government
was concerned.27 Left to defend part of the fronts and the revolutionary
capital in Sta. Barbara, his men were harassed and ordered to accede
to the demand to disarm. This demand was refused, but it greatly
demoralized the Tagalog forces. In April, Tagalog forces stationed in San
Miguel were withdrawn to Capiz, because of the increasingly difficult
relations between the two forces.28 Diocno further complained that the
agents of the Federal State were encroaching on his jurisdiction,
undermining his administrative control over the towns near the border
with the district of Concepcion.29

The central government, burdened by its own concerns in defending

Luzon, tried to mediate a settlement. Apart from the April 27 decree
abolishing the federal government, Aguinaldo tried to work out a
compromise that would allow the Tagalogs to return to the fronts in Iloilo,
without having to disarm themselves. The events are sketchy but by
September, a certain settlement brought about a reconciliation between
the contending forces, and the Federal government lost its champion.
According to Gregorio Zaide, the last President of the Federal State, Jovito
Yusay, signed a decree dissolving the Federal republic on September
23.30 According to sources in the Philippine Revolutionary Records (PRR),
it was upon the instigation of the Consejo de Luzon, the Tagalog faction,
 88 JOSE MANUEL VELMONTE

that the Federal government was finally brought to an end.31 A coup had
always been feasible since they had the military capability and the legal
right to mount one. However, the Tagalogs also knew they had no support
from the Visayans. Delgado was still necessary in the move to dissolve
the Federal government.

By September 21, Delgado agreed to form the Politico-military

government of Iloilo through the help of military leaders of the province,
without the blessings of the civilian Federal government.32 On October 5,
he dissolved the Federal government by virtue of the April 27 decree of
President Aguinaldo.33 On October 20, he appointed his delegates to the
provincial council.34 He now recognized the direct control of Luzon over
the government of Iloilo. In the military council that formalized his
ascendancy as the new Politico-Military governor of Iloilo and General in
Chief of all Panay-based forces, the forces under his control agreed to
recognize the commissions and ranks approved by the Department of
War, rather than those issued by the Federal government. In return,
Diocno took a secondary role to Delgado, in spite of the fact that he had
the better-armed force.

With the demise of the Federal government, the military had to

reorganize resistance against the Americans. During the meeting of the
Panay forces in Sta. Barbara, they effected the unification of the
command structure. The federal forces agreed to accept the hierarchy
and the commissions from Luzon to effect the union.35 The politico-
military governor of Iloilo immediately set out to assume supervision over
the provincial government. Municipal militias and police forces were
taken into account, the collection of the war tax and contributions of war
were mandated and supplies stockpiled. But like the experience of
Diocno, Delgado ran into the problem of lukewarm support for the
revolution. On October 24, Delgado wrote to Aguinaldo complaining
about the indifference and apathy of the local officials in supporting the
cause of the revolution.36 Contributions were gathered only upon the
threat of punitive measures. Delgado’s problems may have emanated
from his relative inexperience in dealing with civilian officials.

On October 27, 1899, General Diocno informed General Delgado of

the docking of the USS Concord at Iloilo with as many as 3,000 troops
and 200 horses. On November 2, two American gunboats bombarded
the town of Banate. On the 5th, American forces began their advance
ETHNICITY AND THE REVOLUTION IN PANAY 89

outside the frontlines toward San Miguel. Landings were made in Banate
on November 25, in Capiz and Calivo in December, and in San Jose de
Buenavista in January 1900. Unable to resist the American advance, the
Filipino revolutionaries retreated to the mountain vastness of Panay.
Delgado retreated to the mountains of Lambunao, Diocno to the hills of
Aclan and Fullon to the vicinity of Mt. Madia-as. By July 1, 1900, the
Panay defenders opted to shift to guerrilla tactics. 37

By the beginning of 1901, the disenchanted revolutionaries were out

of men, out of ammunition and out of food. In February, Delgado
surrendered to the Americans. On March 1, Fullon followed suit and on
March 21, Diocno signed the Paz de Aclan. Colonel Salas continued the
fight until October.

How are we then to view the conflict within the revolutionary forces
in Iloilo? Can we conclude that what transpired actually suggested a
division based on ethnicity? Perhaps it would be best to separate the
various possible motivations for the feud in the Visayas.

