Persons Cases - Annulment To Marriage Settlement

Corpus vs Ochoterena hearings, the respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the
case submitted for decision.9

On May 22, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the
verified Complaint1 of Margie Corpus-Macias (Mrs. Macias) dated May 11,
In the interim, from April 10, 2001 up to April 30, 2001, various motions and
2001, accusing Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena, then Presiding Judge, Regional
manifestations, one after the other but interrelated, were filed by the counsel
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte, of bias,
of Mrs. Macias opposing the hearing on the merits of the case before the
partiality and violation of judicial conduct in connection with his disposition
respondent judge.10 One was denied while the rest were ignored. As
of Civil Case No. S-695 for declaration of nullity of marriage, entitled "Mariano
previously stated, the respondent proceeded with the hearing on April 30,
Joaquin S. Macias v. Margie Corpus-Macias."
2001 without resolving the other motions and manifestations.
The antecedents follow.

It is in the light of the foregoing that Mrs. Macias believes that the respondent
On February 6, 2001, a verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of
judge deprived her of the fundamental right to due process with utmost bias
marriage was filed against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias ("Mr.
and partiality for Mr. Macias; hence, she filed the instant Complaint
Macias"), her husband and incumbent presiding judge of RTC, Branch 11,
containing the above-cited facts before the Office of the Court Administrator
Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte. The case was raffled to the respondent's court.2
(OCA).11 Also in the Complaint is her prayer that an order be issued ex-parte
On the same day the Complaint was filed, the respondent immediately issued
directing the respondent judge to desist from taking any further action in the
Summons to Mrs. Macias.3 However, the Summons was not served on Mrs.
subject case and imposing an administrative sanction against him.
Macias for the reason that her whereabouts were allegedly unknown.4
Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to serve summons by publication.
Without waiting for the OCA's Indorsement, the respondent judge submitted
The respondent granted the motion in his Order5 dated March 7, 2001, with
his Comment/Answer12 on May 25, 2001.13
the directive that Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days after
notice. Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused the publication of the Summons in the
The respondent judge claims that the instant Complaint is fatally defective
local weekly newspaper, "Tingog Peninsula," based in Dipolog City in its
because it is not supported by the affidavits of persons who have knowledge
March 11-17, 2001 issue.6
of the facts and documents needed to substantiate the allegations therein.
Also, he asserts that malice, bad faith, and the intention to harass, embarrass
Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid publication of Summons
and humiliate him had motivated Mrs. Macias to file the said Complaint.
during the first week of April 2001. Without delay, on April 10, 2001 or within
the 30-day period to file an answer, she filed a Motion to Dismiss, which she
The respondent judge disputes violating Mrs. Macias' right to due process. He
set for hearing on April 20, 2001.7 However, instead of first acting upon the
argues that Mrs. Macias was given the opportunity to be heard but chose not
motion, the respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the subject
to give her side, as shown by her failure to appear during the trial despite
case on April 19, 2001, or one day before.
prior notice. Furthermore, he points out that the records of the case would
show that the proceedings was done in good faith and based on law and
On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-set
jurisprudence.
the hearing on the merits to April 30, May 2 and 3, 2001.8 After the scheduled
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 1 | P a g e

Furthermore, the respondent judge posits that even if he may have In summary, Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court that the respondent
committed an error, such should be corrected by availing of judicial remedies judge's actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct unbecoming a
and not by resorting to the filing of an administrative action. He argues that judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and conclusive from
it is only after the Supreme Court finds that a judge had committed malice or the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and
gross ignorance that he should be administratively sanctioned. Moreover, procedure. For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the
respondent claims that a Petition14 dated May 11, 2001, containing similar Court should sanction him.
allegations as the instant complaint, was filed before the Court of Appeals, a
copy of which he received on May 21, 2001. The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which
states that the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due
Finally, respondent judge insists that his Decision15 is valid and prays for the process when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case
dismissal of the instant Complaint for lack of merit. completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed
within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.
In her Reply16 which she filed on July 19, 2001, Mrs. Macias admits having
filed a petition for certiorari17 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the
Procedure with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64733 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which states that: "After the last pleading has
entitled "Margie Corpus Macias v. Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena" on May 18, been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move
2001.18 ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial." Considering that the last pleading
was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first
In addition, Mrs. Macias claims that the Court of Appeals decided the Petition resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set the case
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Prayer for Temporary for pre-trial.
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction in her favor on
July 13, 2001, finding respondent judge blatantly transgressing her right to What happened in the case is a classic example of "railroading" or
due process and ignorant of the basic rudiments of Civil Procedure. She notes "procedural short-cut." Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the
that the Decision19 nullified the assailed proceedings and the Decision20 respondent judge completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial on the
rendered by the respondent judge on May 15, 2001 in Civil Case No. S-695.21 merits of the case by receiving Mr. Macias' evidence ex-parte.
And finally, Mrs. Macias stresses that the instant charge against respondent
judge may simply be verified by checking the records of the case. The respondent judge compounded his blunder when, after denying Mrs.
Macias' Motion to Dismiss, he continued with the reception of Mr. Macias'
On June 4, 2001, the respondent judge retired from the service. However, evidence ex-parte, ordered the termination of the trial and thereafter,
pursuant to the Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 10597-Ret. dated 22 considered the case submitted for decision despite Mrs. Macias' filing of a
October 2001, the Court retained the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying her Motion to Dismiss. In
(P40,000.00) from his retirement benefits, to answer for whatever holding the trial of the case up to its completion, the respondent judge had
administrative sanction the Court may impose in relation to the instant acted utterly oblivious to the pending Motion for Reconsideration.
case.22

