Francisco Vs Comelec
Francisco Vs Comelec
Francisco Vs Comelec
Comelec
GR No. 230249 April 24, 2018
Facts:
Francisco is a registered voter in Cainta, Rizal, while Nieto was elected as mayor of the same
municipality in 2013. Nieto filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) to signify his bid for re-election for the
2016 National and Local Elections.
On April 8, 2016, Francisco filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Nieto,
docketed as SPA 16-062(DC), alleging that on April 1-2, 2016, respondent made financial contributions
out of the government coffers for the asphalt-paving of the road entrance along Imelda Avenue of
Cainta Green Park Village. This, according to petitioner, amounted to the expending of public funds
within forty-five (45) days before the 2016 polls and to illegal contributions for road repairs, respectively
punishable under Sees. 261(v)[2] and 104[3] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Petitioner further claimed that the said asphalt paving was one of the
accomplishments that respondent reported on his Facebook page.
In his Answer filed on April 22, 2016, Nieto countered that the questioned asphalting project was
subjected to public bidding on March 15, 2016, with a Notice of Award issued on March 21, 2016. Thus,
the asphalting project falls within the excepted public works mentioned in Sec. 261(v)(l)(b) of the OEC.
During the preliminary conference on May 5, 2016, the counsels for the parties marked their respective
pieces of evidence. Thereafter, an Order was issued giving them ten (10) days to file their respective
memoranda. The COMELEC would receive copies of the memoranda on May 16, 2016 and, thereafter,
the case was deemed submitted for resolution. In the interim, Nieto would be re-elected as municipal
mayor of Cainta, Rizal, having garnered the plurality of votes upon the conclusion of the 2016 polls.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC acted in grave abuse of discretion in ruling that a petition
for disqualification under Sec. 68 of the OEC cannot prosper without a prior judgment
finding the respondent guilty of an election offense.
2. Whether or not petitioner sufficiently established by substantial evidence that
respondent violated Secs. 261(v) and 104 of the OEC.
Held:
The COMELEC is, thus, fully-clothed with authority to make factual determinations in relation to
the election contests before it. This has been the thrust of the decade’s worth of constitutional
revisions that transformed the COMELEC from a purely administrative body, whose scope of
decision making is limited to those incidental to its duty to enforce election laws, to a polling
commission that also exercises original and exclusive, as well as appellate, jurisdiction over
election contests.
Considering the historical evolution of the COMELEC, the Court now declares that the polling
body has full adjudicatory powers to resolve election contests outside the jurisdiction of the
electoral tribunals. To rule otherwise would be an act of regression, contrary to the intent
behind the constitutional innovations creating and further strengthening the Commission.
2. No, Petitioner have not submitted a substantial evidence in the case filed
The quantum of proof necessary in election cases is substantial evidence, or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Corollarily, the
rule is that he who alleges must prove. Thus, the burden is on Francisco to establish through
substantial evidence that Nieto unlawfully disbursed government funds during the election ban,
a burden that Francisco failed to discharge.
There is simply a dearth of evidence to support petitioner's claim that respondent violated Sec.
261(v) of the OEC. To be sure, petitioner merely submitted the following to support his
allegations:
1. Pictures of the asphalt-paving along Imelda Avenue of Cainta Green Park Village,
Barangay San Isidro, Cainta, Rizal;
2. Picture of the Facebook page of the respondent acknowledging the project as one of the
accomplishments of his administration; and
The photographs petitioner presented depicting the construction and works done on the
asphalting project would only prove the fact of paving, which is not even contested. They do
not, however, establish that respondent expended public funds or made financial contributions
during the election prohibition.
On the other hand, respondent Nieto sufficiently parried the alleged commission of the election
offenses by proving that the asphalting project squarely falls under the exception in Sec. 261
(v)(l)(b). The provision states:
v. Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. - Any public official or
employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before
a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:
1. Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:
xxxx
The Court is in concurrence with the observations of Commissioners Luie Tito F. Guia and Ma.
Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon that the evidence on record sufficiently proved that the expenditure
for the road repair is exempted from the prohibition under Sec. 261 (v) of the OEC. Private
respondent Nieto was able to show with competent evidence that the bidding for and the award
of the subject project were regular and done consistent with existing laws. The charge for illegal
contribution under Sec. 104 of the OEC has even less leg to stand on. There was no contribution
to speak of since it was established that the asphalting work was a government project and not
a contribution.
There being substantial evidence to support Nieto's defense that the construction procurement
for the project was aboveboard, there is then no reason to disturb public respondent's rulings.
No abuse of discretion, let alone one that is grave, can be attributed to the COMELEC Second
Division in dismissing the Petition for Disqualification, nor to the COMELEC En Banc in denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Court declares that in a Petition for
Disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, a prior judgment by a
competent court that the candidate is guilty of an election offense is not required before the
said petition can be entertained or given due course by the Commission on Elections.