It could well have been personal. From accounts of the revolution,

it seems that Diocno was a difficult person who disliked opposition and
had no aptitude for negotiations. He was able to take hold of Capiz
because he ruthlessly crushed opposing forces, be they Spanish or
Filipino, and he had the arms and ammunition to effect this. Hence, on
the personal level, yes, there could have been cause to dislike him.
However, as has been pointed out, several Visayan officers also exhibited
similarly harsh tendencies. Quintin Salas was a particularly good example.
After being refused aid and succor, Salas allegedly ordered the burning
of Dumangas and other towns. But rather than castigate Salas, the
Federal government came to his aid with vigorous denials of the foul
deed. In this sense, then, personality traits alone did not explain the
cause of the fued. Indeed it does appear that more than a hint of
regionalism played a role in aggravating the division in the Visayas.

What about the politics of the leaders? Diocno was an unrelenting

nationalist who was committed to the cause of independence. Within the
government of the Visayans, there were annexationists who favored
American occupation. In January and February 1899, these men were in
a preponderant position in the federal government. They viewed Diocno
with great fear because his forces were well-armed and autonomous of
 90 JOSE MANUEL VELMONTE

their control. Thus they worked to isolate Diocno and make him give up
his base of power which was, in all reality, his military strength. However,
other Visayan nationalists were also opposed to Diocno. Delgado was
also firmly committed to independence but Diocno and Delgado were
mutually antagonistic before September 1899. It was Delgado who
actually stood as the most formidable opponent of Diocno and the
annexationists knew that. Delgado was hugely popular in Iloilo and
controlled the regional forces. But he resented the interference of Diocno
and made common cause with the annexationists in wanting Diocno’s
forces neutralized. The two generals later made peace but maintained
civil, never warm, relations after that.

Could class distinctions have separated most Tagalogs from their

Visayan brethren? Again, this possibility runs aground because, although
the majority of the expeditionary forces were Tagalogs of lowly origin, their
leaders were from the elite. Opposition to the expeditionary forces
included references to the leadership’s intransigence and cruelty. The
complaints that the Tagalogs themselves expressed were also directed
by their leaders against the perceived biases of the Visayan leadership.

So now we come to the question of ethnicity. The Comite de Tagalos

presented a most vivid identification of their exclusion from avenues of
power within the Federal Government based in Iloilo. The complaints
specified the gripes of the leadership of the Tagalogs against what they
perceived as a regionalist bias against them. They spoke of being
unrecognized by the Visayans and left out in promotions. Diocno also
spoke of being denied aid and succor in villages and towns controlled by
the Visayans under the direction of the Consejo de Estado in Iloilo as well
as being made to feel unwanted in the region by elements of the Federal
government.

The Visayans, on the other hand, complained of the high handedness

of the Tagalogs in trying to force their agenda in the region, despite the
delineation—however vague—of jurisdictions. The experience of Capiz
under Diocno was marked by severities in the quest to place the province
under his control. There was fear that he would likewise reduce the rest
of Panay. The Visayans therefore insisted that the expeditionary force
integrate with the regional command. The Visayans also assailed the
penchant of the expeditionary forces to resort to looting and pillage.
ETHNICITY AND THE REVOLUTION IN PANAY 91

But let us refine the problem further. Rather than merely ethnic
biases at play in the dynamics of the relationship between the Visayans
and the Tagalogs, perhaps we should consider the concepts of group
identification or the categories of taga-loob (insider) and taga-labas
(outsider). Filipinos in general are a clannish lot. Kinship plays an
important part in defining relationships with other people. Kinship opens
doors, which would otherwise be closed to an “outsider” or a stranger.
This is almost reflex among Filipinos. There are varying levels of the taga-
loob and taga-labas categories but they usually extend to ethnicity.
Ethnicity is an extension of this clannishness, since we somehow view a
person who comes from the same town or speaks the same language as
an extension of kin. A person refers to another person who hails from the
same town, province or speaks the same language as kababayan or
kasimanwa. In the Philippines, this identification usually stops at the
ethnicity level. Filipinos living abroad identify with each other as kababayan,
but preferentially form sub-groups based on ethnic or regional identification.

This reality is not exclusive to the Visayas for in a sense, ethnicity or

perhaps the identification with in-groups and out-groups has dictated the
course of the revolution in other areas. Take the case of the execution
of Andres Bonifacio in 1897. Bonifacio was identified with the Magdiwang
faction in Cavite while Emilio Aguinaldo was identified with the Magdalo
faction. Bonifacio, although a Tagalog, was an outsider and although
related to Mariano Alvarez by marriage, was not viewed as Caviteño. That
is important in light of the failure of the Magdiwang to defend him in the
face of persistent Magdalo persecution and the seeming collusion
between the two factions in dividing the spoils of war between them. The
bonds of kinship united the Caviteños and although at times they were
in conflict with one another, their conflict was tempered by the recognition
of kinship bonds that united them. Bonifacio, the urban Tagalog, had no
business to be in provincial Cavite.