It is also worth mentioning that, as correctly found by the appellate court, acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, it is his duty to keep always
even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the period abreast with law and jurisprudence.26 When the law or procedure is so
therefor had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a elementary, for him not to know it or to act as if he does not know it
hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default constitutes gross ignorance.27
proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.23
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
In that regard, Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where she gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty
indicated her address and, hence, can be notified by the Public Prosecutor of of either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension
his investigation.24 from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months
or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: "If the defending exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed.
party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney Respondent compulsorily retired from the service on June 04, 2001, thus,
to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if dismissal or suspension from the service is no longer possible. Nonetheless, a
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the penalty of fine may still be imposed upon him considering that under the
evidence submitted is not fabricated." Thus, the report of the Public Resolution of the First Division in A.M. No. 10597-Ret. dated October 22,
Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in the 2001,28 the Court retained the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00)
case. Respondent judge ignored this procedural rule. from his retirement benefits to answer for whatever administrative sanction
the Court may impose upon him with regard to this case. Considering that
While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M. Paculanag had filed this is the first time the respondent judge will be meted a penalty,29 the Court
a Certification dated May 04, 200125 with the respondent judge's court, finds a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) appropriate.
stating, among others, that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General
during the ex-parte presentation of plaintiff's evidence, even cross-examining WHEREFORE, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross
the plaintiff and his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, and that he ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount of
had no objection to the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier
marriage, such Certification does not suffice to comply with the mandatory withheld from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the
requirement that the court should order the investigating public prosecutor OCA is DIRECTED to immediately release to the respondent judge the
whether a collusion exists between the parties. Such directive must be made remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from the
by the court before trial could proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its further
case had already been had. Notably, said Certification was filed after the retention.
respondent judge had ordered the termination of the case. SO ORDERED.
Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the respondent judge violated
Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he completely ignored the pertinent
rules. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of
Castillo vs De Leon – Castillo
On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Baustista void. On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV No.
City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision6 declaring that Lea's first marriage to
90153 and the Resolution2 that affirmed the same. The CA reversed the
Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued
Decision3 dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision dated 22 January 2003 had
Quezon City, Branch 84.
become final and executory. 7
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that
between the parties on the ground that respondent had a previous valid
the proof adduced by petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration of
marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes on the other hand,
nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous. In his
that respondent was not prevented from contracting a second marriage if the
Opposition, 9 petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of
first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not have to
respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had belatedly
await a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.
managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny
that at the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage
The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was
was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer
correct in holding thus and consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration of
in its Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.
nullity of the second marriage.
In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin
it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. 12 The
Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner
dispositive portion reads:
Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
declares the marriage between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-
Nullity of Marriage,4 praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to
CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen Parish
her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under
Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO
Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that petitioner did
based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the Family Code. 13
not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC. The reason for
this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when
she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her
bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license
argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could
therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which
presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so
the solemnizing officer belonged.5
long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing.
Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using
judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to 80,26 81,27 82,28 and 83 (first paragraph);29 and those on voidable
obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph),30 8531 and 86.32
contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage
properties were concerned. 15 His motion, however, was denied by the RTC from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until
in its Order16 dated 6 September 2007. Thereafter, both petitioner17 and annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while
Respondent18 filed their respective Notices of Appeal. a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a
void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot
In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal
Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in
reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived
1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void
1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a
time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.20 voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.33
Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.21 Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v.
Mendoza, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and Odayat v. Amante, 36 that the Civil
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration
denied in the questioned CA Resolution22 dated 16 September 2009. of nullity of a void marriage. 37
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari. In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and
Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her 1949. The second marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was
marriage to petitioner valid be affirmed in toto, and that all properties already dead, while the third marriage was contracted after the death of the
acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared conjugal. In his second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until
Reply to the Comment,24 petitioner reiterated the allegations in his Petition. annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous.
Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its
OUR RULING performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree
We deny the Petition. declaring it to be so.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration.25 In this case, This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially
the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. the same factual antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon,
The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect
the Court likewise ruled that no judicial decree was necessary to establish the However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of
invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code. Appeals, 42 the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to
marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code,
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was
rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue to be governed
after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:
now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage. 38 A second marriage x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge
contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his
considered bigamous and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife
explained the policy behind the institution of this requirement: whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no
be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was
and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was
governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy, found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage.
both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second
essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and marriage to petitioner is valid.
with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social
institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the
diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of
such a socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement through Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment
the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of
only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively petitioner and the children is patent x x x. (Citations omitted)
confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily
verifiable through records accessible to everyone.40 (Emphases As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable
supplied)1âwphi1 to this case. The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to
Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque
City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the
conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find
no reason to disturb its ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September
2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Domingo vs CA be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time
he instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no
of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper
grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no
cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a
declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of
that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying
J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the
the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No.
1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite;
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a
unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on
man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of
April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them
invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in
1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is
Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would
no dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with herein
avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign
petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and void.
employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and
However, as to whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially
completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her
declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra
personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total
v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and
judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to
take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings
and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he
of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
is not authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity
of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property
a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising
in his possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the
any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage
merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the
Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to following.
the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for
within which to file his answer. purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly
certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave belonging to her exclusively.
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to
dismiss. Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7
contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for
explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that of being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own
Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in the interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for
case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of
the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of
separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be
observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties dismissed.
acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the
status of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial
validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage,
avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the
marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and properties acquired during coverture.
distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the
Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz
of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning.8 Petitioner
that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.9
motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would
have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by
decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree
subsequently denied for lack of merit.5 is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is
noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these
Hence, this petition. occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10 marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a
abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed
property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee
nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the
1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
contemplates an action for that purpose." marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint
Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second marriage Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present
can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity." B. Article 39. —
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied the The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of
the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only
marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision
his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. be modified as follows:
No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still only . . .
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral
defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage
himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage
Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read: is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they
are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the
judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise
provided in Article 41. the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void?
Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the
Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void
still have to produce the judgment. marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that
they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say: reworded as follows:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked
judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41. only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is
void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision. judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first
a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable
marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the
the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a
phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if they final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision
is the declaration that the marriage is void. Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not
solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:

For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one
enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
ab initio. previous marriage void. (n)
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the
original wording of the provision as follows: provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant
to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the
remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17 state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for
purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the
is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final
with bigamy. 18 judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes
necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be
before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of
in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a
grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the
instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which
remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the
absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
declaring such previous marriage void.
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private
purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable
declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable? "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely"
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the
stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent should
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he
void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private
very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would respondent's money.
be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive.
For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the
through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together
society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their
definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same properties."
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution
second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific which is the separation of property according to the regime of property
effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following: relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before
whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's
properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse; 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the SO ORDERED.
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law; Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P.
acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such Romero. I should like, however, to put in a modest observation.
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be judicial decree is required to establish their nullity, except in the following
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate instances:
succession. (n)
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said Family Code; viz.:
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
operation of law. (n) 26 remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. (n)
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for
separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of (b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in case a
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where an action or
action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has defense for the declaration of nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the Family
Code took effect (Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed
unaffected by the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the
preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of,
such a declaration, will not give it the status or the consequences of a valid
marriage, saving only specific instances where certain effects of a valid
marriage can still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are
children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity)
and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of
presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or born
before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law
deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant

per se. Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under the old regime nor the
absolute community of property under the new Code (absent a marriage
settlement), will apply; instead, their property relations shall be governed by
the co-ownership rules under either Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. I must hasten to add as a personal view, however, that the exceptional
effects on children of a void marriage because of the psychological incapacity
of a party thereto should have been extended to cover even the personal and
property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages
where the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts and with little
uncertainty, the term "psychological incapacity" is so relative and unsettling
that until a judicial declaration of nullity is made its interim effects can long
and literally hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses themselves
are concerned but also as regards third persons with whom the spouses deal.

Jarillo vs People Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975
of Court, praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
21, 2003, and its Resolution2 dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1,
Criminal Case No. 00-08-11: pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
INFORMATION On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).
crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional
with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only xxxx
discovered on January 12, 1999.
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000,
Contrary to law. before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for
declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and,
thereafter, trial proceeded. On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal BIGAMY.
Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated
November 17, 2000). Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10)
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
in a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City,
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to
the nullity of accused’s bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between
children and their property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal
Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582. consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy."5
Costs against the accused. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court where petitioner alleges that:
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that
assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.3 V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a
certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING
her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE
marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO
marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978. ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its
Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE
time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND
by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck
down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY
of her previous marriage as far back as 1978. PRESCRIBED.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL
Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY
July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,4 denied UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
discussed jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of
evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow
of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s that.
marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial
question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to
nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required
while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
Court categorically stated that: the time the second marriage is contracted.
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case,
of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was
be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
nullity. x x x subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.9
xxxx For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s
conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be
marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner
all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any
question. x x x7 difference.10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
held thus: bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already marriage."11
been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the
Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail. prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore,
ineffectual.1avvphi1
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision
mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous
Article 90 thereof provides that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be
x ." that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code
1978; hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law
defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the
defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.12 minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty
Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be
upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
obtained knowledge of her previous marriage. imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.16
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner
failed to present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner’s is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty
testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional,
married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of
corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that: six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the
duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor
allegedly actually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to
obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10
attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.13 years.
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s
crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment17 to be void
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents]," as ab initio on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of
opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it
marriage.15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner
should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision

of the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8,
2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all
other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

Chan – Tan vs Tan on said lots mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof directly with Megaworld
This is a petition for review1 of (i) the 17 May 2004 Resolution2 amending the Properties, Inc., until the whole purchase or contract amounts are fully paid.
30 March 2004 Decision3 and (ii) the 15 February 2005 Resolution4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, in Civil Case No. Q-01-45743. Susie Tan is hereby authorized and empowered to directly negotiate,
In its 30 March 2004 Decision, the trial court declared the marriage between transact, pay and deal with the seller/developer Megaworld Properties, Inc.,
petitioner Susie Chan-Tan and respondent Jesse Tan void under Article 36 of in connection with the Contract to Sell marked as Annexes "A" and "B" hereof.
the Family Code. Incorporated as part of the decision was the 31 July 2003
Partial Judgment5 approving the Compromise Agreement6 of the parties. In The property covered by CCT No. 3754 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
its 17 May 2004 Resolution, the trial court granted to respondent custody of City and located at Unit O, Richmore Town Homes 12-B Mariposa St., Quezon
the children, ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and City shall be placed in co-ownership under the name of Susie Tan (1/3), Justin
titles in the latter's name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family Tan (1/3) and Russel Tan (1/3) to the exclusion of Jesse Tan.
dwelling. In its 15 February 2005 Resolution, the trial court denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 Resolution7 The property covered by TCT No. 48137 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the City and located at View Master Town Homes, 1387 Quezon Avenue, Quezon
12 October 2004 Resolution,8 which in turn denied for late filing petitioner's City shall be exclusively owned by Jesse Tan to the exclusion of Susie Tan.
motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution.
The undivided interest in the Condominium Unit in Cityland Shaw. Jesse Tan
The Facts shall exclusively own blvd. to the exclusion of Susie Tan.
Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral The shares of stocks, bank accounts and other properties presently under the
in Intramuros, Manila.9 They were blessed with two sons: Justin, who was respective names of Jesse Tan and Susie Tan shall be exclusively owned by
born in Canada in 1990 and Russel, who was born in the Philippines in 1993.10 the spouse whose name appears as the registered/account owner or holder
in the corporate records/stock transfer books, passbooks and/or the one in
In 2001, twelve years into the marriage, petitioner filed a case for the possession thereof, including the dividends/fruits thereof, to the exclusion of
annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties the other spouse.
submitted to the court a compromise agreement, which we quote in full:
Otherwise stated, all shares, bank accounts and properties registered and
1. The herein parties mutually agreed that the two (2) lots located at under the name and/or in the possession of Jesse Tan shall be exclusively
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City and more particularly described in the Contract owned by him only and all shares, accounts and properties registered and/or
to Sell, marked in open court as Exhibits "H" to "H-3" shall be considered as in the possession and under the name of Susie Tan shall be exclusively owned
part of the presumptive legitimes of their two (2) minor children namely, by her only.
Justin Tan born on October 12, 1990 and Russel Tan born on November 28,
1993. Copies of the Contract to Sell are hereto attached as Annexes "A" and However, as to the family corporations of Susie Tan, Jesse Tan shall execute
"B" and made integral parts hereof. any and all documents transferring the shares of stocks registered in his name
in favor of Susie Tan, or Justin Tan/Russel Tan. A copy of the list of the
2. Susie Tan hereby voluntarily agrees to exclusively shoulder and pay out of corporation owned by the family of Susie Tan is hereto attached as Annex "C"
her own funds/assets whatever is the remaining balance or unpaid amounts and made an integral part hereof.