The lukewarm support that the revolution received in areas such as

the Visayas and Cagayan Valley could also be attributed to the perceived
out-group categorization of the “liberating” forces of the Revolution.
American authors like James LeRoy and Dean Worcester point to the
ethnic identification of the Revolution with the Tagalogs as a central
theme of the period 1898-1901. They insist that the revolution was
essentially a Tagalog enterprise which was imposed on other regions and
people. In one, perhaps limited, sense this thesis is true. We must realize
 92 JOSE MANUEL VELMONTE

that Tagalogs made common cause against the Spaniards because they
were most commonly affected by the friar estates, which sprawled in
Cavite, Bulacan, and Laguna. They were also under the severest hold of
Spanish colonialism. Outside the Tagalog region conditions were different.
Nonetheless, there was support for the revolution, though in relative
intensities and with varying motives. Thus the Philippines should be
viewed as being in varying degrees of politicization in 1896.

The revolutionary movement in Panay found a wide degree of support

from the people. But the revolutionary fervor, the expeditionary forces
suffered from a lack of supplies and support more than the Visayan
regional forces. For while the regional government regularly sent supplies
to their troops, the expeditionary forces had to scrounge for food and
ultimately plundered the communities in which they operated. The
Visayan forces would suffer from a similar lack of support only after the
Americans began operations outside the city of Iloilo, cutting old supply
routes and bases of support.38

Clearly there was a failure to identify with the expeditionary forces as

their own. It has been said that bonds of a shared experience are what
unite a nation. The deeper the sense of sharing, the stronger the feelings
of nationalism. At the time of the Revolution, nationhood was only
beginning to be felt in the Visayas. What was stronger was the keen sense
of shared experience with other West Visayans. Negros shared both
kinship and ethnic ties with Iloilo and Capiz. Antique also shared a deep
connection with the Negrenses and Ilongos because of economic and
historical ties. This regional identification was far stronger than what was
then a developing sense of nationhood that encompassed about a dozen
main ethnic groups and a hundred smaller ones.

This could explain why the Iloilo revolutionaries decided to form a

Visayan Federal State, rather than accede to what could well have been
a foreign government in Luzon. The Tagalogs and the Visayans shared
very little in the form of experiences that bound them together. There was
also mutual distrust. The ruling group in Malolos viewed the government
in Iloilo as secessionist, and rather than appoint an Ilonggo, it insisted on
sending a Tagalog to lead an expeditionary force. On the other hand, the
Panay revolutionaries resented the impositions of Malolos and instead of
acceding to a unified structure of government, persisted in creating a rival
government in the Visayas.
ETHNICITY AND THE REVOLUTION IN PANAY 93

It must also be recognized that the Panay revolutionaries had already

formed a governmental structure autonomous of the Malolos government.
The existence of a functioning government would have made it more
difficult to impose another structure that was to the taste of Malolos. And
Malolos was not as representative as it would have wanted to appear.
Fewer than a third of the delegates were elected and the majority of those
who were appointed to represent provinces in the Visayas and Mindanao
came from Manila or Cavite.

On the other hand, even within the Visayas region there was some
disunity. As pointed out earlier, outside of Iloilo and areas it controlled,
parts of the Visayas did not support the Federal government. Cebu, in
theory, should have acceded to the Visayas State but direct
communications with Malolos were conducted. This could also suggest
an ethnicity-related tension between Cebuanos and Hiligaynons, with
Cebu refusing to play a subordinate role to Iloilo. In addition, Samar and
Leyte were clearly outside the hold of the Visayan federals.

The division within the revolutionary movement in Panay was a real

danger to the survival of the movement. As a case in point, the defense
of Iloilo could have been better coordinated if a single command structure
were in place. At that time, there were four generals commanding
differently sized and enabled forces. The two strongest forces refused to
come under the command of the other. In March of 1899, Diocno retired
to Capiz after being hounded by representatives of the Federal government
to disarm his troops. In Capiz he enjoyed a certain level of support.
Diocno's troops were pulled out of Iloilo in April and were absent until
August. Their absence would have exposed the revolutionary capital to
certain peril had the Americans sent the troops to mount an offensive
against Sta. Barbara. It was only in October that the forces agreed to
cooperate in a single command structure, thereby facilitating the defense
of the island. By then, however, American reinforcements were on their
way to break the landward siege of Iloilo.

The divisions within the revolutionary movement in the Visayas also

disabled the Iloilo-based revolutionaries from exercising their leadership
in the region. A move to revive the revolution in Negros to be directed from
Panay was abandoned because of the lack of arms. At the same time,
the government in Luzon, viewing the Iloilo-based revolutionaries as a
 94 JOSE MANUEL VELMONTE

threat, also undermined their effectivity in other provinces of the Visayas

by directly communicating with these component provinces.

However, although the problem of ethnicity was real, it was not

insurmountable. There were several cases of effective governments run
by Tagalogs in regions dominated by non-Tagalogs. Let us view the case
of Samar. The force on the island was organized under General Vicente
Lucban, who had no roots in the province. But despite the handicap of
being entirely unfamiliar with the people and the territory, Lucban led one
of the more successful guerrilla movements in the country. There was
widespread support for his government in all the towns of the province,
so much so that the infamous massacre of Balangiga could be organized
and carried out. In recognition of this support, the Americans retaliated
against Lucban by harassing the Samar citizenry, who supported Lucban,
despoiling the province in the process. To Lucban’s credit, he was
personally affable and easy to like. He also had great sensitivity to the
needs of the people of Samar, addressing civilian issues that other
politico-military governors left to the care of town presidents. Lucban also
had the foresight of conducting his business in the local language and
became fluent in Waray. One must note, however, that unlike Panay, the
revolutionary movement in Samar had not taken off before 1898. Hence
there was little in the form of indigenous resistance to an outsider.

Ethnicity and group identification are part of human experience. We

categorize between those who belong and those who do not. These
classifications are necessary to identify those we bestow favors on,
extend aid to or confide in, knowing that they share the same biases, the
same culture and the same interests as we do. The course of expanding
this classification was very abrupt for many Filipinos in 1898. The republic
was proclaimed and local leaders were called to adhere to the new nation.
While it may have been easy to proclaim adhesion to the state, it was
more difficult to find commonalities with ethnic groups with which a group
is hardly related to. That may have been the root of the problem in Panay.

There are reasons other than group identification that may have
played a more significant role in the divisions that wracked the revolution
in Panay. But it has always been easiest to dismiss these other reasons
and categorize them as being part of the ethnic differences. Thus
Diocno’s harshness was not seen as a personal trait but a group trait. The
annexationist tendencies of many landed Visayan planters was not seen
ETHNICITY AND THE REVOLUTION IN PANAY 95

as sectoral interests but as ethnic predisposition to abandon the

revolutionary cause. This penchant to see things as simply a flaw of
ethnicity engenders ethnic tensions that, in the case of Panay, burdened
the movement and affected the ability of the revolution in Panay to
confront the American threat. They saw a greater threat among themselves.

Endnotes
1 Felix B. Regalado and Quintin B. Franco, History of Panay, (Iloilo City: Central Philippine
University, 1973), p. 174.
2 There are varying opinions on this matter. The more popular view is that the revolution
came to Panay from Luzon, via the efforts of del Castillo and Iban and spread from the
coast to the interior. Another view, which was presented in the Third Conference on the
Revolution in Western Visayas, holds that the revolution was appropriated by the
disgruntled elements of Panaynon society in the interior where it gained a strong
following and a redoubt against Spanish attack. This would explain the strong nativistic
character of the initial phase of the revolution in Panay.
3 Historical Data Papers (HDP): Province of Capiz, National Library.
4 HDP: Province of Aklan, National Library.
5 Regalado and Franco, History of Panay, pp. 176-177.
6 Folio 886/12, Report on occurences in the town of Banate from 1898 showing how
the town was taken possession by the members of the revolutionary party. Selected
Documents, Philippine Revolutionary Records (PRR), National Library.
7 Exhibit 1190, Establishment of the Provisional Government, John Taylor, comp.
Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, Volume 5, (Pasay City: Eugenio
Lopez Foundation, 1973).
8 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, Malolos, Crisis of the Republic, (Quezon City: University of the
Philippines Press, 1960), p. 420.
9 Folio 311/1, Francisco Soriano reports situation in Iloilo, December 1898, Selected
Documents, PRR, National Library.
10 A comment appears in Taylor’s compilation that Pablo Araneta was initially considered
as the head of the expeditionary forces to Panay but because Aguinaldo was unsure of
his loyalties, Diocno was sent in his stead. However, Araneta was still sent to Iloilo as
titular head of an expedition which had little armed capabilities. See Taylor. Philippine
Insurrection, Vol. 2, p. 377.
11 Folio 310/1, Appointment papers of Ananias Diocno, August 30, 1898. Selected
Documents, PRR, National Library.
12 There are conflicting sources as to where Diocno landed. Most are sketchy. However,
conventional wisdom would have placed him near Calivo, because it was nearest
Luzon. However, his main task was to secure the telegraph line which was laid near
Capiz.
13 HDP: Province of Capiz, Municipality of Dao, National Library.
14 HDP: Province of Antique, National Library.
15 Taylor, Philippine Insurrection, Vol. 2, p. 376.
16 It is alleged that the government in Malolos proposed the formation of a federal set-up
for the Philippines. However, there was never any attempt to distinguish the existence
of a Federal State for Luzon or for Mindanao. In the communications of Apolinario
Mabini, it appears that it was commissioner Francisco Villanueva who suggested the
formation of a Federal State of the Visayas.
17 Folio 1046/, Announcement of the arrival of a commissioner who is to establish the rule
of the Filipino Republic. Cabatuan, November 20, 1898, Selected Documents, PRR,
National Library.
 96 JOSE MANUEL VELMONTE