The parties shall voluntarily and without need of demand turn over to the
other spouse any and all original documents, papers, titles, contracts 4. Likewise, the husband shall have the right to bring out and see the children
registered in the name of the other spouse that are in their respective on the following additional dates, provided that the same will not impede or
possessions and/or safekeeping. disrupt their academic schedule in Xavier School, the dates are as follows:
3. Thereafter and upon approval of this Compromise Agreement by the a. Birthday of Jesse Tan
Honorable Court, the existing property regime of the spouses shall be
dissolved and shall now be governed by "Complete Separation of Property". b. Birthday of Grandfather and Grandmother, first cousins and uncles and
Parties expressly represent that there are no known creditors that will be aunties
prejudiced by the present compromise agreement.
c. Father's Day
The parties shall have joint custody of their minor children. However, the two
(2) minor children shall stay with their mother, Susie Tan at 12-B Mariposa d. Death Anniversaries of immediate members of the family of Jesse Tan
St., Quezon City.
e. During the Christmas seasons/vacation the herein parties will agree on
The husband, Jesse Tan, shall have the right to bring out the two (2) children such dates as when the children can stay with their father. Provided that if
every Sunday of each month from 8:00 AM to 9:00 PM. The minor children the children stay with their father on Christmas Day from December 24th to
shall be returned to 12-B Mariposa Street, Quezon City on or before 9:00 PM December 25th until 1:00 PM the children will stay with their mother on
of every Sunday of each month. December 31 until January 1, 1:00 PM, or vice versa.
The husband shall also have the right to pick up the two (2) minor children in The husband shall always be notified of all school activities of the children
school/or in the house every Thursday of each month. The husband shall and shall see to it that he will exert his best effort to attend the same.
ensure that the children be home by 8:00 PM of said Thursdays.
5. During the birthdays of the two (2) minor children, the parties shall as far
During the summer vacation/semestral break or Christmas vacation of the as practicable have one celebration.
children, the parties shall discuss the proper arrangement to be made
regarding the stay of the children with Jesse Tan. Provided that if the same is not possible, the Husband (Jesse Tan) shall have
the right to see and bring out the children for at least four (4) hours during
Neither party shall put any obstacle in the way of the maintenance of the love the day or the day immediately following/or after the birthday, if said visit or
and affection between the children and the other party, or in the way of a birthday coincides with the school day.
reasonable and proper companionship between them, either by influencing
the children against the other, or otherwise; nor shall they do anything to 6. The existing Educational Plans of the two children shall be used and utilized
estrange any of them from the other. for their High School and College education, in the event that the Educational
Plans are insufficient to cover their tuition, the Husband shall shoulder the
The parties agreed to observe civility, courteousness and politeness in dealing tuition and other miscellaneous fees, costs of books and educational
with each other and shall not insult, malign or commit discourteous acts materials, uniform, school bags, shoes and similar expenses like summer
against each other and shall endeavor to cause their other relatives to act workshops which are taken in Xavier School, which will be paid directly by
similarly.
Jesse Tan to the children's school when the same fall due. Jesse Tan, if Petitioner authorized Megaworld Corp. to offer Lot 12, Block 2 of Corinthian
necessary, shall pay tutorial expenses, directly to the tutor concerned. Hills to other interested buyers. It also appears from the records that
petitioner left the country bringing the children with her.
The husband further undertake to pay ₱10,000.00/monthly support
pendente lite to be deposited in the ATM Account of SUSIE CHAN with Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the
account no. 3-189-53867-8 Boni Serrano Branch effective on the 15th of each children. The evidence presented by respondent established that petitioner
month. In addition Jesse Tan undertakes to give directly to his two (2) sons brought the children out of the country without his knowledge and without
every Sunday, the amount needed and necessary for the purpose of the daily prior authority of the trial court; petitioner failed to pay the ₱8,000,000
meals of the two (2) children in school. remaining balance for the Megaworld property which, if forfeited would
prejudice the interest of the children; and petitioner failed to turn over to
7. This Compromise Agreement is not against the law, customs, public policy, respondent documents and titles in the latter's name.1avvphi1
public order and good morals. Parties hereby voluntarily agree and bind
themselves to execute and sign any and all documents to give effect to this Thus, the trial court, in its 17 May 2004 resolution, awarded to respondent
Compromise Agreement.11 custody of the children, ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent
documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowed respondent to stay in
On 31 July 2003, the trial court issued a partial judgment12 approving the the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City.
compromise agreement. On 30 March 2004, the trial court rendered a
decision declaring the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code on Petitioner filed on 28 June 2004 a motion for reconsideration14 alleging
the ground of mutual psychological incapacity of the parties. The trial court denial of due process on account of accident, mistake, or excusable
incorporated in its decision the compromise agreement of the parties on the negligence. She alleged she was not able to present evidence because of the
issues of support, custody, visitation of the children, and property relations. negligence of her counsel and her own fear for her life and the future of the
children. She claimed she was forced to leave the country, together with her
Meanwhile, petitioner cancelled the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills children, due to the alleged beating she received from respondent and the
Subdivision Lot No. 12, Block 2. She authorized Megaworld Corp. to allocate pernicious effects of the latter's supposed gambling and womanizing ways.
the amount of ₱11,992,968.32 so far paid on the said lot in the following She prayed for an increase in respondent's monthly support obligation in the
manner: amount of ₱150,000.
(a) ₱3,656,250.04 shall be transferred to fully pay the other lot in Corinthian Unconvinced, the trial court, in its 12 October 2004 Resolution,15 denied
Hills on Lot 11, Block 2; petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period. It also declared petitioner in contempt of court for non-
(b) ₱7,783,297.56 shall be transferred to fully pay the contract price in Unit compliance with the partial judgment and the 17 May 2004 resolution. The
9H of the 8 Wack Wack Road Condominium project; and trial court also denied petitioner's prayer for increase in monthly support. The
trial court reasoned that since petitioner took it upon herself to enroll the
(c) ₱533,420.72 shall be forfeited in favor of Megaworld Corp. to cover the children in another school without respondent's knowledge, she should
marketing and administrative costs of Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot 12, therefore defray the resulting increase in their expenses.
Block 2.13
On 4 November 2004, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss16 and a motion for
reconsideration17 of the 12 October 2004 Resolution. She claimed she was
no longer interested in the suit. Petitioner stated that the circumstances in
her life had led her to the conclusion that withdrawing the petition was for The Court's Ruling
the best interest of the children. She prayed that an order be issued vacating
all prior orders and leaving the parties at the status quo ante the filing of the The petition has no merit.
suit.
Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed to
In its 28 December 2004 Resolution,18 the trial court denied both the motion file pleadings and appear at the hearings for respondent's omnibus motion to
to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. It held that amend the partial judgment as regards the custody of the children and the
the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution had become final properties in her possession. Petitioner claims the trial court issued the 17
and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any May 2004 resolution relying solely on the testimony of respondent. Petitioner
timely appeal having been filed by either party. further claims the trial court erred in applying to her motion to dismiss
Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 28 December and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Petitioner argues that if indeed the
2004 resolution, which the trial court denied in its 15 February 2005 provision is applicable, the same is unconstitutional for setting an obstacle to
resolution.19 The trial court then issued a Certificate of Finality20 of the 30 the preservation of the family.
March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution.
Respondent maintains that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004
The Trial Court's Rulings resolution of the trial court are now final and executory and could no longer
be reviewed, modified, or vacated. Respondent alleges petitioner is making a
The 30 March 2004 Decision21 declared the marriage between the parties mockery of our justice system in disregarding our lawful processes.
void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual Respondent stresses neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared in court at
psychological incapacity. It incorporated the 31 July 2003 Partial Judgment22 the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion or on petitioner's motion to
approving the Compromise Agreement23 between the parties. The 17 May dismiss.
2004 Resolution24 amended the earlier partial judgment in granting to
respondent custody of the children, ordering petitioner to turn over to The issue raised in this petition has been settled in the case of Tuason v. Court
respondent documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowing of Appeals.28 In Tuason, private respondent therein filed a petition for the
respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City. The 15 annulment of her marriage on the ground of her husband's psychological
February 2005 Resolution25 denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration incapacity. There, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of
of the 28 December 2004 Resolution26 denying petitioner's motion to the marriage and awarding custody of the children to private respondent
dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the 12 October 2004 Resolution,27 therein. No timely appeal was taken from the trial court's judgment.
which in turn denied for late filing petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the 17 May 2004 resolution. We held that the decision annulling the marriage had already become final
and executory when the husband failed to appeal during the reglementary
The Issue period. The husband claimed that the decision of the trial court was null and
void for violation of his right to due process. He argued he was denied due
Petitioner raises the question of whether the 30 March 2004 decision and the process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial
17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court have attained finality despite the court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered
alleged denial of due process. judgment based solely on the evidence presented by private respondent. We
upheld the judgment of nullity of the marriage even if it was based solely on
evidence presented by therein private respondent. As for the applicability to petitioner's motion to dismiss of Section 7 of the
Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
We also ruled in Tuason that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding of Voidable Marriages, petitioner is correct. Section 7 of the Rule on the
upon the client and the neglect or failure of the counsel to inform the client Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of the latter's right to appeal is Marriages provides:
not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.29
SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed
In the present case, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over
resolution of the trial court had become final and executory upon the lapse the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a
of the reglementary period to appeal.30 Petitioner's motion for dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.
reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution, which the trial court received (Emphasis supplied)
on 28 June 2004, was clearly filed out of time. Applying the doctrine laid down
in Tuason, the alleged negligence of counsel resulting in petitioner's loss of The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all
the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial court's judgments. possible defenses in an answer, instead of a mere motion to dismiss, so that
judgment may be made on the merits. In construing a statute, the purpose or
Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she object of the law is an important factor to be considered.32 Further, the letter
may have lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence of the law admits of no other interpretation but that the provision applies
of her counsel, she cannot say she was denied her day in court. Records show only to a respondent, not a petitioner. Only a respondent in a petition for the
petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below, declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable
filing motion after motion. Contrary to petitioner's allegation of negligence of marriage files an answer where any ground that may warrant a dismissal may
her counsel, we have reason to believe the negligence in pursuing the case be raised as an affirmative defense pursuant to the provision. The only logical
was on petitioner's end, as may be gleaned from her counsel's manifestation conclusion is that Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to a motion to dismiss
dated 3 May 2004: filed by the party who initiated the petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage.
Undersigned Counsel, who appeared for petitioner, in the nullity
proceedings, respectfully informs the Honorable Court that she has not heard Since petitioner is not the respondent in the petition for the annulment of
from petitioner since Holy Week. Attempts to call petitioner have failed. the marriage, Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to the motion to dismiss
filed by her. Section 7 of the Rule not being applicable, petitioner's claim that
Undersigned counsel regrets therefore that she is unable to respond in an it is unconstitutional for allegedly setting an obstacle to the preservation of
intelligent manner to the Motion (Omnibus Motion) filed by respondent.31 the family is without basis.
Clearly, despite her counsel's efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter Section 1 of the Rule states that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to a
disinterest in the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion seeking, among petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the
others, custody of the children. The trial judge was left with no other recourse annulment of voidable marriage. In this connection, Rule 17 of the Rules of
but to proceed with the hearings and rule on the motion based on the Court allows dismissal of the action upon notice or upon motion of the
evidence presented by respondent. Petitioner cannot now come to this Court plaintiff, to wit:
crying denial of due process.
Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. - A complaint may be dismissed
by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the
answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed,
the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. x x x
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. - Except as provided in the

preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's
instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004,

the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court
had long become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day
reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either
party. The 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution may no
longer be disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner. The trial court was correct in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss. Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes
final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.33 The
reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders
of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law. Once a judgment
has become final and executory, the issues there should be laid to rest.34
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. We AFFIRM the (i) 17 May
2004 Resolution amending the 30 March 2004 Decision and (ii) the 15
February 2005 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
107, in Civil Case No. Q-01-45743.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Lasanas vs People mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting the award
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial of damages. In support of his complaint, he further alleged, among others,
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and that:
in existent for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of bigamy as defined and
penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968 which marriage was
officiated by Hon. Carlos B. Salazar, Municipal Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo.
The Case Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Exhibit "A"
and made part hereof; which marriage was ratified by a wedding at San Jose
The accused seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on August 29, Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and registered at the office of Iloilo City
2002,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for bigamy Registrar. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as
under the judgment rendered on October 30, 2000 in Criminal Case No. Annex "B";
49808 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, in Iloilo City.
Plaintiff and defendant have no children and have no properties except some
Antecedents personal belongings;
On February 16, 1968,2 Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of Plaintiff met the defendant sometime in the middle of 1967 at the house of
San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Mr. Raul L. Cataloctocan in Burgos Street, Lapaz, Iloilo City wherein the
Socorro Patingo3 without the benefit of a marriage license.4 The records purpose of their meeting was for the plaintiff to consult and seek treatment
show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation by the defendant because the latter was a "babaylan": Plaintiff was treated
to excuse the lack of the marriage license.5 On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and by the defendant and the subsequent treatments were performed by the
Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. defendant at her residence in Barangay, Banga, Mina, Iloilo, the treatment
Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City.6 They submitted no made being on a continuing basis;
marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose.7 Both
ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates.8 In xxxx
1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable
differences.9 On February 16, 1968, defendant asked the plaintiff to come with her to Iloilo
City. They went to Dainty Restaurant at J.M. Basa Street. Plaintiff saw several
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban persons therein. After eating plaintiff was made to sign the marriage contract,
in a religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria which was null and void for lack of marriage license and based on a false
Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status of the affidavit of cohabitation. After their marriage, they went home to Barangay
accused as single.10 Bangac, Mina, Iloilo, which marked the start of a married life rocked with
marital differences, quarrels and incompatibilities, without love, but under
On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage the uncontrollable fear of harm that should befall him should he not follow
and damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City,11 which was docketed her;
as Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch 39 of the RTC. The complaint
alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in xxxx
securing his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches,
psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to suffer
During the period the parties are living together defendant would nag the counterclaim on February 3, 1997, pursuant to Article 203 of the Family Code
plaintiff, fabricate stories against him and displayed her fit of jealousy, neglect and every month thereafter. Costs against the plaintiff.
her marital obligations even committed infidelity, which psychological
incompatibilities and marital breaches have forced the petitioner to live SO ORDERED.16
separately from defendant since 1982 up to the present.12
The accused appealed to the CA.17
In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City.13 After due proceedings, the accused was Ruling of the RTC
formally indicted for bigamy under the information filed on October 20, 1998
in the RTC, viz: On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed decision in
Criminal Case No. 49808, disposing thusly:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, Noel WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Lasanas being previously united in a lawful marriage with Socorro Patingo and of the offense of BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal
without the said marriage having been legally dissolve (sic) or annulled, did Code, judgment is hereby entered ordering him to serve an indeterminate
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
subsequent marriage with Josefa Eslaban. correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as maximum.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
The accused is entitled to the privileges extended to him under Art. 29 of the
The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49808, was raffled to Branch Revised Penal Code.
38 of the RTC in Iloilo City. The accused pleaded not guilty at his
arraignment,15 and trial ensued in due course. SO ORDERED.18
In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its Decision of the CA Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA,
judgment in Civil Case No. 23133 dismissing the accused’s complaint for insisting that the RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally married
annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage between him and Socorro Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation
valid and legal, as follows: and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to
the complaint filed by the plaintiff Noel Arenga Lasanas against the Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not established; that his good faith
defendant, Socorro Patingo, considering that the marriage between them is and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he
valid and legal. had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration
of the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent
The plaintiff Noel Lasanas is hereby ordered to give monthly support to his marriage.19
wife, the defendant in this case, Ma. Socorro Patingo in the amount of
₱3,000.00 a month, from the time that she filed her answer with