18 Folio 311/10. Julio Ynfante tells Emilio Aguinaldo that Iloilo is about to surrender and
that the annexationist feeling is strong. November 6, 1898, and Folio 405, Negros,
PRR.
19 The Republic of Negros surrendered to the Americans, without any resistance, thereby
saving the island from a devastating war. However, there were revolutionaries who kept
up the fight.
20 Bohol, for example, allegedly refused to receive the commissioners sent from Luzon and
styled itself a canton of the Federal State of the Visayas. It is possible that the
inspiration for the government in Bohol originated from Negros because Cebu was
organized following the instructions of Aguinaldo.
21 In a scathing criticism of the Federal government, the Consejo de Tagalos remarked
that Sta. Barbara was being evacuated by residents who felt that it is safer to be on the
other side of the frontlines. Leaders of the government like Raymundo Melliza, Vicente
Franco, and Juan Araneta were also taking up posts in the American government. Folio
52/4, Letter From the Tagalog colony to Emilio Aguinaldo, Sta. Barbara, August 1,
1899, Selected Document, PRR.
22 Taylor, Philippine Insurrection, vol. 2, pp. P. 388, Regalado and Franco, History of
Panay, pp. 187-188, and John Foreman, The Philippine Islands, reprinted, Mandaluy-
ong: Cacho Hermanos, Inc., 1985, pp. 512-517.
23 Taylor, Philippine Insurrection, vol. 2, pp. 388-389.
24 Folio 52/1, Letter reporting Americans are in possession of town of Iloilo, March 14,
1899, Selected Documents, PRR.
25 Folio 117/2, Letter of Leandor Fullon to E. Aguinaldo, May 31,1899, Folio 52/1, Letter
reporting that the Americans are in the possession of Iloilo, March 14, 1899, Selected
Documents, PRR.
26 Folio 1160/7, Selected Documents, PRR.
27 Folio 52/5, Letter showing the feeling between Tagalo and Visayan forces in Panay,
Selected Documents, PRR; and Folio 52/4, Letter From the Tagalog colony to E.
Aguinaldo, Sta. Barbara, August 1, 1899, Selected Documents, PRR.
28 Folio 117/2, Marella informs Delgado of his intentions to return to Capiz, San Miguel,
April 9, 1899, Selected Documents, PRR.
29 Folio 311/1, Diocno’s complaints against the Federals, Capiz, August 25, 1899,
Selected Document, PRR.
30 Gregorio Zaide, “The Patriots of Panay,” in Filipino Heritage (Manila: Felta Book Sales)
vol. 8, p.2165.
31 Folio 1094/10, Federal government displaced by force. Sta. Barbara, September 25,
1899, Selected Documents, PRR.
32 Folio 881/9, Martin Delgado announces that at the request of his troops he has taken
command of the province as P.M. governor. Kabatuan, September 21, 1899, Selected
Documents, PRR.
33 Folio 881/3. Martin Delgado issues proclamation to the Visayans announcing that he
has assumed command as governor president. Kabatuan, October 5, 1899, Selected
Documents. PRR.
34 Folio 881/6, Martin Delgado announces his council of government, October 20, 1899,
Selected Documents, PRR.
35 899/10, Martin Delgado elected military general in chief, October 22, 1899, Selected
Documents, PRR.
36 Folio 886/7, Politico-Military Governor says Iloilo province is indifferent in the present
situation, Kabatuan, October 1899, Selected Documents, PRR.
37 Folio 886/11, Francisco Jalandoni describes formation of the guerrilla bands in Iloilo
Province, July 1,1900, Selected Documents. PRR.
38 It is curious that Delgado immediately claimed lukewarm support after he took the
reigns of government from the Federal government. Could it have been caused by his
perceived alliance with the Tagalogs who engineered the ousting of the Council of State
of the Federal government?