On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision, second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.27
and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
The CA specifically observed:
SO ORDERED.20
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas
Issues and private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence of a
marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can
argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the
349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of
in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those instances when this
before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license nor
purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the
applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in
null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as itself.
provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that,
consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first
subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25 and that his good faith and lack secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private
of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability.26 complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that
but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on
Ruling bigamy.
The appeal lacks merit. Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People
v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these cases have
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which already been abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio-
provides: Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA
229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yap’s ruling too
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by Domingo v. Court
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing
proper proceedings. pursuant to Mañozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all
been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, respect.28
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a Decision of the CA
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the provides:
RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the
absence of the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
solemnizing officer. any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not established; that his good faith proper proceedings.
and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he
had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has
of the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
marriage.19 in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision, second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.27
and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
The CA specifically observed:
SO ORDERED.20
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas
Issues and private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence of a
marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can
argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the
349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of
in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those instances when this
before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license nor
purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the
applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in
null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as itself.
provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that,
consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first
subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25 and that his good faith and lack secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private
of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability.26 complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that
but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on
Ruling bigamy.
The appeal lacks merit. Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People
v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these cases have
already been abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio- marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yap’s ruling too marry again.
had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by Domingo v. Court
of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals, supra. In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of
pursuant to Mañozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625. his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all
respect.28 In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration
of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted;
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
attendant.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable
Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against
marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of him. We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the first
the Family Code, to wit: marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that
was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted,
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a
previous marriage void. (n) decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information
in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:29 dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor
to immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court.
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where Pursuant to Teves, the accused’s conviction for bigamy is affirmed.1âwphi1
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for The crime of bigamy was consummated from the moment he contracted the
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law second marriage without his marriage to Socorro being first judicially
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declared null and void, because at the time of the celebration of the second
declaring the previous marriage void. marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting due
to such marriage not being yet declared null and void by a court of competent
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee jurisdiction.30 "What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy," according
which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the to People v. Odtuhan:31
position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely
marriage is so declared can it beheld as void, and so long as there is no such nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. with the promise of futurity and commitment.
The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for bigamy is prision
especially because the records show that he had filed a complaint for the mayor. With neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance attendant
annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the criminal in the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the medium period
complaint against him but after he had already contracted his second of prision mayor,35 which ranges from eight years and one day to 10 years.
marriage with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him because the Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
RTC (Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of marriage after the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of prision correccional,
information for bigamy had already been filed against him, thus confirming the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the offense, which is from six
the validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering that the accused’s months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence of
subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years
bigamy was established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa and one day of prision mayor as maximum, as imposed by the RTC, was
was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage. proper.
Such argument had no worth, however, because it was he himself who failed
to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of his previous marriage prior to WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
contracting his subsequent marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,32 the promulgated on August 29, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs
Court has explained that "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the of suit.
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for SO ORDERED.
bigamy.
x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore,

would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage."33
The Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People:34 x x x Nollora may Brown vs Yambao
not impugn his [subsequent] marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of
himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He
allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942
stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals: to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged
in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl
that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release ART. 102 An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year
from internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause
executed a document (Annex A ) liquidating their conjugal partnership and and within five years from and after date when such cause occurred.
assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share. The complaint
prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's infidelity in 1945 but
children issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified only filed action in 1945.
to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable.
Brown appeared to this Court, assigning the following errors:
Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently declared the wife in
default, for failure to answer in due time, despite service of summons; and The court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila to act
directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to— as counsel for the defendant, who defaulted.
investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, whether or not The court erred in declaring that there was condonation of or consent to the
a collusion exists between the parties and to report to this Court the result of adultery.
his investigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of copy of this order.
The City Fiscal or his representative is also directed to intervene in the case The court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
in behalf of the State. (Rec. App. p. 9).
Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his marital
As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross- relation with Lilia Deito, who was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as
examined plaintiff Brown. His questions (strenuously objected to by Brown's consel for the defaulting wife, "when the power of the prosecuting officer is
counsel) elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with limited to finding out whether or not there is collusion, and if there is no
another woman and had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, to intervene for the state which
rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, is not the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he
while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a intervened for Juanita Yambao, the defendant-appellee, who is private citizen
misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 and who is far from being the state.".
of the new Civil Code, providing:
The argument is untenable. Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act of
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by
provided there has been no condonation or of consent to the adultery or preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot pursuance of agreement to defend divorce proceedings" (Cyclopedia Law
be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal Dictionary; Nelson, Divorce and Separation, Section 500), it was legitimate for
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the
inference that the wife's default was calculated, or agreed upon, to enable
that there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown's action appellant to obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought without
had prescribed under Article 102 of the same Code: regard to the legal merits of his case. One such circumstance is obviously the
fact of Brown's cohabitation with a woman other than his wife, since it bars
him from claiming legal separation by express provision of Article 100 of the
new Civil Code. Wherefore, such evidence of such misconduct, were proper
subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered circumstantial The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must
evidence of collusion between the spouses. necessarily fail with them.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation ordered.
(and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that
marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which
the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot
be made depend upon the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong
vs, Cheong Gee, 43 Phil, 43; Ramirez vs. Gmur 42 Phil. 855; Goitia vs. Campos,
35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy that the injury by the Fiscal
should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate
whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or
not.
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was
already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation
proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was
upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil
Code, action for legal separation can not be filed except within one (1) year
from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five
years from and after the date when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief
does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense.

Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions
seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public
interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any
legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for
denying the remedy sought (commission of similar offense by petitioner and
prescription of the action), it becomes unnecesary to delve further into the
case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten years also evidences
condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it did not, his situation would
not be improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error.

Arroyo vs Arroyo the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no more than highly colored
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves
bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a from time to time to become involved and would have little significance apart
few short intervals of separation, they have lived together as man and wife in from the morbid condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must
the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their therefore be recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home was
common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her without sufficient justification in fact.
husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce
her to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to compel In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient to
her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The dispose first of the defendant's cross-complaint. To begin with, the obligation
defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had left her which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty
husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way of defense and universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in articles 142
cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on and 143 of the Civil code. The enforcement of this obligation by the wife
the part of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative relief, against the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance of a divorce by
to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it had
partnership; (3) and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial
maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in favor abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel
of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting her him to make provision for her separate maintenance (Goitia vs. Campos
alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the plaintiff should Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and he may be required to pay the expenses, including
pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation, (Mercado
defendant in the trial of the case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case vs. Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.) Nevertheless, the interests of both parties
with the usual formalities by appeal to this court. as well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution
in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses — a
conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From
continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate
abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued
marital relations with him. We have carefully examined and weighed every cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary
line of the proof, and are of the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly from the fault of the husband.
untenable. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of
jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are In Davidson vs Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking through
chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended their the eminent jurist, Judge Thomas M. Cooley, held that an action for the
married life. In view of the decision which we are to pronounce nothing will support of the wife separate from the husband will only be sustained when
be said in this opinion which will make the resumption of married relations the reasons for it are imperative (47 Mich., 151). That imperative necessity is
more difficult to them or serve as a reminder to either of the mistakes of the the only ground on which such a proceeding can be maintained also appears
past; and we prefer to record the fact that so far as the proof in this record from the decision in Schindel vs. Schindel (12 Md., 294). In the State of South
shows neither of the spouses has at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity, Carolina, where judicial divorces have never been procurable on any ground,
or has given just cause to the other to suspect illicit relations with any person. the Supreme court fully recognizes the right of the wife to have provision for
The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife, which are separate maintenance, where it is impossible for her to continue safely to
cohabit with her husband; but the same court has more than once rejected situation does not allow me to indulge the feelings, much less the first feelings
the petition of the wife for separate maintenance where it appeared that the of an individual. The law has said that married persons shall not be legally
husband's alleged cruelty or ill-treatment was provoked by the wife's own separated upon the mere disinclination of one or both to cohabit together. .
improper conduct. (Rhame vs. Rhame, 1 McCord's Chan. [S. Car.], 197; 16 Am. ..
Dec., 597; Boyd vs. Boyd, Har. Eq. [S. Car.], 144.)
To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a judge;
Upon one occasion Sir William Scott, pronouncing the judgment of the English but if it were, it would not be difficult to show that the law in this respect has
Ecclesiastical Court in a case where cruelty on the part of the husband was acted with its usual wisdom and humanity with that true wisdom, and that
relied upon to secure a divorce for the wife, made use of the following real humanity, that regards the general interests of mankind. For though in
eloquent words, — which are perhaps even more applicable in a proceeding particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of
for separate maintenance in a jurisdiction where, as here, a divorce cannot matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great severity upon individual,
be obtained except on the single ground of adultery and this, too, after the yet it must be carefully remembered that the general happiness of the
conviction of the guilty spouse in a criminal prosecution for that crime. Said married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people understand that
he: they must live together, except for a very few reasons known to the law, they
learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know cannot
That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties shake off; they become good husbands and good wives form the necessity of
is admitted, but the question occurs, What is cruelty? . . . remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching
the duties which it imposes. . . . In this case, as in many others, the happiness
What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where of some individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and more general good.
they are not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere (Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.)
austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of
civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-complaint
do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high is not well founded and none of the relief sought therein can be granted.
moral offenses in the marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any
state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law can The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-complaint
relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on the conclusively prove that the plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to
one side as well as on the other, the suffering party must bear in some degree forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that she is under an
the consequences of an injudicious connection; must subdue by decent obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit
resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both must with him. The only question which here arises is as to the character and
suffer in silence. . . . extent of the relief which may be properly conceded to him by judicial decree.
The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly invoked. Humanity The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal rights;
is the second virtue of courts, but undoubtedly the first is justice. If it were a and it is supposed in the petitory part of the complaint that he is entitled to
question of humanity simply, and of humanity which confined its views a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the
merely to the happiness of the present parties, it would be a question easily conjugal home and live with him as a wife according to the precepts of law
decided upon first impressions. Every body must feel a wish to sever those and morality. Of course if such a decree were entered, in unqualified terms,
who wish to live separate from each other, who cannot live together with any the defendant would be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she should
degree of harmony, and consequently with any degree of happiness; but my refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present writer is aware, the question is
raised for the first time in this jurisdiction whether it is competent for the 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar
court to make such an order. to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the
doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other
Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of
province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148.)
to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to have
rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that affirmed an order of the Audencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to
an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do
restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her
can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial
under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the
of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but
that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital
formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that
conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property;
found to warrant it that court would make a mandatory decree, enforcible by and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily
process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was
sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled
orders, and in Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P. D., 52), decided in 1883, Sir James to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the
Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though
Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has
not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.
adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in
England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the
by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de
the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause;
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved
be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of
the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character either instance. So ordered.
of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far
as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a peremptory order requiring
one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife
was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his
domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Gahn vs. Darby,

Persons Cases - Annulment To Marriage Settlement

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Corpus vs Ochoterena hearings, the respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the

case submitted for decision.9

The antecedents follow.

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 1 | P a g e

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 2 | P a g e

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 7 | P a g e

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 11 | P a g e

In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 15 | P a g e

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 20 | P a g e

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 21 | P a g e

Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. - Except as provided in the

However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004,

Costs against petitioner.

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 26 | P a g e

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 28 | P a g e

x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore,

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense.

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 34 | P a g e

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